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Introduction

Kant and Sartre: Existentialism and Critical Philosophy*

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1. Kant and Sartre So Far

Kant and Sartre are two of the most significant figures in modern philosophy, and yet there has, until very recently, been little comparative research undertaken on them. Despite dealing with many shared philosophical issues, they have traditionally been taken to be too opposed to each other to render any search for possible parallels between their works a useful enterprise. Indeed, Sartre is often taken to be one of Kant’s most vocal critics in the literature, and as rather indebted to other major figures, such as Husserl and Heidegger. As a consequence, often, where comparative analysis has been done upon Kant and Sartre, the emphasis has been on their differences, rather than on their similarities. However, as recent research has begun to show, the story is not that straightforward and there is much to be explored with regard to parallels between Kant and Sartre.

Baiasu (2003) has characterised Sartre’s relation to Kant as one of an “anxiety of influence” – Sartre desires to explicitly distance himself from Kant, but this obscures some deeper underlying parallels between them. Such parallels can form a foundation for productive dialogue, more widely, between the schools of Kantian “Critical philosophy” and existentialism.

Recent research has demonstrated the possibility of such a dialogue between the philosophies of Kant and Sartre. A natural starting-point for comparative analysis of both philosophers is that of their ethical theories, which has sparked differences of opinion amongst scholars. Linsenbard (2007), for example, has argued that Sartre’s use of Kantian notions (such as a principle of universalizability) masks more fundamental differences between the two that place them far apart:

[I]t would be a mistake, I think, to interpret Sartre’s views on morality as ‘Kantian’ or as even marginally endorsing Kant’s views. Indeed, Sartre’s continuing preoccupation (one might even say ‘obsession’) with Kant suggests... a path he did not wish to take with respect to the most promising moral terrain (2007: 65).

Due to having radically different ethical theories, despite much talk of Kant and use of familiarly Kantian language, Sartre “cannot... be interpreted as invoking Kant’s meaning” (2007: 80). Painter (1999) on the other hand finds deep similarities between Kant and Sartre on the questions of ethics,

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1 Howells (1986) originally made this point with regard to their respective positions on ethics, which Baiasu (2011) later expanded to cover wider aspects of their philosophies.

2 An example of such a dialogue can be seen in the work of Christine Korsgaard, who explicitly acknowledges her indebtedness to both Kant and Sartre. Whilst her work is more widely recognised as Kantian in spirit, nevertheless it also includes strong existentialist aspects.
identifying a shared inheritance in the tradition of Protestant ethics. Describing Sartre’s relationship with Kant as “flirtatious”, he writes that

> [b]oth find a common ground in a fundamental aspect of the Protestant ethic, characterized by Lutheranism and Calvinism, wherein the everyday takes on great moral significance, and great deeds, or high moral principles that direct actions based on the actualization of virtuous ends become hubristic, impious and immoral… how we approach the simply given in life, the concrete everyday situation, has far more moral significance than any moral principle whose content defines what is right or what is wrong (1999: 211).

Given this shared inheritance, we can see Sartre’s use of Kant’s language and various concepts as an opportunity to illuminate ethical insights from the Protestant ethical tradition, alongside his own idiosyncratic developments, and Sartre himself as unable to escape from shared parallels with Kant on the question of ethics: “Sartre’s critique of Kant’s ethics, and his attempt to develop his own, burns down, like a crucible, the essence of both approaches: a secular Protestantism” (1999: 217).

As part of the project of a comparative analysis on Kant’s and Sartre’s ethical works, Sweeney (1985) has also noted that, in his short story “The Wall”, Sartre uses examples similar to those of Kant’s famous essay “On a Supposed Right to Lie From Philanthropy”, which illuminate the ethical theses that he is attempting to illustrate through the narrative⁢. We see, in this story, Sartre potentially using Kantian resources to argue against Husserl; as Sweeney writes, “Sartre seeks to argue against Husserl by presenting through his use of Kant’s example a counter-example to Husserl’s view” (1985: 15). Though, of course, this in itself does not show that Sartre is adopting a Kantian ethical theory, it does illustrate at least that he was aware of the philosophical resources made available to him by Kant for use in describing and elaborating his own ethical theory.

