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Tracking and representing others’ mental states

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Butterfill, Stephen A. (Stephen Andrew) (2017) Tracking and representing others’ mental states. In: Andrews, K. and Beck, J., (eds.) Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Animal Minds. Routledge handbooks in philosophy. . Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge, pp. 269-279. ISBN 9781138822887

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Official URL: https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/978...

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Abstract

Few things matter more than the mental states of those nearby. Their ignorance defines limits on cooperation and presents opportunities to exploit in competition. (If she’s seen where you stashed those mealworms she’ll pilfer them when you’re gone, leaving you without breakfast. And you won’t get that grape if he hears you sneaking past.) What others feel, see and know can also provide information about events otherwise beyond your ken. It’s no surprise, then, that abilities to track others’ mental states are widespread. Many animals, including scrub jays (Clayton, Dally and Emery 2007), ravens (Bugnyar, Reber and Buckner 2016), goats (Kaminski, Call and Tomasello 2006), dogs (Kaminski et al. 2009), ring-tailed lemurs (Sandel, MacLean and Hare 2011), monkeys (Hattori, Kuroshima and Fujita 2009) and chimpanzees (Karg et al. 2015), reliably vary their actions in ways that are appropriate given facts about another’s mental states. What underpins such abilities to track others’ mental states?

Item Type: Book Item
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BD Speculative Philosophy
B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
Q Science > QL Zoology
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Cognition, Awareness, Philosophy of mind , Cognition in animals
Series Name: Routledge handbooks in philosophy.
Publisher: Routledge
Place of Publication: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY
ISBN: 9781138822887
Book Title: Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Animal Minds
Editor: Andrews, K. and Beck, J.
Official Date: July 2017
Dates:
DateEvent
July 2017Published
8 September 2016Accepted
Number of Pages: 521
Page Range: pp. 269-279
DOI: 10.4324/9781315742250.ch25
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Publisher Statement: "This is an Accepted Manuscript of a book chapter published by Routledge in Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Animal Minds on 01/07/2017, available online: https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9781315742250
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