SECURITY AND MIGRATION: A CONCEPTUAL EXPLORATION

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‘A nation without borders is not a nation. There must be a wall across the southern border’
(Trump 2015).

‘The picture, taken on Wednesday morning, depicted the dark-haired toddler, wearing a bright-red T-shirt and shorts, washed up on a beach, lying face down in the surf not far from Turkey’s fashionable resort town of Bodrum’
(Smith 2015).

Introduction

Without doubt migration is an emotive issue. It is emotive because it raises fundamental questions about the rights of states relative to the rights of persons, about borders as sites of inclusion and exclusion, of ordering and control, and ultimately because migration puts security – viewed by many as the pre-eminent value upon which all else depends – in question. The above quotes provide two contrasting and polarised images of the nexus between migration and security.

The first comes from Donald J. Trump’s campaign for the Republican presidential nomination. It offers a rather traditional conception of the role of the state, the centrality of borders as sites of national security and, in the broader context in which the statement was delivered, a view of migration as inherently threatening to that national security. Indeed, the quote was part of a broader statement on the need for America to institute a much tougher regime along its southern border with Mexico. Amongst other things the statement accused the Mexican government of ‘using illegal migration to export the crime and poverty in their own country’, (Trump 2015) which was itself a toned down version of his earlier more explicit accusation that the Mexican government was deliberately exporting drugs, crime, rapists and ‘tremendous infectious disease’ (Neate 2015). While Trump is careful to single out illegal immigrants, there is obviously a danger that his invective comes to tarnish all migrants crossing the southern border. Migrants, from this perspective, are threatening, as too is the Mexican government, which Trump states is ‘not our friend’ (quoted in Walker 2015). Moreover, the title of Trump’s presidential campaign statement, ‘Immigration reform that will make America great again’, also makes it clear that the stakes raised by uncontrolled migration are high. Immigration into the US is here implicitly depicted as a cause of American decline, or at least curtailing America’s greatness and what it can be in the world; in short it is existential.

For Trump, therefore, the border is the pre-eminent site of security that needs to be enforced and made impermeable through the construction of a wall regulating all movement across the border. This is a common view. Indeed, Trump’s statement closely parallels President Ronald Reagan’s earlier Cold War assertion that ‘A nation that cannot control its border is not a nation’. In many respects this is not an unreasonable proposition. It is obviously the case that states unable to control movement across their borders will be more susceptible to various transnational threats, be that in terms of vulnerability to the activities of transnational criminal organisations, infiltration by foreign state agents, the spread of infectious diseases, or terrorist attacks. Indeed, states deemed unable to control their borders are often depicted as at risk of ‘failing’. An oft mooted example is Pakistan’s apparent inability to control the movement of Taleban insurgents across the border with Afghanistan and NATO’s various incursions in pursuit of them, often without Pakistan’s explicit authorisation. All this suggests that
Pakistan’s sovereignty is both empirically weak and often recognised only in the breach. However, if border control is understood as central to state sovereignty, then the fact that an estimated 11 million undocumented (illegal) immigrants currently reside in the US suggests that America is also vulnerable to such claims and that behind Trump’s undiplomatic and shrill pronouncements lie a number of important issues for consideration (Massey 2015).

The second quote from a report in The Guardian newspaper offers a very different view of the migration-security nexus. The report describes what, at the time, became one of the most poignant and discussed images of the Syrian refugee crisis. It describes the well-publicised tragic picture of Aylan Kurdi, a three-year old Syrian refugee who drowned, along with his five-year old brother, his mother and at least 9 others while trying to escape to Europe by inflatable dinghy from Turkey (Dearden 2015). He died, in no small part, because of the desire of European states to use stricter border and asylum regimes in order to limit the flow of migrants and refugees. Creating barriers to movement, raising the risks of travel posed to those impelled to cross borders, it is hoped will reduce the numbers of those willing to make the journey. Consequently, like many others Aylan’s parents paid unscrupulous people traffickers for their perilous passage. Indeed, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees estimated that as of 19 November 2015 850,571 ‘refugees and migrants’ had arrived by sea to Europe during the course of the year, with a further 3,485 having died or ‘gone missing’ at sea (Ash 2015).

Evidently Aylan was not a rapist, drug smuggler or criminal. His picture reminded viewers, and not least those espousing much anti-immigrant sentiment in Europe, of the human element of many migration stories. Although the conflict in Syria has so far resulted in over 4 million people fleeing Syria for other countries – there are even more internally displaced persons within Syria – with thousands having died trying to get to Europe, the personalisation of this wider tragedy in the image of a limp boy washed up on a beach added a considerable human/humanitarian dimension to what in Europe, had become an increasingly ‘Trumpian’ position about the need for bordering. Most notably it contributed to German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s decision to implement, if only for what turned out to be a limited time period, and in the face of much criticism, an ‘open door’ policy with respect to Syrian refugees. The picture of Aylan shifted the security discussion from the state to those on the move, from considerations of national security to those of human security. When framed this way security requires a more cooperative, less exclusionary approach, and one that challenges the role of borders as primarily sites of division and exclusion.

