

**Manuscript version: Author's Accepted Manuscript**

The version presented in WRAP is the author's accepted manuscript and may differ from the published version or Version of Record.

**Persistent WRAP URL:**

<http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/77921>

**How to cite:**

Please refer to published version for the most recent bibliographic citation information. If a published version is known of, the repository item page linked to above, will contain details on accessing it.

**Copyright and reuse:**

The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions.

Copyright © and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners. To the extent reasonable and practicable the material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before being made available.

Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge. Provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page and the content is not changed in any way.

**Publisher's statement:**

Please refer to the repository item page, publisher's statement section, for further information.

For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: [wrap@warwick.ac.uk](mailto:wrap@warwick.ac.uk).

## **The \$74 Billion Problem: US-Egyptian relations after the “Arab Awakening”**

Oz Hassan

Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, Coventry,  
CV4 7AL, UK

Email: O.A.Hassan@Warwick.ac.uk

Adopting an epistemic communities approach, this article outlines how U.S. foreign policy elites have constructed their response to recent events in Egypt. It argues that through the discursive deployment of elite power a neoliberal-security policy paradigm has been constructed and institutionalised. This policy seeks to promote a democratic transition in the long-term whilst also allowing U.S. elites to pursue more immediate security interests. However, tensions in the policy are evident as a result of continued flows of U.S. foreign aid to Egypt that are contributing to the continuation of an Egyptian-Military-industrial-commercial complex that threatens the likelihood of any democratic transition.

Keywords: United States, Egypt, Coup d'état, Neoliberalism, Security, U.S. Foreign Aid, Military-Industrial-Complex

### Introduction

That the production of U.S. foreign and security policy is elite-led is not a new observation. Indeed, foreign and defence policies are almost wholly delegated to a small elite ‘on the grounds that dealing with other states requires secrecy, continuity, experience and personal contacts’ (Hill, 2003, 42). Thus, even within mature democracies, foreign policy is largely made on their population’s behalf by small and increasingly transnational elites. The implications of this, for understanding the nature of U.S. foreign and security policy, are important. At the core of the American foreign and security policy are a limited number of strategic agents located within specific parts of the state system. These individuals are the custodians of the machinery of state who provide the primary justifications and overall vision of foreign and security policy projects. These core elites are supported by, and are often drawn from, a wider epistemic community of policy-making elites who have policy relevant knowledge, such as those in the wider academic, business, lobby groups, military, non-governmental organisations and think-tank communities. Whilst the core foreign policy elite is reliant on these institutions intelligence gathering skills and knowledge resources, they establish international policy agendas by virtue of a shared value consensus, an agreement over the ‘rules of the game’, and contribute to processes of policy dialogue and official policy narratives (Hassan, 2013, 31–55). Such observations are hardly innovative, but they do build on insights that are very much part of modern elitist state theory, and they provide a starting point for the analysis of elite power (see Evans, 2006).

This article takes these premises as the basis for developing an understanding of how U.S. foreign policy elites have constructed U.S. policy towards Egypt in the aftermath of the so-called “Arab Awakening”. More specifically, it outlines an epistemic

communities approach to briefly set out a theoretically driven, but empirically rich, argument that places an emphasis on elite *discourses* and elite *interpretations* in the construction, reproduction and institutionalisation of elite power. After briefly establishing the theoretical framework, this article turns to U.S. elite's discourse towards Egypt and establishes that U.S. foreign policy elites have constructed a "neoliberal-security paradigm". Using this policy paradigm as a heuristic tool captures the manner in which the U.S. foreign policy elite has constructed a discourse to justify the simultaneous pursuit of both democracy promotion and near term security interests. It also allows the article to explore the rationalisations underpinning U.S. elites actions towards Egypt, by exposing the assumptions embedded in the U.S. elite's discourse and the resultant policy. As such, it is determined that the U.S. foreign policy elite is operating with a neoliberal economic doctrine. This is rationalised by U.S. elites based on the assumption that open markets and free trade will not only provide Egypt with economic stability, but also create modernisation processes and the rule of law. In turn, it is perceived as inevitable that these will result in a democratic transformation and the production of a democratic peace. Simultaneously, the elite's discourse also allows for cooperation with the Egyptian government, whether that is in the guise of the Muslim Brotherhood or the Egyptian military, under the rubric of national security interests such as counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation cooperation and the implementation of the Arab-Israeli peace treaty.

Once the underling assumptions of the neoliberal-security paradigm have been established, this article turns to exploring the internal contradictions and silences within the elite discourse and the policy paradigm. It argues that the military coup d'état in July 2013, that has seen the rise of President Abdul-Fattah El-Sisi, marked a moment of crisis within the U.S. elites discourse that required the use of the elites discursive power to prevent a paradigmatic failure. The events in Egypt directly exposed conflicting interests between trying to promote democracy and supporting the Egyptian military through U.S. foreign assistance. As a result, to maintain the neoliberal-security paradigm, the U.S. elite deliberately remained silent on labelling the events following July 2013 as a "coup d'état" that would have required an alternative policy paradigm to be put in place. This in turn reveals the dynamics of elite power remaining silent over the contradictions of promoting neoliberal economic reforms in the pursuit of democracy whilst providing Egypt with the second highest level of U.S. foreign aid. The contradictions and effects of attempting to promote neoliberal reforms designed to generate a modern free market economy and provide the basis for a democratic transition, whilst also supporting what is in effect a rent in the form of a \$74 billion since 1948. This reveals serious problems with the neoliberal-security paradigm that are not addressed by the U.S. elite, but that will continue to have significant effects on Egypt's political and economic situation through the systemic perpetuation of a military-industrial-commercial complex.

