Subjects of Diversity: Relations of power/knowledge in the constructions of diversity practitioners

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Dissertation
Submitted to the University of Warwick
for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

February 2016
Warwick Business School
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Acknowledgements

I am greatly indebted to everyone who has helped and encouraged me during the writing of this thesis. In particular, I would like to thank my supervisors, Dr Deborah Dean, Professor Kim Hoque, and Professor Martin Parker for sharing their wisdom and experience with me, and for devoting all those hours of reading and discussion to my work. I wish to thank them for encouraging me to push on when I was lost and to push on still whenever I thought I had found my way. Thanks are also due to my examiners Professor Emma Bell and Dr Dulini Fernando for the care taken in considering my work.

I would also like to thank: my family, especially my parents Nu and Roger, for their love and great depths of understanding – I have derived strength from their unerring eagerness to help in their unique ways – my partner Aled, for always having faith in me and supporting me so selflessly throughout, all my dear friends who have cheered me up and cheered me on with their curiosity and restorative moments of escape!

I am grateful to Warwick Business School, the University of Warwick, and the ESRC for providing the opportunity and means for me to pursue this research. Thanks also to my doctoral colleagues for sharing in this adventure.

Finally, I am most obliged to my participants who generously shared their stories with me and trusted that I share their concern for those who find themselves marginalised. Without them I would not have been able to attempt to contribute to knowledge in this field and to open up new discussions.
Declarations

This research was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council [grant number ES/J500203/1]. It is the candidate’s own work and is written solely by the named author. This thesis has not been submitted for a degree at another university.
Abstract

The concept of ‘diversity’ has become a common feature in UK organisations over the last twenty or so years. It offers arguments about what the world is like, who people are, how they relate to one another, and how the world should be. It has been used to bring about a host of different actors, objects and practices. Yet, we know relatively little about one of the central elements of this field – diversity practitioners. They play an important role in defining what diversity means in local contexts, they are the experts of the field. Drawing on Foucault’s theories of power/knowledge and the ‘subject’, along with the notion of bricolage, the research examines the different forms of knowledge that diversity practitioners use to construct themselves as expert subjects, and in turn how they seek to construct a particular subject of others, the ‘diversity trainee’, as the subject who is the outcome of diversity training. The findings show how the subjects of the diversity practitioner and the diversity trainee are shaped by dominant societal discourses of the expert and the neoliberal subject, as well as by the history of equality work and the organisational challenges that diversity practitioners face. But they also show that diversity practitioners are actively involved in forming themselves as subjects by producing subject positions and rationalities, which construct skills, values, and knowledge. Diversity training is shown to mobilise a form of power known as ‘modern government’ in seeking to constitute the diversity trainee as a self-regulating subject, which adds complexity to previous discussions of the ethics of this form of power. Diversity practitioners are central elements of their field, so recognising the relations of power/knowledge in their practices is fundamental to considering any future development of their practices, as well as better understanding the concept of diversity itself.

Keywords: diversity, experts, training, Foucault, government
## Abbreviations

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<tr>
<td>EA2010</td>
<td>The Equality Act 2010</td>
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<td>EDF</td>
<td>The Equality and Diversity Forum</td>
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<td>DP</td>
<td>Diversity Practitioner</td>
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<td>DT</td>
<td>Diversity Trainee</td>
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<td>IEDP</td>
<td>The Institute of Equality and Diversity Practitioners</td>
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<td>HRM</td>
<td>Human Resource Management</td>
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<td>MOS</td>
<td>Management and organisation studies</td>
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<td>NHS</td>
<td>National Health Service</td>
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<td>PSED</td>
<td>Public Sector Equality Duty</td>
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Chapter One – Introduction

The term ‘diversity’ has become a common feature in UK organisations over the last twenty or so years. The concept is constituted by a set of arguments about what the world is like, who people are, how they relate to one another, and how the world should be. It has been used to bring about a host of different actors, objects and practices. And yet, we still know little about one of the central elements of this field of diversity – diversity practitioners. Diversity practitioners play an important role in how the concept of diversity becomes operationalised in local contexts (Zanoni and Janssens, 2004: 56), they are the experts of the field. But what the expertise of diversity practitioners is, who they are, and what they do, is not yet fully understood. Drawing on Michel Foucault’s theories of power/knowledge and the ‘subject’, and the notion of bricolage, the research examines different forms of knowledge that diversity practitioners use to construct themselves as expert subjects, but also seek to construct a particular subject of others, what is termed here the ‘diversity trainee’, as the desired outcome of diversity training.

The thesis proposes that viewing the subjects of diversity as constructions of power and knowledge relations is a way of facilitating a more informed discussion about the future of diversity practitioners, and producing a basis from which practitioners themselves may become more reflexive about their role. By drawing on theoretical
concepts developed by Foucault, the thesis also engages with the field of ethics, suggesting that by being reflexive diversity practitioners can not only work more effectively towards particular goals, and to understand explicitly what these goals are, but also to engage in a practice of freedom and seek to become ethical subjects. Such forms of knowledge will also help both scholars and practitioners to develop better understanding of the concept of ‘diversity’ and the relations that it produces.

In de-stabilising the taken-for-grantedness of the meaning of ‘diversity’ and diversity work, this thesis engages with critical diversity studies – a field of research that brings together studies of equality and diversity with management and organisation studies (MOS).

In organisations the term ‘diversity’ is used to refer to the idea of a heterogeneous population (staff, customers), usually with regard to social characteristics such as gender, ethnicity, (dis)ability, age, sexual identity, and religion (this will be termed ‘diversity-heterogeneity’). In research about organisations, including in this thesis, the ‘diversity’ is also be used to describe a particular way of understanding differences between people and how they should be managed within organisations. The term is used to refer to the concept(s) that are attached to the signifier ‘diversity’ as well as to a field of practices that have developed around promoting the idea that diversity-heterogeneity is something positive, and the different ideas and arguments to support this. Diversity gives people different vocabularies and authorities to speak with, it brings into being particular types of ‘subject’ by providing them with understandings about who they are and how they should live.
Previous research into the subjects of diversity has been limited to an examination of how diversity brings about minoritised subjects. The word ‘minoritised’ is preferred to ‘minority’ because it also avoids implying that the group in questions constitutes a smaller proportion of the population (see Hunter and Swan, 2007a, Hunter and Swan, 2007b). Moreover, it emphasises the asymmetrical power relation that exists between certain social groups and emphasises that this imbalance is socially constructed. In contrast, a ‘majoritised’ group is one that holds a privileged position.

It has been important to investigate how these groups are constructed because the ideas that are evoked, about what diversity-heterogeneity is and why it is good, shape who counts as a minoritised subject and justifies what can be done to them (Ahmed, 2006, Ahonen and Tienari, 2009, Ahonen et al., 2014, Zanoni and Janssens, 2004, Zanoni and Janssens, 2007). But the field of diversity is constituted by a number of subjects, including those actors who are tasked with the creation and dissemination of the ideas and practices of diversity, (who perform ‘diversity work’) and those who are the locus of such work. The aim of this thesis is to extend our understanding of diversity by contributing knowledge about the formation of two subjects that are central to the field but which have received relatively little scholarly attention – the ‘diversity practitioner’ (DP), an expert in diversity; and the ‘diversity trainee’ (DT), defined here as a subject that is sought through diversity training practices. Given that there is no well-established professional body or set of occupational standards for diversity practitioners, nor qualifications that are widely
recognised (Greene and Kirton, 2010: 120), DPs themselves are an important source of information about how they are constructed as subjects. DPs are also involved in constructing the subjects of others, seeking influence over the ways that others think and behave. One key practice in which this occurs is diversity training, which DPs are often called upon to conduct.

Research on DPs and on diversity training is limited and both are important elements of the field of diversity work in organisations. There is a small but rich collection of scholarly texts on each which serve as a starting point for this thesis, and which are reviewed in Chapter Two. To support them, key pieces of literature are drawn from MOS. The review formulates the research questions for the thesis principally by using the technique of problematisation (Alvesson and Sandberg, 2011). This approach challenges assumptions that have been made in previous research and re-imagines them in order to generate new ways of examining the topic.

The lens that is used to develop the research questions and to guide analysis is derived from Foucault (1980, 1982, 1994/1980, 1994/1982a, 1994/1982b), in particular his concept of the subject as something formed through knowledge, or ‘discourse’. Discourses are understood to be ‘more or less successful attempts to stabilize, at least temporarily, attributions of meaning and orders of interpretation’ (Keller, 2013). They comprise arguments about how the world is or should be, and who we
are within it, constructing reality as meaningful. Taking up the idea that social
relations are socially constructed (see for example, Berger and Luckmann, 1991)
does not necessarily mean that one is sceptical about the existence of the world as a
reality of objects and actions, but rather it insists that whether or not particular
objects exist or events occur externally to thought, their specificity is created in the
more or less stable meanings that are attached to them (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001).
Discourse is ‘what makes us human’ (Graesser et al., 1997: 165).

Also central is the notion of *bricolage* (Levi-Strauss, 1962): the continual act of
weaving and welding together different forms of knowledge about
something/someone and, for Foucault, in order to construct something/someone.
This means that subject formation is a process of construction, one that is unstable
and ongoing as different forms of knowledge become available, acceptable, or are
created. This knowledge comes from subjects themselves, from other parties, and
from ideas that have become taken-for-granted by societies (Foucault, 1982, Kelly,
2009, Townley, 1993). By analysing empirical data gathered from interviews with
and observations of DPs, the thesis characterises different *bricolages* of knowledge
that are drawn upon by DPs in order to construct themselves as experts in diversity
and in seeking to transform others into a particular type of subject, termed here the
‘diversity trainee’ (DT), through diversity training. The aim of doing so is, firstly, to
better understand the role of the DP with regards to how one comes to be
constructed as this type of expert, and what type of subject in others is desired by
diversity practitioners. Secondly, it is to show the different power relations that
operate in the construction of DPs and the DT. In particular, how DPs are both locus of power and contributors to it: how they are shaped by discourses such as that of the modern expert, and how a ‘modern government’ form of power (Brewis, 1996, Rose, 1990) is enacted in diversity training. Furthermore, this thesis seeks to develop an analytical framework which can be used to build on the present research.

The purpose of these analyses is neither to argue whether DPs are needed or not, nor doing their work effectively or not, it is to consider what the implications of the status quo are, whether it can be considered problematic and, if so, by whom. It is to make clear ‘what is at stake’ (Dean, 2010: 48) in how knowledge within the field of diversity is currently organised, and to invite practitioners to engage with these interpretations. This foundation of knowledge seeks to facilitate practitioners to develop their own practices of ‘critical reflection’ (Cunliffe, 2004), since encouraging reflection on the way that things are currently done facilitates experiments ‘with the possibility of going beyond them’ (Foucault, 1997/1984: 319). In doing this, this thesis seeks to contribute theoretically to our understanding of: the ‘diversity practitioner’ as a particular role and an expert within an organisation, constituted from a particular set of knowledge/power relations and a process of constructing these; what comes to count as reflexive practice when the concept is informed by Foucauldian ethics; and of what the diversity training interaction functions and what it is trying to achieve from the perspective of the diversity practitioner.
The theoretical framework is explained in greater detail in Part Two of this chapter. Part One explains the history of diversity in the UK, and makes the case for studying DPs and DTs in particular.

Part One – Subjects of diversity

The history of ‘diversity’ in organisations

Diversity has become a key concept used to talk about the heterogeneity of people – within nations, cities, industries – and how to manage them (Ahonen et al., 2014). Over the last twenty years the term diversity has become widespread in European organisations (Kelly and Dobbin, 1998, Lorbiecki and Jack, 2000). In UK legislation, programmes of management, and research into issues of discrimination and inequality, the population has long been considered in terms of social groups according to categories of individuals such as gender, race, sexuality, and so on. The differences between these groups are monitored, recorded, and reported on by government and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). In this thesis, these categories are considered to be socially constructed (Lorber and Farrell, 1991). Before the 1990s, relations between social groups tended to be described and
evaluated in terms of inequality and equal opportunities (EO). Diversity has now taken the place of EO as a way of thinking and talking about how different social groups should be managed (Kirton and Greene, 2009).

EO viewed inequalities between social groups, such as in access to education or employment, as the outcomes principally of unfair, discriminatory processes. The idea behind EO was to develop ways of influencing the relations between these social groups to achieve equality through practices such as training, support networks, and mentoring members of minoritised groups (Liff, 2003, Foldy, 2002, Tatli and Özbilgin, 2007). The perceived problem of EO is that in many cases it was engaged with in response to equality law, which is thought to have compelled organisations to produce only policies on inequality without the introduction of any of these initiatives, making them ‘empty shells’ (Hoque and Noon, 2004). A widespread narrative of dissatisfaction toward EO is thought to have provided fertile ground for a new way of approaching the issue of how to think about and manage social group differences (Ahmed, 2007a).

Diversity was originally popularised in the US in the wake of demographic changes and backlash against affirmative action policies that promoted the use of positive discrimination to redress inequalities between social, particularly racial, groups(Kelly and Dobbin, 1998, Litvin, 1997, Lorbiecki and Jack, 2000). Diversity offered a new way of conceptualising social relations in a manner that was less
antagonistic to majoritised groups by talking about the management of heterogeneity/difference rather than (in)equality. The introduction of the concept of diversity to the UK is widely credited to Kandola and Fullerton’s (1994) book *Diversity in Action: Managing the Mosaic*. This outlined the tenets of diversity and provided recommendations for how it could be operationalised. Scholars argue that diversity has made the management of people who are different from one another about everyone not just the minoritised (Ahmed and Swan, 2006: 98, Ahonen et al., 2014: 9). It therefore reduces the emphasis on social group categorisations and persistent patterns of disadvantage and foregrounds the specific needs of the individual (Ahmed, 2007a: 237). This new discourse promoted competition on ‘equal terms’ by recognising individual needs, and moreover specific skills that could be valued and harnessed (Liff, 1997, Liff, 2003: 439). Diversity expanded the notion of difference to include variables such as education and personality, dissolving the saliency of social group differences (Liff and Cameron, 1997, Liff, 1997).

Where EO drew heavily on the law and the recognition of discrimination and inequality, diversity boasts a positive message; it is celebratory in tone (Prasad et al., 1997) and promises happiness (Ahmed, 2012). In a seminal paper, Liff (1997) explains that diversity is constituted by a number of competing perspectives on difference. She characterises it with a typology of approaches: The first is that of ‘dissolving differences’ wherein differences are recognised and responded to insofar as all individuals differ from one another and have different needs, rather
than emphasising any group-based differences. ‘Valuing differences’, by contrast, responds to group-based differences in order to change the organisation so that all people can excel to the fullest extent. Whilst dissolving and valuing approaches, Liff suggests, are dominant, there are two further strands to how diversity approaches difference: ‘Accommodating differences’ means a commitment to truly fair competition and access, and ‘utilizing differences’ proposes that people’s needs should be recognised even if adapting to them comes at the expense of equality per se. For the latter, Liff gives the example of a policy that offers ‘family’ women a pathway within the organisation even though this might entail more gradual promotion.

This complexity means that diversity can be difficult for people to know how to put into practice (Ahmed, 2007a, Jones, 2007, Lorbiecki and Jack, 2000: 18, Schwabenland and Tomlinson, 2015). It could be termed an ‘empty signifier’ (Laclau, 1996) - a word that acts as a vessel for meaning, but which is not attached to a specific signified message (De Saussure and Baskin, 2011: xxix-xxx) – that when invested with different meanings becomes powerful in different ways. It can be used to form different arguments about who we are and how we should behave, its power mobilised by different parties (Jones, 2007: 388). Diversity serves as something that can be pointed to in order to justify the adoption of particular practices over others. Importantly, diversity also plays a part in shaping how we see ourselves and others, offering certain possibilities for who we can be. The next section expands on this idea and explains why it is important to understand how
subjects are formed in the field of diversity work, before going on to explain why
the specific subjects of DP and DT have been chosen for this research.

Why study the ‘subjects’ of diversity?

According to critical diversity literature, mainstream diversity research considers
diversity-heterogeneity to be derived from differences that are ‘contained in the
traits and qualities of individuals and teams (groups)’ and that it ‘seeks primarily to
render them manageable, reflecting conceptualizations of diversity in companies
and other organizations’ (Ahonen et al., 2014: 9). This is in line with the way that the
employee is viewed in Human Resource Management (HRM) (see, Townley, 1993,
Townley, 1994a): a unit to be measured, managed, and maximised for the interests
of the organisation, and in the context of diversity, in adherence to equality
legislation (Omanovic, 2012: 322). Instead, critical diversity scholars examine
diversity from the perspective that it is a concept which is contextual, historical,
unstable, and that can be configured in various ways. It argues that not only do
actions taken in the name of diversity have effects, but so do the meanings that are
attached to it and arguments made in its name.

Much discussion has centred on how arguments for changes to organisations are
put forward using different ‘cases’ (Dickens, 1994, 1999, 2000, Jones, 2007, Kirton
Schwabenland, 2010). There has also been interest in policy-writing (Ahmed, 2007b, Ahmed, 2012), the popular representation of diversity as a ‘mosaic’ (Swan, 2010a), auditing practices (Mirza, 2006a), and diversity training (reviewed in detail in the next chapter), but overall scholars have suggested that the practices of diversity have received little attention compared with the concept of diversity itself (Ahmed and Swan, 2006). This is significant considering that diversity has created a burgeoning industry of numerous objects that are sold to organisations, and actors who have economic interests at play. How these practices are configured and conducted can have an effect on whose interests are upheld. However, this suggestion implies a distinction between the concept of diversity (as rhetoric) and actions that are taken in its name (as practice). The present thesis looks at the issue from a different angle. Drawing on a discourse perspective, informed by Foucault, it views both talk and action as types of practice since they are both involved in constructing social relations (Howarth et al., 2000: 2). This means that diversity is understood to be something that is equally practiced in how it is talked about, the different cases that are made for it, as by the assemblage of actors and actions of the field.

Diversity has marked out those differences that are seen as salient and, importantly, have become the legitimate locus of management. Scholarly literature has already contributed to understanding how diversity constitutes understandings of ‘difference’ which position subjects as part of minoritised groups, and furthermore as the legitimate object of management practices (for example, Ahonen and Tienari,
2009, Ahonen et al., 2014, Zanoni and Janssens, 2007). In other words, diversity justifies how certain people can be treated, both by individuals and by institutions. Minoritised subjects are one element of the web of actors, objects, and relations that make up the field of diversity. The examination of these subjects as products of diversity has led to important insights about who becomes managed and how this management takes place. Analysis of the subjects of diversity also tells us about agency – who can speak and what they can say (Jones, 2007, Zanoni et al., 2010) and the extent to which they are active participants in the practices that contribute to their subject formation (Kelly, 2009: 88). The next section introduces diversity practitioners as the first research interest of this thesis. It outlines the emergence of DPs and explains why they are key players in the field of diversity.

Why study diversity practitioners through their construction as expert subjects?

As the popularity of diversity grew, some scholars considered whether it offered renewed potential for trade unions to involve themselves in organisations (Dean and Liff, 2010). However, what has emerged over recent years is an industry of diversity experts - DPs. The DP is regarded as being characterised by a claim to specialist knowledge or skills in the topic, or discipline, of diversity. Organisations of the 1980s saw a number of new posts created as part of initiatives and policies.
that were designed to meet the requirements of emergent equality laws (Healy and Oikelome, 2007: 44). These actors were initially tasked with training and advising on issues of community and race relations. This remit was later broadened to encompass a range of inequalities under the banner of EO (Clements and Jones, 2006: 2). Practitioners in this area had a variety of titles and responsibilities such as EO Training Officer, Race Equality officer, EO Manager (Cockburn, 1989: 213-214), but for the purpose of clarity in this thesis specialised roles in EO are collectively referred to as ‘EO officers’. Some organisations, more commonly in the public sector, had units of practitioners who wrote and monitored policies, recommended changes to policy, and developed initiatives (Kirton and Greene, 2009: 161).

In recent years, EO officers have become less commonplace and have been overtaken by roles containing the term diversity (Kirton and Greene, 2009). The terms ‘diversity practitioners’, ‘diversity workers’, and ‘diversity managers’ are used inconsistently in the literature to refer to a wide variety of actors involved in the area of diversity work: These actors may work independently or together, or as a part of other functions such as HRM. Their roles vary as to the hours they work, proportion of their role is dedicated to diversity, and employment status (Kirton and Greene, 2009: 160, Lawrence, 2000). Kirton et al. (2007) created a typology of four types of practitioner working in diversity based on their activities and employment status: ‘Specialists’ are employees, and have responsibilities for policy development, advising and training, and are commonly based in HRM or Corporate Social Responsibility. ‘Champions’ are also employees, involved in policy
implementation and modelling behaviours, but diversity is not their principal role. ‘Consultants’ are freelancers, contracted to work on projects. They are involved in advising organisations, training and campaigning. ‘Trade Union equality officers’ promote equality within and on behalf of trade unions.

For the purposes of this thesis, diversity managers are defined as employees who manage institutional diversity programmes and initiatives but who do not make claims to be experts in doing so. Diversity workers are taken to encompass a broad range of people who are engaged in activities connected with diversity, including those who are seen as bringing diversity to an organisation and those who are the target of diversity initiatives (see, Ahmed, 2012). Diversity practitioners are viewed as a group of actors who do claim specific expertise in diversity. They may be employees or work freelance, but they are considered to be DPs when diversity is their principal responsibility. The thesis focuses on the roles that Kirton et al. (2007) name ‘specialists’ and ‘consultants’.

Research has often focused on middle management in implementing diversity policies and initiatives (Foster and Harris, 2005, Maxwell, 2004, Cornelius et al., 2000), but, similar to their EO predecessors, DPs advise organisations on issues of inequality and discrimination as well as diversity. They are involved in writing equality policies in response to introductions and changes to equalities law (Ahmed, 2007b, Kirton and Greene, 2010). Their activities often extend to
developing and implementing policies, programmes, training, or other initiatives connected with diversity (see for example, Ahmed, 2007b). This makes the DP a key subject in the field of diversity, holding a privileged mantle to circulate and create knowledge about what diversity is and to direct what it does in organisations. DPs are the experts of diversity, and as such like doctors, psychiatrists and psychologists they play an essential part in defining legitimate forms of knowledge and action in a given field (see, Rose, 1998). It is possible therefore to learn about the field of diversity more generally by examining DPs. Despite this crucial role, we know relatively little about them (Kirton et al., 2007, Lawrence, 2000, Tatli, 2011, Kirton and Greene, 2009) – how they define their skills, values, relationships, and what they offer organisations. Previous literature cannot tell us about the different ways that one comes to be recognised as a ‘diversity practitioner’, how much this varies from one to another, and what the potential implications of these markers are. This thesis seeks to describe how DPs are formed as particular types of organisational expert, or in other words what their expertise is. What is already known is discussed in detail in Chapter Two in order to develop the research questions.

Next, the second subject of this thesis is introduced – the ‘diversity trainee’.

**Why study diversity practitioners through the construction of the ‘diversity trainee’?**
This section introduces the importance of diversity training as a practice of diversity practitioners, and of diversity in general, and the relevant literature is explored in depth in Chapter Two. Diversity training is a pedagogic practice in which some sort of transformation of the trainee is sought (see Swan, 2009, Goodman, 2011, McGuire and Bagher, 2010). This thesis examines how diversity training offers knowledge about why the status quo is inadequate in order to create the opportunity for transformation, and how it explains who trainees should be in order to achieve a ‘better’ state of affairs. This desired subject is referred to as a diversity trainee (DT). It is important to understand what knowledge it is that is offered to trainees about who they are and how they should be because these discourses are the basis on which people understand their actions and that make certain actions legitimate or possible. In other words, how one’s personhood, or subjectivity, is understood shapes the agency that one has. Diversity training features in the small body of scholarship on diversity practices but given its prominence as a practice of diversity still remains under-researched.

‘Diversity training’ is an umbrella category of training with a variety of titles, for example ‘diversity awareness’, ‘equality impact assessments’, ‘equality and diversity in the workplace’. It can be conducted with any group of employees of the organisations from entry-level employees to senior management, and it can focus on a particular type of difference, such as disability, race, or gender. Diversity training can be conducted with members of majoritised groups (the dominant identities in the organisation, commonly in the UK white men), or employees who
are members of minoritised groups. Conducted with members of minoritised
groups, it may aim to help employees overcome barriers associated with being from
a minoritised group (McGuire and Bagher, 2010: 495), and with majoritised groups
it is likely to have the same, or similar aims to those of EO: to develop knowledge
about inequality in social relations and how to redress this by taking into account
the needs of people from minoritised groups.

In the UK, training on topics such as race-relations, cultural awareness, and EO was
developed around the introduction of the Race Relations Act 1976, which had
sparked a demand for interventions on the issue of racism (Bhavnani, 2001: 77-78).
As EO began to lose prominence and diversity took its place, diversity training
became a familiar product sold to organisations as a way of engaging with the new
diversity agenda. Training continues to be a popular practice under diversity (Tatli
and Özbilgin, 2007) and some suggest that it is increasingly valued by organisations
as they attempt to engage with and operationalise the ‘business case’ for diversity
(McGuire and Bagher, 2010), which involves articulating how increasing the
diversity-heterogeneity of an organisation, or by better managing existing diversity-
heterogeneity by addressing the needs of employees who belong to minoritised
groups, results in business benefits. This argument, or set of arguments (Liff, 2003),
is also explained in detail in Chapter Two. Much of existing theory is concerned
with the training of the 1960s - 1990s, dating from before the shift to diversity in the
UK (see for example, Brown and Lawton, 1991, Clements, 2000) or focusses on
diversity training in the US (see for example, Lasch-Quinn, 2001, Alhejji et al., 2015).
Because the UK and US share a common language of diversity, some of the research from an American context is useful, particularly in pointing to concerns that have been raised about diversity training.

Having introduced the two subjects who are the topic of this research – DPs and DTs – the second part of this chapter first describes how the ‘subject’ is understood in this research, explaining the ontological assumptions that this understanding rests on. It then outlines the specific concepts that are used as a lens to view the process of subject formation, and which are later used in the analysis of the empirical data. These are drawn largely from Foucault because his process-oriented view of the subject allows for a consideration of different forms of knowledge and the relations of power that are involved in forming subjects. The aim of the following section and the subsequent review of the literature in Chapter Two is to build an analytical framework consisting of a set of questions that facilitate the application of Foucauldian ideas to data on diversity. The present thesis is an attempt to mobilise this framework in order to generate knowledge about two under-researched aspects of diversity, diversity practitioners and diversity training, but also to develop an analytical approach that can be used to conduct further research on the subjects of diversity and which could potentially also be applied to other occupations.
Part Two – Foucauldian subjects

This thesis uses Foucault’s concept of the subject as a theoretical framework for the research because it conceptualises the manner in which people convey themselves to others not as a passive reflection of a pre-existing inner self but as a practice of producing who they are. This is useful in the analysis of how DPs are constructed as experts, and how they seek to shape the subject of the DT, because it facilitates an examination the knowledge with which they do this involves various relations of power. The following part will expand on the framework, but first it will outline the main approaches that have been taken to the study of subjects through the concept of ‘identity’ and explain why a Foucauldian framework that prefers the term ‘subject’ has been chosen.

Approaches to identity in management and organisation research

Identity has become increasingly important as a topic of research in MOS, a number of approaches to it have developed. This part of the chapter begins by briefly outlining the main approaches that have been taken to the study of identity and in so doing explains why a Foucauldian view of the subject offers a useful framework for the analysis of DPs and DTs.
Identity has been addressed using three main approaches: functionalist-technical, interpretive, and critical (Alvesson et al., 2008). This typology does not fully capture the full breadth and variety of frameworks that have been used, but it draws attention to three underlying interests that motivate research on identities: technical, practical-hermeneutic, and emancipatory (Alvesson et al., 2008 referring to Habermas): The functional-technical approach is dominant in mainstream research on organisations and management and is generally concerned with how organisational conditions have an effect on the identities of organisational actors.

There are a number of frameworks that are used within this approach, the most well-established of which is Social Identity Theory (see for example, Ashforth and Mael, 1989), which analyses identity in terms of belonging to ‘in’ and ‘out’ groups. As Alvesson et al. (2008) point out, the goal of these studies has often been instrumental: to identify causal relationships and subsequent modes of intervention in individuals’ identification with their organisations in order to increase productivity (see recent examples, Ellemers et al., 2004, Haslam et al., 2000). This perspective tends to view identity as something that is stable, as belonging to this or that group, and as a ‘self-evident unit’ which possesses ‘an essential personal identity’ (Townley, 1993: 522). This means that it can obscure the multiplicity of identities that a person can have, fluidity in how one identifies in different contexts, conflicts that might arise between different identities, and the effect where two group identities intersect (see Acker, 2006). This view also necessitates the selection, or assumption, of a particular ideological framework through which an individual’s ‘true’ interests can be judged (Fletcher, 1992: 32). By contrast, an interpretive
approach emphasises exactly these things by foregrounding the continuously reconstructed process of identity-formation.

An interpretive approach takes these fluctuating identifications seriously as part of who the person really is rather than fictions or delusions that can be proven to differ from an authentic, essential self. The functional-technical approach views identity as originating from inside individuals and seeks to access this through accounts given by participants, whereas an interpretive approach views accounts themselves as part of the process of constituting identity and not as a reflection of an existing inner reality. The focus of studies that use this approach is practical-hermeneutic (Alvesson et al., 2008), seeking to illuminate the processes of becoming a subject in order to develop understanding of the various sources of identity that are available in a given context, or that are common to particular groups.

One of the weaknesses of this approach can be found in a lack of attention to the possible constraints that there can be on how an individual can identify and relationships of power between different groups. Critical approaches respond to this shortcoming by examining operations of power and, in identifying these relations of power, produce emancipatory knowledge (Alvesson et al., 2008). Critical identity studies seek to describe how people’s professional identities are shaped by discourses that are dominant in society or that are disseminated and legitimated by particular institutions or groups, and also how these might be
resisted (see Willmott 1993, Parker, 2000). For example, Alvesson and Willmott (2002) describe the way that managers seek to control employees by influencing their identities - they call this ‘identity regulation’. The aim of identity regulation is to ensure that the way employees understand who they are, what they should be doing, or what is desirable to them, is compatible with the goals of the organisation. But employees can also resist this form of control by dis-identifying with it (Fleming and Spicer, 2003).

An interpretive-critical approach to identity is appropriate for the study of these subjects because it produces a combination of practical-hermeneutic and emancipatory knowledge because the present research examines what influences the formation of the identity of the DP and how they seek to shape the identities of their trainees and by doing this explores the advantages and disadvantages to different parties of these positions. This involves identifying the multiple forms of knowledge involved in forming the identities of the DP and DT and the power relations involved in making them possible or limiting them. Foucault’s concepts provide a framework for an interpretive-critical analysis by offering a theory of the inter-relationship between knowledge, power, and the formation of the subject. The key concepts of this framework are presented in the following section.
Knowledge, power, and the subject for Foucault

Central to the framework of the present research is the relationship that Foucault conceives of between knowledge, power and the formation of the subject. Foucault understands ‘knowledge’ to be a constituent part of reality. Knowledge is a way of accounting for how the world is, who we are, our relationships with the world and with one another. Knowledge is embedded not only in spoken language but other communicative practices such as ‘writing, listing, numbering and computing’ (Miller and Rose, 1990: 5), and also thinking and behaving (Baxter, 2010) because these too are social practices that ‘entail meaning’ (Hall, 1997: 291). The term ‘knowledge’ in common usage tends to imply a generalizable truth about something. This usually draws on the notion of scientific knowledge wherein knowledge can be taken for granted as universal. By contrast, for Foucault the term knowledge, or ‘rationality’, conveys the multiple possible ways that there are to conceptualise any given aspect of reality, whether an event, act, object, or person: as Townley explains, it refers to the ‘furnishing of accounts or reasons’ (2002: 556) for how something is or why something should be done, which in turn justifies a particular action or relationship. For example, in his study of the ‘clinic’ (2003/1963) Foucault shows that medical interventions can be made by one person upon the body of another person because the body is understood as being ill through the ‘medical gaze’ (2003/1963: 9). Moreover, one person is positioned as an authority, a holder of knowledge about the problem of the body and how to solve it, and the other as without knowledge (see Miller and Rose, 1988). The term ‘discourse’ is also
used by some to describe this idea, but is also used in a wider sense to describe a
group of rationalities that make a field of practices and actors possible, for example
one can speak of a ‘medical discourse’ (Foucault, 2003/1963). A discourse may
become so embedded in the social consciousness as to become a ‘dominant
discourse’ – an understanding of the world that seems to be common sense and is
difficult to contest.

Different forms of knowledge create different ‘conditions of possibility’, which, in a
Kantian sense, refers to the conditions necessary to the emergence of particular
phenomena (Bowie, 2003: 183). In this way, knowledge can be said to have power or
to be a part of power. Foucault sees power not only as an oppressive force that is
wielded by one over another and that creates situations of what he calls
‘domination’, which significantly limits a person’s ‘margin for freedom’ (Foucault,
1994/1984c: 292), but also as productive of the possibilities of reality (Foucault,
1991/1977: 194). Discourses are ‘practices that systematically form the objects of
which they speak’ (Foucault, 2002/1972: 54). Foucault’s approach to power shifts
from examining the symmetry or asymmetry of power relations (Lemke, 2010) to
examining the constitutive ‘capillaries’ of power (Foucault, 1997/1975-6: 27) that
make particular phenomena possible. Foucault’s theory collapses the divide
between knowledge and power since power derives from the ability to define what
something or someone is and isn’t – this idea is referred to as power/knowledge.
Foucault is not sceptical about the existence of the material world per se; instead his ideas are used to emphasise that whether or not particular objects exist or events occur, their specificity is brought about through the process of interpreting them and they are only knowable objects in relation to discourses (Howarth, 2000). He says:

There is no experience that is not a way of thinking, and which cannot be analysed from the point of view of the history of thought; this is what might be called the principle of irreducibility of thought. [...] this thought has a historicity which is proper to it. That it should have this historicity does not mean it is deprived of all universal form, but instead that the putting into play of these universal forms is itself historical. (Foucault, 1984: 334-335).

The physical elements of reality (events, objects, people) become known to us through their ‘identities and differences’ from other elements (Foucault, 2009/1970: 55). Identifying things, naming them, places them on a grid of classification in relation to other things (Ogborn, 1995: 60). The relations of the grid make the elements knowable – this is the productive power of knowledge. What we know, or think of as the truth of reality, is always shaped by the context in which we live. Knowledge of the world, and of ourselves, is therefore not universal but contingent and has changed from period to period of history. Foucault’s research approach is to show that although things, practices or ideas are part of a landscape that is
familiar to us, they are not real in the sense that they exist in a naturally existing order of relations – what is seen to be true depends on what ‘conceptual system is in operation’ (Townley, 1993: 519).

There are two further dimensions of power/knowledge that are important to the present research, namely a) the power/knowledge to act (agency), and b) power/knowledge to influence others (control). In order to understand these, in particular how the notion of ‘control’ is posited, it is necessary to make explicit the relationship between power/knowledge and the formation of the subject.

According to Foucault, the subjectivity of a person, that which makes them more than the physical body, is also produced discursively. People become subjects by taking on meanings just like other elements of reality, through their incitement to discourse (Foucault, 1998/1978: 17). The human being becomes knowable, a subject of knowledge (connaissance) when knowledge ‘attaches him to his identity, imposes the law of truth on him that he must recognize and have others recognize in him’ (Foucault, 1994/1982b: 331). Foucault’s theory emphasises the continual process of becoming of the subject rather than any ahistorical or inherent qualities of the individual; he examines how subjects are constituted through practices – interactions with others and institutions. Subjectivity is ‘contingent, provisional, achieved, always in process’ (Townley, 1993: 522) and can only be understood as a relation to something or someone else (Clegg, 1989: 151).
The rationalities that people accept about themselves and the world in order to become subjects are referred to as ‘subject positions’. The different subject positions that are ascribed to people have a direct implication for what that person can say, can do, or what can legitimately be done to them. A brief illustration of this is the discourse of teenage motherhood: the notion of ‘adolescence’ in Western societies means that certain mothers may take up, or be given by others, the identity of ‘teenage mother’. It is conceivable that such an identity could be taken up positively and be connected to positive connotations of youth in other social relations, but it can also be stigmatised by the discourses of ‘welfare dependency’ or ‘social exclusion’ that have been mobilised in conjunction with teenage motherhood. The effect of this can be to constrain teenage mothers to subject positions that are seen as socially and economically problematic, unless they are resisted and alternative identities constructed (Wilson and Huntington, 2006). This position is likely to have material effects on how young mothers are treated by others and the resources that they have access to through the welfare system. But the subject positions that a person takes up themselves has similar effects on what they can logically or legitimately say and do.

It is because of the relationship that a person has to power/knowledge that the term ‘subject’ is used by Foucault. For Foucault, the word ‘subject’ can have two meanings: an ‘active knowing subject’ and ‘an object being acted upon’ (Ball, 1990: 14), playing on the French ‘assujettissement’. Foucault makes use of this dual
meaning to ‘suggest a form of power that subjugates and makes subject to’ (Foucault, 1994/1982b: 331), we are not only subjects in ourselves but also subject to external forces (Kenny et al., 2011). Building on Foucault’s play on words, it is possible to suggest that the word subject also has a further meaning – that of the field of diversity knowledge, referring to the subject/discipline of diversity. This triple usage of ‘subject’ – subject (person), being subject to, and subject/discipline – is useful in this research because it allows for the examination of the subjects of diversity as engaged in active practices of self-formation as well as being shaped by the discourses of diversity; such as the cases for diversity, and also wider discourses such as the ‘psy’ subject, which draws on knowledge produced by the disciplines of psychology and psychiatry (Rose, 1990), or the autonomous modern neoliberal subject (Townley, 2002).

Towards the end of his career Foucault asserted that his central preoccupation was not power but the subject (Foucault, 1994/1982b: 327). In his analyses of power, Foucault was concerned with how institutions such as hospital, prisons, and schools produced and used knowledge about people – their inclinations, capacities, deficiencies: how they created particular subject positions with which to categorise people and to legitimate actions taken on them (Ball, 1990: 15), and how these subject positions socialised people into certain ways of thinking and behaving in that context (Alvesson and Deetz, 2006, Clegg et al., 1996). Foucault’s project is to discover how certain ‘effects of truth’ are produced in a given time and place.
(Foucault, 1994/1976: 119). In so doing, it seeks to unveil the ‘how’ of power (Fejes and Dahlstedt, 2013: 7, Townley, 1993: 520).

To ask ‘how…?’ rests on an assumption that there is no universal form to power (Foucault, 1994/1982b: 337) and no universal form to the subject, but that these exist in specific practices and relations. In the next two sections, two forms of power are described: firstly, the agency of the subject derives from the active part that the subject plays in its own formation, and secondly, a power to influence the actions of others through governing the knowledge that they accept about themselves.

**Agency in subject formation**

Studies that use Foucauldian theory to analyse power can seem deterministic and as implying that subjects lack agency because power is disembodied and discourses are seen as constituent forces (see Newton, 1998). By contrast, Foucault stated that people are ‘thinking beings’ who make decisions but that these decisions are always made on the ‘specific ground of historical rationality’ (Foucault, 1994/1988: 405). In fact, Foucault’s perspective on the relationship between power/knowledge and the subject views discourses as a *precondition* for agency. Discourses influence our beliefs about ‘who are we?’ (Foucault, 1982: 781) how we should behave, what can and cannot be changed in the world, and even what can and cannot be known. In this view, what we know – or *how* we know (Townley, 1993: 519) – has implications
for how we choose to behave as individuals and groups, how we organise society (Alvesson and Deetz, 2006: 270). Agency is therefore something that is seen as contingent on the forms of knowledge, or discourses, of the context in which we operate.

Foucault’s concept of subject formation ‘presupposes an active participation, engagement and construction’ of the experience of oneself as subject (Townley, 1993: 284). The active aspects of subject formation can be referred to as ‘subjectivation’ (Kelly, 2009: 88), contrasted to the passive aspects which are referred to as being subject to. The active engagement in subject formation can involve the construction of rationalities that resist other rationalities in some way, usually dominant discourses within the context. Knowledge is never quite ‘fixed’ (Knights, 1992: 523) and there is always room for contestation. Subjects therefore have some type of agency to challenge the status quo in all situations but total domination. Lemke (2012) explains that ‘resistance’ is the evocation of an alternative set of discourses about a given element of reality and the assertion of another set of power relations. For example, Knights and McCabe (2000) explore the notion of the employee-subject as not entirely docile but rather a negotiator between management control and resistance. In the context of diversity, Zanoni and Janssens (2007) depict the techniques of ‘micro-emancipation’ that can be used by minoritised employees to resist management control.
Townley is cautious about the use of the term ‘control’ asking ‘isn’t “control and resistance” premised on an A→B/B→A understanding of power?’ (2005: 646), a notion of power that is decidedly oppositional to Foucault’s power/knowledge framework. The use of the term in this thesis locates control as an attempt to influence the actions of another through (re)structuring relations of power/knowledge and does not find itself outside of the power/resistance relationship. Foucault states that resistance is always a part of any relation of power, that any relation of power/knowledge also gives rise to its opposite: ‘Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather, consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power’ (Foucault, 1998/1978: 94-95).

The very technique of power gives rise to the possibility of resistance to it (Carette, 2013: 378). And so, counter-discourses do not transport the subject into a place outside discourse, allowing the subject to escape from power relations since ‘relations of power are not in superstructural positions’ (Foucault, 1998/1978: 94).

Though the analysis of the subjects of diversity considers counter-discourses that are used, and counter-positions that are taken up, it must also take care not to fall foul of the false inference that resistance offers a utopian escape from relations of power (Foucault, 1994/1984b: 298). Nevertheless, exercising counter-discourses or counter-positions means that one is subject to external knowledge to a lesser extent.

Practices of subjectivation, or ‘practices of the self’ (Dean, 1994: 174), are connected to what Foucault calls ‘technologies of the self’ (Foucault, 1994/1982a), which have elsewhere been called ‘techniques of the self’ (Dean, 2003: 194-195). The terms
‘practices’ and ‘techniques’ of the self is preferred throughout the thesis because ‘technology’ can also have a more specific meaning in Foucault’s writings (Dean, 1996). Practices of the self involve working on and enacting the self to transform oneself into a subject of a particular kind i.e. through one’s appearance, behaviour, patterns of speech. This thesis seeks to shift understandings of DPs and DTs to their being a practice, a performative act (Butler, 1990: 25); that the subject is constituted in expressions usually regarded as being an effect of a pre-existing self. DPs are seen therefore as subjects involved in assembling their own sense of who they are as organisational experts, in defining their own ‘expertise’ through a series of claims to knowledge and relationships. But they do so by selecting from a limited range of rationalities that are available in their social context as legitimate ways of explaining the world and human beings. Similarly, those who attend diversity training are not the passive recipients of knowledge offered to them by DPs. They can choose to take on subject positions that are offered to them in the training sessions or draw on alternative rationalities to take up counter-positions. However, the ‘DT’ that is investigated in this research refers to the desired subject sought by DPs in diversity training as projected in the knowledge that DPs offer trainees. Analysis of the DT-subject therefore tells us about the practices of DPs rather than the subject formation practices of trainees themselves, or whether training is successful in achieving the desired transformation.

Foucault’s approach to research focuses on the shifting, competing and multiple nature of rationalities in self-formation. This is an important concept because
diversity practice is not a standardised area; there are many approaches, many different ways of being a DP and different types and techniques of diversity training. Foucault’s framework facilitates identifying the assemblage of rationalities that constitute subjects and drawing out the similarities and contradictions between them. Levi-Strauss’ concept of bricolage is helpful to theorise this process: he describes the figure of the bricoleur as combining the materials of ‘whatever is at hand’ (1962: 11) to create something new. This ‘magpie’ understanding of expertise is spontaneous, unplanned, improvisatory and makeshift in its approach to knowledge (Swan, 2009). Levi-Strauss argues that the piecing together of different forms of knowledge does not necessarily lead to incoherence and confusion, but draws on and recasts existing meanings into new ones; he calls it ‘the continual reconstruction from the same materials’ (1962: 13-14). Derrida argues that we are all engaged in bricolage (1993/1978: 231) since all forms of communication necessitate the negotiation of knowledge: discourses are transformed in each of our utterances and actions, they are never quite perfectly reproduced but always adapted in their application to new contexts to explain new elements of reality.

Diversity is shaped by the way that it is articulated into an utterance or practice; it is (re)constituted according to different rationalities. In delineating the rationalities of the subject, this thesis seeks to show the various components of the ‘toolkit’ (Swan, 2009) that can be and are used to form the subject of the DP and are offered to participants of diversity training. The purpose of this study is not to make claims to comprehensiveness but to do three things:
1. To bring to light an initial set of rationalities (and accompanying subject positions) that DPs use to construct themselves as experts and to seek the formation of the DT,

2. To show the value of such analysis by discussing the relationship of this knowledge to wider discourses and to explore potential implications of different rationalities,

3. To develop an analytical framework for the further analysis of the subjects of diversity and potentially other occupations.

Not only is knowledge/power fundamental to one’s own formation as a subject, knowledge can also be used to seek to influence the subjectivities of others. The thesis takes up this idea to explore how DPs seek influence over others through diversity training. This part of Foucault’s theory will be examined now.

**Governing through power/knowledge**

The terms ‘to govern’, ‘governing’ and ‘government’ are used here not in reference to the operations of the state but in a wider sense to describe the control that an
individual, group, or institution can exercise over another. To govern is not to dominate by means of limiting a person’s physical freedom, but is a way of exercising power more subtly through knowledge to guide the conduct of individuals. Government uses ‘a range of multiform tactics’ (1994/1978: 211) to normalise certain ways of speaking and being (Clegg et al., 1996) which means that it is necessary to pay attention to the day-to-day practices of people. Rose and Miller explain that ‘assemblages of devices, tools, techniques, personnel, materials and apparatuses that enabled authorities to imagine and act upon the conduct of persons individually and collectively’ (Rose and Miller, 2008: 16). As Townley asserts, making something the legitimate locus of control requires a particular knowledge of it; government requires ‘vocabularies, ways of representing that which is to be governed, ways of ordering populations (i.e. mechanisms for the supervision and administration of individuals and groups)’ (1993: 520). Foucault sees this as the management of possibilities, arguing that to govern is to ‘structure the possible field of action of others’ (1994/1982b: 241). This idea is useful to the analysis of DTs since the project of diversity training can be read as an attempt to define the trainee in a way that leads to a ‘convenient end’ (Foucault, 1991/1977: 94, quoting Le Pierre) for DPs. The task of this thesis is to find out what these ends are that are implicit in the way that DPs conduct training. This is also relevant to the formation of DPs themselves as they attempt to define each other to construct a sense of who ‘we’ are compared to others.
The chief way that this power acts is through ‘normalisation’. The conduct of a
person is guided by the establishment of a norm against which the individual can
be judged as abiding or deviating. By dividing and classifying the population (Rose,
1996: 105) into groups, relations between them can be evaluated as normal or
abnormal and intervened in where necessary to bring certain groups closer to the
norm. Foucault describes how normalising techniques make the person visible,
knowable, and governable as an individual: sets of discourses ‘characterize, classify,
specialize, they distribute along a scale around a norm, hierarchize individuals in
relation to one another and, if necessary, discipline and invalidate’ (Foucault,
1991/1977: 223). Normalisation can be used to produce bodies that are ‘likely to lead
a docile, useful, and practical life’ (Ball, 1990: 15), however that utility is defined.

The rationality of government which guides how this process seeks to produce
governable subjects is termed ‘governmentality’ (Rose and Miller, 2008). A
particular form of governmentality has been called ‘modern government’ (Brewis,
1996). Modern government functions by guiding ‘free choice’, making available
(and unavailable) certain courses of action (Ahonen et al., 2014: 5, Lemke, 2002: 2). It
can be said to operate ‘at a distance’, because the operation of normalisation is
internalised into a process of monitoring the self and self-regulation (Dean, 2010).
Modern government is characterised by its use of a Western neoliberal vision of the
subject: autonomous, responsible, calculating (Rose and Miller, 2008: 18),
entrepreneurial (Thorsen and Lie, 2006), economically rational (Lemke, 2002), and
self-regulating, seeking to improve on oneself as a project of the self towards ‘self-
fulfilment’ (Miller and Rose, 1990: 24). The context of neoliberal discourse is important to the analysis of the subjects of diversity because any subject must align at least to some extent with these rationalities of reality in order to be regarded as good, valuable, successful and so on. Moreover, the DT that is constructed must align with it because if strategies of power are seen to limit an individual’s autonomous choice, they will be resisted (Brewis, 1996). Nevertheless, modern government relies on the knowledge of experts who offer knowledge of routes to achieve particular desirable goals, such as health and profitability (Miller and Rose, 1990: 19). The concept of government, in particular modern government, is important to the analysis of how DPs seek the formation of the DT, explored in Chapter 5.

Previous studies have considered the question of how diversity governs to be an important one, asking how it positions particular subjects to be a legitimate locus of managerial control. Bendl et al. (2009) draw on queer theory derived from the work of Butler (1990) in order to show how ‘difference’ is constructed by diversity management to represent otherness in relation to a norm. Butler’s work is inspired by Foucault, among others, in its concern for how knowledge of something is constituted: where its boundaries are, how it is regulated and contested (Parker, 2002). The authors show how diversity management discourses perpetuate the notion of fixed identity categories by referring unquestioningly to different social groups. The identity binaries that diversity evokes reproduce an assumption that identities are ‘fixed’, and are founded on heteronormativity - a position in which
binary heterosexuality is assumed as the default and is privileged. The authors note that a handful of other critical scholars have also drawn attention to the tendency for diversity more generally to essentialise (to understand as being inherent) identity and difference (Lorbiecki and Jack, 2000, Zanoni and Janssens, 2004).

Though Foucauldian concepts are not evoked, other studies have also critiqued the way diversity can affect what type of equality is promoted (Liff and Wajcman, 1996) and what counts as ‘difference’ (Litvin, 1997). In one corner, diversity has been criticised for focussing on the individual as a source of difference, because this diverts attention away from the persistent privileges that have been conferred on particular groups of people over others, for instance white, male, heterosexual, and able-bodied people (Ahmed, 2007a: 237). By placing social groups on a level with individual differences such as education, preferences, experiences, the categorisations of social group difference are no longer privileged ways of viewing the population. It is argued that this individualised discourse of difference risks diminishing the salience of social groups, and ignoring or even negating the specific experiences of people who are minoritised, by making the agenda about everyone (Ahmed and Swan, 2006: 98, Ahonen et al., 2014: 9). In addition, Ahonen and Tienari (2009) looked at diversity at the level of the European Union, suggesting that its processes (through the EU Framework Programme) normalise ideas of nation and gender in such a way that certain voices are privileged and others are marginalised.
Criticism of diversity has also come from scholars who question the underlying assumptions of diversity about the nature of difference as being contained in certain bodies (Ahmed and Swan, 2006). This argument suggests that diversity’s discourse of difference may be detrimental to people from minoritised groups due to the organisational practices that it creates. For example, monitoring the proportions of people from minoritised groups in an organisation or part thereof may well show horizontal or vertical segregation by social group identity, but it also risks overstating the similarities among people from those groups, relying on stereotypes to explain why they are underrepresented in certain areas (see Young, 1990), or selectively highlighting some needs whilst ignoring others (Webb, 1997). Zanoni and Janssens (2004, 2007) argue that minoritised groups may even be inadvertently positioned negatively within organisations by diversity discourses: as lacking in comparison to the norm and in need of extra support rather than their difference being seen as of value. Even where they are valued, it could be problematic for employees to depend on their difference to be regarded as valuable. Some studies of diversity programmes have raised concerns that diversity management can attempt to control employees from minoritised groups by shaping how they are viewed in organisations - as being exotic objects that add ‘spice and colour’ (Ahmed, 2007a: 246). Jones has suggested that even when the voices of the minoritised are placed into a privileged position, in the so-called ‘valuing’ of differences discourse (Liff, 1997), this can cause an ‘exploitation of minority cultural skills in organisations’ as employees are deemed ‘cultural experts’ taking on additional work such as interpreting (2004: 284, see also Zanoni and Janssens, 2007).
Whilst diversity focuses on the differences between people in one respect, making them matter, it also operates a discourse of sameness. Swan (2010a) suggests that the practice of producing images of diversity (specifically the ‘mosaic’) can firstly serve to limit diversity-heterogeneity to a relatively narrow range of differences, and secondly make these differences ‘safe’ by packaging them into a ‘contained’ image of many smiling faces. She argues that the effect of the mosaic is to neutralise any threat that difference might represent to organisations. Commentators have argued that it is precisely because diversity is less threatening to dominant social groups that it has achieved and retained currency in organisations, engaging them in conversations about change (Ahmed, 2007a: 237, Liff, 1997). However, this leverage has been gained by trading away arguments that do not fit with dominant organisational languages, such as those that are based on ideas of promoting social justice (the social justice case) rather than growth. This makes the development and implementation of diversity practices contingent on the bottom line, on being an investment that will generate a financial return (Dickens, 1999, Dickens, 2000, Noon, 2007). Knights and Omanovic show that in some cases the focus that diversity has on the business case can effectively ‘chase out’ (2016: 12) other arguments for diversity and they ask whether, if there is a failure to produce evidence of the business benefits of diversity, interest in diversity will wane or be lost.

