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On the view that we cannot perceive movement and change : lessons from Locke and Reid
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Hoerl, Christoph (2017) On the view that we cannot perceive movement and change : lessons from Locke and Reid. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 24 (3-4). pp. 88-102. ISSN 1355-8250.
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Official URL: http://www.imprint.co.uk/product/jcs/
Abstract
According to the snapshot view of temporal experience, instances of movement and change cannot, strictly speaking, be objects of sensory perception. Perceptual consciousness instead consists of a succession of individual momentary experiences, none of which is itself an experience of movement or change. The snapshot view is often presented as an intuitively appealing view of the nature of temporal experience, even by philosophers who ultimately reject it. Yet, it is puzzling how this can be so, given that its central claim – that we can never just perceive things moving or changing – clearly flies in the face of our common sense view of the phenomenology of experience. In this paper, I offer a diagnosis of how it is possible that the deep conflict between the snapshot view and our phenomenological intuitions can sometimes go unnoticed. The materials for this diagnosis can, I think, be found in some passages in Thomas Reid’s Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, in which he criticises John Locke’s account of the origins of the idea of succession, as presented in chapter 14 of book II of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. As I argue, a crucial aspect of Reid’s criticisms can be seen to turn on the idea that Locke fails to distinguish between two quite different variants of the snapshot view, which I call the memory theory and the mirroring theory of temporal experience, respectively. It is the failure to distinguish between these two different variants of the snapshot view, I suggest, that can also make the snapshot view appear more compatible with our phenomenological intuitions than it in fact is.
Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||||
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Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) | ||||||
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy | ||||||
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): | Experience., Consciousness., Perception (Philosophy) | ||||||
Journal or Publication Title: | Journal of Consciousness Studies | ||||||
Publisher: | Imprint Academic | ||||||
ISSN: | 1355-8250 | ||||||
Official Date: | 2017 | ||||||
Dates: |
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Volume: | 24 | ||||||
Number: | 3-4 | ||||||
Page Range: | pp. 88-102 | ||||||
Status: | Peer Reviewed | ||||||
Publication Status: | Published | ||||||
Access rights to Published version: | Restricted or Subscription Access | ||||||
Date of first compliant deposit: | 24 November 2016 | ||||||
Date of first compliant Open Access: | 1 January 2019 | ||||||
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