Is there a political cycle in bureaucrat assignments? : evidence from the Indian Administrative Service
Iyer, Lakshmi and Mani, Anandi. (2007) Is there a political cycle in bureaucrat assignments? : evidence from the Indian Administrative Service.
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We use data on bureaucrat assignments from the Indian Administrative Service
to examine whether there is a political cycle in bureaucrat assignments. We find a
significant increase in bureaucrat transfers during election years. Detailed month-level
data indicates that this is not primarily driven by the incumbents’ desire to influence
elections. We find that the increased bureaucratic turnover is much more likely to be
caused by the actions of the incoming government after elections.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
J Political Science > JS Local government Municipal government
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Bureaucracy -- India, Civil service -- India, India -- Politics and government|
|Official Date:||November 2007|
|Status:||Not Peer Reviewed|
|Access rights to Published version:||Open Access|
|Is Part Of:||Paper to be presented at the CSWEP sponsored session on “Political Economy in Developing Countries” (AEA Meetings, January 2008).|
Block, S. (2002). Political business cycles, democratization, and economic reform: the
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