Lieberman (1997) has also added to this literature by comparing Kant and Sartre’s accounts of freedom, particularly taking into account the impact that radical evil has upon freedom in Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason. An interesting parallel can perhaps be seen between the choice of a fundamental ethical disposion as an original act of will (which, as far as Kant is concerned, makes all human beings radically evil) and Sartre’s notion of ‘choosing oneself’ – both are choices which are independent of the individual’s environment, are “outside of time”, and serve as an intelligible ground for individual choices, seeing them as part of a “total choice” (1997: 210-212).

However, Lieberman is keen to note that the parallels between Kant and Sartre on the notion of a kind of fundamental ethical choice only go so far; ultimately they differ insofar as “first, Sartre lacks the world view that accepts common (and perhaps unquestionable) knowledge of the moral law; and second, Sartre lacks the theoretical orientation in which an a priori awareness of the moral law is possible – in which a fact about our essence as rational beings precedes, or is at least independent of, our existence – thereby reversing the existential canon that existence precedes essence” (1997: 215). Nevertheless, he speaks of the comparative analysis of Kant and Sartre on this issue as

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³ Though, Sweeney does allow that Sartre could have been inspired to use this example by Plato or Victor Hugo (1985: 16 n7).
“fruitful” in “revealing in the residue of analysis an historical trace that connects Kant to Sartre in some aspects of their thought”, as well as “[bring[ing] to light fundamental problems within their theories and [suggesting] avenues of interpretation and possible solutions” (1997: 216).

Other recent research has focused on issues in the theoretical philosophies of Kant and Sartre. Deep parallels and dissimilarities have both been noted. As an example, Jopling (1986) has discussed their accounts of self-knowledge (a topic that will recur in this volume). A deep affinity can be found in the sense in which the attempt to gain self-knowledge, for both philosophers, is a very difficult endeavour indeed:

Kant and Sartre, I believe, are calling attention to the existence of a blind spot which unavoidably insinuates itself into all our attempts to know ourselves. The activities necessary for self-knowledge... are always one logical step behind themselves, and are blind to the very agency constitutive of and contemporaneous with them. We are unable to know ourselves in the very act of knowing... We know ourselves through the categories, or through the ‘Other’ – and not as absolutely proximate and self-present (1986: 74).

Sartre follows Kant's approach in seeking “to correct the strong tendency towards reification and substantialization which infects... both philosophical and pre-philosophical self-knowing activities” (1986: 75) and holding a “radicalized version of the concept of constituting activity” (1986: 73) that ultimately denies straightforward knowledge of the self. More recently, Darnell (2005 – a contributor to this volume) has also published a monograph on the notion of self in Kant and Sartre, noting the complex relations between the two on this topic, and that Sartre’s misreading of Kant may have led him to distance himself from Kantian thought more than he needed to; for example, “he most likely fell victim to Kant’s characterization of the I of apperception as not only a unity, but also as a ground of identity” (2005: 27). Also as part of this body of research on theoretical philosophy, Gardner has recently considered the extent to which Sartre can be labelled a “transcendental philosopher”. He paints a complex picture of the position of Sartre in the post-Kantian tradition, but nevertheless argues that in a substantial sense Sartre can be seen as following a Kantian line in some of his theoretical thinking. As an example, Gardner points to Sartre’s “anti-naturalist strategy” as being “at least in substantial part, transcendental” (2011: 54) due to the use of recognisably transcendental argumentation.

Of course, there is much more literature now available as part of the growing body of research on Kant and Sartre – these have been merely examples to give at least a limited sense of the wealth of research opportunities available in comparing these two philosophers. This volume of original essays is intended to be a significant addition to the growing body of comparative research on Kant and Sartre, encompassing in an unprecedented manner a number of original papers that embrace many philosophical topics of interest shared between the two thinkers. Many of the papers stem from a conference on Kant and Sartre held at Keele University in November 2012. The volume, split into three major parts, addresses issues in metaphysics, metaethics, and metaphilosophy. Philosophical notions central to both Kant and Sartre, including autonomy, happiness, self-consciousness, self-knowledge, evil, temporality and the imagination are explored in great detail to give us a clearer picture of the theoretical and practical philosophies of both thinkers. In addition to giving us new
insights, the papers also leave many unanswered questions, and thus give us promising prospects for
future comparative research on Kant and Sartre. The rest of this Introduction will discuss some of
the key points of the papers in the order in which they appear in the volume, as well as the issues
and difficulties they raise for future research.

