The Intersectionality of Gender and Citizenship on Livelihood Strategies of Protracted Refugees: a Case Study of Palestinians in Jordan

By

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Division of Health Sciences, Warwick Medical School

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</table>
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I am greatly indebted to the women and men who took time to share their experiences and views with me, without whom this thesis would not have been possible.
Declaration of Authorship

This thesis is submitted to the University of Warwick in support of my application for a degree of Doctor of Philosophy. It has been composed by myself and has not been submitted in any previous application for any degree.

Preliminary findings of this thesis have been presented at the following conferences:

Socio-Legal Studies Association 2015 Conference at the University of Warwick’s Law School (31 March 2015). During the conference I presented part of my research findings on the intersectionality of gender and citizenship on the livelihood strategies of protracted refugees.

University College London (UCL) Migration Research United Student Conference (5 June 2015). During the conference I presented part of my findings on the intersectionality of gender and citizenship in shaping employment opportunities for protracted refugees.

An online article has been published using information from this thesis and can be viewed in Appendix 1, Table 1.2(15) and 1.2(16) of this thesis (page 393).

Statistics on Governorate where the research was based were accessed from the Jordanian Department of Statistics (DOS). However, they are currently not available as the DOS website is currently undergoing revisions (last checked 4 December 2015). As figures and tables are no longer accessible through the DOS website, they have been placed in the Appendix of this thesis.
The Brill’s simple Arabic Transliteration system from Arabic to English has been used in this thesis (Daftary and Madelung, 2013).
**Abstract**

This thesis is an analysis of the intersectionality of gender and citizenship on the livelihood strategies of protracted refugees, through a case study of Palestinians in a Governorate in Jordan. More specifically it looks at the intersectionality of gender and citizenship in shaping access to further education and private and public sector employment of protracted Palestinian refugees in Jordan.

An interpretative research paradigm using multiple qualitative methods has been adopted. A single embedded case study design was used that included non-participant observation and interviews with Transjordanians, Palestinian Jordanians and ex-Gazans as well as policy makers, and training and employment service providers. The data set included a total of (44) individual interviews, (6) focus groups, and (48) days of field observations. The data were analysed thematically using NVIVO 10.

The study extends knowledge empirically by exploring the livelihood strategies of protracted Palestinian refugees in and outside camps compared to their host population. The theoretical original contribution to knowledge extends understandings of how the intersectionality of gender and inclusionary and exclusionary citizenship of protracted Palestinian refugees impacts on their access to further education and employment at the macro, meso and micro levels. Structuration theory is used to examine enabling and disabling factors influencing the agency of women and men to develop livelihood strategies. This research highlighted the nuanced forms of
disadvantage that different types of protracted Palestinian refugees experience in their access to further education and employment compared to their host population. While similar strategies are deployed to improve livelihoods, the intersectionality of gender and citizenship created different experiences for them. An analysis of the intersectionality of gender and citizenship provides a differentiated nuanced understanding of variations in livelihoods in a population often considered to be homogenous which has implications for other protracted refugee populations.

Key words: Jordan; intersectionality; Palestinians; protracted refugees.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Detail</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAAQ</td>
<td>Available, Accessible, Acceptable, Appropriate and of Good Quality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD</td>
<td>After Death of Christ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATI</td>
<td>Access-to-Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BA</td>
<td>Bachelors of Arts or Bachelor’s Degree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BC</td>
<td>Before Death of Christ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPS</td>
<td>British Pounds Sterling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BS</td>
<td>Bachelor’s of Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>Circa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community-Based Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRCs</td>
<td>UNRWA Community-Based Rehabilitation Centres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCG</td>
<td>Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDC</td>
<td>Community Development Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEDAW</td>
<td>Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRC</td>
<td>Convention on the Rights of the Child</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRT</td>
<td>Critical Race Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSB</td>
<td>Civil Service Bureau (<a href="http://www.csb.gov.jo">www.csb.gov.jo</a>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Central Statistics Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSR</td>
<td>Convention Relating to the Status of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of Statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Demographic Health Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPA</td>
<td>Department of Palestinian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EB</td>
<td>East Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHR</td>
<td>European Court of Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESC Committee</td>
<td>Executive Steering Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECRE</td>
<td>European Council on Refugees and Exiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e.g.</td>
<td>Exampli Gratia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAFO</td>
<td>Norwegian Institute for Applied International Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ExCom</td>
<td>UNHCR Executive Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FG</td>
<td>Focus Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSE</td>
<td>Feminist Standpoint Epistemology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTC</td>
<td>Fixed Term Contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBP</td>
<td>Great British Pounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCC</td>
<td>Gulf Cooperation Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GID</td>
<td>General Intelligence Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNI</td>
<td>Gross National Income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HE</td>
<td>Higher Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HESSREC</td>
<td>Higher Education Social Sciences Research and Ethical Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>HR</td>
<td>Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRBA</td>
<td>Human Rights-Based Approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>Islamic Arab Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICARA</td>
<td>International Conference on Assistance of Refugees in Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICCPR</td>
<td>International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICERD</td>
<td>International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICESCR</td>
<td>International Covenant for Economic Social and Cultural Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICPMW</td>
<td>International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICLS</td>
<td>International Conference of Labour Statisticians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISCO</td>
<td>International Standard Classification of Occupations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information Communications Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>Identity Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i.e.</td>
<td>In Other Words</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFC</td>
<td>International Finance Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>Information Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>JD</td>
<td>Jordanian Dinars ($1.41 US dollars)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JoHud</td>
<td>Jordan Hashemite Fund for Human Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Km</td>
<td>Kilometres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MA</td>
<td>Master of Arts or Master Degree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ME</td>
<td>Middle East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MENA region</td>
<td>Middle East and North African Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOE</td>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOH</td>
<td>Ministry of Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOL</td>
<td>Ministry of Labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MW</td>
<td>Minimum Wage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Not Applicable or Available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAF</td>
<td>National Aid Fund (This is a Jordanian government initiative aimed to alleviate poverty).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPO</td>
<td>Non-Profit Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCBS</td>
<td>Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PhD</td>
<td>Doctor of Philosophy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestinian Liberation Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pp</td>
<td>Percentage Point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRS</td>
<td>Protracted Refugee Situations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QIZ</td>
<td>Qualifying Industrial Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>RNGO</td>
<td>Royal Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSS</td>
<td>UNRWA’s Relief and Social Services Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO</td>
<td>Social Dominion Orientation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHC</td>
<td>Special Hardship Cases (This refers to a category of Palestinian refugee households classified as particularly vulnerable by UNRWA).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSC</td>
<td>Social Security Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSPTW</td>
<td>Social Security Programs Throughout the World</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPSS</td>
<td>Statistical Package for Social Sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPP</td>
<td>Social Productivity Program (This is a national initiative aiming to improve the livelihoods of vulnerable Jordanians <a href="http://www.espp.gov.jo/">http://www.espp.gov.jo/</a>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TG</td>
<td>Target Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TVET</td>
<td>Technical Vocational Education and Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDHR</td>
<td>Universal Declaration of Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UIDHR</td>
<td>Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCCP</td>
<td>UN Conciliation Commission for Palestinian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
</tr>
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<td>---------</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>United Nations Relief Works Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VTC</td>
<td>Vocational Training Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>West Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPCs</td>
<td>UNRWA’s Women Programme Centres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZSB</td>
<td>Zero Sum Belief</td>
</tr>
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# Glossary of Terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arabic Transcription</th>
<th>English Definition</th>
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<tr>
<td>ʿAšaʾirīyah</td>
<td>Tribalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ʿAšīrah</td>
<td>Tribes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Nakba</td>
<td>The Arab Israeli War of 1948 after which Palestinians lost their historical land of Palestine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allāh</td>
<td>God</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Waṭan Al Badīl</td>
<td>‘The Alternative State’, which refers to Israeli conspiracies to create Jordan as an alternative home for Palestinians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awrah</td>
<td>Is an Islamic term that refers to intimate parts of a woman and man’s body, that need to be concealed (Islamic Terminology, 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dāʿiš (Daesh)</td>
<td>Is the Arabic acronym for ‘Dawlat Al-Islamiyah f'al-Iraq wa al-Sham’. In English it means the Islamic state in Iraq and Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De facto</td>
<td>The situation in actuality, and not according to legal rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De jure</td>
<td>Entitlements based on the law and legal rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahel-Alzemah</td>
<td>A religious term that defined relations between Muslims and non-Muslims during the Islamic Period (Edaich, 2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dīwān</td>
<td>A family or local meeting place for families and or tribal groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Dūnum’</td>
<td>Refers to acre in English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jus Sanguinis</td>
<td>The right to citizenship on the grounds that parents are citizens of a state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jus Soli</td>
<td>The right of anyone born in a country to citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ḥamula</td>
<td>Extended family clans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ḥarām</td>
<td>Forbidden in Islam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ḥaq Al `Auwdah</td>
<td>In English, this term is defined as the ‘Right to Return’. It refers to the rights of Palestinian refugees to return to their place of origin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilo Dahir</td>
<td>He has support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inshā` allāh</td>
<td>In God’s will</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mağlis Al-A`yān</td>
<td>House of Notables</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mağlis An –Nuwāb</td>
<td>Chamber of Deputies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maḥṣūbīyah</td>
<td>Nepotism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makrumāt Malakiyya</td>
<td>In English, this term means ‘Privileges of the King’. It refers to the quota system that gives privilege to Palestinian refugees in all aspects of life such as higher education, relief from medical expenses and housing provision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mawāzī</td>
<td>In English this term is defined as ‘parallel’. It refers to the fee system used for university students who are below the required average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muḥabarāt</td>
<td>Secret intelligence agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muwāṭanah</td>
<td>Citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nafsiyyah</td>
<td>Spirit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qabīlah</td>
<td>Tribal confederations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qurān</td>
<td>Word of God</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Šarī‘ah</td>
<td>Main source of the Islamic law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sutra</td>
<td>A term commonly used to reference the protection of women’s sexual activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ṭānawī</td>
<td>A term used to mean secondary, as in ‘secondary’ school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tauḡihī</td>
<td>General secondary examination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wasṭah (Maḥsūbiyah)</td>
<td>Using the definition of Loewe et al., (2007), wastah refers to ‘favouritism which is based on preferential treatment of relatives, friends, and neighbours or other acquaintances’ (p.5) which is a widespread pattern of social interaction in many parts of the world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waṭan</td>
<td>Homeland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waṭanīyah</td>
<td>Patriotism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ʿUrf</td>
<td>Tradition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wow Card</td>
<td>Wastah, which is a way of obtaining quick gain through political connections or some form of power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zakāt</td>
<td>One of the five pillars of Islam. It is a religious obligation for all Muslims who meet the necessary criteria of wealth. It is not a charitable contribution</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Brill's simple Arabic Transliteration system from Arabic to English has been used for this Glossary (Daftary and Madelung, 2013).
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Introduction

Personal Background

I am a Jordanian woman who grew up in Amman. I studied for my bachelor’s degree in Archaeology at the University of Beirut, (Lebanon) graduating in in 2000. After graduation I worked for 10 years in the field of human development within Jordan and the Middle East region prior to coming to the University of Warwick to study for a master’s degree (MA) and a Doctorate of Philosophy (PhD).

My employment at the United Nations Development Fund for Women (now UN Women) between 2002 and 2008 offered me first-hand access to the field of human development in Jordan. It also raised my awareness of the gender disparities that women in Jordan faced. Our team managed and directly implemented a number of projects and initiatives that covered a wide spectrum of beneficiaries. One of the projects I worked on was a study that explored the status of women’s participation in the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) sector in Jordan and Lebanon. My involvement in this study gave me the opportunity to learn the essential skills needed in the research process. Moreover, the literature review carried out for the study on women’s economic participation in Jordan highlighted major gender disparities in salaries, promotions and types of occupations, as well as structural barriers that reinforced discrimination between women and men.

In April 2008 I became a partner at Q Perspective, a consulting firm specialising in socio-economic development,
corporate citizenship programmes and institutional development targeting large non-governmental and public sector organisations in Jordan and the Arab region. Given my strong writing and research skills, I have been responsible for translating research findings in the field of social work into recommendations for policy and practice. My work at Q Perspective further exposed me to existing socio-economic gender disparities in Jordan.

In 2008 I was commissioned by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID/Jordan) to conduct a study on disadvantaged youth in Jordan. It was during this period that I extended my understanding of the challenges faced by the most marginalised segments of the youth and adolescent population in Jordan. This included Iraqi and Palestinian refugees in Jordan. During this period, the country was struggling to address the waves of Iraqis who had migrated to Jordan following the Gulf Wars. In the case of Palestinians, their protracted status facilitated their integration within Jordanian society. The study’s findings highlighted the role of individual and institutional discrimination in excluding refugee populations from their host communities, as well as in consolidating feelings of social injustice. Gender was found to be a social marker that intersected all marginalised segments to create greater disadvantage.

After the completion of the study, I chose to volunteer in a shelter for women as well as in several Palestinian refugee camps. I organised regular extra-curricular activities for girls and young women. The challenges these girls and young women faced in
participating in the public sphere were great even at a young age. I saw a tremendous need to address the gender gap prevalent in patriarchal societies such as Jordan, particularly in the economically poorer areas of the country.

This research made me aware of the direction that I wanted to pursue my career in, and also highlighted the skills I would need to carry out applied research.

In 2010, I enrolled for a master’s degree (MA) in Health and Social Studies at the University of Warwick. My MA dissertation investigated neo-material and material health inequalities experienced by women and men residing in a refugee camp in Jordan. The findings highlighted disparities between camp-dwellers compared to other Palestinian camps and the host population. As well as recognising the significance of structural conditions in influencing the agency of individuals and collective groups, the literature review also uncovered theoretical and empirical gaps that needed further exploration. In particular, this was in relation to gaining a better understanding of the intersectionality of gender and citizenship and its relation with structure and agency, particularly in protracted refugee situations. I decided to apply for a PhD at the University of Warwick exploring the intersectionality of gender and citizenship in relation to livelihood strategies of protracted refugees, through case study of protracted Palestinians in Jordan.
About the Study

The research focuses on the intersectionality of gender and citizenship on livelihood strategies of protracted refugees through a case study of Palestinians in Jordan. The research explores the extent to which gender and citizenship intersect to impact on people’s access to further education and employment opportunities, through a case study of Palestinians with varying citizenship statuses and their host population. The study addresses issues of individual and institutional discrimination, as well as strategies used to leverage greater economic opportunities.

Study Aim

The research aims to contribute to a better understanding of the impact of the intersectionality of gender and citizenship in shaping the livelihood strategies of protracted refugees through a case study of Palestinians in Jordan.

Research Questions

The three research questions are:

- How does the intersectionality of gender and citizenship shape access to further education for protracted Palestinian refugees in Jordan?
- How does the intersectionality of gender and citizenship influence employment opportunities for protracted Palestinian refugees in Jordan?
– How does the intersectionality of gender and citizenship influence the agency of protracted Palestinian refugees in Jordan in developing livelihood strategies?

Thesis Outline

This PhD thesis comprises of seven chapters and these are summarised below:

Chapter One: Literature Review

This chapter contains a critical analysis of the existing literature on concepts of intersectionality, rights-based frameworks, citizenship, discrimination and structure and agency. It critically examines existing literature and gaps in the literature are identified. The chapter ends with a delineation of the research topic, research questions and theoretical framework of the study.

Chapter Two: Setting

This chapter provides the context of the study, including the demographic, historical, legal, political and socio-economic aspects. It focuses particularly on the status and rights of women and Palestinian refugees in Jordan.

Chapter Three: Methodology

This chapter focuses on the methodology and methods used in the study and also covers the ethical issues encountered during the
fieldwork, including the positionality, reflexivity and insider-outsider framing of the researcher.

**Chapter Four: The Intersectionality of Gender and Citizenship in Shaping Access to Further Education**

This chapter is an analysis of the findings relating to the following research question:

- How does the intersectionality of gender and citizenship shape access to further education for protracted Palestinian refugees in Jordan?

**Chapter Five: The Intersection of Gender and Citizenship in Influencing Employment Opportunities**

This chapter provides the key findings of the following research question:

- How does the intersectionality of gender and citizenship influence the employment for protracted Palestinian refugees in Jordan?

**Chapter Six: The Intersection of Gender and Citizenship in Influencing Livelihood Strategies of Protracted Refugees**

This chapter provides the key findings of the following research questions:
- How does the intersectionality of gender and citizenship influence the agency of protracted Palestinian refugees in Jordan in developing livelihood strategies?

**Chapter Seven: Discussion and Conclusions**

This chapter involves a critical discussion of the main findings that respond to the study’s research questions. The original conceptual and empirical contributions to knowledge are set out, with a discussion of the study limitations and recommendations for future research. The next chapter will be the literature review.
Chapter One: Literature Review

The topic of this thesis is the intersectionality of gender and citizenship on access to further education and employment through a case study of a protracted refugee population, the Palestinians in Jordan. By further education, this thesis refers to education beyond general secondary education (16 years and above). This includes academic and vocational training beyond secondary level, as well as university education. The literature critically reviewed in this chapter covers the areas of protracted refugees, citizenship, gender relations, intersectionality, discrimination and human rights, livelihoods and structure and agency (See Appendix 1, Table 1.1 (page 380) for the definition of terms used in this thesis, as well as Figure 1.1 (page 386) for the literature review search strategy).

The Situation of Protracted Refugees

According to the UNHCR a protracted refugee situation (PRS) is one where ‘over time, there have been considerable changes in refugees’ needs, which neither UNHCR nor the host country has been able to address in a meaningful manner, thus leaving refugees in a state of material dependency and often without adequate access to basic rights (e.g. employment, freedom of movement and education) even after many years spent in the host country’ (UNHCR Africa Bureau, 2002: 2). Refugee populations can be classified as existing in a protracted situation when 25,000 forced migrants from the same
country have fled to another host country and resided there for a minimum of five consecutive years (Bonfanti, 2014).1

In most cases, protracted refugees share experiences similar to vulnerable populations. These include recurrent experiences of human rights infringements, being discriminated against, having poor access to public services, economic hardship and social marginalisation. As well as facing such challenges, protracted refugees are also at a greater risk of vulnerability because their legal status may exclude them from their full human rights as well as state protection (Purkey, 2013).

With regard to the economic conditions of protracted refugees, unlike recent refugees, those who are protracted often have assistance from state and humanitarian organisations over an extended period of time, and the interventions targeting protracted refugees rather than being purely humanitarian may be more development-focused and multi-sectoral (Bonfanti, 2014).

Much of the theoretical research on PRS has focused on exploring appropriate institutional approaches to addressing their situation. Repatriation is regarded by many states as the most durable solution to the problem of PRS (Rowley et al., 2006).

However, in situations where this is not possible, local integration becomes an alternative option. Refugee integration refers to refugees integrating within the host population, as well as service

1 In 2009, the UNHCR Executive Committee (ExCom) Conclusion redefined protracted refugee situations to exclude the limitation of the requirement to have a minimum of 25,000 refugees displaced. The ExCom Conclusion is however not legally binding (Milner and Loescher, 2011).
integration within local structures (Rowley et al., 2006). The UNHCR has addressed the problem of protracted refugees either by integrating them within the host population or through self-reliance strategies.

For most host countries - particularly those with fragile economies such as Egypt, Iraq and Libya - the situation of protracted refugees is an issue of financial concern (OECD, 2015). The UNHCR has recognised the importance of ‘self-reliance’ to avoid refugees’ long-term dependency on the international community and host countries. This push towards refugee self-reliance was formally recognised by the UNHCR in the 1980s, when discussions on the topic were put forward during the International Conference on Assistance of Refugees in Africa meetings (ICARA I and ICARA II).

It was during ICARA I that protraction was recognised to have an impact on refugees as well as host countries. During ICARA II, a number of principles were established that set out theoretical plans of action to address protracted refugees. Nevertheless, little progress was made towards these principles and the UNHCR continues to struggle in dealing with these issues (Purkey, 2013).

It is important to look at the political setting when trying to identify durable solutions for PRS, and a collaborative approach that encompasses both the United Nations (UN) system and governments is advocated (Betts, 2006). Durable solutions involve the creation of an enabling environment wherein legal structures exist that can be used by refugees to protect their rights and allow them to live a dignified life (Purkey, 2013).
The focus of research on the development sector has contributed to the neglect of legal procedures for the empowerment of protracted refugees (Veroff, 2010). There is a lack of research on the concept of justice within refugee camps and particularly in PRS. Protracted refugees are particularly vulnerable because the lack of legal protection mechanisms exacerbates insecurity, with uncertainty in the status of their future situation (Veroff, 2010).

There is a tendency for host countries to create systems that institutionalise discrimination against protracted refugees as a form of protection and prioritisation towards the host population. Moreover, in some cases ‘very tough system[s] [can be established] in which even the victims play a supporting part’ (Yinger, 2010: 397). However, protracted refugees may have access to some forms of citizenship within the countries they are living in. For example, Palestinians in Syria have complete access to Government services as well as access to education and employment in both the public and private sectors (Shafie, 2003).

In summary, there are few studies of protracted refugees with inclusionary and exclusionary forms of citizenship in relation to gender and livelihood strategies. Studies on the whole, focus on either livelihood or legal status and in the main do not compare the situation of the refugees with that of the host population. The next section deals with the literature relating to citizenship.
Citizenship

The study of citizenship involves sociological, cultural and politico-legal concepts that are all interrelated (Jones and Gaventa, 2002). Issues concerning citizens and their rights have been ongoing since the development of a ‘modern nation-state’ and the American and French Revolutions in the late 1700s (Wimmer and Feinstein, 2010: 764).

It is believed that the Western concept of citizenship originated from the Ancient Greek and Roman periods, with the word ‘citizen’ originating ‘from the Latin word *civis* and Greek equivalent *polites* which means member of the *polis* or city’ (Roy, 2005: 1). Where Greek citizenship was understood as a citizen’s allegiance to the city-state and her/his ‘active participation in governing’ (Lailas, 1998: 84), the Roman definition focused on the rights of citizens and the responsibilities that they had towards their government (Lailas, 1998).

While active participation and freedom were recognised as fundamental aspects of citizenship during the Greek period, they were entitlements of only ‘free native-born men’ (Roy, 2005: 2). This excluded a large segment of the population, including slaves, women, children and foreigners.

The Romans adopted a similar notion of citizenship; however, changes were made to accommodate the large population of diverse ethnicities that had been incorporated into the empire. Citizenship came to be identified as a legal framework whereby state protection
was granted in return for allegiance to the Roman Empire (Roy, 2005).

The introduction of Christianity transformed the idea of citizenship from one of loyalty towards the city-state to that of the church. Most relevant to this research is that the Western concept of citizenship then developed away from religion and towards that of a secular nation-state (Lailas, 1998).

**Contemporary Concepts of Citizenship**

Broadly speaking, three major views dominate political theories on the notion of citizenship. These are liberalism, communitarianism and civic republicanism. This thesis utilises the feminist citizenship approach of the concepts of inclusionary and exclusionary citizenship as used by Lister (2008) and Kabeer (2005), which has developed from the liberalist approach linked to human rights.

Liberalist conceptions of citizenship have linked citizenship to civil and political entitlements and recognised the state’s duty to protect such rights with economic and social entitlements not regarded within the scope of citizenship (Kabeer, 2005). Nevertheless, this does not mean that these rights have to be realised at the same time. Instead, they can be attained gradually or through the strategic planning of national priorities (Kabeer, 2005); this is known as the progressive realisation of rights.

Liberalist views regard inequalities resulting from different forms of discrimination as irrelevant to citizenship (Roche, 1987). Rather it is understood to be the equal entitlement to rights, status
and obligations that should be guaranteed by the state. Unlike liberalists, communitarians emphasise the importance of including ‘affiliation to a community’ in the definition of citizenship, otherwise it will turn into a meaningless concept. Liberal individualistic conceptualisations of citizenship are also rejected by republican definitions because they do not encompass ‘membership in a moral community in which the notion of the common good is antecedent to individual citizenship choice’ (Yuval-Davis, 1997: 6). Meanwhile, civic republicans define citizenship as a male concept for use within patriarchal societies. With civic republicanism came a notion of active citizenship for a common good (Heater, 2013).

Some scholars have criticised both liberal and communitarian perspectives on citizenship claiming that ‘the former conflates ethnic and civic identity, [while] the latter because of its “extreme pluralism” does not leave any room for common identity’ (Beiner, 1995, cited in Isin and Wood, 1999: 9). Instead, citizenship is defined as a form of ‘civic identity’ (Beiner, 1995, cited in Isin and Wood, 1999: 9) that is shared by all citizens. Others adopt a radical democratic approach to citizenship, rejecting the notion of citizenship as ‘one identity among others, as in liberalism, or the dominant identity that overrides all others, as in civic republicanism’ (Mouffe, 1992: 32).

Advances have been made over the past 200 years in the range of citizens’ rights; however, it has been argued that the push by the West for neo-liberalism in developing countries since the 1980s has had negative impacts on citizens’ rights (Haque, 2008). Reduced government subsidies and welfare support resulting from
neo-liberal policies have directly influenced people’s rights. The push for neoliberal reforms in developing states since the 1980s has led to increased economic disparities, food shortages and higher unemployment rates in many of these countries. Moreover, it is believed that the effect of neo-liberalisation on developing countries has had greater negative repercussions on women (Haque, 2008).

In his critique of neo-liberal views of human rights, Gaventa (2010) proposes an ‘active’ conceptualisation of citizenship that portrays citizens as ‘actively engaging to claim their rights and to assert their voice, but not necessarily in the ways or spaces ascribed to them by the dominant institutions’ (Gaventa 2010: 59). Using the language of ‘citizens’, instead of ‘all people’, Gaventa argues that citizens should work together with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to ensure effective relations between them and the state and to ensure their rights are fully enjoyed.

**Citizenship and Human Rights**

One liberal school of thought on concepts of citizenship, adopted by Marshall (1950), was concerned more about citizens as a collective, and with their relationship with the state and the labour market (Hoxsey, 2011). In relation to social citizenship, Marshall (1950) referred to rights being needed to balance the inequality and social injustice prevailing in a state’s economy. Although considered to be one of the major contributors to the study of citizenship, Marshall was nevertheless criticised for being ‘gender blinded and having a conception of citizenship based on a male bred winner model of
citizen that excludes women and the spheres of social production’ (da Silva, 2015: 709).

The philosophical origins of citizenship and human rights are based on the common foundation of equality. Nevertheless, these concepts are different in many ways. The conventional notion of citizenship is based on a person’s membership of a nation-state, human rights are regarded by some scholars as universal (Basok et al., 2006). This has been contested by scholars such as Delanty (2000) who have claimed that ‘human rights are based on ethical and legal concepts of the individual; citizenship is based on a political and legal understanding of the individual’ (cited in Tambakaki, 2009: 8). It has also been argued that the concept of ‘citizen’ is exclusionary because it does not include people who are non-citizens (Hung, 2012).

Unlike human rights, citizenship has a solid political and social structure and is more effectively enforced within the nation-state (Shafir and Brysk, 2006). Based on such reasoning, cosmopolitan citizenship is regarded by such scholars as Shafir and Brysk (2006) as the only way for global human rights to be realised.

Although scholarly work has been carried out comparing diverging notions of citizenship and human rights, Shafir and Brysk believe that both concepts have ‘interconnected historical trajectories’ (2006: 275). They are interrelated in the sense that both modern notions of citizenship and human rights firmly adhere to the belief of the inalienability of the rights of women and men.
A study on current citizenship trends in the United Kingdom (UK) found that the majority of people view welfare assistance as an essential part of the rights entailed through citizenship (Dwyer, 2002). The concepts of exclusion and inclusion have also been used in relation to citizenship. Citizenship has the power to exclude and include citizens at the same time (Lister, 2008).

Both feminist and critical citizenship scholars have focused on the exclusionary side of citizenship. They have highlighted that one of the major problems of citizenship is that it has prevented disenfranchised segments of society - such as women – from accessing their rights. One approach that attempts to address such exclusion is inclusionary citizenship. Inclusionary citizenship entails being given entitlements and assigned responsibilities as a result of one’s affiliation to a state, and being equal to other citizens who are also part of the state (Lister, 2008). Citizenship becomes inclusionary when individuals have the power to legally claim their rights on equal grounds. Inclusionary citizenship also requires the law to ensure that its citizens are treated in an equal manner (Kabeer, 2002).

The four key principles of inclusionary citizenship are ‘justice, recognition, self-determination and solidarity’ (Kabeer, 2005: 5). In her writings on inclusionary citizenship, Kabeer (2005) highlights its importance because it addresses the issue of marginalisation and extends rights to those who are most vulnerable. She refers to Mamdani’s (1989) views on rights and how they are defined by the struggle experienced by those who are disenfranchised and exploited.
Some scholars have contested the applicability of any
globalised definition of citizenship, claiming that this would render it
contradictory (Young, 2011, 1989; Spiro, 2011; Jenkins, 2010). The
universalality of citizenship is also referred to as ‘laws and rules that
say the same for all and apply to all in the same way... [s]pecial
rights need to attend to group differences in order to undermine
oppression and disadvantage’ (Young, 1989: 250-51). Whereas
geographic boundaries do not apply to international human rights
(Cohen, 1999), citizenship is based on affiliations to groups, and
political activism as a result of such affiliations, as well as
entitlements and duties granted to citizens (Teeple, 2005). There is,
however, a general global acceptance of the cosmopolitan version of
citizenship that converges with fundamental and universal human
rights (Isin and Turner, 2007: 12). Nevertheless, it can be argued that
neo-liberal policies have moved us away, globally, from natural rights
to active citizenship.

Feminist thinkers have criticised abstract ideologies such as
human rights instruments and multicultural theories ‘because they fail
to take into account the specific nature of women’s deprivation’ (Roy,
2005: 30). They believe that modern views on citizenship are gender
blind as they emphasise uniform equality without taking into account
societies with strong patriarchal systems.

As countries have become increasingly globalised, the link
between citizenship and nation-state has weakened (Basok et al.,
2006). The modern global community has also led to an emergence
of new concepts of citizenships that lean towards universal
principles. These include notions such as international, transnational and post-national citizenship. Nevertheless, the rise in international migration, coupled with the economic crisis, has also led states to reassess notions of citizenship, and the entitlements and duties of individuals who are not classified as citizens such as for example refugees (Isin and Turner, 2002; Castles, 2000; Smith, 2002).

It is believed by some that the rise of globalisation has led to a transformation of sovereignty (Fraser, 2005). Moreover, countries today are also becoming more and more diverse in terms of culture, nationality and language, erasing notions of a ‘national citizenry, exclusive, sharply demarcated, and resident on a national territory’ (Fraser, 2005: 4). As such citizenship has less relation to nationality, and notions of national identity are blurred.

Scholars such as Evans and Ayers (2006) believe that ‘the human rights discourse is ultimately a strategy of legitimating the neo-liberal agenda [to control global economic markets]; it is a form of power relations over citizens, [and] not the foundation of reinvigorated citizen power’ (cited in Basok et al., 2006: 271).

Because of the effects of globalisation, the concept of citizenship is being universally applied regardless of a society’s cultural and historical context (Al Husban and Na’amneh, 2010).

Historically, in the Middle Eastern (ME) region of Muslim majority states, notions of citizenship were originally taken from the Romans (Scott, 2007). During that period the term *dimma* was prevalent, rather than ‘citizenship’, which referred to a political structure that shaped relations between Muslims and non-Muslims.
Although unequal in status, non-citizens were ensured protection from the state and treated as free people on the condition that they complied with certain rules. The period after the emergence of Islam (622 Current Era) also saw the practice of *dimma*. However, its meaning was changed to distinguish Muslims from non-Muslims (Scott, 2007).

The term ‘*Muwāṭanah* is the Arabic equivalent of citizenship and originally referred to people’s affiliation to their home and place of origin (*watan*). The term *Waṭanīyah* later developed out of it and means ‘patriotism’. As such, it added a political dimension to the concept of citizenship (Al Husban and Na’amneh, 2010).

**Summary**

This thesis when examining PRS, adopts the liberalist approach and, within that, feminist views of citizenship focusing on inclusionary and exclusionary forms of citizenship as developed by Kabeer (2005) and Lister (2008). Focus is placed on exclusionary citizenship and its impact on vulnerable segments of society, such as protracted refugees, specifically with regard to their access to further education and employment. It also focuses on addressing social divisions and public/private dichotomies in relation to gender and the entitlements of citizenship within PRS through an analysis of the intersectionality of gender and citizenship.

The next section of this literature review focuses on gender relations.
Gender Relations

The way in which males and females live within societies is shaped by socially constructed notions of gender. This occurs at the micro level, between individuals in households the meso level of communities, and at the macro level in terms of legislation and policies.

Women’s Rights and International Human Rights Instruments

At the macro level, internationally, women’s economic rights are enshrined in various international human rights instruments, such as the International Convention for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR²), the Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW³) and the Beijing Platform for Action, as well as International Labour Organisation (ILO) conventions relating to maternity regulations, non-discrimination and equal pay (Moghadam, 2015a). Once ratified by signatory countries, they are incorporated into domestic law. The aim of these instruments is to protect women from discrimination and exploitation (Moghadam, 2015).

International human rights instruments such as CEDAW are considered to be a major leap forward for women’s rights. Nevertheless, several challenges remain in the implementation of

² ICESCR was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on the 16th of December 1966 and made effective on the 3rd of January 1976.
³ CEDAW was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on the 18th of December 1979 and was made on the 3rd of September 1981.
these instruments, such as whether states ratify conventions and whether reservations are made on certain provisions, as well as whether certain provisions are in conflict with domestic laws (Tinker, 1981).

In the case of women and men in PRS and international human rights instruments, research is lacking that provides a gendered analysis of the humanitarian assistance provided in such contexts (Rosenow-Williams and Behmer, 2015). Gender is a concept that is important to focus on, particularly in periods of conflict because it focuses on ‘relationships of power… [and as such] informs security theory about structural relations of dominance and non-dominance that often go unrecognized’ (Rosenow-Williams and Behmer, 2015: 12).

In most cases, women and children constitute a large percentage of refugee populations. For example, figures from 2013 indicated that women and girls made up 49 per cent of UNHCR’s beneficiaries. The UNHCR (2014a) has emphasised the need for humanitarian organisations to recognise the different experiences that ‘refugeehood’ imposes on women and men. The agency recommends gender-mainstreaming humanitarian interventions rather than creating separate support services for women and men.

The Fourth UN World Conference on Women in 1995 adopted the concept of gender mainstreaming. According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA, 2010), gender-mainstreaming takes place when ‘[a]ll activities are designed taking into account the different needs of women, men, girls, and boys.'
Gender roles and relations in the affected population are analysed and integrated in project activities and outcomes’ (cited in Rosenow-Williams and Behmer, 2015).

A gender-mainstreamed approach to humanitarian assistance has been endorsed by the UNHCR in 2006 but some consider that interventions are still far from adequate to meet the needs of beneficiaries (Rosenow-Williams and Behmer, 2015). Moreover, some feminist scholars have criticised gender-mainstreamed approaches that focus mostly on women with little attention given to men and their needs (Carpenter, 2006, cited in Rosenow-Williams and Behmer, 2015).

Human security is defined as the state of being ‘free from both fear (of physical, sexual or psychological abuse, violence, persecution or death) and from want (of gainful employment, food, and health)’ (Tadjbakhsh, Chenoy, 2007: 5). In their study of the concept of human security, Dankelman et al. (2008) identify three dimensions to the concept: ‘security of survival’, ‘security of livelihoods’ and ‘dignity’.

Feminists rejecting the ‘human security’ approach to humanitarian assistance claim that the concept of ‘human security’ refers to masculine identities (Rosenow-Williams and Behmer, 2015). Combining human rights and human security approaches in humanitarian assistance, Rosenow-Williams and Behmer (2015) propose a gendered human security perspective as a holistic way of securing the livelihoods of refugees that focuses on both their needs
and rights, and as such combines a human rights and development approach to humanitarian assistance.

International human rights instruments have greatly facilitated women’s struggle to secure their rights (Simmons, 2009). Nevertheless, the gender gap between women and men remains. The section below will examine several explanations of gender inequalities, with a specific focus on women’s participation in the labour market in Arab countries.

It has been argued that the main challenges to women’s participation in the labour market are both at the macro level in terms of state policies and at the micro level of their implementation and the socio-cultural context of people’s lives (Miles, 2002).

**Macro Level Approaches to Understanding Challenges to Women’s Economic Participation at the National Level**

Looking at women’s engagement within the labour market from a macro level focuses on state laws and policies. For example, countries may play a role in consolidating systems of oppression against women by adopting gender-blind policies that reinforce and reproduce gender inequality or institute positive discrimination. So for example, a systematic review of gender dimensions and national employment policies highlighted that women are at a greater disadvantage to men in accessing credit, land and productive resources (Goulding, 2013).

In some Arab countries such as Jordan, for example, family traditions limit women’s rights to inheritance. This means that they
are disadvantaged economically should they want to secure inheritance money for entrepreneurial ventures (Moghadam, 2015). Another example has to do with their freedom to choose an occupation, which in Arab societies is restricted by social views on what constitutes suitable work for women or men. Jordanian labour law, for example, although stating that all citizens are entitled to work irrespective of their ethnic background, language and religious affiliation, has no reference to sex discrimination (Amawi, 2000; El-Azhary, 2003) (See Appendix 1, Table 1.2(14), page 391 for the labour law).

Issues relating to gender equality in Islamic societies have been explored by a number of scholars (Ali, 2000; Badran 2001; Hassan, 2001; Winter, 2001; Lussier and Fish, 2016; Hossain and Juhari, 2015; Coffe and Dilli, 2015). Nevertheless, there is a gap in the literature on gender, non-discrimination and economic citizenship in Islamic societies in the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA) (Naqvi, 2003). A study conducted on economic opportunities in Islamic states emphasised the need to take into account ‘local socio-cultural and economic considerations’ (Syed, 2008: 136) when tackling gender inequalities in the labour market, rather than applying Western approaches.

Factors such as social and cultural norms also influence women’s economic activities (Moghadam, 2015). The codification of strict social norms through family laws in Arab countries has hindered women’s full economic citizenship. Where states are strongly influenced by patriarchy, discrimination becomes embedded within
structures and institutions, consequently hindering women’s progress in the labour market (Moghadam, 2015). So for example, Kabeer (2015) highlights how women are more likely to participate in unpaid family labour in farms that are owned by men in countries such as Egypt and Morocco with strong patriarchal structures.

The legal structure of Arab Muslim countries, of which Jordan is one, consists of a combination of Islamic Shari’a laws and civil codes (Aldmour, 2016), which can contradict each other. While some argue that Islamic religion has consolidated patriarchal systems within Arab Muslim societies, others argue that it has more to do with male-biased interpretations of Islamic jurisprudence (Šarīʿah) (Kazemi, 2000). This is highlighted in the Muslim Family Law (which is also known as the Personal Status Code in North Africa and the Levant), which addresses issues relating to ‘marriage, divorce, maintenance, paternity, and custody of children’ (An-Naim, 2002; cited in Moghadam, 2005: 13). Based on male interpretations of the Šarīʿah, it is patrilineal in nature and gives men legal privileges over women such as in inheritance where women inherit half of what their male siblings receive. Much of the literature on women and the Šarīʿah law focuses on the political and civic implications it has on women. However, less research is focused on examining the Šarīʿah in relation to the ICESCR, which is the main international human rights instrument concerned with the economic citizenship of women and men and which Jordan has ratified.

The patriarchal gender contract is clearly embedded in Šarīʿah law, as it emphasises the role of women as wives and caregivers,
and men as breadwinners and heads of family households. This not only influences women’s economic participation, but also the freedom to control their own mobility (Morrison and Jutting, 2004).

Patriarchal social norms inscribed in the Muslim Family Law also identify women as economically dependent on men. Islamic law has provisions that can be considered as providing positive discrimination to women. Examples include the law that requires male guardians to provide maintenance (financial support) to their wives or daughters. Another example is the entitlement for working women in Islam not to contribute to family expenses. Nevertheless, there have been claims that rather than empowering women, these laws have preserved and reinforced the patriarchal gender contract in Arab society as they emphasise difference and subordination (Moghadam, 2005).

Nevertheless, scholars such as Kandiyoti (1998) have highlighted that economic factors such as poverty and urban development in societies have enabled women to negotiate with the patriarchy in order to exercise greater rights. Moreover, the literature has linked women’s education and employment as an enabler to their proactive agency in challenging patriarchal ideologies (Kabeer, 2001).

Citizenship is important for women because not only does it grant them membership of a nation-state, it also entitles them to economic, civic, social and political rights (Moghadam, 2003). The development of the concept of citizenship over time has affected women and men differently. This is because historically it has been
used to exclude vulnerable groups, on various grounds such as ethnicity, class, gender and country of origin.

Moreover, citizenship has also led to the dichotomisation of the private and public spheres, an outcome of which has been the subordination of women to men. The term ‘private sphere’ came to be identified as domestic, an association that has played a key role in excluding women from the public sphere. Hence, women were associated with the private/domestic sphere, and the public domain was primarily male. Moreover, even though women were associated with the private/domestic sphere, men were the heads of the household. Similarly, modern citizenship places women in society primarily within their reproductive roles (Roy, 2005). As such, women are excluded from the public sphere and have unequal participation in areas such as politics, education, health and employment.

Rights through citizenship should be universal, in that, rather than being particularistic, the state should ensure that they are granted to all citizens. In Arab countries, however, rights are more particularistic in nature and can vary according to factors such as gender and religious background.

Islamic views on gender, non-discrimination and equal rights to work for both men and women have all been highlighted in the Qur’an, which is the main religious text for Muslims (Syed, 2008). According to Badawi (2008) although the Qur’an declares women’s primary function in society to be mothers and wives, it emphasises the need to acknowledge the important function of these roles in the production of future nation-states. Scholars have highlighted that
state control over women’s sexuality and reproductive function is a way to make sure that nations and their cultures are maintained and recreated (Charles and Hintjens, 1998; Kandiyoti, 1991; Perlin and Lynch, 2016; Solinger and Nakachi, 2016).

Furthermore, as well as the state playing a role in defining gender relations within society, it has been argued that colonialism has also reinforced patriarchy by debasing women’s productive role. The argument is that capitalist views have reinforced gender inequalities by devaluing female stereotyped occupations, such as domestic, manual and non-technical work. This is a problem that affects women globally in varying degrees, whereby women’s reproductive roles as child-carers and housewives often goes unrecognised (Moghadam, 2015).

It is also the case that some MENA countries, such as Jordan, have state policies recognising male unemployment as a threat to the economy, but do not include unemployed women in a similar way (Miles, 2002). It is common for societies with strong patriarchal systems embedded into their culture to perceive paid employment as neither suitable for women nor part of a woman’s role. The findings of a study on employment and unemployment in Jordan have highlighted that men perceived remunerated employment for women as a threat to their status as the breadwinners of the family. The study also indicated that men preferred women to work in voluntary unpaid jobs rather than paid ones because this was non-threatening to their status (Miles, 2002). This has changed over time however as increased economic pressure in Jordan has allowed women to better
negotiate with patriarchy and consequently facilitating their economic citizenship (Moghadam, 2013).

State policies of Arab countries contribute to the reinforcement socio-cultural factors that ‘emphasise the definition of Arab-Islamic identity by highlighting the importance of the family in Arab-Islamic Societies’ (Hijab, 2003; cited in Nasser Eddin, 2011: 43). In turn, patriarchal norms are consolidating through such reinforcement.

This research study explores the impact of macro level international and national legislation and policies on the social and economic citizenship of women and men who are protracted Palestinian refugees in Jordan. The next part of the literature review, which looks at micro level challenges to women’s economic participation.

**Micro Level Challenges to Women’s Economic Participation**

There are two main cultural explanations of gender inequalities. The first explains inequality as an outcome of religious ideologies. The second focuses on the process through which states formalise customary values in legislation and policies to reinforce gender inequalities (Cherif, 2015).

Although religion plays a major role in the everyday life of Islamic societies, local traditions and customs and the socio-economic and political context also have an important function in shaping the way Islam is interpreted and practiced (Cherif, 2015). This explains why women’s participation in the labour market is not the same in all Islamic countries.
Women’s oppression within the private sphere has been linked to the patriarchal norms that define gender relations within family units (Nasser Eddin, 2011). There are many definitions of patriarchy, one of which is that it is ‘the organisation and division of all practices and signification in culture in terms of gender and the privileging of one gender over the other, giving males control over female sexuality, fertility and labour’ (Ebert 1988: 19). Meanwhile, Marxist feminist scholars define gender relations as a form of production and reproduction within the household, where capitalism and patriarchy intersect to affect the form of gender relations (Nasser Eddin, 2011: 66). Others like McDonough and Harrison (2013), who also use materialist conceptualisations of patriarchy, perceive sex inequality as a result of women’s economic reliance on men and their inability to take control from men over their own work. Materialists highlight to the importance of earnings and being in control of them, because this generates ‘wealth and power’ (Joekes, 1987: 20). Women who are able to financially contribute to family expenses are more likely to have power to be part of the decision-making process within their households (Allen and Wolkowitz, 1987).

Although women’s participation in the labour market has increased, they are still required to meet the traditional gendered roles assigned to them in the private sphere (Charles, 1993; Glenn, 1985). Hence, the materialist approach fails to explain why patriarchy prevails in contexts where women are part of the productive population of society and are able to generate wealth and income.
Patriarchy is a system that is interlinked to socially constructed meanings that work to control women through concepts such as ‘honour’, ‘shame’ and the belief that women are weak and in need of protection. Both women and men play a role in the production and reproduction of patriarchal systems that subordinate the former and privilege the latter. To highlight this, a study that examined gender roles of siblings within Arab households showed that gendered roles were consolidated and reproduced through parents (Nasser Eddin, 2011). For example, within family households, daughters were expected to be subordinate to their brothers. Male siblings were also socialised to be responsible and consequently in control of their sisters.

Moreover, many Arab societies can be described as being essentially collectivist in character. This means that, rather than being identified as individuals, Arabs associate themselves with groups (Hopkins and Ibrahim, 2006; Joseph and Slymovics, 2001). This explains how concepts such as ‘shame’ and ‘honour’ are associated with the family, rather than being seen as an individual issue (Newman, 1999). Hence, when a woman’s honour is at stake, this reflects on the family group (Barakat, 2005). Female honour in the Arab world is an important issue and refers to women’s adherence to socio-cultural norms (Miles, 2002).

The family unit is commonly perceived to constitute the main segment of an Arab society. A full examination of gender relations within Arab societies can only take place by looking at the family unit as an ‘institution and social setting’ (cited in Nasser Eddin, 2011: 63).
A study that looked at differences in work patterns between women and men in the field of agriculture in Jordan showed that although women have become more economically active through working in family agricultural businesses, men remained in positions of power owing to their ownership of the farmland and produce (Shami and Taminian, 1990). Male sons are seen as assets because after a specific age they are expected to support the family. In the case of daughters, their role remains as dependents and this dependence shifts from the father to the husband on marriage. Nevertheless, they are also perceived as assets in that through marriage upward social mobility can be achieved within family units as well as through education and employment in some cases. It is on this basis that power dynamics are developed within the family unit (Nasser Eddin, 2011).

In the case of protracted refugees, the notion of ‘home’ becomes a trans-local concept, comprising one’s country of origin and that of the existing refuge. It is common for women refugees to reconstruct a sense of ‘home’ in their country of refuge that is akin to the one they had prior to their displacement. Nevertheless, homemaking in protracted refugee situations has several meanings that go beyond that of making a home within the private sphere. It denotes to the ‘process through which people try to gain control over their lives and involves negotiating specific understandings of home, particular regimes of control and assistance, and specific locations and material resources’ (Brun and Fabos, 2015: 12). Hence, on a micro level, the process of homemaking for protracted refugees
encompasses the ways in which relations are established through social networks and support systems. Homemaking represents the formulation of the concept of ‘home’, which refers to ‘values, traditions, memories and subjective feelings of home’ (Ibid, 2015: 12).

Several scholars have highlighted the agency of women to challenge patriarchy in Arab countries (Droeber, 2003; Mohghadam, 2003; Nasser Eddin, 2011). For example, Kandiyoti (1988) found that women in Arab societies choose to have children because by having sons they gain power and are more able to negotiate with patriarchal systems.

Education has also been used as a means for vulnerable groups, such as ethnic minorities and women, to facilitate their upward social mobility. Moreover, greater education empowers women to challenge gender discrimination (Ball et al., 2002; Brooks and Waters, 2011). A study comparing experiences of Muslim women pursuing a higher academic degree in Jordan and Israel highlighted that education was key to building their resilience. It empowered them to better address challenges (Abu Rabia Queder and Arar, 2011).

Education can empower minority groups by expanding their employment opportunities and distancing them from social and economic exclusion (Brooks and Waters, 2011; Gorard, 2008; Kettley, 2007). Scholars have highlighted a greater presence in higher education of minority women compared with men (Shiner and Modood, 2002; Watson et al., 2002). This is because it allows
minority women to better compete with men and non-ethnic minority women in the labour market, and facilitates their upward social mobility (Ball *et al.*, 2002; Brooks and Waters, 2011; Gorard, 2008). Other studies, however, highlight the disadvantages that refugee girls and young women experience in accessing secondary education, training workshops and scholarships for higher education (UNHCR, 2008).

Although education is perceived as an important tool that can empower women, it has been sought after for a variety of reasons. For example, a gendered study on employment and unemployment in Jordan showed that a woman’s education was perceived and valued as ‘a symbol of wealth and prestige… it shows that she is from a good family, it enhances her attractiveness and makes her worthy of a good partner… it brings prestige to her father, and to her future husband’ (Jansen, 2006: 485-86).

While this thesis adopts a materialist stance to understanding patriarchy, it recognises a gap in this approach as it fails to explain why patriarchy prevails in situations where women are actively engaged in the labour force and manage to generate wealth and income (Shami and Taminian, 2006). This study takes place within a Muslim Arab society, which is patriarchal and explores gender relations at the macro level through exploring legislation and policies and how these impact at the micro level on protracted refugees’ lives, using intersectionality in relation to gender and citizenship. The next section focuses on gender inequalities in the labour market, which is the interface of the macro level and micro level.
Gender Inequalities in the Labour Market

Labour markets have been described as ‘gendered institutions operating at the intersection of the productive and reproductive economies: that is, as markets structured by practices, perceptions, norms and networks which are ‘bearers of gender’ (Elson, 1999: 611). Patriarchal norms impose an authority of socialisation in societies whereby men are perceived as superior to women (Fallahi et al., 2015). The labour market portrays such an authority of socialisation, whereby men are more likely to occupy positions of leadership whereas women are more likely to be in subordinate roles. It is more difficult for women to prove themselves suitable for positions of authority because of these challenges. So, for example, they are expected to work longer hours than men to show that they are capable of positions of authority. It is also common for women to be disregarded from training opportunities that are gender stereotyped (Jacobs, 1992).

Labour force participation varies from labour market participation in that the former refers to employment in all its forms, whereas the latter does not include unpaid workers. A woman’s paid employment may not necessarily equate to her empowerment, as it may impose greater responsibilities on her having to balance her productive and reproductive roles. Moreover, paid work does not necessarily mean having control over one’s earnings. In some cases, it can also be insufficient to meet the needs of a woman and her children. Another factor that needs to be looked into to identify
whether paid employment equates to empowerment is their positioning in comparison to men within job hierarchies. Furthermore, increased women’s participation in paid labour may also mean that they have been forced to work because of increasing economic pressure within the household (Elson, 1999).

Comparisons of the wage differential in developing countries indicate that women are more likely to receive lower wages than men. Explanations of this include unequal access to training opportunities, sex-segregation in occupations, or because women accept to being paid less because they have lower expectations (Standing, 1999). One of the key barriers to women’s economic activity in Islamic societies is the importance of gender-segregation and the need to restrict women from engaging with men. Moreover, sex-segregation in the labour market has made it more challenging for women to find jobs in the private sector than for men. This is more of a socio-cultural restraint rather than one related to Islamic religion (Moghadam, 2015).

The productive economy has been defined as part of the ‘market oriented work’ (Elson, 1999: 612) that is paid. Nevertheless, feminists argue that ‘unpaid, un-marketed caring activities’ also referred to as the ‘reproductive economy’ (Elson, 1999), are also important because they are needed to produce a labour force that in turn creates a productive economy. The intersectionality of productive and reproductive economies takes place within the labour market. However, this intersection has negative implications on the reproductive economy. The majority of labour market institutions
function on a short-term cost-benefit basis, disregarding the importance of the reproductive economy in generating a future workforce. It is common for labour market institutions to put the responsibility of the reproductive economy on women. The reproductive role assigned to women places women at a disadvantage and has negative implications on their access to jobs and wages.

There are, however, many advantages to women’s economic participation. Research has highlighted that employed women are more likely to have greater power in decision making within the family unit. Moreover, as well as contributing to the family income, children of educated and employed mothers are more likely to enjoy better well-being (Moghadam, 2015). As for advantages on a broader level, women’s engagement in the labour market encourages development in a country, because it means that more than half the population becomes economically active, as such better allocating the country’s human resources. Moreover, it boosts growth within a country by generating greater human capital (Morrisson and Jutting, 2005). Nevertheless, it should be noted that women’s participation in the labour market does not necessarily mean that they are automatically empowered. This is because they may continue to experience discrimination for reasons such as profitability and lack of structural reforms in labour market regulations.

In the context of PRS, working in the informal sector is a common livelihood strategy for women in developing countries, particularly those who are displaced. While humanitarian
organisations are also regarded as a source of employment for their beneficiaries, the majority of employment opportunities are for men (Rosenow-Williams and Behmer, 2015). It is common for initiatives such as handicraft, with low profit and poor sustainability plans, to target women. Meanwhile, larger income-generating activities such as infrastructure and agricultural projects tend to target men and exclude women. In general, it can be said that women are at a risk of greater vulnerability because they lack income-generating opportunities (Rosenow-Williams and Behmer, 2015).

Summary
The literature on gender in the Middle Eastern Arab region highlights the importance of micro and macro level gendered approaches to better understanding the experiences of protracted refugee women and men in their access to further education and employment.
Intersectionality

An intersectional approach allows scholars to understand how repressive structures in society intersect rather than simply looking at them in a descriptive and comparative manner (Collins, 2002).

The concept of ‘intersectionality’ was first developed by North American critical race theory feminist scholars (Crenshaw, 1989). It emphasises the different experiences of oppression that women go through, which varies according to intersections of different social categories such as nationality, ethnicity, gender, disability and sexuality (Jones et al., 2013).

Through her study of black women’s experiences in the United Kingdom’s labour market, Crenshaw (1989) became recognised as one of the leading scholars in this area. The term ‘crossroads’ was used by Crenshaw (2001) to describe intersectionality. She claimed that women have ‘to deal not only with one form of oppression but with all forms … [w]hich link together to make a double, a triple, multiple, and many layered blanket of oppression’ (cited in Yuval-Davis, 2006: 196-97). This additive understanding of intersectionality gives it a “structural emphasis” (Yuval-Davis, 2006: 197).

Political intersectionality refers to the influence of political agendas on intersectional inequalities. So for example, political intersectionality can be used to explain a state concealing statistics on domestic abuse cases by ethnic groups, which as a result has negative repercussions on women. On the other hand, structural intersectionality ‘reflects the ways in which the individual’s legal status or social needs marginalize them, specifically because of the
convergence of identity statuses’ (Shields, 2008: 305). It is argued that more research is needed on both ‘structural and political intersectionality in policy-making’ (Verloo, 2006: 214). Moreover, for policies to properly combat multiple inequalities, they need to ‘be developed as strategies at the level of structures and institutions’ (Verloo, 2006: 223).

Intersectionality was used to better understand multiple disadvantages and how various intersecting categories create social social inequalities and imbalances of power (Werbner, 2013). Contemporary debates have however shifted to question intersectionality as additive or constitutive, as well as discussions over its systematic or constructionist approach. While the systematic analysis of intersectionality ‘assumes a notion of the human subject as primarily constituted by systems of domination and marginalisation. Constructionists believe markers of identity such as gender, class or ethnicity are not merely exclusive and limiting forms of categorisation, but simultaneously provide narrative and enabling resources’ (Prins, 2006: 280).

Unlike the cumulative disadvantage model, intersectionality focuses on intersections of gender, with constituents including ethnicity and class. Nevertheless, although intersectionality takes into account a variety of variables, Shields (2008) argues that gender is the most evident and persistent variable.

Others argue that intersectionality differs from gender studies and comparative research conducted on women and men in that it ‘tries to catch the relationships between socio-cultural categories and
identities’ (Knudsen, 2006: 61). Hence, intersectionality may be used to analyse the situation of minority rather than majority groups. Closely linked to the notion of intersectionality are exclusionary and inclusionary processes brought about by power relationships.

**Intersectionality and Human Rights Policy Discourse**

The concept of intersectionality has also been applied in human rights instruments such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), CEDAW and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), where issues concerning women, children and race intersect. Examining human rights instruments through an intersectional lens allows a better understanding of the challenges and disparities that women face (Kuokkanen, 2012).

Another example of the human rights application of intersectionality is the proposal for a specific methodology and analysis for intersectionality that was attempted at the Expert Meeting on Gender and Racial Discrimination (November 2000) (Yuval-Davis, 2006). The concept was also present in the resolution on women’s rights held in 2002 at the 58th session of the UN Commission on Human Rights. The resolution acknowledges the need to focus on multiple intersectional discrimination and examine its main causes through a gendered lens (Resolution E/CN.4/2002/L.59).

Other UN documents using intersectionality were called for during the Working Group on Women and Human Rights in 2001 at
the Center for Women’s Global Leadership at Rutgers University. It called for governments to focus on securing the full rights of girls and women who are faced with multiple obstacles to progressing because of variables such as religious, ethnic or cultural background (Yuval-Davis, 2006).

The human rights policy discourse has recognised that multiple forms of discrimination intersect (Banda and Chinkin, 2004), and also that ignoring intersectional discrimination strengthens patriarchal and racial attitudes in society (Banda and Chinkin, 2004). If policies do not recognise that multiple forms of discrimination exist, they cannot effectively combat them. Even though international human rights instruments have started to look at intersectional inequalities, the majority focus on singular forms of discrimination and do not put great importance on the multiple disadvantages faced by women.

In their report on the rights of minorities and women, Banda and Chinkin (2004) called for mainstreaming issues concerning gender and minorities in all international human rights instruments. Additionally, states were asked to work at the national level to create policies that promote the rights of women and minorities and their participation. They also highlighted the need to effectively address any violations made of the rights of women and minorities. Furthermore, the vulnerability of women was recognised as greater than that of the majority population, because they are disproportionately impacted by forms of discrimination in society.

Intersectionality has been used within refugee studies and migration research. For example, Gopal (2013) recognises that social
markers such as gender and ethnicity intersect to impact on refugee experiences and their level of agency. A study on EU migrants in the UK highlighted that while many Roma participants claimed to have fled their countries of origin to escape the discrimination they faced, ethnicity and gender played an important role in their access to employment. The lives that they experienced in their new country of residence gave them spaces to challenge structural barriers and change parts of their identity (Cook et al., 2011).

Spaces created through migration can give women greater freedom to redefine their gendered roles (Ryan et al., 2009). Refugee women are able to practise more power during the resettlement of their families. This is because, having to deal with new societal structures, they are generally expected to take leading roles within domestic spheres (Martin, 2004).

Gender and ethnicity also play defining role, particularly during periods of adversity (Schrijvers, 1999a, 1999b). This was highlighted in a study on Tamil women in refugee camps in Sri Lanka (Schrijvers, 1999a, 1999b). Findings showed how adverse circumstances forced women to re-negotiate gendered spaces and power relations. The women were obliged to take on the role of breadwinners, often with no contribution from their menfolk. As a result, women’s self-esteem and self-confidence were strengthened (Schrijvers, 1999a, 1999b). Often, vulnerable refugee women are forced to undertake several roles to secure the livelihoods of their families (Kessey, 2005).

The concept of superdiversity has recently been used to highlight ‘the growing migration related diversification processes’
(Boccagni, 2015: 611). It is described by Vertovec (2007) ‘as diversification of diversity due to changes in migration patterns worldwide’ (Cited in Blommaert, 2013: 193). Advocates of superdiversity argue that it covers a broader range of differences than intersectionality. As well as being limited in identifying social differences, an intersectional lens is mainly used by feminist scholars. Superdiversity goes beyond intersectionality by recognising an open-ended possibility of intersections, which needs to be regularly examined over a period of time. Furthermore, through a superdiversity lens, ‘diversity’ is looked at in the eyes of migrant beneficiaries as well as centres catering to their needs (Boccagni, 2015). A superdiversity lens perceives immigrant integration as having the ability to make ‘oneself understood’ (Blommaert, 2013: 194) in different social contexts, and this includes the host society as well as other sub-cultures in the country. As well as having to integrate with the host country, migrants also need to integrate within their own communities in their new country of residence. Future research on the notion of citizenship needs to recognise the complexity of integration in countries that are becoming more and more superdiverse (Blommaert, 2013).

While applying superdiversity as a conceptual framework in research is suitable for countries with high rates of immigration and in large cities with superdiverse populations (Boccagni, 2015), it is not applicable for all protracted refugee contexts. One of these is Jordan, which does not have a superdiverse population and, therefore, is not used as a conceptual framework in this thesis.
Summary

Much of the literature to date has focused on extending understandings of gender and ethnicity in the labour market through the approach of intersectionality. There is a gap in the literature on how intersectionality could extend understandings of inequalities within the labour market beyond social categories of gender and ethnicity (Browne and Misra, 2003). Although there has been research on the intersectionality of gender and citizenship within migration studies (Abdi, 2006; Bartolomei et al., 2003; Pittaway and Bartolomei, 2001) research is lacking on the intersectionality of gender and citizenship in shaping livelihood strategies of protracted refugees within patriarchal Arab countries such as Jordan.

The next section of this literature review focuses on discrimination and stigma.
Discrimination

A study on refugee law and discrimination concluded that applying ‘a broader approach to discrimination cases would be more consistent with [the] fundamental principles of human rights and refugee law’ (Dowd, 2011: 28).

Discrimination is defined as ‘any distinction, exclusion, restriction, preference or different treatment that disadvantages a person or group, as compared with others in similar situations’ (Dobre, 2011: 189). It has been prevalent throughout history causing people to be treated unequally because of factors such as prejudice and stereotyping.