The Trump-Aylan comparison therefore suggests that the relationship between security and migration is both complex and complicated. Since it entails crossing borders it could be suggested that (international) migration inevitably raises questions of security – but whose, in what ways and what should be done about it? In a context in which the numbers are increasing year on year, in which, according to the International Organization for Migration (2015), 1 in every 33 persons is a migrant, this is an issue that will not go away anytime soon. This chapter seeks to unpack some of the complexity of the security-migration nexus through an exploratory unpicking of the concept of security. The chapter shows the multiplicity of claims and counter claims that are made about the security effects of migration and in doing so argues that all such debates are inevitably politicised around the relative prioritisation of various interests, preferences and values. More particularly, however, the chapter argues that while migration certainly raises significant challenges, the discussion of migration in the language of security can have significant constitutive effects that, beyond typically framing the nature of policy responses considered, are also often fundamental to how identities of us and them, and perceptions of security and threat, are conceived. This means any discussion of the relationship between migration and security also raises ethical considerations and dilemmas.
Conceptualising and Theorising Security in International Relations

Security is an alluring and intoxicating concept and often reached for as a ‘winning argument’. This is because it is seen to refer to fundamental values or is viewed as the primary value upon which the pursuit of all other (secondary) goals depends. Arguing against security is therefore difficult, while invoking it can disarm the arguments of dissenters. Moreover, because of its connection to the protection of core values security is also a motivational and mobilising concept; it focuses minds and issues a call for action.

Yet security also often appears elusive, a continual work in progress, while its meaning and what it refers to is highly contested. To get a better grip on security scholars of International Relations often interrogate it through asking a number of questions. In doing so they seek to show the bases upon which different understandings and preferences about security lie. There are a large number of questions one might ask about security, but for the purposes of this exploration four are sufficient.

The first question we might ask has been illustrated in the Trump-Aylan comparison above and focuses on ‘whose security’ is at stake? In international politics the historical tendency has been to focus on state security. This is because states are generally viewed as both the primary actors in the international system, but also because, from a social contract theory approach, the raison d’être of states is seen as being that of providing for their citizens’ security. Insofar as states are themselves insecure they will be unable to perform this function, and it is therefore imperative that state security becomes the core focus of attention and state policy (Buzan 1991). This is, however, an idealisation, with critics frequently highlighting that in practice states have often been a primary source of insecurity, anxiety and even terror for their citizens (Booth 1991). Obvious examples include Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, Germany under the Nazi’s, the Soviet Union under Stalin. Indeed, in many countries proclamations in the name of state security have functioned as little more than euphemistic justifications for a prioritisation of the security of ruling regimes. Critics who make this observation are therefore suggesting that the prioritisation of state security confuses means with ends; that ultimately it is the security of people that needs to be prioritised as the referent object of security. This is, in particular, the position upheld by advocates of ‘human security’ and is a view endorsed by the United Nations (United Nations Development Programme 1994: 22-4). In principle, however, security could be focused on any identifiable referent object, be it states, individuals/humans, ethnic and religious groups, the environment/planet or even framed in terms of the protection of particular values like liberty and freedom. Ultimately the prioritisation of one referent object of security over that of others is a political choice. Thus, even though such prioritisations are frequently presented in objective terms, their political implications become evident insofar as prioritising one referent may entail negative security implications for other possible referents.

The identification of possible referent objects of security, however, raises a second question of ‘what security entails’ in different contexts? Again, various answers are available which, broadly speaking, locate themselves at different points along a spectrum from security as limited to ensuring physical survival (as an individual, group, state, ecosystem) to security as requiring a certain quality with respect to the conditions of existence. For instance, advocates of human security are split between narrow and broader understandings of its basic requirements. Narrow conceptions focus on eradicating threats of physical violence – what the UN terms ‘freedom from fear’ – therefore prioritising issues of conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction. Advocates of this approach, for example, have therefore been key proponents of attempts to impose bans and regulations on the use of weapons, be it in terms of the Ottawa Treaty prohibiting the use of anti-personnel landmines or more recent attempts to regulate the arms trade through an Arms

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1 For similar analyses see Terriff et al. (1999: 17-22); Williams (2013); Smith (2005); Baldwin (1997); Rothschild (1995).
Trade Treaty. In contrast, broader conceptions of human security include an emphasis on the need to tackle problems of underdevelopment that blight the lives of billions – what the UN terms ‘freedom from want’. Advocates of this approach have therefore been keen to support the 2000-2015 United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Global Goals for Sustainable Development that have replaced them.

