Competition in unit vs. ad valorem taxes
UNSPECIFIED. (2004) Competition in unit vs. ad valorem taxes. INTERNATIONAL TAX AND PUBLIC FINANCE, 11 (6). pp. 763-772. ISSN 0927-5940Full text not available from this repository.
This paper shows that in a standard model of tax competition, the Nash equilibrium in capital taxes depends on whether these taxes are unit ( as assumed in the literature) or ad valorem ( as in reality). In a symmetric version of the model, general results are established: taxes and public good provision are both higher, and residents in all countries are better off, when countries compete in unit taxes, as opposed to ad valorem taxes. However, the difference in equilibrium outcomes is negligible when the number of countries is large.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions|
|Journal or Publication Title:||INTERNATIONAL TAX AND PUBLIC FINANCE|
|Publisher:||KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBL|
|Number of Pages:||10|
|Page Range:||pp. 763-772|
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