Related to discrimination is the concept of stigma, defined as ‘any label … [l]inked to undesirable attributes that are socially salient and purposefully compiled as a stereotype to categorize people’ (Chen et al., 2011: 2). According to Link and Phelan (2001), stigma is an over-arching concept that encompasses discrimination as one of its components. Moreover, it is a ‘social, attitudinal and political process’ (Sayce, 2003: 627) that consists of identifying: differences between people and distinguishing ‘them’ from ‘others’ with derogatory traits, resulting in unequal opportunities.

Questioning Link and Phelan’s definition of discrimination, Sayce (2003) believes that it is better suited to define stigma instead. He has claimed that whereas stigma can refer to both victims and doers of discrimination, discrimination refers only to those who commit discriminatory acts (Duffy, 1995; Sayce, 2003).
Meanwhile, a clearer comparison between stigma and discrimination is provided by Loury (2003). Although both are caused by prejudice, stigma leads to unequal perceptions whereas discrimination results in unequal treatment.

Relevant to discrimination is the concept of power, which can be defined as ‘the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests’ (Weber 1947: 152). Single-dimensioned approaches to power concentrate on conflicts that arise between power relationships in decision-making processes (Weber, 1947). Those that are two-dimensional focus on tensions arising from situations where both decisions and non-decisions are made. According to Gidden’s (1979) theory of structuration, power relations are always two-way. Individuals possess a degree of power by the nature of being in a social relationship.

Much of the discrimination that women face is based on the norms and beliefs that people hold on how women and men should behave based on conceptualisations of masculine and feminine traits (Komter, 1989). Interpersonal relationships based on patriarchal norms are prime examples of the ‘hidden power in gender relationships’ (Komter, 1989: 187).

It has been argued that discrimination can only be eliminated when power is shifted from those who discriminate to those who are discriminated against (Sayce, 2003). Within this debate, the ethicality
and effectiveness of anti-discriminatory campaigns that de-emphasise differences between groups of people are questioned.

Although Sayce (2003) provides valuable recommendations towards more effective anti-discrimination strategies, he fails to discuss the importance of data collection for this purpose. In addition to allowing for social and economic gaps to be identified between different ethnic groups, data on discrimination can also be used for comparability purposes within and between countries. Both indirect and direct discrimination can be identified through data collected on ethnic groups. Moreover, the data can also be used as evidence to support the future implementation of successful policies (Wrench, 2011).

The three major sources of information on discrimination within the employment sector are ‘official statistics, complaints data and data from research’ (Wrench, 2011: 1719). The problem with complaints data, however, is that employees are likely to under-report discrimination cases because of a lack of awareness of their rights, as well as ineffective organisational laws that protect workers’ rights (Wrench, 2011).

Discriminatory acts, particularly within the employment sector, can occur in ‘multiple forms and can be experienced in very different ways among social groups’ (Ruwanpura, 2008: 78). The dual notion of discrimination has changed throughout time to one that is more complex, involving multiple social and institutional variables and practices.
Discrimination in the employment sector occurs when workers are treated unequally because of ‘perceived characteristics… of which they are identified to rather than individual capabilities’ (Ruwanpura, 2008: 79). Variations in hierarchy and wage on the basis of factors such as gender and race rather than qualifications are examples of this (Banton, 1994).

Within the employment sector are discriminatory phenomena resulting in what is known as the ‘glass ceiling’ - vertical segmentation by gender- and the ‘glass wall’ - horizontal segmentation by gender (Heward et al., 1997). The first is an invisible barrier that prevents women from reaching higher male-dominated positions. The latter prevents them from acquiring certain jobs that are stereotyped as male occupations (Rowe, 1990). Both horizontal and vertical segmentation can take place because of factors other than gender, such as ethnic background and religion (Heward et al., 1997).

By devaluing the productive role of women, they are both ‘marginalize[d] and exclude[ed]… [f]rom routes to power’ (Heward et al., 1997: 216). Economic productivity is important for women because it empowers them to challenge and negotiate power relations in both the private and public spheres (Scheyvens, 2000).

Rowe (1990) highlighted the need to be legally protected from subtle discrimination because of existing micro-inequities in both the employment and education sectors, which work towards sustaining discrimination and injustice within a society. Another study, on academic and occupational segregation in the vocational sector, also
explained women’s academic and occupational pathways according to the socialisation of males and females within their community, and identified a mismatch between the training provided to students and the opportunities in the labour market (Al-Zaroo 2009).

Stereotyping and stigma are common forms of discrimination within the employment sector and can lead to what is known as the ‘chill factor’ (Shirlow, 2006). This occurs when people are disinclined to apply for certain types of jobs and positions because of factors such as gender and ethnicity. In line with this theory is the ‘flight’ reflex discussed by Fasching-Varner (2009), explaining that people are more likely to take a passive than confrontational response when facing discrimination.

In this thesis the concepts of stigma and discrimination are relevant to the literature that examines the barriers that Palestinian female protracted refugees experience in accessing further education and employment in Jordan.

**Discrimination within Education**

Discrimination is also evident in the education sector. In the Middle East, patriarchal norms play a key role in defining women's access to education. For example, the educational pathways for young men tend to be longer than women because of social norms that pressure women to fulfil their reproductive roles. Moreover, unlike the situation with men, women tend to be more restricted in their mobility to nearby universities (Jansen, 2006). Social constraints and patriarchal norms also preclude women from opportunities to study abroad. It is
believed that parents tend to be disinclined to allow their daughters to pursue a higher education abroad because of their inability to exercise social control over them in foreign countries (Arar and Haj-Yehia, 2009).

The value of higher education for women extends beyond direct economic gains. This is because educated women are considered more likely to have a positive impact on their children than those who are uneducated (Arneberg et al., 1988; Heward, 1999). Educated women are also regarded as more able to negotiate with the patriarchy than those who are uneducated. Furthermore, they are more likely to have greater decision-making roles within the family unit (Nasser Eddin, 2011).

As well as patriarchal norms influencing the educational opportunities of girls and young women, other factors such as household economic status also play a role. According to the Arab Human Development Report, the comparatively low participation rate of girls and young women in education in the Arab region is linked to ‘the meager resources available to individuals, families and institutions’ (UNDP, 2003: 3). Hence, in cases where resources are scarce, families are more likely to prefer educating their sons over their daughters (Jansen 2006).

**Summary**

The literature on discrimination reveals that much of the discourse has focused on gendered perspectives and economic theories explaining discrimination particularly within the employment sector.
There is, however, a gap in the literature on the intersectionality of gender and citizenship on experiences of protracted refugees in their access to further education and employment in countries with patriarchal structures and gendered social segregation.
Human Rights Frameworks

For the purpose of this study, modern human rights can be understood as a comprehensive legal system that was developed by the UN in 1948 when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was created (See Appendix 1, Table 1.2(1), page 390 for the link to the UDHR). Through subsequent conventions it is also an internationally recognised legal framework that ‘reflects global moral and political values... [and] frames the interaction of rights-holders and duty-bearers’ (Rother, 2008: 6). Where state parties have ratified the conventions, they have become important international legal instruments. These include the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (UN, 1996), the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (UN, 1996), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) (UN General Assembly, 1979) and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) (UN, 1969) (See Appendix 1, Table 1.2(3)-1.2(6), page 390 for links to the Conventions)

Advocates of a human rights-based approach (HRBA) believe that it brings about justice in society through ‘the equitable distribution of fundamental resources and respect for human dignity and diversity’ (Basok, Ilcan and Noonan, 2006: 267). An important feature of the HRBA is that it allows individuals to make legal assertions on human rights offences. It also places the state and international community responsible and accountable for the recognition of human rights violations. Hence, its effectiveness relies
largely on ‘the quality of the relationship between the rights-holders... and the duty-bearer’ (Rother, 2008: 10).

According to Article 1.3 of the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), ‘[s]tates... [are required] to promote [and respect] the realisation of the right to self-determination’ (ICESCR, 1976). Article 2.1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) also recognises that they should ‘respect... [and] ensure [their civil and political rights] without distinction of any kind such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status’ (ICCPR, 1969).

International human rights law also places the state as the ultimate duty-bearer, responsible for upholding people’s rights. In other words, each state is accountable for the realisation of its people’s human rights, and accountability is a way for states to prove and justify their actions. For accountability to be effective, governments need to ensure: that accountability measures are incorporated in all policies; that ongoing monitoring is carried out by the government and civil society to see what does and does not work; that needed remedies are provided; and, finally, that formal and informal mechanisms are made available, so that human rights issues can be communicated and improved performance promoted (Potts, 2008).

While some scholars advocate the use of the human rights framework, others are sceptical of its functionality. In his critique of the human rights framework, Reubi reports on its ‘inherent flaws, its
foundations which are built on Western biases and outdated notions of nation-states, as well as its poor track record of protecting people’s rights’ (2011: 626). Others like Miller et al. (2011), argue that only through time and deliberation can people successfully improve their customs to new progressive ones and also be able to institutionalise them into their societies.

Another shortcoming of international human rights conventions is that they often remain subordinate to the domestic laws of the state. This is referred to as a compliance gap between a state’s pledge to adhere to international human rights law and its actual implementation on the ground (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2005). While constructivists believe that human rights law has the ability to ‘socialise or teach states to accept the goals and values embedded in international law’ (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2005: 1381), realist scholars have questioned its impact on member-state compliance. They claim that international human rights law lacks the necessary enforcement tools for member states to commit to the treaties that they are accountable to.

It has also been argued that domestic laws can more effectively address and eliminate discrimination than international human rights instruments (Tinker, 1981). Others propose tackling discrimination through policy-level reforms, as well as taking into account socio-political factors that can foster a more inclusionary environment for women to be productive members of society (Singh, 2015).
The critiques of human rights approaches also include the applicability of Western notions of human rights in non-Western contexts. Looking at the debate on human rights and Islam, the discourse involves a conflict between two approaches, one that is Western and ‘universalistic’, and the other that is Orientalist and ‘particularist’. ‘Cultural relativism’ is one of the arguments against the universalism of international human rights, because of its inability to adapt to different cultures and contexts. Islam is the dominant religion in the Arab world and has played a major role in the way that human rights instruments are shaped within the region. The majority of the Arab population is inclined towards an Islamic political system that some (Bielefeldt, 1995; Howard, 1990; Mayer, 1995) might claim to be incongruent with key human rights concepts, namely to be free, equal and free from discrimination. Although Arab states have ratified international human rights (IHR) instruments and acknowledged their importance, they have been tailored according to Islamic principles. Examples include the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights (UIDHR) (1981) and the Arab Charter on Human Rights (2008), both of which reflect the views of Islamic states (See Appendix 1, Table 1.2(7), 1.2(8), page 390 for links to the Charter and Declaration).

Arguments against the universality of human rights on the grounds of cultural relativism are criticised by Halliday (1995) as an oversimplified explanation of the conflict between Islam and human rights. He also questions whether the problem between Islam and international human rights is based on conflicting notions of ‘Islamic particularism’ and ‘Western universalism’ or between two ‘forms of
universalism’ (Halliday, 1995: 159), basing his argument on the Muslim belief that Islamic law is applicable to all.

Scholarly discourse on Islam and international human rights law has been condemned by various Muslim thinkers, such as Mawdudi (1995), on the grounds of the double standards and hypocrisy that the West has adopted with regards to human rights issues. Western claims that human rights were born in the West, are according to Mawdudi, an act of ‘arrogance… alluding to their history of colonialism and imperialism’ (1995, cited in Bielebifeldt, 2000: 91). Mawdudi has claimed that in reality they have been practised in Islamic cultures for more than 1400 years ago (Traer, 1991). Indeed, this argument is further supported by Islamic thinkers of the twenty first century, such as Si Hamza Boubakeur, Ihsan Hamid and Chadine, who are renowned for their establishment of an ‘Islamic vision of human rights’ (Mbow, 2006: 40).

**Human Rights of Citizens and Non-Citizens**

Although international human rights instruments have been used to promote the rights of individuals, the rights of those who are classed as non-citizens – such as asylum seekers, refugees and stateless people – have been overshadowed by those of citizens (Bandyopadhyay, 2007).

Refugee law came about as a means of regulating the forced migration of populations into foreign countries as a result of factors such as armed conflict (Hathaway, 1991). The two main international refugee laws are the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees
and the additional 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees
("See Appendix 1, Table 1.2(2), page 390 for the link to the
Convention and protocol"). Other instruments relating to refugees
include the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons
(1954), the Convention on the Reduction of Status of Statelessness
(1961), and the International Convention for the Protection of all
Persons from Enforced Disappearance (2006). Two of the key
principles of international human rights law are equality and non-
discrimination. Articles 1.1 and 1.2 of ICCPR (1976) and the ICESCR
(1976) use terms that refer to ‘all people’ implying that such
instruments are, in principle, aimed at ‘everyone’, be they citizens or
non-citizens. Moreover, Article 2(2) of the ICESCR (1976) prohibits
discrimination of all forms, including by ‘race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property,
birth or other status’. Various human rights instruments, such as
Article 26 of the ICCPR (1966) and Articles 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of
the ICESCR (1966), have been used to protect the economic rights
of non-citizens. Although Article 17(1) of the Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees (CSR) (1954) does not guarantee ‘legal’
refugees equal employment rights as citizens, states are obliged to
provide them with the ‘most-favoured’ treatment. Article 22 of the
UDHR (1948) states that ‘the economic, social and cultural rights of
man are indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his
personality’.

In spite of the above protections, Article 22 of the ICESCR
(1976) allows the progressive realisation of the Covenant’s rights.
This clause has created problems, as it is difficult to assess whether states have adopted progressive realisation because of their limited resources or in order to avoid actualising the Covenant’s rights (Biermans, 2005).

People’s equal access to their rights is challenged by the multiple forms of discrimination that they face in their daily lives. Adopting a human rights-based approach may be one way to ensure the effectiveness and full implementation of anti-discrimination laws (O’Neil and Piron, 2003).

In her critique on the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jackson (2011) highlighted a major flaw in the definition of ‘persecution’ used, claiming that it left room for critical protection gaps by excluding violations of the socio-economic rights of refugees. The enjoyment of socio-economic rights by refugees is considered by Khalil (2011) to be less an international issue than an issue of these laws being enforced by host countries on a national level. Hence, the problem with refugee law is that, often, the political interests of states have overridden the general rights.

When it comes to refugees, Khalil (2011) highlights the need for legal protection. Although they are able to provide humanitarian assistance, he believes that humanitarian organisations are not legally accountable or responsible for protecting the rights of refugees, and without such protection refugee rights cannot be secured. Both state and non-state actors do have obligations under human rights law, and the literature on human rights and obligations of non-state actors is growing (Mills and Karp, 2015; Noortmann et
However, these obligations differ and those of the state are more extensive and require a greater effort to fulfil than non-state obligations. Moreover, part of a state’s obligation is to ensure that third parties do not commit violations.

The CEDAW (1979) is one of the main international human rights instruments that aims to protect the rights of women. Scholars such as Scott refer to ‘CEDAW as an exercise in combating gender discrimination within human rights discourse itself’ (1999: 653).

In her feminist critique of the human rights framework, Batliwala (2007) has argued that there are various debatable and unresolved issues concerning the discourse on human rights. In a similar way to cultural relativist views, she suggests that the evolution of international human rights has not gone through a genuine process of collaborative effort to filter out ideal values and ethics into a universal representative entity. Batliwala has also criticised human rights discourse for putting inadequate effort into the study of the notion of ‘responsibility’. This has allowed oppressive powers to reassert authority over weaker groups of society.

Some feminist scholars have argued that ‘the Geneva Convention definition of refugees neglects gender as a critical consideration in refugee determination’ (Greatbatch, 1989: 518). Others have asked for a ‘redefinition of the term persecution which acknowledges the feminist theory of social bifurcation’ (Indra, 1987, cited in Greatbatch, 1989: 519). The divide between public and private, and male control of the public sphere, has in Indra’s view transformed the private domain into a site of oppression for women.
The problem with refugee law, according to Indra (1987), is that it focuses on the public male-dominated sphere and fails to address the oppression that women experience in their private lives. Women do face discrimination in the public domain, be that in the education, employment or political sectors of society. For this reason, Indra’s claim is that refugee discourse should include both the private and public spheres of gender oppression (Greatbatch, 1989). One way to gender-mainstream refugee law is to ensure that refugee women’s voices are heard. Rather than categorising and treating refugee women based on pre-established categorisations such as ‘mothers’ and ‘dependents’, their voices need to be heard in order to properly identify and address their needs (Freedman, 2012).

Summary

The literature review shows that there is extensive scholarship on the universality or particularism of human rights, particularly in the context of its applicability in non-Western cultures. There remains an undeveloped area, which is the extent to which rights-based approaches can extend understandings of the complexities of citizenship and access to further education and employment, while taking into account intersectional forms of discrimination, particularly in Arab countries whose national legal systems are based on patriarchal structures.

The next section of this literature review will examine the livelihood strategies and resilience of refugees.
Livelihood Strategies and Resilience of Refugees

The following section is a critical review of the existing research and literature on the livelihood strategies of refugees, including the strategies used to increase their resilience whilst living within host countries. There is a growing literature on the resilience of individuals, households and institutions in adverse circumstances such as post conflict or post natural disasters and this concept is of particular relevance to the situation of refugees.

Although there is no single universal definition of resilience, it has been commonly accepted to refer to ‘a person’s ability to bounce back or adapt successfully after negative life experiences, lifespan transitions or difficult circumstances’ (Pahud et al., 2009: 3).

When studying resilience, it is important to understand the perspectives of individuals affected by traumatic events and to focus on their interpretations of their own experiences (Almedom, 2013). Moreover, individuals’ resilience is directly influenced by community surroundings, and this includes their social and natural context. Resilience refers to the ability of people, societies and institutions to anticipate, resist and deal with traumatic circumstances and/or experiences. It involves a dynamic process of making sense of experiences and events in order to stay functioning normally without losing one’s identity (Almedom and Tumwine, 2008).

When looking at ‘community resilience’ during periods of adversity, this can have several meanings. It can refer to a community maintaining aspects of its identity, resources or well-being (Glandon, 2015). Resilience can also refer to a fluid and multi-
levelled process wherein people adapt to traumatic events. These adverse events can be a consequence of human, institutional or environmental variables (Almedom and Tumwine, 2008). The dynamic nature of resilience is emphasised in the literature as it is not only an outcome of a traumatic event or circumstance, but also a process, and can also be emergent as well (Almedom, 2013).

It is important to gain a better understanding of key variables that consolidate individual and community resilience within specific surroundings. This is because such understandings can be extended to other surroundings and circumstances where conflict arises and human resilience needs to be reinforced (Glandon, 2015). One way in which resilience can be reinforced from a micro level to a macro level is through transformational change. An example of this is changes in livelihood strategies in order to adapt to different environments (Glandon, 2015).

The literature on forced migration highlights a need for more research on refugee resilience (Hollifield, 2005). Personal traits, such as being positive or having competencies and communication skills, are some of the indicators of greater resilience among individuals during stressful situations (Agaibi and Wilson, 2005). Other influences on the outcome of traumatic experiences and events for individuals and communities include the ‘type, timing and level of social support’ (Almedom, 2008: S1-S4), which is usually offered through humanitarian assistance. Education has been found to be an essential factor in strengthening refugee resilience (Gakuba, 2001). It has also been used as a means for upward political and social
mobility for refugees on both individual and group levels (Connor, 2004). A study on Palestinian camp-dwellers in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and the West Bank also highlighted how young women and men perceived education as a ‘tool to overcome many of the barriers faced in refugee camp life’ (Chatty, 2009: 334).

A need for greater research on the economic and non-economic advantages of higher education in PRS has been highlighted in the literature on forced migration (Zeus, 2009). Al-Zaroot and Lewando-Hundt (2003) have also highlighted the importance of education in building the resilience of vulnerable groups such as refugees during conflicts that extend over long periods of time.

Many protracted refugees have had to depend on humanitarian support to access fundamental services such as healthcare and education. This does not simply apply to basic education, but also to adolescents who experience greater challenges in their journey towards being adults. Within refugee camp settings, the importance of education is generally highly valued, as it is considered a tool that facilitates access to already-limited economic opportunities. Higher education institutions also offer spaces for young women and men to engage in spaces outside their camps. In the case of young women, higher education institutions offer them greater access to the limited public sphere. Nevertheless, citizenship and financial constraints are some of the major issues that hinder access to higher education in the case of refugees as compared with citizens (Zeus, 2009).
Since the 1980s, scholars of refugee studies have highlighted the practical and economic benefits of facilitating refugee access to higher education (Dodds and Inquai, 1983). Providing refugees with opportunities to complete their higher education facilitates their local integration and empowers them to become self-reliant. Moreover, it is also considered to be one of the key mechanisms of ensuring durable solutions to the problem of PRS (Zeus, 2011). The majority of PRS are located in countries, where the host states are already struggling to cover the basic needs of its population. Therefore, extending access to protracted refugees becomes more of a challenge in such contexts.

In her study on barriers to higher education in the case of PRS, Zeus (2011) sets out some difficulties. Higher education institutions have to deal with a group who may be temporary, and refugees may resettle or migrate elsewhere, therefore becoming a drain on limited resources. There is also a view that higher education falls under the development sector rather than humanitarian relief because it is considered more of a luxury that caters to the needs of the privileged (Saint, 2009). Moreover, humanitarian relief takes place in emergency situations and entails the provision of basic and necessary services such as healthcare and shelter, whereas, developmental approaches focus more on securing the livelihoods of marginalised populations.

It has been argued that the developmental approach is more effective in addressing the needs of protracted refugees (Zeus, 2011), as it will not only empower refugees to greater self-reliance,
but will also create an enabling environment for them to have a positive impact on the host country. Countries such as Thailand have experienced a shift towards a more developmental approach in addressing the issue of protracted refugees and their access to higher education. Such changes to address PRS were made possible because of the shift in NGOs’ approaches from ‘operational and reactive to strategic and proactive’ (Zeus, 2011: 263).

In the eyes of the international community, refugees are viewed as the ‘other’ and their education a hybrid of that of their country of origin and host state. Within refugee camp settings, memories of flight and displacement are passed on from older to younger generations. Therefore, structural obstacles restricting refugee integration within the local population, such as restrictions on higher education, are likely to widen the gap between them (Fresia, 2006).

Another view is that refugees are unable to deal with the challenges of higher education as they are traumatised victims of war. This assumption portrays refugees as ill, because of the traumatisation of their forced displacement (Malkki, 1995).

A problem with the humanitarian approach to PRS is that it results in what has been termed the ‘dependency syndrome’ (Harrell-Bond, 1986), owing to the dependency imposed on them by relief organisations. Access to higher education, especially in the case of protracted refugee situations can build confidence and resilience. Moreover, refugee women with higher education levels are also more likely to have better skills to deal with the challenges of forced
migration, such as economic hardship (Bonanno, et al., 2007; Shakya et al., 2012; Werner, 2013).

The provision of micro-finance and loans is another form of assistance offered to marginalised populations, such as refugees, to help them improve their livelihoods. There are however some critiques of micro-finance in Muslim societies. It has been argued that Islamic forms of financing are more likely to create successful and sustainable development assistance models in Muslim majority communities (Wilson, 2007). Interest-based loans defeat the purpose of alleviating poverty because loans that are not Shari’a compliant exploit borrowers by imposing additional charges on loans (Abbdul Rahman, 2007).

This thesis is positioned within the literature on individual, collective and institutional resilience in relation to livelihood strategies.

**Coping Strategies as an Aspect of Livelihood Strategies**

The importance of factors such as social support, spirituality and individual attitudes and beliefs as coping strategies during resettlement has also been highlighted in a study on Sudanese refugees (Schweitzer et al., 2007). Family networks were regarded as important sources of emotional and informational support for Sudanese refugees. It is also common for employed parents to regard family networks as a vital source of support for the care of children and the elderly (Hunt, 2008). Without such networks, women
are more likely to choose domestic roles over labour market participation.

The study on Sudanese refugees indicated that social bonds were facilitated between refugee groups because of the common refugee experience that they had gone through. This ‘commonness’ enabled communication and dialogue within and between refugee communities. However, it is usually the case that forced migrants have lost a large part of their family networks. In such circumstances, support may be sought after from community members (Schweitzer et al., 2007).

In-group social support is also a coping strategy to strengthen resilience, especially in situations that are threatening to one’s identity (Berjot and Gillet, 2011). Social support networks can increase self-confidence and self-esteem, as well as control over one’s life. People with greater social support networks are also likely to have greater access to information, as well as outlets to share negative emotions caused by past life experiences (Pahud et al., 2009; Harrop et al., 2006). Moreover, in-group social support can also strengthen self-esteem through consolidating group identification (Berjot and Gillet, 2011). There is a need for more research on the relation between social support systems and refugees’ capacities to deal with adversity during periods of crises (Stanfeld, 2006).

A study on forced migrants in Bangkok, Thailand highlighted the importance of social ties and social networks to facilitate access to resources (Palmgren, 2013). This included services such as
shelter, employment and humanitarian aid. Establishing informal networks is also important for refugees because it facilitates exchange of useful information. This may include security issues relevant to them, as well as opportunities for work in and outside the host country (Palmgren, 2013).

Furthermore, NGOs and Community-Based Organisations (CBOs) can play an important role in accessing information and extending informal networks for forced migrants. Access to information is, however, unequal, and least available to those who are in most need of assistance (Palmgren, 2013).

When exploring experiences of resettled refugees, Simich et al. (2004) and Colic-Peisker and Tilbury (2003) discovered that refugees preferred to seek information through their informal social networks – from families, friends and other refugees – rather than from formal sources. Reasons for a preference include language and technological barriers, as well as poor access to social support services. Palmgren (2013) gives the example of forced migrants in Thailand who through their movements across and within borders established transnational networks. In host countries with rigid regulation of refugees, these networks allowed forced migrants to negotiate some form of agency in order to improve their living conditions.

Religion is another means of strengthening resilience during periods of adversity (Mayer, 2006; Schweitzer et al., 2007). In the case of refugees, it is commonly used to create meaning and give them hope.
The importance of formal and informal support was also highlighted in a study conducted on refugees resettled in New Zealand. Findings showed that both informal and formal support increased refugee resilience and supported their livelihood strategies when dealing with adverse situations. The study also emphasised the need to provide training and income-generating opportunities to facilitate refugees to adjust to their new environment (Pahud et al., 2009). Another factor that increased the resilience of refugees during resettlement was their ability to acquire social positions within their new environment.

Institutional systems within host countries can, however, challenge the proactive agency of forced migrants (Pahud et al., 2009). This is depicted in Hunt’s (2008) study on asylum seekers, the findings of which highlighted the negative repercussions of the loss of their citizenship status. Unprotected by the state and prone to stigmatisation, Hunt’s interviews with female asylum seekers showed that they felt powerless due to their statelessness. Without any legal documentation, stateless persons have ‘no official right to exist within the political-legal-geographic boundaries of the country in which they live’ (McGuire and Georges, 2003: 191). Women and children who do not have any documentation are at greater risk of abuse. They also lack mechanisms to protect themselves and ways in which to seek support (Adams and Campbell, 2012). An intersectional framework allows for a better understanding of the challenges that undocumented women and children face in seeking help to better meet their needs (Moynihan et al., 2008).
Several livelihood strategies were identified in Hunt's (2008) study on female asylum seekers. These included consumption practices such as purchasing as social practices such as joining support networks, and employment practices, whether paid or voluntary. The value of employment among asylum seekers was recognised in the study and its importance in facilitating the women's integration within the wider host community. The vulnerability of these women and risk of exploitation was also highlighted because of the loss of status, as well as the legal restrictions on their employment. A common livelihood strategy for female asylum seekers was to resort to assistance from other refugees who were in similar circumstances, as well as from charity organisations (Hunt, 2008).

Asylum seekers are considered to experience greater vulnerability than recognised refugees because of their legal status. However, protracted refugees who are not granted status are at greater risk of living in precarious conditions (Jacobsen, 2006). This is because their legal status limits their access to basic rights – such as the right to education, health and work over a period of time. It is also often the case that protracted refugees experience discrimination and exploitation in employment and are unable to claim judicial or state protection because of their legal status. Moreover, living in protraction means that disadvantaged experiences are likely to extend to the families and children of refugee populations (Jacobsen, 2006). It is also common in protracted refugee situations for the attitudes of the host societies to
shift over time, from feelings of pity and acts of generosity towards refugees, to those of resentment and tension because of the scarcity of resources and competition for livelihood opportunities (Jacobsen, 2002).

The importance of work entitlements or citizenship rights is, however, pivotal when addressing refugee integration (Nash et al., 2006). In a study comparing the resilience of female and male asylum seekers during resettlement, Hunt (2008) showed how voluntary work was valued by the women who volunteered because of the lack of paid work opportunities. This was because it gave them an opportunity to use their skills and qualifications and gave them a sense of value by being productive members of society and helping the members of their community who experienced similar challenges. Moreover, study findings showed that the women valued the voluntary support services they offered because they viewed themselves as facilitators in the transformation of structural conditions that would have a positive impact on future asylum seekers. Although the study indicated that women were more likely to integrate into society because of the resources that they could draw upon, it did not touch on gender-specific barriers that constrained their participation in the public sphere.

‘Individual mobility’ is one of the strategies used to maintain one’s identity (Breakwell, 2015). It is a practice that has been linked to acts of prejudice, as well as to times when identities are threatened. Individual mobility can take place through assimilation or integration mechanisms into out-groups. This can be done through
processes such as the physical disconnection from in-groups, as well as through acculturation and marriage with members of the out-group. Being part of a dominant group facilitates access to greater economic opportunities through the extension of social networks (Modood, 2013). Integration is a strategy to maintain identity; however, it is more collective than assimilation, which can be regarded as individualistic (Modood, 2013). It occurs in cases when out-group members choose to keep aspects of their culture while integrating into the dominant group culture. Integration can only happen in host countries that generally accept and value multiculturalism and that have a low prevalence of prejudice (Gsir, 2014).

Another strategy used to deal with discrimination is known as passing, which is the active concealment of certain aspects of a person’s identity (Breakwell, 2015). A study that focused on asylum seekers highlighted the influence of power relations on the narratives used to describe the sexual identities of refugees (Berg and Millbank, 2009). Another study conducted in Jordan on Iraqi forced migrants also highlighted similar findings. Because of the negative image that being a refugee carried, some Iraqis preferred to be disassociated with the term when dealing with host communities. Meanwhile, others only chose to reveal themselves as refugees when requesting aid from humanitarian agencies (Chatelard, 2009).
Summary
The research in this thesis is positioned in the area of resilience and livelihood strategies in relation to further education and employment of protracted Palestinian refugees in Jordan with varying degrees of inclusionary and exclusionary citizenship. These livelihood strategies may foster resilience at the level of individuals, households and institutions within the social and economic structure of the host countries.

The next section is a review of the literature on critical realism and structure and agency.

Critical Realism, Structure and Agency
Within the interpretive paradigm of social science research there is an approach known as critical realism (Scotland, 2012). It is defined as ‘any doctrine reconciling the real, independent, objective nature of the world (realism) with a due appreciation of the mind-dependence of the sensory experiences whereby we know about it (hence critical). In critical as opposed to naïve, realism the mind knows the world only by means of a medium or vehicle of perception and thought; the problem is to give an account of the relationship between the medium and what it represents’ (Blackburn, 2008: 84). Critical realism focuses on how individuals express their agency within the social structures of the societies they live in. A critical realist is a person who recognises the important role of social conditioning and humans in the production of knowledge.
Furthermore, a critical realist also believes that ‘real objects are subject to value laden observation’ (Krauss, 2005: 762).

The following section of the literature review is a critical review of the literature on structure and agency with specific focus on refugee studies. It seeks to identify gaps where knowledge can be added to further understandings of the relation of structure and agency in the case of forced migration.

Scholars have extensively studied the relationship between structure and agency. Theories and frameworks have been developed to extend understandings of the relationship between structure and agency include Bourdieu’s ‘theory of practice’ (1977), Berger and Luckmann’s ‘constitution of society theory’ (1966) and Archer’s ‘morphogenetic theory’ (1995).

The study of structuration involves questioning where the power to produce structure lies (Parker, 2000). While objectivists believe that structures are intrinsically created on their own (reification theories), subjectivists posit that they are produced by human agents (reduction theories). Contrary to these theories are those of scholars such as Giddens and Bourdieu who believe that structure and agency are inter-related. The ‘struggle of dualism’ is a term developed by Giddens that refers to the relationship between structure and agency (Bakewell, 2010).

Much of the literature on agency extends understandings of the notion of free will when looking at social actors and their ability to control and express change within their lives (Hoggett, 2001; Williams and Popay, 1999). Agency can be defined as the ability to
exert ‘some degrees of control over the social relations in which one is enmeshed, which in turn implies the ability to transform those social relations to some degree’ (Sewell, 1992: 20).

Social structures exist that may enable or hinder the agency of individuals and groups of social actors. Structure can be defined as the ‘environment of opportunities and constraints in which we find ourselves and which influence our actions’ (Hunt, 2008: 281). Structures are created in society through the interplay of institutional, social, cultural and historical variables. Structure can also be conceptualised as a combination of rules and resources that cannot exist independently from human agents and are therefore interrelated (Kort and Gharbi, 2013). This definition used by Giddens has been criticised on the grounds that it fails to provide a clear understanding of rules (Thompson, 1989). One of the problems with conceptualisations on structure is the tendency to relate it to rigidity and stability, and to be disconnected from human and social change (Sewell, 1992).

The ‘theory of practice’ is another concept used to explain the relationship between structure and agency (Bourdieu, 1977). According to this theory, social actors live their lives constantly negotiating power relations and capitals within a set of social ‘fields’. The theory was developed by Bourdieu, who uses ‘fields’ to refer to structures and defines agency as the ‘habitus’ developed over time as knowledge and emotions are acquired through lived experiences. In this theory, habitus, fields and structure are perceived as the outcome of social practice and are fluid in nature. Moreover, the
‘habitus’ that social actors acquire to challenge different fields is what creates such fluidity (Bourdieu, 1977, 1993). Rather than being passive learners, Bourdieu believes that knowledge is constructed through social interaction (Bourdieu, 1989).

Disagreeing with Bourdieu’s claims, Giddens argues that social fields are defined by the acquired habitus of social actors (1984). Much of Gidden’s work on structure and agency focuses on the different types of power that people are faced with. According to his theory of structuration, people’s agency is influenced by the enabling or constraining nature of structures in society. It is also through this process of negotiation between structure and agency that existing structures are reproduced and new ones are created.

The theory of structuration allows for social transformations to take place through the interaction of structure with social actors who are ‘struggling, negotiating and at times guessing in order to further their interests’ (Bakewell, 2010: 1696). Hence, all individuals are perceived as having the transformative ability to exercise power in varying forms (Kipo, 2013).

The theory of structuration portrays society as a social construction resulting from the unconscious and conscious practices of human agents. Structures are also defined as the outcome of individual interpretation of rules that result in a reproduction and production of social relations. Individuals acquire what Giddens refers to as ‘resources’ through social relations, which in turn are a way of gaining power. Through the duality of structure and agency, Giddens refers to the inter-related nature of both variables, whereby
agents cannot exist without structured practices nor can structured policies in the absence of agents.

Furthermore, structuration theory seeks to ‘determine the conditions which govern the continuity and dissolution of structures of types of structure’ (Giddens, 1976: 120). Because these conditions are many and changing, there are no universal laws to social life as social systems are dependent on time and space.

Giddens is considered to be one of the leading scholars on the theoretical understandings of the relation between structure and agency. In his theory of structuration, the dual nature of structures is highlighted as consisting of the ‘medium and the outcome of the social practices they recursively organize’ (Giddens, 1984: 25). Giddens’s theory of time–space distanciation further explains inequalities in society as an outcome of allocative and authoritative resources that may restrict people throughout their lives (Giddens, 1984). Proponents of the theory of time–space distanciation argue that it does not explain how social systems are reproduced, nor does it ‘talk about the normative aspects of space and spatial representation’ (Kort and Gharbi, 2013: 98).

One of the main criticisms against the structuration theory is that it tends to conflate structure and agency. Although highlighting the ‘dualism of structure and agency’, it gives greater importance to agency and its ability to transform structures through individual determination. Another argument rejects Gidden’s belief in the transformative capacity of human agents because it portrays social systems as weak and changing according to human interaction
(Layder, 2006). Furthermore, it de-emphasises the constraining nature that structure has on agents (Layder, 2006; Thompson, 1989). Another problem with structuration theory is that it focuses on the relationship between structure and agency, while disregarding that between human agents and cultural context.

**Structuration Theory and Migration**

In his study on voluntary and involuntary migration, Richmond (1988, 1993) uses structuration to analyse refugee movements. Rather than referring to voluntary and involuntary migration, Richmond uses the terms ‘reactive’ and ‘proactive’. Applying a multivariate model of migration, Richmond focuses on the relationship between structural variables and households, whereby the former has both an enabling and restraining effect on the latter. Like Scheper-Hughes (2008), Richmond gives refugee migration a level of agency even in times of extreme threat.

Other scholars researching migration through structuration theory include Goss and Lindquist (1995). According to structuration theory, individuals and institutions need to be analysed together, disregarding the potential for agency or institutions to have any causal effects. Applying this theory, Goss and Lindquist (1995) begin by analysing people’s actions and then investigate institutional structures and the distribution of resources.

Another study employing Gidden’s structuration theory was that of Halfacree (1995) who researcheded patriarchy and migration in the US. Although applying Gidden’s theory, Halfacree recognised a
weakness in it, and this was that the voluntary decisions of migrants were foregrounded at the expense of context and structure (1995, cited in Bakewell, 2010).

De Jongh (1994) also included reflections on Gidden’s structuration theory in a study of Mozambican refugee resettlement. Firstly, it depicted migration as a collective movement of groups sharing commonalities through, for example, family relations or culture. Secondly, it defined migration as a process whereby collectives make the decision to migrate. Although influenced by structural conditions, De Jongh (1994) claimed that it is through their own will that Mozambican refugees choose to migrate.

In the case of forced migrants however, the decision-making power that they exercise is less than those who voluntarily migrate (Eichenbaum, 1975). More specifically, ‘it is the reluctance to uproot oneself, and the absence of positive original motivations to settle elsewhere, which characterises all refugee decisions and distinguishes the refugee from the voluntary migrants’ (Kunz, 1973: 130).

Although refugees are usually forced to leave their homes, scholars such as De Jongh (1994) believe that they still have a choice in the decision-making process. For example, refugees have the option of choosing when, where and how to leave, as well as what they want to do when they arrive at their new destination. When analysing the decision-making process in migration, De Jongh (1994) put forward a theory that focused on an understanding of costs and
benefits. In this theory, refugees choose to leave or stay depending on their weighing up of the costs and benefits of migration.

Another study highlighted that Palestinian refugees in host countries such as Lebanon were more inclined to have emigrated to seek better economic opportunities than those in Jordan, because of the severe discrimination that they faced, and the sense of hopelessness that they experienced (Chatty, 2009).

Critiques of the structuration theory claim that the conflation of structure and agency prevents one from studying the relation between them (Bakewell, 2010). Another criticism commonly cited by critical realists is that structuration theory portrays agency as having a hyperactive character. Others argue that there is no clear way of using Gidden’s structuration theory in empirical research (Goss and Lindquist, 1995).

**Critical Realism**

A leading critical realist theorist is Margaret Archer whose theory of morphogenesis (1982, 1995) offers a critique of Gidden’s conceptualisation of structure and agency. According to the theory of morphogenesis, pre-established structures exist at any given point in time, which can be enabling or constraining. However, it is through the agency of social actors that these structures can be shaped, reshaped or changed to enable future negotiation (Archer, 1995). Hence, agents and structures are both seen as subject to adaptation. According to the morphogenetic sequence, looking at these structures separately and the influence they have on agency allows
for a better understanding of the role of agency in changing the original shape of structures (Archer, 1995).

Analytical dualists such as Archer (1995) believe that the relationship between structure and agency occurs over a historical period of time. Although structure and agency are ontologically interrelated, they need to be analysed separately in order to properly understand the relationship between them.

Although the critical realist perspective recognises a relationship between social activity and structures (Archer, 1995), it views social structures as independently existing with causations that may or may not be perceived (Carter and New, 2004). Critical realists highlight the temporal gap between agency and structure, claiming that structures are the outcome of the agency of individuals in the past. By contrast, structuration theory views social structures as an outcome of existing social agents.

The morphogenetic theory looks at the interplay of structure and agency through the following three stages:

1. Agents experiencing structural systems.
2. People negotiating with structural systems to their own benefit.
3. The transformation of original structural systems as a result of people’s actions.

This is known as the morphogenetic cycle. It attempts to explain ‘the temporal interplay between structure and agency’ (Bakewell, 2010: 1696). When studying theories applied to understand migration, it is important to examine the enabling
structural conditions of migrants’ countries of origin, as well as the destinations they chose to relocate to, and the reasons for their migration (Massey et al., 1999, cited in Bakewell, 2010). In turn, Archer’s morphogenetic cycle focuses on the structural systems that influence migration – both in and outwards – the social interaction of migrants, and the evolving systems and networks that emerge (Bakewell, 2010). This thesis is not utilising morphogenesis because the third stage is not part of this research study.

**Structure and Agency in Migration Theory**

Although the relation between structure and agency is key to understanding the concept of migration, there is little research attempting to bridge the gap between them. Some approaches adopt a determinist stance, with little emphasis on human agency. Others lean towards human agency as being central to shaping migration pathways rather than social structures. Meanwhile, advocates of the structuration theory take a balance between both by acknowledging the need to find a middle ground between structure and agency (Bakewell, 2010).

Some scholars argue that no single theory exists that can be used to sufficiently explain migration (Massey et al., 1999). Instead, approaches need to be chosen in relation to the specific context in which migration theory is investigated. Neo-classical approaches have explained migration by looking at wage differences between countries of origin and countries migrated to. Meanwhile, other opposing schools of thought, such as the dual labour market theory,
disagree that wage differentials are a conditional requirement for migration to take place.

Attempts have also been made to analyse migration theory on micro and macro levels (De Jong and Gardner, 1981). However, these have only focused on the macro level structures that influence individual choices that lead to migration. Although meso links have been used in the works of scholars such as Faist (2000) to bridge micro and macro level theories of migration, the relationship between structure and agency is not sufficiently looked into. Meanwhile, other scholars have supported theories that attempt to understand migration by ‘shifting the focus away from individuals to intermediate units of analysis, such as households, or migrant networks’ (Goss and Linquist, 1995; cited in Bakewell, 2010: 1693).

Emphasising the need to look at four dimensions when extending conceptual knowledge to international migration, Massey et al. (1999) reject theories that consider either agency or structure as the driving force of migration. Firstly, there is a need to look at the structural systems that encourage migration out of the original country of residence. Secondly, structural variables that facilitate immigration into countries must be considered. Thirdly, one must look at the drivers, goals and reasons for people to choose to migrate. Lastly, there is a need to look at socio-economic structures.

This research study adopts Gidden’s structuration theory in the analysis of structure and agency and applies it to the situation of protracted refugees, exploring the intersectionality of citizenship and gender through a case study of Palestinian refugees in Jordan.
This thesis explores the intersectionality of gender and citizenship in impacting further education and employment opportunities of protracted Palestinian refugees in Jordan. Furthermore, it explores structure and agency using Gidden’s structuration approach by examining the enabling and/or disabling influence of the intersectionality of gender and citizenship in the livelihood strategies of Palestinians living in protracted refugee situations.

**Gaps in the Literature on Protracted Forced Migration**

When examining the literature on refugee studies, research on young adults is lacking with much of the focus on adults or children (Chatty, 2009). Scholars have highlighted the political agency of young adult refugees, viewing them as active political subjects who question existing power structures through their ‘practices, resistance, strategies and challenges’ (Skelton, 2010: 146). Research is also lacking on the literature on ‘host’ populations within the field of refugee studies (Brun, 2010).

**Conclusion**

The literature critically reviewed in this chapter has covered research on protracted refugees, citizenship, gender relations, intersectionality, discrimination and human rights, livelihood strategies and structure and agency.

This thesis explores protracted refugees’ experiences in further education and employment through an analysis of the
intersectionality of gender and citizenship in order to develop a nuanced understanding of the implementation of legislation and policy (macro level) on the livelihood strategies of men and women (micro level in relation to further education and employment. Much of the literature on migration is gender-blind (Lister, 2003). More specifically, there is a gap in the literature on the intersectionality of gender and citizenship on women’s participation in further education and employment, and particularly in relation to those in protracted refugee situations, which this thesis will address.

This thesis draws on structural and political notions of intersectionality in the analysis of gender inequalities of protracted Palestinian refugees with particular focus on their access to further education and employment opportunities in Jordan. Furthermore, this thesis draws on the work of Yuval-Davis (2006), Lister (2008) and Kabeer (2005) in order to extend understandings of the complexity of citizenship by focusing on the intersectionality of social markers – with specific focus on gender and citizenship - in relation to inclusionary and exclusionary forms of citizenship.

Furthermore, this thesis seeks to extend understandings on how discrimination can have an impact on inclusionary and exclusionary citizenship within protracted refugee situations for women and men as part of a conceptual framework on the intersectionality of gender and citizenship.

This thesis will adopt a gendered rights-based approach on the conceptualisations of human rights within patriarchal Arab societies where key refugee human rights instruments are lacking
and may conflict with national legislation. It will adopt an intersectional lens to discrimination by focusing on the influence of gender and citizenship on women’s and men’s access to further education and employment in relation to protracted refugee situations. The literature on livelihood strategies and resilience often lacks a focus on intersectionality in terms of gender and citizenship, which this thesis will address. In addition, this research is an analysis of not only the individual and household strategies but also those of a state within a particular country, so it is an analysis that encompasses both micro and macro levels.

The literature on structure and agency in refugee studies highlights an extensive amount of scholarly work. In the case of protracted refugees, much of the work has focused on exploring appropriate institutional approaches to addressing their situation. Most of the literature is about a monolithic group of refugees or is a gendered analysis, but there is a lack of theoretical work that extends understandings on the intersectionality of citizenship status and gender on the agency of protracted refugees in developing livelihood strategies.

The proposed research aims to investigate the intersectionality of gender and citizenship on the livelihood strategies of protracted refugees through a case study of Palestinians in Jordan. The three research questions are:

- How does the intersectionality of gender and citizenship shape access to further education for protracted Palestinian refugees in Jordan?
- How does the intersectionality of gender and citizenship influence employment opportunities for protracted Palestinian refugees in Jordan?

- How does the intersectionality of gender and citizenship influence the agency of protracted Palestinian refugees in Jordan in developing livelihood strategies?
Chapter Two: Setting

Introduction

The research aims to investigate the intersectionality of gender and citizenship on the livelihood strategies of protracted refugees through a case study of Palestinians in Jordan. The following chapter provides a contextual overview of Jordan and the situation of Palestinians in the country.

The following section will provide a historical, political and economic background of Jordan including outward and inward migrations of economic and forced migrants. It will then focus on the major Palestinian refugee influxes into the country and Jordan’s policies towards them.

The chapter will include a section examining the status of Jordan in relation to international and regional human rights instruments related to refugees, specifically Palestinians. It will also focus on the country’s policies towards citizenship and employment for citizens and non-citizens.

The final section of this chapter will provide an overview of further education and employment in the public, private and informal sectors in Jordan, and will examine the implications of policies in relation to women and men, as well as on protracted Palestinian refugees.
A Historical Profile of Jordan

Jordan's history is a relatively modern one compared to its surrounding Arab neighbours. It was created by the British in 1922 following the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and was named the Emirate of Transjordan. During this period, the Hashemite monarchy also claimed sovereignty over the country, justifying its rights to rule on the grounds of lineage back to the Prophet Mohammad and under the banner of Arab nationalism (Nanes, 2008).

The reign of the Hashemites began with King Abdullah in April 1921. In 1946, Jordan gained independence from Great Britain. King Abdullah was assassinated in Jerusalem in 1952 and the throne was passed on to his son King Talal and then to King Hussein, who ruled until his death in 1999. His son Abdullah II has since been king of Jordan (Robins, 2004).

Today Jordan is bordered by Syria to the North, by Iraq to the Northeast, by Saudi Arabia to the East and Southeast, and by Palestine to the West (See Appendix 2, Figure 2.1, page 392 for map of Jordan).

Like many Arab countries, Transjordanian society evolved from Bedouin tribes, which were segmentary, patriarchal and patrilocal. There were extended family clans (hamulas) within tribes (‘Ašīrah) that belonged to different tribal confederations (Qabilah). Tribalism is defined as an ‘organizational form based upon strong ties to a relatively corporate family and then to a clearly defined clan’ (Temirkoulov, 2004: 95). A clan is comprises of members with a common ancestry whose lineage is passed on through male
descendants. Many scholars believe that the nation-state model is inoperable in tribal-based societies (Al Husban and Na’amneh, 2010) and, as the nation-state becomes stronger, tribal affiliations and organisations become weaker (Gellner, 1990; Khoury and Kostiner, 1990; Migdal, 1988; Tibi, 1990). The relationship between individuals and the political and cultural structures that surround Arab tribal based societies may therefore differ from Western countries (LeBeau, 2001).

In Jordan, state distribution of resources is based on tribal affiliation (El-Abed, 2014). During their initial acquisition of power, the Hashemites consolidated their position in Transjordan by gaining the support of tribal leaders living in the area. This was done by positioning tribal leaders in senior positions in the army and offering them various benefits and concessions (Al Husban and Na’amneh, 2010). Tribal leaders were in turn expected to support members of their tribes in relation to favours and preferential treatment (Alon, 2007:154).

**Wastah**

Social connections form an important function in Jordanian society. In Jordan, people rely heavily on affiliations with tribes, families and clans for support and the furthering of their interests. The Arabic term *wastah* means to obtain preferential treatment through exercising informal influence and favours. This can occur in many ways, such as through nepotism, favouritism, cronyism, tribalism and patronage (Utstein Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 2005; Pope, 2000). This is
common to many societies where informal ties and social networks are critical to accessing power.

Also known as the ‘wow card’ or *maḥṣūbiyah*, *wastah* is a way of obtaining gains through political connections or some form of power (El-Abed, 2014). In Jordan, *wastah* plays a vital role in securing employment, or as a means of economic sustenance. It is used to evade payments and specific requirements needed to obtain an item, service or position (El-Abed, 2014). *Wastah* reflects privilege through facilitated access to power and *maḥṣūbiyah* refers to the relationship established with individuals who have power. Social connections form an important function in Jordanian society. In Jordan, people rely heavily on affiliations with tribes, families and clans for support.

**A Political Profile of Jordan**

As a constitutional monarch, King Abdullah II bin Hussein has executive and legislative authority. The parliament is made up of a House of Notables (*Mağlis Al-Aʿyān*, 55 members) and a Chamber of Deputies (*Mağlis An –Nuwāb*, 120 members). The most recent parliamentary elections were in January 2013. Although accounts of corruption and fraud have been cited in previous elections, there were fewer mentions of corruption for the one in 2013 and it is in this respect that they were regarded as successful. Nevertheless, only one-third of eligible voters voted, which raises questions regarding the representativeness of parliament (Fishman, 2014).
Compared with other countries in the Middle East, Jordan is regarded as one of the most democratic, and has been commended by the United States (US) for its efforts towards democratisation (Rowland, 2009). Scholars such as Wiktorowicz (1999) postulate that the country’s democratisation was part of a strategy for the Hashemite monarchy to maintain social control over the Kingdom in a period of economic crisis.

The movement towards democracy was received as a precursor of the riots that took place in April 1989 following increases in fuel prices. The riots began in areas in the south, inhabited by Bedouin tribes known to be loyal to the King. It was this issue that posed more of a risk to the regime than the riots themselves. In an effort to consolidate its power, the monarchy established the first elections in Jordan three months after the demonstrations (Wiktorowicz, 1999).

Scholars such as Wiktorowicz (1999) believe that Jordan is controlled by an authoritarian regime, as legal barriers have been drafted that restrict civil society from engaging in the public sphere. Examples include the state’s attempts to de-politicise the press in Jordan by forbidding ‘any information [to be publicised] that harms national unity, encourages crime or sows seeds of envy, hatred or division among members of society’ (Wiktorowicz, 1999: 616). Research has shown that most Jordanians believe that the persistence of corruption in the government’s administrative and financial system is the main barrier towards political reform in Jordan (Alazzam, 2008). In order to understand the political setting in
Jordan, it is necessary to tackle the question of whether people’s basic human rights and freedoms are protected by the law.

In the case of women’s political participation, they were only permitted to vote and to be elected to parliament in 1974. Nevertheless, their fight for rights to election, voting and political participation can be traced back to the 1950s, with the establishment of the Women’s Awakening Association. Although Jordanian law never differentiated between women and men, the reality of the situation was completely different from the theoretical equality written in the constitution, particularly in the political sphere. Women’s political participation has however increased over the last 10 years with the political, social and economic reforms that have taken place in the country (Alazzam, 2008).

Ever since women won the right to be elected to parliament in the 1980s, the number of women running for parliament has increased. This, however, has not coincided with an increase in women parliamentarians. Alazzam’s (2008) paper on political participation in Jordan highlighted that 79.6% of the study’s sample voted for male candidates during the 2003 parliamentary elections. Furthermore, they viewed women’s low representation in the parliament to be a result of their lack of experience in the political and public sphere and of socio-cultural and religious barriers, as well as their inability to gain tribal support.
An Economic Profile of Jordan

Jordan is regarded by the World Bank (2012) as an upper middle income country. The Kingdom’s economy registered an annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate of 3.1 in 2014, which was 0.3 per cent higher than the previous year (The World Bank, 2015a). The growth ‘was led by construction, wholesale and retail trade, and finance and insurance, with a pick up in the mining and quarrying sector’ (The World Bank, 2015b: 4). Growth was also instigated by increased government investments due to ‘higher GCC grants, and narrower trade deficit’ (Ibid, 2015d: 4).

The country’s economy has been gradually recovering from the aftermath of the Arab Spring, including irregularities in the flow of gas from Egypt as well as security issues following the conflict in Syria and Iraq (The World Bank, 2015b). Comparing the fiscal and primary deficits of Jordan’s central government in 2014 and 2013, figures indicate a reduction of GDP by 1.0 and 1.5 percentage point (pp). This is explained by the country’s ‘expanding economy and continued efforts at fiscal consolidation’ (The World Bank, 2015b: 4). As for the gross public debt, figures from the end of 2013 to the end of 2014 indicate a rise by 2.9 pp of the country’s GDP (The World Bank, 2015b). Jordan’s energy imports rose between 2013 and 2014 by 6.4 per cent, which brought about a 1.3 per cent widening in the trade in goods deficit. In 2014, headline inflation fell to its lowest levels since December 2009 and core inflation also saw a deceleration (The World Bank, 2015b).
Unemployment in Jordan between 2013 and 2014 declined from 12.6 to 11.9 per cent. Nevertheless, the result of such a decline was due to a decrease in the participation of Jordan’s labour force rather than an increase in employment. The World Bank explains this decline to be as a result of Jordanians becoming demotivated to work because of the belief that they could not find jobs as a result of increased competition with refugees. Decreased labour participation was also related to reduced government employment opportunities (The World Bank, 2015b). Those who have been most impacted on by unemployment in Jordan are women and youth. Although the unemployment rate for women decreased from 2013 to 2014 by 1.5 per cent, it was still high, with figures reaching 22.2 per cent. Moreover, women’s labour force participation rate also saw a reduction in 2014 to 12.6 per cent, which is the lowest rate among Arab countries (See Appendix 2, Figure 2.2 page 393 for Jordan Labour Market Dynamics between 2008 and 2014). As for youth unemployment in 2014, this is 28.8 per cent for those aged 15 to 24 (The World Bank, 2016).

The latest national figures on poverty in Jordan are from the Household Expenditure and Income Survey of 2010. Findings of the 2010 survey defined poor Jordanians as ‘those whose per capita expenditure is less than the absolute poverty line of Jordanian Dinars (JD) 0.814 per year’ (Dawass, 2015: 6). Meanwhile, Jordan’s poverty ratio was 14.4 per cent in 2010, and the absolute poverty line was JD0.814 for each individual per annum on a national level. The
poverty gap ratio reached 3.6 per cent amounting to a cash value of JD176.8 million (Dawass, 2015).

**Economic Migration to and from Jordan**

Jordan is regarded as a popular destination for economic migrants in the Middle East. Both immigration and internal rural-to-urban migration are major factors that have led to the increasing growth of the country’s urban areas. Net migration in Jordan during the period between 2011 and 2015 was 400,002 (The World Bank, 2015c). Economic migration to and from Jordan has impacted the country’s demography, as well as having economic and political ramifications. During the escalation of oil prices in 1973, Jordanians – mainly those who were of Palestinian origin with high competency levels – had migrated to countries known to produce oil. Of those migrating from Jordan, 39 per cent went to the United Arab Emirates, 36 per cent to Saudi Arabia, 13 per cent to Kuwait, and 7 per cent to Qatar (See Appendix 2, Table 2.1 page 394 for the outward migration of Jordanians in 2008).

According to the Migration Policy Centre (2013), there is a lack of more recent statistics on Jordanian outward migration. This is because the Jordanian Ministry of Labour (MOL) does not gather such information from countries that produce oil, such as the Gulf states, which are major destinations for Jordanians. In turn, data on migration by nationality cannot be accessed from the Gulf states either (Migration Policy Centre, 2013).
As for inward migration into Jordan, the majority of foreign workers are characterised as having few or no skills and are mainly concentrated in the ‘agrarian, construction and services sectors/ (Migration Policy Centre, 2013: 1). The majority of foreign migrants in Jordan between 1994 and 2004 came from Arab, Asian and African countries such as Palestine (29.4 per cent), Iraq (10.2 per cent), Syria (9.7 per cent) and Egypt (28.7 per cent) (Ibid, 2013: 1). Clearly, figures of migrants from Syria have increased during the last two years (See Appendix 2, Table 2.2 page 394 for foreign resident population by countries/region of citizenship between 1994 and 2004).

The Jordanian National Census for 2004 described the majority of foreigners in Jordan to be ‘a) mainly men (59.0 per cent), b) young (mean age of 26.2), c) poorly educated (62.4 per cent have less than secondary level), d) employed at low occupational levels (e.g. 43.9 per cent as craft and related trades workers and 27.8 per cent as unskilled labour e) mainly working in manufacturing (26.6 per cent), construction (22.5 per cent), in the service sector (17.9 per cent, of whom 82.6 per cent were employed in private households) and in the agricultural sector (11.7 per cent)’ (Migration Policy Centre, 2013: 2).

It is estimated that there are 750,000 Jordanians living abroad, of whom most reside in Gulf countries (The Jordan Times, 2015a). Remittances to Jordan from Jordanians living abroad are considered economic gains to the country because they increase cash influx into the economy and benefit local entities that deal with remittances,
such as banks (Migration Policy Centre, 2013). Both remittances and international aid play a key role in the development of Jordan’s economy (Chatelard, 2010) and in 2001 Jordan was among the top 10 recipients of global remittance accounting for 23 per cent of the country’s local GDP (Schiopu and Sigfried, 2006: 6). Remittances into the country from Jordanians living abroad increased by US$27 million (1.5 per cent) during the initial six months (January to June) of 2015, in comparison with the same period a year previously.

**Major Waves of Forced Migration into Jordan**

Jordan’s demography, economy and politics have been influenced by the various forms of inward migrations that have taken place throughout the country’s history (Migration Policy Centre, 2013). The major waves of forced migration that will be discussed in this section are the Iraqis, Syrians and, subsequently, the Palestinians.

Refugees comprise a large portion of the Jordanian population. In fact, it is ranked the third largest host country in the world, with an estimated 302,700 UNHCR-registered refugees (UNHCR, 2012). This excludes the largest refugee population in Jordan, which consists of 2,079,338 UNRWA registered Palestinian refugees (UNRWA, 2015a). When comparing the number of refugees to that of the Jordanian population, Jordan ranks highest worldwide (See Appendix 2, Figure 2.4, page 395 for the number of refugees per 1,000 inhabitants in Jordan for 2012).

It is unclear how many Iraqi refugees are in the country. While national statistics placed this number at almost 450,000 at the end of
2012, this was later reduced to 63,000 (UNHCR, 2012). Moreover, the UNHCR has reported a recent increase in the number of Iraqi refugees in Jordan following growing hostilities from Da’esh in Iraq (UNHCR, 2014b). The situation of Iraqis in Jordan is bleak, as many of those who have fled to Jordan following the war in Iraq are considered as ‘temporary visitors’ (Human Rights Watch, 2006: 3). As such, they are denied the protection entitled to refugees. The UNHCR is responsible for protecting Iraqi refugees and ‘declared a temporary protection regime [for them. However] the Jordanian government accurately insists that it never agreed to it’ (Human Rights Watch, 2006: 3).

Jordan has been receiving aid from the international community\(^4\) to support the most recent influx of Syrian refugees and asylum seekers following the civil war in Syria in 2011. Jordan has not signed the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Therefore, Syrian refugees are regarded as foreign visitors, like their forerunners the Iraqis (Olwan and Shiyab, 2012: 5). With figures rising to over 650,000 Syrian refugees in the country, Jordan’s limited resources and already-competitive labour market have been greatly affected by the Syrian influx (ILO, 2015a).

\(^4\) There is no clear definition of the term ‘international community’. Modern-day definitions have related it to the United Nations, however only when the UN is defined as the ‘entirety of the work accomplished by the United Nations and more particularly by the General Assembly, the Human Rights Commission and by the Special Rapporteurs as representative of the International Community’ (Quenivet, 2003: 197).
Palestinian Refugee Migration into Jordan

The Palestinian–Israeli conflict has been going on for more than 60 years and has resulted in a large-scale population of Palestinian refugees in Jordan. According to UNRWA figures, there are 10.88 million Palestinians globally, as such comprising 20 per cent of the total worldwide refugee population. Moreover, of the five million UNRWA registered refugees, more than half are stateless (Hilal, 2012).

The three major waves of Palestinian migration into Jordan took place during the Arab–Israeli War of 1948, the occupation of Gaza and the West Bank by Israel in 1967 and the Gulf War in 1990 (Chatty and Lewando-Hundt, 2005). It is estimated that 100,000 Palestinians fled to Jordan following the Arab–Israeli War of 1948. In 1950, Jordan annexed the West Bank and became known as the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The Jordanian population reached 750,000 following Jordan’s annexation of the West Bank, before which it was believed to have been no more than 340,000 inhabitants (Nanes, 2008).

