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Turnout and power sharing
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Herrera, Helios, Morelli, Massimo and Palfrey, Thomas (2014) Turnout and power sharing. The Economic Journal, 124 (574). F131-F162. doi:10.1111/ecoj.12116 ISSN 0013-0133.
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12116
Abstract
We compare turnout under proportional power-sharing electoral systems and winner-take-all elections. The effect of such institutional differences on turnout depends on the distribution of voter preferences. If the two parties have relatively equal support, turnout is higher in a winner-take-all system; the result is reversed when there is a clear underdog. We report findings from a laboratory experiment that was designed and conducted to explore this theoretical hypothesis and several other secondary hypotheses that are also implied by the theoretical model. The results are broadly supportive of the theoretical predictions on comparative turnout, the partial underdog compensation effect and the competition effect.
Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||||
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Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics | ||||||
Journal or Publication Title: | The Economic Journal | ||||||
Publisher: | Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd. | ||||||
ISSN: | 0013-0133 | ||||||
Official Date: | 24 February 2014 | ||||||
Dates: |
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Volume: | 124 | ||||||
Number: | 574 | ||||||
Page Range: | F131-F162 | ||||||
DOI: | 10.1111/ecoj.12116 | ||||||
Status: | Peer Reviewed | ||||||
Publication Status: | Published | ||||||
Access rights to Published version: | Restricted or Subscription Access |
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