Chatterjee, Kalyan and Dutta, Bhaskar (2016) Credibility and strategic learning in networks. International Economic Review, 57 (3). pp. 759-786. doi:10.1111/iere.12175

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Abstract

We analyze a model of diffusion in a fixed, finite connected network. There is an interested party that knows the quality of the product being propagated and chooses an implant in the network to influence other agents to buy. Agents are either “innovators,” who adopt immediately, or rational. Rational consumers buy if buying instead of waiting maximizes expected utility. We consider the conditions on the network under which optimal diffusion of the good product with probability 1 is a perfect Bayes equilibrium.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HF Commerce Q Science > QA Mathematics
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Consumer behavior -- Mathematical models, Bayesian statistical decision theory
Journal or Publication Title:	International Economic Review
Publisher:	Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc.
ISSN:	0020-6598
Official Date:	9 August 2016
Dates:	Date Event 9 August 2016 Published 13 May 2015 Accepted 6 November 2013 Submitted
Volume:	57
Number:	3
Page Range:	pp. 759-786
DOI:	10.1111/iere.12175
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access
Funder:	Human Capital Foundation, Vavilov, Andreĭ, 1961- , Pennsylvania State University. Richard B. Fisher Endowment

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