Additionally, diversity research, Ahonen et al. argue, is itself involved in governing in the way that it tends to examine difference at the level of the population.
According to this view, this is implicit in quantitative research that, by its nature, ‘addresses phenomena that target population and differentiable categories and characteristics’ (2014: 6), but is also present in the critical literature because it too is involved in defining, or accepting, the legitimate subjects of diversity research and management: ‘It is a mechanism that enables the production of new legitimate diverse subjects. Diversity is no longer linked to histories of discrimination, colonialism, diaspora and economic exploitation, but rather to individualizable, productive sources upon which competitive advantage can be secured’ (Ahonen et al., 2014: 10). Foucault would call this type of power ‘biopolitics’, a power over the way that life is lived (Foucault, 1994/1988: 417), a mode of governing that manages individual variation, not directly, but in terms of how it affects the overall population. This achieves control without interfering in the everyday freedom that is experienced by individuals. Similar to modern government, outlined above, a biopolitical approach does not contradict the notion of the neoliberal subject.

Overall, it is possible to say that diversity has made differences matter, not only in a conventional sense that it has placed centre-stage a certain agenda for organisations and management, but that it has made material a whole set of subjects and relations: actors, objects, relations between people of different social groups, and rationalities for how difference should and can be managed. The products of diversity exist in a symbiotic, reciprocal relationship with diversity as a concept, at once constituted by it and (re)constituting it ‘in a continuous dialectical process’
Analysing these products is a key method by which we can seek to understand what diversity is.

Having introduced this theoretical framework, the two main research questions for the thesis can be formulated:

How do diversity practitioners construct themselves as expert subjects? (RQ1)

How is the subject of the ‘diversity trainee’ constructed by diversity practitioners? (RQ2)

The analysis will respond to these questions by examining the forms of knowledge that are embedded in the talk/practices of diversity practitioners. The specific sub-questions that facilitate a response to these research questions are generated through the review of the extant literature on DPs and training in the next chapter.

By taking a Foucauldian approach, the desire of the thesis is not to prove previous critical analysis ‘false’ but to reinvigorate critical research (Knights, 1992: 531) for which there have been calls (Zanoni et al., 2010, Calás et al., 2009). Foucault offers a way of escaping from analyses that separate the ‘good’ from the ‘bad’ of a phenomenon to instead consider the underlying power/knowledge that is at work. Such analysis is important because in the power/knowledge paradigm ‘everything
is at stake’ (Huffer, 2013: 437) and ‘everything is dangerous’ (Foucault, 1994/1983: 256), in other words the minute differences in how the ideas of diversity are articulated can have consequences for who subjects are, who speaks, what is said, and ultimately, what is done.
Summary

This chapter has introduced the aim of this thesis: to contribute knowledge in the field of critical diversity studies by considering how two key subjects of the field of diversity work are constructed – the diversity practitioner (DP) and the ‘diversity trainee’ (DT).

The first part of this chapter explained that ‘diversity’ has become a key organising concept in UK organisations, taking over from the concept of equal opportunities. Previous critical research on diversity has investigated how diversity is constituted of different arguments about what minoritised groups are, which subjects belong to minoritised groups, and how they should be treated. How knowledge of these subjects is articulated gives people different vocabularies with which to speak and act. It also makes certain people the legitimate locus of interventions and control. Diversity also produces a wider set of relations, practices, objects, and subjects that compose the field of diversity practice in and around organisations. The DP is a key figure in this field of relations; as experts they occupy a privileged position to define what diversity means in the local context. Given this, we currently understand little about what their claims to expertise are in terms of their values, their relationships to others, and the skills and knowledge they see as being essential to doing good diversity work. Given the lack of formal standards and education for diversity practitioners and diversity practice, it was argued that DPs themselves are a key
source of information about the norms that are being used and circulated about their role.

Diversity training was introduced as a widespread diversity practice that is similarly under-researched. Through training, diversity practitioners seek to influence social relations within the workplace. They seek to do so by shaping the way that trainees view how social relations are and should be, how they understand who they are, how they should think and behave. This thesis examines the knowledge that is offered to trainees during diversity training about why the status quo is inadequate and also how things should be otherwise – how trainees should be otherwise.

The second part outlined the key concepts and the theoretical framework of the thesis. Foucault views knowledge not as a reflection of a pre-existing reality but as a productive part of it. This informs how subjects are viewed, namely as constituted by knowledge. It is important to understand the formation of the subjects of diversity because the rationalities with which they are understood, and the subject positions that they take up, produce different possibilities for who they can be, what they can do and for whom. In Foucault’s view, while external rationalities, and the subject positions that they make available, shape who subjects can be, people are also active participants in their self-formation.
Power is always an effect of knowledge and so knowledge is also a key part of how control is exercised. One way in which people are controlled is through ‘government’, the use of particular forms of knowledge in order to shape how people act and what actions can be legitimately taken upon them. Government also occurs through a process of normalisation in which a ‘normal’ subject becomes the benchmark against which all are measured and found to comply or be deficient. Furthermore, ‘modern government’ was introduced as a form of government that operates at a distance by seeking to shape how people internalise norms and self-regulate. It is closely linked with modern Western neoliberal discourses of the subject as autonomous and rational. The following research is mindful of this discursive context and it is used to evaluate what is lost and gained when diversity discourses align with it. Though few previous studies have drawn explicitly on Foucault, the question of how diversity governs has been an important one throughout critical diversity research. A number of studies were outlined in order to illustrate this.

This chapter has described the purpose of the thesis to answer the ‘how’ questions of the subjects of diversity – how DPs and DTs are constructed. In recognising the different ways that subjects are produced in the name of ‘diversity’ in workplaces, it becomes possible to think about what diversity does, who it does it for and who gets left out. Producing this knowledge is to make clear ‘what is at stake’ (Dean, 2010: 48) and to facilitate experiments ‘with the possibility of going beyond’ how diversity is done at present.
The next chapter reviews the current literature that is available on DPs and diversity training. It uses the framework that has been outlined here as a guide to re-read and problematize these texts, generating sub-questions for the present research.
Chapter Two – Re-framing debates around diversity practitioners and diversity training

The first chapter introduced the subjects of diversity and explained why the specific aim of this research is to contribute to our understanding of two subjects: diversity practitioners and the diversity trainee. The theoretical framework for this thesis was also described, taking inspiration from Foucault’s theorisations of knowledge, power, and the subject. In this chapter, the literature on diversity practitioners and diversity training will be reviewed in order to generate sub-questions. The sub-questions devised will facilitate the answering of the two main research questions:

How do diversity practitioners construct themselves as expert subjects? (RQ1)

How is the subject of the ‘diversity trainee’ constructed by diversity practitioners? (RQ2)

These are derived by ‘problematisation’. This involves identifying the assumptions that have been made in a body of literature and then offering an alternative lens (here, Foucault) for viewing a problem or phenomenon in order to generate new questions and new understandings (Alvesson and Sandberg, 2011). Any given body of research relies on making certain assumptions, for example ontological or ethical,
within which theories are built and against which evaluations are made. These can be identified and reframed using Foucault to generate questions and thus new ways of understanding phenomena. Studies on the role of the diversity practitioner will be grouped, according to the main debates about the diversity practitioner with which they engage, and re-read through the Foucauldian lens.

The following chapter is divided into two main parts, following the two research questions, and each examines the literature on DPs and diversity training in turn. Each part is sub-divided into three sections that address different themes that will guide the analysis. Within each, a number of concepts that are important to the forthcoming analysis are introduced, including specific practices of the self that are described in Foucault’s historical research and dominant discourses about the subject in modern society, such as those that emerged from psychology and neoliberal economics.
Part One: Constructing the ‘diversity practitioner’

This part of the chapter reviews extant literature that pertains to diversity practitioners in order to interrogate the question: How do diversity practitioners construct themselves as expert subjects? (RQ1) The literature has been sub-divided into three parts that speak to the key debates around diversity practitioners. Each set of debates is reviewed and used to generate a question about rationalities that are used in the practices of diversity practitioners, and the subject positions that these rationalities make available. These questions facilitate an examination of the relations of power/knowledge that are involved in constructing the diversity practitioner.

The role of the diversity practitioner

A prominent theme that emerges in the critical literature on those who do diversity work is that of how they work with the uncertainty about what the concept means and how they use it to shape organisational practices. The term ‘diversity practitioners’ is avoided here because it is used in this thesis to refer to those who claim a specific expertise in diversity work whereas existing studies examine a variety of people involved in doing diversity work. It is important to start with the concept of diversity itself because its uncertainty informs how DPs come to claim expertise.
Scholars have noted that diversity lacks clarity about what it means and what it would look like in practice (Jones, 2007, Lorbiecki and Jack, 2000, Schwabenland and Tomlinson, 2015). As one aspect of this, the distinction between diversity and EO has been called into question. Diversity ostensibly diverges from EO in its strong focus on the business case (Kirton and Greene, 2010, Liff, 1997, Liff, 2003, Noon, 2007). Where EO emphasised inequality between social groups, generally sought to ensure equal chances of success for everyone (Liff and Wajcman, 1996: 65), diversity focuses on the benefit that diversity-heterogeneity in the workforce can bring to organisations. It explains in various ways how ‘harnessing these differences will create a productive environment’ (Kandola and Fullerton, 1994: 8).

Benefit from diversity can be argued to accrue, for example, from the individual as a source of specialised skills and understanding of different customers’ needs (Rice, 1994), from creativity that derives from workplace heterogeneity (Malik, 2013), reaching new markets (Lorbiecki and Jack, 2000: 17), being an employer of choice, attracting and retaining a talented workforce, reducing absenteeism (see Liff, 2003), increased productivity (Thomas and Ely, 1996) or lower likelihood of legal action (Segal, 1997). The business case has also been called a form of ‘marketing’ for the organisation since the promotion of good diversity practices can improve the image of the organisation making it attractive to customers or employees (see Ahmed and Swan, 2006, Tatli, 2011). However, the distinction is not so clear: EO also claimed to work with organisations towards their goals (Perriton, 2009) and is known to have used business arguments to engage organisations (Dickens, 1994, Dickens, 1999,
Kirton and Greene, 2009, Liff, 2003, Noon, 2007). Moreover, diversity can also use the social justice case, associated with EO (Liff, 1997). These cases for diversity will be discussed in more detail in the second part of this chapter that reviews literature on diversity training. At this juncture, the key point is that scholars have argued that diversity tends to be similar to EO when translated into practices despite its claims to being a different approach (Kirton and Greene, 2006, Greene and Kirton, 2010, Lawrence, 2000, Tatli, 2011). Because of this, scholars have questioned if diversity is something doable as a distinct approach (Lorbiecki and Jack, 2000: 18).

Evaluations about whether diversity is distinct from EO rests on the marking of an ontological boundary between talking and doing, rhetoric versus reality. For Foucault, there is no such distinction between speaking and doing because speaking is a form of practice in that it creates knowledge. The questions that are generated through Foucault are of how diversity is practiced through speaking and doing, through talk/practice: by creating, using, and re-using particular rationalities about the world in thought, speech, and action. The question of whether the discourses of diversity are the same as those of EO remains valid, and may be a valuable comparison to make in future research, but the task of this thesis is to analyse those rationalities that underlie the subject of the DP. In an ontological sense, this lens provides a way of taking seriously the way that DPs position themselves, in utterances and actions, as contributors to the construction of social relations.
Scholars have also argued that diversity management practices are ineffective irrespective of whether they are different to those of EO or not, echoing Hoque and Noon’s (2004) earlier critique of equality policies as ‘empty shells’. Ahmed has argued that diversity can produce documents that are ‘fetish objects’ (2007b: 597), which become removed from their purpose of producing change in organisations to rectify problems, and instead act as marketing for the organisation (see also, Ahmed and Swan, 2006, Tatli, 2011), showcased as being examples of good diversity practice in themselves (Prasad et al., 1997). This echoes Bell et al.’s finding of a gap between the intention behind a change initiative and what it comes to mean in organisations; that organisations can use their participation in them not only to improve performance but also as ends in themselves to differentiate the organisation from others (2002b: 1071-1077). Similarly, techniques of measurement make diversity auditable for organisations (Mirza, 2006b, Swan and Fox, 2010), providing them with a sign of attention to the topic without having made fundamental changes. Scholars have warned that the techniques of measurement are part of a wider ‘bureaucratisation’ (Ahmed and Swan, 2006: 97) of diversity work that could limit diversity to the implementation of only those practices that provide the organisation with a suitable paper trail (Ahmed, 2007b: 594-7, Mirza, 2006b). The conclusions of these studies point to the role of the diversity practitioner as one in which they are ‘corporate lackeys’ (Kuhn, 2009: 683 re: corporate lawyers) who provide legal and moral cover without making substantial changes to organisations. However, by contrast, others have argued that people with responsibilities for diversity work ‘destabilize the status quo’, fending off attempts by management to reduce contestation (Schwabenland and Tomlinson, 2015: 8).
The assumption within these studies is that diversity has been unable to produce particular types of effect, such as changes to hiring, evaluating, and promoting practices. Such assumptions provide criteria against which diversity is judged as failing to be effective. Foucault would view diversity as having an effect without the need for a framing set of criteria because the evocation of diversity is an incitement to discourse (Foucault, 1998/1978: 17). It is used to call into being; to justify; particular actors, objects, actions and relations. For instance, the bureaucratisation that Ahmed (2012) points to is an effect of diversity, but is seen by her as taking the place of an effective change within the parameters of evaluation. Looking through a Foucauldian lens means that DPs, and the specific combinations of subject positions that they take up, are seen as an effect of diversity, a way in which diversity is manifested. With this in mind, the discussion turns to a further set of studies that focus on the role of the person who has responsibilities for diversity (or similar) work.

Some studies that discuss the role of those doing diversity work have attempted to look at their work from outside the question of effectiveness, to theorise the nature of the work itself. Researchers have taken two main approaches to this task, firstly seeking to describe self-conceptualisations and intentions of those who do diversity work, and secondly stepping outside self-conceptualisation to theorise the role that these practitioners play in organisations. From the first set of studies, there seems to be a multiplicity to the role that diversity practitioners play for organisations.
Schwabenland and Tomlinson, who studied a group of nine DPs by meeting with them over five meetings in six months, note that for some the role ‘seems [to be] about acceptable acts and norms’ but that ‘others see the role as clarifying for people what diversity means’ (2015: 10). However, they suggest that their participants did ‘perceive their role as that of providing constant explanations of the importance and relevance of diversity practices’ (2015: 19). By these accounts the DP role involves a mix of explanation and persuasion. Providing nuance to this, in Ahmed’s (2007a) study of people who do diversity work in higher education organisations in the UK, participants describe themselves as ‘translators’. This image focuses on the idea that diversity is something that needs to be made understandable to different audiences by using different vocabularies with each. This implies that the role of the DP is not one of simple explanation but lies in making this translation. In New Zealand, Jones (2007) studied employment opportunities practitioners (EPs) doing similar work; she echoes Ahmed’s findings in her description of how EPs are ‘chameleons’ who ‘speak for’ and ‘speak from’ different places in different contexts as necessary (2007: 388).

An assumption central to these ‘root metaphors’ (Alvesson and Sandberg, 2011: 254) of ‘explanation’ or ‘translation’ is that diversity knowledge has an underlying constancy despite being rearticulated in different terms. Taking a Foucauldian view, knowledge is inevitably transformed in some way when it is rearticulated, a new form of knowledge is produced. If DPs are thought of not as ‘translators’ but as producers of knowledge, producers of ‘diversity’, this begs the question not only of
what knowledge is being produced (largely addressed in previous research), but also of how they are producing it. Where the ‘what’ has been central to previous research, the ‘how’ of the production of knowledge is a key element of understanding the relationship between the DP and the organisation that is missing so far. Foucault’s writings on the concept of ‘parrhesia’ in Ancient Greek societies is a useful one in thinking about this question. *Parrhesia* refers to a set of practices of the self that can loosely be defined as ‘truth-speaking’ practices or *franc-parler* (Foucault, 1999/1983a: ‘The meaning of…’, para. 3). It is performed through the speaking of new knowledge about a subject, usually to someone of superior status:

The parrhesia comes from ‘below’, as it were, and is directed towards ‘above’. This is why an ancient Greek would not say that a teacher or father who criticizes a child uses parrhesia. But when a philosopher criticizes a tyrant, when a citizen criticizes the majority, when a pupil criticizes his or her teacher, then such speakers may be using parrhesia. (Foucault, 1999/1983a: ‘Parrhesia and criticism’, para. 2)

The person who speaks truth is known as a ‘parrhesiastes’. ‘Parrhesia is a form of criticism, either towards another or towards oneself’ (Foucault, 1999/1983a: ‘Parrhesia and criticism’, para. 2). In terms of subject formation, the function of *parrhesia* is to produce new knowledge of a subject – another or oneself. According to Foucault, how this is achieved can vary: one-to-one (Socratic tradition), in groups
(Stoic), or in public (Cynic); through direct, abrasive, and humbling challenges (Cynic) or through a gentler approach by a known and trusted friend (Socratic) (1999/1983b). The relationship between the subject and knowledge can also be quite different in each form of parrhesia: whether it is of scientific knowledge or of perspectival, local knowledge. The concept of parrhesia is disputed and appears in different forms throughout the writings of Ancient Greece (Foucault, 1999/1983a). My purpose is to use it as a tool for analysis of empirical data gathered in the modern context, and so the usage of the terms in Ancient Greece are unlikely to map precisely onto the practices of the current day. The manner in which I use parrhesia, and related concepts, in this thesis will be introduced now and expanded on throughout this and subsequent chapters.

As an ongoing practice of the self, parrhesia can also involve a ‘basanos’ (Foucault, 1999/1983b: ‘Socratic Parhessia’, para. 13), a guide who helps someone else to become an ethical subject. For Foucault, this is achieved through a congruence between the ethics that an individual has laid out for himself, his logos, and his actions (Foucault, 1999/1983b: ‘Socratic Parhessia’, para. 8). The role of the basanos is to act as a ‘touchstone’ testing the ‘degree of accord between a person’s life and its principle of intelligibility or logos’. It can be inferred that the different relationships to knowledge outlined above confer the basanos different kinds of status as an expert, it shapes how the basanos is of value. The issue of the different types of knowledge is addressed in the third section of this chapter part, but with regards to the question at hand the vocabulary of parrhesia, parrhesiastes, and basanos provides
tools with which to analyse the role of the diversity practitioner and how they are involved in production of knowledge about and for organisations. By probing in new ways, avenues for insight are opened up. The purpose of using these tools is to be able to describe the forms of knowledge that DPs use and how they use them. This generates a characterisation of the diversity practitioner as a subject and helps to scope out the different possibilities in how the DP can be constructed. Multiplicity in the ways that the DP-subject can be constructed is particularly likely given the absence of formal qualifications as means of standardising diversity practitioners’ identities and activities (Greene and Kirton, 2010: 120, Tatli, 2011) for instance by means of a professional qualification. Moreover, the nebulous or slippery character of diversity makes it productive since it can be bent this way and that to produce a host of different actors and relations between actors in a particular context or field.

A second element that is important to theorising the role of the DP relates to the liminal nature of the role of those doing diversity work which is an idea that appears consistently throughout the literature. However, discussions about the intentions, or experiences, of this liminality are more mixed. In Jones’ (2007) study, EPs describe themselves as ‘change agents’ whose goal is to persuade different audiences to make some sort of change (Zanoni and Janssens, 2004: 56) by ‘selling’ certain arguments to them. For Ahmed’s participants it is a ‘cultural change’ that is sought and in seeking this they are ‘counter-hegemonic workers’ (2007a: 241-243). Kirton et al. (2007) theorise that people who do diversity work as ‘tempered
radicals’ (drawing on Meyerson and Scully, 1995) who find themselves in a liminal position using both radical and liberal arguments for change. Doing this work, though, can also be described as ‘selling out’ (Jones, 2007: 397, see also Litvin, 2002, Sinclair, 2000) and that practitioners can feel so strongly that the translation of diversity is a betrayal of its original meaning as to describe themselves as ‘whores’ (Ahmed, 2007a: 241). In these latter images, something is framed as being lost from diversity, compromised by the act of translating it.

The second set of studies steps away from self-conceptualisations to interpret what this in-between role means for whether diversity practitioners are co-opted into organisations or not, finding them not to be either/or but instead both/and. It has been argued that people doing diversity work occupy a ‘double role’ and are ‘outsiders-within’ where they work for the organisation whilst trying to change it (Zanoni et al., 2010, Lorbiecki, 2001). Considering this in greater detail, Swan and Fox (2010) show the different ways in which the practice of diversity work, and the practitioner performing it, can at different times produce effects that challenge the status quo of the organisation or reinforce it. Litvin (2002) shows how compromises are made when consultants supply the diversity ‘product’ that organisations want. And that whilst those doing equality and diversity work use the business case to do so, they can hold personal commitments that are moral in foundation (Lawrence, 2000). More recently it has been suggested that those doing diversity work experience more than confusion about their role, or liminality, reporting that the contradictions that arise in doing diversity work mean that these actors can be
paralysed, caught in a paradox of a role (defining what diversity means) that cannot be fulfilled (because ‘diversity’ is ultimately undefinable) (Schwabenland and Tomlinson, 2015).

In this literature, insiderness and outsiderness are either presented as something that DPs experience as a result of how they understand what their work does (whether they are selling something they believe in or selling out to something they do not), or an experience that is an inevitability of the role (the inherent nature of advocating change means that they play a double role). Reading this literature through a Foucauldian lens, it becomes possible to see the discourses, which position DPs as ‘insiders’ or ‘outsiders’ to the organisations for which they work, not as effects of their role but as constructions involving active engagement. DPs are insiders when a sense of ‘we’ is constructed between the organisation/client and the DP, for instance by sharing its interests or concerns; and are ‘outsiders to it when distance is constructed between the organisation and the DP, for example by drawing a contrast between their aims or methods. In practice though, as previous literature has suggested, their role is both/and, liminal in character. It is worth noting that Swan and Fox (2010) also use the terms ‘insiderness’ and ‘outsiderness’. For them, these terms denote more than subject positions taken up (which is how they are used in this thesis). Instead they refer to evaluations made about whether those doing diversity work are co-opted by their organisations or not. In this thesis the terms are used similarly to ways that the diversity practitioner uses rationalities that mirror that of the organisations for which they work, but this is viewed not as
evidence of their being co-opted, or not, but as necessary conditions of their possibility and indications of the relations within which they exist.

The discussions outlined above open up the field of investigation into the role of the DP. In general, studies treat diversity as a construction that is produced in talk and/or practices but they tend not to recognise DPs as constructions in themselves (with the notable exception of Jones, 2007). The active construction, rather than passive experience, of the liminal relationship between DP and organisation has therefore not been thoroughly explored. In order to do so, Foucault’s subjectivation is a useful concept. Foucauldian work has previously been criticised for insisting too strongly on the idea that subjects are the objects of power and domination (see Crane et al., 2008). In part, this thesis contributes to a growing body of empirical studies that draw on an under-used idea from ‘later Foucault’ (Barratt, 2008) to also emphasise the ethics of the subject and its active participation in the process of subject formation (for example, Siltaoja et al., 2014, Śliwa et al., 2013, Weiskopf and Willmott, 2013, Townley, 1994b).

The aim of the first part of this thesis is to elucidate how the DP is produced in terms of the knowledge they use to articulate the formal role of the DP, the studies outlined above speak to a debate about what the relationship is between the DP and the organisations/clients for which they work. The first sub-question is therefore:
How do diversity practitioners construct the relationship between themselves and their organisation/clients? (RQa)

The relationship between DP and organisation/client is an important one, but there are also other key relations that give order and meaning to the field of diversity work. The next section discusses the literature on who counts as a diversity practitioner in a field where there are many varied and poorly-defined roles. It focuses on a different set of subject positions and relations: those that diversity practitioners have with each other, how they define ‘us’. This approach explores how DPs themselves determine who is a DP, or is not, instead of seeking to find out what a DP is an absolute sense (Bell et al., 2001). The literature that is available has been used to generate the question of how DPs position themselves in relation to each other. This issue has received proportionally less attention in previous literature than others addressed in this chapter.

Who counts as a diversity practitioner

It was noted in the previous chapter that occupational groups in the area of diversity work are not well defined due to the wide range of different actors in the field. People who do diversity work can have varying responsibilities with regards to the proportion of their role devoted to diversity work and having a narrower or wider focus, they may have different employment relations with the organisation
and full or part-time contracts. This complexity means that there are no universally recognised terms to designate different types of actor in the field. There are few organisations that seek to regulate diversity work. DPs do not have formal means of claiming their belonging to the field in contrast to professions such as HR where there is a strong professional association. Two of the more influential organisations that do exist in the field are the Institute of Equality and Diversity Practitioners (IEDP), a nascent association established in 2009 that offers a three-tier accreditation for people who do diversity work; and the Equality and Diversity Forum (EDF), which has a membership of third-sector and non-governmental organisations that do work connected with advising, campaigning, or providing services on and around issues of social equality. Specialist DPs are eligible to become members of the EDF as part of their organisations, but individual consultant DPs are not. It nevertheless acts as a source of information about equality law, equality and diversity policy, and research to any interested party. However, neither of these organisations plays a dominant role. This lack of formalisation in the field also means that there is no accepted understanding about the values that a DP should have since professional bodies not only codify the activities and knowledge of practitioners but also serve as normative spaces (Frankel, 1989, Reed, 2013: 44) that socialise practitioners in a particular field and help to construct a sense of unity in who they are as a group. That is, the perceived legitimacy of a DP, among their peers, depends on whether or not they subscribe to the norms of the group. This research is chiefly concerned with the notion of legitimacy with regards to how DPs recognise each other as valid operators within the field. In particular, in terms of
their motivations for doing diversity work and view of how relations between DPs should be.

In the past someone was likely find themselves in an EO role by way of activism (see Hunter and Swan, 2007b), recruited as advisors on the basis of a campaigning background (see Kirton and Greene, 2009: 161) and personal experience of being part of a minoritised group (Heery, 2006), but it has been suggested that people who do diversity work may be increasingly likely to hail from backgrounds in general management and human resource management (HRM) (Kirton et al., 2007) because this language and knowledge is in keeping with the diversity approach (see also Tatli, 2011). This change is potentially important to the values that diversity practitioners hold. For instance, the degree to which diversity work is positioned as a collective or an individual pursuit, what are regarded as legitimate motivations for doing diversity work, and what the purpose of diversity work is. Wenger describes this as an understanding of ‘joint enterprise’ within a ‘community of practice’: to be competent is to understand the enterprise well enough to contribute to it’ (2000: 229).

It has previously been suggested that networks between people who do diversity work are used to share knowledge about the latest ‘fashions’ in diversity (Prasad et al., 2011: 703) and could be helpful for providing emotional support (Kirton et al., 2007, Kirton and Greene, 2009, Lawrence, 2000). It has been suggested that further
professionalisation or formalisation of networks could be beneficial for the effectiveness of diversity work because it would allow those who do diversity work to share knowledge more efficiently (Ozbilgin and Tatli, 2006). But in order to fully consider how this formalisation might take shape, and what could be gained and lost in doing so, it is essential to have a more detailed understanding of how relations are currently organised between DPs. The ways in which DPs position themselves in relation to one another, ‘divide’ themselves from each other (Foucault, 1982: 777), has potential implications for the possibilities and likelihood for the sharing of such resources.

One way to access the rationalities that express the values of a DP is to look at how diversity practitioners take up subject position that construct specific relations to one another in terms of who is positioned as a legitimate or authentic diversity practitioner over others and why. These forms of knowledge tell us about where the occupational boundaries are drawn and normalised, how DPs decide who is allowed ‘in’ and on what basis (Wright, 2008). The second sub-question is therefore:

_How are relations among diversity practitioners constructed? (RQb)_

A brief reminder is issued here as to why it is important to consider how boundaries are drawn not only in the knowledge conveyed in talk but also in practices. For Foucault, knowledge; whether described as a ‘rationality’, ‘subject
position’, a more established ‘discourse’, or as a another form of practice; is a means of structuring the world. Shared forms of knowledge makes it possible to say and do certain things and, crucially, to have them be understood in a certain way by others.

Earlier, the first section of this review discussed why it is important to understand the relationship that the DP constructs between her/himself and the organisation/client. Part of how a DP communicates their value as a particular type of organisational expert is by making claims to a set of knowledge and skills. The next section discusses the lack of information about and theorisation of the specific knowledge and skills that are involved in doing diversity work in existing research.

**Defining the expertise of a diversity practitioner**

A recurrent theme in the literature on diversity and diversity work is that of uncertainty about what the work involves and the value that it provides. Yet, diversity still has traction in UK organisations, a ‘currency’ that has been lost by EO (Ahmed and Swan, 2006, Ahmed, 2007a, Prasad et al., 2011). An entire field of relations, objects, practices and people has developed around the concept of diversity, of which diversity practitioners are a key part. It is important to understand the claims that the DP makes in order to understand how diversity is constructed by them – through the skills and knowledge (used here in a common
usage sense) that diversity work is understood to require, and what constitutes successful diversity work. In the context of uncertainty around what diversity means in practice, this information will help us to understand better how DPs ‘inoculate’ (Kuhn, 2009: 690) themselves against being seen as corporate lackeys. Notwithstanding the sizeable literature on professions (for example, Ackroyd, 1996, Kirkpatrick et al., 2012, Muzio and Kirkpatrick, 2011), the goal is to explore the ways in which DPs construct an ‘enclosure’ (Rose and Miller, 1992: 188) of diversity work as a distinct occupation and identity (see also Parker, 2000a: 204) by constructing themselves as expert subjects in a particular way.

In a rare study that anatomises the skills of a practitioner in this field, Clements (2000) recorded the self-reported skills and attributes of EO trainers. These include: being flexible, managing group dynamics, knowledge of policy issues, positive outlook, and sincerity. These results provide a helpful overview of the nature of EO training work but they are largely accepted as self-evident concepts and the study does not go on to discuss the context of why the trainers evoke these particular ideas about their value. In their study, Greene and Kirton (2010) look at what DPs perceive to be the attributes necessary to their work noting that patience, personal commitment, and passion were noted more often than academic experience – the authors connect this with the need for tenacity and creativity in the face of opposition to the agenda – though some also talked about the usefulness of management experience to give them the ‘hard’ business knowledge they needed to convince others (2010: 121). Tatli’s (2011) DP-respondents also saw experience in
fields of work outside diversity to be helpful, particularly marketing as this was perceived to help them ‘sell’ diversity.

Other recent work has shown that diversity can be seen by those responsible for it as something that is difficult or impossible to achieve. Schwabenland and Tomlinson suggest that diversity practitioners experience difficulties claiming expertise:

…we realized that we had made an implicit assumption that members [of a group of nine DPs] would present themselves as being, overall, quite knowledgeable and confident. Instead (to our surprise) they presented themselves as relatively ignorant and in need of reassurance (that what they were doing was ‘fine’). (2015: 11)

A series of statements made by one of their participants suggests a paradox in that the diversity practitioner’s role is to ‘get the message across’ but that at the same time, diversity is ‘inherently unknowable’ (2015: 11). If, as the authors suggest, there is a lack of confidence among diversity practitioners about recommending specific definitions of diversity and ways of doing diversity (best practices), then it is not clear as to where their expertise lies. The present research probes this issue, expanding on the sample used by Schwabenland and Tomlinson, asking what claims diversity practitioners make in the face of the uncertainty of diversity.
The concept of normalisation is helpful here because professional associations serve as normative spaces (Frankel, 1989, Reed, 2013: 44). Part of how these bodies normalise professions is by codifying the expertise of the professional in qualifications, certificates, awards, and training. Reed (2013) argues that professional associations can be considered a discursive space in which subjects are produced as experts in a particular field. Without this, DPs themselves are the primary field of production of the subject as a type of expert. The rationalities used to perform their identities and practices, and that are shared, contested, and negotiated with each other, with other organisational actors, and with me as a researcher, attempt to normalise what it means to be a diversity practitioner.

It has been noted that people involved in EO tended to come from a background of community or political activism and were women or black and minority ethnic (BME) people were seen as qualified for the roles at least partly based on their experiences of discrimination and harassment (Jewson and Mason, 1986, Greene and Kirton, 2010). They were a new type of employee whose warrant to expertise was based on personal experiences, personal commitments, and political views. They drew on these forms of knowledge to design, introduce and advocate for changes to the organisation (Kirton and Greene, 2009: 161). It may be that modern diversity practitioners also use experience as a way of legitimising, as a warrant, for their expertise in diversity, but there is currently little evidence of whether or not this is the case. In Greene and Kirton’s study, not one DP evoked their personal
experience of disadvantage as a ‘qualification’ for diversity work, although some
diversity ‘champions’ did (2010: 121). It has only been suggested that with the rise
of the business case, those doing diversity work might come increasingly from
backgrounds in management or HR (Kirton et al., 2007, Tatli, 2011). Schwabenland
and Tomlinson find that DPs sometimes referred to themselves as part of a
minoritised group in situations where it was felt to increase their sense of agency,
but that they found it disempowering when others imposed categories upon them
(2015: 13).

Scholarly focus has been on how diversity work involves what might be called a
skill of persuasion. Persuading work involves using different cases for diversity,
particularly the business case (Ozbilgin and Tatli, 2006, Tatli, 2011), but also
building and orchestrating relationships within organisations. Parallels can be
drawn with what has been described as ‘knowledge work’ (Alvesson, 1993,
Alvesson, 2001, Alvesson and Kärreman, 2007). Knowledge work is regarded as a
form of work that deals with meanings and is exemplified in organisations such as
law and accounting firms, advertising agencies, management (Alvesson, 2001: 863-
864) management consultancy (Sturdy, 1997), and business schools (Petriglieri and
Petriglieri, 2010). It involves the context-specific use of knowledge and a process of
transforming knowledge that people have about their organisations. Knowledge
work cannot be reduced to technical knowledge, ‘the direct or creative application
of a systematic institutionalised body of formal knowledge or esoteric expertise’
(Alvesson, 2001: 867). Instead, knowledge work relies on the production of credible
stories about reality that minimise uncertainty (Alvesson, 1993). For instance, the
diagnosis of an organisational problem and subsequently offering a solution to it
involves the work of establishing knowledge about how the organisation is and
how it should be: ‘indicating a gap between current imperfections and the ideal’
(Alvesson, 2001: 865-866). The part of the diversity practitioner’s role that has been
called ‘translation’ also seems to offer value in this loosely-defined way: it has a
reactive character, its value exists in the reworking of knowledge for an
organisation, or indeed for trainees as will be discussed in the second part of this
chapter. The aspect of production of knowledge involved in this has not yet been
explored.

As discussed in Chapter One, diversity practitioners can be termed the experts of
diversity. It has been argued that modern experts, such as doctors, psychiatrists and
psychologists (Rose, 1998), have authority to govern, to conduct the behaviours of
others based not on religious grounds like authority figures of the past, but on
scientific ones. Claims to scientific knowledge in modern times are predominant,
trumping or even annulling the validity of multiple possible forms of knowledge. It
is important to examine the different relationships to knowledge that are involved
in DP claims to expertise. Foucault (1999/1983b, Foucault, 1999/1983c) describes
several practices of parhessia that involve not only different performances but also
different relationships between the parhessiastes and knowledge. Knowledge opens
up specific possibilities for change, engenders different views of the world and the
relationship between truth and context. There are two main relationships to
knowledge that Foucault articulates in his analysis of the practices of *parhessia*: that of the *parhessiastes*, and that of the philosopher. The role of the *parhessiastes* is reflective rather than prescriptive, it is not to ‘monitor the application of the laws’ (Foucault, 1999/1983b: ‘Socratic parrhesia’, para. 24), but to bring to light the individual’s own truth. Whilst also a truth-speaker, the philosopher offers knowledge about the world as a scientific knowledge, promoting a particular *logos* by which one should live. The role of the philosopher is to ‘discover and to teach certain truths about the world, nature etc.’ which means that ‘he or she assumed a [sic] epistemic role’ (Foucault, 1999/1983b: ‘Socratic parrhesia’, para. 27).

Something further that is largely absent in research so far is a consideration of how emotions feature as a part of diversity work. Although the tolls of isolation and stress of occupying a marginalised role within organisations is well-documented (Ahmed, 2012, Kirton et al., 2007, Kirton and Greene, 2009), the role that DPs may have in managing the emotions of others is not. Tomlinson and Schwabenland have begun to address this gap by highlighting the ‘fears’ that organisational actors have of talking about issues of inequality and diversity-heterogeneity, that it can act as a ‘vengeful spectre, the fear of which was capable of silencing or immobilizing organizational members – and thus exercising a malevolent rather than a benign, influence’ (2015: 11-12). They suggest that the probing of these anxieties can be productive since this may allow for more context-specific forms of action (2015: 20) but stop short in this paper from exploring how diversity practitioners attempt to deal with this fear (and construct an expertise in light of their own uncertainties).
The literature suggests that equality law may also provide a claim to knowledge for DPs. The main piece of legislation that is relevant to diversity work is the Equality Act 2010 (hereafter, EA2010), which consolidated several pieces of legislation dating back to the 1970s, aiming to make equality law simpler to understand and to abide by (Hepple, 2010). EA2010 seeks to protect multiple groups of people from discrimination based on nine ‘protected characteristics’: refer to race, age, gender, sexual orientation, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, pregnancy and maternity, and religion and belief. It is known that the law remains a strong impetus for organisations to engage in diversity work (Tatli and Özbilgin, 2007), which suggests that DPs are likely to make a claim to knowledge in providing organisations with knowledge of it. But it is not yet clear whether the law furnishes DPs with just one or multiple claims.

This section has discussed the issue of uncertainty in the work of a diversity practitioner, but also the need to define one’s claims to specialist knowledge and skills in order to protect one’s value as an occupational group. In order to bring to light the different ways in which diversity practitioners make claims to skills and knowledge, the following sub-question is introduced:

*How do diversity practitioners construct their skills and knowledge? (RQc)*
This question is designed to sensitise the researcher to certain forms of knowledge in the data that relate to the capacities and information that diversity practitioners accord themselves.

**Summary of Part One**

Part One has reviewed literature on DPs by synthesising it into three key areas. The first examines the role of the DP in particular with regards to the relationship that they have with the organisations/clients for which they work. It drew attention to the assumptions that underlie previous diversity research about the difficulties implementing diversity and proposed a way of viewing DPs as themselves effects of diversity, as a way that diversity is manifested. It re-read the dual, or liminal, nature of the DP, posited by other researchers as an experience, as a practice of subject formation thereby opening up the question not only of if this is done, but also how and why. *Parrhesia* was introduced as a set of concepts to theorise the role that DPs play in producing forms of knowledge for organisations and in actively constructing themselves in a particular role. The second section turned to the question of how DPs recognise each other as legitimate actors in the field. How they divide themselves from others and construct a sense of ‘we’ could have an impact on what the aims of diversity work are and whether DPs collaborate or engage in collective action. The third section showed that, although DPs struggle with the uncertainly of diversity work, there is a lack of knowledge about how DPs create an
enclosure for it as a distinct set of skills and knowledge, and in so doing construct what it means to do diversity work.

The next part of the chapter is concerned with the second subject of this thesis – the ‘diversity trainee’ (DT), the subject that is sought through the practices of diversity training. It reviews the literature on diversity training with a view to generating sub-questions that will help contribute to our understanding of the DT.
Part Two: Constructing the ‘diversity trainee’

This second part of the literature review is dedicated to the subject of the diversity trainee and the question: How is the subject of the ‘diversity trainee’ (DT) constructed by diversity practitioners? (RQ2) As explained in Chapter One, research into the ‘subjects’ of diversity has focussed on how ‘minoritised’ subjects or groups are constructed, and there is relatively little literature on the role of diversity practitioners in the practices of diversity per se. This means that the following review draws predominantly on studies on diversity training in general. Diversity training is a widespread practice, but it lacks theorisation by scholars. Much of the research from the UK tends to have been produced within the context of EO. There is research on diversity training that hails from the US but there are important differences between the contexts of the UK and the US. Nevertheless, these bodies of literature provide a useful foundation to understanding what diversity training seeks to achieve and Foucauldian concepts help to generate questions about how it tries to do this.

This Part is divided into three sections that concern: how the problem that needs to be solved by training is defined, the aims of diversity training, and its techniques.
Defining the need for diversity training

Training is a widespread diversity practice in UK organisations (Tatli and Özbilgin, 2007) and training is also a popular management technique in general. There is a large body of literature on training and development (T&D) within MOS and HRM (for example, Armstrong and Taylor, 2014, Kraiger et al., 1993). This work describes and theorises T&D in terms of the need for T&D to develop its design, implementation, and evaluation, along with differences between formal modes of training and informal ones (for example, through social media: Bixby, 2010) In this literature, training exercises are theorised with regards to its design to complement learning (Fanning, 2011) and modes of delivery (Hopp, 2013). In the literature on EO training, it is reported that it employed similar exercises to those used in general, such as role plays, discussions, and videos (Clements, 2000), and it has been suggested that diversity practices employ a range of exercises such as quizzes, presentations and games (Prasad and Mills, 1997).

Classic theories of learning developed by Kolb (1984) and Honey and Mumford (1989) tend to be used to theorise how the design of training exercises can be optimised (see Torrington, 2014). This literature focuses on the processes of learning and improving the transfer of knowledge rather than critiquing the forms of knowledge that are in use. The aim of training in organisations is to produce some sort of change or transformation in the trainee, and diversity training in particular
aims to change how trainees behave by changing their understandings of social relationships, it ‘involves guiding participants towards incorporating new worldviews into their problem solving and decision making activities’ (McGuire and Bagher, 2010: 494-495). Foucault would see diversity training as a space for subject formation, and the trainee as the locus of this discursive knowledge (Foldy, 2002: 104). By neglecting to critique the specific forms of knowledge that are mobilised within the training encounter, it remains unclear in existing literature what type of transformation training seeks – how they want trainees to view themselves, their organisations, and social relations; who they want their trainees to be afterwards.

A handful of authors have drawn attention to the importance of offering new forms of knowledge in diversity training, making diversity training a transformative space. Swan argues that diversity training is not a ‘closed’ discursive event, in which the rationalities at play are completely co-opted by management, but is instead characterised by the ‘openness’ (2009: 310) of multiple voices and politics with roots in business discourse but also in anti-racist and anti-sexist discourses. She argues that trainers can exploit differences in the ways that social relations can be understood to disrupt trainees’ assumptions. With a similar focus, Goodman argues that diversity training can draw attention to how relations of power have an impact on everyone and that inequality is a social rather than an individual phenomenon (2011: 137). She asserts that training offers space in which to talk about social relations and to reframe them, for instance in bringing to attention the default quality or invisibility of majoritised identities (2011: 23). Underlying these two
arguments is the idea of exposing trainees to different possible ways of understanding social relations. This is echoed by Crawley (2007), who asserts that training can open up a space in which racism and sexism can be talked about openly allowing for a change of attitudes, and by Biccum (2007: 139), who suggests that training disrupts individuals’ worldviews to produce a ‘crisis’ that temporarily opens them up to alternative views.

Though their arguments are similar, there are different relationships to knowledge that are in use by Swan and Goodman. For Goodman (2011) training reveals a truer picture of social relations, revealing the powerful effect of privilege, but for Swan (2009) it reveals the changeable nature of social relations and multiple possibilities of knowledge, whilst recognising the persistent inequalities in society. Swan’s approach seems to imply an open nature to the use of discourse in diversity training with the drawing of attention to different forms of knowledge serving a primarily disruptive function. However, in Goodman’s approach knowledge is used to perform a normalising function, offering what is referred to in this thesis as a ‘programme’ of knowledge that is regarded as a more accurate way of viewing the world. This derives from Miller and Rose’s argument that reality is governed by the use of particular rationalities that open it up to being understood in a way that requires management and intervention, it is made ‘programmable’ (1990: 26). In order to transform them, a space must be opened up for the acceptance of new knowledge – through making a case for why the status quo is deficient – and a programme of knowledge offered for how the trainee should be otherwise. How
DPs approach the former of these tasks is addressed by the first sub-question, and
the latter by the second.

Much of the literature on diversity has focussed on the cases that are made for
change in the name of diversity. Scholars have highlighted the dangers of the
business case, criticising it for making the introduction of initiatives or changes
contingent on their benefit to business rather than the pursuit of equality or fairness
in general (Dickens, 1994, Dickens, 1999, Kirton and Greene, 2010, Noon, 2007,
Knights and Omanovic, 2016). Diversity as a general approach has also been
criticised for individualising difference, by being more about individuals than
1997). The dominance of a neoliberal, individualist discourse of the subject in the
UK which focuses on individual responsibility, entrepreneurialism and agency
(Thorsen and Lie, 2006) has been accompanied by a rise of the business case for
diversity: the latter gains ‘currency’ (Ahmed, 2007a: 237) from speaking to the same
underlying rationalities rather than resisting them, and by gaining credibility for
being new and innovative (Prasad et al., 2011).

From a Foucauldian interpretation, what cases do is to offer rationalities for why
reality that is problematic in some way; for instance, that the organisation is not as
equal as it should be, or not as creative and productive as it could be. Foucault’s
methodology of historical analysis focussed on identifying those tuning points in
history where one rationality of government was ‘problematised’ and replaced by another (Foucault, 1994/1984a). Problematisation has a power effect in its creation of new social relations. For Foucault, rationalities do not reflect a pre-existing reality but are ‘technologies of governance’ that construct it as thinkable and administrable (Lemke, 2012: 81). Lemke describes government as an inherently ‘problematising activity’ in which deficiencies with the status quo are identified and by identifying these problems a space is created for interventions to be offered to first measure and then solve them (2012: 81-82, see also Rose and Miller, 2008: 143).

Re-reading the cases for diversity as part of a broader category of problematising rationalities opens up the possibility of identifying rationalities which fall beyond these traditional case-categories. To some extent the case categories have been challenged by scholars, having suggested that the business case has not entirely replaced the social justice case and that they are used in parallel (Liff and Dickens, 2000, Greene and Kirton, 2010). Some have also complicated the equal opportunities-social justice/diversity-business case divide that has been made in mainstream research arguing that EO also used business case rationalities (Dickens, 1994) and even that for some organisations (third-sector) the business case can be collapsed into the social justice case (Tomlinson and Schwabenland, 2010). The present research considers whether there is any further evidence of complexity in the relationship between the cases for diversity. The first sub-question that facilitates the answering of RQ2 is therefore:
How is the status quo problematised in diversity training? (RQd)

This question helps to answer RQ2 by showing how a need for transformation of the trainee is constructed. As indicated earlier in this section, in conjunction with justifying the need for change to the status quo through problematisation, an alternative vision for who the trainee subject should be also needs to be offered in order to seek transformation. Literature pertaining to diversity training’s programme of knowledge is addressed now.

Framing the aims of diversity training

The discussion about what diversity training seeks to achieve has largely centred on if it should change attitudes or change behaviours, and indeed if it can achieve either. Diversity training in the US and EO training in the UK have been criticised for focussing too much on changing people’s attitudes and ‘raising awareness’ about diversity (Karp and Sutton, 1993: 32) and not changing their behaviours, despite its claims to focus on the latter (Foldy, 2002: 105). It has been argued that diversity has not offered solutions in practice and has simply ‘stirred the pot’ (Hemphill and Haines, 1997: 53) and highlighted problems of oppression and discrimination, focusing on ‘ideas and ideologies rather than on behaviours and skills’ (Hemphill and Haines, 1997: 47).
It has been suggested that DPs struggle with the ‘interface between diversity as saying the right thing, as doing/practising the right thing, and as believing the right thing’ (Schwabenland and Tomlinson, 2015: 18). The struggle of deciding which of these things to focus on is a problem born from an assumption that saying, doing, and believing are three separate things. Similarly, in criticisms about changing attitudes over behaviours above, feeling and doing are separated (Bezrukova et al., 2012). According to Foucault’s framework, no divide is drawn between attitude and behaviour in the subject, what one believes or feels compared to what they do. For Foucault, the focus is on uncovering the forms of knowledge that underlie both thoughts and actions, regarding both as forms of practice. By extension, training is a space in which knowledge is not simply transferred to a self-contained subject, but is a process which, if not resisted, necessitates the re-formation of the subject by this knowledge. Swan, Goodman and others outlined above assert the power of knowledge alone, that altering the discourses with which one thinks has material effects on how one acts. Following Foucault that discourses ‘form the objects of which they speak’ (2002/1972: 54), it is proposed here also that changing the knowledge with which one understands the world also has material effect in changing who one is, one’s subject formation.

The task becomes finding out what knowledge about the subject is embedded in explanation about what diversity is trying to achieve, in other words the aims of training. Rationalities about aims will likely concern trainees’ capacity to change, whose responsibility this is, and include recommendations for how they behave in
future. The rationalities that relate to solving problems that have been set out by problematising rationalities, may therefore be referred to as ‘programming’ rationalities. These relate to the way that things should be, for example how organisational actors recognise different types of discrimination, and how they organise to monitor the organisation’s population according to social group characteristics.¹

To allow knowledge about programming rationalities to emerge in the analysis, I ask the sub-question:

_What is the construction of the subject that underlies the aims of diversity training?_ (RQe)

¹ Any form of government is programmatic in character because it more or less explicitly organises and reorganises conduct in the form of procedures, rituals and so forth. Strictly speaking, any given rationality that establishes something as problematic also gives rise to the conditions in which this problem can be solved (Dean, 2010), it exists hand-in-hand with a programming discourse that offers a better way of being. The separation of these two types of discourse is therefore largely a device used to facilitate analysis.
This question does not ask ‘what are the aims of diversity training?’ as they are articulated by diversity practitioners, but rather seeks to discover the assumptions about people in general, and trainees in particular, in order for the aims of training to make sense as rational and achievable goals. This question seeks to elicit a description of the type of subject that diversity practitioners, and their training practices, wish diversity trainees to take upon themselves, and to consider any implications of this particular formation of the subject.

In the final section of this chapter, the techniques of diversity training are reviewed. Extant approaches to categorising the practices of diversity training are summarised, and I explain why Foucault’s ‘practices of the self’ offer a productive way to contribute to how the techniques of diversity training are understood.

**Techniques of transformation in diversity training**

EO training seemingly used methods that were didactic (conventional lecture-based teaching), group work (discussions and exercises), and experiential (learning through relationships with others) (Brown and Lawton, 1991: 29). These techniques can be divided into content techniques (text-based, using reference materials - didactic) and process techniques (encourages self-discovery through participation in exercises - group work, experiential learning) (Brown and Lawton, 1991: 29). Videos and computer-based interactive packages were also used (Bennett and
Keating, 2008, Brown and Lawton, 1991: 59-60). The techniques of diversity work, including diversity training, are thought to comprise activities such as playing board games, following ‘flipcharts, PowerPoint presentations, policy documents, flyers’, doing ‘warm-up exercises, energisers, quizzes, self-audits’, watching videos, and even completing diversity jigsaws (Prasad et al., 1997: 77, see also Jack and Lorbiecki, 2003). Though these provide glimpses of training practices, they do not probe what the activities try to achieve and seek to theorise how they work in relation to the subject/discipline of diversity.

Some information on techniques can be found in writings on EO training, and diversity training in the US. These principally offer interpretations of audience reactions to how trainers engaged with trainees, there are historical and national differences, but they provide important context for understanding why today’s diversity training is organised as it is. ‘Cultural sensitivity’ or ‘group dynamics’ training was used in the US throughout the 1960s and 70s and sought to change trainees’ attitudes towards people perceived as belonging to minoritised groups, primarily African-Americans. Trainers conducted a variety of exercises, some sought to raise awareness of negative stereotypes through asking people to brainstorm them, others sought to draw attention to the unfairness of discrimination by using examples in films such as Elliott’s infamous blue eyed-brown eyed experiment,² wherein a teacher simulates an experience of segregation

² [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0WamPOPjd_E](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0WamPOPjd_E) accessed 28/07/2015
and racism between children with different coloured eyes, and A Tale of ‘O’, a film that draws on work by Kanter (1977), and which presents a vision of a dystopian world in which society’s minority group are visible and so subject to greater scrutiny, or used stories that encouraged trainees to celebrate minoritised difference rather than features of the dominant culture (Lasch-Quinn, 2001: 169-193).