2. Comparing Kant and Sartre
2.1. Metaphysics
The volume proper begins with a contribution by Sorin Baiasu, who considers two objections
generated by his claim that Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception is deeply similar to Sartre’s
(self-)consciousness or pre-reflective consciousness of self. Both objections are prompted by
Baiasu’s claim that Sartrean pre-reflective consciousness of self and Kantian transcendental unity of
apperception play the role of a weak epistemological condition of experience. The first objection
indirectly challenges the weakness of such a condition, whereas the second disputes its
epistemological nature. The first objection is said to have implications for the current debate
concerning non-conceptual content, whereas the second is regarded as linked to traditional debates
concerning the kind of idealism that Critical philosophy and phenomenology offer. After a brief
discussion concerning some methodological problems for comparative philosophical studies, the
chapter answers the two objections and examines their implications.

However, the weak sense of personality important to Baiasu’s argument here, that is, the
epistemological condition offered by the transcendental unity of apperception, which is necessary in
a practical, moral sense, raises questions. We can reflect, for example, upon a shift in Kant’s thought
between the first and second editions of the first Critique; in the former, Kant denies knowledge of
substance in a thick sense, although he seems to allow that we may be substances in a thin, logical
sense, whereas in the latter, he denies even this sort of thin knowledge of ourselves as substances. It
would perhaps be an interesting line of future research to evaluate how a comparison with Sartre
might shift if we concentrate on the differing first and second editions of the first Critique. Furthermore, questions can be raised as to whether there is in fact a notion of a weak sense of
personality in the A edition. Such uncertainty regarding Kant’s position further complicates the
issue of how we compare his commitments in the first Critique with Sartre’s pre-reflective
consciousness of self.

Continuing on the theme of the conditions of our experience, Daniel Herbert’s paper focuses on the
topic of temporality. He argues that a fundamental misunderstanding of transcendental idealism as
involving an ontological commitment to a supersensible reality leads Sartre to make unfair criticisms
of Kant’s treatment of temporality. If we opt for an Allison-style ‘methodological’ or ‘two-aspects’
reading of transcendental idealism (where we refrain from stating that the objects of experience are
ideal, even if space and time are), we can see that Sartre’s criticisms regarding the linking of
temporality to the perspective of a transcendental subject are perhaps ill-founded. However, it is not
clear that traditional worries concerning the Kantian use of the thing-in-itself are avoided under the
two-aspects model, for if the forms of intuition are ideal, and intuition is supposed to provide
evidence for the reality of sensible objects, then we have the worry that sensible intuitions
themselves and the ‘reality’ of the objects are ideal too.

Ameriks has argued that some interpreters are mistaken in ascribing personality to the ‘I’ (2000: esp. Ch. 4).
Nevertheless, Herbert further reflects upon where the two philosophers diverge with regard to temporality; whereas Kant’s account is more impersonal, Sartre desires to ground his understanding of temporality in everyday experience, in particular through our capacity for spontaneity, and not making a distinction between a transcendental ‘extra-mundane’ subjectivity and its empirical counterpart. Kant’s overemphasis on the mathematical sciences leads him, in Sartre’s view, to posit an unacceptably strong distinction between the empirical and the noumenal. Whilst Sartre recognises the relevance of temporality in all domains of human activity, Kant seems to limit this to the domain of science alone.

The discussion opens up further directions for research; for instance, we can examine whether Sartre’s interpretation of Kant on temporality, the foundation on which he forms his objections, is accurate. What seems objectionable is that Sartre sees Kant’s theory of time as relevant to a theory of science but not at the same time to a theory of mind and human cognition. Yet, in fact, Kant’s transcendental philosophy and his account of time can be read as (part of) a theory of the conditions of the possibility of science (e.g. Vleeschauwer 1962) or a theory of mind and cognition (e.g. Kitcher 1990) or a theory of experience (e.g. Aquila 1983). The point is that Kant’s account of time has been read in more ‘phenomenological’ ways, too, and that for comparing him Kant Sartre this could prove fruitful.

With Thomas Flynn’s contribution, we turn from temporality to the imaginary. His paper reflects upon Kant’s influence on Sartre’s psychology, with a particular emphasis on the imagination. Flynn works through a number of Sartre’s works, noting potentially illuminating parallels between the two philosophers. As an example, the young Sartre seemed to have been enamoured with the role that the imagination has to play in the Critique of Judgement, along with Kant’s use of symbolic schematism. Flynn also notes points where Sartre seems to have been spurred by Kant to develop certain aspects of his own philosophy, such as with the notion of an ‘egoless’ consciousness, the placing of the imaging consciousness at the very centre of his philosophical psychology, and the appeal to the ‘as if’ in expanding our imaginary reflections upon philosophical issues (in a parallel with Kantian regulative ideas). The paper concludes with reflections upon the parallels and tensions between Sartre’s later ethics and Kantian moral theory.

