Longworth, Guy (2018) Understanding what was said. Synthese, 195 (2). pp. 815-834. doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1243-5

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Abstract

On the most prominent account, understanding what was said is always propositional knowledge of what was said. I develop a more minimal alternative, according to which understanding is sometimes a distinctive attitude towards what was said—to a first approximation, entertaining what was said. The propositional knowledge account has been supported on the basis of its capacity to explain testimonial knowledge transmission. I argue that it is not so supported.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BD Speculative Philosophy B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Comprehension, Comprehension (Theory of knowledge), Knowledge, Theory of, Meaning (Philosophy), Philosophy of mind
Journal or Publication Title:	Synthese
Publisher:	Springer
ISSN:	0039-7857
Official Date:	February 2018
Dates:	Date Event February 2018 Published 12 October 2016 Available 4 October 2016 Accepted
Date of first compliant deposit:	6 October 2016
Volume:	195
Number:	2
Number of Pages:	20
Page Range:	pp. 815-834
DOI:	10.1007/s11229-016-1243-5
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access
Related URLs:	Publisher

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