Race, Biometrics, and Security in Modern Japan:

A History of Racial Government

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A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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September 2015
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Word count: 79,386
Acknowledgements

This project is funded by an East Asia Postgraduate Research Fellowship at the Department of Politics and International Studies (PAIS), the University of Warwick. I would like to acknowledge the financial assistance that made it possible to conduct my doctoral research. I owe a huge debt of gratitude to Nick Vaughan-Williams who supervised the thesis and continued to offer advice, criticism, and encouragement since my initial PhD proposal. I would also like to thank Chris Hughes who acted as secondary supervisor for his support over the past few years. I am grateful to my colleagues and friends at PAIS for their assistance, academic or otherwise. Katrine Faaberg Steenland read part of the manuscript and provided helpful comments. My special thanks are also extended to Ciaran O’Connor and Nick Taylor for their friendship. Finally, I wish to thank my parents Yoko Iwasaki and Hidenobu Nishiyama for their support and encouragement throughout my life in the United Kingdom.
Declaration

This thesis is entirely my own work and has not been submitted for a degree at another university. Some of the contents in Chapter Three of the thesis appear in my following journal article:


The article arose from work on the thesis before it was completed. Both historical data and interpretations in this thesis, however, have been updated and extended in the context of the present study as a whole.
Abstract

This thesis is an historical study of biopolitical relations between racism and biometric identification in Japan since the late nineteenth century to the present day. Adopting Foucault’s historical method, it challenges progressive accounts of the history of racism and that of biometrics. During the nineteenth century, practices of biometric identification emerged as constitutive of the knowledge of race wherein imperial power relations between superior and inferior races were enabled. Progressive accounts proclaim that colonial practices of biometrics were not scientific but politically intervened, which has since been discredited and replaced by a ‘true’ science of biometrics as individualisation. Contra progressivist claims on post-raciality, the thesis concretely historicises the ways in which subjectification and control of race is conducted through the interplay between the epistemic construction of race and the technology of identification in each historical and geographical context. It analyses three modalities of racial government through biometrics in Japan: biometrics as a biological technology of inscribing race during Japanese colonialism; biometrics as a forensic technology of policing former colonial subjects in post-WWII Japan; and contemporary biometrics as an informatic technology of controlling a newly racialised immigrant population. The thesis concludes that despite a series of de-racialising reforms in the twentieth century, biometrics persist as a biopolitical technology of race. Neither racism nor biometrics as a technology of race is receding but they are continuously transforming in a way that a new mechanism of racial government is made possible. Race evolves, it is argued, not in the sense of social Darwinism but because the concept of race itself changes across time and space wherein a new model of racism is empowered. The thesis contributes to existing literature on the biopolitics of security and biometrics by extending the scope of analysis to a non-Western context, explicating historical relations between racism and biometrics, and problematising biometric rationality at the level of racialised mechanism of knowing and controlling (in)security. It also makes contributions to Foucaultian studies by advancing the analysis of biopolitical racism beyond Foucault’s original formulation and by offering a critique of rationality in the field of biometrics.
Introduction

The Italian philosopher’s refusal

In January 2004 the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben refused to travel to the United States, cancelling his course at New York University. In an article in the Italian daily newspaper La Repubblica, Agamben expresses his firm opposition to the newly deployed biometric technologies at the United States immigration control under the system called the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) programme.¹ He writes:

> From now on whoever wants to go to the United States with a visa will be put on file and will have to leave their fingerprints when they enter the country. Personally, I have no intention of submitting myself to such procedures and that’s why I didn’t wait to cancel the course I was supposed to teach at New York University in March. (Agamben 2004)

The US-VISIT programme is one of several post-9/11 security measures that introduced the use of biometric technologies at immigration controls: foreign nationals are required to submit biometric information such as fingerprints upon their arrival. It is said to enhance the security of the country and beyond by enabling surveillance of international mobility, checking against databases of terrorist suspects, criminals, and illegal immigrants.

In the article Agamben explains the reasons for his opposition to the deployment of biometric technologies. His main concern is not the issue of privacy related to surveillance but fundamentally the political relation between the subjects and the state: he is primarily concerned with the state’s practice of “seizing your body”

¹ As of March 2013, the US-VISIT programme is renamed as the Office of Biometric Identity Management (OBIM) (Department of Homeland Security 2015).
(sequestrare il tuo corpo) (Agamben 2004) in so-called democratic states. The US-VISIT programme for him exhibits an exceptional yet normalised political technology of control in which free and active political participation is replaced by the registration and filling of individual bodies. Biometric registration and identification of a body remarks, in his words, “a body without words” (Agamben 2004) whereby politics is reduced to technical control and manipulation of information under the rhetoric of the state of emergency.

Problematising the state’s practice of seizing bodies, Agamben suggests that the biometric identification under the US-VISIT programme resembles the Western political paradigm of the concentration camp, in particular, tattooing at Auschwitz:

Some years ago, I had written that the political paradigm of the West is no longer the city state, but the concentration camp, and that we had passed from Athens to Auschwitz. … I would have liked to suggest that tattooing at Auschwitz undoubtedly seemed the most normal and economic way to regulate the enrolment and registration of deported persons into concentration camps. The biopolitical tattooing the United States imposes now to enter its territory could well be the precursor to what we will be asked to accept later as the normal identity registration of a good citizen in the state’s gears and mechanisms. That’s why we must oppose it. (Agamben 2004)

Tattooing at Auschwitz was a highly bureaucratised technology of racial government under Nazi Germany in which ‘other’ races – most notably Jews but also Romani people and others – were regulated and controlled and without juridico-political status. It was a direct state intervention over bodies whereby political status and biological, or ‘pre-political’, status of individuals are made indistinct, that is to say, whereby the traditional political relationship between the subjects and the state begins
to blur (Agamben 1998; see also Arendt 1998). What Agamben perceives in the U.S.’s introduction of biometric border control is the beginning of such normalisation of inhumane and exceptional control of biological life, which was found in the political paradigm of early twentieth-century state racism in Europe.

This thesis departs from Agamben’s brief yet suggestive problematisation of the politics of knowing bodies in relation to state racism. I say it ‘departs from’ because while Agamben’s problematisation opens up a scope of political scrutiny of biometrics, it certainly remains partial and requires further examination. Agamben’s problematisation is suggestive in that it prompts us to consider the question of state racism that is historically latent in the politics of biometric identification. Instead of believing in the necessity of security as the state officials proclaim today, it urges us to politicise technologies of identification and to look at political power and its operation. At the same time, Agamben’s problematisation is also limited, and may possibly appear even misleading. My response to Agamben here is certainly not about a lack of theoretical development in the article – it would be unjust to judge a newspaper article in such a manner. There are nevertheless two points that I would like to raise, which will constitute two lines of departure from Agamben’s problematisation: an historical trajectory and a geographical trajectory.

My first departure from Agamben is about a lack of historicisation of the relations between the political deployment of biometric identification and state racism. Agamben seems to rather de-historicise the relations by emphasising the political paradigm of the concentration camp and suggesting the linearity between tattooing at Auschwitz and the US-VISIT programme. Agamben’s problematisation of the US-VISIT programme in comparison with tattooing Auschwitz is potentially powerful in
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политицизм biometric identification, and there are certainly analogous elements in these two modes of biometric control. For example, both biometric controls share not only the state’s practice of seizing bodies but also its consequential political practice of deportation – be it deportation to the concentration camp or deportation from the United States. Both regimes of biometric control are integrated into the state’s act of killing, or better political killing. Tattooing at Auschwitz was integrated into the governmental function of killing in the literal sense – namely, killing in the gas chamber. The US-VISIT programme has also, politically speaking, a similar function of killing: it is a technology of identification that enables the condition of political killing of a suspect or risky population – such as criminals, illegal immigrants, and terrorist suspects – whose political existence is rejected and excluded.

Despite such paradigmatic relations that Agamben points out, however, these two regimes of biometric control are not reducible to the same mode of governing as he seems to suggest. Nor is the history of biometrics, as well as that of state racism, reducible to Agamben’s analogy. Two indicative remarks should suffice to attest to this point. First, while tattooing at Auschwitz was incorporated into the governmental operation of state racism, it was a secondary element of political exclusion and certainly not the condition of state racism as such. Political exclusion under Nazi state racism was in the first instance made possible by the theory of degeneracy that was incorporated in eugenics and social Darwinism (Foucault 1998b; 2004). Second, and relatedly, the political deployment of biometrics precedes tattooing at Auschwitz: it emerged in the context of European colonialism. During the nineteenth century, biometrics – broadly understood as a modern scientific technology of knowing bodies – were widely deployed for the production of the anthropological knowledge of race in the social Darwinist manner. Through biometrics, scientists had persistently sought
to identify the superiority of European bodies to the inferiority or backwardness of non-European bodies (Cole 2001; Gould 1984).

At this point, it can be seen that despite the resembling mechanism of political exclusion between the two regimes, the biometric power of seizing bodies is manifested historically in different forms. It varies from biometric power in terms of the biological and anthropological inscription of race to biometric power in terms of the information control of risky populations. That is to say, while Agamben’s analogy is perspicacious in that it highlights the political role of biometric identification, it does not concretely historicise the relations between biometric identification and state racism in a given spatio-temporal matrix. Problematising at the level of historical continuity, his analogy addresses neither different modalities of biometric governing nor different models of state racism.

Historical discontinuities and transformations in the biometric power of seizing bodies and its correlative political exclusion are what this thesis aims to articulate. My attempt to articulate historical discontinuities and transformations is not simply to reveal their historical contingencies but also, and more crucially, to shed light on the conditions for its persistent historical continuity. The twentieth century had revealed both state racism and biometric inscription of race to be untenable. Yet, as Agamben underlies here, both the state practice of political killing and its deployment of biometric identification appear to be persistently haunting in the contemporary politics of security. The articulation of historical discontinuities and transformations is then to capture how, despite anti-racist denouncements of the modern state formation and biometric technologies, these mechanisms are sanctioned and rationalised to this today.
In addition to the question of history, there is another important issue that I would like to raise in relation to Agamben’s problematisation of state racism and biometrics. The second line of departure from Agamben in this thesis is concerned with a question of geography. Agamben’s analogy is exclusively situated within Western states – namely, Nazi Germany and the contemporary United States. This Western-centric view seems to have caused his lack of attention to the constitutive role of European colonialism not only in the political deployment of biometrics but also in the development of state racism in European societies (*inter alia* Stoler 1995).

The question of geography here is, however, to take one step further from the constitutive role of European colonialism and to investigate what happened to state racism and the political deployment of biometrics outside European colonialism. In this thesis, accordingly, I will scrutinise the history of the state’s act of seizure of bodies beyond Europe by extending the geographical scope of analysis to the context of Japan. That is to say, if my first question on the problematisation of state racism and the political deployment of biometrics is about discontinuities and transformations in an historical axis, my second question here is about discontinuities and transformations that may arise in the course of geographical translation.

In a nutshell, this thesis scrutinises the relations between state racism – and more broadly modern racism with regard to the role of colonialism – and the political deployment of biometric identification by advancing a concrete historicisation of those relations in each historical setting and by extending the geographical scope of analysis from the Western context to a non-Western context. I aim to articulate historical discontinuities and transformations of state racism and the political deployment of biometric identification in time and space. Focusing on the analysis of discontinuities and transformations – from the colonial deployment of biometrics to
the present day of information technology – the thesis is designed to explicate the historical continuity of the state’s practice of seizing bodies and the conditions of the contemporary biometric border control at the global scale.

Research question

Focusing on the context of Japan, the central research question that I seek to scrutinise in this thesis is: What are the historical relations between the political deployment of biometric identification and state racism? This research question underlies the thesis’s investigation throughout. It is derived from a critical reflection on Agamben’s suggestive statement in La Repubblica as described at the outset. I have already indicated that Agamben’s analogy fails to capture the historical relations between the political deployment of biometric identification and state racism due to his apparent de-historicisation. There are also two more concrete puzzles that I would like to address now in order to explicate the rationale behind the research question as my critical reflection on Agamben’s de-historicised mode of problematising biometric control.

The first of these is concerned with the history of biometrics as a technology of government. If Agamben were right to reveal biometrics to be a political technology rather than a mere technological tool, a question to be posed is how this technology operates in the context of the state, as well as in the context of colonialism, and governs bodies in each historical setting. To put it another way, if biometrics were indeed a political technology of seizing bodies, what remains to be examined is how each mode of biometric seizing enables a particular mode of governing. The ways in which contemporary biometrics – that is, biometrics as information technology – operate is analogous to neither tattooing inmate identification numbers (as in Auschwitz) nor the anthropological measurement of bodies (as in the tradition of
nineteenth-century European biological anthropology). Nor is contemporary biometrics equivalent to fingerprinting as a forensic science. While all of these modes of biometrics functions as a technology of knowing bodies and is arguably integrated in the politics of, and through, knowing bodies, they do not function in the same manner of identification or governing. What remains to be examined, therefore, is whether and how each mode of biometric identification empowers a particular mode of governing, or a particular mode of ‘seizing’.

The second of these is concerned with state racism, which is correlated with the first puzzle on the historical specificities of governing bodies. Agamben illustrates how the deployment of biometrics was incorporated in Nazi state racism and its operation of political exclusion. I have also briefly noted that the colonial deployment of biometrics was constitutive of the theory of degeneracy, which gave birth to twentieth-century state racism. In this sense, we can tentatively claim that state racism empowers as well as is empowered by a particular mode of identifying bodies. If state racism and biometric identification were in a mutual relationship of support, what remains to be examined is then not only the historicisation of biometric identification but also that of state racism. Agamben’s analogy is provocative in that it suggests that the U.S.’s introduction of biometric border control is reminiscent of Nazi state racism. While they may resemble each other in certain respects, however, it would be precipitous to equate early twentieth-century state racism with the post-9/11 political climate of the ‘War on Terror’. At least, it would remain precipitous without concretely examining each apparatus of governing. If the contemporary biometric border control were indeed understood as a technology of state racism, as Agamben seems to suggest, what is to be articulated through the historicisation of biometric control are different models and manifestations of state racism in history.
This thesis’s central research question must therefore be understood in terms of the concrete historicisation of the mutual relations between biometrics and state racism. The focus is on the mutual relations in the sense that my historical analysis of biometrics investigates a particular manifestation of state racism in each historical setting, and conversely, my historical analysis of state racism – and the discourse of race and racism more broadly – investigates a particular political deployment of biometrics in each historical setting.

Furthermore, there is another important component that lies behind the thesis’s central research question: that is, the politics of security. I suggest that the question of biometric identification and state racism is ultimately a question of security. There are two tentative points that I would like to address in order to support my suggestion here.

The notion of security is clearly embedded within the political deployment of biometrics under the US-VISIT programme: to identify bodies is, as the state officials proclaim, to secure the state and its population. Similarly, the nineteenth-century theory of degeneracy was also arguably entwined with the notion of security in the sense that to prevent degenerate elements is driven by an incentive to protect the healthy, or ‘normal’, state of society (Foucault 2004). If, then, the political deployment of biometrics and state racism were integral to the politics of security in a given historical context, the thesis’s historical investigation of biometrics and state racism is simultaneously about the historicisation of the politics of security. It is designed to scrutinise a particular political apparatus of identifying and governing danger, threats, and risks in each historical setting.

In short, my central research question is formulated not only in order to historicise the political deployment of biometrics and state racism, as well as to their relations;
my historical investigation is at the same time to scrutinise the history of the politics of security whereby biometric identification takes an integral part of and whereby state racism is manifested.

**Biopolitical racism**

With this emphasis on state racism vis-à-vis security, I situate the thesis’s historical investigation in the field of studies of biopolitics, or more specifically, the biopolitics of security, which has notably contributed to theoretical literature produced by the discipline of international relations and the sub-discipline of security studies in recent years (for example, Dillon 2010; 2015; Dillon and Neal 2008; Dillon and Reid 2009). Studies of biopolitics offer an original exposition of racism: they reveal racism to be an underlying constituent of the politics of security that is deeply embedded in the formation of the modern state.

The concept of biopolitics was originally proposed by the French philosopher Michel Foucault during the 1970s, notably in the first volume of *The History of Sexuality*, entitled as *The Will to Knowledge* (1998b) and in his 1976 lecture series at the Collège de France, *Society Must be Defended* (2004) (see also Foucault 2001: 134-156; 2010).

In these works, Foucault expounds two emergent technologies of power in Europe in the eighteenth century that are no longer based on the traditional model of sovereign power. First, there emerged the *disciplinary* technology of power that is internalised within bodies. Disciplinary power does not rely on coercive forms of power but attempts to make bodies docile and more productive. Foucault (1979) depicts this through his analysis of the modern prison in which the exercise of the sovereign power to kill – vividly displayed in the spectre of public torture – was replaced by technologies of surveillance and training. Second, towards the end of the
eighteenth century, there also emerged another technology of power that specifically targets not at individual bodies but at the biological existence of the collective body called population, which he calls biopower (Foucault 1998b: 140; 2004: 247). Biopower is exercised not by the sovereign right but involves a set of regulatory technologies including “the ratio of births to deaths, the rate of reproduction, the fertility of a population” (Foucault 2004: 243). Through technologies of regulation and supervision of the social body, the ultimate objective of biopower is to foster the life of a population, which inverses the traditional model of sovereign power. It is no longer the power to take life and let live, but the power to make live and to let die (Foucault 1998b: 138; 2004: 241). This form of supervision, not at the level of individual bodies as in disciplinary surveillance – which Foucault calls “an anatomopolitics of the human body” – but at the level of the social body through a series of interventions and regulatory techniques, is what Foucault calls biopolitics (Foucault 1998b: 139; see also 2004: 243).

Foucault characterises disciplinary power and biopower as two new forms of the seizure of power: “So after a first seizure of power over the body in an individualizing mode, we have a second seizure of power that is not individualizing but, if you like, massifying that is directed not at man-as-body but at man-as-species” (Foucault 2004: 243). No longer the sovereign right of seizure in the traditional sense – for example, a right of seizure of things and of life – they are two technologies of seizing bodies through disciplining individual bodies and through regulating the social body.

Concerned with fostering the life of a population, with making life live rather than taking life as in the sovereign model, Foucault’s concept of biopolitics reveals the question of security beyond – importantly not against (I will elaborate this point in Chapter One) – the traditional geopolitical understanding of security: it reveals the
Introduction

question of security in terms of biological threats and risks. As Foucault states, biopower is “a technology which aims to establish a sort of homeostasis … by achieving an overall equilibrium that protects the security of the whole from internal dangers” (Foucault 2004: 249). Michael Dillon and Luis Lobo-Guerrero emphasise the fundamental importance of security practices in biopolitics: “Strictly speaking, therefore, there is no biopolitics which is not simultaneously also a security apparatus. There is no biopolitics of this, or a biopolitics of that. When one says biopolitics one says security, albeit in a certain way” (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008: 266).

This Foucaultian concept of biopolitics of security offers a unique understanding of the role of state racism, which informs the conceptual framework of the present study. Under biopolitical concerns of security, racism is no longer understood in terms of irrational prejudice or discrimination, but rather operates as a political rationality of the modern state in which race is understood as a security concept.

In Part Five of The Will to Knowledge (1998b) and in the last lecture of Society Must be Defended (2004), Foucault scrutinised state racism in the light of the emergence of biopolitics. In particular, Foucault’s intellectual puzzle lies in a seemingly incompatible relationship between the rise of biopolitical incentives to foster the life of a population and the proliferation of state racism that reached its apogee in the first half of the twentieth century, most notably in the context of Nazi Germany. To put it more bluntly, Foucault’s puzzle is: How could the state engage with, and even rationalise, the act of killing, which seems to be the return of the sovereign model of power, under the theme of making life live?

Foucault’s answer to this puzzle is not the return of the sovereign model but lies in the theory of ‘degeneracy’, as well as correlative eugenicist thoughts, that is integral to the very mechanism of biopolitics. Foucault argues that modern racism is not so
much about killing *between* different ethnic groups, which constitutes the previous model of war, but essentially about killing in a biological continuum in order to “make life in general healthier” (Foucault 2004: 255). It is not necessarily about the elimination of enemy races, but driven by a biopolitical incentive to protect the biological condition of the species. “State racism”, as Jeremy Crampton puts it, “is essentially the view of the eugenicists; not so much racial *elimination*, but the *purification and protection* of the worthy stock from the unworthy” (Crampton 2007: 233). What enabled taking life under the biopolitical regime is the articulation of certain groups as degenerate, threatening, and dangerous to the health of a population in a similar manner to the psychiatric exclusion of the abnormal (Foucault 2003: 316-7). Under modern racism, killing is, in short, ultimately conducted in order to *defend society*: it is manifested as social defence from any threats to the life of a population (Foucault 2003: 317; 2004).

Racism in this sense emerges not as a conflict between two groups but as a form of drawing a line between what must live and what must die in the biological continuum: “What in fact is racism? It is primarily a way of introducing a break into the domain of life that is under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die” (Foucault 2004: 254). This is where the old model of sovereign power to kill is revitalised under the theme of biopolitics. Stuart Elden summarises this point as follows: “The reverse side [to make life live] is the power to allow death. State racism is a recoding of the old mechanisms of blood through the new procedures of regulation” (Elden 2002: 147). That is to say, modern racism remarks a borderline of biopolitics: it is a threshold of biopolitics whereby the very idea of security of a population coincides with the practices of killing including political death (Foucault 2004: 256).
In this sense, the biopolitical incentive of making life live is inextricable to the practice of racialisation in which the unworthy, the degenerate, the dangerous, and the undesirable are made subject to (political) death. As Dillon states: “If you biopoliticise you will racialise, however subtly or opaquely recorded in your biopoliticised operating technologies of power that racialising may be” (Dillon 2008: 188). To put it differently, it is security discourses and practices that constitute what may be called *raciality* in a sense that they are essentially constitutive of the manifestation of racial division.

Foucault’s articulation of racism in biopolitical terms – which I will refer to *biopolitical racism* throughout this thesis – allows us to understand race as essentially a political and security concept. The biopolitical conceptualisation of race has contemporary relevance that can shed light on “neo-racism” (Balibar 1991b) in the late twentieth century and security practices of biometric identification under the US VISIT programme.

In the aftermath of the malady of modern racism during World War II, the biological concept of race was shown to be untenable: it was officially discredited in the 1950 UNESCO statement on the ‘Race Question’ (UNESCO 1950). Yet, despite the post-WWII denouncement of scientific racism, the concept of race has haunted the second half of the twentieth century. As Étienne Balibar and Pierre-André Taguieff among others have noted, race re-emerged as a socio-cultural category that racialises the ‘other’ populations without being biologically determinant. Such racialisation of the social has been characterised as “differentialist racism” as opposed to a hierarchical model of biological racism (Taguieff 2001), or “neo-racism” that operates...
without having biological reference to race (Balibar 1991b; see also Barker 1981). This new form of racism can be understood as another manifestation of biopolitical racism in the sense that certain populations, most notably immigrants, and their cultural differences are articulated as threats to the security and order of society in a similar manner to the previous model of biological racism. Roxanne Lynn Doty (2003) characterises this as “anti-immigrantism”.

Under such articulation of racism in biopolitical terms, it also appears no coincidence that Agamben compares the US-VISIT programme with the biopolitical and racial tattooing at Auschwitz. Biopolitical racism is not just operational under the Nazi racial government; the contemporary biometric border politics is also fundamentally the question of biopolitical racism. This is because the US-VISIT programme is a security practice that does not simply identify individuals, but also, and ultimately, it draws a line between the desirable and the undesirable, between the worthy and the unworthy (Amoore 2006; see also van der Ploeg 1999). It draws a line between life and death in political terms without referring to the earlier European taxonomic knowledge of race. The undesirable is made subject to political death in the sense that Foucault articulates in his discussion on biopolitics. Racism is empowered not simply because of a given racial taxonomy – whatever it may be – but fundamentally because of a security concern that educes racial division in biopolitical terms. In this sense, biometric identification is not just a security practice but also, and perhaps more profoundly, a practice of biopolitical racialisation.

In the light of the central question, this thesis is not only informed by the biopolitical conceptualisation of race and racism, but also it aims to advance the

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2 Balibar in particular acknowledges, albeit very briefly, Foucault’s contribution in his discussion on neo-racism (1991b: 26). For his lengthier discussion on Foucault on biopolitics and racism, see Balibar (1992).
analysis of biopolitical racism in geographical and historical axes. The biopolitical conceptualisation of race allows us to problematise racism beyond what is conventionally configured as ‘race’ as such – for example, race that is configured under, to borrow W.E.B. Du Bois’s famous phrase, the “colour line” (2007: 15). It allows us to politicise racism at the level of security discourses and practices; it allows us to politicise racism not only in terms of neo-racism but also in terms of racism beyond European colonialism, beyond white supremacy. At the same time, the thesis also examines the effect of biopolitical racism beyond Foucault’s original formulation; but this is not just to attest to the historical, and possibly geographical, continuous operation of biopolitical racism in these axes. By concretely historicising the operation of biometric identification in a given context, I attempt to articulate particular historical modes of biometric, and biopolitical, racialisation, and to reveal transformations of biopolitical racism since the nineteenth century to the present day.

**Foucault’s historical approach**

The thesis’s engagement with the philosophy of Foucault is not only theoretical – in terms of its scrutiny of biopolitical racism as discussed in the previous section – but also methodological.

Foucault uses history as a method in his work including his exposition of biopolitics. Unlike a traditional historical method, however, Foucault’s historical approach rejects the idea of the origin in two senses. First, Foucault rejects the idea of the origin in terms of the original source of power that can be pinned down in a given temporal context. Instead, he looks at power in relational terms: biopower is not a form of power that can be possessed or originated in a single point of time and space but is generated and exercised through relations with others (Dillon 2010: 63; see also
Elden 2001: 105). Second, Foucault also rejects the idea of the origin in historical continuum: his historical method is to historicise things without presuming an historical constant or a universal. Foucault’s methodological rejection of a universal implies that what is to be historicised is a concept itself: its historical scrutiny looks at the conditions of possibility for a concept to emerge rather than to write a history of a thing in the traditional sense. For example, to write a history of madness is to historicise the concept of madness that emerges from a particular set of practices and exercises of power in a given context rather than writing this or that madness where the concept itself is assumed as an historical constant (Veyne 1997). Thus, it is not just to say that a concept has its history, but also, and more crucially, to write how a concept emerges in history and to examine a concept historically.

In his recent monograph The Birth of Territory, Elden has conducted an historical scrutiny of the concept of territory in this Foucaultian manner. Elden initiates his enquiry by remarking on the lack of historical examination of the concept of territory in contemporary social and political sciences: “there is little that investigates the term territory conceptually or historically. … Although it is a central term within political theory, geography, and international relations, the concept of territory has been underexamined” (Elden 2013b: 3). A concept such as territory, Elden (2013b: 8) argues, does not have a substantive history. Nor is territory a universal (Elden 2013a: 15; cf. Foucault 2010: 3). Rather, he argues that the concept of territory emerges within – and also its constitution is embedded within – Western political thought and practice whereby he calls for “a fundamental need to return to the texts that reveal the concepts that inform the practices” (Elden 2013b: 8). In summary, Elden’s adoption of Foucault’s historical approach offers an examination of territory as a political

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3 In his chapter, Dillon (2010) compares Foucault’s historical approach to the study of biopolitics with that of Agamben.
technology and articulates the relations between place and power under the production of knowledge of territory.

What I draw from Foucault’s historical approach is precisely this line of methodological preposition: *race does not have a substantive history, nor is race a universal*. In the light of the fact that questions of race had previously been paid less attention to in the discipline of international relations, recent studies have shown how race is actually central in the operations of global politics (for example, Anievas et al. 2014; Bell 2013; Lond and Schmidt 2005). Despite their acute problematisations of race in international relations, however, it seems that the historical, as well as geographical, configurations of the idea of race itself remain underexamined. Accordingly, what I will show in this thesis is the ways in which the concept of race emerges within political thoughts, and the discourses on race more broadly, in each historical and geographical setting. The thesis also articulates the configurations of race in relation to concrete practices of racial government, which I will draw from the analysis of biometric identification. Or to put it another way, my Foucaultian approach focuses on relational power of biometrics: it looks at how each mode of seizing bodies empowers, and is empowered by, a particular conception of race and correlative modality of state racism in a given context.

More concretely, there are three methodological propositions of Foucault that this thesis draws from: an *archaeological* critique of the history of science; a *genealogical* scrutiny of power, knowledge, and subjectivity; and the analysis of a *dispositif*.

First and foremost, along with his rejection of the idea of the origin, Foucault’s approach to history begins with a rejection of the ‘conventional’ account of history, which is based on a liberal and modern idea of historical progress and emphasises an evolutionary process of history. Mitchell Dean characterises this as a *progressivist*
theory that “proposes a model of social progress through the teleology of reason, technology, production, and so on” (Dean 1994: 3). A progressivist account of history is a teleological and rationalist one in that it believes that history has a particular telos and that history has a certain end point. It views history as a linear movement that leads to the accomplishment of the ideal in human history.

The idea of historical progress is heavily embedded in the modern understanding of reason and science, which is alleged to lead us to greater truth. Under the progressivist view, the development of biometric identification can be seen as quite literally ‘progressive’. The history of biometric identification is understood in progressive and evolutionary processes. From racial sciences to forensic sciences, and more recently to contemporary information technology, biometrics are evolved towards the establishment of the greater truth about one’s identity, towards the final form of government of identity, consolidating what may be called biometric rationality.

In his exposition of an archaeological method, Foucault (2002) cautions against such progressive accounts of the history of science – in particular, in terms of human sciences – because they do not account for historical conditions and social and political practices that are linked to each historical transition of such ‘progress’. This is not simply to say that each progressive transition is determined by a particular political ideology, but that Foucault’s archaeological precaution here is also about how each transition affects a political organisation. What this thesis investigates does not lie in an acceptance of the end of biometrics as a racial science in the aftermath of World War II. Instead, it examines the ways in which new developments of biometric technologies – such as biometrics as a forensic science or as information technology – are incorporated into, as well as enact, new forms of the biopolitical government of
race. The thesis’s historicisation is ultimately about the question against biometric rationality.

Second, another key methodological precaution that the thesis draws from Foucault is his genealogical question of subjectivity, which is derived from his rejection of a concept as a universal and an historical constant. For Foucault, a concept such as ‘madness’ does not exist in an ahistorical manner. This is not only to say that a concept is always historically contingent or a social construct, but an approach that scrutinises the historical emergence of a concept through particular social and political practices in each setting. It is, as Paul Veyne (1997: 160) succinctly summarises this point, Foucault’s methodological inversion of an object by its correlative practices. This inversion remarks Foucault’s enduring scrutiny of subjectivity or subjectification, as opposed to a static understanding of subject, which emphasises the process of becoming. As Gilles Deleuze puts it: “Foucault doesn’t use the word subject as though he’s talking about a person or a form of identity, but talks about ‘subjectification’ as process, and ‘Self’ as a relation” (Deleuze 1995: 92). It is a process that constitutes a subject, not the other way round. This is where power-knowledge relations intervene: the subjectivity is constituted by the production of a certain set of knowledge that is in a mutual relation with power (Deleuze 1995: 92).

Third, for an historical analysis of such relations and circulations, Foucault proposes the analysis of a dispositif that attempts to capture neither subjects nor objects but regimes, or strategies, of subjectification in which a particular mode of governing is made possible. By the term dispositif, Foucault’s historical approach attempts to articulate a regime of subjectification, and its control thereby, in a given context that is manifested through both discursive and non-discursive practices. That is to say, the methodological significance of the Foucaultian concept of dispositif is to
capture a “heterogeneous ensemble” consisting of components including the discursive construction of a concept, institutionalised practices that are correlative of the concept, and an “urgent need” in a given historical setting rather than understanding these components in isolation (Foucault 1980: 194-5; see also Agamben 2009b: 11; Deleuze 1992).

Drawing on these three methodological propositions of Foucault, my historical investigation of biopolitical racism focuses on discursive practices in which the idea of race is constituted and the political deployment of biometric identification that subjectifies and controls race in relation to an emergent need for identification and control of threats in a given historical, and geographical, setting. That is to say, the thesis’s scrutiny involves the analysis of texts that reveal the concept of race and the analysis of biometric practices that are correlative of the concept. Both discursive and non-discursive practices of racialisation will also be contextualised in each historical setting (cf. Elden 2013b: 8). For example, as I will show in Chapter Three, the thesis scrutinises the emergence of the concept of race in late nineteenth-century Japan in the texts of Fukuzawa Yukichi. Fukuzawa was not only a prominent figure during the modernisation, or Westernisation, process of Japan but also very influential in introducing and popularising the European concepts of race and civilisation. My analysis of the discourses of race is then analysed in relation to practices of biometric identification and the context of Imperial Japan.

By contextualising biometrics in relation to the concept of race in each historical setting, the thesis argues that what is identified under biometrics is never reducible to the ‘discovery’ of a true identity but constitute identity as such in which the production of biometric knowledge is inseparable from the mechanism of power. By analysing the discursive construction of race and the political deployment of
biometric identification, I attempt to seek what may be called the *dispositif* of race, or raciality, in which a particular subjectification of race is manifested in a given historical and geographical matrix. So, for example, as I already suggested above, biometrics in the nineteenth century was constitutive of the idea of race and the consequential operation of racism in European colonialism. Biometric knowledge of bodies in this sense is supported by, as well as supports, European imperial power. In a similar vein, the thesis proposes that we can understand new biometric technologies – through a geographical translation to Japan and further developments during the second half of the twentieth century – as constitutive of emergent ideas of race and of new modalities of the government of race. This is the methodological foundation that the thesis takes as a guide for its historical investigation into the relations between racism and biometric identification beyond its birthplace.

*Outline of the thesis*

The thesis consists of five chapters. Chapter One offers a critical review of existing literature concerning the four main themes of this thesis: security, biometrics, race, and Japan. This review has a twofold objective in relation to the subsequent chapters. First, it will establish the theoretical grounds on which the thesis as a whole is situated and seeks to contribute to: namely, the biopolitics of security and the biopolitics of biometrics, which I will draw from contemporary biometric border politics and from European imperial conducts of biometric identification. In this regard, the chapter offers a more historicised view of the relations between state racism and biometric identification that Agamben seems to dismiss. Second, through my discussion of existing literature on the relations between biometrics and race, I will also identify the scope for further investigation and specify the geographical and historical importance of the Japanese context as an analytical site. This will elucidate the location of the
thesis’s original contributions in the context of studies of the biopolitics of biometrics, as well as the biopolitics of security more broadly. The main issue with existing critiques of racism in the biopolitics of biometrics, the chapter argues, lies in a static and ahistorical presumption of the concept of race in which their critiques are limited to the historical continuity of racially coded structures of biometrics, namely, the codification based on white supremacy. Against the presumption of race and racism as an historical constant, the thesis contributes to the existing literature by explicating the mutual relations between the constitution of the concept of race and the mechanism of biometric identification in each given context. That is to say, the thesis’s contribution lies in explicating the ways in which the concept of race itself transforms across time and space that are relational to each modality of biometric knowledge and control.

In order to historicise racism and biometrics in relational terms, the thesis adopts Foucault’s historical method. In Chapter Two, I will offer an exegesis of Foucault in order to concretely establish the methodological approach adopted throughout this thesis. In the first two sections of the chapter, I will focus on two interlinked methodological critiques that Foucault offers: his archaeological critique of the history of science and his genealogical critique of identity. The discussion aims to articulate the importance of relations between the concept of race and the technology of identification. In the third section, I will also discuss Foucault’s concept of dispositif and how it can be effectively used for the purpose of the present study.

After establishing the scope of the present study in relation to existing literature and its methodological approach, the thesis then turns to my historical investigation of racial government through biometrics in three historical periods in modern Japan: the imperial period (1868 – 1945), the post-WWII period (1945 – the late twentieth
century), and contemporary Japan (since the late 1970s). Running throughout each of these three chapters are three parallel sections: (1) a hypothetical antithesis of race and racism, drawing on a form of anti-racism against a dominant discourse of race and racism in the preceding years; (2) an emergent discursive construction of race in spite of each antithesis; and (3) an institutionalisation of race and racism in biometric identification as a mode of governing, which is constitutive of the manifestation of the idea of race in each context. The first and second section together challenges a progressive view of the history of race and racism by articulating an historical transformation when the concept of race itself evolved. However, it is important to note that an historical sequence does not immediately mean a successive order: each transition may be better understood as an addition to rather than a replacement of in the articulation of race. As an analysis of the dispositif of race, the third section interrogates the discursive construction of race in relation to practices of biometric identification in each context, which together enables a particular mode of racial subjectification and control.

Chapter Three investigates the discourses on race and the government of race through biometrics since the 1868 Meiji Restoration throughout the period of Japanese colonialism in East Asia. Unlike the dominant discourse of race under Western imperialism, the translation of the idea of race in Japan emerged as a very contested and fragile concept. Its own race struggle against the European taxonomy of race – namely, the racist discourse of the colour line, and more particularly, the idea of ‘yellow peril’ – was later explicitly manifested in the Racial Equality Proposal that Imperial Japan submitted at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. However, Japanese anti-racism was at the same time not against the rationality of racism itself. Japan had deeply engaged with the racist colonisation of East Asia for decades by the time of the
proposal. For a clarification of this seemingly paradoxical position of Japan’s anti-racism, the chapter looks at the statement of Former Prime Minister Ōkuma Shigenobu who wrote in the immediate aftermath of the Paris Peace Conference that the proposal was exclusively against the irrationality of racism based on the colour line not racism itself – in fact, he praised the rationality of race thinking. In order to understand this complexity inherent in the discourse of race and racism during Imperial Japan, I will conduct a textual analysis of the emergence of the idea of race in the late nineteenth century, namely in the work of Fukuzawa Yukichi, who translated and introduced the European concept of race and racism and contributed to the understanding of race in the context of East Asia. The work of Fukuzawa, the chapter argues, did not only empower the European concept of racism within East Asia, but also simultaneously introduced the importance of what may be called population thinking in the country, which can be understood as an emergence of biopolitics in Japan.

The problematic of the colour line during the imperial period was also where biometric knowledge came to play a constitutive role in the constitution of racial knowledge. In the third section of Chapter Three, I will look at the production of racial knowledge in Japanese colonial anthropology, which sought to scientifically establish the ‘truth’ of racial differences within a ‘yellow race’ in East Asia, ultimately establishing the Japanese racial yet ‘colour-blind’ superiority over other Asian races. In particular, I will closely analyse extensive studies of fingerprints, conducted in the 1920s and 1930s, led by Furuhata Tanemoto, a prominent scientist in the field of medical jurisprudence (hōigaku) in the early and mid-twentieth century, who developed what he called shimon keisū (‘fingerprint index’) to identify racial and hereditary differences.
Like Western counterparts, the Japanese colonial discourse of race, as well as its biologist deployment of biometric identification, however, ceased to exist in the aftermath of World War II. More globally, the ‘sayability’, as it were, of biological race was denounced in the mid-twentieth century, clearly manifested in the 1950 UNESCO statement on the ‘Race Question’. Accordingly, biometrics such as fingerprinting was no longer a scientific technology to classify and identify biological racial differences but became predominantly a technology of individualisation. In Chapter Four, I will critically examine this paradigm shift in the field of fingerprinting in relation to the development of a new, postcolonial, model of racism in post-WWII Japan. In particular, the chapter investigates the interplay between the postwar governmental discursive racialisation of former colonial subjects in the mainland of Japan – known as the Zainichi (‘residing in Japan’) population – who were abruptly racialised in criminal terms, and the operation of fingerprinting surveillance under the 1952 Gaitō hō (‘Alien Registration Act’), which was introduced to monitor and control the Zainichi population.

Chapter Five looks at the politics of race and the deployment of biometrics since the late twentieth century until today. The chapter begins with a discussion of another anti-racism that was manifested under the idea of human rights, which gradually emerged in the 1970s in Japan. Towards the end of the millennium, the post-WWII model of racial government, which was revealed in the fingerprinting surveillance of the Zainichi population, was shown to be untenable. There was the rise of the discourse of what may be characterised as the rights of the other – including foreigners, immigrants, and the Zainichi population – that had contributed to anti-racist reforms of the political structure of Japan. In the meantime, as in the case of Western countries, there was also the rise of ‘new’ immigrant populations,
predominantly migrant workers from Asia. I will investigate the emergence of ‘new racism’ in the Japanese context in relation to the deployment of biometrics as information technology for immigration control since the late twentieth century to the post-9/11 politics of security.

**Contributions to literature**

Through my historical investigation of biopolitical racism and the political role of biometric identification in Japan since the Meiji Restoration to the present day, the thesis makes the following distinctive contributions.

The first contribution is concerned with the geographical translation of biopolitical racism and the deployment of biometrics. As will be discussed in Chapter One, existing analyses of the biopolitics of security, race, and biometrics are often confined within the Western context – either within Western states themselves or within the history of European colonialism. This is by no means unique to studies of biopolitics: as comparative and cross-cultural studies today have cautioned, the problems related to Euro/Western-centrism are symptomatic more broadly in social sciences and in particular the discipline of international relations (for example, Liu and Vaughan-Williams 2014; Shilliam 2011a). Against the ethnocentric tendency in the intellectual scope of analysis, this thesis offers an original exposition of the operations of biopolitical racism through biometrics beyond Europe and European colonialism. I emphasise that the analysis of a non-Western context in the present study must be understood in terms of ‘beyond’ rather than ‘against’. This is because the act of translating European concepts and scientific practices into a non-Western context is hardly reducible to the oppositional relation between the European ‘original’ and the non-European ‘copy’. It instead involves appropriation and localisation of concepts.
and practices whereby emergent knowledge becomes neither the replication of the original nor the opposition to it.

In Chapter Three, I articulate the transformation and multiplication of the concept of race and scientific practices of biometric identification in the context of Japan whereby biopolitical racism in a non-Western context was made possible and internalised in the formation of the Japanese modern state. Instead of challenging the European discourse of race and racism, Japan deployed the logic of modern racism for the construction of its unitary political subjectivity and for its colonial conquests, which were articulated as security issues and which also inform practices of biometric identification in the context of its own colonialism.

In addition to the expansion of the geographical scope of analysis, there are four main contributions that are particularly related to the thesis’s central question. The second contribution is an exposition of historical relations between biometrics and racism. Existing accounts on the biopolitics of biometrics (for example, Amoore 2006; Bigo 2006; Muller 2010; van der Ploeg 1999) tend to focus on the recent political deployments of biometrics as information technology, and in particular the post-9/11 introduction of biometric security management, thereby neglecting the historical dynamics between the biopolitics of biometrics and the mechanisms of racism. The lack of historical accounts of biometrics often results in that the question of race is either untouched or raised separately from the mechanisms of biometric identification and control. While exposed issues such as racial profiling in the contemporary politics of security is far from being unimportant, the thesis emphasises that racism is not a separate issue from the biopolitics of biometrics but integral to it albeit varies in mode of subjectification and control across three historical settings.
Third, even critiques of biometrics that acutely problematise the technologies as racially coded and biased (for example, Dillon 2008; Introna and Wood 2004; Pugliese 2010) tend to overlook that the idea of race is in essence heterogeneous and constituted through discursive and non-discursive practices in a given spatio-temporal matrix. Rather than being an historical constant and a universal, as well as being statically conceptualised as the problem of white supremacy, the thesis argues that the concept of race constantly transforms itself and overcomes its own limits drawn by a series of anti-racist dynamics throughout the twentieth century. The thesis exposes the persistent role of biometric identification in biopolitical racism since Japanese colonialism not so much in terms of its historical continuity but in terms of historical transformations of the function of biometric government of race and the mechanism of biopolitical racism.

I identify three modes of biometric identification, which are correlative of each discursive construction of the idea of race, whereby different modalities of biopolitical racism were made possible. During the imperial period, the deployment of biometric identification was incorporated into Japanese biopolitical racism in which non-Japanese Asians were articulated as ‘inferior’ or ‘backward’ and as security issues. In the aftermath of World War II, despite the denouncement of scientific racism, biometrics as a forensic science was deployed for the postcolonial governmental technique of policing whose operation was heavily racially coded, exclusively targeting former colonial subjects in the mainland. In the present day, while the post-WWII racial government through fingerprinting surveillance was repealed by the end of the 1990s, the deployment of biometrics as information technology now empowers a new form of biopolitical racism in which immigrant populations are governed through the management of various kinds of information.
In the light of these transformations and the persistence of the political deployment of biometric identification for the Japanese government of race, I argue that the linear progressive account of the history of biometrics is misleading. The history of biometrics is neither a series of manifestations of anti-racism nor a series of successive moves towards de-racialisation. Rather, each mode of biometric identification is relational to a different modality of racial government. Each mode of biometric identification is, moreover, entwined with a particular set of discursive practices of racialisation in a given historical context. If social Darwinist theories proclaim the evolution of race, which was incorporated in the initial configuration of biopolitical racism in nineteenth-century Europe, my historicisation of biopolitical racism would also proclaim the evolution of race not in terms of superior and inferior races but because the conception of race itself evolves. In other words, the thesis articulates the evolution of racism that continuously overcomes its own limit of racial codification while revitalising a new mode of biopolitical codification of populations.

Understanding the evolution of the concept of race and racism through a Foucaultian historical analysis of racial government makes distinctive contributions to existing literature on the biopolitics of security and biometrics. It contributes to theoretical literature on the biopolitics of security by explicating the interplay between the epistemic invention of race as a security issue and security practices of biometric identification and control since the late nineteenth century to the present day. At the same time, it also contributes to extant analyses of the biopolitics of biometrics by problematising the operation of racism in contemporary biometrics not in terms of racially coded structures or other technological failures such as false positives but at the level of its racialised mechanism of knowing and controlling bodies.
While the second and third contributions are mainly concerned with the literature on the biopolitics of security and biometrics, the fourth and fifth contributions are in relation to Foucaultian studies. Fourthly, the thesis advances studies of biopolitical racism that are originally articulated by Foucault in the context of Nazi state racism (Foucault 1998b; 2004). In the light of the ever-growing influence of Foucault in social and political sciences today, a number of contemporary Foucaultian studies have called for a need not only to think with Foucault but also to think beyond Foucault (for example, Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008). What is suggested here is that Foucault-inspired studies should not be limited to mere application and adoption of Foucault’s own theories, but following his methodology, they should also advance his theorisation and historicisation. Elden’s Birth of Territory (2013b) can be read in this regard: Elden does not only conduct a Foucaultian historical approach to the concept of territory but also re-articulates and advances from how territory was understood in Foucault’s own work. Similarly, the present study also not only think with Foucault but also goes beyond Foucault: drawing on his theorisation of biopolitical racism and adopting his historical approach, it explicates the operations of biopolitical racism beyond Foucault’s original articulation.

In particular, there are three kinds of advancement that this thesis offers. In Chapter Three, the thesis presents that practices of racialisation in biopolitical terms were deployed not only in Western societies – as Foucault initially exposed – and in European colonialism – as postcolonial responses to Foucault’s thesis on biopolitics emphasise (for example, Mbembe 2003; Rasmussen 2011; Stoler 1995; Venn 2009). The racialisation of populations in security terms was also thoroughly deployed in a non-Western mode of colonialism. In this context, despite the Eurocentric nature in his theorisation, Foucault’s conceptualisation of racism in biopolitical terms appears
particularly powerful in that it allows to problematise racism at the level of subjectification instead of reducing the mechanisms of racism into a particular racial taxonomy. Chapter Four and Five, on the other hand, explicate the emergence of different modalities of biopolitical racism in the aftermath of the post-WWII denouncement of state racism: respectively, the forensic and surveillant modality of biopolitical racism in the second half of the twentieth century, and the informatic and control modality of biopolitical racism since the late twentieth century. I argue that while the notion of security plays a crucial role in all three modalities of biopolitical racism, the ways in which security practices – and thus racial subjectification and control – are conducted differ from one historical context to another. If security in the early twentieth century was about socio-biological defence against degenerates as Foucault articulated in the context of Nazi state racism, security in the second half of the twentieth century is about the management of criminals whereby security practices are no longer about identification of ‘inferior’ races but embedded in surveillant mechanisms, which were nevertheless racially codified. Above all, the thesis offers an exposition of biometrics as a concrete biopolitical technology of race, which, albeit varied in the mode of identification, has persistently been deployed for racial subjectification and control since colonialism to the present day.

The fifth contribution is concerned with Foucault’s enduring problematisation of rationality. From his earlier study of the history of madness (2007a) to his analysis of the prison (1979) and exposition of state racism (2004), one of Foucault’s overall politico-historical enquiries can be characterised as the problematisation of rationalism. Foucault does not simply historicise concepts such as madness and insanity and shows their historical contingencies. More crucially, his problematisation of rationalism is concerned with the rationality, or irrationality, of concepts in relation
Introduction

to correlative practices in a given historical context. This is explained in his 1977 interview on ‘Questions of Method’ where Foucault stated the following passage:

The ceremony of public torture isn’t in itself more irrational than imprisonment in a cell; but it’s irrational in terms of a type of penal practice which involves new ways of envisaging the effects to be produced by the penalty imposed, new ways of calculating its utility, justifying it, graduating it, etc. One isn’t assessing things in terms of an absolute against which they could be evaluated as constituting more or less perfect forms of rationality, but rather examining how forms of rationality inscribe themselves in practices or systems of practices … (Foucault 1991: 79)

It is in this sense that the thesis problematises what may be called biometric rationality, which concurrently foregrounds the biopolitical mechanisms of racial government. It reveals that the colonial model of biometric racialisation is not in itself more irrational than fingerprinting as a forensic technology or fingerprinting as information technology. It becomes irrational in relation to a system of racial government that involves new ways of identifying and controlling security. In short, my historicisation of biometrics in this thesis offers a Foucaultian critique of rationalism in the field of biometric identification that has been extensively deployed in the contemporary politics of security.
Chapter One: (Dis)Assembling Security, Biometrics, Race, and Japan

Introduction

This thesis is an historical study of racial government through biometrics in Japan since 1868. As I clarified in Introduction, the central purpose of this thesis is not, however, ‘historical’ in the traditional sense: it is neither simply a history of race and racism nor that of biometrics. Rather, it aims to investigate the politics of security at the level of identification and biopolitical relations between racism and biometrics through an historical lens and the eyes of a non-Westerner. This opening chapter is designed to concretely situate this research trajectory in the context of the existing literature. The main objective of this chapter is twofold. First, the chapter offers a critical review of pertinent subject matters for this thesis – namely, security, biometrics, race, and Japan – in order to establish the rationale for the research. Second, this chapter aims to build the rationale for the methodology of this thesis that I will outline and discuss in greater detail in Chapter Two.

With regard to the first objective, there are four relations that I aim to establish in this chapter. The first relation is one between the politics of security and the politics of identity: Why is the study of identity fundamental to the study of security? Second, and conversely: In what way does the analysis of biometric identification, or identification more generally, contribute to an understanding of security? The third relation is about the role of race in the first relation. That is to say: How, if at all, is the idea of race relevant to the politics of security and the politics of biometric identification? The scope of review here is both historical and contemporary, whether
the idea of race is, and/or was, constitutive of the politics of security. The fourth relation is a geographical one; it is about the translation of the first three relations. To put it bluntly: Why Japan? This is the question of whether the analysis of the Japanese context allows us to understand beyond its context: that is to say, whether this geographical focus is more than about relativism; and whether it sheds light on the politics of security and that of race at the global scale.

Accordingly, this chapter examines four ‘bodies’ of literature in order not only to establish the theoretical grounds that this thesis draws upon and contributes to, but also to identify their limits and the possibilities for further research, which I will present in later chapters. I put ‘bodies’ in inverted commas here because most of them are not coherent bodies of literature; most of them are hardly recognised as ‘schools of thought’ in the strict sense of the term. Nevertheless, pragmatic boundaries are helpful to conduct a literature review with some degree of coherency and consistency, and to offer an overview of relevant theoretical and historical grounds that this thesis is located within.