There are open questions here regarding the distance between Kant and Sartre, and indeed whether the latter sees himself as attacking the former. Flynn argues that the ‘egoless’ consciousness forms part of Sartre’s attack on Kant, alongside intentionality and a realist epistemology, posed against Kant’s constitutive character of consciousness. Is Sartre simply interested in different questions than Kant, and can we construe Kant along Sartrean lines, with himself adopting intentionality and a realist epistemology? Is the Kantian constitutive character of consciousness so unamenable to Sartre?

The part of the volume on metaphysics concludes with a paper by Christian Onof on the key metaphysical notions of freedom and the self in Kant and Sartre. More specifically, Onof attempts to use philosophical resources from Sartre to aid Kant with his problem of reconciling transcendental freedom with causal determinism in the Third Antinomy. This account appears to leave us with something of a dilemma with regards to the possibility of evil – if we assume that to be free means
to be moral, then one can only be evil if one is not free, and hence not responsible for their evil actions. (Perhaps we could attempt to resolve the dilemma by allowing for different types of freedom in addition to autonomy, which is a presupposition for being free). We can fill out our understanding of Kant’s views on these points by noting his distinction between Wille (practical reason under the moral law) and Willkür (the legislative – transcendentally free – power of choice). However, we may still wonder how Willkür chooses noumenally, particularly when it does not legislate in accordance with the moral law.

Onof suggests that Sartre’s ontology of the “For-Itself” and the “In-Itself” can aid Kant here in placing spontaneity outside of being, and considers whether this could aid with the potential difficulty that God’s creative act could predetermine our actions. However, Sartre’s account leads to an emphasis on consciousness as the source of negation in a way that the Kantian would resist. Instead, Onof concludes with the suggestion of a modal realist interpretation of transcendental idealism in order to maintain normativity as being connected to what is possible. He also argues that this position is compatible with Kantian moral theory.

The paper raises many questions, as well as tapping into a wider debate (seen in a number of contributions to this volume) regarding how dissimilar Sartre’s “realist” ontology is from Kantian transcendental idealism. As an example, we could consider what “outside” means with regard to the For-Itself’s lying outside of the fullness of the being of the In-Itself. A natural reading would be to take ‘outside’ as denoting ontological distinctness, but what kind of distinctness this could be, given that ‘outside’ of being is outside of ontology itself, is a further question to be considered. In relation to this, how are we to understanding “nothing” in a Sartrean context? Is it absolute, in denoting there not being anything, or merely relative, as a positive something with a specific role to play in Sartre’s philosophy? Indeed, how are we to understand more generally the status of such claims regarding what is beyond being? We may also raise questions about Kant, for example, whether the notions of substance and causation (both a priori concepts of the understanding) should both be modified when faced with the difficulties of accounting for freedom, instead of merely shifting to a different notion of causation.

2.2. Metaethics
In the following part of the volume, our attention moves from metaphysics to metaethics, beginning with Leslie Stevenson’s essay on self-knowledge and its relation to freedom in Kant and Sartre. Stevenson begins by reflecting upon the Sartrean “pre-reflective cogito”, which bears more than a passing resemblance to the Kantian ‘I think’ of the transcendental unity of apperception. Using a contrast with animal mentality, he argues that both Kant and Sartre seem to have a sense that human beings can have conceptualized perceptions that are unavailable to other animals, such that we can become “positionally” aware of ourselves in relation to our environment and explicitly aware of other facts about ourselves. In this regard, Stevenson utilises the pure/impure reflection distinction in Sartre to suggest that we could understand such self-awareness as a kind of “purifying” reflection upon our own fundamental purposes. Finally, the paper concludes by arguing for a deep parallel between Kant and Sartre on the question of self-knowledge in relation to freedom, in that, for both, self-knowledge (in whatever way you wish to construe it) and project-setting can act in tandem.
Further reflections upon Sartre’s account of self-knowledge could focus on the claim, in The Transcendence of the Ego, that non-reflective consciousness is an impersonal, transcendental field of consciousness. If such an impersonal consciousness is the basis for reflective as well as positional consciousness, then can reflective consciousness be said to be personal? It becomes difficult to see how self-knowledge comes from reflective consciousness, given that, according to the early Sartre, it provides an ego that is part of the world and thus not part of a person’s consciousness. The approach of comparing human and animal consciousness in Kant and Sartre is also promising, though poses further questions. One such question revolves around how we should distinguish animal and human consciousness in the context of Sartre’s various commitments regarding consciousness. We may think that animals should not be attributed pre-reflective cogito because the human pre-reflective consciousness of self is what allows us to reflect upon our actions in a way that other animals do not. However, is this enough to deny pre-reflective cogito to animal consciousness, particularly if we may want to grant them pre-reflective positional consciousness, which (according to Sartre) rests upon a pre-reflective consciousness of self? Drawing the lines between human and animal consciousness in this way, within the confines of Sartre’s philosophy, is certainly a research direction worth pursuing.

