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## THE EMERGENCE OF A SECURITY DISCIPLINE IN THE POST 9-11 DISCOURSE OF US SECURITY ORGANISATIONS

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## **Abstract**

This paper explores two views of the changes that have occurred in the US security services as a result of their post 9/11 reform. The first is Bigo's (2008) suggestion that agencies worldwide have become enmeshed in shared activity so as to constitute a new 'field of (in)security'. A second, novel perspective is that the security services have evolved many of the characteristics of a discipline or (after Foucault, 1972) 'discursive formation', constructing intelligence both as a form of expertly constituted knowledge and as the basis for a new type of professional, disciplinary power. The investigation combines corpus techniques with other discourse analysis procedures to examine a corpus of public-facing texts generated by the US security agencies. The investigation aims to synthesise evidence consistent with both views of the security services' recent historical change; that features of their discourse signal their emergence simultaneously as a new field and discursive formation.

**Keywords:** CDA, corpus analysis, discourse, security, FBI, CIA, Foucault.

## Introduction

Fifteen years after the 2001 attacks on the U.S. World Trade Centre by an Al Qaeda cell, we have witnessed the assassination of the organisation's leader, Osama Bin Laden, in May 2011; and the symbolic completion of the 'One World Trade Centre' in 2014 as the centrepiece of a redesigned complex in Lower Manhattan. However, the immediate aftermath of the 2001 attacks was much more downbeat. In particular, the *9/11 Commission Report*, as well as a panoply of other criticisms of the FBI and the CIA, lead to the root and branch re-organisation of the US security services. Not least amongst the issues raised was the recommendation for the increased use of intelligence and its dispersal amongst allied entities. This included the sharing of intelligence not just bilaterally between the US and other countries (Reveron, 2006) but also across agencies within the US (Rovner & Long, 2004). For Svendsen (2008) this made for a 'globalization' and 'homogenisation' of intelligence through a process of 'international standardisation'. One particular focus of the sharing of intelligence within the USA was to make the boundaries more porous between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) - conventionally associated with the collection and monitoring of intelligence outside the USA, and the Federal Bureau of Intelligence (FBI) - traditionally assigned to the collection and monitoring of intelligence within the USA. Permeability within the state was consolidated by the creation of the new institution of Department of Homeland Security in November 2002 (Brattberg, 2012), under whose aegis 22 agencies were consolidated, including those as diverse as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Animal and Health Inspection Service (Martin & Simon, 2008).

In order to make sense of these recent, wide-ranging changes within the security services, as well as the perceived enlargement of their role in contemporary society, several social theoretical and historical approaches have been applied by researchers. Not least, Giorgio Agamben's (2005) thesis -that the 9/11 attacks have been used by the state security apparatus of western governments to justify their expansion- has been 'widely influential' (Colatrella, 2011) in shaping views of developments. Applying the perspective of international relations, Copenhagen School researchers have also theorised "security" as a speech act, in which specific groups or dangers can be constructed as threats necessitating extraordinary security measures (Buzan, Wæver, & De Wilde, 1998; Hough, 2004). Our study investigates two further theoretical perspectives that, in our view, offer particularly useful insights into changes occurring within the security services themselves. Each model

possesses valuable explanatory potential, offering competing perspectives that net crucial insights into the nature of developments currently underway within the security profession. The first is the suggestion that since 9/11 agencies worldwide have become enmeshed in security as a shared activity so as to constitute a new 'field of (in) security' (Bigo, 2008). Bigo's notion of 'field' here draws partly on the term as it is characterised by Bourdieu (1993), comprising simultaneously a system of social positions, and an arena of competition for particular goals and resources. A further perspective, not yet so widely deployed by commentators on security developments, is that the security services have transformed their practices so as to together attain the characteristics of a discipline, or 'discursive formation' (after Foucault, 1972). On this argument, as post-9/11 reforms have taken hold security agencies have increasingly come to construct intelligence as a form of expertly constituted knowledge, as well as the basis for a new type of professional, disciplinary power.

Our study investigates a corpus of web-pages produced by key US security agencies for the purpose of presenting their functions and goals to the general public. By applying the perspective of each of our two selected approaches we aim to recover distinctive but important insights into the nature of the security discourse exhibited in the corpus. Each lens of theory -security as field, security as discipline - offers a competing description of the security activity that is discursively constructed in the documents. Both perspectives, though, are necessary to develop a complete analysis that takes into account the most crucial observations recovered from the texts. This paper will therefore examine the corpus to investigate, via observation, classification and interpretation of their linguistic features: first, the extent to which the US security enterprise is discursively constituted as a new or emerging *field* in the wake of 9/11; and, secondly, the extent to which the US security enterprise is constituted as a *discursive formation* in the wake of 9/11. Our final discussion will seek to make sense of the perspectives afforded by each stage of analysis, and offers a means of synthesising their central insights.