### Epistemic Communities and Elite Power

The epistemic communities approach is a modern elitist state theory best outlined by Adler and Haas in the early 1990s. Attempting to set out a theory for the 'sources of international institutions, state interests, and state behaviour under conditions of uncertainty' they established an elitist state theory that amounts to a theoretically driven 'research program' that demands empirically rich accounts of the role of ideas in international relations (Adler & Haas, 1992, 367). Policy elites are not just policy-

makers, but also those who structurally act as a filter mechanism to preclude inputs into policy debate. As such, policy elites within epistemic communities include stakeholders in professions and with backgrounds in natural and social sciences who have access and the ability to disseminate, shape and preclude certain types of policy relevant knowledge. Within this context, policy elite's *interpretations* need to be fundamentally understood, as it is interpretations that mediate between issues of structure and agency. Within this context, it is argued that policy elite's *interpretations* need to be fundamentally understood, as it is interpretations that mediate between issues of structure and agency. Policy elites assess circumstances and identify interests in attempts at problem solving; they interpret what is politically feasible, practical and desirable. For Adler and Haas, the epistemic communities approach collapses ridged distinctions between the domestic and international spheres with the objective of gaining 'depth and understanding' (Adler & Haas, 1992, 367-8). In this manner, there is a clear departure from more traditionally parsimonious elitist state theories such as that of *The Power Elite* by C. Wright Mills. For example, Mills argued that,

The conception of the power elite and of its unity rests upon the corresponding developments and the coincidence of interests among economic, political, and military organisations. It also rests upon the similarity of origins and outlook, and the social and personal intermingling of the top circles from each of these dominant hierarchies (Mills, 1956, 292).

Whilst there is an intellectual resonance with such a position, the epistemic communities approach adopts a more nuanced and mature position in its understanding of elites. Indeed, significant departures mark the approach out as very much a modern elitist perspective. For the epistemic communities approach dialogue and bargaining within and between epistemic communities occurs, drawing on the policy-elites knowledge base, but also on the skills and knowledge resources of those within the wider epistemic community. As a result, inclusion in the epistemic community is less linked to the similarity of origins and outlook typified in older elitist approaches, and rather draws on membership based on a common policy enterprise and access to knowledge and skills resources (See Adler & Haas, 1992; Evans, 2006, 51). This is particularly fecund in a globalised international environment where foreign policy elites draw on expertise from a wide range of international sources such as foreign-based NGOs, think tanks and academics and not just from domestic sources. Indeed, this blurs the lines between elites being recruited to an epistemic community based on instrumental criteria and intellectual merit.

Defining policy-elites in this way renders apparent the manner in which epistemic communities inherently produce and reproduce 'elite power'. This is possible through their role as institutionalising interpreters dealing with dynamic conditions of uncertainty. Underpinning this function is the role of discourse. As Stuart Hall explains, by 'discourse' what is being referred to is,

A group of statements which provide a language for talking about – i.e. a way of representing - a particular kind of knowledge about a topic. When statements about a topic are made within a particular discourse, the discourse makes it possible to construct the topic in a certain way. It also limits the other ways in which the topic can be constructed (Hall 1996b: 201).

Within this context, the 'elite power' of an epistemic community cannot simply be synonymously reduced to a simple product of class, ethnicity, gender or broader social origins. Rather, policy elites are reliant on *social power*, which presupposes a *power base* of privileged access to scarce social resources, 'such as force, money, status, fame, knowledge, information, "culture", or indeed various forms of public discourse and communication' (Van Dijk, 2001, 355). As Teun A. van Dijk outlines,

Members of more powerful social groups and institutions, and especially their leaders (the elites), have more or less exclusive access to, and control over, one or more types of public discourse ... Those who have more control over more – and more influential – discourse ... are by definition also more powerful (2001, 356).

The importance of this in U.S. foreign policy is that, as an epistemic community, the foreign policy elite possesses power through its ability to shape and control public discourse on foreign policy issues. This is a product of how epistemic communities are constructed from a 'network of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain' who demonstrate 'an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area' (Haas, 1992, 3). As a result of their power base, and in particular their privileged access to foreign policy relevant knowledge and information, they are able to construct the context and structures of relevant policy knowledge whilst excluding others. The U.S. foreign policy elite is therefore able to define, for example, the construction of national interests. Moreover, as custodians of the machinery of the state, they have a privileged position from which to operationalize their strategies for pursuing their goals and objectives.

The methodological importance of this is that to identify and question the U.S. foreign policy elite's power requires de-structuring the knowledge and information that underpins their power base. That is to say, it requires the identification of the structured set of ideas, in the form of 'implicit and sedimented assumptions, upon which actors might draw in formulating strategy and indeed, in legitimising strategy' (Hay & Rosamond, 2002, 151). It is within this context that the U.S. foreign policy approach towards Egypt can be best referred to as following a 'neoliberal-security paradigm', which is a direct expression of elite power and their ability to shape and control the public discourse.

### Elite Discourse and the Production of Policy Paradigms

The *neoliberal-security paradigm* is a term used here as a heuristic characterisation of the U.S. foreign policy elites constructed approach to relations with Egypt. That is to say, it is not a term that would be recognised by the elites themselves, and it is not a term that is used within the current academic and policy debates. Rather it is deliberately distant and reflective term used to characterise the core components of an epistemic communities paradigmatic discourse and expression of elite power. As the name suggests, it highlights how discourses of neoliberal economics have become articulated with discourses of security through sedimented assumptions that are reified into elite practices. The term also highlights how elite power is embedded into an interpretive framework in and through discourse. This then becomes reified in a policy paradigm operated by, and across, foreign policy elites and institutions. Indeed, as Peter A. Hall describes,

Policymakers customarily work within a framework of ideas and standards that specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments that can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing ... this framework is embedded in the very terminology through which policymakers communicate about their work, and it is influential precisely because so much is taken for granted and unnameable to scrutiny as a whole ... this interpretive framework [is] a policy paradigm (1993, p. 279)

A policy paradigm acts as a source of guidance for conducting and evaluating policies and defines the range of legitimate methods available. This in turn demarcates the very intentions and objectives of policy itself. This in short ‘comes to circumscribe the realm of the politically feasible, practical and desirable’ (Hay, 2001, p. 197). This is particularly significant given that there is a strong tendency in the U.S. foreign policy literature to categorise American foreign policy towards the Middle East as either “realist” or “idealist”. That is to say, a policy that should be led by strategic interests versus a policy that should be driven by the need to promote democracy (for an overview see Brown & Hawthorne, 2010; Hassan, 2013, 11–30; Youngs, 2010). Whilst this analytical division is useful in understanding general approaches and schools of thought, it fails to capture the manner in which elites and their discourses have over the last decade attempted to reconcile the two positions. The utility of referring to the policy paradigm underlying the U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East, as the neoliberal-security paradigm, is that it breaks with these more general categorisations of U.S. foreign policy in favour of a more nuanced understanding of how elite discourse is reified into practices. Indeed, for over a decade U.S. foreign policy elites have both publically and privately sought to champion the need for political and economic reform in the Middle East region whilst pursuing core strategic interests (Carothers, 2012; Hassan, 2008; Lynch, 2013). The neoliberal-security paradigm better captures this tension, whilst highlighting how on the one hand the U.S. foreign policy elite champion human rights and democracy and, on the other, cooperate with autocratic regimes in the pursuit of more immediate security concerns. The neoliberal-security paradigm is the epistemic communities approach to focusing on what Henry Kissinger referred to as “the hinge” in U.S. foreign policy (Kissinger, 1994, pp. 29–55).

