Cultural Incorporation in Nietzsche’s Middle Period

by

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy

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Finally, I am grateful to Prof. Peter Poellner and Prof. Ken Gemes for agreeing to examine my dissertation and for their inspiring work on Nietzsche.
DECLARATION

This thesis is submitted to the University of Warwick in support of my application for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. It has been composed by me and has not been submitted in any previous application for any degree.
Abstract

In this dissertation I defend the claim that Nietzsche’s middle period can be read as presenting a theory of cultural flourishing that has as its foundation the project of incorporating truth. The consciously experienced world is the product of a number of interpretive processes operating below the level of consciousness. The intentional structure of experience is universal to human beings, but the content of the resulting world is determined by inherited norms and inculcated associations. Culture in one sense refers to these inherited rules, but in another to the specific worlds that individuals are presented with as a result of them. The experienced world is relative to the interpretation employing in producing it, but experience is structured such that the world is presented as mind-independent. That is, the world is perspectivally constituted, even if each perspective presents its own world as the only one. This claim is what Nietzsche means by ‘truth’ in the project of incorporating truth. To incorporate this amounts to a refusal to commit to any one perspective dogmatically, which translates into the activity of continually altering one’s experienced world. This is achieved by reordering the framework that forms culture. But this is not done because truth has absolute value that demands that it be incorporated. Rather, it is done in the name of health, which for Nietzsche amounts to realising to the greatest extent possible the inherent forces that govern all living things. Continually changing perspectives introduces diversity into one’s existence; being able to maintain an identity in the face of this diversity is a demonstration of the strength of one’s vitality. This balance of stable identity and maximum diversity is constitutive of great health at the individual level and at the cultural level. Since incorporation at the individual level employs the cultural framework, the activity involved automatically has the capacity to affect culture at large. Certain great individuals, who themselves exhibit great health, are conscious of this relation to culture and they use it both to maintain cultural diversity and to unite the community around and ideal that helps engender cultural health. That ideal is science.
Abbreviations of Nietzsche’s Works

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Title</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BT</td>
<td>The Birth of Tragedy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TL</td>
<td>Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UM</td>
<td>Untimely Meditations (containing...)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DS</td>
<td>David Strauss, the Confessor and Writer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HL</td>
<td>The Uses and Abuses of History for Life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>Schopenhauer as Educator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RWB</td>
<td>Richard Wagner in Bayreuth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HH</td>
<td>Human, All Too Human I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HH II</td>
<td>Human, All Too Human II (containing...)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOM</td>
<td>Assorted Opinions and Maxims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WS</td>
<td>The Wanderer and His Shadow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Daybreak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS</td>
<td>The Gay Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSZ</td>
<td>Thus Spoke Zarathustra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BGE</td>
<td>Beyond Good and Evil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GM</td>
<td>The Genealogy of Morals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TI</td>
<td>Twilight of the Idols</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>The Antichrist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EH</td>
<td>Ecce Homo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSW</td>
<td>The Free Spirit Works, i.e. HH, HH II, D, GS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture$^k$</td>
<td>Original German word was Kultur.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture$^b$</td>
<td>Original German word was Bildung.</td>
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</table>
Citations for most works take the form \textit{D} 20 for \textit{Daybreak} aphorism (or section) 20. Prefaces are cited thus: \textit{D P:2} for \textit{Daybreak} preface, section 2. \textit{GM} is cited thus: \textit{GM} 3.12 for \textit{The Genealogy of Morals} 3rd essay, section 12. \textit{EH} and \textit{TI} is cited thus: \textit{EH} ‘Clever’ 2 for \textit{Ecce Homo} ‘Why I am so Clever’ section 2. \textit{FSW} and \textit{UM} are referred to in the singular when abbreviated for ease of reading.

Unless otherwise stated, quotations are from the Cambridge University Press editions (see ‘Primary Sources’ in the bibliography). Some of the above are found in larger volumes. \textit{TL} is found in \textit{Writings from the Early Notebooks}. \textit{DS, HL, SE} and \textit{RWB} are part of \textit{Untimely Meditations}. \textit{HH II} (which is composed of \textit{AOM} and \textit{WS}) is part of \textit{Human, All Too Human}. \textit{TI, AC} and \textit{EH} are part of \textit{The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols and Other Writings}.

\textbf{Nachlasse Fragmente}

References to the \textit{Nachlasse Fragmente} take the form: \textit{NF} \{\textit{year}\} \{\textit{notebook}\}[\{\textit{note}\}]. For example: \textit{NF} 1872 19[25] corresponds to note 25 in notebook 19 in the year of 1872.

Unless otherwise stated, notes are my own translations of the \textit{Nachlasse Fragmente Digitale Kritische Gesamtausgabe Werke und Briefe} (eKGWB). This is a digitised and corrected version of the original Colli-Montinari \textit{Kritische Gesamtausgabe} and are the most accurate available source of Nietzsche’s writing, published and unpublished. I have included the original German in footnotes for all unpublished notes cited.

\textit{The collection can be accessed online at:}

http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB

\textit{The relevant note can also be navigated to directly:}

http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/NF-\{\textit{year}\},\{\textit{notebook}\}[\{\textit{note}\}]

For example: http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/NF-1872,19[25]
In this dissertation I defend the claim that Nietzsche’s middle period can be read as presenting a theory of cultural flourishing that has as its foundation the project of incorporating truth. The first chapter focuses on what I take to be three foundations of the Free Spirit Works (*FSW*), namely *Untimely Meditations*, *Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense* and notebook 19 from the 1872 *Nachlass*. I read these as each contributing something to a potential theory of cultural incorporation which is held back by the lack of overall material and by Nietzsche’s cautious approach to knowledge. *UM* contains various commitments to the nature of culture, but is limited by its scope, which only takes in contemporary and Greek culture. *TL* is richer in theoretical insights that transcend particular time periods, but only mentions culture in its final paragraph and the position there is unclear. Notebook 19 promises to connect the two essays, as it deals with culture as it pertains to the theoretical insights of *TL*. But as mere fragments, these notes are insufficient to flesh out that connection adequately. This situation as a whole is compounded by Nietzsche’s caution about science (understood as *Wissenschaft*). *FSW* promises to fill in this cultural theory in a way that embraces science.

The second chapter is an expansion on the account of experience constitution found in *TL*. It builds on Paul Katsafanas’ claim that drives influence behaviour at least in part by shaping the consciously experienced world that is the source of reasons to act. It extends this claim by examining four kinds of interpretation that drives engage in to produce conscious experience from a manifold of sensations: causation, evaluation, transference, and colouration. It concludes by proposing the notion of a perspective as a way to talk about the combination of these interpretations.

Chapter 3 connects the findings of chapter 2 with the notion of culture. It addresses Nietzsche’s anthropological commitments, which revolve around custom, before showing how he sees custom as giving rise to conscious experience. Language is the result of custom and the chapter explores the connection between language and consciousness, presenting a position that is a synthesis of the positions of two prominent pieces of secondary literature, one by Paul Katsafanas, the other by Mattia Riccardi. The final third of the chapter is


dedicated to applying the previously developed understanding of culture to the notion of culture as self-cultivation. It puts pressure on the idea of self-cultivation as the direct management of the drives with the aim of producing an aesthetically valuable whole. The alternative is to understand a great deal of this self-cultivation as directed at the world as an externalisation of the self. This takes the form of engaging with one’s own artistic output, which serves to highlight one’s perspectives. It also presents the opportunity to reorder the associations one has and thus change one’s perspectives.

Chapter 4 looks at the notion of incorporation. It claims that to incorporate the truth that the world is perspectivally constituted amounts to refusing to commit dogmatically to a single perspective. This can involve adopting new habits such as honesty with oneself, but it centres on the continual change in perspective that self-cultivation as previously described makes possible. Here I engage with Ken Gemes on the notion of a perspective, reinforcing the claim that perspectives – and therefore incorporation – has an irreducibly conscious dimension. This is accompanied by a change in the individual’s self-conception. They see themselves and their activity through the lens of powerful symbols that Nietzsche employs: free spirit, Columbus, the sceptic. So on the one hand, they undermine the meaning provided by their stable experience; and on the other find meaning in this very practice of undermining. This is the balance that Nietzsche takes to be constitutive of great health, the subject of the next chapter.

Chapter 5 connects the project of incorporation to the notion of health. It traces Nietzsche’s conception of life to his biological commitments and sees great health as a maximisation of the forces of life. The strongest, healthiest form of life for Nietzsche is that which unifies the most diverse material. The more internal struggle, conflict and change there is in an organism, while it is still able to maintain its identity, the healthier it is. This is the criterion that Nietzsche uses to measure progress at the individual level. His ultimate value

In the final chapter, I bring together the previous findings to present a theory of cultural incorporation. This is positioned against the background of Jonathan Cohen’s study of \textit{HHH}. I claim that great health for a culture consists in its containing the most diverse range of struggling perspectives and its turnover of perspectives. A scientific culture is most effective at facilitating this. Moreover, the scientific enterprise, while encouraging diversity, unites individuals in shared meaning. I claim that these are the moments of diversity and stability that make culture healthy. All of this is overseen by a small group of individuals who not only undermine perspectives to encourage diversity, but harness the investment people have in cultural frameworks to produce the kinds of behaviours that aid cultural flourishing.

Producing this systematic narrative from \textit{FSW} was a challenge for several reasons. The
works that compose it have received less attention than his later works. Because there are many continuities between middle and late Nietzsche, and because the later works offer more organised, sustained treatment of issues, they have been seen as containing Nietzsche’s ideas in their most mature form. In many cases, this is a legitimate conclusion to draw. But the themes of culture and incorporation, which are first raised even before *FSW*, take a back seat in the later works, at least until very late works. Looking to understand culture in Nietzsche’s work as a whole requires that one look beyond the later essayistic works. The natural refuge for those determined not to tackle *FSW* is *UM*, where culture features prominently and where the traditional essay format is adopted. Much of the work on culture in Nietzsche contents itself with these texts. *UM* offers a great deal to work with on the topic of culture, but also leaves many gaps that make the construction of a cultural theory difficult. They are also highly cautious with respect to the search for knowledge, which makes their lessons difficult to transfer to anything written subsequently.

There are exceptions to this, with good studies of *FSW* being available. They are still far fewer than number than studies of the later works. It is notable, for example, that there has not been a single monograph published on *Daybreak*, and only one on *Human, All Too Human*. Ruth Abbey’s *Nietzsche’s Middle Period* is of great scholarly value, but lacks a solid theoretical core. This is understandable given that it was the first book to tackle the works together. Similarly, Paul Franco’s *Nietzsche’s Enlightenment* traces the subtle changes across the works, and dedicates a chapter to incorporation in *The Gay Science*. But like Abbey, Franco prefers to stick closely to the texts at the expense of more persistent philosophical engagement. His work is, however, an excellent way to get a grip on the structure and themes of the works. I see this thesis as a supplement to, rather than a replacement of, these approaches.

What is it about *FSW* that deters commentators? For one thing, the works are not consistent with one another. Nietzsche’s position on various topics changes in the period that he writes these texts. For another, there are many inconsistencies within each text. The aphoristic style, which Nietzsche adopted for various reasons, is inherently disjointed. Since writing these aphorisms was not an exercise in gradually building a convincing case, there is nothing to keep Nietzsche from introducing whatever idea he happened to be entertaining at a given time. Moreover, he deliberately engages in disorder, although I think the degree to which he intentionally contradicts himself tends to be exaggerated.

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3 *Human, All Too Human, The Wanderer and His Shadow, Assorted Opinions and Maxims, Daybreak and The Gay Science*.
Nietzsche does not want to be systematised. He wants readers to feel like they only get glimpses, and that they must fill the gaps with their own insight. This cannot account for all, or even most, of the contradictory nature of the works, but it certainly contributes to making the works something about which trepidation is warranted.

In posting these warning signs, one must be careful not to exaggerate. Although not systematic, the middle-period works do pursue a limited number of themes, continually revisiting them from different angles. These various perspectives are not, for the most part, contradictory or isolated: they overlap, compliment and reinforce one another. They can also support systematic interpretation. Nietzsche does not order them systematically, often isolating aphorisms that actually contribute something important to a theme that is dealt with at more length in other places. But all that is required is that one try to bring these wayward pieces together. Some might consider this precisely the kind of reconstruction that Nietzsche would oppose, but if one does not subscribe to the reasons for avoiding systematic appraisal, this reordering offers the chance to greatly clarify Nietzsche’s underlying commitments. After all, it is these commitments that produced the consistency between aphorisms, even if those same commitments might have led Nietzsche to scatter them in the published texts. Again it should be noted that this picture of a mere bundle of aphorisms is misleading. The works are mostly grouped into chapters that prioritise a particular theme. The first chapter of HH, for example, far from being a collection of sporadic thoughts, focuses on metaphysics and its origins.

Even in light of these considerations, FSW will always be a difficult body of texts from which to extract a systematic theory. The works lead one to methodological crossroads. Their contradictory nature is the source of most of the headaches. In the natural sciences, one proceeds on the assumption that nature is regular and that one’s theory is falsified when observations contradict it. But no such assumption can be made of a text: authors can and do contradict themselves. The choice is then between acknowledging and accepting contradictions, disregarding some as irrelevant, or trying to read them in a way that makes them consistent. This final option applied to Nietzsche’s middle period would require an unacceptable degree of falsification of the texts. The second option of disregarding some aphorisms is certainly possible. A point that is made several times in various extended aphorisms, but only contradicted a few times in scattered maxims, has to be considered a safe foothold in the context of these works. The first option of accepting contradiction is an inevitability. One must accept at some point that there are several ways to carve up the material and that each will yield outliers. The reader must assess whether the theory presented is grounded enough in the texts to be acceptable.

In the end, the success of any theory drawn from FSW depends on one’s aims. The main dilemma requires that one choose between a narrow and a broad focus. It is possible to be more accurate about Nietzsche by restricting oneself to a very specific point, placing

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8Franco’s book is the best place to find this structure examined. See Franco, Nietzsche’s Enlightenment.
it in a rich historical context and scrutinising the concepts and their subtle etymology, both within and outside of Nietzsche’s oeuvre. This is valuable work of the kind that Nietzsche often praises. Studying one corner of the tapestry that is *FSW* delivers rich detail; but when we step back to look at the entire work, we lose some detail. Subtle differences between aphorisms are lost, but more importantly, many contradictions that in a narrow study can be dealt with have to be ignored. Moreover, one is required to engage in a greater degree of speculation because greater leaps need to be taken between aphorisms. This is something of a disclaimer for the methodology employed in this thesis, which chooses to engage in some of these speculative leaps in the course of rationally reconstructing a theory of cultural incorporation. In my view, neither choice of focus is better, they just serve different purposes. But one must be clear about where one stands on the issue.

An alternative to speculation is to fill in gaps in a systematic account using, where necessary, additional primary sources. I have made use of Nietzsche’s unpublished notebooks, but in doing so I have tried to include only that which is present in more than one note, preferably from different notebooks. I have tried to use notes that have some parallel in the published works. I have also employed ideas from the later works, especially in chapter 5. I have sought in every case to show that the ideas I employ were already formulated, or in the process of being formulated, in *FSW*. In chapter 5, for example, I dedicate a section to arguing against the accusation of illegitimately reading will to power into *FSW*. I have also used *UM*, *TL* and notebooks from 1872. In my first chapter, I argue that these form the foundations for the middle-period project. As with the late additions, I bring these in alongside evidence that the ideas are also present in *FSW*.

Although I consider the thesis to be systematic, I would resist its being labelled a philosophical ‘system’. Quite what is meant by philosophical system is unclear to me, although it is uttered regularly. My hesitation is due to the fact that I cannot claim what I present to be exhaustive of Nietzsche’s middle-period philosophy. The reader will find no mention of several key ideas: eternal return, *amor fati*, tragedy and comedy. I do not mean to deny that these have cultural significance, only that I have not found a place for them in this limited work. I am, moreover, willing to acknowledge that they might fit better in Nietzschean theory that carves *FSW* along different lines. *FSW* is perhaps more eclectic than any other trilogy of texts in the history of philosophy and making a theory out of it might be said to do an injustice to this eclecticism. The renowned anthropologist Clifford Geertz, whose own views are close to those I attribute to Nietzsche, once said of the many definitions of culture in anthropology: ‘Eclecticism is self-defeating not because there is only one direction in which it is useful to move, but because there are so many: it is necessary to choose’. I faced in *FSW* with this conundrum, I chose cultural incorporation as the cornerstone of a Nietzschean theory. This thesis is the outgrowth of that decision.

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Chapter 1

The Foundations of the Free Spirit

Works

Much has been made of the apparently radical change of approach and style between the early and late 1870s. It only takes a few aphorisms of *Human, All Too Human* to realise that something different is taking place in *FSW*. But it is important not to overstate the case for this being viewed as a ‘fresh start’. *HH* is not to the *Untimely Meditations* as Wittgenstein’s *Philosophical Investigations* is to his *Tractatus*. Style aside, the key difference between the two periods is in Nietzsche’s view on knowledge. But even this can be understood as the outcome of tendencies within his earlier work and as resolving certain tensions therein. Nietzsche’s concern with culture defines *UM* and that which precedes it; and his obsession with the conditions for the preservation and strengthening of life, which surfaces throughout *FSW*, is central to his earlier work and continues to the end of his intellectual life. Incorporation of truth, his great experiment for humankind in *The Gay Science*, is present in the first *UM*. *FSW* is often seen as lacking any theory to speak of; its aphoristic style not lending itself to the prolonged engagement with a single issue that an essay makes possible. But although scattered among the texts, there is a great deal of detail to be found in *FSW* on issues that *UM* moves quickly over. Despite a more traditional structure, it is *UM* that lacks a coherent theoretical framework, and *FSW* that has the potential to provide one. The latter should be seen as continuing to engage with the concerns laid down in the work preceding it. This chapter sets out these concerns, highlighting connections that Nietzsche is yet to fully exploit and which predict the theory that I attribute him in *FSW*. I take there to be three pillars on which this theory rests: *UM*, *TL* and notebook 19 of the 1872 *Nachlass* (all subsequent bracketed numbers in this chapter are references to notes in this notebook).1

I.1 Untimely Meditations

*UM* is a collection of four essays published between 1873 and 1876. This was a period of upheaval in Nietzsche’s life and thought, which is reflected in the often inconsistent nature of the essays. Although a deep understanding of them requires that each be treated as a self-standing unit, there are clear and consistent strands that run through the entire collection. The ‘untimely’ [unzeitgemässe] status of the essays arises from their engagement with and criticism of a conception of culture, which was fashionable at the time. What prominent public intellectuals saw as a sophisticated progressivism, Nietzsche saw as an accelerating descent from the heights of culture reached by the Ancient Greeks, heights to which Wagner was supposed to restore Germany. Each meditation can be seen as approaching this problem from a different angle. *David Strauss, the Confessor and Writer* is a personal attack on one of the leading exponents of the fashionable conception of culture, David Strauss. *The Uses and Abuses of History for Life* deals with the regulation of knowledge, particularly historical knowledge, that threatens to erode culture despite being championed as progress by some. *Schopenhauer as Educator* focuses on the production of individuals who both exemplify high culture and enable humanity as a whole to celebrate its existence. Finally, *Richard Wagner in Bayreuth* further cements Wagner’s role in the regeneration of culture after *The Birth of Tragedy* first proposed the idea. To explore and connect all of the key issues shared by these essays would be to pre-empt the theoretical work of the remainder of the thesis. In what follows, I introduce them and highlight their incompleteness.

Nietzsche’s work at this time is basically limited to two eras: the Attic and the contemporary. The former serves as the frame for his entire critique. The way Nietzsche talks about culture in the notebooks at times suggests that it only begins with Homer (e.g. 329). To describe the Greeks as the pinnacle of culture is almost to understate the case: they are the creators of culture. That it is possible to lack culture tells us that Nietzsche is not concerned here with an anthropological definition. Culture is not a matter of customs and habits passed on through teaching, but is rather something more elusive that these things make possible. With the Greeks as his model and with modern culture as his target, there is no need for Nietzsche to engage in the kind of deep historical speculation that defines much of *FSW*.

The tasks of culture vary for Nietzsche, but they revolve around the idea of aligning life with nature. *HL* is concerned with the conditions of life’s flourishing. He derives these conditions from an appraisal of animals, seeing human beings as having strayed too far from their animal existence. Knowledge, in the form of history, threatens to undermine the conditions of life. To allow human life to flourish requires that humanity regulate the pursuit of knowledge in various ways that mitigate its destructive effects. Man must ‘think back to his real needs’, which are obscured by the maelstrom of information to which the modern individual is exposed. The struggle to instigate genuine culture is the struggle to
reverse the hierarchy of human needs and knowledge such that the former regulate the latter, rather than the latter overwhelming the former. Although HL’s focus is history, its content follows directly from the previous meditation, DS, where knowledge more generally is the problem. Nietzsche sees in Strauss’ cultural vision the creation of ‘cultural philistines’ [Bildungsphilister]. To these individuals, culture amounts to the collecting of artefacts from various other times and places and learning endless scientific facts with no concern as to their relevance to their real needs. They engage in cultural activities only so that they can return to their unreflective lives feeling edified by them. The individuals produced by such engagement are ‘walking encyclopaedias’ (HL 4). They are simply repositories of information, but lack anything that unifies that information. They lack a ‘the unity of artistic style’, the very definition of culture in DS (DS 1). It is this unity forged in line with one’s real needs that separates culture from the merely apparent culture.

Nietzsche’s later call to ‘translate man back into nature’ (BGE 230) is a variant of aligning oneself with nature in UM. But by then, ‘nature’ is being used in a broadly scientific way. While this is pre-empted by the comparison of humans and animals in HL, both that essay and SE focus more on the Ancient Greek word for nature, physis [φύσις], although Natur is still part of the story. Physis was subject to various interpretations in the Ancient world, most of which Nietzsche would have been familiar with. In HL, the definition of culture that concludes the essay centres on this concept:

This is a parable for each one of us: he must organize the chaos within him by thinking back to his real needs…. Thus the Greek conception of culturek will be unveiled to him – in antithesis to the Roman – the conception of culturek as a new and improved physis, without inner and outer, without dissimulation and convention, culturek as a unanimity of life, thought, appearance and will. (HL 10)

In the notebooks, we get cryptic clues to further specifications of the physis concept:

Culturek – not vital necessity, rather an overflow.
Art either convention or physis.
The attempt of our great poets to come to convention. Goethe and the essence of drama.
The truth of nature and the pathological were too powerful.
They have not brought form to it. (266)²

There is not much to go on here, but there are at least the core components of the UM narrative. The fourth sentence describes the threat of knowledge, where ‘nature’ here is Natur rather than physis. What this note adds is an opposition between physis and convention, which suggests that Nietzsche is thinking in terms of the Ancient distinction between physis and nomos [νόμος]. Noburu Notomi summarises the history of the distinction as follows:

Nomos originally meant allotted order, but we now translate it as law or custom. In the earlier period, as in Heraclitus, physis normally includes morality and social customs. Later, nomos began its separation from physis, and the Sophists often contrast the two. Nomos initially implied a positive evaluation of human progress in civilization, but later came to have a more negative meaning, as opposed to nature.³

In another notebook entry, Nietzsche distinguishes Greeks and Romans by the fact that, for the former, art is physis, whereas for the latter, it is convention (290). Imposing form on individuals through mere conventions – the ‘Roman’ conception of culture – does not work. The Greek conception involves a retreat from nomos in order to rediscover physis. Only then can the individual successfully impose form on themselves.

The idea of one’s nature as distinct from the form imposed on one by social convention still leaves us with the question of what composes that nature. There is plenty of talk of drives in the texts of this period and although Nietzsche is not using the term in the later theoretical sense that he will adopt, there is a similar emphasis on controlling and balancing drives. I will talk more about this in the next section, since it is mostly restricted to the notebooks. Another possibility is that Nietzsche is thinking of one or more of Aristotle’s uses of physis. In the Metaphysics, physis is, among other things, ‘the genesis of growing things’ and ‘The primary immanent element in a thing, from which its growth proceeds’.⁴ Nietzsche does not explicitly endorse these Aristotelian claims, but they nonetheless share the organic nature of his talk of physis. Genius in SE, for example, should, according to Keith Ansell Pearson, ‘be heard in the Greek sense of “daimon” conceived as an individual fate and organic potentiality’.⁵ There is also a resemblance here to Nietzsche’s later notions of will to life and will to power. At times, ‘life’ in UM foreshadows will to power more obviously, as when Nietzsche writes ‘life alone, that dark, driving power that insatiably thirsts for itself’ (HL 3). The strongest support for the notion of physis as this force that

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⁵In the same article, Ansell Pearson tracks this idea through GS and TI. See Keith Ansell Pearson, “Holding on to the Sublime”: Nietzsche on Philosophy’s Perception of the Search for Greatness,’ in Nietzsche, Power, and Politics, ed. Herman Siemens and Vasti Roodt (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2008), 779.
drives growth is found in *HL* 1, where Nietzsche talks about ‘plastic power’: ‘I mean by plastic power the capacity to develop out of oneself in one’s own way, to transform and incorporate into oneself what is past and foreign, to heal wounds, to replace what has been lost, to recreate broken moulds’. Developing out of oneself in one’s own way suggests the notion of *physis* as an active force as well as simply one’s constitution. It also fits with the way that Thomas Buchheim reads Aristotle on *physis*, claiming that as ‘the principle of growth, and so of the process of nutrition in the organism, φύσις must play a special role in the constitution and preservation of form’.

Vanessa Lemm has claimed that, at least as far as *SE* is concerned, ‘life cannot be given a form because every attempt to give it a form is an intervention that risks de-forming and destroying it…. culture acts negatively, acting against that which forces its form on life’. But Nietzsche’s criticism of giving form to life emphasises its external imposition rather than its developing from the inside out. The division of ‘inner and outer’ in *HL* 10 is the result of the inner power of *physis* being prevented from giving form to the individual’s exterior; which is to say something to the effect that it does not govern their actions, utterances, and general comportment to the world. The unification of the individual, inner and outer, requires that we give some form to life; without this, it is not clear what Nietzsche is actually asking us to do with respect to *physis*.

So far, *physis* has been discussed as an individual matter. But in *DS*, ‘unity of style’ refers to the ‘life-expressions of a people’; and in *HL*, Nietzsche is clear that his analysis of the requirements of life apply ‘whether this living thing be a man or a people or a culture’ (*HL* 1). But although he repeats this several times, the application of the notion of improved *physis* to culture as a larger entity is never undertaken in *HL*. Further elaboration is left to *SE*, to which we now turn.

In *SE*, Nietzsche says that ‘to acquire power so as to aid the evolution of the *physis*’ is an ‘exalted and transfiguring overall goal’ (*SE* 3). This is of benefit ‘At first only for yourself, to be sure; but through yourself in the end for everyone’. A significant part of enabling the evolution of the *physis* is the removal of that which blocks its path; or, in Nietzsche’s words, ‘the removal of all the weeds, rubble and vermin that want to attack the tender buds of the plant’ (*SE* 1). The source of many of these obstacles is the thirst for knowledge that has led to cultural philistinism. There is positive content to the project, however. The title refers to the fact that Nietzsche engages with Schopenhauer as one of his own formative figures. He is upfront about the fact that he made of Schopenhauer that which he needed at the time. This follows directly from the practice of monumental history in *HL*, which involves interpreting historical figures falsely, but which help the individual to achieve greatness.

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Nietzsche’s engagement with Schopenhauer served this function for him. His conception of education centres on the process not of relaying facts or beliefs – he barely mentions Schopenhauer’s philosophy itself – but on drawing out and cultivating the nature of the student. In reflecting on his own education, Nietzsche seeks to better understand his *physis*: that force in him that was waiting to be allowed to shape his exterior self.

I have proceeded as though *physis* were an unchanging essence in the individual, but Nietzsche’s emphasis on improving and developing it suggest that *physis* is itself malleable. There are a few ways that *physis* might be changed. First, it could simply be strengthened as a force. Second, if it is not a single force but actually a set of forces, then a degree of balance in those forces can be achieved; this might well be responsible for its strengthening. Finally, it can be corrected in those instances where it forms the individual in the wrong way. Evidence for all of these is present in *UM*. The final one is described immediately after the quotation about the evolution of *physis*. Part of the treatment of one’s *physis* is ‘to be for a while the corrector of its follies and ineptitudes’ (*SE* 3).

This suggests a criterion of correctness for the activity of *physis* that is not immediately forthcoming in the text. When we dig deeper into the project of *SE*, however, we find Nietzsche reintroducing nature [Natur] as a driving force: ‘nature presses towards man, it thereby intimates that man is necessary for the redemption of nature from the curse of the life of the animal...’ (*SE* 5). This passage illustrates the degree of instability in the essays. In *HL*, humanity was threatened by losing the animal ability to forget; now it is the unconsciousness of animality that is the cause of suffering and reflective awareness that offers the solution. More remarkable is Nietzsche’s talk of redeeming nature, of nature as having a purpose, and of that purpose being human beings. In *SE*, humanity stands as an optimum future state of the organism. It is hard not to read this as a strong teleological commitment. Thomas Hurka has argued that we should not attribute Nietzsche the kind of teleological perfectionism that *SE* seems to present. ‘Teleological perfectionisms’ he writes ‘are committed to some version of the claim that humans tend naturally to develop their natures to the highest degree’. He proposes instead the view that will to power can be realised to greater and lesser extents across nature. It is in this narrow sense that Nietzsche should be viewed as a perfectionist. This argument will become central at the end of chapter 5. In *SE*, although will to power is not present, this general idea it helps us understand what nature’s ‘pressing’ amounts to. Nature fails repeatedly to realise its highest form and only with the intervention of self-cultivation can it actually improve. Even so, Nietzsche’s language here as confused. He implies that nature strives for something, but he does not think that this striving is effectual on its own. So he is not strongly teleological in the sense that we should understand nature in terms of an inherent tendency towards

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8For the first two see Nietzsche’s two maxims of education in *SE* 1.
perfection; rather we should understand it as something with a potential to be higher, where height is measured according to features inherent to life, but which requires us to take action to bring about. This is an issue that will become much clearer in the middle and later works, as well as in chapter 5 of this thesis.

In addition to elaborating on the development of *physis*, *SE* provides a way to understand how such work connects with the larger community. You undertake that development ‘At first only for yourself, to be sure; but through yourself in the end for everyone’ (*SE* 3).\(^\text{10}\) There are various ways that developing one’s *physis* benefits others, including being a living example of what humanity can achieve, something at which the Greeks excelled and which we have forgotten (see *SE* 2). But the overall task of culture – of improved *physis* – is the production of genius. *Physis* and genius are linked in discussion of Schopenhauer:\(^\text{11}\)

> The longing for a stronger nature, for a healthier and simpler humanity, was in his case a longing for himself; and when he had conquered his age in himself he beheld with astonished eyes the genius in himself. The secret of his being was now revealed to him, the intention of his stepmother age to conceal his genius from him was frustrated, the realm of transfigured *physis* was disclosed. (*SE* 3)

This fits with Ansell Pearson’s claim that genius should be read as ‘organic potentiality’. It suggests a close connection between discovering one’s genius and employing it in giving oneself form. This understanding of genius as individual potential has been invoked by commentators seeking to diffuse the claim that *SE* is an elitist text. Rather than reading the production of genius as a matter of individuals sacrificing themselves for the sake of creating a few great figures, the essay should be understood as a call for every individual to become their highest possible self.\(^\text{12}\) But it is hard to square the idea that everyone is invested in such a process with other parts of *SE*, where there seem to be clear distinctions between producers of genius and geniuses themselves. Take the following passage from *SE* 6:

> all who participate in the institution have, through continual purification and mutual support, to help to prepare within themselves and around them for the birth of the genius and the ripening of

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\(^\text{10}\)Hurka rebutts readings of Nietzsche as egalitarian by quoting from *SE*, but here we see that, as with much in *UM*, it is possible to find the opposite position sometimes within a few pages. See Hurka, ‘Nietzsche: Perfectionist,’ 19.

\(^\text{11}\)It should be noted that Nietzsche’s discussions of Schopenhauer in *SE* are almost exclusively based on the character that Nietzsche extracts from Schopenhauer’s writings rather than biographical details.

his work. Not a few, including some from the ranks of the second-
and third-rate talents, are destined for the task of rendering this
assistance and only in subjection to such a destiny do they come to
feel they have a duty and that their lives possess significance and
a goal.

Referring to the genius as a ‘he’ certainly suggests an individual rather than a mere ideal.
The ‘second and third-rate talents’ are surely individuals. But what comes from this is not
a conventional form of elitism: those who seek to create the genius do so only because it
makes their lives meaningful. There is no obvious political compulsion operating here.
Rather, the enterprise looks like one in which everyone can derive meaning from the ‘per-
fecition of nature’ (SE 5), whether or not it is they that achieve the status of genius. I take it
that both of these readings get something right. The cultivation of the self is necessary for
those who eventually become geniuses to realise that potential; but the same cultivation
is capable of helping those who derive meaning from the work of those geniuses. Certain
individuals recognise the special status of other individuals whose potential for develop-
ing physis both individually and collectively is very strong. Nietzsche’s collective cultural
project in SE is still somewhat mysterious. This is a key area to which my thesis will add.
Although there is more that could be said about UM, the basic framework that I sought
to lay down is present. It is time to see how the other works of this period fit in.

1.2 Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense AND THE
Nachlass: Summer 1872/Early 1873

I have chosen to cover TL and the relevant NF in the same section because much of
the theoretical detail of TL is repeated in FSW, and I have therefore tackled the essay
again in chapter 2. Nevertheless, there is something to be said now about the position
that TL occupies relative to UM. It distinguishes itself by virtue both of its content and its
approach. It deals with perception and experience, linking these to metaphor and language
use, and is more traditionally philosophical than UM, which is another way of saying that
it is more theoretically robust. Broadly speaking, it claims that what we call ‘truth’, or the
world that we take to be the ‘true’ world, results from the application of multiple layers of
interpretation, processing and organisation of nervous stimuli. This is compared with the
process by which metaphors are constructed. Every concept, for Nietzsche, is effectively a
metaphor. Culture is mentioned only twice and then only in the final paragraph. There

13Joe Ward makes a similar point, arguing that the distinction between individual greatness and cultural
greatness is blurred, since individual greatness is an achievement of the few but a benefit to humanity as
such. See Joe Ward, ‘Nietzsche’s Value Conflict: Culture, Individual, Synthesis,’ The Journal of Nietzsche
14The details of this rather unclear statement will be given in the next chapter.
is little to connect it with the discussions in *UM*, and what Nietzsche says about culture in *TL* is of little help on its own. All we are told is that when a certain kind of individual, whom he calls ‘intuitive man’, is dominant, ‘a culture can evolve and the rule of art over life establish itself’ (*TL* 2). A few sentences later, Nietzsche links intuitive man with culture and redemption, a theme of *SE*, but does not go into detail. This is surprising given that the notebook from which this essay emerges – Notebook 19: Summer 1872/Early 1873 – mentions culture a number of times, connecting it to core ideas in *TL*. Unfortunately, the scattered and incomplete nature of the notes is their limitation. Even having read them, there are many missing pieces to the picture. Nonetheless, they are fertile ground for ideas upon which the rest of this thesis builds.

In (310), Nietzsche defines culture as art dominating life. What this amounts to is not obvious, but there are some clues as to possible ways this might be interpreted. The first thing to note is that in the context of the Greeks, who serve as Nietzsche’s model, the distinction between art and philosophy is slight; he even uses the term ‘philosopher-artist’ (39). Nietzsche writes ‘the content of art and ancient philosophy is identical, but in philosophy we see isolated elements of art being used to control the drive to knowledge’ (41). This is what allows for the unity that Nietzsche is so invested in:

> All the drives of the Greeks evince a controlling unity: let us call it the Hellenic will. Each of these drives attempts to exist on its own into infinity. The Ancient philosophers attempt to construct a world out of them.

> The culture of a people reveals itself in the unifying control of this people’s drives… (41)\(^{15}\)

It is at this point that the connections between *UM* and *TL* start to surface. Nietzsche claims that ‘the only thing philosophy can do now is emphasize the relativity and anthropomorphic character of knowledge, as well as the universally dominant power of illusion’ (37).\(^{16}\) These are precisely the points Nietzsche makes in *TL*, but we see now that their cultural significance connects directly to that of *UM* insofar as they help to limit knowledge. But there is more to philosophy than simply limiting the drive to knowledge. Emphasising the anthropomorphic character of knowledge is a way for Nietzsche to claim that in adapting knowledge to the needs of life, we are simply extending the very nature of knowledge. That is to say, knowledge is the product of the processes of life and not simply something

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\(^{16}\)Jetzt kann die Philosophie nur noch das Relative aller Erkenntiss betonen und das Anthropomorphische, so wie die überall herrschende Kraft der Illusion.
opposed to it. To learn to work with rather than against our interpretive tendencies to create illusions for life is the foundation of Greek culture.

The ‘art-philosophy’ of the Greeks is linked in a further way to *TL* by the claim that the processes outlined in the latter are the condition of culture. Nietzsche tells us that ‘imitation is the means of all culture’, but imitation does not refer to what anthropologists would call ‘mimicry’. Rather, ‘imitation presupposes an act of apprehending and then a perpetual translation of the apprehended image into a thousand metaphors’ (226). In the next note, it is even clearer that these are the origins of the *TL* essay: ‘stimulus perceived – then repeated, in many metaphors, whereby related images from various categories throng together’ (227). Although culture is not a central theme in *TL*, notebook 19 shows that *UM* and *TL* are both born of cultural concerns. That the mechanisms detailed in *TL* are the condition of culture is iterated in the penultimate note of notebook 19:

First stage of culture: the faith in language, as ubiquitous metaphorical designation.

Second stage culture: unity and coherence of the world of metaphor, under the influence of Homer. (329)

The first sentence is the story of the ‘invention of knowledge’ in *TL*. Through metaphor we come to create concepts that designate various things. Having faith in language amounts, I take it, to believing that its designations really exist as they are presented to us. Creating this world enables Homer to arrive as a unifier of that world, which amounts to his creation of the ‘Hellenic will’. This finally brings us back to *physis* at the end of *HL*: we have arrived at the ‘a unanimity of life, thought, appearance and will’ that constitutes culture. Will, operating through concepts (thought), has come to construct appearances that serve and express life.

These connections bring *UM* and *TL* into dialogue in an interesting way, but they are still fairly cryptic. Too much detail is missing for this to be considered a theory of culture. Nonetheless, the three pillars, as I have called them, set up what I have attributed to Nietzsche in *FSW*. Rather than directly reference all of the places that a given idea will surface, I have tried to present a skeleton that can be born in mind while the flesh of the theory is added.

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17 Das Nachahmen ist das Mittel aller Kultur.
18 Das Nachahmen setzt voraus ein Aufnehmen und dann ein fortgesetztes Übertragen des aufgenommenen Bildes in tausend Metaphern.
19 *Reiz percipirt – jetzt wiederholt*, in vielen Metaphern, wobei verwandte Bilder, aus den verschiedenen Rubriken, herbeiströmen.
21 As opposed, that is, to having faith that language is simply metaphor. This would be attributing a theory of language to Homer that he is unlikely to have had.
22 I concede the possibility that Nietzsche means ‘appearance’ here merely in the sense of outward appearance of the individual, rather than as the opposite of things-in-themselves.
1.3 Life, Knowledge, Science

The major discontinuity between the early and middle Nietzsche, and that which has been most fervently studied, is found in his attitude to science. This does not necessarily refer to the natural sciences – although Nietzsche’s interest in these also expands drastically at this time – but to the German *Wissenschaft*, which also encompasses the humanities. The details of this transition can make it appear sudden, the classic narrative being that Nietzsche’s experiences at the Bayreuth festival caused in him a sudden realisation that he was on the wrong path. Those who have looked more closely at this period have found that this event represented the culmination of various pressures and doubts that Nietzsche had been feeling in his foregoing life and thinking.\(^\text{23}\) Nietzsche was becoming disillusioned with Wagner and Schopenhauerian metaphysics before the completion of *UM*. It seems natural that in this context he might turn to science. But long before this, he had lamented his lack of scientific education. In *Fate and History* (1862), he describes the following feeling when grappling with long-standing philosophical problems: ‘How often has the longing for natural science and history crept over me in the course of my fruitless speculations!’.\(^\text{24}\) Nietzsche never totally abandoned this scientific interest even if it was quietened by the influence of Wagner. In 1866 he read Friedrich Lange’s *The History of Materialism*, which deals with what was contemporary science, including Darwinism. Then there is a period of very little scientific engagement before, in April of 1873, while his notebooks\(^\text{25}\) show that he was preparing *DS*, he read no less than eleven books on natural scientific topics.\(^\text{26}\) This immediately preceded Nietzsche’s first meeting Paul Rée in May of that year, with whom he would later form a close friendship, and who influenced Nietzsche heavily in his aphoristic style, his scientific standpoint and his attacks on metaphysics and its accompanying moral commitments.\(^\text{27}\)

There is a great deal more that one can add to this biography as others have done. But one can also discern within the texts that have been discussed in this chapter several reasons why science came to occupy a greater role. We have seen that *TL* seeks to affect the drive to knowledge by undermining its objective status. This follows from Lange’s neo-Kantian philosophy, which employs findings in perceptual science to undermine possible knowledge of things-in-themselves. Here, science delivers results that come to undermine its own objectivity; it makes sense for Nietzsche to employ it in this way, since he is still employing science for the purpose of protecting life. But it is in *UM* that the conflict


\(^{25}\)Notebook 27, 1873.


\(^{27}\)See Young, *Friedrich Nietzsche*, 212ff.
between life and knowledge takes place and it is there that the tensions in Nietzsche's thought show. The majority of the remainder of this chapter is dedicated to these works.

Nietzsche's internal struggle with the problem of knowledge is captured in a single sentence of \textit{SE}, where he writes 'Nature needs knowledge and it is terrified of the knowledge it has need of' (\textit{SE} 5). The fear of knowledge has been raised already in this chapter, but it is worth consolidating and elaborating on. We have seen that the drive to knowledge threatens to pollute, weaken and obstruct \textit{physis}. But in \textit{SE}, there is a further threat to the individual's identity posed by knowledge. Ever since \textit{BT}, Nietzsche has seen the task of culture as one of finding ways to cover up the pure flux of reality – what Nietzsche refers to as 'becoming'. In \textit{BT}, this was achieved through Greek tragedy, in which the Apollonian element gave determinate, graspable content to the Dionysian. In \textit{SE}, becoming is something 'in beholding which man forgets himself, the actual distraction which disperses the individual to the four winds' (\textit{SE} 4). The worry for Nietzsche is twofold: first, that in seeing himself as merely a link in an on-going developmental chain, the individual loses his independent identity; and second, that in apprehending the infinitely complex series of events that led to his current existence, his identity is no longer limited to by horizon that he can grasp. This recalls a further understanding of \textit{physis} in Aristotle: Buchheim claims that, for Aristotle, \textit{physis} 'transmutes aggregated body stuff into unity and identity as a definite “this”'.\textsuperscript{28} This helps frame what Nietzsche is doing in \textit{SE}. The individual asserts their identity through an exercise of \textit{physis}. They make of themselves a definite being in face of a stream of becoming. Only by limiting knowledge can the individual discover and improve their \textit{physis}; and only by limiting knowledge do they also limit that which they have to fight against in asserting their identity.

This touches on the problem of incorporation, which has to do with the extent to which an individual can find a place for that which they come to know in their life. Nietzsche talks about this in terms of their 'digestion' of knowledge. Precisely what finding a place amounts to is open to interpretation. It clearly has something to do with making things relevant to the individual's life and its projects. Furthermore, it involves falsification in line with the needs of life. In \textit{HL}, Nietzsche has the following to say about incorporation:

\begin{quote}
the most powerful and tremendous nature would be characterized by the fact that it would know no boundary at all at which the historical sense began to overwhelm it; it would draw to itself and incorporate into itself all the past, its own and that most foreign to it, and as it were transform it into blood. That which such a nature cannot subdue it knows how to forget; it no longer exists, the horizon is rounded and closed, and there is nothing left to suggest there are people, passions, teachings, goals lying beyond
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{28}Buchheim, 'The Functions of the Concept of Physis in Aristotle's Metaphysics,' 210.
The preservation the horizon that constitutes identity is evident here, as is incorporation, although the latter is not specified in detail. This passage also indicates that Nietzsche is not entirely risk-averse regarding knowledge. There is the potential to eventually create individuals for whom knowledge is less of a problem than it is currently. Nonetheless, life takes clear precedent over knowledge: the latter threatens the former when it cannot be incorporated. These are, in summary, the reasons that nature fears knowledge. The redemption of nature that Nietzsche envisions requires individuals with determinate identities who cultivate and nurture their \textit{physis}; this is threatened by the eternal becoming presented by knowledge/science.

The ways that nature needs knowledge are also manifold in \textit{UM}. In \textit{HL}, knowledge serves a variety of cultural roles. Of the three kinds of historical engagement that Nietzsche outlines, \textit{monumental} history involves falsification, \textit{antiquarian} serves to uncover and preserve details of the past, and \textit{critical} serves to undermine that which has become dogmatic to the point of paralysing culture. Knowledge, properly controlled, can serve life. But even understanding these roles requires knowledge of them. Knowledge might be the sickness of culture, but it is also the means to its diagnosis and cure. Although Nietzsche does not expressly address it, the ongoing regulation of culture will require individuals versed in these meditations and their underlying theory. Furthermore, since Nietzsche presumably does not take himself to present an exhaustive account of culture or of life, these issues demand continual enquiry. This is precisely what Nietzsche will give them in the remainder of his canon.

In \textit{SE} there are a further two ways in which one might understand the claim that nature needs knowledge. First, there is the very activity of reflecting on one’s educators, which requires that one seek knowledge of one’s own past. This is an even bigger problem when we consider that our past is defined by our ancestors, opening up the enquiry even further, and thus threatening us with an overload of knowledge. Nietzsche writes in \textit{HL} ‘we are the outcome of earlier generations, we are also the outcome of their aberrations, passions and errors, and indeed of their crimes; it is not possible wholly to free oneself from this chain’ (\textit{HL} 3). This is a tricky subject, because it is not clear whether the aim is to genuinely discover that past, whether it is to fabricate a past for oneself, or, most likely, a combination of both. However this proceeds, what is clear is that reflection on one’s nature goes far beyond one’s educators. In the opening of \textit{SE}, we are told that every man is ‘uniquely himself to every last movement of his muscles’ (\textit{SE} 1). It is this unique nature that one seeks to discover in the process of self-cultivation. Self-knowledge is still a form of knowledge and therefore a potential threat. In a claim that predicts Nietzsche’s later notion of the intellectual conscience, which applies to self-knowledge, he writes ‘how we would like to hide our head somewhere as though our hundred-eyed conscience could not
find us out there’ (*SE 5*). This is not a moral conscience, but rather one that implores us to
discover and live according to our true nature. The second way to understand how nature
needs knowledge arises from the idea of man as the pinnacle of nature. The project of
self-cultivation gives meaning to humanity by lifting us out of animal existence onto a self-
reflective plain. This requires in addition to self-cultivation an awareness of the various
manifestations of human life. We need to take in the whole picture of humanity, so to
speak, so as to be able to serve as nature’s self-reflection.

The struggle between life and knowledge is the main source of tension at this time, but
it is not the only one. There is also a struggle between individuality and collectivity. While
*SE* claims that individuals are unique down to the smallest level, Nietzsche relies on the
fact that they are communally determined. This is not as simple as convention versus *physis*,
where the former must be overcome in favour of the latter. The very practices of culture,
that allow individuals to nurture their *physis* are conventional. The Greeks were not simply
a collection of self-cultivating individuals; they were a community bound by a conven-
tional understanding of self-cultivation of which Nietzsche clearly approved. Moreover,
they exhibited a unity of style and a world bound by a firm horizon. Such shared meaning
conflicts with the idea of pure individuality. If there is a way to reconcile these elements,
Nietzsche does not provide it at this stage.

This chapter set out to identify two things: a bare framework for a theory of cultural
flourishing and a number of unresolved tensions in the works of this period. Although
valuable in their own right, these features also make these works valuable as preparatory
for the later Nietzsche. In the remainder of this thesis, I will fill out this framework and
in doing so go some way towards resolving some of those tensions. To prepare the reader
for this, I end this chapter with a brief summary of its findings.