Peter Poellner’s paper focuses upon autonomy in Sartre’s philosophy, with a view to drawing lessons for contemporary debates surrounding practical rationality. To begin with, he explores the Sartrean view of seeing autonomy as tied to a consciousness being both self-determining and sensitive to reasons. Poellner delineates a number of aspects of Sartre’s account of freedom, and argues that these do not have direct metaphysical import, but rather refer to phenomenological facts, to a “practical reality of action”. Under this view, autonomy can be seen as the very foundation of an “ethics of freedom”, and there a possible parallel with Kant lies. He further reflects upon Sartre’s “completion thesis”. Sartre appears to have taken this thesis to have had a certain amount of ontological import, stating that, in pursuing ends, consciousness experiences a lack and feels ‘incomplete’ in a sense. Thus, a corollary of action is a desire on the part of consciousness to complete itself, and overcome the lack that it has previously felt. Poellner, having undertaken a certain amount of “rational reconstruction”, evaluates this “quasi-Sartrean” view and finds it somewhat wanting in its obscurity. Nevertheless, he thinks we can formulate a sufficiently filled-out view such that we can evaluate it in comparison with Kantian ethical theory. In particular, with the notion of a consciousness’ having value insofar as it aims at unqualifiedly valuable ends, a value that potentially encompasses all conscious beings, we may be reminded of the Kantian quest for the summum bonum, or the “highest good”.

Poellner’s paper suggests a further avenue of research when he distinguishes between fundamentally value-centred and reasons-centred views, with Sartre falling under the former umbrella and Kant under the latter. Does this distinction show a fundamental discontinuity between the two philosophers? It is especially noteworthy that Kant’s ethical theory is, in a sense, value-centred, taking good and evil not as values to be derived from normatively neutral features, but in fact as a priori ideas of reason, as we can see from the second Critique.

Justin Alam’s contribution focuses upon two key concepts in the metaethics of Kant and Sartre: respectively, radical evil and bad faith. In Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, Kant introduces the notion of a “supreme maxim”, chosen as a principle for deciding whether to prioritise
morally good or amoral incentives in selecting first-order maxims of action. It is in the selection of an evil supreme maxim that radical evil consists. Alam examines how we can understand the selection of an evil supreme maxim given that we have an overriding reason, following from our autonomy, to choose a good supreme maxim. In order to unpick this difficulty, he draws upon the possibility of self-deception playing a part in the selection of a supreme maxim. However, self-deception itself brings problems with it, such as how we can at the same time both know and be ignorant about a given deception.

It is at this point that Sartrean bad faith comes into the picture. As a way of undermining the difficulties surrounding the notion of self-deception, it provides the possibility of a situation in which an individual does not simultaneously believe one thing and its opposite, but rather distracts themselves from the truth by misinterpreting evidence for it. On this basis, Alam assesses the possibility of a Kantian use of this sort of strategy to make sense of the choice of the “supreme maxim”. The idea of a will choosing a fundamental disposition on the basis of reasons, for example, may still retain an air of mystery (indeed, it may seem that Kant accepted that evil actions are ultimately unintelligible).

It is suggested that a kind of “false freedom” is the promise upon which we decide to prioritise self-love, but the possibility remains that the choice of freedom is more fundamental than the choice to prioritise self-love on Kant’s model; or perhaps we are putting things the wrong way around, for freedom has a secondary value to the good: freedom makes the universal agreement of all rational beings possible, but it is the good that is the object of pure practical cognition. Self-deception itself, though, may also remain a wholly intractable problem. There is still a level of pretence involved in bad faith, contrasted with a sincerity condition required for true belief. Thus, we have a notion of an individual non-sincerely pretending something to be the case, which ultimately may remain just as mysterious as the idea of an individual simultaneously believing in one thing and in its opposite. All these questions foreshadow interesting avenues for future research.

