Equilibrium agenda formation
UNSPECIFIED. (2004) Equilibrium agenda formation. SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, 23 (1). pp. 21-57. ISSN 0176-1714Full text not available from this repository.
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-003-0233-y
We develop a definition of equilibrium for agenda formation in general voting settings. The definition is independent of any protocol. We show that the set of equilibrium outcomes for any Pareto efficient voting rule is uniquely determined, and in fact coincides with that of the outcomes generated by considering all full agendas. Under voting by successive elimination (or amendment), the set of equilibrium outcomes corresponds with the Banks set. We also examine the implications in several specific settings and show that studying equilibrium agendas can lead to sharp predictions, in contrast with well-known "chaos" theorems.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
H Social Sciences
|Journal or Publication Title:||SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE|
|Number of Pages:||37|
|Page Range:||pp. 21-57|
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