In *UM* we find a discussion of cultural flourishing that compares Greek and modern
cultures, but lacks sustained theoretical engagement. In *TL*, we find sustained theoretical
engagement with truth, world-construction, and language, but little being said about cul-
ture. In notebook 19 of the *Nachlass*, we find many hints as to how these connect, but in the
form of notes that quickly move on to other ideas. *UM* presents a risk-averse Nietzsche
whose main concern is with the conditions of flourishing life, which he sees as requiring
strict controls on the drive to knowledge. Although he hints at stronger natures who could
venture boldly into the world of becoming, he is far more concerned with strong, unified
cultures and individuals. These are the result of cultivating the inherent nature – *physis* – of
individuals so that it can shape them in its capacity as a form-giving, growing force. This
often fragile life force is all to easily dispersed into becoming, with individuals ending up
making nothing of their lives. But all of this requires knowledge insofar as the individual
takes it upon themselves to know themselves and insofar as they need to know the con-
ditions of flourishing for themselves and culture at large. Individuals and cultures need
knowledge but are afraid of it; but individuals also need communities and conventions,
while being wary of them. These tensions present a great deal of work than an interpreter needs to undertake to make Nietzsche's vision viable. That is the work of this thesis.

The first aphorism of *HH 1* shows straight away that Nietzsche has come to a decision about the tension of life and knowledge, now favouring maximal engagement with the latter. As he had in 1862, Nietzsche finds himself engaged with old philosophical issues, which he now reduces to one question: ‘how can something originate in its opposite?’ The older Nietzsche, like the 17-year-old one, sees science as the way forward. He calls for ‘Historical philosophy’ which ‘can no longer be separated from natural science’. This takes the form a ‘chemistry of concepts and sensations’, which traces the subtle interactions, reactions and transformations that have occurred in the history of human consciousness. The rise and structure of this consciousness is my starting point for the thesis; only later will it become clear how this leads to a resolution of the tensions of *UM*. 
Chapter 2

The Constitution of Experience

Phenomenological approaches to Nietzsche have been slow in surfacing within the literature. Emphasis has been placed on his naturalism, which is often seen as dethroning the conscious subject by undermining its unity and challenging its position as the guiding force in human action. This project is undertaken under the rubric of ‘drives’, a concept that Nietzsche first employs seriously in *Daybreak*. The drive concept has received far more attention than topics that are arguably more important to *FSW*, e.g. culture and incorporation. It has also led to a move away from conscious experience as a topic of discussion. The current thesis fits into the expanding tradition of those for whom Nietzsche is as much a phenomenologist as a psychologist.¹ For the most part, I avoid discussion of the drives themselves and make limited commitment as to their ontological status, although I do put pressure on the idea that they are best characterised as dispositions. My focus throughout is experience and the experienced world of meaningful, value-laden objects.² How this comes about and its relation to culture are the themes of this and the next chapter. Although the material is segregated to the extent that it can be, a significant amount of the argumentative work that pertains to this chapter is deferred to chapter 3 on the topic of consciousness and chapter 5 on the topics of truth and interpretation in the context of perspectivism. Chapter 6 places this in the context of pragmatism.

Although I mostly leave the discussion of drives to other commentators, there is one paper that is particularly relevant to the current thesis: Paul Katsafanas’ *Nietzsche’s Philo-


Paul Katsafanas addresses the drives in such a way as to also do justice to conscious experience. His paper is a response to a tension within drive theory. On the one hand, Nietzsche claims that our actions are essentially unknown because they originate in processes (the drives) to which we have limited access. On the other hand, we seem to be able to consciously reflect and act on reasons. Katsafanas seeks to do justice to both sides of this divide. His views on consciousness in Nietzsche, along with my own view, will be spelled out in chapter 3. For now, it is in his solution to the aforementioned conflict that his account sets up the remainder of the current chapter.

Katsafanas assumes that drives engage in interpretive activity below the level of consciousness. The world as we experience it consciously is, in the broadest terms, affected by that activity. Our rational decision making defers to constituents of the consciously experienced world, which feature as reasons to act. So the reasons for which we act reach us through a channel that is under the influence of the drives. This is the key to resolving the tension mentioned previously. Drives change the field of reasons, i.e. the world, that we experience so that even if we make what seems like a free choice, the game of deliberation is rigged, so to speak. Certain things do not become reasons for us if the drives do not allow them to become conscious and others become reasons as a result of the drives’ activity.

Katsafanas details a few ways in which drives influence our behaviour by altering the conscious world. One consists in changing the salience of features of the world, making some objects or properties stand out at the expense of others. This is a theory for which there is a body of evidence. There is a phenomenon dating back to at least 1987 in the psychology literature called the ‘Weapon Focus Effect’, which is defined as ‘the concentration of a crime witness’s attention on a weapon, and the resultant reduction in ability to remember details of the crime’. So if a person is confronted by an armed robber, their focus is automatically drawn to the weapon. Their experience is skewed such that the weapon is given attention at the expense of other things. Subsequently, witnesses are less likely to recall features of their assailant, making re-identification more difficult. A Nietzsche-Katsafanas reading of this would be that there is a drive, say the survival drive, which shapes our experience of the armed robbery according to its own ends. It makes that which threatens us stand out. We do not experience this shaping process: the experience first becomes conscious with the weapon made salient. That we take the weapon as a reason to flee or cooperate is partly explained by its monopoly on attention. Salience is a factor even in the

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4 Talks of drives as agents ‘allowing’ things is a necessary short-cut when talking about Nietzsche. In adopting this language I am not thereby committing myself to the view that drives are best characterised in psychological or agential terms.
5 Katsafanas, ‘Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology,’ 740.
6 Although this is framed in terms of recall, the paper goes on to posit a failure to encode the relevant information in the first place, rather than a failure to recall it. See: EF Loftus, GR Loftus, and J Messo, ‘Some Facts about “Weapon Focus”,’ *Law and Human Behaviour* 11, no. 1 (1987): 55, doi:10.1007/BF01044839.
more nuanced reasoning we engage in even when given time to reflect. Katsafanas goes on to claim that drives also affect the content of experience. One’s judgement of an experience is a function of the drives. We interpret the meaning of behaviour, the value of things and so on on account of drives. I might experience laughter as mockery or mirth depending on the drive that is currently ruling in me; I might experience a spider as scary or cute depending on the arrangement of my drives. What appears in experience, how much of our attention it occupies and how we interpret its meaning and value are all the result of our drives. Even with the most careful deliberation, this is the world in which we have to deliberate. In the remainder of this chapter I will extend Katsafanas’ views, arguing that this interpretive activity does not simply affect our experience, but is entirely responsible for constituting that experience.

2.1 Evaluation

Much ink has been spilt detailing the values that Nietzsche attacks and those that he proposes in their place. Less has been said about what values are and how they function. The general consensus is that evaluation is a natural phenomenon that arises in the evolution of organisms with the capacity to respond to their environment. Organisms are selected to be drawn to that which fulfils their needs and repelled by that which threatens them; the pursuit of nutriment and the avoidance of predators are, in a very basic sense, expressions of evaluative stances on the world.

In humans, evaluation becomes more complex. It can be involved in practices such as moralising:

Is the origin of all morality not to be sought in the detestable petty conclusions: ‘what harms me is something evil (harmful in itself); what is useful to me is something good (beneficient and advantageous in itself).’ (D 102)

Whereas we might describe the primitive evaluations of lower organisms in terms of consistent reaction to stimuli, human beings take values to inhere in the external world. Lower organisms simply respond consistently with no capacity to make commitments as to the nature of evaluation; with the rise of more sophisticated representation comes the positing of values as out there in the world. There are still ways of reading the passage that attribute Nietzsche a range of positions with differentially strong commitments. A weak position would be one on which the mistake we make is to believe in absolute essential and eternal value. Morality provides the clearest examples. So the belief that stealing is ‘wrong in itself’ would be an error; the correct thing to say would be that stealing is bad.

Katsafanas, ‘Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology,’ 743.

In chapter 5, I argue that this externalisation only properly attributed to human beings.
for me, it harms me, it harms my community. Moralising involves the failure to recognise that stealing is only wrong relative to the interests of its victims or perpetrators. From here, we might strengthen in two ways. Nietzsche could be using ‘morality’ here to refer to something broader than we traditionally designate with the term. His claims about the universalising tendencies of moral thinking might apply to a wider set, or even all, evaluations. In *HH* 42, Nietzsche links morality with ‘the order of rank of desirable things’, which suggests that when he talks about morality, he actually refers to values more broadly. Further, Nietzsche could be claiming that taking values to exist independently of acts of evaluation is not simply a matter of belief or judgement, but of experience. That is to say, the world as we experience it is value-laden. These two considerations can be applied to yield a range of positions; I want to argue for the strongest, which is that values manifest in our experience as inherent properties of that which we experience. To understand this it is helpful to look at the phenomenology of value.

We are supposing that Nietzsche’s view of values is not restricted to moral values traditionally conceived. Let us take as an example a strongly affective value: disgust. A clear, cross-cultural example of disgust is that experienced at the odour and appearance of rotten meat. One common way to characterise my experience in this case would be to say I experience the rotten meat and feel disgust towards it. I have an experience of the object and feel in myself a response to that object. An alternative would be to say that I simply experience the meat as disgusting. That is, my evaluation shows up as a property of that which I experience. Another way of putting this is to say that my experience of disgust is transparent: when I try to attend to the value of disgust in my experience, I find myself only able to attend to the object in question as disgusting. I cannot separate properties of an experience of disgust from my experience of the property of ‘being disgusting’ in the object. That is not to say that there is no accompanying feeling of disgust experienced. I can experience a reaction to the disgusting thing, but describing this misses a crucial part of my phenomenology of disgust, namely the taking of something to be disgusting. More will be said about transparency later.

Contrary to its presentation in experience, rotten meat is not disgusting in itself. To someone accustomed to it, the meat might appear to contain no such property or feature. Even if I believe that my attribution of the property disgusting is simply the way that my disgust manifests, my experience does not necessarily change simply as a result of having this belief. At this point, we might be tempted to say that my mistake is to take a subjective evaluation as an objective fact, but I think the terms ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ are best left out of the discussion for a couple of reasons. First, there is a way of making sense of our disgust objectively. Disgust is an evolved response to things that could harm us. If we think of the property disgusting as linked to the property harmful, then there is a sense in which our experience can be true or false. Rotten meat really is harmful to me, whereas something else that I find disgusting might not be. In other words, disgust
might track certain features of the world in virtue of which it can be assessed for its truth value. This does not change the fact that it is subjective in the sense of being relative to the evaluating organism. I am not claiming that this is the correct way to characterise affective states such as disgust, just that the possibility of it makes the language of ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ both ambiguous and distracting in the discussion of Nietzsche’s position. The second reason to avoid it is that Nietzsche himself seems to recognise that values might be described as objective. In *D* 137, he claims that ‘we adjudge the value and meaning of an event more objectively when it happens to another than we do when it happens to us’. What Nietzsche presumably means here is that we judge more accurately how an event affects someone from our third-person standpoint. The value in this case is still relative to the needs or goals of the person involved, but there is a correct answer as to whether an event helps or hinders them.

The language of subjectivity and objectivity distracts from the point that underlies Nietzsche’s view on our experience of value: that we cannot separate in experience relative from non-relative properties. Having an experience of the latter is incoherent even if we believe a property to be relative. What would it even mean to experience rotten meat as having the property *disgusting-for-me*? How would this property differ phenomenologically from the property *disgusting-as-such*? We cannot conceive of such properties because the structure of our experience is such that we experience values as mind-independent properties of external objects. That is not to say that I cannot imagine a piece of rotten meat being alluring rather than disgusting. But then I have simply replaced in the imagination one property with another. I have not altered to structure of my experience, which takes such properties to actually inhere in the object.

The question remains whether the evaluative component in such experiences is a feature of all experience. Is it not conceivable that I might experience something that does not elicit an evaluation? There is good evidence that Nietzsche denies this possibility. Take the following passage from *HH* 32:

> ...if only it were possible to live without evaluating, without having aversions and partialities! – for all aversion is dependent on an evaluation, likewise all partiality. A drive to something or away

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9Poellner allows for values to be something that we can be wrong about in this sense. See Peter Poellner, ‘Aestheticist Ethics,’ in *Nietzsche, Naturalism, and Normativity*, ed. Simon Robertson and Christopher Janaway (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 65.

10Poellner makes this point in reference to secondary qualities, e.g. colour. He writes ‘Nothing about the appearance of scarlet marks it out as perceiver-relative’. See Poellner, ‘Perspectival Truth,’ 87.

11By ‘mind-independent’ I mean existing independently of interpretation or representation, and persisting unseen. In this context, the term refers to the idea that properties of an object are represented as being inherent in the object rather than as being the product of an interaction between the object and the subject. We represent the properties as public and persisting when we are not experiencing them.

from something divorced from a feeling one is desiring the beneficial or avoiding the harmful, a drive without some kind of knowing evaluation of the worth of its objective, does not exist in man. We are from the very beginning illogical and thus unjust beings and can recognize this: this is one of the greatest and most irresolvable discords of existence.

The first claim here – that it is impossible to live without evaluating – is not enough to secure that all experience is evaluative. It is compatible with only some experiences being evaluative. The second claim regarding drives, however, suggests otherwise. Recall that for Nietzsche, the drives are what give rise to experience. Every experience is built on drives, which Nietzsche clearly links here with not only being drawn or repelled, but with taking that which the drive is towards or away from as beneficial or harmful in itself. Drive theory commits Nietzsche to the view that all experience requires affectivity. There are other arguments as to why experience requires evaluation. One is that to have any attential narrowing one needs some interest or value. Another has to do with the necessity for there to be a will that accompanies consciousness. I leave these to other interpreters who have done good work on theme. For now, I want to look at additional ways in which experience is constituted, starting with causation.

2.2 CAUSATION

Any discussion of causation, especially with reference to the 19th century, has to make reference to the two poles of Kant and Hume. I will try to show in this section that Nietzsche's view of causation in FSW cannot be reduced to either a Kantian or a Humean picture, although it takes elements from both. In fact, this is really only true of one of Nietzsche's positions on causation, the one that has received the most attention, namely causation between experienced objects. The two kinds of causation are:

1. Causation between objects or events: B is observed to follow A and A is taken to be the cause, or one of the causes, of B.

2. Causation between mind and world: sensations are taken to be caused by an external world.

In FSW, it is the second that receives more attention. The first is still an important part of experience and I will address this first.

In the Enquiry, Hume offers a sceptical account of causation. He claims that we infer causation from the experience of succession: we never experience causation itself nor does


\[14\] See Poellner, *Nietzsche and Metaphysics*, ch. 3.
anything in an object or event we experience necessitate its producing a certain effect. There is no knowledge of an object or event, A, from which we can deduce that B will follow. Hume’s best-known example is of one billiard ball striking another. Nothing that we can know about the first billiard ball’s properties or motion allows us to infer that, on impact, a particular motion in the second billiard ball must follow. ‘May not both these balls remain at absolute rest?’ Hume asks; ‘May not the first ball return in a straight line, or leap off from the second in any line or direction?’. We believe that the motion of the second ball must follow because we are accustomed to seeing certain events regularly follow other events. We experience regular successions and believe that one thing is cause, another effect. We infer this connection from experience, but we never actually experience any connective tissue, so to speak. Neither reason nor experience justifies our positing of such a connection.

Kant frames his position on causation with reference to this Humean account:

This complete solution of the Humean problem... restores to the pure concepts of the understanding their a priori origin, and to the universal laws of nature their validity as laws of the understanding, but in such a way that it restricts their use to experience only, because their possibility is founded solely in the relation of the understanding to experience: not, however, in such a way that they are derived from experience, but that experience is derived from them, a completely reversed type of connection that never occurred to Hume.\(^16\)

The law of causality, along with other universal laws, is what enable us to experience a world at all. While we cannot experience causation as such, things appear in experience as causes and effects because causality is part of what goes into making experiences possible. The final sentence is the most important and clearest: it is in experience that we encounter causes and effects, but that does not mean that we derive causation from experience, as Hume thought. Experiences are as of causes and effects, not of things that we subsequently label ‘cause’ and ‘effect’. We cannot infer causation from the experience of ‘mere’ regular succession because such a thing is never experienced. Where Hume sees regularities as contingent, Kant sees them as necessary orderings under the principle of causation that enable experience to occur. Which of these best reflects Nietzsche’s position? This is a difficult question as the evidence seems to point both ways depending on where one looks. In what follows, I will examine that evidence in an effort to secure a consistent position. I will claim that there is such a position, but that it can be described as both Kantian and Humean. Nietzsche thinks


\(^{16}\)Emmanuel Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, ed. and trans. Gary Hatfield (1783; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), §30/p.64.
that in our evolutionary history, we have, in part because of custom, come to see succession as causation; this is the Humean component. However, the story of the development of this inference is not one of experienced succession that is gradually and increasingly mistaken for causation. Rather, the development of the application of causation is the story of the development of experience. Experience is conditional on the application of the principle of causation, just as Kant claims.

There are passages in FSW that point strongly to a Humean interpretation of Nietzsche:

‘Cause and effect’. – In this mirror – and our intellect is a mirror – something is taking place that exhibits regularity, a certain thing always succeeds another certain thing – this we call, when we perceive it and want to call it something, cause and effect – we fools! As though we had here understood something or other, or could understand it! For we have seen nothing but pictures of ‘causes and effects’! And it is precisely this pictorialness that makes impossible an insight into a more essential connection than that of mere succession. (D 121)

The order of events here seems clear. First, we experience a regular succession; then we name this ‘cause and effect’. The final sentence of the passage is very close to Hume when it claims that we lack into an essential connection between cause and effect. In a closely related aphorism from GS, entitled Cause and effect, we find another seemingly Humean claim:

The specifically qualitative aspect for example of every chemical process, still appears to be a ‘miracle’, as does every locomotion; no one has ‘explained’ the push. And how could we explain! We are operating only with things that do not exist – with lines, surfaces, bodies, atoms, divisible times, divisible spaces…. An intellect that saw cause and effect as a continuum, not, as we do, as arbitrary division and dismemberment – that saw the stream of the event – would reject the concept of cause and effect and deny all determinedness. (GS 112)

Hume also claims that we have no insight into hidden chemical or physical processes. His example is the body’s conversion of bread into energy: ‘neither sense nor reason can ever inform us of those qualities, which fit [bread] for the nourishment and support of a human body’.17 But notice Nietzsche’s alternative reason: the very things between which we seek

17Hume, Enquiry, 4.2.16/p.113.
to posit a causal connection, for example bread and nutrition, are illusions. There are no such entities; there is only a continuum rather than a discrete series of things. Not only is this not invoked by Hume, it clashes with his position. Although nothing about the motion of the first billiard ball necessitates any specific motion in the second, the existence of the two balls is not in question for Hume: ‘every effect is a distinct event from its cause’. For Nietzsche, the distinction between the two events in question is ‘arbitrary division and dismemberment’ brought about by our imposing our picture of things. Alistair Moles captures Nietzsche’s relation to Hume succinctly as follows:

The intellect categorizes the impressions received by the body – which is to say, it proceeds by separating and isolating them from the continuum. By the time we are aware of our experience, in order to reflect on it, it has been interpreted as a series of atomistic events. As a consequence, Nietzsche’s position is very close to Hume’s when it comes to evaluating our conscious awareness of the continuum of forces.

The categorisation hinted at here is actually the complex process that this chapter outlines, including the application of causality that we will see momentarily. Moles’ final point is what I have been putting forward, namely that Hume assumes atomism whereas Nietzsche rejects it. To even make sense of a succession in experience as Hume does is to already have employed causal reasoning subconsciously. Moles goes on to claim that consciousness is epiphenomenal in Nietzsche, and even though, as we will see, I do not agree with this, the pre-conscious activity that is involved to produce the objects of consciousness is more important to Nietzsche than conscious inferences. It is to this pre-conscious that activity, in the form of the second kind of causality, that we now turn.

The second application of causation involves positing a cause for the sensations that one receives. Causation between sensations and external objects is discussed in detail in the context of dreams. In the aphorisms in question, dreams serve as more accessible illustrations of the same processes governing waking life. In \( HH \), this connection is weak: dreams are only the blueprint for understanding waking life in earlier stages of mankind. By \( D \), waking life even today is essentially the same as dreaming life. The aphorisms in question are \( HH \) 13 and \( D \) 119, but it is on the former that I will spend the most time.

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21I use the term ‘sensations’, but it should be noted that Nietzsche uses a range of terms to designate the same thing, including ‘impressions’, ‘excitations’, and ‘nervous stimuli’.
HHI 13 describes the formation of dreams as follows. First, the brain receives a host of sensations from the body. On receiving these sensations…

…there are a hundred occasions for the mind to be involved in puzzlement and to look for grounds for this excitation: the dream is the seeking and positing of the causes of this excitement of the sensibilities, that is to say the supposed causes.

Nietzsche’s example is of having one’s feet bound and dreaming that they are encircled by snakes. We should not read this as an experienced inference, but rather as one that produces an experience. The puzzlement of the mind and its looking for grounds is a pre-conscious activity of making sense of sensations by attributing them to an object. This fits with how Nietzsche breaks down the process:

If, for example, you tie two straps about your feet you may well dream that your feet are coiled round by snakes: this is first a hypothesis, then a belief, with an accompanying pictorial representation and the supposition: ‘these snakes must be the cause of those sensations that I, the sleeper, feel’ – thus the sleeper’s mind judges. The immediate past he has thus inferred becomes through his aroused imagination the present to him.

The last sentence is crucial. The dreamer’s present experience is the result of the immediately preceding mental activity. Clearly, however, this is not something he is ‘consciously’ aware of, otherwise it could not be his present. ‘Becoming present’ should be read as becoming conscious.

One problem with this is that Nietzsche, referring to an example involving sound, then tells us that the dreamer ‘believes he experiences the cause of the sound first, then the sound itself’. This suggests that the cause and the sound are experienced separately, which is surely inaccurate. I do not experience the ringing of a bell before the sound of it ringing. What would it even mean to experience an object before one has any sensations that relate to it? The correct thing to say is surely that one experiences the object in or through the sensations. One takes them to coexist precisely because the sensation is the vehicle for experiencing the object; even the term ‘coexist’ is misleading in suggesting an object side-by-side with sensations pertaining to that object, unless we are talking about one of the many sensations pertaining to that object coexisting with other such sensations. I think Nietzsche’s view is that the sensation comes first, followed by mental activity that

22That which receives and organises sensations is referred to interchangeably as ‘brain’, ‘mind’, ‘imagination’, and ‘reason’.
23I am overlooking the fact that being asleep is not being conscious, but I take conscious here simply to refer to the narrative of a dream that one might recall in a properly conscious state.
assigns that sensation to an object, which it then takes to be the cause of the sensation. But that does not mean that when the experience arises, it is of an object followed by and causing sensation. I am proposing a three-part narrative: first, the sensation is received; then it is assigned to an object; finally, an experience arises in which the sensation features as a sensory mediation of the object to which it is assigned. In the final experience, there is no separation between object and sensation.

This reading of Nietzsche points to a kind of drafting that goes on before the final deliverance of content to conscious experience. In a very short window, the brain makes sense of what it receives before yielding an experience. Nietzsche gives more detail of this with another example. When we close our eyes we encounter many visual sensations, but these arrange themselves into the shapes and figures, which it borrows from our daily experiences. He again describes this as an inference to a cause, where these shapes and colours are taken to be the cause of the sensations. In this case...

...the supposed cause [the object] is inferred from the effect [the sensation] and introduced after the effect: and all with extraordinary rapidity, so that, as with a conjurer, a confusion of judgement can here arise and successive events appear as simultaneous events or even with the order of their occurrence reversed.

Here, we need to be careful because although this looks like a repetition of the same point, it is subtly different. First, there is the same inference from effect to cause, which is the assignment of a sensation to an object. Second, there is the ability to re-order sensations within a very short time frame depending on the inference that is made, i.e. on the final decision about the nature of the object to which these sensations belong. Furthermore, notice that he implies that this reversal is not the common case; he says 'or even', suggesting a possibility. Earlier on, however, when he talked about the pre-conscious activity that took there to be an object behind the sensation, of which the latter was the vehicle, he talked about this as the structure of experience itself, not a mere possibility. The picture so far is one on which sensations are received, assigned to an object, which might involve reordering them within narrow limits, and an experience is delivered as of an object to which these sensations pertain.

We are faced with the question of whether this interpretation can be pushed any further. Does Nietzsche think that it is possible for us to experience sensations without positing a cause for those sensations? Some passages suggest that he does. In HH 13 again, he writes

24I take this to be akin to Daniel Dennett's multiple drafts model, on which experience involves a judgement about the very recent past (measured in milliseconds). During that window, the judgement is open to revision such that the order of parts can be modified, including being reversed. Where they differ, however, is that on Dennett's view, there are multiple drafts in the sense that a judgement might constitute conscious awareness very briefly before being redrafted. Nietzsche seems committed to their being only one final version of the experience made conscious, with the drafts being strictly pre-conscious. See Daniel Dennett, *Consciousness Explained* (New York: Back Bay Books, 1991).
‘If we close our eyes, the brain produces a host of light-impressions and colours... Now, however, reason (in alliance with the imagination) at once assembles these in themselves formless colour-impressions into definite figures, landscapes, moving groups’. It would seem that we can catch reason creating experience. We experience the unorganised sensations, the organisation process and the final result. However, there is reason to think that this is not a case of experiencing the original layer of sensation. Within the above-quoted passage, Nietzsche describes the arrangement of sensations as occurring ‘at once’, which suggests at least the possibility that, although he implies that we are dealing with successive stages, he is actually referring to an indivisible act. There is more evidence for this if we return to the passage that I quoted in discussing the first kind of causation, GS 112. There, Nietzsche claims that in experience we ‘are operating only with things that do not exist – with lines, surfaces, bodies, atoms, divisible times, divisible spaces’. The reason given for the illusory status of causation here is precisely that experience is necessarily already formed of ‘definite figures’. The problem is that we cannot experience that which precedes this, an ability that is attributed only to a hypothetical alternate intellect. He also uses the metaphor of the picture, exclaiming ‘How is explanation to be at all possible when we first turn everything into a picture – our picture!’. Recall that the final stage of forming a dream experience was the production of a belief with ‘with an accompanying pictorial representation’ (HH 13). As he claims in GS 112, we have not been able to look ‘behind the picture’. Access to the unorganised sensations would surely be an example of such looking behind the picture given that this picture is an organised one. Finally, in D 119, Nietzsche makes the claim that ‘all our so-called consciousness is a more or less fantastical commentary on an unknown, perhaps unknowable, but felt text’. Note that Nietzsche does not totally exclude the possibility of ever knowing this text, but all that tells us is that he is not prepared to extend his appraisal of human experience to the status of conditions for any possible experience (he suspends judgement about this).

Nietzsche is committed to a view of experience which relies on taking there to be causes for sensations, where those causes are objects in the broadest sense. This should not be confused with a commitment to experience relying on either a relation to actual objects out there in the world or a belief that what we are experiencing is really out there. The first is ruled out because Nietzsche takes us to be responsible for the construction of objects. The second is clearly false because the ‘definite figures’ that Nietzsche describes as presenting themselves when we shut our eyes could not be mistaken for external objects. Nonetheless, whatever we believe about such objects, we represent them as being a certain distance in front of us, with a certain size etc. The best way to read Nietzsche’s second

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25 This is Schopenhauer’s position. For a more detailed account of the connection between the two on this issue see Maudemarie Clark, *Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy*, Modern European Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 80.

26 A sense-data theorist might respond here that sensations are external to the subject, but I use external here as meaning out there beyond the physical bounds of the individual.
application of causation is as a claim that experience is intentional, and that it relies on positing objectivity as the form of experience. This is not a mistaken inference that we might displace by updating our beliefs: it is encoded in the very structure of our experience. In *TL*, experience involves categorisation, which overlooks differences and focuses on similarities, grouping disparate phenomena. Grouping occurs in the current case too, but sensations are not declared simply to be of the same kind; they are instead declared to pertain to the same thing.

There is a final piece to this puzzle that Nietzsche does not explicitly deal with, but for which any theory of experience should account, namely what in modern philosophical language is called ‘transparency’, which I touched upon in discussing value. To say that experience is transparent is to say that when one tries to attend to features of one’s experience, one finds oneself only able to attend to features of the objects of one’s experience. So when I have an experience of a green leaf, and I try to attend to my experience green-ness, I find myself only able to attend to the leaf itself, which I take to be green. I suggested earlier that it is a mistake to talk about an experience of an object followed by an experience of the sensations that the object causes in us. This is a form of the transparency claim. My brain receives, in addition to other sensations, a sensation of green and it postulates a cause, namely a green leaf. This delivers an experience of a green leaf. But the sensory processing of green is not available to me in consciousness, only the final experience as of a green object. I can only attend to the green leaf, but not to a sensation of green. Experience, although formed by complex, disjointed processes, is well integrated when it appears in consciousness. Moreover, it is integrated in virtue of it being an experience of an integrated world. Transparency, although borrowed here from philosophy of mind, finds precursors in Nietzsche’s own thought. Take the following aphorism from D:

*The two directions*. – When we try to examine the mirror in itself we discover in the end nothing but things upon it. If we want to grasp the things we finally get hold of nothing but the mirror. – This, in the most general terms, is the history of knowledge. (*D* 243)

The first claim of this concise and elegant aphorism is a form of the transparency claim. The mirror represents the intellect, which in this context means not thought in the abstract sense, but rather that which performs the interpretive work required to form experiences. When we try to attend to the mirror, we see ‘through’ it to objects. However, as the second half of the aphorism makes clear, those objects that we discover are really the product of

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27I take Poellner to be making something like the transparency claim about values when he writes ‘the most basic first-order goods or values which co-determine even the value of the “feeling of power”, are given as values in affective experiences that are aesthetic in the sense of being responses to objects (persons, actions) for what they themselves phenomenally are’. See Poellner, ‘Aestheticist Ethics,’ 67.

28Even if one tries to attend to green by imagining a green blob in one’s visual field, one is still attending to an object, namely a blob.

29See also *D* 121 for the intellect as a mirror.
our interpretive activity, which in turn is the product of our drives: that is what Nietzsche means when he says that we discover only ourselves.\(^{30}\)

If this is right, then it is misleading to talk about experiencing sensations. We experience objects whose various features are manifest in our sensory modalities. When I see and hear a gun firing, I have visual sensations that can be construed as a flash, along with auditory sensations as of a bang. My experience of the gun firing brings together of these sensations into a single experienced event. Even if I reflect on the sound of the gun separately from its visual appearance, I am still not attending to sensations in the sense of something internal to me; rather I am attending to what I represent as features of the world. Moreover, these features are themselves composed of multiple sensations. Nietzsche puts this point most clearly in an earlier notebook entry, where he writes ‘we produce beings as the bearers of characteristics’ (\textit{NF} 1872 19[236]).\(^{31}\)

I have moved from talking about dreams to experience, the move Nietzsche makes in both \textit{HH} and \textit{D}. However, I did so unannounced, whereas Nietzsche makes the connection explicitly. Moreover, he draws some comparisons:

Waking life does not have this \textit{freedom of interpretation} possessed by the life of dreams, it is less inventive and unbridled – but do I have to add that when we are awake our drives likewise do nothing but interpret nervous stimuli and, according to their requirements, posit their ‘causes’? that there is no \textit{essential} difference between waking and dreaming? (\textit{D} 119)

Nietzsche sees the same mechanism functioning in waking life as dreaming life, the difference being the freedom of interpretation. While he does not say why there is less interpretive freedom, one possibility is that in dreams, the sensations that we weave into an experience are sporadic. Our sensory faculties are dimmed significantly and information comes through only occasionally compared with the constant bombardment that occurs in waking life. The way Nietzsche talks about the arrival of an ‘excitation’ in the brain is that it ‘works its way up’, suggesting that only a limited number make it all the way. We might think of experience as resulting from a kind of joining up of these scattered points. This fits Nietzsche’s description in \textit{GS} 112, where he writes ‘a continuum faces us, from which we isolate a few pieces, just as we always perceive a movement only as isolated points, i.e. do not really see, but infer’.\(^{32}\) This is not just applicable to movement: we see an object that persists over time by filling in the gaps in our sensory input. We might think of this as like drawing a line to form a graph. In the dreaming case, there are a few scattered points and

\(^{30}\)This ‘only’ will become relevant in the later discussion of idealism since it implies that there is no ‘given’ to be discovered in the world.

\(^{31}\)Wir produziren als \textit{Träger der Eigenschaften Wesen}…

\(^{32}\)This is one of those unfortunate times when Nietzsche suggests that we actually experience a continuum (it ‘faces’ us), something that overall he does not endorse.
there are many equally good ways to draw a line through those points. In the waking case, the ‘resolution’ of sensation is much higher, so there are many more points. As a result, there are far fewer sensible ways to draw a line that fits these points. I will revisit this point at the end of this chapter when discussing the idea of modelling. First, there are additional mechanisms of experience constitution that bear examination.

2.3 Transference

Nietzsche’s reflections on the constitution of experience do not start in *FSW*, but are present in the early 1870s and before. In *TL*, Nietzsche gives the topic the kind of extended treatment that his subsequent aphoristic style makes difficult. The essay does address causation, but its focus is a process that Nietzsche calls ‘transference’, which he claims operates at the lowest levels of perceptual processing. This process is deeply connected with metaphor, which in turn connects it with language. Nietzsche’s obsession with the role of language in constituting experiences persists into *FSW*. We already saw this in the idea that sensations form a text that is commented upon. The use of this metaphor has lead Luca Lupo to claim that ‘consciousness and the unconscious are irreducible to one another, but they are also united by the fact that both should be described as some sort of “linguistic” activity’. In *TL*, sensations are subject to the process of transference repeatedly on their way into consciousness. The essay is as much about the composition of this ‘text’ as it is about its interpretation. Lupo’s choice to enclose the term ‘linguistic’ in scare quotes shows that he has avoided falling into the trap of equating transference at lower levels with language as we know it.

In this section I expand on the notion of transference, but also show that it is only part of what we call ‘language’. Language as we know it, in addition to transference, pertains to the other modes of constituting experience that feature in this chapter. Transference can be broken down into two processes, one which is pervasive in nature and the other which is the domain of language as we know it. The first involves grouping things and responding to them consistently. The second goes further, positing an essence that groups those members. We have already seen this second idea in the idea of causation between world and mind. Both are present in *TL* and in *FSW*, and sometimes they run together somewhat. However, it is useful to deal with them separately, which is what I shall do here, starting with the first claim.

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Transference has multiple names in Nietzsche’s works and notebooks, among which are ‘metaphor’ and ‘analogical inference’. The latter is defined in the notebooks as ‘treating as equal something that one has recognised to be similar in one point’ (NF 1872 19[249]). This is repeated in TL as the claim that ‘Every concept comes into being through the equation of non-equal things’ (TL 1). Nietzsche’s example is the concept LEAF, which we form by ignoring the differences between leaves, focusing only on what they share. That is, we subsume a diverse range of particulars under a single concept. On the face of it, this hardly seems an unreasonable way to proceed. If leaves really are all of a kind, then regardless of their differences, it is surely justifiable to group them. Furthermore, Nietzsche cannot be making the point that we literally do not experience the differences between leaves. That would be an absurd position that would rule out having experiences of green leaves turning to brown leaves, or leaves of different shapes. A more subtle position to attribute to him would be that in grouping things, we take some properties to be essential and others incidental. So we might group leaves by identifying the property of being capable of photosynthesis as essential to them, while their colour properties are merely incidental. Nietzsche could then claim that the problem is not that we ignore the colour differences, but that insofar as we apply the concept LEAF we give one kind of property priority in grouping. The properties that we label ‘essential’ determine the lines with which we carve up the world. These are arbitrary, since it is perfectly possible to focus on a different set of properties as essential. That is, there is an enormous number of ways in which we could divide up and categorise the world.

On this view, when I compare two leaves, I conclude that they are of the same kind. But I can compare a leaf to other things that share properties with leaves. A solar panel, for example, converts light into energy, but we are unlikely take the set of all leaves and solar panels to be a natural kind. In a literary context, I might, for example, compare leaves to politicians since both change colour depending on the season, where ‘colour’ might signify a stance on something and ‘season’ to the proximity to an election. This works as a literary metaphor only because politicians and leaves are not taken to belong to some third natural kind delineated by the essential property of changing colour according to the season. On the view I am attributing Nietzsche, this is not because the property in question is incidental rather than essential. The only difference is that one is conventionally used to demarcate a kind of thing whereas the other is not. Nothing in experience commands us to treat plants and humans as natural kinds but not ‘things that change colour with the season’. If this is the right way to understand Nietzsche on this first kind of transference, then it makes his view close to others who have written on metaphor. Best known among these is probably Donald Davidson with his idea of living and dead metaphors. A living

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35 Metapher heißt etwas als gleich behandeln, was man in einem Punkte als ähnlich erkannt hat.
36 This does not entail that any choice of properties could in practice give rise to a usable conceptual scheme.
metaphor is one that is still novel. So I might describe the place where the river Nile meets the sea as ‘an open wound from which the lifeblood of Africa haemorrhages’. The metaphor of the wound is novel because of its scarcity. Were I to render this literally I might refer to ‘the mouth of the Nile’. But surely ‘mouth’ is metaphorical here? It might be tempting to think so, but in this case ‘mouth’ simply has more than one meaning. Since the phrase ‘mouth of the Nile’ no longer leads me to think further about the comparison between an orifice for taking in food and the end point of a river. Such ‘dead’ metaphors abound and many of us use them without ever reflecting on them. Even the topic of this thesis, culture, is a dead metaphor. It originally concerned only the cultivation of the land, but has since come to refer to certain human activities. This line of thinking fits very closely with Nietzsche’s comments on truth in *TL*:

> What then is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, anthropomorphisms, in short, a sum of human relations which have been poetically and rhetorically intensified, transferred, decorated and which, after lengthy use, seem firm, canonical and binding to a people: truths are illusions that are no longer remembered as being illusions, metaphors that have become worn and stripped of their sensuous force, coins that have lost their design and are now considered only as metal and no longer as coins. (*TL* 1)

This passage already strays into other processes that will feature subsequently, but the key idea of moving from living to dead metaphors is plain to see.

One question this raises is whether Nietzsche thinks that things that are grouped really share properties. If they do, then might it not be the case that the property of being a leaf, for example, is shared among all leaves? Then it would presumably be justified to group them accordingly. This is where the leaf example is a little misleading in that it suggests that falsification only extends to grouping objects according to certain properties. When we look deeper into the essay, this breaks down in two ways. First, transference at the level of leaves is already a fairly advanced stage in the cognitive process. To even present an object that could be categorised is already to have divided the field of sensations into discrete groups. The lower-level processes are also of transference. Second, the properties that we suppose things to have are projections based on sensations. To ascribe the property of redness to an object is to move from an ‘internal’ sensation of red to the positing of an ‘external’ property. This is a version of the error identified in the previous section, where sensations are taken to be caused by external objects. This thought is already present in *TL*:

> But to infer from the nerve stimulus the existence of a cause outside us is the result of a false and unjustified application of the
principle of sufficient reason. If the only decisive factor in the genesis of language had been truth and in the designation of things certainty, how could we say that stone is hard, as if ‘hard’ were known to us in any form other than that of a totally subjective irritation? (TL 1)

The total picture so far is one on which our sense organs are stimulated, giving rise to sensations in the most basic sense. These undergo processing that groups them into discrete ‘packets’, possibly multiple times on their way to consciousness. By the final stage of cognition, the sensations are taken to pertain to external objects. This is consistent with the account given so far in this chapter. The discussion of live and dead metaphors above is restricted to a level that is already constituted by lower level processes of transference. However, given that the mechanism is the same, we can assume that those levels employ only one among a number of ways that the grouping of sensations can occur. Unlike the case of the leaves, where we experience the differences between them, it might also be the case that the grouping of sensations at lower levels actually leads to a cropping process where some sensations are excluded.38

The projection of sensations to produce properties that appear to inhere in the external world is attributed to language. This is important for the sake of the current chapter. Only human beings have language proper, even if some socially sophisticated animals have what might be termed proto-language.39 It is possible, therefore, that only human beings take their to be external objects with properties, rather than merely responding consistently to sensory input. This is my view and I will argue for it at various stages of the thesis. For now, it suffices to say that engaging in transference in the sense of treating as equal things that are only similar is consistent with the idea that animals and even plants engage in transference when they respond the same way to different stimuli. A plant always moves towards a light source whether it is the sun or a bulb. In a very rudimentary sense, it is engaging in transference. To call this linguistic, as Lupo does, is not to call it language, but rather to identify it as transference, which is one of the foundations of language.

38This cannot be total, however, since, as I will argue at the end of the chapter, sensations can falsify our experience.
39Nietzsche himself does not directly endorse this possibility. He sees language as a human affair (e.g. HH 11). In 1868 he read the work of linguist and philologist Friedrich Max Müller, who compares several theories about the animal origins of language. Müller dismisses these, claiming that language did not develop gradually, but it is not clear whether Nietzsche subscribed to this. Given his commitment to gradual development generally, it is likely that he would have committed to at least some form of gradual linguistic development from animal to human. The best candidate is probably some kind of gestural theory (see HH 216). Furthermore, some of the Ancient philosophers with whom Nietzsche was very familiar – e.g. Plutarch and Pliny the Elder – were prepared to grant animals simplified rationality, consciousness and language. For a discussion of Müller’s views see: Gregory Radick, The Simian Tongue: The Long Debate about Animal Language (London: University of Chicago Press, 2007), ch. 1; On the animal communication in Ancient philosophy see Thorsten Fügen, ‘Animal Communication,’ in The Oxford Handbook of Animals in Classical Thought and Life, ed. Gordon Lindsay Campbell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 216–32.
The externalisation of properties and the grouping of sensations are not exhaustive of transference. In employing a concept, we also posit an essence behind that which we group. In the case of the leaf, Nietzsche’s target is clearly a Platonic notion of forms. We take there to be a ‘kind of prototype from which all leaves are woven’. Platonic forms are a fairly easy target for Nietzsche, but he goes on to expound a more subtle position, this time with the example of honesty:

We call a man honest. Why has he behaved so honestly today, we ask. Our answer is usually: because of his honesty. Honesty! This again means that the leaf is the cause of the leaves. We know nothing at all about an essential quality called honesty, but we know of many individualised and therefore unequal actions, which we equate by omitting the inequalities between them and which we now describe as honest actions; it is out of them that we finally formulate a *qualitas occulta* [hidden property] called honesty. (TL 1)

This is to be distinguished from the aforementioned projection of properties. That amounted to a category mistake: a ‘relational’ sensation is taken as an external property. Here, there is the positing of something in addition to what is experienced. We group actions and ascribe them to a single cause, honesty, which exists separate from the actions themselves. At this point, Nietzsche is still operating at the level of objects in assuming that we experience certain actions that we can group, before creating honesty itself. But this process, just like transference, works at a lower level. We tie together sensations through transference and then posit a ‘*qualitas occulta*’, namely a mind-independent object, that causes these sensations. Once again, this activity is pre-conscious. Nonetheless, it is the same process and it is what leads to our experiencing a world of mind-independent objects with inherent properties. *TL* shows that transference is closely linked with this process of positing external objects.

This final part of the analysis of *TL* carries over into *FSW* account of causation, but the role of language, in particular transference, is also present in the latter. In *WS* 11, Nietzsche writes ‘Through words and concepts we are still continually misled into imagining things to be simpler than they are, separate from one another, indivisible, each existing in and for itself’. This arises from the fact that we think that through words and concepts ‘we grasp the *true* in things’. Nietzsche is not careful to distinguish the two kinds of transference. There is clearly a grouping going on here, but there is also the idea that in our taking ourselves to access the truth of something, we distinguish it from other things. Here the activities seem to operate together: grouping sensations by dividing the sensory field into separate objects is part of our taking ourselves to access the true in things. When Nietzsche brings these together, I take it that he talks about words and concepts because he is not applying his analysis to all transference. The mere grouping of sensations does not require
words or even concepts; but taking there to be external objects that are distinct from other
external objects does.\textsuperscript{40} The projection of properties is tied to language again in \textit{HH} 39,
where it is said to err when it ‘designates the stone itself as hard, the tree itself as green’.
The mistake is ‘taking for cause that which is effect’. In the context of the previous section
this makes sense: the effect refers to the object that is posited only after the sensations are
registered. That object, with the properties that correspond to the relevant sensations, is
then taken to be what caused those sensations, this entire process being pre-conscious.

The clearest example of transference in \textit{FSW} is to be found in Nietzsche’s analysis of
compassion [\textit{Mitleid}]. In \textit{D} 133, he lists the subtly different states that make up what
we label ‘compassion’ and then declares ‘All of this, and other, much more subtle things in
addition, constitute “compassion”: how coarsely does language assault with its one word so
polyphonic a being’\textsuperscript{41}. We must be careful about the position that we ascribe Nietzsche
here. He could be saying that ‘compassion’ is more complex than the word implies, but
in such a way that each instance of compassion shares essential properties; or he could be
saying that compassion groups things that are actually different in many ways. Nietzsche’s
analysis suggests a mixture of the two. What unites acts that we describe as compassionate
is that they involve helping others in a way that is not obviously self-interested. Nietzsche
sometimes cashes this out in terms of self-interest being unconscious (\textit{D} 133). He is clear
that the suffering we feel when we supposedly feel compassion is ‘of very varying kinds’,
suggesting that we are not dealing with a single complex entity, but rather a range of
distinct entities grouped under one name. This is supported by the different examples of
selfish motivations that can be operating in an instance of pity.

We are clearly dealing with transference in terms of grouping here. But closer atten-
tion reveals that in fact both kinds are present. This arises in responding to the following
objection: could compassion not simply refer to those actions that involve helping others
with no conscious self-interest? In other words, there really is something common to all
instances of compassion that allows them to be grouped. This could be exhaustive of the
meaning of the word. In practice, however, this is not what the word means. Compassion
does not refer to actions at all, but to something underlying those actions that is responsible
for them, presumably a mental state. The grouping of actions goes hand-in-hand with the

\textsuperscript{40}This will be covered in more depth in chapter 3.

\textsuperscript{41}I have chosen to replace Hollingdale’s translation of \textit{Mitleid} as ‘pity’ with the term ‘compassion’, which
a) conveys the literal translation of \textit{Mitleid} as to suffer [\textit{leiden}] with [\textit{mit}]; and b) does not connote a
degradation of the receiver, even if this is something that Nietzsche does, at points, propose (e.g. \textit{WS} 50).
There is a further reason behind this decision: compassion presents itself as benign and selfless, unlike pity.
Nietzsche thinks that modern morality prides itself on being selfless, and is therefore best characterised
as compassionate. But behind this is a desire to demean the other and raise one’s own status: that is, pity.
But since Nietzsche’s critique is of the fact that this aspect is covered over, it makes sense for him to adopt
something like compassion as that which he critiques. In short, he is critiquing compassion for not being
honest about the fact that it is pity. For a more detailed discussion of these two words in the context
of Nietzsche see David E. Cartwright, ‘Schopenhauer’s Compassion and Nietzsche’s Pity,’ \textit{Schopenhauer
positing of this mental state: the actions are taken to be united by the property of resulting from compassion; but it is also, reciprocally, the existence of the grouping that allows that state to be inferred. Compassion in FSW is given an extended version of the treatment of honesty in TL. In both cases, the error is moving from grouping things according to one property to positing a range of shared properties and a shared essence. Compassion is given pride of place in contemporary morality as though it were a distinct kind of motivation for a distinct set of acts. Compassionate acts are simply a heterogeneous collection of self-interested actions, which are not underwritten by a single mental state. The same move made in TL from this case to a general claim about perception applies: objects as we experience them arise as the result of postulating mind-independent entities that serve as the unifying substrate to the diverse sensations that are grouped in their name.42

TL deals almost exclusively with transference in the two forms described. However, there is a hint in the passage quoted at the beginning of this section that the grouping of sensations and positing of objects enables further processes to occur, namely that the results are ‘poetically and rhetorically intensified’. Nietzsche does not say much more about what this involves in TL, but in FSW we have already seen that value comes to play a role. But value is not the only example of this intensification. There are other processes that do this work, which I will explore by looking at Nietzsche’s claim that the rise of culture involves the colouration of the world.