The second influx of Palestinian refugees took place in 1967, when Israel occupied the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. It is during this period that an estimated 400,000 displaced Palestinians fled to Jordan (Chatty and Lewando-Hundt, 2005). Of the 400,000 Palestinians, around 175,000 are referred to as ‘twice-displaced’ because they had previously fled from their original place of residence in Palestine during the Arab–Israeli War of 1948. They are also referred to as ‘displaced Palestinians’ because they had fled to
areas recognised to be part of Jordan during that period (Chatelard, 2010).

During the Gulf War of 1991, it is estimated that up to 300,000 Palestinians escaped to Jordan from Kuwait. Additionally, up to one million Iraqi refugees also fled to Jordan over the 10 years that followed the Gulf War of 1991 (Chatelard, 2010). The influx of Palestinian and Iraqi refugees has had economic repercussions on Jordan’s economy (Hejoj, 2007).

Jordan is considered to host, on the global scale, the largest number of Palestinian refugees (Chatelard, 2010). Nevertheless, both UNRWA and national figures do not provide precise statistics on the number of Palestinians in the country. Although the national census of 1994 indicates that Palestinians make up around 44 per cent of the Jordanian population, recent figures are much higher, reaching over 50 per cent (Australian Government, 2010).

**UNRWA Assistance in Jordan**

UNRWA is the main UN agency responsible for providing humanitarian aid and services to Palestinian refugees. It is responsible for maintaining and administering Palestinian refugee camps, as well as providing schooling, health and social welfare services to registered refugees.

UNRWA provides services in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. It is estimated that the agency’s beneficiaries reached 4,766,670 within the aforementioned host countries, of whom 3,370,302 live outside UNRWA camps (Khalil,
A large number of refugees are not registered with UNRWA because they do not live in the countries that UNRWA operates in or because they do not satisfy its operational definition\(^5\) (Ibid, 2011: 3).

In Jordan, there are 10 official UNRWA camps, as well as three unofficial camps established by the Jordanian Government. Figure 2.7 (See Appendix 2, Figure 2.5, page 396 for a map of UNRWA camps in Jordan) is a map of UNRWA’s official camps in Jordan. The number of UNRWA registered Palestinian refugees reached 2,097,338 in 2014 (UNRWA, 2015a). It is estimated that 370,000 (18 per cent) of them reside in the 10 UNRWA camps (UNRWA, 2015a). Although UNRWA claims to offer its services to both registered and non-registered Palestinian refugees, differential treatment of non-registered refugees has been documented (Hejoj, 2007).

UNRWA’s services in Jordan include providing primary education to more than 116,5953 students through its 173 schools (UNRWA, 2015a). The agency also provides primary health care through its 23 primary health facilities. UNRWA’s Relief and Social Services (RSS) programme also focuses on Palestinian refugees facing socio-economic hardship. The RSS offers social safety net (SSN) support, which comprises food and monetary subsidies (the annual per capital value being about US$120) (UNRWA, 2015c). Financial support is also provided through one-time cash grants, in

\(^5\) The UNRWA definition of a Palestinian refugee is ‘[a]ny person whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948 and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict, and descendants of such persons, including legally adopted children, through the male line’ (UNRWA, 2015b: 32).
addition to shelter rehabilitation services through the UNRWA’s infrastructure and camp improvement programme (UNRWA, 2015c).

UNRWA has 14 Women’s Programme Centres (WPCs) in its 10 camps, which served 21,641 Palestinian refugee women and 7,251 children and youth in 2012. Services offered through the WPCs vary. They include income-generating activities and legal advice to women, as well as capacity development programmes for youth (UNRWA, 2015c).

UNRWA has also established 10 Community-Based Rehabilitation Centres (CBRCs) in each of its camps, which provided 43,574 services to 11,277 disabled Palestinian refugees in 2012 (UNRWA, 2015c). Another service offered by UNRWA is the Community Managed Fund Scheme. The programme aims to provide disadvantaged Palestinian refugee women with greater access to credit opportunities, coupled with capacity-building activities on budgeting skills.

The agency provides micro-finance opportunities to Palestinian refugees, most of whom (36 per cent) are women. In fact, in 2012, UNRWA managed to provide a total of 10,571 loans to its refugee beneficiaries, with a total worth of US$11.72 million. A small loans programme was opened to women wishing to set up home-based businesses in 2010, and it was estimated that by 2012 a total of 2,756 loans were distributed (reaching a value of US$1.44 million) (UNRWA, 2015d).

Although UNRWA has provided a great deal of humanitarian support, Palestinian refugees continue to experience a ‘protection
gap … on the international and regional level … [because of] the lack of clear legal texts providing for and protecting basic rights, and the existence of discriminatory legal texts that are included in constitutional texts of Arab states’ (Khalil, 2011: 1).

Jordan’s Policies Towards Palestinians

Following the Arab–Israeli War of 1948 and the arrival of the first Palestinian refugees, Jordan’s policies aimed to maintain strong relations with tribal leaders of the country while facilitating the assimilation of Palestinians into Jordanian society. Palestinians migrating into the country from 1948 to 1954 were entitled to Jordanian citizenship as part of Jordan’s plans to unify the West and East Bank.

In the years following the Israeli occupation of Gaza and the West Bank in 1967 there was a weakening of inclusionary policies towards Palestinians. Jordan was used as a central location by the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) to establish an army and develop a political agenda (Chatelard, 2010). Both the monarchy and the government’s attitude towards Palestinians became more exclusionary following the attempted PLO coup d’état in 1970 known as ‘Black September’. Transjordanian nationalism was consolidated

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6 This was the first of several wars which started following the establishment of the state of Israel on 14 May 1948. This war lasted for a year, during which a coalition formed between Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon against Israel. The south-east of Palestine and East Jerusalem was occupied by the Arab coalition. Meanwhile, the Israelis managed to control an area from the Galilee to what was formerly the Egyptian–Palestine frontier, with the exception of the Gaza Strip (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2015).
as the divide between Transjordanians and Palestinian Jordanians widened following the events of Black September. The term ‘Transjordanians’ (or East Bankers) refers to Jordanians whose descendants resided in the East Bank prior to 1948. They are considered by nationalists as the indigenous people and ‘true settlers’ of Jordan (Brand, 1995). Meanwhile, Palestinian Jordanians refer to those who migrated to Jordan following the Arab–Israeli War of 1948 and were given full Jordanian citizenship (El-Abed, 2014).

Subsequent to Black September there was increased focus by the government on the ‘Jordanisation’ (Baylouny, 2008: 289) of its public sector and army. While the private sector was left open to Palestinians, Transjordanians were given preference over others in public sector employment. Public sector remuneration packages included a regular income, free healthcare, a pension and flexible loan arrangements. Army employees and their families were also granted additional remunerations, such as social benefits, free education and increased opportunities for housing subsidies (Baylouny, 2008).

Jordan had drawn up plans to create a federation with the West Bank, Arab Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip. However, after the Rabat Resolution of 1974, when the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) was recognised as the only representative of Palestinians, Jordan abandoned this plan, since they would not at that time negotiate with the PLO after the difficulties in the Black September uprising. The Hashemite Kingdom recognised the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people in 1988 and gave
up all legal and administrative ties with the West Bank (El-Abed, 2004a). Thousands of Palestinians with Jordanian passports had their citizenship withdrawn and their passports changed to temporary ones following Jordan’s disengagement from the West Bank (Human Rights Watch 2010). The government justified its actions by claiming that under Jordanian law it was illegal to hold dual Arab citizenship.

Jordan’s fear of becoming an ‘alternative state’ for Palestine further strengthened the country’s nationalist movement. These fears were exacerbated even more after the country’s privatisation of national companies following the economic crisis in the 1980s, a sector dominated by the Palestinians (Baylouny, 2008). Consequently, the government worked on tightening control over the public sphere and imposing restrictions on Palestinian participation in the political affairs of the country (Chatelard, 2010). Shifting attitudes towards Palestinians were not only for political reasons, but also had to do with diminished lands available for farming after the West Bank was taken away from Jordan following the war of 1967. For this reason, the government encouraged exporting its workforce to countries with strong oil production, such as those in the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula, under the banner of Arab nationalism. The majority of emigrants were Palestinians with Jordanian citizenship. In fact, it is estimated that 42 per cent of the country’s employable population emigrated from Jordan between 1975 and 1985 in search of employment, resulting in a 2 per cent decrease in the unemployment rate (Chatelard, 2010).
Nevertheless, both unemployment and inflation rates increased following the Gulf War of 1990–1991, as 300,000 Jordanian nationals – also known as ‘returnees’ – migrated into the country. Interestingly, although these ‘returnees’ had Jordanian citizenship, most were of Palestinian origin and had never lived in Jordan (El-Abed, 2004a). Jordanians working in the Gulf before 1991 were mainly of Palestinian origin. They were pressured to seek economic opportunities abroad because of the political economy of Jordan since the 1970s. Meanwhile, many East Jordanians sought employment in the army for the status it gave them, as well as for the stability and social protection they were able to secure (Abu-Odeh, 1999; Baylouny, 2008).

The Palestinian Jordanians who arrived in the Gulf between the 1960s and 1980s were composed of two groups: Palestinians who held Jordanian citizenship and were living in Jordan (the East Bank) but left for the Gulf to seek better economic opportunities; and Palestinians who held Jordanian citizenship and were living in the West Bank. The West Bank was occupied by Jordan from 1949 to 1988. The Palestinians of the West Bank also went to the Gulf to earn a better living and sent remittances to their families in the West Bank. They also purchased houses for them in Jordan (the East Bank). This group had never lived in Jordan. They went from the West Bank through Jordan to the Gulf, and transited through Amman. Because many were keen to purchase property in Amman, when the Gulf War took place in 1991 they returned to their homes in
Jordan, while some went directly to the West Bank (Abu-Odeh, 1999).

Profile of the Jordanian and Palestinian Population

According to the latest figures from UNRWA (2011), the average household size and total fertility rate of Palestinians in Jordan in 2012 was 4.8 and 3.3 per cent respectively (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2012). By comparison, it reached 5.4 and 3.3 per cent respectively for Jordanians in 2012 (UNICEF, 2014).

The age distribution of Jordan’s population is considered young, with 37 per cent being under the age of 15 and 70 per cent below 29 years of age (Abu Jaber, 2014). While the median age for Jordanians was 21 years in 2014 (United States Central Intelligence Agency, 2015), it was 19 and 21 years for Palestinians in and outside UNRWA camps respectively (Tiltnes and Zhang, 2013).

The life expectancy at birth for Jordanians is estimated to be 71 years and, for those reaching the age of 60, 18 years of further life were estimated in 2009 (World Health Organisation, 2012). The perceived health of Palestinian refugees is three times better for those living outside the refugee camps than for those inside the camps (Tiltnes and Zhang, 2013).

The sections above provided a brief historical, political and economic overview of Jordan. They also evaluated the impact of major flows of outward and inward migration, focusing on both economic and forced migrants. A brief discussion of the major waves of Palestinian refugee migration was provided together with an
overview of the services that UNRWA offers in Jordan. Furthermore, the sections looked at Jordan’s policies towards Palestinians and provided a brief demographic snapshot comparing Palestinian refugees to their host population.

The following sections will look at Jordan’s status in relation to international and regional human rights instruments concerned with refugees in general and Palestinians in particular. I will critically examine issues related to citizenship in Jordan, including the types of citizenship available to Palestinians and their corresponding entitlements. Issues related to employment rights in the country for citizens and non-citizens will also be discussed.

**Human Rights and Palestinians in Jordan**

The two main international humanitarian laws for protecting refugee rights are the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees supports the ‘national treatment’ of refugees and the host country’s facilitation of their naturalisation (Article 34). The convention states that refugees should have the rights to own property (Article 13), employment (Article 17.1), and participation in trade unions (Article 15). They should also be given the same treatment as host-country citizens in issues such as elementary education (Article 22.1), public assistance (Article 23), social security (Article 23), taxation (Article 29.1) and freedom of movement (Article 26) (Goodwin-Gill, 2008).
Jordan has not signed either the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees or the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. However, several other legally binding Conventions have been ratified. In terms of international conventions that are of relevance to refugees, Jordan has ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the Optional Protocol to the CRC on the involvement of children in armed conflict, and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD).

Other key international human rights instruments specific to refugees, which Jordan has not ratified, include the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (1961), the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (1954), the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967), the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951), the International Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance, the Optional Protocol to CEDAW, the Optional Protocol to ICESCR, and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers.

At the regional level, the country has signed such human rights instruments as the Arab Charter on Human Rights, the Universal Islamic Declaration on Human Rights and the Casablanca Protocol. The Casablanca Protocol, for example, highlights the rights of Palestinians to employment (Article 1), freedom of movement
(Article 2) and equal treatment as citizens belonging to the League of Arab States in terms of applying for visas and residency (Article 5) *(See Appendix 1, Table 1.2(9), page 391 for the link to the Protocol).* Both regional human rights instruments are binding only on member states that have agreed to adopt them either with or without reservations (Takkenberg, 1998; Zerrougui, 2008). Moreover, Jordan signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Norway in 2011, which was concerned specifically with research on Palestinian refugees in the country (Migration Policy Centre, 2013).

The majority of international human rights instruments are relevant to the rights of refugees, such as Article 1.D of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951), which specifies that ‘the Convention shall not apply to persons who are at present receiving from organs or agencies of the United Nations other than the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) protection or assistance’ (Khalil, 2011: 9), which as a result prevents Palestinians from benefiting from the rights of the Convention. Nevertheless, UN Resolution 194 recognises the right of refugees to return to their country and live there if they wish to do so. This is known as the ‘Right to Return’ (Shirazi, 2010).

The situation of Palestinian refugees is regarded as exceptional in comparison to others because ‘[of the] longevity [of the Palestinian refugee situation] combined with [their] non-integration [in most host countries] … [the] demographic scale [of the

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7 Exceptionalism is defined ‘as a kind of biased analysis, where differences are stressed by default, thus ignoring underlying similarities’ (Kagan, 2009: 419).
Palestinian refugee crisis] and [its] ambiguity [in terms of a durable solution] … [their] unique legal and administrative framework⁸ … [the] Palestinian return is precluded by the ethno-religious nationals of the Israeli government … [and the] lack of sovereignty [that Palestinians have] over any of their historic territory’ (Kagan, 2009: 419–20). It is based on these reasons that both the international community and Arab countries separate them ‘from the global refugee protection regime by maintaining a system of separate agencies to address their situation’ (Kagan, 2009: 427). However, being assigned such exceptional treatment has resulted in differential treatment towards Palestinians by host countries and UN agencies.

According to Khalil (2011), the socio-economic rights of refugees are less an issue that is dependent on their recognition by international human rights laws than it is of these laws being enforced by host countries at a national level. In the case of the Palestinians, a major obstacle to their socio-economic rights is their legal status, which changes depending on political factors.

Many Arab countries justify their position against the naturalisation of Palestinian refugees on the grounds that it compromises their ‘Right to Return’. In fact, most Arab countries have made it illegal for Arabs to hold more than one Arab nationality in order to ensure the loyalty of their citizens. Khalil (2011) has

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⁸ The exceptionalism of Palestinian refugees from other groups of refugees lies in that they are not protected by the UNHCR. Rather, they are served by a separate UN agency – and some may even argue two if including the UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCCP). As such, Palestinian refugees are excluded from the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.
argued that the resistance to naturalise Palestinians is due to economic and political factors related to the stability of countries.

**Citizenship in Jordan**

Jordanian citizenship is passed through *jus sanguinis* (right of blood) and not *jus soli* (the right of the soil). Only the father can pass on his citizenship to his children. The only situation where Jordanian mothers are permitted by law to pass their citizenship to their children is where the child is stateless and born in the country (Migration Policy Centre, 2013).

Two factors define the citizenship of Palestinians in Jordan. These are the period of their migration and the place they migrated from (El-Abed, 2014). Article 3 of the Nationality Law (1954) defines a Jordanian citizen as\(^9\) *(See Appendix 1, Table 1.2(10), page 391 for the link to Law No. 6 of 1954 on Nationality)*:

1. Any person who has acquired Jordanian nationality or a Jordanian passport under the Jordanian Nationality Law, 1928, as amended, Law No. 6 of 1954 or this Law;

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\(^9\) Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Jordan/Palestine: Whether there have been any recent change to rules or laws related to Jordanian citizenship or status (or protection) for Palestinians; in particular, whether authorities in Jordan are able to automatically revoke the citizenship of Palestinians who carry Palestinian Authority (PA) passports (2006 - July 2008), 5 August 2008, ZZZ102878.E, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/48d223761a.html [accessed 21 January 2014].
2. Any person who, not being Jewish, possessed Palestinian nationality before 15 May 1948 and was a regular resident in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan between 20 December 1949 and 16 February 1954;

3. Any person whose father holds Jordanian nationality;

4. Any person born in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan of a mother holding Jordanian nationality and of a father of unknown nationality or of a stateless father or whose filiation is not established;

5. Any person born in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan of unknown parents, as a foundling in the Kingdom shall be considered born in the Kingdom pending evidence to the contrary;

6. All members of the Bedouin tribes of the North mentioned in paragraph (j) of Article 25 of the Provisional Election Law, No. 24 of 1960, who were effectively living in the territories annexed to the Kingdom in 1930.

This 1954 Nationality Law predates the migration of Palestinians who fled from the Gaza Strip to Jordan after 1967. These ex-Gazans carried Egyptian travel documents, as the Gaza Strip was annexed by Egypt between 1949 and 1967. In 1968 Jordan provided ex-Gazans who had migrated to the country with travel and identity papers to allow them to travel (El-Abed, Husseini and Al Rantawi, 2014). As Jordan is a signatory to the Casablanca Protocol (1965), it is required to provide Palestinians residing in host countries
‘upon [their] request, [with] valid travel documents … [moreover,] [t]he concerned authorities must, wherever they be, issue these documents or renew them without delay’ (Articles 4 and 5).

According to the Jordanian Nationality Law of 1954, ‘[s]ubject to the approval of the Minister of Internal Affairs, a foreign woman who marries a Jordanian national may acquire Jordanian nationality if she so wishes by making a written statement to that effect: (a) Three years after her marriage if she is an Arab; (b) Five years after her marriage if she is not an Arab’ (Article 8.1).

For eligibility for naturalisation, the Law states that ‘[a]ny person other than a Jordanian who is not incapable by law may apply to the Council of Ministers for grant of a certificate of Jordanian naturalization if: (1) He [or she] has been regularly resident in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan for a period of four years preceding the date of his application; (2) he intends to reside in the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan’ (Article 12.1, 12.2)\(^{10}\).

Today, the majority of Palestinians living in Jordan have either temporary or permanent Jordanian passports. Passports are issued to three categories of people who are of Palestinian descent:

1. All Palestinians who were in Jordan before the war of 1967, as well as those originally from the West Bank and unable to live there. They are entitled to full

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\(^{10}\) In the case of women, she make a written request to become naturalised. She is entitled to apply three years after the marriage to a Jordanian man if she has an Arab nationality, and five years if she has a non-Arab nationality (See Figure 5.1 5.1 Law on Naturalisation of Foreign Women Married to Jordanians).
citizenship rights and have five-year passports and national identities.

2. West Bankers who do not carry travel documents. Although granted five-year passports, they are not given citizenship rights as they do not have identity national numbers and passports are only used for travelling.

3. Palestinian refugees of ex-Gazan origin. They are granted two-year temporary passports that are only used for travelling. They are not entitled to full citizenship rights as they do not have national identity numbers. Although official statistics claim that there are around 150,000 ex-Gazans in Jordan, unofficial sources place this number up to 300,000.

Table 2.3 in Appendix 2 (pages 397-399) provides an overview of categories of Palestinians in Jordan by their origin and the types of citizenship.
The three main groups of people in this study are Transjordanians, Palestinian Jordanians from 1948 and ex-Gazan women and men. While Transjordanians and Palestinian Jordanians with five-year passports and national identity numbers are by law entitled to full access to public services, ex-Gazans with two-year temporary Jordanian passports are not. The latter group of Palestinian refugees is an extremely vulnerable population as they have few civil rights. They are required to pay taxes like Jordanian citizens, but are considered to be Arab foreigners when it comes to acquiring their rights and entitlements (El-Abed, 2005).

Ex-Gazans with two-year temporary passports and without national identity numbers are Palestinians who were forced to flee from Gaza to Jordan in 1967. They are not entitled to full Jordanian citizenship and their temporary passports serve as travel and identity documents, as well as permits to reside in the country (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2014). According to Human Rights Watch (2010), passport renewals cost less for full Jordanian citizenship holders than for those without citizenship.

There is also a group of ex-Gazans in Jordan considered to be stateless as they have had their temporary passports revoked. These include individuals who joined army factions abroad in the 1990s and who when returning to Jordan had their travel documents revoked. There were also cases reported of ex-Gazans having their temporary citizenship revoked because they refused to cooperate with state security. These ex-Gazans are considered stateless and do not have any form of legal verification (El-Abed, 2012). Another marginalised
population is ex-Gazans carrying Egyptian travel documents, which are used solely as travel documents.

**Rights to Employment for Citizens and Non-Citizens**

According to the Jordanian Constitution (1952), ‘Jordanians shall be equal before the law [and] there shall be no discrimination between them as regards to their rights and duties on grounds of race, language and religion’ (Article 6). Moreover, the Constitution highlights that ‘[w]ork is the right of every citizen, and the state shall provide opportunities for work to all citizens’ (Article 23i) (See Appendix 1, Table 1.2(11), page 391 for the link to the Jordanian Constitution).

In the case of foreign employment, this is governed by the country's Law No. 24 of 1973 on Residence and Foreigners (See Appendix 1, Table 1.2(12), page 391 for the Law). Under this law, entry into Jordan is permitted for holders of valid passports or travel documents and with the required visas. Entry of citizens from several nationalities, including from Europe and the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (CCG), is facilitated, as they are permitted to obtain a Jordanian visa at the border (Migration Policy Centre, 2013).

Foreigners with travel documents issued by the Jordanian government are also allowed to reside in Jordan (Article 4a). Stateless persons and refugees with valid travel documents are permitted residence in the country on the condition that they have visas that allow them to go back to the country that has issued them
these documents (Article 4b). Furthermore, the law also states that ‘international laissez-passer shall be issued to the following categories of persons: 1. Stateless persons and persons with no established nationality; 2. Refugees recognized as such; 3. Persons with an established nationality but who cannot obtain travel documents from their own country or from their country of residence for reasons to be appreciated by the competent Jordanian authorities; 4. The wives and minor children under 16 years of age of persons in the above categories, who do not have an established nationality’ (Article 4c).

Any foreigner wishing to reside in the country is required to acquire a residence permit, which needs to be renewed annually. The renewal fee for a residence permit is JD10 during the first year of issuance, after which it becomes JD 6 per annum (Article 23). In the event that a residence permit is not renewed, the foreigner is required to leave the country on the date of its expiry (Article 18).

Foreigners who have legally resided in Jordan for 10 years are entitled to five-year residence permits (Article 22.b). Foreign citizens are, however, not permitted to access public services such as healthcare and education. They are allowed to own property to reside in ‘upon ministerial authorization with reciprocity condition’ (Migration Policy Centre, 2013: 8) and can sell property to a Jordanian citizen only after three years from having purchased it. As for Arab citizens, the Law of Leasing and Selling Immovable Properties to Non-Jordanians and Juristic Persons No. 24 of 2002 states that they are exempt from the law of reciprocity and they are
also entitled to purchase and invest in immovable properties (Migration Policy Centre, 2013).

Jordanian employers and companies seeking to recruit foreigners in the country are required to provide them with residence permits (Article 16). The law states that foreigners with contracts and secure and legal sources of income may be granted residence permits (Articles 26a and 26b). Moreover, individuals may ‘come to Jordan to invest capital in commercial or industrial ventures approved by the Ministry for National Economy’ (Article 26e). The law also exempts Arab nationals from paying residence permit fees ‘on the basis of reciprocity’ (Article 30) (Migration Policy Centre, 2013).

Foreigners entering the country legally who do not have valid residence permits are required to pay a monthly fine of JD10 for their overstay, and those who do have to renew them for JD15 per month (Article 34a and 34b). Jordanian employers failing to issue residence permits for their foreign employees are also ‘liable to a fine of not less than 50 dinars and not more than 75 dinars for each illegal worker thus employed’ (Article 35) (Migration Policy Centre, 2013).

The sections above explored the status of Jordan in relation to international and regional human rights instruments concerned with refugees in general and Palestinians in particular, highlighting unequal rights to access further education and employment citizens and non-citizens. It then looked at issues related to citizenship in Jordan, including the types of citizenship available to Palestinians and their corresponding entitlements. Issues related to employment
Further Education in Jordan

Both Transjordanians and Palestinian Jordanians with full citizenship are entitled to free basic and secondary-level education in government academic institutions. Moreover, in Jordan, education up to the 10th grade is compulsory (El-Abed, 2014). In the case of Palestinian Jordanians, those who are refugees have even wider access, as they are entitled to register for private, public and UNRWA academic institutions. Figures from 2011 show that 57 per cent of schools in Jordan were under the authority of the Ministry of Education (2013), 1 per cent were owned by other government entities, 3 per cent by UNRWA and 39 per cent by private academic institutions (El-Abed, 2014).

UNRWA schools, however, offer education up to the 10th grade. After completing 10th grade, students can continue at secondary school by enrolling in public or private academic institutions. They can also pursue vocational education through the 42 government and 2 UNRWA vocational training centres in Jordan. (See Appendix 2, Table 2.4, page 400 for the structure and organisation of the educational system in Jordan).
UNRWA also suffers from a lack of funding, which has presented challenges in meeting the needs of its beneficiaries. Its cash deficit reached US$65 million at the start of 2014. Moreover, its budget for 2013 reached US$675 million, of which 50 per cent was allocated to its education programmes (UNRWA, 2015e). UNRWA’s educational services have declined in quality as a result of reduced funding and there are reduced training opportunities for teachers and reductions in salaries. Classes also became larger in size, sometimes reaching over 55 students per class. Moreover, reduced salaries are considered to have de-motivated teachers and affected the quality of teaching (El-Abed, 2014).

A study migration and the reproduction of poverty indicated that the educational attainment of the Jordanian host population was higher than that of Palestinian refugees with Jordanian citizenship living in camps (Khawaja, 2003). Moreover, Jordanian children living outside camps were more likely to stay in school longer than Palestinian refugee camp-dwellers (Tiltnes and Zhang, 2013).

During the last two years of secondary level education students are required to take a national high school matriculation examination (‘Tauğîhî). These grades are vital for entrance to further education, be it community college or university, as well as the specialisations that they can enter.

Matriculation has different subjects and is similar in breadth to the International Baccalaureate. Student eligibility to obtain a place at a public university is defined by the average grade that they obtain in these subjects. The required average grades for admission to
universities vary in each department, and also vary each year depending on the highest grades obtained. However, as an example, the range for scientific departments is most often between 80 and 96 per cent. Meanwhile, for other departments, such as the social sciences, it can be between 65 and 85 per cent. The lowest average grade for being accepted to a government higher institution is 60 per cent. Those who do not produce adequate grades are obliged to either apply either to community colleges or to private higher education (El-Abed, 2014).

All Jordanian students who wish to pursue a higher education are entitled to compete for a place at a government university, with eligibility depending on the average grade requirements. During the 1970s, a university quota system was set up by the government, which worked in line with the free competition route. This quota system allowed students to compete for government university places through what is known as the *Makrumāt Malakiya* (‘King’s Favours’), which was a quota granted from the Royal Court to university applicants. The second quota that students could compete for under this system was open to ‘children of military/army and police officers, people resident in northern, western or southern deserts (remote areas) and poor areas (poverty pockets)’ (El-Abed, 2014: 253). The quota system has been described as a form of ‘affirmative action for Transjordanians at the expense of Palestinians’ (Reiter, 2002: 151). The result of this system is that only 20 per cent can freely compete through their grades. There is also a quota specifically for Palestinian refugee camp-dwellers, which allocates
350 seats in government universities to them. This quota system does not, however, equate to scholarships (El-Abed, 2014).

The growing demand for higher education has pushed the government to create evening courses. It also set up a private education system (*Mawāzi*) within public universities for students who do not succeed in competing for government seats (El-Abed, 2014: 258). The cost of this route to higher education is twice that which students accepted to public universities are required to pay.

With regard to ex-Gazans without full Jordanian citizenship, their access to tertiary education is limited, as they are required to compete for an already-restricted number of seats available to Arabs. Moreover, tuition fees are paid in foreign currency (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2014). According to Human Rights Watch, access to higher education for ex-Gazans ‘may be out of reach due to vastly higher costs for non-nationals’ (2010: 3), which is the equivalent of twice that of a Jordanian citizen. Moreover, their access to scholarships in order to pursue higher education in public universities is also limited, as they are, in most cases, not eligible to compete for them (El-Abed, 2012). For private tertiary education, a security clearance is usually required from the General Intelligence Department (GID) to be permitted to enrol in these institutions (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2014).

**General Statistics on the Education Sector in Jordan**

Jordan has one of the highest literacy rates in the Middle East among females aged 15 to 24 (Abu Jaber, 2014). Moreover, females
obtain higher grades than males in almost all stages of educational attainment (Abu Jaber, 2014). According to the latest available national figures, the literacy rate for females and males in Jordan was 89.2 per cent for females, and 96.3 per cent for males (92.8 per cent both together) (United Nations Statistics Division, 2013). The net primary school enrolment rate for Jordan was 97 per cent in 2012, whereas among other Arab countries it was 89 per cent. As for the gender parity index for boys and girls between the age of 6 and 14, this was 1 per cent in 2012. Meanwhile, net secondary school enrolment rate reached 88 per cent in 2011, whereas in Arab countries it did not exceed 77 per cent (Brookings Institution, 2014). The gender parity index in secondary level enrolment for boys and girls in 2012 was 1.1. As for the gender parity index in tertiary level enrolment for both sexes, this reached 103.5 in 2009 (United Nations Statistics Division, 2013). One of the challenges that Jordan faces is the large variation in learning outcomes between population groups from different socio-economic backgrounds. Statistics from 2009 indicate that 57 per cent of females from wealthier households had a level two qualification or higher in mathematics, whereas for females from poorer households this did not exceed 16 per cent (Education for All Global Monitoring Report, 2012).

A study conducted in 2014 showed that the highest employee rates amongst Jordanians aged 15 in 2013 was amongst those who had less than a secondary level education (reaching 48.9 per cent). As for the distribution of unemployment in Jordan, the highest percentage of unemployed persons for Jordanians aged 15 and
above was for those who had less than a secondary education, as well as those with a bachelor’s degree and above (41.3 per cent and 39.8 per cent respectively) (Badran, 2014). With regard to vocational training in Jordan, it is estimated that less than 2 per cent of school graduates choose to enrol in vocational occupations. The low interest in enrolling in technical vocational education and training (TVET) is linked to several factors, namely the ‘absence of counselling, lack of encouragement from parents and family, peer pressure, biased university admission criteria, the declining value of work and wages, and the influx of migrant workers who have replaced Jordanian labour or skilled talent in many fields and sectors’ (UNDP, 2013a: 10).

In the case of higher education, figures from 2012/2013 show that a total of 310,606 students were enrolled in private and public community colleges and universities (See Appendix 2, Table 2.5, page 401 for student enrolment in higher education in Jordan). As for graduate student enrolment in 2013, the highest percentage was for master’s degree holders, followed by those with Higher Diplomas and PhDs (15 and 14 per cent respectively) (Badran, 2014).

Although gender parity in Jordan has seen great progress – particularly at the primary and secondary school levels and in urban areas – this has not been translated into women’s participation in the country’s labour market, which is the topic of the next section of this chapter.
The Public, Private and Informal Sectors in Jordan

Although female education has progressed, this has not been translated into women’s participation in Jordan’s labour market. Of the 2 million eligible workforce in the country, 3.5 million are inactive, of which 54 per cent are identified as ‘stay at home females with a secondary education degree or less in education, employment or training’ (Abu Jaber, 2014: 4).

According to the ILO, the majority of unemployed young Jordanians have a minimum of a secondary education (Messkoub, 2008). It is also estimated that 24.3 per cent of women with bachelor’s degrees are unemployed, a rate that is greater than men of the same educational attainment (Messkoub, 2008).

Scholars such as Al-Qudsi (1995) have highlighted that women with higher fertility and birth rates are less likely to participate in the labour market. Comparisons of economic activity by gender show that unemployment is generally greater for women than for men at all educational levels. Moreover, the participation of women with secondary or lower educational levels in the labour force is very low.

The public sector is the largest area of employment in Jordan. It estimated that 37 per cent of Jordanians employed in the country are in the public sector (Saif, 2012: 8). The advantages of public sector employment include ‘job stability and regular income … [s]ocial security, healthcare and access to emergency loans’ (El-Abed, 2014: 305). There are no statistics available to compare the employment of Transjordanians with Palestinian Jordanians in the
public sector (El-Abed, 2014). Although by law all Jordanian citizens are entitled to equal access to public sector employment, affirmative action exists that works against Palestinian Jordanians (Reiter, 2002). Moreover, ex-Gazans without full citizenship are not entitled to work in the public sector, except in jobs that are unskilled (Human Rights Watch, 2010).

All those working in the public sector are governed by the Civil Service Statute, which was modified in 2007 (See Appendix 1, Table 1.2(13), page 391 for link to the Civil Service By-Law). The national constitution states that ‘[e]very Jordanian shall be entitled to be appointed to public office, whether such appointment is temporary or permanent, shall be made on the basis of merit and qualifications’ (CSS, Section 22, 2007).

The Jordanian Civil Service Bureau (CSB) is responsible for selecting and employing potential candidates. Quotas are placed to provide employment opportunities to disadvantaged segments of society. These include children of martyrs, families receiving subsidies from the National Aid Fund because of their poor economic status, people with disabilities, and families comprising more than three unemployed members who have completed college or higher academic levels (Aeberhard, 2001). In actuality, recruitment into the Jordanian civil service is based on one’s ‘nationality and attainment of 18 years of age, physical and mental fitness, lack of convictions and good behaviour and conduct’ (Aeberhard, 2001: 20).

The military is a popular employment sector within the public sector, particularly among men, and the benefits are many. However
statistics on the number of Palestinian Jordanians employed in the army and the positions that they occupy are not available. Unofficial figures, however, have estimated that this is around 2 per cent, of which most are concentrated in menial jobs such as those in ‘gendarmerie, civil defence and the police department’ (El-Abed, 2014: 300).

These include secure jobs and salaries, as well as ‘healthcare and social security for the entire family; state-subsidised (essentially free) higher education (for employees of the military and their families through university admission quotas); and government-subsidised housing’ (El-Abed, 2014: 300). Moreover, the military is also advantageous to work in because many who retire at the age of 30 or 40 years can seek other means of earning a living while obtaining their pension (Baylouny, 2008).

It is estimated that 22 per cent of the Jordanian labour force participates in the private sector (El-Abed, 2014). Exploitation is a common issue of concern among women and men engaged in this sector, which makes government jobs more sought after. A report conducted by Solidarity Centre (2005) highlighted that long hours and forced overtime are problematic issues prevalent in Jordan’s private sector. Moreover, according to a survey conducted in 2007, average working hours in the private sector were 31 per cent longer than those in the public sector (Rahahleh, 2012).

Although, Jordanian law states that there is no limit to the number of hours that workers can work each week, this must be according to their will and paid for according to the law (ILO, IFC,
2012). However, according to Karkkainen, (2011) the average working hours each day – for non-managerial employees – in the private and public sectors is eight hours and seven hours respectively. Moreover, working hours per week cannot reach above 48 hours in the private sector – not including breaks – and 35 hours in the public sector (See Appendix 1, Table 1.2(15), page 391 for the link to the Jordanian labour law).

The law forbids women to work between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. with the exception of some occupations, such as those working in hotels, airports and hospitals (Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and ILO, 2012). Moreover, women are prohibited from working in specific sectors and they are not permitted to do certain kinds of activities in the mining, shipping and foundry sectors. Pregnant women are also not legally permitted to work in occupations that might pose a risk to their foetuses (ILO and ICF, 2012).

The minimum wage in Jordan is JD190 dinars per month (Social Security Programs Throughout the World (SSPTW): Asia and the Pacific, 2014). Average wages were 22 per cent higher in the public sector than in the private sector in 2009 (Rahahleh, 2012). However, average wages for managerial positions in the private sector were on average 30 per cent higher than in the public sector. Public sector pay is higher for both women and men with a secondary level education or lower (Dougherty, 2010). Professional salaries were 16 per cent higher in the public sector. With regard to bureaucratic and administrative positions, average wages were similar in both the private and public sectors (Rahahleh, 2012: 3).
This can be explained by the ‘high level of incentives, premiums and bonuses which public sector employees are entitled to’ (Rahahleh, 2012:19).

A gender gap in salaries exists, favouring males in both the private and public sectors, with greater gender disparities in the private sector. On average, private and public sector pay is more or less the same for women with university degrees. However, pay is higher in the private sector for men with university degrees than in the public sector. Moreover, the distribution of pay is broader in the private sector for both men and women (Dougherty, 2010). The gender pay gap for professionals in the private sector is 69 per cent, whereas in the public sector it is 26 per cent. It should also be noted that 47.1 per cent of women who are employed are professionals (Sweidan, 2012).

Although the gender pay gap in Jordan is good when compared to other countries that are of middle-income levels, women with greater skills are more likely to be paid considerately less than men (Dougherty, 2010). Wage discrimination also exists in the public sector, and under the Jordanian Civil Service Regulations (No. 30 of 2007), only married men are directly entitled to a family allowance. Women are only entitled to the allowance if they are widows, if their husbands have disabilities or if they can prove that they are the main breadwinners of the family.

The public sector dominates the electricity, water supply, education and healthcare sectors in Jordan. It is estimated that public sector employees make up 75 per cent of those employed in
the education sector, over 50 per cent of those in the healthcare sector and more than ‘80 per cent of employees ‘in the electricity, water and natural gas sectors’ (Rahahleh, 2012: 17). Moreover, it is estimated that up to 75 per cent of women work in the education, manufacturing and healthcare sectors. There is also a significant difference in earnings between women and men in these sectors, even when skill level is taken into account. For example, male professionals earn 33 per cent more than women of the same skill level.

With regard to gender discrimination, Jordan does not have provisions against gender discrimination in its constitution. However, the labour law has protective measures and specific conditions for women’s employment.

Some of the main challenges in Jordan’s public sector include the following: its large size; issues concerning wages and pensions; poor promotion prospects for middle-level employees; and outdated skills of public sector employees. At a management level, the study highlighted that there is ‘poor coordination between responsible bodies’ (Aeberhard, 2001: 45) involved in the country’s civil service sector.

While Jordanian citizens are by law entitled to equal access to employment in the private sector, for ex-Gazans it is more difficult because employers often request, ‘proof of [Jordanian] nationality … or clearance by the GID [General Intelligence Department]’ (Human Rights Watch, 2010: 52). Ex-Gazans are also prohibited from working in specific professions such as law and dentistry. This is
because membership of the professional association specific to these specialisations is obligatory; however, this is only open to Jordanian citizens. The Ministry of Labour (MOL) has not played a significant role in the labour market because labour policies have not placed adequate focus on the MOL’s mandate, nor does it have the capacity to do so (Karkkainen, 2011). All employees (except for domestic, agricultural and unpaid workers) working within the formal sector are required to adhere to the 1996 Labour Code.

The situation for Palestinian camp-dwellers is, however, different as the state permits them to set up their own businesses within these confines. Seeking economic opportunities outside Jordan is also problematic for ex-Gazans because of the difficulties they face in travelling abroad. These difficulties include issues such as obtaining ‘visas, recognition of their travel documents, and passport renewals’ (Al Quds Centre for Political Studies, 2014: 29). According to Human Rights Watch, obtaining visas for many Gulf states requires clearance from the GID, which is only given to Jordanian citizens (2010). In the case of ex-Gazans who have had their temporary passports revoked or did not renew them, most do not seek opportunities abroad, so as to conceal their status from authorities (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2014). Often, ex-Gazans are taken advantage of by private employers because of their lack of citizenship. Examples include having low pay, long working hours and and not being given health insurance during employment (Human Rights Watch, 2010).
Article 7 of Law Number 47/2006 relates to the purchase and sale of immovable property to foreigners. It states that only with a permit from the Jordanian Cabinet are non-Jordanians permitted to rent property in Jordan for a period longer than three years. In the case of ex-Gazans without full citizenship, Article 8 of Law Number 47/2006 requires them to get a permit from the Ministry of Finance, which in turn relies on security approvals from the Ministry of the Interior, making it more difficult for them to obtain approvals than foreigners. As a result, ex-Gazans cannot legally buy property in Jordan, which means that they cannot purchase homes to live in or shops to earn a living from. According to Human Rights Watch, the Jordanian law forbids them from ‘register[ing] a car or business, or liquidat[ing] their investments’ (2010: 54). One of the ways to address this problem has been by registering property with a Jordanian partner who would then give an ex-Gazan power of attorney that would be non-cancellable. However, a law was passed in 2006 that made it illegal for Jordanian citizens to give power of attorney to individuals who are not Jordanian citizens (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2014).

The informal sector is a major source of income for women and men in Jordan, particularly those who are living in economic hardship. Unlike the private sector, the informal economy denotes to economic activities taking place in a country, which are unregulated by the state, and this includes issues related to taxation and monitoring (The World Bank, 2013). Employee rights and duties are more protected in the private sector, whereas individuals working in
the informal sector are more vulnerable to exploitation in issues such as working hours, wages, dismissal and paid and non-paid benefits. A more detailed definition of the informal sector was provided during the 15\textsuperscript{th} International Conference of Labour Statisticians (ILO, 1992). The resolution declares that:

‘The informal sector may be broadly characterised as consisting of units engaged in the production of goods or services with the primary objective of generating employment and incomes to the persons concerned. These units typically operate at a low level of organisation, with little or no division between labour and capital as factors of production and on a small scale. Labour relations – where they exist – are based mostly on casual employment, kinship or personal and social relations rather than contractual arrangements with formal guarantees’ (Paragraph 5(1)).

The ICLS definition of the informal sector is internationally recognised, but it does not include informal employment. Informal employment refers to individuals who take part in informal work outside the informal sector (ILO, 1992). The informal sector in this study refers to both the informal economy and informal employment.

A study conducted by the UNDP in 2013 highlighted that 44 per cent of the country’s labour force was working in the informal sector. Of these, ‘26 per cent of informal workers were in the private sector, 17 per cent were self-employed and 1 per cent worked (in family businesses) without wages’ (El-Abed, 2014: 314). This sector comprises individuals who cannot ‘access primary (regular wage jobs
that are taxed and regulated) or secondary work (lower wage jobs in the service sector)' (El-Abed, 2014: 314).

**Conclusion**

This chapter has provided a description of the historical, political, economic and social context of protracted refugees living in Jordan, with a focus on gender and citizenship and how they influence livelihood strategies of women and men through further education and employment opportunities. Data show existing inequalities in accessing further education and employment opportunities for protracted Palestinian refugees and their host population, and for women and men. Furthermore, national data on Jordan are highly politicised. Consequently, there is a lack of disaggregated data that can facilitate a better understanding of the intersectionality of gender and citizenship in shaping opportunities to further education and employment in Jordan and specifically in the case of protracted Palestinian refugees. This thesis seeks to examine the intersectionality of gender and citizenship in the livelihood strategies of protracted refugees through a case study on Palestinians in Kafa, Jordan. The next chapter will focus on the research design and methods of this research study.
Chapter Three: Methodology and Methods

Introduction

This chapter sets out the methodology and methods used in this research. The first section sets out the research aims and questions, as well as the methodology and study design. An overview of the research process is followed discussing some of the challenges and lessons learned, followed by a section on the sampling strategy and different methods used for data collection and analysis. The final section of this chapter is a discussion of the ethical considerations, researcher reflexivity and positionality.

The research aims to contribute to understandings of the intersectionality of gender and citizenship on the livelihood strategies of protracted refugees through a case study of Palestinians in Jordan. The three research questions are:

- How does the intersectionality of gender and citizenship shape access to further education for protracted Palestinian refugees in Jordan?
- How does the intersectionality of gender and citizenship influence employment opportunities for protracted Palestinian refugees in Jordan?
- How does the intersectionality of gender and citizenship influence the agency of protracted Palestinian refugees in Jordan in developing livelihood strategies?
This chapter begins by describing the research paradigm of the thesis, in order to better comprehend the study’s objectives, aims and methods.

**Research Methodology**

In this research, qualitative research methods were chosen that seek to better understand the experiences of protracted Palestinian refugee women and men with different forms of inclusionary and exclusionary citizenship within a specific context. Moreover, qualitative research was best suited because this study aimed to gain a better understanding of protracted refugee livelihood strategies, through interpreting the meanings that research participants gave to their experiences of further education and employment (Merriam and Tisdell, 2015). Qualitative research also fits well with an intersectionality approach, because it allows the researcher to carry out a nuanced and in-depth examination of individual experiences within a specific setting (Trahan, 2011; Huberman et al., 1994). Both qualitative research and intersectionality focus on bringing out the voices of those who are unheard and marginalised. They also recognise the importance of looking at power relations between the researcher and the research participants (Hankivsky, 2014). Furthermore, qualitative research allows the researcher to pinpoint intersections of categories of difference that are of high significance within a specific setting (Hunting, 2014). It also facilitates the discovery of both anticipated and unanticipated findings about people’s lived experiences.
**Research Paradigm**

Having a clear understanding of the paradigm that underpins a study is important because it gives the reader insight into the researcher’s beliefs and views of the world as it is and as it should be (Thomas, 2010). Furthermore, it allows the reader to better understand a study’s ‘purpose, goals, methods and procedures’ (Rasmussen, 2012: 101). This study adopts an interpretative paradigm that is conceptually framed by intersectionality and structuration theory, as set out in the literature review.

The research has an interpretive epistemological stance, as it seeks to understand people’s experiences in their access to further education and employment, and how these are influenced by gender and citizenship. Interpretivist research ‘looks for culturally derived and historically situated interpretations of the social life-world’ (Crotty 1998: 67) and places importance on empathising with research participants (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000; Gair, 2012; Mattelmaki, Vaajakallio and Kokinen, 2014). An interpretive research design allows researchers to fully explore the opinions and experiences of research participants, by observing and conversing with them in their natural environments (Bryman, 2008). Interpretative research rejects the idea of a single objective truth to knowledge. Rather, it is a process whereby meaning is produced by people through observation, interpretation and inferences (Thomas, 2010). The naturalistic nature of interpretivism means that researching people is
best carried out within their own natural context (Guba and Lincoln, 1994).

**Intersectionality**

Intersectionality is another conceptual approach adopted in this research. Intersectionality, rather than other feminist approaches was chosen, because this study looks at social categories of difference in a mutually constitutive manner, instead of being hierarchical and exclusive (Nash, 2008). Moreover, it recognises the fluid relationship of ‘categories of difference’ and the influence of individual and institutional variables in shaping systems of oppression and privilege. Applying an intersectional approach, this research looks at ‘within-category differences’ by focusing on protracted Palestinian refugee women and men in a heterogeneous manner. It also acknowledges the complexity in understanding causalities between social markers and protracted refugee women’s experiences of oppression and access to justice (Hancock, 2007; Simien, 2007).

Intersectionality is a valuable research paradigm when looking at groups with intersecting marginalised attributes, such as protracted refugees, and can bring out the voices of those who are absently ‘unheard’. Furthermore, it allows for a more in-depth analysis of the effectiveness of policies that target vulnerable groups such as protracted refugee women and men. For example, it can provide a better understanding of how people experience discrimination in their daily lives and of the effectiveness of anti-discrimination policies, which is one of the areas of focus in this
thesis (Hernández, 2005). In this study, intersectionality will be used to gain insight on how multiple marginalisations and privileges intersect to shape the experiences of protracted refugee women and men and their agency to develop livelihood strategies.

**Structuration Theory**

Structuration theory is ‘an approach to social theory concerned with the intersection between knowledgeable and capable social agents and the wider social systems and structures in which they are implicated’ (Gregory, 1994: 600). Various scholars have highlighted the benefits of applying structuration theory as a research paradigm in migration. For example, Goss and Lindquist (1995) refer to structuration theory in their study on migration in Philippines. They describe migrants as conscious and knowledgeable beings, manoeuvring between existing structures that have rules. They argue that it is through networks that migrants are able to choose whether or not to migrate, depending on the option perceived as best for them. Another study that looked at the structuration of patriarchy and family migration highlighted ‘the duality of structure in the migration decision making process’ (Wolfel, 2005: 2). The study also emphasised the importance of focusing on social structures and individual reactions in order to have a gendered perspective on migration.

Other advocates of structuration theory highlight the significance of ‘unintended consequences’ in the choices that migrant women and men make (Boyle et al., 2014). So, for example,
patriarchal structures are reinforced in society when a woman migrates with the intention of improving the situation of the male household and disregards her own. Applying structuration theory as a research paradigm in this study means that emphasis was placed on understanding protracted refugee situations on a societal and individual level. Structuration theory sees individuals as active agents that negotiate with and challenge structural barriers in order to develop livelihood strategies. They can also submit to structural challenges, depending on the intersecting social markers that define them at that point. Another key issue in structuration theory is the notion of ‘unintended consequences’, which has been reflected in this study through institutionalised structures and individual practices that result in the reproduction of patriarchy in society. While protective policies towards women in the labour market may aim to secure their rights, these may not be the outcome of such policies. Structuration theory also believes that all agents have a degree of power. In this study, protracted refugees are shown to exhibit agency by the livelihood strategies that they develop, such as seeking better opportunities abroad and gaining access to wastah. Nevertheless, their agency varies according to the fluid interplay of the social markers that define them. In this study, routinised practices such as institutionalised discrimination were recognised to influence protracted refugee women and men’s access to further education and employment (Wolfel, 2005).

This study has chosen Giddon’s theory of structuration over other sociological modes of perception, such as Archer’s
‘morphogenetic approach’, because it does not view structures as pre-existing and autonomous to agency (King, 1998). Rather, it sees social structures as a product of ‘social practices across space and time’ (Giddens, 1984: 2). This study supports the notion that social structures cannot exist without the interrelations of individuals in their everyday lives and does not see structures as external to agency as Archer does in her morphogenetic approach.

This section has provided an overview of the philosophical assumptions adopted in this thesis. The following section discusses the research design with a rationale for its selection. The section also provides an explanation to justify the selection of the case study site.

**Research Design: A Single Embedded Case Study**

A research design can be defined as the skeleton of a research study, which outlines to the reader how the research is going to be carried out (Thomas, 2010). A single embedded case study design was chosen for this research because it seeks to understand the varying experiences of protracted Palestinian refugees through the interpretation of their perspectives and activities within a specific setting (Gillham, 2000). The case study focuses on Transjordanians, Palestinian Jordanians, and ex-Gazans in Kafa, Jordan. Because of the political sensitivity of the topic under study, and in order to protect the participants involved, the city and the refugee camps have been
anonymised (See Appendix 3, Table 3.1, page 402 for a description of the main pseudonyms).

While case studies can be applied in a positivist paradigm, one is used here within an interpretive paradigm because it allows for the beliefs and experiences of research participants to be sought and understood in their natural environment (Luck et al., 2006). A case study design was believed to be most suited for this thesis because it is a powerful tool for understanding diverse experiences and perceptions of women and men within real-life settings, and in situations where what is researched is highly dependent and linked to the context in which it takes place (Yin, 2003).

Many feminist scholars have advocated for the use of case studies in research because of their capacity to ‘vividly convey the dimensions of a social phenomenon’ (Reinharz, 1992: 174) through multiple sources of evidence. Moreover, case studies allow comparative analysis to be carried out within specific contextual settings (Yin, 2003). Rather than aiming to reach generalisations, case studies focus on ‘specificity, exceptions and completeness’ (Reinharz, 1992: 174), which according to feminists allows greater inclusivity of vulnerable groups, such as women.

A single, rather than multiple, case study was chosen, because this study does not aim to generalise its findings (Yin, 2003). Instead, it aims to generate rich and in-depth data about the livelihood strategies of protracted refugee women and men and the influence that gender and citizenship has in shaping their experiences. The value of the study is in the rich content and
analysis, which in turn may be of interest to future research in similar contexts of protracted refugees (Yin, 2003).

This case study is descriptive and interpretative (Yin, 2009), as it describes and tries to explain the intersection of gender and citizenship in shaping the experiences of protracted refugees in accessing further education and employment. A single embedded case study design was chosen because it targets a variety of research participants, including policy makers and training and employment service providers, as well as employers and employed and unemployed Transjordanians, Palestinian Jordanians and ex-Gazans in Kafa.

A justification for this study's research design has been presented in the section above. The section that follows will provide a brief description of the site selected for this single case study, as well as of the camps embedded in it.

**Selection of Case Study Site: Kafa**

The city of Kafa, located in the north of Jordan (See Chapter Two: Setting for more demographic data on this city) was selected as the site for this case study. It was chosen because it encompasses Alpha and Beta camps, which are mainly inhabited by Palestinian and ex-Gazan refugees with different citizenship statuses. Having two camps within the case study site allowed for comparisons to be made between refugees with different citizenship statuses residing within
either camp and outside the camp settings amongst the host population in Kafa.

The population of Kafa Governorate, according to the latest national figures from 2010 is 183,400, of which 89,100 (48.5 per cent) are female and 94,300 (51.5 per cent) are male (Jordanian Department of Statistics, 2013a). The percentage distribution of Jordanian women in Kafa Governorate who have never been married is 35.8 per cent, as contrasted with the national rate, which is 33.4 per cent. In the case of divorced women, the percentage in Kafa Governorate is similar to national levels (1.4 per cent). As for married women, the figure is 55.8 per cent in Kafa Governorate, a rate that is 1.4 per cent lower than national figures (Jordanian Department of Statistics, 2013b).

Student enrolment in higher diplomas, master’s degrees and PhD-level education is significantly higher for men than women in Kafa Governorate (Jordanian Department of Statistics, 2013c). The gender gap is 100 per cent for students in vocational education (both industrial and agricultural streams) (Jordanian Department of Statistics, 2013d). As for graduates, the percentage of men who complete degrees in scientific specialisations is significantly higher than women. The difference is greatest in engineering and communication, where, respectively, 93.5 per cent and 93.3 per cent of graduates are men, and only 6.5 per cent and 6.7 per cent are women (Jordanian Department of Statistics, 2013e).

Unemployment in Kafa Governorate was 13.3 per cent in 2010 (Saidi and Qudah, 2012), a percentage point higher than the national
rate, which was 12.5 per cent in that year (Al-Sarairah, 2014). However, it rose to 12.9 per cent in the first quarter of 2015 (Jordanian Department of Statistics, 2015a)\(^{11}\). With regard to the economic activity of women in Kafa, it is estimated that 52.9 per cent work in the education sector, a percentage that is higher than the national figure by 11.2 per cent. Women are also economically active in jobs related to human health and social work, with rates reaching 18.9 per cent, also higher than national figures by 4.3 per cent (Jordanian Department of Statistics, 2013f). When considering occupations, the highest percentage of women in Kafa Governorate and the Kingdom as a whole work as professionals, reaching 61 per cent and 57.4 per cent respectively (Jordanian Department of Statistics, 2013g).

When looking at educational levels and economic activity, the highest percentage of employed and unemployed women in Kafa Governorate were bachelor’s degree holders. Figures from 2013 also showed that 77.4 per cent of women with bachelor’s degrees were unemployed, whereas 53.4 per cent were employed (Jordanian Department of Statistics, 2013h). As for women’s marital status and their economic activity in Kafa Governorate, figures show that married females had the highest employment rate (71.2 per cent) as well as source of income (75.1 per cent). Women who were never married were also more likely to be unemployed than those who

\(^{11}\) Statistics on the Jordanian Department of Statistics (DOS) website is currently not available because the site has been going through redevelopment. However, a study conducted by Guegnard et al. (2005) placed unemployment in Kafa at 14.5 per cent in 2003 and an article published by the Jordan Times reported that it was 9.8 per cent (2015b).
were married, divorced or widowed (Jordanian Department of Statistics, 2013i).

With regard to household heads and the average annual income of households, this is highest for men who receive wages through employment (reaching JD3,964.40 per annum). Meanwhile, for women the highest is for heads of households who receive transfers income\(^\text{12}\) (amounting to JD2,685.60). Transfer income is also second to highest for men amounting to JD2,106.70 (Jordanian Department of Statistics, 2013j).

According to the Establishment Census of 2006, sole proprietorships made up the highest number of active establishments in Kafa Governorate. Figures also showed that there were only nine cooperatives and non-profit organisations established there during that period. Furthermore, the census indicated that the majority of active establishments in Kafa Governorate were in jobs related to retail trade\(^\text{13}\) (Jordanian Department of Statistics, 2015c).

Both Beta and Alpha camps are located in Kafa Governorate, and encompass an area of 500 Dūnum’ (500000 m\(^2\)) and 750 Dūnum’ (750000 m\(^2\)) respectively (Al-Husseini, 2011). Beta and Alpha camps were established as temporary spaces for Palestinian refugees and displaced people in 1967 and 1968 respectively after the Arab–Israeli War. Beta camp was built to accommodate around 11,500 Palestinians, with recent figures showing that it has increased to 21,441 inhabitants. As for Alpha camp, there are over 25,496 inhabitants.

\(^{12}\) Transfer income is money received from the government, often as part of social welfare systems.

\(^{13}\) This excludes motor vehicles and motorcycles, and repair of personal household goods.
UNRWA-registered refugees residing there (Badil Resource Center, 2012). In fact, according to a report conducted by FAFO in 2013\textsuperscript{14}, Alpha camp had the highest percentage of Jordanian Palestinian refugees with two-year temporary Jordanian passports (\textit{See Appendix 3, Figure 3.1 page 402 for more on Palestinian refugees with Jordanian nationalities outside the camps}). Meanwhile, the majority of Beta camp’s residents have full Jordanian citizenship status.

There are four schools in Beta and Alpha camps, as well as a Women’s Programme Centre, a Community-Based Rehabilitation Centre, and a food distribution centre. Beta camp has one health clinic, whereas Alpha camp has two. All of these centres are under the umbrella of UNRWA. In each camp, the highest population group comprises Palestinians between the ages of 26 and 45 (Tiltnes and Zhang, 2013). Moreover, when comparing the average household size between UNRWA camp populations, the highest is in Alpha (5.8) followed by Beta camp (5.3) (\textit{See Appendix 3, Figure 3.2, page 403 for the household sizes of refugee camps}). Crowding is most prevalent in Alpha camp compared with all other Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan, as 24 per cent of households live in homes that

\textsuperscript{14} Data in the report were produced using the following sources: ‘1) a comprehensive survey of the 13 Palestinian refugee camps (April to June 2011); (2) a socio-economic survey of a representative sample of Palestinian refugee households residing inside the camps (September to November 2011); and (3) a socio-economic survey of a representative sample of Palestinian refugee households residing outside the refugee camps (January to February 2012)’ (Tiltnes and Zhang, 2013: 15). Additionally, survey data collected by FAFO during the 1990s were used as well as those from secondary sources.
consist of more than two persons in one room. Comparing Beta\textsuperscript{15} and Alpha camps, while 26 per cent of households in the former camp have four rooms or more, only 20 per cent do so in the latter.

In terms of health indicators, Beta camp has only a 3 per cent incidence of severe chronic health problems (Tiltnes and Zhang, 2013). As for Alpha camp, the sewage is a health hazard to many residents, and, although sewers are undergoing recent renovation, less than 2 per cent of households were connected to them in 2013. Poor health can have a negative impact on individuals’ livelihood strategies (See Appendix 3, Table 3.13, page 404 for labour force participation by health status). Palestinian refugees with two-year temporary passports living outside camps are also reported to have the lowest enrolment rate in health insurance plans. For those residing in Alpha camp, only 17 per cent have health insurance (See Appendix 3, Table 3.14, page 405 for more on the health insurance of Palestinian refugees by Governorate). However, Tiltnes and Zhang (2013) highlight that according to the Jordanian law all ex-Gazans are entitled to health insurance, which they claim may be indicative of a lack of awareness of their entitlements.

With regard to illiteracy rates among Palestinian refugees, levels differ depending on factors such as the geographic location of individuals, as well as their ‘gender, age and socio-economic standing’ (Tiltnes and Zhang, 2013: 137). Complete illiteracy is also

\textsuperscript{15} It was difficult to obtain published and up to date statistics on Beta camp. Therefore, some of the data on Beta camp was gathered retrieved through email correspondence with a Centre manager who was the gatekeeper in Beta camp. The statistics provided were for for 2015.
generally higher among Palestinian camp-dwellers (10 per cent) than for those living outside camps (5 per cent). Moreover, the increase in literacy rates since the 1990s was greater for Palestinian women than for men in and outside camps. The complete illiteracy rate also varies by age and gender, as its prevalence among Palestinian women and men under 45 years of age is very low. Furthermore, the illiteracy rate for Palestinians aged 40 and below is higher among men than women both in and outside camps. Illiteracy is also more prevalent among households with low levels of affluence than among those with higher and more secured economic means. There is also a relationship between the educational background of parents and their children (See Appendix 3, Table 3.15, page 406 for illiteracy rate by educational level of parent).

As for illiteracy rates in Alpha and Beta camps, these are 13.8 per cent for the former and 5 per cent for the latter. In both Beta and Alpha camps, the majority of children attend UNRWA schools rather than private or government academic institutions. Children in Alpha camp have much lower school enrolment rates than other UNRWA camps in Jordan. There are four UNRWA schools in Alpha and Beta camps, with 5,063 students in the former and 3,150 students in the latter16 (Alqatami, 2015).

In the case of technical and vocational education and training (TVET)17 and the vocational pathway in secondary education, both

16 Data on Beta camp were obtained through email correspondence with Centre C manager.
17 All Palestinian refugees inside and outside camps are eligible to enrol in the country’s TVET programme. However, there is a 25 per
are not very popular among Palestinians, either in or outside camps. Nevertheless, enrolment in the TVET programme is more common for men residing in camps, as it is a pathway more likely to be taken by poorer families, because it is less costly than a university degree, as well as among children whose heads of households have below secondary education. Gender also plays a role in the subjects selected within the vocational streams (See Appendix 3, Table 3.16, page 407 for refugee enrolment in TVET programme).

