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Effects of antitrust leniency on concealment effort by colluding firms
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Marx, Leslie M. and Mezzetti, Claudio (2014) Effects of antitrust leniency on concealment effort by colluding firms. Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, 2 (2). pp. 305-332. doi:10.1093/jaenfo/jnu008 ISSN 2050-0688.
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnu008
Abstract
We provide an economic analysis of the incentives created by an antitrust leniency programme, with particular attention to incentives created for effort directed at the concealment of collusion. The results point to a need for competition authorities to consider the effects of concealment when evaluating economic evidence of collusion. The results also suggest possible benefits from increasing penalties for cartels that use third-party facilitators.
Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||
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Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics | ||||
Journal or Publication Title: | Journal of Antitrust Enforcement | ||||
Publisher: | Oxford University Press | ||||
ISSN: | 2050-0688 | ||||
Official Date: | 23 July 2014 | ||||
Dates: |
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Volume: | 2 | ||||
Number: | 2 | ||||
Page Range: | pp. 305-332 | ||||
DOI: | 10.1093/jaenfo/jnu008 | ||||
Status: | Peer Reviewed | ||||
Publication Status: | Published | ||||
Access rights to Published version: | Restricted or Subscription Access |
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