Poellner, Peter (2016) Phenomenology and the perceptual model of emotion. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, CXVI (3). pp. 261-288. doi:10.1093/arisoc/aow015 ISSN 0066-7374.

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Abstract

In recent years there has been a revival of a theory of conscious emotions as analogous in important ways to perceptual experiences. In the standard versions of this view emotions are construed as, potentially, perceptual disclosures of values. The model has been widely debated and criticized. In this paper I reconstruct an early, qualified version of the perceptual model to be found in the classical phenomenological approaches of Scheler and Sartre. After outlining this version of the theory, I examine its prospects against objections prominent in the current debate.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Emotions, Emotions (Philosophy), Phenomenology
Journal or Publication Title:	Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
Publisher:	Oxford University Press
ISSN:	0066-7374
Official Date:	15 December 2016
Dates:	Date Event 15 December 2016 Published 5 July 2016 Accepted
Volume:	CXVI
Number:	3
Page Range:	pp. 261-288
DOI:	10.1093/arisoc/aow015
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access
Date of first compliant deposit:	21 September 2016
Date of first compliant Open Access:	15 December 2018
Related URLs:	Organisation Publisher

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