The first section surveys the literature on poststructuralist approaches to studies of security, and the biopolitics of security in particular, which constitute a core theoretical foundation of this thesis. I will begin with an overview of contributions made by what is sometimes generically called poststructuralist scholars in international studies – notably manifested in the 1989 collective work International/Intertextual Relations (Der Derian and Shapiro 1989), David Campbell’s Writing Security (1992) and Michael Dillon’s Politics of Security (1996) – who problematise the consumption of representation and underline the production of meaning. The section then proceeds to closely examine a number of Foucault-inspired studies – notably the work of Dillon in a number of his articles and chapters.
– that conceptualise security in biopolitical terms and bring the question of the collective subjectivity of ‘population’ at the heart of security studies.

The discussion on the biopolitics of security also helps to unravel the important role of biometric identification as an analytical site for security studies, which is the main theme of the second section. I will then examine a number of studies on what Louise Amoore (2006) calls the ‘biometric border’ that characterises the increasing deployment of biometrics as a security measure in post-9/11 Western countries. Albeit varied in their approach and context of analysis (both historically and geographically), this ‘body’ of literature, notably developed by scholars not only in security studies but also in the related fields of border and migration studies, as well as more sociologically-oriented surveillance studies, emphasise the political role of technology. They call for a re-conceptualisation of technology: from biometrics as a means-to-an-end to biometrics *in itself* as a security practice that produces the idea of risk and danger, and thus, that enables the very demarcation of populations into risk categories.

If the first two sections focus on current theoretical debates about biometrics, the third section focuses more on historical aspects of biometrics. The increasing deployment of biometrics in the twenty-first century has certainly reflected current scholarly interests in the politics of biometric identification and surveillance. Yet, biometrics is new neither, in the words of Manuel Castells (2010), to ‘the Information Age’, nor to the context of the War on Terror. In this section, I will survey social approaches to the Western history of biometrics – including Simon A. Cole’s (2001) seminal work on the history of criminal identification, as well as Joseph Pugliese’s (2010) recent response to Cole’s history in the light of digitised biometrics – that
elucidate its inextricable relations with race and racism. Here I will also identify the limits of extant analyses in both geographical and historical terms.

The fourth section then turns to the Japanese context in order to explore the possibility of overcoming these limits in view of its peculiar historical and geographical location. Two specific contexts will be focused upon in this section: race and racism in Japan and its history of politics through biometrics. Among a number of scholars, Michael Weiner has contributed to the literature on race and racism in Japan. The analysis of racism in Japan questions the adequacy of the dialectic of European racism (i.e., the European Self and the non-European Other) and of the politics of the colour line (Du Bois 2007: 15) for the studies of race and racism beyond the Western history. This is because the Japanese politics of race, they argue, cannot be succinctly configured in these formats (Sakamoto 1996; 2004; Weiner 1995; 2004; 2009b). Their works contest the ‘general law’, as it were, of modern (European) racism, and are indicative of the complexity that is inherent in racism at the global scale. Second, the literature on biometrics, especially on fingerprinting, in the Japanese context contributes not only to a scientific racial demarcation in a non-Western context. It also helps to investigate an historical gap in the Western literature on biometrics that tends to leap from biometrics as a colonial science to biometrics as an information technology, especially in the context of the War on Terror. The section shows that the history of biometrics in Japan unveils that fingerprinting control was fully deployed to monitor former colonial subjects – most notably, the Korean population – after the dissolution of the empire, the deployment that had been operational throughout the second half of the twentieth century.

At the same time, albeit rich in its historical context, these works on the Japanese context are theoretically underdeveloped to a greater extent: on the one hand, the
critique of race and racism is predominantly based on the critique of ideology; and on the other hand, biometrics has been problematised predominantly at the level of the concept of human rights. Towards the end of this chapter, I will problematise these interpretations and argue that the inevitable consequence of these interpretations for understanding of biometrics is the conceptual separation between politics and technology, an inability to conceptualise biometric technology as constitutive of politics. The discussion of the Japanese context aims to open up the scope for this thesis’s investigations in the light of the biopolitics of security, that is, to develop a study of the history of biometrics at the level of racial government.

Security and biopolitics

Poststructuralism and the politics of security

Broadly speaking, this thesis draws on, and responds to, what is sometimes generically called the poststructuralist approach to international studies and the politics of security. The poststructuralist approach in international studies was developed between the late 1980s and the early 1990s and is often associated with the works of Richard Ashley, David Campbell, William Connolly, James Der Derian, Michael Dillon, Michael J. Shapiro, R.B.J. Walker, among others, who introduced twentieth-century French philosophers in the context of international studies (Ashley and Walker 1990; Campbell 1992; Connolly 2002; Der Derian and Shapiro 1989; Dillon 1996; see also Edkins 1999; Zehfuss 2004)

In the 1989 book *International/Intertextual Relations*, edited by Der Derian and Shapiro, the approach is characterised as a methodological stance to view the world as
text, and to study the international as a series of intertextual relationships. Shapiro clarifies what it means to read the world as text as follows:

To textualize a domain of analysis is to recognize, first of all, that any ‘reality’ is mediated by a mode of representation and, second, that representations are not descriptions of a world of facticity, but are ways of making facticity. (Shapiro 1989: 13-4)

Its enquiry, therefore, lies in the critique of representation, particularly “the privileged forms of representation whose dominance has led to the unproblematic acceptance of subjects, objects, acts, and themes through which the political world is constructed” (Shapiro 1989: 13; see also Shapiro 1988). Drawing on the work of Foucault among others, Shapiro proposes discourse as the focus of analysis for international studies. The analysis of discourse, rather than that of language, is concerned with its production, as well as reproduction, of meaning and value. In this respect, discourse for the poststructuralist analysis is irreducible to the mode of the representation of ‘reality’; discourse here is treated as a practice that makes facticity and constitutes ‘reality’ as such. For Shapiro, therefore, the discourse of security does not merely represent external threats but more profoundly represents, and enables thereby, particular structures of authority and control – for example, the practice of surveillance – that are manifested within such discourse (Shapiro 1989: 17). In other words, as we will see shortly, the discourse of security is always more than external threats; it needs to be analysed at the level of the effect of its practice.

Similarly, Der Derian articulates the poststructuralist approach as a critique of existence that is treated as if it is independent from representation:

[The poststructuralist approach is] to refute that there is an external being, supreme epistemology, ultimate theory that can prove, adjudicate, confirm an
existence independent of its representation. A poststructuralist approach proceeds by recognizing and investigating the interrelationship of power and representational practices that elevate one truth over another, that subject one identity to another, that make, in short, one discourse matter more than the next. (Der Derian 1992: 6-7)

Its critique of representation consequently challenges and disturbs accustomed ways of thinking and acting in the field of international relations and to offer alternative intelligibilities of the field (Der Derian 1989: 4). It is, in the words of Ashley and Walker (1990), to enact dissident thought against dominant official voices in international studies.

For a poststructuralist approach, with its focus on discourse, studies of security are therefore to be scrutinised at the level of the production of the notion of ‘security’ in which the question of identity, and the very process of identifying ‘danger’, becomes the focal point of analysis.

In his 1992 book Writing Security, Campbell criticises the essentialist, and positivist, account of ‘danger’ and its political representation, and argues that the idea of danger does not exist independently of the process of interpretation. He argues, “danger is an effect of interpretation. Danger bears no essential, necessary, or unproblematic relation to the action or event from which it is said to derive” (Campbell 1992: 2).

Campbell’s point is not an outright denial of the existence of danger but emphasises the role that interpretation plays in the articulation of something perceived to be dangerous. He clarifies that stating danger is an effect of interpretation “does not deny that there are ‘real’ dangers in the world: infectious disease, accidents, and political violence (among other factors) have consequences that can literally be
understood in terms of life and death. But not all risks are equal, and not all risks are interpreted as dangers” (Campbell 1992: 2). What is at stake in the politics of security is, therefore, the production of identity, or more specifically, the very process of identification in which something is articulated as a threat: “danger is the consequence of a calculation of a threat which objectifies events, disciplines relations, and sequesters an ideal of the identity of the people said to be at risk” (Campbell 1992: 3). Campbell (1992) demonstrates and problematises the relationship between the politics of security and the politics of identity through an historical analysis of U.S. foreign policies in which discourses on danger constitute the relationality between the identity of the Unites States and the identity of dangerous states. In Campbell’s study, he investigates specifically how the Soviet Union was thereby constituted as a threat in the U.S. foreign policies during the Cold War.

For Campbell (1992), furthermore, the discourse of security explicates the production of the state that intrinsically lies in the relation between identity and difference (see also Connolly 2002). This leads him to problematise the traditional conception of state sovereignty and to propose that the state does not have its essence in itself but the identity of the state is intrinsically ‘performative’ (see Butler 1999) and is always in the practice of identification (and simultaneously differentiation). From this understanding, the discourse of security is not simply something that the state deploys; it is not the object that the state (as the subject) externally exercises. Instead, the discourse of security is the condition of possibility for the state. The articulation of security and danger – that is, the practice of writing security as Campbell emphasises – is foundational to the identity of the state. Campbell argues:

Ironically, then, the inability of the state project of security to succeed is the guarantor of the state’s continued success as an impelling identity. … The
constant articulation of danger through foreign policy is thus not a threat to a state’s identity of existence; it is its condition of possibility. While the objects of concern change over time, the techniques and exclusions by which those objects are constituted as dangers persist. (Campbell 1992: 12)

Therefore, the politics of security are not only, as it were, the ‘lifeline’ of the state in the traditional sense – protecting itself from external threats – but also the ‘lifeline’ of the state in the stabilisation of its own identity. As Campbell and Dillon put it, “security is more than a mere goal, even the chief goal, of the rationally ordered means-ends calculus which defines the political subject of violence. It is, rather, the generative and immanent principle of formation of that political subject” (Campbell and Dillon 1993: 29).

In National Deconstruction, Campbell (1998) further highlights the politics of identity in relation to the condition of possibility of violence. In his analysis of early 1990s Bosnia, Campbell problematises the naturalised nationalist nexus of territory and identity, which was “complicit in and necessary for the conduct of the war itself” (Campbell 1998: 13). In this sense, security and identity is intertwined not only through a mode of the production of identity but also through the condition of possibility of violence.

In Politics of Security, Dillon (1996) similarly argues that security is not just the representation of the world, but is essentially something that forms the world. Drawing on Foucaultian genealogy, Dillon argues: “For security, the genealogist would insist, is not a fact of nature but a fact of civilisation. It is not a noun that names something, it is a principle of formation that does things” (Dillon 1996: 16).4 “To secure”, argues Dillon, “is not a state but a process, a doing” (Dillon 1996: 122).

4 My discussion on Foucault’s genealogical method and this thesis’s adoption will be discussed in Chapter Two.
Therefore, security is not about mere recognition of danger; it is not a matter of *being-dangerous* but that of, what Dillon (2003) later calls in the context of information technology, *becoming-dangerous*.

Like Campbell, Dillon also argues that the politics of security is inextricable to that of identity; the discourse of security does not simply recognise danger and threat but constitutes the very identity that is now recognised as dangerous. The question for Dillon (1996: 16) accordingly is not *what* a danger or dangerous people are but *how* the discourse of danger, and more broadly that of fear, produces and reproduces an order that constitutes such a category of people.

Through his political philosophical enquiry of security, Dillon notes that the politics of security is inseparable from the Western philosophical tradition of the will to know in which ‘what we are’ is constituted through ‘what we are not’ and in which the unknown and fear are to be mastered. Dillon argues:

> [O]ur (inter)national politics of security are not only always already a politics of identity and difference but also a politics of desire. For in the process of saying that we are menaced by, and in the course of harnessing means for dealing with whatever that is said to be, a politics of security, constituting and mobilising difference, imparts form and character to human being and to its forms of life. It specifies who we are, and what we are allowed to be, by teaching us what to gear about what we are not. (Dillon 1996: 34)\(^5\)

This process is not a mere negative act but a positive one because a source of fear is not something that we simply do not know but something we come to learn. “Fear is an education”, argues Dillon, “in what we are not, what we do not have, what we are supposed to care for and to care about, whose lack, or the fear of it, is so integral to

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\(^5\) Dillon’s use of the term “(inter)national” is to note the inextricable relationship between the national and the international, *inside* and *outside*, which Walker (1993) highlighted.
the pursuit of security” (Dillon 1996: 34). Security must “teach us what to fear” (Dillon 1996: 121). Shapiro also articulates such education of fear in terms of the institutionalisation of danger:

[B]ecause we live in a world in which danger is institutionalized, persons interested in relating their fears to situations of danger have to become consumers of representations from institutions that have the legitimacy to produce interpretations of danger. (Shapiro 1989: 20)

The education of fear itself, continues Dillon, also induces insecurity: “while it teaches us what we are threatened by, it also seeks in its turn to proscribe, sanction, punish, overcome – that is to say, in its turn endanger – that which it says threatens us” (Dillon 1996: 121).

Security and insecurity are therefore interwoven, which Dillon captures with the term ‘(in)security’:

[S]ecurity only occurs by virtue of the interval between itself and its other. It is whatever it is only by virtue of the way insecurity is always already and simultaneously inscribed within security also. In short, security and insecurity are unequally co-determined. Hence my preference for the term (in)security. (Dillon 1996: 127)

The conceptualisation of security in terms of (in)security is also later used by Didier Bigo (2006), who emphasises its process and practice by focusing on (in)securitisation (see below).6

We should note that the concept of (in)security is not analogous to what is called the ‘security dilemma’. The security dilemma is a term that was introduced by Realist

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6 Interestingly, however, Bigo does not refer to Dillon’s earlier articulation despite the use of the identical term in a similar, if not the same, manner. This seems to have impacted on the credit of the concept in critical security studies (cf. Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010: 60-70).
international relations scholar John H. Herz. By the security dilemma, Herz (1950: 157) means a paradoxical relation that the pursuit of one’s security – for example, enhancing one’s military capabilities – actually leads to the rise of insecurity for others. As Dillon characterises it, “my security project may excite your insecurity” (Dillon 1996: 18). In return, others perceiving the intensification of one’s security also may enhance their security, which then may lead to the rise of one’s insecurity. This security paradox, however, does not recognise the fact that the concept of security itself is always already inextricable from that of insecurity. It does not, Dillon (1996: 18-9) emphasises, recognise the inextricable relation between the one and the other, that is to say, security and insecurity at the level of identity. The politics of security through the lens of poststructuralism, by contrast, is not just about one social group attaining more security at the expense of insecurity for another group as in the security dilemma. It is not just about that ‘we’ attaining security causes ‘their’ insecurity. Rather, it lies in the production of ‘what we are’ and ‘what we are not’: it is about the very demarcation of two groups that is made possible by the practices of (in)security.\(^7\)

At this level, practices of security are understood not only as the effect over the other but also the effect over the self because it is these practices that constitute what ‘we’ are:

By being secured something becomes something that it previously was not. … for something to be secured it must be acted upon and changed, forced to undergo some transformation through the very act of securing itself. Securing something therefore violates the very thing which security claims to have

\(^7\) Also, as Jef Huysmans (1995: 56-7) notes, while Herz acknowledges the importance of the role of identity, his articulation still is dependent on the static conception of identity instead of looking at the production and process of identity.
preserved as it is. Securing an object is only possible on the condition that the integrity of the original thing is destroyed. (Dillon 1996: 122)

That is to say, by an act of securing ‘us’, this ‘us’ is no longer whatever ‘we’ are prior to the practices of (in)security. This is because ‘we’ are now newly invented and constituted by these practices, by these relations of (in)security.

From these poststructuralist contributions to understanding of security, the politics of security is now understood in terms of act, discourse, practice, in short, doing, that forms things. The question is then no longer about security in terms of its nominal representation of ‘threats’. It is this emphasis on the formation of things through the practices of (in)security where the politics of security should also needs to be understood as the politics of identity. It is here that the collective identity of population plays a crucial role in the politics of security, which Dillon inter alia articulated in biopolitical terms.

**Biopolitics and governmentality**

The subject of security is not just individuals but also a collective body, namely, a population: “Subjectifying and securing the state necessarily entailed subjectifying and securing the subjects that comprised its population” (Dillon 1995: 338). Dillon among others has articulated the role of population in the politics of security through Foucault’s two interlinked notions: biopolitics and governmentality (Dillon 1995; 2004; 2007b; Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008; Dillon and Neal 2008; Dillon and Reid 2001; 2009; Larner and Walters 2004).

As noted in Introduction, by biopolitics, Foucault means the emergence of a form of politics whose object is population and whose objective is the management of population. It indicates a new form of power in eighteenth-century Europe in which the old sovereign model of right to kill was replaced by this biopolitical model that
Chapter One: (Dis)Assembling Security, Biometrics, Race, and Japan

aims at fostering the life of a population through monitoring and intervening various aspects of their life such as health, hygiene, sexuality, et cetera. Foucault articulated the emergence of biopolitics from the development of ‘social medicine’, the education of sexuality, and the politics of race (Foucault 1998b; 2001: 134-156; 2004). In the following years, he further investigates the condition of possibility for the emergence of biopolitics. Extending his scope of analysis to the question of the state from particular institutional sites that he seems to focus more in earlier works, Foucault now investigates a rationality of government, or what he calls during the 1978 lectures ‘governmentality’ (Foucault 2007b; see also Barry et al. 1996; Burchell et al. 1991; Dean 2010).

Wendy Larner and William Walters summarise Foucault’s concept of governmentality in two ways. On the one hand, governmentality, broadly speaking, “prompts us to consider how governing involves particular representations, knowledges and often expertise regarding that which is to be governed” (Larner and Walters 2004: 2). Larner and Walters note that governmentality is concerned with the production of particular truths that constitute our societies. On the other hand, “governmentality also has a more specific reference to a new way of thinking about and exercising power” (Larner and Walters 2004: 2). It refers to, as Foucault puts it:

The resemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, and the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal for of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security. (Cited in Larner and Walters 2004: 2-3)

It is important to note that the term ‘economy’ for Foucault should not be understood in terms of its ordinary use but, as he clarifies, in terms of “the way of managing
individuals, goods, and wealth” (Foucault 2007b: 94). Larner and Walters argue that this definition of governmentality is helpful to distinguish from the sovereign model of power. The sovereign model of power is concerned with how to preserve its power to rule over a given territory and its subjects (Larner and Walters 2004: 3). Governmentality, by contrast, is no longer merely concerned with the defence of territory but with the defence of territory in relation to population; it is “concerned with ordering people and things” (Larner and Walters 2004: 3). That is to say, the constitution of the state is not so much about the survival of Machiavellian Prince as the survival of population (Foucault 2007b: 90-8; Dillon 1995: 329).

Foucault, committed to the study at the level of governmentality, traces the emergence of biopolitics to the development of liberalism, or liberal governmentality. As Foucault states, “only when we know what this governmental regime called liberalism was, will we be able to grasp what biopolitics is” (Foucault 2010: 22). Liberalism for Foucault is not just an economic doctrine but is a type of governmental rationality that can inform biopolitical mechanism of fostering and managing the population under the management of freedom. In his original interpretation of liberalism as governmentality, Foucault notes two intertwined relation between freedom and security. Liberal governmentality is not about “to be free”; instead, liberalism, as the management of freedom, must produce “what you need to be free” (Foucault 2010: 63). Foucault argues:

Liberalism as I understand it, the liberalism we can describe as the art of government formed in the eighteenth century, entails at its heart a productive/destructive relationship [with] freedom. … Liberalism must produce freedom, but this very fact entails the establishment of limitations,
controls, forms of coercion, and obligations relying on threats, etcetera.

(Foucault 2010: 64)

Therefore, in order to establish and sustain free trade, liberal governmentality must also control and limit a number of things that undermines it (Foucault 2010: 64). This is where the notion of security, the management of dangers, intervenes. “The freedom of the workers”, argues Foucault, “must not become a danger for the enterprise and production” (Foucault 2010: 65). In this sense, the analysis of liberal governmentality shows the two sides of liberalism that are mutually supporting their condition: “strategies of security, which are, in a way, both liberalism’s other face and its very condition … The game of freedom and security is at the very heart of this new governmental reason” (Foucault 2010: 65).

“There is no liberalism without a culture of danger”, Foucault continues (2010: 67). And we can see a series of such culture of danger in the nineteenth century, which is interlinked to the management of the health of a population:

[T]here are the campaigns around disease and hygiene; and then think too of what took place with regard to sexuality and the fear of degeneration: degeneration of the individual, the family, the race, and the human species. In short, everywhere you see this stimulation of the fear of danger which is, as it were, the condition, the internal psychological and cultural correlative of liberalism. (Foucault 2010: 66-7)

Foucault’s contribution to understanding of liberalism vis-à-vis security has been taken up by contemporary scholars including Dillon (1995; 2004).

As Dillon (1995: 337; 2004: 78) carefully reads Foucault’s 1978 lectures, it is, however, important to note that governmentality, as well as the consequential emergence of biopolitics, is not always in opposition to sovereignty (see also Foucault
Nor does governmentality totally replace sovereignty. Dillon argues that governmentality and sovereignty often intersect, especially at the border, drawing a line between natives and strangers, friends and enemies, or allies and terrorists. Dillon illustrates the intersection of biopolitics and sovereignty in the issues of national security, in particular, in relation to the issues of migration, refugee, and asylum seeking:

For the practices of statecraft, especially in the core areas of foreign and defence policymaking and of ‘national security’, for example, are peculiarly preoccupied by – and continually challenged with accumulating the knowledge and expertise concerned to specify – the norm around which the distribution of friends, enemies, allies, terrorists, subversives, and so on may be produced. Around which, also, the classification of conduct as benign, threatening, dangerous, intimidating, subversive, or supportive can equally be distributed. (Dillon 1995: 337-8)

If governmentality educes subjectification, sovereignty, operational at the demarcation of populations, is about political abjection: “The contemporary drive for political subjectivity has resulted in a mass production of political abjection” (Dillon 1995: 351). Political abjection that Dillon illustrates includes migration and refugee in the context of post-Cold War Europe, a political violence that Campbell also highlighted (see above). Similarly, Didier Bigo (2006) also highlights the sovereign mechanism of drawing a line at contemporary immigration control in which the practice of ‘ban’ is operational.

Moreover, just inasmuch as governmentality does not completely replace sovereignty, the birth of biopolitics does not completely take the place of geopolitics either. As Dillon puts it, “there is no geopolitics that does not imply a correlate
biopolitics, and no biopolitics without its corresponding geopolitics” (Dillon 2004: 81; see also Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008). This is not only because territory and territorial belonging (and demarcation) still matters and appears constitutive of subjectification but also because biopolitical technologies – statistical technologies to calculate, manage, and intervene the population – are historically deployed for imperial geopolitics:

Take, for example, the ways in which Malthus’ population science was recruited into racial geopolitical projects in the nineteenth century; how racist doctrines informed European imperialisms, liberal as well as autocratic; and how racial ‘science’ informed German geopolitics throughout the first part of the twentieth century. (Dillon 2004: 81)

While I will come back to the notion of race later in this chapter, suffice to say that, as postcolonial approaches to biopolitics have repeatedly demonstrated in respect of relations between biopolitics and colonialism (Mbembe 2003; Stoler 1995; Venn 2007), biopolitics often intersects with geopolitics.

Similarly, Elden emphasises the inextricable relation between the biopolitics of population and the geopolitics of territory:

Populations are defined, in part, by their location, and territories, in part by their inhabitants. Territory and population emerge at a similar historical moment as new ways of rendering, understanding and governing the people and land. Both are crucial political questions – biopolitics and geopolitics exist, not in tension or as alternatives, but as entirely implicated in each other, intertwined in complicated and multiple ways. (Elden 2013a: 17)

This is of fundamental importance for understanding the operation of biopolitical racism in a specific geographical context.
In this section, I began with the poststructuralist conceptualisation of security as a practice, or ‘doing’, namely, the practice of subjectification. What matters for studies of security is accordingly about the production of the collective subjectivity of ‘population’ that the literature on biopolitics and liberal governmentality has powerfully depicted. The production, as well as the management, of populations is perhaps most manifested at the politics of borders and migration in which individuals are (biometrically) identified through the calculation of risks. The next section closely looks at the literature on border and migration studies with a particular emphasis on biometrics.

**Biopolitical and biometric borders**

Borders were traditionally understood as a territorial line, demarcating a sovereign territory and its legitimacy, as in the Weberian conception of the state (Vaughan-Williams 2009: 2). However, recently, there has been an imperative to re-conceptualise borders in terms of biopolitics (Vaughan-Williams 2009; Walters 2002). William Walters has proposed the concept of a ‘biopolitical border’ in order to understand the mechanism of borders in terms of the management of populations: “The concept of a biopolitical border tries to capture the relationship of borders, understood as regulatory instruments, to populations – their movement, security, wealth, and health” (Walters 2002: 562). Drawing on his genealogical analysis of Schengen, Walters (2002) recognises the ways in which the border becomes a privileged instrument of biopolitics. In this section, I will discuss the ways in which the deployment of biometrics for border control is constitutive of biopolitical borders, as well as particular aspects of biometric identification.
Re-conceptualising biometric technologies

There is a rapid increase in the number of scholarly investigations on the relations between security and biometrics, and between security and surveillance more broadly, since 9/11 and in the context of the War on Terror. However, the deployment of biometrics for immigration control was already operational prior to 9/11, and cannot be reduced to a post-9/11 counterterrorism measure. In Europe, for example, it emerged as the control of migrants from non-European countries who are sometimes dubbed as ‘Third Country Nationals’ (TCN): it emerged as what may be called ‘the securitisation of migration’ (Bigo 2002; Huysmans 1995; 2006; Wæver et al. 1993).

For example, as Irma van der Ploeg (1999) noted, the debate on the introduction of fingerprinting for the regulation of asylum seekers in Europe – the system that is today known as the ‘Eurodac’ (which stands for European Dactyloscopy) – had already emerged in the 1990s, namely, under the Dublin Convention (also known as the Dublin Regulation).

The Dublin Convention, which was initially signed in 1990, is a European measure to control asylum seekers by legally determining the responsibility of the member states of the European Union. Under this measure, the first member state where asylum seekers arrive will be responsible for their application (van der Ploeg 1999: 298). Establishing this responsibility, the aim of the Dublin Convention is to

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8 My use of the term ‘securitisation of migration’ here is only to note the articulation of migration as a security issue in general, not ‘securitisation’ as a theoretical approach of the Copenhagen School, who nevertheless contributes to earlier studies of migration in terms of security (Wæver et al. 1993). In particular, I do not agree with particular theoretical formulations of the School including their emphasis on the ‘speech act’, their conceptual division between ‘kinds’ of security – for example, between societal security and political security – and their conceptual division between ‘politicisation’ and ‘securitisation’ (Buzan et al. 1998). With regard to the former, too much emphasis on the speech act neglects, for example, the role of technologies including biometrics (which I will discuss in the following). With regard to the latter, following the poststructuralist approaches to security that I discussed in the previous section, the idea of security is already constitutive of the political condition of subjectivity. For a succinct overview of the securitisation theory, as well as its critiques, see Columba Peoples and Nick Vaughan-Williams (2010: chapter 5).
prevent refugees moving from the initial country of entry to another as well as multiple application at the member states by a single applicant. In order to monitor asylum seekers’ applications and movements within the European Union, digitised fingerprinting with a centralised database was introduced under the 1997 Draft Convention on the establishment of the Eurodac System for the comparison of fingerprints of asylum seekers (van der Ploeg 1999: 298).

Van der Ploeg’s analysis of the Eurodac project is noteworthy not only because she indicates the operation of biometric control prior to 9/11. She also makes important conceptual points for the analysis of the politics of biometrics. She suggests that the political question on biometric identification is not so much about ‘privacy’, which is generally thought to be a main issue for the use of biometrics and more broadly surveillance technologies. For example, the issue of privacy has been identified in the context of Japan (see also the fourth section in this chapter), where, as in the case of Western countries, various digitised surveillance technologies have been introduced in recent years, and where the relative lack of privacy law has been pointed out (Abe 2004; Wood et al. 2007). Privacy, a right to control one’s own information, as well as human rights more broadly, are important with respect to concerns about the abuse of individual information by the government, commercial industry, and other third parties, as well as the potential leak of sensitive information. As Toshimaru Ogura argues, “individuals should have the right to control data about them that is held by others … As long as the data belong to others … it is unavoidable to be jeopardized by leaks, manipulation, unjust usage and so on” (Ogura 2006:

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9 The Eurodac, whose development was already seen in the 1990s, eventually became operational in 2003 (Broeders 2007: 82).
While acknowledging the importance of privacy, van der Ploeg (1999), however, emphasises that the issue of biometric identification such as the Eurodac system is not merely a technology of verification, discerning individual information; it is not just to verify the true identity of asylum seekers such as if they are telling truth with regard to their record of asylum application.

Instead, van der Ploeg suggests that identification under the Eurodac may be better understood as a political act in which their identity is constituted. She states, “rather than determining any preexisting identity, these practices may be better understood as ways to establish identity, in the sense that ‘identity’ becomes that which results from these efforts” (van der Ploeg 1999: 300). For her, the identity of ‘illegal migrants’ as such does not exist prior to its very identification process; they are not to be identified by the Eurodac system but the system itself makes such identity possible. In this sense, van der Ploeg (1999) argues that biometric identification becomes the technology of marking illegality rather than identifying illegal migrants (see also van der Ploeg 2003).

Moreover, the emphasis on the process of identification, rather than identity, in the operation of biometric control is important not just in terms of legality that van der Ploeg emphasises. It is more broadly the question of the politics of security in which biometric technologies do not simply identify a dangerous individual but ‘marks’ or constitutes the idea of danger and a dangerous body. Dillon (2003) captures this by the term ‘becoming-dangerous’, which emphasises the process of (in)securitisation, thereby opposing to a static and fixed conception of ‘being-dangerous’, in the context of the War on Terror (see also Dillon 2007a).

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Ogura (2006) is nevertheless critical of the ‘privacy’ approach to surveillance, and emphasises more on the right to own information and that of anonymity. However, none of these seems similar to the important point made by van der Ploeg on identity and identification discussed here.
As demonstrated above, the deployment of biometric technologies was already under way prior to 9/11. Nevertheless, the deployment of biometric technologies for the pursuit of state security seems to have proliferated in the post-9/11 era notably in North America and Europe. Dillon (2003), for example, looks at an early debate on the introduction of biometrics in the United States as a counterterrorism measure that is found in a report to the Congress in 2003 on a programme initially entitled the Total Information Awareness (TIA) – soon renamed as the Terrorism Information Awareness programme – that was established by the US Information Awareness Office. The aim of the TIA is, the report states, “to integrate information technologies into a prototype to provide tools to better detect, identify and classify potential foreign terrorists” (cited in Dillon 2003: 552).

While the TIA programme itself was short-lived and suspended by the Congress in the same year, Dillon’s interpretation of the impact of biometric identification as a security measure is worth paying close attention to here. Dillon articulates biometric identification introduced under the TIA programme in terms of a broader political architecture of the War on Terror in which the object of security became ‘uncertainty’: “‘uncertainty’ said … to be the enemy that replaced the Soviet Union with the dissolution of the Cold War and whose manifestation now takes many other forms in the War on Terror” (Dillon 2003: 533). Under the politics of uncertainty, the notion of danger becomes virtual in which the field of security has also transformed:

[Under] the virtual danger of ‘terror’, nothing and nowhere is strategically marginal. Everything and everywhere becomes potentially critical. The War on Terror … exemplifies the point. The field of possibility for politically and epistemically authorising what is significantly dangerous where, when, and how has thus been transformed. It now traverses the potential for everything
and anything to become dangerous, as nothing in the digital age consists of fixed properties – benign or malign – independent of the information systems in which they are produced and reproduced, or in which, autopoetically, they reproduce themselves. (Dillon 2003: 541)\textsuperscript{11}

The introduction of biometric identification under the TIA programme is an exemplar of this logic of virtual security. This is not to say that, as I will discuss shortly, there is no dangerous elements to be identified. At the same time, virtual security politics are not reducible to the identification of dangerous elements either. What Dillon (2003: 554) emphasises here is that what may be regarded as dangerous is embedded within the operation of biometric technologies themselves, within the process of biometric identification. Confronting uncertainty, dangerous bodies are, therefore, formed by and \textit{in} information, which Dillon (2003) characterises as ‘bodies-in-formation’ (see also Dillon and Reid 2001).\textsuperscript{12}

Similarly, Didier Bigo (2002) emphasises the importance of the inverse relation between the securitisation of immigration and its technologies of management. In his article, Bigo (2002) is particularly critical of the securitisation theory of the Copenhagen School that, drawing on the speech act theory of John L. Austin, emphasises the role of speech in security studies (Buzan et al. 1998; Wæver et al. 1993). For Bigo, while the Copenhagen School contributed to the earlier articulation of migration as a security issue, thus widening the scope of security studies beyond the traditional conception of security in military and interstate terms, they did not comprehend the importance of routines and everyday practices of securitisation (Bigo 2002: 73). This is because of the conceptual divide that they make between the

\textsuperscript{11} The theme of virtual security is also elaborated by Vaughan-Williams in the context of the United Kingdom (Vaughan-Williams 2010).

\textsuperscript{12} The inextricable relation between bodies and information under biometrics was also captured by van der Ploeg (1999; 2003).
nonpoliticised, the politicised, and the securitised realms: “‘Security’ is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics” (Buzan et al. 1998: 23, emphasis added).

In the framework of the securitisation theory of the Copenhagen School, therefore, everyday technological practices of identification themselves are not considered to be practices of securitisation – if not practices of politicisation at large (see Edkins 1999: 11) – but only exceptional claims that presents migration as an existential threat are taken into account. Consequently, technologies are understood simply as a means to develop the management of whatever is presented as a threat. Biometric technologies are thus understood as a means of managing and identifying illegal and/or risky immigrants. Contrary to this approach, Bigo argues that in the context of the management of uncertain dangers, or more generally the management of fear or unease, this technological relation of a-means-to-an-end needs to be reversed:

Securitization of immigration is the result and not the cause of the development of technologies of control and surveillance. It is linked to computerization, risk profiling, visa policy, the remote control of borders, the creation of international or nonterritorial zones in airports, and so on. (Bigo 2002: 73)

Under this inverse relation between security technologies and referent objects, therefore, biometrics are not just something to be developed, or indeed that has been developed, in order to manage threats that are discursively articulated. Rather, biometrics are now understood as something that makes the very securitisation of immigration possible.

From the points of van der Ploeg, Dillon and Bigo above, therefore, what matters is the technological production of knowledge of individuals. From these perspectives,
biometric identification can be understood as a combination of two forms of the seizure of power that Foucault theorised (see Introduction). Both disciplinary power and biopower are operational in multiple ways. For example, biometric identification does not only take place on literally individual bodies, at an anatomical level, but it also functions as a surveillant technology to control individual bodies such as immigrant bodies (see also Epstein 2007; Pugliese 2010: 7-10). At the same time, the disciplinary power of biometric knowledge is also correlative to a biopolitical configuration of a population and to a biopolitical incentive of fostering its security. As the authors above suggest, biometric identification for immigration control is not just a technology of verification and surveillance of bodies, but, perhaps more crucially, it enables drawing the boundaries at the level of population, demarcating between a risky population and a healthy population, under the biopolitics of security.

*Preemptive, proactive, everyday surveillance*

Biometric technologies as the production of knowledge of threats are indeed revealed in the actual operation of contemporary biometric borders. Louise Amoore (2006) analyses the introduction of biometric technologies in the context of U.S. border control under the US-VISIT programme, which was introduced in 2004 and implements biometric technologies to identify all foreign visitors upon their arrival.

Like Dillon and Bigo discussed above, Amoore (2006) also emphasises the crucial role that uncertainty plays in the War on Terror, and in the mechanism of the US-VISIT programme. She argues that governing mobilities through biometrics is not solely conducted through a traditional understanding of identification (i.e., a bi-polar verification between an individual data and a body). While the US-VISIT programme certainly engages with the traditional mode of identification such as checking foreign visitors against the watch list, its scope of identification is well beyond checking the
watch list. This is because, Amoore (2006: 339) argues, biometric identification under the US-VISIT programme is networked and connected to over twenty existing databases – including those of police authorities and others relating to health, financial, and travel records – in which individuals are categorised into degrees of riskiness. It is then the calculation of risks through multiple points of identification that enables a divide between legitimate and illegitimate mobilities rather than a pre-given division of legitimacy of mobilities that is simply applied to the process of verification. To borrow David Lyon’s words, biometric surveillance under the US-VISIT programme is more of social sorting than of verification: “To consider surveillance as social sorting is to focus on the social and economic categories and the computer codes by which personal data is organized with a view to influencing and managing people and populations. … Information itself can be the means of divisions” (Lyon 2003: 2).

Biometric identification is consequently better understood as a precautionary measure, in terms of preemption, which has been characterised as a core mechanism of politics in the War on Terror by a number of political and social scientists (Amoore and de Goede 2008; Aradau and van Munster 2007; 2008; de Goede 2008; Vaughan-Williams 2007). Brain Massumi vividly captures the logic of preemption in ‘Smoke of Future Fires’:

It is the question of how a sign as such dynamically determines a body to become, in actual experience. It is the question of how an abstract force can be materially determining. The question is the same for a non-existent present fire signed in error, and for the futurity of a fire yet to come. There is one difference, however. For the future-causal fire, there can be no error. It will always have been preemptively right. (Massumi 2010: 65)
By the ‘future-causal fire’, inverting a sequential relation from smoke to fire, Massumi (2010) depicts the politics of preemption in which acting in the future constitutes the present (see also Vaughan-Williams 2007: 188-9). Biometric borders are no exception to the logic of preemption: they not only fix and secure individual identities in a preemptive manner, but also its calculated threats could result in further preemptive consequences such as detention and deportation.

The calculation of risks and its preemptive identification under the US-VISIT programme are arguably distinct features from its predecessor, namely, the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS), which was established on 11 September 2002. Like its successor, the NSEERS was one of the post-9/11 counterterrorism security measures in the United States that introduced the deployment of biometrics for its border control in order to detect and prevent risky aliens. Unlike the US-VISIT programme, however, the structure of the NSEERS was the system that exclusively targeted certain nationalities that deemed to be ‘risky’ prior to the network of calculation of risks. One of the NSEERS’s distinct features is that not all foreign visitors but certain nationalities such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, and Syria were automatically made subject to biometric registration (Hassan 2002; Epstein 2007). The feature was, quite unsurprisingly, criticised as racist (Hassan 2002); and its discriminatory nature, conflicting with human rights, was received by the U.S. Justice Department and subsequently introduced at the Senate (Human Rights Watch 2004). At the same time, it was also criticised not only for its racist function but also for its incomprehensiveness since it automatically removed other nationalities from being subject to biometric identification (Epstein 2007: 159). Whether it was solely due to the respect with the latter and/or with the former, the NSEERS was terminated in December 2003 and replaced by the US-VISIT
programme in which every foreign visitor is made subject to biometric identification.

The shift from the NSEERS and the US-VISIT programme can be understood in terms of two different modes of surveillance, which Michael Levi and David S. Wall (2004) differentiate in terms of reactive surveillance and proactive surveillance. The NSEERS can be understood as the instrument that is “reacting to events by the surveillance of suspect individuals within suspect groups that had been identified by traditional forms of intelligence gathering” (Levi and Wall 2004: 199-200). This is not to say that the NSEERS is similar to ‘traditional forms of intelligence gathering’ as such. Yet, it can still be understood as reactive surveillance in the sense that it targets a particular population prior to the operation of surveillance. The US-VISIT programme, by contrast, can be understood as proactive surveillance, which is a form of surveillance “of what effectively become suspect populations, using new technologies to identify ‘risky groups’ by their markedly different patterns of ‘suspect behaviour’” (Levi and Wall 2004: 200; see also Amoore 2006: 339).

Under its preemptive nature, the US-VISIT programme, moreover, monitors various kinds of data in which Amoore argues, ultimately the everyday life of individuals become subject to the calculation of risks. It blurs the conception of immigration control that is traditionally thought to be conducted at the moment of border crossing:

[T]he biometric border is the portable border par excellence, carried by mobile bodies at the very same time as it is deployed to divide bodies at international boundaries, airports, railway stations, on subways or city streets, in the office or the neighbourhood. (Amoore 2006: 338)
Drawing on Bigo’s (2001) conceptual application of the Möbius ribbon in the context of internal and external securities, Amoore (2006) argues that risky bodies are to be identified not simply outside of a country but also within countries.

Such indistinction of biometric border control is captured by Étienne Balibar’s earlier suggestion for the re-conceptualisation, or the relocation, of borders. He suggests:

*Borders have changed place.* Whereas traditionally, and in conformity with both their juridical definition and ‘cartographical’ representation as incorporated in national memory, they should be at the edge of the territory, marking the point where it ends, it seems that borders and the institutional practices corresponding to them have been transported into the middle of political space. (Balibar 2004: 109; see also Balibar 2011: 89)

In the context of contemporary Europe, Balibar further illustrates the function of ‘security border’ in which borders operate as the production of the stranger as political enemy:

*Increasingly it is the working of the border … which constitutes, or ‘produces’, the stranger/foreigner as a social type. … the status of borders determines the condition of the stranger/foreigner and the very meaning of ‘being foreign’, rather than the reverse. (Balibar 2009: 204)*

If one analyses the politics of border at this level of subjectification, Kenichi Ohmae’s (1990) post-Cold War provocation of the ‘borderless world’ has an ironical consequence: the ‘borderless world’ is indeed manifested not because bordering

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13 Balibar’s suggestion for the re-conceptualisation of borders has recently been taken up by Critical Border Studies (Parker and Vaughan-Williams 2009).

14 Here, Balibar (2004: 101-114) is not referring to biometric identification but identification in general, that is, the production of the subject in a similar manner to the biopolitical configuration of populations discussed above.
practices are disappearing but because the static geographical location of border is now highly blurred: bordering practices themselves are potentially borderless.

The mechanism of biometric borders such as the US-VISIT programme is then not just about the biopolitical border but also indicates a biopolitical production of collective subjectivity beyond the location of borders. Amoore argues:

As a manifestation of what Walters … calls the ‘biopolitical border’, biometric borders extend the governing of mobility into domains that regulate multiple aspects of daily life. Subject to biopower, the crossing of a physical territorial border is only one border crossing in a limitless series of journeys that traverse and inscribe the boundaries of safe/dangerous, civil/uncivil, legitimate travellers/illegal migrant. (Amoore 2006: 337-8)

In this sense, a core dimension of biopolitics appears to lie in the production, and its correlative governance, of populations rather than exclusively in the act of border crossing. What is at stake is the biopolitical, and biometric, act of drawing the boundaries of such as ‘safe/dangerous’ and ‘civil/uncivil’.

The concept of the biometric border aptly characterises the mechanism of contemporary border politics in which individuals are continuously monitored and calculated and in which governing populations – concerned with their health, wealth, and security – are enacted. In the meantime, however, despite its contribution and the proliferated problematisation of the contemporary biometric border, within the literature discussed above it is possible to point to the lack of an historical account for biopolitical and biometric inscription of boundaries. I suggest that the lack of an historical account is where the question of race and racism intervenes and where the scope of this thesis is initiated and makes its distinctive contributions to studies of the biopolitics of security through biometrics. The biometric act of drawing the
boundaries such as ‘safe/dangerous’ and ‘civil/uncivil’ has a much longer history, which can be traced back to nineteenth-century European racial sciences that had persistently attempted to calculate bodies and to articulate such boundaries in racial terms. In the next section, I will explore the European history of biometrics in which the idea of race operates in biopolitical terms. After the discussion on practices of biometric identification in the late nineteenth century, the section also critically examines extant analyses of race and racism in contemporary biometric identification.

Race in the European history of biometrics

(Mis)Measuring bodies and ‘degenerate’ fingerprints

As social approaches to the history of science have shown (Cole 2001; Gould 1984; Pugliese 2010), biometrics were largely developed in nineteenth-century Europe. Biometrics – broadly understood as modern scientific techniques of measuring bodies rather than digitised and informatised technologies as in contemporary usage – emerged in the traditions of biological anthropology and criminology that sought to identify barbarous and criminal bodies, that is to say, to identify dangerous bodies.

An earlier analysis in this field can be found in Stephen Jay Gould’s 1981 famous work The Mismeasure of Man. Gould (1984) demonstrates various types of scientific ‘mismeasure’ of bodies that sought to calculate intelligence of particular populations in the manner of social Darwinism. For example, Gould (1984: 83) looks at the invention of craniometric identification by the school of Paul Broca (1824 – 1880), the founder of the Anthropological Society of Paris in 1859, who sought to measure the degree of intelligence through measuring the size of head and brain.
The objects of analysis in Gould’s study including craniology are scientific theories of measure that were later explicitly denounced as pseudo-sciences. Simon A. Cole, on the other hand, looks at the history of biometrics, namely, fingerprinting, that had acquired its scientificity by distancing from pseudo-scientific claims. In his 2001 book *Suspect Identities*, Cole (2001) looks at the historical developments of modern criminal identification, which he traces back to early developments since late nineteenth-century Europe. His study focuses on two of influential scientific identification technologies of that time: anthropometry and fingerprinting.

Anthropometry was a scientific technique of measuring a body, which is also known as ‘Bertillonage’ after the name of its inventor French police officer Alphonse Bertillon (1853 – 1914). As Cole (2001: 32-33) notes, anthropometry was one of the earliest modern criminal identification systems, which was introduced for the management of what is today known as ‘recidivism’ in France.\(^{15}\) Its method of identification include measuring various parts of a body such as facial features, head size, foot size, height and so forth. In the context of the rise in the number of recidivists in the second half of the nineteenth century, Bertillon saw the limit of the legal system – in particular, juridical power to control recidivism – and proposed that knowing individual identity is essential.

It is not enough to make a law against recidivists. … In order to condemn a recidivist to relégation [sic], the first requirement is the recognition of his identity. … Unless we find a solution, … make no mistake, the law against recidivists will be difficult and limited in application. (Cited in Cole 2001: 33)

\(^{15}\) Cole (2001: 54) notes that the term ‘recidivism’ in English in fact appeared only after the introduction of Bertillonage in 1886.
The juridical power of ‘you must not’ was, as Bertillon saw, found ineffective for the management of recidivism. For an effective solution, instead, the knowledge of individuals became the focal point for the criminal management. Prisoners were consequently ‘Bertillonaged’ (Cole 2001: 34): each body was calculated and quantified in which one’s identity was established. “No longer a name or a position in society,” Cole observes, “the individual became biological, defined simply, crudely, as a unique body, distinguishable in the eyes of science, from all others” (Cole 2001: 53). Bertillonage, in short, “ensnared the body in a textual net made of its own naked corporeality. … [it] created a definition of the individual that the body could not escape” (Cole 2001: 53).

Anthropometry, however, did not remain a purely scientific technique of individualisation; it also became a technique of classifying bodies into different ‘types’ by penologists and criminologists.

Criminal anthropology … could only shuffle individuals into a bestiary of deviant ‘types’: idiots, imbeciles, morons, lunatics, epileptics, moral imbeciles, degenerates, defective delinquents, born criminals, criminaloids, prostitutes, and so one (Cole 2001: 56).

The demarcation of individuals into deviant types, moreover, was not just a racist application of Bertillonage, the latter being free of political categorisation of populations. In fact, the very individualisation in Bertillonage was also intimately linked to classification and hierarchisation of bodies. As Cole puts it:

[F]ar from undermining deterministic criminology, Bertillonage played into the same categories: for all practical purposes, Bertillon’s recidivist was the criminal anthropologists’ elusive ‘born criminal’, and the special penal

16 For further discussion on the juridical power, see Chapter Two.
regimens designed for the born criminal were simply applied to the recidivist.

(Cole 2001: 58)

In other words, individual identification of recidivists that was proved to be interlinked to the idea of ‘habitual criminality’ was already a political categorisation just like more overtly racial categorisations into types as in criminal anthropology were.

Bertillonage as criminal identification was, however, rather short-lived in part due to the fact that it required various kinds of equipment as well as training for measuring specific parts of a body. At the beginning of the twentieth century, it was gradually replaced by fingerprinting, which became a major technique for criminal identification across the world.

Fingerprinting as a modern identification technique, Cole (2001: 63-5) argues, emerged in Colonial India in the nineteenth century. Although it was initially introduced as a technique for civil identification rather than criminal identification, the deployment of fingerprinting by the coloniser over the colonised was also related to the ‘assumed inferiority’ of the latter: “the civil application was in a colonial context in which the assumed inferiority of the ruled and their attendant deceptions and frauds provoked the search for greater and more efficient social control and identification” (Cole 2001: 65). It was also coupled with the evolutionary ideas about race in which particular tribes such as lower-caste and nomadic peoples were deemed to be criminal suspect. At this point, Cole notes that the ‘habitual criminal’ also became the ‘hereditary criminal’: “Criminality became ethnic” (Cole 2001: 67).

The relation between fingerprints and heredity was perhaps most manifested in the work of Francis Galton (1822 – 1911). For Galton, a cousin of Charles Darwin who famously coined the term ‘eugenics’, fingerprinting was an identification technique in
two senses. The first of these was fingerprinting as to identify criminals, that is to say, fingerprinting as an individualising technique. In the meantime, Galton was also, and more importantly for him, interested in fingerprinting as to identify heredity (Cole 2001: 99). In this sense, Cole argues that fingerprinting for Galton was seen as an equivalent to how DNA is seen today: “Galton saw fingerprint patterns much in the way we now see DNA: as both an identifier and a hereditary marker” (Cole 2001: 99).

This second interest of Galton was, continues Cole, largely forgotten in the history of biometrics:

> Although the attempts to use other identification techniques, such as anthropometry and photography, to trace heredity, delineate differences between the ‘races’, and predict criminality and disease propensity are fairly well known to historians of the nineteenth-century human sciences, the use of fingerprinting for the same purpose has largely forgotten. (Cole 2001: 100)

Unlike earlier studies such as craniometry by Paul Broca and his followers discussed above, measuring fingerprint patterns may not be associated as a racial science, or more broadly a classificatory technique of populations. However, Galton’s second interest led to a series of morphological classificatory studies in the early twentieth century not only in Europe but also later in the United States under the name ‘dermatoglyphics’ that persistently sought to differentiate racial groups and potentially to ‘diagnose’ criminal or degenerate fingerprints (Cole 2001: 114).

While such ‘diagnostic’ fingerprinting research had hardly ceased completely, it was gradually discredited during the first half of the twentieth century. It was denounced, just like Broca’s craniometry, as a ‘pseudo-science’ as opposed to a ‘real-science’ of individualisation. As T.G. Cooke, head of the Institute for Applied Science, a fingerprint school in Chicago, stated in 1925:
Chapter One: (Dis)Assembling Security, Biometrics, Race, and Japan

It is not to the finger-print expert’s advantage … to be associated, in the minds of the public, with fortune tellers and palm-readers. The science of finger print identification is a real science and should not be dragged to the level of the pseudo sciences. (Cited in Cole 2001: 112-3)

Cole argues that it is this separation from a ‘diagnostic’ project, along with the ‘selective amnesia’ – fingerprinting once as a racial classification technology – that “played a crucial role in establishing the legitimacy of fingerprinting in criminal identification” (Cole 2001: 100).

By the end of World War II, the biological definition of race was officially denounced at the international arena, which was clearly manifested in the 1950 UNESCO statement on race (see Chapter Four). A few years later, the denouncement of scientific racial differentiation was also made in the 1963 United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which claimed, “any doctrine of racial differentiation … is scientifically false, morally condemnable, socially unjust and dangerous” (cited in Rose 2007: 167). Fingerprinting was widely established and legitimised as a scientific technology of identification, while racial classificatory identification has now largely been conducted in the field of DNA typing (Cole 2001: epilogue; Rabinow 1993).

It is argued that racial classificatory identification today is shifted to the molecular: “At the turn of the new century, however, race is once again re-entering the domain of biological truth, viewed now through a molecular gaze” (Rabinow and Rose 2006: 206). As Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose (Rabinow and Rose 2006; Rose 2007: chapter 6) note, there has recently emerged a revival of nineteenth-century racial typology in the field of genomic thinking that is set to seek the relations between race and the probabilities of certain diseases. While it would be certainly misleading to equate such new racial differentiation with biological determinism in the tradition of nineteenth-century racial sciences as Rabinow and Rose emphasise here, genomic thinking, which is manifested in the Human Genome Project, nevertheless explicates race as a biological truth not at the ‘molar’ level – such as skin colour and fingerprints – but at the molecular level.

