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British Catholics' Commercial Strategies in Times of International Warfare (1688-1705)

This article investigates the British Catholic merchants' commercial strategies during the Nine Years War (1689-1697) and the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1713). By focusing on the tactics deployed by John Aylward and his partners in France and England, I argue that Catholicism fundamentally sustained Aylwards' trade by ensuring access to various markets and safer commercial plans. Catholicism had an economic dimension and Catholics in trade proved non-communal, working with co-religionists, family but also with non-Catholics in order to pursue profits. This paper tells us how Catholicism, despite being a political and social impairment, was the key to success in commerce. It contributes to recent scholarship on religious minorities in trade and on how commerce functioned in the English Channel and in European waters at times of warfare.

The early modern commercial world fundamentally transformed European society by introducing a new set of values and norms, that among others, profoundly affected the religious discourse as well; in fact, the commercial age forced religious minorities to adopt a new economic rationale which fostered cross-cultural or inter-faith networks. Long-distance commerce opened communal minorities to cooperation with traders with 'no blood, kinship or ethnic ties', as the difficulty to monitor such vast exchanges and the pursuit of profits 'brought strangers into contact'.

¹ This theory exemplifies the strategies of British Catholic merchants involved in Mediterranean and Atlantic trade in the early modern period. They worked with co-religionists as well as Protestants. Decades of co-operation would eventually bring social and political rehabilitation for British Catholics at the end of the eighteenth century.

This paper builds upon these recent findings and investigates the trading rationale of the British Catholic merchant John Aylward. Although a single case study, the Aylward papers offer a vast amount of information on how religious minorities acted in trade and how the early modern commercial world functioned. Aylward did not act in isolation and his activities suggest that Catholicism had an economic dimension and Catholic merchants fostered global networks of inter-faith trade within the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. Furthermore, they defy the stereotype of communality as Aylward and his associates tapped into religious and blood relations alongside wider economic connections.² In fact, this paper focuses on Aylward's commercial strategies during the turmoil of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. By investigating his activities, the aim is to show how Catholic merchants built inter-imperial networks in order to survive the war by exchanging north-European manufactures for Mediterranean goods. By tapping into networks of Catholics, family and Protestant associates, Aylward created global circuits. Furthermore, during the two decades examined, from France and England Aylward traded primarily through smuggling and privateering. Therefore, his dealings enrich the historiography on commercial strategies during

warfare, particularly on privateering in the English Channel, on which developments has only just begun. This will also contribute to a deeper understanding of European trade during the Nine Years War (1688-1697) and the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-1714).

The Aylward papers examined here are a part of a wider collection held in Arundel Castle Archive. The vast amount of business papers span from the 1670s to the 1720s and records the commercial activities of the Aylwards, both male and female. Although focusing on one family, the incredible amount of names and information allow us to reconstruct the strategies of British Catholics on a macro-global level and the political and social norms with which they operated. They prove how British Catholics were entrepreneurs and active players in Atlantic and European trade.

The first business records of John Aylward start in 1672 in Malaga, Spain. He was a general import-export merchant and banker of Irish origin. The *Irish Genealogist* records John Aylward as a merchant of St Malo.³ However, his family was from Waterford, Ireland, and part of the Irish diaspora that left the country during the Cromwellian War. They were possibly part of the Anglo-Irish community settled in London, but it is not clear where Aylward was born. What is certain is that in 1672 he moved to Malaga, where he stayed until 1687. There, he met his wife Helena Porter, daughter of a merchant of Irish origin, Matthew Porter, and widow of the trader Jacques de la Herse Trublet, probably of St Malo. They married on 27th April 1687 and had three daughters. One of them, Marie-Alsen married on February 1708 to Henry Charles Howard of Greystoke. Their son, Charles, would become 10th Duke of Norfolk in 1777. In 1687, Aylward moved to St Malo, where he stayed until 1698, when he settled down in London. He died in London on the 24th of April 1705, leaving his wife to administer his legacy.⁴

In the 1670s, Aylward started as a trader in the Anglo-Spanish trade, the most profitable at the time.⁵ There he moved between Malaga and Cadiz where he found easy acceptance in the mercantile community of Catholic expatriates.⁶ Initially his business accounts showed average trading activity with incomes and losses typical of any merchant involved in that trade. Since the beginnings, Aylward showed non-communality in his exchanges, working with anyone deemed trustworthy and in actuality he closed the most lucrative deals with non-Catholics.

He started as an associate of the merchant house Power & Hill, one of the many English houses that operated in the Anglo-Spanish market between Cadiz and London. This firm was well established with interests that spanned from Europe to the West Indies and it helped Aylward to gain a foothold in the Atlantic trade. Through this house he was introduced to a vast network of merchants based in various European ports. The 1670s-80s were formative years in which Aylward learned how to trade and expanded his contacts. At that time, the most significant partnership was with the Porters,

his in-laws established in Cadiz and St Malo. The Catholic Porters were renowned Jacobite privateers with extensive networks across the European-Atlantic ports.⁷ Through them Aylward was introduced to his wife Helena Porter, and this union brought him a large amount of capital and access to vast mercantile networks.

In 1687, Aylward moved to St Malo where he stayed until 1698. In France, he established himself as an independent merchant without however completely severing his ties with Power & Hill and all the contacts previously established in Spain. When he moved Aylward could not foresee that a decade of warfare would soon erupt. However, it would be during the Glorious Revolution (1688-89) and the Nine Years War (1688-1697) that he realised how his Catholicism would sustain his business. Indeed, it was thanks to his Catholic ties that he was able to smuggle French goods into Spain and England in order to supply the transatlantic vessels. This first stage of warfare saw extensive privateering activity, particularly in the Channel. In the Anglo-French war privateering was possibly the main tactic of both parties and Aylward seized this opportunity, taking advantage of kin and religious ties.

In 1698, he moved to London. There, during the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-1714) his pragmatism allowed him to supply the English market with illegal French and Spanish products, again through contraband. The aim of his career was to continue supplying the Spanish transatlantic vessels in Cadiz and to fuel the Anglo-Spanish trade. As a merchant, his rationale was not unique. Any trader at that time, looking for profits, focused in Cadiz, the gateway of the Atlantic, with its constant flow of American bullion, West-Indian raw materials and Mediterranean and Levant goods. Therefore, there was no exceptionality in his decision to trade there. However, his distinctiveness lies in being a British Catholic merchant who prospered in a time of international warfare. Many of his decisions reflect communal behaviours such as marrying a Catholic woman or in collaborating with co-religionists and family. However, his activity enriches recent historiography on religious communities in trade and capitalist behaviour. He supports recent arguments that, by reinterpreting the Weber's theory on Protestantism and capitalism, argue that instead of a unique work ethic, Protestant states favoured business through their legal and institutional systems.⁸ Indeed, Aylward found himself in the right context in which economic interests overcame religious discourse. By focusing on Aylward's trading strategies from 1688 to 1705, this article aims to shed light on the role played by British Catholics in the early modern trade and contribute to understanding how the commercial world functioned.