The unemployment rate in Alpha is 16 per cent and in Beta Camp it is 17 per cent (Tltnes and Zhang, 2014). The poverty rate is highest in Alpha camp compared to other UNRWA camps in Jordan. It is estimated that 53 per cent of camp-dwellers in Alpha live below the poverty line (set at the rate of US$1 per individual per day). The rate increases to 64 per cent when the poverty line is considered to be US$2 per individual per day. In fact, it is estimated that 610 families in Alpha camp are registered to receive relief support through the UNRWA social safety net. As for Beta camp, 35 per cent live below the poverty line of US$1 per individual per day (Alqatami, 2015).

In terms of employment for Palestinian women outside camps, the following estimates are provided: 51 per cent of the employed work as professionals and managers; 27 per cent work in occupations that require lower academic qualifications, such as technicians and clerks; 10 per cent work in the services sector or in sales; and 4 per cent take on jobs in crafts and trade work or as

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agricultural workers. As for Palestinian female camp-dwellers, their employment is ‘less often [in] ... white-collar jobs. Instead, a higher proportion of them hold service occupations and jobs selling goods, working in various crafts and trades or as agricultural workers’ (Tiltness and Zhang, 2013: 189).

A large number of women work ‘in the education, health and social service sectors’ (Tiltness and Zhang, 2014: 33). However, their rates are lower than national figures. Fewer Palestinian refugees work in government jobs than those who are not refugees. According to a study conducted in 2012, around 25 per cent of Jordanians and between 8 and 9 per cent of Palestinian refugees were employed in the public sector. This implies that over 40 per cent of Jordanians who are not refugees work in the public sector. Refugees residing inside camps are more likely than those residing outside camps to work in elementary kinds of jobs. The transportation and construction sectors are very popular areas of employment for Palestinian refugees in and outside camps across different levels of education (Tiltnes and Zhang, 2013).

Whereas 17 per cent of Palestinian refugee men residing outside camps work in family businesses, this is only 5 per cent for women. Moreover, 27 per cent of women are employed in jobs in the government, UNRWA or non-governmental organisations, as opposed to 14 per cent of men. It is also estimated that 26 per cent of Palestinian refugees with education beyond secondary levels are employed in government positions. As for Palestinians with secondary and basic education and employment in the public sector,
the corresponding figures are 12 per cent and 10 per cent respectively. Nevertheless, 26 per cent of Palestinian refugees living in and outside camps work in private enterprises. However, pay and benefits differ between camp-dwellers and those living outside camps. Refugees living outside camps are also more likely to receive higher non-pay benefits and have jobs with better work environments. Moreover, women receive much lower pay than men both in and outside camps. The income per hour for refugees living outside camps is also much higher than for camp-dwellers (Tiltnes and Zhang, 2013).

Labour force participation for Palestinian refugee women with an educational level equivalent to or less than a basic level is no more than 5 per cent. Meanwhile, it is twice that for those who have a secondary education and goes up to 26 per cent for those with a university degree. However, women who are well educated have higher unemployment rates. In the case of men, their labour force participation remains similar at all educational levels of attainment. This is linked to their role in society as breadwinners. When looking at factors such as marriage, while labour participation increases by 20 per cent for men following marriage, it drops from 30 per cent for single women to an estimated 5 per cent for those who are married. Nevertheless, those who are married make up 40 per cent of working women. Moreover, the percentage rate of labour force participation is higher (42 per cent) for Palestinian camp-dwellers who are 15 years old or older and have two-year temporary passports without national identity numbers than it is for those with full Jordanian citizenship (40
per cent). This is because poverty levels are higher among that former group of Palestinians who do not have full citizenship, and therefore economic hardship forces them to find different means to earn a living (Tiltnes and Zhang, 2013).

Photos of Alpha and Beta camps are provided in the appendices of this thesis (See Appendix 3, Photos 3.1.1 to 3.1.10, pages 408-414).

The section above provided a brief overview of the sites selected for this case study, together with a justification for choosing them. The section below will describe the process in which access to the field was negotiated and data collection took place.

**Negotiating Access**

Data collection was conducted from October 2012 to October 2013 (See Appendix 3, Table 3.17, page 415 for the timeline of key events/activities in accessing the field).

I made a preliminary exploratory visit to Amman in October 2012 to begin negotiating access for the study. I met with a senior employee at a leading NGO in Jordan, as well as a colleague who had previously worked at UNRWA. These informal meetings were made possible through my own social networks of relatives and work colleagues. (See section below on positionality where I discuss my use of wastah).

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18 This is a leading non-governmental organisation with over 30 years’ of experience in promoting sustainable human development in marginalised communities.
On 26 February 2013, I received official approval to conduct my fieldwork at a centre based in the outskirts of Kafa that belonged to the NGO whom I had previously made contact with in October 2012. I was required to provide the NGO with an official letter from my university stating that I am a PhD student at the University of Warwick (See Appendix 3, Figure 3.3.1 and 3.3.2, pages 416-417 for required documentation by the NGO to obtain approval). Having connections with the senior employee at the NGO greatly facilitated my access to the NGO’s centre (here referred to as Centre C) in Kafa. The formalities required to receive approval to conduct my fieldwork in Alpha and Beta camps, were the same in terms of required paperwork (See Appendix 3, Figure 3.3.1 and 3.3.2, page 416-417, for required documentation).

Approval to conduct fieldwork in Alpha camp was obtained through the Department of Palestinian Affairs (DPA) on 7 March 2013. During initial visits to Alpha camp I realised that approaching potential interviewees would be difficult, particularly as I am a female and considered by residents as an ‘outsider’. So I decided to work through the UNRWA centres that were in Alpha camp. For me to do this, I needed to obtain official approval from the UNRWA headquarters in Amman. Using my personal connections, I was able to contact a high-level official at the agency, who greatly facilitated the process of negotiating access to the UNRWA centres in the camp. I was required to provide a letter verifying my status as a PhD student at the University of Warwick (See Appendix 3, Figure 3.3.1 and 3.3.2, page 417-418, for required documentation).
I was granted official permission to conduct my fieldwork through UNRWA’s centres on 1 May 2013. UNRWA had connected me to a gatekeeper that was managing one of their centres in the camp (here referred to as Centre A). As well as providing university scholarships, Centre A also connected job-seekers in the camp with employment opportunities. The centre was located in a building shared by another centre (here referred to as Centre B), which offered women micro-entrepreneurial opportunities among other services. This facilitated access to a more diverse group of participants.

As with Alpha camp, I approached the DPA to gain approval to conduct my fieldwork in Beta camp and received permission on 18 June 2013. I began my fieldwork there by approaching a UNRWA centre (here referred to as Centre D) that provided capacity-building and income-generating activities to women residing in Beta camp.

In all the centres I was assigned a key informant through the gatekeepers who facilitated my access to ‘hard-to-reach populations’ and accompanied me during visits around the camps. The key informant in Alpha Camp was a 28-year-old ex-Gazan single man who was unemployed and had a bachelor’s degree in nursing. The key informant in Beta camp, was a Palestinian Jordanian woman who was married with children. Although unemployed, the woman who was in her fifties, was an active volunteer at Centre D. Choosing an older woman as a key informant proved valuable because it is more socially accepted for older women to engage in the public sphere and talk to men than for younger women. The key informant
in Centre C was a Transjordanian woman in her forties who was single and worked at the centre (See Appendix 3, Table 3.18, page 418 for more information on key informant attributes).

When dealing with gatekeepers and key informants, several measures were taken to ensure research participants’ privacy, confidentiality and anonymity, and to overcome problems of potential bias (greater detail is given in later sections on the sampling process and ethical considerations).

The section above presented an overview of the process required to negotiate access in the key sites of the case study. Using a top-bottom approach greatly facilitated my access to the field. The section that follows will discuss measures taken to build trust with gatekeepers at the key centres that I was assigned to through UNRWA and the NGO.

**Building Trust at the Centres and in the Camps**

Part of negotiating access is gaining the trust of research participants (Merriam and Tisdell, 2015). I made efforts to ensure that I could fit into the context I was studying and to be ‘accepted’ and ‘trusted’ by the community (See section on positionality and reflexivity later in chapter).

Regular communication with the gatekeepers was necessary to ensure the smooth flow of my fieldwork. I maintained this by keeping in contact with them at the centres, as well as conducting volunteer activities alongside my fieldwork. Nevertheless, one of the main challenges faced during my fieldwork was maintaining good
relationships with the different gatekeepers at Alpha camp. It was difficult to recognise the hierarchy of operation within the centres and mechanisms of communication. This was because the centre that I was referred to was located in a building that housed several managers with different offices managing separate activities. This created tension between them and made it very difficult for me to maintain good relations with all of them. However, I did not face this problem when dealing with key gatekeepers outside Alpha camp because the organisational hierarchy of the centres was more clear-cut and they had their own separate physical spaces.

I made sure to maintain a neutral position with all managers and kept in regular contact with them, undertook some volunteering and presented myself as a student, seeking knowledge about my research from the local community. Another simple yet effective measure used to maintain positive relations with the gatekeepers was to ensure that I greeted them when entering and leaving the centres. I made sure to do this even when I did not need information from them. I visited the gatekeepers in their offices and had tea and informal discussions with them on several occasions. We would chat about any issues that they felt like sharing – some of which were not relevant to my research. These offices were central locations for the community and were regularly visited by locals and other stakeholders with an interest in providing services in the camp. Local residents would often visit the managers in their offices and talk about different issues that concerned them. At other times, they
would just sit in their offices and converse with each other about daily affairs.

Gaining the trust of the gatekeepers and key informants gave me the opportunity to sit in during conversations and listen to the discussions that took place. The more I was seen in the offices with the gatekeepers and key informants the more I was able to gain the trust of the people around me, and the more freely they spoke. I also attended social activities that I was invited to by gatekeepers and key informants. For example, I attended an engagement party in Alpha camp, shared breakfast and lunch with the gatekeepers and centre staff, and joined them on social outings in Kafa and Amman.

I was also able to gain trust within the community by conducting volunteer activities during my fieldwork. These activities included the following:

1- Gathering donations for English-language software for the centres in Kafa, and Alpha and Beta camps. The donations were from outside Kafa and obtained through personal connections.

2- Linking gatekeepers in Alpha camp with the Centre C in Kafa. This involved arranging for a meeting with both centre managers and facilitating the discussion. I also connected an ex-Gazan woman and the centre manager in Kafa so that she could carry out embroidery workshops there.

3- Gathering donations for two Ramadan events, one through a centre in Alpha camp and the other
through the NGO’s centre in Kafa. I also gathered donations to purchase food packages that would be distributed through the other centre in Alpha camp.

4- Offering to translate the CVs of centre staff at all three locations.

5- Carrying out a volunteer workshop on CV-writing at the centres.

6- Receiving a donation to paint the kindergarten at Centre C in Kafa.

7- Distributing clothes given as charity through the centres in the camps as well as in Kafa.

8- Accompanying the male key informant and female gatekeeper who managed a centre in Alpha camp to interviews in Amman upon their request.

When carrying out volunteer activities and gathering contributions I made sure that they were equally distributed between the centres, to increase the diversity of beneficiaries as well as to keep good relations with all the gatekeepers.

The section above highlighted the measures taken to build trust with research participants. The section that follows will discuss the sampling process of this study, including the identification and recruitment of potential interviewees.

**Recruitment and Sampling Process**

Measures were taken throughout the sampling process to ensure that the sample included a diverse range of participants, particularly
those with the ‘least voices’ (Choo and Ferree, 2010). Moreover, applying an intersectionality approach meant that the researcher needed to make sure that the sample was able to produce a thorough and rich understanding of the topic under study, and that it was ‘heterogeneous enough to allow for inductive explorations’ (Hunting, 2014: 10). Intersectionality research also highlights the importance of choosing a sample that can highlight power relations between a diverse group of participants (Cole, 2009). For this reason I made sure to include a diverse group of research participants, ranging from high-level policy makers to employed and unemployed women and men (See Appendix 3, Table 3.19, page 419 for a summary of the process for recruiting participants).

Purposive and snowball sampling methods were used to recruit Transjordanians, Palestinian Jordanians and ex-Gazans. Gatekeepers and key informants played a pivotal role in accessing target groups that were difficult to reach such as ex-Gazans without passports and those with Egyptian travel documents. However, several measures were taken to ensure that gatekeepers and key informants did not influence my sampling strategy, as well as to protect the confidentiality and anonymity of research participants. For example, in order to ensure the diversity of the participants, I conducted interviews on my own beyond the centres, in shops in Alpha and Beta camps, as well as in Kafa town, using purposive and snowball sampling. I also carried out home visits in and outside the camps, which were accessed through centre gatekeepers. They were able to provide me with lists of households in the area.
considered to be the most marginalised as they worked directly with these target groups. To ensure the anonymity of research participants, I privately selected and contacted individuals from the list offered to me without informing the gatekeepers of the candidates chosen for interview (See section on ethical considerations in the section below).

Gidden’s structuration theory can generate insights into the power relations developed between the researcher and key informants during the fieldwork. For example, the input obtained from key informants can create structure for the researcher during the fieldwork through suggestions on places to visit and ways in which to address potential research participants (Plump and Geist-Martin, 2013).

Nonetheless, key informants and gatekeepers greatly facilitated the process of building trust with local community members. They also made it possible for me to walk through camps and conduct home visits without any risk. This in turn diversified my sample. Moreover, I was able to visit the market areas and approach potential interviewees during their presence. I was also able to interview service providers through connections established with gatekeepers and key informants.

Purposive and snowball sampling methods were used to recruit service providers. I selected potential candidates based on a desktop review of existing studies on Kafa that identified local community centres in the area (See Appendix 3, Table 3.20, page 420 for the list of reports and publications referred to), as well as
through interviews with participants and discussions with key informants and gatekeepers.

Furthermore, purposive and snowball sampling methods were used to identify policy makers. I also used snowball sampling when potential interviewees were identified during discussions with policy makers.

In addition to including business owners and employers in the private and public sectors, it was also important to interview individuals employed in both sectors. This was made possible by approaching shops in markets in both Kafa and the camps. Examples of such venues included beauty and hairdressing salons and private businesses (e.g. electrical and IT shops, sweet and pastry shops and bookshops). I excluded UNRWA employees because they are beyond the scope of this study, as my research only focuses on individuals working in the private and public sectors (this is further discussed later in this chapter on the section on data collection).

My sample included a total of 105 participants who were interviewed using focus groups and individual interviews. Of these there were 84 (60 female and 24 male) community members and 9 policy makers and 12 service providers. More specifically, my sample included the following:-

- **Policy Makers**

The literature on interviews with policy makers highlights a variety of definitions for the term. These include decision makers holding senior
positions, as well as individuals who are ‘highly skilled, professionally competent and class specific’ (McDowell, 1998: 2135). For the purpose of my research, I define policy makers as those who hold high-level positions with significant decision-making influence, as well as highly skilled experts in the area of my study. These included individuals whose areas of expertise focused on either of the following: employment, further education, gender, Palestinian refugees and/or human rights. The objective of these interviews was to obtain a top–bottom understanding of the influence of gender and citizenship on the livelihood strategies of protracted Palestinian refugees.

Including policy makers in my sample allowed me to gain a holistic understanding of my research topic at the policy level. For example, I chose to interview a policy maker from the army because the army was mentioned by a number of service providers as a key sector of employment for men. This finding concurred with the literature in the Setting chapter that highlighted dependence on employment in the army, particularly in Kafa.

A total of 9 interviews were carried out with policy makers. These were:

1- A consultant with expert knowledge in the field of Palestinian refugees in the Middle East and North African region.

2- A gender and development specialist with an extensive background in gender and employment issues in Jordan.

3- A senior officer in the army.
4- Two senior civil servants in two Ministries (Labour and Education).

5- A public sector representative in one of the camps. During the interview several key figures from the local committee joined, as well as a team from UNRWA that was preparing for an event in the camp.

6- One lawyer at a legal firm.

7- A senior employee at a legal firm.

8- A public sector gender specialist training women on setting up micro-enterprises and cooperative in rural areas.

Participants chose the location of the interviews and these included their offices, their homes or coffee shops. A greater degree of flexibility was used when conducting interviews with policy makers. This has been recommended by scholars such as Harvey (2011) when conducting interviews with policy makers. For example, some policy makers refused to be audio-recorded or for notes to be taken. Another major challenge when conducting interviews with policy makers has to do with obtaining data ‘beyond the official versions routinely presented’ (Barbour, 2013: 128). One way to overcome this challenge was through the use of both open-ended and closed questions (Harvey, 2011). This is because policy makers may be more comfortable with open questions, which do not restrict them and provide the opportunity for them to share ‘their more nuanced insights’ (Barbour, 2013: 129) (See Chapter Seven: Discussion and Conclusion for ‘off the record’ accounts and study limitations). As
these were semi-structured interviews, an open-ended topic guide was being used (See Appendix 3, Table 3.21 and 3.22 for pro formas, Figure 3.4 and 3.5 for topic guides, pages 421-424 for pro formas and topic guides).

- **Training and Employment Service Providers**

By service providers I refer to staff members employed in community centres run by NGOs, as well as CBOs in the camps that were previously under the umbrella of UNRWA. The purpose of these interviews was to gain the perspective of those working to support people trying to overcome the barriers and opportunities that Palestinian Jordanian and ex-Gazan women and men face in their access to further education and employment in Kafa compared to the host population.

A total of 12 interviews were conducted with service providers in the area of Kafa, including Alpha and Beta camps. All interviews were carried out at the offices where participants worked, except for one, which happened at a public venue in Amman.

- **Transjordanians, Palestinian Jordanians and ex-Gazans**

The main target of the study was young adult Transjordanians, Palestinian Jordanians and ex-Gazans residing in Kafa. It was important to include Transjordanians in the research to be able to compare and contrast their views and experiences in accessing employment with those of Palestinians. Women and men aged 25 to 44 were recruited for the interviews. The reason for choosing this age
band was because my research was retrospective and focused on
the experiences of young adults in their access to further education
and employment, as well as older adults looking back on their young
adult years as the children of first-generation protracted refugees.

Young adults were the focus as they made up a large
segment of Jordan’s employable population. Defining a suitable age
range for young adults is not a simple task because it varies
according to different sources as well as in the use of conventional or
non-conventional markers (Lowe et al., 2013). Arnett (2001)
identified emerging adults as those between the age of 20 and 29,
and young to mid-life adults as those between 30 and 55 years of
age. Scholars such as Veal et al. (2010) define adolescence and
young adulthood as those between 15 and 40 years of age. Others
have classified this age group to be between 15 and 29 years of age,
with the possible extension to 39 years (Ferrari et al., 2010; Wein et
al., 2010). According to the United Nations, youth and young adults
comprise individuals between the ages of 18 and 29 (United Nations
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2011).

I referred to the age segmentation groups used by the
International Labour Organisation (ILO) Central Statistics Office’s
online data. ILO age brackets are from 15 to 19, 20 to 24, 25 to 34
and 35 to 44 years. Moreover, the population by age range used by
the ILO Central Statistics Office combines age groups into the
following brackets: 15 to 24, 25 to 44 and 45 to 64 years (ILO CSO,
2013). For the context of my study I chose to use the age group
ranging between 25 and 44.
The International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-ILO 1993) definitions of employment and unemployment were applied in this study. According to the ISCO-ILO, unemployed persons are all those who are of working age who are not working and who are ready and willing to work during a specific period. Employed people are defined as all those within working age who received pay from work within a certain period (be it as an employee, or worker or through self-employment). For the purpose of this study, the term ‘worker’ was applied to denote a more diverse category of people, such that it includes persons working with different forms of contracts (written and verbal), including seasonal and casual/irregular workers.

The section above explained and justified the sampling process in this study. The section that follows will provide an overview of the data-collection tools used in this study, with a rationale for their selection.

**Data Collection Methods**

Data were collected using multiple qualitative methods; these included non-participant observation, qualitative semi-structured interviews and focus groups. A mixed methods approach, using quantitative and qualitative methods is generally regarded as the most suitable methodology in intersectionality research because it produces both conceptual and empirical findings. However, this study chose a mix of qualitative methods instead for several reasons. These include the complex approval formalities of conducting
quantitative research on this topic because of its political sensitivity and the repercussions that this might have on the timeframe of the fieldwork process, as well as the lack of access to primary datasets that are desegregated according to ‘place of origin’ (in this case Transjordanian and Palestinian Jordanian).

Nevertheless, the use of a variety of qualitative data collection tools increased the trustworthiness of findings (Anney, 2014). Having a mix of qualitative methods was also necessary because the research looked at different target groups, which required different means of collecting data from (Morse and Niehaus, 2009). Applying an intersectionality approach in my study also increased the robustness of the qualitative data-collection methods. This is because intersectionality highlights the importance of retheorising the significance of social markers at every stage of the research (Thomas, 2010).

The section below provides an overview of the data-collection tools used for the purpose of this study.

**Non-Participant Observation**

Non-participant observation in research gives the researcher insight into the actualities of events as experienced by participants in their natural settings, in order to compare them with their reported views and beliefs (Gillham, 2000). This allows for a more in-depth understanding and analysis of data findings. I chose to use non-participant observation over participant observation because I wanted to gain a better understanding of people’s behaviours,
actions and beliefs through the discussions and interactions that they carried out in their daily lives without having an influence on them. To avoid misinterpreting recordings of inferences made during observations, these issues were further discussed in focus groups with participants and informal discussions with gatekeepers.

Other measures taken to overcome the limitations of non-participant observation included keeping a research diary to document observations and informal discussions throughout the fieldwork (Gray, 2009). Another effective method practised to gather rich data was to recall events of the day in detail when returning from field visits, either on paper or using an audio-recorder. I made sure to document these events on the same, or the next day at the latest, so that my observations and thoughts remained fresh in my mind. Field notes comprised direct observation, researcher inference, and analytic and personal notes (Taylor, Bodgan and DeVault, 2015).

The field visits consisted of a total of 48 days (around 336 hours in total), and the duration ranged per day from five to nine hours. Field notes documented all visits carried out relevant to my PhD in Kafa and Amman. These included field visits to community centres in Kafa and shops in Kafa town centre, as well as Alpha and Beta camps. Field notes in Amman included documenting observations during visits to policy makers, as well as activities carried out with gatekeepers. For example, I made sure to write down my observations when accompanying the male and female gatekeepers from Alpha camp to job interviews in Amman upon their request. I also recorded my observations during home visits in Kafa,
as well as when participating in conferences and workshops relevant to my research.

A key challenge faced when recording field notes involved the actual documentation of observations and conversations as they took place. This was not possible because it created tension in the environment under study. For example, I was invited to attend a presentation organised by a community centre in Alpha camp for a group of foreign visitors. The discussion involved presenting to visitors an overview of the camp demography and the key challenges that residents faced compared to their host population. I arrived early and sat in the room where the discussion was taking place. There were several camp residents in the room, including local volunteers. They were talking about issues that I found interesting so I began taking notes until one volunteer jokingly commented about me recording their discussion, insinuating feelings of distrust and unease. To avoid tension, I joked about the situation and chose to avoid writing down notes as the discussion took place. Instead, I waited for the presentation to commence, during which I wrote down bullet points of the key issues mentioned during the discussion. I did this so that I would be able to recall and elaborate on them when I returned home. I also faced similar challenges when visiting the managers in their offices, when different conversations would arise as local community members entered their offices.

Hence, taking direct field notes when events were actually happening was not a practical method for collecting data, as this tended to disrupt the natural flow of discussion. A more appropriate
method was to record events with short notes in the field and then to audio-record events of each field visit during my drive back home and then would make extensive field notes using recall and the recording the same or next day.

**Semi-Structured Individual Interviews**

Interviews are generally considered to be the ‘gold standard of qualitative research’ (Barbour, 2013: 111). Through the process of interviewing, an exchange of knowledge takes place between the researcher and interviewee. The richness of the data obtained through interviews not only relies on the questions asked but the extent to which the researcher ‘listen[s] actively’ (Ibid, 2013: 112) to the interviewee.

Interviews were semi-structured and topic guides and pro formas were used (See Appendix 3, Table 3.21 and 3.22 for pro formas, Figure 3.4 and 3.5 for topic guides, pages 421-424). The purpose of the pro formas was to collect the same demographic data from participants, which could be used to identify patterning, as well as to use for ‘thumbnail sketches’ (Barbour, 2013: 113). Contextualised questions were also used to identify patterns in the information gathered during interviews. These included questions such as ‘Do you believe ex-Gazan women with similar experiences as yours would agree with your opinions?’ When interviewing I made sure to ask broad questions that looked at the daily accounts of protracted refugees in, for example, their experiences of discrimination in employment and further education (Hunting, 2014).
This was important because it allowed me to better understand the complex nature of the experiences of protracted refugees through the ‘salient intersections in [participants’] … lives’ (Hunting, 2014: 12).

Interviews were semi-structured because the study did not seek to find or measure causal relationships between variables. Instead, the purpose was to gain an in-depth understanding of the influence of gender and citizenship in people’s access to further education and employment through sharing with the researcher their lived experiences. Rather than having the researcher control the direction of the interview, semi-structured interviews allowed participants to choose aspects of their lives that they wished to highlight (Barbour, 2013). This aimed to create a greater balance of power in the relationship between the researcher and interviewee. It also protected participants, as the topic under study might involve sensitive issues that the interviewee might wish not to disclose.

Following the pro forma questions, I began interviews by asking the interviewee about general and less sensitive issues. As the participant became more comfortable and relaxed in the interview setting, I asked more sensitive questions. Another important technique used during the interviews involved encouraging participants to think about structural variables that may have hindered their access to employment. I made sure to leave time at the end of each interview for participants to add any information they wished to share. I always made sure to end interviews on a positive note and did so by thanking each participant for their time, as well as
for the valuable information shared. Shifting the power balance to the interviewee was another method that proved effective in ending the interview on a positive note. This was carried out by emphasising my appreciation of the knowledge gained from the interviewee.

A total of 44 individual semi-structured interviews were carried out (23 males and 21 females). Of the 23 male participants who were interviewed, 11 were married and 12 were single. Of the 21 females interviewed, eight were married, 11 were single, one was divorced and another was divorcing (See Appendix 3, Tables 3.23.1 to 3.23.21 pages 425-450 for the attributes of participants).

When looking at employment status among males, 18 described themselves to be working, whereas five were not. Of the 21 women interviewed, 12 said they were working and nine were without work. In terms of origin and employment status, of the seven male Transjordanians interviewed, two were not working and another five had work; of the eight male Palestinian Jordanians interviewed, two were not working and six had work. In the case of the eight male ex-Gazans interviewed, only one was not working.

Meanwhile, of the nine female Transjordanians interviewed, four were not working, two were volunteering at a CBO without pay, and three had work. As for the six female Palestinian Jordanians interviewed, two were not working and four had work. In the case of the six female ex-Gazan participants interviewed, four reported to be working and two without work (See Appendix 3, Tables 3.23.1 to 3.23.21 pages 425-449 for the attributes of participants).
Interviews were audio-recorded and notes taken where possible. This however relied on the consent of interviewees.

Semi-Structured Focus Groups

It was decided to use focus groups as some issues were brought up during interviews that required further elaboration. In the focus groups I was able to explore ways in which participants shared their views on topics in the presence and interaction of others (Barbour, 2013). As well as allowing me to examine how views are being generated and expressed, the focus groups provided ways in which opinions could be developed through group interaction.

I chose to carry out these focus groups in order to identify converging and diverging views on challenges and opportunities to accessing further education and employment for women and how their citizenship and gender influenced this. The focus group discussions also allowed women to share their experiences and the livelihood strategies they used when facing common challenges. Several women reported that they felt that the focus groups were therapeutic and even asked for more of such gatherings to take place in the future.

The focus groups were also used to examine sensitive policy issues such as those related to employment and discrimination. As well as sharing views on challenges and opportunities, the focus groups served to provide feedback from individuals whose lived experiences were directly impacted on by these policies. The focus groups also allowed for collective discussions to be made to
‘problematize taken for granted assumptions’ (Barbour, 2013: 137). Focus groups might also be an easier place to address sensitive topics, as participants can be encouraged to talk in a group with people who share similar experiences. Another advantage of focus groups is that they do not place focus on one individual.

A total of six focus groups with women were carried out during the final stage of my fieldwork between September and October 2013. Of the six focus groups carried out, two were in Beta camp, two in Alpha camp and another two outside the camps in Kafa.

A total of 39 women participated in the focus groups. Of the 22 working women taking part in the focus groups, four were with Transjordanians, 11 with Palestinian Jordanians and seven with ex-Gazans. Meanwhile, 18 non-working women were interviewed, of whom seven were Transjordanians, six Palestinian Jordanians and five ex-Gazans. Each focus group varied in numbers ranging from four to eight participants, and ages were from 22 to 48 years.

In summary, a total of 105 interviews were carried. These included individual and focus group interviews with 84 Transjordanians, Palestinian Jordanians and ex-Gazans (24 males and 60 females), 12 training and employment service providers and nine policy makers. Interviews stopped when data and theoretical saturation was reached (Onwuegbuzie et al., 2009). The section below provides an overview of transcription and translation issues concerned with this study.
Transcription and Translation

This study recognises the important role that transcription and translation play in influencing the quality of data analysed and the validity of my findings (Lapadat, and Lindsay, 1999). Moreover, the use of language can influence the manner in which information is analysed. This is because interviewee responses vary according to the way questions are asked and understood. It is important in the qualitative analysis process as it relies greatly on assigning meanings to people’s experiences (Lopez et al., 2008). All focus groups and interviews were transcribed verbatim in Arabic and then translated to English.

One of the challenges I faced had to do with transcribing and translating the interviews carried out during the fieldwork. The literature on social research methods has highlighted a lack of resources offered to international students on addressing challenges in transcribed and translating data (Nikander, 2008). Data changes from raw to processed after being transcribed and translated because researchers employ judgement and interpretation in this process (Wengraf, 2001).

Although it is recommended that the researcher transcribe and translate interviews as soon as they are done (Gillham, 2000), I was unable to do this due to the large number of in-depth interviews carried out. In addition to transcribing the interviews, I was also required to translate them as they were in Arabic. For this reason, I used a professional and certified transcriber and translator, fluent in both Arabic and English, to assist me in the process.
I recognised the limitations of transcribing and translating interviews and the drawbacks this had on the richness of the vernacular. Several strategies were taken to reduce transcription and translation error. I specifically chose a local transcriber/translator who had some background knowledge of the cultural context of the population under investigation (Vulliamy, 1990). To reduce the potential for political influence and bias on the work, I chose a transcriber/translator who was not of Palestinian or Jordanian origin. Back-translation was randomly carried out with interviews to ‘ensure agreement of a correct version of a text’ (Temple and Young, 2004: 163). I also listened to my audio-recordings and made sure that the vernacular of the interview discussions was kept during transcription.

I recorded observations and reflective and reflexive thoughts immediately after the interviews and focus groups and documented them in my field notes on the same day. As well as including thoughts on reflexivity and positionality, my notes included observed information on the emotional behaviour and non-verbal communication of the participants and the physical setting of the interview. The field notes also included informal conversations and meetings. It was important to document such data to provide greater accuracy and trustworthiness of the transcribed and translated (Bryman, 2008).

The following section discusses the data analysis process.
Data Analysis

I began the data analysis when I first started collecting data during my fieldwork and continued throughout the research process. I would spend an average of four days a week collecting data in the field. The remaining days would be spent recording field notes and transcribing and analysing collected data. I made sure not to include findings of the pilot interviews in the analysis.

All the qualitative data (field notes and focus group and individual interviews), were managed and coded using NVIVO 10 software to emergent lower and higher-order themes. The data analysis was both deductive and inductive. Deductive analysis was carried out because of the use of a topic guide and the research questions. Through deductive analysis, I focused on creating connections between accounts of interviewees, social markers and the community that surrounded research participants. Analysis was also inductive because it involved an iterative process, which required immersing myself into the data and producing meanings and patterns out of them (Huberman et al., 1994). Themes were developed from the data through the categorisation of research participants’ experiences and perceptions (Bradley, et al., 2007).

I started my analysis by reading through all the field notes and interviews several times in order to become absorbed in the data collected (Bradley, et al., 2007). I went through each interview and then read through them again by question. This was followed by coding, which involved pinpointing and recording connections between concepts and the experiences and perceptions of research
participants (Bradley, et al., 2007). Coding was carried out using nodes, such as for example research participants’ ‘aspirations’ and ‘gender-related issues’. Tree nodes were also created to develop hierarchical relationships between concepts that were coded. The method I used for coding was flexible and changed throughout the analysis process. Each day that I carried out interviews and conducted field visits, I made sure to record my reflections of the events that same day. Field notes were then uploaded onto NVIVO 10 and put into a folder that was separate from the interviews. Both interviews and field notes were dated.

A gender-mainstreamed descriptive analysis was used for the research, taking into account the following issues: ‘(1) power, (2) boundaries, (3) relationships, and (4) situatedness of the researcher’ (Ackerly and True, 2010: 181). Discourse produced from interviews was analysed to investigate the ‘intersectional dimensions of power’ (Ackerly and True, 2010: 137) and oppression within and between the different populations studied. Categories were analysed to identify inequalities in the relationships between social groups, while recognising their fluid and dynamic nature (Nash, 2008). Moreover, the analysis in this thesis focused on the experiences of different marginalised groups to emphasise the complex way in which categories intersect (Nash, 2008). Using intersectionality in the analysis also entailed a careful examination of the manner in which different systems of oppression influenced experiences of protracted Palestinian refugee women and men in their agency to develop livelihood strategies. Moreover, the analysis used in this research
highlighted the significance of applying both a macro (institutional/societal) and micro (individual) approach to better understand experiences of protracted refugees in their access to further education and employment. For the analysis to take into account intersectionality, significant intersections that related to the research questions were identified. Moreover, ‘all analysis must occur while keeping social and historical context in mind’ (Hunting, 2014: 13).

The analysis did not only rely on the discussion carried out but also on unspoken words, such as the way research participants expressed themselves through ‘body language’ (Ackerly and True, 2010: 181). An example of this was when male participants refused to maintain eye contact with me during the interviews. When analysing the data gathered from the focus groups and individual interviews I was also aware of the subjective nature of the stories that participants shared (Hodgkin and Radstone, 2003). Barbour (2013) argues that, rather than identifying whether accounts are real or false, the researcher needs to ‘look for recurrent themes, challenges or discrepancies … to examine in detail the constituent parts and patterning of the accounts, presented by respondents’ (Barbour, 2013: 127).

The section above described the data analysis carried out in this research. The section below will outline measures taken to ensure the quality of the research.
Quality of Research

According to Lincoln and Guba (1985), the level of rigour of qualitative research can be evaluated by its ‘credibility’, ‘transferability’, ‘dependability and ‘confirmability’. The strategies used in this study to improve rigour were include credibility, triangulation, negative case analysis, transferability and dependability and confirmability.

Credibility

For credibility, the researcher should ensure that the study findings are true. Some of the mechanisms to ensure credibility included extending my period in the field, thorough observation during the fieldwork complemented by rich and reflexive documentation and negative case analysis, as well as triangulating between the data collected (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). The use of triangulation and negative case analysis will be discussed below.

Triangulation

Triangulation is important because it increases the trustworthiness of the data collected (Knafl and Breitmayer, 1991). Triangulation was carried out in this study through the use of a mix of qualitative methods. Triangulating between data obtained from interviews, focus groups, field observations and desktop research facilitated in validating the accuracy of my findings. Differences in what people reported and believed as well as what was observed during fieldwork were also analysed (Knafl and Breitmayer, 1991). For example, in
some situations, interviewed men claimed that they believed women should have employment opportunities equal to men’s, but reported that they did not accept that their female family members or wives could work (Interview, MSC5, unemployed Palestinian Jordanian single man, Illiterate 32, Beta Camp).

**Negative Case Analysis**

Scholars such as Lincoln and Guba (1985) relate the richness of findings to the opposing and varied opinions and perceptions generated from the data collected. The opposing views of participants were reflected during focus groups. It was also made possible because my interview sample was diverse, including policy makers, service providers, employers and employed and unemployed women and men in Kafa. Moreover, the study findings in the results chapters included various quotes from participants with contradictory views to highlight this.

**Transferability**

The transferability of study findings refers to the extent to which they can be generalised in other contexts (Bryman, 2008). It has been argued that one of the weaknesses of qualitative research is its inability to extend the generalisability of findings to other settings (Greenhalgh and Taylor, 1997). One of the mechanisms suggested by Lincoln and Guba (1985) to address this weakness and make transferability possible in research is through the use of extensive description. This was carried out when writing my field notes, and
was used in my findings chapters (See Chapters Four, Five, and Six). Using a thick description allows the researcher intending to generalise findings to another setting to be able to decide whether or not they are transferable to the new context (Geertz, 2002). In this study, transferability applies to a heterogeneous group of protracted refugee women and men, experiencing inclusionary and exclusionary forms of citizenship and within a specific context.

**Dependability and Confirmability**

Dependability refers to the ability to repeat a study’s findings. For this to happen, extensive and detailed recording is required throughout the research process (Bryman, 2008). According to Greenhalgh and Taylor (1997), findings need to be verifiable, and this is possible by indexing quotes to enable them to be linked back to their source and context. Accordingly, actual sources of quotes from interviews and field notes can be traced back by clearly linking them to each other. In the case of field notes, dates were used to refer to actual sources and were used when referenced.

Ensuring the confirmability of findings was important in order to avoid research bias. Strategies used to ensure confirmability included triangulation, as well as continually maintaining reflexivity and positionality throughout the fieldwork. Reflexivity in feminist research aims at understanding the ‘inequalities and processes of domination that shape the research process’ (Outhwaite and Turner, 2007: 552) (See the section below on issues of reflexivity and positionality).
The section above has discussed several strategies used to ensure the ‘trustworthiness’ of this study. The section that follows discusses the ethical considerations that were taken into account throughout the fieldwork process. These include issues such as dealing with informed consent and confidentiality.

**Ethical Considerations**

The main ethical consideration in my research related to the political sensitivity of the topic under study. The Palestinian issue in Jordan is a sensitive topic primarily because of the fear of the country becoming an ‘alternative state’ for Palestine. The concerns about refugees in Jordan has also intensified following a recent and currently increasing influx of around 630,776 Syrian refugees into the country (UNHCR, 2015) which was preceded by Iraqi refugees during the last decade. Other major influxes include 30,000 UNHCR-registered refugees, an estimate that was published in 2013, during the period of my fieldwork (Hart and Kvittingen, 2015a, 2015b). The increasing influx of refugees in Jordan has affected the country both politically and economically, the repercussions of which include increased rental prices and unemployment rates, as well as a reduction in wages (Council on Foreign Relations, 2014).

In addition to taking into account the political nature of the topic, ensuring cultural sensitivity throughout the fieldwork was also required (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2002). This included issues such as dress code while in the field as well as verbal and physical interaction within the context of my study. For example, I made sure
to not shake hands and to avoid physical contact with men, to respect their religious beliefs and practices. I also needed to be very careful in the way I dressed, making sure that it was conservative and modest in terms of clothes that were concealing and loosely fitting. Furthermore, I made sure to communicate with the local community in a language that was respectful and included religious phrases that are used in daily conversation, such as ‘in God’s will’ (Insha’ ‘Allāh) and ‘peace be with you’ (Salaam Aleykum). I also avoided going into the field wearing jewellery and used public transport some of the time.

Ethical permission to carry out the research was obtained from the University of Warwick’s Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee (HESSREC) (See Appendix 3, Figure 3.3.2, page 417 for HESSREC letter). In Jordan there is no ethics committee responsible for approving research work before it takes place. The mechanism needed to proceed with my fieldwork included gaining written approval from the Department of Palestinian Affairs (DPA) in Jordan. An official letter was required that verified my position as a postgraduate student at the University of Warwick. A brief overview of my research was also needed, including the scope of work and duration of my fieldwork. I was also required to provide this information to both UNRWA and the NGO in Kafa in order to gain approval and conduct my fieldwork through their centres.

I worked closely with key informants and gatekeepers for safety reasons and in order to maintain the trust of community members. This was also done to ensure that I presented the
research in a suitable manner to the locals and that my fieldwork was
carried out in a manner that respected the community’s culture and
norms. The importance of gatekeepers and key informants has been
recognised by scholars to facilitate researchers in their fieldwork
(Burgess, 1985; Walford, 1987). This was also my experience during
the fieldwork, particularly in terms of negotiating access to the field
and reaching out to ‘hard-to-reach’ participants. I was also informed
of events and workshops in Kafa related to my research through the
key informants and gatekeepers. However, I made sure to maintain
the confidentiality of my research participants throughout the
research process by using password-protected systems to gather
data, and by keeping hard copies in a locked filing cabinet at my
home. With regard to avoiding bias from key informants and
gatekeepers, I was continuously reflexive of the research process
and made sure to diversify my strategy for recruiting participants. I
also had discussions with gatekeepers and key informants, informing
them of the importance of impartiality in my research ensuring my
research participants’ confidentiality as a key requirement and
regulation imposed by my university.

Dealing with Informed Consent

Verbal informed consent was required from all participants. Potential
participants were provided with an information sheet and consent
sheet in Arabic – unless otherwise requested – a minimum of two
days prior to the actual interview date (See Appendix 3, Figure 3.6-
3.11, pages 450-461 for information sheets and consent forms).
Although it was intended to obtain signed consent forms from all participants, this was not possible because some refused and others were illiterate. One of the reasons for not having all the consent forms signed is that in Arab countries it is ‘not an acceptable custom’ (Damaj, 2008: 148). Nevertheless, I made sure to record their verbal consents prior to proceeding with the interviews and signed the sheets myself with the date.

With regard to ethical issues, before interviewing all participants I made sure that they were eligible to participate and that they were aware that their participation was optional and that they could withhold information or withdraw at any point (Van den Eynden et al., 2011). Information provided to participants (information sheet, informed consent form and other additional informational material) was written in a simple manner using lay person’s terms.

**Dealing with Confidentiality**

All participants were informed of their privacy and confidentiality rights, as well as disclosure options available to them with the implications for their choices. I made sure to respect and adhere to the anonymity and privacy rights of participants throughout the research process. In situations where the information gathered was highly sensitive and was of greater threat than benefit to the participant, the data were not recorded. Any expected risks to the confidentiality and anonymity of research information were discussed with individuals that took part in the research. I also made sure to stop recording when asked to by participants; this was requested on
several occasions during interviews with policy makers and service providers, particularly when discussing the political context of the Palestinian issue in Jordan.

Interviews were carried out individually where possible and in locations that were safe and convenient to both participants and myself. It was intended to have one-to-one interviews in order to ensure the confidentiality rights of interviewees; this was very difficult to control, however, and in some cases this was not possible (this is further discussed in the study limitations section of Chapter Seven: Discussion and Conclusion). The focus groups took place in CBOs that were regarded as neutral locations and as safe for participants to visit. For home visits with participants, I was accompanied by a family member to ensure my safety. However, the family member did not attend the interviews. I also had my mobile with me at all times.

Anonymisation took place for all interviewees when the interviews were transcribed, and pseudonyms were used to ensure the confidentiality of participants. An anonymisation log was also developed and kept in a folder that was different from the anonymised information files. Care was taken to ensure that participants could not be identified in the research findings unless they approved of their disclosure in writing. Nevertheless, all participants were made aware of the limitations of keeping their data confidential (Van den Eynden et al., 2011). I made sure to maintain

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19 I also made sure to anonymise service providers as they can be easily identified in Alpha and Beta camps as well as Kafa. However, the tables on participants’ general attributes in the Appendices provide a more detailed description of the nature of the service providers and policy makers.
participants’ anonymity and confidentiality rights when outsourcing transcription work. This was done by using pseudonyms when audio-recording participants (i.e. none of the participants’ names was mentioned in the recording) and working with a transcriber from another Arab country who lived abroad.

Secure systems were also set up to gather personal data on participants, with regularly updated passwords. All hard copies of personal data and other information relevant to the research were kept in a filing cabinet with a lock (Van den Eynden et al., 2011).

The section above has dealt with ethical considerations relating to this study, including issues such as dealing with informed consent and confidentiality. The section that follows focuses on the subject of reflexivity and positionality in order to gain a better understanding of the extent to which the researcher’s role shaped findings of the study.

**Issues of Reflexivity and Positionality**

It was important to continuously reflect on my positionality throughout the fieldwork and analysis process using reflexivity, as this formed an integral part of the meaning making process of my research (Blaxter et al., 2006). According to feminist research, reflexivity aims at understanding the ‘inequalities and processes of domination that shape the research process’ (Outhwaite and Turner, 2007: 552). This involves looking both within and outside oneself in terms of positionality of the research and research process (Shaw and Gould, 2001). One of the underlying tenets of qualitative researchers in
social sciences is their scepticism concerning value-free research and emphasise on the importance of recognising ‘the socially constructed and situated nature of knowledge’ (England, 2008: 241).

I was born in Jordan and have never been to Palestine, therefore I view myself as a Jordanian. My father and grandfather were also both born in Jordan before 1948, but our family origin is from Nablus (Palestine, West Bank). My mother is of Syrian origin and moved to Jordan in 1949 after marrying my father.

I was asked by several participants about my origin and whether it was ‘Transjordanian’ or Palestinian Jordanian. I managed to use my mixed background to my advantage when responding to this question. So, when I was asked by Palestinian Jordanians and ex-Gazans about my origin I informed them that my father’s family origin, is from Palestine. However, when asked about my origin by Transjordanians, I would say that my father was born in Jordan before 1948.

When interviewing I made sure to inform gatekeepers, key informants and interview participants that I was a student, without letting them know about my previous work experience. This was because I did not want them to see me as a potential connection (wastah) for future job opportunities. However, when addressing policy makers and training and employment service providers, I would inform them of my previous work background in order to facilitate arrangements for interviews and gain greater credibility with interviewees.
I recognised that being a female researcher might create challenges during my fieldwork, particularly in the context of my study. I therefore took great consideration to respect cultural norms and gender roles within the community. I also applied a number of strategies to facilitate my fieldwork. These included using fictive kinship to create trust and maintain respect with key informants and gatekeepers, which is common particularly in Muslim societies (Al-Krenawi and Graham, 2000; Al-Makhamreh and Lewando-Hundt, 2008). For instance, I referred to them as my ‘brother’ or ‘sister’ if they were of similar age to me.

Another issue that was likely to influence people’s perceptions about me was the fact that I am a 36-year old divorced female without children. Social norms in the context of my fieldwork expect women to be married with children at my age. Being divorced can be looked down upon so I refrained from sharing this information about myself with participants. Moreover, being an unveiled female researcher studying abroad and living in Amman created an outsider identity for me among participants. Presenting myself as a student from a university in the UK posed a challenge. This might have been because some distrusted my affiliation to a foreign university, which to them was perceived as ‘non-Arab’ and ‘non-Muslim’, creating a sense of ‘them’ versus ‘us’. Nevertheless, the same culture, religion and language that I shared with interviewees helped me to bridge this gap (Anderson and Jack, 1991). The advantage of having a common religious background with interviewees was highlighted on several occasions when I was asked about my religion and they
learnt that I was Muslim ‘like them’. The information above highlights how I took into consideration insider/outsider aspects of my identity to facilitate my fieldwork and dealing with research participants.

When conducting interviews with men in Alpha and Beta camps I realised on several occasions that gatekeepers made sure the door of the room in which the interviews took place was open. I also noticed during several interviews with religious men that participants avoided eye contact with me. There was also a case where one interviewee turned his chair towards the wall to avoid eye contact with me, which I accepted and continued on with the interview. Maintaining respect towards participants, in terms of their culture, religion, norms and views was imperative for gaining their trust. When they saw that I respected and did not judge them for their actions and beliefs, even though they might be different from mine, participants reciprocated this respect towards me. This was highlighted during my interview with the religious man who had moved his chair and refused to look at me. At one point, he turned his chair and began maintaining eye contact while talking to me.

As previously mentioned, I took great care to dress appropriately when conducting my fieldwork. Moreover, my dress code varied depending on the subjects interviewed. For example, when conducting interviews with participants, I made sure to dress conservatively and modestly. Meanwhile, when I conducted interviews with policy makers I had to dress smartly. Although I felt anxious about conducting the interviews with policy makers, my
previous work experience gave me the confidence to carry them out. I also knew some of the interviewees through family and work connections, which facilitated the interview process.

I was initially anxious about discussing issues that might be considered politically sensitive during interviews. A successful method I used involved beginning discussions by asking general questions. For example, in the case of training and employment service providers interviewed, I would ask them about the services they provided, the groups they targeted and so forth. This made them feel more comfortable during the interviews and allowed me to go into more sensitive topics further on during the discussion. Such an approach has been recommended by scholars such as Richards (1996), whereby sensitive questions are asked further on in the interview, after building rapport with the interviewee.

I applied the same approach when interviewing participants, and asked them about general information on their education and economic background. Another successful approach used to address issues concerning Palestinians and citizenship was by starting the discussion with Syrian refugees and comparing them with the previous influxes of Iraqis and Palestinians, because this is a current topic of concern for the country and is commonly talked about by the general public.

Another important issue regarding my positionality that should be mentioned has to do with my use of personal and work connections (wastah) to facilitate my access to the field and interviewees. My father was a prominent businessman in Jordan.
Moreover, my work at UN Women also provided me with connections that I was also able to use later for the purpose of this study. So my family and work connections made it possible for me to interview high-level policy makers. Utilising family connections also greatly facilitated the approval processes needed to conduct my research in the camps, as well as in Centre C in Kafa. My experience in conducting this study therefore highlighted the importance of social influence (wastah) in Jordanian society. Nevertheless, as mentioned in Chapter Six with my research findings, it is disabling for those who do not have it, and enabling to those who do.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has presented the research methodology and design of this study. It has also discussed the strategies used during data collection and analysis, and issues of reflexivity and positionality within the context of the research. Multiple qualitative methods within a case study approach were used to explore the intersectionality of gender and citizenship on the livelihood strategies of protracted refugees, through a case study of Palestinians in Kafa, Jordan.

The next chapter is the first findings chapter, which explores the intersectionality of gender and citizenship in shaping access to further education for protracted Palestinian refugees in Jordan.
Chapter Four: How Does the Intersectionality of Gender and Citizenship Shape Access to Further Education for Protracted Palestinian Refugees in Jordan?

Introduction

This chapter draws on study data to demonstrate that the intersectionality of gender and citizenship influences pathways into further education for young women and men, with consequential impacts on their future employment opportunities. The agency of protracted refugees in accessing further education is also influenced by intersectional discrimination based on gender and citizenship.

As well as gender and citizenship influencing further education pathways, there is also a gap between labour supply and the market demands, which has been highlighted in various studies and policy documents (Barcucci and Mryyan, 2014; Jordan’s National Employment Strategy, 2011; Taghdisi-Rad, 2012).

Although the value of education was recognised by the majority of Transjordanians, Palestinian Jordanians and ex-Gazans, gender, citizenship status and family income influenced access to further education opportunities. For young graduates, patriarchal structures on micro and macro levels have further widened gender disparities in the labour market. This phenomenon is crosscutting for women irrespective of their citizenship status.
This chapter is an analysis of the intersectionality of gender and citizenship in shaping access to further education through an analysis of data generated from fieldwork observations, individual interviews and focus group discussions with policy makers, training and employment service providers, employers, and unemployed and employed Transjordanian, Palestinian Jordanian and ex-Gazan women and men in Kafa, Jordan.

**Women and Access to Further Education**

Fieldwork data indicated that economic variables and patriarchal attitudes played a role in influencing participants’ access to further education opportunities. The influence of these variables on access to further education also varied by gender and citizenship, as was reflected in the experiences of Transjordanian, Palestinian Jordanian and ex-Gazan women and men recounted during interviews.

In Jordan, irrespective of citizenship, power relations within the private and public spheres are shaped by patriarchal structures. Consequently, male family members are a key influence in the educational pathways of female relatives. The influence of patriarchy in defining gender roles and shaping opportunities for young women and men in their further education was highlighted during a field visit to Alpha camp, when a sketch was acted by a group of female students. The sketch aimed to highlight the challenges that girls faced in their pursuit of higher education due to patriarchal constraints within the private sphere. The sketch took place within a family household context and began by a mother calling for her
children to have lunch. The daughter was depicted sitting in her room studying, while her brother was sleeping. The daughter was showing her mother her high grades when the brother entered the room portrayed as lazy and spending most of his time either sleeping or out with his friends. The sleepy boy entered the room and informed his mother that he would be going out to see his friends and that he did not know when he would be back home. The mother approves of this and when the daughter asks if she can accompany her brother he shouts at her, saying no.

During the next scene the mother is seated next to the father, who is lying down on a couch. She informs the father that their daughter received the highest grades in school and that she thinks that she will want to go to university. The father says that this will never happen and that his daughter will get married and become a wife once she finishes school. The mother tries to convince the father but the father absolutely refuses the idea of his daughter pursuing a higher education. He bases his argument on the fact that the mother did not obtain a higher education and she turned out fine. The mother tries to convince the father but he shouts at her and threatens to divorce her.

The final scene ends with the mother informing her daughter that her father has refused the idea of her continuing her studies. The girl becomes sad and tries hard to convince her mother to change her father’s mind, but the mother informs her that she cannot, so the girl leaves the room crying. After completing the sketch, the girls acting the roles agreed that they needed to
emphasise the unequal treatment of parents towards their daughters and sons. The boys were being given the freedom to do whatever they wanted, with fewer expectations on them. Meanwhile, the girls had less freedom and opportunities in life (Field notes, 18 September 2013).

This passage highlights the influence of patriarchal structures at the family level. As well as ascribing certain roles for women and men, the patriarchal gender order also imposes specific duties, restrictions and ‘ways of conduct’ on them. It creates masculine and feminine roles for men and women that lead to power imbalances between them. The passage also shows how women are perceived as subordinate to men in the household (Connell and Connell, 2005). Nevertheless, it also depicts young women as active agents finding ways to negotiate with patriarchy. In this case, it was the daughter using her mother to reason with her father.

Fieldwork findings indicated that both gender and age influenced power dynamics between family members and decision-making processes within households. This was reflected during an interview with an unemployed young Palestinian Jordanian man from Beta camp who did not complete his secondary education. The man explained that his sisters were able to pursue a higher education because of the consent of his father and elder brothers. However,

If the decision was mine I would not have agreed, not because education is a bad thing, but because they have to go to a university that is outside Kafa and use public transport. I’d prefer that they would stay home and be safe (Interview,
MSC8, Not fixed work, single Palestinian man, 10\textsuperscript{th} grade (incomplete), 30, Beta camp).

This passage highlights the intersectionality of gender and age in defining power relations within the family unit. It portrays girls as ‘vulnerable’ and in need of men’s protection. As explained in Chapter One of the literature review on gender relations, women’s sexuality in the Middle East and other Muslim societies is linked to the family’s honour. Moreover, family honour is of particular concern to men because of their roles as ‘protectors’ within the family unit. The practice of \textit{sutra} (‘sheltering’) women signifies the need to protect them from the dishonour associated with sexuality, because it potentially brings shame not only to her, but to her family as well (Nasser Eddin, 2011). Hence, prohibiting women from engaging in the public sphere is a way of controlling women and preventing them from dishonouring the family. Such norms have influenced women’s access to both further education and employment opportunities. This was also illustrated during an interview with an ex-Gazan man who was married with children and owned a shop in Alpha camp. He explained,

\begin{quote}
\textit{I love education. But mixing women with men in our culture is not accepted by some people because it may lead to … I mean that I am a good person and you are too; but some are not … There is fear and there is also honour (Interview, MGC9, vocational training, 36, Alpha camp).}
\end{quote}

Higher education is likely to be prioritised for male over female siblings. This is because patriarchal gendered roles portray men as
breadwinners within the family unit and women as caregivers and dependents. During a focus group with employed ex-Gazans, a woman expressed how there was a general preference to educate a son over a daughter in cases where economic resources were limited,

‘You cannot afford to educate both the son and the daughter and you are forced to make a compromise’ (Focus group, employed women, Alpha camp).

She continued that one of the reasons for this preference was that,

‘The son will help me later with expenses. But for the daughter, she will eventually marry and go to her husband’s house’ (Focus group, employed women, Alpha camp).

The different opportunities to accessing further education for women and men in their natal families was also highlighted during an interview with a Palestinian Jordanian mother of two. The woman’s father had forced her to discontinue her master’s degree and get married because of the social pressure that constrained women’s participation in the public sphere. Comparing her experience to her brothers’, she insisted that women faced greater challenges to accessing further education opportunities. Highlighting the differential treatment of parents towards male and female sibling, she explained,

*During my years of study my father kept nagging about how shameful my travelling back and forth to Ramallah [which was the location of the university she went to] was and that people are wondering and gossiping about it saying, ‘Why do you have her there?’ On the other hand my brother was travelling...*
freely (Interview, FP_BetaCamp, unemployed Palestinian Jordanian woman, in the process of a divorce, incomplete master’s degree, 33, Kafa).

This passage shows the influence of patriarchy in consolidating gendered power imbalances that give privilege and freedom to men, whereas women are limited in their freedom and mobility. In both scenarios, symbolic meanings of ‘shame’ and ‘honour’ are attributed to women. These are socially constructed and founded on patriarchal ideologies that seek to reinforce male domination and control over women.

Transport was also an impediment for women in their access to training courses offered through centres outside Kafa. For men, transport was also viewed as a problem. However, the reasons were related to costs of commuting. The disadvantage that women faced because of issues related to transport was highlighted during a field visit to Centre D in Beta camp. The centre manager was visited by an employee affiliated to an international organisation based in Amman. They were offering a free training opportunity to camp residents and the manager directly nominated a young man. She explained that it would be difficult for women to commit to such training because of patriarchal constraints that restricted their freedom of mobility (Field notes, Sunday 23 June 2013).

Another challenge reported during interviews with women residing in camps and rural areas of Kafa was the burden of commuting due to inadequate transport services. For example, an
employed single ex-Gazan woman in Alpha camp mentioned the problem of transport during an interview, saying,

*Transport is a problem for those living here …* I took a course last year, which started at 9 a.m. If I do not leave with the 5 a.m. bus I will not get there on time … Sometimes the bus gets full quickly and leaves … [and] the next bus leaves at 6:30 a.m. [which means] I will be late for my course (Interview, FGC08, employed single ex-Gazan woman, 44, Alpha camp).

The long commute was particularly challenging for women in comparison to men because of the multiple roles that women have to fulfil in the private and public spheres.

Nevertheless, interviews indicated that age and marital status influenced women’s experiences in their access to further education. For example, young, single female interviewees were more likely to mention patriarchal constraints to accessing further education opportunities. Meanwhile, older women who weren’t married, such as the 44-year old single ex-Gazan, expressed having relatively greater freedom of movement. She was more concerned about transport costs rather than gender-related constraints. This highlights the different experiences that women face owing to their age and marital status.

Fieldwork findings showed that some participants underlined the importance of higher education for women, with reports of the preferential treatment of female siblings, specifically in cases of divorce and separation. For example, several mothers experiencing discrimination from their spouses, as well as those who were
separated or divorced, preferred educating their daughters over their sons. Education was regarded as a means to strengthen women’s resilience within patriarchal structures, so that they could support themselves if they needed to and in times of vulnerability.

This was highlighted during an interview with a Palestinian Jordanian mother-of-two from Beta Camp. The woman was ostracised by her family and community because of her separation from her spouse and was renting a flat with her two children outside the camp. Because of her harsh experience, she regarded education as vital for her children’s survival and even more so for her daughter. She explained,

It is important for my children to eat and drink, but I won’t think less about education for them … I might be more tolerant with my son but not with his sister (Interview, FP_BetaCamp, unemployed divorcing Palestinian Jordanian woman, incomplete master’s degree, 33, Kafa).

Preferential treatment in educating female siblings was also highlighted during interviews with Transjordanian women. Again, education was regarded as a tool to protect women where they were placed in vulnerable situations. This was reflected during a focus group with employed Transjordanians, when one woman explained,

You never know what will happen to the girl in the future. Even if she gets married she might get a divorce. Without education she has no future (Focus group, employed Transjordanian women, Kafa).
Education viewed as a form of protection for women rather than as a means to pursue a career is limiting. This is compounded by restricting further education for women to particular feminised fields. Traditionally it is socially acceptable for women to work in specific occupations and working environments, whereas for men the opportunities are greater for them. As one employed Transjordanian woman claimed, ‘They [men] can work in anything’ (Focus group, employed Transjordanian women). Another employed Transjordanian woman highlighted the value of education for women owing to the limited opportunities they have in the labour market, claiming, ‘In our community a girl’s only tool is education to find a job. But for guys there are many, they can even go to the army’ (Focus group, Employed Transjordanian women, Kafa).

This passage shows how education was perceived as an asset for women because it allowed them to compete for already-limited job opportunities available to them due to patriarchal structures. These structures limited women’s economic activities to those considered ‘socially acceptable’ for them to engage in. In the case of men however, they were freer in their specialisations and choices of employment, as they are considered to be the breadwinners and providers for their homes.

As well as protecting women against future vulnerability and facilitating access to already-limited fields of employment, a university degree was also found to give women greater social worth within their families and communities. Many men, however, believed that the value of educating women was less for enabling them to
share the economic burdens of family households than for its potential to ‘empower’ women to better perform their reproductive duties within the household as wives and mothers. This was highlighted during an interview with an ex-Gazan man who worked in a family business in the camp,

*I would accept that men marry a teacher because she is well educated so she can help him in teaching and raising her children properly, that is a good idea. But I am against a man who marries a working woman to take her money* (Interview, MGC8, married ex-Gazan man, 26, Alpha camp).

Similarly, another Transjordanian married man who had failed his Tawjihi and owned a shop in Kafa town believed that education was important for women because ‘*she would be more capable to take care of the children*’ (MEBJT5, Married Transjordanian man, Tawjihi fail, Business owner, 41).

Patriarchal structures that defined gender roles within the private and public spheres greatly influenced women’s access to further education. A Transjordanian who had completed her vocational education and was working as a manager at a beauty shop in Kafa town highlighted the diversity of views and practices concerning further education for women. She explained,

*There are some families that are quite conservative and do not allow her to study and work. The female gets married and goes to her husband’s house. Or she may reach the level of secondary school and that’s it. Or she may not be good in school so she stays at home. We have some rural areas*
around Kafa … The female is not allowed to go out and work, she stays at home until she gets married, and this is prevalent … But there are also some that finish universities and are open, and go and come, it depends on the family, on the social and financial status (Interview, FEB01, single employed Transjordanian woman, vocational training, 35, Kafa).

This passage indicates how women’s experiences in their access to further education can also vary according to the social and economic backgrounds of family households.