However, whether the emphasis is on the physical security of ‘freedom from fear’ or issues of welfare connected to ‘freedom from want’, both raise further questions. For instance, it is unclear that the protection of the physical security of existence is uniformly viewed as the primary value. It has, for example, been argued that the story of the Melians refusal to surrender to the Athenians in full knowledge that the decision sealed their imminent slaughter, suggests that for the Melians dying in defence of their conceptions of selfhood and honour was preferential to the shame of surrender (Lindemann 2010: 15; Steele 2008: 94-5). The same might be said of suicide bombers, but also of anyone willing to risk their life in defence/pursuit of a cause. Likewise, an emphasis on conditions of existence and ‘freedom from want’ raises the question of what base line conditions of welfare security should look like. Be it in terms of ‘freedom from fear’ or ‘freedom from want’, therefore, there is always a question of what constitutes sufficiency. Put differently, how much fear is acceptable and how much food, material possessions, education, health etc... is required to meet ‘basic human needs’?

This raises a further issue with important ethico-political dimensions. One of the temptations and dangers of the desire for security is that it can easily become all encompassing. Indeed, the idea of ‘total security’ can be highly seductive but needs to be treated cautiously. ‘Total security’ is both an illusion but also undesirable. As various philosophers (not least Nietzsche and Heidegger) have argued, ultimately the fulfilling life is one that recognises the time limited (and hence ultimately insecure) nature of all existence and therefore the need to embrace a certain amount of risk, anxiety and insecurity. However, the temptation of ‘total security’ is strong and can be seen in the periodical rise of various manifestations of the ‘security state’ over time. One example of this has been the response of various Western states following 9/11 and the declaration of the War on Terror, following which new security agencies have been created, bordering practices reinforced, with citizens constantly encouraged to be extra vigilant, and where civil liberties have been steadily sacrificed in the name of security.

A third question to ask, therefore, is ‘what is the threat’ and where the suggestion just made is that the pursuit of security itself is something of which it is important to be wary. Indeed, insofar as the pursuit of security undermines civil liberties some would argue that the prioritisation of security as the core value should be reconsidered – and where the fundamental challenge is rather how to balance security against other important values. More usually, however, the question of threats is answered in terms of how threats are identified and prioritised relative to each other. It is important to recognise that there are no objective grounds upon which this can be done. Threats which may appear self-evident and objectively identifiable are only so to the extent to which social consensus has emerged around particular issues. As we will see, immigration provides an excellent example of this since there is considerable disagreement within societies about whether or not immigration is a threat per se – it is, after all, often viewed as a solution to some security issues – and if it is, exactly what it is seen to threaten.

Crucially, though, the way in which threats are prioritised often has much to do with the institutionalised power of those making the claim and the context within which such claims are made. This takes us back to the first question of referent objects and where it is evident that states and those that speak on their behalf (be they political leaders or institutionally located security professionals) have much greater capacity and power to set security agendas. It is therefore important always to be
mindful of in whose interest security agendas are operating. One final point here, though, is that the politics of prioritisation is usually influenced by considerations of whether identified threats are deemed manageable or not. For Wæver (1995) it is the manageability of threats that marks out a situation of security from one of insecurity. In respect of migration this is an important point, since most security debates on the issue are not concerned with migration per se, but rather with levels of migration and their associated challenges.

The fourth question to highlight is one that gets right to the heart of public policy considerations and asks ‘how is security to be achieved’? Broadly speaking answers to this question tend to be inflected with either a cooperative or competitive mind-set. Competitive approaches see security as limited and relative and where increasing one’s own security will always be at the expense of enhanced insecurity for others. It is precisely this view of security which characterises traditional (neo)realist accounts and theories of International Relations that depict the international system as comprised of states located in an unforgiving Hobbesian anarchy (see Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2004). In stereotyped terms this power political view is premised on the assumption that security requires power (both military and economic – though with an emphasis on military dimensions), that trust is in short supply (and potentially naïve), and that therefore prudent states will abide by a logic of self-help in a more general competition of all against all for resources and, hence, security. Indeed, such approaches have tended to be critical of the broadening out of security, both to different referent objects beyond the state, but also to different issues beyond that of territorial defence, calculations of the balance of power and military threat assessments and strategies. From this perspective the essence of security is ultimately about war and where the broadening of the security agenda is not only seen to pose challenges for the intellectual coherence of debates about security, but may also be dangerous and irresponsible because it threatens to divert attention from these ‘core’ concerns and responsibilities of the state (Walt 1991). Except insofar as migration raises such concerns it therefore should not be on the security agenda at all.

In contrast, cooperative approaches view security as something that is held in common. As such security is not a limited resource, but something that can be expanded and fostered through developing positive and trusting relations between individuals and groups. Various liberal and more ‘critical’ (e.g. constructivist, post-structuralist, Marxist, feminist) approaches within International Relations have specifically adopted and advocated more cooperative approaches to security – though often in different and not always compatible ways. However, while (neo)realist approaches have a zero-sum understanding of the interdependent nature of security – where my security relies on others insecurity – these approaches all believe that, given sufficient political will, security interdependence can be framed in win-win terms – where my security depends on others security. This suggests that in a world of limited resources the solution to security problems is not best pursued through hoarding and sequestration (which might in fact generate security tensions – not least in terms of providing incentives for mass migration amongst impoverished communities), but rather through enhancing access and more equitable distribution (Galtung 1969; Booth 2007). Cooperative approaches to security are therefore much more likely to emphasise the promotion of justice and human rights, not least through tackling the structural causes of insecurity.