### De-structuring the Neoliberal-Security Paradigm

When asked “what constitutes American national security interests in Egypt?” senior U.S. State Department officials assert that firstly, ‘this be a democratic transition, and not just a transition’, secondly, ‘security in the Sini and counter-terrorism cooperation’, thirdly, ‘cooperation on proliferation and cooperation on the smuggling of weapons from elsewhere in the region’, fourthly, ‘the implementation of the Arab-Israeli peace treaty’, and finally, ‘a stable and strong Egypt that will be a good player in the region’. Pushed further, the same elites identify interests in overfly rights and access to the Suez Canal, but in a single line define their national interests in Egypt as requiring ‘a democratic Egypt that is ultimately more stable and a reliable partner for the United States’.<sup>1</sup> With such a wide array of national interests in Egypt, inevitable

---

<sup>1</sup> Interview with author in Washington D.C. throughout 2013-14, conducted under the condition of anonymity.

tensions emerge. The elite discourse attempts to reconcile these conflicting interests and institutionalise them in practice through the neoliberal-security paradigm.

Used as a heuristic term, the “neoliberal-security paradigm” points to the two central organising discourses the U.S. foreign policy elite have constructed to guide and justify their policy towards Egypt. The term captures the manner in which the U.S. foreign policy elite pursues both an intellectual rationale for an indirect and incremental approach to democratisation through economic liberalisation, in the name of security and long-term stability, whilst also maintaining relationships with autocratic regimes in the pursuit of more immediate security concerns. For the U.S. foreign policy elite, this approach reduces the pressures of a “conflict of interests” problem at the heart of U.S.-Egyptian relations. Whilst neoliberalism has provided the U.S. foreign policy elite with an intellectual articulation between democracy, development, governance, civil society and long-term security, this is seen as a long-term approach that will incrementally lead to democratic transitions. In turn, this provides the U.S. elite with the freedom of pursuing near term interests without using other policy instruments to overtly pressure autocratic partners into pursuing political reforms. The temporal sequencing within the discourse, differentiating between short and long-term interests, has the effect of emolliating the overt tensions within the paradigm as a whole.

The elite rationale for adopting the neoliberal-security paradigm is evident within their discourse and the assumptions upon which it relies. Neoliberalism, which started out as a theory of political economy, suggests that human well-being can be best delivered by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills. However, as David Harvey points out, ‘neoliberalism has, in short, become hegemonic as a mode of discourse’ (2005, 3). In this capacity, neoliberalism has spread beyond its origins as a theory of political economy to become a central ordering discourse for U.S. foreign policy elites. These elites have come to believe that human progress is best advanced through liberating individuals within institutional frameworks that enhance private property rights, free markets, and free trade. As such, they seek to promote political-economic practices that liberate individuals and limit the power of the state. The role of the state, as Harvey summarises, is to,

Set up those military, defence, police, and legal structures and functions required to secure private property rights and to guarantee, by force if need be, the proper functioning of markets. Furthermore, if markets do not exist ... then they must be created, by state action if necessary. But beyond these tasks the state should not venture (Harvey, 2005, 2).

Central to this discourse are definitions of “freedom” and “progress” underpinned by a conception of how social “modernisation” occurs. Within the discourse free markets and free trade rules are both economic and political. They are not only seen as necessary for generating wealth, but as a means of enhancing the overall freedoms enjoyed by the individual. As Secretary Clinton explained, ‘trying to have economic freedom and growth without accompanying political openness is just a recipe for an internal collision’ (Clinton, 2010a). The rationale for this is that U.S. foreign policy elites believe that there is ‘an inherent contradiction between economic freedom and the lack of political freedom, and so there will have to be adjustments made’ (Clinton, 2010b). As such, the promotion of what the Obama administration has interchangeably referred to as “economic freedom”, “economic liberalisation”,

“economic empowerment”, and “prosperity”, is seen as a means of delivering not just “economic progress”, but also “political progress”, “sustainable development” and “dignity”.

The U.S. foreign policy elites promotion of economic freedom is linked to an inherent understanding of how economic freedom can contribute to social modernisation in two ways. The first of these resonates with what political scientists refer to as modernisation thesis, and an understanding of how liberalisation and democratisation are linked to political economy (see Bridoux & Kurki, 2014, 76). For U.S. elites, positive political change can be achieved through pursuing policies of economic growth that result from integration into the global market. This is a theory of political change, which posits modernisation as a functionalist and economic outcome of capitalism. The globalisation of capitalism, and in particular the neoliberal reforms embedded into this discourse by U.S. and other global elites, is portrayed as a method of reducing poverty and unemployment, but also of starting processes of democratisation. Thus,

The idea is that free-market reforms can act as tools for democratisation, because economic liberalisation, and the economic growth it generates, will build an independent middle class that will demand secure property rights, due process of law, and eventually political rights and freedoms from their governments (Wittes & Yerkes, 2006, 6).

Within this schema economic freedom is paramount, and capitalism is seen as fundamental to processes of democratisation because it produces wealth that is assumed will “trickle down” and lead to a higher level of mass consumption, and a well-educated and independent middle class that will demand cultural changes favourable to democracy. For the Obama administration this is seen as a fundamental processes in creating “peace, stability and prosperity” as it helps to “grow the middle class”, by providing “inclusive growth” and create a “new middle class” to fulfil the “promise of economic statecraft”. The direct benefits of this to the U.S. have however not been lost on U.S. elites, who identify that,

Mutual opportunities for growth in subnational agreements create a vortex of opportunity for U.S. business growth, jobs growth, and industry growth. Fueled by the expansion of a ... middle class, a whole range of American companies and products – from communications equipment to automotive manufacturing – have expanding markets (Lewis, 2011).

Accordingly, it is easy to see how those challenging the neoliberal discourse have come to see the U.S. elites definition of “freedom” as exogenous to the societies they are seeking to modernise. Rather, neoliberalism has come to be seen by many as reflecting the elite power and interests of ‘private property owners, businesses, multinational corporations, and financial capital’ (Harvey, 2005, 7). Moreover, as Marina Ottaway (2011) argues, ‘trade doesn’t cost us [the U.S.] anything’.