17
The socio-technical structure of race in contemporary biometrics

It is this separation from the ‘pseudo-scientific’ identification that acquired the scientific legitimacy of contemporary biometric technologies and their use in society, which are generally thought to be ‘race-free’. However, the question of race and racism in contemporary biometric technologies has recently been posed. There are at least two types of racist operation are recognised in these technologies.

On the one hand, despite the use of ‘race-free’ biometric technologies, and surveillance more broadly, in immigration controls, there is still the practice of racial profiling. As Judith Butler points out, there is the heightened racialisation of Arab populations in the post-9/11 period (cited in Amoore 2006: 346). Such racial targeting was perhaps most explicit in the introduction of the NSEERS. This is by no means limited to overtly racial technologies such as the NSEERS but racial profiling, or more broadly racial projection, is said to be operational in contemporary technoscientific management of borders. For example, Amoore argues: “There can be little doubt, at least in my sense of the emerging landscape, that much of contemporary security practice is assembling around a line of sight that conceals racialized and prejudicial judgments inside an apparently ‘expert’ and technoscientific visualization” (Amoore 2009: 28). Also, racial profiling in general was explicit in the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes in 2005 in London (Pugliese 2006; Vaughan-Williams 2007).

On the other hand, the structure of seemingly de-racialised biometric technologies themselves has also been identified as being racially coded in which white supremacy becomes apparent. Lucas D. Introna and David Wood (2004) show the racialised mechanism in facial recognition systems (FRSs). FRSs capture, read, and identify individual faces through algorithm, which can be implemented to CCTV for effective
surveillance. In recent years, especially in the aftermath of 9/11, FRSs, along with other biometric technologies, have become an important technology for security management. Despite that the technology is repeatedly presented as neutral and unproblematic not only by suppliers of these technologies but also security forums, research has found a significant race bias: “Asians are easier [to recognise] than whites, African-Americans are easier than whites, other race members are easier than whites, old people are easier than young people, other skin people are easier to recognize than clear skin people” (cited in Introna and Wood 2004: 190). The racially-biased rate of recognition matters for the politics of security for various reasons: first, it increases the probability of the ‘alarm’ for non-white groups; second, these groups are exposed to a higher probably of false positives; and third, and perhaps most importantly, the reliance on technology, and the belief of technological accuracy, can lead to accelerate individual (i.e., operators’) assumption on usual suspects (of non-white groups) (Introna and Wood 2004: 192). Introna and Wood argue:

The operators may even override their own judgments as they may think that the system under such high conditions of operation must ‘see something’ that they do not. … Thus, under these conditions the bias group (African-Americans, Asians, dark skinned persons and older people) may be subjected to disproportionate scrutiny, thereby creating a new type of ‘digital divide.’ (Introna and Wood 2004: 191)

Drawing on this finding, Dillon (2008) also argues that the biopolitical practice of demarcating populations in the spectrum of risk is not just operational but is operational in racial terms.
Furthermore, in his genealogical approach to biometric technologies, Joseph Pugliese also argues that contemporary biometric technologies, far from being race-free, are in fact racially biased and coded in which the power of whiteness is persistently manifested. He asserts, “particular biometric technologies are infrastructurally calibrated to whiteness – that is, whiteness is configured as the universal gauge that determines the technical settings and parameters for the visual imagining and capture of a subject” (Pugliese 2010: 62).

Pugliese contests this by recognising the continuity of the power of whiteness from the social Darwinian understanding of fingerprints to the technical failure to enrol in some contemporary finger-scan technology. On the one hand, Pugliese (2010: 65) draws from a case of ‘degenerate fingerprints’ that Cole discovers in the work of a Norwegian researcher in the early twentieth century, who posited that fingerprints of Europeans were more ‘evolved’ than Asian (see also Cole 2001: 110-1). On the other hand, Pugliese (2010: 64) also notes that technical failures in some contemporary biometric technologies to scan fingerprints of certain populations, namely Asian females, who are said to have ‘lower-quality’ or ‘faint’ fingerprint ridges. In the light of this continuity of ‘lower-quality’ of Asian fingerprints, he argues, “the bodies of certain Asian subjects are represented as illegible; their ‘lower quality’ ‘faint’ fingerprint ridges are, because of this gendered and racialised infrastructural gauge, finessed beyond schematicity: they literally fail to figure, imagistically and digitally, as templates” (Pugliese 2010: 64). In short, Pugliese’s genealogical account indicates the historical continuity of the “calibration of whiteness” – from the nineteenth-century biometrics in Europe such as phrenology and anthropometry to contemporary digitised biometrics – in which “white subjects have positioned themselves as
somehow transcending racial inscription and, in effect, as producing … the ‘normal,’ unracialised, illusory white world” (Pugliese 2010: 6).

These historical accounts on biometrics above have illustrated the issues of race and racism, more specifically, racial categorisation of populations inherent in the mechanism of biometric identification, which were underexamined in earlier studies of the contemporary biometric border discussed in the previous subsection. Despite their contributions, however, there are three critical reflections I would like to highlight for the purpose of this thesis’s historical investigation of biopolitical relations between racism and biometrics in Japan.

First, while critiques of the racially coded structure of biometric technologies are far from being unimportant, they are also limited. For example, the argument set forth by Introna and Wood (2004) is difficult to maintain outside its context of analysis. They argue that the easier recognition of non-white faces would induce their disproportionate level of suspect and the notion of the ‘usual suspect’. However, other face identification systems experienced a similar issue but in the opposite direction. In a study of Japanese face identification systems, for example, a technically embedded difficulty to recognise was in fact ‘non-Japanese’ faces (Magnet 2012: 42). This shows not only contingency in two contexts but also this would, if one follow the argument of Introna and Wood, lead to conclude that the ‘usual suspect’ for the Japanese are the Japanese themselves.

Second, and relatedly, the scope of analysis in those studies above, as well as their articulation of biopolitics through biometrics, is, perhaps necessarily, geographically specific: their analyses as well as problematisation are centred in the history of the West. While their works are important in their own context, this geographical focus also tends to reduce the question of race and racism exclusively in terms of white
supremacy. It should be noted that ‘whiteness’ is a manifestation of the issues of race and racism, not the manifestation. Or to put it another way, “the power of white supremacy” (Pugliese 2010: 64) is not the power of racism, biometrics, or biopolitics. Instead, as Ian Hacking (2005) suggests, we must take the question of geography seriously for a study of race and racism. The question of geography must be taken into account for a study of racialised mechanisms of biometrics and biopolitics. That is to say, we must not reduce the issues of race and racism, as well as biopolitics through biometrics, into the dialectic relation between white and non-white. Or as I already noted above, biopolitics should not be interpreted as a replacement of geopolitics, as being geographically irrelevant. Instead, biopolitics, and its configuration of populations, is geographically coded.

Third, there remains a period of history that has been underexamined in existing historical approaches to the relations between biometrics and racism: namely, between fingerprinting as a colonial science and digital fingerprinting of today. Cole’s historical account notes that racial classificatory fingerprinting was largely denounced by the mid-twentieth century in which fingerprinting as individualisation established its ‘scientific legitimacy’. From that point on, the question of race and racism appears largely absent in Cole’s account, and reappears in his analysis of DNA typing. Similarly, Pugliese’s account has an historical leap from the racial science of nineteenth-century Europe to contemporary digitised biometrics. A question that remains to be answered in this regard is therefore: What happened to fingerprinting after establishing its ‘scientific legitimacy’, that is, after acquiring its ‘true’ scientificity?18 Rather than simply assuming that fingerprinting became, as it were, ‘race-free’ as the conventional account of the history of biometrics would tell us, we

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18 I will elaborate the problem of scientificity in Chapter Two.
must look at the political, either racial or not, operation of forensic identification in the post-WWII era.

In next section, accordingly, I aim to suggest preliminary responses to these points through my discussion on the literature on race and racism, and biometrics in Japan.

**Race and biometrics in Japan**

Across the last three sections, I have discussed the biopolitics of security, biometric (and biopolitical) borders, and the historical relationship between biometrics and race in which race appears a persistent biopolitical and security concept. I have articulated race as a biopolitical technology of demarcating populations under the logic of security in which biometrics has historically played a crucial role. It offers a more historicised perspective on the relation between racism and biometrics than Agamben’s problematisation that I described in the opening of this thesis. At the same time, I have also identified some of the issues in their configuration of the relation between race and biometrics. In this final section of this chapter, I aim to show preliminary reasons for why the analysis of race and biometrics in Japan can offer responses to these limits, which should constitute the ground for my historical investigation in later chapters.

**Beyond the politics of the colour line**

What do we see today? Machine guns against assegais, conquest sugared with religion, mutilation and rape masquerading as culture: all this with vast applause at the superiority of white over black soldiers!

– Du Bois in *Journal of Race Development* (1917: 436)
One of the issues I have pointed out above is the question of white supremacy, which is not limited to the historical study of biometrics but appears as a generalised tendency in the problematisation of race and racism in international relations. The problematisation of white supremacy was vividly expressed by W.E.B. Du Bois at the dawn of the twentieth century. Du Bois famously proclaimed:

[T]he problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line – the relation of the darker to the lighter races of men in Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the sea. (Du Bois 2007: 15)

This famous passage on “the problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the colour-line” was initially made at the first international Pan-African Conference, which took place in Westminster Town Hall, London, in July 1900, and which Du Bois himself took part in along with black people, albeit small in number (47 in total), across the world (Fryer 1984: 282-5). Recently, the question of the colour line in global politics has been re-posed by international relations scholars in the context of contemporary global politics (for example, Anievas et al. 2014; Bell 2013).

In fact, the discipline of international relations appears to have historically an inextricable relationship with race, and in particular with white supremacy. Robert Vitalis (2005), for example, notes that the birth of the discipline as the study of race, which was manifested in the title of its infant disciplinary journal, Journal of Race Development. As J. Ann Tickner summarises this point as follows:

[W]hite supremacy had a central place in the origins and development of IR. Races as well as states were the early discipline’s two most important units of analysis. The first IR journal in the United States, founded in 1910, was called the Journal of Race Development; in 1919 it was renamed the Journal of International Relations and, three years later in 1922, it became Foreign
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Affairs, the original journal of the Council on Foreign Relations. (Tickner 2011: 612)

The stated objective of the founding journal makes even clearer this point: “The Journal of Race Development offers itself as a forum for the discussion of the problems which relate to the progress of races and states generally considered backward in their standards of civilization” (Blakeslee 1910: 1).

Since the early racist discourses in international relations, Japan was, however, recognised as an exception to such racist norms. The Journal of Race Development stated: “The races and states which will be most frequently discussed, will be those of India, the Near East, Africa and the Far East – excepting Japan, whose civilization is on a substantial equality with that of the nations of the West” (Blakeslee 1910: 1). The exceptional categorisation has also sometimes been used to describe Japan along with ‘white’ countries (Persaud and Walker 2001: 375).

The ambiguous status of Japan must be taken seriously. When modern European concepts such as the idea of the stage of civilisation and that of race were translated into Japan, it was neither a simple assimilation to the West (or white). Robbie Shilliam suggests:

[T]ranslating modernity is not simply an act of assimilating meanings and practices, and neither is it solely an act of resistance. Rather, domination, resistance, appropriation and transformation have to be understood as congenitally entangled in this moment of knowledge production, their entanglement often generating novel meaning of ‘modern’ categories and concepts. (Shilliam 2011b: 20)

In fact, as Joyce C.H. Liu suggests, in the context of modern Japan, the translation of European concepts involved complex processes of appropriation and localisation
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whereby new knowledge emerged (cited in Liu and Vaughan-Williams 2014: 8). The expansion of the geographical scope of analysis in this thesis, accordingly, is not simply to bring another context in a relativist manner but ultimately to question and destabilise the linearity of an existing historical account and historical critique of race and racism. In this regard, the analysis of Japan also takes a different position from postcolonial critiques of biopolitics and race. Ann Laura Stoler (1995), for example, demonstrates how the operation of biopolitics is intertwined with European colonialism. Stoler’s critique, however, must be understood in relation to its particular geographical context (i.e., European colonialism). Equally, the studies of Japan must be allocated in its geographical and historical location, in relation to its ambiguous racial status.

The idea of race and racism in the context of nineteenth-century Japan is indeed reducible to neither the politics of the colour line nor the Orientalist logic (see Said 2003). Racism in this context is irreducible to the dialectic of the racial ‘self’ (i.e., Europeans, or more broadly white) and the racial ‘other’ (i.e., non-Europeans, or the ‘coloured’). The notion of race was from the beginning a very contested one beyond – importantly, not outside – the European, and Western, colonialism. There were at least two particular dimensions in the relationship between racism and Japan that are noteworthy here.

First, the configuration of racism in terms of the colour line is problematic because it would negate other forms of racism. In the light of this, Michael Weiner states, “emphasis on the ‘Colour Line’, as conceptualized by Du Bois, runs the risk of reifying skin colour – of ignoring the fact that the visibility of somatic difference is itself a social construct” (Weiner 2009a: xiv). In the context of Japan, the Korean community, for example, “serves as a preeminent example of racialization in the
The critique of the conceptualisation of racism as the colour line is certainly not exclusive to the Japanese context. As Robert Miles has shown, the case of racism against the Irish labour migration in the UK is another example that proves the limit of the conceptualisation of racism in terms of the colour line (Miles in Weiner 1995: 435).

Second, what was peculiar to the context of Japan is that the racial relationship between ‘self’ and ‘other’ emerged in a complex form. In the context of nineteenth-century Japan, the idea of race emerged as a very fragile one, lying between the dominant Western powers and its Asian neighbour countries, in which the country struggled with the binary code of European racism. In the light of this peculiar context, Rumi Sakamoto (1996) challenges the postcolonial scholars – in particular the work of Homi Bhabha (1994) – whose conceptualisation often falls into the binary relation between the Orient and the Occident. Sakamoto argues that Japanese racism is reducible to neither the dominant colonialis
t discourse of the West nor the counter-discourse of the colonised; but rather, the logic of racism was utilised in order to justify its own colonialism.

While I will scrutinise the emergence and evolvement of the idea of race, and the manifestation of racism thereby, during late nineteenth-century Japan in greater detail in Chapter Three, suffice it to say that the question of geography not only shows ‘another’ model of racism, but also questions the mechanisms, or the political rationalities, of racism beyond the conceptualisation of racism in terms of white supremacy. This also opens up a scope of analysis in the light of biometric knowledge of race, along with the discourse of race and racism, which has predominantly been articulated in terms of white supremacy as discussed in the previous section, in the context of Japanese colonialism.
The re-conceptualisation of racism, and biometrics, beyond the colour line, then, also opens up an historical scope of analysis. The biopolitical operation of racism in biometrics as in Pugliese’s work seems to freeze history by reducing the issue of race in the history of biometrics to the historical constant of white supremacy. If Stuart Hall (1980) was right to suggest that the idea of race is essentially an historical construct, the history of racism through biometrics must be studied in terms of each historical, as well as geographical, operation in a given context. The question that I am concerned with here, and that I will explore in Chapter Two, is the mode of racial government through biometrics that is constituted by and is constitutive of the idea of race in each historical context.

*Biometrics in post-WWII Japan*

My focus on racial government in Japan is also derived from its particular historical period, a period that existing accounts on the history of biometrics seems to pay less attention to: namely, a period between biometrics as a colonial science and contemporary biometrics as information technology. What has not been recognised is the question of whether and how the operation of biopolitical racism through biometrics as a forensic, and non-digitised, fingerprinting was conducted.

Contrary to the Western context, in Japan, fingerprinting in the second half of the twentieth century had received much scholarly and activist attention, probably, far more than in the context of colonialism and in the context of the War on Terror (Chung 2010; Morris-Suzuki 2010: chapter 4; Tanaka 1995; Weiner and Chapman 2009). In the aftermath of World War II, fingerprinting was deployed in the mainland of Japan for the registration of non-Japanese populations, most notably those from two former colonies, Korean Peninsula and Taiwan. This fingerprinting regime had
been highly criticised as a violation of human rights and as a racist regime by scholars and activists, but it had nevertheless persisted until its final abolishment in the 1990s.

For this thesis, however, the concern is not about issues of human rights in the post-WWII fingerprinting in Japan, issues that have also been focused on the context of contemporary surveillance in Japan as I already mentioned earlier in this chapter. Nor does my concern simply lie in the critique of the criminalisation of former colonial subjects. This is because the critique on the basis of human rights is at best limited to the problematisation of its racist implementation of the technology, not the technology of biopolitical racialisation itself. These interpretations do not take the role of the technology seriously and politically: their problematisations lie in the problem of its ideological use of the technology. Committed to the study of racial government, my focus lies in the level of what this technology does, in the level of political production of knowledge. Or to express it in concrete terms, the thesis’s enquiry is about whether and in what way forensic fingerprinting becomes a technology of biopolitical racism. That is to say, my question is how we can understand this postwar fingerprinting as a technology of government, under what political rationality, and its relation to the population management.

The analysis of this context, which I will explore in Chapter Four, then also helps to understand the historical development, or evolvement, of biometric, and biopolitical government of race. Contemporary biometric technologies have been conceptualised in terms of (bio)political subjectification as shown in the second section of this chapter. If this were also operational in the context of contemporary Japan, the analysis of postwar fingerprinting then would help to specify a particular mode of subjectification that is later enabled by digital technologies. The question that I am concerned with throughout the thesis in this regard is about the ways in which
the biometric and biopolitical government of race operate in each historical context rather than simply concluding all operations as biopolitical subjectification.

Conclusion

This chapter explored four ‘bodies’ of literature in order to set the conceptual and historical backgrounds of the thesis’s enquiry. In the first two sections, I discussed the literature that helps to formulate the study of biometrics in terms of security, and more specifically, biopolitics. In the second half of the chapter, I also set the existing literature on the history of biometrics that articulates the politics of biometrics in terms of the biopolitics of race. At the same time, I identified the issues and limitations within these studies. There seems to be a tendency to de-historicise the history of the politics of biometrics in which the problem is ultimately reduced to the problem of whiteness – whiteness being an historical constant rather than an historical construct. On the other hand, the existing literature on the post-WWII Japanese politics of fingerprinting, quite unproblematically, affirms the conceptual separation between politics and technology. My analysis of Japan is then designed to challenge these existing problematisations of biometrics in biopolitical and racial terms and also to open up a scope of analysis at the level of racial government without reducing the idea of race as an historical constant, which I will conduct in Chapter Three, Four, and Five.

Before I conduct concrete analyses of the points I made above, however, the thesis now turns to the discussion on its methodological foundation for the study of race and biometrics in relational terms. In the next chapter, I will establish the relational approach to the politics of race and the technology of identification, which I draw
from the philosophy of Michel Foucault in order to offer a different approach to study the biopolitics of biometrics.
Chapter Two: Archaeology, Genealogy, Dispositif

History is not the progress of universal reason.

– Hubert L Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow (1983: 110)

History, in short, is what separates us from ourselves and what we have to go through and beyond in order to think what we are.

– Gilles Deleuze (1995: 95)

Introduction

In Chapter One, I situated the thesis’s historical investigation of biometrics and racism within the literature of biopolitics of security and biopolitical racism. Through my literature review on topics pertinent to the thesis, I also identified the limits of their approaches and the need for further investigation in two respects: a greater concrete historicisation of biopolitical relations between biometrics and racism; and greater attention to a non-Western context, which the present study focuses on the context of Japan. In particular, I argued that one of the main conceptual issues in existing debates on biometrics vis-à-vis racism lies in an apparent static and historically continuous understanding of race and racism – i.e., the problem of white supremacy in the structure of biometric technologies. The problematisation of racism exclusively in terms of the infrastructure of biometrics (Pugliese 2010) is limited in the scrutiny of biopolitical racism because its scope of problematisation is confined within the technologies that are racially coded rather than conceptualising the process of biometric identification itself is racial coding in biopolitical terms (i.e., an act of
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demarcating populations in security terms). In this chapter, I will establish the thesis’s methodological stance that can overcome such a conceptual separation between biometrics and race and that articulates the inextricable relations between biometrics and race, namely, the production of racial knowledge through biometrics, biometric identification as a form of racialisation in each given context. I will establish this from Foucault’s historical approach.

As this chapter’s epigraph from Deleuze encapsulates, Foucault’s historical approach is to explicate both the problems of history and the importance of history as a method to overcome these problems. My discussion in this chapter aims at providing the exposition of how Foucault’s historical approach problematises conventional, and possibly even existing critical, accounts of the history of biometrics and racism and how it can overcome these issues. There are three particular methodological propositions of Foucault that I will draw on for the formation of this thesis’s methodology: an archaeological critique of the history of science; a genealogical scrutiny of power, knowledge, and subjectivity; and a dispositif as the site of analysis.

As for Foucault’s archaeology and genealogy, commentators have attempted to distinguish the difference between archaeology and genealogy and to articulate the limits of Foucault’s archaeology (for example, Davidson 1986; Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983; Han 2002). The distinction, however, is not always clear, not least because Foucault himself retrospectively uses the term genealogy to describe his earlier works that were initially described as archaeological (Foucault 1998a: 294; 2001: 283). Also, in one of his last interviews in the 1980s, Foucault – who by this stage was proposing an “historical ontology of ourselves” – describes archaeology as a method and genealogy as a design within a single study (Foucault 1997a: 315; 1983: 237).
While I do not undermine the differences between and the developments from archaeology to genealogy, for the purpose of this thesis I will not choose between archaeology or genealogy but, following others’ suggestion (Davidson 1986: 228; Elden 2001: 114; Gutting 1989: 271; Koopman 2013: 30), understand them to be complimentary. In particular, I will attempt to integrate Foucault’s archaeological critique of the history of science and genealogical scrutiny of power, knowledge, and subjectivity for the thesis’s study of racial government.

The first section of this chapter discusses Foucault’s archaeology of science and shows how an archaeological method allows us to problematise the history of biometrics. In the second section, I will move on to Foucault’s genealogical question of identity and the relations between power and knowledge, which explicates the problem of the identity called ‘race’ as such. The first two sections will constitute the thesis’s methodological foundation, constituting the ways that the thesis approaches the history of biometrics and that of race and racism in relational terms. If the main focus of these sections is to problematise the history of biometrics and that of race and racism, the last section aims to propose what may be called the dispositif of race as the thesis’s analytical site. Following Foucault’s concept of dispositif, I will suggest that the dispositif of race – consisting of both discursive and non-discursive practices of racial subjectification – would allow us to articulate, and problematise thereby, racial government through biometrics. An analysis of a dispositif then advances the realm of discourse analysis that earlier poststructural approaches to international studies had adopted (see Chapter One). By proposing an analysis at the level of dispositif, the thesis’s methodology is designed to articulate not just how the idea of

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19 For discourse analysis in the field of studies of race and racism, see David Theo Goldberg (1998: chapter 3).
race is discursively constructed in security terms but also the ways in which the discourse of race is correlated to security practices of biometric identification.

**An archaeological critique of biometrics**

In the previous chapter, I have mentioned the conventional view on the history of biometrics. In this view, the history of biometrics is understood in terms of its linear progressive nature – from the ‘pseudo-science’ of classificatory fingerprinting to the ‘real-science’ of fingerprinting individualisation. The denunciation of scientificity of biometrics in the tradition of biological anthropology had gradually emerged in the first half of the twentieth century, and by the end of World War II, biometrics were said to be effectively de-racialised. Foucault, however, cautions us against the view of progressive history in his archaeology of science.

Foucault’s archaeology is influenced by the critical tradition of the philosophy of science, in particular, by the French tradition such as Gaston Bachelard and Georges Canguilhem (Foucault 2002a: 4-5; see also Gutting 1989). Bachelard and Canguilhem – and also Thomas Kuhn in this regard – problematised the traditional conception of history as continuity, and more concretely, the progressive view of history in the development of scientific reason. In the progressive view of history, the development of scientific reason is seen cumulatively and lineally continuous without interruptions; historical perspectives of this kind attempt to restore changes and

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20 My discussion here will focus on Foucault’s critical departure from the French philosophy of science. For further discussion on Bachelard and Canguilhem, as well as their relation with Foucault’s archaeology, see Gary Gutting (1989: 9-54).

21 While Foucault finds Kuhn’s work “admirable and definitive”, he does not discuss Kuhn in his conceptualisation of archaeology, partly due to the fact that he had already written *The Order of Things* before reading Kuhn’s *Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, published in 1962 (Foucault 1994b: 239-240). Foucault’s discussion on Kuhn is also absent in his subsequent book, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. For an extended discussion on Kuhn and Foucault, see Ian Hacking (2002) and Agamben (2009a: 9-32).
interruptions by seeking continuity that guides us towards greater ‘truth’. Philosophers of science such as Bachelard and Canguilhem criticise this linear conception of history.

Bachelard showed that the development of scientific reason is essentially that of discontinuity. Instead of the continuity of history, states Foucault, “[t]here are the epistemological acts and thresholds described by Bachelard: they suspend the continuous accumulation of knowledge, interrupt its slow development” (Foucault 2002a: 4). Bachelard’s identification of the discontinuity of history – the concept that is now often referred to as epistemological break (see Althusser 2005) – shows not only such discontinuous nature of scientific reason, but also permits the study of changes in scientific rationality itself: “[Bachelard] direct[s] historical analysis away from the search for silent beginnings, and the never-ending tracing-back to the original precursors, towards the search for a new type of rationality and its various effects” (Foucault 2002a: 4-5). Similarly, Canguilhem also demonstrated that the historical development of a concept is not totally progressive and nor does it always increase rationality. Instead, Canguilhem showed that “the history of a concept is … that of its various fields of constitution and validity, that of its successive rules of use, that of the many theoretical contexts in which it developed and matured” (Foucault 2002a: 5). Or in the words of Kuhn (1996), there are shifts in scientific paradigms that underlie the development of scientific knowledge.

In The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault, however, moves beyond – not necessarily refutes (I will come back to this point shortly) – Bachelard and Canguilhem. He goes beyond their critique of the progressive account of scientific knowledge. Foucault argues that they are concerned only with scientific disciplines in which their critique implicitly takes a normative account. For Foucault, both
Bachelard and Canguilhem “accept as normative the concepts and rational standards of current scientific disciplines and write the history of how these concepts and standards won out over prescientific prejudices and misunderstandings” (Gutting 1989: 254). Consequently, Foucault argues that for Bachelard and Canguilhem, the analysis of history remains to be situated at the threshold of scientificity (Foucault 2002a: 209). Foucault describes this type of historical analysis as to discover “how a concept … was purified, and accorded the status and function of a scientific concept … [and] how, in general, a science was established over and against a pre-scientific level” (Foucault 2002a: 209). That is to say, the analysis of the threshold of scientificity is “an epistemological history of the sciences” that is “concerned with the opposition of truth and error, the rational and the irrational, the obstacle and fecundity, purity and impurity, the scientific and the non-scientific” (Foucault 2002a: 210).

For an archaeological history of science, by contrast, the type of historical analysis is not situated at the threshold of scientificity but the threshold of epistemologisation (Foucault 2002a: 210). “At this level”, argues Foucault, “scientificity does not serve as a norm” (Foucault 2002a: 210). At this level, historical analysis goes beyond the norms of scientificity and looks at the process in which such norms of scientificity are attained (Foucault 2002a: 210). In this sense, as Gutting argues, “Foucault opens the way to a historical critique of current scientific norms themselves as something less than absolute conditions for the possibility of knowledge” (Gutting 1989: 255).

Foucault distinguishes his archaeological history from the history of science articulated by his predecessors in various accounts. One of the key contributions he makes is the distinction between two different levels of knowledge: connaissance and savoir. By connaissance, Foucault means “the relation of the subject to the object and
the formal rules that govern it” (Foucault 2002a: 16, note 3), which refers to, as the translator of *The Archaeology of Knowledge* clarifies, “a particular corpus of knowledge, a particular discipline – biology or economics, for example” (Sheridan Smith in Foucault 2002a: 16, note 3). In this sense, Gutting suggests, “connaissance is what is found in what Foucault characterized as disciplines” (Gutting 1989: 251). Thus, the *epistemological* history of the sciences such as Bachelard and Canguilhem analyses the discontinuity of knowledge, knowledge within a particular discipline, that is to say, knowledge in terms of *connaissance*. The archaeological history of the sciences, on the other hand, analyses knowledge at the level of *savoir*. Savoir is “defined as knowledge in general, the totality of *connaissances*” (Sheridan Smith in Foucault 2002a: 16, note 3). The ‘totality’ here should not be confused with the ‘sum’ of *connaissances*. Foucault clarifies this point in his pre-publication interview in summer 1968: “Knowledge [*savoir*] is not the sum of scientific knowledges [*connaissances*], since it should always be possible to say whether the latter are true or false, accurate or not, approximate or definite, contradictory or consistent” (Foucault 1998a: 324). *Savoir* is rather “the conditions that are necessary in particular period for this or that type of object to be given to *connaissance*” (Foucault 2002a: 16-7, note 3).

The conditions of scientific, and more broadly disciplinary, knowledge – that is to say, the condition of possibility for the rise of *connaissance* – are the loci of Foucault’s archaeological analysis. These conditions are reducible to neither structuralism – the conditions in terms of linguistic structures – nor phenomenology – in which the conditions are reduced to “a lived experience” (Foucault 2002a: 200). Foucault clarifies a somewhat general term, ‘conditions of possibility’, in terms of
two distinct ‘heteromorphous systems’. The first system is that which “defines the conditions of the science as a science”:

[I]t is relative to its domain of objects, to the type of language it uses, to the concepts it has at its disposal or it is seeking to establish; it defines the formal and semantic rules required for a statement to belong to the science; it is instituted either by the science in question, insofar as it poses its own norms for itself, or by another science, insofar as it poses itself on the former as a model of formalization. (Foucault 1998a: 326).

Under this first system, the conditions of possibility are “internal to scientific discourse in general and cannot be defined other than through it” (Foucault 1998a: 326). The second system is external to the first system, and neither of them can superpose with another. The second system is “concerned with the possibility of a science in its historical existence”:

It is constituted by a field of discursive sets which have neither the same status, units, organization, nor the same functioning as the sciences to which they give rise. (Foucault 1998a: 326)

This type of the conditions of possibility is not internal to a certain set of rules within sciences. Rather than assigning its analysis within the field of scientificity, it “run[s] through a field of historical determination, which must account for the appearance, retention, transformation [of a science]” (Foucault 1998a: 326, emphasis added). By ‘historical determination’, Foucault suggests that one must account for its historical context. That is to say, savoir as the conditions of possibility for connaissances must be understood at this broad sense beyond scientificity, beyond scientific disciplines. “In a word,” states Foucault, “knowledge [savoir] is not science in the successive
displacement of its internal structures; it is the field of its actual history [*histoire effective*]” (Foucault 1998a: 326/1994b: 725).

It is worth noting that Foucault’s archaeological history of science is not necessarily the refutation of the philosophy of science in Bachelard and Canguilhem since the type of science they historicise is distinct from one Foucault’s archaeology is concerned with. The domain of historicisation in Bachelard and Canguilhem remains within natural sciences such as physics and chemistry. Foucault’s archaeology, by contrast, locates its investigation in the human sciences. As Gary Gutting notes, “Foucault does not move his archaeological critique of scientific norms in the direction of a debunking of scientific rationality as such. Rather, his critique is exclusively directed towards the dubious disciplines of psychiatry, medicine, and the human sciences” (Gutting 1989: 255). Earlier, Ian Hacking had also made a similar point in relation to “the division of labor” between Foucault and Kuhn: “Kuhn says nothing about the social sciences of knowledge of human beings. Likewise Foucault says nothing about the physical sciences” (Hacking 2002: 47).

Different ‘kinds’ of sciences between Foucault and his predecessors are, moreover, noteworthy in terms of why Foucault is particularly interested in social sciences. In several places, Foucault explicitly states that the reason why he was interested in human, or social, sciences is due to their relation to social and political practices. In his post-publication interview, for example, Foucault states:

[I]t seems interesting to me to study these empirical sciences insofar as they are more closely linked to social practices than the theoretical sciences are.

For example, medicine or political economy are disciplines perhaps lacking a

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Foucault, later in his articulation of genealogy, elaborates the term ‘effective history’ in relation to the Nietzschean concept of ‘actual history’. See Foucault’s seminal essay ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’ (Foucault 1998a).
high degree of scientificity, compared to mathematics; but their articulations onto social practices are very numerous and that’s precisely what interested me. (Foucault 1996: 62)

In this sense, archaeology is a sort of theory for a history of “empirical knowledge [savoir empirique]” (Foucault 1996: 62/1994a: 778), whose concerns are not limited to scientific disciplines but also social and political practices.

With his emphasis on social practices, Foucault’s archaeology of science offers us a new insight to the conventional understanding of the history of biometrics that is now, in the eyes of archaeologist, rather problematic.

The shift from biometrics as biological anthropology to biometrics as forensic science indicates an historical rupture or discontinuity in scientific rationality in the field of biometrics. The shift in the mid-twentieth century can be understood as a type of historical rupture in what a body can and cannot identify, or to put it simply, in what it can tell us about its nature. Just like an affirmation ‘species evolve’ differs before and after Darwin (Foucault 2002a: 117), an affirmation such as ‘a body can tell’ can easily mean two different things before and after this shift – a body can tell one’s natural disposition in racial terms or a body can tell if one was at a crime scene, if one committed a crime, et cetera. Yet, this rupture for an archaeologist must be analysed beyond this level of scientificity. Within the current scientific norms of biometrics, while the shift shows the fact that the rationality of sciences is historically contingent, the shift is still conceptualised at the level of scientificity in which the denunciation of classificatory fingerprinting was made possible. The question for an archaeologist here therefore is not whether forensic biometrics is more scientific than classificatory biometrics. The question is not about the progressive succession of biometrics; it is not about if a newer biometrics leads to greater truth (i.e., towards the
true identity). In the eyes of an archaeologist, what is concerned with is an historical context in which each mode of biometrics emerges, and the relations between each mode of biometrics and political practices, rather than assessment of the scientificity of biometrics from the current norms.

Social and political practices here, moreover, are not only discursive but also non-discursive or extra-discursive. Contrary to the common assumption of Foucault’s archaeology as predominantly discourse analysis, the role of non-discursive practices is very important in Foucault’s archaeology of science. In *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, Foucault, albeit rather briefly yet clearly, states: “Archaeology … reveals relations between discursive formations and non-discursive domains (institutions, political events, economic practices and processes)” (Foucault 2002a: 179-80). Elsewhere, Foucault calls such relations as extra-discursive dependencies: that is, “between discursive transformations and others which have been produced elsewhere than in the discourse: such as the correlations studies in *Madness and Civilization* and in *The Birth of the Clinic* between the medical discourse and a whole play of economic, political and social changes” (Foucault 1996: 38). For an archaeology of biometrics, then, historical discontinuities must be analysed at the broader level; each mode of biometrics needs to be analysed in relation to social and political practices and changes in each historical context.

It is important to note that the focus on political practices is not a search for their causal relations with sciences. It is wrong to “try to discover to what extent political changes, or economic process could determine the consciousness of scientists – the horizon and direction of their interest, their system of values, their way of perceiving things, the style of their rationality” (Foucault 2002a: 180). The aim for an archaeology of biometrics is not to describe how political practices determined the
use of biometrics. Rather, I aim to show “how and in what form it [political practice] takes part in its conditions of emergence, insertion, and functioning” (Foucault 2002a: 181). As Foucault emphasises, “political practice has transformed not the meaning or the form of the discourse … it has transformed the mode of existence of the medical discourse” (Foucault 1996: 46, emphasis added). In other words, the question I will pursue in this thesis is not, for example, whether imperial ideology determined a particular mode of biometrics, which the conventional view of the history of biometrics would proclaim. Drawing on Foucault’s archaeology, my question lies in the correlative relation between the mode of biometrics and political practices in each historical context, for example, between classificatory fingerprinting and colonial practices, between forensic fingerprinting and post-colonial practices, and between digital fingerprinting and political practices of today.

A genealogical scrutiny of power, knowledge, and subjectivity

‘Race does not exist’: A genealogist precaution

The conventional view of the history of biometrics is also problematic in terms of its rather static presumption of the subject’s identity. In one sense, the denunciation of classificatory biometrics as a pseudo-science had effectively shown the absurdity of racial sciences. It had invalidated the nineteenth-century anthropologists’ will to differentiate and classify racial groups in a hierarchical manner – that is, classifying

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23 Foucault’s emphasis on political practice and knowledge is later elaborated in his articulation of ‘power-knowledge relations’ in Discipline and Punish, which I will discuss shortly.

24 Foucault’s discussion on ideology can be found in a small passage in The Archaeology of Knowledge (Foucault 2002a: 203-5). He later found the notion of ideology is problematic to use for various reasons including that the assertion of ideology implicitly affirms its oppositional existence of truth (Foucault 1980: 118).
Europeans on the side of civilisation while others on the side of barbarism. At the same time, the critique at this level was incapable of understanding the politics of categorisation itself in which each individual is made to belong to a particular racial group. That is to say, it denounced only a scientific claim that a group is superior, or otherwise, to other groups while affirming a difference between these groups. In a word, racial identity is thought as a given.

For Foucault, by contrast, no identity is a given; it is not an historical constant but only an historical construct. Race, like other social identities, does not exist prior to its correlative practices. The presumption of (racial) identity as a given is problematised by Foucault’s seminal essay, ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’. In the essay, Foucault reconstructs the Nietzschean genealogy as a critique of origin (Ursprung). Genealogy opposes to an historical search for the origin of things. Foucault cautions that the search for the origin dangerously submits one – be it a historian or a philosopher – to the malice of essentialism by capturing the essence of things, immobilising the forms of existence, and protecting identities against the heterogeneity of history (Foucault 1998a: 371). In this sense, the search for the origin is quite literally de-historicising history by its timeless assumption of the same. It is “the metahistorical deployment of ideal significations and indefinite teleologies” (Foucault 1998a: 370), which seeks, and in effect produces, essential and immobile characters of identities.

A genealogist dispels the fantasy of the origin by recognising history at the level of the event (Foucault 1998a: 373). Foucault does not use the term ‘event’ in an ordinary usage as he later clarifies his specific use of the term in the sense of

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25 Foucault also emphasises on the notion of event, as opposed to that of creation, in his 1970 inaugural lecture at the Collège de France, entitled ‘The Order of Discourse’ (Foucault 1981: 67).
eventalisation (Foucault 1991: 76). By ‘eventalisation’, Foucault means “a breach of self-evidence”: “It means making visible a singularity at places where there is a temptation to invoke a historical constant, an immediate anthropological trait, or an obviousness which imposes itself uniformly on all” (Foucault 1991: 76). It is “to show that things ‘weren’t as necessary as all that’” (Foucault 1991: 76). At the level of eventalisation, history is no longer the domain of ordering identities but can be seen as that of making them as such.

For a genealogist who looks at ‘descent’ (Herkunft), or ‘provenance’ as in the French original (see Foucault 1971), rather than ‘origin’ (Ursprung) – respectively, the analysis of events as opposed to the meta-historical unification – racial identity is understood in terms of the constitutive other.26 It is by no means an essential identity, but becomes possible only in the constitutive relationship between the self and the other in a particular historical context. For Nietzsche, therefore, as Foucault puts it: “Germans … were simply trying to master the racial disorder from which they had formed themselves” (Foucault 1998a: 374). In this sense, race fabricates a coherent identity (both of the self and the other); it masks the heterogeneity of identity in history. A genealogist seeks to dissipate such a coherent identity; he or she will analyse each moment of emergence without fabricating an historical constant. As Foucault puts it:

The search for descent [provenance] is not the erecting of foundations: on the contrary, it disturbs what was previously considered immobile; it fragments what was thought unified; it shows the heterogeneity of what was imagined consistent with itself. (Foucault 1998a: 374-5/1971:153)

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26 Edward Said inter alia elaborates the operation of the constitutive other beyond the European context, namely, the making of the Orient and the Occident in his seminal work, Orientalism (Said 2003).
Chapter Two: Archaeology, Genealogy, Dispositif

A genealogical analysis of ‘provenance’ is then combined with an analysis of ‘emergence’, which focuses on the moment of arising and the role of force (which will be discussed in the following subsection).

It is in this sense that Paul Veyne (1997) proclaims, “Foucault revolutionises history”. As one of the earliest commentaries, Veyne’s 1978 essay acutely summarises Foucault’s original methodology to history. He states:

Everything hinges on a paradox, one that is Foucault’s central and most original thesis. *What is made*, the object, is explained by what went into its *making* at each moment of history; we are wrong to imagine that the *making*, the practice, is explained on the basis of what is made. (Veyne 1997: 160-1)

Foucault’s genealogical critique lies in the relation between the object and the practice. He questions the process of objectification: “The history of the ‘objectification’ of those elements historians consider as objectively given … and this is the sort of sphere I would like to traverse” (Foucault 1991: 86). Or as Deleuze (1995: 86) puts it, “We weren’t looking for origins, even lost and deleted ones, but setting out to catch things where they were at work, in the middle” (Deleuze 1995: 86). Foucault’s analytical starting point lies in this sphere of the middle, between things and practices, not in two peripheral ends of analysis, namely, the objects in themselves and the subject’s consciousness (Veyne 1997: 160-1).

“Madness does not exist”, Foucault proclaims accordingly (Foucault 1996: 8). This is not because of the nihilist belief that nothing has a real existence. Rather, this is because madness *in itself* does not exist: “Madness can not be found in its raw state. Madness only exists in society, it does not exist outside of the forms of sensibility that isolate it and the forms of repulsion that exclude or capture it” (Foucault 1996: 8). Madness as an abstract idea does not exist, while its correlative practices, or more
broadly, its “relation to the rest of the world” (Veyne 1997: 177), are very real. In other words, madness does not exist in the sense that it does not have an essence that shapes it as such; there exists only its correlative practices of exclusion, confinement, medicalisation, and so forth, that are historically contingent and that constitutes the condition of possibility for madness to emerge in a given period.

As Veyne notes, two more clarifications should be added here. First, Foucault’s negation must not be taken as his call for relativism. To claim that madness is historically contingent in the way Foucault’s *Madness and Civilisation* (2007a) proclaims is not, and cannot be, relativist because to be relativist, there must be the same object that can be relativised. For Foucault, “the point at issue is precisely not the same from the one era to another” (Veyne 1997: 175). If madness is rendered possible only by its correlative practices within a given historical and cultural context, we simply cannot relativise it. Relativism, in other words, becomes possible only if there is a universal. Second, Foucault is not a moralist in the sense that one makes a priori judgements over the treatment of madness.27 “To say that madness does not exist”, Veyne writes, “is not to claim that madmen are victims of prejudice, nor is it to deny such an assertion, for that matter. The meaning of the proposition lies elsewhere. … The denial of madness is not situated at the level of attitudes toward the object, but at that of its objectivization” (Veyne 1997: 168-9). The denial is situated in the very relation of madness to a modern society in Europe; it is situated in rationalism (Veyne 1997).

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27 On the other hand, Foucault claims that he is a moralist in his 1980 interview but this claim is made in a very particular sense. Foucault states, “I am a moralist, insofar as I believe that one of the tasks, one of the meanings of human existence – the source of human freedom – is never to accept anything as definitive, untouchable, obvious, or immobile. No aspect of reality should be allowed to become a definitive and inhuman law for us” (Foucault 1988: 1). The claim therefore is not contradictory to my use of the term here or his overall genealogical project.
Chapter Two: Archaeology, Genealogy, Dispositif

It is this sphere where biometrics become inextricable to the constitution of racial identity and also where the progressive view of the history of biometrics becomes problematic. On the one hand, as I have discussed in the previous chapter, biometrics in nineteenth-century Europe emerged as a mode of racialisation. The idea of race can certainly be traced back to earlier periods: for example, the categorisation of race based on skin colour was articulated as early as Kant’s essays on race (Bernasconi 2001; Mikkelsen 2013; see also Goldberg 1998). Yet, it was nineteenth-century racial sciences including biometrics that attempted to ‘scientifically’ articulate the ‘truth’ of race both in terms of the meaning – for example, if one racial group is superior or inferior to others – and more broadly differences between racial groups – by calculating their bodily features. On the other hand, the conventional history of biometrics, and of anthropology more broadly, only denounced the former while leaving the very category of race unquestioned. In other words, the conventional view of the history of biometrics effectively historicised the meaning of racial difference, but at the same time, it takes a rather meta-historical assumption on racial identity.

For a genealogist, the question lies in the very production of identity: not simply at the level of ‘temperament’ but at the level of identification itself. Drawing on Foucault’s critique of identity, I shall now propose a methodological precaution of this thesis: race does not exist. As already clarified above, this is not an outright negation of the existence of race but only in terms of race as an abstract idea. By proposing ‘race does not exist’, I will analyse its concrete practices – both discursive and non-discursive – at a given historical and geographical context that are correlative to the emergence of the idea.

28 We should also note that the idea of race is not exclusive to skin colour. As Foucault noted during his 1976 lectures (2004), such an abstract idea well preceded the Enlightenment with various forms of articulation of race. See below.
Therefore, my proposition of ‘race does not exist’ is distinct from that of the so-called ‘racial scepticism’ that is depicted by Kwame Anthony Appiah among others. In his critique of Du Bois’s ‘illusion of race’, Appiah argues: “The truth is that there are no races: there is nothing in the world that can do all we ask race to do for us. The evil that is done is done by the concept, and by easy – yet impossible – assumptions as to its application” (Appiah 1995: 75). Appiah’s racial scepticism arises from the scientific thesis denying biological racial differences, which, Appiah contends, Du Bois had already observed but nevertheless attempted to biologise non-biological differences. As the excerpt above clarifies, his scepticism is situated in the indexicality of the term ‘race’ – if and what the term can refer to or can ‘do’ – which Appiah ultimately limits to the biological discourse of race.

Such racial scepticism is, in the light of Foucault’s genealogy, analytically limited, or worse, can be even counter-productive. It is limited in the sense that racial scepticism fails to recognise that the biological discourse of race is, historically speaking, only one set of practices in which the idea of race is manifested. For example, as Foucault’s Society Must be Defended (2004) shows, the idea of race precedes the biological discourse of the nineteenth-century scientific racism. More recently, the sceptic’s conception of race also fails to recognise a non-biological form of racism such as racism towards immigrant population in late twentieth-century Europe, which Balibar (1991) calls “racism without races” (see also Barker 1981; Taguieff 2001). In the meantime, the outright denial of race is in fact only possible

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29 Michael Omi and Howard Winant (1994: 55) also criticise Appiah for not recognising social structure.
30 More recently, Eduardo Bonilla-Silva suggests ‘color-blind racism’ in his book Racism without Racists (2006). However, I disagree with his criticism of “postmodern-inspired readings on race”: “Too many postmodern-inspired readings on race insist on the malleability and instability of all social constructions. … by focusing on the instability of race as a category, they miss its continuity and social role in shaping everyday dynamics” (Bonilla-Silva 2006: 21-2, note 55). The historical fluidity of the concept that ‘postmodern’ thinkers
if one affirms the ahistorical existence of race. It requires the universal of race in order to abolish it. Appiah’s claim, “the truth is that there are no races”, is fundamentally inescapable from the affirmation of the truth that race is biological. Or to borrow Veyne’s terminology above, the problem of racial scepticism lies in its exclusive critique of ‘what is made’ without historically situating ‘the making’: its critique is made possible only through the arbitrary equation between two – i.e., the biological idea of race and the biological making of race.

Importantly, the shift from the abstract idea of race to the practices of race is also to account political practices specific not only to each historical context but also to each geographical one. In his 1982 essay ‘A Genealogy of Modern Racism’, Cornell West (2002) conducted a Foucaultian approach to the history of modern racism. Although it is rather a short essay, West succinctly analysed modern discourses in the West (predominantly in the eighteenth century), and articulated the constitution of white supremacy. However, Ian Hacking (2005) later commented on West’s genealogy of modern racism where, while appreciating West’s work, Hacking also expresses some degree of uncertainty about the articulation of race strictly in terms of skin colour. Noting the limit of the analysis of race in terms of skin colour, Hacking (2005: 110-113) suggests rethinking the connection between race and geography and between race and different empires.

The methodological precaution, ‘race does not exist’, is about the principle of relations in which the very idea of race – either by biological discourse or not – emerges in a given historical, and geographical context. The idea of race is in essence heterogeneous: it is constantly fabricated and masked as a coherent identity by its

such as Foucault proclaim does not necessarily miss the continuity of racism. Rather, focusing on its fluidity and instability, as I emphasised in Introduction, Foucault’s historical approach can allow us to explicate its persistence.
correlative practices. I understand the biological conception of race as only one kind of fabrication, not the fabrication. My investigation is situated at each moment of arising; instead of grounding its scope of analysis in the universal of race, whatever it may be, this thesis looks at the relations of race with a given context, its correlative practices that educes the condition of possibility of the knowledge of race.

Normalisation: Power-knowledge of biometrics

How then does identity emerge? In ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’, Foucault argues that the moment of arising – which Foucault draws from the Nietzschean notion of ‘emergence’ (Entstehung) – is the entry of forces; it is a particular state of forces that produces emergence (Foucault 1998a: 376-7). The emergence of a concept is interconnected with the play of dominations, which Foucault draws from the famous passage from Nietzsche where the latter argues that the idea of liberty is generated by class domination (Foucault 1998a: 377). Knowledge and power are interconnected, and they cannot be analysed independently.

In Discipline and Punish, Foucault further elaborates this interconnectedness in his concept of power-knowledge relations (Foucault 1979: 27; see also Foucault 2007d: 155). Foucault articulates the concept of power-knowledge from the analysis of the nexus of subjectification (assujettissement) of bodies and objectification (objectivation) of knowledge, which he calls discipline.

Foucault’s use of the term ‘subjectification’ (assujettissement) needs some clarification here. Noticing the lack of an equivalent term in English, Foucault defines it during his 1978 interview:

[W]hat I call subjectification [l’assujettissement], a word I know is difficult to translate to English, because it rests on a play on words, subjectification [assujettissement] in the sense of the constitution of the subject, and at the
same time the way in which we impose on a subject relations of domination.

(Foucault et al. 2012: 110)

Foucault here emphasises “the correlative constitution, throughout history, of objects and the subject” (Foucault et al. 2012: 110). With this emphasis on the relationality of the subject, I believe that the term ‘subjectification’ is a more helpful translation of the term than others such as ‘subjection’ and ‘subjugation’ because the latter emphasises too much on domination over subjects and does not cover its self-constitution aspect.\(^{31}\)

Foucault uses the term ‘discipline’, and ‘disciplinary power’, in two ways. First, as I briefly discussed in Introduction, Foucault articulates disciplinary power in terms of the effect of surveillance that disciplines individual behaviour, making bodies docile, such as under the panoptic mechanism. It is a function of power that attempts to control bodies, bodies used as something “to be molded, reformed, corrected” (Foucault 2001: 82). Second, disciplinary power is also related to the power of disciplines as institutions that “compares, differentiates, hierarchizes, homogenizes, excludes. In short, it normalizes” (Foucault 1979: 183). The power inherent in the examination of bodies here is not exclusive to panopticism but constitutive of disciplines of human sciences such as psychiatry (Foucault 2001: 84). In this regard, disciplinary power is characterised more broadly as “an epistemological power – that is, a power to extract a knowledge from individuals and to extract a knowledge about those individuals who are subjected to observation” (Foucault 2001: 83). Correspondingly, there are two forms – that are nevertheless interconnected – of normalisation: on the one hand, disciplinary power normalises individual behaviour

\(^{31}\) The term *assujettissement* has been translated in English into different terms. The term ‘subjection’ has been adopted in Alan Sheridan’s translation of *Discipline and Punish*, and in Robert Hurley’s translation in *The Will to Knowledge*. David Macey translates it to ‘subjugation’ in *Society Must be Defended*. For the issues on the translation of *assujettissement*, see Milchman and Rosenberg (2007: 55-6).
by the power of surveillance; and on the other hand, disciplinary power as in the institutionalisation of knowledge is also operational at the production of knowledge of what is to be known as normal or pathological.