2.4 Colour

A key middle-period passage that I have omitted from the discussion so far is HH1 16. It provides the following summary of the development of experience:

this painting – that which we humans call life and experience – has gradually become, is indeed still fully in course of becoming… this world has gradually become so marvellously variegated, frightful, meaningful, soulful, it has acquired colour – but we have been the colourists: it is the human intellect that has made appearance appear and transported its erroneous basic conceptions into things…. That which we now call the world is the outcome of a host of errors and fantasies which have gradually arisen and grown entwined with one another in the course of the overall evolution of the organic being, and are now inherited by us as the accumulated trea-

42 It should be noted that there is a distinct disanalogy between these cases and object perception, namely that the inference from acts to mental states does not actually result in an experience as of another’s mental state. This is an from an experienced act to a mental state that is not experienced. But it is analogous to the pre-conscious inference involved in creating objects. Those objects are not simply believed to underwrite sensations, but are experienced as hosting properties to which the sensations are taken to pertain.
There are several features of this passage that I want to explore, the first of which is the reference to meaning. While the other ways in which experience is constituted receive fairly extensive and technical treatment, *FSW* lacks any substantive theory of meaning. While Nietzsche talks about symbols and signification, discussion of the relation between sign and signified is largely absent. Meaning does not require its own section in this chapter simply because Nietzsche’s texts are too sparse to justify one. However, there is still something to be said for the notion of signification since it suggests a relationship that does not easily reduce to transference, and which supplements the picture I have been painting of experience.

In *HH* 215, Nietzsche theorises about the development of music, claiming that, over many millennia, musical sounds were associated with the content of poetry. The result was twofold: music came to evoke the content of poetry and, in turn, the feelings that poetry itself evokes. Music gradually became ‘entirely enmeshed in feelings and concepts’. This is characterised as the introduction of ‘significance’ into sounds. There are two ways to understand the notion of significance in the case of music. Music is significant in that it is important to us; it is also significant that it signifies or points beyond itself. We might call this ‘symbolic’. So a piece of music might be said to symbolise the will, but might also be said to be significant in virtue of the fact that the will, which it symbolises, is itself a significant or important feature of the world. This analysis passes quite naturally to meaning, where something can be said to have meaning in virtue of pointing to something else, but also by being important to us. Let us focus on the symbolic aspect first. The relation between a piece of music and that which it is taken to represent or symbolise is not a necessarily a relation of transference. It is not a matter of shared properties that are taken to be essential. That is not to say that transference cannot feature: a piece of music might literally conjure up something in the world by recreating a property of it. So the crash of cymbals and rumbling of timpani might represent a thunderstorm by emulating its acoustic properties (mimesis). In language, the this example is be akin to onomatopoeia, a limited case of language use just as this is a limited musical application. More often there is just an association between music and the world that is formed by repetition until the music comes to invoke that thing. This need not rely on any shared features. It is the relation of music to the world through association that allows it to stir us so deeply. That is to say, it is the first kind of significance, the symbolic kind, that lends music its significance in the second sense.

Music gains its affective power through its symbolism, but this is of a highly abstract and indirect kind. There are other instances and arenas of symbolism that are more concrete, as when for example Nietzsche uses the symbol of the bird to represent intellectual
freedom. But this kind of symbolism involves transference and might better be described as metaphor. The freedom of the bird to travel without the hindrances presented by various geographical features, for example, mirrors the freedom of the free spirit to extend their knowledge without the hindrance of guilt. The aptness of the symbol in this case is to be found in something shared by it and that which it symbolises. One way we might want to distinguish metaphor from symbolism is in the use of the two. The former is often used as a way to try to make something more intelligible by likening it to something familiar; this is appropriation of the unfamiliar is an important theme in the early notebooks. A symbol on the other hand simply serves to invoke something that may or may not be familiar. Using a symbol in a new context, modifying it, or combining it with other symbols can all potentially affect how we view that which is symbolised. In other words, the symbol stands in for the symbolised in an arena that permits artistry that cannot be directly practised on the world. So for example, once the symbol of the bird is established for the free spirit, an author can involve that bird in various scenarios that we now take to stand for potential scenarios that a free spirit might face. This is a speculative account of the difference between symbolism and metaphor: Nietzsche does not engage with symbolism enough to ground much more than this. Nonetheless, I think the emphasis on association between symbol and symbolised as the grounds for conjuring up features of the latter is a good way to make sense of what Nietzsche thinks has occurred with music.

This leads me on to another important feature of music, which is that it gains its power not from an inference that we make between the music and that which it signifies, but from mere association. There is no conscious mediation required once the association is strong: we simply hear the music as significant. It moves us without our needing to entertain the content that it was originally associated with. Our affective response to something can be transmitted to something else. Nietzsche seems to think that this can occur not just by associating symbols with things in the world, but also between symbols. Affectively charged symbols can be combined and mixed just as colours can be mixed in painting. This is what I take him to mean when writing ‘Odour of words. – Every word has its odour: there exists a harmony and disharmony of odours and thus of words’ (WS 119). The choice of odour here is instructive. Odours have the potential to be strongly affective while not being easily reduced to propositional content. Nietzsche claims that increasing symbolism in art goes with the decreased ability to appreciate simple aesthetic features and, crucially, that this process is a matter of the world coming to have the ‘fragrant odour of “significance”’. Odour here is an addition to the content that we can specify in the symbol, namely that it points to this or that other part of the world. The odour that it acquires is an instant affective response that we have. This separation of content has an interesting evolutionary parallel. Smells like rotting flesh have an cause an incredibly strong and instant reaction in us; the property of being disgusting is deeply embedded in them. This an evolved response, since rotting flesh harbours disease; our disgust has to be strong enough that even when
starving, we cannot overcome it, since to do so would be dangerous. Our representation of the meat as disgusting requires none of this additional information. That is, it does not provide us with reasons over and above the reason that the meat appears disgusting. I take Nietzsche’s talk of odour to reflect this instant reaction that requires no reasoning. True, we are often aware of what is symbolised in art, but the idea that words have an odour does not require that we have insight into the associations that have led to this odour. In other words, associations that are hidden from us account for the instant affective response we have to words. When the artist employs symbolism, they have the power to invoke parts of the world explicitly; but they also have the power to transfer some of the affective response from one thing to another. This can be rendered as the claim that affectivity is transitive. This claim – affect transitivity – will prove to be important to the project of cultural incorporation in chapter 6.

We are now in a position to talk about the metaphor of colour, which Nietzsche employs throughout his work. I think colour, like odour, is deliberately chosen for its phenomenological character. While colour fits nicely with value, which is how some commentators have interpreted it, I think we should avoid falling into the trap of thinking that the process of colouration is just the addition of values to an existing world of objects. Rather, it is simply that of making appearances appear. That he also mentions conceptions suggests that more is going on than mere value judgement. Later on, he describes our study of this historical process as ‘a history of the genesis of thought’. If colour does stand in for value, or an affective dimension in the experienced world, then the very least we can say is that this arose as part of a larger process by which appearances came into being.Appearances are ‘errors and fantasies which have gradually arisen and grown entwined with one another’, which suggests that the colouration of the world is the result of such entwinement. On my reading, the entwinement in question involves transference, causal interrelation, and categorisation, but it also involves the association of things which allows their affectivity to be transferred. Perhaps rather than focusing on whether colour is just value, we should focus on the phenomenological aspects of it. That we are not aware of the processes by which the world comes to be constructed means that, phenomenologically, the world we encounter does not require us to infer value, significance or causation: it is first presented as already containing all of these. Just as we need have no insight into the rationale behind our finding rotting meat disgusting, we require no insight into the processes – historical and otherwise – that lead the world’s immanent experienced character. The var-

ious kinds of interpretation come together in intentional acts that posit particular worlds: these acts are what Nietzsche calls ‘perspectives’.

2.5 Perspective

Nietzsche’s perspectivism is one of the better known parts of his philosophy, and he has much to say on the topic in his later works, which are the subject of the majority of the prominent Nietzsche literature. In FSW, we see Nietzsche beginning to introduce the idea of perspective into his more formal account of knowledge and experience. In the whole of HH, excluding the prefaces, which were added years later, there is only a passing reference to false perspective in painting. In D, there are four uses of the term, all of which encourage experimenting with taking new perspectives. In GS, excluding the later book 5, perspective features ten times and we find it directly implicated in the construction of the world, which is no longer an unfurled painting but a poem (GS 301). In book 5 of GS alone we find a further ten uses of perspective and Nietzsche uses the term ‘perspectivism’ (GS 354). But as Christoph Cox has pointed out, ‘we should read Nietzsche’s “perspective” language within the broader bounds of a general theory of interpretation’; although direct discussion of the former is rare, the latter is mentioned frequently.44

Despite the relative scarcity in FSW of the term ‘perspective’ and its variants, there is clear evidence that the thought is already present. The clearest and oft-quoted published expression of perspectivism is in GM. But the key ideas are present in notebooks from 1881, as the following comparison shows:

There is only a perspectival seeing, only a perspectival ‘knowing’; the more affects we are able to put into words about a thing, the more eyes, various eyes we are able to use for the same thing, the more complete will be our ‘concept’ of the thing, our ‘objectivity’. (GM 3.12)

Exercise: to see things as they are! Means: to see be able to see them through a hundred eyes, through many people! It would be a false path to emphasise the impersonal and to identify the sight out of the eye of one’s neighbour with morality. Many neighbours and through many eyes and through nothing but personal eyes – is right. (NF 1881 11[65])45

44 See Christoph Cox, Nietzsche: Naturalism and Interpretation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 114.

Not only is perspectivism operational in *FSW*, it is a useful term because it allows us to talk about all of the modes of experience construction at once. But it also reminds us that although the construction of experience is a complex, dynamic affair, its product, namely the world as we experience it, is integrated. I do not have to work hard to create the world, I have to work hard to catch myself creating it. As Nietzsche says of our creativity in experience, ‘we catch it for a moment we have forgotten it the next’ (*GS* 301). This should not of course be taken to suggest that we can step out of that experience entirely and witness its construction. With these considerations in mind, I will henceforth use the term ‘perspective’ to refer to combinations of these interpretations.

Perspective so understood is not of a fixed width: one can hold a perspective for a brief moment of relating to a small object, or a perspective on something very large can be held in a culture for many centuries. Every instance of being conscious, i.e. every instance of intentionality, involves both the intentional act and the corresponding intentional object/world. By definition, every perspective is a perspective on something: perspectives are intentional by nature. That does not mean that there need be a mind-independent world for me to take a perspective on. Instead, it means that taking a perspective is at one an interpretive act and the positing of an object on which it is a perspective. This helps us understand the variable width of perspectives. I can take myself to be experiencing a single flash of lightening, a storm or a decade of shifting weather patterns. All of these are intentional objects, yet some are much more complex than others and contain smaller experiences. Nonetheless, each involves a perspective.

Although perspectives can encompass smaller perspectives, Nietzsche does not think that there can ever be a single perspective that encompasses all others or that any one perspective has a claim to being the true one. Furthermore, as we have seen, we can never confirm that there is anything beyond the world of appearances that might vindicate a particular perspective, if such a thing is even intelligible. For Nietzsche, knowledge of the thing-in-itself would be knowledge free of a perspective, a view from nowhere, a contradiction in terms. This is the radical conclusion of perspectivism that makes it so central to Nietzsche’s philosophy.

One instructive way to think about perspectives is as models. Modelling is the attempt to provide a means of predicting a phenomenon to an acceptable degree of accuracy by focusing on a few general features and ignoring the idiosyncrasies of each individual case. Take the model of human behaviour that dominated economics in the latter half of the twentieth century: the Rational Actor model (RA). RA assumes that individuals always seek to advance their self-interest within the constraints of circumstance and available information, which allows it to predict behaviour to a certain extent. However, in the last

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thirty years studies have thrown up data that RA cannot account for. The most famous centres on something called the ‘ultimatum game’, in which individuals consistently choose to punish others for being unfair even if it costs them to do so. RA has been undermined because it dramatically fails to explain the results of this and other experiments. The ultimatum game established a clear, consistent deviation from RA; but models such as this are also criticised on the basis that they falsify reality. That is, they are taken to do a disservice to the variation between individuals. This is the root of the general objection to prejudice, namely that one should refrain from generalisations of people based on a few shared features because everyone is an individual. Prejudice in such case is functioning like a model. But to level such a critique at any model is to ignore the nature and purpose of a model. Excluding the particularities of individuals’ personalities and circumstances, while still being able to predict their behaviour to an acceptable degree, is the measure of success of a model of human behaviour. Were a model to take into account every variation between individuals it would not be a model.

The process involved in modelling is akin to the process of transference. We focus on a few general features and overlook the idiosyncrasies. This is how objects as we know them in experience are produced. So what of the status of those objects? Here the modelling idea helps us. There is no such thing as a perfectly rational actor – a ‘homo economicus’. It is a theoretical entity postulated as part of a model; that it is such an abstraction is precisely what makes it integral to the model. But what if experience is akin to modelling? That is, what if the objects that we experience are like the theoretical entities posited by models? The idea would be something like this: we receive a rich array of sensations in various modalities. This is the equivalent of raw data. It is interpreted by postulating the existence of objects that predict the future data, i.e. the stream of sensations. We experience these objects as mind-independent, but they are actually postulated by the mind as theoretical entities. The economist would be rightly criticised for thinking that their model involved the discovery of a new entity called homo economicus. Extending this to science more generally complicates talk of discovering atoms or genes. But if experience involves building models of an external world of objects based on sense-data, then it too becomes problematic.

Discussing RA as simplifying individual behaviour is itself problematic on this view because it assumes that we are able to experience the idiosyncrasies of individuals and, in

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48 This position has echoes within modern debates in epistemology. It is close to a view that John Campbell considers and later rejects in his paper Berkeley’s Puzzle, although without the context of prediction. Campbell writes: ‘The idea here is that experience is being appealed to only as providing the data which the postulation of objects, with their functional characteristics, is designed to explain. Experience does not provide us with any more direct conception of the object than that’. John Campbell, ‘Berkeley’s Puzzle,’ in Conceivability and Possibility, ed. Tamar S. Gendler and John Hawthorne (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002), 142.
light of those, accuse the model of ignoring them. But our experience of individuals is itself a form of modelling. When we talk about a particular person, we are in fact overlooking their different moods, behaviours, and disposition at different times, for example. We are modelling their existence. The same is true for each characteristic that we might wish to attribute them. Nietzsche’s view, then, should be expressed as the claim that ‘knowledge’ is modelling all the way down. The hope that at some level, the objects we posit in this modelling correspond to objects out there in the world is misguided. There is still the option at this point to invoke something like structural realism in relation to models. So while we might accept that there are, strictly speaking, no atoms, we could just claim that the atom as a model tracks features of a mind-independent world; it gets some purchase on the world as it exists beyond interpretation. For Nietzsche, this is simply an unjustified assertion that cannot be verified. All we can say about a model is that it can make predictions, but to move from that to the claim that it makes those predictions in virtue of connecting with a mind-independent world is a step beyond what we can know. That is not to say that we need to commit Nietzsche to the outright denial of the possibility of correspondence. He allows that it is possible, but you can never confirm that it is the case or present evidence in favour of that, since he sees no reason that predictive power should count as such evidence.\(^49\)

While this appears to descend into complete relativism, we should avoid attributing Nietzsche the view that all perspectives are equally valid. Poellner takes Nietzsche to claim that “there are only interpretations”, none of which can be said to be “objectively” better or to be more “fitting” than any other, since it is not coherent to suppose that there is anything for any interpretation to fit in the required way.\(^50\) I take the point here to be similar to mine, namely that the objects posited in experiential models cannot be taken to fit a realm of mind-independent objects. However, this does not preclude the possibility that some models might fit the data better. We know from the case of dreams that there can be free interpretation when there is less ‘data’ being considered. The data constrain the models that can be generated. In this case, there can be a more fitting interpretation in the sense that the interpretation fits better with the data, not that its objects correspond to real objects. However, it remains the case that there is no correct interpretation and the position is compatible with there being many models that can lay claim to fitting the data. This is the position that I think makes most sense out of Nietzsche on the one hand denying the possibility of knowledge and on the other, dispensing with arbitrary interpretations.

Arbitrary interpretation is something that Nietzsche attacks explicitly, but more in the context of literary interpretation than interpreting sensations. However, recall that for Nietzsche ‘all our so-called consciousness is a more or less fantastic commentary on an

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\(^{49}\) In chapter 6, I will argue that as Nietzsche’s works progress, he comes more and more to adopt a pragmatist position where predictive power constitutes truth.

\(^{50}\) Poellner, *Nietzsche and Metaphysics*, 282.
unknown, perhaps unknowable, but felt text’ (D 119). The idea of a text is instructive
because it is not necessary to maintain that there is a correct interpretation of a text in
order to hold that there can be bad interpretations. For those that subscribe to the ‘new
criticism’ movement in literary studies, which is a great many of those engaged in it, the
interpretation of an artwork or a text is not an attempt to discern the author’s intention or
the meaning they sought to convey. Any such work is amenable to multiple interpretations.
Nonetheless, even these individuals are prepared to allow that some interpretations are bad.
They can point to the text and claim that the interpretation does not fit in crucial respects.
With Nietzsche’s texts, such a thing is always possible. Every book and article written on
Nietzsche seeks to build a model and does so by overlooking some features of the text in
order to concentrate on others. That we judge some to do this to an unacceptable extent
does not entail that we believe there to be a model that accesses the essence of the texts.
Indeed, the need to know exactly what Nietzsche meant is a manifestation of the need
to come into contact with things-in-themselves. The consequence of this is that we can
allow that some conscious experiences are bad interpretations without the need to talk
about there being a correct interpretation. A further important feature of this quotation is
that the text of sensations [Nervenreize] is itself unknown and merely felt. This impedes
the transfer of the idea of pointing to the text into the context of sensations. We cannot
point to the raw data to ‘correct’ an experiential interpretation because it is not possible to
experience that data. Even to say that the data consist of sensations is to model it. Whatever
it is that is originally put together to make our experiences is not itself something that could
be experienced.

This whole way of talking raises an important question which, although I cannot dis-
cuss it at length, needs to be at least addressed: is Nietzsche an idealist (either transcenden-
tal or empirical)? Nietzsche’s texts are highly conflicted on this issue. At times he seems
to oppose the view of metaphysicians who claim that ‘the whole world is spun out of this
faculty of cognition’ (IH 2). In GS 372, he explicitly says that ‘we are not idealists’ but
rather ‘sensualists’, who look to the senses rather than to a world of ideas. Nietzsche allows
that an attempt to cling to a rigid set of ideas will still be liable to clash with the world
that empirical study can reveal. This is compatible with that empirical world being another
interpretive product. At best, this should be described as appearances clashing with certain
rigid ideas that have been distilled from those appearances and fixed.

The first above quotation suggests something stronger, namely that Nietzsche sub-
scribes to there being something that impinges on and constrains our experiences. The
danger here is of making Nietzsche into a transcendental idealist for whom there must be
a noumenal realm to ground experience. Of course, Nietzsche rejects this need, but it is
not as easy for him to do so as he suggests and there are times when he slips into that way
of thinking. For example, we have seen that he thinks of consciousness as a ‘commentary
on an unknown, perhaps unknowable, but felt text’ (D 119). Now, the ‘text’ in question
presumably constrains interpretations otherwise it would be doing no work at all. But we can not become aware of the text without commentating on it, therefore it is unknowable in its original form. We might respond that we know about this ‘text’ as a result of scientific understanding of the functioning of the human body. Nervous stimuli are simply part of the natural world that we study in science. But even this scientific picture is an interpretation of an unknown text. This thought is expressed again when Nietzsche talks about us turning ‘everything into a picture – our picture’ (GS 112). If indeed everything is merely something turned into our picture, why even mention that which is turned into a picture? Why not just say that we create pictures without committing to there being something that is not our picture – and therefore inaccessible – that serves as the raw material to be turned into our picture? If there is something that constrains our experience, but which cannot itself be the subject of experiences, then Nietzsche is not that different from Kant. One response to this would be to say that our experience involves organising sensations, but that we still experience those sensations – albeit organised. That is to say, object of experience function as vehicles for a given manifold of sensations to appear to us, where those sensations are not simply the product of our minds, even if objects are. The difficulty here is transparency: in experience, we can only attend to external properties inherent in objects. But we know that Nietzsche thinks of this as an error of projecting something internal outwards; that is, of making something relational appear to be otherwise. We falsify even our sensations.

An alternative constraint on perspectives is other perspectives. That is, we might want to read Nietzsche as subscribing to a view on which perspectives are constrained by the arrangement and content of existing perspectives. This is the strategy adopted by Christoph Cox, who places Nietzsche alongside Nelson Goodman, W. V. Quine and others whom he labels ‘ontological relativists’.51 Their view according to Cox is that there are many adequate descriptions of the world – where adequacy is indexed to the aims and purposes of a mode of enquiry – and, as such, there are many worlds. There is no world to compare these two and decide which is ‘correct’, nor is it possible to reconcile all of them to form a single description. But these descriptions are not arbitrary; but proposed descriptions are constrained not by a world free of description, but by the existing descriptions with which they have to cohere in some way. Thus constraints on descriptions are internal to human life, but they are not internal to individuals, who are not free to simply create new descriptions. Cox writes, referring to Goodman in a footnote, ‘what reality there is and what constraints there are, Nietzsche argues, are provided solely by the dominant, existing interpretations’.52

Although I agree with Cox that this constraint exists, it is hard to ignore what I high-

51 Cox, Nietzsche, 155.
52 Cox's characterisation of the project of changing perspectives here is close to my own as outlined in this thesis. See ibid., 160.
lighted above, namely that Nietzsche continually refers to the unknown body that determines our conscious experience, or that our translation of everything into our picture supposes something to be translated. But I think one of the problems here lies with trying to decide once and for all whether Nietzsche is an idealist or not; from Nietzsche's perspective, this comes across as the attempt to answer the question once and for all whether there is a world independent of the experience of the subject. Whether we adopt the view that there is an unknown noumenal realm that constrains our experience or that perspectives constrain one another is irrelevant to the question of constraint itself. Our experience can be falsified by sensations that seem to undermine it; we can do science in such a way that we can 'uncover' 'facts' that challenge existing perspectives. When we return to the senses – or perhaps, as Husserl exclaimed, 'back to the “things themselves”'53 – we might just be returning to some deeper interpretation, still moving within idealism; or we might be somehow butting up against an external world that we cannot directly experience. But I take it that at this point, Nietzsche is simply not interested in the question. He is not prepared to acknowledge that we require the noumenal to constrain our experiences any more than he is willing to deny that it does so. But we could never know the nature of the constraint or the nature of that which constrains, hence his indifference. What he attacks Kant for is the requirement of a noumenal and then the use of that noumenal to ground his project.

Having said that, Nietzsche is sometimes guilty of advancing positions that fall victim to his attack on Kant. The field of sensations – the Nervenreize – that is supposedly falsified to become conscious experience comes dangerously close to being an unknowable thing-in-itself conditioning experience. These appeals to the idea of sensations are part of Nietzsche's choice to employ the work of neo-Kantians such as Lange to make his point about the limitations of knowledge. Lange sought to show that an understanding of the physiology of perception yielded Kantian conclusions. He pointed to the physiological processes underlying perception to make the case that perception was irrevocably conditioned by something comparable to Kant's faculties. But something that science can reveal to us in consciousness cannot then be declared to be beyond possible conscious experience. That is, we cannot say anything about the qualities of that subconscious content that is processed to create experience except by first falsifying it so as to become aware of it. Nietzsche should, then, simply remain agnostic regarding the existence of something, sensation or otherwise, that is falsified to create experience, but which is never experienced. His desire to vindicate his project by situating it in the natural sciences in this case overrides his caution with respect to talking about things-in-themselves. I will return to the question of truth in chapter 4 when discussing incorporation. For now, the cultural dimension of Nietzsche's project needs to be addressed and linked to the discussion of experience.

so far.
There are a handful of books and articles that place culture as a central theme in Nietzsche. Many deal with his discussion in *UM*, or with culture as an overall theme across his work, with only one notable book engaging exclusively with *FSW*. Of these texts, few take an approach that seeks to separate and schematise Nietzsche’s various uses of ‘culture’. They tend instead to talk about the kinds of culture in which Nietzsche is interested. We are told that Nietzsche is in favour of a scientific culture, an artistic culture, some combination of these. This is then supported with references to the kinds of behaviours and activities in which members of such a culture engage. This is no doubt useful clarificatory work, but it avoids the question of what ‘culture’ actually refers to. Vanessa Lemm, for example, in her chapter on the distinction between culture and civilisation, goes to great lengths to detail the different effects and tasks of culture, but does not actually venture a working definition. At one point, she claims that ‘culture is the memory of animality and the affirming and holding onto the human beings’ continuity with the animals’. How are we to make sense of culture being a memory? Perhaps Lemm’s claim is that culture, whatever it is, serves to remind us of our animality, but in that case, are we talking about culture as anthropological, artistic, behavioural? This remains unclarified. Eric Blondel goes as far as to suggest that culture ‘might well be no more than a word, a pseudo-concept, referring only to the illusory perception that man, an unconscious natural being, would have of the gap that in him and around him separates nature from itself’. This at least attempts to justify the failure to give a coherent definition or even an outline of a definition, but it still leaves much to be desired.

Jonathan Cohen, in response to the problem of finding a consistent theoretical definition, claims that in *HHH* Nietzsche uses a ‘common-sense’ one. But this generates more

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1 See: Cohen, *Science, Culture, and Free Spirits*.
problems than it solves. ‘Culture’ can refer to acquired behaviours such as table manners; but it is sometimes reserved for higher pursuits. Employing the latter, I can say that a city ‘lacks culture’. On the former, this is clearly false: every city hosts acquired behaviours. Which is the common-sense definition? Add to this the problem of whether the ‘common-sense’ definition is ours or that of the 19th century. One can read Nietzsche without a theory or definition of culture and still draw from him many interesting points. But this is true of concepts such as drive, power, and free spirit. That a ‘common-sense’ understanding allows us to form an interpretation, without theoretical work being undertaken we run the risk of importing unannounced our own assumptions. Concepts like drive have received extended theoretical treatment in the secondary literature and are better defined as a result. Culture has received little such attention, despite being, in my view, one of FSW’s central concepts. In this chapter, I seek to do for culture, or at least start to do, what others have done for key concepts in Nietzsche such as drive and power.

Elliot Jurist provides the most explicit schema, identifying three definitions: 1) habits and practices, 2) self-fathoming, and 3) Bildung. I also take a tripartite approach. The first category is what I will call the ‘anthropological definition’, which encompasses habits, practices, mores, rituals and so on. This is in keeping with E.B. Tylor’s definition, which Clifford Geertz has called the ‘classical definition’. Culture is ‘that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society’. In place of Jurist’s second definition, I talk about communally mediated experience constitution. Finally, I replace Bildung with ‘self-cultivation’. I deal with these in order, starting with anthropology

3.1 Anthropology

Nietzsche’s engagement with the question of culture changes from UM to FSW as part of his wider endorsement of science. UM limits itself to a few millennia, but in HH, Nietzsche is clear that this really only scratches the surface of humanity. He claims early that ‘everything essential in the development of mankind took place in primeval times, long before the four thousand years we more or less know about; during these years mankind may well not have altered very much’ (HH 2). Nietzsche’s interest is now in these early conditions under which culture arose. This still has a practical dimension to it insofar as it facilitates the management of culture:

if mankind is not to destroy itself through such conscious universal rule, it must first of all attain to a hitherto altogether unprece-

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4 Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures*, 47.
dented knowledge of the preconditions of culture, as a scientific standard for ecumenical goals. Herein lies the tremendous task facing the great spirits of the coming century.

The expansion of scope and formal acknowledgement that a deeper knowledge of human history is necessary for cultural flourishing are accompanied by the use of ‘culture’ in an anthropological sense, which was basically absent in UM. There, the opposite of culture was barbarism; in FSW, barbarism is a stage of culture (D 113). Nietzsche is now using it in the way that an anthropologist of the time would have, namely as referring to what they might also have called ‘savagery’.

The anthropologists with whose work Nietzsche was familiar all subscribed to something like Tylor’s definition, and Nietzsche himself was familiar with it. Often applying Darwinian principles, they sought to understand how and why customs came into existence. Much of what Nietzsche has to say on this topic is derivative of these thinkers. So Nietzsche renders Bagehot’s claim that ‘a good rule is better than a bad one, but any rule is better than none’ as ‘the mighty proposition with which civilisation begins: any custom is better than no custom’ (D 16). Such examples are found throughout FSW. But Nietzsche does have some interesting things to say both about the functioning of custom and about specific customs. But I see Nietzsche’s original contribution in his combining of the anthropological notions of custom with his commitments, as outlined in the previous chapter, to the constitution of experience. That the entire experienced world might be profoundly shaped by the application of inherited rules is a possibility that the above-mentioned anthropologists do not really investigate. They are more concerned with detailing habits and behaviours, but, as we have seen, behaviour needs to be also understood with reference to the experienced world in which it is situated. To understand the connection that Nietzsche draws here, we need to know both his position on custom and its relation to the world of appearances.

Nietzsche agrees with his anthropological contemporaries that custom arise in response to survival pressure. In HII 224, he claims that the preservation of communities relies on strong communal feeling. Elsewhere, he discusses the tendency for the needs of the community to be surreptitiously imposed on the individual (e.g. GS 21, 116). Strong customs preserve communities, but there also arise various features of custom that lead it to be preserved within a community. Once a custom arises, it tends to become entrenched. One such feature is that although customs often serve some function, their utility is hidden

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from those who adopt them. This can be broken down into two parts: customs by definition preclude reason; and customs come to have a sanctity that creates fear over breaking them and pleasure in following them, which further helps disguise their origins.

For Nietzsche, customs are mostly explained by their utility. His position on this is even stronger than Darwin's. The latter sees custom itself as having survival value, but concedes that many customs arise that are not useful: ‘the strangest customs and superstitions, in complete opposition to the true welfare and happiness of mankind, have become all-powerful throughout the world’.9 Nietzsche sees the survival value even in these:

Among barbarous peoples there exists a species of customs whose purpose appears to be custom in general: minute and fundamentally superfluous stipulations... which, however, keep continually in the consciousness the constant proximity of custom, the perpetual compulsion to practise customs: so as to strengthen the mighty proposition with which civilisation begins: any custom is better than no custom. (D 16)

Custom is distinct from other utility-maximising behaviour by the fact that its utility does not figure in the motivations of those who adopt it. Nietzsche is unequivocal about this: ‘What is tradition? A higher authority which one obeys, not because it commands what is useful to us, but because it commands’ (D 9).10 Although this appears to involve acting for reasons, I take Nietzsche to be making quite the opposite point, namely that doing something simply because one is commanded to do so is precisely not to actually act for reasons, even if one can form grammatical constructions that make tradition look like a reason (‘because tradition commands’). Reflection and deliberation are usurped by blind obedience. That customs are followed without the individual needing to engage in reasoning helps secure their longevity, since it is reasoning that has the capacity to undermine them. Acting for concrete reasons makes one amenable to being persuaded by competing reasons; one can have one's reasons challenged. But simply obeying custom is, if strongly inculcated, recalcitrant to reasons against one acting in certain ways. In this respect, custom is comparable to faith.

Sometimes custom does seem to involve some form of reasoning. In D, it is followed to avoids the retribution of vengeful gods or ancestral spirits. In primitive tribes, people tend to believe that ‘punishment for breaches of custom will fall before all on the community’ (D 9). But although involving a reason, this is really an instance of reason being immured. The real reasons for customs having come to be are obscured and never debated. Even the apparent reasoning here is better characterised as an atmosphere of fear. Breaking custom

10Nietzsche uses ‘custom’ and ‘tradition’ almost interchangeably.
acquires a kind of affectivity of foreboding; 'atmosphere' is the appropriate term, with Nietzsche talking about gloomy skies, clouds and storms. In truth, this is not exclusive to primitive tribes. Everyone I would wager has experienced the awkwardness or anger that accompanies even minor infractions of taboos. A politically insensitive comment at a liberal dinner party or an accidental swearword in a formal setting: the metaphor of an atmosphere captures well the phenomenology of such cases. This fear is coupled with a tendency to treat customs as sacred, which helps further suppress dissent over them or investigation into their origins. Nietzsche writes ‘Every tradition now continually grows more venerable the farther away its origin lies and the more this origin is forgotten...’ (HH 96). Finally, there is a degree of pleasure to be had in obeying customs: ‘One does what is habitual better and more easily and thus prefers to do it’ (HH 97). The combination serves of fear, sanctity and pleasure serves to keep the majority of humankind firmly within the narrow customs in which they are raised.

Nietzsche's discussion of custom deals with the same anthropological material as Darwin's and Bagehot's. Customs are basically learnt rules of behaviour. Their content is easily specified and understood by those who do not adhere to them. Without having been raised in a tribe I can easily follow their custom of avoiding a certain plant that is deemed holy or remember to take my shoes of when entering the house. What I cannot do easily is see through the eyes of someone raised with those customs. Knowing how people behave and seeing the world in the way that leads them to do so are different things, just as knowing the grammatical rules of a foreign language and speaking it fluently are not the same. The aforementioned anthropologists do not deal with phenomenology, but Nietzsche has a great deal to say about the appearance of the world and its ground in the contingencies of human cognition. To what extent is this cognition culturally specific? Could it be that our understanding of a culture is not exhausted by descriptions of its prescribed behaviours, but includes the world that is presented in experience to those whose lives unfold within it? In what follows, I will show how Nietzsche's anthropology is taken in this direction.

Our starting point is the notion of inherited evaluation. In chapter 2, evaluation was said to be a feature of all life, which is always drawn and repelled by its environment in accordance with its needs. The terms that Nietzsche uses for this are 'aversion' [Abneigung] and 'partiality' or 'inclination' [Zuneigung or Neigung]. The degree to which these are hard-wired in organisms differs depending on their place in the tree of life. Apes can learn these, whereas bacteria cannot. For humans, aversions and inclinations are inherited from the social environment at every stage of life, beginning in infanthood: 'children observe in adults inclinations for and aversions to certain actions and, as born apes, imitate these inclinations and aversions' (D 34). Behavioural imitation leads to an imitation of the feeling behind that behaviour. In the next aphorism, this point is pursued: 'feelings are nothing final or original: behind feelings there stand judgements and evaluations which we inherit in the form of feelings (inclinations, aversions)' (also D 111). The feelings we
have are often the product of associations that we are only vaguely aware of. They act as a kind of enforcer of the customs with which we grow up; this applies particularly with the feeling of pleasure. Custom is ‘the union of the pleasant and the useful, and in addition it demands no cogitation’ (HH 97). We have already seen that the constitution of experience is the result of the activity of inclinations and aversions, as well as feelings, all of which determine the appearance of the external world. As their product, our external world can be said to be acquired.

This acquisition is not restricted to childhood:

...Why are inclination and aversion so contagious that it is hard to live in the proximity of a person of strong feelings without being filled like a barrel with his For and Against?... our transition, from indifference to inclination or aversion is in no way conscious; we gradually accustom ourselves to the sensibility of our environment, and because sympathetic agreement and accommodation is so pleasant we soon bear all the marks and party colours of this environment. (HH 371)

We live ‘in a fog of impersonal, semi-personal opinions, and arbitrary, as it were poetical evaluations’ and ‘This fog of habits and opinions lives and grows almost independently of the people it envelops’ (D 105). The idea of poetical evaluations recalls the processes in TL, where the world that we took to be real was partly constituted through processes of poetic and rhetorical intensification and decoration. Such processes are, we now see, guided by the individual’s social environment. Recalling TL also reminds us of an activity that is governed by acquired rules and which plays an important role in experience constitution: language use. In TL, language – more accurately, transference – is the model for understanding all experience constitution. Although culture is not really dealt with in the essay, the idea of convention is. Nietzsche talks about...

...the obligation to be truthful, i.e. to use the customary metaphors or, to put it in moral terms, the obligation to lie in accordance with a firm convention, to lie in droves in a style binding for all. Of course man forgets that this is his predicament and therefore he lies, in the manner described, unconsciously and according to the habit of hundreds of years – and arrives at a sense of truth precisely by means of this unconsciousness, this oblivion. (TL 1)

Although linguistic processes have their origin in deep history, the development of specific of experienced worlds is here measured in centuries. In D, language is involved in experience constitution again, where evaluations are ‘only images and fantasies’ that result
from the employment of ‘a kind of acquired language for designating certain nervous stim-
uli’ (D 119). This is identified as the language that comments on the ‘text’ of sensations.
Consciousness arises through the use of language, which in turn is embedded in the in-
herited rules of particular cultures. That is not to say there are not shared features of all
languages. But even so, without the presence of the community and its enforcing of norms,
individuals do not acquire language of any kind, as testified to by cases of feral children.

If language is fundamental to the constitution of experience, then it should place a limit
on experience. At times, Nietzsche commits to the view that thought at least is constrained
by language:

Words present in us. – We always express our thoughts with the
words that lie to hand. Or, to express my whole suspicion: we have
at any moment only the thought for which we have to hand the
words. (D 257; see also D 115)

Recalling the idea of existing within a fog, Nietzsche writes in 1880 ‘we arrive at thoughts
via the words that swim around us’ (NF 1880 2[31]). There is evidence elsewhere that
Nietzsche uses thought in a fairly broad sense. In HH 16, he outlines the historical devel-
opment appearances that accompanied human evolution. While this passage clearly deals
with conscious experience, Nietzsche describes it as ‘a history of the genesis of thought’. This
is further supported by HH 11, where the ‘significance of language for the evolution
of culture’ is in its creating ‘a world beside the other world’. Nietzsche pursues the familiar
idea that language involves taking there to be essences independent of the individual to
which words are adequate. He also identifies logic as the source of the presupposition ‘that
there are identical things, that the same thing is identical at different points of time’.

In the next section, I will explore in more depth the connection between language and
consciousness. First, it is worth mentioning another link between culture and conscious-
ness. Chapter 2 saw dreaming as a blueprint for all conscious experience. In HH 12 –
Dream and culture – Nietzsche claims that our dreams are constituted in the same way
that primitive cultures constitute all experience. The cultural significance of dreams seems
to lie in the fact that they are a window into the formative years of culture. Later, in D 119,
culture and dreaming are associated again, except this time waking life, even in modern
culture, is not exempt from the interpretive practices of dreaming: ‘when we compare very
different stages of culture we even find that freedom of waking interpretation in the one
is in no way inferior to the freedom exercised in the other while dreaming…’. The compar-
ison of cultures is here a matter of comparing the interpretive practices that they employ
in the creation of experiences. All cultures interpret, but some are able to reign in their
tendency to wild interpretation. This foreshadows Nietzsche’s realisation in GS that no
stage of culture is free from illusion, a realisation the groundwork for which is already

\[11{\textsuperscript{[1]} \text{Durch die Worte, die uns umschweben, kommen wir auf Gedanken.}}\]
present in *HH*. Dreams and language are culturally significant because culture is a matter of experience constitution.

I have covered two of the definitions of culture that I presented at the beginning of the chapter. Culture in the anthropological sense refers to a body of acquired rules. Acquiring these rules gives rise to our experience of a world of meaningful, value-laden objects. To know that a tribe views a flood as the will of a deity is not the same as experiencing that flood as an act of will. To be able to describe the uses of a word is not the same as hearing the word as meaningful. Anthropology deals in description, but for a project of incorporation we need to engage in the phenomenology of culture, which means engaging with the meaningful, valuable objects as presented experience. Why this is will become clearer in chapter 4. Before then, I will to further cement the connection between language, community and consciousness by looking at a late addition to *GS*, namely aphorism 354.

### 3.2 Consciousness and Language in GS 354

His clearest thought on that topic comes in *GS* 354, which is part of book 5 and, therefore, a later piece of work. This aphorism has received a great deal of attention from those working on Nietzsche, in part because it is one of his clearest expressions of his position on consciousness. In *GS* 354, consciousness is said to be linguistic and, as such, to be an expression of a community or ‘herd’ perspective. These three themes – consciousness, language, communal perspective – are all central to *FSW*, which is why I take this later aphorism to be important. My discussion focuses on a prominent 2005 paper by Paul Katsafanas and a forthcoming one by Mattia Riccardi that responds to it. I will present a third reading that contains elements of both of these accounts, but emphasises consciousness’ experiential world-directedness.

Katsafanas claims that for Nietzsche the conceptual articulation of a mental state is necessary and sufficient for it to be conscious. Mental states can be unconscious, but in such cases they are articulated non-conceptually. Words and concepts are connected insofar as language is necessary for conceptualisation, although we may possess more concepts than we have words for. Katsafanas denies that mere discriminatory abilities are sufficient to ascribe concepts to something, claiming that animals and newborn babies can discriminate between things, even though they lack the relevant concepts:

> a newborn baby can look at a white cat, and her perception will represent the white cat. The newborn lacks the concepts CAT and

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12 Katsafanas, ‘Nietzsche’s Theory of Mind.’

13 Riccardi, ‘Nietzsche on the Superficiality of Consciousness,’ I would like to thank Mattia Riccardi for generously sending me the final draft of his forthcoming paper and for allowing me to quote from it. Page numbers refer to this draft, a version of which is available at http://www.mattiariccardi.net/Uploads/Riccardi_Superficiality_penultimate_draft.pdf. For the full paper see.
WHITE, so the content of her perception cannot be conceptually articulated; the constituents of her perception's content cannot be concepts.\(^\text{14}\)

Concepts involve a type-token relation. The newborn baby does not recognise the object as an instance of the type cat, even though she can distinguish it from, say, a black dog that is sitting next to it. She can represent the white cat, but she cannot represent it as a white cat. Katsafanas goes on the detail two further distinctive features of conceptualisation proper:

\[\text{[the human being] can relate the concept FOOD to other concepts, for her concept FOOD is part of a whole system of concepts which stand in various relations to one another. Second, these concepts can be employed in non-perceptual contexts.}\]

Conceptualisation distinguishes conscious from unconscious mental states. This is partly motivated by the fact that, for Nietzsche, the ego is a myth. There is no 'inner eye' that is aware of mental states in virtue of which they can be said to be conscious; there is no Cartesian theatre. Katsafanas seeks to preserve the conscious/unconscious distinction without relying on this illusory faculty. I have agreed throughout this thesis that consciousness should be taken seriously in Nietzsche, denying its epiphenomenal nature. Katsafanas also holds this position, which is why he seeks to prevent consciousness from being undermined by the undermining of a certain understanding of the ego.

Mattia Riccardi’s alternative view claims that mental states are conscious in virtue of their being the subject of a higher order thought. For example, the mental state ‘desiring \(p\)’ is conscious if and only if accompanied by a higher order thought to the effect ‘I desire \(p\)’, or ‘I am in a state of desiring \(p\)’. This shifts the emphasis away from consciousness as a matter of conceptualisation towards consciousness as self-consciousness. Riccardi rejects Katsafanas’ claim that conceptualisation and consciousness are coextensive, claiming that, for Nietzsche, there can be unconscious conceptualisation. This erodes an important foundation for Katsafanas’ overall interpretation of GS 354.

Riccardi’s argument is based on only a partial reading of Katsafanas. Referring to Katsafanas, Riccardi writes:

\[\text{the kind of conceptualisation responsible for falsification at the perceptual level is generalisation. What seems problematic, however, is the further assumption according to which such a generalisation requires a mental state to be conscious and consequently – given Nietzsche’s view – language-dependent.}\(^\text{15}\)

\(^{14}\)Katsafanas, ‘Nietzsche’s Theory of Mind,’ 4.
\(^{15}\)Riccardi, ‘Nietzsche on the Superficiality of Consciousness,’ 11.
We can indeed imagine generalisation occurring that does not require this assignment to a type and which is therefore not conceptual by Katsafanas’ lights. Riccardi invokes the idea of a sensory template, which is another way of reading Nietzsche’s phrase ‘pictoral signs’ (BGE 268), as a way of thinking about the generalisation that occurs below the level of consciousness:

perceptual concepts are something like ‘sensory templates’ that we form when we first come across some object O and then reactivate on successive encounters with objects of the same kind.16

Riccardi then asks whether this would count as an instance of recognising O as belonging to some type, which he answers in the affirmative, referring to one of Nietzsche’s source for GS 354, Otto Liebmann. Liebmann was part of the ‘back to Kant’ movement in Germany, something in which Nietzsche was heavily invested. He indeed thinks that animals and newborns classify objects in the way Katsafanas requires. But Riccardi does not provide any references to Nietzsche actually endorsing this claim. That Nietzsche was invested in Liebmann’s overall project is scant evidence for his endorsement of specific and technical claims, just as his investment in Darwin’s overall project of naturalising human origins need not commit him to specific claims in Darwin’s work. But even if Nietzsche held the view that sensory templates or pictoral signs count as classificatory, this would not suffice to render them conceptual on Katsafanas’ view. For Katsafanas, concepts relate to one another, forming a conceptual system. This is a necessary feature of conceptualisation, meaning that sensory templates, or pictoral signs, should not be called conceptual unless they enter into such relations. Riccardi does not consider this feature of conceptualisation before he concludes ‘generalisation is a kind of falsification-involving conceptual capacity which falls the wrong side of the divide Nietzsche draws at the beginning of GS 354, namely on the side also populated by animals’.17 Katsafanas can simply deny that this is a conceptual capacity because generalisations do not relate to one other as concepts do.

There is yet more to this disagreement, since for Katsafanas, the distinction between classification and discrimination is connected with the systematic nature of concepts. He tells us that classification ‘might seem like a mere discriminatory ability, but it is not, for the following reasons: concepts are systematically related to other concepts, and concepts can be employed in non-perceptual contexts’.18 Without a conceptual system there cannot be any kind of classification. Therefore Liebmann’s view cannot actually be ascribed to Nietzsche. Why do concepts need to be structured to count as classifications? Katsafanas does not address this question, so I would like to suggest one reason that we might occupy such a position. When we classify an individual as being of the type CAT, we also classify

16Riccardi, ‘Nietzsche on the Superficiality of Consciousness,’ 12.
17Ibid., 13.
it as being of the type ANIMAL. To possess the concept CAT, one must also possess
the concept ANIMAL, along with a host of other concepts. It is intuitive to think that
someone who does not think that cats are animals simply does not possess the relevant
concept CAT. ANIMAL is a type to which cats belong. Concepts are structured such that
the more determinate concepts rest on the less determinate. The newborn might well be
able to distinguish animals from, say stones. She might also be able to distinguish cats from
dogs. But she does not take cats to be animals. She simply lacks the relevant conceptual
scheme that would allow for this. If we pursue this conceptual scheme from the more to
the less determinate where would we end up? Is there a type to which everything else
belongs? A possible candidate for such a type would be OBJECT in its broadest sense.
Calling this a concept is odd, however, since it is not immediately obvious what kind of
discrimination it allows. Does it make sense to have a category that contains everything?
Should such a thing be called a category? But there is a candidate for another category at
this level, namely SUBJECT. To see how this might work, we need to return to Riccardi
briefly.

Katsafanas, as has been mentioned, recognises Nietzsche’s dissolution of the ego and he
seeks to preserve the distinction between conscious and unconscious mental states. He does
this by characterising them without reference to the ego, citing instead their conceptual
nature. Riccardi takes the opposite approach. For him, consciousness is only present in
virtue of the ego or, more accurately, a higher order thought that involves the positing
of an ego. This is the falsification for which language is responsible in GS 354. Riccardi
writes:

we are led to believe that there is an ‘I’ which acts as the bearer
of the relevant mental attitudes. In Nietzsche’s eyes, this is due
to the syntactical structure of our conscious thought. However, he
argues, on this point language simple misleads us.19

This positing of an ego arises from the need to communicate mental states, which involves
forming higher order thoughts about those states; this in turn requires creating an ego to
which they can be ascribed. Riccardi takes consciousness to be self-consciousness both be-
cause it involves higher order thoughts about mental states and because in forming those
thoughts, the self as we know it is effectively created. Nietzsche’s association between con-
sciousness and the creation of the ego goes far back into FSW, and the evidence that this
self-consciousness is present in GS 354 is convincing: ‘[man] had to express his neediness
and be able to make himself understood – and to do so, he first needed “consciousness”,
i.e. to even “know” what distressed him, to “know” how he felt, to “know” what he thought’. 
Consciousness here is synonymous with knowledge of mental states, which is exactly what
Riccardi claims. Moreover, it is difficult to make sense of this passage if there is nothing

surveying mental states. Even if that ego which forms higher order thoughts is an illusion as the result of language, it nonetheless seems that forming said illusion is necessary for the development of consciousness. However, I want to put pressure on Riccardi’s focus on self-consciousness by suggesting a reading that incorporates both a conceptual scheme with intentionality as its foundation and the notion of a unified ego. The claim will be that it is only in positing an ego that we also posit a world of objects. This single act that creates the intentional structure of conscious experience.