The second modality in which U.S. elites have come to see neoliberal reforms as contributing to social modernisation is through its contribution to the rule of law (see Bridoux & Kurki, 2014, 59). Within this schema, economic statecraft is used as a method of promoting good governance, that it is envisaged will contribute to the creation of democratic governance in the long term. As Secretary of State Clinton explained,



Over the long run, you can't have effective economic liberalization without political liberalization. Without the rule of law, people with a good business idea or money to invest cannot trust that contracts will be honored and corruption punished, or that regulations will be transparent and disputes resolved fairly, and so many will end up looking for opportunities elsewhere, some even migrating out of their countries of origin (Clinton, 2012).

The importance of this rule of law approach, embedded in the neoliberal discourse, is that economic statecraft is being seen as a foothold for promoting gradual political liberalisation and democratisation processes. Economic governance is not only seen by U.S. elites as a method of growing innovation, investment and industry, but also cultures of transparency and accountability. U.S. foreign policy elites articulate this neoliberal rule of law approach as a method of indirectly promoting independent judiciaries and free presses, which it is hoped will symbiotically assist in gradual strengthening of civil societies, human rights and free elections as the cornerstones of democratic processes and institutions (See Clinton, 2009).

The U.S. foreign policy elite's articulation of economic liberalisation through a neoliberal discourse is particularly revealing of both its democratisation and security strategy for the Middle East and North Africa. Privately these elites acknowledge that they have a knowledge gap in understanding how 'modernisation from below' operates, as 'social mobilisation is difficult to predict'.<sup>2</sup> However, the neoliberal discourse fills this intellectual gap as these policy makers attempt to solve problems through their policy initiatives. In this way, neoliberalism has become fundamentally sediment into the elites policy paradigm and practices. The discourse serves a distinct purpose of not only meeting these elites economic interests, but of also allowing them to justify economic liberalisation and political liberalisation as a national security objective. For many of these elites, altruistically promoting democracy in and of itself is not the policy objective. Rather, democracy promotion, through economic liberalisation, is seen as a 'means of creating a more stable ends'.<sup>3</sup> The importance of this is that as a 'means to an ends', democracy promotion has become securitised and inherently linked with the elites objectives of regional stability and the potential of a democratic peace.

With a neoliberal discourse embedded in and through the U.S. foreign policy elites discourse, its relationship to security has become reified in U.S. policy objectives. It has become part of what elites in the Obama administration refer to as 'the long game' (see Carothers, 2013). Promoting the values of economic and political liberalisation is now seen to be a long-term gradual, indirect and quieter method of international engagement. Yet, the discourse also provides an enabling function of allowing the Obama administration to pursue its more immediate security objectives in counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation whilst cooperating with the Egyptian government under the discursive construction of national security interests. There is also a sense in which lessons learnt from the failures of the G. W. Bush administration's Freedom Agenda, the invasion of Iraq, and the consequences of pushing for elections only to empower Islamist parties hostile to Washington are embedded in the discourse (See Carothers, 2012, 2013; Hassan, 2013).

### Institutionalising the Policy Paradigm

---

<sup>2</sup> Quote taken from anonymous interviews with author conducted in Washington D.C. throughout September-December 2013.

<sup>3</sup> Quote taken from anonymous interviews with author conducted in Washington D.C. throughout September-December 2013.

The manner in which the neoliberal-security discourse is reified in U.S. policy towards Egypt became apparent following the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks and the institutionalisation of President George W. Bush's Freedom Agenda. From 2002, the G.W. Bush administration identified Egypt as a country in need of long-term incremental political transformation. Central to these efforts were the three main Freedom Agenda institutions, the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the Middle East Free Trade Agreement (MEFTA) and the Broader Middle East and North Africa initiative (BMENA). Whilst these institutionalised wide conceptual commitments ranging from political liberalisation, education and women's rights, the core programming across all three emphasised economic liberalisation and reform. In the case of MEFTA, the George W. Bush administration explicitly tied this to, what was then termed, a 'competitive liberalisation strategy' (Schott, 2004, p. 362). Attacking protectionism in the region was motivated more by geopolitical and security considerations and less by economic concerns. The rationale was that countries in the MENA who were eager for greater access to US markets would vie for Washington's attention and approval, and in return for liberalising their economies MENA governments would avoid legitimisation crises by diffusing popular dissatisfaction (Hassan, 2013). This is clearly a strategy that has fundamentally failed, evident in the uprisings that swept through the Middle East and North Africa in early 2011.

Following the uprisings, however, the Obama administration has increasingly emphasised the importance of economic liberalisation building on the legacy of G.W. Bush's Freedom Agenda. The neoliberal strategy may have failed to deliver peace and stability, but the uprisings have clearly not provided a critical moment of punctuation for U.S. elites to question the neoliberal-security paradigm. As such, the Obama administration has significantly extended the neoliberal-security paradigm. The President made clear in the early months of the revolution that the U.S. would 'promote reform across the region, and ... support transitions to democracy' (Obama, 2011). Whilst imprecise, this overarching objective for Egypt and the wider region adopted a particularly neoliberal flavour. The U.S. launched the Middle East Response Fund (MERF), creating a new U.S.-Egyptian Enterprise Fund, in principle relieving Egypt of up to \$1 billion in debt, providing Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) loan guarantees of up to \$1 billion, supporting job creation through Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) development, and providing letters of credit. In return for this economic assistance, the U.S. also sought to boost trade with Egypt through the MENA Trade and Investment Partnership (MENA-TIP), stimulate greater private sector growth and activity, and expand exports through Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZs) (Greenfield & Balfour, 2012). Indeed, in spite of the counter-revolution being consolidated with the electoral victory of President Sisi, by November 2014, the U.S. sent the largest-ever trade delegation to Egypt to explore business opportunities. This was just a month after President Sisi addressed the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and members of the U.S-Egypt Business Council in New York. As one *Congressional Research Service Report* summarised,

A key focus [of the U.S.] is the role that economic growth can play in solidifying and supporting political transitions in the region ... U.S. trade and investment policy in the region is focused on using trade and investment to foster economic growth, promote greater economic reforms, provide support

for successful and stable democratic transitions, and generally support U.S. foreign policy objectives (Akhtar, Bolle, & Nelson, 2013)