This mutual operation of subjectification and objectification under the disciplinary power, for Foucault, is one of indicative points that we cannot succinctly divide power from knowledge and vice versa. Instead, we must look at power-knowledge relations (Foucault 1979: 27), which Foucault earlier suggested in an inverted form during his 1973 lectures in Rio de Janeiro:

A new knowledge … [is] characterized by supervision and examination, organized around the norm, through the supervisory control of individuals throughout their existence. This examination was the basis of the power, the form of knowledge-power, that was to give rise … to what we call the ‘human sciences’ – psychiatry, psychology, sociology. (Foucault 2001: 59)

Foucault’s concept of ‘power-knowledge’ (pouvoir-savoir) needs some close attention here as the hyphenated term may invite some misinterpretation.  

First of all, power-knowledge relations are not the same as claiming that knowledge is power and vice versa. Foucault states in his 1983 interview:

[W]hen I read – and I know it has been attributed to me – the thesis, ‘Knowledge is power’, or ‘Power is knowledge’, I begin to laugh, since studying their relation is precisely my problem. If they were identical, I would not have to study them and I would be spared a lot of fatigue as a result. The very fact that I pose the question of their relation proves clearly that I do not identify them (Foucault 1990: 43).

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32 Ian Hacking (2004: 73) also cautions us against misinterpretation of Foucault’s concept of ‘power-knowledge’.
The focus on the relations between knowledge and power as a site of investigation means that the biometric knowledge of race is not the same thing as, for example, the imperial power.

Second, power does not exist independently from knowledge. Foucault suggests, “we should abandon the belief that power makes mad and that, by the same token, the renunciation of power is one of the conditions of knowledge” (Foucault 1979: 27). This is certainly not to say that Foucault here is asserting that power does not affect knowledge; he is not saying that the constitution of ‘madness’ is independent of the mechanisms of power. Rather, what Foucault is asserting by this conceptual abandonment is that power is not exterior to knowledge but instead is immanent to its exercise on knowledge. Power is not “a property” that one possesses and uses over knowledge but it is “a strategy” (Foucault 1979: 26). It means, as Elden puts it, “power is often impersonal. Consequently power must be thought of as diffused throughout the social body rather than coming from above” (Elden 2001: 105). Power, in other words, is “something that is exercised and that it exists only in action” (Foucault 2004: 14; see also Foucault 1979: 26-7).

The third clarification of power-knowledge relations is particularly important to think about the relationship between race and biometrics in the period after the denunciation of classificatory fingerprinting. Foucault states:

[W]e should abandon a whole tradition that allows us to imagine that knowledge can exist only where the power relations are suspended and that knowledge can develop only outside its injunctions, its demands and its interests. (Foucault 1979: 27)

That is to say, the concept of power-knowledge relations comes from a critique of knowledge exterior to the practices of power. For the denunciation of classificatory
fingerprinting, it was the disparity between knowledge and power that enabled the very denunciation possible: it assumes that the true knowledge of biometrics (i.e., fingerprint individualisation) comes forth from its dissociation from the imperial power. For Foucault, however, the emergence of knowledge is inseparable from the mechanisms of power because of the fact that the object of analysis – therefore, the object of knowledge – emerges in society as something to be solved. Foucault clarifies this point in his 1978 interview in relation to the human sciences:

Philosophers or even, more generally, intellectuals justify and mark out their identity by trying to establish an almost uncrossable line between the domain of knowledge, seen as that of truth and freedom, and the domain of the exercise of power. What struck me, in observing the human sciences, was that the development of all these branches of knowledge can in no way be dissociated from the exercise of power. Of course, you will always find psychological or sociological theories that are independent of power. But, generally speaking, the fact that societies can become the object of scientific observation, that human behaviour became, from a certain point on, a problem to be analyzed and resolved, all that is bound up, I believe, with mechanisms of power – which, at a given moment, indeed, analyzed that object (society, man, etc.) and presented as a problem to be resolved. (Foucault 1990: 106)

Foucault’s emphasis on objectification questions the power-knowledge relations in biometrics beyond the tradition of nineteenth-century racial sciences. From forensic sciences to information technology, a ‘real-science’ of fingerprint individualisation must be studied in relation to the mechanisms of power that imposes identification rather than simply understanding individualisation fingerprinting as an apolitical,
power-less, technology. The thesis’s concern focuses on the mechanisms of power that persistently analyse bodies and that presents identity as a problem to be resolved.

My historical investigation is particularly concerned with identification through biometric knowledge in terms of normalisation. As already noted above, to monitor bodies, and thus to know them, for Foucault, means to normalise them not just in terms of the panoptic production of “docile bodies” (Foucault 1979), making bodies disciplined and productive. It also means normalisation in terms of the epistemological power in the light of the human science; that is, normalisation in which individuals, through observation and examination, become cases of a particular institutional knowledge, and these cases at the same time give rise to such an institutional knowledge (Foucault 1979: 184; see also Han 2002: 120-2).33

As commentators noted (Deleuze 1995: 174; 2011: 36; Han 2002: 122), it is important to note that Foucault’s articulation of disciplinary power in terms of normalisation is not limited to the prison system or the institutional confinement. Foucault articulates the disciplinary society (Foucault 1979: 193) or “the great social panopticism” (Foucault 2001: 85) that is characterised as the dispersion of normalising techniques, which he initially depicted in his analysis of the modern prison, in various institutional sites throughout society such as schools, hospitals, factories, and barracks (Foucault 1979). Moreover, Foucault, as Deleuze puts it, was “one of the first to say that we’re moving away from disciplinary societies, we’ve already left them behind” (Deleuze 1995: 174). In his 1978 interview in Kyoto, Foucault indeed proclaimed “the disciplinary society in crisis” (‘La société disciplinaire en crise’) (Foucault 1994c: 532-534) in which the mode of control is no

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33 Béatrice Han notes a paradoxical relationship between the universal and the particular that is inherent in this disciplinary mechanism. “The paradox of the norm, therefore, is that it plays individuation against individuality, as the measurement of the individual that it presupposes is effected to the detriment of the respect for the individual themselves” (Han 2002: 122).
longer conducted at institutional sites. In another interview later in the same year, Foucault suggested a new mode of control through normalisation:

Today, control is less severe and more refined, but it is no less terrifying for that. For the whole course of our life, we are totally held within different authoritarian systems; first at school, then in our work and even in our pastimes. Each individual, considered separately, is normalized and transformed in a file controlled by an IBM (Cited in Han 2002: 122; see Foucault 1994c: 670).

Foucault observed that normalisation in the light of the late twentieth century is becoming less of disciplinary confinement by the introduction of digital technology that Foucault here refers to ‘a file controlled by an IMB’. 34

Foucault’s claims in these interviews should not surprise careful readers of Discipline and Punish, as Foucault’s move from institutional sites are glimpsed already in Discipline and Punish: he notes, for example, the “deinstitutionalization” of disciplinary mechanisms and the introduction of “flexible methods of control” (Foucault 1979: 211) and “indefinitely generalizable mechanism of ‘panopticism’” (Foucault 1979: 216). With respect to this context between Discipline and Punish and Foucault’s 1978 interview, Han argues: “Normalization is thus revealed as the general horizon of Foucault’s analysis of subjection (sic) and objectification” (Han 2002: 122). Instead of focusing on confinement, what is at stake in Foucault’s conceptualisation of disciplinary power is normalisation; it is power-knowledge relations that lie in between mechanisms of subjectification and objectification, and that are irreducible to the traditional relationship between the state and its subjects, to the juridico-sovereign model of power.

34 The theme of control by digital technologies was later taken up by Deleuze who proposes “the control society” (Deleuze 1995). See also Chapter Five.
Understanding biometric identification as normalisation in the Foucaultian sense, therefore, the present study is concerned not just with its normalisation of race in the manner of the nineteenth-century biological anthropology, but also with a broad strategy of normalisation inherent in the politics of knowing. For Foucault, “the exercise of power itself creates and causes to emerge new objects of knowledge and accumulates new bodies of information. … The exercise of power perpetually creates knowledge and, conversely, knowledge constantly induces effects of power” (Foucault 1980: 51-2). *Discipline and Punish* (Foucault 1979) cautions us to rethink the modern penal regime that may on surface seems progressive and ‘humanistic’ but that in fact induces a new form of control and subjectification. Are we then not also seeing a new form of racial subjectification and control through a forensic identification and through information technology? Inspired by Foucault’s formulation of the research question (Foucault 1991: 74), the thesis is less concerned with a question of what, under biometric knowledge, is identified as racial superior or inferior than a question of how divisions under its normalising technique of identification are operated in each historical context.

**The dispositif of race**

Foucault’s archaeology and genealogy that I discussed in the previous two sections form this thesis’s methodological treatment of history. They form the methodological stance in which the history of biometrics and that of race is dealt with throughout this thesis. Both archaeological and genealogical methodological propositions induce my historical investigation to look at each emergence of the political deployment of biometric identification and of the manifestation of racial subjectivity without submitting to the progressive account of biometrics or the universal of race. This last
section turns my discussion on the thesis’s methodology to in terms of the locus of analysis within each historical context.

As clarified in Introduction, the thesis’s historical investigation is not simply to historicise the political deployment of biometric identification and the idea of race. Rather, situating the focal point of analysis in their relations, my historical investigation is designed to articulate a history of biopolitical racism through concretely historicising the modality of the government of race through biometrics. In his articulation of sexuality as a biopolitical technology, Foucault (1998b) cautions us not to reduce the politics of sexuality to the repressive model of power; instead, he suggests the analysis of what he calls ‘dispositif’ in order to capture the relations and circulations among different techniques – including discursive practices and non-discursive practices – dispersed throughout a society whereby a certain political rationality of governing is manifested. Inspired by Foucault’s (1998b) analysis of “the dispositif of sexuality”, this section proposes the third component of the thesis’s methodological foundation, which I call the dispositif of race in order to capture the system of relations between the discourse of race and racism and security practice of biometric identification, and to articulate the political rationality of racism in each historical context.

**Foucault on the dispositif of sexuality**

In *The Will to Knowledge*, Foucault (1998b) cautions us not to reduce the politics of sexuality to the juridical model of power. Power over sexuality for Foucault is not simply the matter of permission or prohibition of certain sexual acts such as incest, sodomy, masturbation, and so forth. It is irreducible to the juridical model of ‘you must not’ (Foucault 2007c: 154). Foucault states:
The central issue … is not to determine whether one says yes or no to sex, whether one formulates prohibitions or permissions, whether one asserts its importance or denies its effects, or whether one refines the words one uses to designate it; but to account for the fact that it is spoken about, to discover who does the speaking, the positions and viewpoints from which they speak, the institutions which prompt people to speak about it and which store and distribute the things that are said. What is at issue, briefly, is the over-all ‘discursive fact’, the way in which sex is ‘put into discourse.’ (Foucault 1998b: 11)

Accordingly, Foucault problematises the hypothesis of sexual repression since the seventeenth century – and he equally problematises the so-called ‘sexual liberation movements’ of his time because this notion of liberation is the other side of the binary relationship of the juridical model of repression\(^{35}\) – through closely looking at the mechanisms of power over sexuality that do not simply repress in a negative fashion but positively produces reality. Contrary to the repressive hypothesis of silencing sexuality, Foucault (1998b) finds the fact that sexuality was widely discussed: far from being forbidden, discourses on sex proliferated during the eighteenth and nineteenth century. It was not the prohibition of sexuality but the very process of sexualisation in which particular sexual acts, and henceforth their doers, are coded, managed, and controlled. What Foucault is concerned with is therefore intelligibility through the nexus of subjectification and objectification, through the nexus of power and knowledge, over, and at the same time that induces, sexuality.

\(^{35}\) To clarify this point, Foucault is dubious about the liberation of sexuality – based on a given sexual category such as a gay movement during the second half of the twentieth century. Such liberation is problematic because it begins with sexuality (Foucault 1996: 217). If there is indeed liberation as such, it must be, argues Foucault, liberation from sexuality, that is, to conceive of “sex without the law” (Foucault 1998b: 91).
Instead of reducing power to the juridical model, Foucault suggests us to analyse "the dispositif of sexuality", which he also goes beyond the analysis of the discourses on sexuality. What then, as Deleuze (1992) and Agamben (2009b) have asked, does the concept of dispositif refer to? Foucault defines its methodological functions in one of his post-publication interviews:

What I’m trying to pick out with this term [i.e., dispositif] is, firstly, a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourse, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions – in short, the said as much as the unsaid. (Foucault 1980: 194)

A dispositif is to capture the circular relations between these elements, both the discursive and the non-discursive, without presuming the centre of power – be it the law or the sovereign.

Furthermore, a dispositif is not just Foucault’s expansion of the object of analysis – from discursive to non-discursive practices (in any case, as I discussed above, Foucault’s archaeology of science already suggests the inclusion of the non-discursive) – but the central question for him is now the operation of power that constitutes a certain subjectivity and at the same time that controls it. A dispositif,

36 In The Will to Knowledge, the term is translated to ‘The Deployment of Sexuality’ that should be read as ‘The Dispositif of Sexuality’ as in the French original (Foucault 1976) with respect to Foucault’s original conceptualisation of the term. We should also note that term ‘dispositif’ has been translated inconsistently across Foucault’s books in English. It has often been translated to ‘apparatus’ (for example, Foucault 1980: 194-228; also, Agamben 2009b). Usually, texts that adopt the term ‘apparatus’ helpfully indicate that it is from the translation of dispositif. However, we should not take the term ‘apparatus’ in The Will to Knowledge (1998b) as equivalent of dispositif. It is in fact from the French term ‘appareil’: see, for example, “the state and its apparatus” (1998b: 89), which is read in the original as, “l’État et ses appareils” (1976: 118). In here, Foucault seems to be implying in terms of Althusserian state apparatus (Althusser 1984). Also, David Macey’s translation of Society Must be Defended is problematic in the translation of the term ‘dispositif’, which is inconsistently translated to various terms in English throughout the book: including ‘apparatus’ (Foucault 2004: 13; 45/1997b: 13, 39), ‘disposition’ (Foucault 2004, 171/1997b: 152), and ‘deployment’ (Foucault 2004, 173/1997b: 154).
Chapter Two: Archaeology, Genealogy, Dispositif

argues Foucault, is “essentially of strategic nature”; it is “a matter of a certain manipulation of relations of forces” (Foucault 1980: 196). Foucault states:

I understand by the term dispositif a sort of – shall we say – formation which has as its major function at a given historical moment that of responding to an urgent need. The dispositif thus has a dominant strategic function. This may have been, for example, the assimilation of a floating population found to be burdensome for an essentially mercantilist economy: there was a strategic imperative acting here as the matrix for a dispositif which gradually became the dispositif of control-subjectification [contrôle-assujettissement] of madness, mental illness and neurosis. (Foucault 1980: 195, translation modified. See Foucault 1994c: 299)

With Foucault’s emphasis on its dominant function, Agamben defines a dispositif in terms of its capacity to “capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, control, or secure the gestures, behaviors, opinions, or discourses of living beings” (Agamben 2009b: 14). The possibility of the emergence of subjectivity – the very idea of subjects – is then produced through a certain dispositif (Agamben 2009b: 14). As the excerpt above shows (the part that seems to have been mistranslated in English), the emergence of subjectivity is also that of control.38 Foucault seems to suggest by the

37 We should note that while Agamben’s definition here is helpful to clarify the orientation, determination, control of a dispositif, his treatment of ‘living beings’ appears to be exterior to a dispositif. For Foucault, however, living beings – a form of subjectivity with the notion of life – are already interior to a dispositif; as The Order of Things (2002b) shows, they are produced and emerge within a certain discursive dispositif called the modern episteme (Foucault 1980: 197). In the subsequent paragraph, Agamben (2009b: 14) nevertheless adds the term ‘substances’ as equivalent to living beings, which is a more appropriate reading of Foucault with respect to this reading of The Order of Things.

38 In the English translation, the last sentence reads as follows: “there was a strategic imperative acting here as the matrix for an apparatus which gradually undertook the control or subjection of madness, mental illness and neurosis” (Foucault 1980: 195, emphasis added). The mistranslation seems to be due to another mistranslation of the term ‘assujettissement’ as ‘subjection’, which may have resulted in the use of conjunction ‘or’ (“control or subjugation”, which they are treated synonymously).
hyphenated word, “control-subjectification”, that subjectification is inseparable from control: control is immanent to the way in which a certain type of subjectivity is constructed. For example, the subjectification of madness makes its control possible, and conversely, the control of madness induces its subjectification. It is, therefore, the nexus of power, knowledge, and subjectivity that Foucault attempts to capture by the analysis of a dispositif. Or in Deleuze’s words, Foucault’s dispositif consists of lines of “visibility” (knowledge), “lines of force” (power), and “lines of subjectification” (subjectivity) (Deleuze 1992).

From race to raciality

Following Foucault’s analysis of a dispositif, this thesis proposes an analysis of race and racism at the level of dispositif, which may be characterised as the dispositif of race, or perhaps better, of raciality. By the term ‘raciality’, I emphasise that race throughout this thesis is treated as a process of becoming, and accordingly attempt to articulate the practices and processes of racialisation. My emphasis here is to clarify the point that the term ‘race’ seems rather limited to capture these practices and processes because it affirms a static object called ‘race’ while being so fragile in its definition. I have already suggested that classificatory fingerprinting should not be understood as a technology of classification of race but that of racialisation of social groups. That is to say, the biological knowledge of race in the tradition of nineteenth-century physical anthropology is only an element of raciality. Race understood at the level of raciality captures elements that produce the conditions of possibility for the category called race to emerge. These elements include the concept of barbarism, criminality, and backwardness, the physiological characteristics such as skin colour and fingerprints, and so on, that are not by themselves equivalent to race but constitute it as such.
More concretely, the thesis’s concern here follows the line of Foucault’s emphasis on sexuality rather than sex. During the process of drafting *The Will to Knowledge*, Foucault initially thought, “sex was taken as a pre-given datum, and sexuality figured as a sort of simultaneously discursive and institutional formation which came to graft itself on to sex, to overlay it and perhaps finally obscure it” (Foucault 1980: 210). Soon, however, he found this formulation problematic and accordingly inverted the relation: sex is something that is *produced* by the *dispositif* of sexuality (Foucault 1980: 210). Accordingly, in this thesis, I conceptualise race, and use the term ‘race’ thereby, in terms of raciality that is not something that overlays or obscures race but is the condition of the latter. The idea of ‘backwardness’ as an element of raciality, for example, does not obscure race but constitutes race in a given historical context. In other words, just like the category called sex was produced a particular government of sexuality (Foucault 1998b), race is a form of manifestation that emerged from a certain set of practices of racialisation. It is, this thesis suggests, produced by the *dispositif* of control-subjectification of race, or better raciality.

Accordingly, I do not reduce the history of race and racism to the model of repression and prohibition. On the contrary, I conceive of the ways in which racial repression and prohibition are conducted as constitutive elements of the strategy of race. The model of repression and prohibition is problematic because it separates race from power, assuming power is external to race. Instead, power must be understood as *immanent* to race (see Foucault 1998b: 98). Equally, the liberation of race – for example, the rise of Black Power – dismisses power immanent to subjectification; it dismisses power immanent to the subjectification of the social category of ‘Black’ as well as power immanent to racial subjectification that falls outside of the European taxonomy of race. Instead, by shifting an analytical scope to the level of *dispositif*, I
shall look at very codifications of raciality in each historical moment with its strategic function and with its ‘urgent need’. In short, the thesis investigates the nexus of knowledge, power, and subjectivity, and, instead of challenging a particular mode of racial subjectification, I will scrutinise each mode of racial subjectification in a given context.

Power-knowledge relations in fact take a crucial role in Foucault’s concept of dispositif. As Foucault clarifies:

The dispositif is … always inscribed in a play of power, but it is also always linked to certain coordinates of knowledge which issue from it but, to an equal degree, condition it. This is what the dispositif consists in: strategies of relations of forces supporting, and supported by, types of knowledge (Foucault 1980: 196, translation modified. See Foucault 1994c: 300).

The last sentence is particularly important for this thesis. For my analysis of the discourses on race and practices of biometric identification, I do not seek to the causality between them. My approach is not to find if the discourse of race and racism, or more broadly ‘racist ideology’, produces a certain set of practices of biometrics. Nor is biometrics to ‘prove’ racial differences. My investigation lies in the middle of the discourses on race and practices of biometric identification that are in the mutual relationship of support and that make the modality of racial government intelligible.

So, for example, as I will examine in the subsequent chapters, the dispositif of race does not solely capture the emergent discursive construction of the idea of race in the context of modern Japan – namely, in the texts of Fukuzawa Yukichi who translated and introduced the concept in the country – or in the context of post-WWII Japan where former colonial subjects were consistently racialised in criminal terms by the
state officials. Nor does it solely rely on colonial practices of biometric identification in the manner of biological anthropology or post-WWII practices of biometric policing. By examining these discursive and non-discursive, and institutionalised, practices in relational terms, and contextualising them in each historical setting, the thesis is designed to present different modalities of racial government in Japan since its imperial period to the present day. To put it schematically, I attempt to capture the systems of rationality in biopolitical racism through analysing a political urgent need that emerges in each historical, as well as geographical, context, the discursive construction of race, and practices of biometric identification.

Conclusion

This chapter discussed Foucault’s historical method, which guides the thesis’s historical investigation of the government of race through biometrics. In particular, I discussed three methodological propositions of Foucault: an archaeological critique of the history of science; a genealogical scrutiny of power, knowledge, and subjectivity; and the concept of dispositif as the locus of analysis. Accordingly, the chapter highlighted the importance of these methodological propositions and explicated how they can be constructively incorporated into a study of the history of biometric identification vis-à-vis that of race and racism.

In the light of Foucault’s historical method, the conventional view of the history of biometrics, which conceptually separates the practices of race from the idea of race, is revealed to be problematic because of its static understanding of identity and identification. This issue is not exclusive to the progressive account of biometrics and racism but, as I showed in Chapter One, is equally prevalent in existing critical studies of racism and biometrics that are oriented towards the critique of white
supremacy. In order to overcome this issue, I proposed that the political deployment of biometric identification must be analysed as a process of making identity, and thereby empowering a form of control, in each historical context: that is to say, biometric identification at the level of racialisation. I also proposed that drawing on Foucault’s concept of dispositif, an historical study should look at both discursive and non-discursive practices of racialisation in order to capture a particular modality of racial government – governing in terms of control-subjectification – in a given historical context. Equipped with Foucault’s historical method, the thesis now turns to my historical investigation of the government of race in modern Japan.
Chapter Three: Inscribing Race

Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects of power. Each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth: that is the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true ...

– Michel Foucault (1980: 131)

... alas, no civilisation has a monopoly on racism.

– Étienne Balibar (2014)

Introduction

In Chapter Two, I explicated three methodological propositions derived from the philosophy of Foucault that inform my historical investigation of racial government in modern Japan. The first proposition is an archaeological critique that suggests concrete historicisation of biometrics in each context without submitting to progressivist accounts of science. The second proposition is a genealogical precaution that challenges a static and fixed assumption of ‘race’ as such and instead emphasises correlative practices of making of race. The third proposition is the notion of dispositif that aims to capture circulations and relations between the discursive construction of race and practices of identification, which are in a mutual relationship in the dispositif of control-subjectification of race. I argued that these methodological propositions allow us to scrutinise the historical relations between modern racism and biometric identification beyond existing problematisations of biometrics as reviewed in Chapter
One. In the light of these methodological propositions, the thesis now turns to my substantive historical analysis of racial government in modern Japan, which proceeds via the following three chapters. This chapter focuses on racial government during Imperial Japan, from the late nineteenth century towards the first half of the twentieth century.

The nineteenth century had witnessed the proliferation of racism whereby racial knowledge was incorporated in, and rationalised, Western colonial conducts across the world. As Ann Laura Stoler states,

In the nineteenth century … race becomes the organizing grammar of an imperial order in which modernity, the civilizing mission and the ‘measure of man’ were framed. And with it, ‘culture’ was harnessed to do more specific political work; not only to mark difference, but to rationalize the hierarchies of privilege and profit, to consolidate the labor regimes of expanding capitalism, to provide the psychological scaffolding for the exploitative structures of colonial rule. (Stoler 1995: 27)

It was a form of modern and biopolitical racism that was rationalised under the social Darwinian theme of degeneracy whereby a colonial and racist order was made possible (Stoler 1995: 31-2).

The idea of modern racism was incorporated by Western imperial powers that articulated the non-European colonial others in the spectrum of evolutionary process. Biopolitical racism under the theme of degeneracy in the colonial context was perhaps nowhere more vividly manifested by the idea of mission civilisatrice, expressed by French Prime Minister Jules François Camille Ferry (1832 – 1893) who made the following (in)famous statement in 1884:
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Gentleman, we must speak more openly and honestly! We must declare openly that the higher races indeed have a right over the lower races. … I repeat that the superior races have a right, because they have a duty. They have the duty to civilize inferior races. (Ferry in Hodge 2008: 791)

As I discussed in Chapter One, such racial subjectification was conducted not solely through the discursive construction of race, but also through correlative scientific practices of biometrics. Biometrics – or the ‘measure of man’ as Stoler puts it above – functioned as a technology of race, which ‘identified’ the superior Western bodies and the inferior non-Western bodies, and which demarcated between the ‘civilised’ and the ‘barbarous’ bodies in a mutually constitutive manner. What emerged in this context was, in short, a white supremacist model of biopolitical racism, which non-white races were articulated as inferior and dangerous to the progress of human races, and in which a form of control-subjectification of race was manifested.

Situating the analytical site in the context of Japan, the initial research question of my historical investigation is as follows: Was biopolitical racism, which emerged in nineteenth-century European colonialism, solely about the problem of white supremacy? Or to put it another way: How, if at all, were the concepts of race and modern racism deployed without the hands of Westerners? This first ground of my investigation is a critical reflection on the politics of the colour line that Du Bois had vividly depicted at the beginning of the twentieth century, an influential problematisation that has also impacted on a series of contemporary scrutiny of racism in global politics (see Chapter One).

There are two historical concurrent movements to be examined in the context of modern Japan. First, Japan was no exception to the global politics of the colour line. By the mid-nineteenth century Japan, like other non-Western countries in Asia and
Africa during earlier years, came to confront the Western domination of both physical and epistemic kinds. On the one hand, facing the Western industrial powers, it resulted in the end of its two-centuries-old foreign policy of (quasi-)national seclusion – known as sakoku – and rendered the country open to the global capitalist market. On the other hand, epistemically, the idea of ‘superior’ Westerners was spread not only by its observed industrial advance but also, and more crucially, by philosophical and scientific knowledge of race and civilisation. Like other non-Western populations, the articulation of its racial inferiority was coded by skin colour whereby white supremacy was constituted.

In particular, Japan, and other East Asian countries such as China, confronted the idea of the so-called ‘yellow peril’ whereby East Asians were articulated as a danger to the biological condition of Western countries.39 Facing the growing modern racist norms since the late nineteenth century, Japan eventually proposed the Racial Equality Proposal in 1919 at the Paris Peace Conference, which sought to challenge the global politics of the colour line and the idea of the ‘yellow peril’. In this regard, modern racism at the global scale was a Japanese race struggle of its own.

In the meantime, however, by the time of the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, Japan was also a growing imperial power which engaged with race thinking in its own colonial context. By the early twentieth century, it had already subjugated and colonised across East Asia – from the establishment of Japanese rule in Taiwan in 1895 to the 1910 Annexation of Korea. These seemingly paradoxical movements then beg the question on the ways in which the co-existence of anti-racism and racism was rendered possible. In order to shed light on the condition for this co-existence, the chapter looks back to the period when the European idea of race and racism was

39 For a more archival analysis of the idea of yellow peril, see John Kuo Wei Tchen and Dylan Yeats (2014).
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translated and introduced in Japan. In particular, the focal point of my analysis of the discourses on race in this context is the work of Fukuzawa Yukichi who contributed not only to the modernisation, or Westernisation, of Japan – for example, through his introduction of liberal thoughts – but also to the development of race thinking in Japan and East Asia since the early years of the Meiji period.

My analysis of Western dominant race thinking and the translation of the idea of race and racism in the context of East Asia will constitute the first two sections of this chapter. The third section then moves on to an analysis of the role of biometrics during Japanese colonialism. As I discussed in Chapter One, biometrics during the period of imperialism has been criticised predominantly in terms of white supremacy in existing historical accounts: from Broca’s craniology to Galton’s ‘degenerate’ fingerprints, the scientific knowledge of bodies was incorporated into the rationalisation of European colonialism. Scientific racism was understood as the problem of ‘whiteness’. In this sense, the Japanese anti-racist sentiment against the global politics of the colour line seems to remark its unequivocal negation of the pseudo-scientificity of nineteenth-century European racial sciences. However, little has been discussed in studies of race and racism about the circulation of scientific racism, and more concretely, the translation of scientific methods of knowing race, beyond European colonialism. In the third section, I will investigate the political deployment of biometric identification in the context of Japanese colonialism. In particular, I will analyse extensive studies of fingerprints, conducted in the 1920s and 1930s, led by Furuhata Tanemoto, a prominent scientist in the field of medical jurisprudence in the early and mid-twentieth century, who developed what he called shimon keisū (‘fingerprint index’) to identify racial and hereditary differences.
Through examination of the discourses on race and institutionalised practices of biometric identification during Imperial Japan, the chapter attempts to capture the dispositif of control-subjectification of race and to articulate racial government that is particular to this geographical and historical context.

**Anti-racism I: Japan’s race struggle against the ‘yellow peril’**

*The global politics of the colour line: Du Bois and Japan*

As already noted in Chapter One, Du Bois conceptualised race and racism in terms of the colour line, which is for him ‘the problem of the twentieth century’ (Du Bois 2007: 15, see also 208). Focusing on the problem of the colour line and white supremacy, Du Bois’s concerns were not limited to Pan-Africanism or the ‘Negro problem’. He also projected it onto the global scale in which the coloured as a whole was put under the white subjugation including the Asian context.

Du Bois (2005) wrote a number of articles on Asia including Japan, the country he believed to bring the end of white supremacy. He became explicitly impassioned with the rise of the Japanese empire in the first half of twentieth century. In particular, he praised the rise of the power of the coloured nation in the aftermath of Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War. In 1906, for example, Du Bois expressed the Japanese victory as the beginning of the end of the global politics of the colour line:

> For the first time in a thousand years a great white nation has measured arms with a coloured nation and has been found wanting. The Russo-Japanese war has marked epoch. The magic of the word ‘white’ is already broken, and the Color Line in civilization has been crossed in modern times as it was in the great past. The awaking of the yellow races is certain. That the awakening of
the brown and black races will follow in time, no prejudiced student of history can doubt. (Du Bois 2005: 34)

Du Bois continuously expressed his admiration for Japan in a number of his articles throughout this period, proclaiming that Japan is “hammering on the door of Justice” in the world dominated by “the culture of white folk” (Du Bois 1917: 444-5). Elsewhere, Du Bois claimed that in the nineteenth century, Japan “saved the world from slavery to Europe” (Du Bois 2005: 78).

Du Bois’s enduring passion towards the rise of the coloured nation had sometimes led him to cancel out, or even justify, its colonial aggression in East Asia. While he acknowledged violent and brutal conducts of the Japanese empire in respect of its neighbours, Du Bois also defended these conducts, explaining them as inevitable in order to protect against the invasion by ‘white’ nations. In the light of the Second Shino-Japanese War that broke out in 1937, Du Bois stated: “Unless … Japan took advantage of this breathing spell and made herself dominant in China she would surrender China eventually to Europe” (Du Bois 2005: 89). “Japan, therefore, fought Europe by attacking China, and that is the reason of the present war” (Du Bois 2005: 89). He continued:

The only excuse for war is war. It is to escape annihilation and subjection and the nameless slavery of Western Europe that Japan has gone into a horrible and bloody carnage with her own cousin; but the cause and the blame of this war lies on England, and France, and America; on Germany and Italy; on all those white nations, which for a hundred years and more, have by blood and rapine forced their rule upon colored nations. (Du Bois 2005: 90)
For Du Bois, Japanese aggression and colonialism in East Asia is therefore perceived as necessary in order to ‘save the world’ from white supremacy and to overcome the global problem of the colour line.40

The 1919 Racial Equality Proposal

In one sense, Japan was in fact active in trying to abolish the colour line in accordance with Du Bois’s hope. In the early twentieth century, confronting the malady of the global politics of the colour line, Japan became active in diplomatic efforts to promote anti-racism in the arena of international relations. Traditionally, the emergence of anti-racism in international relations is often traced back to the aftermath of World War II, which is manifested in a series of the UNESCO statements since 1950 that officially denounced the biological ‘facts’ of race (Balibar 2014; Bernasconi 2012: 211; Bonnett 2000: 69; Shilliam 2013: 153; see also Chapter Four).41 However, in studies of race and racism, little has been discussed about an earlier proposal against racism in international relations that was put forward by Japan at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. The proposal known as the Racial Equality Proposal did not, unlike the post-WWII UNESCO statements, achieve international unanimous consensus – it was in fact eventually overturned by U.S. President Woodrow Wilson at the conference – but it is nevertheless worth noting as an earlier manifestation of anti-racism in international relations and also as critical scrutiny of the conceptualisation of race and racism during the Japanese empire.

40 It should be noted, however, that Du Bois did not thoroughly justify the imperial conducts of Japan. At times – especially in the aftermath of World War II – he clearly recognised the atrocity of the Japanese empire. Yet, for him Japan’s atrocity was rather plagued by a tragedy in which “Japan learned Western ways too soon and too well, and turned from Asia to Europe”, and “chose to apply Western imperialism to her domination of the East, and Western profit-making replaced Eastern idealism” (Du Bois 2005: 61).

41 My claim here is exclusively about the emergence of anti-racism in international relations in the traditional sense, not the emergence of anti-racist thoughts and acts in general.
In the aftermath of World War I, Japan attended the Paris Peace Conference as one of five great powers and as the only non-Western country. At the conference, it advanced the Racial Equality Proposal to verbalise the problem of racism in international politics and to promote racial equality in the forthcoming League of Nations. The proposal stated:

The equality of nations being a basic principle of the League of Nations, the High Contracting Parties agree to accord as soon as possible, to all alien nationals of States members of the League equal and just treatment in every respect, making no distinction, either in law or in fact, on account of their race or nationality. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 1919: 446; see also Shimazu 1998: 20).

As clearly stated here, the proposal was to promote a universal principle for racial equality in the age of the global politics of the colour line. At the same time, the proposal also reflected on a particular aspect of the colour line that Japan had struggled with. It reflected on Japan’s confrontation against the idea of the ‘yellow peril’, that is, anti-Asian hysteria notably in the United States where it was instigated by racial theorists such as Madison Grant and Lothrop Stoddard (Mullen and Watson in Du Bois 2005: xi).

The idea of the ‘yellow peril’ had severe negative impacts on the Asian immigrant population in the United States, especially the Chinese and Japanese in California. Its impact emerged as early as the late nineteenth century where the idea was manifested in the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882. In the early twentieth century, there was also the proliferation of anti-Japanese, and more broadly anti-East Asian, immigrant

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42 The proposal was presented on 13 February 1919. The diplomatic documents published by Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (1919) include a number of correspondences around the Racial Equality Proposal, both before and after its eventual overturn. Naoko Shimazu (1998) offers various interpretations on the proposal including reasons and contexts behind it.
sentiments, which led to the introduction of exclusionary practices. A series of restrictive measures against the Japanese immigrant population were introduced including the 1913 California Alien Land Law – which limited leases of agricultural land to maximum terms of three years for the Japanese immigrant population (Shimazu 1998: 76). With regard to its own historical background, the Racial Equality Proposal was also seen as “to resolve the long-standing Japanese immigration problems in the United States and the British Dominions” (Shimazu 1998: 5).

In one sense, the Racial Equality Proposal, as well as the rise of Japan in the early twentieth century in general, may signal a progressive move in the history of racism. Despite the fact that the proposal was overturned, it was nevertheless an attempt to de-racialise the international political structure of that time, either challenging the ‘yellow peril’ in particular or promoting a universal principle of racial equality across the world. However, rather than taking this progressive view that Du Bois seems to have followed, what is important for a critical scrutiny of race and racism in the light of the proposal here is the conditions in which the simultaneous existence of anti-racism and colonialism became possible. An attentive reader would note that the proposal was inherently a paradoxical manifestation of anti-racism: while the proposal clearly pictured the struggle against the global inequality of the colour line, by the time of the Paris Peace Conference, the Japanese empire had heavily engaged with imperial conducts in East Asia for decades including the subjugation of Korea and Taiwan, as well as other islands in East Asia. This paradoxical relationship between the Japanese proposal against racism and its imperial conducts was clearly delineated in Former Prime Minister Ōkuma Shigenobu’s book Jinshu mondai (‘Race Problem’), published immediately after the overturn of the proposal at the Paris Peace Conference.
Ōkuma Shigenobu on ‘Race Problem’

Marquis Ōkuma Shigenobu (1838 – 1922) was a two-time Prime Minister of Japan – for a brief period in 1898 and as a wartime Prime Minister between 1914 and 1916 – and is also known as the founder of Tokyo Senmon Gakkō in 1882 (a predecessor of Waseda University). A few months after the overturn of the Racial Equality Proposal in 1919, Ōkuma published a book entitled Jinshu mondai (‘Race Problem’) in a series of Sekai kaizō sōsho (‘The World Reconstruction’). In its Preface, Ōkuma explicitly expressed his disappointment in the decision at the Paris Peace Conference and persisted for the abolishment of racism in the League of Nations. His advocacy of anti-racism was also seen in his statement where he went as far as to suggest that Japan should leave the League of Nations if the Racial Equality Proposal were to be rejected (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 1919: 495-6).

In Jinshu mondai, Ōkuma maintained a tenacious anti-racist position and claimed that the discrimination and classification of races by mere physiological features, namely skin colour, are absurd: “It is clear for all people that to say that civilisation [white race] belongs to white race while barbarism [yaban] belongs to coloured races is without reason; it is not true” (Ōkuma 1919: 6). Like Du Bois’s call for anti-racism, Ōkuma saw an urgent need for, and demands to overcome, the ‘race problem’ in international relations.

However, Ōkuma, who had been involved in the imperial government since the late nineteenth century, was not against racial thinking as a whole: his critique of racism was exclusively about racial coding based on the colour line. In fact, Ōkuma explained that ‘racial equality’ was not to seek racial equality as such. He stated:

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43 For further discussion on Ōkuma’s involvement in the Paris Peace Conference, see Shimazu (1998: chapter 2).
I am not someone who inconsiderately demands and lapses into the malady of ‘evil equality’ [aku byōdō]. Nor do I purely believe or adhere the fundamental concept of racial equality. … Who could conclude that Taiwanese aborigines [seiban] share the same stage of civilisation as the Western nationals? Who could approve that the cannibal tribe Atayal of the South Seas shares the same stage of civilisation as our Japanese nationals? … I do not judge or discriminate but from the view of justice respecting one’s life there has to be discrimination between them. I approve this discrimination. (Ōkuma 1919: 4-6, see also 49-50)

Ōkuma also made a similar claim in Jinshu mondai more explicitly in terms of the inevitable subordination of some races: he claimed that people like the Chinese were not yet well-equipped for the civilisation process, and thus, we must help them (Ōkuma 1919: 9). In other words, in Ōkuma’s explanation for the Racial Equality Proposal, an ‘unreasonable’ form of racism – i.e., one that is solely based on skin colour – must be eradicated. Yet, a more ‘reasonable’ form of racism should be maintained for an overall civilisation progress, which was pronounced to be necessary to protect the biological existence of human races.

In short, what the 1919 Racial Equality Proposal exhibits is not an exemplar of anti-racism in the age of the global politics of the colour line but rather the problematic of the relations between racism and anti-racism. It exhibits the limits of the knowledge of race, as well as the consequential mechanisms of racism, that was strictly configured in terms of the colour line. Concurrently, it also exemplifies a transformation of the idea of race in which the multiplication of racism was made possible.
Under the Japanese discourse of anti-racism, a singular model of Euro/Western-centric racism – that is, singularly configured in the nineteenth-century European taxonomy of race – was reconfigured and rendered into a more ‘reasonable’ or more ‘rationalised’ form of racism whereby the idea of race was no longer solely constituted by physiological features but reconstituted through elements of raciality such as the stage of civilisation. This should not be understood as a mere replication of the same model of racism in a new geographical context but as a transformation in which the ways in which race was defined changed. Unlike a succinct correlation between race and civilisation in the European model, race at this point was divorced from the notion of civilisation, which nevertheless reconstituted and defined the former.

In the next section, I will explicate this problematic of the relations between racism and anti-racism and the limits and transformation of the knowledge of race through an analysis of the emergence of the idea of race in late nineteenth-century Japan when the Eurocentric idea of race was not simply translated but also localised and appropriated in relation to security concerns in its own spatio-temporal matrix.

**Translating race and racism in Meiji Japan: Fukuzawa Yukichi**

*Security and civilisation: Japan’s survival in the age of Western imperialism*

The European concept of race and racism was initially introduced in the texts of Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835 – 1901) who did not only translate the concept but also appropriated and localised it in the context of East Asia. Fukuzawa was arguably one of the most influential writers in the second half of the nineteenth century who played
a leading role in introducing the Western concept of civilisation and contributed to the modernisation and liberalisation process in Japan. He is, as historian Albert M. Craig describes, “viewed by scholars as the greatest thinker of modern Japan. Fukuzawa was not the only scholar of his era to write of ‘civilization’, but he was the first, and the most prolific, and the most widely read” (Craig 2009: 2). Since the 1860s until his death, Fukuzawa had written a great number of books where he introduced political, economic, and social systems of the Western countries, and interrogated them into the context of Japan.\textsuperscript{44} Fukuzawa compiled various dimensions of Western countries including systems of government, taxation, foreign affairs, military, education, newspapers, hospitals and others (for example, Fukuzawa 1866), and contributed to the popularisation of modern liberal thought in Japan (Tanaka 1993: 27).\textsuperscript{45} Among various dimensions of the West, Fukuzawa continuously emphasised the Western concept of ‘civilisation’ (bunmei) – or ‘civilisation and enlightenment’ (bunmei kaika) – throughout his writings, which was most rigorously elaborated in his 1875 book \textit{Bunmei ron no gairyaku} (An Outline of a Theory of Civilisation in English translation; hereafter the \textit{Outline}) (Fukuzawa 1875/2008).\textsuperscript{46}

During the last years of the Edo period (1603 – 1868) under the rule of the Tokugawa shogunate, Fukuzawa travelled to the United States and Europe as a member of a delegation sent by the shogunate. For Fukuzawa, these travel

\textsuperscript{44} For the reference of Fukuzawa’s works, I refer to the original texts where available. The original books of Fukuzawa can be found in the digital image at the Digital Gallery of Keio University (available at \url{http://project.lib.keio.ac.jp/dg_kul/fukuzawa_tbl.php}, retrieved on 20 July 2015). For the printed version, most of his books cited in this thesis, excluding his short articles and correspondences, can be also found in the 21 volumes of \textit{Fukuzawa Yukichi zenshū} (Fukuzawa 1958-1964).

\textsuperscript{45} Fukuzawa’s introduction of the West first emerged in \textit{Seiyō jijyō} (‘Conditions in the West’), which was initially published in 1866 and consists of ten volumes in total. It became a bestseller of that time – sold more than 250,000 copies, which is an unprecedented number at that time (Blacker in Fukuzawa 1966: x).

\textsuperscript{46} Page numbers of both the original work and the English translation of Fukuzawa’s \textit{Outline} are referenced in the order of the Japanese original followed by the English translation.
experiences did not only provide an opportunity for him to write about the West. Witnessing the social, political, and technological advancements in the West and its imperial powers across the world, Fukuzawa also became seriously concerned with the security of Japan. Takenori Inoki describes Fukuzawa’s confrontation with the West in the 1860s as follows:

These experiences not only exposed him to Western society and ways of life, but also to the vitality and superior development of Western civilization. The trips also enabled him to perceive directly from his own observations, and not just written material, a dangerous scenario in which Japan might share the miserable conditions of those Asian countries which had become colonies for the West. He saw the fate that awaited any country that lost its independence, and this knowledge eventually provided a basis for his thought. (Inoki in Fukuzawa 2008: xv)

It should be noted that this was not the first time that Japan confronted Western powers. In the 1850s, Japan had already confronted Western powers at the arrival of the ‘Black Ships’ (kuro bune), led by Commodore Matthew Perry, which effectively resulted in the end of the Japanese two-centuries-old foreign policy of (quasi-)national seclusion – commonly known as ‘sakoku’.

The Perry expedition led to the signing of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Peace and Amity (Nichi-bei washin jyōyaku), which rendered the country open to the global, or better, Western, capitalist market. Yet, what was noteworthy in Fukuzawa’s exposition of Western powers was that he did not reduce the concept of national security to a measure of material force such as the

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47 The policy of sakoku during the Edo period should be understood not as complete seclusion. During the period of the sakoku policy, Japan’s seclusion was hardly complete and the country had maintained foreign relations mainly with the Dutch and the Chinese in Nagasaki prefecture.
‘Black Ships’. Instead, he argued that national security would ultimately depend on understanding the Western concept of civilisation.

Fukuzawa believed that military and industrial advancements alone would not suffice to secure Japan but it was the Western concept of civilisation that was essential for the survival of the country in the age of imperialism. Or to put it another way, military force was for Fukuzawa just one manifestation of Western civilisation. “He firmly believed that the future direction of the new Japan would be determined by how the Japanese understood Western civilization, and the means by which they maintained balance while adopting it” (Inoki in Fukuzawa 2008: xiii). This view was clearly expressed in the volume six of the Outline where he discussed national independence:

We must admit that the civilisation of Japan is behind the civilisation of the West. When there are levels of progress in civilisation, it is rational [ri] for the advanced to control the backward and the backward to be controlled by the advanced. (Fukuzawa 1875 (vol. 6): 1/2008: 225)

For Fukuzawa, as clearly delineated here, Western imperial conduct across the world in the nineteenth century was hardly seen as irrational, or to put it crudely, wrong. Instead, it was seen as rational for countries with a higher level of civilisation to control those who are in the midst of the process or yet to be civilised. In other words, instead of challenging or resisting its logic, Western civilisation was for him conceived as the ‘natural law’, as it were, of global politics of that time. Accordingly, in order to secure Japanese independence from Western powers that had colonised

48 It should be noted that Fukuzawa occasionally criticised the oppressive nature of Western powers in explicit terms in the chapter (Fukuzawa 1875 (vol. 6)). However, he nevertheless maintains his admiration for Western civilisation not only in the Outline but also in other books.
many non-Western countries during the nineteenth century, Fukuzawa emphasised that it was fundamental for Japan to learn and adopt Western civilisation.

Commentators such as Craig (2009) and Inoki (in Fukuzawa 2008) have highlighted the importance of the Western concept of civilisation in Fukuzawa’s texts – not only in the Outline, but also in other writings (which I will discuss later in this section). Fukuzawa’s introduction and theorisation of civilisation needs greater attention here. The discourse of civilisation in the work of Fukuzawa was not just about the introduction of an abstract idea called ‘civilisation’; it was also introduced in terms of concrete political technologies in which civilisation could be measured and fostered. I will now turn to a closer analysis of Fukuzawa’s texts in this latter sense where his introduction of civilisation is revealed to be the emergence of what may be called population thinking and of political technologies of the population in the country, which appear to resemble Foucault’s articulation of biopolitics. This, as the section proceeds, can also delineate the relations between biopolitics and racism in the context of modern Japan.

‘The spirit of the people’: Economy, statistics, and population

The Western concept of civilisation plays a crucial role in Fukuzawa’s texts on Japan’s security in the age of Western imperialism. In the Preface of the Outline, Fukuzawa defined civilisation as follows:

A theory of civilisation concerns the development of the human spirit. Its import does not lie in discussing the spiritual development [seishin hattatsu] of the individual, but the spiritual development of the people of the whole country [tenka shūjin]. Therefore, a theory of civilisation can be termed a theory of the development of the people’s mind [shūshin]. (Fukuzawa 1875 (vol. 1): 1/2008: 1)
This opening statement of the *Outline* depicts the underlying principle of Fukuzawa’s theorisation of civilisation and his explication of what Japan’s urgent security issue is under the global dominance of Western powers. For Fukuzawa, civilisation should not be conceptualised solely and narrowly in terms of social, political, or technological advancements – which he at times characterised as ‘outward appearance’ [*gaikei*] (for example, Fukuzawa 1875 (vol. 6): 36/2008: 249). Instead, civilisation was essentially about the development of spirit at the level of the people, that is to say, at the level of the *collective body of a country*. In fact, Fukuzawa emphasised throughout the *Outline* that the constitution of the people as a collective body was an indicator of civilisation, and thus, fundamental for the progress of civilisation.

In the chapter ‘The Essence of Civilisation’ [*Bunmei no honshi wo ronzu*], for example, Fukuzawa first differentiated civilisation in terms of knowledge and virtue from civilisation in materialistic terms:

> The meaning of civilisation can be understood in both a broad and a narrow sense. In the narrow sense, civilisation means the increase of what man consumes and of the superficial trappings added on to daily necessities. In its broad sense, civilisation means not only comfort in daily necessities but also refining of knowledge [*chi*] and the cultivation of virtue [*toku*] so as to elevate human life to a higher plane. (Fukuzawa 1875 (vol. 1): 59-60/2008: 45)

For Fukuzawa, it was the latter’s ‘broad sense’ – that is, civilisation in terms of ‘knowledge and virtue’ [*chi-toku*] – that matters. How then can this be achieved? This is where Fukuzawa emphasised the fundamental role of the development of the collective, or social, body. Fukuzawa argued:

> The human race is by nature a social animal. When in isolation, they cannot develop their innate talents and intelligence. The community of the family
does not exhaust the possibilities of society. The more society there is, the more people meet one another; the more human relationships broaden and their laws evolve, so much the more will human nature become civilised and human intelligence develop. (Fukuzawa 1875 (vol. 1): 60/2008: 45)

Fukuzawa drew this point from an etymological analysis of the English term ‘civilisation’. He traced the term to the Latin ‘civitas’, which he defined its meaning as ‘kuni’ (‘country’) (Fukuzawa 1875 (vol. 1): 60/2008: 45-6). His point here was to show that the notion of civilisation is in essence about the development of human companionship [ningen kōsai]: it is about the development of society or the social body. This etymological analysis also led him to differentiate civilisation from savagery and lawlessness: he claimed that civilisation is the concept of forming a unified national system (ikkoku no taisei), which must overcome the savage state of isolation (Fukuzawa 1875 (vol. 1): 60/2008: 46).

Fukuzawa’s theorisation of civilisation accordingly correlated with the construction of the people as a unity. In the age of Western imperialism, what Fukuzawa urged Japan to develop for its defence was the unification of a country not at the level of elites or government but at the level of the social body. In the meantime, the relationship between the social body and ‘knowledge and virtue’ [chitoku] was further elaborated in the second volume of the Outline where Fukuzawa not only emphasised the knowledge and virtue of the social body, but also introduced the governmental techniques of knowing and controlling the population as a whole, which may be called an apparatus of population thinking.

In the chapter ‘The Knowledge and Virtue of the People of a Country’ (Ikkoku jinmin no chitoku wo ronzu), Fukuzawa first explained that civilisation could not be measured or achieved by the knowledge and virtue of one or few elites but at the level
of the collective body. “Civilisation”, argued Fukuzawa, “should not be discussed in terms of an individual but only in terms of the whole country” (Fukuzawa 1875 (vol. 2): 1/2008: 59). It is about the development of the spirit, or ‘ethos’ (kifū), of the people where we can determine the stage of civilisation (Fukuzawa 1875 (vol. 2): 1/2008: 59), and thus where the national defence against Western imperialism can be achieved.

Fukuzawa’s emphasis on the knowledge and virtue of the people, however, was not simply about educating the entire Japanese population – as the title of his another seminal work Gakumon no susume (‘An Encouragement of Learning’) (Fukuzawa and Obata 1872) seems to suggest. After all, Fukuzawa proclaimed that the level of the knowledge and virtue of the people cannot be easily seen or heard, and thus, it cannot be easily measured (Fukuzawa 1875 (vol.2): 2/2008: 60). At the same time, Fukuzawa (1875 (vol. 2): 4-7/2008: 61-3) also argued that the analysis of elites – which he drew from examples of feudal lords – cannot determine the spirit of the people. This is not only because their figure would not represent the collective body, but also because their own life is prone to numerous changes and there is no single characteristic that can determine their whole life.

