Brownlee, Kimberley (2016) Freedom of association. In: Lippert-Rasmussen, Kasper and Brownlee, Kimberley and Coady, David, (eds.) Blackwell Companion to Applied Philosophy. Wiley. (In Press)

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Abstract

This chapter explores the contours of our freedoms to enter into and leave particular associations with particular people. The chapter highlights the fact that often our associations with each other are morally complex and, indeed, morally wrong. This moral complexity stems partly from the fact that associations are necessarily intersubjective: they affect the social needs, claims, and freedoms of at least two people. When our associations are morally wrong, we must determine whether they can be protected nonetheless by our sphere of associative freedom. The chapter shows that our sphere of associative freedom depends greatly on the character and consequences of our associations (or dissociations). The chapter also shows that, under certain conditions, freedom of association is less important than other associative rights, such as the positive associative claim-rights of utterly dependent people.

Item Type:	Book Item
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
Publisher:	Wiley
Book Title:	Blackwell Companion to Applied Philosophy
Editor:	Lippert-Rasmussen, Kasper and Brownlee, Kimberley and Coady, David
Official Date:	March 2016
Dates:	Date Event March 2016 Accepted
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	In Press

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