The metaethical part of the volume concludes with Michelle Darnell’s analysis of the role of happiness in Kant and Sartre, which she argues could play a larger part in the philosophy of both thinkers than is usually supposed. According to Darnell, Sartre criticises Kantian ethics on the basis that it is not a positive ethics; being grounded in a noumenal realm, it is too far removed from the level of concrete events. However, Kant can offer a positive ethics drawing upon the notion of happiness, and the importance of interdependence of persons in creating value in the world, with the end-result of summum bonum, where happiness is established in proportion to virtue. Once we understand this positive aspect of Kant’s ethics, which involves a teleological dimension of the unification of all moral ends, we can see that Sartre’s criticisms are largely unfounded. In stressing this positive aspect of Kant’s ethics, though, have we moved away from the key Kantian emphasis on autonomy?

In response to Sartre’s objections, it seems promising to make the highest good into a social good upon which we ground principles of action. There is a danger, though, that if we make happiness in proportion to virtue a moral principle, we may be placing a fundamentally heteronomous principle at the heart of Kant’s ethics, and if so, sacrificing a part of his ethics that makes it identifiably Kantian. Do we, in replying to Sartre’s objections, grant him too much? Further, Darnell goes on to
consider a possible role for happiness in Sartre’s ethics. At first, it seems that such a role may be entirely negative as an expression of bad faith, marking out a means by which we seek to deny our own existence as for-itself. The beginnings of a possible positive role for happiness comes through a link to authenticity, in which our understanding of happiness can undergo a revolution, becoming a feeling of joy in response to the authentic person’s free creation of a meaningful world. Thus, perhaps a deeper relation, grounded in a fundamentally optimistic attitude, can be found between Kant and Sartre, though questions regarding the kind of happiness that both philosophers have in mind remain. Sartre’s view of happiness as consisting in an authentic life seems more akin to a Stoic model than the view held by Kant.

2.3. Metaphilosophy

The final part of the volume deals with metaphilosophical issues, beginning with a paper by Katherine Morris on the possibility of reading Sartre as a “philosophical therapist”, along the lines of Wittgenstein. The paper, amongst other things, focuses on Sartre’s practice of giving descriptions of everyday experiences, and using such descriptions as springboard for reflections upon the phenomenology of human reality. Adopting a therapeutic approach involves moving from descriptions of experience to phenomenological claims in a way that breaks down resistance to such descriptions due to bad faith. Such an approach stands in contrast to what she calls a “transcendental reading”, in which transcendental arguments are used in order to demonstrate that phenomenological claims are conditions for the possibility of certain kinds of experience. Through the examination of examples given by Sartre concerning the phenomenology of everyday experiences, Morris argues that the descriptions involved are not incontestable such that they can stand as a foundation for a transcendental argument; rather, Sartre can be read as concerned with bad faith as willing to misconstrue phenomenological ontology through resisting certain descriptions of experience. In this regard, we can draw upon Wittgenstein, who attempts to use philosophy to dispel intellectual prejudice, as difficult as that task may be.

Morris ends her paper by answering possible objections to a therapeutic reading of Sartre. One such objection is that Sartre, on this reading, has left behind philosophical argumentation entirely, and another connected objection is that in this way Sartre has decisively left epistemological issues aside. Such objections can be met, Morris argues, through reflections upon Sartre’s specific target on individuals with bad faith. This discussion, in turn, certainly invites further questions regarding Kant, for example, whether we could attempt to interpret Kant along therapeutic lines. As a starting-point for such reflection, Morris notes the impact the therapeutic reading has on the distinction between appearance and reality. The transcendental reading assumes that the distinction in question maps onto a gap that needs to be bridged, whereas the therapeutic reading paints Sartre as undermining the “scandal of philosophy” that is the difficulties surrounding an inference from appearance to reality. If a therapeutic reading of Kant proves successful, would this affect our evaluation of the relation between Kant and Sartre?

