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Is there a political cycle in bureaucrat assignments? : evidence from the Indian Administrative Service
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Iyer, Lakshmi and Mani, Anandi. (2007) Is there a political cycle in bureaucrat assignments? : evidence from the Indian Administrative Service.
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Abstract
We use data on bureaucrat assignments from the Indian Administrative Service to examine whether there is a political cycle in bureaucrat assignments. We find a significant increase in bureaucrat transfers during election years. Detailed month-level data indicates that this is not primarily driven by the incumbents’ desire to influence elections. We find that the increased bureaucratic turnover is much more likely to be caused by the actions of the incoming government after elections.
| Item Type: | Journal Article |
|---|---|
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions J Political Science > JS Local government Municipal government |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics |
| Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): | Bureaucracy -- India, Civil service -- India, India -- Politics and government |
| Publisher: | Unpublished |
| Date: | November 2007 |
| Status: | Not Peer Reviewed |
| Access rights to Published version: | Open Access |
| Is Part Of: | Paper to be presented at the CSWEP sponsored session on “Political Economy in Developing Countries” (AEA Meetings, January 2008). |
| References: | Block, S. (2002). Political business cycles, democratization, and economic reform: the case of Africa. Journal of Development Economics, 67(1), pp.205–228. Cole, S. (2007). Fixing market failures or fixing elections? elections, banks and agricultural lending in India. Working Paper. Hyde, S., and O’Mahoney, A. (2007). International scrutiny and pre-electoral fiscal manipulation in developing countries. Working paper. Iyer, L., and Mani, A. (2007). Traveling agents: political change and bureaucratic turnover in India. Work in progress. Khemani, S. (2004). Political cycles in a developing economy: effect of elections in the Indian states. Journal of Development Economics, 73(1), pp.125–54. Shi, M., and Svensson, J. (2006). Political budget cycles: do they differ across countries and why? Journal of Public Economics, 90, pp.1367–1389. Wilkinson, S. (2004). Votes and violence: electoral competition and ethnic riots in India. University of Chicago Press. |
| URI: | http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/79 |
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