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Hopenhayn, Hugo A. and Squintani, Francesco (2016) Patent rights and innovation disclosure. The Review of Economic Studies, 83 (1). pp. 199-230. doi:10.1093/restud/rdv030 ISSN 0034-6527.
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdv030
Abstract
This article studies optimal patents with respect to the timing of innovation disclosure. In a simple model, we identify forces that lead firms to either suboptimally patent too early or too late in equilibrium, and we determine conditions so that stronger patents induce earlier or later equilibrium disclosure. Then, by solving an infinite multistage patent game with a more explicit structure, we describe innovation growth, and derive detailed predictions that can be used for policy experiments. As an application, we calibrate our multistage game using summary statistics from the seeds breeding industry. We find that weaker patent rights may result in welfare gains of 46% relative to the status quo. The gains are achieved because weaker patents reduce competition, thus leading firms to postpone patenting.
Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||||||
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Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics | ||||||||
Journal or Publication Title: | The Review of Economic Studies | ||||||||
Publisher: | Oxford University Press | ||||||||
ISSN: | 0034-6527 | ||||||||
Official Date: | January 2016 | ||||||||
Dates: |
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Volume: | 83 | ||||||||
Number: | 1 | ||||||||
Page Range: | pp. 199-230 | ||||||||
DOI: | 10.1093/restud/rdv030 | ||||||||
Status: | Peer Reviewed | ||||||||
Publication Status: | Published | ||||||||
Access rights to Published version: | Restricted or Subscription Access |
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