Some trainees were asked to take part in an intensive ‘encounter group’ wherein participants would participate in frank discussions on issues of inequality and prejudice (Lasch-Quinn, 2001: 71). This technique was criticised for becoming a ‘ritual of racial reprimand’ that demanded the exorcising of ‘white guilt’ (Lasch-Quinn, 2001). It was criticised for targeting and intimidating white men in the groups and for dealing with emotionally charged issues in a public forum (Lindsay, 1994). The concept of ‘political correctness’ was also described as contravening first amendment rights to free speech (Mobley and Payne, 1992) and diversity training was likened to brainwashing (Karp and Sutton, 1993, Hemphill and Haines, 1997). This is thought to have led to disengagement or backlash (Hemphill and Haines, 1997, Mobley and Payne, 1992).

In the UK, EO training developed from approaches that date back to the 1950s and 60s which had a slightly different focus to that in the US: either an assimilating approach, teaching immigrants about British culture and the English language, or

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3 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-aVITBmSmUo accessed 15/01/2016
an integrationist (or pluralist) approach, promoting learning among native British communities about other cultures (Bhavnani, 2001: 77). Following the Race Relations Act 1976, there was a rise in demand for anti-racist, or racism awareness, training and the focus of training shifted to educating white people about their attitudes and prejudice (Bhavnani, 2001: 78). EO training of the 1990s predominantly sought to persuade employees of the importance of equality (Brown and Lawton, 1991: 35), to change their attitudes, behaviour, and increase their knowledge about cultures other than their own (Bhavnani, 2001: 86). While there were no reports of extreme negative reactions to EO training like those to diversity training in the US, EO training was still associated with the solicitation of guilty feelings from white middle-class participants (Brown and Lawton, 1991: 26). Trainers were characterised pejoratively by the notions of ‘preaching’ and the teaching of ‘political correctness’ was similarly accused of infringing on freedom of speech (Bennett and Keating, 2008, Crawley, 2007, Penketh, 2000).

By comparison, diversity training is thought to be less confrontational (Taylor et al., 1997). Diversity has been described as being less divisive and more ‘celebratory’ in tone (Prasad et al., 1997). It tends to emphasise a translation of the agenda into the language of the local organisational context and has been seen as essential in making diversity more palatable and more understandable to staff (Foster and Harris, 2005). Despite this, it has been suggested that diversity training in the UK can generate hostile reactions (Swan, 2009: 308), but it is unclear from research that is available as to whether this is the case. The history of hostility to training in this
field provides important context within which diversity training today has
developed. It is likely that techniques used in current training will need to
differentiate themselves from older forms.

Furthermore, the neoliberal discourse of the subject raised earlier in this chapter (as autonomous, entrepreneurial, and valuing free choice) may also act to constrain techniques that are used and the forms of power that trainers can seek to exercise in the training room. As Dick suggests, actions that focus on the systematic disadvantage of groups are likely to draw resistance because modern, Western neoliberal organisations instead champion individualism and self-actualisation (2004: 80). The concept of normalisation is important here because it offers a way of explaining how the behaviours of others can be governed without overtly exercising control, namely through techniques that shape the ‘souls’ of employees (Dean, 1994: 145, Rose, 1990). What could be seen as an objective transfer of knowledge from trainer to trainee is for Foucault a practice of transforming knowledge and an enactment of power. Moreover, it involves encouraging trainees to act on themselves by accepting particular forms of knowledge and performing practices of the self.

In his analysis of Ancient Greek societies, Foucault explains that practices of the self are built on the notion that skills need to be learnt by both theoretical and practical training (Foucault, 1999/1983c: para. 3). This means that learning required the
enactment of a practice, not only the abstract taking on of knowledge. Some of these practices involved speaking, others writing, and some involved certain ways of thinking and taking stock. In recent years there has been an emerging interest in such practices that are used in therapeutic cultures (Cloud, 1998, Ecclestone and Hayes, 2009) including in the context of MOS (Swan, 2008, Swan, 2010b, Shattuc, 1997).

Therapeutic techniques developed in conjunction with the ‘psy’ disciplines (psychology and psychiatry) seek to change the behaviours of an individual or group of individuals. These techniques ask people to speak knowledge about themselves and to enact new selves through certain practices. The idea of governing people from the inside rather than, for example, restricting their movements through a traditional form of disciplinary power (Foucault, 1991/1977), is echoed in ‘identity regulation’ described earlier in this thesis (Alvesson and Willmott, 2002) and ‘moral regulation’ (see Dean, 1994). By introducing and reinforcing certain norms, people are compelled to produce themselves in certain ways in order to be moral, authentic, knowable subjects. This is achieved through self-management, ‘the minute arts of self-scrutiny, self-evaluation, and self-regulation’ (Rose, 1990: 222).

Practices of the self that are used in modern societies range from those promoted by the accepted disciplines, ‘social work, medicine, education, established religion,
forms of sport and physical culture’ to those that are contested, developed in ‘cults of self-liberation and self-improvement (from martial arts to sexual realization) and "how-to" programs in work, business, money, marriage, and love’ (Dean, 1994: 153).

But rather than this operation of power on the inner selves being experienced as such, therapeutic techniques are experienced as individualising, authenticating, and as bringing about freedom in the choices one makes to act on oneself, to transform oneself. It is a project of subject formation experienced as freedom.

‘Truth-telling’ has become the most prominent practice of the self featured in recent literature, since it has been identified as a popular therapeutic technique (Rose, 1990). The concept of truth-telling is associated with self-analysis and disclosure about oneself as a way of producing knowledge about the self. This practice of the self bears strong similarity to parrhesia described earlier in this chapter, but it differs from it in important ways. Confession is connected with the practices of Catholicism rather than those of Ancient Greece and was a technique involved in constructing the ‘pastorate’ as a community under the tutelage of the pastor. Confession requires individuals not only to manifest the ‘truth’ of who they are in their actions, but to verbalise this through self-analysis (Landry, 2009: 119). For the Catholic Church, the confessing of one of one’s sins to the pastor meant that the individual was promised salvation in the next life (Foucault, 2007/1980: 148).
DPs in general find themselves in an inferior position to the authorities of more senior management that surround them and so it makes sense to consider them in terms of *parrhesia*. However, in confessing, individuals who are engaged in truth-speaking are placed in a position of inferiority in relation to an authority who can punish them (Foucault, 1999/1983a: 'Parhessia and Duty', para. 1). In the context of a training room, DPs are afforded a position of greater authority to oversee and approve their trainees – during this event the concept of confession is more appropriate.

The process of self-analysis and of self-disclosure is one of the cornerstones of modern social life in the West as a method for producing knowledge about the self (Foucault, 1998/1978: 56, Diamond, 2011, Miller and Rose, 1990). Truth-telling has become increasingly ubiquitous (Ecclestone and Hayes, 2009, Swan, 2008, Swan, 2010b): people tell stories about themselves to psychologists, teachers, courts, to personal development specialists, coaches, and are encouraged to do so by self-help books and groups. In our ‘confessing society’, contend Fejes and Dahlstedt, ‘verbalisation has become a central method through which people make themselves visible to themselves and to others, people come to know who they are through verbalisation’ (2013: 1). Whereas Foucault’s analysis of the Catholic tradition of confession reveals how the giving of accounts of wrongdoing or deficiency of the subject is connected to the transformation of the subject and the enactment of a new ‘true’ subject, in a therapeutic encounter, the patient does not seek redemption, but cure or authenticity. They are compelled to voice their diagnosis, their deficiency, in
order to take control of it and to take upon themselves the truth of their condition. The goal of the confession is to know and to tell the truth about oneself in order to master oneself, with a view to developing towards an ideal self (Foucault, 1994/1982a: 238).

It has been noted that therapeutic techniques are increasingly being used in organisations. For instance, in performance appraisals (Townley, 1995: 119-120), skills training and management development (Swan, 2008, Swan, 2010b), and management training, recruitment, mentoring, and psychometric testing (Rose, 1990, Rose, 1996). Brewis (1996) analyses manager competency, or ‘personal effectiveness’ (PE), education on a Certificate in Management course in which participants are encouraged to transform themselves in line with managerial ideologies and transform themselves into self-regulating subjects who will continue to pursue these ideals over time. Brewis shows that PE training enacts a modern form of government over its trainee managers.

The concept of modern government is an important idea for theorising the DT. Since DPs face the challenge of a lack of support and resources – money and time – in their work (Tatli and Özbilgin, 2007), this means that diversity training needs to seek a way of influencing the behaviour of trainees that extends beyond the bounds of the training event itself. Modern government and the construction of a self-
regulating subject may help to explain how DPs seek influence beyond the training room.

As noted in Chapter One, previous studies have touched on the issue of how minoritised subjects are constructed through the concept of diversity, but it is equally important to understand the type of subject that is implicated in the techniques of diversity training. The aim of this part of the thesis is to address the ‘how’ of DPs’ attempt to transform their trainees. This is something that has not been addressed in previous research on diversity training according to Lasch-Quinn:

...adherents assume that change in itself is always good. The exact nature of the desired change, however, received little attention (2001: 158)

Elucidating the type of subject that is regarded as doing diversity well is key to understanding what this means. Understanding the knowledge of the subject brought about in the techniques of diversity training, and the practices that it encourages trainees to engage in, is an essential part of building up the picture of the DT. The final sub-question is therefore:
How is the subject of the diversity trainee constructed in the techniques of diversity training? (RQf)

In analysing the problematisations, knowledge that underlies aims, and techniques of diversity training, this research does not aim to produce a unitary, general model of it nor to prescribe a model for how it should be. This would be difficult because training has become fractured over the last thirty years or so, taking on many forms and being loosely knitted around the concepts of equality and diversity (Bhavnani, 2001: 79-83). It seeks instead to disentangle the different forms of knowledge that are mobilised in diversity training, the wider discourses that shape and constrain them, and the desired effects of this orchestration. But that is not to say that the thesis abandons social critique entirely; indeed the aim of anatomising the knowledge of diversity in this way is to contribute to the developing body of work which has shown that an analysis of the subjects of diversity can yield insights into what ‘diversity’ is through better understanding how the relations of power/knowledge operate in the practices that constitute it.

Summary of Part Two

In seeking to locate RQ2 on the construction of the diversity trainee by diversity training, Part two synthesised the main ideas and debates in the literature that pertains to diversity training. The first section reviewed literature that points to the
potential for diversity training to change how trainees think about social relations. It discussed the notion of transformation of the DT in training, introducing the concept of problematisation as a way of creating an opportunity for change.

The second section drew on the Foucauldian framework to reframe debates about how diversity training focusses on changing attitudes rather than behaviours. It suggested that if the subject is seen as constituted by knowledge, then the subject itself is altered through a transformation of this knowledge. It developed the second sub-question that asks what programme of knowledge is offered by diversity training with regards to the interests, capacities, and responsibilities of the DT.

The third section showed that so far there is limited understanding of diversity training techniques with little inquiry into what these they seek to achieve and theorisation of how. It constructed a third sub-question that examines the type of transformation that is sought of the participants of diversity training, that is, who do DPs want the DT to be after the training is complete? The review introduced the concept of practices of the self and listed a number of specific examples of this from Foucault’s work. It outlined in more detail the practice of truth-telling and that has gained prominence in literature on therapeutic cultures that increasingly inform modern Western societies. Finally, it discussed a form of power known as ‘modern government’, which seeks control over individuals by influencing the knowledge that individuals hold about themselves and social relations.
Summary

This chapter has brought together a diverse collection of literature in order to show the landscape of approaches that have been taken to the study of diversity practitioners and diversity trainees. It has pointed to where there are gaps in the current literature but also re-read elements of it using Foucauldian ideas about the relationship between knowledge, power, and the subject – what Dean calls the ‘Foucaultian triangle’ (1994: 164). On this account, I have introduced literature from Foucault and others that provides concepts that will be helpful in guiding the analysis of the empirical materials.

The first part of this chapter broke down the first research question of How do diversity practitioners construct themselves as expert subjects? (RQ1) into three sub-questions about the role, values, and claims to skills and knowledge that diversity practitioners make. The forms of knowledge, or rationalities, that underlie each of these aspect was made the focus of the research:

How do diversity practitioners construct the relationship between themselves and their organisation/clients? (RQa)

How are relations among diversity practitioners constructed? (RQb)

How do diversity practitioners construct their skills and knowledge? (RQc)
The second part of this chapter turned its attention to the second research question: How is the subject of the ‘diversity trainee’ constructed by diversity practitioners? (RQ2). It looked at three aspects of training: its aims, the problems that it identifies and offers solutions to, and the techniques that it uses. I introduced the concept of ‘problematisation’ and expanded on the idea of practices of the self in order to generate specific questions about the ‘how’ of diversity training. The section articulated the issues raised during the review of these elements as:

How is the status quo problematised in diversity training? (RQd)

What is the construction of the subject that underlies the aims of diversity training? (RQe)

How is the subject of the diversity trainee constructed in the techniques of diversity training? (RQf)

It is important to note that the sub-questions listed above have been separated out for heuristic purposes, in order to facilitate an analysis which is ordered and structured for clarity. In reality, these questions are interrelated, and certain rationalities and subject positions that emerge in the analysis could be surfaced under more than one sub-question. How DPs position themselves in relation to their organisation or client(s) could also be read as a claim to a skill, and also how DPs position themselves as experts, and thus authorities, in the field of diversity is likely to have an effect on how trainees respond to the knowledge that they are
offered. However, because DPs are the primary focus of this research, the talk and practices of trainees themselves were not examined.

The purpose of this chapter has been to argue that it is important to ‘unmask’ (Ahonen et al., 2014: 6) rationalities and power relations, and to reflect on the specific possibilities of formation of the subjects of diversity. This is a somewhat Socratic goal of appreciating one’s ‘present relation to truth’ (Foucault, 1999/1983b: ‘Socratic parhessia’, para. 22), in particular of DPs and diversity training because they are largely unregulated and un-standardised features of organisations in the UK and research and practitioners have begun to talk about the benefits of greater formalisation (Ozbilgin and Tatli, 2006). In the recognition of the different rationalities that are at play in the production of subjects and the governing of subjects, it becomes possible to evaluate what they can and can’t do at present, to think about how diversity practices could develop in future and perhaps to shape them to do otherwise, for ‘exposing the dynamics of power makes change possible.’ (Ahonen et al., 2014: 6).

The following chapter discusses the methodology and methods that were used to address these questions. It discusses the alignment that was sought between research question, epistemological and ontological assumptions, methods, and analysis. The chapter considers the research process including participant recruitment and negotiating access, and the limitations of the sample and
difficulties faced accessing certain types of DP. It also reviews the general ethical considerations that had to be made when using these methods, alongside the specific ones that were made for the field of research.
Chapter Three: Methodology and methods

This chapter discusses the methodological design of the research and the practical steps involved in the research process. The chapter considers the research process including participant recruitment and negotiating access, and the limitations of the sample and difficulties faced accessing certain types of DP. It then discusses how the processes undertaken and claims made in the analysis constituted a suitable approach to answering the research questions within the Foucauldian framework outlined. Finally, the text reviews the general ethical considerations that had to be made when using these methods, alongside the specific ones that were needed for the field of research.

Research process

The empirical aim of the research was to bring to light an initial set of rationalities and subject positions that DPs use to construct themselves as experts and use to seek the formation of the DT. In order to achieve this, the collection and analysis of qualitative data was considered to be most appropriate, in particular, qualitative data in the form of interviews and observations. These forms of data provide access to the way that DPs account for themselves and others. Qualitative methods refer to a host of interpretive techniques which seek to ‘describe, decode, translate and otherwise come to terms with the meaning, not the frequency, of certain more or
less naturally occurring phenomena in the social world’ (Van Maanen, 1983: 9). The approach is widely regarded to be unstructured in comparison to the collection of quantitative data (Bryman and Bell, 2003: 280). Qualitative methods take many forms (Gubrium and Holstein, 1997), and the techniques were selected in this study according to the requirements of the framework and research questions, alongside the opportunities and limitations presented by the research context, in order to maximise the richness, nuance, and complexity of data collected (Bryman and Bell, 2003: 305).

The data collection process for this research played a formative role in shaping the final outcomes of the research. This is because the recruitment of participants to interview and access to observe their practices, along with the early findings from analysis, were factors interwoven with development of the research focus and the theoretical framework. The following text explicates how initial forays into the field shaped the participant recruitment strategy for the rest of the research and how data that was collected and analysed early on led to a development in the research focus from the subjects of DPs, to DPs and DTs.

Because of the dearth of empirical research on DPs in the UK, the research was somewhat exploratory, meaning that the empirical data that were collected during the first phases of the research were used to inform both the research design and theoretical concepts. Although the empirical interest in the forms of knowledge
used by diversity practitioners was established from the start, and questions about particular forms of discourse were raised from a review of the literature, the more specific theorisations of power/knowledge relations in the practices of DPs developed as data was collected and analysed. During this process, theoretical concepts were located from the Foucauldian framework to explain the phenomena observed. As Miles argues, in order to reduce the risk of collecting irrelevant, ‘bulky’ data (1983: 119), the researcher needs to achieve a balance between an openness to gathering rich data and generating/locating new theory, and having enough of a framework of theory in place in order to work from. From the outset, the research was located in a post-structural interpretive approach and was interested in how people understood, defined, and practiced their roles as DPs. This facilitated the first steps into fieldwork. Within this framework the DP was viewed as a socially constructed subject and as an ongoing identity project (Alvesson and Willmott, 2002). This perspective was informed by a review of the existing literature on DPs and diversity training in order to generate a ‘typology with empty boxes’ (Silverman, 1985: 9). The framing provided a starting point that was specific enough to develop sub-questions deriving from the literature and to guide the first stages of analysis, but also flexible enough to explore a relatively unknown empirical field, to make use of ‘serendipitous findings’ (Miles, 1983: 117), and to locate appropriate concepts with which to theorise collected data.
Data collection

The majority of the fieldwork for this research was conducted between October 2012 and October 2013. However, familiarisation with the field and recruitment began in early 2012 with attendance at an ‘Unconscious Bias’ conference, that is, a conference that took a psychological approach to managing diversity, hosted by a large diversity consultancy. I was offered access to this via a PhD colleague using her personal contacts. I had informal conversations with DPs over breaks and lunch to find out about the nature of their organisations and roles and to interest them in the research. Contact details were exchanged with a handful of DPs, and one formal interview was successfully arranged. This conference was nevertheless a useful starting point in establishing contacts with DPs and familiarising myself with practitioner vocabularies about their work.

It became evident that there was a wide variety of different roles that practitioners could play within the field of work that related to issues of equality, diversity and inclusion. The decision was initially made to focus on freelance consultants because they are a group of people who have positioned themselves as experts in the field. Moreover, the extant literature tends to rely on data gathered from the full-time employed diversity specialists (except, notably, Litvin, 2002) despite evidence of significant growth in diversity consultancy and increasing use of external services in the related area of HRM (see Greene and Kirton, 2010: 118). Later on, the
recruitment of participants was broadened to full-time specialists when it became clear that the employment boundaries between the two roles were frequently crossed but also that they both collaborate and are in competition with each other for work at different times. This added an extra dimension to the question of relations between DPs. Although it was not a priority of the research, this dimension offered an opportunity to compare the two role-types and to make use of accounts where DPs had talked about the relative advantages of each role-type to see whether there were differences in how the DP-subject was constructed. In order to facilitate this, the suffix -C or -SP is appended to the pseudonyms that were allocated to DPs in order to indicate whether they were designated as consultants or specialists.

A number of participant recruitment strategies were employed during the first stage of data-collection. Firstly, a referral to one consultant was made through the candidate’s supervisor, who recommended another. Participants were also recruited opportunistically: contacts made whilst I interned for a branch of government resulted in the recruitment of two DPs (one specialist, one consultant) and one further specialist was recruited through a friend at a social event. Secondly, contact with potential participants was made using a screening tool, hosted on Qualtrics. It was posted publicly in several professional interest-groups relating to equality, diversity and inclusion on the professional networking website LinkedIn, and was targeted at consultants. The research was promoted in one particular group by a consultant who became a participant in the research. The tool asked DPs
within those groups to describe the nature of their role, their responsibilities, and for short reflections on their experiences. The tool was designed to establish contact with DPs, to introduce the interest of the research in the reflections of DPs on their work, and to open dialogue about the possibility of interviewing them but it did not elicit detailed accounts of diversity work and DP expertise. 126 responses were received but the large majority of these were incomplete and/or respondents did not provide contact details to be contacted about an interview. From those respondents who did, nine interviews were arranged and conducted.

As a result of these interviews I was referred to two other consultants who were interviewed. As a member of the IEDP, one interviewee from the survey provided a further recruitment platform by agreeing to include a call for participants in the organisation’s monthly newsletter. Although just two responses were received, and only one of which resulted in an interview (consultant), it was beneficial as I was subsequently invited to attend a network meeting. By attending the meeting, participant networking spaces became a source of further information about how DPs construct their subjectivities in different contexts. I was added to the network mailing list (email network) and I later sought out access to further networking activities: three practitioner conferences were observed, I was added to a regional NHS email network and attended a face-to-face meeting of it, and in an extended observation I also observed how an individual DP sought to develop a network using personal contacts within the organisation of a new employer. The meeting
also resulted in three other DPs (two consultants and one specialist) agreeing to be interviewed.

As Silverman notes, I found that I was dependant on the ‘goodwill’ of DPs who were prepared to take part in the study (1985: 22). Since there is no large professional association through which to reach DPs, the recruitment of participants largely relied on referral by individuals. I was able to recruit five further participants by approaching DPs directly via LinkedIn groups and DPs’ professional websites (resulting in a further referral), but despite this, it became clear over the course of the first few months of fieldwork that DPs were much more likely to respond to and agree to requests to be interviewed if I had made contact with them having been referred by another DP. In the methodological literature, this strategy is termed ‘snowballing’: one participant is recruited who fulfils the theoretical criteria and then helps the researcher to recruit others through her/his networks (Warren, 2003: 87). Following a lack of responses from direct attempts to contact DPs, a referral method of recruitment became a priority strategy for the recruitment of participants. Since there is no large professional association through which to reach DPs, and so referral was an appropriate strategy.

Many research projects rely on the concept of ‘saturation’, a point wherein the phenomena identified within the data are identified reliably again and again (Morse, 1995), in order to determine sample size. In this study, saturation of the
data was not made a priority following Malterud et al (2015). The authors argue that the sample size that is appropriate and adequate for a qualitative study can be justified on the basis of ‘information power’ where the aims, analytical methodology, and use of theory are factors that define the usefulness of the data: the general principle of this is that the ‘more information the sample holds, relevant for the actual study, the lower amount of participants is needed’ (2015: 1). Since the aim of the empirical side of this research was what the authors would define as ‘narrow’ – to bring to light a number of initial rationalities that are used by DPs in subject formation – the sample was found to be diverse enough to offer a good balance between the degree of discursive variety and commonality. The data also yielded theoretically rich interpretations, drawing on an established framework. Moreover, the analytical strategy was discursive, meaning that a detailed consideration of a smaller number of texts was deemed most useful. The aim of the research was to bring to light an initial set of rationalities that are used by DPs to construct themselves as subjects, thereby revealing a number of discursive tools that DPs (can) use in subject formation. The primary intent was to analyse the possibilities of knowledge rather than to identify patterns.

It was challenging in this research to negotiate with each individual DP to access their practices within organisations, but, taking an opportunistic approach (Buchanan et al., 1988), once relationships with DPs were established, interviews were used as a gateway to negotiate observations of DP practices: towards the end of interviews DPs were approached about possible observation of their work. In this
way, DPs served as ‘sponsors’ (Van Maanen and Kolb, 1982: 15) who lent their implicit endorsement when negotiating with other organisational ‘gatekeepers’ (Bryman, 2003: 2). DPs tended to be reticent about being observed doing ‘desk work’, which consultants tended to perform at home and specialists in an office environment with other staff present, and so access was predominantly negotiated to diversity training, meetings, networking events. These mainly took the traditional form of a face-to-face workshop, but one webinar was also observed. Two DPs were observed doing desk work, one (specialist) was observed in her home, planning an exhibition and training session; and another (specialist) based at an organisation during an extended period of shadowing (included informal interviews with three further DPs). On three occasions, observations also resulted in further interviews: other DPs were present, contact was established, and they later agreed to be interviewed and/or observed (one consultant, two specialists – one of whom referred to three other specialists). Snowballing was therefore useful in a number of ways.

The access to diversity training, as one of the practices that DPs were engaged in, led to the expansion of the research focus. Whilst meetings, networking activities and desk-work provided opportunities to observe how DPs talked about themselves to others and to have further conversations about their role, training was distinctive in that DPs were not only engaged in producing an understanding about who they were but were also producing knowledge about other subjects, namely the subject they wished their trainees to be after training. As Chapter Two
showed, previous research has investigated how diversity discourses in general construct the minoritised subject, but there is a lack of research into how diversity is mobilised to form other types of subject. This expansion in focus meant that a theoretical framework needed to be developed or located that could account for both the process of one’s own subject formation (DPs) but also how people can seek to influence the subject formation of others (DTs). Foucault was identified as an appropriate source of concepts to theorise these two processes since they were capable of accounting for the connection between knowledge, power, and subjectivity in both an inward-oriented sense (self-formation) and outward-oriented sense (control via (modern) government). The adoption of Foucault’s theories in this research shaped the specific framing of the research questions, process of analysis, and findings. This process is described in more detail later in the chapter.

There was little guidance available in the literature on how to delimit what constitutes ‘diversity training’. Training in the field was found to echo literature in being extremely varied in the way that it was named and targeted towards specific audiences across sectors or occupations (Bhavnani, 2001: 79-83). Diversity training was therefore defined as those interactions that are discrete in terms of time and place, and which diversity practitioners considered to be centrally concerned with their work within the field of diversity. In practice, this definition meant that a range of training topics and trainee audiences were included in the study as examples of diversity training. The decision to follow this relatively wide definition seemed appropriate in order to ‘figuratively puts brackets around a temporal and
spatial domain’ (Van Maanen, 1983: 9) whilst not being too limiting in terms of the observational data of DP practices that could be collected. The process of observation and the forms that it took are discussed a little later in this chapter.

It became clearer as the data collection continued that it was difficult to recruit DPs working in the private sector. Although over half of the consultants who took part worked with private sector organisations, it proved more difficult to secure times for interview with specialists in private sector organisations. Attempts were made to remedy this by making contact with more of them: I attended the ‘Diversity Works’ conference in central London at which speakers were diversity practitioners from large international corporations. I also asked existing participants whether I could observe diversity work with private sector clients that they had mentioned. The conference did not successfully foster significant interest in the research, and although two or three DPs did give me their contact details these did not result in interviews due to a lack of response or time to participate. As Warren notes, ‘setting up the interview and making it happen are two different things’ (2003: 90).

Regarding the second strategy, although existing participants themselves were keen to help, it proved difficult to arrange observations within private companies because they did not agree or in the end the projects themselves did not take place. These instances in themselves are not enough to point to the possibility that private companies are less confident in or committed to diversity work, and DPs were not found to express concerns about private companies in particular. Despite the failure to increase the amount of data gathered directly from the private sector via
specialists, the majority of consultants who participated were involved in working within it.

As Silverman (1985: 2) argues, it was considered reasonable that participants should receive access to the findings of the research as an exchange for taking part. Although the thesis will be made available after completion, participants were also offered a concise report on the research. Representatives of the IEDP also expressed interest in the results relevant to the organisation and its members and plans to disseminate them. I completed a short voluntary task compiling a newsletter mailing list for one consultant participant, only one other exchange of work was made – during an extended period of shadowing a DP – where I conducted a small research project on Equality Analysis/Equality Impact Assessment tools used by NHS organisations.

Of the final cohort of 37 participants, 24 were designated as being consultants and 13 as specialists. 8 participants identified their ethnicity as Black and minority ethnic (BME), 21 as White, 4 as of mixed ethnicity, one of ‘other’ ethnicity, and 3 were of unknown ethnicity. The small number of unknown values are indicative of where DPs did not give biographical details in interview or in the provided form and where they were not publicly available, for instance on professional profiles online. 22 participants were women and 15 were men; 8 considered themselves to have a disability and 19 did not (10 unknown); 20 worked with the private sector, 29
worked with the public sector, and 23 worked with the third sector (1 unknown); and 15 had a specific qualification in the area of equality and diversity and 20 did not (2 unknown). Two DPs were accredited by the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development (CIPD) but while one considered this to be a qualification in diversity, the other did not. CIPD accreditation was not recorded as a specific qualification in diversity because although it is a component of the training, the qualification is not solely focussed on diversity work and not always considered a requirement for those doing diversity work even when they are based in HR (Tatli, 2011). The majority of DPs were aged 46 – 55 (n=9) or 56 – 65 (n=9), and had worked in the field of diversity for 10 – 20 years (n=13) or 20+ years (n=13). DPs had a wide variety of professional backgrounds. Although some DPs had a background in HRM specifically (n=4) it was difficult to categorise those DPs who had management backgrounds because the degree to which someone was a ‘manager’ was not always clear from the descriptions of the roles. Full participant details are provided in Appendix One. It is worth noting that the biographical details of three DPs in addition to the main participants of the study were recorded because these DPs are referred to within the analysis.

In total, 33 interviews were conducted lasting around an hour, totalling 33 hours and 25 minutes (4 DPs were observed and not interviewed); 11 instances of networking activities were observed (excluding email networks which were under ongoing observation over the period of 7 months), totalling 13 days; 10 instances of
observation of other practices were made, totalling 27 days, of which 10 were
diversity training, totalling 9 days.

Of the interviews, 20 were conducted by telephone and 5 face-to-face. Face-to-face
terviewing has generally been considered in the literature to be the preferred
method for collecting qualitative data (see Holt, 2010: 113), with telephone
interviewing only being appropriate under specific circumstances (Shuy, 2003: 541-
544, see Harvey, 1988, Miller, 1995). But it has been recognised that telephone
interviewing has practical benefits in that it is a time/cost-efficient method of
collecting data (Fenig et al., 1993, Kirsch and Brandt, 2002, Miller, 1995, Sturges and
Hanrahan, 2004). The decision to conduct telephone interviews in this study was
largely practical because DPs were located throughout the UK and did not all travel
long distances for their work. The strategy to recruit from across the UK meant that
participants were not concentrated in one geographical area, for example London.
This approach fostered potential variety in the responses gathered, which was
important to the research interest in discursive possibilities of DP subject formation.
Furthermore, as Holt (2010) also found, it was thought to be more convenient for
the participants in this study to be interviewed by telephone in terms of
(re)arranging a time for interview due to their having busy work-schedules. This
decision was supported by evidence that telephone interviews gather as rich data as
Another benefit of using this approach was that it was also possible to collect a clear
recording of the conversation by using a microphone-earpiece connected to an
electronic voice-recorder. This was a challenge when conducting interviews face-to-face, an issue that is discussed later in this chapter.

Disadvantages of this method are the potential technological failures (Kirsch and Brandt, 2002: 78), and a lack of visual clues that enable the researcher to appropriately gauge the interviewee’s involvement, to encourage elaboration, or to assess affect (Holt, 2010, Miller, 1995, Stephens, 2007). The lack of visual information means that contextual data that can be gathered about the interaction in person may not feature if not explicitly described (for example the interviewee’s or interviewer’s ethnicities (Holt, 2010: 116)). A number of strategies were employed to minimise the disadvantageous effects of telephone interviewing: care was taken to be audibly present during the interviews and to interject gently whilst interviewees were speaking, with encouraging ‘Mm’s and interrogative ‘Oh?’s, in order to indicate that I was interested to the narrative at hand or would like the participant to elaborate on something (see Stephens, 2007). The lack of visual clues was to some extent compensated for by paying attention to lulls, emphasis, sighs, and hesitations in the participant’s speech (Sturges and Hanrahan, 2004). Moreover, the fact that the participant could not see me meant that I was able to take notes during the interview without distracting the interviewee and to keep track of ideas I wanted to probe later in the interview (Sturges and Hanrahan, 2004: 114).
I attempted to offset the potential difficulty in building rapport with the interviewee by offering personal biographical details about my academic background and ethnicity. The practice of self-disclosure has not been extensively explored in the methodological literature, but it has been suggested that it can help to offset the inherent asymmetry of power in the interview (Abell et al., 2006; Kvale, 1996) and encourage interviewees to be ‘more forthcoming’ (Reinharz and Chase, 2003: 79) in producing narratives of their own. Along with my long-standing academic interest in social group identities and issues of equality, in some cases my sex and mixed-heritage background was considered an important way that I could establish commonality (Song and Parker, 1995) with participants. My ‘coming out’ as a pale-skinned mixed-race woman positioned me as a member of one or more minoritised groups. Although I fully recognised that my experience of this identity was unlikely to bear great similarity to the experiences of DPs who might have self-identified in the same identity-categories – who were women, who were from ethnic minority groups, or even who were mixed-heritage (see McDonald, 2013) – doing so was intended to foster a position of ‘insider’ in terms of political outlook and to build trust whilst maintaining outsiderness to the occupation itself that I needed in order to elicit explanations of it. Unintentionally, it was also the case that during one interview my academic interest in issues of equality was read and responded to by the interviewee as a ‘difference’ (Abell et al., 2006). Reflections on my identity during the research process are discussed further throughout this chapter.
Observations were also built into the research design in order not only to capture naturally occurring data, which showed the discourses that DPs used in other contexts than the interview, but also as a strategy to minimise the disadvantages of telephone interviewing (Sturges and Hanrahan, 2004, Holt, 2010). In particular, extended periods of observation were arranged: I shadowed a specialist DP based in an NHS organisation for the period of two working weeks. During this time, I observed the DP conducting research on and writing a paper for the board outlining the organisation’s future diversity-related goals and strategy to reach them (desk-work). I observed meetings with colleagues, senior members of the organisation, with a private diversity training provider, and DPs at other NHS organisations who were contacts from a master’s degree course on diversity. I also shadowed another specialist, based in a Local Authority, on several occasions. This included: meeting with and advising a children’s services provider; training school children, foster carers, and parents; planning of training; planning an exhibition as part of Black History Month; and various networking meetings with other DPs. This extended exposure to diversity work gave me an experience of the variety of work that the DP role requires but also served to build rapport and offered the chance to witness further naturally-occurring talk of DPs and to have more informal conversations about diversity work that provided additional data for the project.

The three different types of data (interviews, observations, and observation of networking) are relied upon with more or less weight in different areas of the analysis, but particularly with regards to RQ1. This is because the observation data,
gathered in what can be regarded as a public context, yielded different rationalities and subject positions used by DPs in order to construct themselves as compared with data gathered through interview and networks, which were more private spaces among DPs and with me. This is because I was seemingly regarded as an ‘insider’ by DPs, as someone who was seeking to better understand their work from a similar standpoint with which they approach it. This position was fostered because it was expected that being perceived as an insider would help to gain access to the field. I introduced myself to participants as a researcher with a background in gender studies and an interest in how different groups experience work. I also expressed an interest in understanding more about the challenges that DPs face in their work and the approaches they take to it.

The effect of the public/private context on how DPs used different subject positions is explored fully in Chapter Four. There is also a division of the data in Chapter Five where the data that is used to analyse the subject of the DT is largely drawn from consultants. This was a practical issue since, in the sample of participants, it was mostly consultants who conducted training. This means that it is important to be circumspect in generalising the findings that result from the analysis of Chapter Five to the wider population of DPs of different types. More generally, it is important to note that the corpus of texts that were collected and which constitute the data for this research are not intended to be a ‘representative sample from a discursive whole’ and are instead ‘ensembles of utterances which reach out into
different regions of the discursive space’ (Angermuller, 2014: 58) to show the possibilities of meaning that DPs generate and use.

It is worth noting that other aspects of my identity also came into play in establishing trust and rapport with participants. My relatively young age in some cases led to me being positioned as an ‘apprentice’ of diversity work in need of guidance and knowledge (as Parker, 2000a: 237), and as ‘student’ engaged in training for a PhD rather than ‘researcher’. This was useful as it helped me to probe the work of DPs as something unfamiliar. At times during the interview I felt as though I were positioned as an ally or confidant to DPs, an impartial or sympathetic witness to the challenges that they face. This position was likely facilitated by an account of my research background. In only one interview academia was mildly disparaged together with my association with it, the DP positioning herself as having more personal, political, and direct interest in issues of (in)equality. In a minority of cases I was positioned as an expert in diversity and seen as a potential source of consultancy and participants described their experiences, problems, and plans. These subject positions were generally helpful in fostering developed answers to interview questions. At times other aspects of my identity may also have been factors in establishing rapport and eliciting talk on specific topics. As a cisgender woman it is possible that female DPs regarded me as a fellow member of a marginalised group. In another instance, my identity as a woman may have precipitated a participant’s remark about how it was not important that DPs matched the groups they represented (McDonald, 2013): the male DP spoke about
how diversity, which is articulated in terms of being more about everyone than EO (Ahmed, 2007a, Liff, 1997), can also be a form of work practiced by members of majorised groups.

Another form of extended observation that was conducted was that of diversity practitioner networks. Two DP networks were followed in person and online for the period of approximately seven months. The first was a small network of specialist DPs working within the NHS and located in one region of England. The second was a small network of consultant and specialist DPs whose work concerns a particular area of England’s public services. Participants indicated that, although small, such networks were relatively uncommon and so any more specific details about them would potentially compromise the anonymity of the networks and the participants. Other than these, DPs also had personal networks of contacts that they had met through industry or sectoral conferences and events, through undertaking qualifications/accreditations, or by seeking associates with whom to deliver larger projects for organisations.

The next sections examine the methods of interviewing and observation in more detail.

Research techniques
Interviewing

Interviewing is a widely used technique for the collection of data because the data that it collects can be readily documented (see Blaxter et al., 2010: 194), is often rich with detail, and economical of time (Rapley, 2001: 317). Qualitative interviewing is a technique of data collection that is based on conversation, but which breaks with this familiar interaction in that it is guided (Kvale, 1996) and that it is structured by an asymmetrical questioning and answering between researcher and participant (Gubrium and Holstein, 2012: 34, Rubin and Rubin, 2011). Scholars have argued that the interview itself is a piece of interaction in its own right (Nikander, 2012: 398) and can serve as a source of data about power relations (Silverman, 1985: 167). Even when the interview itself is not made the focus of investigation, it is important to recognise that it is a collaborative production (Nikander, 2012: 400) and that it is a text rather than a reflection of the interviewee’s opinions, intentions or beliefs (see Hammersley, 2003). Interviews were regarded in this research as a text in which the DP engages in a practice that produces themselves as ‘specific types of people in relation to the topics of talk’ (Rapley, 2012: 548). This view of interviews is based in a constructionist epistemology (Warren, 2003: 83). Other scholars have also taken this approach to interviews, viewing them as spaces in which people construct, for example their gender (Gill, 1993), age (Nikander, 2002) or, as in the present study, occupation (Marshall, 1994).
My role as an interviewer was, as Rapley suggests, to ‘try to incite the participant to speak and to explore in some detail’ (2012: 549) in order to facilitate the interaction. My role was to encourage DPs to produce accounts of their role and what the aims of their practices were. Interviews were semi-structured with an interview guide that served as an ‘aide-memoire’ (Bryman and Bell, 2003: 343) whilst being flexible enough to facilitate flow and develop rapport. Clusters of questions were designed that they could be asked in any order and that all themes of interest would be addressed whilst avoiding being overly conceptual in academic terms (Kvale, 2008: 58). Interviews began with an open or ‘big picture’ (Janesick, 2014) question eliciting a narrative about the DP’s entrance into diversity work. This and subsequent questions (broad and narrow) aimed to prompt theorising of self, relationships, and of diversity work. These follow-up questions asked for clarifications and comparisons (Janesick, 2014).

Telephone interviews were recorded and transcribed into the software NVivo, a tool designed to facilitate the analysis of qualitative data by offering a framework in which sections of texts can be divided, organised in categories, and different sections of text viewed together. The large majority of the transcription was completed by the researcher but eight interviews were transcribed by two other transcribers – who agreed to protect the confidentiality of the research participants – due to limitations of time. Transcribing most of the interviews myself allowed for a simultaneous process of reflection on and ongoing analysis of the text (Bryman and Bell, 2003: 335) and so additional attention was paid to re-listening to the interviews.
that were transcribed by others not only to check for errors but to develop a similar sense of familiarity with them. Having access to transcribed texts allowed for multiple forms of reading of the material to gain familiarity and to begin to make connections between texts. Face-to-face interviews were not recorded, with one exception, and instead detailed notes were taken and imported. This was due to practical limitations of the public settings in which meetings with participants were arranged. Public locations were preferred because they represented a neutral forum (Mikecz, 2012) in which DPs could reflect on and talk about their experiences that was neither associated with organisations for which they worked, nor involved meeting participants in their private spaces (many consultants worked principally from home). The first face-to-face interview was recorded on tape but was of poor quality making the transcription of the interview labour-intensive and unreliable at some moments when background noises were particularly intrusive. The participant also remarked on the presence of the tape recorder twice during the interview, which I understood to mean that it was a cause of discomfort. As Warren notes, a tape recorder can have different meanings to different people depending on what form of interaction and power relation it is associated with (2003: 91), but I found that in interviews with DPs it did seem to present a barrier. This may be related to the idea that the interview represented a private space to DPs, something that is explored in the analysis of the data in Chapter Four. In remaining face-to-face interviews, the decision was made not to tape record and whilst the taking of notes in front of an interviewee could potentially have been distracting, I did not find this to be a hindrance on the flow of the conversation. The loss in the richness of the
discursive detail of these interviews was somewhat offset by the removal of the tape-recorder barrier.

*Observing*

Observation features highly in qualitative research as a method for gaining ‘first-hand’ (Van Maanen, 1983: 255) impressions of a social phenomenon. The observer seeks to turn ‘the world on its head to make it unfamiliar’ (Sanger, 1996: 8) in order to probe that which is implicit or assumed in interactions. The approach that was taken in the present study was to undertake observation periodically (Daly, 2007: 97) and in a range of different organisations, rather than as an ethnography which requires a long period of time to be spent generally within one context (Sanda, 1983: 20). The purpose of undertaking observations was initially to collect data about how DPs talked about their roles in a natural context, i.e. to clients and other members of organisations. Secondarily, however, it was also used as an opportunity to have further informal conversations with DPs and to get an overall sense of their work. Like interviews, the status of observation data was regarded as a form of text that provides a set of discourses for analysis, rather than as a factual comparator to validate a rhetoric of DPs’ work in interviews. This issue is addressed further in the discussion of validity of the research.
The observations were all conducted overtly and I took up a mixture of participant-as-observer, observer-as-participant, and complete observer roles (Bryman and Bell, 2003: 324) depending on the context. The decision as to whether or not to participate in the activities of the observed event was sometimes made alone, for example it would have been disruptive to have participated in a meeting between a DP and senior board members, and sometimes it was made in conjunction with DPs. Collaborative decisions generally related to diversity training where the DP was able to draw on their knowledge of the audience and consider whether or not it would be disruptive for me to participate. For example, in the training of the staff at an adult care provider, the DPs leading the workshop judged that participation would be unsettling to the dynamics of the group because the staff members, who worked very closely together, had strong existing relationships with one another. In another training session with providers at a free advice service, the staff did not have such strong relationships because they tended to work alone and in shifts. The observer-as-participant role was taken up on occasions where I primarily observed but helped the DP with things such as the distribution of materials to trainees.

Although all observations were done overtly, where I did not participate I attempted to reduce my visibility as an outsider in the room, including preparing how I was dressed before an observation to mirror the expected audience and the manner in which I took notes at the time of the observation. Where I participated, I undertook all of the exercises that trainees were asked to complete and although some trainees seemed initially to distance themselves from me, for example with
remarks about how I was the ‘expert’ during exercises, I attempted to downplay this in order to minimise the effect that I had on how the exercises were performed and managed by the DP. Sometimes it was possible to take what Emerson et al, (2011) call ‘jotted notes’ at the time of the observation, for example in training, but at others I made my notes as soon as I could afterwards (Gibbs, 2008), for example in the car (Liamputtong, 2010) or toilet (Spradley, 1970). I also recorded reflections on the observation using voice-memos (Kvale, 2008: 56) which helped me later to recall my impressions of the event. Field-notes and memos are initial ways of making sense of the data (Liamputtong, 2010: 159) and provide a tangible record of the phenomenon that can be analysed through categorising and coding (Sanda, 1983: 21). These descriptions served as ‘maps’ of the event that were used during the analysis (Van Maanen, 1983: 9).

**Analysis**

As discussed earlier in the chapter, the analysis of the data was integrated with the development of the research framework: an iterative process of forming research questions from the literature, collecting and examining the data, reflecting on appropriate concepts with which to interpret it, and refining questions in the collection of further data accordingly (Bryman and Bell, 2003: 238). In practice, this meant that as diversity training and potential differences between consultant and specialist DPs became topics of interest during the data collection and analysis of these early texts, I subsequently reviewed available literature on these topics and
sought out further opportunities to observe training and to ask DPs about training and their employment status in interviews.

A discourse analysis (DA) approach was selected to guide the analytical method for the research because it is a research perspective that is ‘concerned with the relationship between speaking/writing as activity or social practices and the (re)production of meaning systems/orders of knowledge, the social actors involved in this, the rules and resources underlying these processes, and their consequences in social collectivities.’ (Keller, 2013: 2). DA is an ‘umbrella designator’ (Nikander, 2012: 397) for a variety of techniques of treating the data because it is used in a number of different scholarly fields – Gill (2000) counts at least 57 ways of doing DA. However, all approaches to DA share a constructionist view of social relations (Nikander, 2012: 397) and are united by a concerned with discourse as a central feature of social reality. This thesis takes the perspective of Phillips and Hardy towards the utility of DA: ‘Without discourse, there is no social reality, and without understanding discourse, we cannot understand our reality, our experiences, or ourselves.’ (Phillips and Hardy, 2002: 2).

DA is not a codified method (Carabine, 2001, Liamputtong, 2010, Miles, 1983) and there are many forms of DA (including Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough, 1992, Wodak and Meyer, 2009), Feminist Postructural Discourse Analysis (Baxter, 2008), and the Sociology of Knowledge Approach to Discourse (Keller, 2013)).
Analytical techniques of DA range on a scale from a more fine-grained analysis of text, which pays attention to the (co)construction and rules of communication by examining linguistic devices; to a more broad-brush approach, which looks at entire phrases and sections of text to identify the meanings conveyed within it, connections between ideas and with other texts/discourses (intertextuality), and subject positions created for the speaker and interlocutor; and to a wide cultural-historical approach that is concerned with the transformation of bodies of knowledge over time (see Lemke, 2011: 80). The present research took the second, broad-brush, approach to analysing the texts because the chief interest of the research was in the forms of knowledge that were being used by DPs to create subject positions. This did require attention to how subject positions shifted within sections of a text because discerning the meaning of any utterance necessitates attention to the specific use of language, but the intention of not presenting a detailed analysis of this was to avoid overshadowing the meaning being conveyed in different fragments of text with the ‘how’ of the linguistic devices themselves. Following Foucault, my approach was chiefly concerned with ‘how truth effects are created within discourses’ (Kvale, 2008: 112), but it differed from the approach that Foucault took in his own historical work by focusing on the discourses being used within a defined context.

DA is best described as an ‘analytic mentality’ (Bryman and Bell, 2003: 394): the specific questions that the researcher asks of the text during DA depend on the theoretical framework in use (Keller, 2013: 3). The questions that were posed to the
text were guided by the sub-questions generated in the initial review of the literature and later also by the Foucauldian framework. This style of analysis is appropriate to the interpretive and poststructural theoretical framework because it is directed at showing ‘how’ (Liampittong, 2010: 288) DPs construct themselves as particular forms of subject, and how they construct a desired subject that they wish to achieve through diversity training. The aim was to bring to light what Silverman refers to as participants’ ‘common-sense devices for making sense of the environment’ (1985: 166).

Within DA, interpretation of the data happens throughout the process of transcription, organising the data, and writing up (Gill, 2000: 177), in ‘the syntax, the metaphors, the juxtaposition of information, the special highlighting of data, and the very act of overall summarizing.’ (Sanger, 1996: 69) It involves the classifying of data and comparison of it in order to ‘extract meaning’ (Rubin and Rubin, 2011: 204). Transcripts and notes were read and re-read multiple times and additional memos, interpretations, and reflections were made throughout these readings as patterns emerged and connections between texts were made. Coding is a process of deciding what different parts of the data are about (Charmaz, 2006: 43) used to ‘organise the data in a more meaningful way’ (Liampittong, 2010: 277) and to sensitise the researcher (Keller, 2013: 109) to the content of the text. Coding allowed for a highlighting of ‘component parts that seem to be of potential theoretical significance and/or that appear to be particularly salient within the social worlds of those being studied.’ (Bryman and Bell, 2003: 429). Transcripts and field-
notes were openly coded (Strauss and Corbin, 1990b, Strauss and Corbin, 1990a: 61) into general themes (such as ‘community and co-workers’, ‘approach’, and ‘finding work’) before axial codes, which describe relationships between parts of the data (Strauss and Corbin, 1990a: 69), were used to make connections between categories. I was conscious throughout the process not to overly rely on coding as a method of analysis beyond management of the data since such an approach is not well suited to discourse analysis since it can give a false sense of structure and is difficult to reconcile with the multiplicity of possible meaning within a text (Wood and Kroger, 2000: 33). The aim of this process was not only to look for patterns of discourses drawn upon and subject positions constructed by DPs, but was also to draw attention to their complexity and contradictions in order to show the possibilities of the field. As Lather states of critical qualitative research, ‘its goal is to foster understanding, reflection and action instead of a narrow translation of research into practice’ (2006: 788).

The next section examines how the Foucauldian framework has impacted on how the validity of the research can be determined and the types of claim it can make. It also discusses the ethical considerations that were made in the research design.

Validity of the research
The status of claims

As discussed in Chapter One, Foucault does not equate ‘knowledge’ to scientific knowledge, in the sense that the latter is ahistorical and generalizable, but nor does he relativise knowledge since he recognises that not all truth-claims are equal (see Taylor, 2010: 81). In his genealogies, Foucault sought to describe how what counted as truth changes between different historical periods (Dean, 2003: 2). Taking inspiration from this approach to research and the concepts that Foucault developed to theorise forms of knowledge and power relations, other scholars have sought to describe what counts as truth in present contexts and to elaborate the conditions of production of those truths.

Foldy (2002) describes how the different approaches to power in diversity research contribute different insights: mainstream research investigates how A exerts power over B explicitly, critical research explains how A exerts power over B explicitly and covertly, and Foucauldian research examines how power relations are constitutive of A and B. It is the constitutive elements of the two subjects of diversity (the diversity practitioner and the diversity trainee), in the form of power/knowledge or ‘discourse’, that are the focus of data analysis. Fairclough describes the constituent nature of discourse: ‘discourse is a practice not just of representing the world, but of signifying the world, constituting and constructing the world in meaning’ (Fairclough, 1992: 64). The emphasis of the research is on depicting and
interpreting ‘the reality that is constructed by participants’ (Bryman and Bell, 2003: 394) and to reconstruct the ‘rule system’ (Keller, 2013: 46) by which certain things can legitimately be said by certain people. Discourse analysis is thus a mapping out of the possibilities for how the world is understood.

DA is ‘deeply empirical’ and can be seen as ‘non-interpretative’ (Keller, 2013: 49) in that it does not search for structures of reality, instead focussing on observing utterances and patterns of speech. However, knowledge produced within a Foucauldian framework remains interpretative and perspectival (see Prado, 2000) because its production involves value judgments about the significance, causes and implications of the discourses and subject positions within the data studied. Furthermore, the researcher is enmeshed in a field of power/knowledge much like the participants of the research. There is no ‘view from nowhere’ (1986) from which the researcher can view the phenomenon of interest in order to deconstruct reality, to reveal its true essence or mechanisms. A researcher’s view therefore cannot be said to be truthful in contrast to untruthful accounts given by participants in the research. A participant is not regarded as ‘vessel of answers’ about a particular reality (Holstein and Gubrium, 2004: 149).

Nevertheless, this thesis yields new interpretations of DPs and the training they provide by viewing the field from a different vantage point, a position beyond individual experience of practice by gathering data from across a number of DPs.
This offers the possibility of comparison, the highlighting of common and/or contested concepts. However, in interpretative research, the use of different sources and forms of data does not offer the possibility of ‘triangulation’ (Denzin, 1970), whereby one source of data is used to authenticate the truthfulness of another. For example, within research from other perspectives, interview accounts of a practice may be authenticated by observations of that practice. In the present research, the different forms of data – interviews, observations, and emails – are regarded as texts of ontological equivalence, they are treated as media through which discourses are (re)produced. Social data of different forms are seen by Foucault as the media of ‘truth games’ which ‘produce our sense of who we are and how we should live’ (Brewis, 1998: 61).