Rather than adopting a directly overt approach, the Obama administration has opted to pursue its democracy promotion policy through economic liberalisation. In effect, the “neoliberal” side of the paradigm has become institutionalised in U.S.-Egyptian relations. President Obama’s MENA-TIP, for example, is merely an extension of much of the thinking behind President G.W. Bush’s MEFTA. Moreover, with the institutionalisation of the neoliberal-security paradigm, the Obama administration has set out the basis of the U.S. elites long-term strategy for the region. This has been enabled by the temporal differentiation embedded within the discourse. Fundamental to the operationalization of the paradigm is that the discourse promises immediate and necessary action on the security side of the paradigm in the name of national interests, whilst promising further security through incrementally engineering a democratic utopia in the future. This allows the elite to argue that it is promoting democracy and projecting normative values, but also that it is necessary to pursue more immediate security concerns by backing President Sisi and the so-called ‘military-led transition’ (Sharp, 2014, p. 5). This temporal dimension allows the claims that the U.S. is seeking both its interests in democracy and near term security simultaneously and legitimises the tools the elite deploy in pursuing such ends.

#### Tensions in the Paradigm

The most visible element of the U.S. continuing its more traditional security programme in Egypt is evident in both the level and durability of U.S. foreign aid to Egypt. Whilst between 1946 and 1978 US foreign assistance to Egypt would receive approximately \$4 billion, from 1979 to 2013 this swelled to approximately \$70 billion. To date, this has totalled \$73.174 billion over the duration of the relationship (Sharp, 2014).<sup>4</sup> The steep rise in foreign aid funding to Egypt followed the signing of the Arab-Israeli Peace Treaty and the establishment of a “cold peace” between Israel and Egypt. For the U.S. elite this has proved fundamental to Egyptian-Israeli peace, and provided a corner stone of U.S.-Egyptian relations that has persists into the twenty-first century. Thus, although the nature of U.S.-Egyptian relations since 1979 has been turbulent, it has ultimately remained assured. Indeed, the strength of the relationship has led some to regard Egypt as a client state of the U.S. (Chomsky, 1999, 64; Ide, 2014, 87).

The importance of the U.S.-Egyptian foreign aid relationship cannot be understated. Within the U.S. elites discourse it is seen as fundamental to ensuring Arab-Israeli peace is maintained, but also as a method of providing the U.S. with a regional ally and security partner. This was certainly set out by Secretary Clinton, in perhaps the most succinct expression of the neoliberal-security paradigm,

Egypt has been a partner of the United States over the last 30 years, has been instrumental in keeping the peace in the Middle East between Egypt and Israel, which is a critical accomplishment that has meant so much to so many people. So I think we have to keep on the message we’ve been on, convey that publicly and privately, as we are doing, and stand ready to help with the kind

---

<sup>4</sup> Figures are not adjusted for inflation and are, therefore, represented in historical dollars.

of transition that will lead to greater political and economic freedom (Clinton, 2011).

Whilst such a statement testifies to the seamless nature in which U.S. elites articulate both a traditional security discourse and a neoliberal discourse, this does not, however mean that there are not serious tensions within the neoliberal-security paradigm itself. Indeed, the nature of the internal tensions within the discourse were made highly evident following the Egyptian military's seizure of power in July 2013 that saw the removal the Egypt's first free and fairly elected President Morsi removed from power. This provided a moment of crisis for the neoliberal-security paradigm and challenged the U.S. elite's ability to maintain an internally coherent discourse.

The U.S. elite's initial uncertainties regarding the electoral success of President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) were alleviated by the continued facilitation of the neoliberal-security paradigm (see Hormats, 2012). In an initial experimentation period the Muslim Brotherhood, the Egyptian military and wider Egyptian elites sought an accommodation (El-Sherif, 2014, 14). As senior members of the Muslim Brotherhood and its political wing the FJP made political overtures towards the U.S., in return for political support and economic assistance, it became evident that they regarded U.S. support as crucial to the maintenance of their power. As Nael Shama explains, 'Morsi's new domestic allies, particularly the military, had a vested interest in safeguarding the alliance with the U.S. to ensure the flow of US military aid and training' (2014, 228). This demonstrated the Brotherhood's compatibility with U.S. national interests, which was further epitomised in November 2012 when President Morsi helped mediate a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas (Shama, 2014, 228). This also allowed U.S. elites to maintain their 'long-term investment' in the military. As Secretary Kerry explained,

We are getting a return on that investment that is not inconsequential ... The army ... is helping us enforce security in the Sinai. The army is also helping us enforce the Gaza peace, and the Gaza peace has held (Committee on Foreign Relations, 2013, 16).

However, as anti-Muslim Brotherhood popular protests spread throughout the country in June-July 2013, old elites seized the opportunity to switch allegiances. This facilitated the Egyptian military's unilateral decision to dissolve the Morsi government, suspend the constitution and install Adil Mansour as the interim president pending a new election (El-Sherif, 2014; Sharp, 2014). This proved problematic for U.S. elites as it provided a counter-revolutionary moment that undermined Egypt's democratic transition and created instability. This, in turn, provided a moment of crisis within the elite discourse. The events risked challenging the discourses overall structure by exposing the tensions between supporting an elected President and a democratic transition and backing the military seizure of power.

The response from President Obama was that,

The United States does not support particular individuals or political parties, but we are committed to the democratic process and respect for the rule of law ... we are deeply concerned by the decision of the Egyptian Armed Forces to remove President Morsy and suspend the Egyptian constitution. I now call on the Egyptian military to move quickly and responsibly to return full authority

back to a democratically elected civilian government as soon as possible ... I have also directed the relevant departments and agencies to review the implications under U.S. law for our assistance to the Government of Egypt (Obama, 2013).

Over the coming months as the military began to violently crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, the dynamics and fragility of the U.S. elites discourse were exposed. As a result, the Obama administration withheld 125 M1-A1 battle tank kits, twenty F-16 fighter jets, twenty Harpoon cruise missiles, ten Apache attack helicopters, and suspended U.S. participation in Operation Bright Star (Hawthorne, 2014).<sup>5</sup> This was significant to the extent that it was the first time a U.S. administration had ever suspended any proportion of the \$1.3 billion package in military aid, but the administration's overall response was more revealing. The annual foreign operations appropriations act prohibited the issuing of foreign assistance to a country whose elected head of government is deposed by military coup d'état or decree (see Congress, 2012, 7008). The Obama administration, however, determined that,

Egypt serves as a stabilizing pillar of regional peace and security, and the United States has a national security interest in a stable and successful democratic transition in Egypt. *The law does not require us to make a formal determination – that is a review that we have undergone – as to whether a coup took place, and it is not in our national interest to make such a determination* (emphasis added Psaki, 2013).