This section highlighted the influence of patriarchy on the further education pathways of women irrespective of their citizenship status. It shows how patriarchal notions, such as the male/breadwinner and female/caregiver model and the linking of women’s sexuality to family ‘honour’ and ‘shame’, have consolidated power imbalances that privilege men over women. Moreover they have limited women’s freedom of mobility and consequently their access to educational and training opportunities.

Furthermore, rather than being perceived a means to advance in one’s career, further education had other meanings for women and men, such as being an asset to protect women during periods of crisis, a means for them to better their caregiving duties, and a form of social worth.
Economic Factors Influencing Access to Higher Education

The economic status of families was perceived to be a key factor that influenced the educational outcomes of young women and men irrespective of their citizenship status. Nevertheless, women were at a greater disadvantage because of the male/breadwinner and female/caregiver model that encouraged parents to give preference to investing in their sons rather than their daughters.

Economic hardship also influenced opportunities for further education for women and men. For example, on numerous occasions, the cost of transport to and from university was reported to be a heavy financial burden on families. This was highlighted during an interview with an unemployed ex-Gazan mother, who explained that her husband:

Works in Amman, so he needs JD5 for transport costs; my daughter … Also needed JD5 to go to her university; her brother too because he works. That means we need JD15 each day for transport fees; a big part of our income goes on transport expenses, and the rest of the income must cover the expenses of the family, it is not easy (Interview, FGCHV1, unemployed married woman, illiterate, 44, Alpha camp).

Nevertheless, findings indicated that the rising cost of living has given women greater leverage to challenge patriarchy and a rationale to be educated and trained for employment. This was mentioned during an interview with a mother who worked at a community centre located in the rural outskirts of Kafa. She believed
that a university degree was necessary for women to compete for jobs. Furthermore, the woman emphasised the need for both female and male spouses to earn an income because of the rising cost of living, saying, ‘Look at life now, if you and your husband are employed you are barely able to pay bills’ (Interview, FEB9, employed married Transjordanian mother, 31, Kafa). With the need for women to share the economic burdens of family households, their access to further education was regarded more favourably.

In line with this, several men reported preferring to marry women with university degrees in order to ensure that they would be able share the economic burdens within the family household. There were also various accounts of women seeking to pursue a higher education in order to increase their opportunities of ‘marriageability’. This was reflected during an interview with a Transjordanian mother. She explained,

*It is very common here, now to find that a woman that is not educated, will be single all her life and stay at home with her parents ... Because life is so expensive ... The man will tell you I want someone to help me with the salary and money .... When he goes to get engaged, he would pick a fresh graduate and so forth ... And some days you will find that when he goes to get engaged to the woman, he will ask her what her specialisation is .... Meaning if there is a chance for her to get a job or not* (Interview, FEB3, unemployed married Transjordanian woman, Tauğīhī, 28, Kafa).
Hence, the pressures on families facing difficult economic conditions can enable women to better negotiate within the household for greater educational and training opportunities. Moreover, because of economic hardship, women with an education are increasingly seen as a necessary ‘asset’ to the household livelihood strategies (Chapter Six discusses livelihoods in more detail).

Many parents interviewed expressed the view that higher education was necessary for their children’s future livelihoods to be more secure. As one service provider stated,

_Even if the mother and father have to borrow, the most important [thing to them] is to teach their children. Because right now it is all the teaching sector, even doctors and engineers cannot find jobs, how will the situation be if they sit at home after Tauğīhī (Interview, 8SP, service provider, Kafa)._

Nevertheless, a few were sceptical of its value. Some young women and men interviewed were discouraged from continuing their higher education because of the experiences of their older family siblings who had completed their degrees but remained unemployed. One Jordanian married woman who had completed her matriculation at the age of 28 chose not to continue studying because:

_Everyone told me not to study at university, ‘Don’t study! What do you want with it? Look at us we all have certificates and we are sitting without work, so why would you want to trouble yourself and your children for four years and at the end sit and not work?’ So I thought yes that’s true it makes sense, so I left_

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(Interview, FEB3, unemployed married Transjordanian woman, tauğīḥī, 28, Kafa).

The influence of citizenship and poverty on the further education pathways of interviewees was also highlighted during interviews with ex-Gazans. Strategies to increase family income and reduce economic burdens within the households of ex-Gazans in Alpha camp were likely to be prioritised over education.

State provision of scholarships was one way of offering higher education opportunities to families with poor economic means. Nevertheless, state preferential treatment towards Transjordanians meant that they were at an advantage compared to Palestinian Jordanians and ex-Gazans from similar economic backgrounds. Moreover, ex-Gazans are even more disadvantaged as they are entitled to fewer scholarship opportunities than Transjordanians and Palestinian Jordanians. In the event that they do not obtain scholarships, they are required to pay the same tuition fees as foreigners in both public and private universities (Different scholarship opportunities available to Transjordanians, Palestinian Jordanians and ex-Gazans will be discussed later in the chapter).

The majority of those who questioned the value of a university degree included family members who completed their higher education and were unemployed. There were also reports of families facing economic hardship preferring their children to leave school and work in order to contribute to the family’s income. This was reflected during a discussion with an unemployed ex-Gazan
university graduate who explained that parents might prefer their children to leave school and work,

Because you'll read you [the child] won't benefit us, so it is a waste. So go work ... At the same time the father and his family will plant in the child's head that the father cannot support the family alone ... So the child is then obliged to work (Interview, MGC7, unemployed single ex-Gazan man, BS degree, 28, Alpha camp).

The man then went on to explain that ex-Gazan boys who drop out of school often end up working in vocational jobs such as 'construction, or as blacksmiths, or skilled artisan work' (Interview, MGC7, unemployed single ex-Gazan man, BS degree, 28, Alpha camp). The young man claimed that many of these ex-Gazan boys end up in temporary, low paid and unskilled jobs ‘because of the obstacles to employment in other fields’ (MGC7). This passage shows how poverty and discrimination can influence further education pathways of vulnerable populations such as ex-Gazans.

This section highlighted how economic hardship can create different experiences for young women and men in their access to education and training opportunities irrespective of citizenship status. However, the generally poorer economic conditions in Alpha camp, and lack of employment opportunities owing to the citizenship status of ex-Gazans, created greater disadvantages for them in their access to educational and training opportunities. In the case of women, while often being disabling, economic conditions can also enable them to negotiate for greater educational and employment opportunities.
Disjuncture between the Labour Supply and Market Demand

Fieldwork findings showed that most women and men seeking work gave greater importance to the gaps in their education or work experiences when explaining their unemployed status. These reports were common among Transjordanians and Palestinian Jordanians. However, in the case of ex-Gazans, as well as mentioning these, the majority highlighted their citizenship as a key reason for their unemployed status. These findings were the same for ex-Gazan women and men irrespective of gender.

A Transjordanian woman interviewee who had worked as a volunteer for 10 years at Centre C, expressed the view that her experience gave her more qualifications than a high school diploma. However, ‘Whenever they [employers] check my CV, they tell me if only you had your general secondary matriculation’ (Interview, FEB10, volunteer/unemployed, single Transjordanian woman, tauğīhī (failed), 36, Kafa).

There was also particular emphasis on the value of education among participants who did not complete their secondary and higher education. For example, during an interview with a Transjordanian who had failed her general secondary examination, the woman said,

\[ \text{All my father [who is illiterate] cared about was for us to study.} \]
\[ \text{He used to say all I want from you is to get your high school diploma, even if I have to take loans (Interview, FEB10,} \]


volunteer/unemployed, single Transjordanian woman, tauğīhī (failed), 36, Kafa).

Similarly, a Palestinian Jordanian who had failed to matriculate and worked as a shop owner in Beta camp blamed his poor economic status on his lack of academic achievements. The man said,

I wasn’t interested in studying, I didn’t have it in mind. Now a person feels it, after one gets older and married and the situation changes [meaning his financial responsibilities increased] (Interview, MSC3, married Palestinian Jordanian shop owner, 26, Beta camp).

There were mixed views on the topic of academic qualifications, work experience and access to employment opportunities. Many graduates who were unemployed or underemployed attributed their situation to a lack of work experience. One Transjordanian woman who had recently graduated from university and was searching for a job complained,

All [the companies] want no less than three years of experience, so how can a fresh graduate have this experience? (Interview, FJ1, unemployed single Transjordanian woman, vocational training, 25, Kafa).

Some believed that experience was more important than academic qualifications in facilitating access to employment because, as one unemployed woman explained,

With experience [one] can learn to better deal with problems at work. But women with university degrees and no
experience need training (Focus group, unemployed Transjordanian women, Kafa).

The majority of employers interviewed were owners of shops and in the services sector. Many reported communication skills as one of the most important skills needed, which they believed came with experience and did not require high academic proficiency. A health practitioner interviewed at a clinic in Kafa felt that often, fresh graduates required further training, as they lacked the practical skills needed in the work environment:

_They need a lot of training, they come not knowing anything in practice, mediocre because there is no relation between the university and practice. The new employee is shocked by the work environment. There is training in universities but it is very different from the practical work_ (Interview, FEBJT1, employed married Transjordanian woman, 32, Kafa).

According to her, fresh graduates lacked skills such as ‘issues related to administration and awareness of employment law … Things they do not teach you at university, writing reports … [And] communication skills’ (FEBJT1).

There were also reports of university graduates with little experience being at greater risk of exploitation during employment. One Transjordanian young man highlighted this problem by saying,

_When you don’t have experience they [employers] exploit you. They pay JD150 in Amman. What would I do with this amount?_ (Interview, MEBJT3, employed single Transjordanian, community College, 25, Kafa).
In the case of ex-Gazans with university degrees, they were even more vulnerable to exploitation in the labour market, owing to the limited job opportunities open to them because of their citizenship status.

Explanations about high unemployment were given during interviews with policy makers and service providers as being due to the gap between the qualifications of the labour force and market demands in Kafa. These findings were similar to the literature, which reported a concentration of poorly paid and low-skilled jobs. Instead, there was a general preference for white-collar occupations in the public sector (See Chapter Two: Setting). Such trends were crosscutting regardless of citizenship status and gender.

A senior policy maker highlighted the need for the government to address the oversupply of skills related to specific occupations in Jordan. According to her, university students needed to be directed to fields that are in demand in the labour market (Field notes, PM99, 27 August 2013). An employee at a training and employment centre in Beta camp also highlighted discrepancies between labour supply and market demands from her experience in working with camp-dwellers seeking employment in Kafa. She claimed that:

*Families are surprised to find that their child when he finishes university doesn’t find work and sits and ‘waits in line’ [for employment in the public sector through the CSB] (Interview, 3SP, training and employment service provider, Beta camp).*

The public sector is an important area of employment for university graduates. Many, particularly women, pursue a higher
degree with the hope of having better opportunities to be employed in this sector. The public sector is however very competitive, with limited job opportunities available to women and men. Instead, most employment opportunities are poorly paid unskilled jobs and therefore many new graduates reported preferring to remain unemployed.

Interviews with policy makers highlighted a need for policy-level changes through a top–bottom approach in order to address the gap between the skills sets of the labour force and market demands. A senior policy maker interviewed, who had occupied a high-level position in one of Jordan’s public universities, recognised the role of the state in addressing this gap, but acknowledged that ‘They do not do anything about it’ (Interview, PM93, policy maker).

Similarly, when asked about her views on Jordan’s education system, a gender specialist said,

The education system, forget about it, they need to shake it up from top to bottom, and the vocational aspects of it as well. But the thing is you’re not getting anybody to try something different, and that’s getting everybody stuck in the same mode and cycle … This is what people know, this is what they’re comfortable doing, introduce something different, people are not likely to come (Interview, PM00, policy maker, Amman).

Interviews with policy makers and service providers highlighted the importance of directing students to vocational streams of education in order to meet market demands. Many believed that vocational education offered greater employment
opportunities to young women and men than a university degree. During a discussion with a VTC trainer in Kafa, the interviewee explained,

_In Jordan … Academic job opportunities are few, however vocational job opportunities are greater, so his role [at work] is to try direct the job seeker … To the vocational training centre if he doesn’t have a vocation_ (Interview, 5SP, service provider, Kafa).

The interviewee said that he would direct job seekers to the centre so that they could be trained in vocations such as carpentry and metal work that were demanded by the labour market.

In terms of the role of citizenship status in access to vocational training opportunities, as well as having equal entitlements by law to Transjordanians, Palestinian refugees with full Jordanian citizenship are eligible to receive training from UNRWA’s vocational training centres. In the case of ex-Gazans however, they are required to obtain approvals from the Department of Palestinian Affairs, which is based in Amman (Refugee Review Tribunal Australia, 2009). As mentioned by one ex-Gazan man,

_They make us go back and forth for approvals for almost everything, which costs money and time, at the end we get rejected_ (Interview, MGC7, unemployed single ex-Gazan man, BSc degree, 28, Alpha camp).

In the case of ex-Gazan women, as well as these constraints, they were also faced with social restrictions on their mobility, which posed a challenge in seeking the required approvals.
Another female service provider working in a training and employment centre expressed the view that:

There are many cases where women graduating with diplomas, bachelor’s, or master’s degrees go back to studying vocational skills at VTCs because they cannot find jobs (Interview, 3SP, service provider, Beta camp).

Many participants however – and particularly women – saw vocational education as inferior to other academic streams. During an interview with a Transjordanian university student he stated that he believed people who resorted to vocational training were those who ‘went to university and failed, and were unlucky and did not complete their studies, so they would resort to training to find work’ (Interview, MJEB2, single unemployed Transjordanian, bachelor’s degree, 25, Kafa). The status of vocational education as a less-preferred option for young men and women is common in Arab countries (Vlaardingerbroek and El-Masri, 2008). Often, individuals studying vocational skills are looked down upon and labelled as poor in their academic achievements (Eichhorst et al., 2012).

Similarly, during a focus group with employed Jordanian women, one participant claimed,

Vocational training is not very good for girls, not in our society. The way the community looks at girls who have been educated is different than those who did not get an education (Focus group, employed Transjordanian women, Kafa).

Stereotyped gender roles shape women’s academic and training choices to those that society regards as socially acceptable
for them to engage in. They were therefore more likely to specialise in feminised streams of education and training, such as teaching, which were likely to limit their career development.

However, during my fieldwork I attended several training workshops offered through CBOs on non-conventional vocations that targeted women, such as a workshop on plumbing. During discussions, one woman claimed that she would only apply the learned skills in her home, and not as income-generating activity because such occupations were not socially acceptable for women to work in. Moreover, highlighting gender divisions in roles, another woman said that women find it difficult to do tasks such as plumbing, just as her son cannot iron (Field notes, 1 May 2013).

This passage reflects the influence of masculine and feminine binaries in defining socially acceptable skills and specialisations for both women and men. Similarly, perceptions of stereotyped gender roles were also reflected during an interview with an employee at training and employment centre, who complained that harsh economic conditions in Jordan had forced people to work in non-conventional roles, which he regarded as socially unacceptable. He gave the example of policewomen in Kafa, saying,

You may not like this but I’m telling you my personal opinion … To be a traffic police-woman in Kafa, I would not like. A traffic policewoman to go on the field … I would not like … Even though this is happening in Kafa … Firstly, our religion, our custom and tradition, they are different [from the West] now if you go to the road you will see traffic police-women …
But still there are people that do not accept this (Interview, 7SP, service provider, Kafa).

As for training opportunities for individuals wishing to set up micro-enterprises offered through CBOs and NGOs in Kafa, the most commonly mentioned problem was the lack of marketing and financial support that came with these interventions. This was highlighted as a major challenge to the sustainability of such interventions within and outside the camps. One ex-Gazan woman emphasised the problem of marketing during a focus group discussion by saying,

The problem is not with us. The trainer came and gave us this course on how to make soaps. He brought all the material with him. If you go up to that room now where the course took place, you will find soaps that cost more than JD1,000. The problem is that they help us learn soap making, but do not help us sell them. They know more people that would help us sell things like this, we do not know anyone. When you plan to make a course like this, what is the first thing that needs to be done? Find the material and the connections to sell what you have done, right? If you do not have these things your project fails (Interview, FGC08, employed single ex-Gazan woman, 44, Alpha camp).

This was also reported during an informal discussion with an UNRWA officer responsible for all of the Women Programme Centres in the camps. The woman highlighted the need to work on marketing to sell the women’s products (Field notes, 8 September 2013).
Another social worker in Alpha camp also pointed out this challenge, saying that the programme she was involved in lacked marketing and planning for income-generating projects, and asked me if I could help her with this (Field notes, 2 July 2013). She believed that a major challenge to the sustainability of committees managing CBOs in the camp is that they are run by women, who were not as efficient and productive as men. The social worker said that she was planning on bringing in a man to manage the committee of one of the CBOs in the camp because men are more likely to want to prove themselves and their achievements than women (Field notes, 2 July 2013).

Similarly a gender specialist and trainer emphasised the need for better marketing strategies when providing training and micro-enterprise opportunities to women. The trainer also highlighted the importance of training women to build their confidence, as, unlike men, they lacked such skills.

Another problem reported during an interview with a gender specialist regarding training offered to women on income-generating projects is that:

_They become routine trainings … It becomes a training you give, you move on, with those you can, I mean you’re working with women, some of them have not finished education_ (Interview, PM00, policy maker/ gender specialist, Amman).

Nevertheless, the manager of Centre B in Alpha camp highlighted the active role that women can have as leaders within a community and as facilitators in empowering girls and women in the
camp. Giving the example of herself as the manager of the centre, she said that if she

*Ask[ed] a mother to enrol her daughter in one of our courses, she will accept for my sake, she would be saying that the Director of the Centre advised me* (*Interview, 6SP, service provider, Alpha camp*).

Highlighting the need for better-planned training in Jordan, a gender specialist gave the example of a study conducted by the World Bank on the impact of training and wage subsidy programmes on female youth employment in Jordan (Groh *et al.*, 2012). The study highlighted that:

*Skilled training is not helping people create and enter jobs and maintain jobs, [which means that] you’re wasting millions and millions of dollars in the training … A lot of people [are] training for jobs but … You look at the employment strategy that says 500,000 unskilled jobs, well they [training offered and jobs available] don’t match* (*Interview, PM00, policy maker/gender specialist, Amman*).

Hence, the gender specialist highlighted a mismatch between the training offered to job seekers and the demands of the labour market.

This section highlighted the different explanations that women and men had for unemployment in Kafa. While Transjordanians and Palestinian Jordanians seeking employment gave importance to the gaps in their education and work experiences, ex-Gazans saw their citizenship as a key reason for their unemployment.
Interviews with employers, policy makers and service providers highlighted a mismatch between the skill sets of university graduates and labour market demands. There was also a general preference to be employed in white-collar occupations. However, the majority of jobs in Kafa were in poorly paid positions. During interviews with policy makers, the state was seen as accountable for its inaction to reform the education sector so that it better matched labour market demands.

For women, socially constructed notions of masculinities and femininities further limited their academic and training pathways to socially accepted qualifications and occupations. This made it more difficult for women to acquire skill sets and work in jobs demanded by the labour market.

**Access to Higher Education and Citizenship**

While most Transjordanians and Palestinian Jordanians reported their (Tağīhī) grades to be a main factor influencing their access to higher education opportunities, for ex-Gazans it was their citizenship status, which was temporary with no national identity numbers. This was reflected in an interview with a young woman who claimed that many ex-Gazans nowadays worry about whether or not they will be accepted to university because

*The application for the university now is online … Having a national number is a must … [For example] I got the highest grades in my studies and I was not sure what would happen*
Hence, as well as having to worry about merit, citizenship status created further disadvantages to ex-Gazans in accessing higher education.

Higher educational pathways are limited for ex-Gazans with temporary citizenships in comparison with Transjordanians and Palestinian Jordanians. They are restricted to the occupations that they are legally permitted to engage in. Although a few ex-Gazans who had completed their university degrees mentioned that their choice of specialisation depended on the occupations they were eligible to work in, many participants reported selecting fields that were forbidden for them to work in such as tourism and journalism. Hence, career guidance plays an important role in directing young ex-Gazan women and men to specialisations that they could pursue a career in.

Nevertheless, none of the students in or outside camps reported having career guidance services in their schools to support them when choosing and applying for a university degree. The choice of specialisations open to students relied mainly on the matriculation grade that they received. However, many participants – irrespective of their gender and citizenship – relied on guidance through direct and extended family networks and word of mouth, which were perhaps not always accurate.

The consequences of poor career guidance were more severe for ex-Gazans, who were restricted in the occupations they could
choose owing to their citizenship status. For example, an ex-Gazan young woman shared her experience:

*I had always wanted to study architecture … But they told me I’m not eligible because I don’t have a national number, even though my average was high, I got a 98 per cent. So that’s it, I gave up …* They [her family] advised me to study education, *I said education is better than sitting at home, so I studied education* (Interview, FGC2, unemployed single ex-Gazan woman, BA holder, 25, Alpha camp).

For ex-Gazans to work in the private sector is very much conditional on their acquiring security clearance. This takes at least six months, which makes it difficult for them to secure a private sector job. Meanwhile, in the case of professional occupations (such as pharmacists, lawyers, dentists, doctors and engineers), this is left to the discretion of professional syndicates, each of which have its own political stance.

The exclusionary citizenship status of ex-Gazans also meant that they were more vulnerable to policy changes in the country. For example, an ex-Gazan university graduate shared his experience, saying that he chose to specialise in nursing because when he entered that field there was:

*A shortage of supply in this profession [in Jordan], so they [the government] used to let ex-Gazans work in nursing. It was open and I entered it. Suddenly, everybody went for this field and the opportunities closed up* (Interview, MGC7,
unemployed single ex-Gazan man, BS degree, 28, Alpha camp).

This passage highlights the vulnerability of ex-Gazans to changes in state policies because of their citizenship status. For ex-Gazan women, their experiences were different from Transjordanians and Palestinian Jordanians. This is because of the intersectionality of gender and citizenship for, as well as patriarchal constraints limiting their educational pathways to feminised specialisations, they also faced challenges owing to their citizenship status.

This section highlighted a lack of career guidance services offered to students wishing to continue their higher education. These findings were the same for students interviewed irrespective of their citizenship status. Nevertheless, the impact of poor guidance services was greater on ex-Gazans because of occupational restrictions imposed on them owing to their citizenship status.

As well as merit playing a role in influencing access to higher education pathways, women were further limited in their opportunities to access feminised specialisations. In the case of ex-Gazan women however, as well as merit and patriarchy playing a role in their educational pathways, they were further disadvantaged because of the restrictions they faced owing to their citizenship status.

As was explained in Chapter Two, Palestinian Jordanians with poor economic means are at a disadvantage when accessing higher education. This is because access to higher education in Jordan is either through quota systems that give preferential treatment to
Transjordanians or through individually paid tuition fees (El-Abed, 2014).

While interviews with Palestinian Jordanians highlighted preferential treatment towards Transjordanians as discriminatory against them, another view was given by a high-level education policy maker. The interviewee believed that Palestinians and Transjordanians are given equal access to higher education opportunities in Jordan. He did not see the state as institutionally discriminating against Palestinians. Instead he believed that the problem lay in the tendency for people to misinterpret government policies as discriminatory towards them.

The policy maker gave the example of a change in the higher education system, from offering seats to those with the highest grade point averages to a quota system based on each governorate in Jordan. He claimed that although the system was interpreted by many Palestinians as a form of institutional discrimination against them, in reality, it was introduced to provide greater opportunities to Jordanians living in marginalised areas where educational services are poor. Another example given was the quota system that allocated 20 per cent of government university seats to children of the armed forces. The interviewee explained that Palestinians viewed this as discriminatory because most of these occupations are only open to Transjordanians (Interview, PM93, policy maker). However, he justified the quota system because it aimed to provide assistance to Jordanian families with parents who may have been martyrs by being killed in combat.
Access to scholarships for Palestinian refugees is influenced not only by citizenship status but also by being registered with UNRWA and residing in a camp. This was highlighted during interviews with Palestinian Jordanians and ex-Gazans. They explained that UNRWA scholarships were only accessible to Palestinian refugees residing in Palestinian camps and attending UNRWA schools for no less than five years. An ex-Gazan mother explained,

*Here are the borders of the camp [portraying them with her hands]; if I am here [pointing beyond the borders] I will not be allowed [to apply for the UNRWA scholarship] … You also have to study five years in UNRWA schools; and not be an outsider (Interview, FGCHV1, unemployed ex-Gazan mother, illiterate, 44, Alpha camp).*

By ‘outsider’ the woman meant that one has to be registered with UNRWA as a Palestinian refugee and reside in an UNRWA refugee camp.

Similarly, during a visit to the Department of Palestinian Affairs, an employee informed me that people chose to live in the camp to get royal favours, which he explained were scholarships provided to Palestinians who resided in refugee camps for a minimum of 10 years. Palestinians outside the camps are not entitled to these scholarships\(^\text{20}\) (Field notes, 17 June 2013).

\(^\text{20}\) The actual duration required is a minimum of 10 years. I was informed this during a conversation with an employee at the Department of Palestinian Affairs in Jordan (See field notes, 17 June 2013).
The differential treatment that ex-Gazans experienced compared with Palestinian Jordanians in accessing public universities was mentioned during an interview with an ex-Gazan man. The young man who had recently completed a bachelor’s degree and was unemployed, explained,

You [ex-Gazans] have to pay in US Dollars like any foreign student, but this payment system is for public universities. In private universities, foreigners pay the same as Jordanians (Interview, MGC7, unemployed single ex-Gazan man, BS degree, 28, Alpha camp).

On another occasion during a field visit to Alpha camp, an unemployed ex-Gazan young man compared his situation to foreigners, highlighting the extent to which Gazans are excluded from opportunities in higher education in Jordan. He said,

They treat us like foreigners but with greater constraints … I wish I was treated like a foreigner … Who gets to pay only in US dollars when paying a university tuition … This is what we are asked when paying tuition fees in Jordan (Field notes, 18 August 2013).

A legal aid advisor also highlighted when he was interviewed the unequal access to higher education provided to Palestinian refugees. He explained that the problem with Jordanian society was that:

When we want the right to education, we look for a royal favour [makrumah], or someone who can use their influence and connections for us (wastah) and so on. This is how we
deal with our problems, we don’t look at our rights (Interview, PM96, policy maker/legal aid advisor, Amman).

This section highlighted the differential access to higher education scholarships based on citizenship. Preferential treatment towards Transjordanians through state quota systems placed them at an advantage compared with Palestinian Jordanians and ex-Gazans. Ex-Gazans with exclusionary forms of citizenship were further marginalised from higher education opportunities through restrictions on scholarship opportunities as well as discriminatory policies.

Other factors played a role in influencing access to scholarship opportunities for Palestinian refugees. This is because only refugees residing in UNRWA camps and studying at the agency’s schools for no less than ten years were entitled to UNRWA’s scholarships.

As for ex-Gazans, fewer scholarship opportunities are open to them compared with Palestinian Jordanians. Moreover, their non-citizenship status meant that those who did not obtain scholarships were required to pay tuition fees equivalent to foreigners’ fees and in US dollars. This shows how Transjordanians, Palestinian Jordanians and ex-Gazans go through different experiences in accessing university scholarships owing to their citizenship statuses. Moreover, these findings were the same for women and men, irrespective of gender. This section also highlights the importance of recognising one’s rights to access greater opportunities in further education, which in the case of ex-Gazans is particularly important because of their exclusionary citizenship status.
Career Aspirations

Despite the competitive nature of the labour market, many young women and men aspired to pursue higher education, believing that it would improve their future career opportunities.

Although it was believed that higher education would provide greater opportunities to better-paid jobs and positions, interviews with training and employment service providers showed otherwise. Instead, vocational training was reported as a greater asset to secure jobs, particularly in Kafa. In the case of women, a training and employment service provider explained that although more women held higher educational degrees than men, this does not necessarily mean that it is easier for them to find work, because:

*The requirements [they ask for] are not available ... They prefer office jobs, they don’t like jobs that require manual work, they don’t want vocational [jobs, which is what are demanded by the labour market] (Interview, 7SP, service provider, Kafa).*

Many Transjordanian men with higher degrees aspired to work in the field of their specialisation. Comparing himself to less educated men, a young Transjordanian man said,

*I am an educated man and I finished my studies, so I want to go look for work within my area of study. There are for example men who go and look for jobs to secure themselves and be able to survive, they will not be educated and their situation will be a bit poor ... You have to look at it on a social
level. For example, I am an engineer, and people know that I am an engineer. Would I go work in a restaurant … And wash dishes and wipe tables? … On a social level … They will say he is an engineer, why is he working like that? (Interview, MJEB2, single unemployed Transjordanian, bachelor’s degree, 25, Kafa).

A training and employment service provider highlighted the problem of ‘people preferring to work in the specialisations they have studied’ (Interview, 7SP, service provider, Kafa), giving the example of a person that studies business administration and saying, ‘He will just want to work this, and not look for other options’ (7SP).

Many young men aspired to emigrate abroad, the reasons for which mainly revolved around a lack of ‘suitable’ job opportunities in Jordan. A Transjordanian married man who owned a shop in Kafa town said,

_I want to leave this country. I would do anything to get out of the country … Almost all my friends are like me … They want to leave this country, especially those from Kafa … Because of the economic situation_ (Interview, MEBJT22, Business owner, Secondary education, 32, Kafa town).

In the case of Palestinians, and particularly ex-Gazans, many young men aspired to emigrate abroad for higher education or employment. Emigration was seen as a way out of life as a ‘refugee’. An employed ex-Gazan man with a bachelor’s degree explained that emigration was very popular among young men in Alpha camp. The
man gave an example of a friend of his who immigrated to New Zealand and told him that:

*He spent 32 years in Jordan, and didn’t feel that he lived, he started living only when he emigrated. It was just then when he felt alive* (Interview, MGC2, employed ex-Gazan, married with children, bachelor’s degree, 29, Alpha camp).

Nevertheless, in the case of ex-Gazans, travelling abroad was more difficult because of their citizenship status.

While education was perceived as an asset to secure better economic opportunities for Transjordanians, for Palestinian refugees and particularly ex-Gazans it was a tool to protect them from future uncertainty.

The disadvantage of protracted Palestinian refugees was highlighted during interviews, and education was regarded as a tool that would allow them to negotiate power relations with their host population. Many believed that they had ‘to study harder to enhance [their] personal competitive power and overcome the disadvantages emanating from [their] refugee status’ (Shaath, 1972: 95). This was highlighted during an interview with an ex-Gazan man with a bachelor’s degree who had Egyptian travel documents. He said,

*Parents showed us the importance of studying. They keep telling us that here in Jordan there is only one way to succeed and that is to focus on your studies. If we want to become respected and find suitable jobs, we need to study. Or else we will become like these children in the camp – all they do is stay on the streets* (Interview, MGC4, single ex-Gazan
university student, works part-time in family business, 25, Alpha camp).

Similarly, an ex-Gazan man who was married and had children aspired to emigrate abroad with his family so that his child could ‘be raised not as a Gazan refugee’ (Interview, MGC2, employed ex-Gazan, married with children, bachelor's degree, 29, Alpha camp). This passage also shows how emigration is regarded as a means to overcome negative attributes associated with labels such as ‘refugees’ and ‘camp-dwellers’.

This section highlighted how education was valued by most participants irrespective of citizenship. Nevertheless, this was more so for Palestinian refugees, in order to better deal with future uncertainties. Many perceived themselves to be at a disadvantage to their host population because of their ‘refugee status’. Having an education was therefore necessary for them to better compete with the host population for job opportunities.

In the case of women, most of those interviewed aspired either to complete their education or to study for a higher degree. These findings were similar irrespective of citizenship status. However, traveling abroad to pursue a higher education was not an option for the majority, because of either citizenship status or the intersectionality of citizenship status and gender, as well as a lack of resources.
Conclusion

This chapter has examined the intersectionality of gender and citizenship in shaping further education opportunities for protracted Palestinian refugees in Kafa, Jordan. It highlighted how the intersectionality of gender and citizenship extends understandings on inequalities in further education opportunities for protracted refugee women and men in comparison with their host population and within a patriarchal context. This chapter adopts a holistic lens by examining the views of policy makers (macro level), service providers (meso level) and protracted refugees (micro level) on the intersectionality of gender and citizenship in access to further education.

This chapter also showed the exclusionary side of citizenship and its impact on protracted refugees, in particular Palestinian Jordanian and ex-Gazan women and men in their access to further education. The influence of inclusionary and exclusionary forms of citizenship was highlighted in relation to scholarships. Preferential treatment towards Transjordanians excluded Palestinians with full Jordanian citizenship from equal access to higher education opportunities. Ex-Gazan women and men were further disadvantaged because of their ineligibility to apply for government scholarships and the requirement to compete with Palestinian refugees with greater opportunities than them owing to their citizenship status. Moreover, ex-Gazan women were at a greater disadvantage than men were because, as well as being constrained
by exclusionary forms of citizenship, patriarchal constraints further
challenged their access to further education opportunities.

A clear mismatch between labour market supply and demand
has been highlighted by service providers and policy makers, with
emphasis on the vocational sector as a niche area of employment.
Nevertheless, the negative stigmatisation of such fields further
challenged the needs of the labour supply to meet with the market
demands for men and more so for women. This is because
stereotyped gender roles made it more acceptable for men to work in
vocations than women.

As well as being eligible for vocational training opportunities
through the state, Palestinian refugees are also entitled to those
provided through UNRWA’s vocational training centres, which puts
them at an advantage over Transjordanians. In the case of ex-
Gazans, however, their exclusionary citizenship made it difficult for
them to access vocational training, as they were required approvals
from the DPA, which in most cases several claimed was a rejection.

In the case of women, this chapter has identified social
divisions and public/private dichotomies in relation to gender and
economic citizenship that reinforced inequalities in access to further
education. Findings showed that gendered notions based on
patriarchal ideologies such as feminine and masculine binaries and
the male/breadwinner and female/caregiver model, as well as
symbolic notions of ‘shame’ associated with a woman’s sexuality,
have further disadvantaged them from men in their access to
education irrespective of citizenship.
In general women were at a greater disadvantage than men in accessing further educational opportunities due to patriarchal structures on micro and macro levels. Nevertheless, fieldwork findings showed that, rather than being passive, they often expressed an active agency to negotiate with patriarchy to improve their opportunities. The agency of women and men to access further education varied depending on social markers such as their economic background and gender. This chapter has highlighted how the experiences and agency of women and men to address intersectional discrimination when accessing further education varied depending on their gender and citizenship. Moreover, the importance of being aware of one’s rights in order to make better-informed decisions for one’s future was also emphasised, and particularly among ex-Gazans with exclusionary forms of citizenship.
Chapter Five: How Does the Intersectionality of Gender and Citizenship Influence Employment Opportunities for Protracted Palestinian Refugees in Jordan?

Introduction

This chapter is an analysis of the influence of gender and citizenship on access to employment opportunities of protracted refugees through a case study of Palestinians in Kafa, Jordan. This is an analysis of the influence of intersectional discrimination on macro and micro levels to extend understandings of exclusionary and inclusionary forms of citizenship in shaping the experiences of protracted refugees in accessing employment.

This chapter contains an analysis of policy-level perspectives of labour laws and their implementation in relation to gender and citizenship, specifically for protracted Palestinian refugees. It will also apply a gendered lens to examine perspectives on the influence of labour law policies and practices in shaping public and private sector employment preferences among protracted refugee women and men. This will be followed by an analysis of the intersectionality of gender and citizenship in shaping experiences of protracted refugee women and men in their access to employment compared to the host population in Jordan.

The argument set out in this chapter is that there are clear inconsistencies between the *de jure* and *de facto* implementation of
Jordanian labour laws, particularly in the private sector. Consequently, private sector employees, especially women, are at a greater risk of being discriminated against. Findings highlighted the extent to which multiple forms of discrimination affected employment opportunities in the private and public sector for Palestinian women and men who are protracted refugees. The following section will begin by exploring policy-level perspectives on labour laws in relation to citizenship status and gender, specifically as applicable to protracted Palestinian refugees.

Policy-Level Perspectives on Employment in Jordan in Relation to Gender and Citizenship Status

In Jordan, the issue of citizenship and employment is clear in terms of formal policy, which states that non-Jordanians cannot work without permission from the Ministry of Labour (MOL), which is responsible for monitoring and prosecuting any labour law violations (See Appendix 1, Table 1.2(15), page 391 for the link to the Jordanian labour law).

In the case of Palestinian refugees, those with full Jordanian citizenship are by law entitled to equal access to employment. However, rather than being a legal de jure issue, it is more a matter of de facto discrimination that challenges their full economic citizenship, particularly within the military and security sectors. An explanation for such discrimination was given during an interview with a senior government official, who explained,
It was difficult for them [Palestinian Jordanians] to take over jobs that entailed sensitive state issues ... Related to security ... Because of [incidents of the Black September] ... [For this reason] they [Palestinian Jordanians] have this feeling ... Of disenfranchised rights, they will tell you ‘oh brother we are Jordanians’ ... [If you are] a Jordanian, fine ... You are welcome [to stay in Jordan] ... But you cannot be a Jordanian and Palestinian at the same time ... It’s difficult because the interests of both parties conflict with each other ... So the divide is present, but it is not extreme ... It remains that people who need jobs, who want to be a minister, if they did not get the opportunity, they will tell you, ‘It’s because I am from the West Bank’ ... [Palestinian Jordanians residing in the West Bank do not have feelings of resentment towards Jordan] because they do not have a problem of wanting or not wanting a job ... Whereas here they [Palestinian Jordanians living in Jordan] have a problem of wanting a job ... I mean there is competition (Interview, PM93, policy maker).

Although stating that certain ‘sensitive’ occupations are closed to Palestinian Jordanians, the senior government official claimed that often discrimination is used to explain lost opportunities. Because citizenship is connected to the nation-state model, dual citizenship has not been accepted in many countries, including Jordan. The situation of Palestinian Jordanians with ‘the right to return’ to Palestine highlights possible conflicting loyalties to a nation-state. An expert on Palestinian refugees expressed the view that Palestinian
Jordanians faced discrimination because of their status and origin as refugees who came to Jordan in 1948. Elaborating on the issue, he stated,

Yes you have the legal system of the law, yes you shouldn’t have any difference between Jordanians whatever their origin, but you have the politics, and this is the trick in Jordan. How do you manage a population that is within a system, as citizens, but as well they are outside, they have ‘the right to return’, so that means tomorrow they could leave the country … So this means that people are here and not here at the same time … These people may serve the PLO or the future Palestinian state, who knows whether the PLO or the future Palestinian state will be Jordan’s friend … So why should you … Put them at the heart of the regime … You cannot have it both ways, you cannot continue to claim collective national claims ‘to return’, to be Palestinian, and then individually as well to have rights … And Jordan has taken the decision that did harm [to] dual [citizenship holders] … [Because] when they withdraw your citizenship you find yourself stateless, but it’s out of the political game (Interview, PM95, policy maker).

This highlights how exclusionary forms of citizenship can disadvantage some citizens from others based on – in this case – ‘place of origin’. It also brings about Kabeer’s (2005) notion of justice – which is a key tenet to inclusive citizenship – and refers to the question of when it becomes fair to treat people differently. The unequal treatment of Palestinian Jordanians goes against Article 6(i)
of the Jordanian Constitution, as well as international human rights instruments such as Article 2.2 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and Article 5(e) of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD). Jordan is a signatory to both international human rights instruments, which advocate for equal rights to citizens and prohibit discrimination.

For ex-Gazans with two-year temporary passports the issue ‘is a legislative problem’ according to a gender specialist (Interview, PM00, policy maker). During an informal discussion, another policy maker who occupied a senior position in the government said that the Palestinian Authority did not want host countries to naturalise ex-Gazans so that they can preserve the ‘Palestinian cause’ and continue to signify ‘Palestinian suffering’. She added that Jordan also benefits from this by gaining funds on their behalf. There was also the fear of Jordan becoming an alternative state, as some may argue that more than half of the population is of Palestinian origin. Therefore, the naturalisation of ex-Gazans would greatly disrupt the balance in the country (Field notes, 20 July 2013). Another civil servant, justified the government’s stance towards ex-Gazans by saying,

The PLO don’t want us to give the Gazans [citizenship] because … For us [Jordan] the union happened with the West Bank, and not with Gaza, Gaza was under Egypt, whereas these [West Bankers] had [citizenship entitlements] … But with regards to employment and so on, Gazans and non-
Gazans work, but they do not give them a national number. I mean the son of Gaza does not get a national number, as they don’t give a Syrian or an Iraqi and so forth (Interview, PM93, policy maker/civil servant).

Hence, the interviewee believed that ex-Gazans are not discriminated against because the law does not recognise them as citizens. However, policies do not take into account that unlike other migrants, ex-Gazans are refugees who have been in a state of protraction for 48 years a situation, which is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.

Moreover, under the 1954 Jordanian Nationality Law, ‘Any Arab who has resided continuously in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan for not less than 15 years may acquire Jordanian nationality, by decision of the Council of Ministers taken on a proposal by the Minister of Internal Affairs, if he renounces his nationality of origin and the law of his country permits him to do so’ (Law No. 6., Article 4) (See Appendix 1, Table 1.2(10), page 391, for further information on the Nationality Law). Again, this brings forward Kabeer’s (2005) notion of ‘justice’, which refers to the question of when it is acceptable for people to be treated differently from others. While ex-Gazans are not legally regarded as citizens because of their exclusionary citizenship status, the Jordanian Nationality Law states that rights to naturalisation should be legalised through processes of jus soli – meaning rights to nationality according to one’s duration of stay in a country.

21 This law was last amended in 1987.
Policy makers’ perspectives on women’s participation in the labour market has showed that this has been greatly influenced by formal and informal patriarchal structures that have created unequal employment opportunities for them compared with men. Women’s economic citizenship is strongly gendered and based on a patriarchy that operates on micro and macro levels, delineating what is considered as socially acceptable occupations and environments for paid labour in both the private and public sectors.

The influence of patriarchy on women’s economic participation was reflected during an interview with a senior military officer who explained, ‘We are living in a patriarchal society … What is acceptable for men is unacceptable for women’ (Interview, PM97, policy maker/senior military officer). Highlighting the influence of patriarchy on a macro level in Jordan, a gender expert stated,

*The economic model of Jordan is built on the male being the breadwinner … If you are a married couple, tax exemptions are for the man. It’s not the highest salary … Everything rotates around [the man] as the breadwinner* (Interview, PM00, policy maker).

Hence, gendered patriarchal structures within the labour law have reinforced inequalities between women and men. These structures are based on traditional family norms that identify women as primarily as homemakers and men as breadwinners. Moreover, the ‘patriarchal gender contract’ – where women’s roles in society are as dependents, wives, mothers, homemakers, and caregivers, and men as breadwinners and fathers – is defined by sociocultural norms
that are reinforced on micro and macro levels. Patriarchy is consolidated through, for example, patriarchal practices within the household, as well through being inscribed in legal instruments such as the Islamic Family Laws (Moghadam, 2013).

Stereotyping based on preconceived patriarchal values also influenced women’s experiences in employment. A gender specialist referred to practices of gender stereotyping and gave the example of employers’ perceptions in Jordan that women take more annual leave than men because of their reproductive duties. She said,

*It was not about who leaves more, it was about how easy it is for women to take leave. Married women come to the boss, hand in the leave request, he signs, he doesn’t question. Because [the employer automatically believes that] she probably has an emergency at home so he’s too embarrassed to ask questions, but the impression is she gets it more because it’s easier for her to get it (Interview, PM00, policy maker).*

Conversely, gender-stereotypical perceptions of masculinity have reduced men’s power to negotiate annual leave. The gender expert also expressed the view that employers often preferred to employ men because they were seen as more ‘dependable’ and flexible owing to having more social freedom than women.

A legal aid advisor explained the persistence of gender discrimination in the labour market because of how it cuts costs for employers. She explained, ‘*People [employers] would say, “Why would we choose to let women have experience at our expense?”* So
they choose those who already have the experience [who are men]’ (Interview, PM96, policy maker). This was also reflected during an interview with a gender expert who claimed that employers often believe that women are ‘going to get engaged, and so on, so [the employer] doesn’t want to really hire a woman, so from [the employer’s] perspective it’s not a really good investment to hire a woman’ (Interview, PM00, policy maker).

Findings also showed that patriarchal norms supported highly gendered occupations, with women and men more likely to participate in socially acceptable employment. While one way of expanding women’s participation in the labour market has been to employ them in roles historically seen as acceptable for women, this has led to limitations in the progression and expansion of wider opportunities. For example, the senior military officer explained that, in the army, women have been able to participate through working in conventionally gendered roles, such as secretaries and administrators. The resistance that women faced when attempting to progress beyond such roles was both from the community and from the work environment, including from those in leadership positions.

For women, the suitability and acceptability of occupations and positions are conditioned by views of communities, families, spouses, and the women themselves (Nasser Eddin, 2011). This was a recurrent theme, as a gender specialist explained:

From the woman’s perspective she is not going to work in an office with one man only, unless there are other women colleagues around the office working and can make sure that
none of them are taking leave or absent or whatever, because as a minimum you need at least three other people working with her in the office (Interview, PM00, policy maker).

The senior military officer described such practices as indicative of a lack of professionalism among working women. She believed that women were responsible for some of the negative perceptions that employers had of them. From her experience in the military, she had dealt with several cases of what she described as women showing poor professionalism, for example, where women say they cannot perform certain functions because they need to be close to home and close to their children. She continued,

Women make many demands excuses, [and] requests … This is part of what has created the rejection of women to work in specific areas of employment in the army and even I believe in the private sector (Interview, PM97, policy maker/senior military officer).

Several policy makers also highlighted a gap in the Jordanian constitution, in terms of a failure to protect Jordanian women and men from discrimination. According to a legal aid advisor Article 6(ii) of the Jordanian constitution stipulates that all Jordanians are entitled to equal work opportunities, but there has not been full implementation of this. Elaborating on this point she gave the following example:

If I work in a company, and the employer gives my colleague who does the same work, a higher salary, I cannot file a
lawsuit on the grounds of inequality (Interview, PM96, policy maker).

This problem was also reported during an interview with a gender specialist who referred to employee recruitment, saying, ‘Women are asked questions you’re not supposed to ask, [like] are you married? Engaged? In Jordan there is no law that says you cannot ask these questions’ (Interview, PM94, policy maker). The problem according to the interviewee is that Jordan does not ‘have an equality rights statement ... So if I go to an interview and I apply, and I know that this employer is discriminating against me because I’m a woman, I can’t do much about it’ (Interview, PM00, policy maker).

Interviews with policy makers also highlighted a lack of monitoring of the implementation of legislation relevant to the marginalisation of women. This was reflected during an interview with a legal aid advisor, who claimed, ‘There is a lack of any form of monitoring on decisions related to promotions in kinds of work, and managerial posts [in the public and private sector]’ (Interview, PM96, policy maker). The difficulty of monitoring discrimination at work has been highlighted in the literature on discrimination in employment (Pager and Western, 2012; Makkonen, 2002; Skjeie and Langvasbraten, 2009). This is particularly problematic when addressing intersectional discrimination, as it involves situations where individuals are discriminated against because of a number of factors that ‘interact concurrently’ (Makkonen, 2002: 10–11).
Measures have been taken to protect women in the labour market through policies that address and take into account cultural sensitivities and the social context that women live in. The rationale for such protective measures was, as explained by a legal aid advisor, in order to ‘take into account the nature of our society’ (Interview, PM96, policy maker). Nevertheless, protective policies such as those related to working hours and occupations have further perpetuated discriminatory gender practices within the labour market (Rahahleh, 2012). This was reflected during several interviews with policy makers. A gender expert gave the example of the law that forbids women to work night shifts, saying, ‘I mean if you’re not allowed shifts, or you don’t work late, they [employers] hold meetings late at night and women cannot stay late at night. Then they’re opting out so losing advancement’ (Interview, PM00, policy maker).

The issue of night shifts was also reported during a discussion with a legal aid advisor, who claimed that, although intending to act as a form of positive discrimination towards women, they are ‘expected [by employers] to work at night’ (Interview, PM96, policy maker) therefore creating greater challenges for them. In such cases, the law becomes a form of hidden discrimination. Protective policies such as these were believed to marginalise women from employment opportunities, specifically in the private sector. As, a gender specialist explained,

*This is one of the reasons why the private sector does not hire women, because if you are hiring a woman in a hotel, on an evening shift, it doesn’t work ... It should be optional for
women to opt out [of working late hours rather than this being enforced them] (Interview, PM00, policy maker).

The persistence of gender disparities in the labour market was also linked to inconsistencies between de jure and de facto implementation of the labour law, which will be further discussed in the section below. This was, for example, reflected during an interview with a legal aid advisor, who said,

All legislations and regulations are supposed to impose the same duties and give the same rights for both women and men. Moreover, some codes give women some additional rights related to night work … Sick leave, maternity and breastfeeding rights, at least by law … [However] … When it comes to the extent to which this code is applied … I believe it is different … Women submit to the pressures where there may be a stipulation [by employers] indicating that they shouldn’t have [for example] their [maternity] leave, or to have an unpaid leave if she is married (Interview, PM92, policy maker).

Similarly, another senior civil servant and gender specialist highlighted inconsistencies between de jure and de facto implementation of the labour law saying, ‘We have an ideal [labour] law …The weakness is in the application of the law, commitment to it and poor work ethics … The problem lies with the employees or employers themselves’ (Interview, PM94, policy maker).

Hence, rather than being a legislative issue, the policy maker believed that the problem lay in the poor enforcement of labour laws
and the failure of employers and employees to adhere to them. This was perceived to be a key challenge that further widened gender disparities between women and men in the labour market.

This section focused on interviews with policy makers to better understand employment legislation and its implementation in Jordan in relation to gender and citizenship status. Findings emphasised the impact of exclusionary forms of citizenship in creating unequal opportunities to employment for women and men. Furthermore, the influence of patriarchy on a macro level was also highlighted in relation to consolidating gender disparities between women and men in their access to employment opportunities.

The section that follows is a gendered analysis of employment preferences of women and men in the private and public sectors. It highlights inconsistencies between the *de jure* and *de facto* implementation of the labour law, as strong influencers in shaping participants’ employment preferences. The themes in the following section are based on key issues emerging from interviews and focus group discussions with policy makers, service providers and employed and unemployed Transjordanians, Palestinian Jordanians and ex-Gazan women and men.

**A Gendered Analysis of Employment Preferences**

Fieldwork findings indicated a general preference among women and men to work in the public sector irrespective of gender and citizenship status. While Palestinians with full Jordanian citizenship are legally entitled to rights to employment in the public sector equal
to any other Jordanian citizen, ex-Gazans are not permitted to work in government jobs because of their exclusionary citizenship status.

The public sector was perceived as more ‘socially acceptable’ for women to work in compared with the private sector. As well as reasons such as secure employment, it also gave women greater leverage to carry out their reproductive and productive roles because of shorter working hours than the private sector. Some of the main reasons mentioned for women preferring public sector employment included secured pay and non-payable benefits (such as maternity leave and maternity pay), as well as segregated working environments. This was highlighted during a focus group with employed Transjordanians. One woman explained that women prefer more than men to work in the public sector because:

*Working hours are less ... It is a more guaranteed place for work for women [as] a guy can look for jobs and find them more easily than women ... In addition of course to the effort needed for private sector work, and the government gives maternity leave and annual leave* (Focus group, employed Transjordanian women, Kafa).

Several women also reported experiencing difficulty in progressing within the public and private sector employment ladder, as their access was limited to conventional gendered occupations and positions such as those that are secretarial and administrative. Nevertheless, social factors such as using their informal social networks (*wastah*) played a key role in both enabling and disabling their access to and progression in their employment. However,
access to wastah varied according to gender and citizenship and this will be explored in more detail in Chapter Six on livelihood strategies.

One of the main reasons for the preference shared by both men and women for public sector employment was the view that it offered greater security in terms of secure employment and benefits. Termination of contracts is particularly difficult in the public sector and this was reflected during an interview with a gender specialist, who claimed, ‘It is very difficult for employers to end employee contracts in [the private and public] sectors, [but] it is even harder in the public sector’ (Interview, PM00, policy maker).

In the private sector, compliance with labour law regulations is weaker and dismissals are more common (See Appendix 5, Table 5.1, page 462-463 for firing regulations). There were also several reports of employers issuing temporary contracts without any time limits to avoid costs incurred on permanent posts, leaving employees at greater risk of exploitation. This was reflected during an interview with a training and employment service provider in Beta camp who reported employers issuing contracts to teachers as trainees to avoid paying social security for them.

The greater security that the public sector offered was of particular interest to women in this study because many believed they were at a greater risk of dismissal if they worked in the private sector. Moreover, there were several reports of women claiming that they were at greater risk of being replaced by men in the private sector than in government jobs because of weaker compliance with labour legislation.
Research findings also highlighted discrepancies between the *de jure* and *de facto* implementation of the labour laws on the payment of the minimum wage within the private sector for men and men. According to Jordanian Law, the minimum wage for citizens is JD190 per month, and for non-Jordanians it is JD110\(^{22}\) (See Appendix 5, Table 5.1, pages 462-463 for more information on hiring and wages). During interviews, however, there were several complaints about private sector employees receiving salaries lower than the minimum wage. One service provider reported hearing of cases where monthly wages were as low as JD60.

There were also reports of low pay-practices during an informal discussion with a group of ex-Gazan women working at Centre B in Alpha camp. One of the women said that she had been working as a full-time teacher at the centre for four years and was paid only JD75 a month (Field notes, 12 September 2013). Rather than being passive about her situation, the woman, together with several of her colleagues, had formed an alliance headed by the CBO manager who was a community leader in the camp, to negotiate for increases in salaries with senior management. This is an example of the active collective agency of women in negotiating with oppressive structures to improve their pay. It also highlights the two-way nature of power. The agency of women was also emphasised during an informal discussion with a divorced ex-Gazan woman who worked at a CBO. She believed that women are

\(^{22}\) Some have argued that wage discrimination does not exist between Jordanians and migrants, as Jordanian law specifies that payments can be in-kind or in the form of money.
generally more resilient than men because they are used to having many obstacles in their life (Field notes, 7 July 2013).

Discrepancy in wages is also divided along gender lines. A training and employment service provider informed me of cases where inconsistencies existed between the salaries women received and those agreed in contracts in the private sector. She said: ‘Some work for [a monthly salary of] 100 Dinars even though the contract they sign states that they will get 200 Dinars’ (Interview, 29SP, service provider). Another gender specialist reported that the widespread abuse in pay was particularly common among teachers working in private schools. She mentioned that the Ministry of Labour (MOL) was currently focusing on this problem, as ‘One of the widest, common abuses, is in private sector education, not in the big schools, the smaller schools’ (Interview, PM00, policy maker). The abuse occurs more to women than men because ‘Most of the teachers are women … And men are less likely to tolerate it’ (Interview, PM00, policy maker). During informal discussions with a senior civil servant, I was also informed that Jordan is currently implementing an equal pay for equal work initiative, and is focusing on private education, as many women are given lower pay than men for equal jobs (Field notes, 18 July 2013). Education is one of the main sectors of employment considered to be socially acceptable for women to engage in. Hence, it is a popular area of employment for women. Faced with limited employment opportunities in comparison to men, they are less likely to challenge exploitation.
Employment opportunities for ex-Gazans are further limited owing to their citizenship status. It not only affects levels of pay but also the likelihood of employment in the public sector. Ex-Gazan women and men generally work in private sector education because of structural barriers that prohibit them from public sector employment. Consequently, they are at greater risk of economic exploitation. There were also reports of employees preferring to recruit ex-Gazan women because they ‘accept any salary offered [as they] cannot afford to do anything else. So they take advantage of them’ (Focus group, employed women, Alpha camp). Hence, although gender is a common variable that places Transjordanian, Palestinian Jordanian and ex-Gazan women at greater risk of exploitation, ex-Gazan women are further disadvantaged because of the limited job opportunities they have owing to their citizenship status.

Employment in the public sector also meant that social benefits such as pensions and national insurance were included, whereas in the private sector this was not necessarily the case due to inconsistencies between the de jure and de facto implementation of the labour law (See Appendix 1.2(13), page 391 for more on the Jordanian social security law). The government has only recently focused on enforcing the Social Security Corporation (SSC) law, requiring all organisations with more than five employees to register for social security benefits for their staff. As one trainer interviewed explained, ‘The same rules apply for social security in the private and public sectors’ (Interview, 29SP, service provider). However,
although this is a legal obligation, there is a gap in the implementation of social security law in the private sector. This was highlighted during interviews with both women and men working in Kafa. Some reported that shop owners in Kafa refused to register their employees for social security because of the added costs it incurred for their businesses, making public sector employment more preferable.

Various measures were being taken by private sector employers to evade payment of social security fees. In an interview with an employee at a training and employment centre in Beta camp, the woman explained that employers:

*Play tricks and ask employees to help them [to avoid paying for their social security] … People accepted this because they lacked the awareness of the benefits of social security, even for those who earn low wages (Interview, 3SP, service provider).*

This was reflected when interviewing women and men working in various small shops in Kafa town. One of the most common ways mentioned for evading payment of social security fees involved labelling employees as trainees during inspections from the Ministry of Labour. Nevertheless, some women reported actively claiming their rights during interviews. For example, one Transjordanian who worked as a shop manager in Kafa town claimed that she went to register for social security herself because her employer refused to register her. The woman was required to provide proof of her employment in order to force her employer to register for social
security. This is an example of a woman using her agency to resist and challenge exploitative employment practices.

However, the level of agency that individuals possess is influenced by social attributes such as level of education, economic resources, citizenship status and gender. For example, because of the fewer opportunities open to them owing to exclusionary citizenship, ex-Gazan men and women were more likely to accept working without employment benefits.

Another important factor influencing employment preferences was that benefits such as maternity leave and pay were ensured in the public sector, whereas this was not necessarily the case in the private sector. Under Jordanian labour law, employed women are entitled ‘to obtain maternity leave of ten weeks with full pay prior to and after delivery provided that the period subsequent to delivery may not be less than six weeks’ (Article 70, 1996). Moreover, it is illegal to work before maternity leave ends (See appendix 1.2(11), page 391 for the Jordanian labour law).

Although a legal right, there is a gap in the implementation and enforcement of maternity leave regulations in the public sector, but this is more particularly so in the private sector. This was reflected during an interview with a health practitioner working in a public clinic in a rural area in Kafa. The woman stated, ‘The law for maternity leave existed a long time ago [but it] has only been implemented a month or two ago’ (Interview, FEBJT1, married Employed Transjordanian, 32, Kafa).
A consistent theme during focus groups and interviews with women was the importance of maternity pay in contributing to family income following childbirth. Nevertheless, many complained of poor implementation of the maternity law within the private sector. Others reported a lack of agency to demand maternity rights because women feared losing their jobs. This was more so in the case of ex-Gazan women, because of the lack of employment opportunities open to them owing to their citizenship as well as patriarchal constraints.

There were also several complaints of maternity leave being shorter for private sector employees compared to those working in the government. Consequently, longer paid maternity leave was a major incentive for women to prefer working in the public sector. A health practitioner employed in a government clinic in Kafa highlighted the differences in maternity rights in the private sector compared to the public sector (See Appendix 5, Table 5.1, pages 462-463 for key features related to maternity leave). She compared her status to some of her friends who were working in private enterprises, saying, ‘It [maternity leave] is three months long in the public sector ... And only seventy days in the private sector’ (Interview, FEBJT1, married employed Transjordanian, 32, Kafa).

This section applied a gendered lens to better understand the employment preferences of Transjordanian and Palestinian refugee women and men in the private and public sectors. It highlighted inconsistencies in the implementation and practice of labour law, which shaped participants’ preferences in employment.
The following section is an analysis of how the intersectionality of gender and citizenship shapes experiences of protracted refugee women and men in their access to private and public sector employment. Structuration theory will be used to explore the role that intersectional discrimination has in enabling and disabling the agency of women and men in their access to employment opportunities. The section will begin by looking at the influence of intersectional discrimination in shaping access to public sector employment by protracted refugees. It will focus on the experiences of Palestinian Jordanians as this sector is closed to ex-Gazans.

**Gender and Citizenship and Access to Public Sector Employment**

With up to 34 per cent of the country’s labour force working in the public sector, it is a popular area of employment for both Transjordanians and Palestinian Jordanians. The public sector is closed to ex-Gazans and only accessible to Transjordanians and Palestinian Jordanian citizens.

Although sharing equal entitlement by law, discrimination was highlighted as a key obstacle that Palestinians experienced when applying for employment in the public sector. This was reflected during a focus group with employed Palestinian Jordanians in Beta camp. One Palestinian Jordanian woman explained, ‘Officially, yes [Palestinian Jordanians have equal rights to public sector employment as Transjordanians]. But there is no implementation of this in reality’ (Focus Group, employed Palestinian women, Beta
Another woman agreed and claimed, ‘We have less [job] opportunities, even if we are more educated and brighter … We are governed here by family names, and by where we live’ (Focus Group, employed Palestinian women, Beta camp). Like many Palestinian Jordanians interviewed, the women believed that they were economically discriminated against so that the dominant Transjordanian population could maintain power over the country’s economy.

Looking at discrimination in the public sector, the findings highlighted general discrepancies between the views of policy makers and participants interviewed. Whereas the majority of policy makers reported discriminatory practices in the military and security sector, many Palestinian Jordanians claimed that they were discriminated against in all fields of the public sector. Nevertheless, a view contradictory to the majority of policy makers was shared during an informal discussion with a former minister who posited that there was preferential treatment in public sector employment for individuals belonging to certain Jordanian tribes, and I was advised to look at the Civil Services Bureau (CSB) and investigate the names of the families working there (Field notes, 30 June 2013).

With regard to the military, it is a popular area of employment in the public sector for men, particularly in Kafa. This was highlighted during an interview with a 25-year-old Transjordanian man who worked in a shop in Kafa town. The young man explained that men ‘believe that the army will secure [their] family and … Children’s lives as well, and they [the people] will be respected’ (Interview, MEBJT3,
employed Transjordanian single man, community college, 25, Kafa
town). By ‘security’, the man referred to stable employment and
regular wages. Other advantages to military employment include
state-subsidised housing, social security and healthcare benefits, as
well as subsidised higher education that extended to the employee’s
family. Moreover, the average retirement age in the army ranged
between thirty and forty years. This allowed individuals to seek other
forms of employment after retiring while in receipt of an army
pension.