Because interpretive research cannot be externally validated, its purpose can be said to be to depict the phenomenon in terms that are plausible and that ‘ring true’. The internal validity of such research relies on ‘whether there is a good match between researchers’ observations and the theoretical ideas they develop’ (Bryman and Bell, 2003: 288), this is a ‘consensus theory of truth’ (Knights and Collinson, 1987: 458). Furthermore, knowledge produced by research is inevitably partisan (Silverman, 2006: 357) influenced by researchers’ personal and political sympathies, and how they represent themselves to others during the research process. Becker argues that this does not paralyse social research since these can be reflected upon, in an attempt to make clear who benefits from the knowledge produced and the factors that have influenced its production (1967: 247), although there is debate over the
extent to which reflexivity is possible (Lynch, 2000), and whether too much can be undesirable (Parker, 2000b). Taking the view that reflexivity is a normative ideal that cannot be fully attained but which is strived for, the place of the researcher within the research is considered during this chapter.

The purpose of the present research is to ‘disrupt the present’ (Fejes and Dahlstedt, 2013: 107). Discourse analysis is ‘based on an assumption that everything we perceive, experience, sense is mediated through socially constructed and typified knowledge (e.g. a schemata of meanings, interpretations and actions) – a knowledge that is, to varying degrees, recognized as legitimate and “objective” (Keller, 2013: 61) – and aims to challenge the assumption of that objectivity. It is to show how the taken-for-granted (Silverman, 2007) practices of self-formation that take place within the field of diversity are ‘dangerous’ (Foucault, 1983a: 231) in that they have real effects for what can be done, to whom, and by whom. It is hoped that such criticism ‘can be a real power for change, depriving some practices of their self-evidence, extending the bounds of the thinkable to permit the invention of others.’ (Burchell et al., 1991: x).

**Ethical considerations**
An ethics report was completed and approved by the Humanities & Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee (HSSREC) at University of Warwick. In compiling this, I reflected on both general and field-specific ethical considerations that needed to be made in designing the research.

In all research, but in particular qualitative research in which rich data is gathered about people’s experience, researchers occupy a position of power with regards to the interpretation and use of participant data (Oakley, 1981). Benney and Hughes point out that there are obvious benefits to the researcher, but gains for the participant are less obvious (1956: 139). One way of recognising this imbalance is to make clear the researcher’s role in the production of knowledge (Abell and Myers, 2008: 147). This has been done to an extent in this chapter by acknowledging that the present account of the field does not constitute a claim to a ‘better’ understanding of the two subjects of interest, though neither can it be subsumed to individual DP accounts. It offers instead a novel theoretically-informed reading of them, by providing reflections on the way that participants positioned me during interactions. Furthermore, participants were offered a summary of the research after its completion to which they readily agreed. This not only provides a show of transparency of the research and goes some way to reducing the disparity in how the research is of value to the researcher as compared to the participant, but also promises to offer up the text for debate (Parker, 1995) to both practitioners and scholars as part of the ongoing validation of its utility to each group (Finlay, 2002, Parker, 2000b).
More generally in the writing and presentation of the data, the researcher has a responsibility to consider the potential impact on participants of the research, as Sanger explains:

As researchers we are always walking the fine line of how much people should know about our activities and how unobtrusive we can be, in order to gather ‘authentic’ data. […] The researcher, given his/her privileged status and knowledge of the consequences of research activities, must protect, as well as possible, participants who are unaware of the consequences research and evaluation may have for them. (1996: 36)

In relation to this, it was important to consider issues of consent and anonymity of the research. Participants consented verbally or in a written document to the use of their remarks for the purposes of the present thesis and further educational texts. The issue of fully informed consent is debated in the research ethics literature (see Bryman and Bell, 2003: 542-543) but efforts were made to communicate the general interest of the project in the work of DPs and that the specific theoretical focus of it would develop throughout. All participants consented to partake in the study verbally and most also returned signed information/consent forms, a copy is supplied in Appendix Five. These forms describe the research in the general terms that were set out at the beginning. I remained in contact with participants
throughout the project, frequently updating the description of the research on my online profiles as it progressed, such that they were aware of its development and reassured of the commitment to provide them with feedback on it.

Anonymity of research participants is not always possible or desirable but in many cases it is important to establishing a relationship of trust with participants (Walford, 2005). Blaxter et al. suggest that interviews are a useful research tool because they are relatively easy to keep anonymous (2010: 194). This is true except in cases where participants were recruited by referral, a technique that was relied upon in this research. This means that to some extent the anonymity of those DPs who were recruited by referral is compromised to some degree, but I attempted to mitigate the ethical implications of this by not confirming with referring DPs whether the people they suggested had taken up the invitation to participate. I also did not consider any of the information that referred DPs supplied to be harmful in content to those DPs who had referred them.

Observations, however, involved a number of people who were made aware that the DP was participating in research. In such settings, it can be difficult to obtain formal consent from all parties but actions can be taken to ‘demonstrate respect for the rights and welfare of the participants’ (Reynolds, 1982: 39). In observation settings I always introduced myself as a researcher and the agreement that people in the room would be anonymised was largely unspoken, indicating that the
conventions of research are largely known. Diversity training also had its own conventions of the training room as being a confidential ‘safe’ space.

Assurances were given to DPs that their remarks would be anonymised in any outcomes of the research. This presents a particular challenge in the field of diversity work as the number of DPs is relatively small and some are tightly networked. In order to mitigate this, quotes were edited in order to remove any distinctive speech patterns, and specific details of the relationships between practitioners and the organisations for which they work has not been recorded here. Individual participants were allocated pseudonyms rather than numbers in order to avoid objectifying them within the text. Descriptions of their roles and organisational affiliations needed to balance anonymity with the advantages of a more complete and precise description (Reynolds, 1982: 62). Organisations such as the IEDP and EDF were not anonymised because there was no perceived potential for harm to them as a result of the thesis and their unique natures meant that they would in any case be readily identifiable within the field.

The next chapter is the first of the two empirical chapters in which the methods outlined have been applied. Chapter Four is the longer of the two and contains detailed analysis of the subject positions constructed within interviews that DPs use in constructing their subject as an expert within the field of diversity work. Chapter
Five draws on observation as well as interview data in order to delve into the subject positions that provide a clue to the type of subject that DPs wish to create of their trainees. Both chapters deal with the issue of power/knowledge; the first specifically with the triangle of the DP being both active subject involved in self-formation (subjectivation), being subject to wider societal discourses, and the influence of the subject/discipline of diversity itself; and the second principally with a modern government form of power which seeks control through shaping knowledge of the subject.
Chapter Four – Constructing the ‘diversity practitioner’

The previous chapter laid out the methodology of this research and the methods that were used to gather and analyse the empirical data. The results of this process are presented now in two chapters, Chapter Four responds to the first research question: How do diversity practitioners construct themselves as expert subjects? (RQ1). The three sub-questions generated in Chapter Two guide the presentation of the findings.

Some of the subject positions outlined relate to each other as what may be termed ‘components’, where there are strong similarities in what the subject positions seek to achieve, but have a different inflection. Others relate to each other as ‘supplements’ where they are separate subject positions that are woven together in *bricolage*. Two of the subject positions are ‘antagonisms’ to one another, where their aims are contrasting.
Part One

How do diversity practitioners construct the relationship between themselves and their organisation/clients? (RQa)

In existing literature there are two root metaphors that have been used to theorise the role of the DP: diversity work as ‘explaining’ (Schwabenland and Tomlinson, 2015: 19) and as ‘translating’ (Ahmed, 2007a). In Chapter Two these metaphors were challenged as being comprehensive descriptions of the role of the DP by the idea that all re-articulation of concepts involves the production of a new form of knowledge. This means that DPs can be considered producers of knowledge about diversity but also, crucially, about themselves. The first sub-question about the relationship between the DP and their organisation/clients seeks to contribute to building up a picture of the DP role, as it is constructed by them.

From analysing interviews with DPs, six types of relationship emerged. They have been labelled: ‘educator’, ‘provocateur’, ‘comforter’, ‘warrior’, ‘cynic’, and ‘conduit’. These subject positions pertain to the rationalities of relationship that DPs used in order to construct themselves as subjects, to incite themselves to discourse (Foucault, 1998/1978: 17). These are not mutually exclusive positions but were instead woven together in bricolage. In the following sections the six subject positions will be outlined in turn.
The concept of the *parrhesia* will be used during this analysis. It provides a set of tools to characterise and evaluate the different subject positions by considering their relationship to knowledge. *Parrhesia* describes the role that someone can play in producing knowledge about oneself or others, the different relationships this can involve with others, and different relationships to knowledge that statements can have: as local knowledge (strategic, or contingent) or scientific knowledge (universal, generalisable). These positions have been summarised in Appendix Two.

![Diagram of subject positions](image-url)

*Figure 1 Subject positions that construct relations between diversity practitioner and their organisation/clients*
The first subject position that DPs took on was that of someone who educates their client about a problem and/or method, that is what diversity is and/or how to do it. Sometimes the organisation needed to be ‘diagnosed’ (Sturdy, 1997: 399). As Gerry-C explained, “sometimes the problem in training [is] that people don’t realise that there’s a problem - you almost have to educate the customer that there is a problem”. The DPs weren’t always talking about training: Carole-C agreed that the role of the DP is to “get them [the client] to understand what they should be doing and working constructively with them, and where they are, to get them to where you think they ought to be”. In this way, the DP acts much like a knowledge worker (Alvesson, 2001) framing the problem of diversity (or lack of it) within the organisation. In other cases, several DPs talked about helping an organisation, which had already been diagnosed, to implement its plans: “helping them to collect the evidence” (Amy-C), “help businesses […] to remove the barriers” (Annette-C), “help them to develop a plan” (Joan-C). This subject position was found across DPs in the sample working with private, public, and third sector organisations. The DP acts as a basanos (a guide/touchstone) in this case, promoting an alignment between how the organisation wants to be and their practice.

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4 Key ideas have been emboldened as a navigation aide
In taking up the position of educator, the DP is positioned as a conduit for knowledge:

“I’m very clear that, you know, part of our job is to give our clients honest feedback […] I can only tell the company what might be good for them and what they might want to do, but it’s up to them whether they do it or not.

I’m not on a crusade […] I’m an enabler” (Andy-C)

The neutrality that Andy-C constructed for himself in the quote above shows the positioning of the DP-as-educator as the provider of objective, “honest” knowledge about the problem an organisation has and how it can best be solved. Andy-C is clear that he does not act to try to enforce his recommendations. This is in keeping with, if an extension of, the notion that DPs help rather than discipline the client as suggested by the other DPs quoted above. Further, the position of educator to a noticeable extent tended to be expressed by consultants rather than the specialists. This could be because consultants have precarious employment relations with organisations, working for them on isolated projects, which inhibits them from acting as basanos proper. The neutrality and lack of responsibility for enforcement implicated in the educator role may offset this.

5 Quotes have been subject to minor editing: hesitations and repeated words have been removed, and punctuation added to improve readability. Distinctive speech patterns that could compromise the anonymity of the participant have also been removed. Interjections by the interviewer are indicated in angled brackets <> and ellipses in square brackets […]. Emphasised words are italicised.
A further way that the ‘educator’ role was articulated was through encouraging people to ‘think for themselves’. This form of critical thinking, tends to involve a seeking of scientific knowledge by DPs. Gerry-C said that his role was to “present them [clients] with the facts” and to “help them make their own decisions” about things like news stories in the press. But he also indicated that he hoped to “steer them towards a more balanced, a more fair, a more equal” way of thinking. This steering is equated by Gerry-C to the correction of knowledge to an objective truth, to “a more accurate way of thinking”. This idea is reinforced in how he described the knowledge that the press presents: “the media pushes out so many untruths that sometimes you need to say to people ‘well look’ you know, [...] you start breaking that story down that what they’ve written makes no sense, it’s factually incorrect, it's inflammatory”. Ian-C too juxtaposed the information in the press to the truth: “I’d always take the view that it’s about trying to get people to think for themselves...and not be led by the nose...by the Daily Mail or...whatever poisonous trite [sic.] there is that they get their ideas from.”

As noted in Chapter Two, scholars have remarked on the lack of clarity about how to implement diversity (Jones, 2007, Lorbiecki and Jack, 2000), and though DPs were able to give some specific examples of what could be considered best practice in promoting diversity and inclusion, it was clear that there are gaps in advice for best practice where norms are still to be established. This means that DPs are sometimes unable to give definitive recommendations. Though DPs did not talk about
uncertainty within diversity work directly, as in Schwabenland and Tomlinson (2015), it was implied in the need for best practice be negotiated and worked out on a client-by-client basis. Observing correspondence across two email networks one of specialist DPs based in health services and another of specialist and consultant DPs working with a department of service-provision within local government, ad-hoc appeals were made to fellow DPs for information or advice about what they considered best practice for handling diversity issues. The circulation of recommendations among practitioners indicates a lack of formality in diversity knowledge. Ian-C, who works mainly with school staff, explained:

“The email network is very valued because, for example, if someone spots something in the news, a court case or a new piece of guidance that comes out, so what they’ll do is they’ll circulate it to the network […] If somebody writes some useful guidance that other people might be able to borrow, then we circulate that…”

As another example, during an observation of a diversity training session at a free public advice service, a question was raised by a trainee that drew attention to a specific uncertainty in the concept of diversity: The trainee, who provided advice services, asked what she should do if someone refused to see her on the grounds that she was a woman, something that had happened when her combined gender and status conflicted with the service user’s cultural norms. She called this ‘reverse discrimination’. In this instance, Jamil-C could not appeal to the EA2010 – which
imposes a duty on service providers but not private citizens – and instead recommended the use of judgement and compromise in the local context. This rupture in the ability for diversity to provide scientific knowledge about how one should act extends what we already know about the translation of the cases for diversity in local contexts (Ahmed, 2007a, Foster and Harris, 2005) suggesting that diversity practice itself is also highly localised. This indicates that a normalising power (Foucault, 1991/1977) is in operation, not from a central formalising body, but among DPs, gradually establishing the ‘rules of the game’.

The educator role echoes that of the ‘explaining’ role expressed in Schwabenland and Tomlinson (2015). By examining the subject positions taken up by DPs in accounts of their work, this study reveals four further subject positions that contribute to the DP-subject. These will be outlined in the sections that follow.

**Provocateur**

DPs also took up a position that was not oriented towards the transfer of particular forms of knowledge to the client, but is a component of the ‘educator’ subject position (see Figure 1). This position was concerned with challenging what organisational actors thought they already knew. For example, in reference to a traffic-light system that he used to evaluate his clients’ equality and diversity practices Charles-C said,
“I always say to people that you’re probably going to get some uncomfortable messages […] you’re probably going to have quite a few ambers, maybe a couple of greens, and probably you’re not going to get as many as you think”

Ian-C also described **provoking discomfort** in the client as being important to the role that he plays as a DP:

“I do actually like stirring things up and then opening a can of worms and then going home [laughs heartily] […] because they are important issues and they are fundamental to human life and they are very challenging. If they’re not challenging, then they’re not thinking about it properly.”

Ian-C is clearer than Charles-C in his statement about the de-stabilising of client’s knowledge and getting them “thinking about it” as being an end in itself, but other DPs also took up the position by speaking about “making people think” (Erin-C), that “this is what training is about, challenge” (Emily-C). Andy-C referred to the need to be a “critical friend” when dealing with organisations. Susanne-C recalled a time when working with a government department she “upset that apple cart, which was great!”, and Rebecca-C describes that as she conducts her training with clients “they realise that actually there’s something they need to do because they
don’t have all the answers”. In this subject position, DP’s chiefly seek to challenge others as being ‘knowing’ subjects. Jamil was also observed, in a training session delivered to the staff of a public advisory service, to frequently ask probing ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions when trainees responded to his questions.

Ava-SP, a British DP of Jamaican heritage, talked about how she extended this into her personal life, liking to “embarrass” people. For example, she spoke of a time when a colleague of hers was looking at a family photo she had on her desk and mistook her daughter, who has short hair, for a boy. Her colleague was shocked when she pointed to her actual son who is a fair-skinned and fair-haired boy. In another anecdote she pretended to have booked her daughter who had afro hair into a hair salon that doesn’t usually cater to this hair texture, causing surprise and a ‘lost appointment’ before she presented her straight-haired daughter. In her proud recounting of these tales to me, such events seemed to Ava-SP to be an extension of her diversity work in the opportunities they presented to draw attention to the assumptions that people make about others. In my field-notes I reflected: “she seems to like to make trouble, likes make people think. If she embarrasses people slightly, she doesn’t seem to mind.”

Ahmed (2010) has previously associated diversity with the concept of ‘happiness’, that it promises a carefree and unproblematic vision of the future. In the subject position of ‘provocateur’ used by DP’s in this study it seems that, in contrasting
terms, discomfort is also something that diversity work can provide organisations with. In connection with this, in the literature, diversity has generally been associated with a gentler relationship with organisations (Ahmed, 2007a). This concept of provocation calls to mind the Cynic tradition of parrhesia where the individual is overtly challenged by the basanos (Foucault, 1999/1983b: ‘Socratic Parhessia’, para. 13). It may be that discomfort is related to happiness, that it occurs en route to happiness, for the provocation is caused by a conflict of knowledge: a moment of recognition by the client of a problem, of one’s existing state of unhappiness, the remedy to which can potentially be found through good diversity practices.

In the literature, EO has been criticised for provoking organisations, and receiving backlash from them as a result (Hemphill and Haines, 1997, Mobley and Payne, 1992). Diversity is thought to have carved out a distinctive position by being more aligned with the business case than with the social justice case associated with EO (Liff, 1997). In the extant literature it seems that this shift in balance between the two cases indicates a shift from a position of conflict with organisations to an alignment with them. But there is a potentially crucial difference in how DPs act as provoqueurs that means that their challenges are likely to be accepted. In this research, there is evidence that the business case can also be articulated as a form of provocation rather than alignment with organisations. This idea will be explored now.
At times DPs evoked what might be characterised as moral reasons for why organisations should follow diversity recommendations, whatever they may be, meaning that it is understood as being the “right thing to do” (James-C). The role of DPs was described as being the “conscience of the organisation” (Sophie-C). This was also referred to directly as “the moral case” (Joan-C), or the “ethical case” (Sophie-C). But these comments did not appear as frequently as those that emphasised a business case for diversity: Nearly all of the consultants used the specific phrase “business case” along with the specialists in the private sector (Emma-SP, Jen-SP). One consultant said explicitly that he preferred to appeal to the “business case, not to the moral-social responsibilities” of an organisation (Jamil-C) and similarly another insisted that she was not an “activist” but instead a “businesswoman” (Erin-C). However, specialists working in public or third-sector organisations also used the rationality of diversity as benefiting their organisations in talking about how promoting diversity and inclusion could help improve service-provision and consultation (Harry-SP, Sarah-SP) and fundraising (Claire-SP), echoing Tomlinson and Schwabenland’s (2010) findings that the business and social justice cases can overlap in the third sector. Only one DP expressed outright disapproval and that shifting to a focus on diversity was “a bit of a sop to move away from the language ‘cause I think that’s just to appease people who feel threatened by it [equality]” (Oliver-C).

Aside from the variations in how the business case was used, the key finding on how DPs use cases is the very possibility that the business case can be articulated as
a way of challenging organisations. The following quotes illustrate where a direct connection between challenging the organisation and business benefit, though as already outline above, other DPs also took up ‘provocateur’ positions:

“Challenging and changing a dominant culture is very difficult. […] Sometimes you have to be radical […] Organisations are at commercial risk because they are not going to be recruiting – [although] they might say they are – recruiting people that are different.” (Allen-C)

“The problem is that the, kind of, economic pressures have overtaken and they are looking at short term cost savings and business approaches and not thinking bigger picture: about employee motivation, how to keep the good people they have got, who they are going to attract when they do grow, and that kind of thing.” (Rebecca-C)

This differs slightly from how the business case has generally been theorised in the literature: it still represents a way that DPs align themselves with organisational interests, but instead of being a neutral guide or basanos to the organisation, the DP is positioned as an outsider-provocateur. In the quotes presented earlier in this section, we have seen that taking up a position of challenge in relation to the organisation can be important to the subject of the DP. By positioning the **business case as a challenge**, the DP is able to maintain a subject position of ‘provocateur’
whilst using the currency of the business case. What could otherwise be considered
evidence of the DP being part of the ‘we’ of the organisation is actually articulated
as oppositional to it.

Although utterances that connected business case directly to ‘provocateur’ were not
located frequently among DPs, many used both at some point during their
interview or when they were observed conducting training. It’s very possibility
means that it is worth considering what wider use might mean for what is being
sought and achieved by DPs. On the one hand, if being positioned as an outsider-
provocateur is important to DPs, but the social justice case is not a necessary part of
that subject position, then this may mean that the social justice case becomes
increasingly displaced, colonised, and erased from the toolkit of rationalities that
DPs draw upon. This potentially means that ‘equality’ will become less and less the
outcome that is being argued for. Ultimately, this suggests that the business case
has a form of power that has not previously been identified in research on diversity.
It has been noted that diversity has ‘currency’ thanks to its alignment with existing
discourses of business and the market (Ahmed, 2007a), and that being able to
command it as a narrative is a skill of the DP (Ozbilgin and Tatli, 2006). However,
the examples found in this study suggest that the business case can also offer a way
for DPs to position themselves as outsiders, to defend against potential accusations
of being sell-outs or as co-opted, without the help of the social justice case. On the
other hand, the ‘provocateur’ subject position also offers the potential to hold DPs
to account. As long as DPs utilise the subject position of ‘provocateur’ as part of
their subjectivities as experts, that they want to be seen as being challenging to organisations, this opens up an opportunity for academics, activists, and others to debate whether and how they do so.

It is also important to draw attention to the type of subject formation that is in process here. In many cases, it is possible to interpret the subject position of ‘provocateur’ as the active construction of a subject position as resistance to the dominant rationalities according to which the organisation currently operates. However, in the cases where it becomes articulate with the business case, the subject position of provocateur can be seen as evidence of how DPs are subject to the organisational discourse of the centrality of business above all other concerns.

The analysis of this subject position begins to bring into focus how the DP is formed in a bricolage of subject positions. DPs are subject to the powerful discourses of objective, scientific knowledge highlighted in the previous section, but are also a knowing subjects in themselves (Foucault, 1994/1982b: 331) engaged in subjectivation, actively position themselves as provocateurs in relation to the organisations for which they work. It is possible however for the ‘provocateur’ position to be itself subject to – when articulated through the business case. This particular articulation of the business case has the potential to squeeze out the social justice case in cases where DPs want to be seen as outsiders to the organisations for which they work.
The next section describes a subject position of the DP, which starkly contrasts that of the provocateur, and whose existence points to the liminal position that the DP occupies.

**Comforter**

The third position that DPs took up, supplements the concept of educating the organisation but is an antagonism to the position of ‘provocateur’ as it has contrasting aims (see Figure 1). It is of someone who reassures the organisation and comforts it. This position was constructed through the notion that organisations and organisational actors fear diversity in some way, for example:

“I think people are frightened about equality and diversity […] I think people are frightened still of making mistakes” (John-C)

“…there’s quite a lot of people feeling like they’re treading on eggshells” (Isabelle-SP)
“...perhaps scared is too strong a word the - they’re frightened of reaction of the reaction that they’re going to receive... or they’re frightened of their own reaction to the individual” (Annette-C)

This was sometimes implicitly connected with being a legacy of the way that EO officers dealt with organisations, as implied for example by John using the qualifier “still” in the quote above, by Carole-C in the assumptions she describes that organisations can make about her: “they fear I might frighten the horses, when in fact I don’t”, and also more explicitly by Tess-C:

“There were a lot of trainers that went out there with a very confrontational ‘all white people are racist’, ‘you can’t ask for a black coffee because it’s racist’, ‘you can’t call a blackboard a “blackboard” because it’s racist’ and it all got very silly and it turned people off. [...] I came across a lot of trainers who were confrontational and switching people off. People became frightened to talk about it in case they said the wrong thing and got their heads bitten off.”

John-C, too, asserts that one thing that his trainees appreciate is that he allows them to ‘talk about issues openly’ and is not ‘pulling them up immediately every two minutes’. Ian-C, who spoke the most extensively about wanting to provoke
organisations explaining that he likes to “rock the boat” and that he likes “a bit of an argument”, also explained that he balanced this approach and that he is:

“...kind of challenging but I’m kind of nice with it you know, you have to be nice with it. [...] You don’t want to give people the excuse to say ‘oh well I don’t want to have anything to do with him’”

Tess-C also expressed that her challenges didn’t tend to provoke backlash as EO is purported to have done in the literature:

“...usually they’re very receptive to my challenge, if I said ‘do you realise that by saying that you might be excluding?’ ‘Oh I hadn’t thought about that; we’ll change the wording.’ And they’re usually pretty open to listening to suggestions.”

It is not possible to say from this data and methodology whether organisational actors are really frightened of diversity or not, since a Foucauldian approach does not distinguish between rhetoric and reality in what people say, but what is salient here is that by positioning organisations as fearful of issues around diversity and how to speak about difference correctly, DPs are in a position to offer value in their comforting of organisations: Annette-C tries to “teach people to overcome their own
personal fears of how they’re going to treat somebody who has a disability” and Isabelle argues that her work involves “debunking some of peoples' fears”.

Catherine-C also tries to soothe people’s fears because, she says “fear shuts the mind down” (quoted from notes from interview). James-C explained how “fear” can be thought of by some as the only thing that will get people to do things differently but that he does not agree with this. John-C says that he tries to “make the training interesting and fun and relaxed, so they can ask any questions they want”.

Furthermore, a number of DPs mentioned a desire to create “safe” or “open” spaces (Jamil-C, Gerry-C, Catherine-C, Emily-C), that they have the “ability to get them [clients/trainees] to open up […] without feeling as though you’re reprimanding them” (Sarah-SP), and to foster trust in their relationships with clients:

“…because they trust us. You know what we don’t do is we don’t bang people over the head […] We’re very much ‘OK guys let’s have a coffee and tell us about what you think you’re not doing well what you are doing well. Where are the bodies buried?’ <Laughs> […] You know, they’ve got to trust you.” (Andy-C)

During observations of training, Jamil-C began the session by outlining a set of “ground rules” according to which people should not be afraid to use language that
they would otherwise feel was not ‘politically correct’, allowed people to make mistakes, and asked for respect among speakers and no one to dominate discussions. Ava-SP similarly indicated to trainees that her training sessions should be spaces in which any personal revelations would not be repeated outside the room. James-C made remarks throughout his training session in which he distanced himself from authority figures, levelling himself with trainees, for example: “You can stand up, I’m not a school teacher!”.

DPs are incited to discourse (Foucault, 1998/1978: 77), they become subjects, by way of a comparison to what they are not. As Parker explains, ‘meaning is a relation, and this is particularly true of oppositional terms’ (Parker, 2016: 1). By evoking fear as a problem that organisational actors have, the status quo is problematised (Foucault, 1994/1984a, Rose and Miller, 2008: 14), and space is created for DPs to offer the solution – no longer feeling fearful, feeling safe, feeling trust. It therefore also is in setting up the problem of fear that the subject position of ‘comforter’ shapes what is regarded as a sign of successful diversity work. In seeking to comfort organisations, DPs are successful when they get their trainees to participate in activities and have ongoing relationships with organisations. Key markers of good diversity work become enjoyment of diversity training: “you can feel it when you’re in there they’re enthusiastic about the training and stuff like that so...their attitudes have changed” (James-C). This means that DPs pursue this: “I try to use a lot of humour when I’m training <OK?> yeah, to try and relax people” (Erin-C). Displays of emotion are presented as outcomes of effective work:
“Usually from the first hour of doing a course if I’ve not got everyone engaged I’m very disappointed in myself […] [The clients] were really, really positive and I hadn’t expected that at all - they just said we’ve never seen this before, you know. We’ve had grown men crying” (Charles-C),

As is participation:

“I try to make it fun […] they’ve actually got to participate they’ve actually got to get involved so I make it very interactive […] It’s very difficult to get people to interact amongst themselves... they they’re all just nervous and shy, they hold themselves back and they don’t say what’s on their mind. You’ve got to get rid of that kind of shyness” (Annette-C)

Many of the DP’s who were observed delivering training, emphasised the importance of “fun” and “interaction”. They played games, made jokes, encouraged competition between working groups in the room, and asked people to move around the room physically. Gerry-C said “I really do think people are frightened of it. And so I try and make the training interesting and fun and relaxed, so they can ask any questions they want.”, and Annette-C said that she tries to “make it fun rather than boring and straightforward”. James-C, too, asserted that his trainees “really enjoy” certain parts of his sessions and the importance of maintaining a fun
energy was observed in the training he delivered with Emily-C where they frequently cracked jokes and asked trainees to move around the room. This less confrontational method of truth-telling recalls a Socratic rather than Cynic tradition of *parrhesia*. A Socratic practice of *parrhesia* is thought to have involved the guidance of someone who is proximate to the *basanos* (Foucault, 1999/1983b), wherein the road to knowledge does not necessitate discomfort but a strong relationship. The need for a DP to have a strong, friendly bond with their clients derives perhaps from a need to distance oneself from the perceived confrontational traditions of EO.

The multiple relations between different meanings of the ‘subject’ surface again here: DPs are *subject to* the discourse of EO as being a threat to the harmony of organisations. But, simultaneously, it can also be said that DPs engage in subjectivation, by resisting an association with the negative discourse of EO wherein it is perceived as having been a confrontational approach, and constructing themselves as the opposite to this. In this way, the position of comforter can be read as a counter-position. DPs re-work the notion of what diversity work means by using the concepts of comfort, trust, safety and fun as indicators of success.

The ‘comforter’ position is a supplement rather than be a component of the ‘educator’ role, but it does relate to another subject position in sustaining its condition of possibility. ‘Comforter’ allows the DP to take up the ‘provocateur’
position at other times without inciting a hostile reaction from their organisation/client and risking exclusion from it by failing to win contracts (for consultants) or failing to secure support of senior organisational actors (for specialists, which is thought to be important to their effectiveness (see Bacon and Hoque, 2012)). The two positions are mutually dependant, as Isabelle-C explained:

“...having that trust I think between people so they feel relaxed about asking and engaging, but also challenging as well, and if you haven’t got that trust then people don’t feel able to do that”

The positions of ‘provocateur’ and ‘comforter’ are antagonistic in their aims, meaning that they produce a liminal role for the DP. The liminality of this *bricolage* is of value to DPs. By continually constructing their subjectivity as both comforter and provocateur, DPs put themselves in a position to be able to dish out tough love to their clients. This means that although ‘provocateur’ and ‘comforter’ positions are antagonistic; they are also symbiotic – each facilitating the possibility of the other.

A further subject position relates to how DPs rationalise how they themselves are perceived and treated by organisations. The dominant relationship was that of opposition, but in contrast to the ‘provocateur’ subject position, which is oriented much more around deliberately challenging organisations, the ‘warrior’ position is a reaction to lack of support from them.
Warrior

The ‘warrior’ position is a subject position that supplements that of ‘educator’ because it is the expression of how DPs react to barriers that stop them fulfilling their educative aim (see Figure 1). It emerged only in those accounts that were produced in what might be termed private or ‘backstage’ (Goffman, 1959) spaces, i.e. it arose strongly in interviews with me; which as discussed in Chapter Three, may have felt like a confessional space; and also in network meetings among DPs, but did not appear in talk that took place in front of clients/trainees. However, the majority of the participants of this study drew on a position of **fighting against** their clients, or more precisely as being seen as opponent and needing to react to this. The lexical field of combat was drawn on explicitly as a metaphor to describe the DP role:

“It's a constant battle to be honest” (James-C)

“She talks of her job being a daily ‘battle’ but likes the variety” (Notes from interview with Ava-SP)
Or as being “embattled” (Ian-C), where the organisation, rather than the DP, is portrayed as the warrior.

Other consultants did not evoke the same metaphor but used different forms of imagery to position themselves as coming up against resistance from their clients, such as “being hit by a train” (Gerry-C). Gerry-C, and Ian-C above, use a passive voice indicating that they are the object of the action. Specialist practitioners expressed frustration with how their organisations are (mis)managed (Jen-SP), their roles repeatedly restructured and redefined (Helen-SP), or that they are not consulted with (Nicola-SP). Warrior was contingent position for Tess-C, “if they’re not on board then it’s a real battle”. Whilst Jamil-C also talked at length about his supportive relationship with a private organisation – he had held repeated contracts with them – he was also keen to emphasise that other DPs that he knew suffered more difficult circumstances procuring work despite being qualified: “she struggled so much, but you know she’s advised governments and she’s done huge projects.”

However, the warrior was not taken up by all DPs, Emma-SP, who works for a large government-regulated firm, was pragmatic rather than in conflict with her organisation. She was positive about how she was recruited on the basis of her “personal values and disposition toward social justice/understanding the issues rather than previous experience” (notes from interview) and describes herself as being largely supported despite her budget being “squeezed” each year. Claire-SP
did not take up a warrior subject position, instead she recounted that there had been a recent increase in resources within her large third-sector organisation, devoted to promoting inclusion in service-delivery and extending avenues of fundraising. She explains: “other roles have been created based on our capacity to answer [respond to] the increasing work”. Jen-SP also expressed that she experienced “frustrations” in her role (from notes on interview).

Nevertheless, the construction of the subject position of DP as warrior conveys that in some cases the DP-subject is one that is ignored, maligned, or actively fought against by organisations. It is not possible to make claims about the level or lack of support for DPs within the approach of this study. Read as a subject position, we can see how its oppositional stance contributes to how one comes to recognise a DP: as someone who fights back against organisations. This is a means by which a person is ‘divided from others’ (Foucault, 1982: 778). Foucault talks specifically about this concept in terms of how the individual can be objectivised by others, but it can also be used to describe the means by which an individual produces knowledge about her/himself, as part of subject formation. In constructing this particular subject position, DPs turn any hostility to their work that they experience into something that gives rise to a positive attribute, a particular kind of expertise that the DP performs – fighting. Because the organisation is problematised as resistant, the very act of continuing to try to make changes, and of being resilient becomes part of the DP role itself. Harry-SP described his skills as being partly
“sheer doggedness and having the time to grind away at the issue” (From notes on informal interview during observation).

The purpose of this analysis is not to condemn DPs for achieving too little, but instead to point out that knowledge of the difficult conditions of their work serves to reinforce rationalities about the value of DPs. In one way this minimises the ambitions of DPs making their project smaller and easier to achieve, but in another way the maintenance of a role within an organisation or gaining contracts with organisations is certainly important in order that DPs can have any influence within them, now and in the future. Nevertheless, looking to the future, the subject position of DP-as-warrior and of fighting-for-diversity as diversity work could also become problematic if it obscures failure to also produce effects other than this subject position in itself.

The position of ‘warrior’ can also be characterised as a counter-position in the way that it contrasts with what is thought to be a dominant discourse of the subject/discipline of diversity: that it works with organisations (Perriton, 2009). As a counter-position, the construction of the ‘warrior’ position shows how DPs are not only governed by discourse, but are also actively engaged in constructing alternative positions, in subjectivation. But as Foucault notes, no counter-discourse, no form of resistance, is beyond relations of power (1998/1978: 94-95). This means that in order to be meaningful, the ‘warrior’ position must rely on forms of
knowledge that are already accepted. In this case, that knowledge consists in the idea that DPs are not always recognised by organisations as being valuable. This draws on the knowledge that the person to whom this discourse is communicated needs to have about a) the value of diversity work, and b) a history of struggles to change organisations by the likes of DPs and their predecessors. These forms of knowledge are necessary in the recipient in order that they regard the ‘warrior’ position as a positive skill rather than a failure of DPs. This may explain why the ‘warrior’ subject position only appears in backstage spaces, among audiences that accept these forms of knowledge.

The partitioning of DP subject positions into public and private spaces, and the implications of this, are discussed in more detail in Part Two of this chapter which examines relations among DPs. However, the next section explores a second subject position that appeared in the backstage contexts that is related to, but distinct from the ‘warrior’ position.

**Cynic**

A component of the ‘warrior’ is the subject position of ‘cynic’ (see Figure 1). This position is also based on the construction of the organisation as something that is resistant to the work of DPs, but differs from it in its inflection: whilst as warriors,
DPs construct themselves as actively engaged in a fight, the cynic position expresses the passivity of the organisation in response to the efforts of DPs.

Charles-C was **cynical** about whether organisations really support change, describing how organisations passively resist making changes:

“...sometimes it’s like talking to the cat [laughs] [...] I’ve never had anything very *overt*, no resistance movements externally, but I think it just withers on the vine.”

Others took up a ‘cynic’ position describing the lack of acknowledgement by organisations that there was a problem: “people don’t want to talk about equality and diversity, they think it’s all done and dusted with” (John-C), or that organisations have a commitment to change that is only skin-deep: Jamil-C knew “very few organisations that wanted a sustainable approach they wanted hits quick wins”. Sophie-C said had been met with “complacency, or, in some cases hostility, or just complete apathy... and it’s really hard to get things moving.”

It is possible that this subject position is a symptom of real difficulties in doing diversity work but, whether or not this is the case, the analysis here shows that the subject position of ‘cynic’ can be used to minimise the effect that DPs can be expected to have in organisations, and simultaneously construct a greater need for
them to refuse passivity from their organisation/clients. For example, there were DPs who were cynical about some organisations’ interest in diversity work, but who took up a more active stance in rejecting limits to diversity work imposed on them:

“We’re interested in real development and making equality and diversity alive. […] Whereas other organisations just want to tick a box…and we don’t do tick-box.” (Annette-C)

“…there is a point where your integrity says you have to tell them what it’s about and that they can’t just duck everything.” (Bill-C)

Rebecca-C said that she has refused “dodgy” work in the past and Susanne-C, too, talked about the need for organisations to take “responsibility” and that diversity is not the “nice feel-good factor, ‘oh I can tick that box and say I’ve done that training.’”

As Annette-C’s quote above shows, authentic DPs are constructed as those who are critical about whether organisations are committed to what DPs consider ‘real’ change. The above examples are quoted from consultants, but Nicola-SP, too, expressed a pleasure in being able to “share the kind of dark humour and cynicism”
with other DPs indicating that cynicism can be built into the *bricolage* of both consultant and specialist DP subjects. However, it was notable that neither of the specialists working in the private sector took up the cynical position. It is not clear on the basis of the small number of private sector specialists in this study how generalisable this difference is, but it would be worth exploring in future if DPs in this sector position themselves more in alignment with their organisations than other DPs as to what they consider to be ‘real’ change and authentic diversity work.

This subject position shows an awareness of, and a reaction to, the reputation of diversity work as failing to achieve change in organisations. That is to say, the ‘cynic’ position taken up by DPs is a counter-position to a cynical discourse that is available about diversity work itself. Where Schwabenland and Tomlinson (2015) identify an anxiety among DPs about whether diversity can produce change, the ‘cynic’ position seen above is the subjectivation of the DP as someone who recognises and refuses to accept a discourse about diversity’s irrelevance. The existence of such a counter-position among DPs could be useful to practitioners or scholars who would wish to encourage greater refusal to conduct ‘tick box’ work. Moreover, the fact that there is a discourse of seeking ‘real’ change among DPs, could offer a future professional standard for DPs the opportunity to define what is meant by this.
As noted above, it became evident during the analysis of the data that cynic and warrior subject positions only appeared in what I consider to be backstage. Seen as a *bricolage*, the multiplicity of subject positions seen here is in-keeping with the Foucauldian view of the subject as a more or less stable constellation of rationalities. But not all subject positions are used at all times, the individual may shift from one subject position to another depending on the context of social relations that the subject finds her/himself in. In this case, the separation of subject positions into front and backstage, implies that DPs recognise and judge each other according to different criteria compared with how organisations judge them, or more precisely, how DPs perceive that organisations regard them. This points to the ‘micro-politics of resistance’ as individuals subvert dominant discourses in engaging with their own identity-projects (Thomas and Davies, 2005: 683).

There are two things that the split subject of the DP tells us. Firstly, it points to a precarious position that DPs occupy, in that they hide rationalities that dissent from the dominant discourses of the subject/discipline diversity that it is an agenda which everyone is interested in and committed to. Secondly, it tells us about the importance of networks among DPs to the current construction of the DP-subject. Backstage spaces, such as networks, provide opportunities for DPs to cultivate counter-positions. This means that it is important to pay attention to how these spaces might be transformed in the process of formalising networks or further professionalization of the field.
The next subject position that was taken up by DPs concerns their role in relation to organisations more generally rather than between an individual their organisation/client. Rather than relying on discourses from talk as in the positions outlined so far, the next subject position is derived from the rationalities according to which the practices of DPs operate.

*Conduit*

The final position is DP as ‘conduit’ for information about diversity, which positions DPs as disseminators of knowledge. This position is a component of the role of DP as ‘educator’ (see Figure 1). It differs from the ‘educator’ position in that it does not relate to the conveying of knowledge towards a particular client; instead the emphasis is on the act of being an information source: the DP acts like a magpie: spotting and collecting information that relates to issues of equality, diversity, and inclusion and brings it to one place.

This position was observed in how DPs, in particular consultants, send out e-newsletters (James-C, Charles-C) and other ad-hoc updates (Jamil-C, Erin-C) to organisations that they have worked with or who are potential clients, produce videos (Gerry-C), maintain a blog (Rebecca-C) or LinkedIn group (Charles-C, Erin-C), have a network that members can join to gain access to information and resources (Joan-C), or contribute articles to the newsletter of the IEDP (Amy-C,
Carole-C, Alice-C). The knowledge that they gather typically includes updates to equality law, the outcomes of tribunal cases, upcoming events about diversity or training sessions on offer, links or summaries of new resources and statistics about diversity, concise recommendations for what organisations can do to promote diversity-heterogeneity, and/or commentary on recent news stories.

DPs offer value in being conduits for information. The position is also self-reinforcing in that, as James-C put it: “it’s continually keeping up that awareness of the issues involved.” There can also be an aspect of maintaining visibility. This is a priority especially for consultant DPs who need organisations to buy into, or continue to buy into, the importance of diversity work, as James-C continued: “You have to keep emphasising the benefits, reemphasising the benefits to them.” The ‘conduit’ position is one of neutrality, constructing DPs as nodes for knowledge, routing pieces of information from multiple sources into one place. However, as can be seen in the quotes from James above when he talks about “awareness” and emphasising “benefits”, the practice of being a conduit is not neutral because it is part of a practice of problematising organisations according to specific forms of knowledge about how they are deficient and how they can be improved. It is also involved in influencing what comes to be seen as knowledge that falls within the subject/discipline of diversity.
For DPs, the ‘conduit’ subject position is possible because the diversity field is not yet strongly formalised. It lacks central platforms to gather and disseminate information systematically to practitioners. An exception to this is the EDF, a non-governmental organisation run by a small team (mentioned by Amy-C, James-C, Erin-C, Claire-SP, and Nicola-SP) which aims to act as a “one stop shop” (Janet-SP) for information about diversity:

“[the] website is basically a resource bank […] …information about current debates and new research, or new policy proposals, or information such as finding good guidance on a particular topic. There is also information as a directory of organisations that are working on equality and human rights.”

(Janet-SP)

The EDF is also an association of third-sector organisations. It does not allow individual specialist DPs to join, nor diversity consultants. This is because, Janet explains, the EDF cannot endorse particular consultants as being good or being better than others. In general, DPs have few resources to help them be recognised as legitimate or effective. There are no widely recognised qualifications or other credentials for diversity work. The IEDP seeks to accredit DPs, and has done so on the basis of portfolios that DPs produce about their work, but it is as yet a relatively small organisation. Given this context, being a hub of information is one way that a DP can seek to lend legitimacy to her/his identity as expert. This is a further
example of how DPs construct positive subject positions in response to a context that challenges their identities as experts.

The role of conduit may not be unique to DPs, in particular it may also feature in the roles of other types of consultant who need to sell their expertise to organisations. Nevertheless, it is noted and discussed here because it features in the consultant DP-subject *bricolage* and is another tool that they can draw on to strengthen their identity as an expert. It also shows that diversity practices themselves are *subject to* not only the knowledge that is available in the social context, but also *how* knowledge is circulated and comes to be available – who the sources of knowledge are, and who are seen as the authorities of the subject/discipline. Though Foucault asserts power is not ‘zero-sum’ (Brewis, 2001: 44) meaning that some people have power and others do not, this is not to say that power is shared equally or that the same form of power is exercised by each party. This is illustrated by the fact that those who come to be seen as experts in a field have power because they command knowledge, shape it and how it is circulated, govern with it (Foucault, 2003/1963, Rose, 1998) as DPs do by playing the role of conduit.

Future formalisation and professionalisation of the field may yield benefits for DPs such as greater legitimacy as a distinct profession, in the way that it would create an ‘enclosure’ for their knowledge (Rose and Miller, 1992: 188), and more efficient
knowledge-sharing. However, it may also dissolve the possibility of the conduit role from DPs. This could increase pressure on DPs to uphold other subject positions that construct how they are of value.

**Summary of Part One**

This section has presented six subject positions that pertain to the relationship between DPs and their organisations/clients: ‘educator’, ‘provocateur’, ‘comforter’, ‘warrior’, ‘cynic’, and ‘conduit’. It has characterised these subject positions and elaborated the relationships between them. The aim of identifying these subject positions is to contribute to our understanding of the DP-subject by showing that they are formed of a bricolage of different subject positions that are deployed or emphasised at different times. Not every DP in this research took up every one of the subject positions presented, but all took up more than one of them at different times during interviews or during the interactions with clients that were observed.

The analysis has also shown that the components that make up this subject yield different roles for the DP in terms of parrhesia and whether they are subject to the dominant discourses that surround them or engaged in the active construction of a counter-position to them, subjectivation. The subject positions have an impact on the types of success that DPs claim as part of their role: There were two discourses
of hardship that were prominent in accounts from DPs: that they lack support and that they operate in a context where diversity can be perceived by organisations as irrelevant. DPs used these discourses to construct positive identities for themselves, namely by using them to frame reasonable expectations from them. The subject positions outlined also have potential implications for the future if the field of diversity practice becomes more professionalised and networks between DPs formalised.
Part Two

How are relations among diversity practitioners constructed? (RQb)

This section presents analysis of the subject positions that DPs evoked when constructing relations between themselves and other DPs. The work of diversity practice and the role of the DP is highly non-standardised. Although there are several sources of kitemarks, awards, memberships and other markers of good diversity practice for organisations, there are no widely-recognised organisations that offer standards to regulate the license to practice for DPs. Without such formal sources, DPs normalise the boundaries of the occupation themselves. This part of the research aims to identify norms that have developed for who counts as a DP in the eyes of DPs themselves by examining the rationalities that they used to describe the relations they have with each other, how they recognise each other as legitimate.

Most of the data used to answer this sub-question is drawn from interviews but observations also provided important evidence for subject positions that were mobilised when DPs interacted with one another in DP networks. In the following section I outline three subject positions that DPs share: ‘moral motivation’, ‘a collective ideal’, and ‘a diverse and inclusive occupation’.
Moral motivation

This subject position of being morally motivated has been included under the category of relations between diversity practitioners’ because it emerged as an important idea in the accounts of DPs in describing their reasons for doing diversity work. It was used to construct legitimate and illegitimate reasons, setting out boundaries of who counts as a DP. The term moral is used in this section to characterise the way in which DPs talk about doing the right thing or doing good.

The subject position was used by both consultants and specialists, and the position achieved through defining oneself in contrast to monetary motivation. Being concerned with money was connotated negatively in statements by DPs, for example “what we’re not is a money-chaser” asserted Joan-C. Similarly, Susanne-C said:
“There is an equality industry out there, and there are people who have made their job an equality job and it’s just like any other job, and there aren’t many principles around in terms of values and they just - they’ll take the money and they don’t really care what happens after they’ve done the job. […] I’m not interested.”

Susanne-C differentiates diversity work from being “any other job” by constructing a position in which DPs “care” about the work on a different level. If not directly associated with dubious ethics, making a lot of money was disassociated from moral behaviour, for example by Oliver-C “There are some people who I have seen are very successful financially who I would actually…question their ethics.” Oliver-C went on to describe those who are “in it for the money” as “charlatans”. It can be argued that this demonstrates an ongoing connection to the roots of diversity in social movements.

Making a living as a necessity of life – “paying the mortgage” (Charles-C), “needs must” (Thomas-C) - was distinguished from making money as motivation, used as a caveat to why DPs might take on certain projects. Rebecca-C distanced herself from money as a legitimate reason to work with a client:
“I decided that I would only work with organisations that I thought were professional and had integrity because I didn’t want to compromise my values. And so everyone I have worked with I’ve liked and respected whoever they are. And if I’ve thought that something was slightly dodgy or I didn’t believe in it I said ‘no’. And I’ve walked away. And that’s really hard when you could be tempted by money.”

In statements articulating what does motivate them, several DPs said that they find the work interesting: “It's a fascinating life I live” (Thomas-C), “it’s an interesting time, I’ve got quite a challenging role. It’s a really interesting agenda.” (Helen-SP), that they enjoy it: “I love it” (Jamil-C), or have a passion for it: “anything that I do I think will have an element around this area I think it would be kind of would be quite difficult to not be something around this I’m really passionate about it” (Claire-SP). But several also explained that diversity work was a good thing to do, moral work. This was done in different ways: Two DPs wove together their enjoyment with doing good by promoting empathy in their clients:

“I love it, it’s what I want to do! […] I enjoy talking to people about discrimination and I enjoy doing the training that I’m doing so people get to understand what it’s really like, through my own life experiences and other peoples’ life experiences or a different case studies. They actually get to understand the implications of how they may feel, how their actions may
affect someone else or how their colleagues’ actions may affect somebody else so it’s a good thing, I enjoy it.” (John-C)

“I enjoy what I do…I’m really enjoying what I do. For me the result is about making sure that people carry on and empathise or sympathise with these people” (Annette-C)

Empathy as a desired outcome of diversity work was an important idea that arose in the data and one that has not been extensively discussed in previous research on diversity. A more detailed discussion of this is presented in Chapter Five in the analysis of diversity training.

For others, diversity work offered an opportunity to fulfil a personal desire to change things for the better: “I want to change the world, yeah [laughs]” said James-C and “I want to change the world. <Yeah?> Only to a limited extent, I hasten to add [laughs], but yes, make it a better place” said Bill-C. Gerry-C said that promoting equality and diversity-heterogeneity “matters to me” and for Catherine-C also “…her professional identities well connected her personal life. She’s interested in creating a safer environment dealing with prejudice and damage” (Notes from interview). For these DPs, diversity work offers a way to live in line with the ethics that they have set out for themselves – they are engaged in a practice of parrhesia. In the tradition of parrhesia as a practice of the self, one becomes an ethical subject by creating synchronicity between the logos of life that one has set for
oneself and one’s actions (Foucault, 1999/1983a). It is worth noting that the use of
the term ethical here differs from how the term ‘moral’ is used elsewhere in the text.
References to ‘morality’ are made to characterise DPs’ own rationalities about their
work as doing good or doing the right thing. Instead, ethics refers to ‘a practice or
ethos, a mode of being’ (Dean, 2003: 181). In a Foucauldian sense, the ethical subject
is one that puts their logos into practice.

Two DPs described their personal interest in reducing inequality more explicitly:

“I sort of had an interest you know really from university, so early twenties,
in sort of gender equality issues and race equality issues in particular I
guess, and involvement in anti-apartheid and other sort of groups and I had
a real interest in sort of the social justice issues” (Isabelle-C)

“I suppose I have just always been kind of interested in inequality in a sort
of political type of way” (Amy-C)

Thomas-C connected doing good with fulfilling the teachings of his religion
(Judaism), but he also articulated diversity with a much wider desire to do good for
the world:
“You know, you can't be involved with things that I'm involved in without it being political, well it is political, but it remains political with a small ‘p’ not party politics […] Equalities, diversity work is political it has to be. […] …with a small ‘p’ I'm a ‘political activist’, how about that? You've just turned me back into an activist, Deborah! […] …if you look at green environmentalism, egalitarianism, protecting the poor and yeah, the underdog, which is what I do, you know. It's all part and parcel and all tied up together”

(Thomas-C)

The quotes above have been organised to present an incremental widening in scope of the ‘good’ that diversity work does from fulfilling individual passions and improving individual interactions to being a part of a wider campaign for change: from fulfilling personal interest, to promoting empathy for others, to fulfilling desire to change the world for the better in some way, to a specific desire for social justice in achieving equality, and then finally Thomas-C makes the broadest association between diversity and social justice connecting diversity work not only with a campaign for equality, specifically an egalitarian form of equality, but also with another social movement: environmentalism. This shows how motivations can be articulated in very different ways by DPs. More specifically, they show that being morally motivated to do diversity work is not a unitary subject position. Where some participants made what could be seen as smaller claims to the good that diversity does in a variety of ways (promoting empathy, fulfilling a personal
interest or passion), others positioned their work as something much broader (changing things, promoting equality, part of campaign for social justice).

