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Extreme idealism and equilibrium in the Hotelling-Downs model of political competition
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Ronayne, David (2016) Extreme idealism and equilibrium in the Hotelling-Downs model of political competition. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick. Department of Economics. CRETA Discussion Paper Series (21). (Unpublished)
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Official URL: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/resear...
Abstract
In the classic Hotelling-Downs model of political competition there is (almost always) no pure strategy equilibrium with three or more potential strategic candidates where the distribution of voters’ preferred policies are single-peaked. I study the effect of introducing two idealist candidates who are non-strategic (i.e., fixed to their policy platform), to an unlimited number of potential strategic entrants. I present results that hold for a non-degenerate class of cases: (i) For any equilibrium, it must be that the left-most and right-most candidates (i.e., extremists)
are idealists; (ii) Hotelling’s Law fails: in any equilibrium, candidates do not share their policy platforms, which instead are spread out across the policy space; (iii) Characterizations for symmetric and asymmetric single-peaked distributions of voters’ ideal policy preferences. Equilibria where many strategic candidates enter exist only if the distribution of voter preferences is asymmetric.
Item Type: | Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper) | ||||
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Subjects: | J Political Science > JC Political theory | ||||
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics | ||||
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): | Competition, Idealism, Equilibrium | ||||
Series Name: | CRETA Discussion Paper Series | ||||
Publisher: | University of Warwick. Department of Economics | ||||
Place of Publication: | Coventry | ||||
Official Date: | August 2016 | ||||
Dates: |
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Number: | 21 | ||||
Number of Pages: | 19 | ||||
Institution: | University of Warwick | ||||
Status: | Not Peer Reviewed | ||||
Publication Status: | Unpublished | ||||
Access rights to Published version: | Open Access (Creative Commons) |
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