As will become evident below the questions of ‘whose security’, ‘what security entails’, ‘what is the threat’ and ‘how is security to be achieved’ are fundamental to understanding the nature of contemporary security debates about migration. Before turning to these debates, however, one further theoretical point needs mention. Evident in the above discussion on competitive vs. cooperative approaches to security is a deeper disjunction about the purposes and constitutive role of security theorising (and social theories in general). (Neo)realist theories adopt what Robert Cox (1981) terms a ‘problem solving’ approach to theory. Problem solving theories are characterised by their ‘scientific’ commitment to explain the world ‘as it is’. Problem solving theories therefore
maintain a distinction between theory and the world ‘out there’ and can be termed problem solving because, in taking the world ‘as it is’, they seek to offer advice on how best to cope with those empirical realities (Williams 2013: 3). In contrast, while some cooperative approaches (e.g. liberal approaches) to security are also ‘problem solving’ in their underpinnings, essentially disagreeing with (neo)realists as to the empirical reality of the world ‘out there’, the more critically inclined of the cooperative approaches view theory, not simply as referencing and explaining a world out there, but as part of that world and therefore playing an important role in constituting the very nature of social reality. For them, the danger of the ‘pessimistic’ description of international security environments offered by (neo)realists is that they convince policy makers to act as if their theories were true descriptions of social reality and therefore become self-fulfilling. For critical approaches language is not simply referential, but constitutive, and therefore the language we use matters (Wæver 2002: 28-9). Indeed, insofar as this chapter has already pointed to the prioritising and mobilising power of security language, this should be evident.

All this, however, is not to say that ‘critical’ approaches are inevitably ‘optimistic’ and targeted towards pursuing more cooperative approaches to security. While some are, drawing succour from the possibilities that in changing the terms of the debate it may be possible to advance what they view as more normatively progressive agendas, (e.g. see Booth 2007) others have been more inclined to limit their normative advocacy to encouraging analysts to expose the constitutive dynamics and political implications that underpin various claims about security.

Migration and Security: Challenges and Opportunities

This focus on the constitutive role of language provides a good way into discussing the migration-security nexus in more depth since it immediately suggests we should be cautious about unthinkingly reproducing the terms of debate within which migration is frequently discussed. There are two obvious parts to this. One concerns the politics and implications of debating migration in the language of security and is the focus of the next section. The other concerns the more specific politics of categorisation that attends almost all debates about migration, and which is also evident in the Trump-Aylan comparison introduced above.

Trump’s concern, we have seen, is with ‘illegal’ immigrants, a category of migrant he argues is problematically infiltrated by ‘rapists, drug runners, and other criminals’ (Walker 2015). Indeed, he is keen to stress that ‘Many fabulous people come in from Mexico [as well] and our country is better for it. But these people are here legally’ (quoted in Walker 2015). Evident here is that the categorical distinction drawn in Trump’s discourse between ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ migrants is not simply one determined by whether or not migrants have entered the United States through official procedures, but is also morally infused with notions of good and bad (and perhaps even evil). Illegal immigrants are not simply undesirable because they crossed the border without official sanction, but because they can be expected to pose a threat to the physical security, health and property of America and its citizens. In short, these are bad people.² No doubt, among the 11 million undocumented migrants currently residing in America there are some rapists, drug runners and criminals. It is very unlikely they all are, and rather more likely that such people comprise a very small proportion. By the same token, there are also no doubt undesirable elements among those people that have crossed into the United States legally, just as there are in the American population at large.

Such normative presumptions are also evident in Europe with respect to the Syrian refugee crisis and where there has been considerable political discussion as to the right terminology to use to describe

² Ben Carse, another candidate in the race for the Republican presidential nomination, even compared Syrian refugees to ‘rabid dogs’, thereby dehumanising them (Flores 2015).
them. The key issue has been the extent to which the word ‘migrant’ has become infused with negative connotations in European political debate and where critics argue that the categorisation of Syrians fleeing their country as ‘migrants’ stirs up resentment against them, feeds intolerance and xenophobia and undermines humanitarian efforts to help them (Marsh 2015; Ruz 2015). Those pushing for a more concerted humanitarian approach to their plight have argued they should be labelled ‘refugees’ instead as this term emphasises both their vulnerability (as opposed to threateningness) and their legal rights to protection (and the obligation of other states to provide this) under international law via the 1948 UN Declaration of Human Rights and the 1951 Refugee Convention (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010: 136).