During an interview with a manager at Centre D in Beta camp,
I was informed that there is a 6 per cent quota for Palestinian
Jordanians in the army. The interviewee explained that Palestinian
Jordanians are not treated equally to Transjordanians because they
are not residing in ‘their’ country (Interview, 9SP). Several Palestinian
Jordanians reported that employment in the military rested on third
generation origin, highlighting institutional discrimination in the
recruitment process. According to an employed Palestinian
Jordanian woman,

    They [the military] check the family’s place of birth back to the
    grandfather. And if a Palestinian is married to a Jordanian, the
    children cannot go to the army. My children, because I am
    Palestinian, cannot enlist in the army (Focus group, employed
    Palestinian women, Beta camp).

There are no official statistics on recruitment patterns by origin
in terms of the recruitment of Palestinian Jordanians into the army,
so there is a lack of statistical evidence of this.
Findings also highlighted gender-discriminatory practices in the military. Both Palestinian Jordanian women and men were disadvantaged in accessing military employment because of their ‘place of origin’. However, women were at a greater disadvantage because of the patriarchal constraints they faced. Moreover, although patriarchy was a common obstacle that shaped women’s experiences in accessing military employment, Palestinian Jordanian women were further disadvantaged because of their ‘place of origin’.

The influence of patriarchal constraints in shaping women’s experiences in the military was reflected during an interview with a senior military officer. She claimed that although there was no discrimination by salary in the military, ‘There were red lines that should not be crossed’ (Interview, PM97, policy maker/senior military officer), referring to positions that it was not acceptable for women to occupy. She reported that the army tried to address stereotyping against women in the military through the support of female royalty. Although opportunities for women would be imposed in the military, ‘those in leadership positions sometimes were not convinced, even though it was logical but still they did not accept it’ (Interview, PM97, policy maker/senior military officer). This is an example of vertical and horizontal segregation in occupations by gender in the public sector.

Several Palestinian Jordanians believed that discriminatory practices at individual and institutional levels discouraged them from integrating within their host population. One Palestinian Jordanian woman who was the breadwinner of her family, asserted:
How can we feel integrated when all of the job vacancies are taken by the Jordanians, the higher positions are just for Jordanians, some fields are just forbidden to us, such as the Intelligence, the Army and Air Force? (Interview, FP_BetaCamp, employed Palestinian Jordanian, incomplete master’s degree, divorcing, 33, Kafa).

Similarly, during an informal discussion with an ex-Gazan film producer and Palestinian activist who lived in Amman, the woman claimed that she will never forget ‘the Palestinian cause’, because of the way they are treated and the laws that prevent them from integrating in their host country. The woman believed that providing ex-Gazans with equal economic rights to Jordanian citizens would benefit the country as it would give people equal opportunities to compete in the labour market, and as such allow recruitment to be based on the competency levels of candidates (Field notes, 26 June 2013). This highlights how exclusionary forms of citizenship further challenges integration processes in a host country, particularly in the case of protracted refugee situations. Being able to exercise one’s economic citizenship rights is imperative to the integration of protracted refugees. It also enables them to develop a sense of solidarity towards their host country and to feel part of their wider community. This is especially the case for women, who are often marginalised from the labour market and tend to have higher unemployment rates in their host countries (Ministry for Refugees, Immigration and Integration Affairs, 2004).
The discrimination that Palestinian Jordanian and ex-Gazan women and men experience in their access to public sector employment highlights the complexities in understandings of inclusionary and exclusionary forms of citizenship in protracted refugee situations. It shows how gender and citizenship intersect to shape different experiences for women and men in their access to employment. It also highlights how intersectional discrimination can challenge the integration of protracted refugee women and men with their host population. The section that follows will look at discrimination in military recruitment. It examines the influence of informal discriminatory practices on women’s access to positions and training in the military.

**Discrimination in Military Recruitment**

The military was highlighted as a key area of employment for men and women in Kafa. It is open to Transjordanians and those Palestinian Jordanians who have full Jordanian citizenship. However, preferential treatment is given to Transjordanians in specific positions and for training opportunities in the sector. Ex-Gazans are not eligible to work in the military owing to their citizenship status. This, however, will be further discussed in Chapter Five, which explores how the intersectionality of gender and citizenship influences the employment opportunities of protracted Palestinian refugees in Jordan.

Women were even more disadvantaged in the military because they were restricted to socially acceptable positions and
training. Nevertheless, experiences of women varied according to their citizenship. Whereas Transjordanian women were disadvantaged compared with men, they were at a greater advantage compared with Palestinian Jordanian and ex-Gazan women in the military sector.

Fieldwork findings highlighted informal discriminatory practices in the military that reinforced gender inequalities between women and men. An example of this was given during an interview with a senior military officer, who reported that admission requirements in the military varied between women and men. For women, admissions required a minimum of a secondary education certificate. In the case of men however, they were eligible to apply for certain jobs in the military with qualifications below secondary education. The senior military personnel explained,

*When we used to enlist women in the army … We would not accept anyone without matriculation for a woman that wants to enter armed forces. For men, it is a different situation. He can have failed his matriculation [and reached up to] sixth grade, they [military] accept … Even though I am against this. I believe that the minimum educational attainment should be passing General Secondary Education matriculation (Tauğīhī) (Interview, PM97, senior military officer).*

The application of feminine and masculine binaries within the labour market has facilitated men’s access to a wider range of specialisations within the military that do not require academic qualifications, such as drivers and mechanics. In the case of women
however, such occupations are not socially acceptable for them to engage in. Academic certificates are more important for women than for men because feminised jobs within the military entail a minimum level of academic proficiency, whereas masculine professions, such as mechanics, do not. This passage provides an example of how patriarchal norms can become embedded within systems, leading to informal discriminatory practices that further widen the gender divide between women and men in the military.

Nevertheless, data showed cases where feminised and masculinised binaries were challenged to give women greater training opportunities in the military. This was reflected during an interview with a senior military officer. The interviewee explained that royal female figures were powerful catalysts in breaking the stigma of only feminised training opportunities and positions being available in the military for women. She gave the example of two military personnel who were the first women to be selected for a training course at Sandhurst in the United Kingdom (UK) through support from royalty. After completing the course, they became leaders in positions that were not previously occupied by women. The interviewee also gave herself as an example of breaking informal discriminatory practices against women in the military. She said,

*I am the first [female senior military personnel] to participate in a training in military state defense … Who goes to these trainings? People who want to occupy high positions, not just in the armed forces but also on the state level. Because it is attended by people from the Ministry of External Affairs, the*
Interior, the Finance, the Royal Court, all the relevant ministries and even some organisations that require a high calibre of employees who work at an advanced level in terms of strategic planning and state administration, that allows them to be equipped to occupy future positions in the state. So the perspective of the armed forces was why do we want to give women these skills? Can the woman ever become a leader? Can the woman occupy a leadership position and manage a Directorate? So the subject remained, no we don’t want women in these leadership positions, so in this case there is no need to send women to these trainings for them to become eligible, because the woman that goes will take the position of the man (Interview, PM97, policy maker/senior military officer, Amman).

This passage highlights how the male/breadwinner and female/caregiver model stigmatises against women in further education and employment. It portrays women’s economic citizenship as secondary to men and excludes them from opportunities for career progression. Nevertheless, the passage also highlights how women actively engage in negotiating with patriarchal structures to exercise greater economic rights. This passage also highlights how women’s experiences in the military can vary. The senior military officer belonged to an influential and powerful tribe in Jordan, which may have influenced her access to leadership training opportunities and positions in the military.
Another example of discriminatory gender practices in the military that consolidate and reproduce patriarchal ideologies was highlighted during an interview with a senior military officer. The interviewee explained that, as well as being required to pass their general secondary examinations to be eligible for military employment, women were also required to:

*Be single, unmarried ... Because she has to take training, I mean this will be difficult for a married woman, she might get pregnant, you understand, so this will prevent her from being able to complete the training she needs. Now after the training, after that she can get married or engaged, but during the period of the training she has to be single (Interview, PM97, senior military officer).*

When asked whether the same requirements applied to men, the military officer said, *'I don't know ... I believe it is preferred for him to be single’* (Interview, PM97, senior military officer).

Meanwhile, another gender specialist highlighted the discrimination that women might face through informal policies within organisations. The interviewee recounted a discussion she had with a human resources manager and said that the man informed her that:

*There was a training offered and we immediately sent it to a man because it was assumed that the nominated lady will not travel, I said: ‘Did you give her an option?’ They said ‘No we didn't’ ... So automatically he disqualified the woman, without her knowing that she was nominated, without her getting the*
option of travelling or not, because it is considered inappropriate for women to travel and leave their children (Interview, PM00, policy maker).

She further explained that although gender discrimination exists because of ‘policies of an organisation, it is also reinforced by the practices that happen’ (Interview, PM00, policy maker). These findings were the same for women irrespective of their citizenship status. However, their experiences in accessing employment varied depending on their citizenship (which will be further discussed in the next chapter).

This section highlighted the influence of informal discriminatory practices on women’s access to positions and training in the military. Furthermore, it showed how patriarchal gendered roles limit women’s access to training and leadership positions in the military. The section that follows will focus on the intersectionality of gender and citizenship in shaping experiences of participants in their access to private sector employment. A brief analysis of informal labour engagement will be included in the section below because of the substantial amount of data emerging from my findings. Moreover, much of the informal workforce is active in the private sector (for more information on the informal workforce in Jordan refer to Chapter Two: Setting).
Gender and Citizenship and Access to Private Sector Employment

It is estimated that 22 per cent of Jordan’s labour force works in the private sector (El-Abed, 2014). While public sector employment is accessible to Transjordanian and Palestinian Jordanian citizens, it is closed to ex-Gazans with exclusionary forms of citizenship, which makes the private sector an important source of livelihood for them. Although public sector employment was preferred, the private sector was also an avenue for people to earn a living in the town. Palestinians have been and are actively engaged in the private sector, because of the state’s policies that have limited the participation of Palestinian Jordanians in the public sector since the 1970s. Palestinians are also recognised for their entrepreneurial nature and are known to be active and skilled in farming, artisan work, and craftwork and entrepreneurial activities (El-Abed, 2014).

The findings highlighted that it was common for Palestinian and ex-Gazan camp-dwellers to be self-employed or to carry out entrepreneurial work because state laws and permits are not applied within these spaces (El-Abed, 2012). This was reflected during a focus group with employed ex-Gazan women. One participant claimed that most of the camp-dwellers set up their own shops in the camp and worked as ‘mechanics, in aluminum shops and making, water tanks’ (Focus group, employed ex-Gazan women, Alpha camp). Nevertheless, upward socio-economic mobility is more difficult because of the generally poorer economic conditions of people residing in camps (Khawaja, 2003). It is also more difficult for
women to start their own businesses because of factors such as lack of capital and patriarchal constraints.

As previously mentioned, the private sector is a key area of employment for ex-Gazans. Nevertheless, restricted access owing to their citizenship status in certain professions such as law, journalism and engineering meant that they were at a greater disadvantage in accessing employment opportunities than Palestinian Jordanians and Transjordanians (See Appendix 5, Table 5.3, page 466 for the list of closed professions). Such constraints were highlighted during an interview with an ex-Gazan man who owned a shop in the camp. He said,

_The government doesn’t allow us to work in hotels. Doctors are not allowed to open clinics. Pharmacists are not allowed to open pharmacies. Engineers are not allowed to open offices. A lawyer cannot open an office. A nurse cannot work in a state hospital_ (Interview, MGC1, married ex-Gazan shop owner, 43).

Comparing their situation to foreigners, many ex-Gazans believed that they were at a greater disadvantage. To highlight this, several gave examples of being prohibited from setting up bank accounts and owning land or property. Moreover, foreigners only need work permits to work in these professions. By contrast, as well as requiring work permits, ex-Gazans have to obtain security approval from the state prior to being employed. During a focus group with employed ex-Gazan women, one participant claimed, ‘We need to get security approval to buy a car, to get a job … Every year
we have to go through this cycle [of renewing work permits and licensing cars]’ (Focus group, employed ex-Gazan women, Alpha camp).

Another unemployed ex-Gazan with a bachelor’s degree in nursing explained the disadvantages ex-Gazans faced in accessing private sector employment. He said,

*I don’t know if the private sector has a role in this, or whether they received security instructions [from the state] or something; I don’t know. But what I can observe in nursing, is that if I go to a private hospital, whether you have experience or not – let’s assume you do have experience and you are from a camp, but you don’t have a nationality number – they will tell you to go get a work permit first and then come back to them. You go the Ministry of Labour and they’ll tell you to get a [security] approval … And then come. You go back to get a security approval and they will tell you that they can’t give you an approval before you get a licence, so no result. You get lost between the two. I am sure both sides arranged and agreed on this (Interview, MGC7, unemployed Ex-Gazan man, bachelor’s degree, 28, Alpha camp).

The man explained that they faced this problem when accessing most jobs in the private sector, as they all require a work permit and security approval.

There is a range of ‘socially acceptable’ jobs for women in private sector employment irrespective of their citizenship status. Feminists such as Chafetz (1991) have highlighted the
disadvantages that working women experience in being restricted ‘to lower-paying, lower-status jobs, reinforcing men’s greater access to both resources and power’ (Duffy, 2007: 315). Moreover, because labour law regulations are more poorly enforced in the private than public sector, it is more difficult for women to balance their reproductive and productive roles (For more information on this refer to the section on employment preferences above).

Gender inequality can also consolidate power imbalances between women and men and reinforce systems of oppression. During a field visit to Alpha camp, I spoke to an ex-Gazan man who perceived women’s economic engagement as a threat to the ‘family honour’. This was more the case in the private sector because working conditions exposed women to environments that were socially unacceptable for them to engage in. He recited a poem that described women as ‘Awrah [referring to the parts of a man and woman’s body which must be covered. For men everything between the navel and knee should be covered. For women everything except the hands and face should be covered in front of unrelated men], her body, her face, her hair her hands are all shame’ (Field notes, 2 July 2013). Furthermore, he believed that men had an entitlement and duty to control women, because of their role as ‘protectors’ and ‘guardians’ of their family honour (Nasser Eddin, 2011). Self-determination is one of the key tenets of inclusive citizenship, and this includes the right to ‘property in oneself’, as well as to resources such as education and employment (Kabeer, 2005). Patriarchal
structures that privilege men’s domination over women reinforce gender inequalities between women and men.

The intersectionality of gender and citizenship was particularly in evidence for ex-Gazan women. Ex-Gazan women seeking employment had to navigate a sector with already-limited job opportunities that were ‘socially acceptable’ for them to work in. With fewer opportunities to secure a living in the private sector, they were at a greater risk of exploitation. The vulnerability of ex-Gazan women in the private sector was highlighted during a focus group with employed ex-Gazans. Nevertheless, economic hardship coupled with their exclusionary citizenship enabled them to negotiate with the men in their households for greater access to private sector employment than Transjordanian and Palestinian Jordanian women.

Gender and Citizenship and Access to Informal Work

Findings showed that many ex-Gazan men and women worked as informal labourers because of the limited employment opportunities available to them in the private and public sectors. Working as an informal labourer meant that they were excluded from legal protection and entitlements as stipulated in the labour law. This included benefits such as maternity leave, social security and minimum wage regulations.

Much of the fieldwork data related to informal labour was influenced by the recent influx of Syrian refugees into Jordan. Field observations and interviews with participants highlighted a growing resentment towards Syrians irrespective of participants’ gender or
citizenship. The general perception of the Syrian influx in Jordan was a negative one. Many believed it was adding pressure to an already-competitive labour market and scarce resources. This was particularly the case for informal labour, which is estimated to make up 44 per cent of the country’s work force (UNDP, 2013b). Moreover, government figures from 2010 indicate that 26 per cent of the informal workforce was in the private sector, 17 per cent had their own businesses, and 1 per cent worked without income (See Chapter Two: Setting for more information on the informal sector).

Several participants interviewed believed that private business owners preferred employing Syrians because, as one unemployed ex-Gazan woman put it, ‘They don’t cost them as much, [they] tolerate more and complain less … They [also] normally work three or four shifts with no raise or overtime’ (Focus group, unemployed ex-Gazan women, Alpha camp). Exploitation is more common among Syrian refugees, as they have no form of legal protection in the labour market. Consequently, Syrians have been accepting work at wages lower than those paid to ex-Gazan women and men (Asfour, 2014a; 2014b).

Some Transjordanian interviewees reported that Syrians were employed because employers pitied them. This was reflected during an interview with a Transjordanian woman who managed a store in Kafa. The woman said,

[Trans]Jordanians are very good, they are considerate to the Syrian people … They help them in everything … Take the example of the Syrian woman that wants to work, they will not
say to her there is no work, they promise her work or give her work (Interview, FEB01, employed Transjordanian woman, vocational training, 35, Kafa).

Meanwhile, the majority of Palestinian Jordanian and ex-Gazan women and men interviewed believed that employers preferred employing Syrians because they were a source of cheaper labour. This was reflected during an interview with a Palestinian Jordanian woman living in Beta camp. The woman claimed that Syrians were being exploited by employers in every way, including,

*Rent, food, and everything you could think of, the Jordanians here they believe the Syrians who live here are financially supported by the government and even by the King himself. So they try to exploit them. They envy them very much as they think most of the world countries send them aid* (Interview, FP_BetaCamp, employed Palestinian Jordanian, divorcing, incomplete master’s degree, 33, Kafa).

The shift of humanitarian aid towards Syrians also played a role in increased antagonism towards them. Many Transjordanians and Palestinian Jordanians blamed the Syrians for their misfortunes. Several employers indicated that they would prioritise employing a Jordanian over a Syrian because, as one Transjordanian who owned a shop claimed, ‘*He is a citizen … The son of this country’* (Interview, MEBJT6, Transjordanian man, Secondary education, 26, Kafa town).

When asked whether he would employ an ex-Gazan or a Syrian refugee, the man claimed that he would choose an ex-Gazan because ‘*I consider them as part of this country. They might not have*
a national number but they were born in Jordan’ (Interview, MEBJT6). Similarly, another Transjordanian, a woman who managed a shop in Kafa said:

There is no difference between the Jordanian and Palestinian. We have become brothers and there is no difference. But the problem is with the people that have come to us, Iraqis … Syrians (Interview, FEB01, employed Transjordanian woman, vocational training, 35, Kafa).

This highlights how a host population’s perception of ‘refugees’ can vary over time. As well as facilitating social cohesion with the host population, protraction can also be regarded as an advantage when comparing PRS to new-wave refugees.

The Syrian influence was reported in seasonal jobs as well, affecting both women and men already living in economic hardship regardless of citizenship status. Nevertheless, seasonal occupations were particularly important for ex-Gazans because of the limited opportunities open to them owing to their citizenship status. According to an unemployed woman who was married and with children,

After the arrival of Syrian refugees things started to get worse because the farm owners prefer to work with Syrians rather Jordanian labourers … Many in the camp are affected by this situation (Interview, FGCHV1, unemployed married ex-Gazan woman, illiterate, 35, Alpha camp).

The woman went on to explain, ‘The situation here [in the camp] is too harsh. If the situation doesn’t change … The consequences will
not be easy at all, people can’t bare it anymore’ (Interview, FGCHV1).

The value of seasonal farming for vulnerable families was highlighted during a focus group with unemployed ex-Gazan women. One participant complained:

_They [the Syrians] take our place in everything. Their labour is cheaper. I have debts. In one or two months when I work in collecting olives, I make 300 or 400 liras [JD], which really helps me_ (Focus group, unemployed Ex-Gazan women, Alpha camp).

Because of the economic hardship that many ex-Gazan families experienced, seasonal farming extends to all members of the household, including women and children. However, with the growing preference of farm owners to employ Syrian women, resentment towards them has increased. According to an unemployed ex-Gazan woman interviewed, ‘_They [farm owners] employ Syrian women because they are beautiful and have beautiful eyes_’ (Focus group, unemployed ex-Gazan women, Alpha camp).

Hence, the impact of the Syrian influx within the informal market has had great repercussions on a population that relies heavily on informal work, and particularly on those who are most vulnerable. The new wave of refugees has, however, diverted the resentment of the host population from Palestinians living in protracted refugee situations to the Syrians.
Exclusionary Forms of Citizenship among ex-Gazans

The situation of ex-Gazan women and men highlighted the disadvantage that they experienced in their access to employment compared to Transjordanians and Palestinian Jordanians. However, findings also showed that women and men within this refugee group also experienced varying forms of marginalisation depending on the citizenship status that they had. For example, while ex-Gazans with two-year temporary passports have limited access to employment in the private sector, those with Egyptian travel documents are further marginalised with no employment rights whatsoever. Moreover, ex-Gazans registered with UNRWA are entitled to the agency’s services, whereas those with Egyptian travel documents are not. Holders of Jordanian temporary passports also have the right to travel abroad and return to Jordan, whereas for ex-Gazans with Egyptian travel documents this is more difficult.

In Alpha camp, I interviewed an ex-Gazan with Egyptian travel documents who completed his bachelor’s degree at a private university in Jordan in hotel management. The young man believed that ex-Gazans with two-year temporary passports were at a greater advantage than him because:

*They are recognised when dealing with [employers in Jordan]* … *When it comes to jobs, the documents are the problem. This is because … The Egyptian travel documents are not official … They [employers] say we want a passport (Interview, MGC4, ex-Gazan with Egyptian documents, bachelor’s degree, working in family business, 25, Alpha camp).*
Sharing his experience in seeking employment, the young man explained, ‘When I go to apply for a job in a company or a hotel, the Egyptian documents are not official … They ask for a passport’ (MGC4). He believed that in order to be employed one ‘needs to have a nationality to go back to. It does not matter which country, but they need a nationality. [And in his case] he “cannot take neither a Jordanian nor an Egyptian passport”’ (MGC4).

As well as ex-Gazans with Egyptian passport holders, Alpha camp is also home to ex-Gazans without any identification documents. This category of ex-Gazans has no legal protection from the state nor are they entitled to any economic, social or cultural rights. During my fieldwork I managed to interview an ex-Gazan training and employment service provider who had his passport revoked (Interview, 10SP). After completing the interview, I asked the son of the interviewee why he did not work with his father, since he was unemployed and looking for a job. The 28-year-old man laughed and said that he would never consider it, as everyone who works there has their passports withdrawn by the authorities because they are affiliated to an Islamic faction with political background (Field notes, 27 June 2013). I then asked if that included women too. The young man said there are women in the camp who have had their passports withdrawn because their husbands were associated with Islamic groups and political factions. In his case, it took him and his sister three years to get a two-year temporary passport because his father was associated with an Islamic group (Field notes, 27 June 2013). The man also informed me that it was more difficult for ex-
Gazans to renew their passports compared to Jordanians with full citizenship. He said that whereas it usually takes a day for a Jordanian citizen to renew their passport, for an ex-Gazan it would take a minimum of three weeks (Field notes, 18 July 2013).

Revoking a passport is a state decision adopted on the grounds of national security. According to a legal aid lawyer, ‘The constitution and legislation [state that] ... Whoever obtains the Jordanian nationality cannot lose it through an administrative decision’ (Interview, PM92, policy maker). He explained that there are cases when the ‘sovereignty resolution is applied which is related to the general social, economic and political security [in the country] and when it comes to these, all other codes may be overcome’ (Interview, PM92, policy maker).

The various forms of citizenship granted in Jordan highlight degrees of inclusionary and exclusionary processes that either enable or disable the integration of protracted Palestinian refugees. Within this, individuals with forms of exclusive citizenship are likely to experience social marginalisation, cultural devaluation and economic dispossession. Rather than facilitating social integration and a sense of belonging to a nation-state, exclusionary citizenship further alienates individuals from their host population. It also creates different experiences depending on ‘intersecting social divisions and multiple systems of oppression’ (Thiara and Gill, 2010: 38). Moreover, concepts of rights, responsibilities and equality in treatment cannot exist when citizenship involves experiencing social alienation from one’s wider community.
This section highlighted the influence of gender and citizenship in accessing private sector employment. The section below will look at challenges reported having to do with private sector employment.

**Perceived Challenges to Private Sector Employment**

Fieldwork findings highlighted a general concern that employees in the private sector were more vulnerable to exploitation than those working in government positions. The most commonly reported disadvantages of private sector employment were longer working hours, higher workloads, lower wages and a lack of security. Moreover, many believed that the private sector did not offer employees non-paid benefits (such as maternity, health and social security), whereas this was ensured in the public sector.

The lack of job opportunities in Kafa was also perceived as a key challenge in accessing private sector employment irrespective of gender and citizenship status. Many believed that job opportunities were concentrated in major urban cities such as Amman and Irbid. In line with this is the literature on the Jordanian labour market, which highlights an uneven distribution of job opportunities, with the lowest rates of unemployment reported in major urban cities such as Amman, Irbid and Zarqa, where much of the country’s investment is concentrated (Saidi and Qudah, 2012). Although economic opportunities are more concentrated in major urban cities such as Amman, these are mostly unskilled and low-paid jobs. In this respect, the diverse experiences of women and men in their access to
economic opportunities is affected by whether they live in a major urban city or not.

In the case of ex-Gazan men and women residing in the town, the lack of opportunities compounded with their exclusionary citizenship status placed them at a greater disadvantage. As previously mentioned, ex-Gazan women were further disadvantaged because of patriarchal constraints. This was reflected during a focus group with unemployed ex-Gazan women. One participant claimed that as well as being limited to ‘socially acceptable’ occupations, it was difficult for women to access employment in Kafa because of the

Lack of available job opportunities, and lack of industrial areas [to work in] .... [Moreover] not having a national number for residents in this camp in particular [puts them at a greater disadvantage than Jordanian citizens]. So even if there are opportunities they go to Jordanians (Focus group, unemployed ex-Gazan women, Alpha camp).

Many women and men, irrespective of their citizenship status, also reported that often transport costs made it unfeasible to seek employment in areas outside Kafa. This was reflected during an interview with a Transjordanian who had graduated from university with a bachelor’s degree in literature and was working as a volunteer at a CBO in Kafa. The young woman said,

*Here in Kafa there are no companies … So you have to go to Amman, and in Amman when you want to go work, they [Employers] tell you JD250 as a starting salary … [Which] is not enough to pay for transport and daily expenses (Interview,
**FEB4, unemployed Transjordanian woman, bachelor’s degree, 26, Kafa.**

Often, young men and women preferred to stay at home rather than work because wages were insufficient to cover basic expenses. This was mentioned during an interview with an ex-Gazan man who earned a living by carrying out temporary vocational work in Amman. He said, ‘We feel that if we sat at home without work, it would be the same as working’ (Interview, MGC6, single employed ex-Gazan, tauğīhī, 29, Alpha camp).

As well as transport costs, women faced challenges owing to what was ‘socially acceptable’ in terms of working conditions. This was highlighted during an interview with a Transjordanian who volunteered at a community-based centre in Kafa. The woman said,

*Firstly, there are no private companies in Kafa, but even if she wants to work in Amman, she faces challenges, as her family don’t want her to work in a private company, their working hours are long, there is a lot of mixing [between women and men], and the distance is far and the salaries are not good enough* (Interview, FEB5, Transjordanian unemployed woman, bachelor’s degree, 26, Kafa,).

There were also concerns that the private sector working environment did not allow women to fulfil their reproductive roles. This was highlighted during a focus group with employed Transjordanians, when a participant explained that working in a company outside the town would be difficult for a woman because, ‘At any company, work ends at 4:30 p.m. So by the time I come back
from Amman, even if it’s by car, it will be 6 p.m. How do I have time for my children, the cleaning and cooking?’ (Focus group, employed Transjordanian women, Kafa town).

When looking at factors influencing access to employment, several participants highlighted the issue of being stigmatised by employers when they knew that they were camp residents. Many Palestinians believed that such perceptions affected their opportunities to access jobs and placed them at a greater disadvantage to non-camp-residents. This was particularly the situation for ex-Gazans because of the perceived poor economic conditions in Alpha camp compared to other Palestinian refugee camp-dwellers.

The disadvantages that Palestinian camp-dwellers faced in accessing employment was highlighted during a focus group discussion with unemployed Palestinian Jordanians in Beta camp. One woman reported, ‘If you are a Palestinian Jordanian you do not face any problems, but once they know that you are from the camp a lot of problems arise’ (Focus group, unemployed Palestinian Jordanian women, Beta camp). Another unemployed Palestinian Jordanian woman claimed, ‘A lot of people have misconceptions about the children of the camp, expecting the worst attitude from them … [People] never expect that there are good people living [in camps]’ (Focus group, unemployed Palestinian Jordanian women, Beta Camp).

One of the measures used to address this problem was, as one employed ex-Gazan mentioned, ‘Making sure to put Kafa as our
place of residence on our CVs instead of Alpha camp’ (MGC4). As well as concealing their place of residence, there were several occasions where ex-Gazan job-seekers would present themselves as Jordanians in their CVs – a category that they legally do not have but which provides them with a more positive identity (Field notes, 16 July 2013). Such passing attempts were strategies frequently used by ex-Gazans to overcome institutional discrimination. There were also reports of attempts to conceal place of residence in the case of female refugee camp-dwellers. Moreover, some ex-Gazan women also reported concealing that they had two-year temporary passports without national identity numbers. Others mentioned that they concealed their status as engaged or pregnant during job interviews to avoid gender discrimination.

The section above looked at generally perceived challenges to private sector employment. It also highlighted the way that the intersectionality of citizenship status and gender played in shaping in creating enabling and disabling experiences for protracted refugee women and men in private sector employment.

**Conclusion**

This chapter at the implementation and practice of labour law in both the private and public sectors through a gendered perspective. It showed that while legal instruments such as the Jordanian constitution stipulate that women and men are entitled to equal rights to work, complexities in the *de facto* implementation of labour law exist. This chapter also highlighted the importance of applying
intersectionality and a gendered lens to properly evaluate labour laws so that anti-discrimination and equality policies are ensured. This is because discrimination, in most cases, takes place in multiple intersecting forms.

Both liberalist and feminist approaches were used to explore the experiences of protracted refugees in their access to employment, by focusing on inclusive and exclusionary forms of citizenship as conceptualised by Kabeer (2005) and Lister (2008). It has focused on the exclusionary dimensions of citizenship and its impact on Palestinian Jordanians and ex-Gazans, specifically in relation to their employment opportunities in the private and public sectors.

This chapter also examined the impact of patriarchal structures and gendered social barriers in women’s access to employment. Women faced many intersecting barriers to entering the labour market, owing to their gender and ascribed roles within Jordanian society. Findings show that gender inequalities in the labour market exist and are influenced by both patriarchy and citizenship status as well as by other social markers such as disability. Through the application of a constructionist approach to intersectionality, this chapter has highlighted the enabling and disabling impact of intersecting social markers such as gender, citizenship on the experiences of protracted refugees in their access to employment.

By adopting a macro and micro approach, this chapter extended understandings on the complexity of inclusionary and
exclusionary forms of citizenship for protracted refugee women and men in their access to employment. It highlighted the resilience of vulnerable populations in addressing intersectional discrimination and specifically in a country with legal structures that are influenced by patriarchal systems.

This analysis of the intersectionality of citizenship status and gender extends understandings on access to employment for protracted Palestinian refugees in Kafa, Jordan. It also highlights the importance of notions such as ‘justice, self-determination and solidarity’ in ensuring inclusionary forms of citizenship, as well as facilitating social cohesion and integration processes between protracted Palestinian refugees and their host population. The next chapter will address the intersectionality of gender and citizenship in relation to livelihood strategies of this group.
Chapter Six: How Does the Intersectionality of Gender and Citizenship Influence the Agency of Protracted Palestinian Refugees in Jordan in Developing Livelihood Strategies?

Introduction

This chapter explores the intersectionality of gender and citizenship in influencing livelihood strategies of protracted refugees through a case study of Palestinians in Kafa, Jordan. It seeks to address the following research question: how does the intersectionality of gender and citizenship influence the agency of protracted Palestinian refugees in Jordan in developing livelihood strategies?

The chapter begins by looking at the various livelihood strategies used by Transjordanian, Palestinian Jordanian and ex-Gazan women and men residing in and outside camps. It also examines how gender and citizenship shape their experiences in developing livelihood strategies. Furthermore, it looks at the agency of protracted refugee women and men in addressing structural barriers related to their citizenship and gender to improve their livelihood opportunities.

The argument set out in this chapter is that, in general, similar livelihood strategies were sought after by research participants. However, the intersectionality of gender and citizenship influenced protracted refugee women and men’s access to them. This chapter also emphasises the importance of looking at intersectional
discrimination on micro and macro levels to better understand the livelihood choices of protracted Palestinian refugee women and men. Furthermore, it highlights the importance of looking at social categories as fluid and able to change over time and space. This allows for a better understanding of the resilience of protracted refugee women and men through the choices they make to secure their livelihoods.

The section that follows examines the influence of intersectional discrimination in accessing livelihood strategies of protracted refugees by focusing on the intersectionality of gender and citizenship. It also looks at how gender and citizenship are perceived to enable and disable the agency of protracted refugees in building their resilience and developing livelihood strategies.

**Seeking Better Opportunities Abroad**

Seeking better opportunities was a popular option described by those interviewed – this was irrespective of their citizenship, but there were variations when taking gender into account.

Transjordanians and Palestinian Jordanians – with full Jordanian citizenship – have the same legal rights with respect to their freedom of movement and entitlements to travel abroad and return to Jordan (See Chapter Two: Setting for more information on this). For ex-Gazans with temporary Jordanian passports, their experiences of travelling abroad were different to full Jordanian passport holders (See Chapter Two: Setting for information on legal requirements to travel abroad for ex-Gazans with temporary
passports). In the case of women however, their opportunity of migrating to seek further education and employment was limited because of socio-cultural restrictions. This is particularly the case in rural areas of Jordan and among families who are less affluent, where the influence of religion and tradition is likely to be stronger (Antoun, 2005; Moghadam, 2003).

Women in this research were at more of a disadvantage than men in accessing higher education and employment opportunities outside of Jordan – and even Kafa – because of restricted mobility owing to patriarchal norms. Such restrictions were generally the same regardless of women’s citizenship status. To highlight differences in women and men’s opportunities and freedom of movement, an unemployed Transjordanian woman said, ‘Religiously it is unacceptable for a woman to travel abroad for work’. To be able to travel, the woman explained that she would have ‘to be accompanied by a guardian. So she could take or go with her husband’ (Focus group, unemployed Transjordanian women, outskirts of Kafa). Patriarchal norms embedded through tradition and religious beliefs framed girls and young women as vulnerable and in need of protection. Meanwhile, men were perceived to be heads of their households and assuming the role of protecting girls and women. Such patriarchal gender roles reinforced imbalances of power between women and men and consolidated systems of oppression that worked towards male domination and control over females. It was therefore more difficult for women to seek better
livelihood opportunities abroad because of patriarchal structures that limited their access to them.

As well as migrating to seek better economic opportunities, several Palestinian men reported traveling abroad to pursue higher education. This was particularly popular with ex-Gazans because of the fewer scholarship opportunities available to them in Jordan compared to Transjordanians and Palestinian Jordanians. Pursuing a higher education was also a strategy used to deal with unemployment for both women and men irrespective of citizenship status. However, as with employment, whereas men were able to seek opportunities in Jordan and abroad, the option for women was usually geographically limited to Jordan and sometimes to their area of residence.

The way in which education is highly valued by Palestinian refugees was underlined in Chapter Four. Education is important in building the resilience of vulnerable groups such as protracted refugees. Nevertheless, findings indicated that many male university graduates chose to become economically inactive after finding out that most of the jobs available in the labour market were unskilled and poorly paid (See Chapter Four for findings on further education). The exception to this, however, was in Alpha camp, where underemployment is common among young men and women due to economic hardship and limited job opportunities. Travelling abroad to work was thought of as a means to seek better opportunities for unemployed male graduates.
In the case of ex-Gazan men, seeking better opportunities abroad was a particularly attractive option because of the legal restrictions they faced in securing livelihoods owing to their exclusionary citizenship status in Jordan. According to an ex-Gazan man interviewed who had studied abroad and returned to the camp several years later after receiving a foreign passport,

*More than 80 per cent of the youth of Gaza set a goal to migrate to get out of this tragic situation that people of the camp are living in, which is basically being deprived of work, education, health care and insurance (Interview, MGC1, shop owner, married ex-Gazan man, diploma holder, 43, Alpha camp).*

The challenges that ex-Gazans faced when traveling abroad were different from those mentioned by Transjordanians and Palestinian Jordanians with full Jordanian citizenship. While the main obstacle for Transjordanians and Palestinian Jordanians had to do with the financial burden of traveling, for ex-Gazans several other obstacles were mentioned that challenged their mobility. For example, some reported difficulty in obtaining visas because of their citizenship status. Others were fearful that their travel documents would not be recognised in their country of migration. There were also reports of Jordanian authorities refusing to renew ex-Gazans’ passports. This left them without any legal forms of documentation that would allow them to protect themselves and facilitate their movement. During a field visit to Alpha camp, I had a discussion with several ex-Gazan women and men. Highlighting the impact of
exclusionary forms of citizenship on their livelihood opportunities, one ex-Gazan man informed me that he had recently applied for a position as a pilot in the Gulf and was initially accepted. However, he was later rejected for the post after informing the recruitment office that he did not have a Jordanian national identity number. Adding to the conversation, an ex-Gazan woman believed that their situation was worse than those of ex-Gazan men and even Transjordanian and Palestinian Jordanian women. She said that as well as having to deal with patriarchal constraints – a common challenge experienced by most women – they were also faced with the problem of lacking a national identity number (Field notes, 15 June 2013). This made the experiences of ex-Gazan women different from ex-Gazan men, as well as from Transjordanian and Palestinian Jordanian men and women with full citizenship statuses.

When I asked why it was so difficult for ex-Gazans to apply for visas and residencies abroad, the group of men and women laughed and one person said that it is because the Jordanian government receives a lot of financial support for ex-Gazans, and then he continued saying that unfortunately it never reaches them (Field notes, 15 June 2013). The Jordanian government has been reported as exaggerating refugee rates and the impact of their influx into Jordan in order to attract greater international funding into the country (Al-Khoury, 2007; De Bel-Air, 2008; Stevens, 2013).

The difficulty that ex-Gazans faced in obtaining travel visas was further explained during the previously reported interview with an
ex-Gazan shop owner who was able to obtain a foreign passport while traveling abroad. He said,

_We live in a big prison. Firstly, the passport that ex-Gazans have does not give them the right to travel to any country. It is a travel document to prove identity … The people of Gaza are red marked. We are not allowed to travel like Jordanians … Unless we get a visa. And getting a visa is not as easy because we come from Gaza, so we do not have a national number so we are not recognised_ (Interview, MGC1, business owner, married ex-Gazan man, diploma holder, 43, Alpha camp).

Similarly, during discussions about visa procedures, a 28-year old unemployed ex-Gazan man with a bachelor’s degree explained from his experience in applying for visas in Jordan,

_Some embassies – like the American Embassy – do not allow ex-Gazans to even enter the building. Only in heaven, this is when justice will take place, because God will let those without national numbers enter. Whereas Jordanians with national numbers will not be let in_. He paused for a while and then continued while laughing: ‘Or maybe we won’t even be allowed to go into heaven because we don’t have national numbers too!’ (Field notes, KI1, 15 September 2014).

Another key problem in seeking better opportunities abroad was financial constraints. Although this was reported among women and men irrespective of their citizenship, it was perceived to be a greater challenge for ex-Gazans because of the poorer conditions of
residents in Alpha camp compared to Beta camp refugees and the host population in Kafa. In fact, even though citizenship status was highlighted as a primary barrier that challenged the mobility of ex-Gazans, some perceived affluence as the overriding issue. This was reflected during an interview with an unemployed ex-Gazan mother who said,

*At the end of the day money is the most important thing. You can manage yourself if you have money even if you are from Alpha [camp]. But this is the problem we don’t have money* (Interview, FGCHV1, married unemployed ex-Gazan woman, illiterate, 44, Alpha camp).

The experiences reported by ex-Gazans are in violation of the rights that Palestinians are entitled to through the Casablanca Protocol (1965), which states that Palestinians residing in host countries are entitled to travel and return to their host countries at their own free will (*See Appendix 1, Table 1.2(9), page 391 for the Protocol*). The situation of ex-Gazans shows how legal structures can justify the prolonged marginalisation of individuals with exclusionary forms of citizenship. It also brings forward the issue of whether the notion of ‘justice’ that Kabeer refers to as one of the key tenets of inclusive societies could be applied to the extent to which it is fair for people to be treated differently rather than simply when unfair treatment is justified.

There were also reports where families would choose to emigrate – particularly ex-Gazans – would choose to emigrate for the purpose of securing better livelihoods for their children. This was
highlighted during an interview with an ex-Gazan UNRWA teacher, who planned to emigrate in order to provide a better future. The man said: ‘I intend not to raise him [his son] as a Gazan, I intend to emigrate away from this country’ (Interview, MGC2, married employed ex-Gazan man, BA holder, 29, Alpha camp). This passage shows how emigration was regarded as a strategy to deal with discrimination, through the detachment from negatively perceived in-groups and assimilation or integration into out-groups. It also shows how institutionalised ‘labeling’ over a period of time can strengthen ‘patterns of alienation and politicization’ (Zetter, 1991: 60) of refugee populations.

In summary, people’s experiences of seeking better opportunities abroad and their ability to negotiate with structures that constrained their movement varied depending on factors such as their citizenship status, economic background and gender. Irrespective of citizenship, research participants explained the importance of the right to freedom of movement for further education and employment. Freedom of movement for education was of particular importance to ex-Gazans because of the limited opportunities they had compared to other Palestinian refugees with full Jordanian citizenship in Jordan. In spite of legal instruments such as the Casablanca Protocol (1965), to which Jordan is in supports without reservation, ex-Gazans have limited opportunities to choose migration to contribute to their livelihoods compared to other protracted refugees. Moreover, ex-Gazan women were further disadvantaged to both men and women who were Transjordanians.
and Palestinian Jordanians because, as well as facing patriarchal constraints, they also had to deal with obstacles incurred on them owing to their exclusionary citizenship. Hence, gender and citizenship intersected to create different experiences for women and men in their opportunities to seek better opportunities abroad. The section that follows will look at marriage as a strategy for socio-economic mobility. It will also explore the intersectionality of gender and citizenship in shaping research participants’ experiences in their use of marriage as a livelihood strategy.

**Marriage as a Livelihood Strategy**

Marriage was commonly used as a strategy to improve socio-economic status and gain privileges through association. These findings were similar irrespective of gender and citizenship status. Marriage was a means to reshape identities and shift power imbalances, resulting in both advantages and disadvantages.

It is important to look at men’s views of women’s roles in society, as they play a fundamental part – as spouses – in enabling them to and disabling them from exercising their economic rights. The majority of men interviewed believed that married women should assume their reproductive and domestic roles. Some did not accept that women could work in the labour market while others were more tolerant but under strict conditions. All participants – female and male – saw women’s economic contribution within the household as secondary to men’s.
On the other hand, there were opposing views reported, particularly from women, which highlighted an increasing interest among men to seek employed women for marriage in order to contribute to the family income. During a focus group with employed Transjordanian women, one participant claimed, ‘Everybody [every man] is looking for women who are employed [to marry] … And they even check the specialisation to see if it is employable or not’ (Focus group, employed Transjordanian women, outskirts of Kafa). Another woman continued, ‘Life is difficult, one salary is not enough for a married couple’ (Focus group, employed Transjordanian women, outskirts of Kafa).

The literature on women in the Jordanian labour force has shown that females are more likely to leave work after marriage (El-Azhary, 2003; Heaton, 1996; Singh and Samara, 1996). This is because of the accepted gender roles of men being the breadwinners and women the caregivers within a family unit. Patriarchal norms also entitled men to privileges such as power and control over financial resources within the private sphere. This was reflected during an interview with a 25-year-old ex-Gazan woman who was working at a CBO in Alpha camp. The woman informed me that she was required to give her salary to her father at the end of each month, even though she lived separately from her father as her parents were divorced and he was married to another woman. She also informed me that she was restricted to working in jobs considered as ‘socially acceptable’ for her to engage in by her father and brothers. On one occasion, the woman told me that she had
worked at a salon without informing her father, who later found out and forced her to leave. She said it did not stop her from trying to find other work (FGC6, Interview, employed ex-Gazan woman, tauğîhi, 25, Alpha camp).

The ex-Gazan woman’s experience shows how patriarchal practices can deny women their rights to self-determination by controlling what economic activities and physical spaces are suitable for them to engage in. Nevertheless, rather than being passive, the woman showed an active agency to negotiate and challenge patriarchy. Findings showed that when there was increased economic hardship women may become more active within the labour market. This is particularly evident among ex-Gazan women because of the pressure of economic hardship. Hence, their experiences in developing livelihood strategies differed from Transjordanian and Palestinian Jordanian women.

For Palestinian Jordanian men, marriage to Transjordanian women was commonly used as a strategy to increase social support networks and gain privileges through affiliation. This was highlighted during an interview with a Palestinian Jordanian man, who claimed,

*The Palestinian [man] prefers to take from the other [Jordanian] … [Because he] believes that he has support with a Jordanian female (Ilo Dahir). There is benefit (Interview, MPalJT1, single Palestinian Jordanian shop manager, BA degree, 28, Kafa town).*

Similarly, another ex-Gazan man, who owned a shop in the camp, said,
When young men want to get married they look for women with certain characteristics; he chooses her to be his wife either because she has a job … Or maybe he is looking for someone who has everything covered … [Meaning] her family has high position, power or connections. A family will lift him up (Interview, MGC9, married ex-Gazan man, business owner, VTC training, 36, Alpha camp).

In Jordan, the patriarchal conception of citizenship means that laws grant men the right to pass their citizenship to their spouses and children, whereas for women this is forbidden (See Chapter Two: Setting for more information on naturalisation rights through marriage). For this reason, many Transjordanian and Palestinian Jordanian women highlighted a general disinclination to arrange marriages for their daughters to ex-Gazan men. According to a Transjordanian woman,

Ex-Gazans do not have national numbers. If you have children, you can’t educate them, or treat them when they are ill, and there is no country to protect them (Focus group, unemployed Transjordanian women, outskirts of Kafa).

Similarly, during an interview with Palestinian Jordanian women, the majority mentioned preferring to marry their daughters to Jordanians rather than ex-Gazans. One woman claimed, ‘If you are married to an ex-Gazan … You will suffer. We fear for the future of our daughters if they are to marry an ex-Gazan’ (Focus group, Palestinian Jordanian employed women, Beta camp). They agreed that they would give priority to Jordanians because, ‘A Jordanian is
powerful. But, there will still be discrimination’ (Focus group, Palestinian Jordanian employed women, Beta camp).

Amongst Palestinian Jordanians and ex-Gazans, there was a general preference to marry Jordanians who were of Palestinian rather than East Bank origin. This was particularly the case for women rather than men because of a perceived risk of experiencing discrimination from dominant group members (Transjordanians).

The findings highlighted several cases where Palestinian and ex-Gazan women married to Transjordanians shared experiences of discrimination. One such example was given during an interview with a Palestinian Jordanian woman who had recently separated from her Transjordanian husband. The woman claimed that discrimination against Palestinians exists ‘beyond your imagination’, giving the example of her husband’s second wife:

She stayed for three years without having children, why do they [the husband’s family] still keep her with them? Because she is one of them [a Transjordanian]. I was a ‘foreigner’ [a Palestinian from Beta camp], I gave birth to the children, but they always thought of me as a foreigner. And if you search you will find even worse practices of discrimination (Interview, FP_BetaCamp, divorcing Palestinian Jordanian woman, employed, incomplete master’s degree, 33, Kafa).

Because of the woman’s personal experience of discrimination, she insisted that she would never allow her daughter to marry a Transjordanian. She said, ‘It would be fine by me if my son married a [Trans]Jordanian, but not for my daughter … I don’t want
her to feel oppressed’ (FP_BetaCamp). The woman preferred her daughter to marry an ex-Gazan man because he ‘would be kind to her, they’d be considered relatives’ (Interview, FP_BetaCamp, divorcing Palestinian Jordanian woman, employed, incomplete MA, 33, Kafa). This passage indicates the interviewee’s belief that Palestinian refugee women were at a greater risk of discrimination in the event that they married Transjordanian men. Moreover, it highlights how discriminatory practices over a period of time can further alienate protracted refugees from their host population. Rather than facilitating integration, stronger inclusionary and exclusionary boundaries are shaped to demarcate the ‘us’ from the ‘other’. One woman who lived outside the camp highlighted the divide between Palestinian Jordanians and Transjordanians during a focus group discussion. She said:

*Around my house they are all [Trans]Jordanians. So we don’t mix … You don’t deal with them. Your way is different from theirs … You feel that we are different parties; Jordanian and Palestinian* (Focus group, Palestinian Jordanian unemployed women, Beta camp).

For ex-Gazans, marriage to Jordanian citizenship holders was common and used as a livelihood strategy to gain access to greater rights. In the case of ex-Gazan women, those who marry Jordanian men are entitled to Jordanian citizenship, whereas ex-Gazan men who marry Jordanian women are not. Ex-Gazan women married to Jordanian men are eligible to acquire Jordanian passports subject to fulfillment of certain conditions provided under the law (See Appendix
However, neither the law nor the procedures applied by the Ministry of Interior Affairs require the consent of the husband\textsuperscript{23} (Beiruti, 2015). The drawback of lacking awareness on individual rights was highlighted during an interview with an ex-Gazan woman who was married to a Transjordanian. Her husband did not approve of passing on his Jordanian citizenship to her, and she said, ‘If he does not approve, I am not permitted to apply for a nationality’ (Focus group, unemployed ex-Gazan women, Alpha camp).

Nevertheless, both ex-Gazan men and women used marriage as a strategy to negotiate with and resist institutional discrimination. Looking at land and property ownership rights, for example, provided insights into such strategies. All Palestinian camp-dwellers do not own any legal documents to their homes, as the campsite land is by law the property of UNRWA. However, Palestinian Jordanians are legally permitted to own property outside the camps, whereas ex-Gazans are not because of their exclusionary citizenship status (See Chapter Two: Setting for more information on ex-Gazans and rights to ownership).

A lack of ownership and property rights has had a great impact on the livelihoods of ex-Gazans. Unequal rights to accessing resources such as property means that people are denied their entitlement to self-determination, which is one of the key tenets of inclusive citizenship. Nevertheless, some of the strategies mentioned to deal with such institutional discrimination involved conducting

\textsuperscript{23} I obtained this information through email correspondence with a lawyer in Jordan.
purchases and rent transactions based on verbal agreements and tradition (‘Urf). With regard to purchasing property in the camp, a married and employed ex-Gazan man explained, ‘We can buy it [the land] locally, between residents, everyone knows it is yours, with no legal documents’ (Interview, MGC2, married employed ex-Gazan man, bachelor’s degree, Alpha camp, 29). However, by law, ex-Gazans are required to have a Jordanian citizen as a partner in the purchase of property, as well as obtain approval from a ministerial council (Al-Abed, 2005). Often, ex-Gazan men marry Jordanian women to facilitate their access to property rights. So strategies used to address institutional discrimination in respect to property purchases involved conducting informal agreements with owners, as well as marrying Jordanian partners.

Data showed that ex-Gazan men had a strong interest in marrying women with Jordanian citizenship. This was reflected during an interview with a 28-year-old single ex-Gazan man who claimed, ‘All [Ex-Gazan] men who do not have national [identity] numbers want their wives to have one’ (Interview, MGC7, single unemployed ex-Gazan man, bachelor’s degree, 28, Alpha camp). Another interviewee claimed, that although ex-Gazan men ‘cannot be [Jordanian] citizens by marriage … They can protect their rights by registering their cars and lands under their wives’ names’ (Interview, MGC10, married ex-Gazan man, Employed, PhD holder, 43, Alpha camp).
The man also highlighted the value of marrying Jordanian citizenship holders in order for ex-Gazans to secure the inheritance rights of their families. He went on to explain,

_Instead of marrying a woman from Gaza, they would [prefer to] marry a Jordanian woman, so that if they buy land or an apartment, they can register it in the wife’s name, and the children will then inherit those properties from the wife. They know that if those properties are not registered in their wives’ names, then if the men die, the properties will not be inherited by their children, but will rather go back to the previous owners whom the ex-Gazan men bought them from. We had many cases like this before ... The law does not protect fools_ (Interview, MGC10, married ex-Gazan man, Employed, PhD holder, 43, Alpha camp).

In the event of Transjordanian women marrying ex-Gazans, however, they were likely to experience downward socio-economic mobility. This was reflected during an interview with a Transjordanian woman who was 25 years of age and was forced to discontinue her education and move into Alpha camp after marrying an ex-Gazan man. During the interview, she informed me that her only aspiration in life would be for her to continue her education (Interview, FGCHV1). I also had an informal discussion with another Transjordanian woman who had married an ex-Gazan and moved into Alpha camp. The woman complained about the downward shift in her standard of living after moving into the camp. She also regretted marrying her husband because of the repercussions it had
brought on her children in terms of their future livelihood opportunities.

Meanwhile, there were other accounts from ex-Gazan women preferring to marry Palestinian Jordanians over ex-Gazans as a strategy to overcome institutional discrimination. For example, a single employed ex-Gazan woman said,

*I would not marry an ex-Gazan even if he is better than the others ... So as to avoid suffering, which I already have had my share of* (Focus group, employed ex-Gazan women, Alpha camp).

A number of ex-Gazan women also reported preferring to marry Transjordanians over ex-Gazans in order to acquire Jordanian citizenship and secure their children's future. According to a single ex-Gazan woman in her forties, a lot of ex-Gazans get married to Jordanian citizenship holders ‘To make sure their children are safe and will not suffer as they did ... [It is] for the children’s sake’ (Interview, FGC08, employed ex-Gazan woman, tauğīḥī, 44, Alpha camp).

As with Palestinian Jordanians, there were accounts of ex-Gazan women married to Transjordanians experiencing discrimination. One unemployed ex-Gazan woman who was married to a Transjordanian said,

*Girls who marry Jordanians are always looked down upon by their husbands [and their families]. She would always be referred to as the ‘ex-Gazan’ rather than by her name. So when ex-Gazan families see that, they decide never to marry*
their daughters off to a Jordanian (Focus group, unemployed ex-Gazan women, Alpha camp).

The woman explained that she had to obtain a security approval to marry, which is required ‘only with Palestinians from Gaza who do not have a national number’ (Focus group, unemployed ex-Gazan women, Alpha camp). This passage highlighted the exceptional treatment of ex-Gazans in relation to other Palestinian refugees. It shows how the intersectionality of gender and type of citizenship created different livelihood opportunities for protracted Palestinian refugees.

In summary, irrespective of gender or citizenship, marriage was raised by research participants as an important mechanism to facilitate upward socio-economic mobility and enhance livelihood opportunities. Choice of marriage was based on patriarchal norms as well as categories of citizenship. Social constructions of gender were strongly influenced by patriarchal norms. While the majority of participants perceived a woman’s and a man’s primary role in society respectively as caregiver and breadwinner; economic hardship has enabled women to negotiate and challenge the patriarchal gender contract. These findings were the same for all women irrespective of their citizenship status. However, ex-Gazan women expressed a greater agency to negotiate and challenge patriarchy because of the economic hardship that many experienced and the limited economic opportunities open to them owing to their citizenship.

In the context of the protracted refugee situation, where opportunities are limited, marriage becomes an important agent for
accessing further education, employment and therefore livelihood opportunities. However, this is nuanced by social markers such as citizenship and a person’s ‘place of origin’, and is experienced differently by women and men. There were many reports of Palestinian Jordanian and ex-Gazan women experiencing discrimination when married to Transjordanian men. In the case of Palestinian Jordanian and ex-Gazan men however, this was less prevalent because of patriarchal norms that placed them as the ‘head of the household’. The outcome of discriminatory practices included social exclusion and increased resentment between protracted Palestinian refugees and their host population. Marriage was also perceived as a means for ex-Gazans to exercise their rights to self-determination. This included for example, rights to ownership and inheritance and social influence and status.

This brings us to the next section of this chapter, which looks at the exercise of social influence through informal social networks (wastah) as a livelihood strategy and how the intersectionality of gender and citizenship affects this.

The Role of Wastah in Relation to Livelihood Strategies

Having wastah means having access through social influence and networks to persons with power. It refers to informal connections with people in power who are responsible for their tribe, including close and extended relatives as well as friends. Jordanian society relies heavily on associations through tribes, family and clans for reciprocal
support. Having *wastah* means using social connections to access to power and privilege through such informal networks.

**The Perceived Value of Wastah**

In Jordan *wastah* can be a highly effective means of accessing resources and employment opportunities in both the private and public sectors for women and men irrespective of their citizenship status. It can be described as a ‘web of power that enable[s] actors to gain, control and maintain access’ (Ribot and Peluso, 2003: 155) to resources and livelihood opportunities. Nevertheless, it can also be considered a disabler for those who do not have access to it. This was highlighted during a focus group with unemployed Transjordanian women. Most of the participants perceived *wastah* as ‘an obstacle to work, and study, and everything’ (Focus group, unemployed Tranjordanian women, outskirts of Kafa). However, one woman said, ‘Of course wastah can be good if it works to your benefit (Focus group, unemployed Tranjordanian women, outskirts of Kafa).

The enabling and disabling effect of *wastah* on livelihood opportunities was also reflected during interviews with several Palestinian Jordanian and ex-Gazan women and men. Many participants reported that *wastah* could be enabled through the intersection of various social markers such as ‘place of birth’, class, gender and family or tribal affiliation, which could broaden access to resources and employment opportunities. To highlight the value and use of *wastah* by Palestinian refugees, Miles reports of their frequent
utilisation of ‘informal personal ties rooted in reciprocity, kin relationships, and links of patronage that included older family and village kin, as well as new connections with UNRWA employees, and with the host State and society’ (2002: 398) as a means of upward socio-economic mobility. Hence, wastah was utilised to achieve individual benefits.

Wastah was also believed by many – and particularly those who were unemployed – to have a greater influence in securing job opportunities than other factors such as a higher education. This was reflected during a focus group with unemployed Transjordanians, when one woman claimed, ‘If someone has a high profile connection [wastah], they will find a job even if they are only a high school graduate’ (Focus group, unemployed Transjordanian women, outskirts of Kafa). Similarly, another participant, who was looking for employment, said, ‘I have a bachelor’s degree and I always face the problem of not having wastah. In any interview, I am always asked if I am connected to anyone in the company’ (Focus group, unemployed Transjordanian women, outskirts of Kafa).

There was also a general perception among university graduates that the value of wastah was in facilitating access to jobs within their field rather than to work in general. This was reflected during an interview with a Transjordanian man who graduated from a private university with a bachelor’s degree in economics and was working at his father’s shop in Kafa because he could not find a job in his specialisation. The man believed that for him to access jobs relevant to his specialisation, he would need wastah. He said, ‘If I
wanted to use these kinds of means [wastah], I would have a job [in my specialisation]. But I want to get a job because I am qualified’ (Interview, MEBJT2, employed Transjordanian, bachelor’s degree, 28, Kafa town,). Similarly, another Palestinian Jordanian without a secondary education, who owned a shop in Kafa town, said, ‘If you have wastah, you can go into any specialisation and sector you want. If you don’t have wastah, even if you are a genius and you can benefit the country and people, you will still not get it’ (Interview, MPalJT42, Palestinian Jordanian man, shop owner, 33, Kafa town).

So both interviewees were of the opinion that wastah was more enabling than formal qualifications in facilitating access to employment, and particularly those within the specialisations of job-seekers. Moreover, the experience of the Palestinian Jordanian young man who worked at his father’s shop highlights the value of family networks in broadening livelihood opportunities (this will be further discussed in the section on wastah and private sector employment).

Hence, wastah was perceived to be a highly valued asset irrespective of gender and citizenship. The section that follows will look at wastah as a livelihood strategy for securing greater employment opportunities in the public and private sectors. Moreover, it will explore the intersectionality of gender and citizenship in enabling and disabling women and men’s experiences of accessing wastah in order to broaden livelihood opportunities.
The Use of Wastah to Access Public and Private Sector Employment

In the case of public sector employment, although Article 22(ii) of the Jordanian Constitution states that merit and qualifications are required to be the basis on which employees are recruited, informal social networking and the exercise of influence through personal connections (wastah) plays a major role. As mentioned in Chapter Five of this thesis, employment of Palestinian Jordanians in the public sector – and specifically in the country’s military, political, media and higher education sectors – has significantly decreased because of policies that continue to exist in the shape of ‘non-official and un-transparent affirmative action’ (Reiter, 2002: 137) towards Transjordanians.

As well as being highlighted by research participants, this was also mentioned during an interview with a policy maker who previously occupied a high-level government position in Jordan. The person gave evidence of the prevalent use of wastah in accessing public sector jobs by referring to the Civil Service Bureau (CSB) and advising me to look at the names of families of CSB staff, claiming that I would find a connection between them in that many belonged to Transjordanian families with strong tribal affiliations (Field notes, 30 June 2013). To support such claims, a study on employment in Jordan indicated that, while regulations for employee recruitment through the CSB are based on ‘principles of justice, equality and transparency … [They are in reality dependent on] … Wastah and
the state’s concerns about tribal and geographic representation’ (El-Abed, 2014: 305).

The privileged access of Transjordanians to jobs in the public sector was mentioned during interviews with Palestinian Jordanians and ex-Gazans. As well as subtle structures leveraging this privilege, it is also in part linked to the tribal affiliations and family membership that Transjordanians possess – and Palestinian Jordanians and ex-Gazans lack – which define social status (Ali, Raiden and Kirk, 2013). This was reflected during a focus group with unemployed Palestinian Jordanians, in which a woman said, ‘If you don’t have a wastah, then you will never get a job … The priority is always for a [Trans]Jordanian’ (Focus group, unemployed Palestinian Jordanian women, Beta camp).

A direct consequence of state policies in the public sector has been the exclusion of Palestinian Jordanians from accessing specific areas and positions and the prioritisation of Transjordanians. A consequence of this is the concentration of Palestinian Jordanians in the private sector. Wastah was however, also used in private sector employment, and an example of this is the use of connections to work in family businesses, which was a popular livelihood strategy for men irrespective of citizenship status. My research found that, for many Transjordanian, Palestinian and ex-Gazan men, working in family businesses was a particularly common means of earning a livelihood. Several examples were reported during interviews in Kafa town, as well as in Alpha and Beta camps. Many men resorted to working in family businesses in the event that they could not find the
jobs that they aspired to work in. This is especially the case for refugee camp-dwellers, where legal structures are more flexibly implemented. This flexibility of working within camps was particularly enabling for ex-Gazans, who were barred from certain professions. So for example, during a conversation with an ex-Gazan who volunteered at a CBO in Alpha camp, the man said that ex-Gazans could work in professions within the camp, it was forbidden for them to engage in outside the camp spaces (Field notes, 11 September 2013).