The advantage of the former subject positions to DPs is that they can more easily meet the expectations that they have set out for themselves, or demonstrate that they do so to others. The latter positions make this much harder for DPs, but could be useful to people who might wish to see DPs pushing to produce change that not only favours organisation and their interests, but that improves social justice. The finding that DPs use a rationality that evokes morality and ‘doing good’ as part of their subject formation means that there is a window to challenge DPs to promote social justice more strongly in order to align with their own logos. This could challenge the use of the business case, which scholars have previously warned has potentially negative consequences for minoritised groups because of its contingency (Dickens, 1999, Noon, 2007).

A few of the consultants in this research talked at length in interviews, and also in informal conversations, about the voluntary work that they did. The interviews had been framed as seeking to find out about participants’ work in diversity, so it is pertinent that many DPs talked about unpaid activities that they were engaged in. These participants tended to talk about how their voluntary work was connected with, or part of, their paid work in diversity. They also explained that they enjoy it. For example, Jamil-C stated that he spends 20% of his time on voluntary work so
today is my voluntary day!” and that he “really enjoys it”. Annette-C talked about a website that she runs voluntarily: “it’s something that I... that’s the other side of the coin from the business to business, it’s to do business to consumer, and I quite enjoy [laughs] that side of it to be quite honest.” Amy-C, Joan-C, Andy-C, and Thomas-C all also mentioned voluntary projects that they devoted time to. One DP also talked about how additional projects provided her with a sense of fulfilment that she did not get from her job:

“Where I see my passion is with things outside the organisation so I’ll go and do third sector stuff with this consortium of charities or I'll instigate something, you know, with freelance consultants. So all the exciting and passionate stuff I will get outside of my paid work [...] Small organisations are not interested in window dressing they’re just interested in getting on with the work and there’s more of a collective sense of ‘we want to try and change society’ still and they’re not interested in market share” (Nicola-SP)

The engagement of DPs in voluntary work reinforces the subject position of being morally motivated, in particular not being motivated by money. It is not possible to say from within the discursive analytical approach whether DPs themselves perceive that voluntary work plays a role in shaping how they are perceived by others, that it is a practice of the self that is engaged in strategically, because the discourse analytic approach does not look at text in terms of deliberate or conscious action but instead regards it as an expression of discourse, as an artefact of meaning
that is the object of inquiry in itself. However, it is possible to say that voluntary work may give DPs a form of authenticity through an enhanced coherence in the *logos* that they have set for themselves and the way that they live. By talking about volunteering as part of diversity work, DPs engage in *parrhesia*, constructing voluntary work as part of diversity work. This idea seeks to render the DP an ethical subject, as one who is not financially motivated.

Rebecca-C suggests that this could be valued by clients: by showing that one is not financially motivated, in the “longer term, it wins you a lot of respect”. The question of whether or not the perception of the DP by others is affected by this is beyond the scope of the current work.

There is one more aspect of the subject position of being morally motivated that is important to bring to light because it shows how the slipperiness, or emptiness, of the signifier ‘diversity’ allows the business case to be articulated with moral motivation. By a handful of DPs, ‘doing good’ was at times articulated in terms of ‘maximising human potential’. These quotes illustrate the *bricolage* that DPs are engaged in: they show how the rationality of maximising potential was woven in amongst others that have already been outlined in this section:

“'I've always had an interest in in this subject area or at least I have for an awful long time, you know, looking at how groups of people that have
experienced different forms of discrimination how they cope with it and how they survive but also they *thrive*. How they can make themselves flourish in in certain circumstances <OK?> but also trying to encourage organisations companies to produce more inclusive products and services and workplaces so it’s been central to my work for a long time.” (Erin-C)

“Well at the end of the day Deborah it’s all HR isn’t it? It’s all how we deal with people but it’s in different contexts. So if...whether we’re helping people at a strategic level whether we’re helping them on a personal level if we’re helping them to either stay out of prison or get their lives back on track or whatever at the end of the day at the end of the day life it’s about human resources [...] life is about how you deal with people and about how you support people and how you develop people and I love seeing people develop. I *love* seeing people fulfil their potential.” (Andy-C)

“It's really important to me that, you know, that…there’s phrase within our religion that ‘the world needs to be better for having had you live in it’ And I see that as a really *important* adage and part of the way I live my life is, you know, that I do enough putting in this good stuff to offset the bad just by *existing* and trying to help people achieve…achieve their potential.”

(Thomas-C)
These extracts contain several rationalities of moral motivation but they each also make a connection at some point between doing good and helping people to achieve or reach their potential. This is a rationality that is found within HRM, as indeed Andy-C notes. Within this discipline, it is invoked to legitimate the practices that HRM uses to categorise and organise people using a plethora of governing techniques (see Townley, 1993) in order to maximise the value that workers can contribute to the organisation. This discourse has also been found in diversity by others (for example Ellis and Sonnenfeld, 1994) but what has been overlooked so far is that this discourse can create a linkage between diversity work and morality that by-passes social justice. This shows that the business case can be inflected with moral goals in order to achieve the positioning of DPs as morally motivated practitioners (see also Bell et al., 2001) without need for them to invoke the social justice case. This is a further example of the power that the business case has that is missing from previous analyses – to colonise the toolkit of subject positions that DPs draw upon.

**A collective ideal**

The subject position of having a ‘collective ideal’ is a component of being morally motivated (see Figure 2). A few of the DPs made statements that positioned their work both as morally motivated and part of collective action:
“I’m never going to change the world on my own, and nobody else is either but together, if we all work together, maybe we can start making some strides forwards.” (Tess-C)

“[What] you have to do is to complement what other people do, and again we [DPs] have to complement each other” (Jamil-C)

“…you still need to work in partnership with other people to make things happen. So that’s, I mean for me it’s about getting the message out there and I mean at the end of the day it’s not about whether I do the training or not it’s just about making sure that it happens [laughs]...I need to keep a roof over my head but other than that I don’t really care who does the training as long as it gets done.” (James-C)

In these statements the contribution that the individual DP offers is attributed value in the context of a relationship with the work that other DPs are doing. A further DP, described diversity work as being collective in a historical sense, that it is the latest stage in a progression of work throughout recent history:

“She says that she tries to weave in the philosophical values underlying her work in equality diversity going back to the history of the 1970s. Not to present diversity as coming out of nowhere recently, but out of ‘mass social
movements’ [...] She talks of her gratitude to the civil rights movement and expresses the need to do her bit for future generations” (Notes from observation of training session by Catherine-C)

The collective ideal seems to relate to the moral motivations of diversity work relayed in the previous section, and to its noble goals, specifically in its historical connection with social movements. It also serves to mark out what are understood to be acceptable limitations to what each individual DP can achieve: because diversity is framed as being a movement in which each individual DP can only play a part, the achievement that can be expected of the effective or successful DP is reduced. Recognising of course that all work done by individuals is likely to contribute to some whole, the point of showing the potential minimising effects of this subject position is to remain critical of the fact that although certain rationalities offer promise of change in one way, they may also act to soothe anxieties about not achieving it in another.

The collective ideal was evinced by a minority of participants explicitly, but a related subject position appears to be more pervasive, in how DPs talk about working together, whether sharing information, emotional support, or identity building. The majority of participants talked at some point about the value of their relationships with other DPs as being, in part, one of sharing information. DPs were also observed sharing information with others during the network meetings,
through exchanges on email networks, conferences, and events that I attended. Ian-C spoke about one such network:

“Somebody said, for example, […] somebody's challenged a Sikh pupil for having what they considered to be a dagger on their person, but it wasn't at all, it was a religious symbol. It's something that they have to wear. What do you do? So colleagues in the area […] were able to say well this is what we've done and they circulated their guidance. […] Whenever there's a problem like that loads of people just use it [the network] by saying ‘Help! has anybody come across this what do I do?’ kind of thing”

Positive information-sharing relations were reported: “within this industry everybody is quite willing to share things” asserts Jamil-C. Gerry-C also says that he was sometimes approached for information by people who are new to diversity work “if I can I'll sort of give people a couple of pointers or, you know, I try to contribute” (Gerry-C) and Charles-C too tries regularly “to either post something or to respond to a request for information or advice”. It is notable that these are consultant practitioners speaking, who might be expected to be more reticent to share advice with others given that they compete with each other for work.

This subject position is consistent with the moral motivation and collective ideals outlined above, but sharing information with others could also be used to the
practical advantage of DPs since networks sometimes helped diversity consultants to procure work: Working as associates means that DPs can take on larger projects “we all scratch one another’s back if you know what I mean” (Annette-C; also talked about by Bill-C) and to bring different specialisms to a project “you know of people who have got particular specialties in particular areas and you try and put together a little project team depending on what you’re being asked to do” (Erin-C). Advantage could also be gained this way by positioning oneself as ‘conduit’ as discussed earlier in this chapter, giving an individual or group a higher profile and status, and in gaining governing power through the control of knowledge (Foucault, 2003/1963, Rose, 1998), though this was not something that DPs themselves asserted.

Networks among DPs were described as providing another important resource – emotional support. One practitioner talked about interactions with other DPs as providing “counselling” and that they offered a chance to “offload” because “otherwise you’d go mad” (Sophie-C), Ian too asserted that “you have to meet up sometimes, to cheer everybody up!” Some further examples:

“We’ve been quite a close bunch really […] I find it really refreshing. I find that I can be the person that I really am. And I’m a lot more confident and I would say I have more vigour when I’m working with people outside the organisation […] It’s a very lonely job, you don’t get into conversations like that with people. They don’t care, they just want you to come and tell them
how to do stuff and go away. [...] That’s alright but sometimes you just want to have a conversation with somebody who sort of gets you [...]” (Nicola-SP)

“People working on equality diversity and inclusion and human rights in big organisations can feel like they are the only person in that organisation with that brief, and that networking opportunity is hugely valuable to information exchange and practice exchange, but also for emotional support, just for the pleasure of spending a couple of hours with people who have the same objective as you!” (Janet-SP)

The subject position that is created through these reports and practices of the lone, or maligned DP supports the ‘warrior’ subject position outline earlier in this chapter. And yet, these relations can be read as playing a further role in the subject formation of DPs: relations with other DPs can be seen as an opportunity for one to re-affirm that there are others like oneself either in a professional capacity (Janet-SP, above) or a personal one too (Nicola-SP, above). In this way, networks between DPs are platforms for identity-building. The knowledge shared in these spaces normalise both diversity practice, which they discuss (information sharing), but also the very norms of ‘speaking and being’ (Clegg et al., 1996) as a DP. The norms that are shared validate them, or invalidate them where necessary (Foucault, 1991/1977: 223).

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This process is connected with the emotional support function that DPs describe. The lack of support from organisations that DPs suffer means that they face an ‘identity threat’ (Brown and Coupland, 2015) to their being a valuable member of the organisation. Interactions with other DPs provide reassurance of the markers of what a DP is, such as those outlined in this section and earlier in the section on RQa: what they should be doing, what they should be capable of, and what they are unlikely to be able to change. Networks are therefore a space in which there is a focus on subject formation. DPs within the network are subject to the norms of what it means to be a DP that are mobilised by their peers, but also actively contribute to forming and reforming this knowledge.

The identity-building function of networks has so far been overlooked in the literature, but is important to consider this if steps are to be taken to develop them in the future as has been suggested (for example, Tatli and Özbilgin, 2007). An increased formalisation of networks between DPs to facilitate the sharing of strategy and norms of best practice, will have an impact on, for instance, the way that meetings are structured, who is present, what type of knowledge is shared and how. These factors may have an impact on how well they can serve to meet the identity-building needs of DPs, and the emotional ones attached to them.
There was for some DPs a distance between experience and the ideal of a collective movement of DPs who share information, with a considerable number of DPs noting how supportive relationships between DPs were not being enacted or could be threatened. The idea of a **challenging economic climate** was raised by many and was provided by diversity consultants in particular as a reason why DPs could be **competitive** with one another:

“[Relations between diversity practitioners are] *generally* positive. I think it is a bit of a dog-eat-dog world so people are keeping things close to their chest.” (Oliver-C)

“I’d like to see us as professionals working together but unfortunately that doesn’t always follow...<oh right?> because you know, lots of people particularly in the climate that we’re in at the moment, financial climate we’re in at the moment, people will...be *cut-throat*” (Annette-C)

Several consultant DPs mentioned limited finance as a barrier to diversity work in the difficult “economic climate” (Erin-C) (also, Jamil-C, Gerry-C, Catherine-C) and some specialists gave an indication of a similar problem by describing how their organisations were being re-structured (Harry-SP, Claire-SP, Helen-SP). When asked about the future of diversity work and when it might gain more support Rebecca-C answered “it’s really *tough* out there and we’re just trying to survive”. 
A lack of money for diversity work and a reduction in the number of permanent posts available (mentioned by Claire-SP) is likely to contribute to an increased competition among consultants as specialists move into consultancy. There was also a perceived threat to diversity consultants by the taking ‘in-house’ of diversity work including diversity training, cutting out the need for them: two consultants mentioned that they had conducted “Train the Trainer” sessions for organisations (Jamil-C, Andy-C). Catherine-C also spoke about how she was protective of her materials because otherwise she can easily be undercut by someone in-house. Despite this, there was a general insistence that DPs had supportive relationships with others and where competitiveness was mentioned it was always expressed with sadness.

It was more difficult however to discern a consensus that explains the relationships between consultant and specialist DPs. One consultant DP talked of good relations with the specialists he worked with on projects “We [consultants] do much more than we get paid for because we have empathy with people [specialists] and we know that they do a lot more than their companies are paying for” (Jamil-C), whilst another consultant described the relationship as a tense one that threatens the expert identity of the specialist because it is seen “as a personal slight if it’s seen as they need help” (Sophie-C).
Other consultant DPs tended to talk about the relationship between specialists and consultants in ways that positioned their own role-type as being better positioned to do diversity work effectively. These consultants each gave slightly different reasons for why specialist DPs face additional challenges to consultants: one said that “you’re kind of constrained a little bit. There are too many hoops to jump through and there’s too much compliance and political shenanigans” (James-C). Others said that specialists’ ongoing relationships with trainees can be problematic because diversity training can deal with sensitive issues (Oliver-C), and that there can be difficulty “trying to embed yourself into the company” (Andy-C). However, two others attributed the advantage of consultants not to the employment relationship itself but the likely conditions in which consultants would be hired, that organisations just want “external verification that all is well” because they’re “quite well sorted” (Sophie-C), in other words, that “you only get approached by the people who want to do something” (Amy-C). Only one consultant used a counter-position to this, expressing that the hiring of consultants demonstrated a lack of organisational commitment because they felt they couldn’t “divert anyone” from within the organisation to do it (Bill-C). This shows two contrasting interpretations of the same phenomenon.

Comments on the relationship between consultants and specialists do not provide evidence that organisations do in fact demonstrate or lack commitment by hiring either specialists or consultants. However, they do suggest that the construction of contrasts between consultants and specialists is an additional way that some
consultants define who they are and how they are of value. By contrast, specialists did not tend to evoke a comparison with consultants in order to define their roles. This may indicate that they enjoy a security in their identity as diversity experts, which consultants need to reinforce. A potential implication in how consultants draw a dividing line between themselves and specialists is that the legitimacy of specialist DPs could become diminished over time if these rationalities were to be accepted and spread into wider use. Another is that by drawing contrasts between the two types of DP the collective ideal of diversity is disrupted and there may a decreased chance of collaboration between DPs of different types.

**A diverse and inclusive occupation**

The final subject position of this section is a supplement to the two subject positions already outlined (see Figure 2): it is one in which DPs are understood to value diversity within their own occupational group and to be inclusive of difference. Erin-C who comes from a background in campaigning for rights and social change as well as working with organisations on EO says that:

“I recognise I’ve come into it via a different route but we are all very diverse, it’s a very interesting part of the sector, in the voluntary sector, and people have come into it in a variety of different routes really.”
Carole-C, who is centrally involved with the IEDP and was speaking for it, is also keen to value diversity among DPs. She says:

“All of us have a passion for justice and equality but we do recognise that there are many ways in which it can manifest and many ways of doing it. And we don’t want to say there’s only one way.”

Though only two voices are expressed here, the voice of the IEDP is significant because its values and ways of thinking about the field of diversity have been informed by a group of DPs. It has developed norms of the accreditations that it offers based on existing working practices of DPs (according to Alice-C).

This subject position reflects the wider one of valuing difference and being inclusive that DPs themselves use in working with organisations. In taking up this subject position, it is desired by DPs that the theory of diversity is externalised into practice. This is reminiscent of the discussion earlier in this chapter on voluntary work as a way of living the logos of diversity, but here it is expressed at an occupational level rather than on a personal one. In talking about a desire to enact the logos of diversity within the community, the DP strives to produce her/himself as an ethical subject in a Foucauldian sense.
This alignment may not be straightforward to achieve. There were two voices that suggested that pressures exist towards normalisation among DPs:

“Maybe there is an element of… if you speak out of turn, if you disagree after a number of people have agreed, what will that do in terms of your credibility? And, you know, how you are viewed. I don't know. It’s a little bit like the Emperor’s New Clothes in that respect.” (Oliver-C)

And Gerry-C talked about “larger consultancies who dominate the market for diversity work, squeezing out independent diversity consultants” referring to economic relations that mean some voices gain greater prominence over others within the field. These statements, expressed in a disappointed tone by the DPs, are further indication of the ideal of inclusiveness within the occupation.

Two participants suggested that the disagreements that occur between DPs is an inevitability of the work, despite the wish to act as a community:

“On the whole we tend to agree with each other because we feel like we’re slightly embattled anyway. So we're likely to be sticking up for each other anyway... I mean there are controversial issues obviously that's the nature of it.” (Ian-C)
“...a lot of the diversity practitioners recognise that everybody is going to have different views” (Jamil-C)

These DPs frame the work of diversity as inherently productive of tensions, suggesting that there may not be a way of viewing things, or an approach to the work that is accepted by everyone. In some ways this parallels the finding of Schwabenland and Tomlinson (2015) that diversity work is ambiguous, but in the present research DPs did not express anxiety about this. A possible explanation for this apparent difference is that the discourse of valuing difference, diversity and inclusion within the occupation seen in this study is a symptom of the very phenomenon that Schwabenland and Tomlinson identify: that the subject position is a coping response to the underlying ambiguity of diversity work and the anxiety that it might otherwise (without the subject position) cause DPs.

The use of the discourse of valuing difference by DPs indicates that the IEDP may be attempting to occupy a precarious governing role in the field of diversity practice. The purpose of an association that offers accreditations to some and not others is to standardise DPs, however the subject position of being diverse and inclusive sits in tension with this. There are two juxtaposing ideas that the IEDP is caught between: the need to be inclusive and the need to standardise, finding expression in a reluctance to govern. From a theoretical point of view, this is
perhaps to be expected since the Foucauldian ethical subject emerges from the striving to minimise how much the individual is governed by those other than himself: ‘the art of not being governed quite so much’ (2007/1978: 45), to free her/himself from power to the maximal extent. Whereas, by nature professional associations seek to govern in order to unite, define, and standardise by exercising power over others, in using the discourses of diversity and inclusion in relation to their own occupation, the IEDP and other DPs resist discourses of standardisation, seeking to form an alternative form of expert identity, an ethical one which is in keeping with their logos. At the same time, they contend with being subject to those discourses that value consistency as an indicator of expertise (in claims to scientific knowledge, (see Rose, 1998)).

This has implications when thinking about how DPs might become more professionalised in the future since attempts to establish strong frameworks for who DPs should be, what they should know, and what they should do, could be challenged by the subject position of desiring diversity within the occupational community. One way that the IEDP tries to negotiate this tension is explored in the next and final part of this chapter on knowledge and skills.

**Summary of Part Two**
The subject positions raised in this section have been shown as important to consider for any project of standardisation or professionalisation that were to develop in future. The first section focussed on the rationalities of motivation that DPs put forward for doing their work and indicated that although there was a strong subject position of being motivated by morality, the act of doing good could be articulated in many different ways. The analysis of these showed that they wish to create an alignment between the *logos* of diversity that they convey to others and their own practices. The possible implications each subject position could have for DPs were also discussed. This discussion also drew attention to the possibility for slippage between the cases for diversity. I also suggested that the business case has a form of power not yet remarked in the literature: that it has potential to colonise other cases.

A further subject position evaluated pertained to having a ‘collective ideal’. Many of the participants of this study positioned their own work as part of a collective project in some way, although the reality of dwindling budgets for diversity were also offered as a reason that this could not be fully realised. Networks play a role in constructing a sense of community among DPs, acting not only as information-sharing spaces but also identity-building ones. Some consultants positioned themselves as being freer to act than specialists and I suggest that this could have negative implications for the future legitimacy of specialists and the collaboration between DPs of different types.
The final section examined the internalisation of the discourse of valuing difference and being inclusive within the occupation of DPs. Though such an alignment between the *logos* and practice of diversity constructs what Foucault would identify as an ethical subject, the subject position juxtaposes with the project of normalising diversity practice: to govern the field in order to standardise and protect the specific expertise and license to practice of DPs.

The next part of this chapter presents the last set of rationalities that were analysed in order to understand the subject formation of DPs. These pertain to the different skills and knowledge to which DPs make claim.
Part Three

How do diversity practitioners construct their skills and knowledge? (RQc)

This part seeks to understand the DP-subject by looking at the types of knowledge and skills that DPs claim. In this section, I examine the different ways that DPs articulate their value to organisations and the justifications, or warrants, for their knowledge (as understood in common usage) about diversity as a field of expertise. As laid out in Chapter Two, it is particularly important to understand the rationalities that DPs use to describe their own knowledge and skills because of two features of the context in which DPs work: firstly, that diversity work is uncertain regarding what it is and whether it has value (Ahmed, 2007b, Jones, 2007, Schwabenland and Tomlinson, 2015), and secondly that DPs lack a formal association or set of standards that would act as a central point of reference and a warrant for the value of diversity work. Given this context, the rationalities that DPs use to guide their work are a key source of information about what is understood to be ‘what it takes’ to do diversity work. Traditionally, diversity work has been theorised as translation of the same knowledge into different contexts (Ahmed, 2007a, Jones, 2007). The investigation conducted here instead asks what type of knowledge DPs produce in their talk and practices.
Strictly speaking the entire chapter thus far has been concerned with the forms of knowledge and skills that DPs engage in, for they are regarded within the framework as becoming subjects through the very incitement of different forms of knowledge (in a Foucauldian sense: about themselves, others, the world). Specific claims to knowledge and skills in the non-Foucauldian sense has been separated in the analysis as a heuristic device in order to capture rationalities that do not relate to relationships to organisations/clients or relations among DPs. This final part of the chapter therefore presents the remaining elements of the toolkit of the bricolage self. Given this, it starts with a reminder of what has already been discussed regarding the skills and knowledge of DPs before moving on to discuss further discursive tools that emerged in the data: ‘best practice’, ‘neutrality’, ‘equality law’, and ‘diversity as ethic’. The chapter finishes by discussing three warrants that are offered for diversity expertise: ‘personal experience’, ‘indirect experience’, and ‘continual learning’.

Skills of the diversity practitioner

The subject positions taken up by DPs that were identified earlier in this chapter will be re-framed and given specific names in order to identify the particular skill that they give rise to (see Figure 3). As ‘educator’ and ‘provocateur’ the skill that DPs perform can be called ‘problematising’. In putting forward specific cases to organisations in order to identify a problem with them, DPs produce new
knowledge about it – the way that it is deficient and how it can be improved. As ‘comforter’, the skill that is implied is that of ‘managing emotions’ – soothing anxieties and fears about doing diversity to build and maintain relationships of trust with clients. As ‘warrior’, DPs engage in ‘maintaining space’ – because DPs do not consider themselves to be supported by organisations, and sometimes feel resisted by them, fighting for the existence of their role is a skill of diversity work in itself. As ‘conduit’, DPs are both ‘gathering information’ and ‘keeping on the agenda’, serving to gather and synthesise disparate information and to maintain the visibility of the subject/discipline of diversity.

The following sections give more details about the knowledge and skills of DPs that have not yet been fully presented in the analysis of the empirical data, and discuss the warrants and relationships that underlie them.
Best practice

In the discussion of ‘educator’ in part one of this chapter, the idea was introduced that DPs do not only appeal to knowledge derived from the law, or put forward cases for what is economically beneficial or moral about diversity and inclusion, but also recommend the use of localised knowledge and judgement as to what is diversity ‘best practice’. In this previous discussion the notion of localised knowledge was used to argue that there can be gaps and inconsistencies in the rationalities of diversity as a set of truths. Now I would like to use this same idea to
argue that this also shows DPs to be *producers of diversity knowledge* rather than translators of *a priori* truths.

From interviews and observation of the email networks between practitioners, it is clear that DPs write and tend to share guidance on what is best practice in situations where the law is ambiguous on how to guard against discrimination and on how to promote equality (for public bodies under the PSED). In an example that supports those presented earlier, NHS-based Harry-SP describes this:

> “We circulate information around that network. So if somebody has got a query about something that they’re working on they can ask that question or if they’ve got something that they want to share they can do *that*... We have worked on various things together most recently the network produced a sort of protocol it was called for *Trans* patients, transgender patients, and that was like an *outline* of the sort of things you need to consider if you’re developing a local policy […] Somebody will pick up on the, I don’t know, policy document or information guide or…code of practice that’s appeared on the human rights website or they’ll pick up on a webinar or an article that’s circulated around for colleagues.”

Helen-SP too referred to a “group of about four or five of us” who “have shared quite a lot of information, helped each other out quite a bit, shared policies or
shared approaches to monitoring” and “shared how we’re getting on with setting up different staff equality groups, what are the barriers with our directors or trustees.” Frequent instances of giving recommendations and sharing guidance and policies were observed across the two email networks that are predominantly for specialists but one of which also includes specialist-turned-consultants. Harry-SP was also observed swapping advice with a colleague in person, a specialist based in a neighbouring NHS organisation (not interviewed separately), about the schedule and content of diversity training that she organises for staff. Ava-SP was similarly observed giving advice on what would constitute good practice to an organisation that provides childcare. She explained that “the organisation should do everything within their power, within the reasonable amount of effort, to comply with the duty” (from notes on observation of Ava-SP). This echoes the guidance usually issued in relation to “reasonable adjustments” for disabled people (explained in training by Catherine-C). The rationality of being ‘reasonable’ is appropriated and the logic applied to other needs, in this case of parents who are non-English speakers. In this situation, Ava-SP had power to appropriate and therefore extend the rationality of reasonable adjustments, and to define what a ‘reasonable amount of effort’ would look like for the organisation that she was advising. Although this norm is of course also shaped by the other advice on best practice that is circulated among DPs and organisations such as the EDF. This means that in deciding on and sharing best practices, DPs exercise a certain degree of normalising power over what counts as promoting diversity or as an inclusive measure. Best practice is not necessarily a claim to scientific knowledge, about “what’s working and what is not” (Janet-SP), but can also be a strategic form of knowledge about what is currently
considered the most reasonable, fair, or effective solution for all parties involved. For instance, this was the type of solution that was offered by consultant Jamil-C to the ‘reverse discrimination’ dilemma, described earlier in this chapter. Janet-SP too explains how a more nuanced form of knowledge can be helpful in diversity work in particular:

“It can bring up some really difficult issues, particularly around the intersection between rights about religion and belief, and rights around gender and sexual orientation equality. That is not the only area but it is the obvious one, where there is frequently perceived to be a direct conflict between two rights, and what we have thought to do is rather than say that one trumps the other, we have tried to develop ways of thinking and forms of practice that tries to honour different rights and tries to balance them rather than say one is more important than the other. Particularly when things get into the legal arena, because almost by definition the legal case is going to result in one right, in this particular case with this particular set of facts, being seen as taking priority over the other. Whereas in practice, in work places and educational settings, these issues get addressed every day, and are resolved in ways that don’t involve saying that this right comes before that one, but trying to actually find solutions that honour different people’s rights.”
Though legal decisions on diversity issues might help DPs to arbitrate conflicts (the law is discussed in greater detail later on in this part), according to Janet-SP, the absence of a universal form of knowledge sometimes can be helpful to DPs, giving them room to manoeuvre around what would otherwise be decisions about whose ‘difference’ matters most. In these cases, they act as a *basanos* guiding the organisations to produce their own form of knowledge about the problem and accompanying solution. Parallel to this, however, claims to scientific knowledge as an objective form of knowledge featured strongly in the interviews with DPs – this will be examined now.

**Neutrality**

A noticeable subject position that emerged early on in the data was that of the DP as a neutral provider of knowledge, or, a *provider of neutral knowledge*. This supplements ‘best practice’ because it differs in its orientation to neutral, scientific knowledge rather than local knowledge. Unsurprisingly, among consultants this involved using rationalities that placed value on outsiderness to the organisation. Sophie-C too expressed that “it’s helpful to have someone external to come and have a look.” James-C, who works with both private and public sector organisations providing them with advice and training, described how he observes work practices in order to gauge the “feeling” of the organisations with which he works. He argued that it’s “always good to have a fresh pair of eyes on the issue”, though he
also acknowledges that there can be an advantage to diversity work being conducted by someone in-house who knows the organisation “inside out” and who “know[s] the staff team and some of the issues involved”.

However, the concept of the DP as offering neutrality was also articulated by a few in another more striking way – by contrasting the DP to a ‘preacher’: Charles-C said for example, “There’s some people who come with a preconception that I’m going to basically be like a bishop and I’m going to preach at people”, and Gerry-C used the same image to explain his neutrality:

“What I say to people within training or people within equality is that I’m not here to preach to you I’m not here to tell you this is how I think and this is how you should think because, to me, I’ve got no right to say you should think in this way because you know I’ve not lived their life, I’ve not been in the situations they’ve been in. But what I can do is present them with information present them with facts and basically help them to help them make their own decisions and hopefully I can steer them towards a more balanced a more fair a more equal, and also in some cases a more accurate, way of thinking.”

Ian-C uses the image slightly differently to frame his less confrontational and more dialogic approach, asserting that when he started training he “used to rant and rave
and scream and shout <laughs> that didn’t work” but that now he takes a different approach: “so not to preach I suppose, but to say ‘this is the situation what do you think we should do?’ and to keep challenging”. Annette-C uses the image to serve as a contrast to her preferred interactive approach “instead of me standing up in front of people and preaching to them they’ve actually got to participate they’ve actually got to get involved”. Andy-C does not use the religious metaphor but similarly distances himself from the exercise of control over his clients labelling himself instead an “enabler”. Although they differ slightly, the common thread in these evocations of the ‘not a preacher’ subject position is that of relinquishing a didactic form of control.

As a metaphor, because EO is unlikely to have really been articulated in religious terms, the metaphor of ‘not a preacher’ implies that the DP is different to the EO officer because they are without a political stance or agenda. It is reported that the notion of ‘political correctness’ used in EO training was accused by participants of infringing on ‘freedom of speech’ and training was characterised pejoratively as ‘preaching’ in terms of how it tried to influence how people thought and behaved (Bennett and Keating, 2008, Crawley, 2007, Penketh, 2000). This is an idea that Annette-C seems to draw on in explaining the need to distance herself from old approaches: “[the] ‘political correctness gone mad’ phrase came into the lexicon of most employers and that did us a lot of damage I think.” A contrast is drawn with a perceived former field of work that was ‘political’. This has the effect of discrediting the legitimacy of political action and necessitating an appeal to neutrality of
knowledge. This is a reflection of the strong discourse of scientific knowledge, which has been argued to be privileged in modern Western societies (Foucault, 1980: 85). For Foucault, scientific knowledge is a particular ‘regime du savoir’ - ‘regime of truth’ (Foucault, 1991/1977, Foucault, 1982) which allows forms of power to be exercised by experts in that it renders legitimate their interventions and their definitions of reality. Appeals to scientific knowledge have more currency, greater power, to change how people view the world than appeals to ideals of society and morality.

It could be argued that this may be doubly true in the context of business, which is informed by neoliberal discourses of the free market as an objective process, a mechanism outside of politics. However, religious discourses do circulate within management in the ‘missions’ of organisations and prophet-like management gurus (see Bell and Taylor, 2003). The latter fact suggests that DPs disassociate themselves from religious discourse, not entirely because it doesn’t have any purchase in organisations, but because of the idea that their predecessors lost the faith of organisations in the past. The image of EO practices as chastising organisations contrasts with the positively-inflected, affirming experiences that management gurus offer (Bell and Taylor, 2003: 330). In order to re-establish themselves as legitimate actors within organisations, DPs appeal to the powerful discourse of scientific knowledge.
The DP’s subjectivation as ‘neutral’ is supported with the provision of forms of knowledge that are regarded to be objective – primarily numbers and statistics – that are interwoven into their cases for diversity and recommendations for best practice. Being able to provide evidence, particularly in quantitative form, was prized among the participants: Jamil-C emphasised several times that a key challenge that DPs face is to collect enough “supportive evidence”, meaning measurements, statistics, and cases other than the logic of arguments for change. Erin-C and an associate DP (not interviewed formally) offered a special workshop that aimed to train people to calculate the return on investment of introducing inclusive measures for a staff in the workplace. This was an aim that Jamil-C in his interview was sceptical about being able to achieve despite his insistence on the value of such evidence. I observed this day-long workshop that took place in central London. The workshop introduced participants, the large majority of whom were diversity specialists from around the country, to a method of calculation that could be used by employers in order to decide whether or not it was cost-efficient to meet the additional needs of an employee rather than recruiting a replacement for them. A number of limitations to the specific model were raised by participants, the most prominent of which was the difficulty in quantifying all aspects of an employee’s value to the organisation. Despite this, there was a great enthusiasm shown by participants for the possibility, even need, to be able to practice diversity in quantifiable ways. Rebecca-C talked about the currency of “hard” evidence as providing a gateway to other persuasive techniques: “I’ll actually use hard evidence because that’s that the only way […] you can’t really appeal to them in a way that they perceive as emotionally at first”.

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By positioning oneself as a source of scientific knowledge, as opposed to what could be seen as a contrasting political vision of how organisations should be, DPs could be said to act here as ‘philosophers’ rather than as a parrhesiastes. In Foucault’s analysis of Ancient Greek societies, philosophers speak from a particular worldview rather than act as guides to one’s own truth and logos for life as a parrhesiastes does. By building a relationship to objective or scientific knowledge into the subject of the DP, a form of power is gained that has currency in modern Western societies (Rose, 1998). This is a particularly important subject position to be able to occupy as it helps to defend DPs from any anxiety about the uncertainty of diversity work and the interpretation of it, by practitioners or clients, as ‘illusion’, ‘deceit’, or ‘coercion’ as identified in Schwabenland and Tomlinson (2015: 16). The perception of coercion is a particular problem for DPs: in general, any overt attempt to control others is likely to be resisted in the present context of neoliberal discourse of individual freedom (Brewis, 1996), and this is also part of a history of hostility towards EO (Hemphill and Haines, 1997, Mobley and Payne, 1992), with which DPs contend.

**Equality law**

This section focusses on the different ways that DPs draw on equality law, in particular the Equality Act 2010 (EA2010), as a source of knowledge. The aim of this
The primary function of this section is to show that knowledge of equality law is not unitary in form and there are several ways that it adds to the DP’s toolkit of expertise.

Equality law was an important element of the accounts of DPs. Some consultants in this study focussed specifically on the law in their work (Charles-C, Catherine-C, Carole-C) and most mentioned adherence to equality law at some point in interviews. All of the specialists talked about legal requirements apart from the two based in the private sector. It is difficult to make concrete inferences about why this was from the data, but it could be that the difference stems from a) the additional duty (PSED) this requires private sector organisations who provide services on behalf of public organisations to demonstrate that they are considering and actively fostering equality, and b) a preference for the business case in private organisations. But overall knowing what the EA2010 stipulates, and how it differs from the equality laws it replaced, emerged as a key form of knowledge provided to clients by the DP.

This function was fulfilled at different levels of detail. For example, these DPs needed to convey basic knowledge of what the law is and who it protects: “one of the challenges of equality and diversity is that you have to stay abreast of it most of… [client Y] that we were with last week didn’t even know that there was an equality act” (Joan-C), and in the observation of training conducted by Jamil-C only three of the eleven participants raised their hands to indicate that they knew the
contents of the EA2010. Catherine-C however gave significant detail about the protections that the EA2010 offers during her specialised training – particularly about which conditions are, and are not, covered under the ‘disability’ provision and why – and the new protections that had been or were soon going to be added.

Equality law was the most universally evoked field of knowledge that DPs talked about and were observed using, despite their preference to use cases other than the ‘legal case’ when persuading others of the necessity of their work, as shown earlier in this chapter. The law is usually separated from the business case, participants tended to list them as independent cases “we’re looking at the business case but we also look at the moral case and then we look at the legal case” (Joan-C), “there’s a moral case there’s an educational case there’s business case and a legal case” (Ian-C). Some also showed reluctance to use the law as an argument for making changes in the name of diversity, for example Jamil-C explicitly stated that he prefers to use the business case. And others associate it with a lack of real change: Joan-C went on to state “we don’t want them doing the legal case because all you’re doing is tick a box”.

But the data also shows a more complex relationship between the law and other cases for diversity: for some the legal and business cases are linked together. For example, in reference to the PSED which requires not only public organisations but also their contractors to fulfil additional duties that aim to promote equality and
inclusion, Charles-C argued that: “in this financial year alone about a hundred and thirty-two billion pounds is going to be spent by the public sector in tenders and contracts and if you’re in the private sector and you want your share of that money, you’ve got to show what you’re doing on the E&D front.” Addressing all organisations, Thomas-C felt he “had to reinvent a kind of a corporate response to diversity, which is ‘can you afford to get it wrong? […] If you get it wrong and someone ends up at tribunal and you end up with compensation or compromise agreements or whatever it might be, can you afford that?’”. Ian-C combined both maximising potential and legal protection arguments:

“It’s actually not just because the law tells you, and it’s not just because it’s just a soppy thing to do but you get more out of your staff you know if you embrace their ideas and different styles and there’s a human rights case that people can come to work and not be discriminated against in work, and the business case is that it costs a lot of money and your reputation if you get sued and then I always end up with the legal one at the end.”

Though the distinction that Ian draws between the law and ‘soppy’ motivations distances his business case from moral or emotional arguments, he also weaves ‘human rights’ into this argument connecting business and legal cases together. Erin-C, too, explained during a workshop that the PSED is important to adhere to because not doing so could result in talent shortages. Isabelle-C distanced herself
from the law as a reason to make changes in itself, but also saw her role as
explaining why the procedures that the law sets out are beneficial to the business of
the organisation:

“If the only reason people are doing it is to tick a legal box then you’re never
really going to really make that progress. I think that’s one part of it. And
then the other part of it is making it practical and real if they see it’s a benefit
to them and I also think that having practical examples of where it’s been
helpful so being able to say, well, being able to say ‘equality impact
assessments in this particular area led to this much better decisions as a
result of it’, or this series of decisions.”

Here again a connection is being made between the business case and another case
that might be seen as being separate from it – the legal case. In this particular
articulation of the legal case it is lent it the currency of the business case (Ahmed,
2007a: 237). In this instance the colonising effect of the business case is perhaps less
concerning than in those instances discussed earlier in the chapter because the
difference here is that the business case cannot render the legal case contingent on
business goals. The law has the ability to exercise a ‘sovereign’ form of power, it has
the power to punish (so-called by Foucault in reference to that traditionally
attributed to the monarch (1991/1977)). This power of the law is recognised by DPs,
and is seen as advantageous, if not always preferable: “She uses recourse to the law
if she can’t connect with values. […] you can’t change people’s views all the time
and in these cases you have to draw the law, she says” (Notes from interview with Catherine-C). Carole-C too argues that the law is definitive:

“Personally I don’t compromise my approach but if the law says X it says X, and it should apply equally to everybody. [...] The challenge is to get them to understand what they should be doing and working constructively with them, and [where] they are, to get them to where you think they ought to be.”

In contrast to earlier positions that valued ambiguity, focussing on the law provides Carole-C with a subject position as ‘uncompromising’, which offers protection against uncertainties about diversity work. Susanne-C also finds the clarity of sovereign power useful in terms of recommending best practice: “The point about using actual case law is that it’s not hypothetical, this is, if you were in a similar situation, and case law is precedent, therefore its very practical”, she sees her role as to “explain in practical terms what the law says and what will happen to them”. This shows a view of herself as a neutral conveyer of knowledge about a form of power wielded from elsewhere. Charles-C also borrows the sovereign power of other bodies to inform how he exercises normalising power to persuade organisations that they are falling short of best practice: “scrutiny bodies like Ofsted and the Equality Care Commission and supporting people […] have their own benchmark questions so you can usually reconcile the two together”.
But there is also clearly value that is added by the DP to the explanation in practical terms of the law:

“...less emphasis on the style of your delivery, and more on your understanding of what the Equality Act is seeking to do, and your ability to convey that, and support organisations or individuals in using the law effectively.” (Carole-C)

“...it’s a practical interpretation of the Equality Act it’s not section XY statute, it’s something that really means something to them.” (Susanne-C)

This is the closest match in the data to ‘translator’ model for the DP outside of articulating the cases for diversity in different ways. In explaining the law into ‘practical’ terms for clients, DPs not only outline the types of situation in which the organisation would be discriminating, but also provide the form of knowledge described earlier as ‘best practice’. The EA2010 seems to provide DPs with a concrete basis on which the need for their work cannot ultimately be called into question and room to develop and disseminate norms about what is best practice. In this way, it can be a component of either ‘neutrality’ or ‘best practice’ positions.
For those concerned with the PSED, DPs are constructed as arbitrators of how best to promote diversity and inclusion and show what the law calls ‘due regard’ for the needs of protected groups of people: Ava-SP, Jamil-C, and James-C were all observed in their training offering best practice solutions to avoid discriminating against people with a particular protected characteristic. Even Carole-C states that ‘what you can do with the law is extend, push the boundaries’ meaning that DPs have some space to negotiate how exactly the law becomes operationalised into practice.

A further form of knowledge of the law that was articulated in different ways by DPs was in explaining why the law protects those that it does. Jamil-C and James-C did not offer explicit rationalities for why certain groups are protected over others and simply presented the current legal requirements, even when James elicited surprise from his trainees when asking them to guess who is protected by the law and who isn’t. By contrast, Ava-SP and Catherine-C did and did so using different rationalities from one another. Here is an extract from my notes made after observing Catherine-C’s training session:

“She gives examples around transvestism and debates around dress code she skilfully avoids condemning aspects of the law for not covering particular forms of discrimination whilst agreeing [with trainees] that it is unfair. She simply deals with [the law] on a surface level, of what it does
and does not cover, and engages with questions as to how the law is made saying that it isn’t made on what the government believes is a moral principle.”

Catherine-C attributes the particular set of characteristics that are protected in the law to a question of who has historically been discriminated against, and did not give reasons for why this may have been the case. Whereas Ava-SP did give a reason: she explains that those characteristics that are protected under the EA2010 are those that are “extremely difficult to change about oneself”. Catherine-C gives the law historical-contextual roots and Ava-SP attributes it with essential ones. Whilst these differing explanations did not appear to have immediate implications, they could do so in the long term. Other scholars have noted that diversity can have a fixing effect on difference that render certain groups of people the focus of management control (Ahonen et al., 2014). The rationality that Catherine disseminates for why the law protects certain ‘characteristics’ may provide a method of subtly circumventing such dangers.

This section has sought to show that the knowledge of equality law that DPs can exercise is not a unitary form of knowledge. It is instead a set of knowledges, and of powers, that add to their toolkit as expert subjects. The next section considers how diversity can be extended and its rationalities appropriated across contexts.
Diversity as ethic

This section explores how DPs used the idea that diversity was more than a specific set of practices and legal obligations but rather that it was a particular rationality for thinking about and doing things, what we might call an ethic of practice. It is characterised as a component of the ‘neutrality’ position because it seeks to construct underlying scientific knowledge and constancy to the concept of diversity.

This idea emerged sporadically in interviews and observations of practices. Talking about equality law Claire-SP expressed that the frequent changes to the law can detract from “what it [diversity] really means” and that DPs working in the public sector in particular where the PSED has necessitated so much education about the EA2010 that DPs “have just been looking at this, so, ‘what does the law say, what do we need to do’ and just following that rather than the spirit of what it is”. Catherine-C too, in her detailed training session on the EA2010, repeatedly emphasised “learning the principles of the equality act rather than nailing down every single judgement that might be made” (Notes from observation of Catherine, emphasis added). Others referred to the need to be pragmatic in order to make progress: “if practitioners in the corporate sector can make better progress using diversity and inclusion framework to talk about the issues then they should do that.” (Janet-SP).

In reference to how she determines her approach Carole-C said “my days of being interested in academia are long gone. I’m much more practically based around
making a difference in peoples’ lives”, and Claire-SP said “we do need to be more pragmatic about how we approach it - the language we use, how we link it in to what’s going on”. The idea here is that, although the language of their work may change in order to pragmatically gain support from organisations, DPs are always engaged in promoting the same underlying principles. This echoes the notion that the field was merely subject to surface-level change by the shift to diversity (Prasad et al., 2011). However, where Prasad et al. warn that this brings a ‘false sense of novelty’ and that it can render diversity ‘cosmetic’ and ‘without teeth’ (2011: 718), in the findings of the present study DPs talk in very positive terms about the constancy of underlying principles. This is more in line with the ‘selling’ diversity idea found by Jones (2007).

Another way that diversity appeared in the data to be a type of ethic rather than a particular set of recommendations is that DPs have different ways in which they specialise or generalise their knowledge. Most of the consultants defined themselves as having particular areas of expertise, for example the law (Charles-C, Carole-C), race and hate crime (Erin-C), disability (Annette-C, Bill-C, Tess-C), gender relations (Thomas-C), mental health (Rebecca-C). This is not unexpected due to consultants’ otherwise direct competition with each other. However, it also appeared that generalising one’s knowledge could also be beneficial. This was seen in how many of the participants (both consultants and specialists) had played diversity roles in different sectors or industries, but was acutely observed in the case of Ava-SP, who is based in a local authority. Ava-SP was observed on seven
occasions over the course of two months. Some of the activities that were observed pertained directly to advising the local authority or organisations that provided public services, but there were also adjacent groups of people to whom Ava was called upon to give advice in her capacity as a DP. Those observed were: foster carers (on inclusion of foster children), parents at a local school (on race hate and bullying), and school children (on diversity and inclusion). During these sessions, at one level Ava-SP’s knowledge of the structure and procedures of the local authority were certainly helpful, for example in recommending who to contact for support, but what is remarkable is that she also made use of her diversity knowledge in very similar ways across the different contexts. By using diversity as a general ethic about the imperative to consider differences and the needs of others, Ava-SP was able to render diversity relevant to a wide variety of audiences. The transferability of diversity across different contexts was something that Ava-SP herself spoke about during informal talks with me in the car to and from these events. She spoke of her strategic use of this generalisability as a way to ensure and increase the value of her role within her organisation amid cuts to diversity in other organisations that she was aware of. It is notable also that another public-sector DP, Isabelle-SP, talked about how her role in a governmental department has been re-structured to create a position that oversees not only diversity but also issues that concern planning for the future, namely sustainability. It could be argued that the strategy of specialising helps to protect the DP from the competition of other DPs, whilst the strategy of generalisation helps to increase the value of the DP to the organisation.
Further evidence that diversity was framed as an ethic relates to references from two DPs about diversity work as being something removed from their own interests, that eventually working oneself “out of a job” (Claire-SP) is the ideal of their work, and that they wouldn’t “need to exist” (Janet-SP). Similarly, Andy-C says that “if I’m doing the same thing for a company, you know, year after year I’m not doing my job properly. I mean part of my job is to make myself redundant. I don’t want them to be dependent on me.” This relates to the ‘moral motivation’ discussed earlier in the chapter. However, this idea is articulated slightly differently here in that it was framed as unlikely that DPs would no longer be needed. Claire-SP is sceptical about the likelihood of this happening soon, as is Helen-SP: “actually that doesn’t happen by a process of natural evolution and osmosis. You do need the specialists to keep reminding everybody how to make sure it’s mainstreamed and embedded”. As Helen-SP says, the idea that is being implied in these statements is that of ‘mainstreaming’ diversity. Mainstreaming involves the building in of a consideration for diversity into all organisational procedures.

There has been significant discussion of the potential and limitations of mainstreaming in terms of gender, but less discussion of how it relates to diversity as a concept (notable exceptions, Bacchi and Eveline, 2009, Eveline et al., 2009, Hankivsky, 2005, Greene and Kirton, 2010) but what has not yet been identified about it is the type of power that it relies on. Mainstreaming may rely on sovereign power of management to sanction its employees for not properly adhering to the diversity elements of procedure, or of external regulatory bodies sanctioning
organisations for failing to comply with standards, but it may also function as a modern form of government, which encourages individuals to regulate their own behaviour moment-to-moment by shaping how they exercise choice, aligning them to the governing programme (Rose and Miller, 1992: 189). For example, Gerry-C alludes to the importance of influencing how people choose how to act: “people can know what the right thing is to do but it’s whether they choose to do it or not that’s what matters”. This form of government, and how DPs try to achieve it in diversity training, is elaborated in detail in Chapter Five. But for now, it is the relationship to knowledge that DPs take on in performing this role that is the focus: The DP performs the role of a basanos in promoting the internalisation of a particular manner of thinking such that it will shape how organisational actors, and organisations, will behave. However, there is a difference between the DP-basanos role in this subject position and the basanos described by Foucault. In Foucault’s accounts (1999/1983a, 1999/1983b), the basanos traditionally acted as a guide or ‘touchstone’ (Foucault, 1999/1983b: 4) in order to help individuals to find and live by their own logos, whereas DPs have a particular manner of thinking in mind (they act as a philosopher). Nevertheless, similar to the original basanos, DPs seek to monitor how well the actions of their clients compare to the ethic that they have set out to follow. Though the DPs are still providing a particular form of knowledge as logos – an ethic of being considerate for the difference of others – here the persuasion element takes a back seat and the act of a continual comparison between ethic and action is primary. The differences in opinion between DPs that are presented above, arise from a difference in belief about whether the basanos can be internalised by the organisation or not.
Recognising the rationality of diversity as an ethic has brought into focus a number of issues. The limited resources and contact time that DPs receive gives rise to the need to strive for a form of government that will mean that organisations self-regulate, i.e. the mainstreaming of the diversity ethic into procedures. In the meantime, DPs act as a *basanos* (Foucault, 1999/1983b: 4) striving to ensure that the organisation’s actions align to the ethic of diversity. Secondly, the diversity as ethic rationality offers a way that DPs can not only specialise to enclose their expertise and protect against their replacement, but also generalise it. These two strategies are valuable to DPs in terms of staving off competition from one another, but having competing subject positions could be detrimental to the construction of a unified concept of diversity expertise and to construct the protective ‘enclosure’ (Rose and Miller, 1992: 188) or ‘professional identity’ (Parker, 2000a: 204), since there is a fractured picture about what diversity expertise means. One way in which the IEDP seeks to resolve this conflict is explored in the next and final section of the Part. This latter issue may also be the case for other professional groups, for example lawyers, where the occupation is sub-divided into different specialisms that enclose specific areas of expertise. This thesis does not consider the finding in terms of the literature on the professions, pointing to the potential to explore how DPs might negotiate a general and more specialised enclosures compared with other professions.

The next and final section of this chapter examines a slightly different set of rationalities about skills and knowledge that pertain to the justifications that DPs
provide for having them. It discusses three such warrants for knowledge and skills that were put forward by DPs.

**Warrants**

DPs drew on a number of different warrants for their knowledge and skills in diversity. This commonly included the evocation of having worked for large or well-known organisations, and time spent working in the area, as might be expected from any number of organisational actors. The focus of this section is to examine in detail those warrants that are closely linked to the specific history or context of diversity work, and which are more localised to the field.

In previous literature it has been suggested that due to the shift in discourse from EO to diversity, DPs may be increasingly likely to come from positions in HRM or management rather than activism (Kirton et al., 2007). In conjunction with the importance of the business case in the work of DPs (Ozbilgin and Tatli, 2006) this means that knowledge of business, management, and HRM may have also become prominent ways that DPs situate themselves as experts rather than being so-called ‘experts by experience’. This section of the chapter explores whether this is the case by examining how DPs talk about their **personal experience** in relation to their work.
A number of the DPs in the study brought up the issue of personal experience, some in reference to their own experiences of disadvantage or being a member of a minoritised group, and others to their lack of this. It became clear in the following quotes that, for some DPs, claims to expertise based on personal experience were not confined to membership of minoritised groups.

