Low, Jason, Apperly, Ian A., Rakoczy, Hannes and Butterfill, Stephen A. (2016) Cognitive architecture of belief reasoning in children and adults : a two-systems account primer. Child Development Perspectives, 10 (3). pp. 184-189.

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Abstract

Characterizing the cognitive architecture of human mindreading forces us to address two puzzles in people’s attributions of belief: why children show inconsistent expectations about others’ belief-based actions, and why adults’ belief reasoning is sometimes automatic and sometimes not. The seemingly puzzling data suggest humans have multiple mindreading systems that use different models of the mental. The efficient system is shared by infants, children and adults, and uses a minimal model of mind, which enables belief-like states to be tracked. The flexible system is late-developing and uses a canonical model, which incorporates propositional attitudes. A given model’s operation has signature limits that produce performance contrasts, in children as well as adults, between certain types of mindreading tasks.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Reasoning in infants, Reasoning in children , Change (Psychology), Decision making
Journal or Publication Title:	Child Development Perspectives
Publisher:	Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc.
ISSN:	1750-8592
Official Date:	September 2016
Dates:	Date Event September 2016 Published 13 May 2016 Available 10 March 2016 Accepted
Volume:	10
Number:	3
Page Range:	pp. 184-189
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access

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