On Riccardi’s reading, only higher order thoughts about mental states are linguistic. Some words clearly pick out mental states and we can imagine someone wanting to communicate those states. Being in a state of compassion is something that one might wish to communicate. One might form the higher order thought ‘I feel compassion for this person’ and communicate that thought. As we know from D 133, the word ‘compassion’ does not actually refer to any unified thing, but rather falsifies a vast array of discrete, selfish calculations. To the extent that ‘compassion’ has any meaning, it has to falsify. Although D 133 makes no mention of communication, language is already involved in the falsification of mental states. Notice, however, that ‘compassion’ makes no secret of referring to a mental state. We do not take compassion to be out there in the world except in the form of a mental state. This is part of our theory of mind, which Riccardi claims to be the socially acquired error that features in consciousness. Contrast this with the word ‘tree’, which refers to a different kind of entity. When we use the word ‘tree’, we do not make explicit reference to a mental state. When we run Nietzsche’s evolution of language story for this case, we see a similar difference. I might say to you ‘I feel compassion for you’, in which case I am communicating a mental state; equally, I might say ‘there is a tree behind that ridge’. The latter case makes no reference to my mental state. It is not reducible ‘I believe there is a tree behind that ridge’. Were that the case, we could not make sense of the fact that ‘there is a tree behind that ridge’ can be false, while ‘I believe there is a tree behind that ridge’ can be true. To put the point simply, we use language to talk about mental states and to talk about objects in the world. If higher order thoughts are exclusively about mental states and they are the only domain of language, this object talk needs to be accounted for.

One response open to Riccardi is to say that mental states make reference to objects. To have higher order thoughts about those mental states allows language to refer to objects. For example, the mental state of seeing a tree might be rendered conscious by being the subject of a higher order thought that uses the word ‘I’ as well as the word ‘tree’. When I say ‘I see a tree’, I falsely take there to be an ego, a mental state of seeing and a tree. When unconscious mental states are feature in higher order thoughts, every element in them becomes linguistic and therefore falsified in line with ‘socially mediated propositional articulation’, as Riccardi calls it.\(^{20}\) In this example, the subject is the ‘I’, the mental state

\(^{20}\) Riccardi, ‘Nietzsche on the Superficiality of Consciousness,’ 2.
is ‘seeing’, and the object is ‘tree’. Riccardi accounts for the first as we have seen, but he also accounts for the second, claiming that there is a generalisation involved in picking out a mental state. It is a generalisation that is socially mediated: ‘Nietzsche seems to hold that we interpret our own mental states in light of a socially developed “theory of mind”: we attribute to ourselves the same types of mental states we also attribute to others’.  

Seeing, believing, pitying, or fearing that \( p \) are all socially constructed names for mental attitudes to \( p \). It is these attitudes that constitute the type of mental state one is in, and these that come from a socially developed theory of mind. However, this leaves out \( p \) itself. That is to say, it supposes only that the type of mental state is falsified, when in fact, the content is also falsified. When I say ‘I see a tree’, I am positing an ego, attributing it the mental attitude of seeing, and taking there to be an entity called a ‘tree’. Riccardi thus faces a dilemma. He could claim that the type of mental state one is in is determined by its content, i.e. the object that it takes. That way, the entire mental state would be falsified linguistically. But then there will have to be a different type of mental state for every single possible object of experience. Or he could claim that the content of the mental state is not subject to falsification, only its type is. But then he needs to deny that words like ‘tree’ falsify in a way that is socially mediated. But surely anything linguistic is socially mediated on his reading. This dilemma is not a difficult one to escape from: Riccardi simply needs to modify his account so that the content of mental states as well as their type are part of the falsification involved in consciousness. However, in this case, what was a theory of mind is now a theory both of mind and of world.

Riccardi’s position is not as much contradictory as it is incomplete. He places too much emphasis on the subject side of the subject/object divide. I take there to be a symmetry between the positing of an ego and the positing of objects: between a theory of mind and a theory of world, so to speak. Evidence of this symmetry can be traced right back to before FSW. Compare, for example, Riccardi’s characterisation of ego constitution with a much earlier note from 1872. Riccardi writes ‘we are led to believe that there is an “I” which acts as the bearer of the relevant mental attitudes’;  

Nietzsche writes ‘we produce beings as the bearers of characteristics’ (\( NF \) 1872 19[236]).  

In this note, Nietzsche discusses both the falsification of the subject and of objects, in this case trees. He is keen to emphasise the dual nature of this fantasy. In \( FSW \), the errors of language are clearly object directed (e.g. \( HH 39, D 133 \)).

One of Riccardi’s moves is to point to the indexical structure of higher order thoughts. The thought ‘I desire that \( p \)’ is only possible with reference to an ‘I’. But this grammar also

\[ 21 \text{Riccardi, ‘Nietzsche on the Superficiality of Consciousness,’ 9.} \]
\[ 22 \text{Ibid., 14.} \]
\[ 23 \text{See also } NF 1885 2[87]: \text{‘the “thing” in which we believe was only invented as the foundation for various predicates’ (das „Ding“ an das wir glauben, ist nur als Ferment zu verschiedenen Prädikaten hinzuerfun-} \]
relies on objects in the majority of cases. Moreover, the object of the sentence is only the object as compared with the subject. To exclaim ‘tree’ need not involve picking out an object nor to pick out a subject. This returns us to the problem of how OBJECT might be said to be a classification. If objects only exist as objects in virtue of being distinguished from subjects, then to conceive of an object already presupposes that I conceive of myself. That is, we must take there to be a self in order to take there to be an other. Consciousness arises in this moment of diremption. This is similar to Hegel’s claim that ‘Consciousness simultaneously distinguishes itself from something, and at the same time relates itself to it’. Seen like this, it becomes clear why talk of ‘sensory templates’ as involving object recognition is misleading. A finger print recognition system can respond to a template, but the finger print is not thereby an object for it. It only becomes an object for it when it has the capacity to distinguish itself from the object. It is only with some form of self-consciousness that object consciousness arises.

The reading I have given, like Katsafanas’, connects consciousness with conceptualisation. What is the nature of this connection? This breaks down into two questions. Does Nietzsche think that whatever is conscious is necessarily conceptual? Does he think that whatever is unconscious is non-conceptual? The fact that consciousness is a linguistic affair suggests that he indeed thinks that consciousness is inherently conceptual. Consciousness takes place in language, although I take it that Nietzsche here thinks of language as including concepts for which there are not single words. But can consciousness include non-conceptual content? Certain common examples of non-conceptual perceptual content in contemporary philosophy of mind are ruled out. Three examples stand out:

**Contradictory States of Affairs** We experience illusions that require entertaining contradictions, for example Escher paintings. Conceptual content cannot be contradictory in this way.

**Nature is Analogue** Nature does not divide neatly in the ‘digital’ way that concepts do; it is rather an ‘analogue’ affair.

**Fineness of Grain** Experience is more fine-grained than conceptual frameworks could ever allow for.

These examples are all ones that Nietzsche is likely to reject given his comments on consciousness. He claims that in becoming conscious we impose the laws of logic on our experi-

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24I say in the majority of cases because a complete sentence should technically contain a subject, verb and object, there are exceptions that do not strictly contain an object, for example ‘I see clearly’, ‘I dine out regularly’, ‘I cry’. Notice, however, that such sentences are useless for communicating almost anything of the kind that Nietzsche has in mind in the aphorism.


26Poellner makes a similar point when writing on Nietzsche: ‘Even if we assume, then, that a subject might find itself in this way entirely passively enjoying experiences as of spatial particulars, this would not yet allow for a distinction between a self and real objects’. Poellner, ‘Perspectival Truth,’ 104.
rience, suggesting that he thinks of genuinely contradictory experience as precluded from consciousness (so much the worse for consciousness, perhaps); how he would respond to examples such as Escher paintings is unknown. He also claims that we divide up a continuum when we consciously experience; this favours the view that he thinks of experience as digital and not analogue. Conscious experience, he would claim, is conditional on this division, so he likely to deny the fluidity of conscious experience. Finally, the idea that the world is more fine-grained than concepts allow for is precisely Nietzsche’s problem with consciousness. It simplifies by employing broad brush strokes. This would surely not be a problem if conscious experience really were fine-grained; Nietzsche I take it thinks that in becoming conscious, fineness of grain is sacrificed to some extent presumably, in part, because concepts are employed. These are only preliminary considerations. I suspect a full answer to the question of non-conceptual content in Nietzsche would run out of textual support very quickly. Nietzsche did not have the conceptual framework or perhaps inclination to answer such questions in depth. It is not vital to my argument that we take a position either way, but, for the sake of clarity, an attempt at answering the question of concepts and consciousness is warranted.

This brings us to the second question: does unconscious mean non-conceptual? We know that concepts proper only arise with consciousness. However, this does not entail that concepts are only employed in consciousness. It is compatible with the idea that concepts arising in the development of consciousness might come to be employed outside of that context. In other words, it might be that the subconscious representations of conscious beings differ from those of beings who were never conscious. Whether Nietzsche holds this position is difficult to answer from his texts alone. He clearly thinks that human beings have become homogenised to a large extent as a result of being part of communities held together by herd perspectives. Incorporation, after all, is not merely an aim of his philosophy; that which he struggles against has also been incorporated at some point. This is often cashed out as a matter of inculcating shared conceptual frameworks. One way to understand this is to say that what occurs below consciousness is not conceptual in the sense of genuinely picking out objects *qua* objects. It might simply involve consistent response to stimuli. But the pattern of this response might be deeply embedded in the conceptual scheme that is employed at a conscious level. That way, the homogenisation of consciousness can make the whole individual homogeneous to a certain extent, without the need to talk of the unconscious as genuinely engaging with objects as a true subject engages with its world.

The interpretation that I have presented runs into a problem towards the end of the aphorism, where Nietzsche writes ‘it is not the opposition between subject and object which concerns me here; I leave that distinction to those epistemologists who have got tangled up in the snares of grammar’. Does this not undermine all of my talk of subjects and objects? On closer reading, I think this actually vindicates rather than condemns my
interpretation. The second half of the sentence gives us the first clue. Nietzsche claims that he wants to avoid entering into the discursive framework of those ensnared in grammar, but this does not mean that he does not want to talk about the framework itself. Indeed, that is precisely what he does talk about. He is best read as saying that once we reflect on the snares of grammar, we realise that the distinction between subject and object is misleading. This seems to threaten an interpretation that rests on that distinction. But there is another way to read the claim. Suppose that Nietzsche’s target view, which he attributes to ‘folk metaphysics’, is that there exist external objects on which we can all take a perspective. There is a shared world of objects and there are subjects whose experience allows them access to those objects. If so, then GS 354 could be read as a discussion of how subjects fail to come into contact with objects. If, however, he simply does not think there are any objects without subjects – that the only objects that it even makes sense to talk about are intentional objects – then questions about what objects are really like independent from subjects would be irrelevant and misguided. That he goes straight on to also distance himself from talk of things-in-themselves suggests that this is indeed the line of thought he is taking.

The interpretation that I have been giving brings together Katsafanas and Riccardi. It relies on conceptualisation proper being restricted to consciousness. To classify objects already means to employ a conceptual structure, which in turn relies on the kinds of connections between concepts that can only be achieved by higher cognition and language. In this, I agree with Katsafanas. However, employing a conceptual structure in this manner already supposes that one distinguishes oneself from the world of which one is conscious. It already relies on taking there to be a subject and an object, which relies on the positing of a unified ego. This allows the individual to take themselves to be the bearer of mental states, but it also allows them to posit external objects that can act as the bearers of characteristics. This is to be contrasted with simply responding consistently to roughly the same sensory input on different occasions. Because of this symmetry, the constructed ego, although a myth, cannot be discounted from the story of consciousness any more than the objects of consciousness can be discounted because they are falsifications. Both myths arise together, they are bound together and they are codified in a grammar that, as far as Nietzsche or we are aware, is universal to human language communities. As such, self-consciousness is required for consciousness, just as Riccardi claimed, but consciousness is not exhausted by a higher order thought account.

The work of interpreting GS 354, even though it comes much later in Nietzsche’s thought, pays off in the connection between perspectivism, experience constitution and herd mentality. As Nietzsche renders it:

27Of course, he has to enter into it insofar as he uses language. But he does so cautiously and aware of not falling for its traps.

28In BGE 54, Nietzsche makes clear that the ego is not transcendental, but is rather the product of the the thinking process. But by ‘product’ here, I take him to mean that it is bound up with the process of thinking.
due to the nature of consciousness – to the ‘genius of the species’
governing it – our thoughts themselves are continually as it were
outvoted and translated back into the herd perspective…. every-
thing which enters consciousness thereby becomes shallow, thin,
relatively stupid, general, a sign, a herd-mark; that all becoming
conscious involves a vast and thorough corruption, falsification,
superficialization, and generalization.

Nietzsche seems to be committed to the view that grammar is universal in humans.\textsuperscript{29} However, that does not make it any less a matter of culture. On Nietzsche’s account, without learning a language, human infants would not develop consciousness or self-awareness that comes with employing it. Similarly, they would not develop object awareness proper. However, the general structure of true languages permits a vast range of variation, both grammatically and in vocabulary. When Nietzsche talks about the herd perspective, we are inclined to think that he is referring to the universal grammar that gives rise to consciousness.\textsuperscript{30} But there are clearly many herds with many perspectives. The herd perspective in this case also applies to the specifics of the herd in which an individual is raised.

We are in a position to pass a verdict on the topic of culture as experience constitution. As early as TL, we see it being linked with customs whose age is measured in centuries. This allows for a great deal of cultural variation. In FSW, we see the interpretation involved in dreaming rendered as a process of experience constitution; this is linked to culture. In D, this process is also said to govern our waking lives and the cultural link is iterated. Furthermore, in D, it is the status of consciousness that is at stake. Consciousness is described in terms of an ‘acquired language’ that allows for the interpretation of nervous stimuli. Consciousness here is object-directed, as we see in Nietzsche’s main example, which is of interpreting another’s laughter. It is cultural, linguistic and a matter of experience constitution. The acquisition of language we can assume operates in a similar way to that of values: infants imitate adults and even adults constantly and unconsciously take on features of their social surroundings. They live ‘in a fog’ of values, words, judgements and so on; in short, a culture. When we arrive at GS 354, this experience constitution is tied to becoming conscious, which is in turn connected with occupying the perspective or perspectives of those that surround one. At the deepest level, one’s consciousness is not the personal, private and immediately knowable entity that many philosophers have thought it to be: it is defined through and through by the culture in which one finds oneself. It is, paradoxically, the least individual part of oneself. Culture, then, is not merely ‘that complex whole

\textsuperscript{29}This should not be confused with a Chomskian notion of universal grammar, which holds certain rules to be innate to humans. Nietzsche’s view is compatible with grammar being learned, and therefore not strictly universal, since an infant might fail to acquire these rules; the rules are universal in the sense that they are common to all language communities, which is, \textit{de facto}, all known human communities.

\textsuperscript{30}This should not be confused with the kind of innate grammar proposed by Chomsky. See Noam Chomsky, \textit{Aspects of the Theory of Syntax} (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1965).
which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society': it is the external world that we experience as a result of such things. It is the root of experience as such, the origin of all appearances. This insight has far-reaching implications for the communal aspects of Nietzsche’s project of culture; these are the topic of chapter 6. But it also effects culture in the sense of self-cultivation. It suggests that consciousness should be an important rather than fringe consideration in self-cultivation. That is what the rest of this chapter focuses on.

3.3 Cultivation

Human evolution for Nietzsche has involved the homogenisation of the human animal. This has taken various forms and operated at different depths of the psyche. Many powerful drives have been tamed that in animals express freely.\(^{31}\) The difference between present and past is that we are now in a position to take control of this and ‘to watch over the destiny of culture\(^k\) with a sharp eye in future’. When culture ‘led an unconscious animal-and plant-life’ (\(HHI\) 24), continual checks had to develop to keep it on track. Conscious culture can recognise the necessity of managing the drives and no longer requires coercing. I take Nietzsche here to mean consciousness in the sense of reflection on oneself rather than simply undergoing conscious experience. Although this taming process is used in the context of customs, we know that the deeper level of rule-following had to develop under the same conditions.

This acknowledgement that Nietzsche sees culture both as regulating drives and as allowing consciousness to arise means that we are in a position to view conscious self-cultivation either as continuing the work of regulating drives, continuing the work of experience constitution, or both. I favour the final option.\(^{32}\) Nietzsche has both in mind, but consciousness has been overlooked in favour of focusing on drives. In what follows, I first put pressure on self-cultivation being cashed out in purely drive terminology, before providing an alternative. I explore the drive cultivation model through the lens of the analogy of the garden.

3.3.1 The Garden Analogy for Drives

Self-cultivation is the subject of various analogies in \(FSW\), but the most prominent is that which compares the self to a garden.\(^{33}\) In addition to direct comparisons between garden

\(^{31}\) Here Nietzsche follows Bagehot’s use of the concept of taming as applied to human cultural development. See Bagehot, \(Physics and Politics\), 32.

\(^{32}\) Ansell Pearson links these, claiming that culture has given us the regularity to become great, but also claiming that we are not to throw away consciousness in this endeavour. Instead, we need to employ concepts in new ways. See Keith Ansell Pearson, 'Incorporation and Individuation: On Nietzsche’s Use of Phenomenology for Life,' \(Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology\) 38, no. 1 (2007): 75–79.

\(^{33}\) This occurs in \(D\) 174, 382, 560 and .
and self, *FSW* is littered with gardening metaphors. Culture is associate with trellis, soil, fungus, plant, shoot, weed, vineyard, fruitful field. There are two main contributions of this analogy. By comparing them to drives, it gives us a way to think about the management of the latter. It also provides a way of thinking about the self as a complex that we can modify to produce an aesthetically valuable whole. In what follows I put pressure on two assumptions that underlie this analogy. The first is that self-cultivation primarily addresses drives directly; the second is that the self can be appreciated by the individual in the same manner as a garden, thus allowing them to assess its aesthetic properties in an equivalent fashion. Although the garden analogy itself is not extensively studied in the secondary literature, these two assumptions are pervasive. Before looking at the garden analogy, I briefly examine the notion of direct drive cultivation.

Nietzsche details the techniques involved in drive cultivation in *D* 109, where he lists six ways to ‘combat the vehemance of a drive’. Aphorisms such as this lend support to the idea that self-cultivation deals directly with drives. But if this directness is taken to be an introspective affair, then this account immediately runs into difficulties. As early as *TL*, Nietzsche demonstrates deep scepticism about our access to our complex underlying psyche. He claims that man lives ‘as if he were hanging in his dreams from the back of a tiger’ (*TL* 1). Our conscious lives are supported by many subtle processes unknown to us. This is partly the result of the inherent simplification involved in trying to reflect on our inner lives. *D* 115 states the problem as follows:

> Anger, hatred, love, pity, desire, knowledge, joy, pain – all are names for extreme states: the milder, middle degrees, not to speak of the lower degrees which are continually in play, elude us, and yet it is they which weave the web of our character and our destiny.

There are two problems here for a theory of direct drive cultivation. First, focus on that which we can name introspectively is destined to be shallow and to ignore that which weaves ‘the web of our character’. Second, the states listed here are not obviously drives even if, for example pain and knowledge, involve drives. Since these are names for extreme states, we might still maintain that only in naming them do different types of state arise; in reality, there are just different configurations of drives. Even so, in cultivating ourselves directly, we would have to expose the drives that underpin each state, which relies precisely on the access to the unconscious that we are denied. The material that we work with in introspective attempts to self-cultivate is almost cartoonish in its simplicity.

That only simple states are introspectively accessible has led commentators to illustrate drive theory and its associated model of self-cultivation by focusing on relatively unambiguous cases such as hunger and thirst. There is value in starting with clear-cut examples, but if we commit to drives as operating at all levels, we are still faced with the considerable

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challenge of applying the lessons from things like hunger to the rest of the psyche. With hunger, we have a clear ‘drive’ towards food in the sense that we feel drawn to it. We also experience a lack that an object promises to fill. Our having the drive disposes us to seek out food. But can all of these features be transposed to cases of memory, representation, or emotion? I do not deny that they can, but Nietzsche’s texts under-determine such a project. Still, hunger does serve as a model for some important drives. The feeling of being drawn to something that can fill a void in us is common to many scenarios amenable to explanation in drive terms. These are important in self-cultivation, but far from exhaust the weaving of our character. The garden model, which deals with such drives, is at worst limited rather than useless. The task now is to see to what in it, and its underlying assumptions, is usable.

One strength of the analogy is that plants are a good metaphor for certain drives. Plants grow continuously unless hampered by the environment or the gardener. Some plants are vigorous growers which need to be constantly kept in check to prevent them taking over. Others are nearly impossible to eradicate. For those in whom the hunger drive causes weight problems, for example, these could be useful parallels. It may help someone manage their hunger by recognising it as a blind force with a life of its own, which does not need to be eradicated, but merely controlled before it gets out of hand. The plant metaphor can be stretched to help us understand cultivation of multiple drives. If I want to control a particularly fast-growing plant I might prune it, which is the equivalent of exercising self-control over one’s hunger drive. Or I might restrict its nutrients, which in the hunger case might amount to avoiding situations or experiences that stir the drive. I could introduce competition, encouraging the growth of plants/drives that compete with the one I seek to suppress. If I nurture a drive to fitness by various means, it might come to out-compete my hunger drive, allowing me to lose weight. The idea of a weed is also useful. A weed is any plant that is not desired in an area, but it is normally used to refer to particular native species of plant that grow vigorously where they are not wanted. Nietzsche uses this as a metaphor for unwanted drives that must be continually dealt with (e.g. D 435). Drives, like weeds, grow on their own unless we take action to control them. A final strength of the garden analogy is that it supposes working with what is present rather than creation from nothing. Clearly, we cannot create a self from scratch, but rather when we seek to cultivate ourselves, we already are a collection of drives in a certain arrangement. I take the these three points – plant/drive similarity, weeds and cultivation as working with what is there – to be the main strengths of the garden analogy.

The problems start with the move from this to the idea of drives as a complex whole that we are able to observe and assess aesthetically. Even a small garden presents a complex scene, with many colours, textures and structural properties. But we know that such complexity is precluded from our introspective access to drives. We appreciate the garden as an aesthetic whole because we are able to represent many plants side-by-side, their relations to one another, their competition, their colours and so on. At any given time, how many
drives can I represent simultaneously? The hunger-vs-fitness example that I gave involves two, and perhaps a few more could be added to this. But simplified to the level that introspection demands makes of the drive structure something that resembles no garden that one is likely to encounter. Even supposing that the garden actually reflects the complexity and structure of the subconscious, since this is not available in introspection, it is not clear how a conscious project of self-cultivation goes about ‘doing the gardening’.

There are responses available to this. It could be argued that I do not actually take in the whole garden at once. I might have to walk through it to reveal different parts; even within one part, my eye must take in pieces one at a time that contribute to the whole. Could the same not be true of our experience of the self, where drives present themselves in experience in such a way that I can synthesise them into a comparable experience? I think the distance between the two phenomena is still too great. Even small parts of the garden are far more complex than the drives presented in reflection. Regarding the other claim, in the perceptual case we can at least get a grip on how the rapidly experienced parts come to form a whole represented as present before us in its rich detail. In the drive case, there is no such rapidity nor is there the breadth of content. Another response would be to say that introspection is not the right way to understand this analogy. It is compatible with our learning about drives by other means and gradually piecing together a complex picture that is analogous to the garden. But here we have the problem of in what mode of representation this piecing together takes place. Does it amount to having a picture in our minds of a garden-like arrangement of drives with all the complexity of an actual garden which we can then appreciate as an aesthetic whole? Such a thing is difficult to imagine, to say the least.

The garden analogy helps us visualise what would otherwise remain abstract. It also has the potential to alert us to features of drives that we might not have considered. On the basis of one set of shared structural properties between gardens and drives, we might come to see other shared properties, illuminating something about drives that was previously obscure. In the case of cultivating specific drives that we can access introspectively, these benefits are welcome. However, in trying to understand the self as a whole composed of multiple drives that is capable of being treated as a work of art, the ability for the garden analogy to help us visualise the otherwise abstract is a double-edged sword. It leads us into thinking that because we understand how a garden could be an aesthetic whole, we therefore understand how drives could be such. The analogy is so useful in helping to visualise drives that it becomes an explanatory crutch. When we want to talk about drives as aesthetic wholes, we find ourselves falling back on the analogy. In short, the effectiveness of the analogy is also its danger: it makes us think we have a clear picture of drive cultivation until we come to actually shape our drive structure. Ironically, this is because the two things being linked are not actually that similar. Drives are similar enough to plants that we can move easily beyond this aspect of the analogy. But with the aesthetic comparison, there
is too great a leap from the analogy to the actual content. This leap can make us feel that we have progressed a great deal towards understanding the issue, but it really just leaves us stranded. The analogy trades on the fact that the drive-as-plant part of it is sound; this side of the analogy helps further support the side that is unsound.

Although this analysis has focused on a single analogy, it applies to all self-cultivation as a matter of modifying a drive structure like a work of art. How we actually envision that structure in its complexity and ascribe it aesthetic properties is the challenge faced by such accounts. I do not have space to examine whether a symphony or a novel might serve as better analogies for the self that is cultivated. These at least rely on a temporally extended appreciation of structure that is more akin to the self. The problem here is likely to be one of mapping the content of these onto drives, something that the garden analogy manages well. Perhaps there is a way that these can all be brought together in a mutually strengthening way, but if so, it would be the subject of another entire thesis. Rather than take this approach, I propose that aesthetic appreciation of a complex whole in all its detail is not the best way to understand self-cultivation. We should allow for there to be a structure of those simpler drives to which introspection gives us access; but the majority of our complex selves should be dealt with indirectly, namely by addressing that which it gives rise to in experience. Furthermore, although activity directed towards this complex self can be said to fit into an overall project, it should not be a project that is comparable to finding a place for each small piece in an artistic whole. Most of what I have described will feature in the next chapter. The rest of the current one will address the indirect engagement with our complex selves.

3.3.2 Externalisation

If drives are responsible for the constitution of our experience, then the world that we encounter in experience presents us in some sense with ourselves. D 48 captures this point: “Know yourself” is the whole of science. – Only when he has attained a final knowledge of all things will man have come to know himself. For things are only the boundaries of man’. Elsewhere, Nietzsche makes a great deal of attending to the experienced world. I take it that although this is a way to understand the world of appearances, it is also a way to understand oneself as the creator of that world. But charting the ‘boundaries of man’ takes in the entire experienced world and is therefore vast. Furthermore, if experience and the processes that constitute it are hidden or transparent to that which is experienced, it is hard to know where to start with self-cultivation. We need a middle ground, which this section provides.

This middle ground is art in its various forms, but because Nietzsche talks about it most often I will focus on writing. The world is an externalisation of the self, but so to is a novel or a painting. Nietzsche often talks about books as containing their author. In HH 208, the
‘author has drawn the happiest lot who as an old man can say that all of life-engendering, strengthening, elevating, enlightening thought and feeling that was in him lives on in his writings…’. In the preface to the second volume of *HH*, he writes ‘My writings speak only of my overcomings: “I” am in them, together with everything that was inimical to me, *ego ipsissimus* [my very own self], indeed, if a yet prouder expression be permitted, *ego ipsissimum* [my innermost self]’ (*HH* II: P:1). These sentiments are consistent with the way Nietzsche later treats his books as records of himself. But they are not literally diaries. Rather, it is in observing the content that he (his drives) produced that Nietzsche is able to reflect on himself.

We know that consciousness is a commentary on a ‘text’. Nietzsche’s commitment to the linguistic foundations of our experienced world means that the text serves as a microcosm of the larger world. This has led some commentators to liken his genealogy to the practice of philology. The production of a text for Nietzsche is experience constitution on a smaller scale. It serves as a record of the perspectives that one takes at a given time. But it also has the capacity to distil, exaggerate and concentrate those perspectives, making them more readily accessible. Imagine a writer who has racial prejudices, but is unaware of that fact. He reads his own novel and realise that characters of a particular race are typecast. They are never heroes but are regularly villains. They are symbolised with traditionally dirty animals, whereas other races are symbolised as noble animals. This writer discovers many such patterns within his novels. When writing, he simply used what felt right at the time, what he felt the book needed. Only in reflecting on the work does a pattern emerge. He concludes that he harbours racial prejudice that govern his writing, but also presumably the way he perceives the world. Finally, he reflects on his behaviour and realises that he treats members of this race differently. Now, however, he has an insight into why: his behaviour takes its cue from the world as presented to him in experience already altered by his prejudice. This is an example of what I take Nietzsche to mean by *ego ipsissimum* – ‘my innermost self’.

This practice of externalising the self shows itself in various guises in twentieth-century psychoanalytic practice. One that Nietzsche clearly prefigures is dream interpretation: ‘Interpreting by dreams. – That which we sometimes do not know or feel precisely while awake – whether we have a good or a bad conscience towards a particular person – the dream informs us of without any ambiguity’ (*AOM* 76). This lack of ambiguity arises from three things. First, our ‘civilised’ nature or our conception of ourself as such is no longer blocking out these baser drives. Second, the dream contains events that are drastically reduced in complexity compared with waking experiences. Finally, dreams have fewer sensations to organise, meaning that their narrative freedom is much greater than that of waking life. These features allow the psyche to produce a world in which its commitments are exaggerated and presented for reflection. Alongside dreams, there are more obvious kinds of

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35 Blondel, *Nietzsche, the Body and Culture*, See the subtitle of Blondel’s book:
externalisation in psychoanalysis, including, but not limited to, free association, stream-of-consciousness writing and the Rawshark test. In all of these, externalisation serves to exaggerate existing perspectives.

The problem with introspecting on drives was that it painted in broad brush strokes. The external world and works of art produced in it have the potential for a much higher resolution. Whereas our author might reflect on a feeling he has in the presence of another race, when he externalises his prejudice in the form of writing, he can then study the subtle associations that demarcate it. Given that drives are what determine the way we constitute experience, it makes sense that the best way to come to know them is to attend to their presented content rather than simply reflecting on them as independent entities. It could be objected that this analysis is compatible with the garden model insofar as it seems to involve collating information about the number and nature of our drives, which then puts us in a position to cultivate drives in an aesthetic whole. In the case of the racial prejudice, this makes sense because the example involves a forensic procedure that reverse-engineers the constitution of experience. But to limit ourselves to cases in which such a process is possible is only necessary if we take self-cultivation to require direct reorganisation of our drive structure. If, instead, we bracket the underlying drives and focus on the associations as they appear externally, then we are able to deal with the most subtle details. Observing associations made within a text we produce is already observing ourselves; we do not necessarily need to reverse-engineer this in order to arrive at the self.

Those invested in the model of self-cultivation as reorganisation of the drive structure in line with an artistic plan might protest that we do not learn anything about ourselves other than that we associate certain things. We still do not know why we do so. When we shift the emphasis away from drives to perspectives, this becomes less of a concern. Seeing how we construct the world by making various associations, employing concepts in certain ways and so on is to understand our perspectives. There is the further question of what drive or drives underlie a perspective, and in many cases discovering this will be important, but it is not necessary for us to recognise and break with a perspective that is dogmatic in us. Even in the racial prejudice case, we need not understand why we have that prejudice or what drives go into it in order to break it. Such information might be valuable, but we can act on ourselves without it in many cases.

This leads to the active element in self-cultivation. Having presented ourselves with our own perspectives, we are able to do two things. First, we can consciously break with a particular perspective. Imagine that our racist author now deliberately sets out to cast the discriminated-against race in the role of the hero. Through the act of writing and the reflection on the product of that writing, he may come to change the way he sees that race. That is, he will have broken his perspective somewhat and replaced it with another one. For an example closer to home, we could imagine a philosopher who uses ‘she’ in all of his examples in the hope of overcoming his own perspective on philosophy and philoso-
phers. Indeed, I take it that the trend in academic writing to default to female pronouns in examples is built on the assumption that new associations can be forged unconsciously, leading to an alternative perspective and, in the long run, more equality in academia. This brings us to the second point, namely that we can not only break perspectives by forming new ones, but can also create new behaviours in ourselves by forming new perspectives. If our author assumes that his racial prejudice leads him unknowingly to treat one race unfavourably, he can engage in this reforging of a perspective to lead to new behaviour.

In the next two chapters, I expand on this, outlining a form self-cultivation that relies not on placing every drive or feature of the self into an artistic plan, but on the ongoing activity of breaking down perspectives. But as we will see, this leaves room for self-cultivation in the sense of arranging one’s drives. The difference is that this arrangement need only focus on a small set of fairly simple drives. It is the correct arrangement of these that leads to the activity of undermining the much more complex web of associations that make up our character. Thus the project reaches into our complex selves, but not in a way that requires that we find a position in a complex whole for each of these parts. Rather than think of this in terms of a painting whose many dots and lines are the minute features of our drives structure, and which we can step back and admire, I instead use the notion of incorporation to map out an ongoing activity that deals with each small part of the self in turn. But dealing with the self in this context is going to amount in many cases to dealing with the world of appearances that we are presented with. This world is our externalised self. In the final chapter, we will see that although personal in some ways, this world, just like the individual, is also communally constructed. This will prove the key to cultural incorporation.

Appendix: True Culture, Low Culture, High Culture

Having outlined culture as it functions in both UM and FSW, we are in a position to more fully address an important difference between the two periods. In UM, culture is something to be attained by a human community; in FSW, culture is universal, but admits of higher and lower varieties. One reason for this universalisation of culture in FSW is that Nietzsche weaves an anthropological strand into his use of the concept. Since anthropology views culture as a matter of acquired customs, it would be remarkable indeed if Nietzsche were to deny culture of most communities, as he does in UM. Every human community plays host to inherited customs of some form. So it could simply be that FSW represents a simple modification to the UM definition of culture such that anthropology is included. Higher culture would then simply correspond to the possession of culture in UM; lower culture would be the lack of culture in UM. Closer examination of Nietzsche’s use of the terms, however, reveals this mapping of concepts to be far from clean, as the rest of this section will seek to illustrate.
In *UM*, lack of culture amounts to a lack of unity. Nietzsche calls this lack ‘barbarism’, and it is characterised by a diversity of cultural material that is not bound together in the relevant way. It must be pointed out, however, that all communities, even in *UM*, exhibit unity to some degree. To even criticise modern attempts at culture requires that there be something binding those attempts together. German pseudo-culture, for example, might not qualify as culture for Nietzsche, but it still shares a common language, concepts and beliefs. So when we talk about a lack of unity, what is really meant is a failure to reach a certain minimum threshold of unity. By contrast, culture in *FSW* is used to refer even to that which fails to meet the *UM* threshold. The contrast between this minimal threshold view of culture and that of *FSW* can be made clearer by analogy with the concept of intelligence. We sometimes describe people as intelligent when their cognitive abilities exceed a certain threshold. But unintelligent people can still do basic maths, solve problems etc. That is to say, intelligence in this sense refers to a certain level of cognitive ability of the relevant kind; but unintelligent people still display the relevant cognitive ability to some extent. Similarly, Nietzsche in *UM* talks about a culture, or a cultured individual, when a certain level of unity is attained. He does not thereby commit to the view that barbarism is entirely lacking in unity. Now, we might well talk about intelligence in a different way. For example, we might say that relative to animals, all humans are intelligent. That is to say, intelligence might be understood to refer to the mere possession of certain cognitive abilities. So the attempt to create artificial intelligence will still be successful if it fails to create an Einstein; it will be sufficient for it to create an intelligence that, as a human being, would be described as unintelligent. An artificial intelligence that can match Einstein would be very intelligent, or have a ‘higher’ intelligence. This understanding of intelligence as a universal feature of human beings mirrors the way that Nietzsche uses the concept of culture in *FSW*. He no longer denies culture of human communities, but he does distinguish higher and lower culture.

If this were the sum of the difference between the two periods, then translation of Nietzsche’s cultural talk would be simple. The higher-lower dichotomy in *FSW* would correspond directly with the absence-presence one in *UM*. In other words, every time we read ‘higher culture’ in *FSW* we could think ‘presence of culture’ from *UM*. We have touched upon the fact that anthropology’s introduction into *FSW* makes this problematic, but even without this addition, there are complications to this direct mapping. The difficulty of transposing the concept from one period to another results from a difference in what Nietzsche considers constitutive of cultural progress. In a nutshell, *UM* emphasises unity; *FSW* emphasises diversity. In *UM*, possession of culture requires that diversity be carefully managed or, failing that, excluded. Culture breaks down when it is overwhelmed. By contrast, in *FSW*, lower culture is characterised by strong adherence to customs, whereas higher culture is broadly characterised by a freedom from narrow constraints and an embrace of diversity. *UM* already hints at something like this: Nietzsche talks about the need to break
from custom and become genuine individuals. Indeed, this is important to him. However, he is torn between that individualism and a stronger collectivism that is concerned with culture as a collective unity of style. It is only in *FSW* that this is resolved somewhat by a clear emphasis on the individual (though, as we will see, there is also a collective dimension to *FSW*).

The difference between higher and lower culture in *FSW* cannot be exhausted by a discussion of the relative weightings of unity and diversity, even though, through that lens, many of the aphorisms mentioning the divide come into sharper focus. Several aphorisms on higher culture in *FSW* are not obviously concerned with diversity. Nonetheless, we will see in chapter 5, for example, that discussions of the virtues present in higher individuals in fact bear on the issue of unity and diversity. This pattern will be repeated throughout this thesis: the more the underlying theory of *FSW* is fleshed out, the more that diverse aphorisms on higher culture begin to come together.

In this chapter, culture has been divided into three kinds, where each is connected with the others. Nietzsche's discussions of higher culture fall into these categories. Often, the description of higher culture pertains to individual cultivation, as in the following:

> He who has furnished his instrument with only two strings – like the scholars, who apart from the drive to knowledge have only an acquired religious drive – cannot understand those men who are able to play on more strings than two. It lies in the nature of higher, many-stringed culture that it should always be falsely interpreted by the lower (*HH* 281)

Here we see the idea of diversity within the individual, a notion whose place in this thesis will become clear over the next two chapters. Sometimes, higher culture seems to refer simply to the fact that an individual has cultivated themselves more than others, as when Nietzsche talks of the Epicurean who ‘employs his higher culture to make himself independent of dominating opinions’ (*HH* 275). At other times, higher culture refers to a community rather than an individual, as when Nietzsche talks about the ‘higher cultures such as those of Peru and Mexico’ (*D* 204). This suggests an anthropological understanding of higher and lower. Finally, higher culture is connected with the way we construct the world – specifically, the degree of freedom in our interpretations – in *HH* 13.

While the theory presented in this thesis is capable of bringing together a number of key aphorisms on higher culture, it has its limitations. There is not enough space to demonstrate for each aphorism how the theory helps to interpret it. There is also a limit to the degree to which all such aphorisms can be made systematic. After all, *FSW* is a contradictory and ever-shifting collection of thoughts. As I alluded to in my introduction, systematising such a body of work is only ever a case of providing one way to carve things up. Furthermore, much of the time, Nietzsche reads like any other cultural critic who
treats the notion of higher culture as self-evident. He does not base every aphorism on his own theory, but sometimes merely comments from a particular perspective. So there will always be aphorisms that seem to support just taking higher and lower culture at face value. This thesis does not preclude doing so, it merely provides an option for more consistent theoretical engagement. We can produce claims to the effect that higher culture is scientific, or that it values unpretentious truths, or that it involves giving style to one’s character. But to simply collate these features would not be to provide the substantive theory that defines the current project. To try to collate all of higher culture’s features, and provide the theory, and tie them together all in the space of this thesis would do a disservice to all at once.

Two questions, then, have been answered in this appendix: How can Nietzsche talk about a lack of culture in *UM* if every community exhibits key features of culture? and To what extent do the categories of higher and lower culture fit with the discussion of culture in *UM*? The answer to the second inevitably looks forward to the rest of this thesis. The emphasis on diversity, the interaction of different senses of culture (individual, anthropological, interpretive), the idea of liberation from custom – all will be addressed in more detail as we proceed such that, hopefully, by the end, the reader will have available to them a theory of cultural flourishing wherein the terms higher and lower have a basis in Nietzsche’s wider theory.
Chapter 4

Incorporation

Most readers of Nietzsche focus on the bodily aspects of incorporation, which makes sense given that the German – *Einverleibung* – literally translates as ‘bringing into the body’. The body includes the drives that are said to make up the psyche. So we see plenty of discussion of incorporation in drive terms. I agree that there is a sense of incorporation that has to do with drives, but I also take there to be other ways of understanding the term that have more to do with conscious experience. That this experience is grounded in drives means, of course, that incorporation at any level is in some sense drive-involving. But it is nonetheless useful to draw a distinction, just as it was in the previous chapter between direct and indirect drive cultivation. To start the chapter, I examine John Richardson’s account of incorporation, which addresses drives and the incorporation of truth. Richardson’s contribution is valuable, but I think he is drawn too far into a project of naturalising Nietzsche that assumes that the language of conscious experience must be replaced by that which pertains to unconscious processes. I see my account in this chapter as extending, not replacing, the way he thinks about incorporation.

4.1 Drive Incorporation

4.1.1 Richardson on Drives

For Richardson, ‘a Nietzschean drive is a disposition that was selected for a certain result; this result is its individuating goal, which explains its presence and its character’.\(^1\) Human beings as we find them today are the result of a breeding process, namely evolution by natural selection. This has bequeathed us with the drives that compose us. Through genealogy we gain an insight into the evolutionary history of our drives, as well as into the more local history of those of our drives that have been shaped in our lifetime. This is the insight that is to be incorporated. Incorporation is a matter of forming ‘dispositions that oppose drives

and habits where and insofar as they express sources we choose against. Richardson goes on to claim that this is a matter of building into our lives the habit of honesty, which continually exposes the origins of our values. This in turn relinquishes some of their hold on us. Only in this state of relative independence can we create and employ our own values. This involves a kind of self-selection wherein we adopt the role previously only played by forces outside of us.

I agree strongly with some of Richardson’s points. He claims that the aphorisms serve as small instances of diagnosis, that honesty needs to become habitual, and that we continually break with small errors in order to be free. As we will see through the remainder of this thesis, these points will be reflected in my account. However, there are some claims that clash with thesis and there are some that are difficult to give determinate content. It is to these that I now turn.

The first point of disagreement comes with the role of consciousness. Richardson claims that the incorporation of dispositions, for example to honesty, must go beyond consciousness. Talking of the insight provided by genealogy, Richardson writes:

Although these truths about values do detach from the values, they do so only in theory, i.e., only in consciousness and language. As we’ve seen, Nietzsche takes this to be a superficial and secondary kind of valuing. What we need to do, to be free, is to bring this insight down into our drives and habits, to give it substance there. It’s only by its presence there that this insight gives rise to new dispositions, with new goals and values.

The first sentence is misleading about the status of consciousness in Nietzsche. Here, Richardson equates consciousness and language with theory. Presumably what he means is something like the following. We have some insight into the origin of a value, for example that valuing sex is the result of the evolution of sexually reproducing organisms. This is theoretical insofar as it is stated in the form of a proposition that makes reference to other propositions that come together to make a theory. These are all formulated in language and I am conscious of them insofar as I entertain a thought with the relevant proposition as its content. In that sense, consciousness certainly is theoretical and incorporating the insight in question has to involve a lot more than simply assenting to the proposition. However, consciousness is not a merely theoretical realm: it is an experiential one. For example, I can consciously entertain the belief that there is a war in the Middle East, but I can also consciously experience that war. These are different, but both are conscious. Richardson persists with his narrower understanding of consciousness when he claims that Nietzsche ‘thinks of values as creatures not of consciousness but of our drives and habits, which are

2 Richardson, *Nietzsche’s New Darwinism*, 102.
3 Ibid., 101.
more obviously difficult to “select” than our opinions’. This implies a division between values and opinions that makes the first unconscious and the second conscious. But what does the claim that values are not conscious amount to? Does it mean that we cannot be conscious of our values? This is feasible – albeit still far-fetched – if the claim is that consciousness is only ever a matter of judging that we have a certain value. It could then be claimed that the judgement is conscious, but not the value. However, I think we should resist this. Consciousness is not mere judgement, it also experience. As we have seen, it is the experience of things as valuable.

This is the sense in which value shows up in consciousness, namely as inhering in intentional objects. When Nietzsche talks about our colouring of the world as partly involving taking things to be valuable, he is clearly referring to our conscious experience of a world of appearances that contains values. If we take consciousness to be restricted to judgements about this world that have a propositional form, then we might conclude that opinions are the proper domain of consciousness. When we allow that consciousness is also experiential, then it is not clear how values are not ‘creatures of consciousness’ given that they show up in that experience. One line of response that Richardson could take here is to say that what remains unconscious is the activity of drives that produces the experience in question. An opinion is something like a judgement whose content is accessible to consciousness in propositional form, whereas the content of a judgement of value only shows up as a property of objects: we do not have access to its content in propositional form. Even if this is right – and I think there is something to say for drawing a distinction here – it does not make values themselves any less part of conscious experience.

The two sides of this divide do exist: there are propositional judgements and there is unconscious activity in the brain that affects our behaviour without the mediation of consciousness. The mistake is in taking these two be the only two states one can be in. This overlooks the possibility that our conscious experience can be modified by incorporating propositional claims. That is to say, there is a way of thinking about incorporation that does not require the crude division between consciously entertaining a thought and turning that thought into an unconscious disposition. Incorporation can occur within consciousness. Katsafanas, whose views grounded chapter 2, sees his position as a development of John Richardson’s dispositional account, but one that allows conscious evaluation to play a role. My view is very close to his:

Thus, the link between drives and values is this: drives generate affectively charged, selective responses to the world, which incline the agent to experience situations in evaluative terms. We can summarize this point by saying that drives are dispositions that gener-

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4 Richardson, Nietzsche’s New Darwinism, 101.

5 That is not to say that all values need be conscious.
This provides the blueprint for the model of incorporation that I wish to present. I do not agree with Richardson that incorporation should be thought of exclusively in terms of turning insights into unconscious dispositions. Instead, incorporation should be seen in three ways. Firstly, it can involve training oneself to have certain dispositions that one no longer need think about. That is, I do not deny that in some cases, Richardson is correct. This is what I refer to as the incorporation of drives. Secondly, incorporation is a matter of changing the way that one consciously experiences the world. One might consciously entertain judgements about what is valuable, which would be the kind of consciousness that Richardson has in mind. But such judgements can come to change the intentional objects of one’s conscious experience. This should be thought of in terms of perspectives. One can recognise the objects that a perspective posits and finds to be of value, but one can go further and actually see from this perspective. This is a conscious form incorporation that is far from shallow, as implied by Richardson’s comments. This is what I call the incorporation of perspectives. Finally, I take Nietzsche to be concerned with the incorporation of truth, where the truth is not simply that our drives are the product of selection, but is rather the claim that all experience is a falsification that posits being where there is none. While incorporating this truth does involve thoroughgoing honesty, there is a kind of embodiment implied by this honesty that Richardson touches upon but does not explore to its full potential. I take this up in the penultimate section of this chapter, which deals with the incorporation of truth. Before moving on to consciousness and cultivation, I want to present Nietzsche’s contribution to our understanding of drive cultivation as I understand it.

4.1.2 Nietzsche’s Contribution

There are some drives or dispositions that Nietzsche sees as important for his project. These he encourages the reader to incorporate by making behaviour habitual. Honesty with oneself, for instance, is something that Nietzsche want us to get into a habit of doing. Although such dispositions might affect the world that we experience, this need not be the case. They might simply involve behaviour modification. In this section, I will look more closely at this kind of incorporation through habituation. I will argue that although present in Nietzsche, most of what he says about it is fairly pedestrian when viewed in the context of those ethicists that went before him. I will consider in turn various ways that his theory might be said to be original, before concluding that although pedestrian, this aspect of drive incorporation is interesting insofar as it serves a further project. It is in that further project that Nietzsche is both original and interesting.

Katsafanas, ‘Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology,’ 745.
The idea of forming habits that allow one to quieten drives, instincts, or passions is ancient. Epictetus in the *Discourses* portrays the formation of habits in a very similar way to Nietzsche in *D 109*. How does Nietzsche stand out against this backdrop? As I see it, answers to this fall into five broad categories, expressed in the following claims:

1. Nietzsche has a relatively sophisticated psychological theory based on the drive concept, whereas the Ancients simply assume the reader understands the meaning of common psychological terms.

2. Nietzsche’s views were informed by scientific insights not available previously.

3. The methods Nietzsche adopts for incorporating drives are novel.

4. The drives that Nietzsche encourages us to incorporate are different from those of his predecessors.

5. The incorporation of drives fits into a philosophical framework that is radically different from that of his predecessors.

In the remainder of this section, I will address these in turn.

