Skip to content Skip to navigation
University of Warwick
  • Study
  • |
  • Research
  • |
  • Business
  • |
  • Alumni
  • |
  • News
  • |
  • About

University of Warwick
Publications service & WRAP

Highlight your research

  • WRAP
    • Home
    • Search WRAP
    • Browse by Warwick Author
    • Browse WRAP by Year
    • Browse WRAP by Subject
    • Browse WRAP by Department
    • Browse WRAP by Funder
    • Browse Theses by Department
  • Publications Service
    • Home
    • Search Publications Service
    • Browse by Warwick Author
    • Browse Publications service by Year
    • Browse Publications service by Subject
    • Browse Publications service by Department
    • Browse Publications service by Funder
  • Help & Advice
University of Warwick

The Library

  • Login
  • Admin

The Neo-Russellian Ignorance Hypothesis : a hybrid account of phenomenal consciousness

Tools
- Tools
+ Tools

McClelland, Tom (2013) The Neo-Russellian Ignorance Hypothesis : a hybrid account of phenomenal consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 20 (3-4). pp. 125-151. ISSN 1355-8250.

Research output not available from this repository.

Request-a-Copy directly from author or use local Library Get it For Me service.

Official URL: http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2013...

Request Changes to record.

Abstract

We have reason to believe that phenomenal properties are
nothing over and above certain physical properties. However, doubt
is cast on this by the apparent epistemic gap that arises for attempts to
account for phenomenal properties in physical terms. I argue that the
epistemic gap should be divided into two more fundamental concep-
tual gaps. The first of these pertains to the distinctive subjectivity of
phenomenal states, and the second pertains to the intrinsicality of
phenomenal qualities. Stoljar’s ignorance hypothesis (IH) attempts to
undermine the epistemic gap by arguing that the apparent inexplica-
bility of the phenomenal is merely a symptom of our limited concep-
tion of the non-experiential world. I establish some obstacles to IH,
and argue that the correct analysis of the epistemic gap means these
obstacles can only partially be overcome. I propose, nonetheless, that
IH can still be put to good use as half of a hybrid account of phenome-
nal consciousness. The proposal combines a self-representationalist
account of the subjectivity of phenomenal states with a Russellian ver-
sion of IH that accommodates the qualitative character of those
states. This neo-Russellian ignorance hypothesis (NRIH) credibly
undermines the appearance of an epistemic gap between the physical
and the phenomenal.

Item Type: Journal Article
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
Journal or Publication Title: Journal of Consciousness Studies
Publisher: Imprint Academic
ISSN: 1355-8250
Official Date: 1 January 2013
Dates:
DateEvent
1 January 2013Published
Volume: 20
Number: 3-4
Page Range: pp. 125-151
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Access rights to Published version: Restricted or Subscription Access
Related URLs:
  • Publisher

Request changes or add full text files to a record

Repository staff actions (login required)

View Item View Item
twitter

Email us: wrap@warwick.ac.uk
Contact Details
About Us