The volume concludes with a consideration of transcendental idealism in Kant and Sartre by Richard Aquila. He argues that both philosophers espouse a form of transcendental idealism called “transcendental phenomenalism”, in which a judgement of an appearance as “real” involves both,

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5 This is a line taken by Graham Bird (for instance, 2007).
from one point of view, affirming the appearance as phenomenon and, from another, affirming that it is an appearance within an infinite series of appearances of the phenomenon involved. Such a similarity is possible, if one construes transcendental idealism more generally as stating of a “real” phenomenon that a judgement is being made of a consciously-available object whose ontological status is left open. An empirical judgement requires an appeal to being-in-itself in addition to an appeal to infinity with regard to those species of appearances to which the objects in question are reducible. The appeal to being-in-itself, however, is not to be considered as regarding said objects as things-in-themselves from a transcendental perspective. It is through such parallels that Kant and Sartre can be seen as holding similar positions.

Nevertheless differences between Kant and Sartre remain, such as, for example, surrounding the distinction between the Kantian “thing-in-itself” and the Sartrean “being-in-itself”. Aquila’s paper invites deeper metaphilosophical questions regarding the framework within which we compare Kant and Sartre. How are we to deal with technical terms like phenomena and appearance within the framework of different philosophies? Taking appearance and phenomena as our example, not only might Kant and Sartre mean different things by these terms, but also the relationship between the two terms may differ, making any fruitful comparison between the two on these issues very difficult indeed. Further research of such issues is invited here.

3. Conclusion

So, to conclude, what questions and possible future avenues for research do these papers raise? To begin with, we can consider wider issues surrounding the kind of comparative analysis undertaken here, particularly when one philosopher (in this case, Sartre) is consciously reacting to another (Kant). In such a situation, not only do we have to attend to varying competing interpretations of the positive philosophies of both figures, but we also have to be careful in placing the later philosopher’s interpretation of the earlier philosopher amongst these various options. In the case of Kant and Sartre, a comparative analysis of these two philosophers may be very illuminating, and in particular may help to clarify various aspects of Sartre’s philosophy and how he sees his own position in the history of philosophy. However, we may be misled if we are not clear on the question of which interpretation of Kant he is reacting to, a factor which would be crucial for any successful comparative analysis. Indeed, does it matter if Sartre is unfair to Kant, or if he is a perceptive, sensitive reader of him?

In addition to such an endeavour, we may still desire to compare Kant and Sartre on their own terms, regardless of how the latter interpreted the former, but we must be clear that this is an entirely separate issue. Further reflection could take place on which approach we find the most useful for our philosophical research – there may be a substantive difference between the two, they may complement each other very well, or it may just be a matter of taste, with differing aims for research in the history of philosophy. In addition to this, a number of papers in this volume have attempted reconstructive work on the philosophies of Kant and Sartre in light of the contrasts and parallels between the two. However, this raises the question of how far we should go with such reconstructive work, and whether there is a point at which we lose something essential from the philosophy that is being reconstructed. There is perhaps a point in which we should leave a philosophy as it is, despite the difficulties it faces, in order to preserve unique insights that we may wish to plunder for our own philosophical needs.
Leaving methodological issues aside, these papers have also raised a number of issues pertaining specifically to comparative research on Kant and Sartre. One general question we may wonder about is the extent to which Kant can be viewed as a kind of ‘proto-existentialist’, or if that is too much, the extent to which the existentialists draw crucial insights from specifically Kant’s thought (as opposed to Kantian thought more generally). In addition, there are important metaphilosophical questions to answer regarding how Kant and Sartre both regard the aims and methods of their philosophies. To take an example, Kant’s project in the Critical period is very carefully constructed (and rather idiosyncratic) to respond to specific issues in philosophy at that time, a situation that had certainly moved on by the early 20th century. Is there a sufficient amount of crossover between Kant and Sartre on the question of metaphilosophy to substantiate substantive conclusions through comparative analysis? Or, are there simply fundamental discontinuities between these two philosophers on these key issues?

Such worries also impact upon any attempt to focus on specific topics within their philosophies – for example, if one philosopher’s treatment of freedom has very different aims and methods than another philosopher’s account, then it will be very difficult to make secure, substantive comparative points on that topic. Nevertheless, the papers in this volume show that, despite difficulties, much can be done in comparative research of Kant and Sartre. The two philosophers do have a great deal to say to each other, as well as to us. In conversation, they not only illuminate aspects of the philosophy of their interlocutor but also parts of their own. Doubtless, this conversation will continue in future research with a great amount of success.

References