As we have seen, Nietzsche has a theory of drives that includes fairly radical claims, for instance the claim that the individual is nothing more than the sum of their drives. This is not a claim that occurred to the Ancients, for most of whom reason was an independent faculty capable of managing the drives. Other than this, Nietzsche’s talk of incorporating certain drives, at least in *FSW*, is compatible with the concept of drive used by the Ancients. This refers to things like hunger, thirst, bravery and so on, which can be thought of as dispositions or as motivating feelings. It if often these that Nietzsche has in mind. For example, the drive to truth is, for Nietzsche, comparable to hunger in certain ways: it seeks satisfaction through the acquisition and consumption of something called ‘truth’. When understood in this way, drives and habits go together well. Making a behaviour habitual is a matter of creating in oneself a disposition to act in a certain way or to feel drawn to a particular object. Taken in this sense, the division between the Ancients and Nietzsche regarding the status of reason is not particularly salient. Even if enforcing habits on ourselves is just the result of a drive, it looks a lot like the imposition of habits by reason. In both cases, we simply behave a certain way, as a rule, until eventually we behave this way...
automatically. We have thereby incorporated a habit or disposition. Nietzsche’s theoretical account of drives adds little to this picture.\(^8\)

I am not claiming that the incorporation of habits and dispositions is not important to N: on the contrary, he wants to help us rediscover the practices of Ancient ethicists for whom care of the self was paramount. I am claiming that incorporation as a theory in Nietzsche is not best explored in the context of habits of this kind. These can be incorporated in the sense that we can change the way we tend to behave in certain situations, making that behaviour automatic to some extent, but this is something that on its own is not enough. This leaves us with the final two ways in which Nietzsche stands out from the Ancients, which is that he endorses different drives and that these fit into a larger philosophical project that is genuinely original. The former of these claims, at least with respect to \(FSW\), is only partially true. While there are some original drives favoured by Nietzsche, the key ones – intellectual honesty, scepticism, magnanimity, courage and others – are all borrowed from Greek philosophy. What makes Nietzsche original and interesting is not his re-description of these and the methods for their incorporation in modern, scientific terms, but rather the place that they have in his greater theory, which actually is deeply informed by his time and its discoveries. One such discovery with which we are already familiar is that the world we experience is the product of our faculties and has therefore developed along with them; it is the story of the development of conscious experience of an external world. This insight, which combines Kant, Hume, Hegel, Darwin and others has been the backbone of this thesis so far. I have called it experience constitution and I am arguing that it is the key to understanding \(FSW\). By focusing only on dispositions and dismissing consciousness, it is easy to overlook this aspect of Nietzsche.

We can think of this as a matter of disposition versus interpretation. Richardson is interested primarily in the former. He effectively dismisses the latter in a footnote, writing ‘drives “interpret” others just by their plastic tendencies to incorporate them; I think we can read “interpret” in this thin sense in, e.g., WP643 [1886].\(^9\) This goes along with a minimal reading of the term ‘perspective’:

a perspective is constituted \textit{merely by virtue} of a responsive or ‘plastic’ system having been selected to bring about some outcome. The amoeba’s adapted pursuit itself amounts to a ‘viewpoint’ on the world. And we must think of the ‘posit’ in valuing in a similarly minimal sense: the amoeba ‘posits’ the value of feeding, in and by the way its perceptive and motive systems have been selected to bring about feeding.

\(^8\)Richardson does attempt to import evolutionary theory into self-selection, but ultimately this proves to be limited both by the disanalogies between natural and artificial selection, and by the the fact that the specific application of evolutionary concepts (‘population’, ‘stochastic’, ‘aggregation’, ‘statistical’) is left unexplored. See Richardson, \textit{Nietzsche’s New Darwinism}, 83.

\(^9\)Ibid., 57n123.
Richardson’s commitment to the irrelevance of consciousness allows him to move freely from perspectives as described above and those found in human existence. A perspective just is a disposition and human life mostly unfolds unconsciously much as it does for an amoeba. This view leaves the status of our experience of values ambiguous. We are not simply amoebae with epiphenomenal consciousness bolted on. Unlike amoebae, we experience a world that is meaningful and valuable. To reduce perspectives to mere unconscious dispositions is to overlook Nietzsche’s constant references to the appearance of the world to those with various perspectives. Gemes is more cautious in relating the notion interpretation to that of disposition. He discusses humans, animals, and plants. His animal example is a hyena interpreting a wild boar as food and attacking it:

Note the hyena does not interpret the boar as food by explicitly making the judgment that it is food, rather it interprets it by interacting with it in a certain way, e.g. attacking it.

In the animal case, to interpret is simply to react in a certain way. This is contrasted with explicit judgement, which is presumably supposed to occur during episodes of consciousness. Gemes is not here committing to a dismissal of consciousness, but he is subscribing to a fairly strong dichotomy of conscious and unconscious. That which is conscious is explicit judgement, perhaps thought with propositional content, whereas that which is unconscious, as in the animal case, is dispositional. But there is a way of preserving some degree of interpretation as we ordinarily understand it, even in the animal case, namely by using the notion of a representation. Representations can occur even beyond the realm of living things: thermometers represent temperature, maps represent landscapes, and so on. These things represent their objects insofar as they share structural properties with them and they reliably co-vary with them. In the case of a thermometer, the height of the mercury is proportional to the ambient temperature, and when the temperature changes, the thermometer consistently tracks that change. In this basic sense, a plant can be said to represent its environment. There are certain cells within the plant that reliably co-vary with the position of the sun. As organic life becomes more complex, developing a central nervous system, so does representation. When we arrive at the level of humans, representations are highly complex, interacting in various ways. Many representationalists in philosophy of mind would, at this point, claim that mental phenomena – consciousness, experience, belief – can be exhaustively captured by a sufficiently developed representational theory.

The notion of representation provides a way of talking about interpretations, and therefore perspectives, that a) avoids making them supernatural; and b) allows them to explain

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10 Katsafanas presents a number of convincing reasons that Nietzsche should not be read as endorsing epiphenomenalism about consciousness. One such reason is that Nietzsche sees consciousness as a danger, which is mysterious if it has no effect. See Katsafanas, ‘Nietzsche’s Theory of Mind,’ 1.

behaviour rather than merely describing it. That a plant represents the position of the sun amounts to the claim that some part of it consistently co-varies with the position of the sun; this leads it to change position.\(^\text{12}\) The hyena, by contrast, has more sophisticated representations that guide adaptive behaviours. The hyena has something like a map of the environment available to it. Human beings represent their environment, but they also represent themselves as distinct from it as I described in section chapter 3; furthermore, they apply concepts in the way outlined by Katsafanas (see chapter 3). It is at this point that humans can be said to experience a mind-independent world as mind-independent. They take their mental map to be a map, rather than it simply feeding into behaviour.

I read Nietzsche as holding the view that consciousness arises gradually as the emergence of a certain representational structure. Gemes, by contrast, applies his analysis to human perspectives as follows:

The Christian interprets the world as being of little value not by making the explicit judgment ‘the world is of little value’ – indeed many Christians would think it sacrilege to make such a judgment since the world is God’s creation. Rather they interpret it as being of little value through their interactions with the world.\(^\text{13}\)

Here we find what I suspect is the motivation for Gemes’ account: we are faced with a choice between explicit judgement and mere disposition. With such a decision, it makes sense to deny the important role of conscious experience (rather than merely thought). With the notion of representation, we need not be committed to such strong divisions. We can talk about, for example, implicit rather than explicit judgement; in representational terms, this might just be a matter of how we represent the world in experience, rather than specifically thinking about it. Implicit and explicit judgements come apart quite naturally. For example, a recovering alcoholic looking at a pint of beer might well explicitly judge it to be of significant disvalue to them, but they might nonetheless experience it as being alluring. Similarly, the Christian might make the claim that the world is highly valuable as God’s creation, but nonetheless represent it as containing a great deal of disvalue in experience. They might be disgusted by human sexual behaviour and feel uncomfortable when confronted with it, yet when asked claim that reproduction is the sacred duty of human beings and that the whole process is a miraculous testament to the divine. Many such cases of self-deception can be imagined wherein an individual is dishonest with themselves about their experience of the world. If explicit judgement is something like the formation of propositions that an individual is inclined to express when prompted, then it can come apart from the judgements of experience. Indeed, this is surely what Nietzsche

\(^{12}\)I confess that this is more difficult to make sense of if the co-variance of cells just is the physical change that alters the plant’s position.

\(^{13}\)Gemes, ‘Life’s Perspectives,’ 565.
has in mind in *GM* P:1 when he writes ‘As far as the rest of life is concerned, the so-called “experiences”, – who of us ever has enough seriousness for them? or enough time?’. I take it Nietzsche is referring to conscious experiences here – what, after all, could Nietzsche mean here if not conscious reflection?

In both the human and the animal cases, representation provides grades between disposition and explicit judgement. The hyena does not explicitly judge the boar to be food – indeed, given that explicit judgement in the Christian case seems to amount to a conscious thought, it is not clear whether hyenas can even make explicit judgements. However, the hyena can be said to represent the boar as food, which is to say interpret it as food, i.e. take a perspective on it as food. It is this perspective that leads it to attack the boar. As I have suggested, the human case should be viewed as a case of representation. Conscious experience is a form of representation, but it is more complex than animal representation. It includes the representation of a subject as distinct from an object. It is this new level of complexity in representation that means that humans come to experience a world of external objects as external objects. In each case – plant, animal, human – we find perspectives insofar as we find representations of the environment. However, those perspectives differ with the differing complexity of the representational apparatus involved. There is no need to reduce the human level to the plant level when talking about perspectives any more than there is when talking about representations. That is not to say that all human perspectives are conscious experiences any more than it is to say so of representations. There are many processes that never arrive in consciousness that can be said to represent. Our bodies make constant adjustments to the environment that we are never aware of. Moreover, there is clear interaction between subconscious representations and conscious ones and it is perfectly natural to claim, as Nietzsche does, that the unconscious can influence the conscious.\(^{14}\) When discussing perspectives, then, I am committing to a view on which the term can apply to levels below that of consciousness – indeed to any sphere of reality in which representation is involved. But I am restricting my discussion of perspectives to those conscious interpretations that involve a certain sophisticated representational structure. This does not preclude the idea that incorporation involves every level of the human animal, conscious or otherwise. But it is consciousness, I would argue, that has been somewhat overlooked in discussions of both perspectivism and incorporation.

My reasons for taking seriously perspectives in the conscious sense is that for all of his attempts to ‘translate man back into nature’ (*BGE* 230), Nietzsche clearly thinks that the unconscious can influence the conscious.\(^{14}\) When discussing perspectives, then, I am committing to a view on which the term can apply to levels below that of consciousness – indeed to any sphere of reality in which representation is involved. But I am restricting my discussion of perspectives to those conscious interpretations that involve a certain sophisticated representational structure. This does not preclude the idea that incorporation involves every level of the human animal, conscious or otherwise. But it is consciousness, I would argue, that has been somewhat overlooked in discussions of both perspectivism and incorporation.

\(^{14}\)Representations interact in complex ways that give rise to consciousness in humans, but that does not require that they be of a different kind in lower organisms. We can talk about interpretation in the rich sense of phenomenology without being committed to the view that that rich phenomenology must be applicable at all levels. I take Katsafanas to make a similar point when he writes: ‘we can deny that drives, considered in isolation, can reason, evaluate, and interpret, while maintaining that embodied drives – drives considered as part of a whole organism – can reason, evaluate, and interpret’. I would adapt this to the claim that we can think of drives in isolation as akin to drives within an organism in which there is not a well-ordered complex drive structure. See Katsafanas, ‘Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology,’ 744.
the rise of human beings, something new has come into being and, moreover, presented us with a problem. He blames this on language, which he also sees as responsible for consciousness. Language has its origins in those animals most closely related to humans, but it is not present until humans, even though Nietzsche traces some of its key components right back to plants. Once language has come to shape us, the task of translating us back into nature cannot be one of straightforwardly reducing our perspectives to those in other species, however much Nietzsche sometimes tries to do so in his most vehement struggles with anti-naturalists. Consciousness may only be a surface as far as Nietzsche is concerned, but it is nonetheless the surface that hosts the orchestration of cultivation and incorporation, even if both aim ultimately to force something below that surface. Moreover, if Katsafanas is right that drives influence us by changing the conscious world that we navigate in daily life, then it makes sense to claim that the range of choice we feel belongs to consciousness decision making is illusory; but even so, it is within this illusory field that the project to continually overcome such limitations is planned and carried out. Directing ourselves towards the experienced world can be a means to incorporation; demonstrating this is the task of the rest of the chapter.

4.2 Perspectival Incorporation

There is a difference between being recounted an event and experiencing it. Similarly, there is a difference between knowing that someone is in pain and being in pain oneself. Again, there is a difference between knowing the meaning of a sentence and hearing it as meaningful. These differences, although obvious, are key to understanding what it means to incorporate a perspective. I take the incorporation of a perspective to consist in allowing one’s experience to be shaped in ways relevant to that perspective. So to incorporate the perspective of a palaeolithic person might be to experience the howling of the wind as the angry voice of an ancestral spirit rather than as the mere rapid movement of air. This should be distinguished from simply believing that certain palaeolithic peoples took the wind to be the voice of ancestral spirits. It is in this difference between having beliefs about others’ perspectives and occupying them.

This presents a number of problems that will be dealt with in the remainder of this chapter. The main two are as follows: first, it is clearly a difficult if not impossible task to completely satisfy the conditions for incorporating a perspective. The problem of other minds is insurmountable, seemingly making it impossible to know how anyone else experiences the world. Even if this were possible, coming to experience the world as someone else does surely means taking on their past experiences, their particular physical make up and so on. This in turn relies on suppressing the same parts of myself. Surely a modern individual can never know what it is like to have grown up in a community ignorant of some of the most basic facts about the world around them and who believed in things far
removed from that which we now hold onto? This is indeed a challenge, but I hope to show that it is not as insurmountable as it appears. Second, there is the problem of incorporating multiple perspectives. How are we to incorporate multiple perspectives if each contradicts the others? What does it even mean to experience through many eyes at once? This problem will be dealt with in the next section.

It is all too easy to dismiss certain projects in Nietzsche’s work because their full realisation seems nonsensical. Complete freedom from custom, for instance, is hardly intelligible, yet being free for Nietzsche has to do with breaking with customs. Rather than dismiss this as an unrealistic definition, we should bear in mind that such things admit of degrees. One can aim to be perfectly consistent in one’s treatment of others even in the knowledge that such perfection is probably impossible to achieve. Nonetheless, the closer one gets to perfection in such a case, the better. Similarly, freedom need not be an all-or-nothing affair; realising this makes it much less problematic for Nietzsche to define freedom in ways that make its full realisation impossible. In the same vein, the problem outlined above regarding perspectival incorporation is less severe than it appears. While one cannot hope to completely enter another’s perspective, the potential for overlap is great. One can approximate another’s perspective in important ways even if the nuances remain ungraspable. The remainder of this section relates to methods by which one comes to experience at least partially through an alternative perspective. They break down into three basic methods: behaviour modification, imaginative exercise, and art.

We saw earlier that Nietzsche wants us ‘to live in drives and activities so as to create eyes for ourselves’ (NF 1881 11[141]). If drives are dispositions, then it stands to reason that what is involved here is a change of behaviour that leads one to see the world differently. There are a few ways that this might work. One might behave in such a way as to expose oneself to facets of things that one would not otherwise encounter. For instance, changing one’s routine to include an early morning walk in a city before it fills with people might expose one to a beauty that one previously denied of that place. Over a long period, one’s entire outlook on the city might change as a result, including one’s perspective on it at other times of the day. Such a change of routine might have other effects; it might mean that one is tired at different times of the day. Tiredness can cause irritability, which in turn can colour our experiences. Something that we would welcome when fully awake might be too much when we are not. This is a change in the value properties of the world. Changes of routine and other such things may seem trivial, but they are just the kind of thing that Nietzsche calls us to focus on in FSW. We have historically overlooked the degree to which such things determine the world we experience. At the more extreme end of such experimentation, we can imagine someone depriving themselves of water for days, thus stoking their drive for water. To such a person, a single glass of water suddenly appears very different than it did when he was able to simply run the tap and drink. Such

\[15\textit{leben in Trieben und Beschäftigungen, um damit Augen zu machen...}\]
an example fits with the formulation of living in drives so as to create new eyes.

As well as these changes in routine, one can change the way that one comports oneself. As this becomes habitual, it can change one’s perspective. Recall our racist author who discovers a prejudice in himself. He reflects on his behaviour and realises that he is unfair to this group because he perceives them to be less valuable than other groups in some regard. He might then decide to experiment with this by treating that group equally if not better, regardless of whether he actually sees them as such. As he makes this behaviour habitual, it is perfectly conceivable that he comes to see that group as having equal value to others. This would be an example of a disposition becoming incorporated such that it modifies one’s perspective. Our author might be disposed to treat this group equally without having the corresponding perspectival shift, but over time, this situation can change. I take this kind of experimentation with one’s behaviour and perspectives to be part of Nietzsche’s vision for experimentation as the key to cultural progress.

Behavioural changes can also be used to incorporate perspectives from ways of living distant in either space or time. Say I want to see the world through the eyes of an agricultural worker from centuries ago. One way I might to this would be to spend an extended period engaged in farm work using only tools from that time. Contrast this with someone who has studied the relevant period. They might know much more about the daily life of such an agricultural worker, but this knowledge is somewhat ‘dry’. Within the discussion of perspectives this makes sense: the scholar has not had their experience altered by the information. This recalls Nietzsche’s own claim about TSZ, namely that readers can only be said to have begun understanding it who have been wounded by it in some way (GM P:8). This emphasis on the need to have one’s experience changed by a truth claim rather than simply assent to it as a proposition.

The changes in behaviour that I have detailed are experiments in living whose goal is to alter one’s perspective, even if only for the duration of the experiment. There are limits to this. I might spend time living as someone from the past might have done, but ultimately I cannot make myself forget entirely about the existence of modernity. I know my tools are made of atoms, that they belong to a bygone era, that they have been superseded. My experiment is, at best, a simulacrum. This method is further limited by the material conditions that a modern individual is capable of recreating. While tilling a field with hand tools is a realistic project, sailing to an undiscovered country on a fully rigged sailing ship or partaking in the Greek polis is not. Behavioural modification alone needs to be supplemented with other tools.

One such tool is the human imagination. The imagination can take us into worlds that would are otherwise closed to us. I can, for instance, imagine what it might be like to partake in a Greek polis. Naturally, this is limited since it rests on certain cognitive abilities that are difficult to employ. It relies on suspending disbelief, putting aside my current knowledge, prejudices and so on. Nonetheless, this is an important tool in incorporating
perspectives. Its limitations are mitigated to some extent by a couple of things. First, the imagination can be trained. We can practice suspending disbelief and we can dedicate time to imaginative exercises. As with the experiments detailed above, this is the kind of intellectual work that has been historically overlooked. Second, imagination need not be used in isolation: it can be used in combination with experiments in living. The practice of suspending disbelief when combined with a radical lifestyle change might help an individual enter into a perspective. Similarly, the ability to fill in the gaps with imagination is an important tool in such experiments. Our experimenter who seeks to take on the perspective of a pre-industrial agricultural worker might be well aware that just behind the hill next to his field is a modern industrial estate, but when he looks at the hill he might exercise his imagination in an attempt to elide that fact. Such practice, which is almost self-deception, might again be limited, but there is nothing to say that a culture in which such practice is formally recognised and cultivated would not achieve much greater successes than we can.

The suspension of disbelief, which is important in imaginative practice, is also central to an area of culture which Nietzsche sees as both useful and threatening: art. Art in its various forms occupied Nietzsche for much of his life and his relationship to it was tumultuous. I do not mean to provide a theory of art in Nietzsche nor do I claim that its sole purpose is to aid incorporation, however I think incorporation is something for which art is highly suited. The visual arts present a perspective on something. Paintings, even fairly abstract ones, literally take a perspective on something by showing it from a particular angle. But they also have the capacity to present the evaluative and symbolic components of a perspective. This is precisely the reason that we do not judge paintings for their photorealism. Were we to do so, Picasso would fall well short of the scores hobbyists painting the countryside in watercolours. Picasso’s genius is not in reproducing the scene exactly, but in capturing, exaggerating and thereby revealing to us something about the scene that we might otherwise miss. Yet while there is something universal in that which Picasso shows us, for it is this universality that explains his success, we nonetheless take this to be his vision. His paintings are a window into the way that he sees the world. In other words, they present a perspective in all the rich sense of that word that was detailed in chapter 2 of this thesis.

The perspectival power of art lies in its ability to change the way we see the world by presenting it as filtered through someone else’s experience. An otherwise familiar object now appears alien or vice versa. In analysing a painting, we can draw conclusions as to the values of those who made it. This goes back to the very inception of art. Some of the oldest art is agreed to be ancient carved figurines of women that date back up to forty thousand years. These figures have enlarged breasts and are more body fat than would have been likely at the time they were made, and the common interpretation of this is that they are fertility symbols. Here we see the values of the artist made manifest in their artwork at the expense of realism. Although a crude example, this serves to illustrate the claim that I am
making.

In chapter 3 I claimed that self-cultivation is best achieved through art, where writing can reveal one’s own drives to oneself. Now we see that art can also be used to reveal to us perspectives other than our own. Just as we are able to cultivate ourselves through it, the artist whose work is public is able not only to show their perspective, but to depict alternative perspectives to their own, to experiment by rewiring the various mechanisms that produce perspectives and record the results in their art. The author can create new connections by employing metaphors; the painter can do the same by combining conventional symbols in new ways. What has this to do with incorporation? Appreciating work of art or reading a novel does not necessarily effect a permanent shift in one’s view of the world. But even if only temporarily, a work of art can place one into a perspective that is different from one’s own and which thereby challenges the latter’s authority. In my view, it is this challenge that holds the key to understanding incorporation for Nietzsche. To understand how this is so, we need to examine the central target of incorporation in Nietzsche: truth. Before looking at that, however, I want to provide some textual evidence to support what I have been saying. This evidence will serve not only to support the idea of perspectival incorporation, but also give us a hint as to how it relates to truth.

_HH_, Nietzsche’s most ‘positive’ work, at times encourages a calm detachment from the fervour of modern culture. He describes the age as overheating and in need of ice packs restore a degree of moderation. The nineteenth century was a time of great intellectual upheaval and the advances of science were clashing with religion, leading not only to hyperbole on both sides, but also to a new wave of thinkers who sought moral lessons in scientific insights and were not afraid to employ rhetoric to this end. In this context, the idea of deliberately incorporating many perspectives in the ways described seems like something that Nietzsche would not encourage. Would this not involve falling into the many illusions that Nietzsche accuses art of perpetuating? Would it not create in the individual a chaos of conflicting values rather than a moderate, controlled and, above all, personal set? Were Nietzsche to consistently reject art in favour of science, it would make sense to read him as agreeing with these worries. However, even in the midst of _HH_, in which art receives its harshest treatment, we find abundant evidence for a calculated engagement rather than straightforward rejection of artistic practices. This is most explicit in _HH_ 251, entitled _Future of science:_

higher culture, must give to man a double-brain, as it were two brain-ventricles, one for the perceptions of science, the other for those of non-science: lying beside one another, not confused together, separable, capable of being shut off; this is a demand of health. In one domain lies the power-source, in the other the regulator: it must be heated with illusions, onesidednesses, passions,
the evil and perilous consequences of overheating must be obviated with the aid of the knowledge furnished by science.

Nietzsche is very clear that science must be prevented from cleansing human life of all illusory practices. Rather, these are to be kept for their usefulness. In this case, that usefulness consists in their ability to make knowledge-seeking pleasurable. There is no mention of perspectives here, but when we try to think through precisely what it might entail, the idea of perspectives is useful. By providing us with alternative ways of viewing the world, art has the potential to make things that we would otherwise find mundane into objects of mystery, of potential discovery and so on. A scientific picture alone is not enough to continually draw us back to explore it; it needs some poetry to it. This might well be contested by those for whom the discoveries of science possess a grandeur and majesty to match anything provided by religion. But precisely these feelings have their root in those illusions of transcendence that ground religion. Is the beauty and mystery of a supernova a 'scientific property' that it has? Should a strict scientist not dismiss such properties as projections and therefore illusions?

This use of illusory practices as inspiration for continued scientific enquiry is not, on its own, the same as the perspectival incorporation discussed above. The engagement with different perspectives through art is merely fuel for the scientific fire. However, elsewhere we find evidence that this idea of the double-brain is extended in more relevant ways. We can think of this in terms of two moments, one of allowing oneself to be carried away by illusions and another of returning to a strict scientific mindset that keeps a watchful eye on the self. This idea finds expression in WS 306:

*Losing oneself.* – Once one has found oneself one must understand how from time to time to lose oneself – and then how to find oneself again: supposing, that is, that one is a thinker. For to the thinker it is disadvantageous to be tied to one person all the time.

This makes sense when understood as expressing the view that to seek knowledge one must use various means to occupy the perspectives of others. Losing oneself here, I think, means suspending one’s own judgement of the world so as to take on someone else’s.

There is another implication in losing oneself, namely that during the process one is not reflecting and analysing the situation. When we talk about losing oneself in the moment, it is with reference to this suspension of scrutiny. If Nietzsche advocates this, then he strays from the careful watchfulness over the self which characterises Stoic readings of FSW. A few aphorisms earlier, it is clear that this is precisely what Nietzsche has in mind:

For as long as one is experiencing something one must give oneself up to the experience and close one’s eyes: that is to say, not be an observer of it while still *in the midst* of it. For that would disturb
The irony here is that in order to better enter into a perspective, one needs to close one’s eyes. I take ‘eyes’ to stand for observation; while one clearly observes the world in a visual experience, one need not attempt to reflect on one’s experience in the sense of forming propositional thoughts about it. One needs to suppress the tendency to explicitly make judgements. Losing oneself in the experience means temporarily shutting off the scientific brain so that one can enter into and experience through an alternative perspective.

The counterpart of losing oneself is finding oneself. Both moments are present in WS 306. That one must have an ability in order to find oneself suggests that it is possible to lose oneself permanently, or at least for extended, unplanned periods. What does this ‘finding’ look like? The first thing to say is that the self referred to here is he who is in a position to employ his scientific brain. To be in command of oneself involves being able to observe and judge the world and one’s relation to it. We should bear in mind that the individual who has cultivated this double brain will also have cultivated various drives associated with the search for knowledge: intellectual honesty, scepticism, care for details. The return to the self is partly a rediscovering of these drives, which required temporary suspension in the moment of absorption by a perspective. This suggests a way to understand the inability to find oneself. If one is so drawn in by a particular perspective as to take it not to be just a perspective, but a window into the true nature of things, then one might see no more need for that scientific brain. This would effectively mean succumbing to the metaphysical need, a danger which plagues even the freest spirit. The following passage on the free spirit expresses this danger:

[The free spirit] feels a profound stab in the heart and sighs for the man who will lead him back to his lost love, whether she be called religion or metaphysics. It is in such moments that his intellectual probity is put to the test. (HH 153)

What makes metaphysics so appealing is the same thing that marks it out as opposed to perspectivism. A metaphysical viewpoint makes the claim to be an eternal, universal view of reality. On the one hand, this makes metaphysics abhorrent to the scientifically minded individual who recognises that reality is becoming; on the other, the sheer explanatory power, albeit illusory, of such systems of explanation is very tempting. It is this promise to explain that tempts the scientist, not just the promise of a world laden with eternal significance. In WS 31, Nietzsche describes the thinker as a wanderer in the desert. He draws a parallel between mirages and philosophical systems that promise comprehensive explanation. To some natures, these simply make them more determined to pursue science; however, ‘there are other natures, to be sure, which stand still, as if bewildered by the fair
illusion: the desert swallows them up and they are dead to science’. Although not explicitly about perspectivism, what emerges from this is the idea of losing oneself permanently by being stuck in a perspective. This amounts to taking that perspective to be not ‘only’ a perspective, but a universal truth. The wanderer repeats this cycle of losing himself and finding himself again. He experiences the world in a new way, unreflectively entering a perspective; he then withdraws from it, reflecting on the experience having come through it. In other words, he continually moves between perspectives, not allowing himself to settle with any single perspective as an unquestioned universal. This is what allows him to chart the many possible worlds that a human being can occupy. In book 5 of *GS*, we see this portrayed as a noble and important enterprise:

Anyone whose soul thirsts to experience the whole range of previous values and aspirations, to sail around all the coasts of this ‘inland sea’ (*Mittelmeer*) of ideals, anyone who wants to know from the adventures of his own experience how it feels to be the discoverer or conqueror of an ideal, or to be an artist, a saint, a lawmaker, a sage, a pious man, a soothsayer, an old-style divine loner – any such person needs one thing above all – the great health, a health that one doesn't only have, but also acquires continually and must acquire because one gives it up again and again, and must give it up! (*GS* 382)

What was alluded to before is now made explicit. The goal of the great individual is to experience a range of values, but also an understanding of ‘how it feels’ to occupy a perspective. This involves giving up a perspective to take on a new one. Continual giving up and acquiring are here components of what Nietzsche calls ‘the great health’, the subject of chapter 5.

What we have so far in this thesis is a way to understand the construction of a world of appearances, which takes place within an intentional structure captured in the notion of a perspective. Additionally, we know how these perspectives come to be and how they survive in culture. We also know how it is possible to incorporate various perspectives in the sense of coming to experience the world as those perspectives take it to be, rather than simply assenting to propositional claims that those perspectives make. Finally, we have seen that rather than incorporating a perspective permanently, the great individual incorporates a perspective only temporarily before expelling it in order to take on another. But what has any of this got to do with the incorporation of truth? If individual perspectives cannot be true, how can incorporating them be a matter of incorporating of truth? And even if they could be true, why give up a true perspective to incorporate another one? In what sense is that incorporating truth? To answer these questions, we need to look more closely at the incorporation of truth, which, it turns out, will not be a matter of
incorporating a single perspective, but will instead be a distinct kind of incorporation, but one which relies on everything said so far.

4.3 Incorporation of Truth

The most pressing question when considering the incorporation of truth is: what is the truth to be incorporated? Nietzsche seems to rule out the possibility of truth, or at least our access to it, on many occasions. In order to make sense of the incorporation of truth, we need to know what we are incorporating. GS 110 identifies incorporation as central: ‘To what extent can truth stand to be incorporated? – that is the question; that is the experiment’ [my emphasis]. Helpfully, this question is posed in the context of a discussion of the errors against which we can make sense of truth. These are familiar from chapter 2: ‘that there are enduring things; that there are identical things; that there are things, kinds of material, bodies; that a thing is what it appears to be; that our will is free; that what is good for me is also good in and for itself’. All but one are the falsifications inherent to the construction of a world of intentional objects that is undertaken within a perspective or perspectives.  

The truth must therefore be that there are no such entities.

This is often cashed out as the claim that the world is flux or becoming. If this is taken to pertain to the nature of a world underlying appearances, then it is strong even if derived negatively, namely from the falsity of those appearances. There is no justification to move from the view that all perspectives so far encountered falsify in a certain way to the view that there is a world free of perspectives with a certain character. There is no obvious reason that there could not be a world with which some of our perspectives line up. Even to deny that requires that one compare perspectives to such a world and find them wanting. This leads Nietzsche to adopt what we might call indifferentism with respect to the noumenal world (see HH 9). But perhaps this demand that we need to compare a perspective to the ‘real’ world to judge their veracity is too strict. Every perspective presents an intentional object or set of objects as mind-independent. In doing so, it takes the world of appearance to be something they are not. Entailed in this is an idea of a world that persists through various perspectives being taken on it. This need not entail a belief about the status of objects; rather, the structure of experience is such that objects are presented as enduring independently of any perspective taken on them.

Human history contains a vast array of perspectives interacting and changing. Each perspective when originally occupied illegitimately purported to be a window on a mind-independent world. From this, we arrive at flux in a different sense. The world of appearances is constituted by ever-changing perspectives, therefore it too is in a state of flux.

16Free will is a whole other issue in Nietzsche that would take up far too much space here to deal with adequately. For treatments of the topic, see: Ken Gemes and Simon May, eds., Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
Perspectives are not what they purport to be, namely windows into a mind-independent, stable world; and the world that perspectives present is not what it seems to be, namely mind-independent and stable. Perspectives and the world of appearances are interlocked in a constant and reciprocal state of change. I take this to be the truth that Nietzsche seeks to incorporate. It is a matter of coming to terms with the world of appearances within which we find ourselves.

The incorporation of truth has now been formulated as the incorporation of perspectivism. We might think then that to incorporate perspectivism we need simply extend the project of incorporating perspectives phenomenologically. That is to see, we might come to see the world as perspectival. Or we might come to experience perspectives as themselves intentional objects present in our experience. But there are good reasons to think that this is doomed to failure. The first is that perspectivism denies that there are any stable objects, but to incorporate a perspective requires that one at least temporarily posit the stable objects pertaining to a perspective. The second is that perspectives are transparent. As such, they cannot feature as objects of experience. Let us look at these more closely.

Perspectivism involves a commitment to the nature of the world of appearances, namely that it is constituted in multiple ways simultaneously, that it varies between persons and cultures, and that it presents as properties that are relational as independently inhering in external objects. To incorporate perspectivism in an experiential sense, one would have to experience objects in multiple ways at once, as relative to individuals and cultures – indeed, as possessing relative properties at all. But this is contradicts the nature of experience. Perspectivism takes there to be many eyes that each correspond to a world; to incorporate it experientially would be to see through many eyes at once, which is non-sensical as the idea that one might see without eyes: that one might be able to occupy a view from nowhere. That does not preclude the possibility that one might experience through one perspective followed by another. In this case, however, one is still, at any one time, experientially committed to a single, unified world.

We might think that perspectivism simply involves coming to experience perspectives as intentional objects that we can identify separately from those objects that they themselves posit. However, this angle fails because perspectives are transparent, a notion that we met in chapter 2. When we try to attend to a perspective, we only find ourselves able to attend to the objects of that perspective. We need another way to understand incorporation if we are to get a grip on the incorporation of truth. It has been suggested that truth can be replaced here with truthfulness or honesty, as we saw Richardson do earlier. To incorporate it truth would then amount to incorporating these virtues. While I believe this to be an important part of the story, on its own, it is difficult to square with the texts. Nietzsche talks as though he had a particular truth in mind, just as he talks about particular errors. The virtue of honesty only makes sense in the context of some truth that one either faces or ignores. If it does not require this, but is simply a set of behavioural dispositions
that we call honest, then why talk about truth at all? My suggestion is going to be that honesty or truthfulness serves as a means to incorporating truth in a way distinct from those already mentioned. For reasons that will become apparent at the time, I will discuss these virtues in the next chapter. I will now outline this third kind of incorporation that is neither merely dispositional nor a matter of coming to experience a particular world.

At the end of the previous section we saw that the great individual does not stick to one perspective but instead continually moves between perspectives. Each perspective asserts itself as the truth, which may include but does not require a belief; it is a matter of the way the external world is presented. I take this to be Rex and Welshon’s point in Nietzsche’s Perspectivism:

objects are convenient fictions, constructed in some manner to satisfy the interests of some particular perspective. Objects are in this way are perspectival just as he claims truth is perspectival…. language misleads people into accepting object realism.\(^{17}\)

The authors distinguish objecthood from truth, suggesting that they also distinguish experience from belief.\(^{18}\) Where I differ from the authors is in their claim that objects are ‘bundled together via perspectives taken on properties’. Perspectives are intentional in virtue of being perspectives on objects, not properties. Moreover, properties, if they are posited as being external to us, are already a falsifying projection of relations. Nonetheless, what the authors capture, and what I am also pushing for is that a change in perspective means a change in the presented world.

This can occur at a fairly superficial level, as when I overcome my fear of spiders. In this case, spiders go from having the property of being scary to having that of being cute. From this one learns that the properties in question are not inherent to spiders, even though they present themselves in experience as such. This example deals with a perspective that at an individual level might be very powerful, but which at the level of culture is not entrenched. It is safe to assume that every human community contains members who differ in such matters and whose differences are acknowledged without difficulty by that community. However, when it comes to other value properties – usually of the moral variety – this is not the case. Good and evil are examples of values that are usually entrenched in communities. The transition from seeing murder or rape as evil or wrong to seeing it as good is unlikely, at least in most known societies, to be simply waved away. This is because the property of being evil or wrong taken to inhere in the act itself. We can imagine an individual entertaining the perspective that murder is good, even if only as a thought experiment,


\(^{18}\)That does not mean, however, that the acceptance of object realism cannot not involve a belief as well as an experiential commitment. Indeed, it likely does most of the time.
before concluding that this property is relative to the perspective one occupies. Great individuals are able to change their perspectives in deeper ways than others; this is ongoing and does not take as sacred any particular perspective.

At this point, it could simply be responded that changing one’s perspective is compatible with there being a true world. Just because someone sees the world one way today and another tomorrow tells us nothing about the nature of the world, which might well remain consistent through this change. Indeed, this is the common-sense view: we assume that when someone overcomes their fear of spiders, abandons their religion, or subscribes to a new philosophy that the world remained the same and only they changed. The substance of this response could hardly be denied, but it misses its mark somewhat. Changing the world of appearances for oneself is not meant to provide evidence for the truth of perspectivism. It is way for those already convinced by perspectivism as a result of additional considerations to live perspectively, so to speak. These individuals are not seeking confirmation that there is no underlying world to which some perspective might be adequate. One can never confirm a negative. They are engaged in an ongoing scepticism; insofar as the constituents of a perspective can be undermined they undermine it, moving to a different perspective.

One could also respond that of course we experience from a certain perspective, but that does not preclude us from having knowledge of a mind-independent world. It just means we occupy a perspective on that world, just as seeing something from the side is not seeing it entirely, but is still seeing it. But Nietzsche thinks that we construct representations out of sensations. In such a case, we have no way to verify that our representation is as of a mind-independent object. The most we can say is that some representations tie the sensations together more effectively or they allow us to predict future sensations more accurately (this will be addressed again at the end of chapter 6). But even if we allow that some perspectives allow us to access a mind-independent world rather than constituting it for us – something that Nietzsche denies – the degree of independence that perspectives attribute that world would be too much. In the case of value, for example, we would still have the problem that the value properties we accept as relative, such as something being disgusting, present themselves as independent. We surely would not want to say that anything really is inherently disgusting even if it presents itself as such. Perspectives push for dogmatic acceptance; Nietzsche thinks that in any such case, they can be undermined and incorporating truth amounts to engaging in this undermining at the level of experience.

This deep anti-dogmatism is at the root of another important concept in FSW: justice. Alongside the use of this term to refer to our dealing with conflict and criminality, there is a sense of justice as connected with our epistemic engagement with the world. In the

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19 Nietzsche might even be attributed a kind of disjunctivist position here. He does not rule out a priori that some of the many perspectives that we can occupy could count as knowledge in the sense of correspondence. But he would say that we have no way to know when we are in possession of knowledge.
preface to *HH*, Nietzsche tells us that life is ‘conditioned by the sense of perspective and its injustice’ (*HH* P:6). Specifically, this injustice consists in the fact that perspectives are formed within the narrow constraints of a particular form of life, which takes itself as the ‘goal and measure of things’. I take Nietzsche to be claiming that a form of life presents its narrow perspective as that which really picks out the way the world is. The injustice, then, is precisely that which the project of incorporating truth as I have described it seeks to overcome. This thought is not confined to the anachronistic prefaces. In *HH* 32, Nietzsche claims that life is unavoidably unjust because we cannot live without valuing. The specific injustice here lies in the fact that we can never have a complete picture of that which we judge because not only are things more complex than we can hope to grasp, but we as knowers are subject to constant vacillations in drives. The injustice here is not simply that we have an incomplete picture, it is that we move from that picture to a definitive judgement of a thing. This maps well onto perspectivism: each perspective involves taking only a few parts from an incredibly rich field of sensations, forming a model and, finally, asserting that model as pertaining definitively to mind-independent objects. The assertion amounts to the becoming conscious of the appearance; that is, becoming conscious of an object requires that it ‘assert’ itself as mind-independent, out there in the world. The injustice is in positing the existence of mind-independent objects with a certain character, when really there are only appearances whose character is mind-dependent and fluctuating. The idea of justice as anti-dogmatism surfaces elsewhere, as in *HH* 636, where the just person opposes all convictions, and *GS* 3, where the noble individual is unjust because they take their perspective to be uniquely correct. In *GS* 289, a ‘new justice’ is called for wherein individuals are permitted their own philosophy rather than being constantly pressured to adhere to social norms. Here, justice consists in the diversity rather than hegemony of perspectives.

Justice is connected closely with this project of continued change in the penultimate aphorism of *HH*, 637. First, N tells us that ‘Opinions grow out of passions; inertia of the spirit lets them stiffen into convictions. – He, however, whose spirit is free and restlessly alive can prevent this stiffening through continual change’. Here we see a process akin to that of values asserting themselves as dogmatic perspectives on the world. The countermeasure is a restlessness and an abundance of life that refuses to allow the free spirit to settle on any one perspective. Nietzsche then goes on to present a dichotomy that maps the moments of losing and finding oneself onto the notion of justice. The two moments are rendered here as ‘fire’ and ‘spirit’:

> But let us, who are compound creatures, now heated up by fire, now cooled down by the spirit, kneel down before justice as the only goddess we recognize over us. The fire in us usually makes us unjust and, from the viewpoint of that goddess, impure; in this
condition we may never grasp her hand, never will the smile of her pleasure light upon us. We revere her as the veiled Isis of our lives; abashed, we offer up to her our pain as penance and sacrifice whenever the fire seeks to burn and consume us. It is the spirit that rescues us, so that we are not wholly reduced to ashes; it tears us away from the sacrificial altar of justice or encloses us in a coat of asbestos. Redeemed from the fire, driven now by the spirit, we advance from opinion to opinion, through one party after another, as noble traitors to all things that can in any way be betrayed – and yet we feel no sense of guilt.

First, the free spirit evinces a clear commitment to justice. Then there is the claim that the fire in us makes us unjust. Now, however, there is an inversion in the relation to justice. The fire is that which draws us towards justice, not injustice. So on the one hand, the fire in us leads us to be unjust; on the other, it is that which tethers us to justice in such a way as to hinder us in pursuing truth. Similarly, the spirit is that which tears us away from the altar of justice.

Although N is not yet talking in terms of perspectives, the project of incorporating truth can shed some light on this apparent confusion. Two aphorisms earlier, we find individuals who take themselves to be seekers of knowledge, but who are in fact only interested in igniting and maintaining ‘the fire of convictions’ (HH 635). Those who foster convictions think they do justice to the world because, as far as they are concerned, there is a real world out there and as knowledge seekers we are duty bound to align our perspective with it. However, if perspectivism holds, then this way of treating the world is unjust because it treats intentional objects as something other than the fluctuating, mind-dependent entities that they are. So the fire that burns to keep individuals before the altar of justice is the very same thing that leads them to be unjust. That is, their strong desire for knowledge, because it does not realise itself within the framework of perspectivism, ends up preventing them from incorporating truth. The free spirit, by contrast, is seen as an unjust traitor by those who take their perspective to be the truth and they seek to make him feel guilty for abandoning it. However, his cultivation of the scientific spirit prevents him succumbing to this. The free spirit has a more complex relation to justice. On the one hand, he is freed to a certain extent from the demand to adhere to that perspective which does justice to the world (to kneel at the altar); on the other, his activity of moving through perspectives actually does more justice to the nature of the world of appearances. Nietzsche’s ‘new justice’ does not seek to reduce all perspectives to one, but treats them as perspectives qua perspective. Even so, the free spirit, as long as he lives in perspectives – i.e. lives at all – he is still, to some extent, unjust.

The difference between the free spirit and those whom Nietzsche is attacking in this
passage is not that one lives in illusion and the other not; nor is it that one is just and the other unjust.\textsuperscript{20} Both are unjust insofar as they live within perspectives. This difference is made clearer in \textit{GS} 57, where Nietzsche attacks those he calls ‘realists’. Realists take themselves to be ‘\textit{incapable} of drunkenness’: they take their perspectives not to be the result of their passions and related interpretations, but windows into reality. Nietzsche responds:

\begin{quote}
There is no ‘reality’ for us – and not for you either, you sober ones – we are not nearly as strange to one another as you think, and perhaps our good will to transcend drunkenness is just as respectable as your belief that you are altogether \textit{incapable} of drunkenness.
\end{quote}

‘Our’ will to transcend drunkenness cannot be a will to access a noumenal realm, since we know that is out of the question. I suggest that that transcendence should be understood as realised through the project of incorporating truth as I have outlined it. It is not a matter of standing outside of perspectives, but of immersing oneself in as many perspectives as possible. This does not do justice to a world beyond appearances by finding that perspective which is adequate to it; instead, it remains within the world of appearances and does justice to it as appearance. This is a justice that must, at the same time, play cautiously with its opposite, namely the claim that each perspective presents to be justified in presenting the objects that it does as mind-independent things-in-themselves. The individual who takes on this project puts himself at risk because he undermines the stability of the world around him, as well as that of his own character, which is inextricably entwined with that world.\textsuperscript{21}

This thesis has so far concerned itself with Nietzsche’s theoretical descriptions of the origins and structure of experience. But Nietzsche’s project is as much a normative as it is descriptive. Gemes recognises this in his analysis of perspectivism.\textsuperscript{22} He dismisses semantic and epistemic readings of perspectivism in favour of one that has a ‘psychobiological’ descriptive component and a normative component that revolves around health. One of Gemes’ main reasons for rejecting semantic perspectivism is that it refutes itself. Gemes

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\textsuperscript{20}Maudemarie Clark and David Dudrick incorrectly claim that in \textit{HH}, Nietzsche’s free spirits are able to transcend valuation. They claim talk about \textit{HH} 34 as ‘his presentation of the “better man” as one who abstains from evaluation’. But this conclusion does not follow from the passage. Their quotation of it contains the claim that the for the attribution of responsibility, not with value. The aphorism opens expressly talking about moral ‘oughts’ no longer being employed, with pleasure and pain being all that remains. I am claiming that pleasure and pain are precisely evaluative in that they draw us to or repel us from aspects of our experienced world, which manifests as experiencing things as having value properties. Nietzsche goes on to claim only that the free spirit is free from ‘the traditional evaluations of things’, but not evaluation as such. Therefore the free spirit is still unjust insofar as he writes his own values into the world. See Maudemarie Clark and David Dudrick, ‘Nietzsche and Moral Objectivity: The Development of Nietzsche’s Metaethics,’ in \textit{Nietzsche and Morality}, ed. Brian Leiter and Neil Sinhababu (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 200.

\textsuperscript{21}Denat has proposed something similar, albeit in the context of language. She sees the need for us to embrace the fluid nature of language rather than deny it. Like my project, hers focuses not on transcending language, but on embraces certain features already within it. See Denat, “To Speak in Images”: The Status of Rhetoric and Metaphor in Nietzsche’s New Language,’ 36.

\textsuperscript{22}Gemes, ‘Life’s Perspectives,’ 563.
follows the principle of charity in interpretation: one ought 'not to ascribe incoherent views to interpretees'. He also claims that there are few mentions of perspectivism in the published texts. Given that, we ought not to use the texts to justify overruling the principle of charity and attributing Nietzsche an incoherent view. However, this is slightly misleading in that it overlooks the fact that the underlying commitments on which perspectivism is grounded are not in short supply in the texts. His not using the term perspectivism in every case does not justify our dismissing such passages. As I hope to have shown in chapter 2, the theory of experience constitution that Nietzsche proposes points in the direction of the self-undermining view that we cannot legitimately make any true claims about a mind-independent world; this is sometimes rendered as the claim that there are no facts, only interpretations.

What Gemes wants is a theory perspectivism that does not fall victim to what he calls 'facile refutations'; that is, it is not easily shown to be self-undermining. This is what a psycho-biological account is supposed to provide. But does it? The basic claim is that organisms are composed of drives which struggle with one another to interpret the world, where interpretation just amounts to responding in a certain. We are a totality of drives and nothing more. But how can such a strong claim not have implications for either knowledge or truth? Any claim we might make about the nature of the world is presumably just a particular disposition in us that is dominant at the given time, including our tendency to express the claim that we are composed of drives that interpret by reacting in certain ways. That there are no facts, only interpretations is a claim that arises from the same view of the individual, namely as a collection of drives each of which presents the world in accordance with its end. For every dominant drive, there is a corresponding perspective and therefore a corresponding presented world. That world is just a function of the drive's interpretation. That Gemes reduces interpretation to mere behaviour makes this even more problematic. It is not clear that behaviourism, where this line of thinking ends up, can give any viable account of knowledge.

The normative components of Gemes’ view centres on health and perspectivism’s ability to engender it. He quotes a passage from GM 3.12 which deals with perspectivism, writing the following about it:

Where this passage is, in the traditional matter, interpreted as a discourse on the nature of knowledge and objectivity or as a thesis about truth or justification, its function in GM is totally obscure.

