Akerlof, Robert J. (2016) Anger and enforcement. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 126 . pp. 110-124. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2015.10.022

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Abstract

Observers who are angered by rule violations and punish violators often play a critical role in enforcement. Hence a key question is: when will noncompliance provoke anger, and when will it be excused? This paper develops a theory of rule compliance as the outcome of a two-person Bayesian game. The core of the model is its description of what constitutes an excuse. Noncompliance is excused when a “reasonable person” in similar circumstances would also have failed to comply. Phenomena explained include the role of “legitimacy” in enforcement; corruption traps; graduated sanctions for repeat offenders; and tolerance of self-interestedness in markets.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Economics -- Psychological aspects, Rules (Philosophy), Bayesian statistical decision theory
Journal or Publication Title:	Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Publisher:	Elsevier BV * North-Holland
ISSN:	0167-2681
Official Date:	10 November 2016
Dates:	Date Event 10 November 2016 Available 27 October 2015 Accepted 8 October 2015 Submitted
Volume:	126
Page Range:	pp. 110-124
DOI:	10.1016/j.jebo.2015.10.022
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access

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