There are a couple of things worth noting about these cases. First it highlights that categorisation is politically relevant and where the label applied can have the effect of shifting which referent object of security is prioritised – the state or the migrant. Thus, while distinctions drawn between different types of migrant – be it legal/illegal, temporary/permanent, voluntary/forced, economic/refugee/asylum-seeker – can provide an important way of trying to understand the nature of phenomena underway and the different drivers and causes of migration, it is also important to understand the extent to which many of these terms have become politically (and morally) loaded and variously legitimising/delegitimising in their effects. Second, it is important to recognise that, once again, these labels are not demarcated by ‘objective’ criteria. For instance, whether someone is defined as a legal or illegal economic migrant will depend on the criteria (often framed in terms of economic needs) of the state they are trying to enter – criteria that has a tendency to change over time. Similarly, whether someone is defined as a ‘voluntary economic migrant’ or as being forced to move in order to escape dire and life debilitating poverty, is very much a matter of perspective. Meanwhile, while under international law states are obliged to provide protection to anyone seeking asylum from persecution, states are free to determine their own criteria for what constitutes a legitimate asylum claim (Bali 2013: 525). Thus it is that women facing physical or sexual abuse as a result of the culturally inscribed practices of the society in which they live were able to claim asylum in the United States during the presidency of Bill Clinton, had this right removed under the presidency of George Bush, only for it to be restored during the presidency of Barack Obama in 2009 (Smith 2010: 298). There is, therefore, considerable power evident in the ability of states to assign migrants to different categories, with this itself emphasising their vulnerability.

As noted earlier, however, the relationship between migration and security is both complicated and contested. Indeed, the distinction drawn between legal and illegal migration is itself indicative of the fact that migration may itself be viewed as being a benefit to security as much as a threat to it. And, of course, the security implications of migration depend very much on the referent object (‘whose security’) we focus on.

For instance, migration can be viewed as having a security dividend for various referents. For migrants it can obviously offer escape from political, religious, ethnic or gendered persecution, from war and famine, or can offer the chance of economic enhancement through access to a different labour market. It is also frequently undertaken for reasons of family reunification. For states of origin there may also be benefits in encouraging emigration. In this respect, Donald Trump is right in pointing out that the Mexican government has actively promoted both legal and illegal emigration of its citizens to the United States. In part this is because it has been viewed as a way to ease some of Mexico’s internal economic problems of high unemployment and its attendant welfare burden. Emigration, however, does not just provide a safety valve for tensions that may develop as a result of these problems, but states of origin (and citizens left behind) also benefit from the remittances that migrants send back to their families. The figures here can be surprising, with the The World Bank (2014: 2, 4) estimating that in 2013 they totalled $404 billion, of which India received $70 billion, China $60 billion and Mexico $22 billion. For Tajikistan, remittances accounted for a staggering 52% of its total GDP. And it is also
the case that political parties, ethnic groups and governments in states of origin have also seen
emigration as a means to rid their country of groups deemed undesirable. At its most extreme this can
take the form of ethnic cleansing as, for example, was widespread during the wars occasioning the
break-up of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. However, it was also evident in the run-up to the enlargement of
the European Union in 2004, when it became apparent that officials in some of the accession countries
in Eastern Europe saw membership as offering the opportunity of reducing the size of their Roma
populations as a result of the EU’s commitment to free movement.

Lastly, states of destination can also see a security imperative in encouraging immigration. For
example, foreign migrant workers are often seen as a solution to various economic and social policy
problems, be it the need for (un)skilled workers and entrepreneurs in order to maintain international
economic competitiveness, the need to counteract an ageing population and generate enough tax
revenues to pay for pensions and associated welfare costs, or the need to find workers to fill shortages
in strategically important professions and industries. In respect of this latter issue the United Kingdom,
has, for example, for many years been forced to trawl the world for health professionals in order to
staff its much admired National Health Service. Given our particular focus on security, however, it is
also notable that in many countries migrants increasingly make up a sizeable number of the nation’s
fighting forces, and not just once they have become naturalised citizens. Thus, whereas historically
bearing arms through conscription was deemed a fundamental duty of those who were already
citizens, in many countries, including the United States, serving in the military as a non-citizen has
become one route towards being granted citizenship – a practice which gives the ‘national’ in national
security an ironic flavour (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services: no date).

Of course, migration can also create security challenges and vulnerabilities. As in the case of Aylan
Kurdi and the thousands of others who have died trying to cross international borders, or the hundreds
of thousands of (mainly) women and girls trafficked annually as part of the international sex trade,
migration can be fraught with risks of exploitation, violence and death. In short, illegal trafficking has
become big business for various transnational criminal organisations. This includes ‘terrorist’ groups
like ISIS which by May 2015 was reported to have already generated up to $323 million from such
activities (Walt 2015). Relatedly, and as demonstrated on 11 September 2001, migrants can also pose
a direct threat to the state of destination, with all the 9/11 terrorists being non-American citizens,
most of whom had entered the US legally.