Finally, Aylward also enriches Catholic historiography. Indeed, either scholars do not associate Catholics with trade or, if they do, they describe it as mainly communal or conducted for

ideological or political reasons.⁹ However, I believe that Aylward was not communal and he never engaged in privateering for political reasons. His religion was certainly part of his identity, but in times of international warfare it was mainly instrumental. He realised how Catholicism could secure better strategies and he seized this opportunity. In Britain Catholicism was a social impairment.¹⁰ However, in trade it proved crucial to success, allowing access to various markets and international networks. Here, John Aylward used both his religion and his national identity. This narrative does not aim to undermine the religious dimension, but to emphasise how British Catholic merchants played a largely unrecognised but vital role within the Atlantic and Mediterranean economy. They did not reject their beliefs but, like Trivellato's 'Port Jews', their religion coexisted with wider economic connections, as merchants acted 'merely for money'.¹¹

I

In 1688, the birth of the King James II's son alarmed the English Protestant establishment. Indeed, the Catholic James II had already undermined the Protestant political power by trying to repeal the Test Act, which restricted all government posts to members of the Church of England. As a consequence, the birth of the new Prince of Wales, by ensuring the succession, could mean a return to Catholicism.¹² Therefore, the Dutch William III, James II's son-in law, was invited to intervene.

The Dutch dreaded a possible alliance between James II and his cousin the Catholic French Louis XIV, a scenario that would have disrupted the European balance of power and British-Dutch commerce in Europe. But economic interests were much more important than the Catholic threat. In fact, France never hid its pretensions of a universal monarchy and Louis XIV's territorial expansion met firm opposition from the Dutch and the English who would not have allowed the French monarch to become the new arbiter of Europe.¹³ Once the Glorious Revolution began, James II fled to France. In February 1689 William and Mary were declared sovereign, and shortly thereafter in the spring, war was declared against France in order to protect Anglo-Dutch economic interests. No one could foresee that this conflict would last for nine years in which France fought England, the Netherlands, Spain and Austria. Therefore, the international scene was grim and the prospects for European trade were not promising. Nevertheless, it was during this decade that Aylward's business thrived. In actuality, the late 1680s and 1690s was the most profitable time of his career and his business boomed. He would amass a significant fortune that in later years would allow him to retire in country retreats and enjoy the springs in Bath.¹⁴

During the Glorious Revolution and the Nine Years War Aylward was in St Malo, one of the hubs of Channel privateering. There, he started to make use of his in-laws' extensive networks; Indeed, Malouins privateers had vast global connections. They ventured across the Atlantic reaching South America, the Caribbean, Newfoundland, but also West Africa, China and Arabia. The import-export focused on English tin, lead, Irish provisions, cod and Breton linens. With England, in particular London and Bristol, the privateers of St Malo smuggled goods through the islands of Guernsey and Jersey.¹⁵

During the war, the end of legitimate exchanges stimulated smuggling as for the English ports 'the amputation of their French trade' would have had detrimental consequences.¹⁶ Indeed, although under embargo, French goods continued to retain their value and to be in high demand. Moreover, at that juncture they were cheap since officially no one could export them. There was the possibility of great profits and Aylward's ability to support them developed his career. He realised how Catholicism could be crucial for this trade and he seized the opportunity. In fact, thanks to the vast capital and wider networks of family and co-religionists introduced by his wife, he accessed the Channel privateering activities, and secured trade to English ports thanks to his Protestant partner. whereas, Spanish Catholic ties provided for the supply of the transatlantic vessels in Cadiz. Indeed, Aylward's aim was to continue to meet the demand of the Spanish-American market, and for this reason he had left his nephew Robert Butler in Malaga with the task of supervising the supply of the *flota* and galleons.¹⁷ Nevertheless, in Spain Aylward corresponded with his firm Power & Hill since his nephew was not entirely reliable, having mismanaged his deals more than once.

When the war erupted and French goods were embargoed, Aylward prepared new schemes on French imports to Spain and England. To Spain he thought about smuggling goods through Hamburg and Amsterdam by resorting to neutral vessels, usually Danish and Swedish. Indeed, Denmark and Sweden at the time were embroiled in Baltic conflicts against Russia and each other, and they did not side any party. The Allies failed to bring them into the blockade and these neutral vessels profited greatly from the French trade that the Dutch and the English had officially abandoned. The main role of Sweden and Denmark was to provide convoys to protect allied cargoes in the Channel;¹⁸ whereas in order to introduce French goods to England Aylward resorted to privateering and his capital increased. The affairs in the Channel were orchestrated mainly with the Protestant Thomas Brailsford, an associate of Power & Hill, who was acquainted with Aylward since the 1680s.¹⁹ Nevertheless, it was in 1688-89 that they started corresponding. After the Anglo-French war erupted Aylward realised that he needed an English non-Catholic partner to introduce his goods to London.

In those two years, Brailsford and Aylward exchanged many letters and it is striking how over the months a wide variety of different strategies were discussed. Privateering in the Channel was a common tactic of war at times of Anglo-French rivalries and both governments tacitly approved this business in order to damage the rival's commercial interests. 'Commercial warfare raised to new prominence' in those years as both rivals found this naval war cheaper and more effective in damaging the enemy's mercantile activities.²⁰ For the merchants however it provided the opportunity to introduce goods officially embargoed. In fact, with the right documents and the right connections, Aylward and Brailsford closed excellent deals. Their interests were varied, ranging from fabrics, calicoes, dye products, and silver. Their success was in the ability to tap into inter-imperial networks, as the Channel provided a flow of commodities coming from the Spanish Americas, the French West-Indies or the Levant and the Mediterranean. Their exchanges were vast involving the major transatlantic ports like London, Amsterdam, Bristol and Port Royal in Jamaica.

As mentioned, the goods in which they invested were numerous and diverse, however, the most striking aspect of their correspondence is how those goods were dealt with. After the hostilities began, a customs war between France and England ensued. An embargo was issued on foreign ships and consequently smuggling flourished. In order to avoid the blockade, Brailsford and Aylward deployed various tactics. First they secured reliable 'friends' at the customhouse, as the support of the port administrator was essential for the smuggler to succeed.²¹ This friendship was usually quite expensive as apparently 100 guineas were necessary to 'blind the eyes of some clarks and prevent too much examination'. A significant amount if a vessel insurance of 20 or 30 guineas was deemed extremely expensive.²²

However, the French imports were not necessarily arriving from France as at times they were first moved to Holland where Aylward worked with Catholic expatriates, particularly in Amsterdam and Rotterdam;²³ from there the commodities would be introduced to Scotland or the north of England. The vessels used were mainly Danish as the country was not part of the hostilities and the captains were always given secret instructions, so that nobody knew where these vessels headed.²⁴

Another tactic was to resort to English or Dutch men-of-war and to fake a privateer's assault on a French vessel in the Channel. This was one of the most common devices arranged by the two traders, as Dutch or English ships could access all the English ports. Aylward's role in this was to procure 'the King of France's pass', permits necessary for the ships not to be taken beforehand by French privateers. The crew should have been English and possibly trusted 'mates'.

At this initial stage, Aylward's letters proved extremely accurate and show obsessive attention to detail. Every single stage of the exchange had to be thought carefully. Nothing was left unplanned, from the name of the vessel to the mark on the barrels. Any minimal inaccuracy could have caused the failure of the operation. Caution was never enough and privateering although institutionally sanctioned was a risky enterprise where losses as well as rewards could be sensational.²⁵

Interestingly it was all based on trust. Aylward and Brailsford were not related or part of the same religious community. That they did not share the same beliefs was openly suggested by Brailsford's aversion to James II, when writing that he [the King] 'endeavoured to subvert the Constitution of the Kingdom, [...] by the advice of the Jesuits and other wicked persons'.²⁶ Nevertheless, they had common economic interests and the desire to reap the profits of the Spanish transatlantic trade. They met as traders of the same counting house and for the sake of profits embarked in the same hazardous enterprise. By necessity Aylward resorted to non-communal networks. Undeniably, his business was built on circuits of family and co-religionists. Nevertheless, he was pragmatic and did not disregard non-Catholic partners if it was more profitable to trade with them.

