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What asymmetry? Knowledge of self, knowledge of others, and the inferentialist challenge

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Cassam, Quassim (2015) What asymmetry? Knowledge of self, knowledge of others, and the inferentialist challenge. Synthese . doi:10.1007/s11229-015-0772-7

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0772-7

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Abstract

There is widely assumed to be a fundamental epistemological asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of others. They are said to be ’categorically different in kind and manner’ (Moran), and the existence of such an asymmetry is taken to be a primitive datum in accounts of the two kinds of knowledge. I argue that standard accounts of the differences between self-knowledge and knowledge of others exaggerate and misstate the asymmetry. The inferentialist challenge to the asymmetry focuses on the extent to which both self-knowledge and knowledge of others are matters of inference and interpretation. In the case of self-knowledge I focus on the so-called ‘transparency method’ and on the extent to which use of this method delivers inferential self-knowledge. In the case of knowledge of others’ thoughts, I discuss the role of perception as a source of such knowledge and argue that even so-called ’perceptual’ knowledge of other minds is inferential. I contend that the difference between self-knowledge and knowledge of others is a difference in the kinds of evidence on which they are typically based.

Item Type: Journal Article
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BD Speculative Philosophy
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Self-knowledge, Theory of, Other minds (Theory of knowledge), Inference
Journal or Publication Title: Synthese
Publisher: Springer
ISSN: 0039-7857
Official Date: 30 May 2015
Dates:
DateEvent
30 May 2015Published
11 May 2015Accepted
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-015-0772-7
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Access rights to Published version: Restricted or Subscription Access

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