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Gappiness and the case for liberalism about phenomenal properties

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McClelland, Tom (2016) Gappiness and the case for liberalism about phenomenal properties. Philosophical Quarterly, 66 (264). pp. 536-558. doi:10.1093/pq/pqv128 ISSN 0031-8094.

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqv128

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Abstract

Conservatives claim that all phenomenal properties are sensory. Liberals countenance non-sensory phenomenal properties such as what it's like to perceive some high-level property, and what it's like to think that p. A hallmark of phenomenal properties is that they present an explanatory gap, so to resolve the dispute we should consider whether experience has non-sensory properties that appear ‘gappy’. The classic tests for ‘gappiness’ are the invertibility test and the zombifiability test. I suggest that these tests yield conflicting results: non-sensory properties lend themselves to zombie scenarios but not to inversion scenarios. Which test should we trust? Against Carruthers & Veillet, I argue that invertibility is not a viable condition of phenomenality. In contrast, being zombifiable is credibly necessary and sufficient for phenomenality. I conclude that there are non-sensory properties of experience that are ‘gappy’ in the right way, and that liberalism is therefore the most plausible position.

Item Type: Journal Article
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Consciousness, Perception
Journal or Publication Title: Philosophical Quarterly
Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
ISSN: 0031-8094
Official Date: July 2016
Dates:
DateEvent
July 2016Published
8 January 2016Available
20 November 2015Accepted
Volume: 66
Number: 264
Number of Pages: 23
Page Range: pp. 536-558
DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqv128
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Access rights to Published version: Open Access (Creative Commons)
Date of first compliant deposit: 9 September 2016
Date of first compliant Open Access: 9 September 2016
Funder: European Research Council (ERC)
Grant number: 313552 (ERC)

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