In order to make the national body intelligible, and to facilitate the civilisation progress thereby, Fukuzawa urged Japan to develop a set of techniques, or an apparatus, of knowing and regulating the people as a unity, and to deploy these techniques throughout society. He introduced a method to capture the spirit of the people of the country as a whole and to compare it over a period of time, which would make it possible to draw conclusions on the basis of empirical observation (Fukuzawa 1875 (vol. 2): 7-8/2008: 63). Fukuzawa drew a proposed method from the work of the English historian Henry Thomas Buckle. Buckle’s History of Civilisation, Fukuzawa
(1875 (vol. 2): 8-9/2008: 64) argued, demonstrates that we can determine a particular pattern, or rule (kisoku), in society when an analysis is conducted at the level of the ‘heart of a country’ (ikkoku no jinshin) as a unified body. Fukuzawa (1875 (vol. 2): 9/2008: 64) showed this through examples of crime and suicide:

A definite pattern cannot be found in it [i.e., crime] from studying the actions of one person, but as long as the conditions within a country remain constant, the number of criminals can be predicted. Take the case of murders. Many murders result from momentary passion, so it cannot be anticipated in advance who will murder whom at what time and place. However, the total number of murders in France can be predicted to be more or less the same every year, and even the kinds of weapons used will not be different from one year to another. (Fukuzawa 1875 (vol. 2): 8-9/2008: 64)

The same can be said, Fukuzawa (1875 (vol. 2): 9/2008: 64-5) continued, of the phenomenon of suicide: despite the way in which suicide is thought to be based on an individual’s own decision, there is a clear pattern in the number of suicides at the population level (cf. Durkheim 2005).

Fukuzawa also extended this to the field of economy where he highlighted the importance of the production of knowledge at the societal level. He argued that to buy or not to buy a product is entirely the buyer’s prerogative, and thus, cannot be comprehended by a merchant. But the production of knowledge of the collective body would allow us to find a certain pattern in everyday trade and to establish a more effective economic arrangement, which would prevent unnecessary loss by unsalable items (Fukuzawa 1875 (vol. 2): 9-10/2008: 65). Here, Fukuzawa’s emphasis on economy should not be understood narrowly in terms of trade itself. What matters for the knowledge of the collective body is economy in a broad sense of organising
individuals, goods, and wealth in a similar line to Foucault’s formulation (see my discussion on liberal governmentality in Chapter One).

In short, what Fukuzawa introduced and urged Japan to develop under the theorisation of civilisation is the Western concept of statistics: “Hence, probable patterns within a country cannot be discerned from one event or one thing. Actual conditions can only be determined by taking a broad sampling and making minute comparisons. This method is called statistics in the West” (Fukuzawa 1875 (vol. 2): 10-1/2008: 65). The statistical method should be deployed throughout society, ranging from economy to demography:

If we chart the figures for land area and population, the rise and fall of the price of commodities and wage rates, and the number of the married, the living, the sick, and those who die, and so on, the general conditions of a society will become clear at a glance, even things one ordinarily cannot calculate. (Fukuzawa 1875 (vol. 2): 11/2008: 65-6)

This is, Fukuzawa (1875 (vol. 2): 11/2008: 66) proclaimed, the problem of Japan’s civilisation, and thus for its security against Western powers. What was crucial for the future security of Japan lay in the development of a set of technologies or an apparatus of population thinking that makes the production of the knowledge of the collective body possible and that simultaneously empowers the state’s act of monitoring and controlling the population.

With respect to Fukuzawa’s introduction of civilisation in terms of an apparatus of population thinking, his theory of civilisation, I would suggest, emerges not simply as the conceptual introduction of civilisation but also as the concrete political and institutional arrangement to be deployed. It is the latter where Fukuzawa’s writing appears to be indicative of the emergence of biopolitics that Foucault articulated in
the context of late eighteenth-century Europe. Yet, quite remarkably, the role of security in the context of nineteenth-century Japan appears to have a different twist from earlier biopolitics in Europe.49

As I discussed earlier in this thesis (see Introduction and Chapter One), Foucault articulated the role of security in eighteenth-century Europe, which played an inextricable role in the constitution of biopolitics. The biopolitical theme of making life live was coupled with security practices of preventing its internal dangers in the manner of social Darwinism. In the context of Japan, however, the discourse of security also took place in the arena of dominant Western imperialism. In this particular historical and geographical context, population thinking became not so much about the prevention of internal dangers, but more profoundly about security against, or better in relation to, Western powers. It was not strictly speaking ‘against’ because while the discourse of security was associated with potential Western colonisation of Japan, population thinking was introduced in accordance with Western civilisation. Namely, it was introduced as a progressive political thought and an institutional arrangement that would foster Japanese civilisation, and thus defend against Western colonialism. In the global context of nineteenth-century Western imperialism, an apparatus of population thinking itself emerged as a security measure; an apparatus of population thinking as to preserve Japan’s independence.

Moreover, the discourse of security in late nineteenth-century Japan shows that it was not reducible to a dichotomous relation between security and insecurity (i.e., between Japan and the West). Concerning security in relation to Western norms, there

49 Here, I am particularly concerned with the role of the discourse of security in the emergence of population thinking in Japan, which, as I will proceed in the next section, becomes constitutive of the condition of racism in Japan, rather than actual security practices.
also emerged the third dimension of security where a new model of racism towards other Asians was rendered possible.

*From race to civilisation: A birth of ‘race without race’ in the late nineteenth century*

Fukuzawa’s urgent call for the development of ‘the spirit of the people’ in his theorisation of civilisation was the condition of possibility for racism in East Asia. His theorisation of civilisation empowered and rationalised a unique model of racism beyond the European taxonomy of race. As well as being known as the key figure in introducing the concept of civilisation, Fukuzawa is also widely acknowledged as having popularised the idea of ‘race’ (*jinshu*) through his writings on civilisation (Morris-Suzuki 1998b: 85; Sakamoto 1996; 2004). Prior to the *Outline*, Fukuzawa introduced the concept of race in two books during 1869.

The first of these is *Shōchū bankoku ichiran* (‘Pocket Almanac of the World’, hereafter the *Almanac*), which is one of the earliest, if not the earliest, discourses on scientific racism in Japan. Following his other books during this period, the *Almanac* is based on Fukuzawa’s translation of existing texts in English available at that time. Overall, the *Almanac* (1869b) is a book that provides geographical information of the world: it introduced five continents with a hand-written map of the world and some detailed accounts of Western countries including their population size, territory, capital, language, currency, and others. In addition to geographical

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50 The chronological order should be corrected here. Tessa Morris-Suzuki (1998b: 85) claims that Fukuzawa’s *Sekai kunizukushi* (1869a), which was published few months after *Shōchū bankoku ichiran* (1869b), as the first representation of the idea of race. However, Fukuzawa’s discussion on the idea of race in *Sekai kunizukushi* is mostly the replication of his earlier discussion in *Shōchū bankoku ichiran*.

51 Four English texts are acknowledged at the end of its Preface (Fukuzawa 1869b: 3).
information, the Almanac introduced the European taxonomy of race, or what he calls a ‘theory of race’ (jinshu no ron) (Fukuzawa 1869b: 5).

Fukuzawa’s theory of race is heavily influenced by the European discourse of scientific racism: he introduced five racial categories – “hakutetsu jinshu” (‘white race’ or more precisely ‘white wise race’), “ōshoku jinshu” (‘yellow race’), “sekishoku jinshu” (‘red race’), “kokushoku jinshu” (‘black race’), and “chashoku jinshu” (‘brown race’) (Fukuzawa 1869b: 5-8). Along with physiological descriptions of each race, Fukuzawa, as with European racial scientists in earlier years, theorised the idea of race in terms of the liberal idea of civilisation. For example, he asserted: “the white race possesses a temperament to reach the highest stage of civilisation. [...] [Civilisation] progress is severely behind among the yellow race including China. [...] The black race has not yet known civilisation” (Fukuzawa 1869b: 6-8).

He further classified the level of civilisation into four progressive stages: “konton” (‘chaos’), “banya” (‘barbarism’ or ‘savagery’), “mikai” (‘uncivilised’), and “bunmei kaika” (‘civilisation and enlightenment’). He accordingly classified as follows: Central Africa and Australian Aborigines in the stage of ‘chaos’; Mongolia, Arabia, and North Africa in the stage of ‘barbarism’; China, Turkey, and Persia in the stage of the ‘uncivilised’; and North America and Western Europe in the stage of ‘civilisation and enlightenment’ (Fukuzawa 1869b: 9-11).

In the subsequent section entitled ‘A difference between barbarism and civilisation’ (Banya bunmei no betsu), Fukuzawa further elaborated the concept of civilisation with concrete examples. His measurement of the concept of civilisation included eating habits – for example, insect eater and cannibalism as the indicator of the stage of ‘chaos’ – literacy, lawlessness, the discrimination of women, the

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52 The term ‘ban-ya’ is hardly used in contemporary Japanese. It is more commonly used today in its reverse form, ‘ya-ban,’ to denote ‘barbarous’.
development of agriculture, technological development, urbanisation, and others (Fukuzawa 1869b: 8-11). In particular, civilisation, in his account, concerned the development of the individual belonging to the state and their geographical settlement. The nomadic way of life was conversely articulated as an indicator of barbarism: nomadism, vagrancy, and wandering were, he argued, one of the major burdens for the civilisation process of the state. Fukuzawa wrote: “barbarism is about those who do not often have a permanent home to live but migrate to seek food [whereas] civilisation is to reside in a regular and secure home” (Fukuzawa 1869b: 8).

Retrospectively, we can read Fukuzawa’s point here in relation to his emphasis on the knowledge of the people in the Outline that I discussed in the previous subsections: nomadism is not just a indicator of barbarism but also a great hindrance of population thinking, and thus, of civilisation.

A few months later, Fukuzawa’s discussion on civilisation in the Almanac was almost replicated in the sixth volume of Sekai kunizukushi (‘All the Countries of the World, for Children Written in Verse’) (1869a), which is entitled ‘Chirigaku no sōron’ (‘The General Theory of Geography’). The book was widely circulated across the country and is even sometimes regarded as “the most popular among all Fukuzawa’s works”.

In the volume, Fukuzawa discussed three types of geography: ‘astronomical geography’, ‘physical geography’ and ‘political geography’, which Fukuzawa translates as ‘human geography’ or ‘human geoscience’ (ningen no chigaku) (Fukuzawa 1869a: 1). In the third section on ‘political geography’, Fukuzawa (1869a: 13-22) repeated his earlier discussion of the stages of civilisation in the Almanac including his distinction between civilisation and barbarism. There are, however, some slight yet noticeable modifications. First, while the individual

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53 See Digital Gallery of Keio University Library (project.lib.keio.ac.jp/dg_kul/fukuzawa_title.php?id=34, retrieved 16 May 2014).
affiliation to the state was again described as an element of civilisation, it was not merely about a geographical settlement, but about “being content with ‘national business or industry’ (kokumin gyō)” (Fukuzawa 1869a: 17). This aspect can be read in the line of Fukuzawa’s emphasis on the development of the national unity in the Outline discussed above. Second, Fukuzawa (1869a: 16) now introduced the category of ‘hankai’ (‘semi-civilised’) as equivalent to what was previously categorised as ‘mikai’ (‘uncivilised’), the category that he allocated Asian races. Third, perhaps most notably among his modifications, Fukuzawa now gave less emphasis to skin colour as a marker of race. In fact, while he still referred to five difference races, he did not refer to skin colour in his diagnosis of the stage of civilisation as he did in the Almanac. Fukuzawa’s later theorisation of race gave greater emphasis to sociocultural elements than the biological marker of skin colour although the biologist and evolutionist tone of his voice still remained in his discussion of civilisation (Fukuzawa 1869a: 14-7).

Despite these modifications, nevertheless, these early discourses on race and racism illustrate the translation of nineteenth-century European race thinking into Japan. At this stage, European norms of modern racism were seamlessly translated whereby the racial superiority of white was generalised and adopted outside the context of the origin rather than being resisted. It was a seamless translation in part due to the absence of discussion on Japan in Fukuzawa’s treatment of race and racism in the 1869 books. Throughout Fukuzawa’s discussion on the taxonomy of race and the stages of civilisation in the Almanac, nowhere did he mention Japan or interpellate the country into the discourse of race and civilisation.  

Craig interprets this as

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54 It is arguable that there was a significant political pressure during the early years of the Meiji period towards writing against Japan. For example, Kato Hiroyuki, another key scholar who contributed to the introduction of Western thoughts in Japan during the same period,
Fukuzawa’s own omission: tracing the original texts that were thought to have been translated by Fukuzawa for writing the *Almanac*, Craig (2009: 46-9) indicates that Japan was in fact included in the taxonomy of race and the discourse of civilisation in the original English texts in a similar manner to other Asian races such as China.\textsuperscript{55} Even in *Sekai kunizukushi* where Fukuzawa did mention Japan, he hardly related it to the European taxonomy of race that would inevitably establish the biological inferiority of the Japanese by the colour line and would racially homogenise the Japanese into a broad category of the ‘yellow race’. With the absence of discussion of Japan in racial terms, the European discourse of race and that of civilisation were, during these early years of the Meiji period, quite seamlessly translated into the context of developing Japanese modern state.

Fukuzawa’s 1869 books did not – with or without his intention of omission – confront the location of Japan since the entire discussion on race and civilisation was carried on in the third person. Yet, the confrontation was eventually inevitable for Fukuzawa who was not only a committed follower of European theories including the theory of race – that would have subordinated its own race to the European domination – but also equally passionate about the modernising and liberalising process of Japan. It was in the *Outline* where Fukuzawa fully interrogated Japanese civilisation in relation to the European theory of race.

The *Outline* did not only introduce the Western conception of civilisation, but also investigated for the first time the concept of civilisation in the context of Asia – with a particular focus on East Asia. He clarified this objective in his post-publication description of the book: “[the *Outline*] is to shed light on what civilisation is by means stated retrospectively that he had postponed the publication of materials that are explicitly against Japan (Tanaka 1993: 30).

\textsuperscript{55} Craig (2009: 46-9) argues that the original English text that refers to Fukuzawa’s section in the *Almanac* is the work of Samuel Augustus Mitchell, *Mitchell’s New School Geography*. 
of adopting Western theories and comparing them with the reality of Asia” (Fukuzawa 2001: 404). In his translation of the Western concept of civilisation in the context of East Asia, a new knowledge of race, and a new model of racism thereby, emerged, which was no longer founded on the European taxonomy of race.

In the chapter ‘Western civilisation as our goal’ (Seiyō no bunmei wo mokuteki tosuru koto), Fukuzawa reiterated the theory of race in a similar manner to Sekai kunizukushi – i.e., without explicitly referring to the term ‘race’ (jinshu) as such, but focusing on the stages of civilisation – this time, with the inclusion of Japan. Fukuzawa discussed racial classification, which was now somewhat simplified into three categories: European countries and the United States as the “highest civilised countries” (saijyō no bunmei koku); Turkey, China, and Japan as the “semi-civilised countries” (hankai no kuni); and Africa and Australia as the “barbarous countries” (yaban no kuni) (Fukuzawa 1875 (vo. 1): 21/2008: 17). This inclusion of Japan in the Eurocentric taxonomy of race, however, was not just a simple translation of modern racism. Following his proposed objective of the Outline, he began to dissect the relationship between civilisation and race within a singularised (under the European discourse of race) context of the ‘semi-civilised countries’, or to put it in explicit racial terms, in the context of the ‘yellow race’.

In particular, Fukuzawa (1875 (vol. 1): 34-9/2008: 26-9) compared the level of civilisation in China to that of Japan through his historical analysis of political systems in each country. During antiquity, Fukuzawa first observed, both China and Japan had experienced the same stage of political system, namely an autocracy or a theocracy:

In antiquity Japan had a theocracy which ruled the people, and the people’s minds were simply, unquestioningly believing the one in whom the most
sacrosanct and the most powerful positions in the land were united. Here, of course, the Japanese people were no different from the Chinese, in that their minds were inclined in a single direction. (Fukuzawa 1875 (vol. 1): 36/2008: 28)

Both countries had suffered from ‘credulity’ (wakudeki) under the single sovereign. However, by the late classical period, continued Fukuzawa (1875 (vol. 1): 36-7/2008: 28), Japan unlike China moved from the model of governance by the single ruler when there emerged a separation between the powerful and the sacred – the samurai class (buke) and the emperor respectively. Fukuzawa argued that the separation between the powerful and the sacred itself does not signal the stage of Western civilisation as such. Yet, nevertheless, the difference between Japan and China where ‘credulity’ under the single ruler was prevalent indicates Japan’s relative historical progress in civilisation. This was because such plurality in the earlier Japanese political system allowed the Japanese people room for the exercise of intelligence and reason (Fukuzawa 1875 (vol. 1): 38/2008: 29). With such room for exercise of intelligence and reason, rather than blindly following the single ruler, Japan was seen as more equipped to advance the progress of knowledge, and thus, more equipped than China to adopt Western civilisation (Fukuzawa 1875 (vol. 1): 39/2008: 29).

What Fukuzawa’s theorisation of race vis-à-vis civilisation in the Outline depicts here is that the translation of the European concept of race was not simply about the introduction of the concept in a new context. An act of translation is never identical to an act of replicating meanings and practices, and nor is it simply an act of resistance (Bonnett 2005; Sakamoto 1996; see also Chapter One). Instead, it needs to be understood as a process that involves appropriation and localisation and where new knowledges can be manifested. In fact, in the context of late nineteenth-century Japan,
the European conceptual relation between race and civilisation was appropriated and localised in a way that its own racial codification beyond the European ‘original’ framework was made possible. That is to say, Fukuzawa’s interrogation of civilisation in the context of East Asia transformed the earlier European model of modern racism. Through his historical analysis of political systems in East Asia, Fukuzawa contended that despite the European taxonomy of race and its discourse of civilisation, the Chinese and Japanese belong to different stages of civilisation, and thus, to different racial groups since the idea of race is, since the earlier European discourse of race and racism to Fukuzawa’s *Almanac*, inseparable from the discourse of civilisation. To put it another way, the idea of race was re-articulated through the appropriation of socio-cultural dimensions of civilisation without directly referring to biological features such as skin colour. In this context, racism emerged ‘without race’ not in ‘differentialist’ terms – because it still functioned in a hierarchical manner (cf. Balibar 1991b; Taguieff 2001) – but in the sense that it was no longer configured by the European taxonomy of race.

Moreover, Fukuzawa described the Japanese as a distinct racial category in his discussion on *kokutai* (‘national polity’, or quite literally, ‘national body’), where he merged the concept of race with that of nationality:

*Kokutai* refers to the grouping together of one race [*ichi shuzoku*] of people who share joys and sorrows, the creation of a distinction between fellow countrymen than with foreigners, the fostering of more cordial and stronger bonds with one’s countrymen than foreigners. It is living under the same government, enjoying self-rule, and disliking the idea of being subject to foreign rule; it involves independence and responsibility for the welfare of
one’s own country. In the Western word, it is called ‘nationality’. (Fukuzawa 1875 (vol. 1): 40/2008: 30)

Racial conceptualisation of nationality was important for him to adopt the Western discourse of racism vis-à-vis civilisation in the context of East Asia. By doing so, along with his socio-cultural analysis of political systems in East Asia discussed above, the multiplication of the Western concept of race was made possible. This is not to say that modern racism was identical to nationalism. Nor should modern racism be reduced to nationalism. Rather, it was the racially coded discourse of civilisation that enabled the construction of the Japanese nation as a unity.

Fukuzawa’s re-articulation of modern racism is probably most clearly manifested in his infamous 1885 article in *Jijishinpō* (a predecessor of *Sankei shinbun*), a daily newspaper that Fukuzawa founded in 1882. In the article entitled ‘*Datsu a ron*’ (‘A theory of fleeing Asia’), Fukuzawa stated:

> Our principles could be summarised in two words: ‘Fleeing Asia’ (*Datsu-a*). Japan is located in the eastern extremities of Asia, but the spirit of her people have already moved away from the old conventions of Asia to Western civilisation. Unfortunately for Japan, there are two neighbouring countries. One is called China and another Korea. These two peoples, like the Japanese people, have been nurtured by Asiatic political thoughts and mores. It may be that we are different races or it may be due to the differences in our heredity or education; there is a significant difference between these two nations and Japan. The Chinese and Koreans are more like each other and together they do

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56 *Jijishinpō* was a ‘ō-shinbun’, which is equivalent of a broadsheet that focuses on social and political issues as opposed to ‘ko-shinbun’, which is closer to a tabloid. *Jijishinpō* is believed to be a middle-rank newspaper among broadsheets with a growing circulation since its establishment: 1,500 in 1882, 3,000 in 1885, 13,000 in 1896, and 50,000 by 1906; and its annual number of issues was 4,779,954 in 1893, which was almost the same scale of circulation as *Tokyo nichinichi shinbun* (Today’s *Mainichi shinbun*) (Ikeuchi 2004: 11, note 5).
not show as much similarity to the Japanese. These two countries do not know how to progress either personally or as a country. (Fukuzawa 1933: 41/1997: 352)

This was, importantly for Fukuzawa, a security issue in two senses. On the one hand, the alleged indifference to Western civilisation among the Chinese and Korean peoples meant that they would not be able to maintain their independence: “these two countries cannot survive as independent countries with the onslaught of Western civilisation to the East. … within a few years, they will be ruined with their lands divided among the civilised countries in the world” (Fukuzawa 1933: 41/1997: 352). This was because China and Korea violate the natural law, or ‘nature’ (ten’nen), of civilisation and enlightenment (Fukuzawa 1933: 41-2/1997: 352).

On the other hand, and crucially for the security of Japan, their indifference to Western civilisation was also potentially a threat to Japan because of their geographical proximity and the spread of Western powers in the East. “From the eyes of civilised Westerners”, argued Fukuzawa, “they may see what is happening in China and Korea and judge Japan accordingly due to the three countries’ geographical proximity” (Fukuzawa 1933: 42/1997: 352-3). He continued:

The government of China and Korea still retain their autocratic manners and do not abide by the rule of law. Westerners may consider Japan likewise a lawless society. … The Chinese are mean-inspired and shameless, and the chivalry of the Japanese people is lost to the Westerners. Koreans punish their convicts in an atrocious manner, and that is imputed to the Japanese as heartless people. … It is not different from the case of a righteous man living in a neighbourhood of a town known for foolish, lawlessness, atrocity, and
heartlessness. His action is so rare that it is always buried under the ugliness of his neighbours’ activities. (Fukuzawa 1933: 42/1997: 353)

This was understood as a fatal issue not simply because of the potential for Western colonisation of East Asia as a whole, but also because this could be a serious obstacle for Japan to conduct diplomatic affairs with the West (Fukuzawa 1933: 42/1997: 353).

In the light of this security concern, Fukuzawa urged Japan to leave Asia: “We do not have to wait for the enlightenment of our neighbours … It is better for us to leave the ranks of Asian countries and cast our lot with civilised countries of the West” (Fukuzawa 1933: 42/1997: 353). Accordingly, he also urged Japan not to arrange special treatments with Asian neighbours, but to follow the ways in which civilised countries behave: “As for the way of dealing with China and Korea, no special treatment is necessary just because they happen to be our neighbours. We simply follow the manner of the Westerners in knowing how to treat them” (Fukuzawa 1933: 42/1997: 353). The last statement on ‘the manner of the Westerners’ can be read as an imperialist conduct of civilising China and Korea. Certainly, it would be too indiscreet to claim that Fukuzawa’s Datsu a ron was a direct ‘cause’, as it were, of the Japanese imperial expansion in the subsequent years. Yet, suffice it to say that his writings on civilisation and race in the context of East Asia can shed light on the condition of possibility for a new model of racism to emerge and explicate the relationship between racism and anti-racism in the 1919 Racial Equality Proposal.

In the light of the translation of the concept of race in the work of Fukuzawa, a seemingly paradoxical relationship between racism and anti-racism in the 1919 Racial Equality Proposal no longer appears paradoxical but rational. In his 1919 Jinshu mondai, Ōkuma (1919: 87) in fact proposed an international political classification
not on the basis of a ‘racial standard’ (jinshu hyōjyun) but a ‘civilisational standard’ (bunmei hyōjyun), which clearly resembles Fukuzawa’s appropriation and localisation of the concept of race in the context of East Asia. Like Fukuzawa’s theorisation, Ōkuma used a ‘civilisational standard’ that ‘racially’ differentiates China from Japan, describing the former as an inferior ‘race’. As Ōkuma put it, “From the point of a civilisational standard, China is an also-ran” (Ōkuma 1919: 90). In other words, the discourse of anti-racism, expressed in the Racial Equality Proposal and in Ōkuma’s Jinshu mondai, by no means opposed the discourse of civilisation, which was founded upon the logic of modern racism; it was a form of anti-racism against the colour prejudice without being anti-racist at the level of raciality. If racism in late nineteenth-century Japan was without race, anti-racism, which was manifested in the 1919 Proposal, was equally without race. It was anti-racism without race whose functionality was thoroughly in accordance with the logic of modern racism. The concept of race beyond that of the colour line in the discourse of anti-racism was ‘naturalised’ or de-politicised at the level of which the colour-less racial subjugation was reproduced.

Modern racism in late nineteenth-century Japan marks a form of racism that is neither simply against nor accorded with the European racial thought. In one sense, it was a race struggle of its own: the colour boundary could not be incorporated into its nation-state and empire building but exposing the country to Western colonisation. In the meantime, its own translation of race, which focused on a raciality of civilisation, also activated and sustained its nation-state and empire building by using a similar yet not identical logic to the Western discourse of race and racism. Critical studies of race and racism (for example, Hall 1980) have shown that the idea of race is never fixed or static but is historically contingent. Yet, in the light of modern Japan, its contingency
is not only historical, but also geographical. It was not simply a matter of visible, or visualised, racial and biological differences – colour, hair, bone, and so forth – but also about cultural differences that were nevertheless racially coded under the discourse of civilisation.

**Biometrics as a biologico-political technology of race**

In the previous two sections, I analysed discourses of race, racism, and anti-racism, and explicated the emergence of a new knowledge of race, and a new model of racism, in the context of modern Japan. The idea of race was transformed from the initial biologist and Eurocentric model to a model of racism that was no longer confined to the politics of colour line. This new model of racism – which I have suggested as a precursor to ‘racism without race’ (cf. Balibar 1991b) – emphasised socio-cultural aspects whereby racism was made possible beyond Eurocentrism and within a singularised non-white race. I argued that instead of directly resisting the global politics of racism in the nineteenth century, race thinking was internalised in the modernisation and civilisation process of Japan. Racism was manifested as its own political rationality, and as an urgent security issue, to defend Japan in the age of Western imperialism.

Discourses of race, racism, and anti-racism in modern Japan can be seen as Japan’s reaction against the European scientificity of racial knowledge, refusing to accept the scientific biological facts of raciality, most notably, a racial codification based on skin colour. In the light of this, Former Prime Minister Ōkuma’s statement on the 1919 Racial Equality Proposal discussed in the first section may indeed be seen as an exemplar of condemnation of the pseudo-scientificity of nineteenth-century European racial sciences.
In this sense, the emergence of modern racism in Japan may be characterised as a shift from biological racism to cultural racism, departing from the biological determinant of skin colour to socio-cultural discourses of civilisation. However, Japan’s critical attitude to the Western biological knowledge of race in the early twentieth century did not lead to the negation of the scientificity of racial sciences as a whole. Instead of being completely invalidated, the scientific discourse of race was also incorporated with the production of racial knowledge in Japan whereby the idea of ‘Japanese race’ vis-à-vis other Asian races was constantly biologically inscribed.

During modernisation in Japan between the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, various Western scientific methods – including biology, eugenics, and genetics – were introduced as a domain of the production of racial knowledge (Morris-Suzuki 1998a). Among these scientific methods of calculating race, biometrics was consistently deployed to produce the ‘truth’ of races in East Asia beyond the racial codification of skin colour.

This chapter now turns to an analysis of institutionalised practices of biometric identification during Japanese colonialism in order to scrutinise the role of biometrics in modern Japanese racism. In the first part, I will look at early physical anthropological studies of race in the Japanese colonies in East Asia. The second part focuses on studies of shimon keisū (‘fingerprint index’) that was invented by Furuhata Tanemoto, Professor of Forensic Pathology and one of the leading figures in the development of scientific methods of identification in the country. Shimon keisū was widely deployed for the knowledge of race during the 1920s and the 1930s.

**Colonial anthropology in East Asia**

During the years of Japanese colonialism, Japanese anthropologists in overseas colonies endeavoured to find biological traits of Asian races and distinguished
characters of the Japanese race. For example, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the office of Governor-General of Taiwan (Taiwan sōtoku-fu), classified Taiwanese aborigines or seiban – which literally means ‘raw barbarian’, the term that was used to indicate Taiwanese tribes during the early years of the occupation.\(^{57}\) They were classified into those who were seen as relatively peaceful and obedient and those who were seen as ferocious and dangerous with regard to tribal customary practices and their behaviours under the Japanese occupation (1895 – 1945).

In 1914 anthropologist Mori Ushinosuke reported the lack of civilisation among Taiwanese aborigines and regarded some tribes as ‘dangerous elements’ (kiken bunshi). While tribes such as Paiwan and Tsuo were thought to be nonthreatening elements who tended to be obedient and peaceful under Japanese rule, Atayal – a tribe that was particularly infamous for their custom of headhunting among other tribes – was thought to be the fiercest and most rebellious, and therefore, in need of subjugation by the government (Mori 1914: 58-9). In his study, Mori had already employed some anthropometric measurements such as head size and the height of tribes, but such measurements remained descriptive and were not yet systematically calculated or categorised in any particular manner. Nor were they linked to characteristics or temperament of tribes. Racialisation in earlier anthropological studies such as the work of Mori was instead predominantly conducted through the observation of behaviours of tribes such as headhunting and explicit resistance to colonial rule. At this point, biometrics were not yet fully deployed as a technology of inscribing race or of ‘revealing’ the ‘truth’ of racial identity.

Despite the lack of systematic scientific identification of race, an anatomical investigation of colonial bodies was nevertheless persistent as a form of anthologists’

\(^{57}\) The term ‘seiban’ was originally from Chinese and subsequently used by the Japanese empire at least until 1935 when another term ‘takasago zoku’ was introduced.
will to know race. Various measurements of bodies were continuously conducted across the colonies. Gradually, from circa 1920, human anatomy in the colonies became an inscriptive technology of racial knowledge; it began to operate as a form of scientific ‘truth’ of race rather than a mere description of bodies. In 1919, Kubo Takeshi, Professor of Anatomy at Keijō Medical College in Korea under Japanese rule (1910 – 1945), conducted what he called a ‘racial anatomical study of Koreans’ (chōsenjin no jinshu kaibō gakuteki kenkyū). Kubo argued that anatomical knowledge of colonial bodies is crucial for imperial ethnic governance:

> As we recognise differences and peculiarities in the outward physique of human bodies among different races, it is needless to say there should be differences among each ethnic group in terms of muscles, organs, vessels, nerves, et cetera. … For the ethnic governance [minzoku tōji], I believe that it is important to research a constitution of each ethnic group and differences in their bodily system, and to educate and train them in order to improve their inferior parts. (Kubo 1919: 69-70)

Kubo’s emphasis on the knowledge of colonial bodies and the subsequent training or disciplining their inferior parts was not limited to anatomy itself, but his anatomical analysis also involved identification of Koreans’ inferiority in terms of their temperament or civilisational characters. Kubo’s generalisation of the racial inferiority of Koreans was clearly evident in the so-called ‘Kubo incident’ when the alleged relationship between anatomy and criminality was explicitly revealed. In May 1921 there was student unrest and a boycott among Korean students when the professor’s generalised criminalisation of Koreans became obvious. The incident occurred after a skull went missing from a laboratory at the college and when Kubo explicitly accused Korean students of: “Kubo accused the Korean students of the
crime based on his expertise in the physical anthropology of the Korean people. Anatomically speaking, Kobo elaborated, Koreans were barbarians whose racial traits determined their historical developments” (Kim 2013: 412).

The articulation of the racial inferiority of other Asian races in evolutionist terms proliferated during this period. In 1922 Miyake Hideo, an anatomist at Nanman Igaku Dō in Manchuria (a predecessor of Manchuria Medical University), also conducted an anatomical study of Korean and Chinese bodies, in particular their palm prints and fingerprints, where he ‘identified’ the biological traits of their ‘degeneracy’ [taika]. Drawing from the samples of Polish palm prints, Miyake (1922: 761) concluded that Korean palm prints, which appear to be the same as Chinese palm prints, signified the ‘degeneracy’ of Koreans in comparison with Poles. Miyake’s evolutionism was also coupled with a geographical proximity within East Asia: he asserted in his analysis of the little finger that the Koreans are ‘racially speaking’ situated between the Chinese and the Japanese (Miyake 1922: 762).

Along with some earlier discourses on degeneracy such as over Korean and Chinese bodies, the idea of barbarism and its biometric articulation was particularly prominent in the production of the knowledge of Taiwanese aborigines. Kanaseki Takeo, an anthropological anatomist and professor of medicine at Taihoku Imperial University in the 1930s, collected biometric data of seiban for the purpose of what he called a ‘statistical observation’ (Kanaseki 1929: 520). Drawing on Western theories of fingerprinting including those of Harris Hawthorne Wilder and Otto Schlaginhaunfen, Kanaseki categorised and classified racial groups including Atayal, Japanese, Korean, Chinese, and Europeans, and concluded, “the character of Atayal

58 In the same analysis, Miyake (1922) also asserted the degeneracy of women.
men’s fingerprints tells us that they are much more primitive than any other neighbouring race” (Kanaseki 1929: 544).

As shown above, since the early years of Japanese colonialism, colonial bodies were often treated as a domain of the production of racial knowledge in their methods of identification and calculation, although their methods varied and perhaps rather inconsistent. By the late 1920s, however, among other anthropometric measurements, fingerprinting in particular had become one of the methodical ways of identifying races in East Asia. It became one of the ways of systematically calculating and measuring racial traits of the Japanese and other Asian races.

The scientific method of fingerprinting in general was introduced at the beginning of the twentieth century in Japan by a group of scientists who had formerly studied the identification technique in Europe. Like the Bertillonage in late nineteenth-century France, it was initially introduced as a modern method of identifying, and thus of managing, recidivists rather than a method of racial classification (I will discuss its initial inception in detail in Chapter Four). Soon after the introduction, however, fingerprinting was increasingly deployed in the context of Japanese colonies in the pursuit of the knowledge, or the biological ‘truth’, of Asian races. It began to be deployed widely and on a large scale across its colonies, as well as throughout Japan, particularly after a prominent scientist Furuhata Tanemoto pioneered a mathematical formula called ‘shimon keisū’.

*Furuhata Tanemoto and the invention of shimon keisū*

In 1926 Furuhata Tanemoto gave a lecture at the Kanazawa Association of Criminology and proposed a systematic way of calculating fingerprint patterns, which he coined ‘*shimon keisū*’ (literally, ‘fingerprint coefficient’ or ‘fingerprint index’). Furuhata was Professor of Forensic Pathology and one of the pioneers of scientific
methods of identification in Japan, who also later became a leading figure in the field in post-WWII Japan as the chief of the National Research Institute of Police Science (for his role in the post-WWII context, see Chapter Four).

Furuhata’s *shimon keisū* was a biometric reading of heredity and race through anatomical classification and statistical calculation of fingerprint patterns, which was largely based on and advanced earlier European studies of fingerprinting during the late nineteenth century, most notably, the work of Galton. In his 1892 book *Finger Prints*, Galton (1892) classified fingerprint patterns primarily into three types: ‘arches’, ‘loops’ (which consists of ‘radical’ and ‘lunar’ loops), and ‘whorls’. Galton sought to identify hereditary and racial differences through the calculation of fingerprint patterns, and to identify ‘degenerate fingerprints’ (Cole 2001; see also Chapter One). Drawing on Galton’s fingerprint classification, Furuhata established a mathematical formula of *shimon keisū*, which was calculated by dividing the proportion of whorls by the proportion of loops (both radical and lunar) and then multiplied by 100: \( shimon \ keisū = \frac{W}{R+L} \times 100 \) (Hirai 1928: 1257; see also Furuhata 1930: 278-282). At the lecture, applying the *shimon keisū* formula to existing data of fingerprint patterns from earlier years, Furuhata demonstrated racial differences in fingerprint patterns and categorised people into four types: a score of over 90 was classified as the Manchurian type; between 90 and 70 as the Japanese type; between 70 and 60 as the Italian type; between 60 and 59 as the Indian type; and below 50 as the Western type (Hirai 1928: 1258).

This simplified and generalisable mathematical formula of *shimon keisū* was widely used in the following years by Furuhata’s students and colleagues, as well as other advocates including biologists, anatomists, and anthropologists. It was followed by large-scale studies, using an extraordinary amount of fingerprint samples –
including samples from Europeans (for example, British, Italian, Norwegian, Polish, German, and others) and Asians (Chinese, Korean, Indian, and so forth) to indigenous populations in East Asia such as Ainu, Ryukyuan, and Taiwanese tribes. Most of the research outputs were published in academic journals, notably in a series of studies entitled ‘Nihonjin shimon no kenkyū’ (‘Research on Japanese fingerprints’). At least 38 articles in the series were published between 1928 and 1939 in Jyūzenkai zasshi, published by Kanazawa Medical University, along with other articles in journals such as Hanzaigaku zasshi (‘Journal of Criminology’). It should be noted that some earlier studies also investigated its relationship to age, gender, and blood group (for example, Kishi 1928a; Kishi 1928b; Kishi and Masaki 1928); yet, the scope of studies of shimon keisū was nevertheless predominantly concerned with the knowledge of race in the context of East Asia.

Other earlier studies of shimon keisū were also conducted within the mainland of Japan as an attempt to articulate a regional difference and distribution of fingerprint patterns and to determine the biogeographical origin of the Yamato people, which is believed to be the dominant native population in the history of Japan. In the second issue of ‘Nihonjin shimon no kenkyū’ under Furuhata’s supervision, Hirai Sumimaro (1928) conducted his study to understand ‘racial peculiarities’ (jinshu teki tokui sei) and to investigate the origin of Yamato (see also Furuhata 1930: 283-288). Analysing a significant number of Japanese fingerprint samples – 17,320 samples, that is, 173,200 fingerprints – across all 47 prefectures, Hirai concluded his result as follows: the lowest shimon keisū was 55.88 in Kanagawa; the highest was 78.04 in Toyama; 29 prefectures were in the 60s; 17 prefectures were in the 70s; the only prefecture whose shimon keisū was in the 50s was Kanagawa; and the national average was 68.52 (Hirai 1928: 1263). Investigating the biogeographical distribution of shimon
Hirai also concluded, “the study shows the tendency that *shimon keisū* was higher in Hokkaido and prefectures on the coast of the Sea of Japan, whereas it is lower on the side of the Pacific and towards south” (Hirai 1928: 1264). Hirai produced the map of Japan (with the Korean Peninsula) in which he marked each prefecture differently according to the *shimon keisū* variance (see Figure 1).

Along with his analysis of *shimon keisū*, Hirai (1928) also compared his result with other biological measurements – what he called “*jinshu keisū*” (‘race coefficient’ or ‘race index’) that was based on the blood type, and the measurement of height and
head. He argued that there is consistency among those three types of biological data, which can help to identify the biogeographical origin of the Yamato people in relation to the influence of other Asian races, a possible racial influence of non-Yamato from the continent. This presumption can also be seen in Furuhata’s (1930: 285) map of Japan where he indicates such influence from the Korean Peninsula with two arrows (Figure 2).

![Figure 2: ‘A distribution of fingerprints in Japan’ (Furuhata 1930: 285)](image)

In Hirai’s work, shimon keisū was deployed in order to trace the hereditary origin of the Yamato people. It was incorporated into the search of the ‘pure’ Japanese. Yet, studies of shimon keisū in the subsequent years were not limited to the internal construction of the Japanese race. They became predominantly about the production of racial knowledge in East Asia in which other Asian races were not simply biologically differentiated but also hierarchicalised in a similar manner to earlier
Chapter Three: Inscribing Race

colonial anthropology. That is, *shimon keisū* was deployed not only to trace but also inscribe its meaning in racial and civilisational terms.

In subsequent studies, fingerprint data collected from mainland Japan, the colonies, and across the world, were all put into the *shimon keisū* formula whereby each population category was systematically ordered.  

Table 1, reproduced here, is an extract taken from Hibono Masaru’s (1935: 2199-2201) study. It shows *shimon keisū* of various populations, ranging from Taiwanese aborigines to Europeans. Its variance ranges from 170.183 for Atayal and 127.61 for Ami – both Taiwanese aborigines – to 30.56 for Jews.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-Japanese</th>
<th>Shimon keisū</th>
<th>Japanese</th>
<th>Shimon keisū</th>
</tr>
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<td>Shiga</td>
<td>107.52</td>
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<td>Ami (Taiwanese aborigine)</td>
<td>127.61</td>
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<td>Jews</td>
<td>30.56</td>
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Table 1: *Shimon keisū* (Hibino: 1935: 2199-2201)

59 For fingerprint data outside the Japanese empire, they drew from similar studies by Western scientists from Galton to Harold Cummins who was a prominent figure in dermatoglyphics in the United States during the 1930s and 1940s (Cole 2001: 114). See Hibino (1935: 2199-2201) for the full list of researchers.
These *shimon keisū*, in particular the deviant ones such as that of Atayal, became the indicator of race and temperament rather than that of biological and geographical origin of race and population as in the case of the Yamato. The barbarism of particular *seiban* was inscribed in *shimon keisū*. In his comparative study of five tribes – Paiwan, Tsuo, Yami, Ami, and Atayal – Itō Shizuo (1935: 1441) calculated their *shimon keisū*, respectively 51.31, 86.96, 107.93, 127.78, and 161.64. Accordingly, Itō concluded:

The *shimon shisū* [sic] of Yami, Ami, and Atayal are more than 100, and thus they belong to the Manchurian type; that of Paiwan is more than 50 and is the Indian-type; and Tsuo is the Japanese type. Among all *seibai*, it is convincing that Atayal who are said to have the most atrocious and primitive character have more whorls and Paiwan and Tsuo who are said to be gentle and highly civilised have less whorls. (Itō 1935: 1441)

*Shimon keisū*, in other words, became the numerical ordering of racial knowledge. It not only ordered bodies in East Asia in racial terms, but also became the indicator of civility and barbarism. *Shimon keisū*, in short, emerged as a biopolitical technology of racialisation. Importantly, this biopolitical technology of inscribing race or the ‘truth’ of race was not so much in accordance with the European taxonomy of race but its own colonial governance. It became a technology of normalising the Japanese race and civilisation – in establishing both its own distinct raciality and its relative superiority to other Asians – that was nevertheless within the European logic of modern racism.

The analysis of studies of *shimon keisū*, as well as colonial anthropology in general during Imperial Japan, exposes that biometrics in the traditions of physical anthropology were not solely incorporated into a white supremacist mode of scientific
racialisation as extant historical accounts on the history of biometrics have shown (see Chapter One). The scientific method of identification of race was also translated into the context of Japan whereby its practices were localised and appropriated for its own colonial domination. The nineteenth-century European concept of the ‘degenerate’ fingerprints was multiplied: instead of challenging the ‘degenerate’ fingerprints of Asians, there emerged other ‘degenerate’ fingerprints across East Asia whereby the Japanese race and racial superiority was manifested.

Biometric racialisation under Japanese colonialism is revealed to be correlative of the earlier discourse of race and racism that I discussed in the previous section. And it is this correlation that the present study is concerned with for the articulation of racial government. As a Foucaultian historical analysis, colonial anthropology and shimon keisū discussed in this section should not be reduced to the problem of ideology. The analytical focus of this thesis does not lie in the assessment of the scientificity of biometrics. Nor does it deny ideological impacts on practices of biometric identification. These colonial practices of identification did not – in fact, could not – ‘ideologically’ obscure race because the latter does not exist as a universal (see Chapter Two). Instead, they are, along with the discourses on race, better understood as practices that have concrete effects on the constitution of the knowledge of race in a given context. These practices of racialisation are concurrently exercises of power that provided the rationality for its imperial domination, the racialised domination that was rationalised in security terms.

In short, the dispositif of control-subjectification of race in East Asia was empowered by the localised discourse of race and racism and equally localised practices of biometric identification, which were institutionalised and widely dispersed across the empire. Its modality was heavily based on the biological
inscription of race that was nevertheless transformed from, and irreducible to, the European model.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has delineated the emergence of modern race thinking and the role of biometric identification in the production of racial knowledge during Japanese colonialism in East Asia. The European concept of race was translated and introduced in the work of Fukuzawa in the early years of the Meiji period. Its translation was, however, neither a mere replication of the idea, which would have inevitably subordinated the Japanese to white race, nor an outright rejection as Du Bois foresaw. Instead, during the course of translation, there emerged a transformation of the idea of race in which racism within East Asia was made possible. Through re-conceptualising race in civilisational terms, the Japanese race was discursively constructed whereby other Asian races were concurrently articulated as inferior races. Accordingly, Japan’s anti-racism against the global politics of the colour line was not against racism; it rather exhibits the problematic of the relation between anti-racism and racism when race was understood as a static object, and the limits of the knowledge of race in the European taxonomy of race. The 1919 Racial Equality Proposal was certainly critical of the global politics of the colour line, clearly condemning its racial hierarchisation utterly fabricated and plainly untrue. Yet, this anti-racism was fully in accordance with its own imperial and racist conducts in East Asia, which was made possible by the transformation of the idea of race.

This emergence of what may be called ‘racism without race’ in late nineteenth-century Japan was, however, by no means a total negation of racial sciences. In fact, the scientific practices of racialisation were fully incorporated into the production of
racial knowledge during Japanese colonialism in its own manner. Perhaps, due to the lack of biological facts of skin colour, biometrics, fingerprinting in particular, played a constitutive role in the production of racial knowledge in East Asia. From early anthropological studies in its colonies to studies of *shimon keisū* in the 1920s and 1930s, biometrics were incorporated into the production of ‘truth’ about the Japanese race and other Asian races. Not only were biological racial differences identified, but such differences were also interpreted as a signifier of the superiority of the Japanese, as well as the inferiority of other Asians. Biometrics, in short, became a biological-political technology of race that produced its own racial knowledge and scientifically rationalised the Japanese imperial conducts in a similar manner to the French idea of *mission civilisatrice*, a mission projected not towards non-white races but within East Asia.

In this context, Foucault’s theorisation of racism in biopolitical terms is revealed to be useful: ‘racism without race’ in modern Japan was rationalised as a crucial security measure in the age of Western imperialism. The emergence of racism in East Asia was not reducible to racism between two different races, or what Foucault called “ethnic racism” (Foucault 2004: 261); rather, it was thoroughly rationalised under the evolutionary idea of the civilisational progress of human races as a whole where Japan projected itself. At the same time, the chapter extended studies of biopolitical racism not only in terms of geographical translation but also by articulating the emergent *dispositif* of control-subjectification of race under Imperial Japan through the appropriation and localisation of the European concept of race and practices of biometric identification that were dispersed across its colonies.

At the end of World War II, however, both Japanese imperialism and its racial science ceased: the imperial subjugation and control of Asian races came to an end
and the idea of barbarism and eugenicist and biological anthropological techniques of ‘knowing’ bodies gradually disappeared from both political and scientific discourses. In short, the rationality of its colonial government of race was discredited. Instead of taking this as the end of racism in a progressivist manner, the next chapter critically interrogates the concept of race and the political deployment of biometric identification in the context of post-WWII Japan.
Chapter Four: Policing Race

The idea of dangerousness meant that the individual must be considered by society at the level of his potentialities, and not at the level of his actions; not at the level of the actual violations of an actual law, but at the level of the behavioral potentialities they represented.

– Michel Foucault (2001: 57)

A question to be raised ... is whether and how the increasing fear of crime – this ideologically produced fear of crime – serves to render racism simultaneously more invisible and more virulent.

– Angela Y. Davis (1997: 269)

We maintain the following: The word ‘criminal’, applied to blacks by whites, has no meaning. For whites, all blacks are criminals because they’re black. This amounts to saying that in a white city, no black can be criminal.

– A statement by the Groupe d’Information sur les Prisons (GIP) in 1971

Introduction

In Chapter Three I expounded the colonial model of racial government during Imperial Japan in which biometrics – in particular, fingerprinting – played a constitutive role in control-subjectification of race in East Asia. Instead of challenging

60 The statement originally appeared in a booklet by the GIP, written by French writer Jean Genet (Heiner 2007: 340).
Chapter Four: Policing Race

the Eurocentric idea of race and racism, race thinking was thoroughly appropriated and localised in Japan as a crucial measure to defend itself in the age of Western imperialism. In the light of this, I suggested that the emergence of Japanese modern racism is better understood in biopolitical terms not simply because the European taxonomy of race was inapplicable in this context but more profoundly because racism was manifested as a security measure that coincided with the introduction of an apparatus of population thinking. Upon the end of Japan’s imperial age, however, the racialised mechanism of biopolitics was dissolved and the biological discourse of civilisation eventually disappeared. Biometric knowledge in the tradition of nineteenth-century European racial sciences became illegitimate: fingerprinting as the inscription of barbarism was gradually replaced by fingerprinting as a means of individual identification.

In one sense, the end of the imperial age and the denouncement of its racist dogma may seem to mark the end of the racial codification of biopolitics and the racist mechanism of biometric knowledge. However, as I explicated in Chapter Two, the present study rejects linear and progressive accounts of the idea of race and the scientificity of biometrics. For a more historically nuanced exposition of racism and biometrics it is necessary to engage in a concrete historicisation of the idea of race and practices of biometric identification in a given context. In view of the thesis’s methodology, this chapter scrutinises the post-WWII political structure of Japan that on the surface appeared to be ‘race-free’ with respect to its political and scientific decolonisation.

The discussion consists of three sections that proceed in parallel with the previous chapter. The aim of the first section is to set up the broad historical context following World War II. I will illustrate the emergence of anti-racism through a brief analysis of
the 1950 UNESCO statement on the Race Question. The UNESCO statement had
officially denounced the biological concept of race in terms of racial superiority and
inferiority and its consequential political uses. Accordingly, scientific methods of
racial classification such as fingerprinting in the tradition of colonial anthropology
were said to be de-politicised or de-racialised. The scientific norms, or scientificity, of
biometrics had shifted: fingerprinting became no longer a ‘pseudo-science’ of racial
and ‘diagnostic’ identification but a ‘true’ science of individualisation (see Chapter
One). Fingerprinting was no longer a technology of inscribing civility and barbarism
as articulated in Chapter Three.

This post-WWII ‘de-racialising move’ in the history of racism, and concurrently
that of biometrics, is where the second and third sections of this chapter are set to
critically intervene. In the second section, I will interrogate the transformation of the
idea of race in the context of post-WWII Japan. While the biologicist discourses on
race gradually disappeared in the field of politics and science in the aftermath of the
dissolution of the empire, the idea of race was persistent in cultural and behavioural
terms whereby former colonial subjects were criminalised. To this day, racism in the
post-WWII context has been recognised as various legal forms of prejudice and
discrimination against former colonial subjects residing in the mainland who are often
called the Zainichi population, especially as forms of depriving their citizenship (see
for example, Chung 2010; Morris-Suzuki 2010; Tanaka 1995). My focus, however,
concerns the discursive construction of race – or better raciality (see Chapter Two)
because the emergent racialised category was often characterised without referring to
the term ‘race’ (jinshu) – in biopolitical terms. The section attempts to articulate the
inextricable relations between the postwar politics of security and postwar
racialisation, and to show the ways in which the idea of criminality and fear played a
constitutive role in the post-WWII knowledge of race. For this end, I will focus on parliamentary debates concerning postwar security and the 1945 electoral reform where the Zainichi population, particularly the Zainichi Koreans, was criminalised.\textsuperscript{61}

While the focus of the second section is the discourses on race and security, the third section examines security practices of identification in post-WWII Japan where I will critically interrogate the notion of ‘race-free’ biometrics as individualisation. It begins with discussion on the development of fingerprinting as a forensic technique of managing security and crimes in prewar Japan, which can be characterised as surveillant fingerprinting (cf. Foucault 1979) that is distinct from the colonial model of biological and inscriptive fingerprinting (see Chapter Three). In the postwar context, surveillant fingerprinting began to be used beyond penal governance (i.e., the management of recidivism): it began to be used also for civil governance, particularly for monitoring suspect populations including a newly criminalised, and racialised, population of the Zainichi Koreans. Against the ‘de-racialising move’ in the history of biometrics, the last part of the section analyses the political deployment of biometrics for monitoring the Zainichi Koreans under the 1952 \textit{Gaikokujin tōroku hō} (Alien Registration Act), which can shed light on a new modality of racial government.