Brailsford never disappointed him and their cunning showed no bounds. In fact, during the summer of 1689, the situation escalated and even neutral vessels, such as the Danish or Portuguese, were seized by the English and Dutch privateers, if coming from France. The authorities knew that neutral cargo could conceal on board enemy's property and even English vessels were taken if crossing the Channel.²⁷ Aware of these high risks, Aylward and Brailsford decided to resort to yet another tactic: fishing, or more precisely fishing vessels. During the war, it was indeed fairly common for fishermen to support the smuggling effort in order to protect the commercial deals disrupted by the hostilities. Particularly in the Channel, fishermen on both sides maintained the contacts established in peace time and in 'being friends of all nations' defended the interest of the coastal communities.²⁸ After obtaining the proper documents, and changing the vessels' names in English, Aylward sent the ships from France to Faro in Portugal where the goods could be unloaded and moved to a fishing boat. The fishing boat arriving at Portugal would then go to Malaga where Brailsford would have registered the goods under his name. Then the cargo from Spain would have been freely admitted to England.

Among the various strategies, such as resorting to fishermen, bribes or fake seizure, Aylward and Brailsford also exchanged goods for prisoners. Again this was usual among merchants and Aylward resorted to this tactic more than once throughout the decades, always proving successful. The usual plan was to ask permission to return some English prisoners from France and to pay around 100 crowns for each man. In return, they sent to Calais French prisoners held in England. Brailsford

would obtain the right documents from the ‘Kings Commission for Exchange of Prisoners’, whereas Aylward would buy an English vessel taken as a prize, and together with the men, he would send all sorts of goods, anything he deemed a ‘penny worth’.²⁹ He also arranged to have the French passes to avoid French privateers, and he registered the bills of loading under Brailsford’s name. The latter would ensure safety from the English assaults. They carefully thought about any likely scenario and how to act accordingly.

In this first stage of warfare, the Aylwards’ dynamics support the theory that Channel privateering flourished in times of warfare. That area was possibly the most strategic zone for Britain as the overseas trade would mainly access British ports through it.³⁰ Indeed, from St Malo Aylward could access the French imperial markets and the Irish provisions, and exchange them for English fabrics to supply the *flota* and *galleons* in Cadiz. He maximised his profits by establishing inter-imperial networks and his success lies behind his religion. The opportunity to be based in France and to rely on Catholics in Spain assured him an advantage over his Protestant associates. He was extremely pragmatic and his religion ensured great profits in this first phase of warfare.

Nevertheless, In the 1690s Aylward’s correspondence did not focus only on Channel privateering but also on the West-Indian trade between London, Bristol and Jamaica. His partners in Port Royal, the Halls sent hundreds of hogsheads of sugar and dyestuff, primarily indigo.³¹ The Halls were Brailsford’s family and had been involved in the Jamaican trade since the late 1670s when Power & Hill kept accounts of African slaves sold by Henry Hall. Aylward mainly corresponded with William and Francis, possibly Henry’s sons. He must have been introduced to them by Brailsford because before the 1680s there was no correspondence with them. During the first years of the Nine Years War, the Halls moved between Port Royal and London, supervising the shipment of Irish beef, pork, butter, and returning with cargoes of West-Indian sugar, indigo, pimento and brasilwood. Aylward supervised the Irish deals and he was warned to be careful about his agents as it was quite common to mix pickles with ‘old beef and pork’, selling them as fresh. Direct correspondence with the Halls proved crucial since from Port Royal, they provided the most up-to-date information about which commodities were in demand and which were better avoided. They also monitored the movements of the Spanish galleons, often sharing with Aylward their concerns as the war might have stopped or hinder the exchanges. The only advice was to ‘hitt the naile while it is hot’.³² Indeed, The Halls lamented that the Atlantic trade was a lottery; however it was potentially extremely lucrative. Clearly Aylward agreed as he tapped into this trade from the 1670s and left part of the family in Cadiz to monitor the arrival and departure of the fleet and to control the quality of the merchandise supplied.

In the south of Spain Aylward's main agent was his nephew, Butler. As a Catholic he found welcoming policies and he could tap into networks of Catholic expatriates based there. Thanks to Butler, in the 1690s Aylward monitored and supplied the transatlantic vessels with French and English products. Until the late 1680s when Aylward left Malaga, his nephew had proved nothing but a source of great concern, but during the early 1690s he showed some abilities. For more than a year, they exchanged a vast correspondence under pseudonyms, adopting the Dutch sounding names of *Van Holstein* and *Jacob Van Angracht*.³³ This strategy was not atypical in the mercantile communities and Trivellato has identified the same device among the Iberian Jews of Livorno.³⁴ Mercantile correspondence was frequently controlled by the authorities in particular during warfare.³⁵ Therefore, it was imperative to mislead the authorities if the letters were intercepted. Moreover, at the time it was possibly safer to pretend to be a Dutch merchant in Spain than French. Indeed, the Spanish government had issued a *pragmatica* (decree) forcing all French merchants to move at least 20 leagues from the harbour of Cadiz.³⁶ 'Van Holstein', alias Butler, from Cadiz supervised the shipping of Spanish fruit, wine and French fabrics. The goods were moved very cautiously, resorting to neutral vessels, mainly Swedish but also Polish and Venetian.³⁷ Dutch and English privateers were a constant threat off the Spanish coasts. Moreover, the Spanish authorities supervised the arrival and departure of the American fleets, protecting their precious cargo of silver, gold and West-Indian dyes. From Spain these raw materials and bullion were then exchanged for north-European manufactures.³⁸ Butler directed shipments to England, Holland and Genoa. He used different vessels in order to minimise risks and he relied on Swedish and Danish vessels for moving the products, but Italian ships to send the letters to his uncle. 'Van Angracht' received tonnes of fruit and cinnamon and sent back fabrics and letters with detailed instructions.³⁹ They ran different transactions at the same time, moving cargoes between the north and the south of Europe, the west and the Levant. The most important thing was to keep the wheels of commerce spinning.

In these times of crisis, Aylward tested his skills to profit and his ability to survive the political turmoil. From his papers it seems his trade was carried on mainly through privateering during the nine years-conflict. This device was somehow legitimate as both parties waged a commercial war. However, confusion with piracy was frequent as both seized commercial vessels. Officially, they both targeted the enemy's cargo, but in times of international turmoil anyone could easily turn into prey. During the last decade of the seventeenth century, privateering became a common practice. A simple letter of marque would be enough for a captain to act as a privateer and introduce the seized vessels into his own port. Therefore, Aylward and his partners, although affected by these assaults, resorted to them as well. France and England tacitly approved and sponsored licensed piracy against

the enemies' merchant shipping.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, trade between England and France was not legitimate.

