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Vice epistemology

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Cassam, Quassim (2016) Vice epistemology. The Monist, 99 (2). pp. 159-180. doi:10.1093/monist/onv034

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/monist/onv034

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Abstract

Vice epistemology is the philosophical study of the nature, identity, and epistemological significance of intellectual vices. Such vices include gullibility, dogmatism, prejudice, closed-mindedness, and negligence. These are intellectual character vices, that is, intellectual vices that are also character traits. I ask how the notion of an intellectual character vice should be understood, whether such vices exist, and how they might be epistemologically significant. The proposal is that intellectual character vices are intellectual character traits that impede effective and responsible inquiry. I argue that situationist critiques of virtue epistemology pose no significant threat to this proposal. Studies by social psychologists of belief in conspiracy theories suggest that it is sometimes appropriate to explain questionable beliefs by reference to intellectual character vices. Neither ‘regulative’ nor ‘analytic’ epistemology has any good reason to question the epistemological significance of such vices.

Item Type: Journal Article
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BD Speculative Philosophy
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Knowledge, Theory of, Dogmatism, Prejudices, Negligence
Journal or Publication Title: The Monist
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISSN: 0026-9662
Official Date: 1 April 2016
Dates:
DateEvent
1 April 2016Published
16 March 2016Accepted
Volume: 99
Number: 2
Page Range: pp. 159-180
DOI: 10.1093/monist/onv034
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Access rights to Published version: Open Access
Funder: Arts & Humanities Research Council (Great Britain) (AHRC)
Grant number: (AH/M011089/1)

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