Why after having in section 11 finally identified the priest as prime mover behind the ascetic ideal, the focal point of the third essay of

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23Gemes, 'Life’s Perspectives,’ 556.
24Christoph Cox has made the point that Nietzsche uses ‘interpretation’and ‘perspective’in a very similar, if not identical manner. Once we see that, then given the ubiquity of discussion of interpretation, perspectivism is no longer a fringe theory. See Cox, Nietzsche, 111ff.
GM, does Nietzsche turn to epistemological/semantical concerns, after which, in the remainder of the essay, he concentrates on the effects of the priest as a failed physician who only serves to make the sick sicker? I suggest that it is really functioning here to surreptitiously give Nietzsche’s countermodel of and injunction towards genuine health.  

Gemes’ claim is that the GM passage should be understood as an injunction to health and I agree with him. But that does not mean that it does not take the form of an epistemological/semantical claim or claims. There is no mention in the GM passage of anything resembling Gemes’ psychophysical account. The following passage from the same section looks a lot more like the conscious, experiential project of incorporation that I have been describing:

Finally, as knowers, let us not be ungrateful towards such resolute reversals of familiar perspectives and valuations with which the mind has raged against itself for far too long, apparently to wicked and useless effect: to see differently, and to want to see differently to that degree, is no small discipline... (GM 3.12)

The emphasis here is not on merely coming to respond differently to the world, but on seeing differently. Reading the rest of the passage, it is hard not to take it to be making either epistemological or semantic claims. I propose that a more natural way to think about the descriptive/prescriptive divide is as follows. Nietzsche’s perspectivism is epistemological in that way I have described in this thesis; moreover it falls victim to self-refutation when pushed; however, Nietzsche is not ultimately concerned with its validity, but rather its ability to engender health. I still think that Nietzsche believes in his theory and perhaps fails to notice that it undermines itself. But assuming he is aware of it, perhaps he views self-undermining as an occupational hazard for sceptics, since almost any reason given in favour of scepticism is vulnerable to it. It could also be the case that the self-undermining nature of perspectivism, while not necessarily being deliberate as some commentators have suggested, is nonetheless instrumental to health in virtue of the fact that one cannot simply take it as dogma. Its undermining of itself forces the individual to seek for an alternative theory of knowledge; but Nietzsche thinks that all such theories undermine themselves in some way. As such, the individual who is actually receptive to these possibilities of undermining is not simply going to alight on another theory of knowledge; they are going to

27 Nietzsche often presents a theory in such a way that he wants the reader to question it. He says of will to power, for example, ‘Granted, this is only an interpretation too – and you will be eager enough to make this objection? – well then, so much the better’ (BGE 22).
continue to be sceptical, just as perspectivism prescribes. Something like this will feature in the next chapter, albeit with the notion of scepticism as an identity.\(^{28}\)

I think Gemes takes a valuable step in shifting the focus towards perspectivism as a means to health. I also agree that at bottom, Nietzsche is more concerned with health than truth. However, I also think that perspectivism’s content – and it needs content, even if it is a tactical deployment – is not captured by the psycho-biological account, which is as vulnerable as any other to accusations of self-refutation and is not supported by the text. In the next chapter, I focus more on the criterion of health that underpins Nietzsche’s philosophy.

\(^{28}\)An alternative strategy is to adopt ‘weak perspectivism’ of the kind that Hales and Welshon put forward. They claim that perspectivism is true in all human perspectives, which is not to say that it is extra-perspectivally true. Moreover, they claim that this is one of a very limited set of such things (logic being another). On this reading, we might think of the activity of the free spirit as a continual testament to weak perspectivism. In every perspective he occupies, the free spirit demonstrates the truth of perspectivism by undermining that particular perspective. See Hales and Welshon, *Nietzsche’s Perspectivism*, 31.
Chapter 5

Progress

Nietzsche’s works are full of expressions of his preferences for various qualities in individuals, institutions, and cultures. Some of these can be interpreted as following on from deeper commitments that he has; others can be attributed to his character and its context. By preferences I simply mean values that have no obvious place within a larger value structure. My preference for oranges over apples need does not make reference to any other values that I have; but I might well value oranges over apples with reference to other values and this is less amenable to being spoken of as a matter of preference. Once we accept a value or set of values, we can make sense of progress as measured relative to the instantiation of that value. Applying this to Nietzsche, it is possible to understand Nietzschean progress as being based on his preferences. One form of this approach is to talk about that which Nietzsche takes to be ‘higher’ or to belong to ‘higher individuals’ without specifying the criteria that decide whether something is higher or lower. Ruth Abbey, for instance, adopts this approach. She writes passages such as the following: ‘the major factor separating higher from lower seems to be the degree of rivalry one feels, the extent to which one takes independent pleasure in the self rather than needing to subordinate others for self-aggrandisement’.

The danger in such an approach is that one ends up in a tight and explanatory circle: some types are higher because they possess certain qualities; those qualities are higher because they are possessed by higher types. That is not to devalue Abbey’s work, which does a fine job of assigning the proper focus to various elements in FSW, many of which define it as distinct from the later works. However, this is largely a descriptive enterprise which rests on taking Nietzsche’s division of qualities into higher and lower at face value. The alternative is to try to identify from where Nietzsche derives these values. I suggest that his higher qualities have their root in a quasi-biological conception of life. The individual virtues derive their value from their instrumental relation to the seeking of knowledge and the project of incorporation. This in turn rests on the concept of life which, in the later works, will become the will to power. This is the foundation that

provides a way to measure progress. I address these topics in the order of their reduction: virtues, knowledge, health, power.

5.1 Virtues

There is evidence that Nietzsche takes virtues to be valuable as means rather than ends. That is to say, virtues are not constitutive of flourishing, but only instrumental to it. This is captured best in *WS* 212:

> morality (inherited, handed down, instinctual acting *in accordance with moral feelings*) is on the decline: but the individual virtues, moderation, justice, repose of soul, are not – for when the conscious mind has attained its highest degree of freedom it is involuntarily led to them and comes to recognize how *useful* they [sic] are.

We already know that freedom is associated with the search for knowledge. Virtues can be said to aid in that search in two main ways: directly and indirectly. Honesty falls into the former category, since Nietzsche mostly uses the term not to talk about honesty regarding oneself and one's experiences, rather than as regulating one's exchanges with others. This is tied closely to his notion of the intellectual conscience, which is partly what allows an individual to free himself from the grip of a perspective that seeks dominance over his experience. Circumspection is another virtue that, although not traditional, is described as 'the virtue of virtues, their great-grandmother and queen' (*WS* 294). This is the virtue that finds its expression in Nietzsche's original discipline, philology. In talking about books he tells us 'to read slowly, deeply, looking cautiously before and aft, with reservations, with doors left open, with delicate eyes and fingers' (*DP*:5). Nietzsche sees experience as a text and this approach to reading extends into an approach to experience more generally. Once again, we have here the means to finding in our perspective the cracks that eventually allow us to prise it apart. The battle against dogmatism is not fought only through the destruction of perspectives, but through close attention to oneself as the source of convictions, which 'grow up in us like fungus: one morning they are there, we know not how' (*D* 382). Full access to the subconscious may be precluded, but close attention to what we can discover and its relation to our experience plays a role in the project of incorporation.

Virtues that can be said to indirectly serve knowledge include bravery and magnanimity. Bravery is needed by those who undermine the very foundations that give meaning to them and their culture. In an 'age full of danger', Nietzsche writes, 'bravery and manliness become more valuable' (*D* 172); an enlightenment requires 'brave soldiers of knowledge' (*D* 576). Magnanimity is brought together with bravery in Nietzsche's use of imagery borrowed from knighthood and aristocracy. In *EH*, he even uses the phrase 'knight of
knowledge’ (EH P:4). Nietzsche connects magnanimity to ‘knightly virtue’ (D 191), and describes it as the ‘fairest virtue of the great thinker’ (D 459). This knightly life suits the reality of Nietzsche’s free spirits rather well. They must be able to live with a degree of indifference to the opinions of others and to external contingencies; but they must also be able to face those things which impinge on them despite their attempted indifference. The way Nietzsche writes about knighthood suggests that he not only sees it as useful, but that he himself is drawn to it. There is room for both of these, but it is in the former that further work can be done with his texts. Having said that, chapter 6 will show that the romantic aura that surrounds knights is something Nietzsche is not only drawn to, but which he exploits. For now, there is a final virtue to discuss: moderation.

Moderation is a running theme in Nietzsche’s middle period; the word itself features twenty-seven times across the works. Although it does not immediately present itself as epistemically relevant, it actually provides a rich understanding of the relation of virtue to knowledge when tracked in the text. Moderation allows an individual to remain sober (AOM 326). This is an important link to knowledge because sobriety is opposed to intoxication, and intoxication has strong epistemological connotations in FSW. Intoxication is mentioned in a few contexts, including religious and artistic feeling. What connects many of these instances is the idea of being lost in something, whether it be an idea, a belief or a mood. There is a sense of total commitment to that thing. For instance, intoxication is linked to Christianity’s declaration that doubt is a sin (D 89). This is seen as an attempt to keep the individual locked into a particular belief system rather than engaging in the circumspection mentioned above. Intoxication in this context relies on shutting out everything but that with which one is intoxicated; this is captured with the nearby concept of infatuation. Just as with literal intoxicants, the strength of one’s intoxication is proportional to the loss of one’s faculties of judgement. Intoxication is not exclusive to religion, but can be found in any area that fosters strong, narrow feeling. There is one aphorism that provides a strong link between intoxication and perspectivism: GS 57, To the realists.

Here, Nietzsche accuses those that call themselves realists of believing themselves to be free of a drunkenness, which they presumably associate with metaphysics, art and religion. Nietzsche claims that their obsession with reality, with avoiding the drunkenness they see in others, is, in fact, its own form of drunkenness. In other words, the world they take to be real is constructed by the forces of interpretation that all appearances spring from. Nietzsche, unlike these realists, recognises that we cannot help but be embedded in such a world; the difference comes down to this: the realist believes themselves to have escaped intoxication, whereas Nietzsche and his free spirits recognise that they are embedded in such intoxication, but employ methods to limit it. That is, they strive to be sober to the extent that such a thing is possible, using the incorporation of truth as I have outlined it. The downfall of the realist is in their taking there to be a single correct perspective – that which reveals the world they designate ‘real’ – and, as a result, they are in fact as intoxicated
This is the danger that faces the free spirit, namely that they are tempted at points in their journey by perspectives that appear to be the ‘true’ perspective. This could be a scientific theory, a metaphysical system, or a moment of religious transcendence. These moments seem to the free spirit to challenge the doctrine of perspectivism by offering to encompass all reality without remainder. Despite presenting themselves as the release from intoxication, they are simply a new form of it. The danger for the free spirit of these perspectives is that he run aground on them, unable or unwilling to launch himself back into the sea of becoming. The realist, despite his disavowal of the metaphysical commitments of religion, actually exhibits what Nietzsche calls ‘the metaphysical need’. This is the need to feel that one is in touch with the singular, stable substratum to reality. That the free spirit must resist the metaphysical need is stressed more than once in _FSW_ (e.g. _HH_ 153).

The idea of becoming stuck in a single perspective surfaces again in the preface to _HH_, where Nietzsche talks about the free spirit emerging from his isolation...

...to that *mature* freedom of spirit which is equally self-mastery and discipline of the heart and permits access to many and contradictory modes of thought – that inner spaciousness and indulgence of superabundance which excludes the danger that the spirit may even on its own road perhaps lose itself and become infatuated and remain seated intoxicated in some corner or other, to that superfluity of formative, curative, moulding and restorative forces which is precisely the sign of *great health*... (HH p4)

This dense passage contains some key ideas that I have been discussing. First, there is the idea of inner spaciousness, which I take to refer to the fact that the individual is not committed to a single, narrow perspective, but is rather a traveller and explorer of perspectives. This is what Nietzsche means by ‘contradictory modes of thought’: they are contradictory because each presents a different world. Second, the concepts of intoxication and infatuation are mentioned in the same breath as a danger that the free spirit avoids. Given the context, this infatuation should be taken to pertain to single perspectives. The idea of being seated in a corner somewhere also speaks in favour of this: a corner is a narrow dead end in the world. This is precisely what the great health avoids.

The foregoing can be boiled down to the claim that intoxication, although having connotations of an elevated mood, is, a great deal of the time, an epistemic phenomenon. In light of this, we should understand sobriety not only as a way of being that relates to one’s mood, but as a matter of refraining from being drawn to deeply into a single perspective such that one risks becoming stuck. This analysis carries over to moderation, which can now be understood as an epistemic virtue. Being moderate consists in not allowing drives to flare up whenever the opportunity for their satisfaction is present; but a significant
part of drive activity is interpretation and it is these interpretations by which drives create domineering perspectives that moderation helps to guard against. This is why Nietzsche continually connects the aloofness of the free spirit to his ability to encounter a range of perspectives. It is his moderation that allows him to avoid being dragged into the tumult of human life.

It should be noted that there is a balancing act here between being stuck in a perspective and entering into perspectives for the purpose of incorporating truth. The individual must allow their experience to be altered without being at the whim of perspectives. This measure of control reaches its fullest expression when Nietzsche compares to a dance in HH 278. He talks about the need to enter into metaphysics, religion and poetry, a clear sign that a retreat to pure stoic contemplation is not an option. But he also warns of the danger of ‘a feeble vacillation back and forth between different drives’. This motion, he claims, is to be distinguished from a dance, which involves tightly controlled but also free-flowing movement. The dancer throws themselves into various often passionate movements, just as the thinker throws themselves into perspectives, committing temporarily to them. Great dancers do not lose themselves in such passion. They maintain strict control over their timing, their posture and so on. Indeed, at least in the case of dancing, this control is what allows them to give the appearance of losing themselves in the moment. Similarly, the free spirit cultivates the moderation to avoid becoming genuinely lost in a perspective, but that does not exclude losing himself as the dancer does, namely as part of a bigger project, and with the intention to emerge from that perspective to move to the next. Just as dancers train for many years to achieve this control, so the free spirit must cultivate his virtues to allow for this intellectual dance. This, ultimately, is the moderation that I think Nietzsche has in mind. It is not a permanent retreat from human life into quiet contemplation and solitude. True, the free spirit craves these things as well, but he does so as part of a greater cultural project that includes working one’s way deeper into human life than those who are engaged in it. Moderation, read in the context of the parable of the dance, should be read as self-control even in one’s deepest perspectival experiments.

Virtuous individuals are capable of entering into the project of incorporating truth. *FSW* details many ways in which this is so. It remains valid to say that higher individuals possess certain virtues, but now we see that what unites those virtues is a deeper project. Measuring progress can no longer consist in simply measuring the degree to which certain virtues are instantiated, but should make reference to the degree to which truth is incorporated. In the remainder of the chapter, I will try to show that incorporation should be understood as connected to health, which is in turn derived from what it is to be a living thing. This separates virtues from health such that it no longer makes sense to say that health, even of the ‘soul’, consists in possessing certain virtues. Rather, health will prove to be a matter of expressing the maximum will to life.
5.2 **Health**

5.2.1 **The common conception**

To be in good health ordinarily means that one's vital systems are functioning as they ought to: kidneys filter waste effectively, the heart pumps blood, and the blood carries oxygen to cells and waste away from them. While there are other uses for the term, such as mental or spiritual health, this basic notion of physical health is the most well-defined and universal. In each of the examples given, an organ or part of the body has a function and its health consists in fulfilling that function. It is only in virtue of having a function that a part of the body is subject to the normativity inherent in the notion of health. These functions are in turn determined by a particular end, namely survival and reproduction. The filtration of waste is only the function of the kidneys because it allows for the survival to reproductive age of the organism. The evolutionary history of the kidneys is what fixes their function and their continued functionality is what, in part, explains their continued appearance in nature.

The above is a simple evolutionary account of health, but one can have a conception of physical health without knowing anything about evolution. However, one cannot have such a conception without some notion of function. The Ancient Greeks did not need to know evolutionary theory to recognise that the heart serves to pump blood round the body, nor did they require it to know the difference between a faulty and a working pump. That is to say, they could recognise a healthy heart without knowing the evolutionary history of the heart. Nonetheless, they connected health to survival and reproduction, as does anyone employing the notion in its common form. Both the evolutionary thinker and the layman conceive of health as a matter of perpetuating life, whether within or across generations. When restricted to bodily health, this is compatible with range of positions on the health of the soul which choose to assign human beings some purpose over and above survival and reproduction. So spiritual health might be taken to consist in happiness, greatness, creativity and any number of criteria without these impacting the way we conceive of bodily health.

For an organism to be healthy, its parts must serve the whole, each fulfilling their function in the overall structure. This organisation is where organisms get their name. When an organ fails to fulfil its function, the survival and reproduction of the organism is threatened; it is said to be unhealthy. That is not to say that the organisms chances of surviving and reproducing are limited every time it becomes unhealthy: there are many cases where poor health does not affect these, for example having a minor cold. The claim more precisely is that the health of the organism is historically determined by its ability to survive and reproduce, and this bestows on the parts their own function within that whole. That organ's function can be expressed in terms of survival and reproduction. Once
this function is assigned, any impediment to the organ fulfilling its function can be labelled unhealthy, and it is only in virtue of it having this function that such a label means anything.

On this simplified view, the conditions of life are that each part of an organism fulfil its function and that the organism as a whole control the functioning of those parts. It is in virtue of maintaining this relationship of executive control by the whole on the parts that an organism can be distinguished from a mere collection of organs or agglomeration of biochemical material. These basic conditions of life yield a notion of health that captures the vast majority of our use of the term to talk about the body. Diseases, malfunctions, defects, cancers – all can be understood as impediments to the functioning of the body as defined in terms of survival and reproduction, or a breaking down of the its structure. Contained in this account are several ideas that Nietzsche attacks in his middle period. The key ones are first that there is a single end – survival and reproduction – that is universal to everyone and second that it makes sense to talk in teleological terms about nature. Rather than address these here, I want to further elaborate health, but in the context of Nietzsche’s own biological commitments. This will help us not only to understand how he conceives of health, but also why he opposes the claims I have just mentioned. The first step is to look more closely at Nietzsche’s conception of life, the conditions of which determine health.

5.2.2 Nietzsche on Life

The importance of the notion of life for the current chapter is that it forms the basis for understanding health for Nietzsche. That which constitutes life is that which allows health to be measured. The common conception of health that I have outlined follows from attention to the conditions of survival for a life form. For Nietzsche, mere survival should be distinguished from flourishing, which for him involves an abundance of life within the individual. Clearly survival is a condition of this abundance, but it is not equivalent. In this section, I will argue that Nietzsche’s understanding of the nature of life leads him to offer a conception of health that supplements and extends the common conception. Contrary to some of what he appears to say, Nietzsche does not seek to abolish the common conception of health. We will see why this is so at the end of the section. First, the task is to see what precisely Nietzsche finds unacceptable in the common conception of health and the notion of life that he employs.

On the Darwinian account that I have given, the health of organs follows directly from their function in aiding survival. The organism is healthy when its organs function correctly. From a Nietzschean perspective, this presents two problems. First, it assumes that the governing principle of life is survival. Second, the functional account cannot be applied to organisms unless they too have a function; but no such function is apparent. The organism is not itself an organ, nor is its function survival. To understand both points, we first need to know more about Nietzsche’s criticism of and alternative to Darwinism.
The organism, as the name suggests, involves organisation. Since the healthy organism is one in which the parts – organs and cells – serve the whole, we would be forgiven for using the analogy of a cooperative commune in which every member fulfils their role for the good of the whole. But if the organism is a community, then for Nietzsche it is not a peaceful, cooperative one, but a tyranny in which the tendency of individuals to overpower, dominate and threaten the whole needs to be constantly kept in check. For Nietzsche, it is the nature of living things, including cells, to expand, grow, assimilate and overpower; it is only the command structure of the organism that manages this struggle such that the whole remains intact. Nietzsche’s source for this idea is biologist Wilhelm Roux’s work *The Struggle of Parts in the Organism*. This view answers a sceptical worry that Nietzsche has about Darwin’s explanation for evolution. The best survival strategy is to stick with what has proven to be successful. After all, some of the simplest organisms on earth are some of the most successful. With change, Nietzsche reasons, comes risk. On Roux’s picture, living things at every level exhibit an expansive force. Change within the whole is therefore a constant. Evolution, in the minimal sense of change, occurs at different rates depending upon limiting conditions. So some changes can be suppressed, for example. Nietzsche thinks that natural selection involves the suppression, or slowing, of change and therefore of evolution. The formation of new parts in the organism occurs on account of the inherent expansiveness of its constituents. Moreover, survival is neither a driving force of this change, nor does it guide it at every stage. Nietzsche’s clearest expression of this opposition to Darwin is in his later notebooks. For instance, he writes the following in 1886:

For the longest time during which a quality is being formed, it does not preserve the individual and does not benefit him, least of all in the struggle with external conditions and enemies. . . . The individual itself is a struggle of parts (for food, space, etc.): its development associated with *victory, hegemony* of individual parts with a *stunting* or ‘reduction to organs’ of other parts… (NF 1886 7[25])

This thought has its counterpart in *FSW*. In D 122, Nietzsche talks about the evolution of the eye, claiming that ‘vision was not the intention behind the eye… vision appeared, rather, after chance had put the apparatus together’. The question of teleology arises here, which will be discussed momentarily. The other point that I take Nietzsche to be making is that the process by which new features of an organism develop is divorced from the function that they come to serve. Therefore, the function cannot explain the development. Vision cannot explain the development of the eye because vision is a function that is only

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2 die längste Zeit, während deren eine Eigenschaft sich bildet, erhält sie das Individuum nicht und nützt ihm nicht, am wenigsten im Kampfe mit äußeren Umständen und Feinden…. Das Individuum selbst als Kampf der Theile (um Nahrung, Raum usw.): seine Entwicklung geknüpft an ein *Siegen, Vorberrichten* einzelner Theile, an ein *Verkümmern*, „Organwerden“ anderer Theile…

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subsequently bestowed upon it. Christian J. Emden has claimed that for Nietzsche ‘The emergence of biological forms... could not be seriously detached from the functions they perform’. His evidence is Nietzsche’s claim that ‘a new form will not for long be without a relation to a partial advantage and subsequently develop with ever greater perfection according to this use’ (NF 1886 7[25]). But since the eye, for example, is already a complex form, development clearly can be detached from function, since to say that the function of the eye is only subsequently assigned is to allow a great deal of functionless development, so to speak. In my opinion, Emden underplays the distinction between Nietzsche and Darwin on the question of gradual evolution, where every stage of which must be beneficial. This clashes somewhat with the idea that organs are defined in terms of their function. If the eye is that which sees, it is not clear how it could have developed before having the function of vision. This never seems to occur to Nietzsche and he gives little auxiliary comment on it. I suspect that is because his real target is the idea of evolution aiming at a function rather than that function explaining evolution in a non-teleological way. That is to say, his desire to combat strong teleology spills over into his views on the development of organs in this passage.

Although I think Emden exaggerates the degree to which function is part of Nietzsche’s evolutionary explanations, he is right that Nietzsche thinks of natural selection as having a role in the preservation of certain features of organisms. Once the eye comes to have the function of vision, it serves to help preserve the organism. Those lacking vision are out-competed by those with it. There are many occasions on which Nietzsche talks about survival pressure being responsible for the continued presence. In GS, he claims that the interpretive practises by which we constitute experience are the result of natural selection:

Through immense periods of time, the intellect produced nothing but errors; some of them turned out to be useful and species-

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4Quoted from Emden. Original: eine neue Form nicht lange ohne eine Beziehung zu einem partiellen Nutzen stehen wird, und dann dem Gebrauche nach sich immer vollkommener ausgestaltet. See ibid.
5At another point, Emden again read these thinkers as closer than they are by emphasising the fact that for Darwin, evolution need not proceed methodically, but could take place according what Gould and Eldredge call ‘punctuated equilibria’. That is, it could occur rapidly in short bursts, interspersed by periods of little change. The problem with applying this to Nietzsche is that these bursts still involve multiple generations with small changes; the theory does not refer to mutations that lead to new complex structures within a generation. The void between Darwin and Nietzsche regarding gradual development is not affected by this, since the former still thinks that many small steps that are beneficial occur in evolution, whereas the latter does not think that selection applies until after the formation of a quality. The ‘leap’ that Emden sees in Nietzsche – involving the creation of morality – seems to be one that occurs at a definite point in history, but the kind of leaps that Gould and Darwin hypothesise are still on a relatively large time scale, albeit not when compared with evolution as a whole. They are still gradual in the sense of being spread over many generations. See Emden, *Nietzsche’s Naturalism*, 195f. On punctuated equilibria see Stephen J. Gould and Niles Eldredge, ‘Punctuated Equilibria: An Alternative to Phyletic Gradualism,’ in *Models in Paleobiology*, ed. T. J. M. Schopf (San Francisco: Freeman, 1972), 82–115.
preserving; those who hit upon or inherited them fought their fight for themselves and their progeny with greater luck. (GS 110)

This complicates Nietzsche's critique of Darwin. What he really seems to be opposed to is the view that change is generated in response to survival pressure. This is certainly not Darwin's own position: variation is the keystone in Darwin's argument. But in the *Origin* at least, he remains agnostic as to its cause, and certainly would not commit to the view that their future survival value actually caused variations to appear. Natural selection is the process by which less advantageous variations are eliminated, leaving the more advantageous ones to be passed on and spread through the population. So in one respect, Nietzsche’s expansive life force is actually a supplement to Darwin in that it provides an explanation for the 'raw material' of evolution, namely variation. There is still a crucial difference between the two, however, which is that for Darwin, all evolution is gradual and natural selection operates at every stage. For Nietzsche developments can reach a degree of complexity before they are assigned a function and assimilated into the economy of the organism.

Nietzsche’s real target to be those who conflate function with goals or purposes. In *GM*, where we are told that “The “development” of a thing, a tradition, an organ is therefore certainly not its *progressus* towards a goal, still less is it a logical *progressus*, taking the shortest route with least expenditure of energy and cost’ (*GM* 2.12). In the same passage, functions are still part of the natural order. Indeed, for human beings at least, goals and purposes are also meaningful. We can have goals, but to read that ability into evolution is a mistake. We plan things by projecting or representing future states that guide our current actions, which is a perfectly natural activity enabled by our representational capacities. This is not a matter of backwards causation because the future state is represented in the present, and it is the representation that causes us to behave in certain ways. This does not map onto the evolutionary process itself. Nietzsche reacts to this lack of foresight by falling back on mere chance and randomness, without appreciating that this is a false dichotomy. The function of vision explains the evolution of the eye in way that makes its existence non-random, but it does not explain it in virtue of their being a final state of sophisticated vision that was the target of the process of development from basic to complex eyes. Perhaps Nietzsche is best read as claiming that there is an irreducible element of chance in evolution such that nothing inevitably evolves. As I noted before, however, Nietzsche does not deny that the eye has the function of vision, only that this was not the reason that it first evolved.

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7I have claimed that Nietzsche gets Darwin wrong in several respects, but this assumes that Nietzsche is actually aiming his critique at Darwin. Extensive work has been carried out by Emden to show that Nietzsche is really engaging with a range of Darwinist positions around at the time. Even calling Nietzsche an anti-Darwinist is misleading given that Darwinism was not a consistent position at the time. See Emden, *Nietzsche’s Naturalism*, ch. 3.

8This is Emden’s position. See ibid., 102.
A useful metaphor for understanding Nietzsche's position is that of pushing and pulling. In the case of purpose, there is a pulling force exerted by a future state that ensures development arrives at that state. It is as though something were tied to a rope and then thrown randomly into a maze before being reeled in. Such an object inevitably escapes the maze, taking a path that is determined by the position of the rope. So in the case of the eye, the completed state of the eye with the function of vision pulls the development of the eye along a historical channel. Nietzsche erroneously sees Darwin's view as subscribing to something like this on a larger scale in that the preservation of life is an aim towards which life is constantly pulled. Nietzsche's view is that development is the result of a pushing force. Life is constantly expanding, multiplying and diversifying; development occurs because of this force. It is as though the maze had at its centre a spring that constantly pumped water. As the water spreads out it fills various channels; where it meets resistance, pressure builds until that resistance is overcome, or pressure builds to the point that the water backs up and ends up flowing more vigorously down an alternate path. Thus development is inevitable, provided the spring continues to flow, but the paths down which that development occurs are not chosen in advance. Like all metaphors, this one is limited. While life is expansive, it is more than mere energy; living things have a certain structure and they only continue to live in virtue of that structure remaining intact. The expansion of life is not only the reproduction of cells, but also the formation of ever more complex, dynamic systems.

Nietzsche's anti-Darwinism is not a complete denial of the role of natural selection, nor does it emphasise dynamism at the expense of stability. Rather, it seeks to restore a balance into evolutionary theory such that it is not exhausted by the mechanism of natural selection. If we are to conceive of health as based on the nature of life, then on this new picture, it should make reference both to the survival of the organism and to its inherent expansive forces. The problem with the common conception of health is that it prioritises the survival of the individual at the expense of the expansive life energy which Nietzsche sometimes refers to as the abundance of life. There is a final nuance to this picture which will help make sense of the notion of great health later on. The regulation of the organism that allows it to survive is not the exclusive remit of natural selection. It is also a manifestation of that force in all life that tends to expand the sphere of its influence. The parts of the organism constantly impose themselves on the other parts; the organism as a whole is command structure that imposes its authority on the struggling parts. If this account is reminiscent of the later notion of will to power, that is because, as I will later argue, will to power and will to life are already present in some form in *UM* and *FSW*. I have answered Nietzsche's first problem with the common conception of health, namely that it overlooks the expansive force of life in focusing on survival. The task now is to deal with the second problem with the common conception, which is that it relies on a functional account of organs and life systems, which, given that organisms lack a comparable function, makes...
the overall health of the human being a different prospect.

Whether we should or not, we can talk about the goal of an organism being survival, but to say that survival is its function is to posit a larger system of which it is a part. Leaving aside the case of societies or communities that might well assign a function to organisms, function is not the best way to characterise the health of an organism. The function of the heart is to pump blood and anything that performs that function in the body is legitimately called a heart. An artificial heart is still a heart even if it performs the function of pumping blood in a completely different manner than that which it replaces. A living thing, by contrast, is characterised not by function, but by various processes. The precise details of this are a matter of ongoing debate in biology. Some common features of life are less contentious than others. Ernst Mayr identifies eight ‘characteristics’ of living things, which in turn imbue them with a further seven ‘capacities’.

**Characteristics:** evolved programs; chemical properties; regulatory mechanisms; organisation; telenomic systems; limited order of magnitude; life cycle; open systems.

**Capacity for:** evolution; self-replication; growth and differentiation via a genetic program; metabolism (the binding and release of energy); self-regulation, to keep the complex the system in a steady state (homeostasis, feedback); response to stimuli from the environment (through perception and sense organs); change at two levels, that of the phenotype and that of the genotype.

Mayr’s list is by no means the only one and some of its items are problematic than others. For instance, the characteristic chemical properties of living things are that they consist of molecules ‘not found in inanimate nature’; these include ‘peptides, enzymes, hormones’. The controversy of this claim arises from the efforts of those for whom life is a matter of form. That is to say, it is conceivable that one could replace cells with nano-robots that perform the same tasks and need not employ any of these chemicals. It would be misleading to describe an organism in which this occurs as dead. But this is not the technological circumstance under which the controversy arose. Rather, it was the project of making artificial life, which consists for the most part in programming computer simulations of living systems. Many of those engaged in such projects reject the label ‘simulation’ to describe those systems, because, they argue, life is not a matter of matter but form. Provided the

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10 Ibid., 21.

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computer system exhibits the structure of a living thing, it is alive. This threatens several other members of Mayr's lists. 'Limited order of magnitude' stipulates that organisms occupy a 'limited range in the middle world', something to which the formal account would not assent. The references to genetics are also problematic if genes are not defined in terms of their information-carrying function, but in terms of their chemical makeup. 'Evolved programs' makes reference to the specific history of life as we know it on Earth. If Mayr is taken to be putting forward a definition of life, this stipulation makes identifying life elsewhere in the universe, with its own unique history, a contradiction in terms.

Placing Nietzsche within such debates would be time-consuming and of questionable value given the limitations of biology in the nineteenth century. Nonetheless, the emphasis on structure over chemical composition will become relevant to Nietzsche's understanding of culture as detailed in chapter 6 of this thesis. More relevant here is that many of the less controversial features that Mayr identifies are ones to which Nietzsche would assent. UM and the surrounding Nachlass contain many references to digestion and assimilation. HL can be seen as the attempt to prescribe the use of different kinds of history as regulatory mechanisms within a culture. This is taken as an extension of the conditions of life, 'whether this living thing be a person or a people or a culture' (HL 1). The biological processes outlined enable the organism to survive and reproduce. More accurately, the survival of the organism just is the continuation of these processes. But as we know, for Nietzsche, the development of life is not explained only in terms of survival; it is characterised by excess, expansion, growth and so on. This leads Nietzsche to view health, as an extension of the principles of life, to consist in engaging in these processes to the maximum extent possible without destroying the organism. This is true even in HL:

[T]he most powerful and tremendous nature would be characterized by the fact that it would know no boundary at all at which the historical sense began to overwhelm it; it would draw to itself and incorporate into itself all the past, its own and that most foreign to it, and as it were transform it into blood. (HL 1)

With the phrase ‘into blood’, Nietzsche is only hinting at a biological underpinning to his notion of a strong form of life. When Nietzsche encounters Roux and others, he synthesises from their work a biological framework to support his notion of life. This is evident in 1881:

The freest person has the greatest feeling of power over himself, the greatest knowledge of himself, the greatest order in the necessary struggle of his powers, the comparatively greatest independence of his individual powers, the comparatively greatest struggle in himself: he is the most discordant being and the richest in fluctuations and the longest living and that with the richest appetite,
self-nourishing, that which *excretes* the most from itself and most *renews* itself. (*NF* 1881 11[130])

Here we see Nietzsche moving from mental realm (knowledge, feeling) to the biological (excretion, nourishment). It is telling that he makes this transition because it shows that while he adopts a certain picture of biology, he does not limit it to biology. Nietzsche understands these principles to apply, for example, at the level of the psyche, which is a structure composed of drives that follow these biological principles. It not clear what to make of Nietzsche's movement between different domains in this way. Is the life of the psyche not metaphorical? How about culture as a living entity? Surely that is a metaphor. Nietzsche's relationship with metaphor is complex. We saw in chapter 2 that concepts originate as metaphors. Nietzsche could simply say that in calling these things living entities, he is proceeding as if the properties shared by such entities were essential, the others being incidental. This is of course the strategy adopted by the formal account, which claim that chemical make-up is incidental, but that self-regulation is essential to life. Nietzsche, then, is best viewed as a kind of formalist for whom life manifests in different systems not all of which are traditionally biological. It is unlikely that modern formalists would accept Nietzsche's practice here. After all, psyches and cultures are sufficiently different from one another and from organisms to make this unappealing, where artificial life shares a great deal more in common. But we should be careful about reading into Nietzsche a degree of caution in his reductionism that he never actually displays. With that in mind, we are in a position to talk about Nietzsche's alternative conception of health – the great health – which, I will argue, takes place in the domain of perspectives, but which maximises the features inherent to life.

5.2.3 **Great Health**

Taking health to be the grounding value of Nietzsche's cultural project is made difficult by his apparently contradictory attitudes towards it. In *GS*, he is scathing of the will to health, asking whether it ‘is not a prejudice, a cowardice and a piece of most refined barbarism and backwardness’ (*GS* 120). But particularly in the later additions to *FSW*, Nietzsche advocates strongly what he calls the ‘great health’. Faced with this tension, we might simply respond that Nietzsche changes his view on health after *FSW*. But if so, we would be left wondering why he chose to emphasise it so strongly when returning to the works to add material. When we look more closely at his comments in *GS* 120, we see that his worry is actually ‘whether especially our thirst for knowledge and self-knowledge do not need

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12 Der freieste Mensch hat das größte Machtgefühl über sich, das größte Wissen über sich, die größte Ordnung im nothwendigen Kampfe seiner Kräfte, die verhältnißmäßig größte Unabhängigkeit seiner einzelnen Kräfte, den verhältnißmäßig größten Kampf in sich: er ist das zwieträchtigste Wesen und das wechselreichste und das langlebendste und das überreich begehrende, sich nährende, das am meisten von sich ausscheidende und sich erneuernde.
the sick soul as much as the healthy’. Yet great health is closely related to knowledge. In
the preface to *HH*, the free spirit undergoes ‘years full of variegated, painfully magical
transformations ruled and led along by a tenacious will to health’ (*HH* P:4). When we
allow that there are two notions of health operating here, things become easier. *GS* 120
can be read as attacking the will to health understood in the common way, namely as
mere survival. This would involve wanting simply to avoid anything that challenges one’s
constitution. Great health might then be seen as adhering to that expansive principle of life
outlined previously. Expansion and growth might only be possible by taking on sickness.
What Nietzsche really opposes is a pure will to survival free from challenges, the biggest
of those being found in the search for knowledge.

Earlier in the aphorism Nietzsche proposes that health even at the biological level
depends on one’s goal. This suggests a reading on which what Nietzsche is simply trying
to displace survival as the aim of health. He would thereby be abolishing the common
conception of health in favour of an individualist account. I think we should resist this
reading for a number of reasons. First, in adopting it, we no longer allow ourselves the
possibility of talking about sacrificing our health for the sake of some further goal, such as
knowledge. If something serves our goal, we could no longer call it sickness, since health
and sickness would be determined only by that goal. Second, any goal that an individual
might have is conditioned on their surviving to pursue it. This is consistent with criticising
the undue prioritising of survival by avoiding risks, which might inhibit one from achieving
one’s goal. Provided survival remains part of the picture, it makes sense to talk in terms of
health as commonly understood. Nietzsche plays with the idea of balancing this survival
with a greater form of health when he uses the phrase ‘dangerously healthy’ to suggest
not just that one must overcome danger to preserve health, but that great health seeks out
danger. Great health requires not that one avoid risk, but seek it out.

The most explicit formulation of what great health actually involves can be found in
the already-quoted *GS* 382:

*Anyone whose soul thirsts to experience the whole range of previous values and aspirations, to sail around all the coasts of this ‘inland sea’ (Mittelmeer) of ideals, anyone who wants to know from the adventures of his own experience how it feels to be the discoverer or conqueror of an ideal, or to be an artist, a saint, a lawmaker, a sage, a pious man, a soothsayer, an old-style divine loner – any such person needs one thing above all – the great health, a health that one doesn’t only have, but also acquires continually and must acquire because one gives it up again and again, and must give it up!***
The beginning of the passage is a clear expression of the project of incorporation as I have described it, namely an ongoing process of occupying different perspectives. Emphasis is not placed on learning about alternative perspectives, but on experiencing the world that they create. The end of the aphorism also hints at the continual nature of this enterprise: there is no end goal specified here, but rather an unending mission. It is also clear that this is not bodily affair, but instead occurs at the level of conscious experience.\(^\text{13}\) I claimed in the previous section that Nietzsche sees the principles of life operating at multiple levels. The remainder of this section will offer a way to understand the above quoted passage that brings together the biological conception of life and the project of incorporation.

The first step in understanding how the sphere of conscious experience can be related to biology is to understand what kind of risk is actually involved in pursuing a perspectival project. In biology, risk to an organism’s health can be understood in terms of death or reduced chances of producing viable offspring. But, exceptional circumstances aside, the free spirit does not risk death in pursuing the incorporation of perspectives. The kind of risks that immediately spring to mind are broadly psychological. To some extent, we all find ourselves in a fluctuating world and our conception of ourselves undergoes similar fluctuation. But we still have some degree of consistent identity and we still experience a meaningful world of stable objects. To lose these things would amount to the cessation of our psychological selves. A bundle of perspectives is not a self in any clear way. Selfhood requires the imposition of structure on experience. The individual could in principle lose this by undermining every meaningful world and every image of themselves that offered any stability. The resultant chaotic psyche would resemble complete insanity. In practice, it is questionable whether an individual could philosophise their way into madness. The claim that Nietzsche himself went mad as a result of his philosophy has proven to be a myth, the consensus being that it resulted from a pre-existing neurological condition. Even so, Nietzsche at times entertain[s] the possibility, claiming, for example, that ‘in that age in which Christianity proved most fruitful in saints and desert solitaries, and thought it was proving itself by this fruitfulness, there were in Jerusalem vast madhouses for abortive saints, for those who had surrendered to it their last grain of salt’ (\(D\) 14). Although Christians, these saints were prototypical free spirits. Just like an organism, the psyche has its own organisation and regulation without which it perishes.

The more likely reason to fail to achieve or maintain great health is becoming enamoured with a single perspective and thereby falling into dogmatism. Nietzsche describes the great health as guarding against ‘the danger that the spirit may even on its own road perhaps lose itself and become infatuated and remain seated intoxicated in some corner or other’ (\(HH\) P:4). Within \(HH\) itself, Nietzsche talks about the need for the free spirit

\(^{13}\)It is necessary to acknowledge here that for Nietzsche, this is a problematic idea, since everything is, in a sense, a matter of the body for him. Nonetheless, since the relation between body and conscious experience is far from fleshed out in Nietzsche, it still makes sense to draw this distinction provided one does not take it to be ontological.
to be on his guard against the ‘metaphysical need’ (*HH* 153). Where common health in a bodily sense involves the avoidance of that which threatens the functions of the body, its psychological analogue is the adherence to a narrow perspective that renders the world familiar and meaningful. This is most evident in mythopoetic cultures that were the norm for millennia and within which, Nietzsche claims, the morality of custom and consciousness itself was formed. The greatest health, then, requires living as close to the precipice of dissolution as possible without destroying the unity and meaning that is required to maintain the psyche.

As we have seen, organisms contain diverse, struggling parts that are kept in check by the executive control of the organism. They also undergo transformations, taking in and excreting material, while regulative processes maintain their organisation through these. By taking on more material, an organism is forced to exercise this regulation and unification to a greater extent. This expansion is an expression of the fundamental expansive nature of life; but the organisational and regulative forces that are forced to strengthen in response to this are also an expression of this force. The great health involves pursuing a similar expansion in the realm of perspectives, taking on new perspectives and in the process overcoming previous ones. In doing this, the individual’s self-conception – his perspective on himself – is forced to strengthen to prevent his existence dissolving into chaos. He is forced to unify a highly diverse, overturning experience. Although there is a balance struck here between unity and diversity, Nietzsche’s comments suggest that it is in the response of the stabilising processes to the challenge of diverse perspectives that great health is located. It is something that one gives up repeatedly in the process of incorporation. Only in so doing can one acquire that health even more strongly. The closest that Nietzsche gets to definition of great health is in the preface to *HH*, where he talks about a ‘superfluity of formative, curative, moulding and restorative forces which is precisely the sign of great health, that superfluity which grants to the free spirit the dangerous privilege of living experimentally and of being allowed to offer itself to adventure’ (*HH* P:4). It is these forces, which are analogous to the self-regulatory and organisational forces of the organism, that are strengthened in the project of incorporation.

So far, we have seen that the inherent risk of living experimentally is the loss of meaning and identity, which is prevented by the aforementioned forces of great health. This helps provide a degree of clarity on the nature of those forces: they involve meaning and identity. They are the psychological equivalent of the processes by which the integrity and order of an organism is maintained. At this point, it helps us to invoke certain passages from *UM*. In *HL*, the strongest nature is one that can take in material (in this case history) without ever being overwhelmed thanks in part to self-regulatory mechanisms (*HL* 1). These allow it to ‘digest’ that which to those who lack that nature amounts to ‘a huge quantity of indigestible stones of knowledge’ (*HL* 4). The influx of historical knowledge is tantamount to being exposed to radical flux or becoming, something that is of great
concern to Nietzsche in *SE*:

He who regards his life as no more than a point in the evolution of a race or of a state or of a science, and thus regards himself as belonging wholly to the history of becoming, has not understood the lesson set him by existence and will have to learn it over again. This eternal becoming is a lying puppet-play in beholding which man forgets himself, the actual distraction which disperses the individual to the four winds, the endless stupid game which the great child, time, plays before us and with us. That heroism of truthfulness consists in one day ceasing to be the toy it plays with. (*SE 4*)

The disjunct between *UM* and *FSW* is evident in the opening to the quotation. In *FSW*, being part of the history of science is seen as noble. Acknowledging the infinitely complex conditions that have led to one’s own existence is part of Nietzsche’s project from *HHI* onwards. We could divide *UM* from *FSW* according to the concern Nietzsche demonstrates for the potential consequences of facing the stream of becoming, something with which *BT* also occupies itself. But as the quote from *HL* above shows, Nietzsche is already thinking of facing up to becoming as potentially having a strengthening effect. In this *SE* passage, he is concerned with the threat to individual identity that arises from being ‘dispersed’. He is called upon to assert an identity that persists despite the forces that threaten to pull it apart. Here, the emphasis is on a denial or at least refusal to yield to becoming; it is seen as a lie. So we have two moments in *UM*, one of strength in being able to face and digest becoming and another of imposing one’s being on the stream of becoming.

Contained in *UM* are the as yet disjointed elements that eventually become the great health. The expansion and digestion of foreign material, and the imposition and regulation of order (or in this case identity, which for an organism is tantamount to the order of the system) in the face of chaos. In what follows, I want to present an account of great health that makes sense of these comments in *UM* and which allows for *FSW*’s commitment to not denying the multitude of perspectives of history. It offers a way to mediate the conflict between the conflicting demands of life and knowledge. From *SE*, it borrows the concept of a heroism of truthfulness, turning this idea into the cornerstone of the project of incorporating truth as I have construed it.

Maintaining one’s identity involves taking a perspective on oneself. Sometimes for Nietzsche this amounts to constructing a narrative that joins certain points in one’s past. But this in turn involves thinking of oneself as a certain kind of person in the present. The free spirit, for example, recognises his own free spiritedness: he thinks of himself as a free spirit. This interpretation of himself leads him to act in certain ways that he associates with being that kind of person. Someone who conceives of themselves as, for example, being of
a certain nationality or class both sees their past through this lens and acts in ways that they see prescribed by this identity, which is a perspective on the individual themselves, but it also has a bearing on the meaningful world that presents itself to the individual. It is narrow parochialism that the free spirit seeks to overcome. The past perspectives that the free spirit seeks to re-occupy were all, at one point, the remit of individuals whose identity was bound up with a particular worldview and a way of conceiving of themselves, even if they were not aware that they were engaged in such self-constituting practice. Such individuals, who represent ‘unconscious’ stages of culture, occupy what we might call first-order perspectives on themselves. When Nietzsche talks about strong natures in HL, it is first-order perspectives that he has in mind. The strong individual maintains their perspective on themselves despite facing the flux of the past. They simply incorporate that material by finding a place within their identity for it. In UM, this effectively involves falsifying it. So, for example, someone who forges their identity in association with a particular artistic or intellectual paradigm could interpret everything they learn about through the lens of that paradigm. The romantic could find the romance in everything; the pessimist could find the suffering. While this is the kind of interpretive practice that FSW will fight against, in UM it is precisely the kind of thing that allows life to continue in the face of knowledge. The strongest nature in this context is apt to render everything they encounter meaningful in line with their perspective on themselves and the world.

We can distinguish first-order perspectives from second-order ones. A second-order perspective is a perspective on the activity of creating and maintaining an identity by means of taking a perspective on oneself. We can illustrate this with Nietzsche's own comments. The romantic and the pessimist are both instances of what we might call a hero of truthfulness following Nietzsche's own phrasing. At one level, their identity is different because it involves different perspectives. But they share an identity as individuals that are adept at imposing meaning on the realm of becoming. Being a hero of truthfulness is compatible with a range of first-order identities. Although Nietzsche is in favour of certain first-order perspectives, mostly for their consequences, his real values lie at this second order. What he sees in the great figures of history is a meaning-making ability. It is from this that the notion of great health arises. In FSW, meaning-making is not simply an individual affair, but is the history of culture. Indeed, culture for Nietzsche centres around the creation of meaningful worlds and individuals in the ways that chapters 2 and 3 deal with.

Thinking in terms of this second-order perspective on meaning-making helps give content to Nietzsche's description of culture as ‘conscious’ (HH 24). HH is described as a ‘book for free spirits’ and in reading the book the free spirit cannot help but come to be aware of this understanding of cultures and individuals as creating meaning. Once this insight is adopted, the free spirit is not in a position to engage in the naive first-order meaning making. Nietzsche’s own identification of these conditions of life makes the conscious awareness of such practices inevitable provided he is actually read and understood.
In *HL*, engagement with history requires different approaches at different times, some of which – particularly monumental history – involve falsification. But to manage this effectively requires that at least some individuals are aware that they are engaged in falsification. Nietzsche’s own in that work is already a degree of remove from those who simply engage in certain kinds of historical practice. Nietzsche seeks to control knowledge in *HL*, but to do so he requires knowledge of the conditions of life. This tension eases when he makes explicit this commitment in *HH*. So the free spirit is aware of the fact that they are engaged in meaning-making. Understanding how this self-awareness combines with incorporation gives us a way to understand how to achieve great health.