In 1691 Aylward started corresponding with Charles Horde, another Protestant associate based in London. Brailsford died in 1691- in one of the letters Aylward was informed of his funeral in Lothbury Parish Church, ironically for a businessman, the closest church to the Bank of England. Between the winter of 1691 to the summer of 1692 Aylward and Horde exchanged a vast correspondence in which they discussed policies, vessels and from whom to seek protection.⁴¹ Their collaboration is emblematic of how Aylward survived these difficult times. For pursuing profit any tactic was deemed legitimate. Solidarity and excellent skills were fundamental in these circumstances as they needed to be cautious not only about the commodities but also the vessels employed. The right documents were vital for smooth transactions. Horde had contacts among the port officials and thanks to their cooperation, he introduced Aylward's Jamaican indigo from France. They were extremely cautious and always insured the cargoes under Horde's name. At the time, Jamaican indigo was in high demand since imports from Jamaica had stopped after the terrible earthquake of 1692.⁴² The indigo still available in Europe increased greatly in value. The deals were extremely lucrative and Aylward resorted to any strategy in order to exploit them. Bribes, goods exchanged for prisoners, staging of false assaults- anything was adopted with Horde.⁴³

Again exchanges were made through privateers. The tactics already tested with Brailsford were refined and improved. They frequently bought English-seized vessels in France, any small 'toole' that could be bought reasonably. They collected accurate information about the content, the marks on the merchandise, the names of captains and vessels, and from where it had departed. They would unload the English merchandise and load the same amount of French goods. Then the vessel would return to England where after 'much pain' and '50 guineas' it would surely pass the control in the customhouse.⁴⁴

Meanwhile the hostilities between France and England escalated. In July 1692, frequent letters were exchanged discussing how James II had threatened England with a possible 'reinthroning' supported by the great army of Louis XIV. Furthermore, an English army of 20,000 men was ready to depart from Portsmouth directed to France. Therefore, Aylward and Horde stopped the direct exchange from France to England and moved the French goods first to Amsterdam and from there to any English port.⁴⁵

The most striking aspect of the Aylward-Horde correspondence is how they constantly honed their tactics. Each exchange needed a different strategy and in each letter Aylward and his partners mapped out all the different possibilities. They accurately considered all the different routes, how to

procure the goods, and which vessels they would deploy. Any tactic was deemed legitimate and resorting to privateering was possibly one of the safest plans in times of warfare. Probably it was the only opportunity offered to merchants at the time as commercial interests defied diplomacy.⁴⁶ In fact, France, not disposing of a competitive navy, always adopted the *guerre de course* against England.⁴⁷ The English government itself did not despise this strategy. In fact, although French goods were banned in 1689, in 1692 it became possible to introduce them as prizes and a percentage of the proceeds would have been for the Crown. This new legislation offered splendid opportunities to Aylward to introduce French goods to London by faking seizure. His English associates, themselves privateers, exchanged his goods for their own with forged passes obtained through friends and bribes. English goods were usually introduced in France through Dunkirk and Brest where the seized English and Dutch vessels would be brought.⁴⁸

All these plans and personal contacts paired with great abilities proved worth the risk as during the first years of the hostilities, Aylward's business was extremely lucrative. During this time, Aylward dealt directly with the contacts previously established in Spain. After 1688, English Protestant partners proved vital as they allowed profitable exchanges. Their religion did not prevent successful collaborations. The strategies adopted by Aylward testify to his ability to resort to any means in order to continue his trade. Despite the political turmoil he was aware that French goods were still in high demand; therefore, he traded them. In these difficult times, it was essential to work with skilled partners, whether Catholic or not. This did not mean a complete disregard of Catholic ties, however, the associates had to be competent, audacious and reliable. Every single process of the transaction had to be accurately planned. There was no room for error; therefore, partners were carefully selected. Aylward worked and trusted Brailsford and Horde as they were based in London and shared the same interests in organising risky but potentially lucrative deals. However, these partnerships coexisted with the deals Aylward carried on with his family, which in those circumstances proved surprisingly competent. Aylward did not prioritise familial or religious networks, but used them on occasion. His aim was to meet the market's needs even though this meant privateering or smuggling. In the quest for profits he worked with anyone deemed capable.

The Aylward papers during the Nine Years War offer a clear picture of how merchants were forced to sustain trade. The traditional routes and systems were disrupted and privateering seemed the only option available. The French ports of St Malo and Dunkirk figured as prominent centres. James II and Louis XIV financed this practice against the English Navy and merchant shipping, in actuality gaining a tenth of the profits.⁴⁹ On the other side, the English government tacitly approved, with the Channel Islands of Jersey and Guernsey playing a prominent role. In the literature Aylward has

been mentioned among the Jacobite privateers that smuggled English goods, men and information to support James II's cause.⁵⁰ However, Aylward never mentioned any political or religious ambition besides his deals. His partners were certainly non-Catholic and judging by the scornful comments about James II, it is reasonable to assume that they were not sympathetic of the Catholic cause either. Aylward's tactics contribute to our understanding of how privateering in the Channel functioned at the time. Furthermore, he defies the theory that British Catholic privateers would act solely in support of Jacobitism. In actuality, in England, Aylward was suspected of Jacobite activities, but his friends testified that although during the Glorious Revolution he was in France, he was never in the service of King James II.⁵¹ His trading strategy reflects the economic rationale of other religious minorities in trade in early modern times. During the seventeenth century, commerce expanded but it was still highly unregulated. Legal systems were slowly emerging but merchants had to act quickly and the only option was to rely on personal contacts worth of trust, whether religious, familial or economic.

II

Aylward arrived in London as an established merchant with a great deal of experience, resources and contacts. In 1698 he had been in business for almost thirty years in which he had learned how to trade. Religion and outstanding skills enabled him to thrive, whereas with experience came the ability to recognise the most reliable partners and how to act in commerce. Once in London, after the years spent in Malaga and St Malo, Aylward was able to single out the best men, whether family or not, to know the best goods in which to invest and which were the best strategies to adopt. In fact, all the tactics previously learned and tested, became more imaginative and effective. In the 1680s and 1690s Aylward resorted to his religion, family and numerous partners, whereas in London he would coordinate his operations by only using a few traders strategically placed. These last years would be the culmination of his career and shows how, once again, Catholicism helped to secure successful deals.

The contacts previously established in Spain and France were not however severed. In France various letters were sent to Rouen, St Malo, Bordeaux and Paris, where Aylward could still count on family, friends and Catholic expatriates, whereas in Spain he relied mainly on a few counting houses and skilled partners. Nevertheless, what is certain is that he selected and treasured only the best commercial ties. In fact, during these years his correspondence would be exchanged with a few partners, such as Paul Den, Julien Grant and the firm Woulfe & Trublet. This counting house was part of his wife's dowry. The associate Trublet, 'a fine and modest man', was the first husband of

Helena, Aylward's wife.⁵² This firm was based in Cadiz but it had contacts in all the major Atlantic and Mediterranean ports. In the 1690s, this vast circle of traders allowed Aylward to survive and thrive and in times of warfare these contacts proved crucial; by disregarding religions, nationalities, and by acting 'merely for money' these men assured the endurance of Aylward's business.

In the previous decades, religion had been important in securing a foothold in trade and for planning trading schemes, however, during the Spanish war it proved fundamental for accessing Catholic Spain and France, which were off limits to English or Protestant merchants. In this last phase of Aylward's career, Catholicism fundamentally sustained his business. Being based in London and accessing other European markets, meant for Aylward the advantage of dealing with both contenders and the possibility to negotiate from a privileged position.