Hence, the situation between Palestinian Jordanians and ex-Gazans is different. Competition and discrimination in the public sector have pushed Palestinian Jordanians towards the private sector and entrepreneurialism. Meanwhile, legal constraints in accessing formal employment opportunities in the private and public sectors have compelled ex-Gazans to seek livelihoods through entrepreneurialism and informal employment.

For women, using wastah to access employment in the private sector was also practised. However, it was less accessible to men (See Chapter Five: Findings on Employment for women’s and men’s access to private sector employment). Moreover, patriarchal constraints made it more difficult for women than men to consolidate connections at work, irrespective of their citizenship status.

During a field visit to Alpha camp, a woman highlighted the perceived disadvantage that ex-Gazan women faced compared to other women in developing livelihood strategies and the value that wastah had in facilitating opportunities. She gave the example of her
situation and explained that she had managed to open a shop in the camp, which had proved to be successful. During a competition targeting Palestinian refugee women residing in camps with entrepreneurial ventures, she was promised a sewing machine and equipment. However, when she went to claim them, the woman said that she was refused the equipment because she did not have a national identity number. Moreover, the woman believed that she would not have had any problems obtaining the equipment if she had had wastah (Field notes, 18 September 2013).

Nevertheless, women were not passive and showed agency to resist the challenges they faced in developing livelihood strategies. For example, during another visit to Alpha camp, an ex-Gazan woman took me to her grocery store. She explained that she had set up the shop as an extension to her house in the camp, which made it easier for her to gain the support of her family. Moreover, the woman believed that being older in age also gave her greater leverage to engage in the public sphere than if she had been younger (Field notes, 18 July 2013). Hence, age played an important factor in enabling and disabling women from taking part in livelihood activities. This was also reflected during a discussion with a CBO manager in Beta camp, who said that in most cases younger women were more restricted than those who are older, because they are either busy taking care of their children, or their husbands are stricter about their leaving their homes (Field notes, 12 September 2013).

It was common for participants and particularly women – with the exception of ex-Gazans – to relate their experiences and views of
practices of *wastah* to the public rather than private sector. This is because for women, socio-cultural norms restricted their economic activities to 'socially acceptable' occupations that were predominantly in the public sector.

However, patriarchal norms that gave preference to men and restricted women’s freedom of movement in the public sphere and ability to develop networks placed them at a greater disadvantage in accessing *wastah* regardless of whether they were Palestinian or Transjordanian. This was reflected during a focus group with employed Palestinian Jordanians, when a woman complained,

*My parents supported my brother in his education and used all their connections to help him find a job, but it was the opposite with me, [they said] I cannot [continue my] study and work, just get married* (Interview, employed Palestinian Jordanian woman, incomplete master's degree, 33, Beta camp).

A study conducted in 2002, highlighted *wastah* as a key enabler in accessing suitable employment opportunities in Jordan. Nevertheless, it is often the case in large Jordanian families that daughters are disadvantaged compared to their brothers because sons are given greater access to family *wastah* than their sisters (Miles, 2002). Nevertheless, Transjordanian women were perceived to be at an advantage over Palestinian Jordanian and ex-Gazan women. This was because they were more likely to have ‘inherited’ stronger informal social networks through tribal affiliation and family membership.
CBOs played a significant role in empowering women to gain access to resources and economic opportunities. This was evident in my findings both within and outside of the camps. They offered spaces where women could establish informal social networks that were also used as a form of *wastah* to facilitate access to resources and job opportunities.

This section highlighted *wastah* as a vital livelihood strategy to securing greater employment opportunities in the public and private sectors. This was a common view of research participants irrespective of gender and citizenship. Nevertheless, the experiences that research participants had in accessing livelihood opportunities through *wastah* varied depending on social markers such as gender, citizenship and ‘place of origin’. Transjordanian women and men were perceived to be at an advantage to Palestinian Jordanians and ex-Gazans because of the social networks they inherited through tribal affiliation and family membership. *Wastah* was also perceived to be more accessible to men than women because of patriarchal norms that restricted women’s ability to develop networks, as well as family practices of preferential treatment to sons. The section that follows will look at *wastah* as a means to deal with institutionalised discrimination and access greater rights for protracted refugees experiencing exclusionary forms of citizenship.

**Wastah as a Means to Access Greater Rights**

While *wastah* was used to facilitate access to greater livelihood opportunities, it was also used as a strategy to resist and challenge
human rights infringements through tribal kinship. In the case of ex-Gazans whose citizenship did not entitle them state protection, *wastah* was an extremely valued asset for them. Moreover, it facilitated daily livelihood procedures, which often required security approval in the case of ex-Gazans (El-Abed, 2014). Use of *wastah* to claim rights was mentioned during an interview with an ex-Gazan who had his passport arbitrarily revoked by authorities. In such situations, the ex-Gazan claimed, tribal connections were used to redeem passports and often proved to be more effective than legal channels. For example, during an interview with an employed ex-Gazan employed in Alpha camp, the man said,

*People are afraid to act and speak up as they fear the authorities might withdraw their passports ... If this happened [the passport is withdrawn] you would seek help from elder tribal leaders or some high principal, who might help get it back from the authorities (Interview, MGC2, married employed ex-Gazan man, bachelor's degree, 29, Alpha camp).*

Therefore, it seems that *wastah* can be used as a strategy to accessing rights when necessary, and not just as a livelihood strategy.

The findings highlighted that, in general, Palestinian Jordanian women and men were more vocal in voicing, challenging and resisting the disadvantages they faced. This was because their full citizenship legally empowered them to challenge discrimination and claim their economic rights. Meanwhile, ex-Gazans in interviews often normalised discrimination by accepting their situation and
referring to ‘Allāh. Thus, perhaps one of the mechanisms used to normalise discrimination was religious faith. For example, several ex-Gazans interviewed claimed to accept their situation, seeing it as ‘Allāh’s will. However, acceptance of life circumstances in Muslim society is often expressed through referring to ‘Allāh. This is the dominant trope or discourse. It may be less a statement of faith than an acceptance of their disadvantaged situation. Similarly, during a discussion with unemployed ex-Gazan women, participants also claimed to accept their situation as a condition of their being, with one woman saying, ‘We will live and die with this tragedy, we were born with it’ (Focus group, unemployed ex-Gazan women, Alpha camp).

As well as normalising discrimination, many ex-Gazans considered rights to be luxuries rather than entitlements. To them, securing the basic needs of their families was a priority. This was reflected during an interview with an ex-Gazan young man who did not complete his matriculation (‘Tauǧīḥī) and did part-time menial work in Amman. He described the changing attitudes of ex-Gazans saying,

*They stopped objecting and just went with the flow. They started looking for what would give them money so they could bring back food to their homes. They stopped caring if the government did this or that or didn’t, instead they looked for what could bring them money and a good life* (Interview, MGC6, single ex-Gazan man, 29, Alpha camp).
Moreover, several ex-Gazan participants prioritised economic rights over other entitlements such as rights to citizenship and political participation. During a home visit to an unemployed ex-Gazan mother, the woman explained,

*If we can enjoy good economic conditions there will be no need for a national number ... We can dispense with the national number* (Interview, FGCHV1, Unemployed ex-Gazan woman, Illiterate, 44, Alpha camp).

The findings above indicate how exclusionary citizenship over a prolonged period of time has disempowered ex-Gazans from demanding their rights to live in dignity and seek justice. Instead, focusing on employment and making a living became the primary concern and livelihood strategy for them. For Palestinian Jordanians, their inclusionary citizenship enabled them to recognise their ‘right to have rights’ (Arendt, 1986) and be more vocal in demanding their entitlements.

In summary, the categories of citizenship have become normalised by those who are most disadvantaged, who describe themselves as having limited agency to challenge discrimination. The section that follows will explore the utilisation of wastah to access humanitarian assistance.

**The Use of Wastah to Access Welfare and Humanitarian Assistance**

*Wastah* was recognised as a way to leverage access to welfare and humanitarian aid from state and non-state actors. Many refugees and
vulnerable Transjordanian women and men living precariously and without adequate income to support themselves and their families relied on welfare and humanitarian aid as a key livelihood strategy. While assistance from state and non-state actors was highly valued by many research participants irrespective of their citizenship status, gender and citizenship played a role in shaping their experience of accessing it.

_Wastah_ in some circumstances was believed to further exclude individuals that were already considered to be vulnerable in Alpha camp. This was reflected during one of my field visits to the camp, when I attended a meeting between local camp authorities and a team working on a project that aimed to rehabilitate homes of poor ex-Gazan residents. During the discussion, several local committee members were concerned about the process by which beneficiaries would be selected, fearing that this would be based on _wastah_, as was usually the case during implementation of previous projects in the camp (Field notes, LC01, 15 July 2013). The concern to them was that _wastah_ would exclude those who were most marginalised and fail to address the needs of those who were most vulnerable in the camp.

The majority of Palestinian Jordanians and ex-Gazans interviewed were of the opinion that Transjordanians were at an advantage to accessing humanitarian assistance because of the stronger tribal affiliations that they had, which enabled them with greater access to _wastah_. Meanwhile, several Transjordanian women and men believed that Palestinian Jordanians were at a greater
advantage over them because of their access to welfare services from the government, as well as humanitarian assistance from non-state actors that specifically targeted Palestinian refugees such as UNRWA. As mentioned in the previous sections, patriarchal norms limited women’s access to wastah, consequently placing them at a disadvantage to men in their ability to use it to facilitate access to humanitarian assistance.

Other social markers such as a woman’s marital status were also factors that influenced their vulnerability. This was highlighted during an interview with a Palestinian Jordanian mother-of-two who was in the process of a divorce. She reported that she was ineligible to apply for aid because the law would only recognise her as independent from her husband after the official divorce. The woman believed that had she possessed wastah, she would have been able to access the humanitarian aid she needed (Interview, FP_Betacamp, unemployed Palestinian Jordanian woman, divorcing, incomplete master’s degree, Beta camp).

The issue of aid dependency was highlighted as a problem during interviews with employed Palestinian Jordanians, some of whom had businesses in the camp, and others in Kafa town. For example, it was mentioned during an interview with a Palestinian Jordanian shop owner in Beta camp. The man believed that, ‘People got confused from whom to take, and they looked for who gives better financial assistance. They do not look at the future, nobody raises awareness about these issues’ (Interview, MSC4, married Palestinian Jordanian, shop owner, diploma holder, 35, Beta camp).
A major concern regarding financial aid was that it encouraged people to become dependent rather than self-reliant and productive members of society. A Palestinian Jordanian shop owner in Kafa town said this had particularly negative consequences on youth because:

When a young man gets used to being spent on by an organisation, and his age goes from 7 to 10 to 15 and 20 years of age, he enters university and is still paid for. What will he become? ... He is not encouraged to work. As such, he is used to depending on others rather than relying on himself to earn a living (Interview, MPalJT42, married Palestinian Jordanian man, shop owner, 33, Kafa town).

Similarly, another employed ex-Gazan woman expressed her concern with financial aid programmes, saying, ‘They [organisations offering financial aid] have created a society of beggars ... People have become reliant ... Even the young who are very healthy and capable of doing something in their lives’ (Focus group, employed ex-Gazan women, Alpha camp).

Hence, many research participants interviewed expressed concern about the effects of aid dependency as a livelihood strategy on youth. The extent to which aid dependency negatively impacted on individual livelihood strategies was raised during a focus group with employed Palestinian Jordanians, when one woman said, ‘If an opportunity for personal development comes, the person would turn it down, preferring instead to rely on regular income from aid’ (Focus group, employed Palestinian Jordanian women, Beta camp).
However, several Transjordanians and Palestinian refugees reported topping up the aid they received with work. For example, there were participants receiving services from UNRWA who also reported working in occupations such as seasonal farming, construction and low-paid jobs in the services sector. Others also mentioned setting up shops in the camp to increase their income. These reports were mainly from men, as women’s participation in the public sphere was more limited.

During discussions with a Palestinian shop owner, the man emphasised the need for livelihood programmes that encouraged youth empowerment and self-reliance. He gave the following example:

Open him [young man] a shop and put items for sale, you will force him every end of the year to pay zakāt [almsgiving]. As such you will direct him to the right path (Interview, MPalJT42, Married Palestinian Jordanian man, shop owner, 33, Kafa town).

Similarly, a development approach to humanitarian assistance was suggested during a focus group with employed women in Alpha camp. One participant believed that, rather than encouraging community members to be dependent on financial assistance, ‘Monetary aid given to the camp should be in the form of projects that create job opportunities and dignified lives for people’ (Focus group, employed Transjordanian women, Alpha camp).

There was general tendency for humanitarian assistance to be perceived to be an act of generosity rather than a responsibility to
ensure the basic rights of vulnerable individuals. This played a significant role in defining power relationships between ‘givers’ and ‘receivers’ of assistance and was highlighted during discussions with Palestinian refugees in Beta and Alpha camps. Several participants believed that financial assistance offered through CBOs in the camps was used as a strategy to control people through continued dependence. The inability to ‘give back’ created asymmetries in power between vulnerable populations, such as refugees, and their ‘givers’. Moreover, it positioned them as inferior to those who controlled and distributed aid.

A number of research participants, particularly those in Alpha camp, expressed scepticism on the value and true motives behind the work of various humanitarian organisations in the camps. This was highlighted during one of my field visits to Alpha camp. I noticed that some of the houses had large signs painted on the sides of their walls. The key informant told me that these were names of the organisations that had rehabilitated houses of poor families in the camp. The signs were used as advertisements to promote their work. He then added that by doing so these organisations also wanted to embarrass their beneficiaries by identifying them as extremely poor and marginalised to the community (Field notes, 27 June 2013). Another woman, who was working on an international project to rehabilitate homes of the poor in the camp, joined the conversation, saying that many of these organisations were corrupt and just wanted to promote their work (Field notes, 22 August 2013).
The passage above highlights how poorly implemented accountability mechanisms in the field of development and aid can lead to long-term experiences of injustice, specifically in the case of protracted refugees. Moreover, asymmetries in power between ‘givers’ and ‘recipients’ were likely to result in downward rather than upward accountability in aid. This imbalance in power relations extended to the host and protracted refugee populations, including those who had been naturalised and were by law regarded as citizens. It was reflected when Transjordanians made references that labelled Palestinian refugees as temporary ‘guests’ and ‘visitors’, whereas they saw themselves as providers of ‘hospitality’.

Several Transjordanian participants expressed a sense of privilege owing to their family having settled in Jordan before 1948 and being therefore categorised as ‘true Jordanians’ with a status accorded to them because of that\(^{24}\). It gave power to some citizens in Jordanian society and allowed the exclusion of others based on their original settlement into the country. This was reflected during an interview with an unemployed Transjordanian who relied on welfare aid as a livelihood. The man complained about the increasing economic hardship that Transjordanians faced because of the overwhelming influx of refugees in the country. He was of the opinion that ‘The son of the country is a priority’ (Interview, MJEB3, home visit, unemployed married Transjordanian, 42, outskirts of Kafa). Meanwhile, comparing Syrians to Palestinians in the country, another Transjordanian who volunteered at a CBO said,

\(^{24}\) By origin I refer to nationalist views that define ‘true Jordanians’ as the descendants of those who settled into Jordan before 1948.
Palestinians, aren’t they our guests in Jordan [Meaning they are guests compared to Transjordanians]? .... Jordan did them well and they are thankful to the country. The Syrians on the other hand … They just take and are not happy with what they get (Interview, FEB4, unemployed single Transjordanian woman, 26, Kafa).

This shows how the politicisation of labelling over a protracted period of time can normalise discrimination by both the privileged and oppressed.

Although reported by some as a threat to individual productivity, humanitarian aid was recognised by many as an important livelihood strategy– and particularly by and for those most marginalised – irrespective of gender and citizenship. The section that follows will look at the use of loans, micro-financing and income-generating opportunities as a livelihood strategy for research participants. It will also examine the influence that gender and citizenship have in enabling and disabling research participants’ access to these livelihood strategies.

**Loans, Micro-financing and Cooperatives**

With regard to loans and micro-financing opportunities, eligibility in most cases required individuals to be Jordanian citizens. Hence, they were accessible only to Transjordanians and those Palestinian Jordanians who were full citizens. UNRWA also provided such services to Palestinian refugees registered with the agency and residing within the camps. This means that Palestinians residing
outside the camps and not registered with UNRWA were technically not eligible for these services. So, for example, during a discussion, an employee at a CBO, who managed a project that provided loans to women in the camp, explained that eligibility criteria required them to be ex-Gazans residing in the camp and to have a guarantor (Field notes, 8 September 2013). The disadvantage that ex-Gazans faced compared to other Palestinian camp-dwellers was highlighted during a conversation with an UNRWA social worker. The social worker claimed that, in general, income-generating projects were poorly planned in all of UNRWA’s camps. However, the case of Alpha camp further disadvantaged residents because they do not have as many rights as other camp-dwellers do (Field notes, 2 July 2013).

Although several Palestinian Jordanians and Transjordanians rejected the idea of loans because they viewed them as forbidden in Islam (‘Harām), it was generally more accepted among ex-Gazans. This was reflected during a focus group with employed ex-Gazan women, when one participant said,

*I believe it is forbidden (Harām), but give me another means and I will take it … The number of people resorting to loans is increasing [in the camp] … because the economic state of people is declining. They have no other choice (Focus group, employed ex-Gazan women, Alpha camp).*

Moreover, during interviews with service providers offering loans in Alpha camp, there were reports of most women using the money to pay off bills or for house commodities. One service provider in Alpha Camp said,
I think the loan is more of a burden to the people than a solution to their problems. Because, when we take the money, we don't utilise it efficiently. We sometimes get unnecessary things, like buying something for your house or fixing things at home, or painting (Interview, 4SP, service provider, Alpha camp).

When asked how people repaid their loans, the ex-Gazan woman said,

*Sometimes people give them back and some other times they go to court because they are unable to pay; and sometimes they borrow from somewhere else to pay back the first loan. So they end up with bigger problems. So it is better not to take the loan in the first place* (Interview, 4SP, service provider, Alpha camp).

There were also several reports of women being used by their husbands to obtain loans and micro-financing opportunities. This was reflected during an interview with a gender specialist, who said,

*Men use women as tools to get loans. But still those women are liable for the loans, and if the men don't pay, then the women are jailed ... I don't see how micro-finance has created empowerment for women. They only signed a paper, while men got the loans* (Interview, 29SP, gender specialist).

The majority of respondents were more willing to join cooperative associations than take loans because they were not regarded as forbidden in Islam. This was highlighted during an
interview with an ex-Gazan woman working at a CBO. The woman said,

*I have never taken UNRWA loans or any designed for women … All loans are forbidden according to Islam [haram] because there is interest added to them … I prefer cooperatives instead* (Interview, FGC08, employed ex-Gazan woman, 44, Alpha camp).

One of the requirements of joining a cooperative is for the individual to be a Jordanian citizen. In the case of ex-Gazans, I was informed during an interview with a Centre manager related to cooperatives in Kafa that they were only entitled to become part of cooperatives within their camp, again depicting the flexibility of labour laws within such spaces (Interview, 1SP, Service provider, Kafa). Meanwhile, Palestinians in Beta camp with Jordanian citizenship were eligible to join cooperatives within and outside the camp spaces. In the case of women, most Transjordanians and Palestinian Jordanians reported that they would join cooperatives on the condition that the membership was female-only because of socio-cultural norms.

Another drawback to being part of an association was highlighted during a workshop that was arranged by Kafa local authorities. During the workshop, an attendee mentioned that many residents were unwilling to become members of cooperative associations because of the requirement to invest a JD1,000, which was too high for many. Although the workshop moderator explained that alternative option to becoming a member would be to pay JD500
and to pay the rest of the JD1,000 through instalments over around one year, participants were still reluctant to joining.

During my field visits to Beta camp I interviewed a Palestinian Jordanian who had set up a cooperative for women within the camp. The interviewee explained that, although women preferred working in the public sector, cooperatives were an alternative option for generating income for those who cannot access government jobs. She said,

*Everyone wants to go to the government they will tell you it’s more secure, in terms of salary … However those who do not have the opportunity to go to the government, have projects like these [cooperatives], which are also good. It will increase your income as a woman, I mean it will help support your family income, make you feel active, make you feel part of a community, give you value, as a member of a women’s co-op* (Interview, FSC1, married Palestinian Jordanian woman with children, manager of a cooperative, tauğīḥī, 44, Beta camp).

The cooperative\(^{25}\) that the woman set up was an example of a successful enterprise and a means for females to generate income in a collaborative manner. Nevertheless, during a focus group with employed women in Beta camp, several participants expressed their disinterest in joining the cooperative. Although they saw monthly fees as a barrier to joining, many women refused to become members.

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\(^{25}\) The cooperative that the woman set up provided various services in Beta camp, as well as areas in Kafa. These services included capacity-building classes for school children, water distribution to homes, sewing and embroidery for women, as well as cooking and delivery of homemade meals.
even if they had the money. According to a gender specialist and trainer, it is common for women in Jordan to dislike working together. She explained, ‘We have not been raised on team working… in our universities and even when studying for our master’s degree we did not learn anything about working in teams’ (Interview, 29SP, trainer on gender budgeting/service provider).

Social support plays a major role in facilitating women’s access to income-generating opportunities such as cooperatives. In the case of the women’s cooperative in Beta camp, the woman who set up the business believed that:

The biggest obstacle is the people, and their spirit [nafsiyah]. The people do not support you, they start to put you down. [These people are] here around me, the neighbourhood, my family ... Instead of encouraging and supporting the person, they start to put you down and tell you that you will fail, [they say] ‘tomorrow the project will fail [they say], tomorrow you will end up in jail, tomorrow and I don’t know what’ (Interview, FSC1, married Palestinian Jordanian woman with children, manager of a cooperative, tauğīhī, Beta camp,).

Nevertheless, the woman persevered and ‘went against all their talk and didn’t listen to any of them’ (FSC1). She believed that ‘more support from people around her is needed, this is what helps people succeed’ (FSC1). The woman, who was in her forties and married with several children, also highlighted the problem of ‘having to deal with a lot of men’ (FSC1). This was a challenge for her as the majority of cooperatives in Kafa comprised of men and that ‘was
[according to her] the only barrier [to starting her business] (FSC1).

However, her age and the support she received from her family enabled her to overcome these challenges.

The potential of cooperative associations was also highlighted as a mechanism for women to generate income and facilitate their economic participation. This was mentioned during a conversation with a gender specialist. However, she believed that in their current state cooperative associations were not being set up in a way that facilitated sustainability nor were they taking into consideration gender-related constraints. The gender specialist explained,

*These income-generating projects are given to organisations without training, without follow-up, without solving the mobility issues that women have, without knowing how to price. They’re not business women … And all of a sudden they’re stuck with managing a business … But the foundations of a business is not there (Interview, PM94, policy maker/ gender specialist)*.

This section highlighted the use of loans, micro-financing and cooperative associations as a livelihood strategy for research participants. It showed how gender and citizenship created different experiences for women and men in their access to such livelihood opportunities. The section that follows will look at the role of CBOs in enabling women’s agency to develop livelihood strategies. Furthermore, it will also explore the influence that gender and citizenship has in enabling and disabling women’s agency to actively engage in the public sphere through spaces such as CBOs.
The Role of Community Based-Organisations

CBOs played a major role in providing financial and non-financial services to individuals in and outside camps. Non-financial assistance included capacity-building and awareness-raising services. They played an additional role in that CBOs were neutral spaces where young men and particularly women could engage outside the confines of their homes. A young man who volunteered at one of the CBOs in Alpha camp highlighted this saying, ‘I feel this centre is a breather for everybody here, especially for women, as they get to go out of the house and see something different’ (MGC2).

Nevertheless, during my fieldwork observations I noticed that a major concern for community members – particularly the older generation – was that these spaces were gender-mixed. One of the centres I frequently visited during my fieldwork received a lot of negative criticism from the local community because, as well as providing services to young women and men, the working environment was not segregated by gender.

A strategy used to deal with unemployment was to register for courses that were offered through CBOs in the hope of becoming more employable. In the case of women, enrolling for courses was an attractive option because it was a means for them to engage in the public sphere. Volunteering in CBOs was also a popular strategy used by women and men to deal with unemployment. This was less common among men, particularly those who had completed higher education. Many preferred to ‘stay at home’ rather than volunteer or
seek work in vocations or the farming sector because of the culture of shame. In the case of ex-Gazans, however, volunteering was popular among both men and women because of the greater difficulty of finding job opportunities.

Volunteering also allowed women to gain work experience until they found employment. As well as providing them with neutral spaces beyond the confines of the private sphere, it gave women the opportunity to extend their network beyond the family domain (Miles, 2002). This was reflected during a focus group discussion with employed ex-Gazan women. One participant, who used to volunteer before becoming employed said, ‘We get to learn new things and meet new people [through volunteering]’ (Focus group, employed ex-Gazan women, Alpha camp). During a discussion with Palestinian Jordanian employed women, one participant said, ‘A lot of people who studied and cannot find a job resort to volunteering to help the community because it is better than staying at home’ (Focus group, employed Palestinian Jordanian women, Beta camp).

Another reason mentioned for volunteering was that it gave women the opportunity to strengthen their skill sets. It also gave them a sense of dignity and worth, particularly in cases where women belonged to poor families. According to scholars such as Hamilton and Fenzel (1988), volunteering strengthens the political citizenship of individuals by fostering a sense of civic duty and responsibility towards their society. In the case of refugees in camps, volunteering in CBOs provided camp-dwellers with a sense of solidarity towards their community rather than to the host society as a whole. This was
reflected during a focus group with unemployed ex-Gazan women, when one unemployed participant said that many chose to volunteer because, ‘We would like to [be] useful in our society … To benefit as well … It’s a positive thing to our community’ (Focus group, unemployed ex-Gazan women, Alpha camp).

Fieldwork findings highlighted that individuals volunteering in CBOs in and outside camps were doing so for little material return. This was particularly the case for women, and even more so for ex-Gazan camp-dwellers. Women and ex-Gazans were less likely to oppose exploitation because of the limited economic opportunities available to them. The majority of participants interviewed who were or had volunteered mentioned working hours equivalent to full-time jobs and getting paid negligible pay ranging from JD50 to JD100 a month for several years (Field notes, 20 June 2013). Since volunteering is not paid employment, any pay was low and poorly, and they were not entitled to any employment benefits.

To summarise, CBOs have the potential to play a key role in locally integrating protracted refugees by empowering them to become self-reliant rather than dependent on state and or non-state assistance. They also provide gendered spaces that contribute to girls and women’s greater engagement in the public sphere. Furthermore, CBOs are spaces where women can be empowered to re-negotiate patriarchal structures and power imbalances. However, volunteering over a long period is not a livelihood strategy in itself. Rather it is a means to subsequent employment through more social contacts, skills and experience.
Conclusion

This chapter has highlighted the impact of inclusionary and exclusionary forms of citizenship on the livelihood strategies of protracted refugees. The analysis showed that freedom of movement, marriage, wastah, and humanitarian assistance from state and non-state actors were all important livelihood strategies. However the specific experiences of these strategies were shaped or moderated according to citizenship and gender. Hence, the livelihood strategies of protracted refugee women and men were influenced by intersectional discrimination.

Women were faced with patriarchal barriers in their pursuit of livelihood strategies. Nevertheless, the findings highlighted a continuous expression of agency among women to preserve their productive roles and re-negotiate imbalances in power relations. Patriarchal structures are being challenged at different levels, particularly in situations where economic hardship is experienced. Factors such as education, marital situation, financial conditions and citizenship status, as well as variables such as social support networks, intersect to facilitate women’s agency to become economically active.

The case of protracted refugees highlights how individuals constantly use different strategies to negotiate, resist and challenge intersectional discrimination in order to maintain their livelihoods. Moreover, it conveys the influence of various social markers such as
gender age, citizenship’, in enabling and disabling access to livelihood opportunities.

This chapter has examined the experiences and views of protracted refugee women and men with different levels of exclusionary and inclusionary citizenship and the influence this has on the livelihood choices they make. It highlighted the influence of micro (household), meso (CBOs) and macro (national and international policies) level variables in shaping livelihood strategies of protracted refugees. As well as giving the reader a viewpoint of what it means to be excluded, it has also illustrated what a more inclusive community entails. Nevertheless, it has also portrayed how individuals negotiate with intersectional discrimination to broaden their livelihood opportunities.
Chapter Seven: Discussion and Conclusions

Introduction

This thesis is a study of the intersectionality of gender and citizenship on livelihood strategies in relation to further education and employment of protracted refugees through a case study of Palestinians in Kafa, Jordan.

Methodologically, this research has used a qualitative interpretative paradigm. A single embedded case study design was carried out using multiple qualitative methods namely individual interviews, non-participant observation and focus group interviews. This case study is descriptive, exploratory and explanatory (Yin, 2009), as it focuses on the experiences of protracted Palestinian refugees in Jordan. A single embedded case study design was chosen because the sample included a variety of research participants including 9 policy makers, 12 training and employment service providers and 11 employers. The study included 31 Palestinian Jordanian, 26 ex-Gazan and 27 Transjordanian women and men in Kafa, Jordan who were with and without work.

This chapter will set out the original empirical and theoretical contribution of this research and discuss the study limitations. It will also provide recommendations for policy and further research.

Research Questions

This thesis examines the intersectionality of citizenship and gender on the livelihood strategies of protracted refugees through a case
study of Palestinians in Jordan. The research questions that this thesis sets out to explore were:

1. How does the intersectionality of gender and citizenship shape access to further education for protracted Palestinian refugees in Jordan?

2. How does the intersectionality of gender and citizenship influence employment opportunities for protracted Palestinian refugees in Jordan?

3. How does the intersectionality of gender and citizenship influence the agency of protracted Palestinian refugees in Jordan in developing livelihood strategies?

**Original Empirical Contribution to Knowledge**

A close examination of the literature on protracted refugees in the Middle East shows that research with young adults, as well as on host populations, is lacking (Brun, 2010; Chatty, 2009). This gap in the literature is addressed by this research. In Jordan, much of the literature on Palestinians has focused on the legal and political dimensions of citizenship and its influence on accessing economic and civic rights (Al-Husseini and Bocco, 2009; El-Abed, 2012, 2014; Shiblak, 1996, 2006). Other researchers have focused on the living conditions of refugees within camp settings (Arneberg, 1997; Hejoj and Badran, 2006, Hejoj, 2007).

The original empirical contribution to knowledge of this research is that it extends understandings of the influence of gender
and citizenship on the livelihood strategies of protracted refugees in relation to further education and employment looking at Palestinians with varying forms of citizenships within and outside refugee camp settings in comparison to their host communities. This case study compares the situations of Transjordanians, Palestinian Jordanians and ex-Gazans in terms of how the intersectionality of gender and citizenship shapes their experiences of further education and employment. Unlike many previous studies it unravels the differences between these three groups rather than contrasting Palestinians as one group with Transjordanians. Most studies in this area have comprised interviews and surveys with Palestinians and service providers. This research study includes not only interviews with Transjordanians, Palestinian Jordanians and ex-Gazans, but also training and employment service providers, as well as employers in the private, public and third sectors and high-level policy makers. Unusually, the field site is a medium-sized city north of Amman and includes Palestinians living both outside camps and within camps and in rural and urban contexts, whereas most previous research has been based in Amman, the capital city.

While there is one study looking at the intersectionality of gender and class in Jordan, it focuses on Amman and looks only at women, while combining Palestinians into one category (Nasser Eddin, 2011). This thesis is an intersectional analysis of the experiences of men and women in further education and employment, with a focus on protracted Palestinian refugees with varying degrees of inclusionary and exclusionary citizenship.
Rather than combining heterogeneous groups into one category, this qualitative study examines different degrees of inclusionary and exclusionary citizenship in Jordan, by focusing on Palestinian Jordanians and ex-Gazans as examples of protracted refugees with varying citizenship statuses. This study illustrates how citizenship status and gender can influence the livelihood strategies of protracted refugees over a period of time. Furthermore, it highlights the inclusionary and exclusionary dimensions of citizenship and gender in relation to further education and employment for Transjordanians, Palestinian Jordanians and ex-Gazans.

Original empirical findings from this study addressing the first research question, concerning access to further education have highlighted that it might appear that Palestinian Jordanians with inclusive forms of citizenship have wider access to scholarships and training opportunities through the government and UNRWA. However, the reality of the situation is that UNRWA scholarships are very limited due to reduced funding, and government scholarships are based on a Jordanian quota system that is favourable towards Transjordanians. Only a small percentage of university places in higher education are left for students to freely compete for. This highlights how state policies have reinforced institutionalised discrimination in Jordan’s higher education system. Through these policies different levels of inclusive citizenship grant greater privilege to some citizens over others.

The most disadvantaged are ex-Gazans with exclusionary forms of citizenship. They have no access to government
scholarships, and can only access public and private higher education at fees equivalent to that paid by foreigners. Ex-Gazans were also further limited in the subjects they can choose owing to legal restrictions on approved occupations.

In the case of training opportunities, while Transjordanians and Palestinians with full Jordanian citizenship are entitled to education and vocational training, ex-Gazans are required to obtain approval from the Department of Palestinian Affairs to be eligible for such opportunities. Hence, the citizenship status of ex-Gazans has legitimised Jordan’s exclusionary processes that regulate access to further education for protracted refugees without citizenship. There was also a general lack of awareness among ex-Gazans of their rights due to their experiences of exclusionary forms of citizenship, which have influenced their educational pathways and choices.

The intersectionality of gender with inclusionary and exclusionary citizenship was evident in that, in general, all young men had more opportunities than young women as they had greater freedom to travel and less responsibility within their households, and their ability to earn was prioritised. Gender roles also limited the choices available for women in relation to further education pathways. For women it was considered more socially acceptable to train or study locally for feminised occupations such as teachers, beauticians or seamstresses. For men, their role as breadwinners in society broadened their choices. Informal discriminatory practices in relation to women’s access to positions and training prospects also hindered their opportunities to progress in their careers.
Despite these difficulties, however, young women and particularly protracted refugees valued further education for itself and as a way to widen their choices and protect them from future uncertainties. Moreover, the agency of women to negotiate with patriarchal structures for greater access to further education depended on factors other than citizenship such as household economic status. Families experiencing economic hardship were likely to give preference to their sons due to male/breadwinner and female/carer perceptions.

The findings in response to this research question of my thesis build on existing literature (Al-Zaroo, 1998, 2009; El-Abed, 2014; Hart and Kvittingen, 2015a, 2015b) by using an intersectional approach to better understand the different experiences of protracted refugee women and men in their opportunities for further education compared to their host population, as their agency in dealing with intersectional discrimination.

The original empirical findings related to the second research question on the intersectionality of gender and citizenship in relation to employment pinpointed contrasts between formal de jure legislation and informal de facto practices. The de facto implementation of employment legislation in the private sector was perceived as weak in general in relation to issues such as dismissals, wages, maternity pay and leave, working hours and social security benefits. Such inconsistencies in the implementation of the labour law influenced participants’ preferences in employment.
Employment in the public sector was open to Transjordanians and Palestinian Jordanians. However, preferential treatment was given to Transjordanians in the military and security sector, a preferred type of employment for men in Kafa.

Further education was perceived as a means to secure employment, particularly in the public sector. However, the majority of young adults interviewed who had university degrees were unemployed for long periods, as opposed to those whose further education was more vocational, who were more flexible about their job expectations. A key problem highlighted by service providers and policy makers was the mismatch between the occupations sought by both women and men, and those in demand in the labour market, as well as the high dependency on the public sector for employment.

Women and men seeking employment expressed frustration that social networks of influence (wastah) and the lack of job opportunities in Kafa were major obstacles to accessing public and private sector employment. Although described by many as a disabler to accessing employment opportunities, wastah was at the same time a vital livelihood strategy used by women and men irrespective of citizenship status. In the case of Palestinian Jordanians, institutionalised discrimination shaped their opportunities in accessing public sector employment such as a lack of access to a major sector of employment in Jordan, namely the military and security sector.

Ex-Gazans had no access to the public sector and therefore worked in the private and informal sectors. There were many reports
of exploitation in the private sector, such as low wages, work without formal contracts, long working hours and less access to training. Institutional discrimination extended to the private sector, where ex-Gazans were not permitted to work, as well as the requirement for them to obtain work permits and security approvals for private sector employment, which were in most cases difficult to obtain. Ex-Gazans were also limited in their access to micro-enterprise opportunities and in joining cooperative associations because of their experience of exclusionary forms of citizenship. Moreover, a lack of legal protection mechanisms to protect ex-Gazans placed them at a greater risk than Palestinian Jordanians when policy changes in the host country were made, the outcome of which left them in a permanent state of insecurity and uncertainty about their future situation. An example of this would be the closure of specific specialisations and occupations such as health care professions (with the exception of nursing and medicine, which required annual licence renewals) to ex-Gazans.

Unlike Transjordanians and Palestinian Jordanians, ex-Gazans with university degrees were more accepting of being underemployed because their experience of exclusionary forms of citizenship created limited economic opportunities for them. Many worked in family businesses within camps. However, unlike Transjordanians and Palestinian Jordanians, it was more difficult for them to set up businesses outside camp spaces, as their exclusionary citizenship did not entitle them to rights to own property. Other factors reported to have had an influence in shaping both women and men’s experiences in their access to employment
included disability and place of residence, as well as a lack of identity documents.

In terms of gender, women reported less access to employment opportunities than men did irrespective of citizenship status. Nevertheless, the challenges they faced varied and factors such as citizenship status, educational and economic background and place of residence, as well as disability, created different experiences for the women.

Some of the main challenges women faced in their economic activity were employers’ preference to hire and train men because of negative stereotypes about working women, vertical and horizontal segregation by gender, and less access to informal social networks of influence. Hence, while patriarchy played a role in determining the employment pathways of all women, it was more accepted that ex-Gazan women would work in the private and informal sectors because of the limited economic opportunities they faced owing to their citizenship status.

Both men and women saw women’s productive role as secondary to men’s. However, increased economic hardship allowed women to break out of assigned gender roles in the public sphere. This was highlighted in both camp and non-camp settings, but more so in Alpha camp because of the prevalence of poverty. Study findings also showed that women’s economic activity did not necessarily mean that they were empowered. Factors such as control of income and reproductive and productive workload needed to be taken into account. Research exists that highlights the
importance of focusing on social constructions of gender when examining the impact of increased economic activity on women (Lister, 2003; Nasser Eddin, 2011, 2014). This research study extends previous understandings by using intersectional discrimination to better understand the impact of women’s economic activities on their lives.

The findings of this thesis also focus on the agency of women and men to negotiate intersectional discrimination in order to improve their employment opportunities. So, for example, while the practice of passing was reported by Palestinian Jordanian and ex-Gazan camp-dwellers to avoid being stigmatised by employers, there was no mention of this from Transjordanians. Moreover, as well as concealing place of residence, refugee women living in camps also reported concealing their marital status during interviews to avoid gender discrimination. This showed how women’s and men’s strategies of addressing discrimination to improve their employment opportunities varied.

This second research question related to the experiences of protracted refugees in accessing employment. The findings of my thesis extend the existing literature (Chaaban, et al., 2010; El-Abed, 2014; El-Abed, 2006; Hart and Kvittingen, 2015a, 2015b; Nasser Eddin, 2011, 2014; Tiltines and Zhang, 2013) and extend understandings through the use of an intersectional approach to better understand the influence of gender and citizenship shaping women’s and men’s experiences in their employment opportunities,
as well as the agency of women and men in dealing with intersectional discrimination.

The third research question addressed how the intersectionality of citizenship and gender shapes the livelihood strategies of protracted Palestinian refugees. This research highlighted how women’s agency is not specific to one group and was expressed by Transjordanians, Palestinian Jordanians and ex-Gazans in different ways. Women’s agency varied because of the inclusionary and exclusionary forms of citizenship that they experienced in their livelihood opportunities. The study found that citizenship created different experiences for women in relation to the livelihood strategies that they employed to strengthen their resilience and the societal obstacles they faced due to patriarchal norms.

Various livelihood strategies were practised by women and men to achieve upward socio-economic mobility. These included strategies such as marriage, seeking better opportunities abroad, and the use of influence (wastah), as well as building capacity through training and education. Other livelihood strategies were deployed through civil society and humanitarian aid organisations and through reliance on welfare support. Although previous studies on forced migration have covered this area, this thesis examines how the intersectionality of citizenship status and gender created different experiences for women and men in the livelihood strategies they pursued. So, for example, one livelihood strategy to achieve upward socio-economic mobility was through pursuing further education. However, experiences of young women and men varied depending
on the intersectionality of citizenship and gender. In other words, Transjordanian men with inclusive forms of citizenship and institutionalised preferential treatment had greater opportunities to receive further education than Palestinian Jordanian and ex-Gazan men, and all men had greater chances than women irrespective of their citizenship status.

This third research question explored the livelihood strategies of protracted refugees in relation to their host population. The findings of my thesis build on and extend existing literature (El-Abed, 2014; El-Abed, 2006; Khawaja, 2003; Nasser Eddin, 2011, 2014), by using an intersectional approach to better understand the different livelihood strategies of women and men, as well as the agency of women and men in dealing with intersectional discrimination.

There is also a comparative dimension to the original contribution to knowledge of this thesis in relation to the similarities in the experiences of protracted refugees in Jordan to those in host countries where refugees experience degrees of inclusive and exclusive citizenship. The situation of protracted Palestinian Jordanian refugees in Jordan is unique to host countries in the Middle East. This is because, unlike other host countries in the Middle East, such as Syria or Lebanon, in Jordan the majority of Palestinians have been granted Jordanian citizenship. With citizenship, Palestinians in Jordan are by law entitled to a degree of inclusive citizenship, such as is accorded to refugees who are granted asylum and subsequently granted indefinite leave to remain and subsequent citizenship in other countries.
There is a current crisis within Europe as refugees from the Middle East and North Africa are fleeing the instability in their home countries. The experiences of Palestinian Jordanians can perhaps be generalised to the situation of refugees in European member states where they will experience degrees of exclusionary and inclusionary citizenship. Inclusionary citizenship requires all citizens to have equal civic, political and social rights (Phillips, 2009). An integration process that does not ensure this leads to exclusionary forms of citizenship. Hence, it can be argued that Palestinian refugees granted citizenship rights in Jordan and those in European member states may share some similar experiences of exclusion.

In the case of other Arab host countries, protracted Palestinian refugees’ right to citizenship is not a legal entitlement, and it has not been granted to most Palestinian refugees. In countries such as Lebanon, Syria and Egypt, the situation of Palestinian refugees is more like that of ex-Gazans in Jordan who are excluded from citizenship.

Another comparative dimension to the original contribution to knowledge of this thesis is that the findings in terms of livelihood strategies can be generalisable to other more recent forced migrants in Jordan, such as Iraqis and Syrians, who have experienced or are experiencing exclusionary forms of citizenship.

Jordan has used different labels to categorise forced migrants. These include ‘guest workers’, ‘asylum seekers’, ‘refugees’ and displaced persons’. These have all been employed by the state to justify its authority to delineate exclusionary processes in the
experiences of forced migrants during their stay in their host country. Such categorisations have been used by the state to privilege some citizens over other citizens and non-citizens.

It can be argued that Iraqis, Syrians and ex-Gazans have used similar livelihood strategies because of the common legal restrictions that they face in their access to employment in Jordan. For example, like ex-Gazans, many Iraqi ‘guest workers’ and Syrian refugees who do not have a guarantor for employment or the financial means to secure their stay in Jordan have relied on more precarious livelihood strategies owing to their lack of legal status in their host country. These include working in the informal sector and being at risk of exploitation, as well as relying on humanitarian aid which has become depleted over time (Balsari et al., 2015; Chatty and Mansour, 2011).

Moreover, Nasser Eddin (2014) highlights changes in ‘natural’ gender roles that have taken place in the case of Iraqi refugees in Jordan. Women have assumed roles as breadwinners in the public sphere by working in the informal sector and seeking aid through charities. Nasser Eddin (2014) explains that women were generally regarded as less threatening than men and more flexible to changing environments. Furthermore, social norms have made it more acceptable for women than men to seek charity because of men’s masculinity. By contrast, Iraqi men have been more confined to the private sphere and assumed the role of carers, resulting in shifts in their masculinity. Nevertheless, patriarchal gender roles remained
within the private sphere, reinforcing male dominance of females (Nasser Eddin, 2014).

The original empirical contribution to knowledge of this qualitative embedded case study extends understandings of the situation and experiences of Palestinian men and women living in and outside camps with different degrees of inclusionary and exclusionary citizenship in relation to further education and employment.

**Original Conceptual Contribution to Knowledge**

The original conceptual contribution to knowledge of this thesis lies in the use of the intersectionality of gender and citizenship as a framework to extend understandings of the experiences of protracted Palestinian refugees in Jordan in accessing further education and employment. A nuanced analysis has been undertaken, unravelling the complexities of differing degrees of inclusive and exclusive citizenship for Palestinian men and women in this setting and the livelihood strategies that they have developed.

Extending conceptual knowledge as developed by Kabeer (2005) and Lister (2008), this thesis focuses on the experiences of protracted refugees with inclusionary and exclusionary forms of citizenship with specific focus on their access to further education and employment. It examines the role of intersectional discrimination – specifically through the intersectionality of gender and citizenship status – on micro (family) meso (institutional) and macro (national) levels to better understand the impact of inclusionary and
exclusionary forms of citizenship on protracted refugee women and men in their access to further education and employment within patriarchal societies. Drawing on notions such as stigma and stereotyping, it extends knowledge of the influence of intersectional discrimination at different levels, in the experiences of protracted refugees in their access to further education and employment compared to their host population.

Furthermore, looking at the macro level, and specifically within a patriarchal context, this thesis adopts a gendered rights-based approach to conceptualisations of human rights to better understand the influence of intersectional discrimination on the experiences of protracted refugee women and men in their access to employment. Furthermore, a micro/meso/macro level analysis of the intersectionality of gender and citizenship is carried out in this thesis to extend knowledge of the resilience and livelihood strategies of protracted refugees.

This thesis goes beyond social categories of gender, class and ethnicity, which much of the literature on intersectionality and the labour market is concentrated on (Browne and Misra, 2003). This thesis addresses a gap in the literature on forced migration by focusing on the experiences of protracted refugees and their host population in their livelihood strategies using the intersectionality of gender and citizenship (Brun, 2010; Chatty, 2009). Drawing on and extending the work of Yuval-Davis (2006) and Kabeer (2005), this thesis highlights the complexities of the intersectionality of gender
and citizenship in relation to the livelihood strategies of protracted refugee women and men.

This thesis has applied Giddens’ structuration theory within a framework of intersectionality of gender and citizenship amongst this protracted refugee population. Although structuration theory has been used in relation to intersectionality and gender in the Middle East (Nasser Eddin, 2011), it has not been applied to the intersectionality of gender and citizenship. Some studies of refugees have utilised the concept of structure and agency without a gendered approach (Bakewell, 2010; Den Boer, 2015; Gateley, 2015; Kelly and Hedman, 2015). Others extending theoretical knowledge on the study of forced migration in patriarchal societies have focused on intersectionality and structure and agency. However, they have tended to homogenise refugee populations and apply feminist approaches that are exclusionary of men’s perspectives on gender issues (Kofman, 2000; Nasser Eddin, 2011; Wright, 1995). This study has utilised a gendered approach to structuration theory that looks at both women and men (Giddens, 1984). This has been applied to host and protracted refugee populations, through a lens that has emphasised the heterogeneous nature of a protracted refugee situation, using the intersectionality of gender and citizenship to better understand their livelihood and resilience-building strategies. More specifically, it extends understandings of the agency of men and women who are protracted refugees, experiencing inclusionary and exclusionary forms of citizenship to negotiate intersectional discrimination.
Study Limitations

Individual Interviews

Individual in-depth interviews have been recognised as useful ways to gather rich data on individual experiences and views on topics that may be controversial. This is because individuals may feel more comfortable disclosing sensitive data privately rather than within a group (Kaplowitz and Hoehn, 2001). Moreover, individual interviews generate depth and breadth in the data gathered, as they allow the researcher to probe more into issues that emerge through the discussion. It is also easier to build trust with an interviewee when interviews are on a one-to-one basis (Marshall and Rossman, 2011).

For this reason, only the interviewer and interviewee attended the individual interviews where possible. However, it was difficult to control attendance on many occasions, particularly when they took place in shops and offices that were frequently visited by community members and employees.

I also faced this problem when conducting individual interviews during home visits. The reason for this was that often male family members would choose to be present during the interviews as they saw themselves as the ‘protectors’ and heads of their household. Moreover, many of them were unemployed and therefore stayed at home. All of the homes visited consisted of small spaces with a room for the family to sit in, therefore it was difficult to carry out one-to-one interviews. Nevertheless, it is usual behavior in non-Western settings for women or men to be present during home
interviews with an outsider. In these cases, often individual interviews become household interviews. Moreover, on many occasions children were present.

This was recognised to be part of the study’s limitations, as private and public accounts of interviewees might differ. Nevertheless, several steps were taken to address this problem. For example, when a husband joined his wife during the interview, I would explain to him that one-on-one interviews were necessary because discussions would touch on topics that were specific to ‘female issues’. During occasions when I was unable to have individual interviews, such as when meeting with managers and shop owners, individual interviews became group interviews. In these situations, I managed to control the conversation by ensuring that my questions were directed towards the interviewee. Nevertheless, it should be noted that, when individual interviews were not possible, participants that attended sometimes facilitated the gathering of richer content.

Another limitation is that 9 interviews were excluded from the analysis of individual interviews. This was because there were many more individual interviews with women than men and the topics in these excluded interviews had been raised in other individual and focus group interviews. It was therefore an indication of saturation. So for example, when interviewing ex-Gazan women about their experiences of livelihood strategies I was able to learn more through the focus group discussions about discriminatory practices that they experienced from the host population as well as Palestinian
Jordanians. Participants were more comfortable sharing their experiences and views during focus group discussions of this sensitive topic. Other issues that came up during individual interviews and were further elaborated on during focus groups had to do with the dependence on humanitarian aid from community-based centres and charities in the camps. Hearing each other talk gave the women confidence to share their views the effectiveness of such livelihoods strategies and how gender and citizenship influence their access to them. I also relied on the in-depth fieldnotes that were taken during the fieldwork, which included information that was further elaborated on and clarified during individual interviews. Fieldnotes were important because they highlighted participants’ attitudes and behaviours while taking into account the context they were in. An example highlighting the importance of fieldnotes was during visits to community centres, where issues were discussed between centre managers and visitors that clarified and elaborated on some of the interview topics conducted.

‘Off-the-Record’ Conversations
When conducting interviews with policy makers, gaining trust with interviewees played a major role in the richness of the data that could be obtained from the discussions. This in turn required building rapport, which according to Harvey (2011) should be worked on prior, during and after the interviews. Although we were able to discuss politically sensitive issues, they would sometimes request the information to be ‘off the record’.
On other occasions, one policy maker and one service provider refused to have the interview audio-recorded. Often people are more comfortable disclosing confidential information when interviews are not audio-recorded (Byron, 1993; Peabody et al., 1990) and some policy maker interviewees had off-the-record comments. The main drawback to not being able to audio-record was that I was unable to have a verbatim script of the interview. It was also difficult to properly engage with the interviewee and make notes, as I was focused on documenting the conversation (Harvey, 2011).

In such cases, I excluded any information that was ‘off-the-record’ and refrained from audio-recording where requested. However, I made sure to take thorough notes and audio-recorded my observations on the discussion as soon as I left the interview.

**Changing the Research Methodology**

Initially a mixed qualitative and quantitative methods approach was chosen for the purpose of this study. However, after obtaining ethical approval to conduct my fieldwork, I was unable to get the primary data I needed from government bodies. This is because of the political sensitivity of the topic under study and the lack of existing national data on higher education and employment desegregated by ‘place of origin’ (i.e. Transjordanian or Palestinian origin) (El-Abed, 2014).

The complexity of constructing desegregated data according to various categories has been highlighted in the literature on refugee studies (Yuval-Davis, 2006). Often, sensitive data is not
accessible to researchers because of government restrictions. Moreover, on some occasions, reliance on quantitative research methods can be to the researcher's disadvantage because of the difficulty of obtaining reliable statistics. Where such data can be reached, they can only be accessed through complex procedures, and issues such as the validity, reliability and credibility of the data are often questioned. In these cases, the use of methods that produce more credible and reliable data is recommended (Goldstein, 1986). For this reason, I chose to use multiple qualitative research methods as they allowed me to collect politically sensitive data in a more discreet manner.

I had also originally planned to conduct a single case study with one refugee camp. However, after proceeding with my fieldwork, an additional camp was included within the single case study because it allowed for richer data to be gathered through comparisons of different citizenship holders as well as between and within the host population of Transjordanians and Palestinian Jordanians in the town and camp settings of Palestinian Jordanians and ex-Gazans. This was because Beta camp had a majority of residents who were Palestinian refugees with five-year citizenship and national IDs, whereas Alpha camp had more residents who were ex-Gazans with two-year temporary Jordanian passports without identity numbers. I was aware of the necessity of maintaining a flexible approach that would be open to adjustments when conducting fieldwork, as this has been cited in the literature as an important part of postgraduate research (Scott et al., 2006). This is
because unexpected and uncalculated issues may often arise during the fieldwork that require contingency plans and flexible approaches (Borbasi et al., 2005).

**Ethical Challenges**

Beginning my fieldwork through well-established grassroot organisations made it easier for me to gain the trust of community members. It also facilitated my access to potential participants particularly those who were hard to reach. Nevertheless, such an approach also brought about challenges in my fieldwork.

When approaching potential participants through the CBOs, I made sure to maintain participants’ confidentiality, anonymity, informed consent, data ownership, usage and publishing rights. Nevertheless, I did face problems regarding confidentiality issues during my fieldwork, which were documented in my field notes. For example, when I first started my interviews in Alpha camp, the CBO manager requested that I provide her with the names of the participants interviewed. I explained to her clearly that I was unable to provide her with the list of names as it breached research ethics of confidentiality and anonymity that I had promised my interviewees and was against university regulations.

Home visits were also accessed through the CBOs. Although this may have limited the scope of my sample and brought forward the issue bias in recruitment, it was the most effective way for me to access ‘hard-to-reach’ populations. This is because the centres had records of family households living below the poverty line in Kafa and
the camps. Moreover, the population that I targeted for the home visits were ‘hidden’ groups, including poor households living in remote locations. The issue of access has been recognised by scholars such as Jacobsen and Landau (2003) as a challenge in refugee studies. Although raising issues of self-selection and bias, working with the host centres gave me access to these hidden groups.

I provided drinks and falafel sandwiches bought within the camps during focus group interviews as a compensation for their time and efforts. In such contexts, compensations such as these proved to be more culturally suitable than monetary remuneration. I also carried out several volunteer activities and gathered donations for the host centres. However, all research has an impact on the individuals studied, in varying degrees (Jacobsen and Landau, 2003). Nevertheless, several measures were also taken to address these ethical challenges, such as making sure that only gatekeepers were aware of the donations and that they were from anonymised individuals.

**Reflexivity**

Feminist scholars have highlighted the relationship developed between ‘the researcher’ and ‘the researched’ as an integral part of conducting research (Tuana and Tong, 1995). According to them, this relationship involves affinity, social penetration, reciprocation and empathy. Nevertheless, establishing relationships during the fieldwork can result in ethical challenges. Moreover, my research
falls within an interpretive research paradigm, which emphasises individual interpretation as a fundamental means of reality-making, and this includes researchers (Bradley, 1993). In order to maintain the trustworthiness of this qualitative study, emphasis has been placed on maintaining ‘credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability’ (Lincoln and Guba, 1985: 301-328) throughout the research process.

Issues about my positionality, such as, for example, being a divorced and non-veiled woman, were also likely to have challenged my ‘fitting in’ and gaining the trust of community members. However, I was able to overcome such challenges by concealing parts of my identity from participants (such as being divorced). I identified myself as a Muslim, to which religious category I belong, but did not discuss my degree of observance. I dressed more conservatively. These measures greatly facilitated my gaining the community’s trust. I drove an old car and was seen as an outsider from Amman who was a student.

Conceptions of researcher objectivity have been criticised by feminist scholars (Harding, 1991; Hartsock, 1987; Rose, 1997). They have highlighted the importance of reflexivity because of the role of factors such as positionality and social markers such as gender, nationality, class and identity in shaping the perspectives of researchers.

Diversifying Focus Group Participants by Age and Sex
Other study limitations had to do with the sample age of focus group participants. During the recruitment of focus group participants it was difficult to recruit younger women as most were above 40 years of age. According to the centre manager in Beta camp, this was because many women within the study age group were married with young children. They were unable to attend because it would be more difficult for them to leave their children at home.

Another limitation to the study was that no focus groups were carried out with men. One of the reasons for this is because being female made it more difficult to moderate a focus group with male participants, particularly as the topic involved politically sensitive issues. I was also warned by the gatekeeper in Alpha camp to be careful with whom I talked to, as some could be informers for the security forces. This issue was highlighted on several occasions during my fieldwork in Alpha camp. Focus groups with men would have allowed me to further examine issues that evolved from the individual interviews, as well as for comparisons to be made of focus group findings with women.

An example of the level of security measures taken by the authorities in Alpha camp was when I was invited to attend a discussion organised by a camp centre for a group of foreigners. Two informants entered the lecture room in which the event was taking place and stood at one corner of the room and listened to the discussion. I later spoke to a staff member inquiring about them and she said that they were undercover security officers. She laughingly claimed that they were suspicious of the large group of foreigners
entering the centre and so decided to investigate further on the issue. On several other occasions, I was also followed by an old man who had questioned me about the purpose of my visit to the camp. The gatekeeper informed me that this person was an informant and to be careful what I said to him. On another occasion a fight had erupted between a group of ex-Gazan men from Alpha camp and residents living on the outskirts of the campsite. The fight had escalated to large-scale violence, during which the camp was closed off and security in the area was further tightened.

So I decided to carry out focus groups with female participants in order to avoid possible conflict with security officers. Focusing on women also helped me gain a better understanding of their views on gender and citizenship and how they influence access to employment for them and their children. Moreover, in order to address this limitation, I focused on carrying out individual interviews with working and unemployed men during the final stage of the fieldwork.

**Unaccounted for Categories of Palestinians**

During initial interviews in Alpha camp I also identified groups that were not previously included in my sample. These included Palestinians without passports, and those with Egyptian travel documents, as well as Palestinian Syrians. Although it was difficult to initially access Palestinians without passports and those with Egyptian travel documents, this was subsequently made possible through the ex-Gazan key informant. Palestinian Syrians were
excluded from my sample because they were beyond the scope of my study.

**Policy Implications**

Jordan is a small Arab country with insufficient supplies of water, oil, gas, and other natural resources. Poverty, unemployment and inflation rates are fundamental problems. Some of the problems Jordan faces are mainly focused on the lack of foreign grants, a budget deficit, attracting investments and a lack of job opportunities.

It also became a host country for Palestinians, Iraqi and, latterly, Syrian refugees in different waves of forced migration. Improving technical skills and providing opportunities to engage in income-generating activities is a key to developing higher resilience of individuals, households and institutions residing within the Jordanian host country and, in particular, of protracted refugees living in precarious situations.

The suggested policy and practice recommendations that follow from this research study are:

- To compile desegregated data on further education and private and public employment according to social divisions such as gender, citizenship, ‘place of origin’ and ‘place of residence’. Having disaggregated data on further education and labour market statistics not only improves the way policies are developed, analysed and refined, but also allows for better
monitoring and enforcement of non-discrimination and equality policies in these sectors.

- To strengthen the role of cooperative associations as a key livelihood strategy for women in rural areas of Jordan. This can be done by: institutionalising education and capacity-building opportunities in rural contexts in cooperatives; duplicating case studies of success stories in rural areas; supporting organisations that encourage and provide support to cooperatives that focus on marginalised populations, such as women and protracted refugees with exclusive forms of citizenship such as ex-Gazans; promoting constructive partnerships between cooperatives and the private and public sectors; endorsing cooperation in cooperative development on a national and regional scale; and endorsing research and disseminating results on negative and positive case studies of cooperative practice.

- To review and reform government policies and legislation in a manner that facilitates cooperative development, which can be achieved by applying ILO Recommendation 193 as well as other UN Guidelines.

- To create a more enabling environment that allows refugees with non-citizenship and exclusionary forms of citizenship status to sustain their livelihoods
beyond informal sector employment. This could be carried out through encouraging private sector engagement to identify labour skill gaps and growth sectors, particularly for women, as well as by financing innovative income-generating activities.

To widen access to vocational and technical training and employment related opportunities to protracted refugees with exclusionary forms of citizenship, such as ex-Gazans, and those with non-citizenship status, such as Iraqis and Syrians. Of greater importance is the need to revisit existing vocational and technical training curricula so that they are geared according to labour market demands and supply gaps. Linking training to market demands can be actualised by engaging employers in designing and carrying out programmes. Moreover, a gender-based analysis of labour market gaps and opportunities is needed to cater to the needs of vulnerable populations such as women. Such analysis is necessary because it identifies the particular requirements and capabilities of women, men, girls and boys, while taking into account intersectional social markers, so that interventions are targeted and successfully reinforce livelihood resilience of marginalised populations.

It should however be noted that the above recommendations provide temporary solutions to the situations of ex-Gazans and Palestinian
refugees. Rather than addressing policies that influence the livelihoods of ex-Gazans and Palestinian refugees in their host countries on a micro and meso level, more sustainable and ‘just’ solutions are needed. These solutions should take into account the political implications of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict on the status of ex-Gazans and Palestinian refugees. This allows a more macro level understanding of the underlying causes of the continued limbo status of ex-Gazans.

Hence, what is needed is a just and durable response to the situation of ex-Gazans and Palestinians refugees; which cannot be addressed unless the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is resolved, with Palestinians having inclusionary citizenship in their own country.