The Obama administration's discursive act of refusing to determine that a coup d'état had taken place was deeply significant. It allowed the majority of military aid to flow to Egypt, but also allowed U.S. elites to signal their displeasure by withholding "prestige" items and showing that there was at least a price for the Egyptian military's actions (see Wittes, 2013). In a clear demonstration of the U.S. foreign policy elites discursive power, they were able to circumvent legislation and down play the importance of the events so as to continue the pursuit of the neoliberal-security paradigm. When a clear conflict of interests emerged, between supporting a potential democratic transition and pursuing security, the U.S. foreign policy elite pursued the latter whilst insisting that the former come to fruition in the future. The importance of the temporal functioning of the discourse cannot be understated, as it was fundamental in maintaining the eventual appearance of internal consistency within the discourse itself.

### The Seventy-Four Billion Dollar Problem

That the Egyptian military's coup d'état could cause such an acute crisis within the U.S. elite's discourse is symptomatic of the wider tensions within the neoliberal-security paradigm. It provides a tangible instance of U.S. foreign aid policy conflicting with the objective of promoting democracy through a neoliberal doctrine. Yet, this instance is also symptomatic of wider structural problems within the paradigm that the U.S. elite has failed to address. This is particularly fecund given the role that the Egyptian military played in counter-revolutionary practices, and is symptomatic of what Root, Li and Balasuriya refer to as 'the alliance curse' (2009, 46). Whilst the U.S. elite argues that neoliberal reforms provide a route democratisation through processes of modernisation and the construction of cultures

---

<sup>5</sup> Operation Bright Star is a biannual military exercise involving the U.S. and the Egyptian military.

favourable to the rule of law, U.S. foreign aid is in tension with these processes. Foreign aid acts as a “free resource” that reduces ‘pressure for regime modernisation, reducing the imperative for sitting governments to develop accountability mechanisms to their own people’ (Root et al., 2009, 41–2). The U.S. role here should not be overstated, especially given the role of Gulf states in financing Egyptian fiscal deficits, but nor should the U.S. role in distorting Egyptian domestic politics and economy be ignored (see Hassan, 2015).

U.S. foreign aid to Egypt is primarily delivered through three accounts; Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Economic Support Funds (ESF), and International Military Education and Training (IMET). Of the \$1.56 billion per annum in U.S. foreign aid to Egypt, FMF has amounts to approximately 83.5% of this total, compared to 16% in ESF and below 1% in IMET. Whilst the U.S. Congress appropriates the precise allocation of these funds, the FMF account is administered by the U.S. Department of State and implemented by the U.S. Department of Defense. The FMF account is then used for the procurement of weapons systems and services from U.S. defence contractors. Sales of goods and services are, however, conducted through government-to-government Foreign Military Sales (FMS), coordinated by Office of Military Cooperation (OMC) based in the U.S. embassy in Cairo. In effect the U.S. government buys products for Egypt through this procurement channel and Egypt does not receive a cash transfer (see Sharp, 2014, 18–40).

The importance of this procurement channel is two-fold. Firstly, in its current configuration it points to a complication in cancelling U.S. FMS. The Egyptian FMF account is intrinsically linked to the U.S. military-industrial complex, and adjusting or cancelling FMS would have an impact on U.S. defence contractors. FMF operates as subsidy for U.S. defence contractors. Secondly, however, the U.S. military-industrial complex is intrinsically connected to Egyptian elites and an Egyptian military-industrial-commercial complex. This is directly the case, for example, with the coproduction of M1A1 Tank kits produced in Michigan but assembled in a factory in Cairo. Nevertheless, with the Egyptian military allocating few national funds to the procurement of U.S. military equipment purchases, the Egyptian military has been able to allocate resources elsewhere. FMF is therefore a subsidy to the Egyptian military (see Schenker, 2013). Given the military’s ability to allocate funds elsewhere, its ownership of land, and access to military recruits as a de facto workforce, the Egyptian military-industrial-commercial complex has spread to the wider economy creating a ‘military-run commercial enterprise that seeps into every corner of Egyptian Society’ (Stier, 2011). This includes the manufacturing of a wide range of items such as cars, clothes, kitchen appliances, gas bottles, and food, but extends into hotels and resorts. Estimates of the military owned percentage of the national economy vary as widely as 5-40% (Blumberg, 2011). By acting as a subsidy, therefore, FMF plays a systemic role in perpetuating a political economy in which the Egyptian military is a deeply significant player with strongly vested interests. In terms of the neoliberal-security paradigm, this situation is contrary to the U.S. foreign policy elite’s objectives and is masked within the discourse itself.

Moreover, the role of the military in the Egyptian economy has expanded since July 2013. This was cemented with the election that saw President Sisi officially take power in June 2014, but has been underpinned by state stimulus spending and capital from the Gulf, which has allowed the Egyptian military to expand into new sectors previously controlled by large corporations (Adly, 2014, 1). As Samer Atallah

argues, ‘the military came to the forefront of the political arena to protect its economic interests. But these interests are the main roadblock to real and credible political change in Egypt’ (Atallah, 2014). In effect, what’s emerging in Egypt is a neo-authoritarian national security regime ran by an elite set of actors willing to seize state power to further their economic interests and patronage networks.

This raises questions regarding even the long-term effectiveness of the neoliberal-security paradigm. Egypt has undertaken varying degrees of economic reform since its retreat from Arab Nationalism and the institutionalisation of the 1974 *infitah* (“open door”) policy. In the 1980s and 1990s this saw the ‘imposition of neo-liberal economic policies through stabilisation and structural adjustment agreements’ (Beinin, 2012, 20). Since 2004, Egypt pursued a more vigorous implementation of neoliberal policies, which correlated with a rise of neo-authoritarianism justified by the Mubarak regime as necessary to crack down on Islamic violence. As Joel Beinin demonstrates in significant detail, rather than a greater privatised Egyptian economy leading to the creation of entrepreneurs with access to global capital seeking greater political power, what emerged was a form of crony capitalism and neoliberal opposition movements (Beinin, 2012, 26–32). This is contrary to assumptions within the U.S. elite’s discourse regarding the sequencing between neoliberal reforms leading to emergent trends in modernisation and the rule of law. Neoliberalism in Egypt transforms into crony capitalism, where entrepreneurs have moved closer to the patronage of the regime whilst movements such as *Kifaya* (“Enough”) have emerged in part as a result of opposition to neoliberal reforms (Beinin, 2012).