In fact, unlike during the Nine Years War when only French goods were illegal, from 1701 even Spanish products were banned by the English government. Indeed, in 1700 the death of the childless Charles II in Spain opened serious dynastic issues. His designated heir was the Duke of Anjou Philipp V, Louis XIV's grandson, and although in his testament Charles II had declared that the thrones of Spain and France be separate, the Dutch and the British did not tolerate this settlement. The English and the Dutch allies were not necessarily worried for the Spanish throne itself, but feared they would no longer be able to access the riches of the Spanish Empire.⁵³ The threat was that the Spanish and French joint fleet would block British access to the Mediterranean and a possible French Netherlands would have hindered access to the continental markets as well. Once again, French hegemonic pretensions triggered a decade of international turmoil and major disruption to trade that had not yet recovered from the previous European conflict.⁵⁴ Privateering once more was the only option for traders as the Spanish market was closed, the Baltic uncertain, and the French corsairs loomed in the Channel.⁵⁵ Therefore, Aylward needed to devise the grandest strategies to run his exchanges and to overcome these problems. Although initially he considered to introducing goods directly from France, he soon abandoned this plan when the English government implemented privateering policies in 1702, declaring that privateers would now retain the pillage and have a better share of the prizes.⁵⁶

Therefore, since trading across the Channel was no longer the safest option, Aylward looked at Portugal, England's ally, and diverted all his French and Spanish goods there.⁵⁷ To this end, Aylward first moved French goods to Spain. Second, French commodities would join Spanish ones and then all the merchandise would be moved to Portugal where partners would ship them to England. Indeed, when a new deal was opened Aylward would start sending letters to his partners in St Malo, Rouen and Paris. The goods usually reached Marseilles and from there they went to Spain

and Portugal. Finally, the partners moving between Malaga, Port St Mary and Cartagena would introduce the French and Spanish goods to Portugal, mainly Faro and Lisbon.⁵⁸ The smuggling process was basic but a vast amount of capital, men and resources were involved. The goods were shipped on Hamburg, Scandinavian or English vessels. With pseudonyms, Aylward and his partners covered the shipments and signed the correspondence. These measures were taken in order to avoid any French or Spanish hint and pretend all the exchanges were controlled by English merchants resorting to English vessels and crews. Vast networks of co-religionists, relatives and loyal non-Catholic partners assured the transactions. For this reason, the support of the mercantile community was essential, but Catholicism would always be the key as it allowed Aylward to deal with Catholic countries. In fact, Aylward was aware of his advantage over his Protestant partners and for this reason he made sure to seize this opportunity. Therefore, he accurately selected the best contacts from the French and the Spanish markets and resorted to the best tactics and men disregarding their religion; however, he was always aware that his faith was crucial in the survival of the business. In all these exchanges Aylward always showed a clear business knowledge and shrewdness in organising his cargo. He tapped into Catholic networks and blood ties to secure the goods needed and to import the merchandise into the enemies' docks. Thirdly, he resorted to nationality and the mercantile community to ship the products towards England, but not necessarily London.⁵⁹ During the war, the English ports facing the Channel were to some extent all involved in smuggling and Aylward's goods would mainly come through Portsmouth or Bristol. From there they were moved and dispatched in London.

During these years, Aylward mainly worked with Paul Den. Den was an associate of Woulfe & Trublet and he was an old acquaintance. During the previous decades there was no significant collaboration between them. However, during the War of the Spanish Succession, this agent proved fundamental in suggesting strategies and choosing partners since he was mainly based in Portugal. The vast amount of goods mentioned in their letters suggests that their association was extremely successful, moving tonnes of commodities, from food to silks. However, the tactics discussed are the most interesting aspect. Aylward and Den had a clear grasp of the vicissitudes of trade and a clear awareness of the political situation. During the Spanish war they introduced goods to England from Portuguese or Italian ports, using vessels from Hamburg or Sweden. They resorted to pseudonyms or acted under the cover of trusted friends, mainly John Goold of Lisbon or the Creaghs in Amsterdam, both prominent Catholic Jacobites involved in smuggling.⁶⁰

In Portugal the French and Spanish goods were exchanged for English goods shipped from London. The letters, however, were never shipped with the merchandise and would reach Aylward through

France or Portugal. Judging from the long accounts, Aylward's gains were enormous, even in times in which everyone complained that 'no money was stirring.'⁶¹ Den's organisational skills proved fundamental, allowing Aylward to smuggle goods into England and to load the Spanish vessels with English manufactures. The merchandise was primarily introduced from Portugal, however, they often resorted to vessels from Hamburg that could enter England and move freely between England and Portugal with regular stops in Spanish ports. Den was well aware of the political events and in such circumstances, he knew prospects could be grim. Therefore, specific trading strategies were needed to succeed. Indeed, he believed that trading through Hamburg would have been a good solution, until at least 1703 when Hamburg 'declared for the Emperor', losing its neutrality.⁶² After that Den thought it would be safer to deploy Scandinavian or Italian ships.

Den proved a trustworthy agent, constantly moving around the Iberian commercial cities of Antequera, Port St Mary, Malaga, Cadiz and Faro. He was an acute observer of the market, always informing Aylward when best to sell or keep merchandise. He always provided detailed accounts of exchange rates and price fluctuations. When dealing with textiles, he recommended which colour was best in which to invest, according to the season and the fashion. They sometimes worked with long-term partners or with Aylward's family. However, the majority of the transactions were supervised by the firm of Woulfe & Trublet.⁶³ As the hostilities between England, France and Spain continued, in 1703 Den's and Aylward's strategies became more diligent. Den, for instance supervised all the shipments, using neutral fishing vessels. These vessels were used in clandestine traffic because they were small, usually no more than 20 or 30 tonnes, so as to be easy to manoeuvre into busy ports.⁶⁴ They were also cheaper than the usual commercial ships, in order to lead to fewer losses in case of seizure. Like in the previous decade, smuggled goods were moved by fishing boats, taking advantage of the availability of fishermen eager to continue a trade that the war had disrupted.⁶⁵

Furthermore, the possibility to use fishing boats gave Aylward the opportunity to diversify his ventures at times when the situation was escalating. In fact, any Dutch or English vessel approaching the coast of Spain or Portugal was in serious danger. The vessels were attacked, the merchandise seized and the crew imprisoned. For instance, Den reported on an English ship that was seized while coming from Livorno, containing 23 bales of silk, wine and rice. The goods were taken and two members of the crew killed and the captain maltreated by the 'galleys' [privateering vessel] soldiers who 'left him no more than what he had on his back'.⁶⁶ In Spain, the trading officials 'visited' all the merchant houses, leaving guards to prevent illicit dealings.⁶⁷ Apparently Den's movements around the commercial cities of Antequera, Cartagena and Faro raised suspicions

and he was taken prisoner for three days, on suspicion of trading in Spanish goods through Portugal. Fortunately, he had taken 'some precaution', having previously been informed about the control and since the authorities did not find anything, he was set free on bail.⁶⁸ Den feared trading for him would soon be difficult and although there was no interceptions of letters yet, he became extremely cautious in writing about specific matters. It was time to resort to safer strategies and to adopt even more secure measures for assuring trade. Therefore, he started to protect his identities with nicknames. Den started to sign the letters with various names, calling himself Parento Maquing, Lorenzo Baptista or Peter Jackson.⁶⁹ Had the Spanish authorities sifted through the mail, they would have not caught him or Aylward. Later in the year, writing as Anthony Mosset, Den informed Aylward that their goods were ready in Cadiz, possibly loaded on the transatlantic vessels, but these could not sail since the English and Dutch were off the Spanish coast, ready to hinder any transatlantic deals.⁷⁰