Overall, the chapter aims to articulate not just an historical continuity of biopolitical racism in post-WWII Japan. Also, and more importantly in view of the thesis’s objectives, it aims to articulate the emergent dynamics of racial government that involves new ways of subjectifying and controlling race and security through biometrics, which, despite the postwar denouncement of scientific racism, rendered biopolitical racism possible.

\textsuperscript{61} Most of parliamentary documents are digitally accessible from the following two sites: \textit{Teikoku gikai kaigiroku kensaku shisutem} (available at \url{http://teikokugikai-i.ndl.go.jp}) for texts until March 1947; and \textit{Kokkai kaigiroku kensaku shisutem} (available at \url{http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp}) for the subsequent years.
Anti-racism II: A paradigm shift in the knowledge of race and biometrics

‘The truth of race’: The 1950 UNESCO statement on the Race Question

The international denouncement of the scientficity of biological knowledge of race and its consequential racism was officially made in the UNESCO statement on race, which came three decades after the 1919 Racial Equality Proposal. In 1950, UNESCO made an anti-racist statement in ‘the Race Question’, which clearly discredited the idea of race as politically deployed in the preceding years. It stated:

The importance which the problem of race has acquired in the modern world scarcely needs to be pointed out. Mankind will not soon forget the injustices and crimes which give such tragic overtones to the word ‘race’. … For, like war, the problem of race which directly affects millions of human lives and causes countless conflicts has its roots ‘in human minds of men’. The preamble of Unesco’s Constitution, adopted in 1945, specifically named racism as one of the social evils which the new Organization was called upon to combat. (UNESCO 1950: 1)

The Race Question was an international denouncement of the biological concept of race and the consequent racist dogma that had ordered the human races in a hierarchical and social Darwinist manner and that was most explicitly manifested in Nazism. In the statement, the notion of ‘truth’ played a key role in its denouncement of the idea of race. It was about the re-establishment of the ‘truth of race’: “[The Race
Chapter Four: Policing Race

Question is] to re-establish in the minds and consciences of men everywhere the truth about race” (UNESCO 1950: 2).

The statement continued further to emphasise the ‘knowledge of the truth’ to be established in order to overcome the fallacy in the idea of race:

Knowledge of the truth does not always help change emotional attitudes that draw their real strength from the subconscious or from factors beside the real issue. Knowledge of the truth can, however, prevent rationalizations of reprehensible acts or behaviour prompted by feelings that men will not easily avow openly. (UNESCO 1950: 2)

Emphasising the knowledge of the truth, the Race Question problematised scientific methods of the nineteenth century that were not ‘purely’ scientific, but that became incorporated into the field of politics: “Science was faced with the problem of race at the beginning of the nineteenth century when the great evolutionary theories were being formulated. Unfortunately, the problem soon shifted from the purely scientific field to the field of politics” (UESCO 1950: 3). Racism was, the UNESCO statement declared, empowered not by scientific practices but by their lack: “Instead of being based on scientific facts, it [i.e., racism] is generally maintained in defiance of the scientific method” (UNESCO 1950: 3). To put it schematically, the problem of race that was identified in the Race Question was the problem of scientificity. It was, as the statement puts it, to divorce the biological fact from a ‘social myth’ (UNESCO 1950: 8).

The problem of the social myth of race was later emphasised in the revised UNESCO statement, the Statement on the Nature of Race and Race Differences, in 1951 (Montagu 1972: 139-147). While both statements generally are in agreement, the explicit tone of condemnation of the concept of race in the 1950 statement and a
lack of consideration with scientists in the field of physical anthropology and genetics in drafting the first statement immediately invited a critical reception. Their criticism focused on the outright denial of the existence of race, which was already present in the 1950 statement, and emphasised the still scientific relevance on the biological category of race. Nevertheless, the critiques and the revised statement agreed with the original Race Question on the problem of the political use of the idea of race that attempted to calculate and establish the ‘intelligence’ or ‘temperament’ of race and that determined superior races and inferior races. As the 1951 Statement on the Nature of Race and Race Difference clarified:

There was no delay or hesitation or lack of unanimity in reaching the primary conclusion that there were no scientific grounds whatever for the racialist position regarding purity of race and the hierarchy of inferior races to superior races to which this leads. (Cited in Montagu 1972: 139)

Physical differences of race, they emphasised, gave “no support to popular notions of any general ‘superiority’ or ‘inferiority’ which are sometimes implied in referring to these [racial] groups” (cited in Montague 1972: 143).

In short, the 1950-1 UNESCO statements on race mark an historical shift in the scientific norms of relevant disciplines such as biology and anthropology and of relevant methods of identification including anthropometry and biometrics.

*Individualisation: Fingerprinting as a ‘true’ science*

Scientific methods of identification including biometrics were accordingly de-racialised in the post-WWII context, although some scientists continued to seek to identify biological traits of race. The scientificity of biometric identification such as fingerprinting was sustained by divorcing it from ‘diagnostic’ racial classification and
Chapter Four: Policing Race

hierarchisation: it was sustained under the sole purpose of individualisation (see Chapter One).

It should be noted, however, as clarified in Chapter One, that this shift in the scientificity of biometrics was by no means exclusive to the UNESCO statements, but had already been glimpsed in the first half of the twentieth century among some scientists who condemned biometric racial classification as a ‘pseudo-science’. Nor was a de-racialised technology of identification born exclusively in the post-WWII context: as Cole’s (2001) history of fingerprinting demonstrated, fingerprinting as individualisation co-existed with fingerprinting as racial classification since the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, in the post-WWII context, biometrics as racial classification – at least, in terms of hierarchisation of races – was officially and scientifically discredited. Practices of biometric identification were no longer about the classificatory identification of race. Or as the UNESCO statements above put it, biometric racial classification was no longer conceived of as ‘the knowledge of the truth’.

This shift was not limited to the Western context. The shift in the scientificity of fingerprinting also had an impact in the post-WWII context of Japan. This can be clearly seen in the emergent role of Furuhata’s scientific authority in the country. As I discussed in Chapter Three, Professor Furuhata had invented the fingerprinting racial classification called shimon keisū in the 1920s, which was incorporated into the hierarchisation of Asian races in the line of colonial physical anthropology. However, in the aftermath of World War II, he became a prominent figure of ‘true’ scientific methods of identification. In particular, Furuhata had made a notable contribution in the development of fingerprinting as individualisation as well as the blood type classification and identification in Japan. The shift in the scientificity of biometrics in
here, as in the case of the Western context, was by no means a clear succession. On the one hand, Furuhata had already noted fingerprinting in terms of individualisation in the early twentieth century (Furuhata 1930). On the other hand, his endeavour to classify, not hierarchise (at least explicitly), races was also persistent in the second half of the twentieth century along with his emphasis on individualisation (for example, Furuhata 1949; Furuhata et al. 1956). Nevertheless, his contribution to ‘true’ scientific methods of identification became highly influential in the context of post-WWII Japan. He later became the director of the National Research Institute of Police Science (Kagaku keisatsu kenkyū jyo) that was established in 1948 – initially named as Kagaku sōsa kenkyū jyo but subsequently renamed in 1959 – as a part of the National Police Agency (Keisatsu cho) in order to enhance scientific criminal investigation.

Despite this de-racialising move in the scientific field, however, the post-WWII international denouncement of the idea of race by no means marked the abolishment of racism in political structures, let alone in racial prejudice and discrimination at the individual level. There are many reasons for this. For example, the international anti-racist statements did not lead to the abolishment of racist political structures across the world including the Jim Crow laws in the United States and Apartheid in South Africa, not to mention persistent colonial practices. An exclusive focus on the biological concept of race in the UNESCO statements on race was rather impotent to tackle systemic and structural racism. As Robert Bernasconi states:

One consequence of the UNESCO strategy is that it makes racism not so much moral failing or a political tool as an epistemological error. … in the 1950s when racism came to be associated more frequently with colonialism and

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62 Kagaku sōsa kenkyū jyo still remains today as local research institutes of scientific investigation.
segregation, a more forgiving approach was taken, and indeed one that tended to ignore or downplay systemic or structural racism. (Bernasconi 2012: 211)

Also, what may be called the ‘de-politicising’ move in the UNESCO statements – problematising racism exclusively in political terms – was not only ineffective in tackling racism, but also counterproductive because it simultaneously “depoliticized the meanings of the sufferers’ cultural complexes and complexions, extricated them from inherited hierarchies of power and thus segregated from the inherited and living struggles against (post-/neo-)masters” (Shilliam 2013: 153). Above all, the denunciation of biological racism helped neither to tackle nor understand culturalist or differentialist forms of racism (Balibar 1991b; Taguieff 2001).

In view of the thesis’s research question, my critical analysis of race and racism in the post-WWII context will take another angle, namely in relation to biometric identification, which was said to be de-racialised and no longer used to calculate or establish the inferiority or superiority of races if not racial categories as a whole. However, in the light of archaeological and genealogical precautions proposed in Chapter Two, this historical shift in the scientificity of biometrics should not be treated simply as an historical progress, but must be scrutinised in relation to a wider social and political context where this ‘new’ technology was deployed. That is to say, instead of assuming the end of scientific racism as the end of biometrics as a biopolitical technology of race, it is important to examine the ways in which practices of this ‘new’ biometric identification were put into operation in the post-WWII context. It is equally important not to assume the end of scientific racism as the end of racism because, as Foucault suggests (see Chapter Two), identity such as race is in essence heterogeneous and can be constituted only within a given spatio-temporal matrix.
In the following two sections, I will concretely contextualise the constitution of the idea of race and the political deployment of biometrics in post-WWII Japan, which can not only offer a critical intervention to the de-racialising move discussed in this section but also articulate a new modality of racial government that involves new ways of biometric identification and control of race.

**Mobilising fear: The discourse of security in post-WWII Japan**

During the imperial period, as discussed in the previous chapter, colonial subjects across East Asia – including various tribes in Taiwan, and Chinese and Korean nationals – were racialised through the discourses on civilisation and barbarism. Imperial expansionism and inclusionism was ultimately about the articulation of their ‘civilisational inferiority’ that was incorporated into the discourse of security and that enabled and sustained the Japanese imperial ideology of ‘leading’ East Asia. In the post-WWII context, however, this articulation of racial others had ceased: the discourse of civilisation and barbarism eventually died out; the racial and biologistic classification of bodies was discredited from the field of scientific and political discourses, be it eugenicist or social Darwinist racialisation. At the same time, during the early years of the post-imperial state of Japan, there emerged a new mode of racial othering in which the otherness was produced without the biologistic and naturalist discourse of civilisation and barbarism; instead, it became othering of the former ‘Japanese’, most notably the Korean residents in Japan, through the discourses on security and criminality.

Contemporary scholars of postwar Japan (for example, Chung 2010: chapter 2; Morris-Suzuki 2010: chapter 3 and 4) noted that, at the end of World War II, the post-imperial Japanese government notoriously excluded former colonial subjects who had
been resident as ‘Japanese’ under the imperial subjection of ‘shinmin’ (‘subject of the emperor’) in the mainland of Japan. In the immediate aftermath of the war, there were a remarkable number of Koreans, as well as Taiwanese to a lesser degree, inside the country – the population that is commonly known as ‘Zainichi’ (literally, ‘staying in Japan’ or ‘existing in Japan’). The Zainichi population was predominantly as a result of immigration from its colonies during the preceding decades, which had rapidly increased since the early twentieth century. In particular, the Korean population had increased since the Annexation of Korea in 1910, and the number went even greater as labour force since the late 1930s as the empire went into the Second Shino-Japanese War and eventually into World War II (Sellek 2001: 18). By the end of the war, the Korean population in Japan was estimated to be more than two million (Sellek 2001: 19).

Under the imperial government, despite the fact that racism was rife, these non-Japanese populations were nevertheless regarded as ‘Japanese’, and to some degree, their social and political rights were granted: for example, the legal restriction of immigration to Japan for Koreans had been abolished in 1922; also, their rights to vote in the Japanese elections were granted since 1925 (Chung 2010: 68). Following the Japanese surrender to the Allied Forces in August 1945, however, the imperial subjection of ‘shinmin’ came to be abolished during its decolonisation process: the geographical decolonisation in which the imperial territories across East Asia such as the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, and Manchuria, took place together with the decolonisation of the imperial subjection whereby they were ‘re-nationalised’, as it were, to the country of origin, be it Korea or Taiwan. During this decolonisation process former colonial subjects were unilaterally excluded from the post-imperial state of Japan, the decolonisation process that is arguably peculiar to Japan. As Erin
Aeran Chung puts it, “whereas European colonial powers opened their doors to former colonial subjects and affirmed their rights to citizenship during the process of decolonization, Japan closed its borders and unilaterally stripped former colonial subjects of their Japanese citizenship” (Chung 2010: 62-3). The act of depriving their Japanese citizenship is perhaps well illustrated in the promulgation of two alien registration laws that produced their ‘alienness’. Former colonial subjects had first time been legally, yet temporarily, pronounced as ‘aliens’ in Gaikokujin tōroku rei of 1947 (‘Alien Registration Ordinance’). Furthermore, immediately after the end of Allied Occupation, the Ordinance was followed by Gaikokujin tōroku hō of 1952 (‘Alien Registration Act’) in which their ‘temporal’ alienness was made permanent.63

However, while such de jure articulation of the status of former colonial subjects arguably played a significant role in the post-imperial government of racial others, racialisation must not be solely reduced to it for understanding of their political subjectivity. Or to put it more bluntly, the post-imperial mode of racism was irreducible to a plain diagnosis of ‘racism against foreigners’.

In this section, I will first contextualise the status of former colonial subjects in the immediate aftermath of World War II, the context in which they neither remained ‘Japanese’ nor became ‘foreigners’. After illustrating the limitation of legal articulation in which the status of former colonial subjects essentially lay in ambiguity, I will then analyse the discursive construction of race in post-WWII Japan, which indicates a transformation in the operations of racism. The scope of analysis here focuses on postwar political discourses in the second half of the 1940s – namely, parliamentary discourses and the 1945 electoral reform – in which biopolitical racialisation of the Zainichi population was conducted without referring to the

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63 For the ‘temporality’ of the non-Japanese status of former colonial subjects, see, for example, Ōnuma Yasuaki (1986: 48). These laws will be discussed in the subsequent section.
biological concept of race (*jinshu*) but in cultural and behavioural terms. Like the colonial model of racism, the discourse of security, as I will show, were once again heavily incorporated into and constitutive of this emergent racialisation but not so much in terms of the nineteenth century idea of degeneracy or barbarism as of the postwar notion of public order and security.

‘Third Country Nationals’: From ambiguity to criminality

Upon the collapse of the empire and its consequent decolonisation process, the status of former colonial subjects became increasingly ambiguous, and repeatedly described with reference to the term ‘Third Country Nationals’ (*dai-Sangokujin*) by the Japanese government since the very early years of the Allied Occupation (1945 – 1952). Under the Allied Occupation of Japan, the legal and political status of the *Zainichi* population became ambiguous in that they were commensurable neither with the duality of the postwar Japanese political structure – i.e. Japan and the Allied Forces – nor with the political framework of the international whereby each person is given at least one nationality.

Legal scholar Takano Yūichi defined the term in 1947 as follows:

Third Country Nationals means those who are not the Allied nationals or neutral nationals, that is to say, foreign nationals, and at the same time who do not necessarily have the same status of Japanese; [in short, it means] Koreans

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64 The term ‘*dai-Sangokujin*’, or simply ‘*Sangokujin*’, has recently drawn public attention in Japan after Governor of Tokyo Ishihara Shintarō’s nationalistic statement addressing to the Japanese Self-Defence Forces in April 2000, which he used the term as a synonym for ‘foreigners’ (*gaikokujin*) in the context that he highlighted the increasing number of crimes by foreigners in today’s Tokyo. Ishihara’s use of the term has since been criticised as a discriminatory and insensitive word to the *Zainichi* population by the Korean communities, its sympathisers, scholars, and the like (for example, Mizuno 2010; Chōsen kenkyūkai undated). Also, the use of the term ‘*dai-Sangokujin*’ was criticised in the late twentieth century: one of its earlier criticisms can be found in the early 1970s when the term was used in a manga magazine (Utsumi 1971).
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and other ‘nationals of countries formerly under the domination of Japan’.
They may be called the liberated people, so to speak. (Takano cited in Utsumi 1971: 16)

This definition in a legal journal article was also adopted in the governmental articulation of the term: for example, the Metropolitan Police Department published a similar definition in 1949 (Utsumi 1971: 16). In the meantime, these ‘liberated people’ were, however, never fully liberated or autonomous but remained subject to the regulation of the Japanese government in collaboration with the Allied Forces:

Like ordinary Japanese, they were, as a general rule, under the Japanese jurisdiction, administrative authority, and in particular follow local legislation rules. That is to say, their status is different from foreigners in general. The same can be said of monetary measures, taxation, food distribution, and police authority. (Takano cited in Fujinaga undated)

From the side of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (aka SCAP) too, the ambiguous status of the Zainichi population was also highlighted: “You will treat Formosan-Chinese and Koreans as liberated people in so far as military security permits. They are not included in the term ‘Japanese’ … but they have been Japanese subjects and may be treated by you, in case of necessity, as enemy nationals” (cited in Morris-Suzuki 2010: 59).

From these points of view, it may be said that the subjectivity of Third Country Nationals lay in ambiguity that was neither ‘us’ nor ‘them’: it was neither the imperial perpetrator nor the victorious Allied Forces; it was neither the (Japanese) nationals nor foreign nationals. Or to put it conversely, they were both Japanese and foreigners at the same time: they were regulated under the Japanese government and subject to the Japanese jurisdiction, while their colonial subjectivity as ‘Japanese’ was officially
denounced as untenable. The status of former colonial subjects in the immediate aftermath of the war, in other words, indicates a temporally *undecidable* moment of political subjectivity: it was no longer associated in the imperial configuration of subjectivity; nor did it neatly fall into the structure of the international where political subjectivity is understood in terms of nationals and foreigners, or better, nationals and foreign *nationals* with respect to the presumption that to be a foreigner is to be another national.

In terms of legal articulation, their ambiguous status had continued until the promulgation of *Gaikokujin tōroku rei* (*Alien Registration Ordinance*) in 1947, and its successor, *Gaikokujin tōroku hō* (*Alien Registration Act*) in 1952, which pronounced them ‘aliens’ or ‘foreigners’. If postcolonial racial otherness in Japan was indeed reducible to these legal articulations of ‘foreigner’ then this begs the question: How were Third Country Nationals articulated and understood between 1945 when they lost ‘our’ national and a moment and when they were pronounced as ‘their’ (foreign) nationals, be it 1947 or 1952? The analysis of earlier discourses on Third Country Nationals illustrates the production of postcolonial racinality that was not simply the result of the status of being foreigners, but rather an emerging constituent of the latter.

As discussed in Chapter One, Dillon suggested that the status of the unknown is where the politics of security intervenes: the unknown is to be mastered by a positive act of constitutive othering and of teaching fear (see Dillon 1996: 34). Dillon’s theorisation of the politics of security in terms of the education of fear helps to understand the process in which the ambiguous status of former colonial subjects in post-WWII Japan was made intelligible.

Since the very early years of post-WWII Japan, the otherness of former colonial subjects began to be articulated in the discourses on public security whereby they
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were consistently described in lawlessness and criminality. Throughout early parliamentary discussions, they were repeatedly problematised and described as subversives and criminals that obstruct the security of ‘our’ Japan:

Upon the end of the war, Taiwanese and Koreans … ignore the public order, laws, and regulation of our Japan and take arrogant behaviours that we cannot shut our eyes.

Shiikuma Saburō, Member of the House of Representatives

(Teikoku gikai Shūgiin 1946: 3)

With regard to Third Country Nationals, some of them are frequently engaging with black-marketing activities, some of them steal a ride on a train and engages with violent behaviours on a train. Such activities discomfort the nation as a whole and this is a serious element disturbing the public security of our country.

Ōmura Seiichi, Minister of State

(Teikoku gikai Shūgiin 1946: 4)

This plenary session at the House of Representatives in August 1946 is one of many examples in the second half of the 1940s that discussed the maintenance of postwar public order and security whereby former colonial subjects were exclusively problematised. Elsewhere, some members of the House of Representatives went even further to propose a ‘democratised’ form of a public security preservation law entitled the ‘Public Moral Control Act’ (Fūkyō torishimari hō) for the regulation of Third Country Nationals:

A Proposal for a Democratic Establishment of the Public Morals Control Act:

For the construction of a democratic and peaceful nation, we had already repealed the Public Security Preservation Act, and freedom of speech,
assemble, and association are now assured. … [But] illegal activities by Third Country Nationals are prevalent and cannot be ignored. … Therefore, we desire that the government should immediately establish a public morals control act and establish the basis of a peaceful nation.

Imai Hatsu, Member of the House of Representatives, et al.

(Kanpō 1946: 58, 60)

In particular, the lawlessness and criminality of the Zainichi Koreans such as black-marketing was often highlighted by both the Japanese government and the SCAP:

It is estimated that some five thousand Koreans landed at night, have been rounded up and returned [to their homeland]. The influx of Koreans is a menace to the health of the Occupation and the Japanese nation as a whole. … Some Koreans come to Japan to operate in the blackmarket.

Douglas MacArthur, SCAP

(cited in Conde 1947: 43)

Especially Third Country Nationals [are openly black marketing]. Or sales of staple food under the names of Third Country Nationals are openly traded. If you go around Asakusa district [in Tokyo], they are openly selling. … Last month when I boarded on the train from Nagaoka city [in Niigata] to Ueno district [in Tokyo], it was an almost black-marketing train. Everyone has a large bag of rice. One Korean among these people openly told me that s/he has itto [approximately 15 kg] of rice.

Arahata Katsuzo, Member of the House of Representatives

(Teikoku gikai Shūgiin 1947a: 2)
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Such post-imperial articulation of the Zainichi Koreans in the discourses on security and criminality was consistent throughout parliamentary debates, during these early years of post-imperial Japan. Perhaps, it was nowhere more strikingly manifest than in Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru’s letter to General Douglas MacArthur, which is thought to have written later in September 1949:

One of the post-war problems in Japan is about Koreans and Taiwanese who were previously Japanese nationals and who have remained in Japan today. For the moment, I will not mention the problems with Taiwanese because the number of Taiwanese residents is relatively low and they hardly cause problems. However, we have to resolve problems about Korean residents immediately. There are about one million people, and about half of them are illegal immigrants. I personally hope that all of these Koreans will return to their mother country. The reason of this is as follows:

(1) Regarding to the current and future situation of food supply in Japan, it is impossible to preserve a spare population. By the courtesy of the United States, Japan is importing a large quantity of food, and using a part of it to maintain Koreans. This kind of import will impose a burden on the future generation [of Japan]. I think it is unfair to impose this part of burden owed to the United States for Koreans on the future generation;

(2) A vast majority of Koreans do not contribute to restoration of Japanese economy at all;

(3) Even worse, subversive elements account for a large proportion among Koreans. They are regular violators of Japanese economic laws and ordinances. Most of them are communists or sympathisers, have a strong
tendency to commit the most villainous kind of political crime, and its situation is that there are always more than 7,000 [Koreans] in prison.

Yoshida Shigeru, Prime Minister
(cited in Ōnuma 1979: 96-7)

With regard to the issues of illegal immigration of Koreans and black-marketing by Koreans that were highlighted by the Prime Minister, the SCAP, as well as Japanese politicians in general, it is important to note, as Tessa Morris-Suzuki (2010: chapter 3) has emphasised, that those so-called ‘illegal immigrants’ during this period were largely those who had previously lived in Japan and simply tried to re-enter Japan, and black-marketing was rampant among both Japanese and Koreans, the latter arguably accounts for only a small proportion. Despite this, the threat of the Zainichi Koreans to the postwar reconstruction of Japan was continuously and widely discussed in these years.

Since the early years of post-WWII Japan, former colonial subjects, in particular Koreans, were exclusively problematised and criminalised – in short, they were racialised in biopolitical terms, being articulated as a threat to the postwar public order and security. This discursive construction of postcolonial race was thoroughly rife in parliamentary debates in these years despite the fact that it was a period of social and political unrest across the country regardless of nationality. The postwar discourses on security, in short, contributed to the production of knowledge of ‘what these Koreans are’ whose subjectivity, at least in legal terms, essentially lay in ambiguity. The postwar discourses on security as an emergent form of racialisation was also manifested in the 1945 electoral reform, which, together with these

65 Morris-Suzuki (2010: 67) points out that the proportion of Korean immigrants intending to trade in the black-market was arguably about ten per cent.
parliamentary debates, can shed light on the reconfiguration and transformation of biopolitical racism in post-WWII Japan at the discursive level.

*Postwar democracy and its discontents in the 1945 electoral reform*

The constitutive nature of the discourses on security and criminality in the production of the racialised knowledge of former colonial subjects can be also found in the process of the postwar electoral reform in December 1945 in which the Korean suffrage was deprived not simply because of their pre-imperial belonging but arguably because of the postwar security concerns.

As I have mentioned earlier in this section, the suffrage – both the right to vote and eligibility for election – had been granted for *shinmin* including the Korean population during the imperial period. The 1925 electoral reform had granted ‘universal’ – in the sense that it was the first time reform in the country that removed the tax qualification – yet male suffrage that was applied both ‘Japanese proper’ (*naichijin*) and ‘Japanese’ *shinmin* as long as they were resident in the mainland of Japan. As a result, they were, at least to some extent, integrated in Japanese politics during the imperial period: for example, in the 1930s a Korean candidate Pak Chun-geum was elected as a member of the House of Representatives (see Matsuda 1995: chapter 3).

As one of the core democratic reforms of postwar Japan, the 1925 ‘universal’ suffrage was further expanded in the 1945 electoral reform by “lowering the age limit of the voter from 25 to 20 years and that of the person eligible to election from 30 to 25 years, granting franchise and eligibility to women” (Kiyose 1946: 6). Granting the franchise to women first time in the country, the 1945 electoral reform may be understood as ‘universal’ and the postwar democratisation of the Japanese political structure. On this aspect, its democratisation seems to show some level of its success:
at the subsequent election, the 22nd general election on 10 April 1946, a number of female candidates including Imai Hatsu mentioned above were elected. In the meantime, however, it was the 1945 electoral reform that deprived the suffrage for former colonial subjects despite that they were still regarded as ‘Japanese’ in 1945.

The official explanation for the deprivation of their decades-old suffrage was concerned with the decolonisation of Imperial Japan under the Potsdam Declaration. Upon the promulgation of the 1945 House of Representatives Election Act, Kiyose Ichirō, a newly appointed chairman for the committee for the electoral reform, stated:

With regard to the issue on the suffrage for Koreans and Taiwanese, we have agreed that it is appropriate to temporarily suspend it. In the ground of acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, Korea and Taiwan will sooner or later secede from the imperial territory, and accordingly Koreans and Taiwanese are in principle thought to lose the nationality of the empire. (Teikoku gikai Shūgiin 1945a: 1)

Carefully articulating that they were ‘thought’ to lose the Japanese nationality, Kiyose acknowledged the ambiguous status of former colonial subjects in this context: he noted that they are also thought to have a legal status as ‘Japanese’ until some treaty eventually determines (Teikoku gikai Shūgiin 1945a: 1). Yet, such ambiguity eventually resulted in a ‘temporal’ suspension of their suffrage as the committee concluded that it was not appropriate for them to participate in the postwar election.

There are two points to note here. First, as Kiyose’s conclusive explanation shows, depriving of their suffrage on the basis of the assumption of ‘foreigners-to-be’ indicates that there was no option for them to acquire the Japanese, or dual, nationality. Second, more importantly for the articulation of the postcolonial other, although the legal framework in the process of decolonisation may sound pertinent,
especially if they chose to leave the country, the decision made by December 1945 was not uniformly supported during the initial period of the reform.

At the initial stage of the electoral reform, the Japanese government was rather in favour of the opposite approach: in fact, they proposed to preserve the suffrage for former colonial subjects. In *Shūgiin giin senkyo seido kaisei yōkō* (‘Outline of the Revision for the Electoral System at the House of Representatives’), which was officially decided in the cabinet meeting and published on 23rd October 1945, the following article was included:

**Article 6 Measures on Korean and Taiwanese Residents in the Mainland:**

Korean and Taiwanese residents in the mainland shall be granted the franchise and eligibility for election. (Cited in Chihō jichi kenkyū sentā 1977: 11)

A month later, by 21st November, however, this article on the Korean and Taiwanese suffrage abruptly disappeared. Instead, the article on ‘*koseki*’, a civil registry whose unit is family and that indicates if one is ‘Japanese proper’ (*naichijin*) or those from the colonies (*gaichijin*), was included, which was used for the basis of the deprivation of the Korean and Taiwanese suffrage (Chihō jichi kenkyū centā 1977: 16-8).

Within about one month, the electoral reform went one pole to the totally opposite pole; needless to say, no legal articulation of their status had changed during this one month.

A closer look at the process of the 1945 electoral reform would shed light on this sudden shift in political subjectivity of former colonial subjects, which the discourses on security appears constitutive of such exclusionary practice. Between 23rd October and 21st November, Kiyose had repeatedly argued against the initial decision in the

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66 *Koseki* is a registration system that had also been applied during the imperial period when colonial subjects were, despite their ‘Japanese’ nationality, registered separately from ‘Japanese proper’. The *koseki* system has been criticised for being discriminatory not only in terms of colonial subjects but also in terms of gender, the feudal caste system, and extramarital children. See Satō Bunmei (1984).
Outline of October; he had expressed “serious doubt” on the government’s decision on the suffrage of Koreans and Taiwanese “with regard not only to their legal status in theory but also to political reality [seiji no jissaijyō]” (cited in Mizuno 1996). In one of two memoranda that are thought to have been submitted to the committee during this period, Kiyose outlined six points to illustrate why Koreans and Taiwanese should be deprived of their suffrage. While most of them are concerned with their legal status, one of them addresses exclusively his political and security concern:

The political doubt that I mentioned at the beginning [of the memorandum] is nothing other than this: … In our country there has been no national [minzoku] division in the past, and conducting election for each nation is unprecedented. This time [i.e., the Outline] may begin this. What would happen if this were coupled with ideology? I am seriously concerned about this. At the next election, Korean candidates would advance the abolishment of the emperor system. (Cited in Mizuno 1996)

This memorandum shows a constitutive element in the final decision in December that was omitted in the official explanation of the deprivation. For Kiyose, the deprivation of the Korean and Taiwanese suffrage was not solely in consideration of the legal articulation as in the committee’s explanation in December but it was combined with political and security measures to prevent subversives – an example given here is one against the emperor system – and the national division (minzoku no bunretsu). The homogeneity of the nation, in particular, was also emphasised elsewhere: for example, at a plenary session of the House of Representatives in December, Kiyose emphasised the term “Japanese nation” (nihon kokumin), and describing Japan as “one nation, one country” (Teikoku gikai Shūgiin 1945b: 11), which at the same time ignored the imperial discourse of multi-ethnic empire.
One may perceive the 1945 Election Act as a successful democratisation move in post-WWII Japan; but as a matter of fact, it coincided with and was inextricable from a rather undemocratic exclusionary act towards former colonial subjects. Or to put it another way, the postwar Japanese democratisation was in part founded upon what may be called an “absolutely nondemocratic condition” (cf. Balibar 2004: 109). It was, furthermore, nondemocratic at two levels: it was an abrupt exclusion and selection of the subject of the suffrage; and moreover, this act of exclusion was even conducted in the absence of the legal articulation but by the discourse of security where the notion of potential dangerousness constituted their subjectivity without being a foreigner in law.

What the 1945 electoral reform, along with postwar parliamentary debates concerning postwar public order and security more broadly, show is a transformation of the model of biopolitical racism that was no longer configured by the nineteenth-century notion of degeneracy, which had previously played a crucial role in the colonial model of biopolitical racism in Japan as well as in Nazi state racism that Foucault (2004) explored. This emergent model of biopolitical racism was configured by the postwar notion of public order and security whereby the Zainichi population, particularly the Zainichi Koreans, were criminalised.

Certainly, the idea of criminality was also constitutive of the colonial discourses of race: for example, criminalisation of Korean students in the 1921 Kubo incident that I discussed in Chapter Three. Despite such analogous elements between two historical contexts, the postwar discursive racialisation must be understood as the emergence of a new model of biopolitical racism in that it transformed the ways in which the idea of race was constituted. Unlike the colonial model, the biologicist conceptualisation of race – and in fact the explicit use of the term race (jinshu) – was
absent in the postwar discursive racialisation; instead, the criminality of the Zainichi Koreans was articulated in more cultural and behavioural terms. To put it bluntly, they were racialised not because of their heredity but because of their behaviours. Yet, importantly, the idea of dangerousness here, as Foucault put it in the epigraph of this chapter, concerned not so much with their actual criminal behaviours as with their potentialities whereby the generalised racial subjectivity of the Zainichi Koreans was made possible.

In the next section, I will analyse the ways in which this transformation of the model of biopolitical racism at the discursive level interplayed with the political deployment and practices of biometric identification in post-WWII Japan. Against a progressive view on the history of biometrics in the post-WWII context illustrated in the first section of this chapter, I will articulate an emergent modality of racial government through biometrics that involved new ways of identifying and controlling race. That is to say, if the present section explicated the persistence of racism despite the post-WWII international denouncement of racism, the next section focuses on remodelling of seemingly de-racialised biometrics as a political technology of race.

**Biometrics as a forensic-political technology of race**

On 30th August 1949, after the dissolution of the empire, Professor Furuhata Tanemoto was invited as an expert witness at the Committee of Judicial Affairs at the House of Representatives for his expertise in fingerprinting (Kokkai Shūgiin 1949c). At this postwar national committee, however, Furuhata, who had contributed to the construction of scientific knowledge of race by initiating the studies of shimon keisū in prewar Japan (see Chapter Three), was not invited in his advisory capacity to suggest the official implementation to classify racial groups. Nor did he say a word on
any potentiality of fingerprinting as classification – be it racial or gendered – throughout the committee. Instead, Furuhata’s advisory capacity was exclusively about fingerprinting as a technique of forensic identification for the future scientific criminal investigation in the country, a use of fingerprinting that has been conventionally known to this day.

As compared with the imperial context, Furuhata’s figure in this post-WWII context may depict an historical discontinuity in the scientificity of biometric identification: it depicts a shift in the scientificity of biometrics, a shift in what scientists can know, or what scientists can say, from the analysis of fingerprint patterns. Following similar developments in many Western societies during the late 1930s (Cole 2001: 112-3; see also Chapter One), the ‘raciological’ classification of biometrics gradually became something unsayable and deemed a kind of ‘pseudoscience’ in postwar Japan. The scientific authority of biometric knowledge had gradually shifted from classificatory identification to individual identification. In a nutshell, this was an historical shift in the scientific rationality in the field of biometrics.

This section critically investigates this ‘new’, de-racialised, biometrics – namely, fingerprinting as a forensic technology of individualisation – in the context of post-WWII Japan for my scrutiny of biopolitical relations between biometrics and racism. First, I will trace its history back to the initial introduction of fingerprinting in early twentieth-century Japan when fingerprinting as individualisation was implemented as a modern technology of penal governance. From its initial deployment for the management of recidivism as well as a forensic science in the subsequent years, I will show that fingerprinting as individualisation emerged as a technology of monitoring – as opposed to a technology of ‘diagnosing’ as in the colonial model – and its
mechanisms of power were embedded in surveillance, which was both panoptic (Foucault 1979) and beyond. The section then analyses the political deployment of this surveillant mode of biometrics for the management of public order and security, through monitoring suspect populations. In particular, I will closely look at the introduction of fingerprinting surveillance that exclusively targeted the Zainichi population under the 1952 Gaikokujin tōroku hō (Alien Registration Act). The analysis of fingerprinting surveillance under Gaitō hō, I will argue, does not simply exhibit the continuous political deployment of biometrics as a technology of race. It can also shed light on a new modality of racial government whereby the ways in which biometrics subjectify and control race were transformed from the colonial model.

**Recidivism and the birth of modern identification**

In Japan, as touched upon in Chapter Three, the fingerprint system – or sometimes called ‘shimon hō’ in Japanese – was first introduced as part of the penal reform in the early twentieth century.

In April 1907, the Penal Code (Keihō) was promulgated – that came into force in October 1908 – that aggravated punishments for recidivism: Chapter 10 on Recidivism (Ruihan) described the aggravation including a controversial article 58 in which the aggravation for recidivism can be applied even after a judgment is made at the court (Keihō 1907). Upon this penal reform, the Ministry of Justice (Shiho-shō) formed a group of officials, named the ‘Association for the Investigation of Criminal Identification’ (Hanzai-nin idō shikibetsu hō torishirabe-kai) in order to develop an effective method of recidivist, as well as more broadly criminal, identification. The Association – whose members included Hiranuma Kiichirō, the director of the Penal Bureau (Minkei-kyoku) at that time and also the 35th Prime Minister during 1939, Ōba
Shigema, a councillor at the Ministry, and Oyama Atsushi, the director of the Prison Bureau (Kangoku-kyoku)\(^{67}\) – had studied fingerprint systems in Europe and soon translated them to the management of recidivism before the enforcement of the Penal Code.

In August 1908, Hiranuma, a representative of the Association, introduced two biometric identification systems – the Bertillonian anthropometric system and the fingerprint system – in the journal Kangoku kyōkai zasshi (‘Magazine of the Prison Society of Japan’) (Hiranuma 1908).\(^{68}\) In his article, Hiranuma (1908) interpreted the inclusion of Article 58 – which was later deleted from the Code – as an indication of the current lack of an effective and prompt identification method, and argued that Article 58 would not be necessary once we established the effective method. He problematised existing methods of identification that were either ineffective or infeasible: for example, the official documentation of personal information such as name, address, age, and so forth, can be easily deceived. The Bertillonian anthropometrics had previously been introduced in the late nineteenth century by Kaji Shōtarō in the journal, Dai-nihon kangoku kyōkai zasshi (with its French title, Bulletin de la Société Pénitentiaire du Japon), a predecessor of Kangoku kyōkai zasshi in the late nineteenth century (Kaji 1888). However, upon the penal reform, Hiranuma argued that while the Bertillon system would be a reliable identification method, it would be ineffective or unfeasible in practice; he problematised its cost in terms of economic concerns – because the Bertillon system requires reliable machines that accurately and consistently measure various parts of a body – and time – because each measurement of bodies requires substantial time. These aspects were also the reasons

\(^{67}\) For the list of the members of the Association, see Furuhata (1930: 394).

\(^{68}\) Earlier, the journal was also titled as ‘Bulletin of the Society of Penitentiary’ in English in the original. This article is based on Hiranuma’s speech made a month earlier, on July 1908, which was three months prior to the actual implementation of the fingerprint system in the penal regime.
why the Bertillon system, which was implemented for criminal identification in the 1880s, had gradually disappeared from the field of criminal identification in Europe including its birthplace France.\(^{69}\)

Pointing out these issues with the Bertillon system, Hiranuma (1908) proposed the fingerprint system for the official identification method. In the article, explaining the various developments of the fingerprint system in nineteenth-century England and its colonial India – namely, by Galton, William Herschel, and others – Hiranuma proposed the implementation of the Henry system – developed by the head of the Metropolitan Police Sir Edward Henry (1850 – 1931) – for the Japanese penal management. A month later, Ōba (1908) similarly introduced various fingerprint systems including the Hamburg system – or the Roscher system after the name of the chief Hamburg police Gustav Roscher (1852 – 1915) – that was predominantly based on, but also greatly improved from, the Henry system. Based on these studies, on 14\(^{th}\) September 1908, the Association wrote a report to Minister of Justice Okabe Nagamoto, proposing the fingerprint system – namely its latest model of the Hamburg system (Furuhata 1930: 301) – as the effective and practical criminal identification method (Kangoku kyōkai zasshi 1908a; see also Furuhata 1930: 394-403). A month later, on 16\(^{th}\) October, upon the enforcement of the Penal Code, fingerprinting was enforced first time in the country as criminal identification; it was initiated by fingerprinting convicts for the management of recidivism (Kangoku kyōkai zasshi 1908b).

The introduction of fingerprinting was at the same time about a Japanese modernisation process of the penal reform, which may appear parallel to the modern penal reform in eighteenth-century Europe that Foucault (1979) discussed in

\(^{69}\) For further details of the Bertillon system, see Cole (2001) and also my discussion in Chapter One.
Discipline and Punish. The emergence of fingerprinting as a modern identification system reflected the abolishment of ‘pre-modern’, as it were, criminal identification. During the Edo period, criminal identification was conducted through marking on flesh: tattooing, known as boku kē (‘ink punishment’) or irezumi kē (‘tattoo punishment’), was widely used to identify recidivists (see van Gulik 1982: chapter 1). Boku kē was one of the punishments translated from Go kē (‘Five Punishments’) in Ancient China, which were corporal punishments. All ‘Five Punishments’ were conducted on physical bodies: ‘boku’ as tattooing; ‘gi’ as the rhinotomy or mutilation of nose; ‘hi’ as the mutilation of a leg; ‘kyū’ as the castration for men or the confinement for women; and ‘taiheki’ as capital punishment. It is recorded that tattooing as punitive identification was widely used at least until the early eighteenth century, marking, or ‘inking’, particular characters or symbols, mainly either on the forehead or an arm of a convict, depending on feudal domains. The punitive tattooing was used for identification of recidivists and its method was accumulative: for example, upon the first conviction, one black stripe was tattooed on the left arm of a convict; if the offence were repeated another stripe would be added (van Gulik 1982: 11-2). Another example is tattooing a character of ‘dog’, consisting of four lines, on a convict’s forehead (van Gulik 1982: 11-12).

Punitive tattooing was eventually abolished at the beginning of the Meiji period when tattoos in general were prohibited until 1948. It’s abolishment was in part due to the civilisation, or Westernisation, project of Japan. During the early years of the Meiji period, under the ideology of ‘civilisation and enlightenment’ (bunmei kaika), the Japanese concern with the ‘Western eyes’, which I discussed in Chapter Three,
also arguably contributed to the prohibition of customary practices that were thought to be ‘un-civilised’, ‘barbarous’, or ‘pre-modern’: customary practices such as the exposure of skin in the public, ‘mixed’ (between men and women) bathing, and pornography (shunga), came to be prohibited (Yamamoto 1997: 93). Similarly, tattooing was prohibited: “Shortly after the Emperor Meiji took power in 1868, new regulations made tattooing illegal, partly on the grounds that the defacement of the body was against the teachings of Confucius, and partly because it was considered a barbaric custom which humiliated Japan in the eyes of Europe” (Scutt and Gotch 1974: 48). The ‘pre-modern’ or ‘barbarous’ biometric identification of punitive tattooing was then replaced by the ‘modern’ biometric identification of fingerprinting in the early twentieth century as a more effective – than documentation – identification of recidivists.

The emergence of fingerprinting has a number of impacts on the operation of power, which was enabled by its invisible structure of surveillance that Foucault theorised and distinguished from a juridical model of power (see Chapter One and Two). Like the panoptic surveillance that emerged in the eighteenth-century European penal regime (Foucault 1979), the operation of punitive fingerprinting can involve the indirect power of normalisation over individual behaviours. Once a convict was fingerprinted, he or she will be embedded within the invisible structure of visualisation: a convict’s criminal record is exposed in its biometric data where the governance of recidivism inheres in this invisibility, that is to say, in the potentiality of being monitored without a visible observer, or a surveill-ant. Within this surveillance structure of power, a convict’s behaviour (i.e., recidivism) can be regulated, or ‘disciplined’ in Foucault’s (1979) terms, without the physicality of
punishment such as corporal mutilation and beyond a juridical model of ‘you must not’.

However, it should be noted that unlike the panoptic surveillance, this mechanism of biometric surveillance did not require the architectural confinement, which is a crucial point for the operation of another mechanism of power, namely the security mechanism of identification as in the field of forensics – the mechanism that was equally foreign to punitive tattooing. While the fingerprinting system for the penal regime was initially and primarily about the means of identifying recidivism, this surveillant structure of fingerprinting also made its forensic use possible. In his introduction of the fingerprinting system in 1908, Hiranuma emphasised the superiority of fingerprinting over Bertillonian anthropometrics due to the fact that the latter would require a body to be present for identification, while the former would enable criminal investigation to identify fingerprints left at a crime scene (Hiranuma 1908: 20). Indeed, Hiranuma’s interpretation of fingerprinting as forensic identification came to be approved two decades after the initial introduction, in the arrest of Tsumaki Matsukichi in 1929.

Tsumaki Matsukichi was a repeated robber and rapist in Tokyo during the late 1920s until his arrest in 1929.⁷¹ In 1927, between 19th March and 28th June, there had been seven robberies in Tokyo whose modus operandi was all similar to one another. One of their common peculiar modus operandi was ‘preaching a sermon’ or ‘lecturing’ a victim during robberies: while breaking in at a house, confining residents, or assaulting women and children, the robber repeatedly lectured a victim about the prevention of robbery, advising them to strengthen lock-up, to have a watchdog, to light up a house, and so forth. The robberies were accordingly called

⁷¹ For the details of the incident, see Furuhata (1930: 346-54).
sekkyō gōtō (‘sermon or lecturing robbery’). Sekkyō gōtō, including its copycat criminals, continued during the late 1920s, which was eventually discussed at the parliamentary debates on public security. The severity of the crime was noticeable: for example, the number of the officials who involves in the investigation reached 9,440 by January 1929 (Furuhata 1930: 347-9). While the situation had been without success, during an investigation meeting a month later in February, an official brought another case that occurred in December 1926 in which fingerprints were found at the entrance of the house that was broken in. After days of identifying these fingerprints against those of recidivists, the official eventually verified them as Tsumaki’s, whose fingerprints were taken for his earlier conviction of larceny, deception, and embezzlement, and who had also been imprisoned during the early 1920s. Soon later, Tsumaki’s fingerprints were also identified with those left at one of the cases of sekkyō gōtō, which eventually led to his arrest on 23rd February 1929. The case of Tsumaki was remarkable in the history of fingerprinting in Japan: as Furuhata put it, it indicated “the ideal example to illustrate how powerful fingerprinting as a scientific criminal investigation was” (Furuhata 1930: 352).

Fingerprinting, in short, became a surveillant technology of power, which was found more effective than the previous model of identification such as punitive tattooing and corporal punishments more broadly. It was found more effective in terms of its surveillance structure that can regulate and discipline individuals such as through the identification of recidivism on their bodies and criminal identification throughout society. The deployment of fingerprinting as a surveillant technology was soon extended and dispersed in post-WWII Japan when it was introduced for the management of public order and security in general.
Postwar national security and fingerprinting

During the early years of postwar unrest, fingerprinting as a surveillant technology that was born of the modern penal reform in the early twentieth century began to be discussed as a technique of civil governance. Furuhata, along with other forensic scientists, was invited as an expert witness to the Committee of Judicial Affairs at the Diet on 30th April 1949, which was held to discuss scientific criminal identification for “the maintenance of national security” (Kokkai Shūgiin 1949c: 1). In particular, the Committee was held to discuss on the Shimoyama incident that had occurred a month earlier.

On 5th July of the same year, Shimoyama Sadanori, the first president of Japanese National Railways (Nihon kokuyū tetsudō, often known as its abbreviation, Kokutetsu), went missing and was found dead and dismembered on the railway line in Adachi ward, Tokyo, on the next day. The official autopsy of Shimoyama’s body was conducted by a forensic pathology school at Tokyo University, led by Furuhata and Kuwashima Naoki, the latter as the person in charge (Kokkai Shūgiin 1949c: 5), both as the leading figures of the classificatory studies of shimon keisū less than two decades ago.72 Despite the autopsy, the incident itself has remained unresolved – unresolved of whether the incident was a murder or a suicide to this day – and, with two other incidents related to National Railways that occurred during the summer, is sometimes regarded as generically the ‘National Railways’ Three Big Mysteries’.73

At this particular Committee on Judicial Affairs, Furuhata was asked by a member of Shūgiin regarding to identification of this dismembered body. He stated:

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72 For their studies of shimon keisū, see Chapter Three.
73 Along with two other incidents – the Mitaka incident that occurred in Mitaka, Tokyo, on 15 July 1949, and the Matsukawa incident in Fukushima on 17 August 1949 – they are sometimes called Kokutesu sandai mystery.
We took fingerprints of the body as Dr. Kuwashima had suggested, but [the problem is that] the fingerprints of President Shimoyama had not been taken. That is to say, we cannot identify between the fingerprints of the body and that of the president. … [However,] we used the fingerprints that had been [separately] detected from [Shimoyama’s] drawer and the like by the section of criminal identification in order to verify the body as Shimoyama. (Kokkai Shūgiin 1949c: 11)

Emphasising the importance of fingerprinting as forensic identification, among other physical records such as tattoos, moles, and scars, as individualisation for the scientific criminal investigation, Furuhata suggested the necessity for the introduction of fingerprinting not simply for the purpose of identification of bodies as in Shimoyama’s case but for the purpose of total surveillance of the society at large. He stated:

It is very much necessary to collect fingerprints of the nation in these circumstances [circumstances in which they cannot verify a body because no fingerprinted was collected prior to a crime scene]. The fingerprint registration of the nation must be done. If we collect fingerprints at companies, schools, and the like, it will be very useful to know the movement of that person. (Kokkai Shūgiin 1949c: 11)

The proposal for fingerprinting the nation, which is sometimes referred to ‘Kokumin shimon hō’ (‘National Fingerprint Act’), was not exclusive to Furuhata’s individual will but it was a prevailing notion in this period. The national fingerprinting surveillance was earlier proposed during another parliamentary discussion on scientific criminal investigation (Kokkai Shūgiin 1949b: 7). Also, in the subsequent year, its official petition – called ‘A Petition for the Establishment of the National
Fingerprint’ – was repeatedly made during November and December (Kokkai Shūgiin 1950a; 1950b).

The National Fingerprint Act was, however, never legally materialised despite the proposition by Furuhata, other forensic scientists, and state officials especially from the police department. Yet, social surveillance through fingerprinting was tenaciously pursued, and at times conducted at various local areas since the late 1940s: for example, fingerprinting all residents of 14 year-old and above had been conducted in Miyagi prefecture by 1951 (Kokkai Sangiin 1951: 15). Other examples also include: for driving licence holders between 1951 and 1964; successful candidates for civil servant examinations between 1955 and 1970; and all third grade junior high school student in Aichi prefecture between 1955 and 1970 (Tanaka 1995: 86).

Furthermore, fingerprinting was also nationally enacted for surveillance of suspects under the post-WWII reform of the penal regime. According to Shihō ennakushi (‘Judicial History Magazine’) published by the Ministry of Justice, when it was initially introduced in 1908, fingerprinting applied exclusively to convicts: as it was primarily to identify recidivists, fingerprints were not taken prior to a conviction (Watanabe 1999: 279). However, its use was expanded in the postwar context. The 1948 amendment of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Keijisoshō hō) expanded the authority of fingerprinting to monitor suspects. Article 218.2 of the Code states:

For a suspect in custody, his or her fingerprints or footprints may be taken, his or her height or weight may be measured, and his or her photographs may be taken without the warrant set forth in the preceding paragraph in so far as he or she is not stripped naked. (Keijisoshō hō 1948, emphasis added)
Under this amendment, all *suspects in custody* were now subject to fingerprinting regardless of their conviction and without issuing a warrant.\(^74\) The 1948 amendment is an indication of a prevailing trend to deploy fingerprinting as a technology of social surveillance rather than solely as a technology of identifying ex-convicts.