The persistence of crony capitalism and the increased economic roll of the military in Egypt demonstrate that there is a fundamental silence within U.S. elites discourse and that the neoliberal-security paradigm is problematic. Whilst U.S. elites operate on assumptions that the policies institutionalised after the Arab Awakening will provide both democracy in the long-term and security in the short-term this remains questionable. U.S. foreign aid is contributing to the systemic reproduction of an Egyptian military-industrial-commercial complex that is empowering Egyptian elites through a merger of guns and money. At the same time, neoliberal reforms are being institutionalised into corrupt practices and patronage networks between the military and a class of private business. Formal trade liberalisation is not giving rise to an independent middle class, but rather is distorted through unequal competitive pressures under the direct control of the current ruling elite. Neoliberalism is empowering an Egyptian elite that is seizing the opportunities of privatisation through unequal access to financial services (see Wurzel, 2012). Neoliberal reforms, when institutionalised in Egypt, are not creating transparency in a real market economy, nor are they providing the basis for sustainable development for lower social strata in a country of enormous wealth inequality. They are further empowering an elite who under the banner of free market reforms empower themselves, whilst also redirecting state wealth and public funds towards supporting their own profits. This hardly appears to be the basis of a democratic transition in the short, medium, or long term, nor the basis of sound policy-making from U.S. elites and the epistemic communities they belong to.

## Conclusion

Understanding how U.S. foreign policy elites are embedded in epistemic communities can provide significant insights into the wider U.S. relationship with the Middle East

and North Africa, but also demonstrate how elites construct policy paradigms through interpretation and discursive power. This was apparent in the aftermath of the “Arab awakening”, when U.S. foreign policy elites drew on familiar discourses to justify both their overarching strategy and the deployment of policy instruments towards Egypt. Indeed, the neoliberal-security paradigm is a hybrid discourse that bares all the hallmarks of the “Washington Consensus” and the “war on terror”. Neoliberalism has become defined as an incremental pathway to greater prosperity, peace and freedom, whilst simultaneously counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation and regional stability have justified the maintenance of strong relations with the Egyptian military and the continued flow of U.S. foreign aid. Elite power has helped to mask the tensions between these two approaches, but it has not removed what are fundamental tensions within the U.S. elite’s discourse.

A closer analysis of the U.S. elites discourse reveals that there are serious and significant problems, which need to be addressed even if the Obama administration wants to ‘play the long game’. Supplying the Egyptian military with FMF is not only empowering elites, but also helping to create interest structures that have proved counter-productive to Egypt’s democratic transition. The U.S. is contributing to the systemic expansion of an Egyptian military-industrial-commercial complex that is now willing to play a more active role in protecting its interests in domestic politics. U.S. elites are also contributing to the creation of crony capitalism that is serving the needs of the few and has little hope of creating a modern free market economy. That the Obama administration opted to continue with large flows of U.S. foreign aid to Egypt following the July 2013 coup d’état demonstrates a symptomatic problem. When a “coup d’état” cannot be deemed a “coup d’état” in the interests of national security, farce becomes tragedy. This is particularly the case when the existence of the Egyptian military-industrial-commercial complex would seem to suggest that peace in the region is in the interests of the Egyptian military as much as U.S. elites. However, the continuation of the neoliberal-security paradigm is testimony to the lack of alternative ideas and a lack of imagination within the U.S. foreign policy elite. The neoliberal-security paradigm may well be an intricate articulation that balances democracy promotion, economic statecraft and security, but there appear to be at least seventy-four billion reasons why it may well not produce the U.S. elites desired results.



## Bibliography

- Adler, E., & Haas, P. M. (1992). Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and Creation of a Reflective Research Program. *International Organisation*, 46(1), 367–390.
- Adly, A. (2014). The Future of Big Business in the New Egypt. *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. Retrieved from [http://carnegieendowment.org/files/big\\_business\\_egypt.pdf](http://carnegieendowment.org/files/big_business_egypt.pdf)
- Akhtar, S. I., Bolle, M. J., & Nelson, R. M. (2013). *U.S. Trade and Investment in the Middle East and North Africa: Overview and Issues for Congress* (p. R42153). Washington D.C.
- Atallah, S. (2014). Seeking Wealth, Taking Power. *Sada*.
- Beinin, J. (2012). Neo-Liberal Structural Adjustment, Political Demobilisation, and Neo-Authoritarianism in Egypt. In L. Guazzone & D. Pioppi (Eds.), *The Arab State and Neo-Liberal Globalisation: The Restructuring of State Power in the Middle East*. Reading: Ithica Press.
- Blumberg, A. (2011). Why Egypt's Military Cares About Home Appliances. *NPR*. Retrieved from <http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2011/02/10/133501837/why-egypts-military-cares-about-home-appliances>
- Bridoux, J., & Kurki, M. (2014). *Democracy Promotion*. London: Routledge.
- Brown, N. J., & Hawthorne, A. (2010). New Wine in Old Bottles? American Efforts at Democracy Promotion. In N. J. Brown & E. E.-D. Shanin (Eds.), *The Struggles over Democracy in the Middle East: Regional Politics and External Policies* (pp. 13–28). Oxon: Routledge.