After disclosing his worries about the situation in Spain, the correspondence between Aylward and Den shows a sudden shift in trading activities with Italian ports. The Mediterranean still played a crucial role in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, despite the Atlantic commercial expansion. It was not cut off from the riches and the power struggles that followed the dramatic expansion of European commerce.⁷¹ In fact, many of the goods which supplied the Spanish-American vessels or were exchanged for English fabrics were Mediterranean products. Indeed, Aylward worked with Livorno that at the time was the most important port in the region as its pragmatic religious and economic policies suited the interests of various nationalities and religious minorities. The possibility to pay low custom duties and to practice one's religion freely was almost unique in the Italian peninsula or in any other European port. In establishing contacts, Aylward was possibly facilitated by his Catholicism and his interests touched not only Livorno, but also Genoa and Marseilles from where it was possible to purchase Levantine goods. In the winter months of 1702-1703 Den moved frequently between Italian and French ports. Initially, he complained that no money was 'stirring' and nobody was buying wine or fruit. English ships were not in sight and sales were extremely dull. Nevertheless, prospects improved when the Hamburg convoys started arriving in the spring, followed by Portuguese ships from Faro and Lisbon. The goods purchased there could then be moved to Spain or England. In fact, the Italian ports secured cargo that could safely go to London. There was plenty of fruit and sweet wines to be shipped, and the vessels could sail through Faro and Lisbon or any other way Aylward 'shall judge best'.⁷²

The English presence in the Italian ports was common particularly in the late seventeenth century when the Venetian decline promoted English incursion.⁷³ Like any other British merchant of the

time, Den worked in the Italian ports, especially Livorno. The Italian deals seemed to show the desire to mitigate potential losses by trading in neutral areas, however the business accounts soon clearly showed that these exchanges did not involve just Italian merchandise. Indeed, Den frequently went from Livorno to Marseilles, where French goods were exchanged for wine and fruit and were loaded on Hamburg or Swedish vessels.⁷⁴ From the Italian ports, French goods were bound for Portugal, Holland or Sweden and ‘if there can be a way’ they also went to England.⁷⁵ Therefore, it becomes clear that this new focus was just one of several strategies used to introduce French goods into English ports. In fact, English vessels could not load in France and many cautious traders were against these dealings since they deemed them too hazardous; however ‘since a man cannot say what it is the best to do’ Den thought it was worth trying. He mainly used Genoese ships bound for Marseilles, thinking they were secure enough. Portugal was ‘the only place all people aim(s)’ to go and his vessels would have touched there.⁷⁶ Clearly, these designs were dangerous and before organising the cargo, they needed assurances from their partners in Faro, considering that they were not only smuggling French goods to London, but also introducing English products to France. None of these schemes were legitimate and the consequences could have been detrimental. From France and Italy Aylward purchased a vast amount of commodities, while Den juggled the business between the south of France and the north-Italian ports.

At the beginning of 1703 the hostilities escalated and it became crucial for Aylward that their strategies to be as accurate as possible because of the dangerous nature of these vast exchanges. Moreover, the agents involved had to be carefully selected. Indeed, in one of the many letters Aylward was introduced by Den to a ‘trustworthy Spanish gentleman’.⁷⁷ This trader supervised the movement of English goods from Portugal to Fuengirola, in the south of Spain, where a man ‘would come ashore’ and facilitate the transaction with Spanish goods. The name of this trader could not be mentioned but Den assured he was a good friend and he ‘could inform very well of him’.⁷⁸ For the exchange, Den encouraged Aylward to send the English *long ells* of good quality and ‘without any English leads’ which were in high demand in the Spanish market. The goods for which these fabrics were exchanged were procured by Den from the province of Malaga, in particular fruit. In one transaction Den shipped 600 or 700 barrels of fresh fruit.⁷⁹ In actuality, they were forced to deal with what was available as many commodities were scarce or forbidden, such as Spanish and French wines. Nevertheless, they constantly considered all the options in order to make a profit, or at least to minimise potential losses. They mainly focused on fruit and wines, but sometimes they loaded their cargoes with barrels of buckles and pewter buttons. Placing the merchandise was not an easy task either and all this scheming was worthwhile only for goods of the finest quality. The last couple of years saw a vast correspondence, exchanged in order to make the

plans as effective as possible. Aylward's and Den's names disappeared from the letters, signed only with fanciful names.⁸⁰ For forwarding the letters they resorted to more than a few merchants so to minimise risks and not to raise any suspicions.⁸¹ Their smuggling activities extended widely across European waters and they shed light on how merchants kept the wheels of commerce spinning in those twenty years of warfare.

The collaboration with Paul Den represents the peak of John Aylward's career. The ability to survive these last years of warfare proved outstanding and stemmed from years of experience, the strategic use of Catholicism and various partners. Aylward deftly used the resources available, from familial networks and identity, to the various traders he met throughout his career. The work with Den is emblematic of how Catholicism and family played a crucial role in developing his business. In fact, Den was introduced by Aylward's wife's networks; however, the partnership was solely based on mutual trust and common interests, and there was never mentioning of religion. Den proved crucial in organising the smuggling schemes and in accurately planning every single detail, whereas Catholicism allowed Aylward to access various markets and countries. The collaboration with Den exemplifies how Aylward was initially helped by family and survived thanks to his abilities and religious identity. Furthermore, in London, Aylward's partnerships strengthen the theory that Catholic merchants moved beyond their religious borders, trading with anyone deemed reliable and trustworthy. Aylward needed partners placed in strategic commercial centres, able to inform him about what the market wanted and to provide the best merchandise. In times of warfare, being able to supply the most requested goods, despite the difficulties, was crucial for surviving in business. Smuggling, using false identities and accessing different countries were the only options offered at the time, and Aylward resorted to these tactics, like any other merchant willing to survive the warfare. However, his activities were more outstanding because of his religion. As previously mentioned, instead of representing an impairment, Catholicism proved fundamental at this stage. Nevertheless, excellent trading skills also proved essential for assuring the continuity of the activities. Therefore, the work with Den typifies how Aylward established himself as a merchant knowing that survival would be assured not only by his excellent trading abilities, but most of all by his Catholicism.

III

The years in St Malo and London showed Aylward's ability to resort to a range of tactics and to tap into different networks. Although no longer in Spain, Aylward continued to be involved in the Anglo-Spanish trade and to supply the transatlantic vessels in Cadiz. The *flota* and the galleons needed European manufactured goods to exchange for American bullion and West-Indian raw

materials. The ability to meet these needs assured great profits. Particularly French and Spanish fruit and wines were highly requested in England and the north of Europe in exchange for fabrics and tools to ship to the Americas. Therefore, Aylward's ability to fuel this trade ensured his success. He used his Catholic contacts to acquire Spanish and French goods and Protestant partners to introduce them into England. Aylward adopted diverse strategies to survive European warfare. His most successful deals were planned with skilled merchants that were chosen without regard for nationality and religion. Aylward was part of Catholic communities of expatriates in Cadiz and St Malo and among his contacts there were renowned Jacobites that fervently supported the Catholic cause and James II's privateering designs. Nonetheless, Aylward never showed any involvement in Jacobite activities or never appeared to be devout. Perhaps he was like any other seamen of the time, 'showing no manner of respect to God';⁸² he never mentioned his private beliefs and his religious ties coexisted with other economic connections. As recent scholars have clearly shown, the early modern commercial world was too vast to be controlled and resorting to wider networks was the only possibility to survive.⁸³ This did not imply denying one's religious beliefs but simply adopting a pragmatic attitude. Aylward regarded religion and nationality as assets to use as opportunities on the market place. His mercantile behaviour proved perfectly standard, like any other merchant involved in transatlantic commerce. Aylward, as part of a religious minority, possibly was forced into commerce because of exclusion from public offices; nonetheless, he was not communal and with his career, he proved that even Catholics could be successful entrepreneurs, influenced by 'the Spirit of Capitalism'.⁸⁴ The aim is not to discuss Weber's assumptions on enterprise and success, however, Aylward fits perfectly in recent theories that suggest that more than the Protestant ethos, it was the social and political context that ensured success and promoted enterprise.⁸⁵