Two DPs made statements which indicated directly or indirectly that membership of a minoritised group, and of a particular minoritised group gives a person valuable and irreplaceable insight into the issues:

“…race has been forgotten, there’s a huge - particularly among the Afro-Caribbean diversity practitioners because they understand it, you know. I can’t pretend to understand challenges that are faced by Afro-Caribbeans [sic.] in the UK, they see stuff that I’ll never see” (Jamil-C)

“People can empathise with your experience and your feelings but that’s all they can do. They will never understand it themselves, because they’ll never understand unless they’ve been a victim of racism themselves, they’ll never understand.” (John-C)
But others expressed reluctance to use their personal experience in the context of their work, indicating that there is a question of legitimacy regarding expertise by experience: “I have but only in context. It’s one of those sorts of things that I don’t want to… It’s a balancing act” (Gerry-C), and talking of the lowest level of accreditation that the IEDP offers: “Level one would be for anyone who had an interest in equality and possibly was an advisor, something the Met police described as “expert by experience”’ (Carole-C). Catherine-C also demonstrated a reluctance to use her personal experiences of discrimination on the basis of her sexual identity in her work, because those memories were too upsetting.

With a contrasting emphasis, Amy-C evoked the idea that the concept of diversity has enabled people to see commonalities among the needs and experiences of different minoritised groups, explaining that “there are people in the E&D world that sort of feel that people themselves you know that you shouldn’t speak for other people” but that now “people are more used to or more used to the idea of looking across the different strands and the different characteristics […] more clear now about the parallels and distinctions between the different areas”. This quote Amy-C is careful to note also that differences still remain.

The tension between positioning experience as something unique and valuable, but also justifying the role of representing people, whose experiences the DP has not shared, is illustrated in this quote from Rebecca-C:
“[Speaking about the chair of a diversity organisation] she really struggled because she had challenges well you know “you’re white, you can’t understand” or “you’re able-bodied how can you understand?” and it’s like well, “it’s not, it’s about empathy and listening isn’t it?” It’s... How could I even as an Indian woman understand the needs of, let’s say, someone who I mentored - a refugee from Somalia? Just because you’ve got a particular colour doesn’t mean that you can understand somebody.” (Rebecca-C)

Here Rebecca-C weaves together both rationalities, retaining a link to both a legacy of feminist and race equality movements, from which the uniqueness of experience was emphasised (for instance, Hartsock, 1983), and to the idea of being able to empathise about other peoples’ experiences. Empathy for others is an important element of the diversity discourse and is explored further in Chapter Five.

Rebecca-C’s rationality of indirect experience is a warrant that was useful for two DPs who do not identify themselves as members of minoritised groups. There were also other, less direct, relationships to experience that could be evoked to support the authority of these DPs in the field. Ian-C talks about acting as a conduit for the experiences of others:

“I suppose my job is to listen to the people who know what they’re talking about it first before I start going off and spouting about it...because my
credibility or people like me...we’re only as credible as how well informed we are about […] we’re not making it up are we...so...we’re just...we’re just...telling other people...we’re just passing it on.”

He goes on to explain that he seeks out people from minoritised groups directly as his sources of information and “listened to what they have to say”.

Ian-C goes on to suggest that his identity as a member of a majoritised group can be an advantage to how he can make diversity an interesting topic to others like himself “I’m not part of an oppressed minority. I mean one thing I am able to do is to make it a mainstream issue and to say ‘look’, and people say ‘well why I wonder where he’s coming from?’”. In this statement Ian-C is getting at the idea that people from minoritised groups who do diversity work may be seen as having a personal agenda, whereas as a white man he is regarded as a neutral party conveying a neutral form of knowledge.

Oliver-C mentions another route to emotional connection to diversity work, having raised his involvement in creating policy and training in the aftermath of the Stephen Lawrence inquiry and McPherson report, an event that has been credited as a key impetus for the development of UK equality work (Clements and Jones, 2006, Lorbiecki and Jack, 2000). This connection was evoked in the context of a narrative about how he became a DP and so acts mainly as a warrant for interest in
or opportunity to do diversity work, but he also stated that “you could almost say that was my epiphany” indicating that it was a turning point of commitment to the agenda beyond professional interest. This is something that, as seen earlier, is important if not to the knowledge then to the legitimacy of the DP.

For Tess-C, personal experience did not give her a warrant to knowledge other than the specific condition that she has herself, but it does give her credibility in the eyes of others:

“Well I only know about my disability, I don’t read braille, I don’t do sign language, I only know what it’s like to have my disability, which doesn’t make me an expert. But for some reason it does increase that credibility. I’m not saying thank God I’m disabled, I’m absolutely not, but I do think… I don’t think I could have done this without being disabled. I don’t think it would have been authentic.”

Amy-C too says that before a close family member came out as gay, addressing LGB and T issues “felt like it was a bit of a cheek” and that she subsequently had more “credibility” from being “involved in some way”.

Rebecca-C used the subject position of expertise by experience in a further way. She did not evoke her own membership to a minority ethnic group as a warrant for
expertise, but instead talked about her closeness to other groups of minoritised people:

“I guess I've been lucky you know. I've grown up, went to a very diverse school I've got able bodied friends, friends who aren't, I've got friends with various conditions, you know. I've got friends with depression, my nephew's got Asperger’s another friend’s brother has autism and I mentored him for a while. I think you've just got to open yourself to those different communication styles and those different things. And not everyone's comfortable with doing that I suppose.”

By talking about her closeness to minoritised individuals as being “lucky”, she frames expertise by experience not as an expertise derived from experience of disadvantage, but as an expertise gained from practice of accommodating others.

By surfacing the different ways that personal experience was used as warrant for knowledge in the data, the section so far has sought to show that experience – both direct and indirect – remains an important subject position among DPs, and is widely considered to lend legitimacy to DPs in their own eyes and the eyes of clients. This points to a continuing relationship with the discourses of the social movements that spawned the field. This is the case even though it may no longer be regarded as enough to qualify someone to do diversity work alone, and that new articulations about the importance of experience are possible (Rebecca-C). This shift
is indicative of a desire echoed elsewhere in the data to create an enclosure for the expertise of DPs based on command of certain forms of knowledge.

This third warrant that emerged as specific to the history and context of DPs’ work was an emphasis on **continual learning**. On a practical level, referring back to the ‘conduit’ position that DPs take on, both consultants and specialist DPs need to keep up with the developments in equality law and related case law from tribunals, recommendations for best practice, and news items to illustrate good or bad diversity practice:

“…you’ve got to be up to date and to do that you’ve got to be interested in public policy and do your reading around your subject. Know what the changes are not just know the DD [Disability Discrimination] legislation but also be aware of the political climate” (Bill-C)

“[What] I really do is try to update my knowledge ensure that I’m up to date make sure I’m familiar with current cases and what’s in the media” (Gerry-C)

Thomas also described his work as a process of co-learning: “the more I work with people the more I help them to be aware...of themselves the more I become aware of myself as well.”
The IEDP also recognises this as a particularly important feature of the DP role:

“Our realised that what we were looking for was practitioners that could demonstrate that they were reflective, that they were learning practitioners because we were very aware that goalposts shift in this field very, you know, often quite fast actually […] We needed evidence that people were reflecting on their practice” (Alice-C)

The IEDP itself does not offer training. Instead, the accreditation asks for evidence of expertise in a number of forms including recommendations, evaluations, and pieces of reflective writing. From the perspective of the IEDP being a regulatory body, it seems that the subject position of continual learning and being ‘reflective’ provides a way of uniting the practice of DPs across the huge variations in their responsibilities and specialisms under one standard for practice. The notion of being reflective is used as a point of commonality in order to create a standard for what DPs stand for and do. This provides the occupation with one way of creating an enclosure for diversity expertise, drawing a boundary between different people operating in the field, and producing a ranking or taxonomy (Foucault, 2009/1970, Townley, 1993: 528) for DPs of different levels.
The idea of diversity expertise as something that is incomplete emerged in instances where DPs indicated a reluctance to call themselves experts in diversity. Talking about how to convey what diversity means Thomas-C said “I still struggle with it [diversity work] on a daily basis”, Jamil-C talked about his reaction to being asked for advice on diversity for the first time, “[they said] ‘we notice you’re an expert in diversity’ I was no expert and in fact I still don’t feel like an expert in diversity”. Helen-SP talked about gaps in her knowledge “sometimes I go to things and I think ‘I’m really learning a lot and these people are really experts and maybe it’s an area I know less about’”. Tess also distanced herself from the category of ‘expert’ despite having both experience as a diversity trainer and being a member of a minoritised group:

“They tend to come to me for advice. I don’t know why! I’m not particularly an expert although I was a trainer. But they’ll come to me for advice on physical access issues which I don’t know anything about. Because they see me as an, in inverted commas, ‘expert’ not only because I run [organisation Z] but because I’m a disabled person. […] I wouldn’t know whether a website is accessible or not but I know someone who can. So what I then tend to do is say ‘I can’t answer your question but this person can or this person will be able to help you.’ […] I’m flattered that people ask, and I’m glad they see the need to ask, but I can’t have all the answers.”
Here, Tess positions herself as a *basanos* in a slightly different way to that outlined earlier - as a network coordinator, striving to produce an alignment between the way that the organisation wants to be, and those people who can help it to enact this in practice.

Jamil-C implied that DPs can only have partial knowledge but that this is valuable:

> “I wake up some mornings feeling a fraud. I don’t believe I know everything I need to know and to me that makes me a fraud. Then I realise from talking to someone else I realise how much I actually do know. [...] A lot of people get into [diversity] in different ways and a lot of people focus on gender, race, disability. Other people will focus on organisational development. Everybody’s doing something different, so knowledge is specific to their background.”

These examples show how DPs elected in interviews to highlight gaps in their knowledge. However, many of them subsequently talk about their attempts to compensate for these gaps, as seen earlier by learning and cultivating closeness with minoritised groups. But if we consider this idea of gaps in diversity knowledge in context of the subject position of expertise by personal experience discussed above, gaps in diversity knowledge are, what may be termed, ‘de-problematised’ (the opposite of a Foucauldian ‘problematising’) by being positioned as inevitable
because people always have the best knowledge of their own experience. Moreover, the gap can become of value: the act of learning and seeking information is produced as a skill of diversity work and a warrant to the DP occupying a position of authority within the field.

This section has sought to show that the rationalities of personal experience, indirect experience, and continual learning are evoked as warrants for diversity expertise. It showed that expertise by experience plays a role in the bricolage subject of the DP, but that there is also a reluctance to rely on it as a sole warrant perhaps in order to achieve greater legitimacy as an occupation. The warrant of continual learning helps to strengthen the DP subject as expert in light of an ongoing subject position based on value derived from the first-hand experience of minoritised groups.

Summary of Part Three

This final part of the chapter has offered an analysis of several elements of the DP’s toolkit, which aid them to claim knowledge and skills in diversity. It has suggested that the recommendations that DPs make for best practice exercise normalising power where claims to generalisable knowledge about what organisations or individuals should do in any given context cannot be made. But it has also shown that, where possible, claiming neutrality via scientific knowledge, lends DPs
currency in modern organisations and helps to alleviate anxieties about diversity as coercion. The analysis of how DPs mobilise the law in their work showed that knowledge of the equality law is not a unitary form of knowledge but rather offers DPs several discursive tools, and the concept of an ‘ethic’ of diversity was offered to explain the way that DPs sometimes seek to achieve a governing form of power that reaches beyond themselves. Finally, the chapter discussed how the warrants of personal experience and continual learning emerge from the particular history of DPs and respond to problems that they face.
Summary

This chapter has analysed several subject positions that help to answer the question: How do diversity practitioners construct themselves as expert subjects? (RQ1) This analysis was structured in three parts which outlined: a) the relation between DP and the organisation and/or clients, b) the relations among DPs, and c) the skills and knowledge that are claimed by DPs.

In the first part, six subject positions were characterised as ‘educator’, ‘provocateur’, ‘comforter’, ‘warrior’, ‘cynic’, and ‘conduit’. Each position constructs for DPs a different relationship with their organisation/clients and entails varying relationships to knowledge as parhessiastes, basanos, philosopher in Socratic or Cynic traditions. This analysis showed that instead of being unitary subjects, DPs are a bricolage of different subject positions. The implications of this idea, and the findings generated from taking this perspective, will be discussed in Chapter Six. The parrhesiastial relationships that have been raised throughout the chapter have been summarised in Appendix Two.

In the second part, the analysis brought to light three different subject position – ‘moral motivation’, ‘a collective ideal’, and a ‘diverse and inclusive occupation’. This analysis showed that morality and ‘doing good’ is an integral subject position to the DP-subject. It also revealed the complex relationship between the cases for
diversity, highlighting in particular the power of the business case to colonise them by rearticulating them. It also drew attention to the important role of the DP network, as an important ‘backstage’ space to the process of forming the DP-subject. Finally, potential tensions between consultant and specialist DPs were pointed to, arising from the way that consultants present themselves as being in a better position to do diversity work than specialists. It also highlighted a tension that all DPs negotiate between the ideal of respecting and valuing difference within the occupational community, in line with the logos of diversity itself, and the need to standardise in order to achieve legitimacy as experts.

The third part of this chapter addressed rationalities of knowledge and skill claimed by DPs, that had not already been highlighted in the chapter - best practice, neutrality, equality law, diversity as ethic. It sought to show how DPs are not only conveyors of pre-existing knowledge, but play a role in producing knowledge about diversity and thus producing the subject/discipline of diversity itself. It showed that DPs occupy a range of positions: they construct themselves at times as basanos guiding their clients towards their own knowledge about diversity, at others claims to a neutral, scientific knowledge are important to DPs in light of the legacy of EO, but these claims are not always available to them. Furthermore, the analysis showed that knowledge of the UK’s equality law is not unitary, but is instead a set of different forms of knowledge. The concept of an ‘ethic’ of diversity was used in order to explain how many DPs construct diversity as being a constant way of
thinking and doing, unchanged by the different ways that it is translated for others, and that this constancy is a positive thing.

Lastly I drew attention to the role that experience and continual learning play as a warrants for knowledge, suggesting the former is linked to the roots of DPs in social movements. The latter is constructed as a skill of the DP and remedies the gaps in knowledge that DPs are perceived to inevitably have, and which arise partially from the subject position of expertise by experience.

The theme of government that has been raised in this chapter in relation to the formation of the DP-subject is taken forward now into the next chapter in order to theorise how DPs seek control over other subjects. Specifically, Chapter Five analyses the knowledge and techniques that DPs use in diversity training in order to produce a particular type of diversity trainee.
Chapter Five – Constructing the ‘diversity trainee’

The previous chapter presented empirical data to answer RQ1 concerning the knowledge and practices that construct the DP as an expert subject in the field of diversity. This chapter seeks to contribute to the understanding of DPs’ work by examining another subject that they are involved in constructing – the diversity trainee (DT). As a widespread diversity practice, and that DPs are often called upon to provide, it is important to understand what DPs seek to achieve in diversity training and how. The data for this analysis was gathered from interviews with DPs but also from observations of diversity training. In line with this, the following analysis examines how diversity training techniques seek to construct the desired subject – the ‘DT’ – rather than inquiring into the self-concepts of trainees. Training was mainly conducted and talked about by consultants in this study and so the majority of the analysis draws on data provided by them. This means that the comparison between specialists and consultants does not continue in this part of the thesis.

Training can be read as an attempt to govern the trainee in a ways that lead to a ‘convenient end’ (Foucault, 1991/1977: 94 quoting Le Pierre) for DPs. The task of this thesis is to find out what these ends are, what the characteristics of the subject are
that are seen to facilitate a reaching of these ends, and to describe the techniques that are employed to produce this subject. The chapter provides an anatomisation of the forms of knowledge that are mobilised by DPs in order to construct the trainee as a subject who has particular interests, capacities, and responsibilities, which are useful to how the subject/discipline of diversity wishes to govern organisations. Informed by Foucault’s concept of the subject and using the notion of transformation outlined in Chapter Two, the analysis describes the forms of problematising rationality and programming rationality that diversity training uses in an attempt to shape the DT, and the techniques of the self that trainees are asked to engage in. The analysis seeks to disentangle the various forms of knowledge that are mobilised in diversity training, the wider discourses that shape and constrain them, and the desired effects of this orchestration. Furthermore, the chapter uses the concept of ‘modern government’ to theorise the form of power involved. Such reflections are important to understanding the limits and potential of diversity training, the forms of power that are enacted, and gained and lost in taking particular approaches.

The present chapter addresses the second research question: How is the subject of the ‘diversity trainee’ constructed by diversity practitioners? (RQ2) It does so in three parts, each addressing one sub-question that was outlined in Chapter Two.
Part One

How is the status quo problematised in diversity training? (RQd)

As discussed in Chapter Two, training aims to transform its participants in some way by offering them new ways of understanding the status quo and how things should be otherwise. In order to construct a need for trainees to take on new forms of knowledge, diversity training articulates why existing knowledge is deficient. Forms of knowledge that do this can be termed within a Foucauldian framework as problematising rationalities but are usually discussed in the diversity literature as the ‘cases’ for diversity. As mentioned in Chapter Four, DPs frequently referred to the ‘business case’ in interviews, but they rarely expanded on this using individual rationalities for why promoting diversity-heterogeneity was good for organisations. This is likely a result of the insider status that I sought to cultivate with DPs, which allowed me to access the backstage accounts discussed in Chapter Four (see Chapter Three). In training contexts DPs did explain on occasion what they meant by the business case in terms that have previously been documented. For example, in training the staff of an advisory service Jamil-C used ‘valuing difference’ (Liff, 1997), giving an example of how someone with Asperger’s has unique qualities that can be of benefit to an organisation (also observed in a session hosted by Claire-SP’s organisation on ‘neurodiversity’), “We’re all really good at something” he said, we just need to “find the right job”. He also talked about the need for the organisation to
promote wider participation from the local community in order to fulfil its aims, which he supports with figures such as the proportion of BME people, and people with a low reading age, within it. But in most cases, DPs did not explain in detail trainees why considering diversity would benefit their organisations: for example, James-C and Emily-C did not provide specific arguments to their trainees of an adult care provider, providing evidence only in a general sense by referring to large businesses who had invested in promoting diversity. They also conducted a quiz that asked trainees to guess the proportion of the population that, for example, had additional learning needs or suffered from mental health conditions. But no explicit case for diversity accompanied this. This generality could be because it was assumed that the organisation already accepted its need to accommodate the specific needs of their service-users. Training sessions by Ava-SP and Erin-SP also addressed audiences where the benefits of considering diversity by those present had already been accepted. The lack of detailed problematising suggests that by the time DPs were invited to conduct training, organisations had already bought-into the case for diversity. However, DPs were found to mobilise problematising rationalities that pertained to the individual in front of them, and why they personally should engage with the diversity agenda: ‘professional competence’ and ‘empathy’.

**Professional competence**
This section examines how the notion of ‘professional competence’ in training is a way of articulating the business case that expands previous characterisation of it. The business case has been a dominant topic of discussion in the literature on diversity since its popularisation during the 1990s (Dickens, 1999, Liff, 1997, Liff, 2003, Noon, 2007) but was also a feature of EO (Dickens, 1994). Discussions have outlined a number of ways that the business case is invoked in relation to improving staff recruitment, retention, absenteeism and creativity (see Liff, 2003). This section describes the way in which the business case can also be articulated in terms of the interests in relation to the individual employee – problematising the individual rather than the organisation – through the concept of diversity as part of professional competence.

The concept of professional competence was used by Annette-C who suggested that certain competencies were required in order to be able to “deliver” diversity: “we have something called the five Cs framework […] we have competence and confidence, how to make your staff confident about the agenda and how to give them the competencies.” She indicated that training is an opportunity to develop this competence. Joan-C articulated diversity as part of the professional competence by re-appropriating the acronym ‘PC’ from ‘political correctness’:
“You know; people say it’s ‘political correctness’ but we say no it’s ‘professional competence’. You’re being paid to do this job and doing this job means that you thread equality and diversity through...”

This rationality constructs the existing practices of the trainee as incompetent because they lack a fundamental element: good equality and diversity practices. ‘Political correctness’ is a concept that has been received negatively in recent years and is commonly used to trivialise efforts to promote equality (Crawley, 2007). This re-appropriation seeks to monopolise a common rejection of PC by reimagining it as something that is a necessary component of an individual’s professionalism and success at work. Similarly, Rebecca-C asserted: “Diversity is nothing more than respect and good business practice.” The adjectival phrase ‘nothing more than’ minimises the idea that diversity is an additional burden: it positions diversity considerations as essential to properly performing the skills that organisations already demand, and as part of respectful professional interactions between people in the workplace.

Sometimes diversity was connected to the professional competence of people in specific organisations, sectors, or roles: Susanne talked about diversity as an important feature of customer service “where you make sure that they don’t treat disabled customers any differently to anybody else, you know?”, and Charles-C connected diversity considerations with the “soft skills” required by people
working in courts: “[It’s] soft skills and the work that they’re already doing in the court with vulnerable witnesses - mainly people with learning disabilities or people who have suffered sexual abuse or people who have...who are elderly who have come into court.” Another example came from James-C and Emily-C’s training session with adult care staff wherein they made a connection between the staff’s duties to meet their clients’ health needs and to meet needs of certain cultural traditions and to overcome language barriers of the diverse local population. When working with school teachers and governors, Amy-C too said that she tries to “get them to see that the responsibilities that we have as people who work with young people [...] try and make a fairer world through our work with young people. [...] Equality and diversity for me has always been the underlying thread.”

The examples above illustrate how the business case can be shifted sideways from its most documented forms, which emphasise the productivity and profitability to the organisation of diversity, onto the immediate professional interests of the employee. It is demonstrative of how the business case is re-articulated to meet the needs of a diversity training encounter which has as its focus the transformation of the individual trainee. It makes the individual responsible on the basis of professional expectations – it is a role-based business case for diversity. This echoes in part the rationality of diversity, found to be increasingly used in the US, as a managerial competency (Anand and Winters, 2008). However, the relationship of this argument to other cases for diversity, and the potential limitations of this rationality, have not yet been discussed.
The potential limitation to this case, similar to other business cases, is that it is an argument that is constrained to the workplace since diversity is articulated as an essential part of those behaviours that need to be enacted in work roles and in a work space. This idea was expressed in other utterances by DPs:

“I often have an exercise around the fact that we all have prejudices - we’re human beings. It's about managing and leaving them outside in terms of the people that you work with and the people that you serve.” (Charles-C)

“We had a discussion [...] about having a Quaker member of staff who was a peace activist in a children’s centre where there were a lot of...there was a local military base and there were a lot of service peoples’ children and members of staff that were connected to the services. And what it - would it be ok to for that member of staff [...] to, you know, to say particular things.” (Rebecca-C)

For DPs the partitioning of how the subject should behave within and out of the workplace is advantageous because the problematisation of the trainee is one that finds the individual’s skills deficient rather than their beliefs per se. Joan said that when people “recognised that it was a part of their job” they were “keen to...show willing”. The rationality leaves ambiguous the requirements for individuals to alter
their behaviour outside work spaces and relationships in what might be considered the private sphere in their interactions with others as customers or service-users, as friends and family members. In drawing a line between work and non-work interactions, a **public-private split-self** is constructed, ruled by two different rationalities depending on context. This constructs a space in which DPs have no right of influence.

**Empathy**

As illustrated in the examples used so far in this thesis, the business case for diversity was dominant in this research. Moreover, it displays a colonising tendency in how it can be merged with legal and what are characterised by DPs as ‘moral’ cases. References to the social justice case were sporadic and general, for example when training foster carers Ava-SP argued that “we should prepare our children to be good global citizens” (extract from field-notes), and Catherine-C believed in a karmic underlying connection that people have to each other “therefore how we treat each other is important as we can cause damage to each other and therefore to ourselves” (notes from interview). Where the idea of diversity as moral consideration featured more commonly it was articulated in terms of ‘empathy’. This idea was composed of a number of rationalities about a person’s capacities, dispositions, and interests.
Firstly, ‘empathy’ contained a rationality for the human capacity for empathy: that people feel the pain of others and, crucially, experience a natural desire to alleviate that pain. For example, Gerry-C said: “People don't really feel things for abstract - you know ‘because Africa is suffering’…Jonny’s suffering and he's having a hard time. ‘Right? I can do that.’” He asserted that his aim in training is therefore to try to make people “actually feel something” because “if they feel something then they'll do something.” Similarly, Gerry-C explained that his training involves evoking empathetic feelings in his trainees for those who suffer discrimination. More on the techniques used to promote empathy are discussed in Part Three, but what is key at this juncture is that Gerry-C’s case relies on constructing a particular knowledge of the subject - that the suffering of others is manifested in those that witness it, whether more or less directly.

According to Sophie-C this capacity is asserted as a characteristic of people who are predisposed to work for the NHS in particular. She appealed to the nature of people in this sector as having a “human side” that appreciates the NHS as “good for society, good for community”. She said that “quite often they join the NHS because they’ve had a personal experience either within their family or themselves they may want to give something back” and that she can get through to people if she can get them to remember the “good feeling that you get from doing the right thing.” Here, the subject’s capacity for empathy rests on an assumption about what people are like who work for the NHS: the NHS-subject is conceived of as having a disposition to empathise with others and to help others, often based on a connection to a
previous suffering of their own. Sophie-C framed this disposition as being inherent and that people have simply lost touch with it.

By connecting diversity to a concept of empathy that is inherent, the DP is positioned not as teaching people a new capacity but as helping them to re-enable a natural part of what it is to be human. The same idea was extended beyond the NHS to all people by Joan-C who talked about her trainees’ reactions to being given information about diversity issues:

“People will leave the room and say ‘I’m really sorry but I need to apologise to somebody.’ [...] You know, and then you get people who will say ‘I’ve got to stop some of those things that I’m doing.’ [Some] don’t leave the room but recognise that things that they’ve been doing that are not acceptable.”

She describes how DTs can recognise the unintentionally discriminatory behaviour and, through doing so, remember their natural intention to avoid discriminating against others that has simply not been properly exercised recently. This involves a technique of ‘remembering’. Framed as remembering, diversity training reminds trainees of what they already know, rather than offering them a correction of their views and behaviour. This can be likened to the Greek Stoic techniques that Foucault describes as askesis which instead of eliciting a ‘disclosure of the secret
self’, is a remembering of rules already known (Foucault, 1994/1982a: 238, Fejes and Nicoll, 2014). Gerry-C echoes this:

“‘I don't train people in things they don't already know. What I do is I bring it to the forefront of their minds [...] I’ve got to be respectful to what they know, but it’s my job to draw out of them what they know rather than me imparting on them knowledge because they know what the right things to do are - I’ve just got to pull them out.’ (Gerry-C)

This positioning of the subject means that a time-loop is created whereby the DT is already the desired subject – instead of changing the individual, diversity training enables them to be more authentic, more their true selves.

Sophie-C’s statement above also shows the way that doing good for others can be connected with doing good for oneself: “that good feeling that you get from doing the right thing”. Examining diversity practice in higher education, Ahmed (2010) has previously described diversity as a ‘promise of happiness’ made to organizations. Arguments involving empathy make a similar promise to the individual: happiness through the alleviation of pain and anxiety about the feelings of others. But further to this, it also promises goodness: by considering the needs and preferences of others, the person is doing the “right thing”, s/he is committing a moral act.
In being connected with a morality, one might expect arguments that involve the notion of empathy to fall within the parameters of an social justice case for diversity, given that the social justice case argues that the diversity agenda is important for the social good. Certainly, empathy appears to be associated with the social justice case because it situates considering diversity as connected with a feeling of the right thing to do, for example:

“Well it is but the moral case is, you know, ‘if this was you…’ and this is why we do the case studies <I see…> ‘if this was your mother, if this was your son or your daughter’…” (Joan-C)

It echoes the ‘Golden Rule’, that you should consider the needs, preferences, and feelings of others because you would want others to do the same for you. This form of ethics can be found in religious texts including the Bible: ‘do unto others as you would have them do unto you’ (1967 Luke 6: 31). The idea of ‘empathy’ is founded on the rationalisation that it is right to take into account the needs and preferences of others, a potentially powerful tool for DPs.

And yet, the data also reveals a way that empathy diverges from the social justice case. It is strikingly individualised compared with a traditional social justice case for which a central idea is that particular groups in society have been historically
disadvantaged and that they have a right to be treated equally or to enjoy equally the benefits of society. Within arguments based on the idea of empathy, the other’s individual pain is the motivator, i.e. it relies on a specific person feeling pain on behalf of another. The danger is that this could manifest diversity work in individual interactions but fail to contribute to any wider changes to organisational practices. Whilst this may not be the aim of diversity training, it indicates that over-reliance on training could limit the types of change that can be achieved.

There were also statements that indicated a relationship between empathy and the business case. For example, the business case and social justice case seemed to flow one into the other in Amy’s statement wherein for school staff empathy helps to meet one of their key objectives:

“Another exercise I used to do a lot was getting people to think about a time when they were treated unfairly in some way <yeah> or discriminated against and just to sort of talk about it and maybe share it with the person next to them, or whatever. And then what we do is look at the, you know, “how did that make you feel?” and have a list of different responses to that situation, you know, whether people are upset, angry, or frustrated. And then sort of say to people well, “what do we know about - if young people are feeling this - what do you know about how they are going to achieve at
school?” And so I suppose in a way that is making a business case isn't it?”

(Amy)

It shows empathy to be a bridging case between the social justice case and the business case. This echoes the findings of Tomlinson and Schwabenland (2010) in studying the use of the business case in the third sector. But a quote from Sophie-C also shows another blurred boundary between the social and business cases:

“…we’re really tapping into the emotional the ethical...the human side...of equality and so now what I’m finding is that where I’m being asked to do work it’s far less about policy governance - all of that kind of persuasion around business case - and it’s far more about getting together staff stories patient stories what’s gone wrong in complaints, what's going wrong in grievances, and trying to pull together information so people understand and feel in a very human way the impact of getting in right”

She draws a contrast between the methods of making a business case, through presenting figures and costs, and appealing to the need to care for others - the “human side”. Despite this, her reference to using examples of “complaints” and “grievances”, in order to make this appeal, indicates that there is also a business interest in caring for patients. The positioning of the patient as customer and the NHS as business makes it possible for her to speak with business and social justice
vocabularies simultaneously. The claim that considering diversity is good for business is, however, problematically simple because it frames the organization as a monolithic entity rather than a collection of ‘fragmented unities’ (Parker, 2000a: 5) composed of numerous actors with different interests: how exactly empathy comes to be articulated in relation to the business case can have implications for whose interests are (in)visible.

This may tell us something about the relative utility of the business case and social justice case for diversity work in organisations since arguments related to the right thing to do were generally expressed not in terms of social justice, but in terms of empathy. It suggests that the business case has greater power than the social justice case in organisational settings, even when addressing the individual organisational actor. As the empathy rationality, arguments for engagement with the diversity agenda, which are connected to the idea of being the right thing to do, are separated from histories of inequality and discrimination. In being shifted to empathy, the social justice case is rendered ‘social justice lite’; stripped of its power to justify behaviour with the goals of equality or emancipation directly.

**Summary of Part One**

The analysis so far has revealed two rationalities that complicate the traditional cases – business case and social justice case – the cases of ‘professional competence’
and ‘empathy’. According to the former, considering diversity is an essential business skill and part of one’s identity as a professional subject. Its appeal is oriented toward the interests of the individual organisational actor. In this way, it can be called a ‘role-based’ business case. The second section showed how a rationality of empathy is used to justify why trainees should consider the needs and preferences of others. The analysis of the use of ‘empathy’ suggested that arguments that use the concept are not easily characterised as social justice case or business case illustrating another area of possible slippage between the two cases.
Part Two

What is the construction of the subject that underlies the aims of diversity training?

(RQe)

This question does not intend to ask what the aims of diversity training are in themselves, or as they are articulated by diversity practitioners, but instead seeks to examine the forms of knowledge that are mobilised in order that diversity training appears to have rational and achievable aims. These forms of knowledge relate to the subject: the nature of people in general, and of trainees in particular. As illustrated in Chapter Two, in previous scholarship the aim of training has been understood to be to transform the trainee in some way. This transformation relies on the changing the trainee’s ‘worldview’ (McGuire and Bagher, 2010: 494-495) meaning that the training event is a space for discursive work (Crawley, 2007, Foldy, 2002, Swan, 2009). But the acknowledgement that training creates a space in which to transform the knowledge that the trainee holds about her/himself and about social relations only provides a partial understanding of the aims of diversity training. The question remains about what forms of knowledge about the subject make the aim of transformation possible: that the trainee is a kind of subject with particular interests, capacities, and responsibilities. This forms part of the programme of knowledge for who the DT is constructed to be. This part of the chapter explores this issue by outlining the rationalities involved in setting out
trainees’ capacity to change in term of a ‘layered model of the self’, and ‘journey to diversity’.

Layered model of the self

The first set of rationalities about the diversity trainee that are used in the articulation of the aims of diversity training are about the trainee’s capacity to change. In extant literature, there have been criticisms of EO training in terms of its failure to produce change to two different things: the attitudes of trainees (see Liff, 1997: 22) or their behaviours (Hemphill and Haines, 1997: 47). For Foucault this dualism is a construction, a classificatory device that produces a certain form of knowledge. In this case it is knowledge about the trainee’s capacity to change in different ways, and therefore also about the logical aims of training. I will begin by examining what forms of knowledge of the trainee’s capacity to change are used by DPs, before going on to describe DPs’ rationalities for how change is possible.

In interviews, DPs presented themselves as hopeful of changing the attitudes of their trainees, albeit acknowledging that this is not always possible. Two DPs singled out specific people who are difficult to convince: “Generally most people are good. You get the occasional, very occasional, person who has very fixed views and is not really prepared to change them” (Gerry-C), “I think that’s one of the major setbacks sometimes it’s changing peoples’ attitudes particularly when they’re
entrenched, say in someone's who's older...and that's not always the case, it could be someone who's younger as well” (Annette-C). By contrast, Rebecca-C presented initially resistant trainees as those for whom there was the most hope, “people with a bit of a chip on their shoulder, usually and you can often you can usually turn them around so that they become your biggest advocates”. Overall, the position was clear among DPs that attitude change is the goal of diversity training:

“I think if you are doing an equalities training session it’s very unlikely that you are going to win them all. [...] People have very different approaches to this I’ve noticed I mean some people in equality and diversity will say, it doesn’t matter what people think - what matters is what they do. And so your job as an equalities trainer is to tell them what the law says and tell them what they have to do, you know, make it clear what they have to do. But I, I don’t really subscribe to that I think what you are trying to do is to win hearts and minds. You know, you want to persuade people I think and… I think you just want to make people think and make people challenge their perceptions and their ideas” (Amy-C)

Here Amy-C frames behavioural change as a superficial form of change in contrast to winning “hearts and minds”, to enlighten the trainees and change how they view social relations. Catherine-C and Ian-C associated the legal case for diversity with behavioural change in justifications of why using the law is a second choice. They
said that where attitude-change isn’t possible then you can ‘remind them of the law’ (Ian-C). In Foucauldian terms, this indicates a wish to exercise a form of control via what has been called the ‘souls’ of trainees (Rose, 1990), the knowledge that they hold about themselves, rather than solely regulating the actions that they perform. The form of power that is implicated in doing so is related to ‘identity regulation’ (Alvesson and Willmott, 2002), but the specific form that this takes is discussed in more detail in Part Three of this chapter.

Further forms of knowledge are needed in order to explain how individuals are capable of accommodating the needs of others and why they should do so. In one training session, for a groups of adult care workers, James-C and Emily-C made use of what might be termed a ‘layered model of the self’. According to this model, people are seen as being composed of certain elements and that these sit at different levels. An individual’s values and beliefs (and in this model, ‘prejudices’) are presented as being ‘below water’, understood as being invisible, unconscious, and relatively stable. ‘Above water’ one has attitudes, and behaviours (represented here by ‘discrimination’) that are visible and more flexible to change. The DPs did not cite a specific source for this idea, nor did they claim it as an original idea, simply referring to it as the ‘iceberg’ model, see Figure 4. This model of the self was echoed by Ava-SP when she described the protected characteristics listed under the Act and explained that they were accorded special rights as opposed to other characteristics, such as membership to other social groups and communities, appearance, and preferences, because they are aspects of a person that are “difficult to change”. This
model was not universal in form among DPs, however, for example, Thomas-C described “racist or sexist” beliefs not as core values but placed them into a category of non-intrinsic “learned stuff” which he can help trainees to change. But what is common to them is that the subject is constructed as an entity composed of compartmentalised and layered elements.

These models bear a similarity to the compartmentalising model of Loden and Rosener’s (1991) ‘four layers of diversity’ that has been found to guide research and practice in diversity management by Bendl et al. (2009). In this model, the different layers of diversity dimensions are all grouped around a core ‘personality’, which is considered to be the most stable. Around this core there is an inner circle that is

Figure 4 Iceberg model of the self
composed of six dimensions: age, race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, and physical abilities. Beyond this, in the outer circle are education, religion, customs, income, family status, location, parenthood, appearance, professional experience, and leisure behaviours, which are considered to be the least stable. Bendl et al. consider a different compartmentalised model of the self. Their focus was on how such models are problematic because they suggest that identity can be neatly categorised and ordered into its components and layers. The interest in layered models of the self here is not their (lack of) novelty or the way in which they are potentially problematic, but the way in which they make it possible to construct a particular form of subject in the DT.

James-C and Emily-C used two further exercises to establish a layered model of the self which positions values and beliefs as more deeply rooted in the subject than behaviours. The first model did this by presenting the self as a three-tiered structure: the “concrete”, the “behavioural”, and the “symbolic”. Emily-C wrote out the names of the three layers onto separate pieces of flipchart paper and asked trainees to go and stand by the one that was “more important” to them. Speaking with the DP after the event, she explained that in her training sessions most people will go and stand by the ‘symbolic’ sign to indicate the fundamental importance of their value and beliefs to them above all else. The second supporting exercise was one that uses the three-stage theory of childhood development by sociologist and
The DPs explain that value-formation occurs at a young age when children are “sponge-like”, absorbing values from their immediate social context. Here early acquisition means that values have the most fundamental status to an individual’s being. This idea is also echoed by Ava-SP as she describes the influence of parents in informing the “difficult to change” aspects of a person. What these models of the subject have in common is that they assert that the values and beliefs of a person are not only stable, but are difficult to alter in adult life, and that they constitute the core of a person. Values and beliefs are made primary and stable, whilst behaviours/actions are regarded as secondary, changeable, and more under a person’s control. DPs tended to refer to childhood experiences and the influence of parents in determining one’s values and beliefs.

This argument sidesteps a potential danger of the homogenising of social groups and essentialising difference – positioning them as inherent to the self (Litvin, 1997) – (though there was no evidence in the data of DPs doing this), whilst maintaining a coherent rationale for why other people’s (differing) values need to be accommodated, since they are presumed to be difficult to change.

Such models show the power that classification has in general, a power that is exercised through knowledge. The determining of what things are different from and similar to gives them meaning, stakes out what concepts can be used for.

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Classification has power in that it renders the visible into a ‘system of variables all of whose values can be designated’ (Foucault, 2009/1970: 148). In this case, the classification into a hierarchy or schema of parts of the self means that different parts of the self can act, or be acted upon, as distinct elements. By offering these forms of knowledge about the self, the DT is constructed as a self-mastering subject and is made accountable for her/his actions if not her/his beliefs.

Other DPs, too, drew a distinction between that which was natural and involuntary, and that which could be controlled by the individual. For example, one exercise used on different occasions by Ava-SP involved a ‘matching pairs’ game. The trainees were allocated a small note card with either a term relating to the topic of diversity (such as, prejudice, discrimination, indirect discrimination, victimisation, and harassment) or a definition of a term. Trainees were asked to move around the room and speak to each other in order to match terms to definitions. The definition for ‘prejudice’ described it as an inherent disposition that people have to prejudge others based on prior experiences and stereotypes. The DP’s explanation of this term did not frame prejudice as the holding of negative and incorrect beliefs about others per se, but as a natural function of the mind to make assumptions about others. Prejudice, as pre-judgment of others, was therefore not framed as being a problem in itself. ‘Discrimination’ on the other hand was problematic because it is under the individual’s control: a behaviour that leads to differential or unequal outcomes for people, or “to treat someone unfairly”. Annette-C also talked about the “natural feeling” of it getting your “back up” if someone with Tourette’s
syndrome is swearing at you, and Catherine-C talked about how “we don't intend to discriminate but nor is discrimination entirely subconscious, rather that we act unthinkingly” (Notes from interview).

These are ‘depth’ models of the subject, different to Foucault’s theory of the subject which focuses on how the subject is rendered meaningful by discourse. Depth models recall understandings of selfhood found in the psy disciplines (psychology and psychiatry). The rendering of the self as something that can be changed, and that can be mapped into different parts (Venn, 1998: 128) recalls a psy form of knowledge that, as a field of discourses, functions as a way to understand ourselves and our relationship to others. Helen-SP, who does not conduct training herself, mentions psychology explicitly:

“We all form judgments and form impressions of people based on all sorts of things. Upbringing, background, education, social influences, all sorts of things. […] I think that doing that kind of work does require us to look at our own psychology and our own attitudes and our own responses and reactions to people from all sorts of different diverse backgrounds and so on.”

Psy knowledge governs practice in the sense that it seeks to align the subject to certain norms (Rose, 1996). The development of psy has been accompanied by a
growth in therapeutic techniques, which are important in Part Three. Psy knowledge is a powerful resource for DPs because it has been incorporated into the modern ethical repertoire of individuals: ‘it is used in the languages that individuals use to speak of themselves and their own conduct, to judge and evaluate their own existence, to give their lives meaning, and to act upon themselves.’ (Rose, 1996: 64).

It therefore potentially lends greater grip to the programme of knowledge that is being offered to diversity trainees.

Crucially the layered models of the self offer a dual advantage to DPs: a) behaviour is regarded as being flexible and under the control of the individual, whilst b) attitudes are underlying and fixed. This model, which might also be termed ‘fixed-and-flexible’, implies two things: that one’s behaviour can/should be controlled to accommodate the fixed attitudes of others, and that these changes do not challenge one’s own underlying attitudes. Both these elements are essential to provide a way out of a conceptual bind that seems to be at heart of diversity – the need to change oneself in order to accommodate others whilst upholding a respect for diversity (in the sense of heterogeneity), including one’s own needs and preferences. John-C describes this respect as “cultural diversity” explaining that “just because we’re English and we live in Britain or whatever, doesn’t mean that our customs and our cultures are right and that other people’s cultures are wrong.” The protection of the inner core of the self in the model allows both for the respect for one’s own difference, and the difference of others. Trainees are invited to inhabit a version of
the subject who is not only capable of changing one’s behaviours to accommodate others but is also compelled logically to do so.

The layered model seems to represent a different approach than has been noted in previous research, which aim to ‘reform’ the prejudices of the trainees, or to ‘transform’ them (Tamkin et al., 2002). Training is likely to be experienced as relatively unthreatening to individuals since it does not claim to seek to change the core of the individual but only their behaviours. Despite these claims, Foucault would identify the form of power that is in action as one that does govern the core of the subject, the ‘soul’ (Rose, 1990), through the very incitement to discourse about its nature.

It is worth noting a problematic element of the model’s logic. The rationality ostensibly demands an equal level of change from all people, not only those from majoritised groups. However, one incident in the data indicated that the layered model is an incomplete rationality: the query posed to Jamil regarding ‘reverse discrimination’ that was described in the previous chapter. An asymmetry in the responsibility to change occurs in situations where there is a conflict between the needs and preferences of particular individuals or groups and one party is providing a service to another. It is ambiguous as to where the line is to be drawn between prejudice – as sexism, disablism, racism, ageism and so forth – and a person’s values. This ambiguity in the discourse of diversity was hinted at by
Emily-C who warned off-hand to her trainees that it could sometimes be difficult to balance “adapting” and also “keeping one’s identity”. The concept of ‘balance’ used by Emily-C acts as a supplement to repair the discourse. This idea was seen in Chapter Four where the rationality relating to reasonable adjustments for disabled people was appropriated and the logic applied to other needs. It was also echoed by Charles-C in his newsletter, which give updates on the outcomes of tribunals, where he emphasised that employers be “reasonable, practical and proportionate” in order to fulfil the requirements of the EA2010.

Journey to diversity

A further form of knowledge that offers trainees a sense that they are capable of change is the rationality of the journey to diversity. This involves constructing the idea that change is possible because some things have already changed for the better:

“You know; things have changed in a very short space of time. I mean it's like I can remember, and this is not going back that far, so within my lifetime I can remember when it literally was impossible for lesbians and gay men, same sex couples, to have legal recognition of their relationship. [...] So there's been an enormous amount of change in a very short space of time”

(Erin-C)
James-C described change in his trainees:

“I see a huge kind of change in the staffing since I went. The staff themselves in terms of their attitudes <oh right?>. Yeah honestly it’s quite tangible you can actually...you can feel it when you’re in there - they’re enthusiastic about the training and stuff like that.”

Tess-C approached the issues from a different angle suggesting that there has been a “massive shift backwards” in recent years in terms of disability discrimination. Although the direction of change for Tess-C is backwards, change is still understood as something that is possible.

A problematisation is implied in this rationality, namely that change is still needed: James-C continued that despite success with individuals “the business as a whole, its attitude hasn’t changed a great deal - it's just about ticking the box.” Rebecca-C said that “change can’t happen overnight”. John-C stated that what appears to be change is not authentic, “People think that things have changed, things have got better. I don’t believe they have. People have got a little bit wiser about being overt, but this situation still happens every day.” The notion of the journey to diversity is a rationality that establishes the capacity, but also the ongoing need, for change.
The DT her/himself is also positioned as in need of, and engaged in, change. The desired subject of training is on a journey, rather than one who is necessarily already doing diversity well. For example, Ian-C said: “I encourage that sort of thing where it’s actually OK to change your mind”. As was also noted in Chapter Four, the act of asking questions in order to learn more is particularly encouraged and seen as a marker of successful diversity practice.

**Summary of Part Two**

Part Two has outlined two rationalities that contribute to the programme of who the desired DT should be, in particular what their capacities to change are. The first section described how the layered models of the self are used in diversity training to render the DT responsible for adapting their behaviours to the needs of others. It showed how this model makes it possible to establish a claim that the individual not only has the capacity to change, but has a responsibility to do so. This knowledge of the self manoeuvres around a thorny conceptual issue at the heart of diversity, making it possible to both adapt to others whilst respecting one’s core. However, Foucault would regard the form of power in action as one that does in fact target the core of the individual by seeking to incite the subject to discourse in a way that is convenient for government by the subject/discipline of diversity. The second section examined the notion of the ‘journey to diversity’ as both an
organisational and individual engagement. The rationality establishes the capacity for change within the organisation, individual, or society in order to establish the requirement for further change.

The final part of this chapter considers what is meant by change – what exactly DTs can do in order to better respect, accommodate, or promote diversity. The next section looks at the programme for this that was set out by DPs in the form of a number of training techniques that incite DTs to engage in practices of the self.
Part Three

How is the subject of the diversity trainee constructed in the techniques of diversity training? (RQf)

While Chapter Four focussed on how subjectivation occurs via the construction of counter-positions, the final part of this chapter examines the techniques of diversity training and how they incite trainees to act upon themselves to become a particular type of subject through practices of the self (Foucault, 1999/1983a, Dean, 1994). Techniques of the self are incited by training to encourage trainees to take new forms of knowledge upon themselves, to practice being in a different way. The intention of examining subjectivation in Chapter Four was to emphasise that trainees are not simply objects, subject to the discourses of the subject/discipline of diversity. The following analysis shows that neither are people entirely freely-acting agents when acting upon themselves, that trainees can also be subject to knowledge which encourages them to do so in very particular ways. In the following part, I present four techniques that encourage such action: ‘fact-finding’, ‘systematic thinking’, ‘promoting empathy’, and ‘diagnosing, confessing, and writing’.
**Fact-finding**

Where possible, DPs provided *specific advice* or examples of diversity best practice where a problem is understood to be caused by the needs and preferences of a person or group. For example, Jamil-C described how the ambulance service can practice routinely carrying around “cards with different languages on” in order to solve language barrier difficulties “they showed the individual the pictures with the language so they could say you know, ‘which one is yours?’ And they could send an interpreter straightaway”. Annette-C too described how in a previous company she worked for, they created opportunities during recruitment “so that people could phone us up and have a chat about our organisation so that they could get a feel for it before they came in.” Others turned to case law in order to demonstrate the correct and incorrect actions to take in specific contexts, “The point about using actual case law is that it’s not hypothetical, that is, if you were in a similar situation, and case law is precedent. Therefore, it’s very practical: if you had similar case this is the way it’s likely to be” (Susanne-C). Charles-C too talked about the case of the “women of the cross” where the courts had upheld and not upheld complaints of discrimination brought by cross-wearers in two separate cases. Such examples were peppered throughout interviews with DPs but did not occur frequently in the training sessions that were observed, meaning that the DT is only partially positioned as someone who knows what diversity best practice is. Instead, trainers tended to focus on promoting the skill of *fact-finding*, the willingness and ability to find out information about what other people’s (protected) characteristics meant for
their needs and preferences. Here is an extract from my notes on the observation of
the training session led by James-C and Emily-C. In this part of the training session,
participants had been asked to read and react in groups to fictional case studies:

“It became apparent that there are no right answers for these cases, but
rather it is an exercise in thinking things through from lots of different
angles and asking whether [the protected] characteristics are relevant to the
experience of the people in the cases. Many of the conclusions from the
trainees and DPs are, ‘we need more information’. [...] The answer is advice
seeking, getting recommendations, and fact-finding.” (extract from field-
notes)

This exercise constructed subjects in two ways. Firstly, the subject of the ‘other’, the
person whose characteristics require accommodation, is constructed as being
knowable (though as yet unknown). Importantly, the idea that the other’s needs
and preferences can be entirely assumed from their characteristics is resisted. It has
been noted in previous research that giving specific recommendations for practice
based on the provision of knowledge about minoritised groups and their needs,
could be seen as problematic in that it can over-estimate the homogeneity of social
groups (Litvin, 1997). Instead, the DT is one who acknowledges that s/he needs to
seek more information, whether about the needs and preferences that are generally
associated with protected characteristics, or about an individual’s specific
preferences. The reason to hypothesise that both these types of fact-finding are encouraged comes from remarks that were made by DPs about asking people directly about their needs: for example, in a training session with foster carers, Ava-SP emphasised “complexity and case-by-case judgements. It doesn't give any procedures or outlines of things to do.” She praised a trainee who offered a story about “looking after a child with Afro-Caribbean hair and their own ignorance and embarrassment [not knowing how to do this], and [the] learning curve of looking after children”. The moral of this story is that the trainee realised that she could “go to a salon and needs to ask questions and not be embarrassed by this” (extract from field-notes). Rebecca-C too said:

“I think because its common sense, you know, isn't it? It’s like well, what do you know until you’ve asked them? Just ask them for goodness sake! I think sometimes people are - it’s easier isn’t it - it’s convenient to put people in a box.”

The end of this quote shows the connection that can be made between fact-finding and resistance to stereotyping through the metaphor of the category ‘box’. It also points to a key idea from Chapter Four that trainees should ask questions without fear.
John-C also said “Is there anything wrong with asking questions? If you don’t ask questions, you won’t find out. If you make mistakes, as long as they’re innocent mistakes at least you know you’re learning something so don’t be frightened of making mistakes, it doesn’t make you a bad person as you may not know.” The emphasis on “innocent mistakes” here is important as it indicates a distinction between discrimination (intentional) and mistakes (unintentional). This contradicts the legal stance of the EA2010 since discrimination is regarded as independent of intention, however, for DPs, the idea of mistakes is an important one to them being able to establish the idea of the journey and in order that trainees are encouraged to engage in ongoing learning about diversity. Referring to analysis in Chapter Four again, this was also linked to a notion of safety and fostering trust in DPs. For Catherine-C it was essential to “create a safe environment for people with people feeling they have the right to express their views and to change their views.” (Extract from notes on interview). Fact-finding casts human subjects as incomplete and that improvement should be actively pursued. For example, Thomas-C insisted “none of us are...so in touch with it [diversity] that we can say that we’re going to be perfect at all times”, Annette-C talked about the invisibility of some disabilities “they’re not always easily identifiable and you wouldn’t necessarily know somebody if they’ve got bipolar for instance”, and during a training session Jamil-C emphasised “taking a couple more seconds to think about what you are going to say” (extract from field-notes), thereby constructing a trainee whose first instincts may not always be appropriate. The notion of intrinsic fallibility is valuable because it means that trainees can engage in fact-finding without the fear or guilt, that, as described in Chapter Two, has been associated with EO.
The DT is constructed as one who is in a continual state of becoming, of improvement, and who is responsible for that project. Thomas-C said he emphasises to trainees that “it’s OK to change your mind in fact it’s a really good thing”. Joan-C asserted that “that’s the thing that gets people to think about where they’re at, to say ‘everybody here today is at a different developmental level’”. She framed diversity as being something that cannot fully be completed: “You have to try and help them to go on the journey and that’s one of the things that we say that ‘equality and diversity is a journey it’s not a destination’ because people say ‘I’ve done it’ and you can’t do it; it’s all developmental.” This seems at first to echo Schwabenland and Tomlinson’s (2015) findings that DPs express uncertainty about whether diversity is a concept that can truly be known and put into action; but where for these authors the notion caused an anxiety on the part of the DPs, the evidence here suggests that the ever-unfinished character of diversity-as-process can also be useful to DPs. The subject position of the DT as one who is committed to fact-finding seeks to compel the individual to take action upon themselves, perform a practice of the self. But in doing this they are subject to a discourse of individual responsibility.