However, security challenges can also assume a more political dimension, as when granting asylum
entails at least implicit criticism of the country from which asylum is sought. A state’s asylum policy
can therefore potentially damage diplomatic relations between countries. A good recent example of
this was Ecuador’s decision in 2012 to grant asylum to Julian Assange, the founder of Wikileaks, who
was subsequently holed up in the Ecuadorian Embassy in London, thereby avoiding extradition to
Sweden to face prosecution for sexual offences. Assange’s fear, upheld by Ecuador, was that from
Sweden he would subsequently be extradited to America where he would face trial and almost certain
lengthy imprisonment for Wikileaks’ publication of US diplomatic and military files leaked to the
organisation in 2010 by Chelsea Manning. Ecuador’s decision to grant political asylum soured relations
with both the UK and the US, much in the same way as Russia’s protection of Edward Snowdon from
the arms of American justice has done for its relations with the United States. Tensions like these can
be exacerbated when larger groups of migrants who have fled persecution are involved and that
mobilise on mass against the ruling regime in their home state. For instance, the 4-5 million Palestinian
refugees in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan, many descendants of an original 700,000 who were forced out
of Israel during the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict, have been an enduring irritant for these countries
relations with Israel, a major challenge for the Middle East peace process, but have also at times
created problems for domestic stability (Bali 2013: 526).
High levels of migration can also create security challenges of a more social and economic nature. States or origin, particularly in the developing world, typically face the difficulty of coping with skills shortages as their brightest and best are enticed to fill vacancies in the developed world. The World Bank, for example, has identified ten countries that in 2000 lost over 70% of their tertiary educated population to emigration. Similarly, it is estimated that around 20-30% of all physicians trained in sub-Saharan Africa take up posts elsewhere (The World Bank 2011: 18, 33). Such movements embed structural inequalities that lie at the heart of broader conceptions of human security and raise questions about the developed world’s commitment to tackling global poverty and improving global health as laid out in the Millennium Development Goals (Browning 2013: 97-8). However, it is also evident that high levels of immigration pose important challenges to receiving states, which face logistical and economic burdens in terms of meeting enhanced housing, education and other needs. Likewise, while business communities are often favourable to high levels of immigration, seeing it as creating a larger pool of workers to choose from, and which in turn can help keep wage costs down, precisely for this latter reason workers’ unions sometimes complain that high levels of immigration threaten to undermine the security of their members by undermining their ability to push for better pay and conditions.

Societal Security and Securitization

Tensions over the economic, social, political and security implications of migration often crystallise in debates about the integration of migrant groups into the wider national community. In short migrants are often seen to pose a threat to ‘societal security’, a concept which concerns the ability of a community to sustain its conception of self-identity. As Buzan et al. (1998: 119) put it ‘Societal insecurity exists when communities of whatever kind define a development as a threat to their survival as a community’. A good example of such fears was presented by Samuel Huntington, a political scientist best known for his theories about ‘the clash of civilizations’. In 2004, however, he published another book instructively asking the question Who Are We? The book manifests considerable levels of anxiety that high levels of Hispanic immigration into the United States are posing a fundamental challenge to established conceptions of American identity as a country with a fundamentally Anglo-Protestant heritage. In short, if something is not done quickly to reverse the trend, Huntington argued the America of the Founding Fathers would cease to exist (Huntington 2004).

Arguments like Huntington’s have become the currency of populist politicians the world over and reflect a tendency to depict identities in essentialist terms. This is to say there is a belief that a fixed core lies at the heart of all identities – be they personal, national, civilizational etc. – and that if challenged threaten to turn us into something we are not. When identity is understood this way, as opposed to being viewed as socially constructed, flexible and always open for revision, identity becomes existential and something that needs to be defended at all costs. Such concerns can clearly be seen to underpin ongoing debates about the compatibility of Islam with Western values, and where Islam and Islamic practices (Sharia law, wearing headscarves etc) are seen by many in the West, not simply as being ‘non-Western’, but as posing a fundamental threat to the West. In Huntingtonian terms, the West and Islam are viewed as pitted against each other in a clash of civilizations, with this clash always liable to turn violent.

Post-structuralist scholars of security have an important take on such tendencies. Although they view identity as socially constructed and malleable they argue that people generally act ‘as if’ their identities were primordial and fixed, while for politicians, making claims to identity in essentialised terms is generally much more politically effective than trying to convince citizens they should view the nation’s identity as socially constructed (Neumann 1999: 214-6). Moreover, post-structuralists have also argued that while the constitution of any identity is always dependent upon the identification of
that which it is not, there is also a strong temptation and tendency to frame difference/otherness in radicalised and threatening terms because the identification of the enemy helps crystallise our own claims to identity (Campbell 1998).