The notion of surveillance of suspects, that is to say, the management of the *potential* criminals, became even clearer in the police use of fingerprinting exclusively towards those who were regarded as a security issue yet not even taken into custody. For example, the Metropolitan Police Department used fingerprinting as a security measure to monitor prostitutes. As Tsukamoto Kyūichi from the Criminal Identification Section stated: “the other use [of fingerprinting by the Metropolitan Police Department] is that we are taking fingerprints of ‘night ladies’ [*yami no on’na*] and prostitutes due to hygiene and security concerns” (Kokkai Shūgiin 1949c: 17).

The increasing deployment of fingerprinting in post-WWII Japan may be characterised as what David Lyon (1994) called ‘surveillance society’ in which biometric identification became more about the management of crime at the societal level through the collection of individual biometric data rather than identification of criminals at the individual level. Fingerprinting as individualisation, which emerged in the early twentieth-century penal reform, was no longer solely about verification of individual bodies – for example, identification of recidivists – but increasingly becoming a security measure to monitor society, which involved surveillance of convicts, suspects, latent prints (i.e., fingerprints left at crime scenes), and so forth.

However, the emergent surveillance society through fingerprinting in post-WWII Japan did not lead to the development of total surveillance of the society at large as the proponents of the ‘National Fingerprint Act’ anticipated. Instead, it was tightly

\(^74\) For the parliamentary debates on the amendment of the Code of Criminal Procedure, see for example, Kokkai Sangiin (1949) and Kokkai Shūgiin (1949a).
entwined with the representation of dangerous groups. And it is this latter aspect that the deployment of fingerprinting surveillance appears to have a (post-)colonial relevance in which former colonial subjects, especially the Zainichi Koreans, became the exclusive target of surveillance, and that helps to understand an emergent biopolitical relation between de-racialised biometrics and racism in this historical context.

Gaitō hō: Postcolonial surveillance

In April 1952, immediately after the end of the Allied Occupation, Gaikokujin tōroku hō (‘Alien Registration Act’) – also known as its abbreviation, and hereafter, Gaitō hō – was promulgated for the management of former colonial subjects in the mainland, predominantly the Zainichi Koreans. The mechanism of Gaitō hō was not simply the documentary registration of aliens as its title may suggest, but also, and more importantly, involved the introduction of the penal model of surveillant identification: fingerprinting was first time legally and nationally enforced as a form of civil governance of the Zainichi population.

Before analysing the surveillant mechanism of Gaitō hō, there are two particular aspects that should be noted in order to understand it as a security measure exclusively against the Zainichi population. The first of these concerns its enunciative function. Unlike the 1940 U.S. Alien Registration Act (aka Smith Act), Gaitō hō, with its predecessor, Gaikokujin tōroku rei (‘Alien Registration Ordinance’, and hereafter Gaitō rei) of 1947, has an enunciative function that enabled a legal articulation of ‘aliens’ in the post-imperial context. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the political and legal status of the Zainichi population in the immediate aftermath of World War II fundamentally lay in ambiguity. On 2nd May 1947, a day before the enforcement of the Constitution of Japan, however, the Zainichi population became legally
pronounced as ‘aliens’ under *Gaitō rei*: Article 11 states, “this ordinance assumed Koreans and Taiwanese … as aliens for the time being”. Hereafter, they were no longer regarded as *shinmin* (‘the subject of the emperor’) or *gaichijin* (‘the people of the overseas territories’) – that is to say, they were no longer ‘Japanese’ – but became *gaikokujin* (‘aliens’ or ‘foreigners’). The temporal aspect in *Gaitō rei* – being aliens ‘for the time being’ – was later made permanent in 1952 by *Gaitō hō* (see also Tanaka 1995: 66; Ōnuma 1986). In short, while the U.S. *Alien Registration Act* was about the governance of aliens, *Gaitō hō*, with its predecessor, *enunciated* the very alien-ness of the former members of the empire in which their political and juridical subjectivity came to being. It was not simply that which enforced registration but at the same time that which articulated the subject of registration.

Secondly, it was not the registration of aliens as a whole but it operated exclusively for the management of the *Zainichi* population, mainly those from the Korean Peninsula. During the early years of post-war Japan, immigration to the country was temporarily suspended: Article 3 of *Gaitō rei* prohibited immigration in general except those who were approved by the SCAP. Accordingly, the ‘alien’ in *Gaitō rei* could be applied to those who were already inside the country, namely the *Zainichi* population and the officials and relatives of the Allied Forces. The latter, as the occupation forces, was exempted from being subject to the registration as in Article 2 of *Gaitō rei*. Even after the Occupation period, the exclusive focus on the *Zainichi* population in the registration was also clear: the mandatory registration of the 1952 *Gaitō hō* was only applied to those who reside or intend to reside for more than 60 days (Article 3), exempting temporal visitors. With regard to these aspects, *Gaitō hō* can be seen as a legal measure exclusively targeting the *Zainichi* Koreans.
As the management of the Zainichi Koreans, Gaitō hō introduced fingerprinting: under Article 14, it mandated those who are 14 year-old and above to provide their fingerprints on various documents – including the document to be kept by the government and the registration card that one is required to carry at all time. Fingerprinting under Gaitō hō was, it should be noted, not the first deployment of the surveillance technique of the Zainichi Koreans. Prior to the enforcement of Gaitō hō in 1955, fingerprinting the Zainichi Koreans was at times conducted at a local scale: for example, in Osaka where a large proportion of the Zainichi Koreans resided, fingerprinting was conducted by a local authority in cooperation with the occupation army in 1946 (Teikoku gikai Shūgiin 1947b: 10). Following the mechanisms of punitive fingerprinting discussed above, the fingerprinting of Gaitō hō has a twofold mechanism: identification at the individual scale in a similar manner to identification of recidivists; and surveillance as a security measure at the social scale in a similar manner to forensic identification. It was rationalised in, respectively, the problems of ‘mitsunyūkoku’ – that can imply both ‘illegal immigration’ and ‘smuggling’\(^\text{75}\) – and in that of ‘kokunai no chian’ (‘domestic or internal security’).

On the one hand, Gaitō hō was said to be an effective identification method at the immigration control, identifying the Zainichi Koreans, that is to say, those whose residency was as a result of the collapse of the empire, and the non-Zainichi Koreans who were newly immigrating to the country by impersonating as the Zainichi Koreans. Since the late 1940s, the officials had warned about the illegal immigration by the forgery of the registration cards – the ones that were not fingerprinted – and

\(^{75}\) During the late 1940s, the term ‘mitsunyūkoku’, which literally means a ‘secret entry to a country’, was used to imply both ‘smugglers’ and ‘illegal immigrants’, sometimes indiscriminately in which the criminalisation of Koreans was persistently manifested. For further linguistic analysis of the term, see Morris-Suzuki (2010: 55).
fingerprinting was extensively discussed as a resolution. For example, a senior officer of the Metropolitan Police Department stated in 1951:

As we all know by now, fingerprints are ‘the million people disparity’ [banjin fudō] … [and] adding fingerprints on it is the best method to prevent the forgery and alteration. This is by no means the aim to criminalise Koreans but rather becomes the good ground to protect and respect the rights of good-natured Koreans. (Kokkai Shūgiin 1951a: 14)

During another Special Committee on Administrative Inspection that took place in August of the same year, the issue of forgery was further highlighted in terms of illegal trade: a counterfeit registration card was believed to be on sale for the price of 10,000 yen in Pusan and 5,000 yen in the mainland of Japan (Kokkai Shūgiin 1951b: 1). In another occasion, in 1954, it was also reported that the number of re-pasting a photograph on the registration card was recorded 110 cases between 1952 and 1953, and the number of re-issuing the card – which was believed to be one of the main results of forgery – went up to 5,267 for the same period (Kokkai Shūgiin 1954a: 4). In these respects, fingerprinting, as the official emphasised, may be considered to be a means to verify the Zainichi Koreans against other Koreans.

On the other hand, fingerprinting of Gaitō hō was also deployed as a domestic security measure during the post-WWII unrest. The implementation of fingerprinting in Gaitō hō was not simply about the management of ‘illegal immigration’ but also that of ‘public order and security’ (chian). At the Committee of Juridical Affairs in 23rd May 1953, for example, it was discussed and rationalised as a domestic security measure: as Minister of Justice Inukai Takeru emphasised, “as far as the current security situation is concern, collecting fingerprints is the safest. … The biggest problem [that we confront today] is security … [and for this end] we must adopt
fingerprinting” (Kokkai Sangiin 1953: 6). The contextualisation of this ‘current security situation’ of postwar Japan would shed light on the second operation of fingerprinting, fingerprinting as a surveillant technique inside the country.

As explicated in the previous section, since the immediate aftermath of the war, Koreans – regardless of the status of Zainichi – were persistently criminalised in the parliamentary debates concerning public security. In particular, Koreans’ involvement in the post-WWII relentless black market was repeatedly cautioned not only due to its violation of economic laws but also due to violent crimes related to their black-marketing activities. In addition to this general criminalisation of the Zainichi Koreans, there were violent incidents that were particularly considered as a security issue during this period.

On 26th April 1948, at the Committee on Public Order and Local Governments System, the criminality of Koreans was highlighted in the case of the violent incident in Hamamatsu city that occurred earlier in the same month. On 4th April 1948, in Hamamatsu city, Shizuoka prefecture, a territorial issue in the black market between a local gang, the Ono organisation, and a group of Koreans occurred, which eventually resulted in a series of armed fights across the city with more than 200 armed members from each side (Kokkai Sangiin 1948a). During the same committee, furthermore, the issue of public security and the criminality of Koreans were emphasised in relation to the outbreak of violence among Koreans in Hanshin area – including Kobe and Osaka prefectures – in April 1948, sometimes known as ‘Hanshin kyōiku tōsō’ (‘Hanshin Education Struggle’) or ‘Hanshin kyōiku jiken’ (‘Hanshin Education Incident’) (Kokkai Sangiin 1948a). The incident was the violent reaction by Koreans against the government proposal to close the Korean ‘ethnic education’ (minzoku kyōiku) in Japan, and the scale of unrest was unprecedented in the post-WWII context, which the
Allied Forces eventually declared a state of emergency. Through the parliamentary discussions on these violent incidents, the plenary session at the Diet on the next day explicitly and exclusively articulated the criminality of Koreans under the phrases such as ‘Korean problems’ (Chōsenjin mondai) (Kokkai Sangiin 1948b). Their criminality was also highlighted by the statistical observation that was specifically coded on the basis of ‘nationality’ (Kokkai Sangiin 1948b: 3). It was these contexts that Minister Inukai and others at the committee discussed the implementation of fingerprinting as a domestic security measure.

The fingerprinting of the 1952 Gaitō hō can be considered a security measure with regard to its surveillant function – namely, the disciplinary mechanism of social surveillance of crimes rather than individual verification of criminals. In the initial proposal of Gaitō hō, the requirement of the fingerprinting registration was a set of ten fingerprints rather than fewer or just one. If the purpose of fingerprinting Koreans were solely about verification of individuals as in the management of ‘illegal immigration’, effectively, one or few fingerprints would be sufficient. Collecting ten fingerprints, by contrast, was essential for forensic investigation in order to maximize the likelihood of identification at a crime scene (i.e., identification of latent prints). In this respect, Tessa Morris-Suzuki has pointed out its “symbolic significance”: “under this system each foreigner was to have a full set of ten fingerprints taken each time he or she was registered. The practical difference was small, but the symbolic significance profound. … There could be one reason for taking all ten prints: to provide a store of data against which police could match prints found at crime scenes” (Morris-Suzuki 2010: 115).

This interpretation, however, needs a slight correction. The requirement of ten fingerprints had in fact repeatedly been criticised at the Diet prior to the enforcement
Chapter Four: Policing Race

of Gaitō hō in April 1955: for example, Suzuki Hajime, the head of Immigration Bureau, expressed his opposition to the requirement of ten fingerprints at several occasions (Kokkai Shūgiin 1954a: 1; Kokkai Sangiin 1954: 4). Eventually, this initial proposal was repealed and the actual operation was conducted only by one (left) index fingerprint precisely due to the persistent counterargument at the Diet that Morris-Suzuki argues here (Kokkai Shūgiin 1954b: 5). Nevertheless, social surveillance of ‘suspects’ remained even in this modification: the collection of a full set of ten fingerprints was required for re-issuing, which was, as discussed above, thought to be the main cause of forgery (Kokkai Shūgiin 1955: 4).  

With regard to the disciplinary mechanism of fingerprinting, the power lies in the invisible structure of surveillance that may or may not be affected by the number of required fingerprints. As Foucault (1979) would suggest, it is this virtuality of surveillance that can function as a security measure by disciplining or ‘normalising’ the potential criminal behaviours of the Zainichi Koreans through making them aware of the ‘invisible eye’. The disciplinary power that I refer to here, however, needs to be clarified further since it was not identical to one that was operational in the panoptic carceral architecture. First of all, the biometric surveillance of Gaitō hō was by no means identical to the operation of disciplinary power that is inseparable from the architectural confinement. As a form of civil governance, it was certainly not equivalent of “[d]iscipline [that] allows nothing to escape” (Foucault 2007: 45), at least in physical terms. At the same time, there was another noticeable distinction from the panoptic disciplinary mechanism: that is, the role of legal orders, or legal ‘confinements’, which effectively reinforced placing the Zainichi Koreans under surveillance without the architectural confinement. It was not only the legal

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76 The requirement of ten fingerprints for re-issuing the registration card was eventually repealed in the late twentieth century.
confinement in which the rejection of fingerprinting registration would be imposed by penalties such as fine and short-term imprisonment. The registration card was essential for various social accesses: without it, they would not be able to access to food supply, to send their children to school, to obtain a driving license, and not to mention, to re-enter to the country (Kokkai Sangin 1953: 6). These legal ‘confinements’ were deemed an essential function of Gaitō hō; without them, it would be difficult to place the Zainichi Koreans who were already inside the country under surveillance.

The analysis of the emergence of fingerprinting surveillance under Gaitō hō exposes concurrent yet opposing movements in the post-WWII history of biometrics. On the one hand, there emerged a de-racialising movement in terms of the scientificity of biometrics, which biometrics as a classificatory and diagnostic technology of race was scientifically discredited. On the other hand, however, there also emerged a ‘re-racialising’ movement in terms of the political deployment of biometrics whereby this de-racialised technology of identification was appropriated for, as well as empowered, a new form of racial government.

The racist operation of the post-WWII fingerprinting surveillance in Japan, I suggest, was not merely the continuity of the colonial model of racism. Nor was it reducible to a shift from biological racism to cultural racism, although this was certainly constitutive of its emergence at the discursive level (i.e., the discursive criminalisation and racialisation of the Zainichi Koreans in cultural and behavioural terms). In view of the thesis’s analytical trajectory, locating its scope of analysis at the level of the interplay between biometrics and racism in history, the post-WWII fingerprinting surveillance is revealed to signal a transformation in the modality of biopolitical racism and the ways in which biometrics subjectify and control race. The
mechanisms of biometric identification had shifted from the colonial inscription of civility and barbarism to the management of public security and criminality; and yet, this shift did not halt a racial codification of biopolitics that articulates the idea of race in security terms. What was transformed was the ways in which biometric knowledge and control operates. The role of biometric knowledge in the postwar surveillant fingerprinting was no longer to inscribe the biological inferiority of the Japanese racial others, but to monitor, or surveiller, their behaviours where control of race was made possible.

**Conclusion**

This chapter analysed the discourses on race vis-à-vis security and the political deployment of biometric identification in the context of post-WWII Japan, and articulated a transformation of the modality of biopolitical racism where biometrics were remoulded as a new technology of racial government.

One may argue that following the dissolution of the empire, the post-WWII political structure of Japan indicated the end of racism. Its end of racism was certainly not in terms of legal, political, and social structures but it was at least manifested in terms of the history of biometrics along with other scientific methods of identification. As the UNESCO statements on race in the early 1950s declared, the scientific methods of racial classification, or more precisely racial hierarchisation, were unanimously denounced and the scientificity of these methods were rendered untenable. Accordingly, biometrics was de-racialised – or de-politicised with respect to the UNESCO’s problematisation of politics in the field of science – whereby its scientificity was sustained only with its sole purpose of individualisation. In this
sense, the post-WWII context may be seen as an historical progress in both the history of racism that was entwined with that of biometrics.

Contrary to such a progressive view, the chapter exposed not only the persistence of racism in the context of post-WWII Japan, but also a transformation of the modality of biopolitical racism. Racism persisted in a form of discursive criminalisation of the Zainichi Koreans in post-WWII Japan just as much as in the colonial era. Yet, its persistence was irreducible to a mere revival of the old model of racism. Unlike the colonial and biological discourses of race, the postwar discursive racialisation was concerned with public order and security and conducted in cultural and behavioural terms. The raciality of the Zainichi Koreans was constituted in the postwar discourses on public order and security. While the notion of fear played a constitutive role in both colonial and post-WWII racialisations, it was also mobilised from the fear of civilisation progress to the fear of crime in which a new form of racism was rationalised and rendered more invisible than the biological manifestation of racism in the preceding decades.

The emergent transformation of the modality of biopolitical racism, moreover, was not just in terms of this shift in discursive racialisation. Focusing on the interplay between biometrics and racism, I also articulated a transformation of biopolitical racism in terms of the ways in which race was subjectified and controlled through biometrics. Though my analysis of the postwar fingerprinting surveillance under Gaitō hō, the chapter not only showed the continuous deployment of biometrics as a political technology of race, but also explicated new ways of identifying and governing race through biometrics. In post-WWII Japan, the government of race was no longer through biometric inscription of barbarism but through biometric policing whereby the activities of the Zainichi Koreans can be monitored and disciplined. The
racial mechanisms of power, accordingly, were no longer simply embedded in the articulation of racial inferiority or criminality but also embedded in surveillance that was found more effective for racial government in this context. In short, the de-racialised technology of identification had by no means actually de-racialised the political structure but only its scientific rationality. It unveiled the limit of critiques of biometrics and racism at the level of scientificality. My historicisation of biometrics in relation to social and political practices showed that biometrics was actually remodelled as a biopolitical technology of race in post-WWII Japan. It became not only heavily incorporated into its racist postwar politics of security but also enabled a more effective control than a simple diagnosis of racial inferiority.

Today, however, the racist structure of biometric policing under Gaitō hō is revealed to be short-lived. During the 1980s, there emerged the social movement against the fingerprinting surveillance at the national scale – the movement sometimes known as the ‘anti-fingerprinting movement’. Its racist structure was eventually found untenable, and in the end of the millennium, the post-WWII model of racial government through biometrics was abolished. In the meantime, since the late twentieth century, there also emerged discourse of what may be called ‘new racism’, that is, racism that is neither towards particular nationals such as in the case of the Zainichi Koreans nor based on skin colour, but towards immigrants in general. In the next chapter, I will critically interrogate this disappearance of Gaitō hō fingerprinting and the emergent form of racism where new, digitised, biometrics came to be deployed for the government of immigrants.
Chapter Five: Controlling Race

... racism is not receding, but progressing in the contemporary world.

– Étienne Balibar (1991c: 9)

Introduction

In Chapter Four, I argued that neither the end of colonialism nor the discrediting of racial sciences led to the end of state racism – that is, the racial configuration of the state – in post-WWII Japan. Instead, I argued that the emergence of a new modality of biopolitical racism whereby former colonial subjects in the mainland, or the Zainichi population, were racialised not in biological terms, but in cultural and behavioural terms. They were generically rendered as the population not of hereditary criminals or barbarism but of habitual criminals. Instead of taking a path to postcolonial integration, the non-biologic discourse of criminality of the Zainichi population – in particular, the Zainichi Koreans – operated as an exclusionary function of state racism in which they were abruptly and undemocratically excluded from the postwar democratic state of Japan. Moreover, I articulated the interplay between these discourses on race and security and security practices of biometric identification in post-WWII Japan. Despite the discrediting of biometric identification as racial classification, biometrics re-emerged as a new technology of race, as a forensic-political technology of race. They were governed not through the biological inscription of racial knowledge – classifying populations in a hierarchical manner – but through the surveillant function of knowledge – monitoring and disciplining a particular population.
This shift in the political deployment of biometric identification indicates the shift in the mechanism of power-knowledge relations of race between these two historical periods. During the imperial period, power appears to have inhered in the epistemological inscription of racial knowledge that had justified and enacted its colonial conquest in East Asia. It was, to borrow the words of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, the non-Western adaptation of the “epistemic violence of imperialism”, which is “the construction of a self-immolating colonial subject for the glorification of the social mission of the colonizer” (Spivak 1999: 127). Upon the discrediting of racial sciences by the mid-twentieth century, the power of identification emerged not as the identification of hereditary inferiority; instead, it emerged as an internalised and embodied form of (surveillant) disciplinary power, which was coupled with postcolonial epistemic violence through the set of non-biological discourses of criminality.

By the end of the twentieth century, however, it became clear that the surveillant mechanism of the post-WWII government of race was transitory. This chapter investigates the discourses on race and the deployment of biometric identification since the late twentieth century to today. The objective of the chapter is to articulate the mechanism of contemporary biopolitical racism, which is neither reducible to the imperial modality of biopolitical racism nor the post-WWII modality of biopolitical racism. It aims to articulate and problematise the persistent racist structure of the state that may on its surface appear ‘post-racial’.

The chapter proceeds as follows. The first and second sections examine the emergence of two different sets of discourses on race and racism that emerged concurrently in the late twentieth century. The first of these is concerned with the emergence of the discourse of another anti-racism in late twentieth-century Japan –

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77 For a critical analysis of post-raciality, see David Theo Goldberg (2014, especially chapter 9 and 10).
the third form of anti-racism following the paradigm shift in biometric identification in the mid-twentieth century and anti-racism against the global politics of the colour line in the early twentieth century that I articulated in the previous two chapters. Since the 1970s, the post-WWII model of state racism came to be widely denounced due to its inherent and visible racist structure that explicitly racialised and criminalised the Zainichi Koreans. In the second half of the twentieth century, there emerged anti-racist sentiments across the world, which were witnessed in a series of events in the 1960s such as the Civil Rights Movement in the United States and anti-racist struggles in the United Kingdom. Following such globally widespread anti-racist sentiments, the racist nature of the post-WWII formation of Japan and its surveillant government of race came to be heavily criticised and challenged by not only the Zainichi Koreans themselves but also human rights activists, and sympathisers. Their political dissidence – which is sometimes retrospectively dubbed as the ‘Korean civil rights movement’ (Chung 2010: 25) – later resulted in the abolishment of the postwar surveillant technology of race, repealing the Gaitō hō fingerprinting by the dawn of the twenty-first century.

The second section examines another set of discourses on race that emerged during the same period, namely the discursive construction of ‘new’ forms of race. As contemporary scholars have indicated, since the late 1970s, and perhaps more profoundly during the 1980s, there emerged what is sometimes called ‘new racism’ across European countries. Martin Barker (1981), Étienne Balibar (1991) and Pierre-André Taguieff (2001) inter alia have earlier recognised a new form of racism in the United Kingdom and France. This new form of racism racialises the immigrant population not in biological terms but in cultural terms, not in a hierarchical manner but in a differentialist manner. The rise of immigration in the late twentieth century
was not foreign to Japan: since the 1970s, a large number of migrant workers, predominantly from neighbouring countries in Asia, began to arrive (see for example, Mori 1997; Sellek 2001; Weiner 2000). As in the case of European countries, the rise of ‘new’ immigrants, I will argue, was soon racialised in biopolitical terms. This immigrant population was discursively constructed as a new population category of the undesirable, which was distinguished not only from the Japanese population but also from the ‘old’ immigrants of the Zainichi population.

The third section then examines contemporary biometric immigration controls, in particular the biometric system called the Japan Biometric Identification System (J-BIS). Less than a decade since the total abolishment of the post-WWII fingerprinting regime, the biometric government of race was reintroduced in 2007. Today, under the generalised political climate of counterterrorism in the post-9/11 era, biometric identification has been widely implemented for the immigration control particularly – though not exclusively – among Western states. In the United States, for example, biometrics has been implemented under the US-VISIT programme, introduced in 2004, as the security and risk management in the age of War on Terror (Amoore 2006; see also Chapter One). In Japan, while the threat of ‘tero’ (‘terror’) was widely adopted for the reintroduction of biometric governance, the section argues that it was primarily implemented for the management of migrant workers who were since the late 1970s racialised in security terms. This reintroduction of biometric governance of foreigners, however, should not be reduced to a mere revival of the postwar model of surveillant biometrics as critiques of fingerprinting have previously interpreted (Chung 2010: 1; Morris-Suzuki 2010: 246). Instead of limiting the scope of analysis to the criticism of fingerprinting surveillance in general, the section examines particularities of the contemporary biometric technology, which is in essence
information technology as opposed to the previous and forensic model of paper-based identification. In particular, the section closely analyses the ways in which newly racialised populations are identified and controlled under a new technological architecture of immigration control.

Through my threefold analysis, the chapter articulates another transformation of the modality of biopolitical racism since the late twentieth century, and sheds light on the ways in which the contemporary digitised and informatised biometrics operate for racial government of today.

Anti-racism III: Denunciation of the post-WWII state racism

The rights of the other: Human rights beyond the nation

By the end of the twentieth century, it became clear that the post-WWII model of the government of race was short-lived. In the late twentieth century, more specifically, since the mid-1960s and perhaps more visibly since the 1980s, the post-WWII modality of state racism outlined in Chapter Four was increasingly condemned under another emergent discourse of anti-racism. It was denounced by both the Zainichi Koreans and state actors and under the emergent discourse of rights – more precisely, the discourse of the rights of foreigners, immigrants, and the Zainichi population, which may be generically characterised as the rights of the other.

Emphasising ‘the rights of the other’, the discourse of rights here should be understood in relation to the problems of the modern articulation of human rights, and in particular the post-WWII Japanese articulation of human rights. The modern conception of rights in a formalised form appeared first time in Japan in the postwar Constitution where ‘human rights’ (jinken) are legally articulated. However, the idea
of human rights in the Constitution was by no means understood in terms of the rights of Man whereby rights are understood as, or at least said to be, intrinsic to a bare fact of being human. Instead, it was articulated in terms of, and thus exclusive to, the nation rather than people in general. During the drafting process of the postwar Constitution (Nihonkoku kenpō 1946), the Japanese officials amended the term ‘jinmin’ (‘the people’) – that was used in the initial draft prepared by the SCAP – to the term ‘kokumin’ (‘the national people’ or simply ‘the nation’) whereby only the Japanese people were guaranteed for human rights in the Constitution (Dower 2000: 381-2; Inoue 1991: 184-190). Under this context, the rights of the other – including the postconflict displaced people such as the Zainichi Koreans – were excluded from the outset.

Hannah Arendt famously recognised such exclusionary and paradoxical nature of the idea of human rights in The Origins of Totalitarianism. She argued: “the right of asylum, the only right that had ever figured as a symbol of the Rights of Man in the sphere of international relationships, was being abolished” (Arendt 1979: 280). The fact that human rights need to be recognised and protected by the state, for Arendt, indicates that the very idea of ‘human’ here is innately exclusive whereby the rights of the other is withdrawn (see also Lyotard 1993; Rancière 2004). The discourse of human rights in post-WWII Japan was precisely embedded in this paradoxical nature. They were from the very beginning ‘the end of the rights of man’, as Arendt (1979: chapter 9) would put it, because the regime reduced human rights into the rights of the nation but not the rights of the other. To put it another way, human rights in post-WWII Japan were already abolished when they were created.

The post-WWII exclusionary framework of rights, however, arguably changed in the late twentieth century. One of the earliest discourses of the rights of the other in
the Japanese context appeared in the context of the rights of the Zainichi Koreans – namely, their residential right – in the immediate aftermath of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea under *Nikkan kihon jyōyaku* (also known as the *Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea* in English) of 1965. More precisely, it emerged in the Treaty’s concomitant agreement called *Nyūkan hōteki chii kyōtei* (‘Agreement on the Legal Status of South Koreans in Japan’) (1965). The concomitant agreement ensured a permanent residency of the Zainichi Koreans through the introduction of *Nyūkan tokubetsuhō* (‘*Special Act on Immigration Control*’) (1965), which amended various restrictive clauses of *Shutsunyūkoku kanri rei* (‘Immigration Control Ordinance’) (1951) exclusively for the South Korean residents. Under this special act, it also rendered their resident permit more lenient in terms of deportation criteria than a general permanent resident permit (*Nyūkan tokubetsuhō* 1965: Article 6). It should be noted that as this was as a result of the Treaty between Japan and South Korea, such a unique permanent resident permit was applied only to the Zainichi Koreans who held the South Korean nationality, leaving those who identified themselves North Koreans alone. The residential right of the Zainichi Koreans as a whole – regardless of the North and South divide – came later by the establishment of what is commonly called the ‘special permanent resident’ under *Nyūkan tokureihō* (‘*Special Act on Immigration Control*’) in 1991.

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78 The full title of the treaty is *Nihonkoku to daikanminkoku tono aida no kihon kankei ni kansuru jyōyaku* (1965).

79 The full title of the agreement is *Nihonkoku ni ijyūsuru daikankoku kokumin no hōteki-chii oyobi taigū ni kansuru nihonkoku to daikanminkoku tono aida no kyōtei* (1965).

80 The full title of the act is *Nihonkoku ni ijyūsuru daikankoku kokumin no hōteki-chii oyobi taigū ni kansuru nihonkoku to daikanminkoku tono aida no kyōtei ni jisshi ni tomonau shutsunyūkoku kanri tokubetsuhō* (1965).

81 Compare with *Shutsunyūkoku kanri rei* (1951: Article 24).

82 The full title of the act is *Nihonkoku tono heiwajiōyaku ni motozuki nihon no kokuseki wo ridatsu shita monotō no shutsunyūkoku kanri ni kansuru tokureihō* (1991).
The exclusionary articulation of rights, furthermore, began to change since the late 1970s when the discourse of the rights of the other was further widened internationally and nationally. Firstly, it began in 1979 when the country ratified with the *International Bill of Human Rights*, the bill consisting of the 1948 *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, and two later covenants of 1966, namely, the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* and the *International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights*. While the rights of the other such as the Zainichi Koreans were still limited in comparison with the rights of the nation to this day, the ratification led to widening the rights of the other such as gaining a social access to public housing by removing a ‘nationality clause’ (*kokuseki jyōkō*) of relevant laws (Tanaka 1995: 159). The removal of a ‘nationality clause’ was further advanced and the discourse of the rights of the other was permeated after the ratification with the *United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees* in 1981. This ratification was in part due to the arrival of the so-called ‘boat people’ – namely, the Vietnamese refugees, or generically the Indochina refugees (including Cambodian and Laotian refugees) – in the aftermath of the collapse of Saigon in the mid 1970s. The 1981 ratification did not simply lead to the country’s refugee recognition first time in history, renaming the *Immigration Control Act* to the *Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act*. It has also extended the rights of the other beyond the South Korean residents in terms of moderation of the deportation clause, removing leprosy, welfare recipients and mental disorder as the reasons for deportation, as well as by modifying the social welfare system, which had previously been accessible only for the nation, so that the non-Japanese populations can also access to it (Tanaka 1995: 160-3).

83 The title is renamed from *Shutsunyūkoku kanri hō* to *Shutsunyūkoku kanri oyobi nanmin nintei hō*. 
In the meantime, the discourse of the rights of the other was sometimes coupled with the idea of assimilation of the Zainichi Koreans, a change in the attitude of the immigration authority towards them, which seems to have also contributed to the social welfare reform in the early 1980s. Since the mid-1970s, the idea of assimilation of the Zainichi Koreans slowly began to be accepted among the officials, which started within the Immigration Bureau of Japan, the Ministry of Justice. In 1975, the Immigration Bureau set a call for papers on the future immigration control administration for the 25th anniversary of the bureau. A young immigration officer named Sakanaka Hidenori (1989) wrote and submitted a paper that challenged an existing – that is, rather exclusionist – attitude towards the Zainichi Koreans and proposed a more assimilatory approach to their management. Sakanaka’s paper portrays the culturalist discourse of inclusion. Sakanaka proposed that the Zainichi Koreans, despite their legal status as foreigners, should be treated as members of Japanese society because they had not only been resident in Japan for decades but also culturally accustomed to the country more than Korea.

Despite the persistence of an exclusionist view of that time, Sakanaka’s call for assimilation was widely welcomed at the Immigration Bureau (his paper received an award for excellence) and arguably contributed to a shift in the official attitude towards the Zainichi Koreans. It should, however, be noted that such an inclusionary approach to assimilation was not always welcomed among the Zainichi Koreans: a number of Koreans in fact criticised Sakanaka’s proposal that appeared to urge assimilation at the expense of their Korean identity through naturalisation, somehow resembling the Japanese imperial subjectification (Sakanaka 2005: 169-74). Nevertheless, his award-winning paper seems to mark the emergence of an official

84 For discussion on Sakanaka’s paper in English, see Morris-Suzuki (2010: 231-6).
inclusionary attitude towards the Zainichi Koreans, an issue that had previously been raised only by a small number of the left wing or simply been left ignored (Sakanaka 2005: 158).

These inclusionary discourses on the Zainichi Koreans seem to indicate a shift in articulation of their raciality: it seems to indicate a shift in the ‘truth’ of the Zainichi raciality that had, since 1945, been articulated in criminal terms and in an exclusionary manner. It marks the emergence of a new racial articulation of the Zainichi Koreans as “permanent members of Japanese society rather than as foreigners” (Chung 2010: 147). The representation of the Zainichi raciality, or the ‘truth’ of the Zainichi Koreans, emerged no longer abruptly as the ‘criminal class’; they were at least less articulated in criminal terms than during the early years of the post-WWII Japan.85

‘The Korean civil rights movement’: Towards the abolishment of the postwar fingerprinting

The discourses on rights did not only appear in legal frameworks of that time, but also permeated among the Zainichi Koreans themselves who began to actively engage with it and to struggle against the post-WWII modality of state racism. Their race struggle had eventually led to what is sometimes retrospectively characterised as ‘the Korean civil rights movement’ (Chung 2010: 25). During the 1970s, their race struggle was gradually brought to light. The post-WWII modality of state racism came to light in various aspects of lives of the Zainichi Koreans: including employment and residential discrimination, and discrimination at a state examination and a state pension (see Tanaka 1995: 130-55). Among these various forms of race

85 However, it should be noted that this is not always the case. Today, far right organisation such as Zaitokukai (Zainichi token wo yurusanai imin no kai) persistently advocate nationalistic, xenophobic, and exclusionist views.
struggle, this sub-section particularly focuses on two events that illustrate the rise of resistance movement during this period: first of these is the 1970 Hitachi trial on employment discrimination, which was one of the earliest Zainichi race struggles that came to light; and second of these is a Korean refusal of the post-war fingerprinting registration in 1980, which eventually led to a social movement at the national scale.

In 1970, a young Zainichi Korean resident named Pak Chong-sok filed a lawsuit against Hitachi, a Japanese multinational electronic giant, for the latter’s conduct of racial discrimination. Pak, a new high-school graduate from Aichi prefecture who was a permanent resident under the 1965 agreement between Japan and South Korea, had applied for a job at Hitachi and taken a recruitment examination under his Japanese name, Arai Shōji. Soon, Pak learnt that he passed the examination, and received an employment notification asking him to bring a copy of his family registry (koseki). Since koseki is the official documentation for the Japanese only, Pak informed Hitachi about this, enquiring for an alternative identification. Despite its initial decision, however, as soon as Hitachi learnt that he is a Zainichi Korean, the company withdrew his employment, abruptly justifying its withdrawal by stating, “we do not employ foreigners” (Tanaka 1995: 131). Hitachi’s racist decision led not only to Pak appealing the decision but also to the rise of social movement, consisting of the Zainichi Koreans and Japanese advocates, supporting Pak in particular and struggling against racial discrimination more broadly. Eventually, in June 1974, the Hitachi trial ended with Pak’s full victory, ruling that Hitachi should employ Pak, and pay consolation money as well as the unpaid wages during the period of the trial. It was also in the aftermath of Pak’s victory when the predecessor of the Human Rights

86 The details of the Hitachi trial adopted here is largely from Tanaka (1995: 130-6). The discussion on the trial in English is also available in the following literature: Chung (2010: 97-100); Morris-Suzuki (2010: 231); Weiner and Chapman (2009: 172-4).
Chapter Five: Controlling Race

Association for Koreans in Japan – known as Mintōern\(^{87}\) – was inaugurated, which has since endeavoured to establish the co-existence of Japanese and the Zainichi Koreans (Tanaka 1995: 136).

A decade after the Hitachi trial, the Zainichi race struggle was once again brought to light, which eventually led to a nationwide social movement. In September 1980, at a local municipality in Tokyo, a first generation Zainichi Korean named Han Jong-sok refused to be fingerprinted for his alien registration, which was introduced under the postwar regime of governing race (see Chapter Four). Han’s resistance was certainly not the first resistance against the fingerprinting regime (see Tanaka 1995: 82-9). Nevertheless, it was the first resistance that led to nationwide resistance by the Zainichi Koreans.

Han’s resistance was in part coming from the idea of rights: in his own words, “nowadays, we enthusiastically clamour for ‘internationalisation’ and ‘international human rights’ in Japan. [However,] I cannot help thinking that the fact that we still have fingerprints [i.e. the fingerprinting regime] is contradictory to it” (cited in Tanaka 1995: 78). Despite that his refusal was by no means organised but conducted on his individual decision at a local municipality, anti-fingerprinting resistance was soon widespread across the country and became a nationwide social movement during the 1980s – that is sometimes known as shimon ônatsu kyoji undō (‘anti-fingerprinting movement’). The Korean residents, advocates, human rights activists, and others, formed protests in public; and in 1985 alone, the number of those who refused to be fingerprinted for their alien registration was more than 10,000 (Chung 2010: 107; Weiner and Chapman 2009: 178). The first nationwide political dissidence by the Zainichi Koreans, which emerged in the context of the increasing discourses on

\(^{87}\) Its full name is Minzoku sabetsu to tatakau renraku kyōgikai.
rights and on assimilation since the late 1970s, eventually led to a series of repeals of the fingerprinting regime throughout the 1990s, abolishing the regime as a whole in 1999 (enforced in 2000).

The anti-racist reformation of the government of race during the late twentieth century was multiple, involving national and international actors and institutions, and the Zainichi Koreans, blurring succinct lines between structure and agency, between the enforcer and the enforced (Chung 2010: 101-6). For the present study, however, a key question is not about the ‘direction’ of power – be it top-down or bottom-up – in the constitution of this anti-racist reformation. Or in Foucault’s (1984: 77) words, it is not directed to search for the ‘origin’ of the anti-racist reformation. Rather, following Foucault, the aim is to look at a broader field of production of power and knowledge: at the historical emergence of a paradigm of race – that is to say, what becomes legitimate and illegitimate, or more broadly what becomes true and false, in thinking of race – that this anti-racist reformation may shed light on.

During the late twentieth century, the post-WWII modality of state racism became increasingly challenged, moderated, and denounced, which seems to signal the emergence of another new form of anti-racism. In Chapter Four, I discussed the emergence of anti-racism in the aftermath of World War II, clearly manifested in the 1950-1 UNESCO statements on race that formally denounced the idea of race in the tradition of nineteenth-century physical anthropology and racial sciences. Yet, as my analysis of the post-WWII deployment of fingerprinting surveillance explicated, dereculturalised biometrics became constitutive of the government of race not in a biologico-political strategy but in a forensic-political strategy. Now, anti-racism that emerged in the late twentieth century has denounced the post-WWII modality of the government of race, and it has rendered the surveillant mode of government of race
and its racially coded security management untenable. In this sense, late-twentieth century Japan seems to signal another de-racialising move, which may characterise an historical progress in terms of racism and a racist deployment of biometrics.

However, my argument is that neither racism nor biometrics as a technology of racial government was abolished at this point. During the same period as the anti-racist reformation discussed above, there seems to have also appeared a transformation of racism, that is, an emergence of racism against immigrants, which is sometimes characterised as ‘new racism’. In the next two sections, I will examine the emergence of ‘new’ racism in late twentieth-century Japan, and a re-deployment of biometrics for governing this newly racialised population today.

‘New racism’ in late twentieth-century Japan

What we call the ‘predominance of human rights’ is an ideological phenomenon that certainly is of symptomatic value, but is not enough to change social structures. There are even ways of using it that hide the varieties of racism ...

— Étienne Balibar (2014)

The emergence of the rights of the other certainly contributed to anti-racist reforms in late twentieth-century Japan, in particular, contributed to the acquisition of social rights of the Zainichi Koreans and the abolishment of the post-WWII biometric surveillance. Its denunciation of racism, however, did not terminate racial government as whole. As Balibar argues in his recent interview quoted above, the rights of the other emerged in late twentieth-century Japan were not enough to abolish racially coded political structures of Japan.
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The emergence of the rights of the other did not end the operation of state racism in two respects. First, it did not totally abolish *de jure* forms of the post-WWII state racism, let alone *de facto* forms of racist prejudices and discrimination. The comparison with anti-racism that emerged in the United States during the second half of the twentieth century is illustrative in this regard.

The denunciation of racism in late twentieth-century Japan was not manifested in the same way as how it was done in the United States in the 1960s. The U.S. Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s had eventually led to the abolishment of *de jure* forms of racist practices; the *Civil Rights Act* overruled the Jim Crow laws, abolishing the decades-old racial segregation in the Southern United States. As shown in the previous section, some Zainichi Koreans had sometimes perceived the rise of their resistance movements against the post-WWII Japanese regime as an equivalent of the U.S. Civil Rights Movement, referring a Korean Reverend named Yi In-ha, who had involved in and supported their resistance, as the “Martin Luther King, Jr. of the Korean civil rights movement” (Chung 2010: 25). However, unlike the U.S. Civil Rights Movement, the ‘Korean civil rights movement’ did not reach to the acquisition of the same set of social and political rights as the Japanese, most notably their right to vote that have not yet been granted today.

Second, biopolitical racism in Japan – understood as a dynamic that racially subjectifies a particular population in security terms – did not die out in the late twentieth century. Instead, there emerged a new realm of state racism, namely, racism towards ‘new’ immigrants who are now categorised as a security threat, and thus, become a biopolitically racialised population, which has been characterised as a new racism or neo-racism in the European context (Barker 1981; Balibar 1991b). This
section is particularly concerned with this second aspect of biopolitical racism where biometric identification has been once again deployed and operational until today.

**Migrant workers in the age of globalised capitalism**

In the last few decades of the millennium, like many advanced industrial societies across the world, Japan had come to experience a wave of international labour migration: or to borrow Stephan Castles and Mark J. Miller’s (2009) expression, Japan has entered into ‘the age of migration’.

Since the late 1970s, and more visibly in the 1980s, there had been a rapid increase in the number of immigrants. They were sometimes dubbed as ‘newcomers’, the term that is to distinguish from ‘oldcomers’ of the Zainichi population – who were predominantly from neighbouring countries in Asia including Korea, China, and Philippine. According to the Immigration Bureau of Japan (cited in Sellek 2001: 28-9), the number of immigrants entering the country for the first time was approximately 739,000 in 1976. By 1982, however, the number was doubled, recording over 1,479,000, and continued to grow, reaching over 2,455,000 by the end of the 1980s. The number of immigrants went even higher since 1990 partially due to the amendment of the *Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act*, granting a working permit for the Japanese descendants abroad, known as the ‘Nikkei’ population, mostly from South American countries such as Brazil. In 1991, the number reached over 3,237,000, and remained over 3,000,000 during most of the 1990s. It should also be noted that these numbers counts only the legal entrance and stay, and the actual number of immigrants was estimated even higher: the Ministry of Justice estimated the number of ‘overstayers’ – that is, those who continued to stay in the country after their initial visa expired – over 106,000 in 1990, which was almost tripled, recording nearly 300,000 in the subsequent years (cited in Sellek 2001: 34).
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Such a rapid increase cannot be reduced to a single cause but there are a number of contributing factors (see for example, Mori 1997; Sellek 2001: 39-50). First and foremost, there was a significant economic growth in Japan during the second half of the twentieth century, marking a remarkable gap between Japan and other Asian countries. This factor plausibly attracted migrant workers from countries that had less economic opportunities. According to the World Bank’s report (cited in Sellek 2001: 40), the per capita GNP (Gross National Product) of Japan was 12,850 US dollars in 1986 whereas that of Korea, Philippines, and China was, respectively, 2,370, 570, and 300 in the same year. For the per capita GNP of Bangladesh that also counted a relatively – relative to the above countries – small proportion of migrant workers in Japan, the gap was more than 80 times (160 US dollars per capita). In the meantime, during the course of its rapid economic growth, there had also been severe shortages of labour force. The shortages of labour force in the 1980s involved several contributing factors including: the demand of service industry as compared to heavy industries during the earlier decades; and the unwillingness to engage particular manual works among young Japanese, who were highly qualified due to the improvement of the education system, the kind of jobs that are sometimes dubbed the ‘3K’ (kitanai, kiken, kitsui) jobs – that is equivalent to the ‘3D’ (dirty, dangerous, and demanding) jobs in English (Sellek 2001: 40-4).

It is important to note that the economic growth of Japan was not new to the context of the 1980s: its postwar growth, sometimes known as the ‘Japanese miracle’ (Johnson 1982), began in the preceding decades, most notably during the 1960s. In addition to the change in the nature of labour demand mentioned above, there were a number of differences in the socio-economic situation between the preceding decades and the 1980s onwards (see Mori 1997: chapter 2). Sociologist Saskia Sassen, for
example, has provided another contributing factor to explain this specificity of the 1980s. Sassen argues that one of the main reasons why Japan became the key destination country in Asia is irreducible to the traditional understanding of migration exclusively focusing on the push and pull factors, which would have caused the flow of migration workers in earlier decades. Instead, it was in part due to “the fact that in the 1980s Japan became a major presence in a regional Asian economic system … Japanese firms began to set up a large number of manufacturing operations outside Japan, with a heavy concentration in other Asian countries” (Sassen 2007: 144). “This expansion”, she continues, “has created legal and illegal networks linking those countries and Japan, and made them into exporters of immigrants to Japan” (Sassen 2007: 144). This aspect also indicates what is distinct in migration in the late twentieth century from earlier migration: it is particular to the age of economic globalisation where the production process has been offshored and internationalised in order to lower the cost of the production of goods that are meant for the domestic markets (Sassen 2007: 142-3). So, the emergence of the increasing number of an immigrant population in late twentieth-century Japan was inseparable from the development of globalised economic structure.

Despite these complexities inherent in the emergent phenomenon, the arrival of migrant workers in Japan was soon abruptly entangled with the politics of security, or better “(in)security” as Dillon put it (see Chapter One), where a new biopolitical racialisation emerged.

*The construction of a new ‘dangerous’ population*

These new immigrants were soon constructed as a distinct population category, being distinct from a category of foreign nationals as a whole including ‘old’ immigrants of the *Zainichi* population. The construction of this new population category in late
twentieth-century Japan was not simply the introduction of a (new) foreign national category but its articulation was heavily stigmatised and problematised in security terms: that is to say, it became racially coded in biopolitical terms.

The articulation of these immigrants in biopolitical terms seems to have first emerged during the 1970s in the National Police Agency’s (NPA) White Papers (Keisatsu hakusho) whereby they were represented as a threat to the national security. It began to appear in the discursive construction, as well as criminalisation, of the population called ‘general foreigners’ (ippan gaikokujin) that is the population category of foreign nationals excluding Koreans, Chinese, and those related to the United States Forces Japan. This was an attempt to distinguish them from the Zainichi population. This emergent population category called ‘general foreigners’ can be found in the national crime statistics in the 1970s. The 1973 NPA White Paper, for example, highlighted the number of crimes committed by ‘general foreigners’ in proportion to the number of immigrants (National Police Agency 1973: chapter 3.5).  

The representation of the criminality of ‘general foreigners’ in the national crime statistics was also articulated in comparison with the criminality of other foreigners. The 1975 NPA White Paper, for example, stated:

The number of arrest of Chinese and Koreas is in the downward trend despite the increase in the number of alien registration. However, the number of arrest of general foreigners shows a similar trend to the number of immigration, showing the upward trend in the last ten years. (National Police Agency 1975: chapter 3.3)

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88 A full text of the National Police Agency’s White Papers from 1973 to today is available online at [http://www.npa.go.jp/hakusyo/index.htm](http://www.npa.go.jp/hakusyo/index.htm).
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Such comparative representation of the criminality of ‘general foreigners’ was also prevalent in the NPA White Paper in the subsequent years in the 1970s (for example, National Police Agency 1977; 1978; 1979).

The criminalisation of ‘general foreigners’ was persistently conducted despite the relatively insignificant ratio of crimes committed by them. In 1974, for example, the total number of arrest of ‘general foreigners’ was less than 1 per cent of the number of immigration, whereas the same ratio for the Koreans and Chinese was over 10 per cent (National Police Agency 1975). In spite of this, the discursive criminalisation of the latter population category, which played a crucial role in the post-WWII modality of state racism, was noticeably moderated. In fact, in the NPA’s representation of the national crime statistics, the discourse of their criminality was absent during this period. By contrast, the criminality of ‘general foreigners’ was consistently discursively constructed in the manner that the increase of immigration was articulated as an ‘inherent threat’ to the national security.

In the light of this discursive construction of ‘general foreigners’ during this period, Morris-Suzuki saw a resemblance to the post-WWII discursive construction of the Zainichi Koreans who were articulated as a criminal and dangerous class. She argues:

[Al]though the targets of concern were new, the rhetoric was oddly familiar. Stereotypes of criminality, in which undocumented migrants were associated with lawlessness and disorder, proved both enduring and versatile, and could be applied as easily to Filipinos, Iranians and Chinese newcomers in the late twentieth century as they had been Koreans and Taiwanese in the days of the postwar occupation. (Morris-Suzuki 2010: 240)
In this sense, racism against ‘general foreigners’ in the late twentieth century may be understood as the re-emergence of the old, post-WWII, model of racism. In both contexts, raciality was made intelligible through similar discursive criminalisation and through articulating them as an urgent security issue.

Despite such resemblance, however, racism against ‘general foreigners’ here should not be reduced to a mere replication of the same mechanism as the post-WWII model of racism but with a new object. If we closely look at the political process of making this new population intelligible during the 1980s and 1990s, it can be seen that its mechanism was subtler than the previous model.

For a more exclusive articulation of its population category, the categorisation of new immigrants was revised at the beginning of the 1980s, which came to emphasise on the status of foreigners rather than their nationality. In the national crime statistics, the term ‘general foreigners’ began to be replaced by the term ‘Rainichi gaikokujin’ (‘visiting foreigners’) as opposed to the Zainichi (‘staying’) population (National Policy Agency 1980). This was because the population category called ‘general foreigners’ during the 1970s was limited in differentiation between the Zainichi population and new immigrants due to its classificatory technique of population that was solely based nationality. It could not differentiate between a Zainichi Korean and a new immigrant from Korea during this period. The revised category called ‘Rainichi’ foreigners was then used in the national crime statistics from 1980 onwards, persistently representing the criminality of the Rainichi population while the discourse of the criminality of the Zainichi population became almost non-existent in the NPA’s White Paper during the 1980s.

The criminality of the Rainichi population was then further manifested during the 1990s when the Japanese economy went into crisis – the period that is sometimes
described as ‘a lost decade’ (Hayashi and Prescott 2002). During the economic stagnation in the 1990s, the issues were becoming even more exclusively about foreign workers (rōdōsha) rather than the criminalisation of the Rainichi population as a whole. This representation became clear in the 1990 special issue in the NPA White Paper featuring ‘foreign workers’ (gaikokujin rōdōsha), the category that had since been problematised by the officials and in the media (for example, Mainichi shinbun 1990; National Police Agency 1990).