The rationality of the DT as process taps into the neoliberal project of the self who is encouraged to continually seek ‘self-fulfilment’ (Miller and Rose, 1990: 25). This discourse positions the subject as one who is self-regulating and improving. The rationality of fact-finding enacts a form of power over individuals, governing them
through their own actions. The discourse empowers subjects, or ‘responsibilises’ them (Lemke, 2002: 5). What can be termed ‘modern government’ (Brewis, 1996) acts to guide the free choice of individuals; it makes available (and unavailable) certain ways of identifying and certain courses of action by determining whether they are understood as rational, moral, or practical (Lemke, 2002: 2, Ahonen et al., 2014: 5). This operation of power is experienced as individualising, authenticating, and as providing freedom in the choices one makes to act on oneself, to transform oneself. This is compatible with the value that neo-liberal discourses place on choice and individual responsibility. It is therefore unlikely to be challenged or rejected (Brewis, 1996: 69-70). The subject position of DT as process is therefore a potentially powerful way of seeking control beyond the training room, whether or not this is consciously done by DPs.

Systematic thinking

A second technique – systematic thinking – involves encouraging DTs to engage in a manner of thinking, it is a way of structuring fact-finding. The root of this idea seems to be the public sector practice of Equality Analysis (EA) (formerly conducted as Equality Impact Assessment7). EA played a significant role for DPs who work in the public sector because it was a practice required to demonstrate fulfilment of the ____________________________

requirements of ‘due regard’ for equality. EA is a process whereby a service is checked for whether it is likely to have differential impact across different sections of the community and whether this can be justified or whether it is potentially discriminatory and therefore needs to be reviewed before implementation. An equality analysis ‘tool’ is designed to help the policy developer to recognise potential problems. It is commonly structured using the protected characteristics in the form of a table within which the assessor confirms that needs pertaining to each characteristic have been considered.8

Trainers invariably provided a list of the protected characteristics at some point during training. Not only did such lists serve to help explain the protections offered by the EA2010, this tool was recommended in training to aid in the development of a new service or policy. Isabelle-C talked about how the process of considering the needs of others did not necessarily need to take place on paper but could instead be a series of conversations. However, it was sometimes also provided as a guide to the way trainees should be thinking: a continual mental-process guiding self-regulation. Jamil-C recommended to trainees to “do a mini impact assessment […] in your head”. As Ian-C explained “I’ve got like a list of…like a menu for each of the protected characteristics just to get people thinking you know”. The “menu” of characteristics to consider serves to systematise how the DT thinks. By engaging in

systematic thinking, the DT is formed as a subject through the knowledge offered to her/him by the DP, but within a process of self-formation.

Classically the law has been regarded as serving what Foucault would call a ‘sovereign’ function (Foucault, 1991/1977: 47) because it is a mechanism of punishment wielded by the State. Foucault uses the examples of the State and law in order to draw a distinction between visible and invisible forms of power and tends to distinguish the law from his main scholarly concern for local ‘capillary power’ (Hunt and Wickham, 1994: 48). He asserts that the modern modalities of power are ‘not ensured by right but by technique, not by law but by normalization, not by punishment but by control’ (Foucault, 1998/1978: 89) and that the law acts in concert with a whole range of wider governing techniques (Foucault, 1994/1978: 67-71). However, it has also been argued that the law also has normalising effects, that it controls through norms without the use of punishment (Smith, 2000). The present research supports this idea in that the EA2010 is used by DPs as a source of norms: about which differences DTs should routinely consider, i.e. the protected characteristics.

Systematic reflection, as a practice of self-analysis about how well one has acted in line with the logos of diversity, echoes the practice of ‘evening examination’ described by Foucault in his research on Ancient Greek society: Evening examination involves an individual putting ‘questions to his soul’ nightly as if he
were to ‘appear before a judge’ (Foucault, 1999/1983c: ‘Seneca and evening examination’, para. 1 citing Seneca’s ‘De ira’). However, Foucault explains that the language that Seneca uses to describe evening examination shifts the regulation of the self away from being a judicial process to an administrative one: one takes stock of the day’s activities as a routine task to identify possible improvements rather than an act of judgement (Foucault, 1999/1983c: ‘Seneca and evening examination’, para. 6). Within this vocabulary the individual does not commit crimes but ‘mistakes’ (errores). Foucault echoes Joan-C and John-C, above, asserting that mistakes occur when there is a break between intentions and actions, ‘ends and means’ (Foucault, 1999/1983c: ‘Seneca and evening examination’, para. 6). There is therefore no penance, only correction of the administrative process. Similarly, diversity as systematic thinking shifts it from an agenda concerned with morality – people’s beliefs about how they should behave – to being an administrative task. Systematic thinking is a potentially powerful way to encourage consideration of the needs of minoritised individuals and groups without being perceived as an attack on individuals and provoking backlash.

There are however two potential pitfalls: The first is that the ‘menu’ of differences, or of possible needs and preferences, that is systematically cycled through could be overly prescriptive, providing only a limited number of differences to be considered. The second is that ‘to have considered’ or ‘to have shown due regard for’ becomes demonstrated simply by ticking the boxes on the menu, physical or mental, without genuinely considering the need to adapt. Evidence from my time
observing Harry-SP at an NHS Trust, and conversations with Ava-SP who is based in a Local Authority, indicated that this was already a problem with EA. Ava-SP’s struggle with this led her to frequently telephone colleagues across the organisation in order to check that EA tools were being filled out correctly and to offer help where needed. She also ended up conducting a lot of the analyses herself. During my time observing Harry-SP, I conducted a review of the EA tools that were being used by other NHS organisations across England and found that one or two required a signature of approval from a more senior member of staff. This shows sovereign power (of the governing body – management) put in action to remedy, or at least to safeguard against, the failure to embed EA in the habitual routines of organisational actors.

**Promoting empathy**

Part One described how DPs use a rationality of empathy to problematise the habitude of not considering the needs and preferences of others. This section addresses the techniques used by DPs to encourage DTs to empathise with others.

To encourage empathy, DPs talked about and used exercises that encourage members of the audience to put themselves ‘in the shoes of’ people facing
discrimination. Jamil-C used a clip from the film of Jane Elliot’s (1970)9 ‘Eye of the Storm’ blue-eyes/brown-eyes exercise to illustrate the upset that children felt when they were divided by the colour of their eyes and the two groups treated unequally, then asked members of the training group to recount a time when they felt that they had been treated unfairly. Other DPs used case studies which give an emotive narrative of an individual’s experience of discrimination or maltreatment (James-C and Emily-C, Gerry-C, Erin-C). In one instance, where cases were taken from real-life, a photographs were used:

“A picture of disabled young man appears on a slide - Stephen - the trainer describes how the boy was having an eighteenth birthday party, was disabled and openly gay. He was a victim of a homophobic hate crime and died from burn injuries. In another case, the trainer personalises the case by saying ‘Francesca, or Frankie to her friends’. She was also eighteen years old and had a disability. […] Frankie was burnt so badly that she needed to be identified by their dental records. These are very violent stories. The final case involves Ian, who had previously attended a workshop conducted by the trainer. The openly gay man, he had been out drinking with a friend of his on a Monday night. He received verbal abuse from a ‘young blonde lady’ and receiving an attack from another man, he had “crashed down to the ground” that led to his death. There must have been many people around;

9 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gRnRIC9JQTQ accessed 12/12/2015
but the teenagers attacked him anyway we are told. The trainer also has personal connections to Ian, she says, ‘hate crime is not an academic issue for me, it touches my life constantly’. A picture of the young woman appears. Finally, the case of Stephen Lawrence is presented in detail.”

(Extract from field-notes observing a webinar led by Erin-C)

In this example of training, the real-life nature of the case, connection to the trainer herself, and the accompanying photographs presented, sought to make the cases more emotionally accessible. The gravity of the attacks is striking and the painful feeling was enhanced by the humanising details used to describe the victims, such as their youth, personalities and relationships with others, for example: “Frankie to her friends”. As a webinar focussing on hate crime these examples were more extreme than those found in other diversity training sessions, but other DPs similarly gave examples from their own lives where they had suffered discrimination, such as being treated prejudicially by service staff (Jamil-C, Tess-C, Gerry-C, Erin-C). By recounting their own stories, the experience of discrimination is made immediate and given physical form. As Rebecca-C explained, “I talk about some of my own personal experiences which really resonates with them because it makes it more human for them”. Two diversity training sessions conducted by Ava-DP with school children were observed as part of the investigation of diversity as ‘ethic’ examined in Chapter Four. Many of the techniques used in these were found to be strikingly similar in the use of case studies, discussions of ‘prejudice’ and ‘discrimination’, and use of the protected characteristics to guide an ethic of care for
others. With the school children, the DP also promoted empathy: she asked the trainees to raise their hands if they had ever felt “left out” in the past and in response the children all raised their hands. The purpose of the exercise was to encourage the trainees to recall the feeling of being treated unfairly and to associate this with how others would feel if they did not think about good diversity practices. However, Ava-SP did not use this technique in any of the adult training sessions that were observed (parents and foster carers). It is not clear why this was from the data, but it is likely that these audiences were perceived by the DP to already empathise with those people whose differences they need to account for (children).

These techniques attempt to reduce what might be termed the ‘empathic distance’ between the trainee and the ‘other’ for which it is hoped that they feel empathy. The deliberate evocation of emotion in organisational actors contrasts to traditional views of the workplace, which positioned it as an emotional vacuum with emotion being the antithesis of rationality (Ashforth and Humphrey, 1993). The production of feeling is one way that the trainee is encouraged to act on her/himself in a context where this may not have been traditionally expected or encouraged.
Diagnosing, confessing and writing

DPs reported and were observed using self-diagnostic exercises. In one example, trainees were asked to reflect on their personal and organisational practices and to “grade” themselves in terms of “how you tackle discrimination, and how you foster good relationships between the different workers” on a scale borrowed from the Ofsted framework, which is designed to evaluate schools in the UK (Joan-C). The act of reflecting and disclosing has been interpreted as a practice inherited from the tradition of confession (Fejes and Dahlstedt, 2013: 29). In Joan-C’s diagnostic tool, the three duties outlined in the public sector equality duty for public organisations are combined with the Ofsted ratings system to facilitate a comparison between good practice and practices of trainees and/or their organisations. Placing oneself on a scale makes it possible to measure how far away one’s practices are from an ideal or norm. This distance becomes a marker of abnormality and a justification of the need to change (it is problematising). Borrowing from other frameworks that are considered legitimate lends the practice a neutrality that shields it from potential resistance to politics.

Susanne-C described how she used non-fictional case studies:

“So they get their case studies and I say to them: ‘I’m not particularly interested in what you think the result was, whether the applicant won or
not, I want you look at them as a group manager and how you think the thing should have been handled internally so it didn’t tip into the court. Or, as an employee, how you feel you should have been treated properly. And then let me know what you feel happened there and why you think you came to that particular decision. And then report it back to session and I’ll let you know what actually happened.’”

In this exercise, though the behaviours and judgement of the trainees are evaluated, this is not connected, at least in the accounts of the exercises given by DPs, to what might be considered inherent characteristics of the subject. Evaluation could be made for example of the personality, values, or attitudes of the trainees but instead the trainee is asked to practice placing themselves in the position of the employee or the employer and to judge how the situation could unfold for the greatest benefit to each party. Firstly, this approach is potentially less confrontational and less likely to invite a hostile reaction such as that which is risked by some forms of diversity training which ask people to ‘admit’ their prejudices (Brown and Lawton, 1991: 26). Secondly, the provision of “what actually happened” allows the trainees to then evaluate their own judgement or knowledge against an external, neutral measure. The ‘pathologising’ (Venn, 1998: 119) of aspects of how the individual thinks or behaves, particularly as part of a self-analysis, is reminiscent of modern therapeutic techniques that seek to correct them against a neutral measure (Rose, 1990, Rose, 1996, Swan, 2010b, Townley, 1994a).
There was among DPs, however, a description of ‘natural prejudice’ that people have. As discussed in Part Two of this chapter, the layered model of the self that can be evoked by DPs means that inherent disposition to prejudge people is seen as distinct from taking actions that are discriminatory. DPs did ask trainees to reflect on these prejudgements, treating them as judgments that everyone makes.

Prejudices were attributed explicitly by several DPs to people’s upbringings (Ava-SP, Helen-SP, Joan-C, Thomas-C, Jamil-C). Because prejudices were regarded as being formed by external factors, asking people to reflect on their own prejudices privately, if not to speak them aloud in front of the training group, seemed not to challenge the core of the person, asking them instead to reflect on how prejudices may have been provided for them in childhood or other formative experiences. This knowledge opens up two potential actions: a) because prejudice is understood as a natural disposition, diversity training can seek to realign the prejudgements that have been made by trainees about others in line with facts about others (correcting prejudgements), or b) to realign prejudgements and behaviours (correcting unintended discrimination).

At the end of training sessions, participants were encouraged to express that they had learnt something during the session. This exercise was usually set up by a short exercise at the beginning in which trainees are asked to diagnose their own training needs either aided by verbal prompts from the trainer, or with a series of questions on a form, for example Joan-C asked trainees to evaluate themselves as ‘excellent’, ‘good’, ‘need for improvement’, or ‘inadequate’ in terms of how they promote
equality and diversity. In other observed sessions, the trainers either asked trainees to verbally express what they wanted to learn from the session (Ava-SP), or to write them down onto post-it notes (James-C and Emily-C). At the end of the session, trainees are asked to either publically or privately make a record of what they have learnt during the session and still have to learn: James-C and Emily-C asked trainees to speak these aloud to the rest of the group and then to note these down. Ava-SP asked her trainees to draw a picture to illustrate the journey that they had taken during the session. Foucault’s writings on ‘confession’ can be used to theorise how the act of admitting one’s failings can enact a form of power. Foucault analyses the Catholic tradition of confession to explain how avowing wrongdoing or deficiency of the subject is connected to the transformation of the subject and the enactment of a new ‘true’ subject. The principle of confession links the telling of the ‘truth’ about oneself with transformation of the self and self-mastery (Foucault, 1994/1982a: 238). Confession requires individuals not only to manifest the ‘truth’ of who they are in their actions, but to verbalise this through self-analysis (Landry, 2009: 119).

For Foucault, there is no truth to the self beyond the ways we have come to understand ourselves within the remit of available subject positions. The rationalities that are available to us not only limit how we are able to make sense of ourselves, but are constitutive of our selves. In the context of participants’ learning accounts in diversity training, this means that in telling the stories about themselves, trainees produce themselves, fashioning new understandings of who
they are. In describing the learning journey that the trainee has experienced, the speaker-subject is similarly deemed to be the true source of truth about oneself. The confession of not having known all the answers at the beginning of the session, and at the end of the training avowing that they learnt the importance of diversity and good diversity practice, is valued for showing humility and recognition of the truth about oneself; ‘rendering oneself truthfully into discourse’ (Rose, 1990: 219).

Confession has been identified by scholars as a typical and popular therapeutic technique (Fejes and Dahlstedt, 2013, Rose, 1990) and it has been suggested that therapeutic techniques are increasingly being used in organisations (Swan, 2008, Swan, 2010b) because it offers a mode of influencing employees that is effective in the context of dominant neoliberal discourses of the free subject. Foucault asserts that ‘Western societies have established the confession as one of the main rituals we rely on for the production of the truth’ (Foucault, 1998/1978: 58). Truth-telling practices involve particular relations of power between the ‘listener’ and the ‘teller’ of truths: the witness to the confession, here the DP, is in an authority (Besley, 2009: 83) who ‘requires the confession, prescribes and appreciates it and intervenes in order to judge, punish, forgive, console, and reconcile’ (Foucault, 1998/1978: 61-62). The process of ‘selfing’ requires an audience, for confession ‘binds us to others at the very moment we affirm our identity’ (Rose, 1990: 240).
From her study of the drafting of diversity policies in higher education, Ahmed warns that the problem with the process of diagnosing organisational problems and pledging to fix them, is that the commitment itself becomes the practice of diversity with no further action taking place (2007b: 599). This is also a concern that can be raised with regards to the technique of confession in diversity training since DPs potentially serve simply to witness and absolve those present of their bad practice. DPs were observed seeking to mitigate the risk of that training failing to transform the DT by encouraging trainees to continue to act upon themselves using the **techniques of writing** ‘action plans’. Trainees were encouraged to set targets for themselves, to pledge to continue to think and learn about diversity in the manner demonstrated in the training, and to record this on paper. Fejes and Dahlstedt (2013) term this the ‘log-book’. James-C and Emily-C also asked them to write down a number of personal targets for ongoing learning in a table especially designed for the purpose in their workbooks, and Ava-SP asked her trainees to partner with another trainee to set targets for learning and agree to check-up on each other in a few months’ time. These techniques seek to produce the subject as a project to be worked on and improved (Grey, 1994, Rose, 1990) and to make the trainee responsible for this endeavour. Changing the way that people act on themselves is a method of achieving control at a distance. DPs can therefore be said to mobilise practices of the self as a strategy of government.

The practice of creating a tangible and lasting point of referral for employees or their managers is a way of constituting the trainee as an authority unto her/himself
after the training session has ended. By setting targets and writing them down, a similar relation of power is constructed between the inscription and the trainee. In her research on managerial competency training on a Certificate in Management programme, Brewis (1996) draws on the notion of confession to show that Personal Effectiveness (PE) education utilises a practice of confession: self-diagnosis tools encourage the student to 'tell the truth' about her/himself, in which attention is drawn to the distance between themselves and an 'ideal', in this case the competent manager. In so doing, the trainee is encouraged to take on a subject position of the continually self-analysing subject, which is presented as integral to the 'competent manager':

Participants experience the process of self-diagnosis as enlightening and as motivating them to better themselves. Thus, while they are in fact being constituted as self-regulating subjects, they feel that they are being given the opportunity to discover, and moreover, improve themselves [emphasis in original]. (Brewis, 1996: 78)

On 'the arts of oneself' in Greco-Roman culture, Foucault describes how 'written notation of actions and thoughts' were an 'indispensable element of the ascetic life' (Foucault, 1983b: 'Huponmenata', para. 1-2). He argues that 'obliging oneself to write plays the role of a companion by giving rise of disapproval and to shame' (ibid), it produces a form of self-surveillance. Foucault also describes the Greek Stoic
technique of writing ‘letters to friends and disclosure of the self’ (Foucault, 1994/1982a: 232). Letter-writing provides both a commitment to paper of self-disclosure, and a witness to authorise the disclosure although they are not present. The setting out of action plans and partnering with others similarly aim to set up forms of basanos for DTs, for when the DP her/himself is no longer present to guide the trainee towards an alignment of logos and practice. In seeking to produce an internalised basanos, writing practices echo mainstreaming but are manifested at the level of the individual trainee.

Additionally, Foucault writes about the practice of keeping huponnemata: a set of writings that act as ‘books of life, as guides of conduct’. They were places in which one kept for oneself ‘extracts from books, examples, and actions that one had witnessed and read about, reflections or reasonings that one had heard or that had come to mind’ along with poignant quotes (Foucault, 1983b: ‘Huponmenata’, para. 1). The huponnemata also act as a tool to facilitate the action of the individual on her/himself in subjectivation, they are ‘a material and a framework of exercises to be carried out frequently: reading, rereading, meditating, conversing with oneself and others’ (Foucault, 1983b: ‘Huponmenata’, para. 2). The practice is a means of condensing and reducing the possible knowledge about the world into something that will be useful and avoid ‘scattering’ the thoughts of the individual with too much information (Foucault, 1983b: ‘Huponmenata’, para. 5). It can be argued that the training workbooks that James-C and Emily-C provided their trainees with so they could jot down notes, ideas, and plans, were intended to act as huponnemata.
that could be referred back to and gradually internalised. Whether these techniques successfully serve this function or not is beyond the scope of the research, and it is important to be mindful that this attempt at modern government may fail and require the support of sovereign power, such as including diversity knowledge and practice into employee evaluations (Hepple et al., 2000: 56).

These exercises were generally limited to the beginning and end of the workshop; acting as a frame to the session. During the sessions observed there was little time spent on diagnosing the trainees directly. Instead, exercises that involve the discussion of case studies encouraged trainees to engage in what resembles an indirect form of the confession practice, what might be termed ‘third-person confession’. In the workshops that were observed, diversity trainers gave trainees case studies to discuss. These were both fictional and taken from real life. This is also a common method of management training, for example the popular Harvard ‘case study method’. In terms of diversity training, in interviews DPs tended to talk about asking trainees to identify what they would do in the situation of the case - as described earlier in the discussion of diagnosis and evaluation. In the observed sessions they were also used in a different way: trainees were provided with a full narrative of how the situation was handled and were asked instead to identify what the actors in the case did right or wrong, and what they would have done differently. These case studies therefore allowed trainees to talk about what other

10 \[http://www.hbs.edu/teaching/inside-hbs/\] accessed 03/11/2015
people were/are doing wrong and how they would have handled the situation.

Instead of challenging the prejudices of trainees directly, the use of the case study constructs a third person who would not have managed the situation as ‘we’ in the training group would do so and confession is done on their behalf.

In a similar time-loop to that described in Part One, through the construction of this ‘unethical other’, the self of the trainee is reconfigured as one who has already been persuaded of the value of diversity, who is already committed to treating all individuals well, and that needs only modest guidance as to how best to do this.

The diagnosis of the deficiencies of others means that trainees are asked to engage in confession via a ‘third-person’. This technique circumvents a threat to the self-concept (Giddens, 1991) of the trainee as moral and competent, whilst seeking to engage her/him in new forms of knowledge. But the lack of threat in this approach is problematic. Alvesson and Willmott (2002) describe how ‘identity work’, a process of formulating and reformulating one’s own narrative of self-identity, is a continual process but it relies on an intense experience to spark a transformation of the subject. The technique of third-person confession is unlikely to provide this.

Harry-SP, though he does not currently conduct training, expressed a similar concern: “there is a danger that the audience sees those discriminatory processes are still being something that other people do rather than that they do”. It can be argued that third-person confession is a diluted form of confession, it is not confession as Foucault describes it, involving ‘renunciation of the self’ (Foucault, 1988a); instead it is a way of avoiding confession.
This practice did not replace the bookending of diversity training with practices that promote self-analysis, as described earlier in this section, but did make up a significant body of the training sessions observed. This may be because DPs need to be circumspect in using direct truth-telling practices given the backlash that EO trainers received, accused of demanding confessions of guilt from their trainees in order to exorcize them (Lasch-Quinn, 2001). DPs are seemingly unable to make full use of the examining ‘gaze’ that other experts have (Foucault, 2003/1963) and instead focus on encouraging DTs to turn the gaze of the subject/discipline of diversity inwards upon themselves.

**Summary of Part Three**

Firstly, this part of the chapter presented data that speaks to the recommended behaviours of the desired diversity trainee. Where possible, DPs give specific advice, but often their focus is on producing a diversity trainee who will voluntarily and continually engage in a form of knowledge seeking, or ‘fact-finding’. It is hoped by some that this fact-finding can become a systematised way of thinking, a type of internalised process of Equality Analysis. This aim attempts to mobilise a modern form of government, which guides the ‘free choices’ that individuals make, and is potentially powerful in the context of dominant neoliberal discourses of the individual and responsible subject. Secondly, it described a manner of structuring
how DTs think about diversity drawing on the list of protected characteristics in the
EA2010 as a norm for those differences that should be accounted for. The chapter
then outlined how DTs are encouraged to feel empathy for people who have
suffered discrimination or disadvantage, whether fictional, real-life, or the trainers
themselves. Trainers use stories, pictures, and relationships in order to try to reduce
the empathetic distance between trainees and people from minoritised groups.
Lastly, a series of techniques are used to encourage trainees to diagnose themselves
of deficiencies, to confess them and thus achieve self-mastery, and to pledge to
continue learning aided by the practice of writing.
Summary

This chapter has responded to the question: How is the subject of the ‘diversity trainee’ constructed by diversity practitioners? (RQ2) by presenting data on several forms of knowledge that are mobilised in diversity training: rationalities that problematize the existing trainee, rationalities that underlie its aims to transform, and has also reviewed techniques that are used in diversity training to encourage trainees to engage in practices of the self.

Part One described two problematising rationalities that had not yet been surfaced in Chapter Four and which add complexity to previous characterisations of the cases for diversity – the business case and social justice case. It first analysed diversity as ‘professional competence’, which requires DTs to engage in diversity practices within the workplace in order to fulfil the requirements of the competent employee. Second, it analysed the notion of ‘empathy’ as a set of arguments that are not easily characterised as social justice case nor business case. The implications of this analysis is that over-reliance on the empathy rationality, this ‘social justice lite’, could reduce the range of possible diversity practices.

Part Two described how a layered model of the self positions trainees as capable of changing their behaviours whilst respecting the core of the individual. This helps diversity out of a conceptual bind whereby all people’s differences need to be
respected but adaptations also need to be made. The DT’s capacity to change is strengthened by the rationality of diversity being a ‘journey’, placing trainees on an ongoing timeline of change.

Part Three examined techniques that are used in diversity training through the lens of practices of the self. These encouraged trainees to take new forms of knowledge upon themselves, to practice being in a different way. The DT that is sought in training is one who will voluntarily and continually engage in ‘fact-finding’ about other people’s needs and preferences. This fact-finding manner of thinking can be systematised by drawing on the protected characteristics as a menu, or check-list, of groups to consider. In attempting to produce this subject of the trainee, diversity training uses a modern form of government which guides the free choice of the individual, a technique which is compatible with neoliberal discourses of the subject. DPs were also found to be ‘promoting empathy’, wherein trainees are encouraged to feel the distress of those who suffer discrimination or disadvantage. Finally, the techniques of ‘diagnosing, confessing, and writing’ were examined. This sequence of practices encourages trainees to constitute themselves as self-regulating subjects who internalise the basanos of the DP.

In the next chapter the findings of Chapters Four and Five will be synthesised and discussed in further detail, placing them in the context of current research in order to evaluate their contribution.
Chapter Six – Discussion and conclusions

This chapter summarises the findings of the research and discusses its contributions. The first two parts provide an overview of how this thesis has addressed RQ1 and RQ2, then the chapter discusses a number of other overarching themes that have emerged from analysing the DP and the DT as subjects. The discussion subsequently turns to the limits of the present research and how it has pointed to further questions for the future. The chapter closes with a summary of the main contributions that this research has made to critical diversity studies and MOS.

Constructing the ‘diversity practitioner’

The first half of the empirical analysis spoke to the research question: How do diversity practitioners construct themselves as expert subjects? (RQ1). It examined the data in light of three sub-questions about the rationalities that DPs use to construct their role in relation to their organisation/clients, their relations to one another, and claims to skills and knowledge.
How do diversity practitioners construct the relationship between themselves and their organisation/clients? (RQa)

Previous literature had two main ‘root metaphors’ (Alvesson and Sandberg, 2011: 254) for the role of DPs: ‘explanation’ (Schwabenland and Tomlinson, 2015) and ‘translation’ (see Ahmed, 2007a, Jones, 2007). In general, studies treated the concept of ‘diversity’ as a construction that is produced in talk/practices but they tended not to elaborate on DPs as constructions in themselves. Using a Foucauldian lens, the analysis attempted to do the latter. In so doing, the research built on existing understandings of the role of DPs by first presenting six subject positions that pertained to the relationship between DPs and their organisations/clients: ‘educator’, ‘provocateur’, ‘comforter’, ‘warrior’, ‘cynic’, and ‘conduit’. By anatomising and characterising these positions, it was possible to consider the limits and advantages of each position to DPs. Furthermore, the analysis drew on Foucault’s writings on the concept of ‘parrhesia’ (truth-telling) in the societies of Ancient Greece showing that a number of different relationships to knowledge are mobilised within the role of the DP (these are summarised in Appendix Two).

Firstly, the position of ‘educator’ was shown to be based around claims to scientific knowledge (universal, generalizable) in relation to other sources such as the media. However, the data also suggest that there are areas of the subject/discipline of diversity that do not (yet) allow for such claims, meaning that DPs arbitrate and
normalise diversity knowledge among themselves. This relates to the concept of ‘best practice’ which was discussed in relation to RQc. The educator role is the subject position that most closely echoes the ‘explaining’ role of DPs found in Schwabenland and Tomlinson (2015), and was also central for DPs in this study. However, this research revealed a number of additional subject positions that were taken up and that were components of the ‘educator’ role or that supplemented it.

A component position was that of ‘provocateur’. This constructed the destabilisation of the organisation/client’s knowledge as an end in itself for diversity work. This adds complexity to previous characterisation of diversity as being the ‘promise of happiness’ (Ahmed, 2010), by suggesting that discomfort is also a desired outcome of diversity work for DPs in the immediate term. The concept of provocation echoes the Cynic tradition of parrhesia where the individual is overtly challenged by the basanos (guide/touchstone) (Foucault, 1999/1983b: ‘Socratic Parhessia’, para. 13), in this tradition discomfort may be something that occurs en route to happiness where one’s logos (the way of life one desires for oneself) and one’s actions align.

Connected with provocation, was an opposite role of comforting. Constructing this position, DPs evoked a notion that organisations fear the diversity agenda to problematise the status quo of the organisation (Foucault, 1994/1984a, Rose and Miller, 2008: 14). This fear was implicitly connected with being a legacy of the way
that EO officers dealt with organisations. Whether or not it was indeed the case that organisational actors fear issues relating to diversity (though there is some evidence in previous literature that they do (see Greene and Kirton, 2010: 127)), the idea that they do functions to create a space for DPs to offer a solution to the problem, namely creating a feeling of safety and trust, by promoting fun and participation in diversity work. This approach, which is framed as being less confrontational of truth-speaking than EO, recalls a Socratic tradition of parrhesia: guidance is provided by someone who is proximate to the individual (Foucault, 1999/1983b). The ‘comforter’ position seemingly allows the DP to take up the ‘provocateur’ position at other times without inciting a hostile reaction from their organisation/client and failing to secure support of senior organisational actors (for specialists, which is thought to be important to their effectiveness (Bacon and Hoque, 2012). This means that, although antagonistic, the two positions are symbiotic.

The finding of these positions builds on a debate in previous literature it had been suggested that people who are involved in persuading organisations to engage with issues of equality and diversity speak from different positions in order to speak to different audiences (Foster and Harris, 2005, Jones, 2007: 388). Scholars have found that these practitioners occupy a liminal ‘dual’ position within organisations – they work for them while working against current practices (Zanoni et al., 2010), use different cases for change simultaneously (Kirton et al., 2007, Tomlinson and Schwabenland, 2010), and their practices serve to both challenge and reinforce
organisational discourses (Swan and Fox, 2010). The finding of both insider and outsider positions here adds supportive evidence to the concept of DP-liminality, but also extends it. The provocateur-comforter antagonism-symbiosis points to the liminality of the DP as being not only as an experience of the role, but as a condition of the possibility of the role, something that DPs actively construct. Only when DPs construct both subject positions can they construct the necessary trusting relationship with organisations and yet also offer a new and valuable form of knowledge.

Further to this another element of duality was found, in the spaces in which DPs perform subject positions: The ‘warrior’ emerged only in data gathered from accounts produced ‘backstage’ (Goffman, 1959), that is, interviews and DP networking interactions. The ‘warrior’ position constructed the DP as being seen as opponent by organisations and needing to fight it. DPs were also positioned as ‘cynic’ in backstage spaces – a component of the ‘warrior’. This was characterised by cynicism about whether organisations really support change, describing how organisations passively resist change. The split-subject, into front and backstage, tells us that DPs occupy a precarious position since they hide rationalities that dissent from the dominant discourses of the subject/discipline diversity that it is an agenda which everyone is interested in and committed to. It also tells us about the importance of networks to the construction of the DP-subject. It has previously been suggested that networks between DPs function to share knowledge about the latest ‘fashions’ in diversity (Prasad et al., 2011: 703) and emotional support (Kirton et al.,
This research has developed the idea that backstage spaces, such as networks, provide opportunities for DPs to cultivate subject positions for themselves that construct themselves out-of-alignment with organisations. For both scholars and practitioners, this means that will be important to be attentive to how these spaces are transformed in any processes of formalisation or in professionalization of the field.

These backstage positions were characterised as being counter-positions to the dominant organisational discourse of diversity as being something welcomed and valued. The finding that DPs constructed counter-positions was an important element of RQa, not only in their positioning as outside organisations but also in how they constructed their value. DPs actively engaged in the creation of subject positions because they find themselves subject to subject positions that are available but that would be disadvantageous to them. In the position of comforter, DPs are subject to the discourse of EO as being a threat to the harmony of organisations. The position of comforter is as a counter-position that constructs value for DPs by framing concepts of success: comfort, trust, safety and fun. The position of ‘warrior’ can also be characterised as another counter-position in the way that it contrasts with what is thought to be a dominant discourse of the subject/discipline of diversity: that it works with organisations (Perriton, 2009). But it also shows that DPs are subject to discourse in that DPs are not always recognised by organisations as being valuable. In constructing this subject position, DPs turn perceived hostility to their work into something that gives rise to a skill that the DP performs –
fighting. The knowledge of the difficult conditions of DPs’ work serves to reinforce the value of DPs: maintaining a role within an organisation or gaining contracts with organisations is certainly important in order that DPs can have any influence within them, now and in the future. However, it was worth noting within the analysis that the subject position of fighting-for-diversity as a skill itself could become problematic if it obscured failure to also produce effects other than this subject position in itself.

The ‘cynic’ position reacts to the reputation of diversity work as failing to achieve change in organisations: it is a counter-position to a cynical discourse that is available about diversity work itself. Where Schwabenland and Tomlinson (2015) identified anxiety among DPs about whether diversity can produce change, the ‘cynic’ position is an example of how the DP refuses to accept diversity’s perceived irrelevance. The existence of this counter-position among DPs could be useful to practitioners or scholars who would wish to encourage greater refusal to conduct ‘tick box’ work and could offer a future professional standard for DPs the opportunity to define what is meant by ‘real change’.

The subject position of ‘provocateur’ was another subject position that was constructed to resist dominant rationalities according to which the organisation currently operates. But a key issue that was raised as a result of uncovering this position was that it was possible to articulate this outsider position using the
business case. In cases where DPs want to be seen as outsiders to the organisations for which they work, the articulation of the business case presented by DPs here has the potential to squeeze out the need to evoke ‘moral’ cases, including the social justice case. However, it may also be that as long as DPs utilise the subject position of ‘provocateur’ as part of their subjectivities as experts, that they want to be seen as being challenging to organisations, this also opens up an opportunity for academics, activists, and others to debate whether and how they do so.

Finally, the position of ‘conduit’ constructed DPs as disseminators of knowledge. In the relative absence of formal authorities from which organisations can gain information about diversity (notwithstanding the Equality and Diversity Forum), being a ‘conduit’ for diversity knowledge is a further element of their toolkit of expertise. The conduit position shows that diversity practices themselves are subject to not only the knowledge that is available in the social context, but also how knowledge comes to be available – who are the sources of knowledge, and who are seen as authoritative within the subject/discipline. Being a hub of information for others lends legitimacy to the identity of the DP as expert in the context of an occupation which lacks agreed qualifications, associations, and standards. It had been previously argued that formalisation and professionalisation of the field may for DPs yield benefits that have been suggested in the literature, such as more efficient knowledge-sharing (Ozbilgin and Tatli, 2006), but I suggested that this may also dissolve the possibility of the conduit role for DPs. This could increase pressure on DPs to uphold other subject positions that define and uphold their value.
Overall the analysis of RQa contributed to answering RQ1 by showing that DPs constructed themselves as a distinctive type of expert in the *bricolage* of a number of subject positions and that the DP is thus more usefully considered to be a process. I have suggested that previous theorisations of the DP are not comprehensive and that their static view of the DP limits what can be seen of the negotiation and instability of the DP-role. The analysis in this part have therefore contributed to filling a gap in attention to the micro-level ‘discursive struggle’ (Zanoni and Janssens, 2015: 1478), that is an important but neglected feature of diversity work (Hunter and Swan, 2007b), by turning attention not to how DPs shape ‘diversity’ with different cases (Greene and Kirton, 2010, Zanoni and Janssens, 2004) but how they themselves are negotiated constructions.

*How are relations among diversity practitioners constructed?* (RQb)

This section analysed the rationalities that DPs evoked to construct relations among DPs. Diversity work and the role of the DP is highly non-standardised. Without formal voices that codify the aims and values that DPs should have (Frankel, 1989, Reed, 2013: 44), DPs normalise the boundaries of the occupation themselves, determining who is allowed ‘in’ as part of ‘us’ and on what basis (Wright, 2008). Previously it has been suggested that DPs may increasingly hail from backgrounds
in management and HRM (Kirton et al., 2007), rather than via activism (Hunter and Swan, 2007b, Kirton and Greene, 2009), because the language of these disciplines is more in keeping with the diversity approach (see also Tatli, 2011). This could affect the degree to which diversity work is constructed as being a collective pursuit and what the legitimate motivations for doing diversity work are understood to be.

Whilst the shift to diversity meant that DPs did come from a variety of backgrounds, as suggested in the literature (Greene and Kirton, 2010), in the subject positions that DPs used to determine the bases for legitimacy of a DP there were also indications of an ongoing connection to the discipline’s historical roots. The first subject position was characterised as having ‘moral motivation’. The DP was constructed as concerned with doing good over any financial concern. The scope of this good ranged from fulfilling individual passions and improving individual interactions to being a part of a wider campaign for change. A second subject position described ‘a collective ideal’: that the work of the individual DP contributes to a wider movement for change. This rationality was found to be played out in practices of sharing information and emotional support among DPs, observed in this study via email and face-to-face networks. It was argued that networks are an identity-building space – where the very norms of ‘speaking and being’ (Clegg et al., 1996) a DP are normalised. Network participation can validate DPs, or invalidate them (Foucault, 1991/1977: 223). This process is connected with the emotional support role that DPs report, suggesting that DPs face an ‘identity threat’ (Brown and Coupland, 2015) to their being a valuable member of the organisation.
It was suggested that these subject positions also function to frame reasonable expectations or success for DPs. Narrowly-defined rationalities of doing good offer DPs the advantage of being able to meet their goals and construct themselves as successful, and an ideal of diversity as a collective endeavour minimises the expectations of what a DP can achieve on their own and potentially soothes DP anxieties about this. Where they exist, wider definitions of the good that DPs aim to achieve may be useful to associations or academics who might wish to see DPs pushing to produce change that not only favours organisational interests but that strives for social justice. The use of these subject positions could challenge the use of the business case, which scholars have previously warned is contingent on organisational interests (Dickens, 1999, Noon, 2007). However, it was shown that moral motivation can also be articulated in terms of a business case: doing good’ was at times articulated in terms of ‘maximising human potential’. This latter idea has also been found in diversity by others (for example Ellis and Sonnenfeld, 1994), but what this research has highlighted is that the business case can be inflected with moral goals in order to achieve the positioning of DPs as morally motivated practitioners, without need for them to invoke the social justice case. Although it has previously been established that the business case and social justice case co-exist (Greene and Kirton, 2010, Liif and Dickens, 2000), this power to colonise other cases is a form of power that the business case has that is missing from previous analyses.
A difference was noted in how consultants and specialists talked about the relations between DPs: consultants tended to talk about the relation between specialists and consultants in ways that constructed consultants as in better position to act, whereas specialists did not. This may indicate that specialists enjoy a security in their identity as diversity experts, which consultants do not have. The dividing line drawn between these two types of DP could result in the legitimacy of specialist DPs becoming diminished over time if these rationalities were to become dominant. Furthermore, the construction of a contrast between the two types of DP may make it less likely that they can/will collaborate. Talk and practice of volunteering reinforced a subject position of moral motivation, and helped to align DPs with their own logos, producing them as ethical subjects (Foucault, 1999/1983b: 'Socratic Parhessia', para. 13). But this is also an indicator that this is to some extent not possible within the scope of their professional work. For some DPs, the collective ideal was not realisable because of increasing competition between DPs due to lack of finance, particularly for consultants who need to attract work (Greene and Kirton, 2010).

The final subject position in this section was of ‘a diverse and inclusive occupation’. This supplements the other two subject position in that it reflects the wider notion of ‘valuing difference’ (Liff, 1997) suggesting that the DP occupation itself should be inclusive of diversity-heterogeneity thus externalising the theory of diversity into practice. This produces the occupation as ethical in a Foucauldian sense, rather than the individual subject in relation to moral motivation. Inclusivity within the
occupation may be difficult to achieve as larger consultancies of DPs gain greater voice and power to normalise discourses within the field. An alignment could also be difficult to achieve for a professional association because it would need to negotiate competing requirements to include and to standardise. In some ways the notion of a diverse profession parallels the finding of Schwabenland and Tomlinson (2015) that diversity work is uncertain, but contrasting to their findings, DPs in the present research did not express anxiety about this, constructing it instead as something positive. The subject position may be a symptom of the very phenomenon that Schwabenland and Tomlinson identify, acting to alleviate the anxiety that it might otherwise (without the subject position) cause. Furthermore, it was argued that the IEDP occupies a precarious position trying to negotiate the desire to value difference within the profession and the desire to standardise.

Overall this analysis contributed to answer RQ1 by showing that how DPs construct themselves as a distinctive occupation is shaped by the very discourses of the subject/discipline of diversity itself. It also showed that, despite the strong influence of the business case within diversity (Greene and Kirton, 2010, Ozbilgin and Tatli, 2006), DPs have not (yet) entirely moved away from the root of their profession in social movements.
How do diversity practitioners construct their skills and knowledge? (RQc)

Amongst scholars, diversity has come under scrutiny and criticism for lacking clarity (Jones, 2007) and being ineffective (Ahmed, 2007b). But the subject/discipline of diversity is still thought to have traction in UK organisations, a currency that had been lost by EO (Ahmed, 2006, Ahmed, 2007a, Prasad et al., 2011). Schwabenland and Tomlinson suggested that there is a paradox for DPs that they seek to ‘get the message across’ but that diversity itself is ‘inherently unknowable’ (2015: 11). This part approached this issue by examining the knowledge (in a common usage sense) and skills that DPs claim. This builds on the understanding that DPs persuade others using the business case (Ozbilgin and Tatli, 2006), by showing that they engage in other forms of knowledge work by producing credible stories about reality that minimise uncertainty (Alvesson, 1993).

The analysis had already brought to light a number of skills that DPs construct: As ‘educator’ and ‘provocateur’ the skill is ‘problematising’, producing knowledge about organisational problems and how they can be improved. As ‘comforter’, the skill that is implied is ‘managing emotions’ – from soothing fears about doing diversity to building trust with clients. As ‘warrior’, DPs engage in ‘maintaining space’ because they are resisted by organisations, and so fighting for the existence of their role is constructed a skill of diversity work in itself. As ‘conduit’, DPs are
both ‘gathering information’ and ‘keeping on the agenda’, synthesising disparate information and maintaining the visibility of the subject/discipline of diversity.

The first new skill that was outlined was in providing organisations with ‘best practice’. Collectively and individually, DPs produce knowledge about what counts as acceptable practice, although legal decisions on diversity issues can also help DPs to arbitrate conflicts. However, the absence of a universal knowledge can sometimes be helpful to DPs, giving them room to arbitrate on the best solution within the local context. In doing this, they act as a basanos guiding the organisations to produce their own form of knowledge about the problem and solution. The forms of knowledge that are circulated as part of ‘diversity’ have a bearing on what it can be used to argue for, the power it has to mobilise people into action and what form of action are legitimated by it. The suggestion that DPs play an active role in shaping diversity knowledge supports suggestions that they are involved in creating ‘local hegemonic discourses’ (Zanoni and Janssens, 2004: 56) and builds on it by showing evidence that this knowledge is not limited to the local but is negotiated and communicated between DPs across networks, normalising diversity discourse within industries and sectors.

Related to this was the way that DPs used equality law. Whilst it has been previously noted that equality law remains a strong impetus for organisations to engage in diversity work (Tatli and Özbilgin, 2007), the analysis suggested that the
EA2010 offers DPs multiple forms of knowledge that they can use, this builds on existing literature which suggests that the law can be a gateway for introducing other cases for change (Dickens, 1994, Dickens, 2007: 407). The sovereign power of the law to punish (Foucault, 1991/1977) was seen by DPs as advantageous but not always a preferred option. The DP can make claims to knowledge through explaining why the law protects those that it does and operationalising the EA2010 in practical terms. This related to ‘best practice’ described earlier and most closely matches the ‘translator’ model for the DP outside of articulating the cases for diversity in different ways. The EA2010 is therefore a powerful source of knowledge because it provides DPs with a concrete basis on which the need for their work cannot be called into question but also room to develop and disseminate their own norms. DPs also used the law to articulate a business case, mobilising the Public Sector Equality Duty as a financial motivator. This finding contributes to the discussion of complexity in the cases for diversity, showing how the business case is able not only to be woven together with other cases as previously suggested (Greene and Kirton, 2010, Kirton et al., 2007), but can colonise them.

Claims to ‘neutrality’ were also significant, and shaped by the subject/discipline of diversity as well as wider discourses. This neutrality discourse orients to universal, scientific knowledge rather than local knowledge. Among consultants especially, the claim was linked to being an outsider to the organisation, helping to construct their value. The most striking articulation of this as a subject position juxtaposed the DP to a ‘preacher’ as a way of indicating a relinquishing of didactic forms of control.
used previously in the field. EO is unlikely to have really been articulated in religious terms, and so what is presumed to be the metaphor of ‘not a preacher’ implies that the DP is different to the EO officer because they are without a political agenda. The contrast drawn serves to discredit politics as a legitimate motivation or aligns to a discourse in which it is already discredited. It was argued that this is connected with the strong discourse of objective knowledge, which has been argued to be privileged in modern Western societies (Foucault, 1980: 85). In claiming scientific knowledge, DPs act as ‘philosophers’ rather than as a parrhesiastes, gaining a form of power that has particular currency in modern Western societies (Rose, 1990). This is a particularly important for DPs as it defends them from any uncertainty about possible ‘illusion’, ‘deceit’, or ‘coercion’ in the subject/discipline of diversity, something identified in Schwabenland and Tomlinson (2015: 16). The perception of coercion is particularly dangerous for DPs since overt attempts to control others are likely to be resisted in a modern context of neoliberal discourse of individual freedom (Brewis, 1996). For diversity specifically this danger is reinforced by a history of hostility towards EO (Hemphill and Haines, 1997, Mobley and Payne, 1992).

Lastly, DPs used the rationality that diversity was more than a set of practices and legal obligations but was instead a way of thinking about and doing things – an ethic of practice. It was characterised as a component of ‘neutrality’ because it constructs diversity as having a constancy. Where others had found some DPs to talk about EO and diversity as being part of one another, these tended to emphasise
diversity as a progression of EO (Greene and Kirton, 2010). My analysis found a constancy in the concept of diversity to be expressed in two alternative ways: firstly, reading the constancy of a diversity ethic in terms of *parrhesia*, the DP performs the role of a *basanos* in attempting to instil an ethic into the organisation, hoping that it will internalise a particular manner of thinking such that it will shape how organisational actors, and organisations, will behave. Though, DPs expressed differences on whether the *basanos* can successfully be internalised by the organisation or not. Secondly, in terms of the constancy of diversity work as a skill: whilst a number of DPs specialised their knowledge (about a particular characteristic, for example), diversity could be generalised with the same ethic (of considering the needs and preferences of others) being applied in a variety of contexts. It was argued that the strategy of specialisation helps to stave off competition from other DPs, the strategy of generalisation protects the DP from the possibility that they could be seen as of less value than other professionals. The difference in strategies employed could potentially be detrimental to the construction of a unified concept of diversity expertise and to construct the protective ‘enclosure’ (Rose and Miller, 1992: 188) or ‘professional identity’ (Parker, 2000a: 204), since there is a fractured picture about what diversity expertise means.

The final section of this part was dedicated to examining warrants that are used to justify claims to knowledge. The analysis showed that both are a result of the particular history and discursive-formulation of the subject/discipline of diversity. Personal experience of disadvantage or discrimination was claimed either directly
or indirectly through closeness with minoritised people. It was also possible for DPs to argue that empathy allows someone to understand the experience of others, and that if a DP has a privileged identity as part of majoritised group then this gives her/him legitimacy through a claim to neutrality in the eyes of the audience. Despite this, there was also an ongoing subject position which asserts that experience gives a person valuable and irreplaceable insight into the issues indicates that the subject/discipline continues to have a connection with its roots in anti-racist and feminist social movements. The analysis of these warrants reiterates the extension to literature that was made in terms of connection to the roots of diversity in activism: despite the prominence of the business case in the subject/discipline of diversity and the development of management and HR as a background of DPs (Kirton et al., 2007, Tatli, 2011), diversity still some links to its root discourses. The way that ‘personal experience’ was found to be a valued claim to expertise also speaks back to Greene and Kirton’s (2010) study, since they did not find evidence that this was significant to DPs. This absence signified for the authors that the shift to diversity meant a de-politicising of DPs, which is something that was also suggested in this study in the way that DPs claim neutrality. This indicates that there has perhaps been a reclaiming of the value of personal experience as a warrant now that distance from the legacy of EO has been created over a number of years, even though experience cannot stand as a warrant for expertise alone.

It also extends Schwabenland and Tomlinson’s finding that DPs can use their membership of a minoritised group as a source of agency (though it could be
disempowering when others imposed categories upon them) (2015: 13) by highlighting how indirect experience and empathy can also be mobilised for this purpose. The finding also contributes to the debate in the literature on experience in that it had been argued that people may conduct diversity work with particular personal commitment if they are members of minoritised groups and therefore be more effective (regarding trade union equality representatives, Heery, 2006: 532), though there may not be strong evidence that it enhances how effective they are (Bacon and Hoque, 2012). The finding presented here suggest that personal experience is also a legitimating warrant, that DPs are able to use in order to be taken seriously by others and hence to achieve change.

The second warrant that emerged in the data was ‘continual learning’. This was observed manifested in two ways: Firstly, in the Institute of Equality and Diversity Practitioners’ accreditation, which requires its members to be reflective about their work. This approach provides a way of unifying the practice of DPs across the huge variations in their responsibilities and specialisms under one standard for practice. This allows practitioners to be ranked or classified (Foucault, 2009/1970, Townley, 1993: 528). Comparing this idea of ‘reflexivity’ in MOS literature – a process that in research ‘turns back upon and takes account of itself’ (Alvesson et al., 2008: 480) – reflective practice may entail being reflexive about the strategies for doing diversity work, but does not seem to include an explicit requirement to reflect on what is gained and lost in taking different approaches to the concept of diversity, and of the DP role itself. This stops short of a fully reflexive approach in MOS terms which
turns a subject/discipline, or subject (person), back on the very knowledge on which it is founded. Secondly, diversity expertise was constructed as something inherently incomplete. This was linked to the uniqueness of personal experience of discrimination or disadvantage. The inevitability of these gaps in knowledge meant that they were ‘de-problematised’ (the opposite of a Foucauldian ‘problematising’), and continually seeking to improve upon one’s knowledge is the best practice a DP can engage in.

The analysis of RQc contributed to answering RQ1 by building on work that suggests diversity work requires knowledge of the business case (Ozbilgin and Tatli, 2006) and HR and management (Kirton et al., 2007) by showing that DPs make multiple claims to skills and knowledge and that these are shaped by the context in which they operate: the (perceived) legacy of EO and history of hostility to their work, the discourse of the modern expert, UK equality law, and the roots of the subject/discipline of diversity in social movements.
Constructing the ‘diversity trainee’

DPs are not only involved in their own subject formation, but also seek to influence the formation of other subjects. The latter was examined in the context of diversity training because it is a widespread practice in the UK (Tatli and Özbilgin, 2007).