The tendency to depict identities in ‘as if’ terms, however, is not simply an issue of political efficacy, but arguably responds to the deeper psychological anxieties people have about the nature of being and existence. As the literature on ‘ontological security’ (the security of being) has argued, our ability to ‘go on’ with everyday life is dependent upon our ability to block out existential anxieties about the nature of being, about the imminence of death, and about who we really are (Giddens 1991). Narratives of self-identity, their production, performance and reinforcement, are a key mechanism by which ontological security can be generated. At a cognitive level they do this by positioning us in the world in relation to others and identifying what is deemed as significant. Emotionally, however, the sense of biographical continuity they foster is comforting and fundamental (Kinnvall 2004: 746). More particularly, though, individuals are prone to embed their own narratives of self-identity within those of larger groups like nations and/or religions. Connecting one’s identity to a broader collective, and vicariously living through the achievements of that group, offers individuals the illusion of life beyond death, but can also provide something positive, continuous, stable and safe for them to hold on to in situations when other aspects of their personal life may be uncertain (Kinnvall 2004: 742-4).

One effect, however, is that ontological security is often reduced down to reinforcing particular conceptions of identity, with the preservation of specific identities becoming securitized. This is particularly liable in the face of dislocatory events. We might think here of terrorist attacks like 9/11, the 2005 bombings in London or the attacks in Paris in 2015. Such attacks generated anxiety in all these societies about the stability of national identity, the strength of social cohesion, the role of these countries in world politics. Ontological security analysis argues that when such anxieties emerge a typical response is to deflect them through identifying objects of fear to physical security that leave the core identity and sense of moral certitude and purpose of the society unscathed, thereby enabling systems of meaning about the nature of the world and identity to be re-established (Rumeliili 2015). This process of ‘turning anxiety into fear’ (Steele 2008: 64 original emphasis) was also notably displayed by Donald Trump during his presidential nomination campaign, when, in the aftermath of the Paris attacks and a mass shooting carried out by two Muslims in San Bernardino (California), he called for ‘a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the US’ – a statement that explicitly identified all Muslims as inherently suspect and potential terrorists (BBC News 2015).

Statements like this are obviously indicative of the temptation to securitize migrants as threats. In the discipline of International Relations, however, the concept of securitization has come to have specific meaning and has been the focus of vibrant research into the constitutive effects of presenting issues in the language of security. Most important has been the work of Ole Wæver (1995), who argues that in (international) politics security is inimically tied to discourses of ‘national security’. Therefore, when security is raised he argues it is always prone to become embedded in a ‘threat-defence’ logic, one that is ultimately connected to war and the survival of the realm. For Wæver, securitization is the process by which presenting something as a matter of security has the effect of identifying it as being of existential importance that thereby justifies the use of emergency and extraordinary measures to tackle it. In short, securitizing an issue can depoliticize it by closing down the bounds of legitimate debate as regards whether or not something should be treated in this way, or what measures are appropriate as a counter. This is because to do so can itself be construed as threatening national security (Buzan et al. 1998: 21-6). Security, therefore, is a language that carries considerable moral(ising) and political influence.

Trump’s call to ban Muslim immigration into the United States is precisely just such an attempt to securitize an issue (a securitizing move), and like most securitisations it has the effect of drawing
categorical boundaries of difference between ‘us’ and ‘them’. It also, notably, calls for the imposition of exceptional and extraordinary measures – banning movement into the US of all members of a particular religious affiliation, much in the same way as his calls to build a wall are designed to keep Mexicans and other South American’s out. In this way the securitization of migration can be seen to have legitimated particular types of bordering practices that might in other times be viewed as unacceptable, or at least questionable. For instance, in Australia the securitization of migration has seen the country establish offshore detention centres where asylum seekers and refugees are held while their asylum claims are processed. Such centres often appear little different to prison camps and have been widely condemned by human rights organisations for their poor conditions and the implicit criminalization of migrants that they entail (Amnesty International 2013). Similarly, however, border control processes are being constantly enhanced, with many countries introducing new technologies (e.g. iris scanning equipment) and information gathering processes in order to weed out the undesirable from the desirable. However, border control practices are no longer confined to the border. Increasingly border control is happening within states, partly in recognition of the fact that many so called ‘illegal’ migrants actually crossed the border ‘legally’ in the first instance, but subsequently breached their visa conditions. One consequence in the UK, for instance, is that the government has now placed a legal duty on various organisations (not least universities) to enforce border control regulations, thereby implicitly turning large numbers of public sector workers into (often unwilling) agents of border security control.