**Areas for Further Research**

Further research could be undertaken comparing the long-term impact of protraction on the resilience of different groups of protracted refugees in Jordan. This could be done by comparing the livelihood strategies of Palestinian refugees with previous and recent incomers in Jordan such as Syrians and Iraqis. Comparative research between different groups of protracted refugees using the intersectionality of gender and citizenship can extend understandings on the impact of exclusionary forms of citizenship and the way women and men express their agency to negotiate with legislation, policies and practices in order to secure their livelihoods. Moreover, a gendered analysis will provide insight into the role that displaced women and men play in cultivating resilience within different refugee
populations, which is lacking in the literature on displacement (Darychuk and Jackson, 2015). Gendered comparisons could be made between protracted and recent refugees with focus on young adult women and men, as they are under-researched groups within refugee studies (Chatty, 2009).

Further comparative research could be done on the intersectionality of gender and citizenship in shaping informal sector opportunities for marginalised populations such as vulnerable Jordanians and forced migrants. This can extend understandings on how social divisions intersect to both enable and disable women’s and men’s agency to develop livelihood strategies in a sector where marginalised populations are most vulnerable to exploitation.

My fieldwork findings highlighted cases where various factors such disability and citizenship further excluded ex-Gazans from livelihood opportunities. This extended beyond ex-Gazans with two-year temporary passports, to those with Egyptian permits, as well as those without any form of legal documents. Looking at the intersectionality of gender, citizenship and disability on the livelihood strategies of protracted refugees in Alpha camp can extend understandings on notions of vulnerability and the impact of exclusionary forms of citizenship in protracted refugee situations through a gendered lens.

The intersectionality of gender and citizenship as a framework for exploring the livelihood strategies of protracted refugees using a gendered structuration approach could be adopted in further research on refugees from the Middle East in different European
countries or in other countries of the Middle East. This would extend understandings of how exclusionary and inclusionary types of citizenship impact on the lives and livelihoods of these women and men living in these difficult circumstances.

Further research on the impact of protracted refugees on the host population at the micro, meso and macro levels could also extend understandings of intersectional discrimination and intracategorical intersectionality of gender and citizenship.

Although Palestinian refugees have been living within Jordan since 1948, with more recent migratory waves, there continue to be forced migration and growing numbers of protracted refugees throughout the Middle East and Europe. Therefore, this is an area of research that needs to develop further for evidence-based policy making and inclusionary practices to be established.
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### Table 1.1 Definition of Key Terms

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<tr>
<th>Term</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assimilation</td>
<td>To become part of the dominant society and in the process to give up one’s cultural identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asylum Seekers</td>
<td>People who have left their original country and who are seeking asylum in their host country but have not yet received an acceptance on their application yet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beta Camp</td>
<td>Palestinian refugee camp in Kafa (with a majority of camp-dwellers holding five-year Jordanian passports and national identity numbers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black September</td>
<td>In 1970, war broke out between the Jordanian army and armed Palestinian militants, which resulted in the expulsion of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) from Jordan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Displaced Palestinians</td>
<td>Palestinians who had previously fled from their original place of residence in Palestine during the Arab-Israeli War of 1948, and were also forced to migrate again during the war of 1967. Most went to areas recognised to be part of Jordan during that period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Displaced Person from 1967</td>
<td>Refers to a person who migrated to Jordan because of the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, and who was not a refugee from the war of 1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Migrants</td>
<td>Individuals who have traveled to other countries not as refugees but as migrants seeking to improve their economic conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>Refers to individuals who are working, those who have a job but are temporarily not working and those who are ‘self employed (ILO, 2015b)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ex-Gazans</td>
<td>In this thesis the term ex-Gazans refers to Palestinians who had previously resided in the Gaza Strip but were forced to migrate in 1967 and reside in Jordan. However, they might not have originally been from the Gaza Strip. In this study they refer to Palestinais refugees residing in Alpha camp who are holders of two-year temporary Jordanian passports without national identity numbers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forced Migration</td>
<td>This is a broad term used to describe refugees and internally displaced persons as well as individuals forced to leave their original homes because of reasons such as natural or chemical catastrophes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full Jordanian Citizenship</td>
<td>Individuals holding five-year Jordanian passports with national identity numbers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gatekeepers</td>
<td>Individuals who have control over accessing research.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gazans with Egyptian Travel Documents</td>
<td>Palestinian refugees who initially looked for refuge in Gaza after the Arab Israeli War of 1948. When Egypt controled Gaza following the signing of the armistice, all Gazans received Egyptian travel documents. Because of frequent conflict in the area, many sought further refuge in Egypt between the 1950s and 1967; and others went to Jordan after the 1967 war. The Egyptian travel documents were issued since 1960 and require renewal every five years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal Employment</td>
<td>Denotes employment that can include working in the formal sector, such as in businesses that may underpay – or not pay – employees, or that fail to provide employees with paid and non-paid benefits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal Sector</td>
<td>Also described as the ‘shadow’, or ‘hidden’ economy, which usually involves illegal employment. It is described ‘as consisting of units engaged in the production of goods or services with the primary objective of generating employment and incomes to the persons concerned. These units typically operate at a low level of organization, with little or no division between labour and capital as factors of production and on a small scale. Labour relations- where they exist – are based mostly on causal employment, kinship or personal and social relations rather than contractual arrangements with formal guarantees.’ (15th ICLS, 1992, Paragraph 5(1))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration</td>
<td>To keep one’s cultural identity while becoming part of a host population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kafa</td>
<td>City in Jordan where the case study was carried out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Informants</td>
<td>Individuals with first hand information about the society and culture understudy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Force</td>
<td>Individuals who provide labour that can be service- or product-oriented within a set timeframe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginalisation</td>
<td>To be culturally and psychologically detached from the dominant society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Jordanian</td>
<td>Citizens residing in Jordan after 1948 with five-year Jordanian passports and national identity numbers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Makers</td>
<td>Individuals who are regarded as experts in specific fields and/or who are in positions of power such as policy makers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protracted Refugees</td>
<td>Refugees with the same nationality living in a host or asylum country for five years or more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Sector</td>
<td>Refers to ‘all employment of general government sector as defined in System of National Accounts 1993 (Appendix 9) plus employment of publicly owned enterprises and companies, resident and operating at central, state (or regional) and local levels of government(^{27})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>Is ‘a person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it’ (United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee from 1948</td>
<td>Refers to a person who used to permanently live in what is known as the State of Israel, and who was forced to migrate to neighbouring countries because of the Arab-Israeli War of 1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee from 1948, then displaced in 1967</td>
<td>Refers to a refugee who was displaced in the war of 1948 and who resided in the West Bank and was forced to migrate again following the war of 1967</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Refugee from the Gaza Strip</td>
<td>Refers to individuals who came into Jordan from Gazan the majority of whom were from the 1967 war and some of whom were already displaced as a result of the 1948 war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returnees</td>
<td>Jordanians returning to Jordan following the Gulf War of 1990-1991, most of whom were of Palestinian origin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right of Return</td>
<td>The right enshrined in Resolution 194(III) which recognises that ‘refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible’ (The United Nations General Assembly, 1948)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transjordanians</td>
<td>The term is used to describe Jordanians who are considered the original settlers of Jordan. These are those who resided in Jordan before 1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary Jordanian citizenship</td>
<td>Individuals holding two-year temporary Jordanian passports without national identity numbers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unemployed</strong></td>
<td>Refers to individuals over a certain age and within a time frame who are ‘without work’ (not involved in self-employment or paid employment), ‘currently available for work’ (are able to work or be self employed during a specific timeframe) and ‘seeking work’ (have taken certain measures within a specific timeframe to look for work or become self-employed) (ILO, 2015b)²⁸</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Undocumented Migrants</strong></td>
<td>Refers to foreigners ‘present on the territory of a state, in violation of the regulations on entry and residence, having crossed the border illicitly or at an unauthorized point: those whose immigration/migration status is not regular, and can also include those who have overstayed their visa or work permit, those who are working in violation of some or all of the conditions attached to their immigration status: and failed asylum seekers or immigrants who have no further right to appeal and have not left the country. It has been argued that the term is ambiguous as it refers both to migrants who have not been documented (recorded) and those without documents (passports etc)’ (Undocumented Worker Transitions, 2008: 19)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Wage | Refers to an agreed-upon payment that can be either in-kind or in the form of cash, and is regularly given to an employed person for their work as well as for the period when they do not work during employment such as paid holidays (ILO, 2015c)\(^\text{29}\)

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**Figure 1.1 The Literature Review Process**

The literature review search process involved searching for relevant articles and publications through the use of specific terms and words individually or as groups. Below are some examples of terms used to retrieve relevant articles:

**Concept 1 Protracted refugees:** key words related to ‘protracted refugee situations’; ‘refugees’, ‘durable solutions’, ‘integration’, ‘host population’, ‘self-reliance’, and ‘livelihood strategies’.

**Concept 2 Citizenship:** key words related to ‘citizenship’; ‘nation-state model’; ‘contemporary concepts of citizenship’; ‘liberalism’; ‘communitarianism’; ‘neo-liberalism’; ‘republicanism’; ‘citizenship’ and ‘human rights’; ‘citizens’ and ‘non-citizens’; ‘citizens’ rights and duties’; ‘feminism’ and ‘citizenship’; ‘inclusionary citizenship’; ‘exclusionary citizenship’; ‘universal citizenship’; ‘global

citizenship'; 'Islam' and ‘Arab region'; ‘Lister’ and ‘citizenship'; ‘Kabeer’ and ‘inclusionary and exclusionary citizenship’

**Concept 3 Gender Relations:** key words related to ‘gender’ ‘CEDAW’ and ‘Arab countries'; ‘gender contract'; ‘breadwinner/caregiver model'; ‘protracted refugees’ and ‘women’ and ‘men'; ‘refugees’ and ‘gender relations'; ‘humanitarian assistance’ and ‘gender approaches'; ‘feminism’ and ‘protracted refugees'; ‘refugees and ‘livelihoods’ and ‘gender'; ‘gender’ and ‘Islam’ and ‘Arab countries'; ‘women economic empowerment'; ‘gender’ and ‘economic citizenship'; ‘gender equality’ and ‘Islam'; ‘patriarchy’ and ‘refugees'; ‘private’ and ‘public spheres'; ‘gender relations’ and ‘resilience’ and ‘protracted refugees'; ‘patriarchy’ and ‘economic citizenship’ and ‘Arab countries'; ‘second class citizenship'; ‘gender relations’ and further education'; and ‘gender relations’ and employment'; ‘Moghadam’ , ‘gender relations’ and ‘Islam'; ‘gender’, ‘power relations’ and ‘Islam’.

**Concept 4 Intersectionality:** key words related to ‘intersectional discrimination'; ‘political intersectionality'; ‘intersectionality’ and ‘social research'; ‘intersectionality’ and ‘protracted refugees'; ‘intersectionality’, ‘citizenship’ and ‘gender'; ‘intersectionality’ and ‘human rights'; ‘intersectionality’ and ‘refugees’ and ‘livelihoods'; ‘Crenshaw’ and ‘intersectionality’; ‘intersectionality’ and ‘superdiversity’


Concept 7 Livelihood Strategies and Resilience of Refugees: key words related to ‘protracted refugees’ and ‘resilience’; ‘protracted refugees’ and ‘livelihood strategies’; ‘protracted refugees’ and ‘employment’; ‘protracted refugees’ and ‘education’; ‘protracted
refugees’ and ‘gender relations’; ‘protracted refugees’ and ‘host population’; ‘protracted refugees’ and ‘self-reliance’; ‘protracted refugees’ and ‘dependency syndrome’; ‘protracted refugees’ and ‘coping strategies’; ‘protracted refugees’ and ‘exploitation’;

**Concept 8 Structure and Agency:** key words related to ‘critical realism’; ‘structure’ and ‘agency’; ‘protracted refugees’ and ‘structure’ and ‘agency’; ‘structuration theory’; ‘protracted refugees’ and ‘structuration theory’; ‘protracted refugees’, ‘structuration theory’ and ‘gender’; ‘protracted refugees’, ‘structuration theory’ and ‘livelihood strategies’.

The literature review began in January 2011 and ended in October 2012. Studies included were in English only. I also used references of relevant articles and publications. Moreover, the following databases for the literature review were used:

- JSTOR
- Google Scholar
- ProQuest-all databases
- HeinOnline
- United Nations Official Document System
- SocINDEX
- Taylor Francis Online
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Link</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Entry into force, 23 March 1976)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Entry into force, 3 January 1976)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(CEDAW, 1979)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Entry into Force: 4 January 1969</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Entry into force 15 March 2008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>URL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Law No. 6 of 1954 on Nationality (Last Amended in 1987)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4ea13.html">http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4ea13.html</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Law No. 24 of the 1973 on Residence of Foreigners</td>
<td><a href="http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4ed4c.html">http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4ed4c.html</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 2  Chapter Two: Setting

Figure 2.1 A Map of Jordan Under the British Mandate, 1920
(Source: Procon.org, 2008)\(^\text{30}\)

Figure 2.2 Jordan Labour Market Dynamics (2008 and 2014)³¹

Table 2.1 Outward Migration of Jordanians in 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JORDANIAN STATISTICS</th>
<th>DESTINATION COUNTRIES' STATISTICS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(available only for oil-producing countries, 2008)</td>
<td>(most recent data, c. 2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jordanian emigration stocks (a)</strong> by country of residence</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UAE</strong></td>
<td>54,834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Qatar</strong></td>
<td>50,928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kuwait</strong></td>
<td>30,748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oman</strong></td>
<td>18,888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Saudi Arabia</strong></td>
<td>3,396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Libya</strong></td>
<td>3,060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>161,854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main total</strong></td>
<td>339,755</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a): In destination countries’ statistics, Jordanian migrants are defined according to the country of birth (A) or country of citizenship (B) criterion according to countries of residence. In Jordanian statistics, Jordanian migrants are defined according to the country of citizenship criterion.

(b): According to data availability, “Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (SEM) countries” include Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Palestine and Turkey, while “Other countries” include Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland, Belarus, Georgia, Russia, Ukraine, Canada, US, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and Israel.

Sources: Jordanian Ministry of Labor (Jordanian statistics); population censuses, population registers, registers for foreigners, etc. (destination countries’ statistics).

Table 2.2 Foreign Resident Population in Jordan by Countries/Region of Citizenship for 1994 and 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/region of citizenship</th>
<th>1994</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>Average annual growth rate (%)</th>
<th>2004 Economically active population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>157,998</td>
<td>205,887</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab Asian countries</td>
<td>92,131</td>
<td>115,190</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which Palestine</td>
<td>24,501</td>
<td>40,084</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>31,805</td>
<td>38,130</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>127,976</td>
<td>117,754</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab African countries</td>
<td>124,566</td>
<td>112,392</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which Egypt</td>
<td>21,608</td>
<td>58,146</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Arab Asian countries</td>
<td>9,933</td>
<td>13,552</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which Sri Lanka</td>
<td>7,383</td>
<td>10,486</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>314,965</td>
<td>392,273</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of foreigners on the total resident population</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>13.2 (*)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Percentage of economically active foreigners on the total economically active population.

Source: Jordanian national Census (1994 and 2004)

---


395
Figure 2.4 Number of Refugees Per 1,000 Inhabitants in Jordan for 2012

[Diagram showing the number of refugees per 1,000 inhabitants for various countries, with Jordan having the highest at 49, followed by Chad at 33, Lebanon at 32, Rep. of Congo at 24, Syrian Arab Rep. at 23, Mauritania at 23, Djibouti at 22, Malta at 20, South Sudan at 20, and Montenegro at 18.]

Figure 2.5 Location of UNRWA Official Camps in Jordan (UNRWA, 2012) 35


35
Table 2.3 Categories of Palestinians in Jordan by Origin, Citizenship and Corresponding Entitlements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Residence</th>
<th>Kind of Passport</th>
<th>Family Book&lt;sup&gt;37&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Card of Crossing&lt;sup&gt;38&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Accessibility to Services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transjordanian</td>
<td>Permanent residency in Jordan</td>
<td>5-year passport with national ID number</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>Full access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordanian Palestinian of 1948</td>
<td>Permanent residency in Jordan</td>
<td>5-year passport with national ID number</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>Full access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordanian Palestinian of 1967</td>
<td>Permanent residency in Jordan</td>
<td>5-year passport with national ID number</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yellow Card&lt;sup&gt;39&lt;/sup&gt; - Family reunification</td>
<td>Full access</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Continued)


<sup>37</sup> Records family civil status, including information on place and date of birth and whether family members are married or not.

<sup>38</sup> Palestinians are given a card of crossing by the Inspection and Follow-up Department, which is a branch of the Jordanian Ministry of Interior.

<sup>39</sup> A person with a yellow card is considered by law as a resident of Jordan and is allowed to travel to the West Bank.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Residence</th>
<th>Kind of Passport</th>
<th>Family Book</th>
<th>Card of Crossing</th>
<th>Accessibility to Services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jordanian Palestinian of 1967</td>
<td>Permanent residency in the West Bank</td>
<td>5-year passport without national ID number</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Green Card</td>
<td>Needs to a work permit, university education payment in foreign fees, ownership with the approval of a ministerial council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordanian Palestinian from Jerusalem</td>
<td>Permanent residency in Jerusalem</td>
<td>5-year passport without national ID number</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Green Card</td>
<td>Work needs a work permit, university education payment in foreign fees, ownership with the approval of a ministerial council</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Continued)

40 Records family civil status, including information on place and date of birth and whether family members are married or not.
41 Palestinians are given a card of crossing by the Inspection and Follow-up Department, which is a branch of the Jordanian Ministry of Interior.
42 Palestinians with Green cards reside in the West Bank and are allowed temporary visit to Jordan. They are however required legal justification to visit the country (i.e. work permit, education).
### Table: Passport and Residence Status of Palestinians

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Residence</th>
<th>Kind of Passport</th>
<th>FamilyBook&lt;sup&gt;43&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Card of Crossing&lt;sup&gt;44&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Accessibility to Services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Palestinians of Gaza</td>
<td>Permanent residency in Jordan</td>
<td>2-year temporary passport</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Blue Card&lt;sup&gt;45&lt;/sup&gt; - In case of family reunification</td>
<td>Work needs a work permit, university education payment in foreign fees, ownership with the approval of a ministerial council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinians of the West Bank or Gaza Strip</td>
<td>Permanent residency in the West Bank or Gaza Strip</td>
<td>Palestinian authority passport (LP)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Permission to enter</td>
<td>Treated like any Arab in Jordan: as long as there is a valid residency they can access services permitted for foreigners</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>43</sup> Records family civil status, including information on place and date of birth and whether family members are married or not.

<sup>44</sup> Palestinians are given a card of crossing by the Inspection and Follow-up Department, which is a branch of the Jordanian Ministry of Interior.

<sup>45</sup> The blue card is for ex-Gazans residing in Gaza or Jordan and indicates that they were included in reunification cards and are able to live in Gaza.
Table 2.4 Structure of the Educational System in Jordan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Educational Level</th>
<th>Educational Institution</th>
<th>Degree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4-years old</td>
<td>Kindergarten (KG)1</td>
<td>Private sector schools</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 years old</td>
<td>KG 2</td>
<td>Public and private sector schools</td>
<td>Foundation level which upgrades to basic education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 – 16 years old</td>
<td>Basic Education (Compulsory)</td>
<td>UNRWA schools, government schools and private sector schools</td>
<td>Upgrades to secondary education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 – 18 years old</td>
<td>Secondary Education (Academic):</td>
<td>Government schools and private sector schools</td>
<td>High school exam (Tauḡīhī), upgrades to university or community college studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Scientific branch</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Literary branch</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- IT branch</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Industrial branch</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Agricultural branch</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Commercial branch</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 – 18 years old</td>
<td>Vocational secondary education</td>
<td>UNRWA (vocational training centre) and public vocational training centres</td>
<td>Certificate in vocational training and apprenticeship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 – 21 years old</td>
<td>Community college technical/vocational diploma (2 years)</td>
<td>UNRWA (Naour teachers’ College), private and public community colleges</td>
<td>Specialised diploma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 – 21 years old</td>
<td>University degree (4 years)</td>
<td>Private and public universities</td>
<td>Bachelor’s degree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.5 Student Enrolment in Higher Education in Jordan, 2012/2013\textsuperscript{47}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No. of Community Colleges</th>
<th>No. of students enrolled in community colleges</th>
<th>No. of Universities</th>
<th>No. of students enrolled in Universities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public Sector</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>28265</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>201,495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14191</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>66,655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>42,456</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>268,150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total no. of students in higher education: \textbf{310,606 students}

Appendix 3 Chapter Three: Methodology

Table 3.1 Description of Main Pseudonyms in this Case Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pseudonym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kafa</td>
<td>City located in the north of Jordan and capital of a governorate of the same fictive name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alpha Camp</td>
<td>Palestinian refugee camp in Kafa, the majority of whom are ex-Gazans and who have temporary Jordanian passports without national identity numbers that require renewal every two years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beta Camp</td>
<td>Palestinian refugee camp in Kafa, the majority of whom are Palestinian Jordanians and hold five-year Jordanian passports with national identity numbers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3.1 Palestinian Refugees with Jordanian Nationality in and Outside Camps (in %)\(^{48}\), 2013\(^{49}\)

---

\(^{48}\) This is based on a survey conducted by Tiltnes and Zhang (2013), which included a sample size of 15,123 Palestinian refugees residing inside camps and 197642 outside camps.

Figure 3.2 The Mean Household Size of Refugee Camps in Jordan, 2013

The sample size in this study include 9,626 Palestinian refugees outside camps and 11,530 inside camps (Tiltines and Zhang, 2013).

Table 3.14 Health Insurance\textsuperscript{53} Among Palestinian Refugees in Jordan\textsuperscript{54, 2013}\textsuperscript{55}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No Insurance</th>
<th>CIP</th>
<th>RMS</th>
<th>University</th>
<th>Private</th>
<th>n</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outside camps</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15,118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amman</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5,741</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zarqa</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5,133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irbid</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4,244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inside camps</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>197,642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jarash</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14,488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hussein</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16,076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zarqa</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5,225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wihdat</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17,088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hitteen</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>34,199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prince Hassar</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5,910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azmi Al-Mufti</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16,524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baqa’a</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>57,763</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irbid</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10,221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madaba</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3,919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talbiyeh</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2,916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sukhneh</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2,695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Souf</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10,668</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{53} The total in this table exceeds 100% because several individuals in the sample were registered in more than one insurance scheme.

\textsuperscript{54} The sample size in this study include n=15,118 Palestinian refugees outside camps and n=197,642 inside camps (Tiltnes and Zhang, 2013).

### Table 3.15 Illiteracy Rate\(^{56}\) of Palestinian Refugees in Jordan, 2013\(^{57}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household income level</th>
<th>Outside camps</th>
<th>Inside camps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lowest income</td>
<td>Lowest income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low income</td>
<td>Low income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle income</td>
<td>Middle income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High income</td>
<td>High income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Highest income</td>
<td>Highest income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational attainment of household head</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No schooling</td>
<td>3 4 5</td>
<td>3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary</td>
<td>7 4 6 9</td>
<td>7 4 6 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic</td>
<td>2 2 3 2</td>
<td>2 2 3 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>1 1 0 1</td>
<td>1 1 0 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-secondary</td>
<td>1 0 0 0</td>
<td>1 0 0 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{56}\) Comparison of Palestinian outside-camp refugees by annual per capita household income quintiles (n=11,390) and educational level of household head (n=11,402) and inside-camp refugees by annual per capita household income (n=142,148) and educational level of household head (n=141,443).

Table 3.16 Subject of Study Amongst Palestinian Refugee Students\textsuperscript{58} - Vocational Stream, 2013\textsuperscript{59}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject of Study</th>
<th>Outside camps</th>
<th></th>
<th>Inside camps</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food products</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer science and IT</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical (installation)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building, construction</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nursing</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services for cars and machines/mechanics</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing, knitting and leather work</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal grooming</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional professions and handicraft</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air conditioning and plumbing</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpentry, decor and crafts</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotel and tourism</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronics (TV, radio, mobile phone)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{58} The comparison of Palestinian refugees outside camps and inside camps in this study included a sample size of (n=76) (n=150) respectively.

Photos 3.1 Personal Photos Taken During my Fieldwork

Photo 3.1.1 Photo of Kafa town centre

Photo 3.1.2 Hand made products at a CBO in Alpha camp
Photo 3.1.3 Bricks and tires used to support aluminium roofing in Alpha camp

Photo 3.1.4 Girls in the street at Alpha camp
Photo 3.1.5 Hand made products at a CBO in Beta camp

Photo 3.1.6 Hand made products at a CBO in Beta camp
Photo 3.1.7 Open sewage and wastewater system in Alpha camp
Photo 3.1.8 Alpha camp sewage and waste water system under renovation
Photo 3.1.9 Alpha camp market area
Photo 3.1.10 House with sign of organisation that restored building in Alpha camp
## Table 3.17 Timeline for Key Activities Related to Accessing the Field

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KEY ACTIVITIES/EVENTS</th>
<th>TIMEFRAME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Informal meetings with NGO</td>
<td>Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HESSREC approval</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Start of fieldwork</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration for approval from NGO to work in Centre C</td>
<td>25-Jan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration for approval from DPA to work in Alpha camp</td>
<td>25-Jan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration to obtain approval from UNRWA to work in Affiliated CBOs (Centres A and B)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration for approval from DPA to work in Beta camp</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramadan period</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End of fieldwork</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
18 February 2013

To Whom It May Concern

This is to confirm that Hana Asfou is registered for a Postgraduate Degree at the University of Warwick in the United Kingdom. Further details are given below:

**Student Details:**
- Ms. Hana Asfou
- Correspondence Address: PO Box 26 Amman Jordan, 11118, Jordan
- Warwick ID Number: 10629678

**Course Details:**
- Title and Level: PhD Health and Social Studies
- Start Date: 03/Oct/2011
- Expected End Date: 03/Oct/2015
- Mode of Attendance: Full time

Hana Asfou is currently in her second year as a PhD student at the University of Warwick and has received an official approval from the University in January 2013 to conduct her fieldwork in Jordan. She has completed her taught courses for a PhD. Her research design has been examined and passed and she has received ethical approval from the Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities Ethics Committee (copy of approval letter attached). A mandatory requirement of the School of Health and Social Studies Doctoral Programme is to complete a year of fieldwork. The student’s PhD research aims to explore employment patterns of women and men through a case study in Jerash, Jordan including the Palestinian refugee camp of Gaza. The objectives of the fieldwork is to gather data through interviews on women and men’s experiences when seeking work and to examine the interplay of social and economic factors that may influence their access to employment.

Her supervisors are myself, Professor Gillian Hundt and Dr Maria Stuttaford and if you have any further queries please do not hesitate to contact me.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

Gillian Hundt
Professor of Social Sciences in Health

www.warwick.ac.uk
Figure 3.3.2 HSSREC Letter of Approval from University of Warwick

The University of Warwick

Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee
Kirby Corner Road
Coventry
CV4 8UW

21 February 2013

Ms Hana Asfour
School of health and Social Studies
University of Warwick
Coventry
CV4 7AL

Dear Ms Asfour

Ethical Application Reference: 26/12-13
Info-Ed Reference: 35299

Thank you for submitting your amendments to your application to the Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Sub-Committee for Chair’s approval.

We are pleased to advise you that, under the authority delegated to us by the University of Warwick Research Ethics Committee, full approval for your project is hereby granted for the period of 18 months effective from the date of this letter.

Any material changes to any aspect of the project will require further consideration by the Committee and the PI is required to notify the Committee as early as possible should they wish to make any such changes.

May I take this opportunity to wish you the very best of luck with this study.

Yours sincerely

[Signature]

Professor R Probert
Chair, Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Sub-Co

www.warwick.ac.uk
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Informant in Centre A (Alpha Camp)</th>
<th>Key Informant in Centre C (Beta Camp)</th>
<th>Key Informant in Centre D (Outside Camps)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 years old</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelors Degree</td>
<td>Bachelors Degree</td>
<td>Tauğîhî</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp resident</td>
<td>Non-Camp resident/ living in Kafa</td>
<td>Camp resident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex-Gazan</td>
<td>Transjordanian</td>
<td>Palestinian Jordanian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Group</td>
<td>Method</td>
<td>Sampling Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Policy makers                   | Individual interviews         | Purposive sampling, Snowball sampling | - The type of information sought after is held by specific members, such as gender specialists and experts on forced migration  
- To insure inclusion of important high-level actors |
| Training and employment service providers | Individual interviews         | Purposive sampling, Snowball sampling, Desktop research | The type of information sought after is held by specific members |
| Transjordanian women and men    | Individual interviews, Home visits, Focus groups | Snowball sampling, Purposive sampling, | Several sampling methods were used in order to ensure diversity of participants |
| Palestinian Jordanian women and men |                               |                                   |                                                                                        |
| ex-Gazan women and men          |                               |                                   |                                                                                        |
### Table 3.20 List of Studies Referred to in the Desktop Review

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Reports and Publications Referred to</th>
<th>Key Terms Used to Search for Resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

---

60 As well as using the above publications and reports, I was able to access data on Kafa through the World Bank Group, the Jordanian Department of Statistics as well as dissertations and thesis that have focused on Kafa Governorate. I was also able to reach out to service providers through gatekeepers and key informants.
### Table 3.21 General Pro Forma Used for Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant ID</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type of interviewee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed &amp; seeking work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed &amp; not seeking work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Date |
| Time of interview |
| Location |
| Residence |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Passport$^{61}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transjordanian/ Palestinian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordanian or ex-Gazan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Marital Status |
| Age |
| Sex |

| Educational background |
| Employment status |

| If employed, |
| Public sector |
| Private sector (type) |
| Informal employment |
| Years of occupation |
| Position |

---

$^{61}$ Including number of years and whether or not the passport includes a national identity number.
Figure 3.4 Topic Guide Used for Participants

- Experiences in accessing further education
- Experiences in accessing employment in the private and public sectors
- Main barriers to accessing further education
- Main barriers to accessing employment in the private and public sectors
- Discrimination in education and employment in the private and public sectors
- Future aspirations and goals

- Can you identify participants to interview:____
- Researcher comments Interviewee:_______
- Researcher:__________________________
### Table 3.22 Pro Forma Used for Policy Makers and Service Providers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant ID</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time of interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation Name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 3.5 Topic Guide Used for Policy Makers and Service Providers

- Main barriers to accessing further education in Kafa on a micro and macro level
- Main barriers to accessing employment in Kafa on a micro and macro level
- Influence of gender and citizenship in accessing further education on a micro and macro level
- Influence of gender and citizenship in accessing employment a micro and macro level
- Gap between the demand and supply end of the labour market

- Can you identify participants to interview: ________________
- Researcher comments Interviewee: ________________
- Researcher: ________________________________
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Org.</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Interview Location</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Key Services</th>
<th>Pseudonym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NGO in Kafa</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Kafa</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>Training Income generating</td>
<td>1SP</td>
<td>A manager of a government branch organisation related to cooperative associations in Kafa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO in Kafa</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>Kafa</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>Training Income generating</td>
<td>7SP</td>
<td>A manager of Government branch organisation responsible for providing training and recruitment opportunities to women and men in Kafa who are seeking employment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Continued)

---

62 Org. = Organisation that interviewee works at.
63 F = Female ; M = Male.
64 T = Transjordanian , PJ = Palestinian Jordanian , G= ex-Gazan.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Org.</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Interview Location</th>
<th>Sex(^{65})</th>
<th>Origin(^{66})</th>
<th>Key Services</th>
<th>Pseudonym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NGO in Kafa</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>Kafa</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>Training Income generating</td>
<td>15SP</td>
<td>A manager at a CBO in the outskirts of Kafa of which services include awareness raising, training and employment opportunities for Kafa residents, with focus on women and young adults</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admin.</td>
<td>Kafaa</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>T</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8SP</td>
<td>Programme coordinator and assistant at centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPO</td>
<td>VTC trainer</td>
<td>Kafa</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>Training and employment</td>
<td>5SP</td>
<td>A vocational trainer at a VTC in Kafa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{65}\) F = Female ; M = Male.  
\(^{66}\) T = Transjordanian , PJ = Palestinian Jordanian , G= ex-Gazan.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Org.</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Interview Location</th>
<th>Sex$^{67}$</th>
<th>Origin$^{68}$</th>
<th>Key Services</th>
<th>Pseudonym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>Beta camp</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>PJ</td>
<td>Training and employment</td>
<td>3SP</td>
<td>An employee at a Centre in Beta Camp of which services include training and recruitment opportunities to Beta camp residents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>Beta camp</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>PJ</td>
<td>Training and employment</td>
<td>9SP</td>
<td>A manager at a religious affiliated Centre in Beta camp whose services include training and employment opportunities to Beta camp residents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>Alpha camp</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>Training and employment</td>
<td>10SP</td>
<td>A manager at a religious affiliated Centre in Beta camp whose services include training and employment to Alpha camp residents</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^{67}$ F = Female ; M = Male.
$^{68}$ T = Transjordanian , PJ = Palestinian Jordanian , G= ex-Gazan.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Org.</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Interview Location</th>
<th>Sex&lt;sup&gt;69&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Origin&lt;sup&gt;70&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Key Services</th>
<th>Pseudonym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>Alpha camp</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>Training and employment</td>
<td>4SP</td>
<td>A manager at a Centre in Alpha camp whose services include training and employment specifically for disabled individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>Alpha camp</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>Training and employment</td>
<td>6SP</td>
<td>A manager at a Centre in Alpha camp whose services include awareness raising, training and employment opportunities to Alpha camp residents. The Centre also supports women entrepreneurs in the camp and provides them legal advise to women</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>69</sup> F = Female ; M = Male.  
<sup>70</sup> T = Transjordanian , PJ = Palestinian Jordanian , G= ex-Gazan.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Org.</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Interview Location</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Key Services</th>
<th>Pseudonym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>Beta camp</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>PJ</td>
<td>Training and employment</td>
<td>11SP</td>
<td>A manager at a Centre in Alpha camp whose services include awareness raising, training and employment opportunities to Alpha camp residents. The Centre also supports women entrepreneurs in the camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freelance work</td>
<td>Gender specialist</td>
<td>Amman</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>PJ</td>
<td>Training</td>
<td>29SP</td>
<td>A gender specialist training women on setting up micro-enterprises and cooperative in rural areas such as Kafa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.23.2 General Attributes of Policy Makers (Individual Interviews)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Org.(^74)</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Residence</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Citizenship</th>
<th>Psuedonym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public sector/Think Tank</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
<td>Amman</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>PJ</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>PM95</td>
<td>A consultant with expert knowledge in the field of Palestinian refugees in the Middle East and North African region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freelance Consultant</td>
<td>Gender Specialist</td>
<td>Amman</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>PJ</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>PM00</td>
<td>A gender and human development specialist with a extensive background on gender and employment issues in Jordan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Senior military officer</td>
<td>Amman</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>PM97</td>
<td>A senior military officer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^73\) M=Married, S=Single. PJ=Palestinian Jordanian, T=Transjordanian, G=exGazan. FJC= Full Jordanian Citizenship (5 years & national ID), TJC = Temporary Jordanian Citizenship (2 years, no ID)

\(^74\) Org.= Organisation that participant works at.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Org.</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Residence</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Citizenship</th>
<th>Psuedonym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public sector</td>
<td>High level senior servant</td>
<td>Amman</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>PJ</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>PM99</td>
<td>A former high-level civil servant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Committee Office for the DPA</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>Alpha camp</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>TJC</td>
<td>LC01</td>
<td>A local committee representative in Alpha Camp. During the interview several key figures from the local committee joined as well as a team from UNRWA who were preparing for an event in the camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public sector</td>
<td>Previous senior government official</td>
<td>Amman</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>PM93</td>
<td>A former high level civil servant and senior member of a public university in Jordan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Amman</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>PJ</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>PM96</td>
<td>CEO of a legal aid organisation in Jordan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Lawyer</td>
<td>Amman</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>PM92</td>
<td>A lawyer at the legal firm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Amman</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>PJ</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>PM96</td>
<td>CEO of a legal aid organisation in Jordan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.23.3 General Attributes of Transjordanian Men (Individual Interviews)\textsuperscript{75}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pseudonym</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Marital status</th>
<th>Interview location</th>
<th>Citizenship</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Work status</th>
<th>Sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MJE62</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Kafa CBO</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>BSc</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MJE63</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Home visit</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>High school</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>PS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEBJT22</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Kafa town centre/ Barber shop</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>Secondary education</td>
<td>BO</td>
<td>PS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEBJT2</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Kafa town centre/ Shoe shop</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>PS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEBJT6</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Kafa town centre/ Shoe shop</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>Secondary education (vocational)</td>
<td>BO</td>
<td>PS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEBJT3</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Kafa town centre/ Mobile shop</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>Community college</td>
<td>Employee/ Part-time</td>
<td>PS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEBJT5</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Kafa town centre/ Clothes shop</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>Tawjih Fail</td>
<td>BO</td>
<td>PS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{75} S= Single. M= Married. FJC = Full Jordanian citizenship (5 years) with national ID. BO= Business owner. PS = Private Sector.
Table 3.23.4 General Attributes of Palestinian Jordanian Men (Individual Interviews) \(^7^6\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pseudonym</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Marital status</th>
<th>Interview location</th>
<th>Citizenship</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Work status</th>
<th>Sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MSC4</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Beta camp</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>Secondary education</td>
<td>BO</td>
<td>PS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSC2</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Beta camp</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>High school</td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>PS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSC3</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Beta camp</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>Tawjihi Fail</td>
<td>BO</td>
<td>PS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSC5</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Beta camp</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSC10</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Beta camp</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>Community college</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSC8</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Beta camp</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>High school drop out</td>
<td>Not fixed work</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPalJT1</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Kafa town centre</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>BO</td>
<td>PS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPalJT42</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Kafa town centre</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>High school</td>
<td>BO</td>
<td>PS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^7^6\) S= Single. M= Married. FJC = Full Jordanian citizenship (5 years) with national ID. BO= Business owner. PS = Private Sector.
Table 3.23.5 General Attributes of ex-Gazan Men (Individual Interviews)\textsuperscript{77}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pseudonym</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Marital status</th>
<th>Interview location</th>
<th>Citizenship</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Work status</th>
<th>Sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MGC8</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Alpha Camp</td>
<td>TJC</td>
<td>Tawjihi Fail</td>
<td>Work in family business</td>
<td>PS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MGC6</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Alpha Camp</td>
<td>TJC</td>
<td>Tawjihi Fail</td>
<td>Day work</td>
<td>Ps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MGC4</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Alpha Camp</td>
<td>ETD</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>Part-time work</td>
<td>Ps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MGC10</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Alpha Camp</td>
<td>TJC</td>
<td>PhD</td>
<td>Coordinator</td>
<td>NPO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MGC9</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Alpha Camp</td>
<td>TJC</td>
<td>Vocational training graduate</td>
<td>BO in camp</td>
<td>PS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MGC2</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Alpha Camp</td>
<td>TJC</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>Employed in camp</td>
<td>PS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MGC1</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Alpha Camp</td>
<td>TJC</td>
<td>Diploma</td>
<td>BO in camp</td>
<td>PS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MGC7</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Alpha Camp</td>
<td>TJC</td>
<td>BSc</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{77} S= Single. M= Married. TJC = Temporary Jordanian citizenship (2 years) without national ID. ETD= Egyptian travel documents. BO= Business owner. PS = Private Sector, NPO = Non-profit organisation.
# Table 3.23.6 General Attributes of Transjordanian Women (Individual Interviews)\(^78\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pseudonym</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Marital status</th>
<th>Residence</th>
<th>Citizenship</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Work status</th>
<th>Sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FJ1</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Outskirts of Kafa</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>Vocational training</td>
<td>NW</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEB4</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Kafa</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>NW</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEB5</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Outskirts of Kafa</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>NW</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEB10</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Outskirts of Kafa</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>Tawjihi fail</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>NPO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEB9</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Kafa</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>Diploma</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>NPO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEB3</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Outskirts of Kafa</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>Tawjihi pass</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>NPO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEB01</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Kafa</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>Tawjihi vocational</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>PS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEBJT11</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Outskirts of Kafa</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>NW</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEBJT1</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Outskirts of Kafa</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>NPO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^78\) S= Single. M= Married. FJC = Full Jordanian citizenship (5 years) with national ID. NW= Not working, W= Working, V= Volunteering. BO= Business owner. PS = Private Sector, NPO = Non-profit organisation.
Table 3.23.7 General Attributes of Palestinian Jordanian Women (Individual Interviews)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pseudonym</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Marital status</th>
<th>Residence</th>
<th>Citizenship</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Work status</th>
<th>Sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FSC1</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Kafa</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>Tawjihi pass</td>
<td>BO</td>
<td>CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSC3</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Beta Camp</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>Tawjihi fail</td>
<td>NW</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FP_BetaCamp</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>Beta Camp</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>MA incomplete</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>PS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPJ01</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Kafa</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>BO</td>
<td>PS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSCHV2</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Alpha Camp</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>Tawjihi fail</td>
<td>NW</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GC04(47)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Alpha Camp</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>PS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

79 S= Single. M= Married, D= Divorced/ing. FJC = Full Jordanian citizenship (5 years) with national ID. NW= Not working, W= Working, V= Volunteering. BO= Business owner. PS = Private Sector, NPO = Non-profit organisation.
Table 3.23.8 General Attributes of ex-Gazan Women (Individual Interviews)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pseudonym</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Marital status</th>
<th>Residence</th>
<th>Citizenship</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Work status</th>
<th>Sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FGC2</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>Alpha Camp</td>
<td>TJC</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>NW</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGC7</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>Alpha Camp</td>
<td>TJC</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>NPO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGC6</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>Alpha Camp</td>
<td>TJC</td>
<td>Tawjihi</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>NPO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGC08</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>Alpha Camp</td>
<td>TJC</td>
<td>Tawjihi vocational</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>NPO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGC10</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>Alpha Camp</td>
<td>TJC</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>NPO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGCHV1</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Alpha Camp</td>
<td>TJC</td>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td>NW</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.23.9 General Attributes of Employed Transjordanian Women (Focus Group Interviews)\textsuperscript{80}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Marital status</th>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Years working</th>
<th>Citizenship</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Reasons for stopping education</th>
<th>Recieves Aid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>PU</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>Diploma</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>PU</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>Diploma</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>PU</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>PU</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{80} S= Single. M= Married. PU= Public Sector. FJC = Full Jordanian citizenship (5 years) with national ID. NW= Not working, W= Working, V= Volunteering. BO= Business owner. PS = Private Sector, NPO = Non-profit organisation.
Table 3.23.10 General Attributes of Employed Palestinian Jordanian Women (Focus Group Interviews)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Marital status</th>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Work status</th>
<th>Citizenship</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Reason for stopping education</th>
<th>Receives aid from</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Employee</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>Bachelor's Degree</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Employee</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>Tawjihi - Pass</td>
<td>Marriage</td>
<td>MoSD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Employee</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>Diploma</td>
<td>Marriage</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Employee</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>Bachelor's Degree</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Employee</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>Diploma</td>
<td>Marriage</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Employee</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>Bachelor's Degree</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Employee</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>Diploma</td>
<td>Marriage</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>Tawjihi-Fail</td>
<td>Is currently repeating Tawjihi</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Employee</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>Diploma</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Employee</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>High School</td>
<td>Not interested</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Employee</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>Diploma</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

81 S= Single. M= Married. PU= Public Sector. FJC = Full Jordanian citizenship (5 years) with national ID. NW= Not working, W= Working, V= Volunteering. BO= Business owner. PS = Private Sector, NPO = Non-profit organisation.
Table 3.23.11 General Attributes of Employed ex-Gazan Women Interviewed (Focus Group Interviews) $^{82}$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Marital status</th>
<th>Work status</th>
<th>How participant secured job</th>
<th>Years working</th>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Citizenship</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Reasons for stopping education</th>
<th>Registered with UNRWA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>Through volunteering</td>
<td>3 years</td>
<td>Works at a CBO in the camp</td>
<td>TJC</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>Financial reasons</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>Through private networks</td>
<td>3 years</td>
<td>Works at a CBO in the camp</td>
<td>TJC</td>
<td>Tawjihi pass</td>
<td>Financial reasons</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>Through merit</td>
<td>1 year</td>
<td>Works at a CBO in the camp</td>
<td>TJC</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>Through volunteering</td>
<td>1 week</td>
<td>Works at a CBO in the camp</td>
<td>TJC</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>Financial reasons</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>Through private networks</td>
<td>1 month</td>
<td>Works at a CBO in the camp</td>
<td>TJC</td>
<td>Diploma</td>
<td>Financial reasons</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>Through volunteering</td>
<td>1 year and 3 months</td>
<td>Works at a CBO in the camp</td>
<td>TJC</td>
<td>Diploma</td>
<td>Financial reasons</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>Through volunteering</td>
<td>10 years</td>
<td>Works at a Kindergarten</td>
<td>TJC</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.23.12 General Attributes of Unemployed Transjordanian Women in Kafa (Focus Group Interviews) 83

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Marital Status</th>
<th>Reasons for not working</th>
<th>Years not working</th>
<th>Citizenship</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Reasons to stop studying</th>
<th>Registered with UNRWA</th>
<th>Receives aid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Increase in refugees</td>
<td>2 years</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>Diploma</td>
<td>Acceptance grades for higher education is too high</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>No work</td>
<td>2 years</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>Diploma</td>
<td>Financial reasons</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>No work</td>
<td>2 years</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>Tawjihi fail</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Situation in general</td>
<td>3 years</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Work regulations</td>
<td>3 years</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>Diploma</td>
<td>Acceptance grades for higher education is too high</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>No work</td>
<td>4 years</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>Tawjihi pass</td>
<td>Acceptance grades for higher education is too high</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>No work</td>
<td>4 years</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

83 S= Single. M= Married. PU= Public Sector. FJC = Full Jordanian citizenship (5 years) with national ID. NW= Not working, W= Working, V= Volunteering. BO= Business owner. PS = Private Sector, NPO = Non-profit organisation.
Table 3.23.13 General Attributes of Unemployed Palestinian Jordanian Women (Focus Group Interviews)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Marital status</th>
<th>Reasons for not working</th>
<th>Years not working</th>
<th>Citizenship</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Reasons for stopping education</th>
<th>Registered with UNRWA</th>
<th>Receives Aid</th>
<th>Receives Aid From</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>No work, married</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Eligible for FJC but doesn't have one</td>
<td>High school</td>
<td>Marriage</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>UNRWA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>No university degree</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Eligible for FJC but doesn't have one</td>
<td>Tawjihi pass</td>
<td>Marriage</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>No jobs</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Eligible for FJC but doesn't have one</td>
<td>Tawjihi pass</td>
<td>Marriage</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>No jobs</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>High school</td>
<td>Marriage</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>MoSD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>No jobs, unmarried</td>
<td>9 months</td>
<td>Eligible for FJC but doesn't have one</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>CBO in Camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>No jobs, family constraints</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>FJC</td>
<td>High school</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>CBO in Camp</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.23.14 General Attributes of Unemployed ex-Gazan Women Interviewed (Focus Group Interviews)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Marital status</th>
<th>Residence</th>
<th>Reasons for Not working</th>
<th>Years without work</th>
<th>Citizenship</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Reason for not Continuing Education</th>
<th>Registered with UNRWA</th>
<th>Receives Aid</th>
<th>Receives Aid From</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Alpha Camp</td>
<td>No work in Kafa</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>TJC</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>No finances</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Alpha Camp</td>
<td>No work, low education</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>TJC</td>
<td>Diploma</td>
<td>No finance</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Outskirts of Kafa</td>
<td>Tawjih education</td>
<td>Since 1991</td>
<td>TJC</td>
<td>Tawjih</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Alpha Camp</td>
<td>No work in Kafa</td>
<td>Since 2000</td>
<td>TJC</td>
<td>Tawjih - Fail</td>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>CBO in camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Alpha Camp</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>TJC</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.23.15 Total Individual and Focus Group Interviews with Female and Male Participants (including Policy Makers and Service Providers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Individual Interview Participants</th>
<th>Total Focus Group Participants (A total of 6 focus groups)</th>
<th>Total Number of Service Providers</th>
<th>Total Number of Policy Makers</th>
<th>Total Number of Participants interviewed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.23.16 Total Individual Interviews with Female and Male Participants in Kafa (Excluding Policy Makers and Service Providers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin of Participants</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Total individual interviews with female and male participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transjordanian</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ex-Gazan</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Jordanian</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.23.17 Total Individual and Focus Group Participants by Sex and Employment Status (Excluding Policy Makers and Service Providers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

86 Volunteers at CBOs are classified as unemployed because they do not get paid.
Table 3.23.18 Total Employed and Unemployed Participants in Kafa from Individual and Focus Group Interviews (Excluding Policy Makers and Service Providers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Individual Interviews</th>
<th>Focus Groups</th>
<th>Total Focus Group and Individual Interviews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transjordanian</td>
<td>Palestinian Jordanian</td>
<td>ex-Gazan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total unemployed female participants</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total employed female participants</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of focus group and individual interviews</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.23.19 Total Individual Interviews with Males by Employment Status and Origin (Excluding Policy Makers and Service Providers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Employed</th>
<th>Unemployed</th>
<th>Total employed/unemployed males interviewed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transjordanian</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Jordanian</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ex-Gazan</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>17</strong></td>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
<td><strong>23</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.23.20 Total Female Focus Group Participants by Employment Status and Origin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Employed participants</th>
<th>Unemployed participants</th>
<th>Total employed and unemployed by origin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transjordanian</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ex-Gazan</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Jordanian</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total employed / Total unemployed for all origin groups</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total focus group participants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.23.21 Total Working in the Private, Public and Other Areas of Employment by Origin and Sex

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Private Sector</th>
<th></th>
<th>Public Sector</th>
<th></th>
<th>Other(^{87})</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transjordanian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0(^{88})</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Jordanian</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5(^{89})</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ex-Gazan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10(^{90})</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{87}\) This includes non-profit organisations, CBOs, and Cooperative associations.
\(^{88}\) This is excluding the two women volunteering at a CBO in Kafa because they are not paid.
\(^{89}\) This includes 1 woman working at a cooperative association and 4 working at a CBO.
\(^{90}\) All the women were working at CBOs in Alpha Camp.
Figure 3.6 General Participant’s Consent Form
Participant identification number where applicable

CONSENT FORM

Project Title: Understanding the different types of further education and employment patterns for women and men: A case study of Palestinians in Kafa, Jordan.

Name of researcher:

I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet dated

For the above project which I may keep for my records and have had the opportunity to ask any questions I may have.

I agree to take part in the above study and am willing to: (please initials to confirm)
Be individually interviewed

For the interview to be tape recorded

For the interview to be transcribed

I understand that my information will be held and processed for the following purposes:

For usage in this study, reports and presentations, subject to the data being fully anonymised, so that I cannot be identified

I am happy not to be anonymised in the study, reports and other documentation produced from this research

I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving any reason.

_________________   _______________   ________________
Name of Interviewee   Date                 Signature

_________________   _______________   ________________
Researcher           Date                 Signature
Figure 3.7 General Participant’s Information Sheet

You are being invited to participate in a research study. Please read this and take time to consider before deciding whether to take part.

I am Hana Asfour and I am a student at the University of Warwick, UK. I would like to invite you to take part in my research on the experiences of women and men in their access to further education and employment in Kafa, Jordan. I will be interviewing people in Kafa and Alpha and Beta camps who are of working age, because my research aims to understand the different experiences that women and men have when looking for work. Although the research does not provide direct benefit to you, it will produce important information and understanding about access to employment in these areas. You do not have to take part in this research and can stop from being involved at any time during the study. The services you receive will not be affected if you decide not to take part.

I am looking for volunteers who would be willing to discuss their experiences of looking for work with me. If you agree to take part, you will be contacted by the researcher to arrange for a suitable day and time for the interview. The interview will take place at a centre in Kafa. If you prefer for the interview to be at your home, this is also possible; but the researcher will be accompanied by a family member. Nevertheless, the interview will not be conducted in the presence of the family member. The interview will be recorded and transcribed only if you give your permission. The interview will last around 45 minutes, depending on how much you would like to say. During the interview you are free not to answer any questions that you choose. You can also drop out of the interview at any time without giving a reason.
Anything you tell me that may identify you would be removed and your name will not be included in the transcripts and tape recording. Apart from myself, only my two academic supervisors would listen to the taped discussions or read my notes. The only exception is that if you say anything that suggests that someone is in danger from illegal activities, I would need to let a senior management know. All data collected would be kept securely for a period of ten years and then destroyed. The information collected would be written up as part of my thesis. The findings may be presented at conferences, in journal articles or reports. If you are interested, I will send you a summary of the research.

I will be contacting you after 3 days to inquire as to whether you wish to take part in this research. If you agree to take part you would be asked to complete the attached consent form. It is encouraged that you consider the issues mentioned in the information sheet and discuss any inquiries you have with me before deciding whether or not you would like to take part in the interview. If you have any questions or comments about the research, I can be contacted on:

Mobile: 00 962 79 55 19 433

Email: h.asfour@warwick.ac.uk

If at any time you have any complaints that you would like to discuss, please contact:

Nicola Owen

Deputy Registrar, Deputy Registrar’s Office

University of Warwick, Coventry, CV4 8UW

Telephone: +00 44 (0) 2476 522 713

Email: Nicola.Owen@warwick.ac.uk
CONSENT FORM

Project Title: Understanding the different types of further education and employment patterns for women and men: A case study of Palestinians in Kafa, Jordan.

Name of researcher:

I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet dated DATE:

For the above project which I may keep for my records and have had the opportunity to ask any questions I may have.

I agree to take part in the above study and am willing to: (please initials to confirm)

Be individually interviewed
For the interview to be tape recorded

For the interview to be transcribed

I understand that my information will be held and processed for the following purposes:

For usage in this study, reports and presentations, subject to the data being fully anonymised, so that I cannot be identified

I am happy not to be anonymised in the study, reports and other documentation produced from this research

I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving any reason.

_____________       ___________       ___________
Name of Interviewee  Date             Signature

_____________       ___________       ___________
Researcher          Date             Signature
Figure 3.9 Service Provider’s Information Sheet

You are being invited to participate in a research study. Please read this and take time to consider before deciding whether to take part.

I am Hana Asfour and I am a student at the University of Warwick, UK. I would like to invite you to take part in my research on the experiences of women and men in their access to employment in Kafa, Jordan. I will be interviewing service providers working in Kafa, because my research aims to understand the different experiences that women and men have when looking for work and the conditions and policies that affect employment patterns. In addition to highlighting barriers and opportunities faced by women and men in their access to employment, these interviews will also help in identifying major service providers and employers in Kafa. You do not have to take part in this research and can stop from being involved at any time during the study.

I am looking for interviewees who would be willing to discuss their work and expertise in the development sector, particularly concerning information on employment patterns of women and men in Kafa, Jordan. If you agree to take part, I will contact you to arrange for a suitable day and time to meet with you at your office to conduct the interview. The interview will be recorded and transcribed only if you give your permission. The interview will last around 45 minutes, depending on how much you would like to say. During the interview you are free not to answer any questions that you choose. You can also drop out of the interview at any time without giving a reason.

Anything you tell me that may identify you would be removed and your name will not be included in the transcripts and tape recording, unless you approve of having your identity disclosed. Apart from myself, only my two
academic supervisors would listen to read the transcript of the interview. The only exception is that if you say anything that suggests that someone is in danger from illegal activities, I would need to let senior management know. All data collected would be kept securely for a period of ten years and then destroyed. The information collected would be written up as part of my thesis. The findings may be presented at conferences, in journal articles or reports. If you are interested, I will send you a summary of the research.

I will be contacting you after 3 days to inquire as to whether you wish to take part in this research. If you agree to take part you would be asked to complete the attached consent form. It is encouraged that you consider the issues mentioned in the information sheet and discuss any inquiries you have with me before deciding whether or not you would like to take part in the interview. If you have any questions or comments about the research, I can be contacted on:

Mobile: 00 962 79 55 19 433
Email: h.asfour@warwick.ac.uk

If at any time you have any complaints that you would like to discuss, please contact:

Nicola Owen
Deputy Registrar, Deputy Registrar’s Office
University of Warwick, Coventry, CV4 8UW
Telephone: +00 44 (0) 2476 522 713
Email: Nicola.Owen@warwick.ac.uk
Figure 3.10 Policy Maker’s Consent Form

CONSENT FORM

Project Title: Understanding the different types of further education and employment patterns for women and men: A case study of Palestinians in Kafa, Jordan.

Name of researcher:

I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet dated DATE:

For the above project which I may keep for my records and have had the opportunity to ask any questions I may have.

I agree to take part in the above study and am willing to: (please initials to confirm)

- Be individually interviewed

- For the interview to be tape recorded

- For the interview to be transcribed
I understand that my information will be held and processed for the following purposes:

For usage in this study, reports and presentations, subject to the data being fully anonymised, so that I cannot be identified

I am happy not to be anonymised in the study, reports and other documentation produced from this research

I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving any reason.

| ___________________ | ______________ | ____________ |
| Name of Interviewee | Date          | Signature    |

| ___________________ | ______________ | ____________ |
| Researcher         | Date          | Signature    |
Figure 3.11 Policy Maker’s Information Sheet

You are being invited to participate in a research study. Please read this and take time to consider before deciding whether to take part.

I am Hana Asfour and I am a student at the University of Warwick, UK. I would like to invite you to take part in my research on the experiences of women and men in their access to employment in Kafa, Jordan. I will be interviewing people from the public sector, United Nations agencies as well as local and international non-governmental organisations working in Kafa, because my research aims to understand the different experiences that women and men have when looking for work and the conditions and policies that affect employment patterns. In addition to highlighting barriers and opportunities faced by women and men in their access to employment, these interviews will also help in identifying major service providers and employers in Kafa. You do not have to take part in this research and can stop from being involved at any time during the study.

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Deputy Registrar, Deputy Registrar’s Office

University of Warwick, Coventry, CV4 8UW

Telephone: +00 44 (0) 2476 522 713

Email: Nicola.Owen@warwick.ac.uk
### Appendixes Chapter Four, Five and Six

#### Table 5.1 Key Firing Features in the Jordanian Labour Law\(^{91}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regulation concerning dismissal of redundant worker</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Is it legal for an employer to terminate the employment contract of a worker on the basis of redundancy?</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Must the employer notify a third party before terminating one redundant worker?</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Does the employer need the approval of a third party in order to dismiss one redundant worker?</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Must the employer notify or consult a third party before dismissing a group of 9 redundant workers?</strong></td>
<td>Yes, both notify and consult</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Is there a retraining or reassignment obligation before an employer can make a worker redundant?</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Regulation concerning firing costs</strong></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legal notice period for redundancy dismissal after 20 years of continuous employment?</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the severance pay formula?</td>
<td>None; the worker would be covered by the social security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the severance pay for dismissal after 20 years of continuous employment?</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Unemployment protection regimes</strong></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Does your country have an unemployment protection scheme?</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How is the unemployment protection scheme funded?</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the amount of the unemployment benefit and for how long does an unemployed worker receive it?</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 5.2 Key Hiring Features in the Jordanian Labour Law

#### Regulations on Fixed Term Contracts (FTC)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Are FTC prohibited for a permanent task?</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum duration of FTC (months)</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rules of renewing a FTC</td>
<td>No limit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum cumulative duration of a FTC relationship (in months), including all renewals</td>
<td>No limit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Minimum Wage Arrangements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Setting the MW</th>
<th>150JD per month with the exception of (women-dominated) employment in domestic work and export-processing zones (QIZs), for which minimum wage remained at 110JD per month</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coverage</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Regulation Concerning Standard Workdays and Overtime

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Length of the standard work day</th>
<th>8 hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maximum overtime limit in normal circumstances</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum for overtime work</td>
<td>25% during the day; 50% for the night</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum number of working hours allowed per day</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum number of working days per week</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandatory pay premium for night work (% of salary)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandated decreased shift time for night work</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrictions on women’s working hours</td>
<td>Night work is prohibited by the 1996 Labor Code between 19:00 and 6:00 o’clock, ‘except in the instances specified by decision of the Minister of Labor’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Regulation concerning rest and vacancies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minimum number of hours of rest between workdays</th>
<th>13</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legally defined specific weekly rest day</td>
<td>Friday</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandatory paid annual vacation (in working days) after 20 years of continuous employment</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Regulation on maternity leave

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Normal duration</th>
<th>10 weeks of maternity leave which should be taken before or after delivery, provided that the period taken after delivery is at least 6 weeks. During this time it is legal for women to work.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Compulsory leave</td>
<td>6 weeks after confinement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extension</td>
<td>A woman working in a private enterprise employing 10 workers or more is entitled to 1 year unpaid leave to raise her children (optional maternity leave).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of benefits</td>
<td>Social security corporation SSC (Employers 12.25% of gross-salary; Employers: 6.5% of gross salary)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 5.3 List of Closed Positions for Foreign Labour in Jordan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>List of closed professions for foreign labour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1)</td>
<td>Medical sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2)</td>
<td>Engineering sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3)</td>
<td>Administrative and accounting fields</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4)</td>
<td>Professions related to writing, including typing and clerical work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5)</td>
<td>Labour for call centers, telephones and communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6)</td>
<td>Warehouse labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7)</td>
<td>Labours in selling of all types</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8)</td>
<td>Coiffeurs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9)</td>
<td>Décor work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10)</td>
<td>Education professions of all specialties, with the exception of specialties for which there is no Jordanian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11)</td>
<td>Sellers of Fuel (or combustible materials) in major cities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12)</td>
<td>Electrician field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13)</td>
<td>Mechanic and car repair professions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14)</td>
<td>Drivers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15)</td>
<td>Guards and delivery personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16)</td>
<td>Building helpers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---


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Figure 5.1 Law on Naturalisation of Foreign Women Married to Jordanians

The wife of the Jordanian has a right to acquire a Jordanian nationality subject to approval from the Ministry of Interior, should she make a written request to become naturalised. She is entitled to apply three years after the marriage to a Jordanian man if she has an Arab nationality, and five years if she has a non-Arab nationality. The procedures for this begin… after receiving a letter from the Ministry of Interior approving naturalisation of the wife. The applicant in this case is required to:

- Present herself in person to the office at the Department.
- Present a copy of the approval from the Ministry of Interior
- Present her family book
- Present her passport from her previous nationality
- Two personal photos
- Pay a fee of JD250, and fees for stamps
- The applicant then receives a Jordanian nationality with a national identity number. The applicant’s date of birth will be amended to the following date: 1/1/- , however her year of birth must remain as it is.
- The applicant’s Jordanian nationality will be printed and handed to her.
- The applicant is then eligible to obtain a passport by following to the required procedures from the Department’s offices.
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