- Burns, W. J. (2012). Interview With Lamis el Hadidi, CBC TV, Cairo, Egypt. *U.S. Department of State*. Retrieved from <http://www.state.gov/s/d/2012/180455.htm>
- Carothers, T. (2012). *Democracy Policy Under Obama: Revitalization or Retreat?* (pp. 1–58). Washington D.C.
- Carothers, T. (2013). Barack Obama. In M. Cox, T. J. Lynch, & N. Bouchet (Eds.), *US Foreign Policy and Democracy Promotion* (pp. 196–213). Oxon: Routledge.
- Chomsky, N. (1999). *Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel and the Palestinians*. London: Pluto Press.
- Clinton, H. R. (2009). Expanding the U.S.-Indonesian Dialogue. *State Department*. Retrieved from <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/02/119423.htm>
- Clinton, H. R. (2010a). Remarks on Innovation and American Leadership to the Commonwealth Club. *State Department*. Retrieved from <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/10/149542.htm>
- Clinton, H. R. (2010b). Town Interview Hosted by Media Prima in Malaysia. *State Department*. Retrieved from <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/11/150325.htm>
- Clinton, H. R. (2011). Interview With Candy Crowley of CNN's State Of The Union. *State Department*. Retrieved from <http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/01/155588.htm>
- Clinton, H. R. (2012). Remarks on Building Sustainable Partnerships in Africa. *State Department*. Retrieved from <http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/08/195944.htm>
- Committee on Foreign Relations. (2013). *National Security and Foreign Policy Priorities in the Fiscal Year 2014 International Affairs Budget*. Washington D.C.: U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. Retrieved from <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113shrg86860/pdf/CHRG-113shrg86860.pdf>
- Congress. Consolidated Appropriations Act. , Pub. L. No. 125 STAT (2012). Government Printing Office. Retrieved from <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-112publ74/pdf/PLAW-112publ74.pdf>
- El-Sherif, A. (2014). *Egypt's Post-Mubarak Predicament*. Washington D.C.
- Evans, M. (2006). Elitism. In C. Hay, M. Lister, & D. Marsh (Eds.), *The State: Theories and Issues* (pp. 39–58). Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Greenfield, D., & Balfour, R. (2012). *Arab Awakening: Are the US and EU Missing the Challenge?*. Washington D.C.

- Haas, P. M. (1992). Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination. *International Organization*, 46(1), 1–35.
- Hall, P. A. (1993). Policy paradigms, Social learning, and the State: The case of Economic policy making in Britain. *Comparative Politics*, 25(3), 275–296.
- Harvey, D. (2005). *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hassan, O. (2008). *The End of Bush's Freedom Agenda? Middle East Democracy Promotion under Obama*. (pp. 1–23).
- Hassan, O. (2013). *Constructing America's Freedom Agenda for the Middle East: Democracy and Domination*. New York, USA: Routledge.
- Hassan, O. (2015). Undermining the Transatlantic Democracy Agenda? The Arab Spring and Saudi Arabia's Counteracting Democracy Strategy. *Democratization*, 22. Retrieved from DOI:10.1080/13510347.2014.981161
- Hawthorne, A. (2014). What's Happening with Suspended Military Aid for Egypt? Part I. *The Atlantic Council*. Retrieved from <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/egyptsource/what-s-happening-with-suspended-military-aid-for-egypt-part-i>
- Hay, C. (2001). The “crisis” of Keynesianism and the rise of Neoliberalism in Britain: An ideational institutionalist approach. In J. L. Campbell & O. K. Pedersen (Eds.), *The rise of Neoliberalism and institutional analysis* (pp. 193–218). Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- Hay, C., & Rosamond, B. (2002). Globalization, European integration and the discursive construction of economic imperatives. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 9(2), 147–167.
- Hill, C. (2003). *The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hormats, R. D. (2012). LiveAtState: Doing Business With the United States. *U.S. Department of State*. Retrieved from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ime/188117.htm>
- Ide, D. A. (2014). *Egypt's Past and Potential: Nationalism, Neoliberalism, and Revolution*. New York: Hampton Institute Press.
- Kissinger, H. (1994). *Diplomacy*. London: Simon and Schuster.
- Lewis, R. J. (2011). Leveraging State-to-State Global Relationships: Remarks by the Special Representative for Global Intergovernmental Affairs. *State Department*. Retrieved from <http://www.state.gov/s/srgia/2011/185288.htm>
- Lynch, T. J. (2013). George W. Bush. In M. Cox, T. J. Lynch, & N. Bouchet (Eds.), *US Foreign Policy and Democracy Promotion* (pp. 178–195). Oxon: Routledge.

- Mills, C. W. (1956). *The Power Elite*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Obama, B. (2011). Remarks by the President on the Middle East and North Africa. *The White House*. Retrieved May 19, 1BC, from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/19/remarks-president-middle-east-and-north-africa>
- Obama, B. (2013). Statement by President Barack Obama on Egypt. *The White House Office of the Press Secretary*. Retrieved from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/07/03/statement-president-barack-obama-egypt>
- Ottaway, M. (2011). *Interview with author at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. Washington D.C.
- Psaki, J. (2013). Spokesperson Daily Press Briefing. *U.S. Department of State*. Retrieved from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2013/07/212484.htm>
- Root, H. L., Li, Y., & Balasuriya, K. (2009). The US Foreign Aid Policy to the Middle East. In R. E. Looney (Ed.), *Handbook of US-Middle East Relations: Formative Factors and Regional Perspectives* (pp. 38–50). Oxon: Routledge.
- Saudi News Agency. (2011, January 29). Saudi King telephones Egyptian President, slams “malicious sedition.” *BBC Monitoring Service*. Riyadh.
- Schenker, D. (2013). Inside the Complex World of U.S. Military Assistance to Egypt. *The Washington Institute Policy Watch 2130*.
- Schott, J. J. (2004). Assessing US FTA Policy. In J. J. Schott (Ed.), *Free Trade Agreements: US Strategies and Priorities* (pp. 359–381). Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics.
- Shama, N. (2014). *Egyptian Foreign Policy from Mubarak to Morsi: Against the National Interest*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Sharp, J. M. (2014). *Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations* (p. RL33003). Washington D.C.
- Stier, K. (2011). Egypt’s Military-Industrial Complex. *Time*. Retrieved from <http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2046963,00.html>
- Van Dijk, T. A. (2001). Critical Discourse Analysis. In D. Schiffrin, D. Tannen, & H. E. Hamilton (Eds.), *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis* (pp. 352–371). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Wittes, T. C., & Yerkes, S. E. (2006). *What Price Freedom? Assessing the Bush Administration’s Freedom Agenda* (No. 10) (pp. 1–32). Washington D.C.
- Wittes, Tamara, C. (2013). Reported Suspension of U.S. Aid to Egypt a Short-Term Measure. *Brookings: Up Front*. Retrieved from <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/10/09-us-egypt-aid-wittes>

Wurzel, U. G. (2012). The Political Economy of Authoritarianism in Egypt: Insufficient Structural Reforms, Limited Outcomes and a Lack of New Actors. In L. Guazzone & D. Pioppi (Eds.), *The Arab State and Neo-Liberal Globalisation: The Restructuring of State Power in the Middle East* (pp. 97–124). Reading: Ithica Press.

Youngs, R. (2010). Democracy and Security in the Middle East. In N. J. Brown & E. E.-D. Shahin (Eds.), *The Struggles over Democracy in the Middle East: Regional Politics and External Policies* (pp. 29–41). Oxon: Routledge.