On the 24th of April 1705, John Aylward died in London. He had been in trade for almost thirty years and was aware of how commerce worked. He worked in all the major European-Atlantic ports and his engagement might have been fortuitous, but he nevertheless assured great fortunes. In fact, in the early 1700s, he retired in his country retreat on the outskirts of London and spent the springs in Bath as expected from any wealthy gentleman of the time. His is a story of economic integration and success. The Protestant others worked with him. Perhaps, the mercantile community showed connivance towards his Catholicism, nevertheless it was inclusive. It allowed Aylward to prosper and to adapt to the most diverse circumstances. Over his Protestant associates, he had the advantage of dealing with the Catholic enemies. He was sought after by his partners because they needed him to procure the highly requested French and Spanish goods. Certainly at the end of the seventeenth century English Catholicism was not facing rehabilitation; but Aylward did not experience

intolerance in the mercantile community. As any merchant belonging to a religious minority he worked with family and co-religionists; however, he was not communal and he closed the best deals with non-Catholics. Aylward made great use of all his ties as long as they offered access to various markets. He smuggled because this was one of the few options for traders at time of warfare. His career suggests a tale of social and economic integration. The early modern commercial world was too vast to be controlled and ‘it encouraged new conversations between strangers’.⁸⁶ Aylward trusted only the mercantile values and his dealings had not political or religious influence. In his lifelong pursuit of wealth, he was an ordinary merchant, who had an extraordinary career.

¹ Trivellato, *The Familiarity of Strangers*, 5.

² *Ibid.*, 1-21.

³ Walton, *The Irish Genealogist*, 216.

⁴ AY 135; AY T30, *Personal Correspondence*, Helena’s last will and testament.

⁵ McLachlan, *Trade and Peace with Old Spain*.

⁶ O’Scea, “Special privileges for the Irish in the Kingdom of Castile (1601-1680)”, 108.

⁷ Bromley, “The Jacobite Privateers in the Nine Years War”, 139-165.

⁸ Barbalet, *Weber, Passion and Profits*, 75-110; Blum and Dudley, “Religion and Economic Growth”, 207-230; Arrunada, “Protestants and Catholics”, 890-918.

⁹ Glickman, *The English Catholic Community*, 59-64; Marshall and Scott, *Catholic Gentry in English Society*, 1-30; Lamikiz *Trade and Trust in the Eighteenth Century Atlantic World*.

Cullen, *Economy, Trade and Irish Merchants at Home and Abroad*. Lamikiz, agreeing with Cullen, further argues that these merchants and businessmen intermarried with each other; Nash, “Irish Atlantic Trade in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” 329-356.

Truxes, *Irish American Trade*, 84; Cullen, *Economy, Trade and Irish Merchants at Home and Abroad*; Cullen, “Galway Merchants in the Outside World,” 63-89; Schuller, “Irish –Iberian Trade”, 175-196. Monod, “Dangerous Merchandise”, 150-182. Bromley, “The Trade and Privateering of St Malo”, 339-388.

¹⁰ Haydon, *Anti-Catholicism in Eighteenth Century England*; Glickman, *The English Catholic Community*. Aveling, *The Handle and the Axe*; Claydon and McBride, *Protestantism and National Identity*.

¹¹ Trivellato, “The Port Jews of Livorno”, 31-48; Haggerty, ‘*Merely for Money*’?.

¹² AY 20, f. 31, *Business Correspondence*: Power & Hill to Aylward: ‘the Prince of Orange and Parliament had declared wars with the French’. Parker, *Global Crisis*, 390; Benjamin, *The Atlantic World, Europeans*, 477.

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- ¹³ Holsti, "War and Peace in the Era of the Heroic Warriors", 43-70.
- ¹⁴ MS, Lett. C. 192 Bodleian Library, Letter of Mr Hill to John Aylward, from Priory 1700. Hill commented on the country house bought by Aylward in Hampstead.
- ¹⁵ Bromley, "The Trade and Privateering of St Malo", 280-281; Grafe, *Distant Tyranny, Markets*, 52-79. In her interesting study on the Spanish market and state, Grafe argues how *bacalao* cod was a trans-imperial commodity, fished by the British and French and consumed by the Spanish. Although scorned by mercantilist thinkers, it nonetheless met great success by answering the Catholic countries' fasting needs.
- ¹⁶ Bromley, *Corsairs and Navies*.
- ¹⁷ Bromley, "The Jacobite Privateers in the Nine Years War", 139-166: The Butlers were active Channel privateers and they also involved in military operations during the Nine Years War.
- ¹⁸ Holsti, "War and Peace in the Era of the Heroic Warriors"; Bromley, *Corsairs and Navies*, 42- 73; Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean*.
- ¹⁹ AY 102, *Business Accounts*, Bills, accounts, for merchandise to 1688.
- ²⁰ Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean*, 156-159; Starkey, *British Privateering*, 35-84. There were two modes of privateering, a full-time cruise hoping to take prizes, and armed merchantmen with a letter of marque, ready to profit if the chance presented itself. Private shipowners resorted to this strategy if the war stopped trades; from Dunkirk and St Malo privateers prospered against the Anglo-Dutch allies. The French adopted a mix of royal and private ships to disrupt the allies' commerce so to disrupt their naval power as a consequence. In England all economic activities depended on coastal shipping. The French Crown resorted to privateering mainly because it could not sustain the French royal fleet.
- ²¹ Renaud, "The Game of Identities, Fraud and Smuggling", 248-282.
- ²² Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean*, 'Note on Conventions': A Guinea was an English gold coin whose sterling value was fixed at 21s in 1717. CO 110-152, *Brailsford Papers*, National Archives. The costs of assurance were shared among the partners to cover the ship until it would have eventually landed in the port of destination and in order to avoid all the vagaries of: 'the Seas, Men of war, Fire, Enemies, Pirates, Rovers, Thieves, [...] all other perils, losses and misfortunes.
- ²³ AY 18, f. 6, f. 5, *Business Correspondence*.
- ²⁴ AY 18, f. 4, *Business Correspondence*.
- ²⁵ Starkey, *British Privateering*, 85-110.
- ²⁶ AY 18, f. 2, *Business Correspondence*, Letters to John Aylward from Thomas Brailsford and Richard Holder at London, Oct. 1688-Sept. 1689.
- ²⁷ Starkey, *British Privateering*, 85-110.
- ²⁸ *Ibid*, 211-247.
- ²⁹ AY 18, f. 11, *Business Correspondence*.
- ³⁰ Rodger, "Sea-Power and Empire", 169-183.
- ³¹ AY 103, *Business Accounts*, Accounts, Bills for merchandise to Dec. 1689.
- ³² CO 110-152, *Brailsford's Papers*.
- ³³ AY 20, f. 60, In the back of the letter there is this caption: letter written to Aylward on the 3rd of May 1692 by Mr Robert Butler. Answered on the 2nd of June. AY 20, f. 54, Again we can read the letter written to Aylward on the 11th of February 1692 by Robert Butler. Answered on the 10th of March. AY 20, f. 51, letter written on the 3rd December 1691, answered on the 31st of December.
- ³⁴ Tivellato, "Port Jews of Livorno".
- ³⁵ Pincus, *1688: The First Modern Revolution*.
- ³⁶ AY 20, f. 50, *Business Correspondence*.
- ³⁷ AY 20, f. 60, f. 49, *Business Correspondence*.
- ³⁸ AY 20, f. 49, *Business Correspondence*; Elliott, "Illusion and Disillusionment", 131-148. During the seventeenth century, the Spaniards acknowledged that the Indies' wealth was enriching their enemies, particularly the Dutch and the English, as Spain did not produce any manufactured goods for her colonies. Spain had become 'the Indies of Europe'.
- ³⁹ AY 20, f. 61, f. 64, *Business Correspondence*. AY 30, f. 50, *Business Correspondence*.
- ⁴⁰ Bergin, *The Seventeenth Century*, 134.
- ⁴¹ AY 51, f. 3, *Business Correspondence*, Business letters to John Aylward, from Charles Horde at London, Nov. 1691-July 1693. Most of the letters are counter-endorsed from Amsterdam by Philibert Brothers.
- ⁴² AY 51, f. 10, *Business Correspondence*
- ⁴³ AY 51, f. 4, *Business Correspondence*.
- ⁴⁴ AY 51, f. 20, *Business Correspondence*.
- ⁴⁵ AY 51, f. 11, *Business Correspondence*; AY 51, f. 12, f. 13, *Business Correspondence*.
- ⁴⁶ Morieux, "The Game of Identities", 248-282.
- ⁴⁷ Bergin, *The Seventeenth Century*.
- ⁴⁸ AY 20, f. 56, *Business Correspondence*.
- ⁴⁹ Bromley, *Corsairs and Navies*.
- ⁵⁰ Monrod, "Dangerous Merchandise".
- ⁵¹ AY 135; AY T30, *Personal Correspondence*, Helena's last will and testament.

