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Strategic information transmission networks
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Galeotti, Andrea, Ghiglino, Christian and Squintani, Francesco (2013) Strategic information transmission networks. Journal of Economic Theory, 148 (5). pp. 1751-1769. doi:10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.016 ISSN 0022-0531.
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.016
Abstract
We study a model of multi-player communication. Privately informed decision makers have different preferences about the actions they take, and communicate to influence each othersʼ actions in their favor. We prove that the equilibrium capability of any player to send a truthful message to a set of players depends not only on the preference composition of those players, but also on the number of players truthfully communicating with each one of them. We establish that the equilibrium welfare depends not only on the number of truthful messages sent in equilibrium, but also on how evenly truthful messages are distributed across decision makers.
Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||||
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Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics | ||||||
Journal or Publication Title: | Journal of Economic Theory | ||||||
Publisher: | Academic Press | ||||||
ISSN: | 0022-0531 | ||||||
Official Date: | September 2013 | ||||||
Dates: |
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Volume: | 148 | ||||||
Number: | 5 | ||||||
Page Range: | pp. 1751-1769 | ||||||
DOI: | 10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.016 | ||||||
Status: | Peer Reviewed | ||||||
Publication Status: | Published | ||||||
Access rights to Published version: | Restricted or Subscription Access |
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