The Japanese term ‘rōdōsha’ here, as in the English term ‘workers’, has a strong connotation as a class signifier. In fact, it was the use of the term as a class signifier that took an important role to articulate this population group whereby the racialisation of new migrants was expressed in class terms. New migrants, or ‘visiting foreigners’, were not just articulated as ‘foreign workers’ but also, as the 1990 special issue in the NPA White Paper emphasised, as ‘manual workers’ (tanjyun rōdōsha) (National Police Agency 1990: chapter 1). Clearly distinguishing it from skilled workers and professionals, migrant workers that were particularly problematised during this period was mainly categorised into two emerging trends. The first of these was female immigrants, notably since the early 1980s, who were predominantly from South Asian countries and largely worked in sex industry called ‘fūzoku’, and who were sometimes known as ‘Japayuki-san’ (‘Miss Gone-to-Japan’). The second category was male immigrants, whose number was rapidly increasing since the late 1980s, who engaged in manual work (National Police Agency 1990: chapter 1). Similarly, another set of discourses that racialised the migrant population in class terms emerged under the term, ‘economic refugees’ (keizai nanmin), which was used

89 The word ‘Japayuki-san’ is a pun on ‘Karayuki-san’ (‘Miss Gone-to-China’) that was used to describe Japanese women who travelled abroad to work as prostitutes in the late nineteenth century (Mackie 1998: 46-7).
to differentiate from political refugees (namely, post-conflict Vietnamese (Indochina) refugees), and which were problematised in the media since the late 1980s (for example, *Asahi shinbun* 1989).

In the light of such persistent articulation of the ‘new’ dangerous population in class terms, it seems that racism against foreigners in late twentieth-century Japan was not just racism in nationalist and xenophobic terms. Instead, it appeared as, to borrow Balibar’s (1991a) phrase, ‘class racism’, or more precisely, racism *with* class. The raciality of immigrants was articulated both in terms of their foreignness *and* class whereby foreign nationals of working class in particular were problematised. This is indicative of the fact that the mechanism of state racism in the late twentieth century was not a mere replication of the post-WWII state racism with a different object, replacing ‘oldcomers’ by ‘newcomers’. It was ‘new’ racism in the sense that its articulation of raciality was no longer conducted *just* on the basis of individual geopolitical status – be it nationality or ethnic and tribal category – but heavily correlated with the notion of class. Its raciality was now formed through, as Balibar puts it, “the phantasmatic equation of ‘labouring classes’ with ‘dangerous classes’, the fusion of a socioeconomic category with an anthropological and moral category” (1991a: 209).

Noting the emergence class-connoted raciality, it must not be understood as ‘race as class’, however. It is not to equate race with class (see also Goldberg 1998: 70; Miles 1982: 156). My claim here is rather to indicate that raciality in late twentieth-century Japan is no longer *simply* confined in race articulated in national or ethnic terms. In the previous two models of racism in Japan, it seems that the signifier of class did not take place in the articulation of raciality: as discussed in Chapter Three.
and Four, the racinality was predominantly constructed by the geopolitical belonging.90 Also, even though the socio-economic concerns were present in racist discourses such as the 1949 Prime Minister Yoshida’s letter to General MacArthur, the intelligibility of race during post-WWII Japan was made possible by nationality regardless of class (see Chapter Four). Raciality in late twentieth-century Japan, by contrast, seems not simply embedded a generic population category called nationality. This is also the point in which racism appears irreducible to nationalism albeit they are heavily interlinked. It is irreducible to the nationalistic dichotomy of ‘us’ and ‘them’ because its operation did not solely lie in the fact of not being ‘us’ (i.e., the Japanese) and also because ‘them’ was not a unified category, varying from the Zainichi Koreans, ‘visiting foreigners’, and migrant workers.

Furthermore, the 1990 special issue in the NPA White Paper seems also indicative of the re-articulation of ‘visiting foreigners’ not just in terms of class but also as ‘illegal workers’ (ふひおうしろしゃ). The term ‘illegal workers’, as the NPA clarified, implies immigrants who either work beyond their granted visa status or keep staying and working after their visa expires. In particular, the special issue problematised what they called ‘disguised students’ and ‘disguised refugees’ who pretend to be the Indochina ‘boat people’. In the 1990 special issue, quite noticeably, the terms ‘foreign workers’ and ‘illegal workers’ were very often used interchangeably: for example, its opening section began with the illustration of what the NPA called “the rapid increase of foreign workers”, which abruptly appears to be exclusively about “the rapid increase of illegal workers” (National Police Agency 1990: chapter 1). This was followed by the statistical representation of their criminality like the previous years but with more detailed and lengthier illustration of various kinds of criminal cases.

90 In the European context, by contrast, Balibar argues that class racism had already emerged during the industrial revolution (1991a).
The representation of their criminality predominantly focused on felonious crimes such as murder and robbery. Its criminal representation appears as a form of *demonising* the illegal workers.

There appears, in other words, the dual normalisation of the criminality of immigrants: first, they were articulated in terms of illegal residency; and second, this category whose illegality was highlighted was further problematised in terms of their ‘inherent atrocity’, as it were. It was this representation as ‘illegal workers’ that had since the early 1990s been increasingly problematised: not only due to their violation of immigration laws but also because they were, the NPA emphasised, one of the major factors of the rise of crimes of atrocious kinds by migrant workers (for example, National Police Agency 1993; 1994). As the 1993 NPA White Paper put it, “The rise of these illegal workers … is related to the cause of various social problems, and from the point of public security, we cannot overlook it” (National Police Agency 1993: chapter 2.2.1). Such representation has arguably contributed to the construction of consensus and hegemony for *policing the crisis* of the national security (cf. Hall et al. 1982). Representing through atrocious crimes, the issues were no longer a matter of immigration but articulated in socio-moral terms. It depicts what may be called “insecurity syndrome” (Balibar 2004: 62) wherein the illegality of migrants was reproduced in both an illegality in terms of immigration laws and an illegality in terms of their alleged ‘inherent criminal nature’. I would suggest that the latter not only justified and necessitated the intensification of their governance but also rendered a political question of the former – for example, whether their residency can be more tolerated – almost unsayable precisely due to its demonisation.

In short, illegal migrant workers were problematised not just due to its violation of immigration laws but as a threat to the national security, being articulated as atrocious
criminals. It may resemble the production of raciality in the post-WWII period in which the possible integration of former colonial subjects was abruptly cut off by characterising them as habitual criminals and subversives. Yet, the new model of racism seems more powerful and consensual than the post-WWII racism. This is because it does not ‘racially’ – ‘racially’ here in a sense of nationality and/or ethnicity – target a particular population as the object of racism as in the case of the Zainichi Koreans but the current racialisation is already in part constituted by the illegality of their residency and by demonisation. This transition in racial articulation seems to have a profound effect on racism: its operation appears ‘a-racial’ or ‘post-racial’ since it no longer lies in irrational prejudice or discrimination of a particular nationality or ethnic group, which had been condemned as a racist practice in the previous decades. Emphasising illegality rather than a particular population, racism seems to have acquired a political rationality, which, as Balibar depicted in the epigraph of this section, hides its own racist logic.

**Biometrics as an informa-political technology of race**

In the previous two sections, I explicated two concurrent movements in race thinking in late twentieth-century Japan. On the one hand, there emerged another anti-racist movement that condemned the post-WWII model of state racism whereby the Zainichi Koreans were subjectified as a security issue, and that effectively abolished the biometric surveillance under Gaitō hō of 1952. On the other hand, there also emerged a new model of racism where labour migrants since the 1970s began to be racially coded in biopolitical terms. Unlike the previous two models of racism during the colonial period and the post-WWII period, this new model of racism was no
longer simply coded on the basis of a given population category, which makes its racist logic difficult to discern but at the same time rationalises it.

This newly racialised population in security terms in the last decades of the twentieth century soon came to be biometrically governed under the political climate of the War on Terror. In 2007, less than a decade after the total abolishment of the Gaitō hō fingerprinting surveillance, Japan reintroduced biometric technologies for the immigration control. It was in order to, as the director of the Immigration Bureau of Japan put it, “protect public safety, peace of mind, and life of the nation” (Kokkai Shūgiin 2006a: 12).

This section analyses this new deployment of biometrics in contemporary Japan. First, I will contextualise its introduction that was initially said to be a counterterrorism measure but that in fact appears, after a close examination, fundamentally as a technology of governing ‘new’ race. After establishing the newly introduced biometric control as a technology of governing immigrants or ‘new’ race, I will analyse its mechanism of identification and control that is specific to, and is empowered by, information technology. In particular, the second part of this section is concerned with the overall technological architecture of contemporary border control where digitised and informatised biometrics are embedded. Unlike the previous models, contemporary biometric identification is ultimately about the management of various kinds of individual information, which signals new ways of identification and control and which goes beyond identification of bodies itself in a distinct manner from forensic identification. By expounding its peculiar nature inherent in contemporary biometric control, the section aims to articulate a new mode of racial government through biometrics, which marks another transition of the modality of biopolitical racism.
Chapter Five: Controlling Race

The J-BIS and the rhetoric of ‘terror’ in post-9/11 Japan

[T]he terror is revealed as the most fundamental mechanism of the ruling class for the exercise of his power, domination, hypnosis and its tyranny.

– Foucault (1994c: 83)

On 10th December 2004, the newly established Headquarters for the Promotion of Measures Against Transnational Organised Crime and Other Relative Issues and International Terrorism (2004) published the Action Plan for Prevention of Terrorism. Under the post-9/11 political climate of counterterrorism, the Headquarters was established earlier in the same year, reorganised from the Headquarters for the Promotion of Measures Against Transnational Organised Crime and Other Relative Issues, in order to reformulate its objective exclusively designed for the prevention of terrorism. As its core measure of the prevention of terrorism, the Headquarters proposed a tightening of immigration control by introducing biometric identification. As the Action Plan stated:

The effective way for stopping terrorists at border is to collect fingerprint to identify the passenger as well as check against blacklists at landing examination. (Headquarters for the Promotion of Measures Against Transnational Organised Crime and Other Relative Issues and International Terrorism 2004: 7)

Later, in 2006, its legal enforcement was expressed in the Amendment of the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act, proposed by the Ministry of Justice at the Diet, which was soon passed at the plenary session of the House of

91 In Japanese, the Headquarters is known as Kokusai-soshiki-hanzai, kokusai tero taisaku suishin honbu; and the Action Plan as Tero no mizenbōshi ni kansuru kōdō keikaku.
92 The preceding Headquarters is called Kokusai-soshiki-hanzai tō taisaku suishin honbu.
Councillors on 17th May (Kanpō 2006: 11). Eventually, on 20th November 2007, fingerprinting was reintroduced as allegedly a security measure against terrorism.

As I discussed in Chapter One, the discourse of terrorist threats in the post-9/11 era has impacted upon the implementation, or intensification of, biometric surveillance in the Western context such as in the United States and in Europe. Japan was no exception to such post-9/11 political climate of the War on Terror. Yet, its counterterrorism measures appear specific to its geographical and historical background, and are not identical to, for example, that of the United States. David Leheny argues: “Since the September 11 attacks, Japan has moved somewhat closer to global norms on counterterrorism, though more as an afterthought than by initial design” (Leheny 2006: 149). Japanese counterterrorism as an afterthought includes the intensification of countermeasures not against al Qaeda but against North Korea, as well as China, especially with regard to the maritime territories and security (for example, Nishiyama 2014). Similarly, the introduction of biometric border control also appears about the intensification of tackling a rather ‘old’ – that is, prior to the 9/11 attacks – problem of immigration control emerged since the late 1970s under the rhetoric of ‘tero’ (‘terror’ or ‘terrorism’).

This newly established biometric border control in Japan was initially named ‘foreigner’s biometric information identification’ by the Ministry of Justice (2005); but its name has been inconsistent and called differently until today. For example, the NPA, in the recent report on ‘Countermeasures on International Terrorism’, has called the system the Biometrics Immigration Identification System (BICS) (National Police Agency 2011: 8). The Ministry of Justice (2011: 2) has also later called the system the Japan Biometric Identification System (J-BIS). For the sake of simplicity, I shall adopt the term ‘J-BIS’ in the rest of the thesis.
The J-BIS is often said to be similar to the US-VISIT programme in that both biometric identification operate at immigration controls such as at an airport and a seaport. In fact, the J-BIS is sometimes dubbed as ‘the Japanese version of the US-VISIT programme’ especially by critics and sceptics of the system (for example, Amnesty Japan 2007). Under the introduction of the J-BIS since 2007, all foreign nationals are subject to fingerprinting upon their arrival along with a facial photograph. The excepted non-Japanese population to this biometric identification includes foreigners under 16 years old and the Zainichi population who hold the special permanent residence.

Having recently witnessed a series of social unrest with regard to fingerprinting foreigners, notably the Zainichi population, since the 1980s, the establishment of the J-BIS was not without confrontation, however. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the country had come to condemn and eventually abolish the post-WWII surveillant fingerprinting of Gaitō hō during the 1990s with respect to human rights. In the light of this historical background, during parliamentary discussions on the legislation of the J-BIS in 2006, not only human rights activists and the Zainichi population but also politicians of the opposition parties came to criticise, or at least became dubious about, the reintroduction of biometric regime. For example, at the Committee of Judicial Affairs in March 2006, a member of the Democratic Party of Japan questioned on the relationship between the reintroduction of fingerprinting foreign nationals and their rights because of the fact that it was the latter that was a legal ground for the abolishment of the post-WWII model of fingerprinting (Kokkai Shūgiin 2006b: 1). Similar criticisms of the reintroduction of biometric surveillance have also been made by a number of organisations including the Japan Federation of
Bar Association (JFBA) (2005), Amnesty Japan (2007), and Solidarity Network with Migrants Japan (2007).

Despite these criticisms with regard to the consistency with the abolishment of the post-WWII fingerprinting surveillance from a standpoint of human rights, biometric identification was once again justified and introduced under the notion of security, not security against internal ‘criminals’ and ‘subversives’ as in the post-WWII context but security against terrorism. Under the growing post-9/11 political climate of counterterrorism, the use of biometric identification was proposed as an effective method to prevent terrorism. At a parliamentary discussion in 2006, director of the Immigration Bureau Miura Masaharu clarified:

> With regard to the provision of biometric identification such as fingerprinting proposed under this bill [the amendment to the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act], the biggest legislative purpose for biometric identification is the prevention of terrorism. … Its purpose is to protect public safety, peace of mind, and life of the nation. (Kokkai Shūgiin 2006a: 12)

Throughout the parliamentary discussions on the issue during this period, the senior officials – including the director of the Immigration Bureau, Minister of Justice Sugiura Seiken, and Vice-Minister of Justice Kōno Tarō – emphasised the protection of the life of the nation from terrorism. This was the rhetorical point that they alleged to differentiate it from the old mode of biometric surveillance (Kokkai Shūgiin 2006a; 2006b). Being challenged by critics and sceptics who repeatedly drew on the precedent (i.e. the abolishment of the post-WWII fingerprinting), the officials persistently relied on the rhetoric of ‘tero’ and justified the reintroduction on this basis.
However, it soon became clear that the implementation was also, if not mainly, about security with regard to illegal immigration and crimes by foreigners rather than exclusively terrorism. Despite that the officials persistently claimed the consistency with the abolishment of the old model under the rhetoric of ‘tero’ and the life of the nation, they, perhaps rather paradoxically, also announced its use for the internal management of illegal immigrants and crimes by foreigners. As Minister of Justice Sugiura stated:

We believe that this amendment [of the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act] is very meaningful as a measure against terrorism and for its prevention. …[At the same time,] this would not only contribute to immigration control but also to a measure against crimes by foreigners and against illegal immigrants. (Kokkai Shūgiin 2006a: 1)

In fact, the J-BIS as the management of illegal immigrants appears more manifest than as the prevention of terrorism during the parliamentary discussions in March 2006. This is not just because Japan does not, as the director of the Immigration Bureau clarifies, have any system or criteria that define ‘terrorism’ or recognise ‘terrorists’ but only follows the data provided by the United Nations Security Council (Kokkai Shūgiin 2006a: 9). The J-BIS as a technology of governing illegal immigrants is also manifest in its relation to correlative databases.

One of the biometric databases that the government developed at the point of its introduction, and used in conjunction with the J-BIS, is the biometric database of deportees that was introduced in 1996. At the time of March 2006, the system, which is called the ‘Deportees’ Fingerprint Identification System’, contained fingerprint information of 800,000 individuals (Kokkai Shūgiin 2006a: 12). Just like the European biometric immigration control such as the Eurodac project (see Chapter
One of this thesis), the implementation of new – that is, informatised and digitised – biometric governance in Japan had already emerged in the 1990s for the management of illegal immigrants, though the identification at the border control was not introduced until 2007. Another database is the biometric database of the NPA – the biometric database that was introduced in 1982 as the first Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) (Kiji 2005). The NPA database contains the ICPO’s wanted list and the national wanted list of over 10,000 individuals, and which will be offered to the Immigration Bureau under the J-BIS (Kokkai Shūgiin 2006a: 12).

Furthermore, the biometric data collected by the J-BIS is not simply to be used for identification at the border but to be stored for an individual’s lifetime (i.e., between 70 and 80 years), which is specific for the management of ‘repeaters’, that is, those who had formerly violated immigration laws (Kokkai Shūgiin 2006b: 10).

Despite these aspects that demonstrate that the J-BIS is more of a technology of governing immigration rather than exclusively terrorism, the rhetorical exceptionality of ‘terrorism’ and ‘counterterrorism’ seems to have enabled the Japanese reintroduction of biometrics surveillance. It appear to override, or even suspend, the rationale for the abolishment of the post-WWII fingerprinting surveillance, re-articulating its potential threats against the life of the nation in biopolitical terms.

*Information control: A strategy for ‘the safest country in the world’*

The re-introduction of biometric control under the J-BIS is not the replication of the post-WWII biometric surveillance under *Gaitō hō*, however. This is not simply because its spatial arrangement at the national border in which identification and control appear to operate in a “ban-optic” manner (Bigo 2006; see also my discussion in Chapter One) rather than as an internal surveillant operation of *Gaitō hō*. Nor is this simply because of advances in time and speed of identification process that are
enabled by information technology. Perhaps more profoundly, the contemporary biometric control is distinct from the previous model of racial government because of the ways in which people are identified and controlled. The operation of the J-BIS does not simply rely on biometric identification in the ordinary sense (i.e., verifying a body against databases) but fundamentally lies in the management of various kinds of information that enables biometric control beyond biometrics itself.

The Ministry of Justice has published ‘the Plan on the Immigration Control and System Optimisation’ (hereafter, the Optimisation Plan) at various occasions (for example, Ministry of Justice 2005; 2006; 2011). According to one of the most recent Optimisation Plans, identification of immigrants is embedded in the network of various database and systems. The current structure of the immigration system consists of the Foreign Entry and Departure Information System (FEIS), the J-BIS, the IC Passport Attestation System, the Immigration Examination Comprehensive Management System, the Fingerprint Identification Check System, the Positioning Information System, the Foreigners’ Immigration Record Same-day Acquisition System, the Advance Passenger Information System (APIS), and the Crew Landing Permission Support System (Ministry of Justice 2011: 2). They are also linked to the Refugee Recognition System, the Immigration Bureau’s ‘Information Reception’, among others. Since 2012, the system has also been linked to the Resident Control System, replacing the abolished Gaitō hō. In addition to these, the centralised system called the Intelligence Centre – also known as the Intelligence System – was introduced since the earlier Optimisation Plan in 2006 (Ministry of Justice 2006: 25-7), and is to be operational as of October 2015. These systems are all interlinked and most of data in each system is digitised and allows information exchange within this overall technological architecture of immigration control.
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Under the Optimisation Plan, the practice of identification has been disperse and conducted in a multi-direction. For example, the APIS, which has been implemented in the Japanese immigration control since 2005, allows offshoring bordering practices and identification of security risks or ‘suspicious passengers’ before the entrance of the country. Information under the APIS is instantly sent to the immigration control in Japan for the management of risks before the immigration control check. In practice, in 2008, the APIS marked ‘suspect passengers’ at the departure airport in South Korea, informing the immigration authority in the mainland of Japan, which resulted in the arrest of three Korean women upon their arrival (*Yomiuri shinbun* 2008).

At the same time, the border control is also internally deployed. There emerged diffused bordering practices inside the state border, which is more than a legacy of the post-WWII surveillance model. The internal function of management of race was, as shown in Chapter Four, already operational since 1945; but the deployment of new technologies and open technological architecture further intensified the operation in the contemporary context. As for more effective control of overstayers, bordering practices become operational inside the border. The implementation of the Positioning Information System, which came into operation in 2008, and that of the Resident Control System, operational since 2012, is particularly noteworthy in this regard.

The Positioning Information System is the system that electronically constructs, or ‘maps’, geographical information of illegal immigrants and host institutions (for example, schools and companies). It visually provides information for the purpose of investigation of the real state of affairs and violations of immigration laws (Ministry of Justice 2013: 10). The system literally produces a ‘map of illegal immigrants’, marking ‘a dangerous spot’ (Ministry of Justice 2006: 28), by collecting such as their geographical information including information ‘offered’ by local residents – an act
that is called ‘teihō’, which I will discuss shortly – and the record of locations where they had been arrested in the past.

Such internal operation of bordering practices is further intensified by the recent introduction of the Resident Control System that has replaced Gaitō hō. The Resident Control System is a management through issuing the resident card at an airport, transferring biometric information – namely a facial photograph taken from the J-BIS – onto the card (Ministry of Justice 2011: 32). It applies to “persons who have been granted a status of residence with a period of stay of more than three months”, excluding temporary visitors, those with diplomatic status, and the special permanent residents such as the Zainichi population (Immigration Bureau of Japan, undated c: 1). The system first of all enables tracking of the address of foreign residents: it does not simply enforce them to register their address at a local municipality within 14 days from their arrival but also enforce them to re-register each time their address changes within 14 days (Immigration Bureau of Japan, undated a: 10). The up-to-date information of foreign residents at local municipalities is then to be centrally controlled, investigated, and analysed by transferring the information to the Ministry of Justice (Ministry of Justice 2011).

The centralisation of information regarding to their everyday life inside the state border is also consolidated by enforcing non-state actors to act as, as it were, a ‘border agent’. The new system enforces a host institution, be it a company or a educational institution, to report the employment or enrolment record of its ‘guest’ foreign residents within 14 days by imposing penalties upon a host institution who either knowingly or unknowingly hosting them beyond its resident visa (Immigration Bureau of Japan, undated a: 13). Furthermore, the intensification of internal border politics is not solely dependent on these infrastructural technological changes in the
government of information. It is further intensified by the involvement of non-state actors in border politics who are not only those host institutions but also can ultimately be anyone in the country. One of the significant developments in this regard is the establishment of the ‘Information Reception’ at the Immigration Bureau’s website.

The ‘Information Reception’ (Jyōhō uketsuke) is available at the Immigration Bureau website and allows anyone to anonymously inform the Immigration Bureau about relevant information about illegal stayers (Immigration Bureau of Japan, undated b). A similar technique has been seen in the United Kingdom where the London Metropolitan Police has called for citizen vigilantism under the banner of ‘if you suspect it, report it’ (Vaughan-Williams 2009: 167). However, in the Japanese context, it is not about terrorists, but exclusively about illegal immigrants. The Ministry of Justice describes this by a neologism ‘teihō’, literally meaning ‘offering information’, instead of a more traditional form of informing, ‘tsūhō’ or ‘reporting information’ (Ministry of Justice 2006: 28). The function of such voluntary information is in essence based on the culture of suspicion rather than taking an official procedure of reporting: it allows anyone to anonymously (or named) ‘offer’ information about foreigners. Information that one can input in the website includes: a place where suspected foreigners are working, an address where they are living, and even a place where an informant simply see them; and the number of suspected foreigners, their sex, names (or nicknames), and assumed time when they are at home (Immigration Bureau, undated b).None of information above has to be factual but suspicion is sufficient to produce information: as the Immigration Bureau states, the

93 These details can be found in its input page in the same webpage.
website accepts information related to foreigners that “are thought to be illegal immigrants” (Immigration Bureau of Japan, undated b, emphasis added).

An offer of information by a non-state actor has in fact intensified the power of internal control of immigrants not simply theoretically but in practice. In August 2008, the Tokyo Immigration Bureau arrested a 51 year-old Korean woman in Nagano prefecture, who passed the biometric border four months earlier by biometric impersonation – namely, altering her own fingerprints, along with other traditional impersonation such as the use of a fake passport (Yomiuri shinbun 2009). The woman had previously been working as a ‘hostess’ – the occupation in one of the sexualised industries in Japan where women serves drinks at a bar, a club, or a ‘cabaret’, and where many female immigrants since the 1980s, known as ‘Japayuki-san’ (see above) are concentrated – in the Nagano city in 2007. She was arrested and deported when the Immigration Bureau found her overstay in July 2007. As her fingerprints had been taken upon the deportation procedure in 2007, she purchased a ‘special tape’ that other’s fingerprints are imprinted with a fake passport and an airline ticket from a broker for her re-entrance to the country in 2008. Upon her arrival at the Aomori airport, where the J-BIS and the Fingerprint Identification Check System that checks against the biometric database of the former deportees were operational, she managed to ‘slip through’ the immigration control because the machine could not identify her deportation record.

The case of this Korean woman indicates not simply the imperfect nature of the contemporary biometric border control beyond the issues such as false positive (cf. Magnet 2012). While the immigration authority itself was unable to attain biometric identification, the arrest was, however, made possible by a non-official informant who informed the Immigration Bureau about her by simply telling “there is the same
woman in Nagano”. What I would like to highlight from the case is not the effectiveness of the Information Reception system but a shift in the traditional conception of border control. The Information Reception system indicates the indistinct nature of contemporary surveillance whereby ultimately everyone can be a surveill-ant and that empowers a more comprehensive and more local form of immigration control that is no longer confined within the state actors or state borders.

Information collected from these various systems including biometric information collected under the J-BIS are now to be centralised and managed at a new institution at the Immigration Bureau called the Intelligence Centre. The Ministry of Justice has recently confirmed the establishment of the Intelligence Centre for further enhancement of security of the country (Nihon keizai shinbun 2015). The Intelligence Centre is now, as the officials emphasise, framed as a security measure that is particularly concerned with the forthcoming 2020 Tokyo Olympics. However, its establishment was already proposed as early as the 2005 Review of the Immigration Control and System Plan (Ministry of Justice 2005: 17). Later, it was also introduced as part of the government’s ‘Strategy to Make “Japan as the Safest Country in the World”’ (‘Sekai-ichi anzenna nihon’ sōzō senryaku ni tsuite) published in December 2013 (Kantei 2013: 47).94

There are two main mechanisms of information control under the Intelligence Centre. First, the Intelligence Centre – or the ‘Intelligence System’ as earlier plans for the immigration control phrased it (Ministry of Justice 2006: 25) – centralise the existing information of foreigner’s arrival and residence from relevant government agents including the NPA, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, municipalities, and so forth (Ministry of Justice 2011: 26). Information the Intelligence Centre gathers,

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94 The slogan, ‘Japan as the Safest Country in the World’, was also earlier proposed during the Koizumi Cabinet in 2003 (Kantei 2003).
furthermore, is not just from national agents but it also collects information from foreign agents about deportees, illegal immigrants including overstayers and ‘impersonation stay’ (gisō taizaisha), and terrorists (Nihon keizai shinbun 2015).

Second, and perhaps more importantly, the Intelligence Centre is not just to gather and centralise information but it also creates new information through the analysis of existing data. The Ministry of Justice explicates this second function in the 2011 Optimisation plan:

By constructing the intelligence system, we multifacetedly analyse the data stored in the integrated data management system. … We create intelligence information such as the location and behaviour characteristics of security risks, and make an effective use for border measures at airports and seaports, for seizing overstayers, for residency examination, and so forth. (Ministry of Justice 2011: 25-6, emphasis added)

Collecting various kinds of information including biometric data and crisscross data analysis, the system is to produce a new knowledge of security and to make uncertainly intelligible by patterning. What the system does, in other words, is not about data analysis itself but what is today commonly known as data mining. Under the introduction of the Intelligence Centre, it is such information through data mining that is to be used to control immigration by promoting “early detection of potential criminal threats and prevention of the movement of international organised crimes across countries” (Ministry of Justice 2011: 26).

Biometric identification at this level of information network and control is then not simply identification of individual bodies or threats but it in itself appears to become a domain of creating the knowledge of threats. Accordingly, the government of ‘new’ race in contemporary Japan is no longer conducted through a surveillant
technology of biometrics or through policing a particular population (for example, the Zainichi Koreans). While a surveillant method in a sense of policing a particular population is still operational in contemporary biometric control to certain respects (e.g., checking individual fingerprints against the watch list), its operation fundamentally lies in control of information that does not simply demarcate between desirable and undesirable foreigners but that makes such demarcation possible by creating, or patterning, knowledge of what is to be undesirable (see also Chapter One).

I suggest that the difference between the modality of contemporary biometric identification and the previous one can be illustratively informed by a new, ‘post-disciplinary’, mode of subjectification that Foucault had already foreseen in the 1970s, and that Deleuze elaborated further in his theorisation of the ‘control society’. As discussed in Chapter Two, Foucault anticipated the emergence of a new modality of subjectification and control through his observation of computer filing of individuals by an IBM. Deleuze suggests that Foucault’s anticipation of a ‘post-disciplinary’ subjectification should not be understood only in terms of the presence, or absence, of architectural confinement. In his ‘Postscript on Control Societies’, Deleuze (1995) reassesses the significance of information technology in the field of relations between power, knowledge, and subjectification, and argues that the control of information also signals a conceptual shift from an individual to a dividual. By a neologism ‘dividual’, Deleuze (1995) suggest the emergence of subjectivity that are no longer strictly and statically characterised in relation to a particular social group but that is constituted by dividing practices through continuous control.

Certainly, this reading of Deleuzian concepts of ‘dividual’ and ‘control’ is nothing new and has been discussed among social and political scientists (for example,
What I would like to draw from Deleuze here is, however, the implication of the idea of control in the sense of dividing practices in the field of the construction of the idea of race and racial government. This is by no means to claim that my adoption of Deleuze in the field of racism is the pioneer one. Michael Hardt (1998) has earlier interrogated Deleuze’s thesis on control society in his analysis of racism. Hardt’s analysis of racism, however, does not discuss the role of information technology but largely relies on the conceptual distinction between biological racism and cultural racism that Balibar had earlier articulated. This is precisely where contemporary informatic control of ‘new’ race can shed light on.

Under the technological architecture of contemporary Japanese immigration control, the operation of subjectification and control of race no longer solely replies on a pre-given population category or on its criminalisation. Rather, it is enabled through the management of various kinds of individual information in which identification, and thus control, of threats becomes possible. It appears to be more of controlling in the sense that the control-subjectification of ‘new race’ are conducted through managing, dissecting, and creating information than of policing the particular as in the post-WWII model of racial government. To illustrate in Deleuze’s (1995: 178) words, the government of race through biometrics today is no longer simply based on a pre-given ‘mould’ of the dangerous but conducted through ‘modulation’ of information control whereby a mould of the dangerous is to be created. It is in this sense that the mechanism of contemporary biometric control is distinct from the previous model of policing not simply because of advancements of identification

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95 The difference I highlight here is also similar to the distinction between surveillance and ‘dataveillance’ that Roger A. Clarke (1988) referred to (see also Levi and Wall 2004).
process but fundamentally because the way in which threats are identified is distinct from one another.

**Conclusion**

This chapter articulated the contemporary modality of biopolitical racism and the ways in which informatised biometrics operate as a technology of racial government. Through my analysis of the discourses on race and security and practices of biometric identification since the late twentieth century to the present, I explicated how the modality of biopolitical racism and the deployment of biometrics as a technology of race have transformed from the post-WWII racial government.

In one sense, Japan witnessed a crisis of the systems of governing race in the late twentieth century: the disciplinary mechanism of the post-WWII surveillance of the Zainichi Koreans came into crisis. This was in part because of the anti-racist sentiments, the widespread idea of human rights, or more precisely the rights of the other, and the consequential political dissidence among the Zainichi Koreans, which eventually delegitimised the racist operation of policing under Gaitō hō. It was not so much about a crisis of disciplinary power in terms of architectural confinement – after all, the Gaitō hō fingerprinting surveillance was a technique of civil governance not penal governance – as a crisis of disciplinary power in conceptual terms. That is to say, this crisis lay in the disciplinary operation of racial subjectification in which racialisation were based on given population categories, and which the post-WWII racialised surveillance was founded upon.

The post-WWII model of racial government also came into crisis because practices of policing that were strictly on the basis of nationality and that were deployed for the internal management of public order and security were found
ineffective. It was found ineffective in the light of ‘new threats’ of immigrants and the politics of security today. In a similar manner to the emergence of the securitisation of migration in the late twentieth century across European countries (see Chapter One), the rapid increase of migrant workers in Japan since the 1970s was continuously represented as an urgent security issue whereby they were heavily criminalised and racialised in biopolitical terms. I explicated biopolitical racialisation of this population in the analysis of the NPA White Papers where the discursive criminalisation of the Zainichi population was gradually replaced by that of migrant workers. This emergent racism – which is sometimes described as ‘new racism’ or ‘neo-racism’ – is irreducible in xenophobic and nationalistic terms. It was not simply racism against foreigners. Unlike the previous models of racism, its racial codification involves residential status and class whereby migrant workers in particular were demonised. They were, moreover, demonised not simply with regard to their immigration status, but also in terms of their ‘criminal dispositions’, which had been persistently represented in the NPA White Papers between the 1970s and the 1990s, and in which its racist logic was rationalised without being explicitly racist.

It was this emergent model of biopolitical racism where digitised and informatised biometrics have been not only reintroduced but also remodelled as a new technology of racial government. Despite the abolishment of the previous regime of fingerprinting in the end of the 1990s, Japan reintroduced biometric identification system called the J-BIS in 2007 under the political climate of the War on Terror. Against the official rhetoric of ‘terrorism’, I expounded that the 2007 introduction of biometric identification for its border control is ultimately about the government of ‘new race’ and ‘threats’ of migrant workers. This is, however, not a mere replication of the post-WWII racial government through biometric surveillance with a different
object. Analysing the complex technological architecture of contemporary Japanese immigration control, I argued that the ways in which race is subjectified and controlled in this context has changed. The model of policing and disciplining a particular population was transformed into the model of controlling information. What is biometrically identified, and controlled thereby, is no longer the knowledge of individual bodies themselves but various kinds of information whereby a new knowledge of threats are created through data mining.

The contemporary dispositif of control and subjectification of race, which I explicated through the analysis of the discursive construction of race and institutionalised practices of biometric identification, is no longer confined within that which had previously been understood racially relevant. From the colonial racialisation in biological terms to the post-WWII racial policing of a particular population, anti-racist reforms were made possible precisely because their mechanisms were clearly recognised as racially relevant. Today, biopolitical racism and biometrics as a technology of racial government persist in a more invisible manner because both discursive construction of race and biometric control of race are operational in a less racialised way. It does not explicitly refer to ‘race’ as understood in previous decades, yet the operation of biometric identification is still deeply embedded within the racialised dynamics of the biopolitics of security.
Conclusion

I initiated this study with a discussion of Agamben’s problematisation of contemporary biometric identification under the US-VISIT programme, which he alludes to as a political technology of state racism. Departing from his allusion, the thesis has conducted an historical investigation of biopolitical relations between biometric identification and racism in the context of modern Japan. I have scrutinised three historical settings (in Chapter Three, Four, and Five) where biometric identification, albeit in different modes, plays a constitutive role for the government of race.

During the period of colonialism in East Asia, along with the translated concept of race in Japan, the biometric production of knowledge appeared in conjunction with the manifestation of Japanese imperial power. The way in which Asian races – both the ‘Japanese race’ and other Asian races – were identified or subjectified was incorporated into a political rationality for its imperial conducts. In the post-WWII context, the colonial mode of biometric identification – that is, biometrics as a racial classificatory technology – was discredited. Yet, the ‘true’ or de-racialised science of biometrics as individualisation was nevertheless racially deployed for the postcolonial surveillant government of former colonial subjects in the country. This was followed by another seemingly anti-racist ‘progress’ of biometric identification by the end of the twentieth century. This time, what was de-racialised was not the scientificity of biometrics but its political deployment: the post-WWII deployment of biometrics that exclusively identified and controlled the Zainichi population came to be denounced, which eventually led to the abolishment of the racist surveillance in the 1990s. Today, however, biometric identification has once again become a technology of race, or
‘new race’. Like the U.S. VISIT programme, Japan reintroduced biometric identification for its border control whereby immigrants are, biopolitically speaking, continuously racialised in security terms.

In the light of these historical relations between the political deployment of biometrics and racism in Japan, this conclusion now turns to assessment of its implications and contributions in relation to existing literature.

Towards a critique of biometric rationality

There are five main contributions that the thesis has made, namely in relation to the literature on the biopolitics of security and biometrics and to the field of Foucaultian studies. These contributions, however, are not separate from one another but interlinked; and my pragmatic outline in this section is only to plainly delineate different dimensions that the thesis has contributed to.

First and foremost, the thesis presented an original exposition of biopolitical racism in the context of modern Japan. As I addressed in the Introduction (also in Chapter One) extant analyses on the biopolitics of security tend to be Euro-/Western-centric in that their scope of analysis often focuses on the Western context or at best European colonialism. Against the backdrop of Euro-/Western-centrism, I offered in Chapter Three a more global perspective on biopolitical racism through my analysis of translation of the European – and indeed Eurocentric – concept of race and biologistic practices of biometric identification into the context of modern Japan whereby racism was made possible in a non-Western context.

Second, practices of biometric identification are revealed to be integral to racism in each historical context, which ahistorical accounts appear to neglect. As discussed in Chapter One, contemporary studies of the politics of biometrics often focus on the political deployment of biometrics as information technology that has proliferated in
the twenty-first century (for example, Amoore 2006; Bigo 2006). While their call for politicisation of biometrics – i.e., biometrics as a political technology of demarcation rather than a mere technology of verification – is clearly insightful, the lack of historical perspectives overlooks the historical dynamics between the biopolitics of biometrics and the mechanisms of racism. My claim here is certainly not to say that racism cannot exist without biometrics; rather, it is to show how biometrics become a constitutive technology of racial government that subjectifies and controls race.

The idea of race is in essence indefinite and there is no single definition that can succinctly determine what ‘race’ is. This is not just because of historical contingency of the idea – varying from race as a biological concept to race as a cultural concept – as a number of critical studies of race and racism have exposed (for example, Balibar 1991b; Hall 1980; Taguieff 2001). This is also because the idea of race is revealed to be geographically contingent whereby the European taxonomy of race appears only one system of racial classification and its Japanese translation as another (see Chapter Three). Race, in short, is not, and cannot be, an historical, and geographical, constant or a universal but can be only determined in each historical and geographical setting. This is not to suggest an outright negation of the existence of the object called ‘race’ in a nihilist manner. Instead, this is to shift an analytical site from an abstract idea to concrete practices in order to throw light on the systems of race and racism. Informed by Foucault’s methodological emphasis on correlative practices of an object rather than an object as a universal, the thesis analysed practices of biometric identification as a domain, along with the discursive practices of race, in which the idea of race is constituted, and thereby, racism can be rendered operational. Throughout three historical settings in Japan, the ways in which individual bodies are biometrically identified and controlled appear relational to the idea of race and the operation of
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racism in each context. From a classificatory modality to a forensic and informatic modality, each mode of biometric identification and control is embodied in the government of race.

Third, and relatedly, the thesis also makes a contribution to extant critiques of biometrics as racially coded and biased technologies (see Chapter One). The presented relations between biometric identification and racism are not just about historical continuities but also, and more importantly, about historical discontinuities and transformations. In fact, it is historical transformations of racial government through biometrics that can explain the persistence of racism despite a series of anti-racism throughout the twentieth century. There were three anti-racist passages in twentieth-century Japan: its challenge against the global politics of the colour line under the 1919 Racial Equality Proposal; the post-WWII discrediting of the scientificity of biometrics as a racial classificatory technology, which was internationally manifested in the 1950-1 UNESCO statements on race; and in the late twentieth century, the condemnation of the post-WWII racist political structure through the discourse of the rights of the other. On the surface, these three passages may appear as successive progresses of anti-racist or de-racialising reforms. In particular, the latter two passages seem to have effectively de-racialised the political deployment of biometrics.

However, for a Foucaultian historical approach, a progressive account of the history of biometrics must be critically scrutinised in relation to each historical context where biometric identification and control was deployed. In the light of this, instead of successive progresses, there appear historical transformations in which racism constantly overcomes anti-racism: a biological modality of inscription by a forensic modality of policing, and a forensic modality of policing by an informatic
modality of control. It signals, I suggested, the ‘evolution’ of racism. It is to apprehend the ‘vitality’, or perhaps ‘epidemic’, of modern race thinking and practice. The point here is not to assess one modality is more racist than another. “It’s not”, as Deleuze puts it, “a question of asking whether the old or new system is harsher or more bearable, because there’s a conflict in each between the ways they free and enslave us” (Deleuze 1995: 178). The post-WWII reform of biometrics freed colonial subjects from the biological knowledge of barbarism, while it also enslaved them under the surveillant modality of the government of race. Similarly, the Zainichi population was freed from the racist policing at the end of the twentieth century, while biometrics today have also begun to enslave ‘new’ race under information control. It is not to assess – in fact, it cannot be assessed – whether the old or new system of racism is harsher. The point is that each modality creates a particular racial division in its own manner.

My historicisation of the government of race through biometrics contributes to understanding of relations between biometrics and racism through advancing existing accounts on the question of race in biometrics. In recent years, the question of race has been posed in studies of biometrics. Far from being ‘race-free’, social and political scientists of today including Dillon (2008) and Pugliese (2010) have argued that contemporary biometric technologies are persistently racially coded whereby non-white populations are rendered suspect, or even ‘degenerate’, populations. This thesis not only explicated how such problematisation of white supremacy is limited through the analysis of the Japanese context. It also brought the problem of race to light in terms of biometrics as a technology of subjectifying and controlling race. What the thesis explicated is not so much about how biometrics are racially coded in which the idea of race is understood as a given but how practices of biometric
identification themselves code race and empower the government of race in a given context.

In addition to the literature on the biopolitics of biometrics, the thesis’s contributions are also about advancement in the field of Foucaultian studies. Fourth, the thesis advances studies of biopolitical racism by concretely expounding biometrics as a technology of race and by extending an historical and geographical context of analysis from Foucault’s original theorisation, and also from postcolonial responses to Foucault (inter alia Stoler 1995). In Society Must be Defended (2004), as well as in The Will to Knowledge (1998b), Foucault explicated how racism in modern Europe was rationalised under the biopolitical theme of the security of the population. What enabled modern racism such as one under Nazism were, for Foucault, practices of subjectification in which particular populations or races were classified as dangerous, degenerate, and undesirable. In one sense, the thesis has abided by Deleuze’s suggestion for Foucault-inspired studies: “The study of the variations in the process of subjectification seems to be one of the fundamental tasks which Foucault left to those who would follow him” (Deleuze 1992: 161-2). Or to put it another way, it is my attempt to think with Foucault and beyond Foucault that contemporary Foucault-inspired works suggest (for example, Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008). Following this biopolitical logic of racism, I explicated the ways in which racial subjectification, as well as racial control, in security terms were concretely conducted. I demonstrated this through, on the one hand, an historical analysis of the discourses on race since the initial translation of the European idea of race in Japan, and on the other hand, an historical analysis of political practices of biometric identification until the present day. It was revealed that while biopolitical racism appears tenacious
throughout the twentieth century and until today, the mechanisms in which racial subjectification and control is conducted varies from one historical context to another.

Concurrently, the historicisation of the modality of biopolitical racism sheds light on manoeuvres of the politics of security that are equally historically embodied and shaped. As discussed in Chapter One, poststructuralist approaches to studies of security elucidated that the politics of security is entangled with epistemic creation of collective identity. This is not limited to the discursive construction of identity but also the deployment of technologies. As Dillon and Reid state, “the emergence of new problematisations [of danger] is profoundly influenced by the complex interplay of epistemic invention and technological innovation” (Dillon and Reid 2001: 52).

Analysing the discourses on race and the deployment of biometric identification, the thesis explicated and historicised such interplay within the biopolitics of security. Therefore, it is not just about historical contingency in what is deemed to be dangerous to the state and the population. The thesis exposed the ways in which the dangerous is discursively constructed and correlative security practices of identification and control are conducted in each spatio-temporal matrix.

Fifth, and above all, my Foucaultian historical analysis of biometric identification throughout this thesis contributes to a critical scrutiny of what may be called biometric rationality. In a sense, from his earlier study of madness in the 1960s to a scrutiny of state racism in the 1970s, one of Foucault’s overall politico-historical enquiries can be characterised as the problematisation of rationalism. As Veyne puts it, “we have the right to presume that no natural object is hidden behind the thing, and to doubt the rationalism of mental health” (Veyne 1997: 169). This is because how the concepts such as ‘madness’ and ‘insanity’ are objectivised varies from one historical context to another. More concretely, Foucault’s problematisation of rationalism is to
historicise rationalities, and irrationalities, in each historical context and in relation to correlative practices. Accordingly, Foucault argued that public torture is by no means more irrational than imprisonment but becomes irrational in relation to new ways of governing (Foucault 1991: 79; see also the Introduction of this thesis).

Following Foucault’s problematisation of rationalism, the thesis historicised the rationality of biometric identification and control. I argued that the biological and anthropological reading of shimon keisū is not in itself more irrational than the post-WWII fingerprinting surveillance under Gaitō hō; but it is irrational in terms of a system of the government of race that involves new ways of identifying and controlling security. Classificatory and diagnostic biometric identification becomes irrational in relation to the ways of managing the postwar internal security in which techniques of monitoring and disciplining individual behaviours are found more effective and functional. Similarly, Gaitō hō is not in itself more irrational than information control that is manifest in the technological architecture of contemporary Japanese immigration control; but it becomes irrational in relation to the ways of managing contemporary immigration security in which controlling of individual information is found more effective and functional. In other words, the rationalism of racism itself has been condemned and reformed throughout the twentieth century but not biometric rationality of identifying and controlling bodies that is in fact integral to the operation of biopolitical racism.

It is this problematisation of biometric at the level of rationality that can offer a critique of biometrics of the present day beyond the issues of a false positive and racially coded infrastructure. My critique of biometric rationality is neither about how contemporary biometric technologies may fail to identify particular bodies nor about how the infrastructure of biometric technologies is biased in racial terms. Instead of
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orienteing a critique towards the ‘imperfect nature’ of biometric technologies today, my problematisation lies in its very rationality of knowing bodies vis-à-vis controlling bodies where racial government is made possible.

Limitations and avenues for future research

Having acknowledged these contributions, the thesis’s historicisation of biopolitical relations between biometrics and racism is by no means exhaustive. Its inexhaustiveness is mainly in two senses: limitations within the present research framework and materials of the investigation; and potential avenues for future research beyond the present research framework.

Reflecting on the thesis’s methodology, in addition to Foucault’s historical method, informed by archaeology and genealogy, the thesis is set to study what I have called the dispositif of race or raciality. I attempted to capture this through two main domains of racialisation: the discourses on race and practices of biometric identification, that is to say, the interplay of the production of racial, and security, knowledge and technologies of governing race and security. Yet, this is by no means its comprehensive picture. One of aspects that can be investigated further in this regard is the question of liberalism, which Foucault himself substantially interrogates in later years (Foucault 2007; 2010; see also Chapter One). The question of liberalism here is not just about the introduction of race as part of liberalisation of Japan that I insinuated in Chapter Three. Its critical interrogation is not simply oriented towards the ‘originary’, as it were, relations between liberalism and racism that contemporary critical race studies have interrogated (for example, Goldberg 1998, chapter 2). Rather, it is to historicise relations between racial government and liberalism in each context. That is to say, the analysis of liberalism vis-à-vis racial government is to
expound how each context – namely, a colonial, post-WWII, and neoliberal one – can inform, and can be informed by, each modality of racial government.

More specific to materials that the thesis has used, there is a blind spot that is currently inaccessible. With regard to the informatic modality of the government of race in Chapter Five, I have explicated that biometric identification and control is conducted through management of various kinds of information whereby new knowledge of security is created under a new institution called the Intelligence Centre. While this is not to undermine my analysis of the contemporary system of identification and control, what is yet to be investigated is further details of what kind of information they manage beyond what the chapter presented and, perhaps more importantly, concrete ways in which data mining under the Intelligence Centre is conducted. Any practices of racial profiling within its data mining process – for example, whether there is a particular nationality that is deemed to be risky – would offer an illustration of subtler mechanisms of the government of race through information.

There are also avenues for future research that is not necessarily within the current research framework but can help to capture different dimensions of the government of race.

The first avenue for future research is to investigate systems of exclusion and domination through subjectification and control – be it biometric or otherwise – prior to the introduction and translation of the European concept of race. As discussed in Chapter Three, the idea of ‘race’ or Jinshu was introduced in the early years of the Meiji period but this does not mean that systems of exclusion and domination in Japan emerged at this point of history. The Japan’s outcaste Burakumin who was excluded during the feudal era – and who are still subject to prejudice and
discrimination today – is probably one of the most illustrative cases in this regard. An analysis of systems of difference in a context prior to the emergence of the idea of race would enable not only to clearly delineate the effects of the translation of the modern European concept of race. It would also enable to conduct a comparative study with Foucault’s (2004) analysis of an historical shift from a pre-modern model of ethnic racism to a modern model of biopolitical racism.

The second avenue is to research the role of gender within the government of race through biometrics. This avenue is not simply to add a gender dimension to the present research framework but to scrutinise the role of gender that is immanent to the mechanisms of racism. Balibar, for example, noted that historical systems of exclusion and domination in both racism and sexism, and argues, “it is not in practice simply the case that an ‘ethnic racism’ and a ‘sexual racism’ exist in parallel; racism and sexism function together and in particular, *racism always presupposes sexism*” (Balibar 1991d: 49). Similarly, Stoler suggested that state racism in Europe that Foucault had explicated was also deeply coded in gender terms: “State racism has never been gender-neutral in the management of sexuality; gender prescriptions for motherhood and manliness, as well as gendered assessments of perversion and subversion are part of the scaffolding on which the intimate technologies of racist policies rest” (Stoler 1995: 93).

In fact, the role of gender appears to be embedded in early biopolitical racism through biometrics in Japan. As I noted in Chapter Three, during colonialism, biological classificatory and diagnostic biometric identification was at times deployed to inscribe the degeneracy of women in a similar manner to the degeneracy of other Asian races. Also, in the late twentieth century, racism against ‘new’ immigrants was sometimes highly gendered and sexualised. Migrant sex workers who are punned as
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‘Japayuki-san’ since the 1980s are particularly noteworthy in this regard (see Chapter Five) (also, the post-WWII surveillance of prostitutes mentioned in Chapter Four may have a relevance to this field). These are indicative of biopolitical relations between race and gender in the Japanese context, which are yet to be investigated.

The third avenue is concerned with generalisation of this thesis’s findings. Certainly, as the analysis of the translation of the European concept of race in this thesis showed, each historical study must be located in a particular geographical context. Yet, it is not completely impossible to generalise three modalities of racial government that the thesis expounded. I am particularly concerned with the post-WWII modality of racial government here, which seems to have been paid less attention to than other two contexts (see Chapter One). In the United States, for example, the surveillant technique of governing race was also operational in the aftermath of World War II – namely, surveillance over the black community, in particular, the Black Panther Party, under the FBI’s programme called ‘COINTELPRO’, which was operational since the mid 1950s to the early 1970s (Newton 1980). While the U.S. Alien Registration Act and the Japanese equivalent (i.e., Gaitō hō) are distinct from one another in various aspects as discussed in Chapter Four, the U.S. surveillance (biometric or not) of the Black Panther Party can be comparable with the Japanese surveillance of the Zainichi population.

Nevertheless, these limitations and avenues should be taken as supplementary to the present thesis. I initiated the present study in order to articulate the historical relations between the political deployment of biometric identification and state racism. In sum, the thesis reveals that from colonialism to the present day both racism and biometrics evolved in parallel. Their concurrent development must not be understood as a series of steps towards de-racialisation, as a progressive view would
proclaim. Instead, I have argued that they must be seen as the emergence of different modalities of biopolitical racism and different ways in which race is subjectified and controlled.

Today’s political desire to identify bodies does not speak to race because it pretends to know what race is. This is a blinding effect of biopolitical strategies of which they make use.
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