Chapter Five addressed to the question: How is the subject of the ‘diversity trainee’ constructed by diversity practitioners? (RQ2) It looked at three aspects of training: the ‘problems’ that it identifies, the knowledge which renders its aim of transformation possible, and the techniques used to encourage practices of the self.

How is the status quo problematised in diversity training? (RQd)

It has been argued that diversity training aims to change the attitudes and/or behaviours of trainees by changing their ‘worldviews’ (Biccum, 2007: 319, McGuire and Bagher, 2010: 495) by disrupting existing understandings of social relations (Goodman, 2011, Swan, 2009). As a space in which knowledge is transformed (Crawley, 2007), Foucault would identify diversity training as a space for subject formation, and the trainee as the locus of discursive power/knowledge (Foldy, 2002: 104). Knowledge that is used to open up a space for this transformation can be identified as a ‘problematising’ rationality (drawing on Foucault, 1994/1984a). Reading the cases for diversity as part of a broader category of problematising rationalities, the analysis was able to extend previous literature on DPs by
identifying rationalities that they use within it, which fall beyond these traditional case-categories.

Echoing previous literature (Greene and Kirton, 2010, Ahmed, 2007a), DPs were found to refer to their use of the business case, a rationality for why considering or promoting diversity-heterogeneity is good for the organisation. But in interviews, DPs tended not to explain this, likely due to the insider status that was cultivated by the researcher. In training, it was also rare that trainers explained the business case, suggesting that organisations are already assumed to have bought into the value of diversity by commissioning training. There were two ways that DPs used problematising rationalities directed at the individual trainee that were explained:

The first rationality was of ‘professional competence’, that considering diversity was essential to being professional in general or in particular industries. This problematises the existing trainee as an incompetent professional if they did not engage in the practices suggested by DPs. This rationality was characterised as a ‘role-based business case’ because it argues that the diversity agenda is of benefit to the organisational actor (namely, the DT). It was noted that, similar to the business case, it is constrained to influence over people’s actions in the workplace, constructing a public-private split-self.

A second set of rationalities that was examined related to the notion of ‘empathy’:

DPs constructed the DT as capable of feeling the pain of others and desiring to
alleviate that pain. The contribution of empathy to the debates in the literature was in terms of the relationship between cases for diversity. One might expect arguments the evoke the notion of empathy to be easily characterised as a component of the social justice case because it evokes the idea of doing good. However, empathy also had elements in common with the business case in that it was shown that being empathetic could be articulated as a part of fulfilling organisational objectives. The relation that it has to both social justice case and business case shows empathy to be a bridging case between the social justice case and the business case. It was argued that this may be telling about the relative power of the business case and social justice case for diversity work in organisations since arguments related to the right thing to do were generally expressed not in terms of social justice, but in terms of empathy.

Empathy was strikingly individualised compared with a traditional social justice case, evoking the idea of doing good for others because it does good for oneself. Previously, scholars have argued that diversity individualises difference and erases the salience of social groups (Ahmed and Swan, 2006, Ahmed, 2007a, Ahonen et al., 2014, Dean and Liff, 2010, Liff, 1997). Similarly, the use of empathy is separated from histories of inequality and discrimination, located in individual interaction. It can be termed ‘social justice lite’; stripped of its power to justify behaviour with the goals of equality or emancipation. By highlighting individualism, it was argued that it may be problematic to rely on training a way of operationalising diversity. Though it is perhaps expected that individualised arguments are used in an exercise
that is directed at groups of individuals, this expectation derives from an assumption about organisational actors that they are most likely to act in their own rather than organisational interests. This is in keeping with the discourses of the neoliberal subject who has individual responsibility, entrepreneurialism and agency (Thorsen and Lie, 2006). Moreover, excessive reliance on training could increase the responsibility for improving diversity to individuals.

A further contribution was made in the identification of a technique of ‘remembering’ in how DPs promoted empathy. This sets up a time-loop whereby trainees are already the desired DT but just need reminding of that fact. This was likened to the Greek Stoic techniques that Foucault describes as *askesis* that, instead of eliciting a ‘disclosure of the secret self’, is a remembering of rules one already knows (Foucault, 1994/1982a: 238). This sleight of hand side-steps direct challenge of the existing subject, enabling them to become their authentic selves (again). It was suggested that this practice is shaped by a discourse of EO as having been too accusatory.

Overall, this analysis contributed to answering RQ2 by showing that the focus of training is to problematise the DT as an individual rather than problematising the organisation as a whole. It also showed how the practice of problematisation is shaped by the wider discourses that surround the subject/discipline of diversity.
What is the construction of the subject that underlies the aims of diversity training? (RQe)

This part of the analysis sought to understand the forms of knowledge about the trainees’ capacities, interests and responsibilities that are required to construct transformation as a possibility within the subject/discipline of diversity. This re-oriented discussions in literature that centred on whether diversity training aims to change trainee attitudes and/or behaviours (Hemphill and Haines, 1997: 53, Karp and Sutton, 1993: 32). Instead, for Foucault how one thinks about the world has a material effect on who one is and how one acts since discourses ‘form the objects of which they speak’ (Foucault, 2002/1972: 54).

The ‘journey to diversity’ constructed the possibility for change in general: change is possible because things have already changed for the better. A responsibility for further change was also constructed because change can operate in both forward and backward directions. Within this rationality, the desired subject, the DT, is one who is on a journey, rather than one who is necessarily already doing diversity well. At an individual level, capacity to and responsibility for change were constructed using a particular model of the self. The ‘layered model of the self’ was theorised as a tool that DPs used to construct a desired subject. This model was a device to classify (Foucault, 2009/1970: 148) aspects of the self into parts that are
understood to be within a person’s control and those that are not. It is not the originality of the model that was of interest in the analysis but how the fixed-and-flexible capacity of this model facilitates two things: that one’s behaviour can/should be controlled to accommodate the fixed attitudes of others, and that these changes do not challenge one’s own underlying attitudes. Hence the DT was found to be constructed as a self-mastered subject, made accountable for her/his actions, if not her/his beliefs.

This ‘depth’ model of the subject is powerful because it draws on psy knowledge (from psychology and psychiatry) about selfhood that is deeply embedded in modern Western ways of understanding this self (Rose, 1996). It also creates the possibility for individuals to act on themselves or for professionals to intervene. This model is an effect of the subject/discipline of diversity because it makes possible the need to change oneself in order to accommodate others whilst upholding a respect for diversity. Despite this claim to protect an individual’s core, Foucault would identify the form of power that is in action as one that does govern the core of the subject, the ‘soul’ (Rose, 1990), through the very incitement to discourse about its nature.

Overall, the analysis in this part contributed to answering RQ2 by showing that DPs position DTs as logically responsible for monitoring and adapting their behaviours
in order to accommodate others. They also constructed them as capable of changing themselves without the need for DPs to challenge the core of the subject.

*How is the subject of the diversity trainee constructed in the techniques of diversity training? (RQf)*

Previous literature on the techniques of EO and diversity training remained at the level of identifying its didactic methods (Bennett and Keating, 2008, Brown and Lawton, 1991: 29, Jack and Lorbiecki, 2003, Prasad et al., 1997: 77) and demonstrating that they could be met with hostility for being seen as an attack on trainees and their freedom of speech (Bennett and Keating, 2008, Crawley, 2007, Hemphill and Haines, 1997, Karp and Sutton, 1993, Lindsay, 1994, Mobley and Payne, 1992, Penketh, 2000, Swan, 2009). It remained unclear how to theorise the way that training seeks to transform its trainees (Lasch-Quinn, 2001: 158). It was suggested in Chapter One that the perceived legacy of EO could mean that diversity training uses techniques that engage a form of power that is not overtly challenging, but that seeks control over the trainee from the inside, by shaping the ‘souls’ of trainees (Dean, 1994: 145, Rose, 1990). This is technique that had been found to be a common feature in the ‘therapeutic’ cultures of other contexts (Cloud, 1998, Ecclestone and Hayes, 2009, Shattuc, 1997). This involves trainees acting upon themselves to transform into desired subjects, to take new forms of knowledge upon themselves to practice *being* in a different way – engaging in practices of the
self (Dean, 1994). Four techniques that encourage such action were found: ‘fact-finding’, ‘systematic thinking’, ‘promoting empathy’, and ‘diagnosing, confessing, and writing’.

Trainees were encouraged to act on themselves emotionally, through ‘promoting empathy’, encouraged to act on themselves to produce feelings (of pain) for another. DPs sought to reduce what was termed ‘empathetic distance’, by the use of pictures, violent narratives, and personal experiences of DPs. But they were also asked to commit to particular understandings about how they should behave in non-emotional ways. DPs provided specific advice about best practice but they also recommended an ongoing practice of seeking information about the needs and preferences of minoritised groups and about individuals – a practice of ‘fact-finding’. The notion of intrinsic fallibility within the DT was positioned as being of value because it means that trainees can engage in fact-finding without fear or guilt, something that had been associated with EO. The rationality of the DT as being continually improved on draws on the neoliberal project of the self who is encouraged to continually seek ‘self-fulfilment’ (Miller and Rose, 1990: 25). The DT is constructed as one who is self-regulating and improving. ‘Systematic thinking’ was a concept used to guide DTs’ thinking about how to accommodate difference. This idea stems from public sector practice of Equality Analysis (EA) (formerly conducted as Equality Impact Assessment): a tick-list of differences to consider when developing new policy or initiatives. This was found to be appropriated as a mental practice. This finding provides further evidence that the law has not only
sovereign power, but also normalising power over how subjects understand appropriate ways of thinking/doing (Smith, 2000). Systematic thinking is a practice of self-analysis about how well one has acted in line with the *logos* of diversity to accommodate difference. It was likened to the Ancient Greek practice of ‘evening examination’ (Foucault, 1999/1983c: ‘Seneca and evening examination’, para. 1 citing Seneca’s 'De ira') because it renders self-criticism an administrative practice rather than one that necessitates punishment.

These techniques functioned in similar ways to distance DPs and their training practice from overt attempts to control. The rationality of fact-finding enacts a form of power over individuals, governing them through their own actions. It should in theory be experienced as individualising, authenticating, and as providing freedom because modern government acts indirectly, by making available (and unavailable) certain courses of action by determining whether they are understood as rational, moral, or practical (Ahonen et al., 2014: 5, Lemke, 2002: 2). This form of power is compatible with the value that neo-liberal discourses place on choice and individual responsibility and is unlikely to be challenged or rejected (Brewis, 1996: 69-70).

Systematic thinking is a potentially powerful tool for DPs to encourage consideration of the needs of minoritised individuals and groups without being perceived as an attack on trainees. However, two potential pitfalls of this latter technique were identified: firstly, that the ‘menu’ of differences, or of possible needs and preferences could be overly prescriptive, providing only a limited number of differences to be considered. And secondly, that ‘to have considered’ or ‘to have
shown due regard for’ could become demonstrated simply by ticking the boxes on the menu, physical or mental, without genuinely considering the need to adapt.

In a similar vein, ‘diagnosing, confessing and writing’ was a set of techniques that involved self-diagnosis, admittance of shortcomings, and committing to improve. Foucault’s writings on ‘confession’ were used to theorise how the act of admitting one’s failings enacts a form of power and contributes to subject formation and self-mastery (Foucault, 1994/1982a: 238). Confession requires individuals not only to manifest the ‘truth’ of who they are in their actions, but to verbalise this through self-analysis (Landry, 2009: 119), scholars have argued that it has become one of the cornerstones of modern social life in the West as a method for producing knowledge about the self (Foucault, 1998/1978: 56, Diamond, 2011, Fejes and Dahlstedt, 2013, Rose, 1990). The location of this technique in diversity training contributes to analyses of therapeutic techniques in organisational practices (Brewis, 1996, Swan, 2008, Swan, 2010b, Townley, 1995). Committing to improve was done through various techniques of writing, including ‘action plans’. This constructs the subject as a project to be worked on and improved (Grey, 1994, Rose, 1990) and to make the trainee responsible for this endeavour. The practice was likened to the practices of letter-writing (Foucault, 1994/1982a: 232) and keeping *hupomnemata* (Foucault, 1983b: ‘The Hupomnemata’, para 1), which seek to produce for DPs an internalised *basanos*, who guides the trainee towards an alignment of *logos* and practice when the DP is no longer present.
Case studies were also identified as evidence that the more direct confession seemingly elicited by EO has to some extent been replaced by a practice of ‘third person confession’ by some DPs: where trainees diagnose anonymous others of their shortcomings in how they (do not) consider diversity. This creates a similar time-loop to that described earlier: through the construction of this ‘unethical other’, the self of the trainee is reconfigured as one who has already been persuaded of the value of diversity and who needs only modest guidance as to how best to do this. It was argued that third-person confession is not confession as Foucault describes it, which involves the ‘renunciation of the self’ (Foucault, 1988b) and that it is instead a way of avoiding confession. This may be because DPs need to be careful not to incite the backlash that EO trainers are thought to have received. The avoidance of confession in this way suggests that DPs are unable to make full use of the examining ‘gaze’ that other experts have (Foucault, 2003/1963) and instead focus on turning the gaze of DTs upon themselves.

Overall, the analysis of the techniques of diversity training contributed to answering RQ2 by showing that trainees are encouraged to act upon themselves in different ways that seek to construct them as self-regulating subjects. This is in keeping with dominant discourses of the neoliberal subject, but also the historical discourses of the subject/discipline of diversity.
Key contributions arising from the research

As has been outlined, a number of contributions were made in the analysis of the individual sub-questions of the research. The following text picks out and discusses the most prominent ideas that have emerged by looking at the responses to RQ1 and RQ2 as a whole, pointing to the main empirical and theoretical contributions that this thesis has made to critical diversity studies. The section closes with a consideration of what the findings about relations of power/knowledge have contributed to discussions about ethics in diversity practice.

The subjects of diversity as process of negotiating power/knowledge

The concept of *bricolage* was used to offer a new theorisation of the subjects of diversity as formed in the piecing together forms of knowledge, a process in which we are all continually engaged (Levi-Strauss, 1962). The analysis of how DPs are constructed from a *bricolage* of subject positions showed them to be involved in a continual process of subject formation (Townley, 1993: 522), assembling a sense of who they are as organisational experts, and defining their ‘expertise’. This builds on previous work that suggests DPs construct the meaning of ‘diversity’ by using different cases and negotiating what it means in local contexts (Zanoni and
Janssens, 2004, Greene and Kirton, 2010, Kirton et al., 2007) by suggesting that the expertise of DPs themselves is also achieved through a process of local negotiation. Similarly, DTs were shown to be sought through the offering of a bricolage of forms of knowledge that seek to disrupt and transform existing understandings about who/how subjects are. Making explicit the forms of knowledge that underlie the everyday practices of subject formation has the potential to help both scholars and DPs to recognise the ways in which their subjectivity is shaped by multiple forces, and to make ‘clear what is at stake’ (Dean, 2010: 48) when certain forms of knowledge/power are used.

This is done by using (being subject to) or resisting (subjectivation) rationalities that are available within the context of their work and the subject/discipline of diversity itself. Where Foucault has been criticised for focussing too heavily on the passive side of subject formation (see Crane et al., 2008), this research has shown the possibility of resistance of DPs and how it is achieved not from a position outside power relations, but from within them (Foucault, 1998/1978: 94-5) since ‘the self is both the target of power and also the condition for acting differently’ (Crane et al., 2008: 18). In my analysis of DPs, I have sought to show not only how they are the object of discourses of the subject/discipline of diversity, but also how they are involved in shaping and reshaping it, adding to the growing body of work that draws on Foucault’s later works (Barratt, 2008) (for example, Siltaoja et al., 2014, Śliwa et al., 2013, Weiskopf and Willmott, 2013). Recognising that resistance comes from within a relation of power is not to dismiss its emancipatory capacities, as
Crane et al. point out, ‘According to Foucault, freedom comes from the ability to participate actively and purposefully in power relations, not from escaping them’ (2008: 10).

The variable importance of claiming scientific knowledge to the expertise of diversity practitioners

Previous writings on the modern ‘expert’ have suggested that claims to generalizable scientific knowledge are key to establishing their legitimacy and are also the principal source of their power to influence how others think and behave (Rose, 1998). This thesis has supported this argument with specific empirical examples, finding that DPs make claims to scientific knowledge wherever possible both in their own subject formation and in seeking to transform others. It was argued, though, that this was a particularly important practice for DPs because it helps them to combat the discourse of EO legacy as ‘preaching’ and as political in the sense that it interferes with free speech.

The present research has also contributed to analyses of modern experts by drawing attention to two places where claims to scientific knowledge were not used and where other means to claim expertise were required. Firstly, gaps in diversity knowledge: where DPs were not able to provide a definitive answer about the meaning of the EA2010 in practice (with regards to ‘reverse discrimination’) they
were involved in producing local knowledge of what constitutes best practice and used the notion of ‘balance’ as a repairing rationality. Secondly, the ongoing presence of a subject position that values personal experience of disadvantage or discrimination. This subject position shows ongoing influence of feminist and anti-racist movements within the diversity field and could offer a point of leverage should practitioners or scholars deem it desirable to emphasise connections between these social movements and the work of DPs, for example to reinforce the connection between diversity work and social justice. The interpretation of personal experience as a warrant for knowledge also extends discussions in the literature about the backgrounds of those involved in diversity and equality work (Bacon and Hoque, 2012, Greene and Kirton, 2010, Heery, 2006, Kirton and Greene, 2009).

Slippage between the cases for diversity

The analysis in Chapter Four brought to attention a number of examples that suggested that the boundaries between two traditional cases for diversity, the social justice case and business case (see Liff, 2003), can be blurrier than suggested in existing research. It showed that problematising in diversity practice involves not only a bricolage of distinct cases, but also the bricolage of knowledge within cases – re-articulating knowledge about the nature of the subject, of morality, and of the purpose of business in order to create hybrid cases. This extends arguments that have been made previously in the literature that different cases for diversity can co-
exist (Kirton et al., 2007, Jones, 2007), in particular the social justice case and business case (Liff and Dickens, 2000, Greene and Kirton, 2010). It adds to recent studies that find not-only co-existence but complex relationships between cases (Tomlinson and Schwabenland, 2010). It also builds on theories of the power that the business case has (such as Ahmed, 2007a): the findings indicate that the business case has a ‘colonising’ tendency, the ability to reformulate other cases for diversity. The business case can therefore be said to have the capacity to exercise a form of power not yet remarked in the literature.

This deepens our understanding of each of the cases for diversity with regards to how they are used in practice. These new understandings suggest that caution be exercised over the excessive reliance on diversity training, at least in its current forms, because of its individualistic focus. It also suggests that perhaps traditional case categories are not sufficient to capture the complexity of the knowledge that is being mobilised in diversity practice, opening the door for the development of supplementary and alternative lenses.

**Differences between the subjects of consultant and specialist DPs**

Previous research has identified that there are different types of diversity practitioner working in the field with different employment relationships (Kirton et al., 2007, Greene and Kirton, 2010), but has not considered what these different
positions might mean for their identities as DPs. Since the two types of practitioner were used in the sample for this research, throughout the analysis of Chapter Four comparisons were made and some differences emerged. Whilst consultants tended to specialise their diversity knowledge, for instance in one form of protected characteristic, only specialists were found to talk about diversity as a generalisable ethic. Some consultants elevated their expertise by comparing themselves favourably to specialists, and also constructed themselves as hubs of diversity knowledge, whilst specialists did not. It was suggested that the insecurity of the consultant role is likely the source of the need to make these additional claims and that the drawing of such contrasts could be damaging for collaborative work or collective action. One could add to this a concern about the lack of access that consultants have to the private spaces of DP networks since this study has found them to play an important role in normalising who counts as a legitimate DP and informally regulating their subject formation.

Some similarities were also noted: both consultants and specialists used subject positions of cynicism about organisations in private spaces such as DP networks, and both types of DP drew on moral motivation as central to being an authentic diversity practitioner, and referred to diversity work as a collective endeavour in which they support one another. This suggests that the norms for who counts as a legitimate diversity practitioner are shared to some extent across the different role-types.
The ethics of forming the diversity practitioner

Part of the analysis done in this thesis showed how DPs normalise the subject of the ‘diversity practitioner’ in the absence of formal standardisation, which is mentioned but not fully explored in existing literature (see Tatli, 2011). Instead of considering these practices in relation to the more traditional literature around ‘professional closure’, they will be considered in terms of Foucauldian ethics.

It was argued that this research provides an opportunity for DPs to reflect more deliberately on who they want to be and to act on themselves accordingly. Although DPs are already engaged in a form of reflexivity through the notion of continuous learning, it was suggested that this approach does not fully achieve reflexivity in the sense often evoked in the MOS literature which requires the questioning of the very nature of a practice or discipline (Alvesson et al. 2008). This approach, something that Cunliffe (2004) refers to as ‘critical reflexivity’ would require diversity practitioners to embrace ‘subjective understandings of reality’ (2004: 407), that is, to firstly re-consider the self-evidence of reality – practices, identities, organisation – and secondly to use the assumption that it is socially constructed as a basis for thinking about and potentially re-thinking who we are (existential), our relations to others (relational), and how we do things (praxis) (2004: 408). What I have attempted to add to this idea, through the use of Foucault’s
concept of ethics, is the suggestion that by drawing attention to the particular configuration of the DP-subject and desired trainee-subject at present, a basis is created for evaluation and choice: whether to continue doing things the same way, or to seek a different way. This basis allows certain questions to be asked: Are the ways in which the ‘diversity practitioner’ and the ‘diversity trainee’ are defined congruent with what diversity practitioners want to achieve? What is strategically gained or lost from accounting for history or the present in different ways?

Crucially, for Foucault, asking these questions and engaging in active choice in light of the answers is how one becomes an ‘ethical’ subject:

...ethical behavior from his perspective would entail analyzing, critiquing and revealing the regimes of truth that legitimated such rules, and then going beyond criticism towards developing modes of thought and action that minimized domination by these regimes. (Crane et al., 2008: 17)

By reading the concept of reflexivity through Foucauldian ethics, the practice becomes one that is directed towards the minimisation of government and the achievement of an ethical subject as a normative goal. The goal of engaging in existential, relational, and praxis reflection is a way not only of increasing awareness of one’s position among relations of power/knowledge, but is a means of exercising freedom. Foucault’s framework does not allow for a complete escape from power, for both power and resistance are reciprocal, each producing the other.
Towards the end of his life, Foucault sought to show people that they are ‘much freer than they feel’ (Foucault, 1988b: 10). Foucault’s version of freedom is a partial one, a freedom to reflect, achieved in the resistance to government by others and a seeking of the governing of oneself. This resistance, he advocated, could be practiced by examining the ‘conditions of our freedom in organizations’ (Crane et al., 2008: 3). He believed that by conceiving oneself, not as an essential subject, but as a subject produced through ethical practices in the sense that the subject is formed in an ongoing process of decision-making about the type of person we want to be and taking of action to effect that person. I wish to suggest that the analysis of knowledge, in the form of rationalities and subject positions, and how as speech and practice these contribute to the subject formation of the DP and of the diversity trainee, offers those working in and researching the field of diversity tools with which to engage in an ethical practice. Foucault’s work in this area has been accused by some as promoting only ‘endless criticism’ (see Feldman, 2002: 146), but reflexivity informed by Foucauldian ethics can be a productive force for academics and practitioners alike as it provides direction in the form of the ethical self; as a subject for whom logos and practice are aligned.

The knowledge produced in this thesis provides DPs with the basis to reflect and to make more informed choices based on these reflections as a means of developing their practice but also as a way of achieving greater freedom at both individual and occupational levels. As Dean says, ‘One of the things that such an analytics allows us to do is to raise what Weber calls “inconvenient facts”’ (2010: 48), in so doing it encourages reflection on the implications of current practices – and equally of
subject positions – and facilitates experiments ‘with the possibility of going beyond them’ (Foucault, 1997/1984: 319).

Foucauldian ethics may however be more conducive to application in some forms of organisational practice than others. This idea is developed during the last section of this discussion, which follows.

**The ethics of governing the diversity trainee**

I have argued in this thesis that diversity training mobilises a modern government form of power in seeking to influence the future behaviours of trainees by representing them in particular ways (Foucault, 1994/1982b: 341, Townley, 1993: 520), encouraging them to accept certain forms of knowledge about themselves and the world, to take this knowledge unto themselves in the form of practices of the self, and to construct themselves as self-regulating subjects (Rose, 1990: 222). The theorisation of diversity training as an example of an attempt at modern government, and that it uses techniques of truth-telling, places it among the growing number of examples of therapeutic cultures (Cloud, 1998, Ecclestone and Hayes, 2009, Shattuc, 1997), including in work contexts (Swan, 2008, Swan, 2010b, Villadsen, 2007, Garsten and Grey, 1997, Townley, 1993, Townley, 1994a, Townley, 1995). I have suggested, following Brewis (1996), that this approach is less likely to be resisted in the context of neoliberal discourses which champion the free will of
the individual. Moreover, it is supported by the neoliberal knowledge of the subject as entrepreneurial (Thorsen and Lie, 2006). I argue that this is particularly important to DPs in the specific historical context of diversity work, and may be useful to DPs who lack support from organisations because it seeks control at a distance.

The techniques of modern government seek to responsibilise diversity trainees, to make them the objects of the subject/discipline of diversity, via their own subjectivities. Discussing the implementation of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in organisations, Siltaoja et al. (2014) have warned that the techniques of modern government, which seek to responsibilise individual employees for matters of social justice, but which do not ask for their participation in producing the knowledge of the subject/discipline, limit the scope for employees to reflect and to engage in critique. They ask how employees can truly occupy the ‘empowered’ position that CSR discourses claim to offer them if they are the ‘mere implementers’ of it (2014: 542-543). The authors point towards a false sense of freedom that is being offered to employees by CSR, and the same can be said for diversity trainees. However, where Silataoja et al. follow a Foucauldian ethic to suggest the greater inclusion of employees in the production of CSR knowledge (2014: 455), I wish to explore a different line of thinking with regards to how the subject/discipline of diversity is implemented.
It has been argued in this thesis that diversity training is an attempt to govern others using a particular framework of knowledge – it is an attempt to manage although it may not always come from those we designate as ‘managers’ within organisations. Crane et al. warn that Foucault’s ethics can be more difficult to reconcile with techniques of management because ‘his focus is on self-governance rather than the management of others.’ (Crane et al., 2008: 23). If DPs were to promote Foucauldian ethical activity amongst their trainees, this might entail greater reflection on the nature of ‘diversity’ as a subject/discipline, as a programme of knowledge, a questioning of its assumptions about human nature, the moral responsibilities of individuals and of organisations, what is ‘morally right’, and even what the purposes of organisations are. It has been argued that the role of the expert would be more ethically positioned if they were to reduce the hierarchy between conveyer of knowledge and the reader/listener in receipt of it (Townley, 1994b: 26-27), to engage in ‘permanent reflexivity in relation to one’s own perspective and value position’ (Barratt, 2008: 530). This would engender a greater degree of freedom for organisational actors and a more ethical subject in a Foucauldian sense, but it is easy to see that this would pose problems for diversity practitioners in two crucial ways: a) in selling their work to organisations, since there is a potential danger that ethical reflection could prompt employees to openly question the workings and goals of organisations, since it is a ‘theory of ethics that is oriented to how the self is constrained and made free whilst enmeshed in disciplinary forces’ (Crane et al., 2008: 18), and b) in being able to influence over how people behave, namely, compelling organisational actors to consider the needs and preferences of others and to accommodate them. Changing the nature of
diversity training from ‘programme’ to ‘ethical practice’ would radically alter the role of the DP and redefine the subject/discipline of diversity.

And what implications would such a redefinition have for the promotion of greater diversity and equality in organisations? The concepts of equality and diversity themselves fall within a particular ethical framework, drawing on a set of rationalities about morality, social justice, and of the desired future for modern society. It may be that by promoting the ethical subject, through reflection on the goals and responsibilities of individuals and organisations, that organisational actors would agree that equality and diversity are socially ‘noble goals’ (Jones et al., 2005: 44-46) and that they would be willing to commit themselves to the pursuit of them. Indeed, a commitment made under these conditions would offer promise that individuals and organisations would make changes to their practices. However, the results of a genuinely open process of reflection would be unpredictable and it may well be that such a consensus is not reached, and such commitments not made. So, if an ethics of freedom is practically out of the question for diversity practitioners, it remains to think about the seeking of government, and modern government in particular, in diversity training as an alternative.

Extant literature on the techniques of government, and in particular of modern government, have followed Foucault to warn about how it limits freedom (Dean, 1994, Brewis, 1996, Rose, 1990). But perhaps the negative judgement of government
is not as straightforward to make when the goal of government is ultimately a more equal distribution of power, of resources, or is emancipatory. One could ask if it is strategically appropriate to ‘fight fire with fire’; to fight control with control rather than with freedom. If one were to decide that modern government would be an acceptable strategy in the pursuit of certain ‘noble’ goals, then the multiplicity of the subject/discipline of diversity and the subject of the DP poses a further problem. As demonstrated throughout this thesis, and in previous research, the cases with which arguments for change are made vary between social justice goals and business goals (and those that, as I have suggested, blur the two). We are left then to decide case-by-case whether DPs have noble goals in mind. This offers a reframing of how programmes of government can be read, at least in some cases. This reversal of viewpoints perhaps recalls the way in which du Gay drew on Weber to argue that bureaucracy, which had at the time become maligned as cumbersome ‘red tape’ and the instrument of despots (2000: 1-2), can in other cases be key to ensuring equality of treatment through its formal, depersonalised procedures however much they might cause frustration to individuals (2000: 43).

This research has extended discussions within the literature on government, and in particular modern government, by complicating the relationship between freedom, power, and morality. I have suggested that it may be deemed an acceptable, even suitable, strategy in some cases. But it has also contributed to the capacity of researchers and diversity practitioners to consider the appropriateness or
acceptability of the use of government in diversity training, and more generally in diversity work. As Dean explains, the analysis of government:

…makes it possible for us to consider how we have come to conduct ourselves and others, and hence the possibility of thinking and acting in new ways. Some of these ways might thus concern how particular forms of the relation between liberty and domination are being transformed. (Dean, 2010: 49)
Limitations

While this thesis has made the empirical and theoretical contributions outlined so far in this chapter, there are also limitations to it which must be highlighted in order to situate what it has achieved and what remains to be explored. The thesis has generated knowledge about two under-researched elements within the field of diversity. The scale of the sample made it possible to conduct detailed analysis of the forms of knowledge used by DPs in their subject formation in diversity training. However, I am mindful that this limits the generalisability of the findings to the wider field of diversity practice. Nevertheless, in opening up this field for further study the present research indicates certain fruitful directions for future enquiry.

This thesis has offered a detailed analysis of a variety of different forms of knowledge that DPs can draw upon in their subject formation. In so doing it has opened the door to further possible research that was not possible within the scope of the current thesis. Previous research on the cases for diversity indicates that there could be differences in how these are used in different contexts: Tomlinson and Schwabenland (2010) show how cases can become blurred in the third sector where the core business of organisations is social justice, and both Jones (2007) and Kirton et al. (2007) point towards the interweaving of different rationalities. It could also be that there are differences in how DPs construct themselves among different sectors. The original research envisaged a sample of consultants and specialist DPs from
across the three UK sectors – public, private, and third. Although a good number of consultant participants were recruited who work across all three sectors, it was difficult to gain access to specialists located in the private sector. This means that while comparisons were able to be made between types of DP, in terms of the extent to which they took up subject positions outlined (e.g. provocateur, warrior).

Moreover, any sectoral differences in the forms of knowledge that they draw on to construct their subjectivities were not able to emerge properly. Furthermore, it may have been productive to compare differences between the rationalities and subject positions used by inwardly and outwardly focussed DPs – those concerned with the workforce and those concerned with service-use/customers. In future research, the framework that has been developed in this thesis could be used to investigate this. Work could also be done to theorise why it was more difficult to recruit participants from the private sector. In addition to this, some scholars have suggested that with the rise of the business case the backgrounds of DPs may be changing and that this would potentially have an impact on how they approach diversity work (Kirton et al., 2007). An analysis of the route that DPs took into diversity work was not the focus of this research, but further examination of this could help scholars to understand for instance whether business cases are more likely to be used by DPs from backgrounds in management and HRM, and building on the present research, whether those business cases replace or colonise other possible cases.
Furthermore, this thesis has suggested that the production of knowledge about how DPs and DTs are formed as subjects facilitates conscious decision-making about the future of DPs and training by both individuals and professional bodies. Although the present study included references to one nascent professional body, the research provides a framework with which to analyse the type of DP-subject that is legitimised by professional standards that may be developed in future. It could also be considered whether the help that DPs provide organisations to acquire kitemarks and awards also helps to construct the DP as expert (see Bell et al., 2001).

The potential importance of networks has also been highlighted in scholarly literature (Tatli and Özbilgin, 2007, Kirton et al., 2007, Kirton and Greene, 2009, Lawrence, 2000). The present research has argued that they are also important in a further way, as a location for subject formation and maintenance of the liminality of the DP. Future research would benefit from examining the different types of DP-networks that exist and the way that networks among diversity practitioners are developing: what is lost and gained, and for whom, when DP-networks become bigger or more formalised?

The analysis of networks in this thesis also hinted towards a role that they play in regulating the emotions of DPs. In the past, the ‘costs’ of doing diversity work have been analysed from the perspective of career development (Kirton and Greene, 2009) but there remains scope for an exploration of the emotion work (Hochschild, 1979, Hochschild, 2003) that DPs engage in, their embodied experiences of diversity work, and the wider materiality of their role. In addition to this, both parts of the
Analysis in this thesis found what can be referred to as **split-subjects**, which use different forms of knowledge in different contexts – the DP in front and backstage spaces, and the trainee in work and private spheres, and also potentially as a service provider and a service user regarding the concept of ‘reverse discrimination’. Further research and theorisation is needed in order to understand how such splits might be experienced and negotiated.

The findings of this thesis regarding diversity training have extended previous discussion of governmental power, and have opened up further potential opportunities to explore the power dynamics of diversity training. Where the present study was DP-focussed, surfacing the forms of knowledge used in seeking to (re)construct the diversity trainee, trainee-focussed research is still needed. As Foucault emphasises, power/knowledge is a reciprocal relationship and attempts to govern the behaviours of others is perpetually subject to some degree of failure (Rose and Miller, 1992: 190). Though this study has shown how DPs use techniques of modern government to seek a particular transformation from trainees, and for them to engage in certain practices of the self beyond the training room, it remains to be known whether trainees do in fact do so. Future research would benefit from asking whether diversity trainees resist the knowledge that DPs provide during training, and if so what are the counter-positions with which they engage in subjectivation? Do trainees perform ‘tick box’ actions that give the appearance of the desired diversity subject, and offer the organisation a ‘badge’, while their everyday practices remain unchanged (see McGivern and Ferlie, 2007, Bell et al.,
Furthermore, the techniques currently found to be employed in diversity training could be subject to further theorisation, for example, what potential do documenting practices have if they were to act as true *huponnemata*? How would this be operationalised and embedded into management or HRM practices?

Finally, this study is limited to DPs in the UK. Diversity research tends to be focussed in certain geographical locations – Western European countries, North America, Australia and New Zealand. This study offers a framework with which to compare the subjects of diversity in the UK with those in other national contexts.
Conclusion

This research has built on work in critical diversity studies, which had suggested diversity practitioners are involved in shaping what ‘diversity’ means in their local context (Greene and Kirton, 2010, Jones, 2007, Zanoni and Janssens, 2004), by examining them as subjects who are themselves constructed through the negotiation of a web of power/knowledge relations, and as negotiating power/knowledge to seek influence over others. In considering the ethics of subject formation and subjectivation, the thesis also contributes to a wider body of work in MOS that explores the usefulness of Foucault’s later works.

By deriving and responding to the question: How do the practices of diversity practitioners construct them as expert subjects? (RQ1), the thesis has made an empirical contribution to the field of diversity research by bringing to light a set of rationalities and subject positions that are used in the formation of its experts – diversity practitioners. In so doing, a theoretical contribution was also made, in the conceptualisation of the DP as a process, namely a product of a continual bricolage of knowledge. This theorisation allowed for the evaluation of the individual subject positions and rationalities that form the DP-subject in terms of how they are limiting or advantageous to DPs, scholars, and future professional associations. Doing this form of analysis has contributed to existing literature in the following ways: It has re-oriented debates about whether they occupy insider or outsider
positions in organisations by viewing their liminality as an active construction that is both an effect of the context in which DPs work and also a condition of their possibility. The view of DPs as translators of knowledge and disseminators of different cases for diversity has been extended by theorising them as arbitrators and producers of knowledge about themselves and about others. The issue of what qualifies DPs has also been elaborated on, extending previous examinations by showing how DPs respond to a challenging context of diversity work in order to frame their value to organisations.

The thesis also made an empirical contribution to understanding the work of diversity practitioners, through the practice of diversity training by asking how the techniques of this practice seek the construction of other subjects, and what type of subject this is. This was articulated in RQ2: How is the subject of the ‘diversity trainee’ constructed in the practices of diversity practitioners? The analysis in response to this question built on the notion that training is a discursive space in which trainees are transformed, advancing the theory that DPs mobilise modern government techniques of power. The mobilisation of the forms of knowledge and techniques in the training interaction seeks to encourage trainees to act on themselves, using practices of the self, to transform into subjects who are self-regulating individuals with both capacity and interests in considering the needs and preferences of others.
Responses to RQ1 and RQ2 have shown the value of the analytical approach employed by exploring the potential implications of taking up different subject positions and using different rationalities. Hence, other contributions to the fields of equality and diversity studies and MOS were also made. Firstly, it has made a theoretical contribution to our understanding of the cases for diversity by showing the relations between what we might identify as the traditional cases (social justice, business, legal) to be even more complex than previously thought. I have argued in particular that the business case, already recognised as a powerful discourse of diversity (Ahmed, 2007a) and an influence on the work of DPs (Greene and Kirton, 2010), has a further power in that it has the capacity to colonise the other cases. Secondly, an empirical contribution has also been made to the small but growing body of literature that engages with Foucault’s later work, by examining examples of the active participation of the subject in subject formation – known as subjectivation (Kelly, 2009: 88) – and on ethics and freedom. I have shown that DPs are not only subject to the discourses of the subject/discipline of diversity, the organisations for which they work, and the societal context, but they are also engaged in reacting to and reformulating them, constructing counter-positions in order to create a positive identity for themselves that allows them to occupy the position of expert. Thirdly, the theorisation of diversity training as a programme of modern government feeds back into the literature on government in management and organisation studies furnishing it with a new set of empirical examples about the workings of government and the role of its experts in this (Rose, 1990), but raises questions about how we might judge the techniques of modern government as applied in an area that might be considered socially just. It also triggers questions
about the ethics of government by showing how a Foucauldian ethic of freedom might clash with ethics based on the seeking of goals such as equality, diversity, or emancipation.

The final contribution of this thesis lies in the analytical framework that it has generated. Foucauldian concepts have been taken up and applied to analytical and empirical problems by scholars in many ways, some following Foucault’s own genealogical approach (for example Hoskin and Macve, 1986) and some drawing on his concepts of discipline, biopolitics, and so on (Ahonen and Tienari, 2009, Ahonen et al., 2014). Whilst the use of Foucauldian concepts in this research is not new as such, it has contributed a novel structure of questions with which to interrogate the empirical phenomenon of a set of practitioners and an element of their practice. In this thesis, the investigation has been focussed on the subject positions and rationalities which are used to construct two subjects of diversity, but there are other fields of practice within organisations that have seemingly similar practitioners who engage in training: those that concern employee health and wellbeing, such as mental health specialists, occupational health, and health and safety; and those that concern the development of skills or knowledge in particular fields, such as leadership, management, negotiation, and customer service. The framework of the two main questions and six sub-questions developed by and used in this research could be used to facilitate the analysis of the subjects of other fields.
These scholarly contributions may have implications for practitioners as individuals and as an occupational group. The research conducted here has developed knowledge about the current workings of the field of diversity, meaning that more informed reflection, evaluation, and decisions about current practice can take place. As Burchell et al. explain, Foucauldian analysis ‘can be a real power for change, depriving some practices of their self-evidence, extending the bounds of the thinkable to permit the invention of others’ (1991: x). With regards to the subject of the diversity practitioner, this research offers an important foundation of knowledge to inform future projects which endeavour to standardise or otherwise professionalise DPs. By recognising the limits and potential of current practices, DPs have the opportunity to engage in critical reflection, and to make choices about the future of their work that are critically. By doing this, they also engage in a practice of freedom, designed to minimise government and to facilitate the construction of an ethical subject. The knowledge produced in this thesis therefore provides DPs with the basis to reflect and to make more informed choices as a means of developing their practice but also as a way of achieving greater freedom at both individual and occupational levels.

Similarly, with regards to diversity training, the theorisation of it as a programme of knowledge, which seeks to govern the individual and that proposes the individual knowledge with which to transform itself into a subject, has enabled the identification of precisely what type of subject is desired from this transformation. The techniques of diversity training currently orient towards the construction of a
self-regulating subject. This finding has not been used in this research to criticise diversity training for seeking to limit what Foucault would identify as the individual’s ethical freedom, but instead, ‘by making it clear what is at stake when we try to govern in a particular way and employ certain ways of thinking and acting, an analytics of government allows us to accept a sense of responsibility for the consequences and effects of thinking and acting in these ways’ (Dean, 2010: 48). The discussion of the findings extends the literature on government, and in particular modern government, by complicating the relationship between freedom, power, and morality.

Much as the concept of ‘diversity’ serves as a touchstone for a set of arguments about what the world is like, who people are, how they relate to one another, and how the world should be; and that it brings about different actors, objects and practices; these arguments, actors, objects and practices also shape what diversity is. The products of diversity exist in a symbiotic, reciprocal relationship with diversity as a concept, at once constituted by it and (re)constituting it. Diversity practitioners are a central element of the field of diversity practice, so recognising the relations of power/knowledge in their practices, that construct who they are and who they encourage others to be, is not only important to facilitating discussion about the future of their practices but is also fundamental to understanding the concept of ‘diversity’ itself and its role in constructing the social relations of organisations.
Bibliography


Dickens, L. (1994) ‘The business case for women’s equality, is the carrot better than the stick?’ Employee Relations, 16 (8), 5-18.


## Appendix One – Participant data

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<td>ABL</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>C</td>
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<td>C</td>
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<td>Int</td>
<td>Tel</td>
<td>1 hr</td>
<td>ABL</td>
<td>Separate</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>46-55</td>
<td>Government</td>
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<td>FtoF</td>
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<td>F</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>5-10</td>
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<td>Y</td>
<td>5-10</td>
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<td>BME</td>
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<td>M</td>
<td>C</td>
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*Observed at the same time as one or more other DP's. Duration included in the final count as a singular instance.
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<td>20+ years = 13</td>
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**Key**

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<th>Interview</th>
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<td>PU</td>
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<td>Third</td>
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<td>Ethnicity</td>
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# Appendix Two – DP Parrhesiastial roles

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<th>Manifestation</th>
<th>Organisational role</th>
<th>Knowledge</th>
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<td><strong>Basanos</strong> (Socratic)</td>
<td>Monitor</td>
<td>Promotes alignment between how the organisation wants to be and their practice</td>
<td>Educator</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Basanos</strong> (Cynic)</td>
<td>Critical friend</td>
<td>Challenges the organisation/client overtly in order to promote re-evaluation of knowledge</td>
<td>Provocateur</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Parrhesiastes</strong></td>
<td>Subjectivation as ethical subject (individual)</td>
<td>Striving to align personal actions with the <em>logos</em> of diversity</td>
<td>Moral motivation</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Parrhesiastes</strong></td>
<td>Subjectivation as ethical subject (occupation)</td>
<td>Striving to align the organisation of the DP occupational community with the <em>logos</em> of diversity</td>
<td>Diverse and inclusive occupation</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Basanos</strong></td>
<td>Arbitrator</td>
<td>Producing local forms of knowledge about problems and accompanying solution. Circulating these to other DPs.</td>
<td>Best Practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Philosopher</strong></td>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>Positions oneself as a source of generalizable, scientific knowledge. Speaks from a particular world-view.</td>
<td>Neutrality</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Basanos</strong></td>
<td>Negotiator</td>
<td>Guides the organisations to produce their own form of local knowledge about the problem and accompanying solution.</td>
<td>Equality law</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Basanos</strong></td>
<td>Network</td>
<td>Promotes alignment</td>
<td>Continual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coordinator</td>
<td>between the way that the organisation wants to be, and those people who can help it to enact this in practice.</td>
<td>learning</td>
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<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Basanos</strong></td>
<td>Transformer Promotes internalisation of a particular manner of thinking such that it will shape how organisational actors will behave.</td>
<td>Diversity as ethic</td>
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Appendix Three – Interview guide

Opening questions

Tell me about how you got into doing diversity work?
Could you describe the approach you take to your work?

Experience, qualification and learning

How do you find it, doing your work?
How do you generally find work for yourself in this field [consultant-focused]?
How did you get into doing diversity work?
How did you develop your knowledge/expertise in diversity work?
Have you any special qualifications or support from professional bodies?

Practices, relations

Tell me a bit about what your work consists of: do you conduct training? (What else do you do?)
What kind of materials/practices/techniques do you use?
Do you mainly work with public/private/third sector organisations?
What type of contact do you have with other practitioners in the field?
What type of relationship do you have with other practitioners?

Goals, challenges, satisfaction

What is purpose/goal of your work? What do you aim to achieve?
What is your approach to… (practice)?
What would you say it is that clients want from you?
How do you know if your work is successful?
How do people respond to your work?
What do you think makes you good at your job?
What would you say are the major challenges of doing what you do?
Are there things that you’d like to do in your work that you don’t get to do currently?

Future, reflection on the field

Have you seen any recent changes to demand or approach in your field of work?
Do you think you will stay in this line of work for the foreseeable future?
How do you see the future development of the field?
Appendix Four – Information sheet

Training session identification number:

CONSENT FORM TO BE COMPLETED BY REPRESENTATIVE OF ORGANISATION

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Project Title:</th>
<th>Diversity and equality work in the UK</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name of Researcher:</td>
<td>Deborah Brewis</td>
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For the above project which I may keep for my records and have had the opportunity to ask any questions I may have.

I agree to take part in the above study and am willing to:

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<td>Be interviewed about my work</td>
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I understand that my information will be held and processed for the following purposes:

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<td>Doctoral research, research papers and educational purposes</td>
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<td>Anonymous data may be added to a research database such as the UK Data Archive</td>
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I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving any reason without being penalised or disadvantaged in any way.

________________   ____________   __________________
Name of Participant   Date   Signature

________________   ____________   __________________
Researcher  Date  Signature
Participant identification number:

INFORMATION SHEET

Project Title: Diversity and equality work in the UK

Name of Researcher: Deborah Brewis

Supervisors: Dr Deborah Dean
Professor Martin Parker

Aims of the project

This project is funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and aims to make an original contribution to knowledge of diversity and equalities work. This project explores diversity professionals’ work through an inquiry into their experiences and practices of equality, diversity and inclusion training and consultancy. It is envisaged that this research will lead to a deeper understanding of the experiences and practices of diversity professionals working in the UK by contextualising them within broader theoretical debates surrounding social movements for equality, political discourse and organizational change.

Data will comprise interviews and observations of professionals with ‘diversity’ and/or ‘equality’ responsibilities and through an analysis of complementary documents such as training materials, policies, websites and press releases. Analysis of the data will be informed and supported by theoretical work.

Details of participation and confidentiality

During shadowing of the trainer the researcher may take notes and may aid the trainer with any administrative tasks but will not interfere with the training session.

Any information will be made anonymous in the final research: participants or organisations will be identified by characteristics that will not infringe anonymity such as by pseudonym, age, role, type of organisation and sector. Participants have the right to inform the researcher of any characteristics that they wish to be withheld from research outputs.
Participation in this research is entirely voluntary and participants may withdraw at any time with an assurance that this will not affect future treatment (where applicable) or have any negative consequences. Data will be kept in a secure location by the researcher for ten years and then destroyed.

Outcomes of the research and benefits to participants

The research methodology begins with a broad research focus that will narrow as it is guided by the data. The primary research output for this project will be the production of a doctoral thesis by the researcher. Secondary outputs are envisaged to be academic papers, educational resources and materials relevant to professionals and organisations.

Participants will be offered a report of the research findings at the end of the project. It is hoped that participants will find the research an opportunity to discuss their experiences of their work, share the challenges they face, and to reflect on practice, and that the research will add to the body of knowledge about diversity and equality work in the UK.

Further information

If you require further information please contact the researcher directly at: deborah.brewis.11@mail.wbs.ac.uk +442476524962 (group office)

For information about the University of Warwick’s complaints procedure contact the Deputy registrar Nicola Owen at: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/services/rss/researchgovernance_ethics/complaints_procedure/ Tel: (024) 7652 2785
Appendix Five – Key terms

Power and knowledge

**Power/knowledge**
Foucault makes an inextricable connection between knowledge and power, arguing that power derives from the ability to define what something or someone is and isn’t – this idea is referred to as power/knowledge. Power/knowledge is involved in the constitution of one’s own agency and in seeking to influence others.

**Government/control**
The terms ‘to govern’, ‘governing’ and ‘government’ are used here not in reference to the operations of the state but in a wider sense to describe the control that an individual, group, or institution can exercise over another. Specifically, it describes instances where something is made the locus of control by constructing a particular knowledge of it. Foucault calls this the management of possibilities, that is, to ‘structure the possible field of action of others’ (1994/1982b: 241).

Modern Government
Modern government functions by guiding ‘free choice’, making available (and unavailable) certain courses of action by shaping the rationalities about social relations that are accepted as legitimate (Lemke, 2002: 2). It operates ‘at a distance’, because the operation of normalisation is internalised into a process of monitoring the self and self-regulation (Dean, 2010).

Subject formation

**Subject**
According to Foucault, the subjectivity of a person, that which makes them more than the physical body, is produced discursively. That is, people become subjects by taking on meanings just like other elements of reality (Foucault, 1998/1978: 17). The subject is continually becoming, constituted through practices – interactions with others and institutions.

**Subject position**
The rationalities about who people are, which people use to construct themselves as subjects are referred to as ‘subject positions’. The different subject positions that are ascribed to, or are taken up by people have a direct implication for what they can say, can do, or what can legitimately be done to them.
**Bricolage**
From Levi-Strauss (1962): the continual act of weaving and welding together different forms of knowledge about something/someone. Used within a Foucauldian framework the notion is applied to how something/someone is constructed as a subject.

**Subject/discipline**
The forms of knowledge which constitute the field of diversity, including the arguments made in favour of promoting diversity-heterogeneity or accommodating the needs and preferences of people from various social groups (cases for diversity).

**Subject to**
Subjects are formed partially through the influence of the available discourses that are regarded as legitimate in the social context, particularly dominant discourses that have greatest power.

**Subjectivation**
Subjects are partially formed through the person’s active engagement in their own subject formation, selecting from, assembling, or resisting available discourses.

**Practices of the self**

**Parrhesia**
*Parrhesia* refers to a set of practices of the self that can loosely be defined as ‘truth-speaking’ or franc-parler (Foucault, 1999/1983a). It is performed through the speaking of new forms of knowledge about a subject, either oneself or another, usually in the form of criticism. The function of *parrhesia* is to produce new knowledge of a subject in order to alter the construction of that subject.

**Logos**
*Logos* refers to a rationality or set of rationalities that one has laid out for oneself and according to which one wishes to live (Foucault, 1999/1983b).

**Ethical subject**
In Foucault’s writings on Ancient Greek societies, an ethical subject is achieved through an alignment between a person’s actions and his/her *logos* (1999/1983b).
**Basanos**
A person who acts as a touchstone or guide, who strives to help another live as an ethical subject through achieving alignment between his/her actions and *logos* (Foucault, 1999/1983b).

**Confession**
Confession is connected with the practices of Catholicism, used in the exercise of power by the church over the pastorate. Confession requires individuals not only to manifest the ‘truth’ of who they are in their actions, but to verbalise this through self-analysis (Landry, 2009: 119). Confessing one’s sins to the pastor meant that the individual was promised salvation in the next life (Foucault, 2007/1980: 148).
Appendix Six - Research questions

How do diversity practitioners construct themselves as expert subjects? (RQ1)

How do diversity practitioners construct the relationship between themselves and their organisation/clients? (RQA)

How are relations among diversity practitioners constructed? (RQB)

How do diversity practitioners construct their skills and knowledge? (RQC)

How is the subject of the ‘diversity trainee’ constructed by diversity practitioners? (RQ2)

How is the status quo problematised in diversity training? (RQD)

What is the construction of the subject that underlies the aims of diversity training? (RQE)

How is the subject of the diversity trainee constructed in the techniques of diversity training? (RQF)