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Antitrust leniency with multiproduct colluders

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Marx, Leslie M., Mezzetti, Claudio and Marshall, Robert C. (2015) Antitrust leniency with multiproduct colluders. American Economic Journal : Microeconomics , 7 (3). pp. 205-240. doi:10.1257/mic.20140054 ISSN 1945-7669.

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20140054

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Abstract

We use a global games approach to model alternative implementations of an antitrust leniency program as applied to multiproduct colluders. We derive several policy design lessons; e.g., we show that it is possible that linking leniency across products increases the likelihood of conviction in the first product investigated but reduces it in subsequent products. Thus, firms may have an incentive to form sacrificial cartels and apply for leniency in less valuable products to reduce convictions in more valuable products. Cartel profiling can mitigate this undesirable effect, but also reduces the probability of conviction in the first product investigated.

Item Type: Journal Article
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor
K Law [Moys] > KN Common Law, Private Law
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Cartels -- Research -- Mathematical models, Antitrust law
Journal or Publication Title: American Economic Journal : Microeconomics
Publisher: American Economic Association
ISSN: 1945-7669
Official Date: August 2015
Dates:
DateEvent
August 2015Published
26 July 2014Accepted
Volume: 7
Number: 3
Page Range: pp. 205-240
DOI: 10.1257/mic.20140054
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Access rights to Published version: Restricted or Subscription Access
Date of first compliant deposit: 25 July 2018
Date of first compliant Open Access: 25 July 2018
RIOXX Funder/Project Grant:
Project/Grant IDRIOXX Funder NameFunder ID
DP120102697[ARC] Australian Research Councilhttp://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100000923

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