At the beginning of this chapter, I detailed the virtues that allow the free spirit to engage in seeking knowledge, where this is understood in terms of the incorporating truth by moving through perspectives. But the more general characteristic of the free spirit is scepticism, which should be understood as facilitating that continued undermining of the pictures of the world presented by particular perspectives. This is a new form of the heroism of truthfulness. It is heroic in a way that fits with heroism as it is found in mythology: the hero takes on dangerous challenges in a noble manner. Nietzsche’s imagery surrounding the free spirit testifies to the degree to which he has this kind of heroism in mind. But while heroism of truth undermines stable meaning, threatening to destroy the individual, it also provides him with a new identity. His identity consists precisely in this ability to take on the meaninglessness that threatens in the project of incorporation. To put it another way, he derives meaning from the very activity of undermining meaning. His own meaning-making ability is tested to its limit by the challenges that he sets it. The danger here is that since this perspective on himself as a sceptic, free spirit and hero of truth is vulnerable to being undermined by its own practice. But notice that even in the act of questioning his interpretation of himself as all of these things, the individual is actually providing one more confirming instance of the hypothesis that he is a sceptic. His identity is confirmed by its own attempts to undermine itself. This complex and highly reflexive way of being could place the individual at the cusp of dissolution into madness, but at the same time, it tests those forces of great health to the limit. But by channelling those forces through a conception of the self as engaged in the practice of incorporation, the individual need not be pulled from the precipice in order to convalesce. Their activity of threatening their health is the same activity that their health as seekers of knowledge consists in. This is what Nietzsche means by being ‘dangerously healthy’.

For all of his talk of health as a purely individual affair, great health for Nietzsche has the same structure for all individuals. It involves a strong meaning-making force to maintain the individual’s identity despite their continued undermining of stable perspectives. This is an extension of his biological picture of organisms. The organism maintains its unity with various processes that struggle against the forces that threaten to dissolve that organism: it preserves a homoeostatic equilibrium. Human beings as meaning-making an-
imals hold their consciously experienced world and the self that experiences it together in the same manner. This is more than an analogy: both are simply instances of life. But nature is not only about preservation; it is about expansion and growth. The strongest organism expands and assimilates as much as it can without being overwhelmed. Great human beings in their meaning-making practices have been able to do this throughout history; however, their has always been the countervailing, stabilising force that seeks to limit this. For human beings to live according to nature would require that they embrace both the stabilising and the expansive aspects of life. Those with great health are those who are able to expand into many perspectival domains while remaining unified. This expansion is as a testament and stimulant to their inherent abundance of life. Before moving on, it is necessary to deal with a potentially serious objection regarding the universal status of Nietzsche’s prescriptions.

5.2.4 Universality vs. Idiosyncrasy

The great health as I have outlined it is derived from a conception of life that is universal. But in certain places, Nietzsche denies that there can be a universal concept of health. Nowhere is this more explicit than in GS 120:

For there is no health as such, and all attempts to define such a thing have failed miserably. Deciding what is health even for your body depends on your goal, your horizon, your powers, your impulses, your mistakes and above all on the ideals and phantasms of your soul. Thus there are innumerable healths of the body; and the more one allows the particular and incomparable to rear its head again, the more one unlearns the dogma of the ‘equality of men’, the more the concept of a normal health, along with those of a normal diet and normal course of an illness, must be abandoned by our medical men.

It would seem that my attempts to ground health in life are misguided. However, things are not actually that simple. On the one hand, Nietzsche claims that individuals should tailor their virtues; on the other, he names certain virtues ‘cardinal’, as we saw at the beginning of this chapter. He denies that health has a common goal, yet he seeks to cultivate individuals whose shared goal is the incorporation of truth. There is a tension here that runs throughout Nietzsche’s thought, namely that between the idiosyncratic individual and the shared project of culture of which they are a part. In light of this tension, passages such as that above need to be interpreted carefully. We need to take seriously Nietzsche’s stress on individuality, but we also need to reconcile it with his outline of a great health in which great individuals partake.
Health and great health were connected by their involving a degree of control by a single force over a diversity of material; this is part of what it is to be alive. In the quoted passage, Nietzsche is suggesting that the goal of survival, which defines physical health in its most basic sense, can be replaced with other goals. For instance, one might seek to be a great artist. With that as one's goal, one might be willing to sacrifice one's 'health' otherwise construed. As I claimed earlier, I do not think that Nietzsche abolishes the common conception of health, since he wants to allow that health can be sacrificed in the name of some other goal, which is now presumably being labelled 'health'. However, our example of the artist is not that of the great health. The great health is only achieved by those who enter into the very specific epistemic practices that Nietzsche outlines. This suggests a third kind of health that sits somewhere in between the two, perhaps a transitional phase. This makes sense of a curious fact about Nietzsche's corpus, namely that he does not condemn in equal measure all historical figures who commit to metaphysics or religion. On the contrary, he singles out several figures whom he sees as having not only an important role in the history of culture, but as possessing a certain vitality lacking in their contemporaries. I believe some of these figures hold the key to finally clarifying these opposing kinds of health.

Nietzsche takes the comparison of cultures and the resulting relativism to be a fairly recent phenomenon. The acknowledgement of the perspectival nature of reality, which is a prerequisite for great health, is even more recent. This tells us something important, namely that great individuals of the past took their perspective on the world to be true rather than their own creation. This is a distinction that Nietzsche outlines explicitly in GS. In GS 55, he describes the noble spirits that existed in past stages of mankind. Such spirits hit upon novel perspectives, furnished themselves with new goals and ‘discovered’ new values; but, as GS 3 points out, a noble individual of this sort ‘believes that the idiosyncrasy of its taste is not a singular value standard; rather, it posits its values and disvalues as generally valid’. These past nobles are neither fettered nor free spirits: they escape universal demands of the herd perspective to a certain extent, but only to ground a perspective that takes itself to be a universal demand. This model applies to artists who take themselves to have discovered a true perspective, but hitherto unrecognised, perspective on the world, and to those who found new religions that they take to be the one true religion. Such rebellions have an important place in history for Nietzsche in that they break the hold of other dogmatic perspectives. They also represent for him an expression of a strong life force in that they seek to encompass a wide range of material in a new way for the individual in question. As such, individuals in possession of such a perspective exhibit a kind of enhanced health. However, they still fall short of the free spirit, who is aware that perspectives he occupies are relative. The free spirit's much more subtle engagement with perspectives, and his ongoing scepticism, is what allows him to continually grow and develop. The danger for the intermediate noble spirit is that they escape the stagnation of
culture only to become trapped in a narrow perspective of their own.

For these individuals, *GS* 120 holds true. They have unique goals that mean that health for them can be understood in a unique way. *GS* 120 can be read as an attempt by Nietzsche to open up the possibility for redefinitions of health that complements the goal of survival with alternative goals. As we have seen, he sees the great health as being achieved when a new goal – knowledge – comes to take the place of survival as primary. However, even this intermediary health does not differ from the great health, or the common conception of health, entirely. It still involves the fundamental structure of health, which is the unification of diversity. Regardless of an individual's goal, their health still consists in their bringing everything else in line with that goal. Clearly the content of such health will differ depending on the goal, but the form remains the same. This brings us to the heart of what Nietzsche opposes in *GS* 120. He is undermining the claim that individuals are all alike and that, as such, they can be brought to health with blanket prescriptions.

Seen from this perspective, Nietzsche's view is less radical than it first appears. Even within traditional medicine, cures need to be tailored to individuals. Some people react to foods differently, some to medicines. The view that individuals are identical is not appropriately attributed to any competent physician. This gives us a way to resolve, at least to some extent, the tension between individuality and commonality. When we apply this logic to the seeking of knowledge, we see that there too, the course of an individual's progress is determined to a large extent by their unique features. For example, take the fact that becoming a free spirit requires that one free oneself from various cultural perspectives that one has adopted over the course of growing up. Prescriptions for one individual would differ greatly from those for another. Nietzsche even goes as far as to claim that being a free spirit is a relative concept, relative, that is, to one's starting point in culture. The achievement of great health might take the same form for different individuals, but the methods for achieving it, the balance of virtues required, and so on will need to be tailored by the individual to themselves. Even those symbols that Nietzsche attaches to seekers of knowledge – the sailor, the bird, the knight – might carry less weight to someone in whose culture such symbols are lacking or diminished. Such an individual might need their own versions of these. The narrative that the individual constructs of themselves as a seeker of knowledge will always be unique insofar as it refers to personal struggles and employs symbolism that they find to be particularly evocative. Nonetheless, the end result is still great health of the form I have outlined. It is requires the freedom from dogmatic perspectives, facilitated by a cultivated scepticism, which in turn enables the individual maximum expression that unifying force that defines all life. The question now is: what is the nature and force of this idea as a normative foundation for Nietzsche's project?
5.3 Normativity

The aim of this chapter was to outline the criteria by which progress can be measured. The concept of life and that of health with follows from it has been put forward as a criterion. But one could specify any number of criteria that would allow for the comparison of individuals and cultures. Happiness, courage, knowledge: anything that can be attained to differing extents serves to provide a scale of measurement. The first problem, then, is how to justify prioritising the notions of health and life. A further problem arises from the notion of justification being used here. Specifically, what lends health its normative force? Even if we know what being healthy entails, why ought we to be healthy? Or, to weaken the question, what makes health a more compelling value than other candidates? Without at least addressing these questions, any account of progress in Nietzsche threatens to reduce to either assuming certain criteria or to describing the kinds of future states that Nietzsche wants to bring about without understanding why he wants to do so and why anyone else might agree with him.

One reading of Nietzsche we can exclude straight away sees normativity as pertaining to a transcendent moral order from which norms get their force. But we also need to be wary of talking about what we ‘ought’ to do, since Nietzsche’s sustained attack on morality makes the idea of there being anything commanding us to act problematic. We also have good reason to be cautious of universalisability, although, as I have claimed, there is a universal dimension to Nietzsche’s understanding of health. It is against the backdrop of these concerns that accounts of normativity in Nietzsche have been and continue to be formulated. The interest in this topic is steadily growing and has yielded excellent work. We can broadly distinguish two positions on this question in the literature. One holds that the normative dimension arose in the course of human social evolution. Human beings were ‘tamed’ in various ways, becoming consistent in their behaviour and capable of following and creating rules or norms. The other position holds that normativity is present in the notion of will to power or will to life. Overcoming resistance, assimilation, growth – all of these are features of the organic world that make it already normative. These positions are not necessarily or even in practice at odds with each other. There is no a priori reason to think that they cannot be combined. Indeed, I take both to capture something important in Nietzsche’s project. The first position is put forward by Richard Schacht in a way that chimes with much of what has been presented in this thesis. It is his paper that I engage with to outline this view before moving on to the second position.

14 For example, see Christopher Janaway and Simon Robertson, eds., Nietzsche, Naturalism, and Normativity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
5.3.1 Normativity as Arising from ‘Forms of Life’

In his 2012 paper, *Nietzsche’s Naturalism and Normativity*, Schacht presents an account of normativity in Nietzsche that he contrasts with Korsgaard’s classic account. He focuses on Korsgaard’s claim, as he renders it, that ‘real’ normativity is a matter of “oughtness” with respect to those things that one (“we”, anyone, everyone) really ought or ought not to do. He identifies two requirements here for any account of normativity: one must account both for the content of any normative requirement and for the force that requirement. In other words: what ought we to do? and in virtue of what does that ‘ought’ have authority? This is the context in which Schacht develops an account of normativity in Nietzsche; he characterises this account as ‘naturalistic’.

Schacht sees normativity as naturalistic in the sense that it arise in the natural course of human history. It can be explained in evolutionary terms, where evolution does not necessarily entail Darwinism. Although specific normative content might make reference to the supernatural, the history of such content would be amenable to explanation in naturalistic terms. In short, normativity is a feature of the life of the human animal. Human communities have developed rules that govern their behaviour and as a member of a community, one internalises those rules:

Forms of human linguistic, social, cultural, and institutional life are normatively structured. When one identifies with them, buys into them, and internalizes them, those structures and the undergirding and surrounding values are parts of what gets internalized.

Although Schacht discusses morality, he does not limit himself to it; rules that are not necessarily moral are included. Instead, he talks about what he calls ‘forms of life’, which are normative frameworks in which individuals are embedded. Schacht commits Nietzsche to pluralism about these forms of life: there are many such forms in existence and many more that have existed. Normative content, then, is part of the history of human social evolution. Korsgaard would of course acknowledge that there are many normative claims, but, at least as Schacht reads her, she is interested in ‘real’ normativity. This is where Nietzsche and Korsgaard diverge for Schacht. For the latter, we cannot decide which form of life – which set of norms – we really ought to adopt because there exists no normative

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16 Ibid., 246.
17 Ibid., 236.
18 Ibid., 255.
19 This is less of a clean division when thinking in terms of the morality of custom, which arguably renders anything customary a moral issue.
framework that is not itself one of these forms of life. Without such a framework, there are no external criteria with which to assess the normative claims contained in a form of life. To even talk in normative terms, one must already have adopted one of many possible normative frameworks and any claim about what we really ought to do is just an expression of that particular framework. All we can do is internally critique a set of norms.

This connects to the question of force. Were there something external to a form of life that could ground universal normative claims then the particular claims within a form of life could be assessed. But since normativity only exists as a result of the particular rules that govern each form of life, normative force is limited to that form of life. Forms of life are inherently normative, being governed by rules, making demands and so on. Insofar as one is invested in a form of life, one is subject to those rules and demands. This is distinct from claims to effect that since one has signed a contract to be part of a form of life, so to speak, one really ought to uphold that contract. Rather, the claim is that adhering to certain rules and responding to certain demands is constitutive of being invested in a form of life. But human beings cannot help but be invested in some form of life and there is therefore no mystery as to the origin of the force of normative claims. With this commitment in place, we need not point to something universal that compels individuals one way or another. This does not mean that one really ought to obey that which is commanded by the form of life in which one is invested. It is that there are claims to the effect ‘you ought to do such and such’ that are natural products of human social organisation and whose force is simply part of the minimal commitment that the individual has to have to a normative framework to be taken to be participating in the relevant form of life. I say ‘minimal’ because within any form of life, it is still possible to identify conflicting normative claims; thus individuals need not adopt and act on every single norm. Forms of life can be brought to task for their various inconsistencies and changed as a result. Normative conflicts can also be settled by determining the priority of claims. Schacht sees this as Nietzsche’s main task, which he calls determining an ‘order of rank’ of values.21

Schacht’s account is very close to my own in key respects. I have attributed the rise of consciousness and, with it, the world of appearances to the development of normative frameworks like the ones Schacht describes in his notion of a form of life. In this context it is clear why we cannot help but be invested in a form of life, since to fail to be so would amount to a dissolution of structured consciousness. This notion of being already invested in a normative framework will prove crucial to the project of cultural transformation in chapter 6. However, there are some issues with Schacht’s account. For instance, his emphasis on the plurality of forms of life renders Nietzsche’s criticisms of them mysterious. Nietzsche passes judgement on almost every past form of life at some point. He praises the Greeks, admonishes Christianity, and is ambivalent towards asceticism and pessimism

21 On this idea in Nietzsche see HH P:7, BGE 221, GM 1.17. For Schacht’s claim about its priority in Nietzsche’s project see Schacht, ‘Nietzsche’s Naturalism and Normativity,’ 251.
depending on where one looks. How is this possible if his pluralism is as pronounced as Schacht suggests? According to what normative framework does Nietzsche take specific forms of life to task? One response might be that there is significant overlap in these forms of life. All those listed are in the same Western tradition of thought, for example. But Nietzsche also engages with so-called ‘savage’ cultures, knowledge of which he gets from extensive accounts in, for example, the work of Lubbock. If we allow that despite the plurality of normative frameworks, there is significant overlap between them, then a universal normativity is possible. One need only make reference to that which is shared by all. Korsgaard and Kant point to reason as something shared by all agents in virtue of their being agents; this is where they locate normative force. Schacht quotes GS 335 to support the claim that Nietzsche is irreducibly pluralist. Nietzsche talks about ‘human beings who are new, unique, incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create themselves’.\(^{22}\) But this passage expresses what we might call a second-order value, namely the value of individual self creation. Nietzsche values those who share the characteristic of creating their own values. Even where such individuals do not share first-order values, they are united by their pursuit of individuality. Nietzsche’s emphasis on pluralism does not arise from nowhere: it is derived from his conception of the human being and life more generally, which Nietzsche takes to apply universally. That is how he is able to determine which forms of life are ‘better’.

Forms of life are the source of many specific norms which give rise to meaningful worlds. But the forms-of-life interpretation needs to be supplemented with discussion of the form if life. Human beings are united by the fact that they create forms of life with normative commitments, creating worlds for themselves. This is in turn an extension of the activities engaged in by all living things.\(^{23}\) This is not to say that there are formal codes of conduct laid down for living things to adhere to, but there are rules which if followed enhance or restrict life in line with the definition of what being alive entails. This provides the criterion by which Nietzsche assesses forms of life: he compares them according to whether they enhance or restrict life as such. The later Nietzsche cashes this out in terms of will to power. One place that Nietzsche is clear that we can compare forms of life is the preface to GM, where he proposes that the value of any given morality has now become a central question. In other words, values embedded in forms of life should be brought to task (GM P:6). This brings us to the second position on which normativity is a feature of organic life as such.

### 5.3.2 Normativity as Life and Power

Accounts of the normativity inherent in nature tend to focus on the will to power, which in turn is associated with the later works. There we find the suggestion that morality as

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\(^{22}\) Quoted in Schacht, ‘Nietzsche's Naturalism and Normativity,’ 254.

\(^{23}\) That is not to say that all living things construct worlds.
involving the unthinking adoption of values and blind adherence to norms would be to blame ‘if man, as species, never reached his highest potential power and splendour’ (GM P:6). He is clearly critiquing forms of life, and, moreover, power as an overall criterion is central to his critique. Throughout the later works, power is connected with life. For example, the tendency among Darwinists to focus on adaptation to external circumstances as the motor of evolution is criticised as follows:

> But this is to misunderstand the essence of life, its will to power, we overlook the prime importance that the spontaneous, aggressive, expansive, re-interpreting, re-directing and formative forces have, which ‘adaptation’ follows only when they have had their effect. (GM 2.12)

This is basically a continuation of what was discussed above regarding the nature of life. But Nietzsche is clear in TT that understanding life and power instructs us in how we should ensure the future flourishing of humanity. Part of that project is to ‘create a new sense of responsibility for doctors in all cases where the highest interests of life, of ascending life, demand that degenerate life be ruthlessly pushed down and thrown aside’ (TT ‘Skirmishes’ 36). Nietzsche uses the term ‘responsibility’ here and the aphorism is entitled Morality for doctors. The normativity of life and power is plain to see. I will explore this normativity further, but before doing so I can no longer delay in addressing an objection to the entire thrust of the chapter so far, namely that the will to power and even the will to life are not applicable to FSW, but are later ideas that could not have been at the heart of those works.

**Life and Power in FSW**

The phrase ‘will to power’ [Wille zur Macht] appears as early as 1876, at the beginning of Nietzsche’s preparations for HH (NF 1876 23[63]). At this point, it is merely one among many psychological phenomena that Nietzsche is thinking about; it serves no theoretical role. In HH, power appears as a motivation alongside several others that underlie pity (HH 103). The phrase does not appear at all in the FSW works as originally published. However, close approximations of the phrase do appear. HH 137 contains the phrase ‘lust for power’ in a context that echoes the discussion of the ascetic ideal in GM; HH 142 connects this lust for power with ‘the feeling of power’. When we reach D, this latter expression becomes very common, being invoked to explain a wide range of phenomena. Nietzsche begins to italicise the phrase, suggesting both that he places great importance on it and that he is manoeuvring it into position as a theoretical construct. The level of Nietzsche’s commitment to the concept can be seen in D 23, where he writes that ‘It has become [man’s] strongest propensity; the means discovered for creating this feeling
almost constitute the history of culture. If we take this seriously, then the interpretive activity that creates a meaningful world for humanity is the result of an associated feeling of increased power that such activity engenders. During GS, we see the feeling of power used to unite what was previously taken to be opposed. Helping and hurting other people are both viewed as expressions of power (GS 13). HH 104 is the place that Nietzsche gets closest to aligning life with power. Nietzsche first define pleasure as the ‘feeling of one’s own power, of one’s own strong excitation’, before going on to claim that ‘Without pleasure no life; the struggle for pleasure is the struggle for life’. Adding these together yields the claim that the struggle for the feeling of power is the struggle for life. This is remarkably close to the claim in GS 349 that ‘the will to power… is simply the will of life’.24

In UM, life is an expansive force that is characterised by incorporation. In HL, it is only through incorporation and assimilation that life can deal with knowledge. Nietzsche not only seeks to protect this force, but also to encourage and manage it to produce great individuals. Nietzsche’s characterisation of the ‘tremendous’ natures is as of individuals who seek to maximise the range of material they can incorporate. Despite Nietzsche’s warnings about the surplus of history, even here he suggests that greatness is to be sought in allowing knowledge of the past to enter the individual provided he can still incorporate it. This is understood in terms of interpretation, which I have claimed is not restricted to human beings, even if it only takes the form of conscious experience in human beings. Will to power is a ‘re-interpreting’ and a ‘formative’ force in the later works (GM 2.12). These are same characteristics that define life in UM, even if Nietzsche does not explicitly discuss levels below that of psychology in those early essays.

Nietzsche takes this expansive, incorporating force to be the essence of life, right from UM and through FSW. Growth and expansion are key features of life, as is the maintenance of executive control during that growth and expansion. Indeed, that an organism, a culture, a society can be said to grow is only possible if it also maintains the structure that makes it what it is. This is the concept of life that I take Nietzsche to be operating with. If these conditions are sufficient to fulfil the criteria of a will to power doctrine, then regardless of whether Nietzsche uses the phrase ‘will to power’, we can attribute him the claim that life is will to power. This does not amount to a metaphysical endorsement of will to power, only a biological one. At the heart of Nietzsche’s project of incorporation, we find this concept of life as power: ‘knowledge became a part of life and, as life, a continually growing power, until finally knowledge and the ancient basic errors struck against each other, both as life, both as power, both in the same person’ (GS 110). This is the conflict that leads to incorporation as a project. The experiment of incorporation has been in Nietzsche’s work since UM, where life was challenged to incorporate the deliverances of knowledge. In fact, it should come as no surprise that the drive to knowledge should

24 Richardson has helpfully pointed out that the Cambridge translation renders this incorrectly as ‘the will to life’. I have corrected the quotation accordingly. See Richardson, ‘Nietzsche On Life’s Ends,’ 764.

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be associated with this continual growth: the very notion of drives that Nietzsche begins
to use in *D* is such that each drive expands unless checked by another drive. That the indi-
vidual is a struggling mass of drives each looking to expand shows that he conceives of life
as conditioned on growth and expansion; that the controlling force in the organism is just
another drive demonstrates his commitment to reducing the organism to a single concept,
in this case the drive concept.

To straightforwardly apply will to power to *FSW* would be problematic, but Nietz-
sche’s understanding of life already contains the key ideas at this point. One difference that
can be observed between life before and during the later works is in Nietzsche’s emphasis
on structure and organisation. In later works, his emphasis is more on growth, expansion,
assimilation, overpowering, overcoming resistance. But all of these presuppose organisa-
tion and unity. Without some unity of the individual there is nothing into which material
is incorporated or assimilated; nor is there being that can be said to have overcome any-
thing. Those key notions from *UM* of assimilation and incorporation define the later will
to power and *UM*’s emphasis on unity becomes an assumption of the will to power theory.
Indeed, it is *UM* more than *FSW* that really offers support for the employment of will
to life as the basis for Nietzsche’s cultural project. As I pointed out in chapter 1, however,
these are the foundation of *FSW*. When Nietzsche equates will to life with will to power in
the late book 5 of *GS*, he is really just making explicit something that Nietzsche is already
operating with in *FSW* as a whole.

**Power and life as normative**

We come now to the second position regarding normativity, which takes it to arise from
the nature of life. This is the position that Emden adopts, expressing it as follows:

Nietzsche’s naturalism implied that the value of fitness, or the
value of further growth, could not be seen as external to the
processes described. The reason why the growth and expansion of
life constituted a normative standard was simply that they were a
constitutive characteristic of living things.\(^25\)

The will to power is neither a metaphysical construct, nor does it
map easily onto evolution if the latter is seen exclusively in terms of
natural selection. Rather, against the background of his reading in
the life sciences, Nietzsche views the will to power as describing
the formal conditions constitutive of living things, such as over-
coming resistance, development, and growth. The will to power,
thus, emerges as a normative principle.\(^26\)

\(^{25}\)Emden, *Nietzsche’s Naturalism*, 141f.

\(^{26}\)Ibid., 146.
My position is basically Emden’s, but it bears further specification nonetheless. The point about the value of growth not being external to the processes of life is important because it avoids Nietzsche’s own critique of attempts to provide a foundation to normative claims. He writes ‘To know “this is health, this preserves life, this harms one’s offspring” – is definitely not a regulative morality! Why live? Why live completely joyously? Why offspring?’ (NF 1880 6[123]).

Just a few notes later, we find this line of thinking continued:

The moralist who wants to establish a morality is driven to state a final purpose. ‘If you want to be healthy you must be moderate. But you must want to be healthy: for it is the condition of being happy or achieving your goals etc.’ A new goal manifests behind every goal: and the moralist ends up having to state the purpose of existence. I can say: there is no purpose to existence, and it is therefore impossible to arrive at a morality based on purpose. (NF 1880 6[134])

The reduction here, which pursues instrumental purposes down to their roots in an ultimate purpose, bears similarities to that which I have attributed to Nietzsche. He too takes virtues to serve knowledge, knowledge to serve health, and health to be an expression of life. Yet for Nietzsche, life, or existence as he puts it here, has no purpose. This seems to rule out the possibility that life – even in the form of expansion, growth or power – can serve as a final goal. Life cannot refer to anything beyond itself if it is to serve as a normative foundation.

Emden correctly points out that Nietzsche’s view on evolution does not require that it be measured in terms of something external to it. Darwin, by Nietzsche’s lights, postulates such a goal, namely preservation. Nietzsche’s own conception of evolution is that it has no external goal. In D 108, he writes:

Evolution does not have happiness in view, but evolution and nothing else. – Only if mankind possessed a universally recognised goal would it be possible to propose ‘thus and thus is the right course of action’: for the present there exists no such goal. (D 108)

I take the statement that evolution only aims at evolution to amount to the claim that evolution is simply change that perpetuates itself. That is, that organisms grow, expand and...
change is just a feature of them rather than something that they aim at. Certainly, evolution
does not aim at happiness, but neither does it aim at health. Health is just constituted by
the continuation of those processes. This distinguishes between a principle of life and a
good of life.29 To say that human life does not have a single goal or set of goals is not to
say that it does not, at some level, operate by a single principle or set of principles. That
principle is will to power; it is ‘life alone, that dark, driving power that insatiably thirsts
for itself’ (HL 3), as Nietzsche renders it even before FSW.

There is a further important point to be made here, namely that just because will to
power is a constitutive principle of life does not mean that living things automatically max-
imise their will to power. As Emden points out, Nietzsche is critical of Herbert Spencer
for his belief in the inevitability of progress. He quotes the following note: ‘Spencer’s image
of the future of humanity is not a scientific necessity, but a wish according to the ideals of
the present’ (NF 1881 11[98]).30 Nietzsche thinks that human beings have consistently failed
to make any progress because they have failed to maximise their power; in fact, they have
produced ways of living that hinder that maximisation. This makes more sense if we take
into account that will to power functions at different levels. Drives are governed by it just
as individuals are. One drive’s growth and expansion can inhibit that of others. So a drive
can become powerful in an individual to the detriment of their other drives. This leads to
their overall potential being squandered. This is a case of the maximum expression of life
at one level hindering it at another level. I take it that this is a big part of what Nietzsche’s
project is all about. It connects directly with my notion of incorporation as preventing the
ascendancy of dogmatic perspectives whose rule would hinder others from being expressed.
This basic idea also features in those who view Nietzsche’s conception of health in drive
terms. Gemes, for example, writes ‘ascending life, health life, is a collection of drives that
through sublimation has achieved concerted, maximul expression’.31 Sublimation is the
alternative to repression, which involves certain drives preventing others from expressing
just as I have described.

So far, we have seen that will to power or life is a principle that governs all life, including
human life. It allows us to measure the strength or health of a form of life; we might even
say it helps measure the ‘aliveness’ or vitality of a form of life. This is a norm only in the
sense that it allows for success and failure: it is a constitutive norm. A game of chess serves
as a good illustration of this kind of norm. One is only playing chess if one moves pieces
in a certain way. Someone who moves bishops along ranks and files rather than diagonals

29 Thus we find in BGE the principle of will to power, but the staunch denial of a goal: ‘Above all, a living
thing wants to discharge its strength – life itself is will to power –: self-preservation is only one of the
indirect and most frequent consequences of this. – In short, here as elsewhere, watch out for superfluous
teleological principles!’
30 Emden’s translation. Original German: ist das Bild Spencer’s von der Zukunft des Menschen nicht eine
naturwissenschaftliche Notwendigkeit, sondern ein Wunsch aus jetzigen Idealen heraus. Emden, Nietzsche’s
Naturalism, 165.
31 Gemes, ‘Life’s Perspectives,’ 573.
is not playing chess, but some other game. We might say that they ought to move them along diagonals if they want to play chess. But this is not a moral ought, rather it simply informs someone of the legal moves available to a chess player. Furthermore, it is not an instrumental ought. It is not the same as saying 'if you want to capture her knight you ought to sacrifice that pawn'. In such a case, the player may or may not want to capture the knight. The force of this ought depends on something external to it in that she must additionally have some desire, intention or reason to capture the knight. But to say ‘you ought to move your bishop along diagonals’ is just another way of saying that insofar as you are playing chess your possibilities for future moves are constrained. To do anything else is simply to stop playing chess. Applying this to life means that life as will to power is normative in the sense that to continue to be a living thing just means to continue to express will to power. Nietzsche does not need to impel individuals to express will to power; they cannot help but do so. This is what I take Emden to be getting at: that a description of life is normative because it specifies criteria for success and failure. One cannot describe life without these criteria any more than one can describe chess without thereby dictating constraints that apply to the actions within that game.

One can play chess well or badly, which is only possible because of the nature of the game. Moving pieces randomly along legal paths on the board and taking one's turn are not sufficient to be playing chess. Within the game one needs to at the very least aim to avoid being checkmated. Someone who does not even try to avoid checkmate at a point that will result in them losing has either given up playing and is merely going through the motions or has not understood, and is not therefore meaningfully participating in, the game. Applied to life, the claim would be that expressing will to power is constitutive of being alive, and it is possible to do so better or worse. This can be applied to the various characterisations of will to power: one can incorporate, assimilate, grow, expand etc. more or less effectively. To describe chess to someone about to play is already to lay down the tracks down which future moves must proceed for that person to play chess well. To describe living things is to lay down the tracks for the flourishing of living things. Because will to power, not survival, is constitutive of successful life, proceeding down those tracks involves maximising will to power.

32 Nadeem Hussain captures this well when he says “To be alive is, in part, at least, to have a tendency towards expansion, growth, domination, overcoming of resistances, increasing strength, and so on. It is this picture of life, and the accompanying fundamental evaluative standard, that is present even where Nietzsche does not use the reductive-sounding locution of the “will to power”. See Nadeem J. Z. Hussain, ‘Nietzsche’s Metaethical Stance,’ in The Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche, ed. Ken Gemes and John Richardson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 402.
33 I owe thanks to Adam Arnold for pointing out to me that someone might play chess with the aim of losing if, for example, they stand a better chance of winning the overall tournament in which the game is situated. That is why I restrict my claim to a single game.
34 Railton also maintains that living well is normative in the sense that life has success criteria of the kind given here and denies that this need be seen as involving a moral ‘ought’ to be normative. Rather than chess, he uses the example of sailing. See Railton, ‘Nietzsche’s Normative Theory,’ 32.
The problem we still have is that above Nietzsche asked ‘why live?’ as a challenge to grounding normativity in life. We cannot tell someone unconditionally that they ought to live any more than we can tell them that they just ought to play chess. But insofar as someone is alive, they are already engaged in will to power.\(^{35}\)

Only killing themselves puts an end to their participation in the ‘game of life’. Just as for Schacht, being invested in a form of life brings with it normative force, being invested in life as such brings with it normative force. Nietzsche and Korsgaard are no longer that far apart. Korsgaard seeks ‘to explain the normative force of [certain] principles by showing that they are constitutive of reflective mental activity itself’.\(^{36}\) Nietzsche on the other hand explains the normative force of the principle of will to power by showing that it is constitutive of the activity of all life.\(^{37}\) For Nietzsche, all life is will to power even in those who condemn life. He talks about Schopenhauer, whose ‘enemies held him tight and kept seducing him back to existence’ (\textit{GM} 3.7). He goes on to claim that ‘Every animal, including the bête philosophe, instinctively strives for an optimum of favourable conditions in which to fully release his power and achieve his maximum of power-sensation’. Later, in \textit{TI}, he writes ‘A condemnation of life on the part of the living is, in the end, only the symptom of a certain type of life’ (\textit{TI} ‘Anti-Nature’ 5). This is equivalent on the Korsgaardian picture to something like the claim that to dismiss the importance of rationality by giving reasons is to actually tacitly accept it.\(^{38}\)

None of this supposes that there can be an absolute commanding force that everyone ought to obey in virtue of being instances of will to power. Nietzsche is well aware that the goal of maximising one’s will to power is not built into us, but must be adopted. That is because will to power does not itself set goals, even the goal of power. It simply moves down the avenues available at a given time. This is what Nietzsche means when he says that evolution – or life – aims at itself and nothing else. But the end of this aphorism, which I did not quote, is crucial to understand Nietzsche’s project, and demands being quoted at length:

Only if mankind possessed a universally recognised \textit{goal} would it be possible to propose ‘thus and thus is the right course of action’: for the present there exists no such goal. It is thus irrational and trivial to impose the demands of morality upon mankind. – To rec-

\(^{35}\)Richardson neatly captures the position that I am proposing: ‘what’s essential is a directedness, at an end. This end can be achieved or realized to a greater or lesser degree. So there is a scale, running from lower/worse to higher/better, along which all living things can be ranked—are ranked by their own essential aiming’. He goes on to identify will to power as this end, going into more detail than I have space for here. Richardson, ‘Nietzsche On Life’s Ends,’ 772.

\(^{36}\)Christine M. Korsgaard, \textit{The Sources of Normativity} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 236.

\(^{37}\)Emden captures this point in his discussion of Korsgaard, where he too sees the main distinction as lying in the fact that Nietzsche seeks to extend his understanding of human agency in the biological rather than mental world. More accurately, the latter is an extension of the former. Emden, \textit{Nietzsche’s Naturalism}, 187f., 196ff.

\(^{38}\)No doubt Nietzsche could be accused of something like this at times.
ommend a goal to mankind is something quite different: the goal is then thought of as something which lies in our own discretion; supposing the recommendation appealed to mankind, it could in pursuit of it also impose upon itself a moral law, likewise at its own discretion. But up to now the moral law has been supposed to stand above our own likes and dislikes: one did it want actually to impose this law upon oneself, one wanted to take it from somewhere or discover it somewhere or have it commanded to one from somewhere. (D 108)

I take Nietzsche’s project to be a matter of supplying mankind with the goal of maximising will to power – of maximising life. We have the potential to be arrangements of will to power that deliberately arranging themselves in ways that maximise their overall power. That is, we are life that has the potential to set as its goal life’s own enhancement. Will to power is already universal to us as a principle but not as a goal. Part of our naturalisation is to realign our goals with the principle of life. In the passage, Nietzsche is clear on how this should be achieved. We cannot go around preaching the maximisation of will to power as a new obligation of humanity. We must ‘appeal’ to people to take on this goal, which means we must operate with the values that are already in place. The final chapter of this thesis takes this idea to a deeper level, using it as the basis of cultural incorporation. To understand how, it is necessary to recall Schacht’s idea of forms of life. We are invested in worlds that we create through certain normative frameworks. Those worlds are meaningful and affectively charged in ways specific to the communities in question. To bring about the maximum expression of life in individuals and cultures, Nietzsche exploits our investment in these worlds. That is to say, what he above calls ‘likes and dislikes’ can be understood at a much deeper level as the affective investment we have in the world we inhabit. So rather than command mankind as a new prophet of will to power, Nietzsche intends instead to bring about life-enhancement by tapping into the existing worlds that form culture. He does this as a way to instil in mankind a goal that is commensurate with flourishing, understood in terms of life and power.

The appeal to existing values is central to Nietzsche’s project insofar as it allows him to avoid having to place too much weight on the normative dimension of will to power. I have argued in this section for a kind of constitutivism regarding will to power. As living things, we are already will to power. Therefore maximising will to power is maximising what we already are. But we are still left with the question of why we ought to maximise what we are instead of simply being what we are, a question that constitutivist readings of Nietzsche struggle with. If I am already instantiating will to power, what obliges or even motivates me to maximise it? This kind of pushing back to fundamental normativity in Nietzsche is misguided if it seeks a foundation that everyone can recognise obliges them to flourish. But
we must remember that Nietzsche’s project was never meant to reach everybody. He knows that some people’s drives are not suitably arranged to be affected by his appeal to concepts like health, strength and life. He targets those who will respond to him by appealing to existing cultural frameworks; he seeks to win us over. In doing so, he believes he can effect not just change in certain individuals but, through them, wider cultural change. Having said that, he does not believe himself to be fighting against existing justifiable normative foundations: such things do not exist, and where they are purported to exist, Nietzsche is the first to question them. In a world without such grounds – an ocean on which we have ‘burned our boats’ (HH 248) – any project of cultural change must appeal to our drives.

What I further hope to have shown in the narrative of this chapter, from virtue to knowledge to power, is that will to power need not lead to noble blond beast who prey on slave types. The calm, moderate seeker of knowledge is an expression of ascending life. Rather than being ruled by a single dominant drive whose expression is left unfettered, the seeker of knowledge in Nietzsche’s sense is the most diverse being because he prevents the stagnation that arises when complex drive structures are left to themselves. Careful management of the drives through thoughtful reflection and experiential experiment allows for the maximum expression of the greatest number of them. If anything, it is the psychological notion of will to power that yields unpalatable interpretations; the biological one prescribes a life of knowledge. That is not to say that we should prioritise the palatable Nietzsche, at least not unless our palate is subject to the kind of scrutiny that his project dictates. But nor should we use the will to power to portray Nietzsche as someone that, most of the time, he is not. The concerted effort of scholars in the last century to challenge this negative image of Nietzsche might well have been motivated by an existing set of morals or values, but it has, in my view, got Nietzsche broadly correct, something that I hope this work to contribute to. The task now is to try to bring culture as grounded in life and power into this environment.
Chapter 6

Cultural Incorporation

Nietzsche is often held to be a philosopher of radical individuality for whom the production of a few great figures should be the aim of entire generations. In the later works, themes such as aristocracy, enslavement and eugenics surface, and Nietzsche’s position on them is not one with which a world that has seen incomparable horrors in the previous century is comfortable. That the subtlety of Nietzsche’s work makes his dismissal on these grounds problematic is a message that is yet to reach the frontier of his influence. This is not helped by claims that he makes in later works. In addition to the increased care in reading Nietzsche, there is an increased attention to FSW as the source of a different side to Nietzsche’s thought. He is still concerned with individual greatness and, at times, it seems as though great individuals have little time for the concerns of the masses, which proceed in the ancient cycle of unexamined life. The free spirit, for example, is aloof and solitary, seeking a ‘free, fearless hovering over men, customs, laws and the traditional evaluations of things’ (HH 34). Solitude forms a persistent theme in FSW and we would be forgiven for thinking that although the free spirit is preferable to GM’s ‘large birds of prey’ who live by ‘carrying off the little lambs’, his indifference to the larger human world still amounts to an unacceptable apathy in the face of the plight of humanity. This would be a mistake, since even though solitude forms an important part of his life, the free spirit is concerned with culture at large and with the potential for the human species to flourish. Nietzsche is concerned with culture not just as the cultivation of the prize specimens of the species, but as the collective framework that binds human groups together. His great individuals, under various guises in FSW, are charged with the task of caring for culture. How they do so and by what guidelines that care proceeds are the topics of this final chapter.

6.1 The Cultural Project: Cohen’s Reading

Accounts of culture in FSW are few and far between. One of the most relevant for this chapter is that presented by Jonathan Cohen, whose book focuses on HH, but takes ques-
tions of culture and free spirits' interaction with it as central. There are a few points on which I agree with Cohen's reading, but there are problems in his account that I think mine can solve. It should be noted before proceeding that I am not restricting myself to \textit{HH}, but covering \textit{FSW} and the relevant notebooks. Cohen sets his account up by raising a number of challenges presenting by Nietzsche's account. The three that I take to be most significant are:

1. How does the free spirit communicate with culture at large given that he is both solitary and inevitably misunderstood.

2. What does the free spirit communicate to culture?

3. What makes culture receptive to this communication given that the majority of people misunderstand and resent the free spirit?

Cohen's account can be summarised as follows. The free spirit possesses certain opinions, which he acquires gradually in the course of careful, scientific enquiry. These are the unpretentious truths that Nietzsche talks about in \textit{HH} 3.\footnote{The idea that science is concerned with the collection of small facts is deeply misleading. Those facts always fall within the framework of a larger theory, something that is true of Nietzsche's work. His work is not a collection of minor observations: it also contains claims such as 'there are no opposites' (\textit{HH} 1), 'there is no essential difference between waking and dreaming' (\textit{D} 119), and 'Through immense periods of time, the intellect produced nothing but errors' (\textit{GS} 110). It is only within the context of Nietzsche's theoretical commitments that his activity of accumulating unpretentious 'truths' even makes sense.} The free spirit has a different attitude to these truths than the masses: he takes them to be 'conditional, probable, and at most enduring', whereas the masses take them to be 'true unconditionally and forever'.\footnote{Cohen, \textit{Science, Culture, and Free Spirits}, ch. 5 sec. VI.} His attitude arises from science, which recognises its theories as open to revision. Free spirits disseminate their truths into culture, but they do so knowing that they will be adopted as unconditional. The content will make in into culture, but the attitude to that content will not. This deflects the first question above because it does not require that the free spirit be understood when he makes truth claims with a certain attitude. Provided the content is grasped, the attitude can be misunderstood without preventing communication. Cohen characterises this transition as operating between the realm of truth, occupied by free spirits, and that of illusion, occupied by culture. As for why culture is receptive to these truths, Cohen cites \textit{HH} 272 as evidence that culture has an excess of energy as the result of education.\footnote{Ibid., ch. 5 sec. III.} Every generation learns the entire corpus of science and has a little energy left over. This energy needs to be directed to new ideas and the free spirit is there to provide them. To sum up, culture contains individuals who are hungry for new ideas and the free spirit provides ideas, which those individuals convert from humble claims to unconditional truths in their adoption of them. There are a number of points here that I have already agreed with in this thesis. Free spirits do have a different attitude than the masses. They treat
perspectives as temporary interpretations rather than windows into a mind-independent world. I also agree that Nietzsche’s future culture will rely on science. Regarding the details of Cohen’s view I think there are several issues that I will now address.

The first problem is that Cohen’s division between truth and illusion is suspect given Nietzsche’s position on truth in *HH*. Cohen writes:

And so when Nietzsche argues that illogicality, injustice, and error are necessary to life and mankind, he is saying they are necessary to the well-being of culture. It is thus possible to distinguish between the sphere of truth, in which the free spirits operate, and the sphere of illusion, which is the proper greenhouse in which to grow culture.⁴

Cohen takes the injustice referred to here to be that mentioned in *HH* 32, where Nietzsche claims that we judge the nature of the world on the basis of ‘aversions and partialities’, and laments ‘if only it were possible to live without evaluating’. This commits Cohen to the untenable position that free spirits live without evaluating. Not only does this contradict Nietzsche’s own lament, but it runs counter to his whole conception of living things as evaluating entities. How are we to understand drives if not in terms of evaluation or even aversions and partialities of any kind? Do free spirits lack drives? Nietzsche sometimes suggests that one might be removed from such things, but far more consistently he states that transcending the evaluative realm of life is impossible. Being above illusion puts the free spirit outside of the world of appearances; but this amounts to the cutting off of the human head that he mocks in *HH* 9.

As for the attitudes that supposedly lift free spirits out of illusion, Cohen cashes them out in terms of taking truth claims to be ‘conditional’, ‘probable’ and ‘at most enduring’.⁵ He does not spell these out, making his reading difficult to assess. ‘Conditional’ is ambiguous if we do not know on what a claim is conditional. It could mean that a claim is true only if certain of its assumptions are correct. We should adopt such a claim cautiously until a sort of due diligence has been undertaken. But this suggests that potentially, once this due diligence is complete, we might be able to endorse a claim as true. But true in what sense? If the answer is that our claim does in fact pertain to a mind-independent world, then Nietzsche’s scepticism rears its head again. The same problem arises with ‘probable’ truth claims. Does this imply a good chance that the claim does in fact pertain to a mind-independent world? Given that Nietzsche thinks that all such claims employ falsification, they are almost certainly not true in this sense. Temporariness is also problematic, since it suggests that we might accurately map a brief window of a mind-independent world. So, for example, we might make claims about a species of animal knowing that such animals

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⁴Cohen, *Science, Culture, and Free Spirits*, ch. 5 sec. V.
⁵Ibid., ch. 5 sec. VI.
only exist temporarily in the course of evolution. But this again does a disservice to the
depth of Nietzsche’s scepticism, which holds truth claims to be part of a framework that
is itself subject to historical change. This framework is responsible for the constituting the
objects of experience, and all such objects, whether seen as temporary or otherwise, are
interpretation-dependent.

A further problem with Cohen’s account is in his placing science on the side of truth,
with the rest of culture on the side of illusion. For Cohen, the difference between a scientist
and a free spirit lies in the fact that it is ‘their involvement with science that gives science
its cultural significance’.6 They ‘formulate the truths of science and convey them to the
general public so that they can be utilized in the production and enhancement of culture’.7
Yet the free spirit is still a ‘paragon of science’.8 Later in this chapter I will put pressure
on this reading, suggesting that science has a different approach to truth than Nietzsche’s
great individuals. In anticipation of that, I want to highlight a few weaknesses with this
position. First, it leaves unspecified exactly what the free spirits do to the truths of science
to make them acceptable to culture. Perhaps Cohen has in mind a selecting of ideas that
will lead to particular behaviours. Or perhaps ideas are made palatable to culture. If the
former, then we have to wonder how these individuals that are thirsty for new ideas do
not come across the rest of science, given that it is conducted in a relatively public forum.
If the latter, then why invoke the thirst for ideas at all? This thirst was supposed to explain
why ideas are taken up, but if those ideas are made palatable, then they should be taken
up anyway. Furthermore, this thirst was supposed to result from learning the curriculum
of mankind; it should surely then be possessed by the ‘learned and scientific men’ that the
free spirit directs (HH 282). But since they are already scientists, what is the benefit of
formulating scientific truths for them? The cultural energy that is supposed to drive the
masses is actually only present in those who are already scientists or are, at least, well versed
in science.

These problems do not detract from the fact that Cohen gets a lot right about HH.
Moreover, many of these problems result from his attempt to do justice to a book that
contains deep contradictions. This attempt to bring some systematicity to bear inevitably
leaves gaps, as no doubt could be said of this thesis. Nevertheless, in the remainder of this
chapter I present an account based on the skeleton of Cohen’s, but which avoids some of
the problems mentioned. My first move is to question the assumption that what is at stake
in the interaction between free spirits and culture is communication.

6Cohen, Science, Culture, and Free Spirits, ch. 5 sec. II.
7Ibid., ch. 5 sec. I.
8Ibid., ch. 5 sec. II.
6.2 The Interaction with Culture

We need not rule out entirely the possibility that the free spirit communicates with culture. But since there are major barriers to such communication, it makes sense to ask whether this is the best way to characterise the interaction. Furthermore, if communication is taken to involve propositions, then focusing on it implies that the main activity of free spirits is the generation of propositions. This would be the case if, for example, free spirits were primarily engaged in forming new beliefs. In chapter 4, I argued that this was not the best way to understand Nietzsche’s vision. Rather, incorporation plays the central role. On any plausible reading of incorporation it involves more than simply forming beliefs. This is particularly true for my account, which centres on experience rather than belief. In any case, culture is not best understood as a collection of opinions or beliefs. Even on the ‘common sense’ picture, it has more to do with customs and habits. That is not to say that beliefs do not feature, but they are only a fraction of the whole. The correct relationship between the individual and culture should be understood as taking place on all cultural frontiers, and belief is a fairly small part of this story. It is more useful to focus on the effect that the free spirit is able to have on the cultural framework, rather than talking in terms of the communication of propositional content or even the attitude to such content.

