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Reflective epistemological disjunctivism

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Cunningham, Joseph John (2016) Reflective epistemological disjunctivism. Episteme, 13 (1). pp. 111-132. doi:10.1017/epi.2015.62 ISSN 1742-3600.

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2015.62

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Abstract

It is now common to distinguish Metaphysical from Epistemological Disjunctivism. It is equally common to suggest that it is at least not obvious that the latter requires a commitment to the former: at the very least, a suitable bridge principle will need to be identified which takes one from the former to the latter. This paper identifies a plausible-looking bridge principle that takes one from the version of Epistemological Disjunctivism defended by John McDowell and Duncan Pritchard, which I label Reflective Epistemological Disjunctivism or (RED), to Metaphysical Disjunctivism. Moreover, it identifies a modification the proponent of (RED) could, and should, make to the Internalist component of their theory, and argues that the commitment to Metaphysical Disjunctivism remains, even if such a modification is made. The upshot is that the commitment to Metaphysical Disjunctivism on the part of (RED) is shown to be particularly robust.

Item Type: Journal Article
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Disjunction (Logic)
Journal or Publication Title: Episteme
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISSN: 1742-3600
Official Date: March 2016
Dates:
DateEvent
March 2016Published
February 2016Available
12 October 2015Accepted
Volume: 13
Number: 1
Number of Pages: 22
Page Range: pp. 111-132
DOI: 10.1017/epi.2015.62
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Date of first compliant deposit: 30 March 2016
Date of first compliant Open Access: 30 March 2016

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