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- ⁵² AY 54, f. 1, *Business Correspondence*, Letters to John Aylward from Nicholas Kehoe at Puerto de Santa Maria, Mar. 1701-Mar. 1702
- ⁵³ Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean*, 164.
- ⁵⁴ Holsti, *Peace and War*, 43-70.
- ⁵⁵ Starkey, *British Privateering*, 90.
- ⁵⁶ Satsuma, "Impact on Reality: Legislation".
- ⁵⁷ Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean*, 167. In 1703 Portugal signed the 'Methuen Treaties' with England. England coveted an alliance with the country because of its Brazilian bullion, whereas Portugal needed imports of textiles and manufactures. Moreover, it needed protection for its overseas empire, therefore an alliance with the dominant naval power was more important than the inland threat from Spain.
- ⁵⁸ MS, Lett. C. 192 Bodleian Library; AY 30, f. 49, f. 50, *Business Correspondence*, Letters to John Aylward from Paul Den at Malaga, one from Cadiz and one from St Malo, June 1685- Nov. 1703. Other than wine, also textiles and fruit were also exchanged between England, Spain and France.
- ⁵⁹ AY 30, f. 32, *Business Correspondence* Letters to John Aylward from Paul Den at Malaga, one from Cadiz and one from St Malo, June 1685-Nov. 1703; Monod, "Dangerous Merchandise," 154.
- ⁶⁰ Monod, "Dangerous Merchandise", 170.
- ⁶¹ AY 30, f. 30, *Business Correspondence*, Letters to John Aylward from Paul Den at Malaga, one from Cadiz and one from St Malo, June 1685-Nov. 1703.
- ⁶² Bromley, "The North Sea in Wartime", 53. Hamburg's role in the Spanish war was always ambivalent, a wolf in sheep's clothes as Bromley defined it. In fact, although siding with the allies, the local authorities never enforced the prohibition on trade with the enemy. In actuality, Hamburg constantly traded with France and Spain.
- ⁶³ AY 30, f. 19, *Business Correspondence*. Den loaded 30 *butts* of wine, 315 barrels of raisins, and other 233 barrels of wine at 4 pounds sterling per tonne.
- ⁶⁴ Cullen, "The Smuggling Trade in Ireland in the Eighteenth Century", 151.
- ⁶⁵ Moreiux, "The Fisherman, Friend of All Nations?", 211-247.
- ⁶⁶ Bromley, "The French Privateering War", 170, The small vessels called Galleys were mainly used by the French; AY 30, f. 40, *Business Correspondence*, Some merchants left for fear of persecution. AY 30 f. 39. Den mentions the *cedula* granted by the King of Spain, on which he had to register. Some of their friends found shelter in the churches.
- ⁶⁷ *Ibid*, 337. Bromley, "French Traders in the South Sea", 325-338: Bromley argues that Spanish officials connived at the law's evasion however we should not overemphasise their venality as not everyone was willing to break the law even for a bribe.
- ⁶⁸ AY 30, f. 38, *Business Correspondence*, On the 13th May 1702, English and Dutch merchants and goods were embargoed in Spain. Two English seamen were killed. The English ship taken was *The Expectation*. 'There is so much rigour even though war has not been declared, can you imagine what will happen when it is declared'; AY 30, f. 34, *Business Correspondence*, The Spanish market was greatly affected and there were no prospects for the sale of oil. Den also tried his best to dispose of the textile *bays*. It is probable that ships bound for the Levant would have taken them. In the meantime, they waited for the incoming of the *flota*. Aylward was impatient about the arrival of the American vessels, because he had invested in some commodities shipped to Jamaica and he needed to enquire about wine and 'vellon'.
- ⁶⁹ AY 30, f. 62, f. 66, f. 68, Letter of Paul Den, signed Nicholas Baptista of Sandonat. In f. 54 Den was called Lorenzo Baptista. In f. 50 Den's alias was Andreas Ferrar. In f. 48 he signed Parentius Baptista; AY 30, f. 42, *Business Correspondence*, Parento Maquing wrote from Leghorn. In f. 40, Peter Jackson wrote from Malaga.
- ⁷⁰ Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean*, 169: The allies were interested in Gibraltar for its strategic position, and skirmishes ensued off Malaga. In general both parties were interested in the commerce in Cadiz; AY 30, f. 41, *Business Correspondence*, An army of 15,000 had landed in Spain. 'you may judge in what consternation the poor merchants and the inhabitants are in'. 'I have all thing packd up in order to send them into the country in case they should bomb'.
- ⁷¹ Trivellato, "The Port Jews of Livorno"; Fusaro, *Political Economies of Empire*.
- ⁷² AY 30, f. 42, *Business Correspondence*, The partners involved were Mr Carter, Mr Persival and March, advised by Mr Willmot. They covered the letters and were based in Lisbon.
- ⁷³ Fusaro, *Political Economies of Empire*.
- ⁷⁴ AY 30, f. 44, *Business Correspondence*.
- ⁷⁵ AY 30, f. 43, *Business Correspondence*, Den is writing as Parentius Baptista, on the 21st Oct 1702.
- ⁷⁶ AY 30, f. 43, *Business Correspondence*, Letter from Marseilles.
- ⁷⁷ AY 30, f. 62, *Business Correspondence*, Den is writing as Nicholas Baptista di Sandonat.
- ⁷⁸ AY 30, f. 62, *Business Correspondence*, Letter of 12th June 1703. Den thought 'being no convenient' to mention the name of the merchant.
- ⁷⁹ AY 30, f. 62, *Business Correspondence*.
- ⁸⁰ AY 30, f. 62, *Business Correspondence*. In this letter Den was Nicholas Baptista di Sandonat.
- ⁸¹ AY 30, f. 66, *Business Correspondence*; AY 30, f. 68, *Business Correspondence*.
- ⁸² Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean*, 215.
- ⁸³ Trivellato, *The Familiarity of Strangers*; Haggerty, 'Merely for Money?'
- ⁸⁴ Tolles. *Meeting House and Counting House*. Poggi. *Calvinism and the Capitalist Spirit*.

⁸⁵ Barbalet, *Weber, Passion and Profits*, 75-110; Blum and Dudley, "Religion and Economic Growth"; Arrunada, "Protestants and Catholics".

⁸⁶ Trivellato, *The Familiarity of Strangers*, 20.

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