Re-describing this interaction delivers interpretive results for key aphorisms in *HH*, notably *HH* 224. There, Nietzsche claims that communities contain a stabilising, conservative force that helps them to survive, but which also leads to stagnation. This force is referred to as ‘established authority’ and ‘strong communal feeling’. The key to cultural progress is to strike a balance between the stabilising force and experimentation with new things. This experimentation, undertaken by free spirits, has the following value:

> It is the more unfettered, uncertain and morally weaker individual upon whom *spiritual progress* depends in such communities: it is the men who attempt new things and, in general, many things….
> they effect a loosening up and from time to time inflict an injury on the stable element of the community.

There is no mention here of truth or the communication of positive content; rather, we see the negative idea of ‘loosening up’. This negative activity is treated separately from the positive one of introducing new things into culture. Communication as a model for free spirits, at least as Cohen presents it, is obscure. Elsewhere in *HH*, free spirits are not restricted to a negative role: they help create a new culture. But that does not warrant collapsing the negative and positive activity.

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9This need not exclude the possibility of positive content having a negative effect, but this is clearly not what Cohen has in mind.
If the negative role is not best understood in terms of communicating truths, how should we think of it? At this point it is useful to re-examine TL. Here we find Nietzsche characterising what he calls there ‘intuitive man’, whom he describes as a ‘liberated intellect’:

For the liberated intellect, the huge structure of concepts, to whose beams and boards needy man clings all his life in order to survive, is only a scaffolding and a toy with which to perform its boldest tricks: by smashing, jumbling up and ironically reassembling this structure, joining the most alien elements and separating the closest, it demonstrates that it can do without those makeshift resources of neediness and is now guided not by concepts but by intuitions. (TL 2)

We see in this one passage some core ideas of the current thesis. There is no mention of perspectivism, but the individual engages in a continual reorganisation of the concepts that govern experience. The emphasis is on transference and metaphor, not value or meaning, because the latter were not Nietzsche’s focus at this time. The whole enterprise is carried out in order for the individual to demonstrate his ability to live without the stability that others require, which lines up well with the notion of great health as that identity that reasserts itself no matter how much its stable world is challenged. We should not be too surprised by these similarities given that TL is one of the foundations of FSW. The relevance of this passage for current purposes is that it depicts a negative activity that makes more sense of HH 224. First, the activity here is not separate from culture at large. The intuitive man employs the structure that culture maintains, it is just that he disassembles it where the community fights to preserve it. There is no problem of communication here since both individual and community use the same framework, and the free spirit is not trying to ‘communicate’ a particular attitude. Second, the activity is a negative one in the sense that it is ‘destructive’ of what is present in culture. There is positivity here, since this activity forms the identity of intuitive man; but this positive identity is defined by negative activity in relation to the cultural framework.

Such behaviour should only be cautiously labelled as ‘destructive’. One of the behaviours listed is reassembling, which is a more accurate way to understand what is going on here. In chapter 4 the process of incorporating truth continually undermined perspectives. But this was achieved by moving from one perspective to another, not by simply casting off a perspective. This latter activity makes little sense given that perspectives are required for conscious experience, nor can we simply cease to consciously experience something in some way or other. We cannot discard a conceptual scheme and then look for a new one. Any change that we effect must dovetail with what is already present. We can think of this as analogous to trying to repair a ship at sea. The work we can carry out at any one time is
limited by the fact that the ship needs to stay afloat. However, over time, the entire vessel can be radically altered. Nietzsche clearly recognises this in GS 58:

What kind of a fool would believe that it is enough to point to this origin and this misty shroud of delusion in order to destroy the world that counts as ‘real’, so called ‘reality’! Only as creators can we destroy! – But let us also not forget that in the long run it is enough to create new names and valuations and appearances of truth in order to create new ‘things’.

The creation new names and appearances fits squarely with the activity of TL, where metaphors gradually come to be regarded as truths. Values are an addition of FSW. It is clear now why it is so important for free spirits to know the preconditions of culture, including the mechanisms of experience constitution. Their personal activity of incorporation relies upon such knowledge, but so to does their effect on the wider cultural framework.

The way I have presented GS 58 is clearly positive in the sense that creation is as relevant as destruction. But it still fits within the negative project as I delineated it earlier. Before addressing the positive cultural project, I want to look more closely at the interaction between free spirits and culture. How does the free spirit positively influence culture? The groundwork for answering this question was laid down by Katsafanas’ paper, which I addressed at the beginning of chapter 2. The key claim was that our behaviour, even that which results from rational deliberation, takes its cue from the experienced world, which is at the interpretive whim of drives. I extended this claim to say that the world that we consciously experience is fully constituted by the interpretive activity of drives. Moreover, this activity is best understood with reference to the communal forces that shape it. TL and GS 58 make clear that the processes that go into constituting the world of appearances can be commandeered by certain individuals; the world of appearances can be remodelled. This gives individuals the power to change behaviour in subtle ways. It does not require, although it may include, communicating propositions that can be adopted as beliefs. It need only change people’s experience. It is this kind of cultural change that goes unnoticed in the daily activities of the majority of people, but which has the deepest effect on the way we behave. The key aspect of this that I want to focus on is its affective dimension. Rewiring of the cultural framework that casts things in a new affective light and thereby changes how we behave towards them. I will now spend some time on this idea.

Clark and Dudrick claim that the project of GS is to understand how to confer values on the natural world. But Nietzsche is clear that we never experience a world free of values that we have to struggle to implant values in. Only as creators of value can we destroy them in the first place. See Clark and Dudrick, ‘Nietzsche and Moral Objectivity,’ 202.

Denat gives a more detailed account of the employment of various linguistic practices to bring about change and to create new thoughts and feelings. See Denat, “‘To Speak in Images’: The Status of Rhetoric and Metaphor in Nietzsche’s New Language.”
So far, I have discussed the interaction between individuals and culture with reference to two figures: the free spirit of *FSW* and the intuitive man of *TL*. But the most practitioner about whom we know the most is Nietzsche himself. Not only does employ common literary devices, but even his apparently direct philosophical engagements can often be interpreted as self-consciously crafted for ends other than merely communicating the relevant content. This is part of what makes Nietzsche's ideas so slippery for those seeking to grasp them in the normal way. We might call these the philosophical and literary dimensions of the texts, but although at times useful, these distinctions are ultimately inadequate. They separate what arguably cannot be separated cleanly; nevertheless, they are implicitly adopted by some writers on Nietzsche. For some, the literary devices are flourishes added to the text that, although of aesthetic or literary value, get in the way of the solid philosophical content; for others, there is no such content: there is only rhetoric and literature. The alternative to adopting these extremes is to recognise the various roles of the literary devices in Nietzsche's works or the overall strategy that explains their general deployment. In fact, his use of such devices follows directly from his cultural philosophy, which is to say that the literary practices that he engages in are instances of the activity that he takes to be necessary in reshaping culture. Nietzsche is both engaged in a descriptive enterprise and one of affecting the reader in ways that bring about a change in them. This is the key feature that distinguishes Nietzsche from a scientist, even when science is taken as *Wissenschaft*. My engagement with this question of Nietzsche as scientist is divided between the remainder of this section and section 5, in which I look more closely at the idea of a scientific culture.

Nietzsche's affective engagement with the reader has been explored by several writers, but the standout work in my view is by Christopher Janaway, who also engages with the question of Nietzsche as a scientist. In one paper, Janaway positions his views on this affective engagement as a response to Brian Leiter's influential reading of Nietzsche as a naturalist. Specifically, he targets what Leiter calls 'methods continuity', which is one criterion on which to decide whether a thinker should be labelled as a 'naturalist'. The claim is that Nietzsche is a naturalist insofar as his work is continuous with the methods of natural science, i.e. that his work emulates scientific enquiry. Janaway's engagement with Leiter is nuanced and I do not have time to address it all. One point is of particular interest though, which is that the practice of genealogy is distinct from history in that the former involves engaging the affects, whereas the latter, like most sciences, involves quietening them to be more 'objective'. Janaway goes on to give an account of the function of Nietzsche's affective engagement in *GM*, expanding on his 2003 essay, which goes into

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13 This is not the only distinguishing feature. See: ibid., 347.
great depth on the same topic. There he claims that the object of study in genealogy is one's own affective states. One treats oneself as both a repository of the historical affects that precede one and as capable of bringing those states back into conscious awareness for study. On several occasions, Nietzsche is deliberately controversial because he wishes to lead the reader to feel disgust, shame or other negative emotions. In eliciting this feeling, Nietzsche exposes the reader's prejudices, affects and so on, making the psyche available for study. This is similar the process that I outlined in chapter 3, where literature served to externalise and make available for study the individual's psyche, as well as allowing them to break with perspectives.

I agree with Janaway that Nietzsche's affective engagement represents a break with the methods of science, but not necessarily with all of his reasoning. I would argue that insofar as Nietzsche's work involves revealing the affects as an object of study, it is continuous with science. Science cannot proceed without something to study. Many scientific endeavours involve a great deal of work simply to reveal that which is to be studied. The palaeontologist who spends an inordinate amount of time carefully exposing a fossilised skeleton in a dried-up river bed is engaged in scientific practices. His hours of painful labour are comparable to the gradual unmasking of the self that occurs in the therapy of Nietzsche's work, at least for those affected in the intended way. Janaway is very careful in his final formulation of his criticism:

To the extent that scientific method is conceived as an impersonal, affect-free search for truth, Nietzsche is critical of it, because he holds that it disables the identification of one's affects through feeling them, and so obscures the truth about the causal role of affects in the production of one's values.

If science is by definition affect-free then of course practices that invoke the affects are unscientific. But this is begging the question somewhat. If the only way to reveal the object of study in the case of affects is to invoke them, and doing so does not prevent their study in other ways, then a case could be made for invoking the scientific principle that one must reveal one's object in order to study, overruling in certain cases the definition of science as affect-free. I take it Janaway sees the definition of science as affect-free as coming from Nietzsche's own rejection of Rée, which he deals with in the essay. If this is right, then it is on Nietzsche's own terms that he would not consider genealogy to be science, in which case I think Janaway's position is stronger. Moreover, this is only one of a host of arguments that Janaway brings to bear against Leiter's position. Nonetheless, where I think affective engagement most prominently distinguishes Nietzsche from a scientist is


in his prescriptive project; he uses affects to bring about certain behaviours in his readers by manipulating them at a level below that of rational engagement and is involved in something that scientific practice does not formally acknowledge. Although one could make the case that even scientists engage in metaphor and persuasion, what Nietzsche does is much more calculated and comprehensive than this.

In chapter 2, I proposed something called the transitivity of affectivity, which was the claim that the affectivity could be transferred between things through various kinds of association. This can also occur in the symbolic realm, where a symbol carries with it the affectivity of that which it signifies and can interact with other symbols, as well as being connected with other concrete things. Nietzsche engages in symbolism throughout his work. For example, he uses knights to symbolise the free spirits. On reflection, the use of this symbol is odd given that knights have not existed, at least in their fairytale form, for hundreds of years. Knights are not part of my experienced world other than as symbols or depicted in art. Yet they have a strong symbolic presence in western culture. They are part of a deep tradition of romantic mythology. This lends them a great deal of affectivity. While we might give propositional content to that affectivity by listing the various ideas associated with knighthood, our experience contains none of that explicitly: we simply find the symbol to have a kind of aura of nobility. When Nietzsche uses the knight symbol, he transfers its aura onto the free spirit. In those for whom knighthood is an alluring prospect, but who recognise it as no longer a viable career choice, seeking knowledge might serve as a replacement if conceived of in the same light. To this end, Nietzsche could simply describe the free spirit as noble, or detail free-spirited activities that look noble. But he recognises that culture contains a great deal of accumulated affective capital and he uses that as leverage in encouraging the behaviour he wants. He cashes in the ‘accumulated treasure’ mentioned in III 16, using it to affect the degree and manner in which knowledge is sought. The colouration of the world that arises through culture is the palette with which Nietzsche paints his cultural vision.

Symbolism such as described cannot be arbitrary. The knight works as a symbol not just because it invokes a certain mood, but also because there are similarities between knights and seekers of knowledge that permit comparison. Both struggle with adversaries, experience solitude, and make sacrifices. One can enumerate many such comparisons, the point being that it is these that allow the symbol some degree of purchase. However, in the case of the knight, Nietzsche is not employing the metaphor as we sometime do, namely to invite potentially fruitful structural comparisons. He specifically has in mind the bravery and nobility of the knight. His purpose here is clearly not one of instruction but of inspi-
I am proposing that many such symbols are present in his work, where shared properties allow for the application of the symbol, but the aim is to transfer the affectivity of the symbol to a new object. We should contrast this with cases such as use of the garden to symbolise the drives. Although gardens have a cultural symbolic significance, Nietzsche employs this metaphor to instruct us in the management of drives. Just like the knight, birds shares qualities with the free spirit, but this is not why Nietzsche employs it as a symbol. It is because of the affectivity of the experience of a bird in flight and the prevalent romanticising of such flight in culture serves to inspire the reader with borrowed affectivity. There are of course many cases where both benefits of comparison are present, but that does not undermine the existence of a valid and useful distinction.

In practice, employing symbolism is more complicated than this. I stand by my analysis of these simple cases, but it would struggle with an image such as the desert in which the wanderer ventures. The aptness of the desert for comparison with the life of the free spirit is easy to locate, as is its affective dimension: those have never even been in a desert have still had it presented to them in many cultural contexts as a harsh, unforgiving environment. The numerous paintings, books and poems that take it as their setting and build up an affective relation that goes beyond mere beliefs about it. When we think of wandering in the desert, however, the work that stands out is the Bible. In a Christian culture biblical imagery is pervasive and powerful. Given that Nietzsche is heavily invested in undermining Christianity, his use of the desert as a symbol acquires extra layers of complexity. Does Nietzsche imply that the free spirit is to start a new religion? Or that the commitment of religion to solitude, albeit misguided, is not to be thrown out with the death of God? Is he inverting the idea of wandering in search of to God to suggest searching for godlessness? The work of deciding such questions is that faced daily in the study of literature and art more broadly. But this does not make the simple analysis I have given redundant. Firstly, the use of the desert symbol still achieves the transfer of affectivity that I have described. Secondly, this discussion of biblical references merely serves to show that cultural frameworks are incredibly complex historical entities and that employing them effectively to produce the desired effect is difficult. Anyone who has invested significant effort in the art of writing knows how precious such devices are and how difficult they are to use, however effortlessly Nietzsche does so.

The way I have presented this symbolic engagement in Nietzsche should not strike the reader as a particularly original insight given that such practices are both widespread.

The idea of inspiration over reasoning by employing existing cultural elements has been addressed by other interpreters. Railton highlights this practice and, moreover, allows that Nietzsche is well aware that only certain people will be affected by it to the level of becoming great individuals. My addition is to claim that Nietzsche does not merely discount those who are not affected. He simply seeks different effects for different kinds of people. Some he wants to practice science, others he wants to become free spirits proper. See Railton, ‘Nietzsche’s Normative Theory,’ 47–49.

For one account of the symbolic importance of the garden image in Nietzsche, see Michael Ure, *Nietzsche’s Therapy: Self-Cultivation in the Middle Works* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 2008), 202.
and conspicuous in society. Transferring the affective aura from one thing to another is a staple of modern advertising. When a celebrity is paid to be seen wearing a brand, the underlying premise is that some of that individual’s aura will come to be associated with the brand. When the consumer is faced with a decision between two products, they are unconsciously drawn to one as a result of these associations. Although unconscious, these change conscious experience and, thereby, behaviour. This applies at very subtle levels. For instance, advertisers tailor advert voice-overs to their target market. But this is not just because familiarity breeds liking: certain accents and ways of talking have associations that give them a certain phenomenal character that cannot be captured in propositional terms. Someone learning a language can be told that a particular accent is, say, associated with a particular social class, but that is not the same as them experiencing it in the relevant way. These associations are rich material for those seeking to manipulate behaviour.

This reaches its pinnacle in advertisers who cannot communicate the benefit of their product in propositional terms at all, or in those whose products have little to separate them from their competition. In the case of something like perfume, its one distinguishing feature – fragrance – cannot be conveyed in propositions. As a result, perfume adverts are highly stylised and richly symbolic, capitalising on their target culture’s romantic imagery and including celebrities who have built an affective aura around themselves. In short, these companies engage every association they can to build an aura around their product. In the other category are companies that sell, for example, sportswear. Often their product is little different from their competition’s so they focus heavily on branding and image. They want their product to stand out on the shelf not in virtue of its features, but the affectivity built around its brand. In most cases, different marketing strategies are combined such that distinguishing features and affectivity are relevant. Just like these advertisers, Nietzsche engages the reader on both rational and sub-rational fronts. He is not selling a product, but he is selling a vision. This activity is the result of his recognition that culture’s accumulated treasure of affectivity is key to its cultural transformation.

This is one example of a broader manipulation of the cultural framework. Not only can new associations be formed to create new valuations, but conceptual relations can be challenged, broken and reforged. All such activity serves to alter the consciously experienced world in relation to which behaviour is formed. This is the same process by which artists are able to change the perspectives within a culture. Indeed, Nietzsche’s work as I have depicted it is heavily invested in artistic practices. This leads to a clash with the view of Nietzsche’s middle period as favouring science over art, particularly *HH*. Although I have argued that Nietzsche is not best viewed as a methodological naturalist, the inclusion of art to this extent could be seen as an unacceptable swing the other way. This criticism can be mitigated by highlighting the many places even in *HH* where Nietzsche finds a place for art.

One use for art in *HH* is in its ability to reintroduce past perspectives into culture: ‘Art
as necromancer. – Among the subsidiary duties of art is that of conserving, and no doubt also of taking extinguished, faded ideas and restoring to them a little colour: when it performs this task it winds a band around different ages and makes the spirits that inform them return' (HH 147). The artist does not necessarily create a perspective here, but renders a past perspective phenomenologically approachable, i.e. makes it something through which we might experience the world. Art, then, fits squarely with the project of incorporation outlined in chapter 4. Past perspectives provide additional cultural material that can be employed as leverage. Nietzsche is clearest about the need to preserve and restore this cultural heritage of affectivity in HH 251, where he talks about the ‘double-brain’, which is formed by science on the one side and metaphysics, art and illusion on the other: in ‘one domain lies the power-source, in the other the regulator’. The power here is a matter of being drawn into the world in various ways. Science is said to act as a limiter on such commitments and while I think this persists through FSW, I will argue in the final section that the opposition between metaphysics and science is actually complex. Science does not simply regulate our engagement with the world of appearances, but itself needs to be deeply invested in that world in order to remain a central cultural activity. Nonetheless, science will prove to be the positive content of Nietzsche’s project of cultural incorporation. Before addressing that, and having outlined the negative and positive aspects of the interaction between free spirits and culture, it is necessary to locate this in the theory of health given in chapter 4.

6.3 Cultural Health

As Gregory Moore has pointed out, ‘The analogy between the organism and the state is of course an ancient one’, and he does a fine job of tracing Nietzsche’s own take on this analogy. He identifies Lange’s Der Geschichte des Materialismus, which Nietzsche read in 1866, as the likely first source of the idea. Lange describes the theories of Rudolph Virchow, who proposes the idea of the Zellenstaat [cell state]. The body is composed of cells organised like citizens of a state. This idea will resurface when Nietzsche discovers Roux in 1881. Most of Moore’s material comes from notebooks in 1882 and onwards, wherein we find the second phase of Nietzsche’s engagement with Roux. Moore is right to focus on the notebooks that he does given that his book does not prioritise one period in Nietzsche’s work and that the later engagement with Roux is the clearest expression of these ideas. For my purposes, however, which pertain to FSW, it is important to decide whether the analogy between individuals and larger entities – cultures, states, nations – is applicable before 1882. I will argue that it is and from there explore the possible configurations of culture and how they relate both to the individual and to the idea great health.

The metaphorical application of the state to the individual could hardly be absent from Nietzsche’s first engagement with Roux since it forms a significant pillar of the latter’s
work. Indeed, this is what we find in the notebooks, where “The free person is a state and community of individuals” (NF 1881 11[130]). However, this works both ways, with larger organisations being described as organisms. Peoples, states and communities are described as the last organisms whose culture we see (NF 1881 11[316]). There is a chain of development that sees evolution after the single cell yielding ever more complicated entities: ‘Herds and states are the highest known to us – very imperfect organisms’ (NF 1881 12[163]). Coupled with this, we find Roux’s emphasis on struggle being rendered in Nietzsche’s language of power. This is not restricted to biology: Nietzsche applies it to all kinds of social and cultural relations (see NF 1881 11[303]). Just as the individual is said to be a struggle of drives in D, the wider organising structures in which individuals find themselves play host to struggles that are only kept in check by the executive control of custom or state. So the Nietzsche who was writing GS was also fervently engaged in the idea that individuals have the same basic structure as larger organisations. Individuals are states unto themselves; states are individuals unto themselves.

Nietzsche also employs this analogy much earlier in his writing. In an 1870 notebook we find him describing states and churches as ‘large organisms’ (NF 1870 5[79, 110]). In HL, Nietzsche is concerned with the conditions that preserve and enhance life, but his prescriptions apply ‘whether this living thing be a person or a people or a culture’ (HL 1). Twice more in this essay Nietzsche iterates this list, the final time making clear that his concern is the health of these entities. Since the conditions for life are the same for each, it is safe to assume that Nietzsche takes them to have a similar structure. It is the unity and organisation in these entities that Nietzsche is concerned with. There is nothing here about cells, metabolism or evolution, but this later language is less a new strand in Nietzsche’s thought and more a new way to couch the thoughts that had obsessed him since the early 1870s: how best do we preserve and enhance life with the means that life itself has given us. Life, even in these early works, is a concept that ties us to nature. It does not simply refer to the human experience, but to that which connects all living things. Indeed, it is the human incarnation of this that has first given rise to the problems of modernity; but it is also that incarnation that is capable of life’s greatest manifestation. Nietzsche’s adoption of Roux is driven not by the discovery of a new fundamental direction, but by that of a new way to propel himself in the direction that he is already going.

Given this evidence, it makes sense to read cultural health as analogous to individual health, which was based on Nietzsche’s understanding of biology. To be healthy was to command a range of diverse material. At a more determinate level, this involved biological processes such as metabolism and excretion. The strongest individual turned over perspectives while maintaining his identity. Understanding culture as composed of perspectives

18 Der freie Mensch ist ein Staat und eine Gesellschaft von Individuen.
19 Die letzten Organismen, deren Bildung wir sehen…
20 Heerden und Staaten sind die höchsten uns bekannten – sehr unvollkommenen Organismen.
makes it natural to apply this at the cultural level. A culture that contains the greatest range of perspectives while also being unified is a culture that exhibits great health. This is the position that I want to argue for, but to do so requires that the analogy be fleshed out since cultures are not merely identical to large individuals. What counts as unity and diversity will differ in some ways, for example. Giving cultural equivalents of the components of individual health, as well as connecting the project with the idea of incorporation, forms the body of the rest of this section.

In the individual case, great health was a continual assertion of identity through the activity of undermining perspectives. For culture, stability is a somewhat more complex affair. At a deep level, the world of appearances is dependent on a broad convergence in experiencing of the world. So the commitment to their being external objects is shared by all cultures. At a more determinate level, there is agreement between even distant cultures on the rough boundaries of certain things. This is what permits there to be phenomena such as joint attention, without which it is hard to imagine language learning being possible. Words vary across cultures, but the use of language as such is universal. That is not to say that such things existed before culture: they are part of culture. Through the development of language as such, consciousness developed. As chapter 3 argued, treating things with consistency does not amount to true concept possession: that requires connecting concepts. Similarly, that we can jointly attend to things with human beings of a different culture does not secure the view that we experience the same object. We might take ourselves to be experiencing very different things. This combination of agreement and divergence is key to culture. It is what allows us to make sense of culture as a collection of interacting, diverse perspectives.

Without some overlap in perspectives, there could be no such thing as diverse, interacting perspectives simply because they could not interact. Nietzsche, for example, presents alternative perspectives on compassion. His perspective struggles against the existing one. But in so doing, he has as his object those actions that are traditionally construed as unselfish. His perspective is not so much on compassion itself, but on those actions that are called compassionate. He has to work at providing an alternative perspective while at the same time overlapping with the existing one. He makes this concession in many cases. When he talks about the criminal as being sick rather than guilty, he is forced to employ the prevalent concept of criminality and the grouping it entails. But in doing so, he presents an alternative perspective wherein the distinction of criminality and sickness is dissolved. This involves competition between the traditional perspective on the criminal and Nietzsche’s perspective. Were the Nietzsche’s to win out, there is no saying that the concept of criminality would survive with it at all. The language of criminality might be replaced with that of sickness, and the world divided differently. Change in this di-

\[21\] Which is not to say that pre-linguistic infants engage with objects *qua* objects, something that I denied in chapter 3.
rection, however, requires disagreement that is based on a common ground. Although a mere bundle of perspectives would be diverse in one sense, it would also lack the constant struggle that defines diversity for Nietzsche. Perspectives would not as much clash as pass like ships in the night. One of the stable elements in culture is the agreement on certain objects. That is not to say that everyone need agree on the nature of those things, it just requires a consensus on them such that there is something that disagreeing perspectives actually disagree about. In addition, there is a host of other elements that must overlap for a culture of diverse perspectives to exist. These range from the mundane habits that mean that people actually encounter alternative perspectives to norms that permit language and the wider symbolic framework to exist. These things taken collectively construct the arena in which diverse perspectives can fight over the conscious experience of those who play host to that culture.

The stable base of culture maintains certain meaningful, valuable objects. Free spirits can create contention and dissent that centres on those objects. This has the effect of, as it were, knocking those objects from their equilibrium. They are pulled this way and that by those who employ them in novel ways and in different fields. In the long run, this shifts the centre of that equilibrium; but there must always be a centre for this process to continue. The objects of a culture, then, are like many gyroscopes whose motion is continually challenged but which are kept spinning by the fight for consensus. It is the agreement of the community that keeps them spinning, but a select group of individuals that continually complicates their orbit. The result is gradual change in the world of appearances that mirrors, albeit over a longer period, the metabolic process that Nietzsche sees as essential to life. The healthy culture contains diversity in the sense that it allows cultural objects and symbols to be mixed to create something new and different; but it is also diverse in a temporally extended sense such that over time, the perspectives that monopolise culture gradually change.

It is no accident that this process resembles evolution. In *HII* 224, it is the weak spirits that help culture evolve and although Nietzsche has a problematic relation to Darwin, he does not dispute the fact of evolution. He sees it as the result of an inherent, expansive life force. If culture is to be treated as a living thing, evolution is part of the expression of a strong life force. Exhibiting that force is constitutive of health. This can be thought of in two ways. First, evolution for Nietzsche amounts to continual change rather than a march towards an ideal future state. At one point he writes that ‘Evolution does not have happiness in view, but evolution and nothing else’ (*D* 108), i.e. the attainment of individual human goals is irrelevant to a process in which change is continuous. When Nietzsche advocates cultural evolution, there is a level at which he refers to change for its own sake. But there is a second sense of evolution for Nietzsche. Since certain individuals have an insight into how culture comes to be, they can consciously choose a direction for evolution to take. They can seek to bring about a particular cultural arrangement with an otherwise
absent degree of planning. Natural selection has lent humanity the stability that allows for the world of appearances; Nietzsche sees the possibility for a conscious evolutionary step that changes that introduces new stable perspectives. So we have a rather complex arrangement here. Evolution for Nietzsche necessarily involves change and natural selection opposes change. Free spirits enable cultural evolution insofar as they undermine the stabilising, but also stagnating, force that preserves the species. But change also gives rise to possibility of producing new perspectives that might become the stable perspectives of a future culture.

Why does Nietzsche want to introduce new stable perspectives if he values continual change? If the stabilising force of culture is always present, then is it not enough to engage in the negative work of undermining perspectives? And if stagnation arises as the result of a dominant perspective becoming too entrenched, why would Nietzsche seek construct alternative perspectives that themselves will become entrenched? The answer to these questions is the same answer given with reference to the individual in chapter 5, namely that certain perspectives encourage diversity even if their adoption is an instance of stability. For the individual, this involves conceiving of oneself as an explorer, free spirit, sceptic and so on. It is a second-order perspective on the self that prevents the individual from dogmatically committing to first-order perspectives. For culture, this amounts to a stabilising force that unites people as a community involved in a common enterprise while at the same time encouraging a diversity of perspectives. In the individual, incorporating truth amounts to a continual undermining of perspectives undertaken in the name of an overarching second-order perspective on that activity as meaningful. The task now is to better understand the perspective that will form Nietzsche’s new culture. Just as in the case of the individual, where the struggle between truth and life is transformed into the search for truth as a higher expression of life, so Nietzsche’s proposed culture will base itself on truth. However, this will not amount to a culture entirely composed of free spirits: it will be a scientific one.

6.4 Scientific Culture

In this section I argue that Nietzsche’s future culture will be a scientific one, but that science so understood should not be mistaken for the activity of free spirits. What a scientific culture looks like depends on how we conceive of science. There is a definite change in Nietzsche’s conception of science within and after FSW. In the first chapter of HH, he is still working with a correspondence theory of truth in light of which the world of appearances can be described as illusory. Yet he talks about science as giving us truth even though, as I have argued, we should read him in line with the conclusion of his logic in chapter 1, namely as claiming that science is a perspective. We do not know whether Nietzsche simply fails to notice this or he sees science as serving his short term goal there of undermining
a certain kind of metaphysics. As *FSW* progresses, Nietzsche’s notebooks reveal that he is beginning to acknowledge the implications of *HH*. Far from countering the drive to create a world of appearances, science simply continues this process (*NF 1881 11[18]*)

Although ‘Science cannot cope with it’, it is ‘a main source of nourishment’ for the poetic drive. Elsewhere Nietzsche talks about the need for science to ‘build new beings’ (*NF 1881 11[65]*)

Science, Nietzsche claims, ‘continues the process that has constituted the essence of the species, namely to make endemic the belief in certain things’ and the ‘Uniformity of experience, previously striven for by community and religion, is now striven for by science: the normal taste fixed to all things, and perception, resting on the belief in persistence’ (*NF 1881 11[156]*)

These new agreements on external objects amount to giving the world a new ‘skin and surface and the old one forgotten’ (*NF 1881 12[50]*)

Skin and surface are in turn aligned with something’s being an ‘object of consciousness’, suggesting that it is the conscious world of appearances that science concerns itself.

On the one hand, science recognises that models simplify, and are relative to the ends of those who construct and employ them; on the other, there is a commitment to the project of getting in touch with an underlying reality. Science exists somewhere between the naive realism of the herd who simply take the world to be the way it presents itself and the free spirit, who seeks to engage in perspectives in way that testifies to their perspectival nature by refusing to fall for their presentation of a mind-independent world. The free spirit takes perspectives seriously just as the child at play does with their fantasy, but he nonetheless sees them as fantastical. The scientist, on the other hand, recognises that there are epistemological complications that arise from the practice of modelling reality, but does not go far enough as to say that they engage in fantasy or subscribe to some kind of pragmatism. This is what, for Nietzsche, science ‘cannot cope with’.

Unlike the scientist, the free spirit adopts a second-order perspective because it is life-enhancing, i.e. the perspective on himself as a sceptic. He also recognises that perspectives are models of the world and treats at first-order ones appropriately. Although he cannot literally change the structure of his experience, he works within that structure, adopting perspectives, but also experimenting with his experience as testament to its perspectival nature. At no point does the free spirit aim for a perspective that corresponds to, gets in touch with, or is verified by a mind-independent world of objects. The scientist, on the other hand, proceeds on the assumption that his enterprise is one of correctly representing a mind-independent world. This need not amount to the idea that such representations per-

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22*Die Wissenschaft kann sie nicht schaffen, aber die Wissenschaft ist eine Hauptnahrung für diesen Trieb.*

23*Die Wissenschaft setzt also den Prozeß nur fort, der das Wesen der Gattung constituirt hat, den Glauben an gewisse Dinge endemisch zu machen... Uniformität der Empfindung, ehemals durch Gesellschaft Religion erstrebt, wird jetzt durch die Wissenschaft erstrebt: der Normalgeschmack an allen Dingen festgestellt, die Erkenntniß, ruhend auf dem Glauben an das Beharrende...*

24*neue Oberfläche und Haut gab und die alte vergessen wurde...*

25*Gegenstand des Bewußtseins.*
fectly capture the world without remainder; it is sufficient for the scientist to be committed to a notion of scientific progress measured by the accuracy of scientific representations of reality or their verisimilitude relative to such a reality. That free spirits direct the activities of scientists, as claimed in HH, shows that they are clearly not scientists themselves. That they take themselves to be incapable of transcending illusion despite taking steps to do so shows that they are not prepared to countenance progress towards a situation in which their representation of a mind-independent world is actually adequate to such a world.

This account of science presents three key questions for a view on which Nietzsche seeks to instigate a scientific culture. If science is still grounded in metaphysics, in Nietzsche's sense, then how is it an improvement on religion? Why not seek to create a culture based on a free spirited acknowledgement of perspectivism? How does Nietzsche propose to create and maintain a scientific culture?

The answer to the first question this lies in the fact that science pursues its truth differently to previous cultures, even if it is still enmeshed in metaphysics. It involves behaviour that has benefits for cultural health, and it encourages certain virtues such as bravery, magnanimity, and honesty. Although also virtues of the free spirit, these are still required even in normal scientific practice. Scientists have not yet jettisoned the idea of arriving at a correct perspective, but their virtue prevents them from simply taking the easiest option available in the form of faith in, say, religion. Science emphasises experimentation, questioning the status quo, independent thought and scepticism. Notice, however, that it does all of this with the assumption that those things will produce perspectives that are a better fit with reality. A common narrative of scientific heroism that circulate to this day depicts the lone scientist, convinced of an idea that everyone else dispels, who risks everything to follow that idea and, eventually, overthrow consensus. This myth contains many things that Nietzsche values: individual endeavour, valour and experimentation. But he does not think of this as progress towards the truth. It is simply the turning over of perspectives, which he values. The overturning of perspectives by scientists convinced they have made a discovery pertaining to a mind-independent world is an inevitable part of scientific culture.

Science involves a combination of the drive to create consensus around the currently accepted paradigm in a particular area and the constant challenging, scepticism and experimentation that eventually leads to the undermining of perspectives and their turnover in culture. This is all done in the name of truth as correspondence; only the free spirit sees the whole enterprise as a strong expression of life. So when the free spirit seeks to guide culture by creating diversity, one of the ways he does this is by instilling a certain perspective on science: it is held in high esteem, recognised as heroic and so on. This leads to a culture that is constantly turning over perspectives, but which nonetheless soldiers on in the search for truth by seeking out challenge, experiment and uncertainty. Science, although it aims at consensus, in doing so fosters originality, and, as Nietzsche claims in the notebooks, to
enjoy originality ‘would perhaps be the start of a new culture’ (NF 1880 3[151]).

It might be objected that for Nietzsche, nobility consists in living free from attachments to the notion of truth that grounds science. If this is right, then how can HH 224 – *Ennoblement through degeneration* – be talking about instilling a scientific mindset that treats truth in this way? To respond to this, I would like to draw attention to a passage from GS regarding nobility, GS 3, which speaks of the ‘eternal injustice of the noble’. This injustice lies in the fact that although the noble person has their own perspective, they believe that it is a universal one. This fits well with the idea of the trailblazing scientist, who attempts to ground a new perspective without recognising that this perspective is only the product of interpretation. It is, according to GS 3, ‘very rare’ that someone is able to recognise that their perspective is only a perspective. This reflects a distinction between scientists and free spirits. Scientists are noble for various reasons – they often stand outside and challenge views, they possess certain virtues – but they are not yet just as measured by the standards of Nietzsche’s ‘new justice’. Only a very small band of individuals actually incorporates truth in themselves, continually moving through perspectives and therefore treating the world as genuinely perspectival. This is what Nietzsche means by ‘ultimate noblemindedness' (GS 55), namely that one does not try to convince everyone else that one has discovered the correct perspective on something.

This ultimate noblemindedness of the free spirit seems to contradict with the idea that he seeks to create a general valuation of science as noble. Would this not involve imposing a perspective? This would be the case if Nietzsche thought that a healthy culture should contain only scientific perspectives. But he is clear that even within a scientific culture there is a place for religion and metaphysics. In HH, this manifests as the claim that culture should have both a metaphysical side and a scientific one, and that it requires a ‘double brain’ (HH 251). The metaphysical side fuels the individual so that they want to discover and explore; the scientific side provides an outlet for that. Later on, it becomes clear that rather than simply alternating between illusions and science, there is something of a unity of the two. The alternation was said to prevent us from losing interest in science, but this is better serviced by the activity described in this chapter, where symbols borrowed from elsewhere in culture are applied to science to keep us invested in it. The image of the hero is but one example of this. This is the line of thought that Nietzsche indeed comes to adopt in the notebooks, where science is not driven by a pure love of knowledge. The poetic drive
is a strong motivation, and Nietzsche compares the seeker of knowledge to the spider that concentrates only on ‘web-spinning and hunting and sucking blood [Aussaugen]: it wants to live by means of this art and activity and have its satisfaction’ (NF 1881 15[9]). That there is a significant personal investment in science is repeated in AOM 98: ‘the happy, inventive ego, even that honest and industrious ego already mentioned, has a very considerable place in the republic of scientific men…. Taken as a whole and expressed without qualification: to a purely cognitive being knowledge would be a matter of indifference’. This answers the question of how science is made the focus of culture. The scientist becomes the dominant heroic and romantic figure in the narrative of culture.

We are still left with the question of why Nietzsche does not see a culture entirely made up of free spirits as desirable. There a few ways to respond to this. It could be that Nietzsche’s idea for a scientific culture is simply the best next step towards a culture based on free spirits. Or it could be that he does not think that everyone is capable of free spiritedness. Whereas science has a place for even those with limited talent who undertake some of the more ‘administrative’ research, the careful balance and self-cultivation of the free spirit requires a great deal of the individual. I tend to favour this latter reading because it makes sense of Nietzsche’s persistent division of society into higher and lower types. Furthermore, as I claimed in the previous section, and as I will flesh out more later, it is not necessary for great cultural health that everyone be a maximally healthy individual.

By creating and sustaining a dominant perspective which sees scientific labour as heroic and noble, the free spirit is able to unify culture. Scientists introduce alternative perspectives and compete as it were to bring theirs to the fore. Artistic and religious individuals form a minority, and in so doing provide both further alternative perspectives, but also a great deal of symbolism that can be used in connection with science. Although they can conflict with science in their content and approach, they have their place in a balanced culture. Just a balanced ecosystem relies on species that push for dominance – it is a dynamic equilibrium – so culture is a continually struggling, diverse balance. The job of the free spirit is to preserve that balance. This relies on a further distinction between the free spirit and the scientist, albeit it is something of an extension on what has already been said. The free spirit is aware of their activity to an extent that the scientist is not. As far as the scientist is concerned, the scientific culture is in the business of coming to accurately map the underlying structure of reality. This activity makes their life meaningful. Were they to accept that in fact they were simply participating in the production and destruction of perspectives, they might well take their activity to be meaningless. That is not to say that the work of a scientist who is superseded would necessarily seem meaningless to them; they might well see this as a necessary chain in the progress of science towards truth. But to see science as making no such progress would be a deeper blow. For the free spirit, how-

29 mit Netze-weben und Jagd und Aussaugen thut: sie will leben vermöge dieser Künste und Thätigkeiten und ihre Befriedigung haben.
ever, what makes science a meaningful activity is precisely that it consists in a continuous struggle to create meaning. Science is a form of life that continues to assert itself despite its inherent upheaval. The very thing that would render science meaningless to the scientist is what makes it meaningful to the free spirit. The scientist takes seriously the fictions he creates; the free spirit recognises them as fictions, but takes them seriously because he takes the creation of fictions to be an expression of life.

This is how I understand Nietzsche’s claims in passages such as the following:

the free spirit is brought into disrepute, especially by scholars, who miss in his art of reflecting on things their own thoroughness and antlike industry and would dearly love to banish him to a solitary corner of science: whereas he has the quite different and higher task of commanding from a lonely position the whole militia of scientific and learned men and showing them the paths to and goals of culture. (**HH** 282)

I have tried to not only read this in the context of **HH**, but to stay faithful to the spirit of it while extending the account of culture through to **GS**. The picture of culture is one in which a multitude of diverse perspectives engage in struggles that centre on objects maintained by the consensus that exists at any one time. This struggle is partly the result of the activity of those like Nietzsche who write in such a way as to manipulate various cultural elements – symbols, concepts, ideas – and there by strain and undermine existing perspectives. It is also the result of artists who do similar work, and scientists whose own perspectives on the world are not only continually revised but often clash with non-scientific perspectives. These elements within culture – the artistic, the scientific, the religious – are balanced in such a way that they produce the greatest range of perspectives that are permitted the greatest degree of struggle. But that balance also provides the cultural resources that allow those who know how to use them to create certain ruling perspectives that, provided they can be shielded somewhat from the ongoing struggle, actually help to perpetuate and manage that struggle. Chiefly, the perspective on the activity of science as a noble enterprise is one that the free spirit seeks to preserve, but he does so by continually borrowing from other parts of culture, many of which are created by art or even religion, that have strong affectivity. This helps keep science in its position as the dominant activity of culture. The entire structure of culture as I have described it mirrors that of a living organism: diverse struggling perspectives are kept in check by a regulative perspective, namely that which keeps science at the forefront of culture. That which for Nietzsche characterises great health, namely the ability to maintain identity through maximum change, is clearly visible in this scientific culture. The free spirit seeks to maximise the health of this organism just as he does his own. I contend that he can only do this because he adopts the theory of culture that I have laid out. He takes perspectives to be as I have described them, sees their malleability and
how it is exploited, and sees how deeply embedded human behaviour is in the conscious world that he is able to manipulate.
Conclusion

The three foundations of *FSW* have been drawn together to form a theory of cultural flourishing. Science, which in the early 1870s was a threat to cultural unity, has come to form the central activity of culture. Cultural health is no longer simply unity, but a balance of unity and diversity. Science provides the unifying central ideal, but it is an ideal that inherently encourages diversity. This is brought about and maintained by individuals who understand the underlying interpretive processes operate to bring about the communally determined world of conscious experience. These individuals engage in this world in order to cultivate themselves, but also to disrupt dogma and establish new dominant perspectives within the community.

Were Nietzsche’s vision to come to fruition, there would be small group of free spirits would be the generals of Nietzsche’s cultural campaign. This elite would guide culture towards health. Cultural elitism of this kind should be distinguished from political elitism insofar as the latter enforces through policy what the former seeks only to encourage through influence. *HH* contains reflections on politics, but the free spirit eschews it in favour of cultural activities. But even if free spirits only ever cared for their own flourishing, to think that it is beyond the reach of politics is naive. The free spirit, like anyone living in a modern society, is produced by an education in which state legislation plays a role; the same is true of his mature existence. While profound change is clearly possible through cultural control, it is likely to be more effective with the addition of political and legal compulsion. Perhaps this is why Nietzsche’s project, insofar as it pertains to the relationship between strong and weak individuals, develops the more sinister character of the later works. There is also evidence that he starts to entertain something like a genetic account of human development, although of course without the concept of a gene. Some developments in the species occur ‘in the blood’, and it is in response to this that Nietzsche talks about breeding and the restriction of the breeding rights of certain individuals. But the logic here is disconcertingly sound: if some change is for the good of humanity and that change can only be brought about genetically, it is not obvious that such breeding is wrong. If the aim of the project is to fundamentally change human consciousness to produce a higher form of life, is a cultural approach, which works behind the back of rea-

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30 Transmission in the blood: *BGE* 208, 213, 261, 264; breeding humanity: *BGE* 203, 251. On restricted breeding: *TI* ‘Skirmishes’ 36.
son, different in kind from a sustained political project grounded in force and legislating breeding and education? These are questions beyond the scope of this thesis, but their relevance to Nietzsche studies is this: that the middle and late Nietzsche might not be easily distinguished for their acceptability to a modern liberal mindset. The middle works still propose exploiting the manipulation and influence offered by culture; and the later works, with their political force and breeding projects, might still, in their own, way aim at the flourishing of the human race. If Nietzsche's concept of life is the criterion of progress that unites these works, then one cannot invoke, at least within Nietzsche, the kinds of rights that allow us currently to distinguish between breeding and politics, and culture. At least not unless those rights are grounded in will to power.

There are further lessons for Nietzsche studies that have arisen in the course of this thesis. First, that the question of culture should not be reduced to one of behaviours, habits and practices. Culture is not merely the kinds of things we do as the result of our upbringing; it also pertains to the world that we find ourselves in as a result of such things. This touches on a bigger issue, namely consciousness. I am by no means them only person to say that Nietzsche's project is irreducibly conscious. Not only is consciousness necessary for us to undertake planned, reflective projects, but conscious experience is a vital domain of study in coming to know ourselves and an arena in which we have the potential to change ourselves. The Nietzsche who reduces everything, including consciousness itself, to blind processes is, in my opinion, on his way out; he is being replaced by one for whom conscious experience is an additional level of explanation. The naturalism that underlies the attempt to reduce all levels of explanation to one is grounded on a commitment to there not being any difference in kind that renders consciousness, or any other level, a metaphysical substrate distinct from nature. But acknowledging levels of explanation need not commit us to anything like this. Although Nietzsche sometimes pushes for a naturalism that reduces everything to a single explanatory paradigm, discussion of conscious experience does not disappear from his actual explanatory practice. We should be cautious in always subscribing to what Nietzsche advocates, rather than what he himself does.

In the wider context of philosophy, this thesis places Nietzsche alongside phenomenologists like Heidegger and Husserl, who advocate the study of the experienced world as a means to understanding the individual. Although committed to science in several ways – something that marks Nietzsche out against Heidegger – the former comes to share with the latter the view that science studies that which is determined pre-scientifically in the activities of human beings who find themselves in a world constituted by their own activity. On the question of science, Nietzsche, even in *FSW*, is concerned with its relation to flourishing. This thesis raises the question of whether philosophy’s engagement with the sciences should be understood in terms of a continuity of methods. This narrative overshadows something else that Nietzsche is deeply invested in, namely the ethical potential of a life based on science. Whether science should be adopted for reasons other than truth
value is a question that requires us to look beyond the absolute valuation of truth, which few since Nietzsche have questioned.

This in turn has ramifications for the study of culture as it proceeds in the various relevant disciplines, from evolutionary anthropology to cultural studies. Although heavily invested in a descriptive project, Nietzsche's work is thoroughly normative. His exploration of culture seeks to discover the optimum conditions for cultural flourishing. While merely descriptive projects tend to deliver relativist conclusions, Nietzsche is, by contrast, not a cultural relativist. This might seem an odd conclusion given his reputation and his legacy, but while he is concerned to undermine the claim to universality of specific customs, he does think that cultures can be compared by adopting his criteria of health. He spends much of his time condemning some cultures and praising others. Just as we might question the will to truth, we might also question the emphasis on description in our study if culture and ask ourselves how cultures might be better or worse \textit{quaque} culture. In addition to this normative dimension, this thesis hopes to have shown that no matter what discipline studies culture, the objects of that culture should not be overlooked in favour of descriptions of behaviour or customs. Phenomenological reflection is not an obstacle to a proper scientific understanding of culture, it is a necessary contributor to a full understanding of it.

Finally, this thesis has relevance beyond academic circles. The cultural construction of our shared experience governs our behaviour. In the last half-century we have witnessed a gradual takeover of this space by corporate interests, with advertising being inescapable in a Western society. Advertisers incorporate the same knowledge, albeit updated, that Nietzsche relied on to understand how to influence people through this shared consciousness. This thesis does not restrict Nietzsche to competing to describe this influence. Its normative dimension calls on us to employ cultural frameworks for the benefit of culture itself. With the power to harness culture comes the possibility to employ it to promote cultural flourishing. Nietzsche wants to use culture to improve culture; advertisers seek only profit. Seeking knowledge of culture without the intention of promoting cultural flourishing only provides fuel to fire of those who would exploit cultural influence for their own ends. Seeking to understand culture so as to take control of it to promote its flourishing is more important now than it was in Nietzsche's time.
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