Dislocatory events like the terrorist attacks of 9/11, or the bombings in London and Paris, and the securitization of migration that has followed, has not only had effects in terms of promoting enhanced emphasis on border control. As argued above, attendant with the securitization of migration societies have also characteristically simultaneously been prone to securitizing core elements of their identity as a mechanism for coping with anxiety and enhancing ontological security. One important effect of this in the West has been to spark renewed debate as to the respective benefits of building national identities along either multiculturalist or assimilationist lines. During the 1990s many Western societies openly embraced multiculturalism, welcoming the cultural differences brought by migrants as enhancing and enriching established conceptions of national identity. Indeed, for many embracing cultural difference became viewed as the mark of a truly liberal society. Since 9/11, however, multiculturalism has increasingly, not simply been portrayed as misguided, but as having undermined national security insofar as it is argued it created fractured societies, with immigrant communities living in enclaves and rarely interacting with mainstream society. The fact that various ‘home grown’ terrorists emerged out of these communities has added to the sense of fear that surrounds them. In the opinion of Chancellor Angela Merkel, the multiculturalist experiment in Germany has ‘failed utterly’, (quoted in Connolly 2010) while British Prime Minister David Cameron (2011) has reflected populist sentiment by calling for a more ‘muscular liberalism’ that takes a stand on the nation’s core values and which expects immigrants to embrace them. Instead of multiculturalism, therefore, immigrants are increasingly expected to assimilate into a core conception of nationhood.

However, such assertions raise important questions, not least with respect to identifying exactly what it is immigrants are expected to assimilate into. The notion of core values or conceptions of nationhood indicates that underpinning assimilationist arguments lie particular essentialist conceptions of national identity that can be articulated clearly and unproblematically. In practice, there is little agreement on these things. Thus, while for some wearing headscarves or other Islamic forms of attire is perfectly compatible with core conceptions of national selfhood in many Western states, for others it is not, and may even be felt as an affront and threatening and therefore something to be banned.

One effect of this whole debate, however, is that it places migrants in the almost impossible position of constantly having to prove their belonging. Typically, such communities are subject to levels of
scrutiny that would be deemed unfair for others. A good example of this is how Muslims living in the West have, in recent years, been increasingly expected to publicly condemn violent actions perpetrated by other Muslims since, for many people, their loyalty to the state is deemed inherently suspect. However, in making such declarations they already know these will not be fully believed and that they will be expected to repeat them. Also notable is that many of Europe’s 39 million Muslims are not migrants at all, but born in the states in which they reside. However, insofar as a discourse has emerged that depicts Islam as in some sense ‘non-Western’ then their religious identification can have the effect of placing them in the immigrant category and subject to scrutiny in ways that suggests their belongingness in the state in which they are citizens remains in question. Thus, while securitizing anti-immigrant rhetoric can have the effect of reinforcing a sense of ontological security for the majority, it typically comes at the expense of undermining the security of migrants, for whom anxieties and threats to physical security are liable to increase.

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that claims about the security implications of migration are always politically framed and never objective as such. To understand the nature of the migration-security nexus it is therefore necessary to be attuned to the various (and often implicit) assumptions that underlie claims about the security effects and threats of migration. This chapter has argued that doing this requires going back to first principles and interrogating claims about security by asking a number of basic questions. Key questions, it has been argued, are ‘whose security’, ‘what security entails’, ‘what is the threat’ and ‘how is security to be achieved’. However, it has also been argued that along with a focus on what security means, we also need to be attuned to what (the language of) security does. That is, how security focuses minds, mobilises people to action and, at times, can establish a threat-defence logic that can have significant effects in legitimising certain types of policy responses over others. Because of its constitutive power it is therefore important to consider the extent to which the presentation of migration in the language of security, does not simply describe a security reality and environment ‘out there’, but is constitutive of how we understand that environment and the threats we see.

These considerations are important. Because of the pre-eminence attached to security, security is often depicted as beyond politics. When governments, politicians, security professionals or populist demagogues invoke security they often do so in a way that suggests that the issues they attach it to are of such magnitude that to challenge their claims is not only foolish, but also itself potentially threatening to national security. Security, in other words, is beyond debate. It is not. To the contrary, this chapter argues that claims about security necessarily need to be problematized because such claims are always working in the interests of some and against those of others. This makes them both deeply political, but also a point for concerted ethical reflection.

To end where we began, Donald Trump’s depiction of Mexican/Islamic migration as a national security threat requiring the building of walls and the banning of Muslim immigration, not only points to very real challenges of how to manage the movement of large numbers of people across international borders, and how to successfully integrate them once they arrive, it also privileges state security over the human security of migrants. In doing so, it also constitutes those migrants as threats, and also often as targets of hate and dehumanisation. As the story of Aylan Kurdi exemplified, however, the demonization of migrants only serves to occlude from view the fact that the targets of such invective are often highly vulnerable and whose lives may have been characterized by high levels of insecurity. It also occludes from view the fact that such human insecurities are often themselves directly linked to the foreign, economic and environmental policies of the states which they are seeking to enter. Until those broader issues are tackled then a focus on enhanced and exclusionary (and sometimes
racist) border control measures is unlikely to solve the problems identified. To this extent, the referents of state security and human security are not as diametrically opposed as sometimes presumed. Indeed, the suggestion here is that in the long run prioritising human security is also the best way of enhancing state security.

Bibliography