## Theoretical Framework

There has long been a generative relationship between the conceptualisation of ‘field’ and discourse. Notably, the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu conceived of field as a ‘social topology’ (Martin, 2003, p. 39) differentiated into several analytically distinct domains, such as academia (Bourdieu, 1988 [1984]), politics, and state bureaucracy (Bourdieu, 1994). A field is defined by its unique stakes and interests which cannot be reduced to the stakes and interests of other fields.

Fields present themselves synchronically as structured spaces of positions (or posts) whose properties depend on their position within these spaces and which can be analysed independently of the characteristics of their occupants (which are partly determined by them) (Bourdieu 1993, p. 72).

This suggests that a field is structured by way of the power relations which exist between its agents, who are engaged in a struggle over the distribution of capital within their field. In other words, a field is a social space which has antagonistic internal relations, and within which conflict takes place between the agents who operate within it. Forms of capital within a field are not restricted to the traditional Marxist notions of economic capital but can, famously, include ‘cultural capital’ (Bourdieu, 1988 [1984]), ‘symbolic capital’, (Bourdieu, 1991) and also - of significance to the findings that follow - ‘information capital’ (Bourdieu, 1994). The interests of those agents who have a monopoly over the forms of capital specific to a field, and on which the basis of their power or authority depends, often tend towards maintaining the dominant ways of thinking – or *doxa* – specific to the field. Of significance for this study and for discourse analytic and critical linguistic approaches more generally, is the fact that the *doxa* itself, as well as the different orientations towards it - be they ‘orthodox’ or ‘heretical’ (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 73) - are produced, transmitted and reproduced through language and discourse ([author(s)], 2002).

More recently, it has been proposed (Bigo, 2008) that security agencies also be conceived of in terms of ‘field’, ‘habitus’, and also ‘figuration’ (after Elias, 1994). For Bigo, the ‘field of (in)security’ is no longer located in mutually exclusive agencies such as the police – who have conventionally been preoccupied with security operations internal to the nation state, or the military – who have conventionally been preoccupied with external security operations. Rather, the field ‘traverses’ a plethora of different agencies, combining also, for example

private security firms and the European border control agencies in a ‘dedifferentiation of internal and external security issues’ (2008, p. 17). In this respect, Bigo’s conceptualisation of the field of security professionals describes ‘the institutional archipelagos within which they work, either private or public’ (2008, p. 22). This field of (in)security appears to us as being fundamentally discursive, since, on Bigo’s account, it ‘...depends on the capacity of agents to produce statements on unease and present solutions to facilitate the management of unease [...] the capacity of people and techniques to conduct their research into this unfolding bode of statements at a routine level, to develop correlations, profiles and classify those who must be identified and placed under surveillance’ (2008, p. 23).

However, as well as social relations within the field, new combinations of knowledge, science and technology are also being brought into play in order to achieve the aims of national security. One hypothesis informing this study is that within the current period, security is being constituted as a discipline within the US. However, discipline is constituted through language and discourse, and we would suggest it is, in Foucault’s (1972) terminology, a ‘discursive formation’. On this argument, we suggest that what may be taking place is in fact a realignment of different knowledges and disciplines which are already in play. In *The Order of Things* (1970), Foucault traces the ‘rupture’ that takes place at the end of the eighteenth century with the emergence of the human sciences as particular combination of the ‘sciences of life, language and economics’ (p. 244). In this respect, we will also consider the extent to which a new conjunction of power and knowledge may be emerging from the recent reconfigurations that have taken place within contemporary security technologies.

By combining the theoretical constructs of ‘field’ and ‘discursive formation’, we are able to examine the ways in which the language and discourse of public-facing texts of the US security services operate in order to constitute: first, the social relations within and between the different agencies (i.e. forms of relations); secondly, their technologisation of intelligence as the basis for a new discipline (i.e. forms of knowledge); and third, through our final discussion, the dialectical relationship between these social relations and these forms of knowledge. In this respect, we seek to add to the earlier strand of research into the security services which has been driven by a Bourdieusian sociology (e.g. Bigo, 1998, 2008), through extending the discursive focus of the analysis.

## Literature Review

Critical studies of security discourse originated with historical accounts of documents and speeches produced during the Cold War, and post-Cold War, era which took a range of different analytical approaches (e.g. Chilton, 1985; Dunmire, 2005). These laid the ground for a panoply of critical accounts of documents and speeches which justified the invasion of Iraq, produced both by the US Bush Administration (Hodges, 2011; Kerr, 2008) and to a lesser extent by the UK Blair Administration (Kerr, 2008). However, fewer critical accounts have been written of US or UK security discourse post-2005, the period following the attacks on the London Transport system by which time the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan was already underway. Our own research has to date focused on the post-2005 UK context, first by analysing two substantial corpora of policy documents to compare UK internal security policy before and after the 2005 attacks ([author(s)], 2013; [author(s)], 2013a) and then by analysing a corpus of webpages of associated security organisations in order to investigate the securitization of the 2012 London Olympics ([author(s)], 2013b).

A considerable amount of research within security and intelligence studies has investigated the reconstruction of the US security services from, with the possible exception of Svendsen (2008, 2012), a predominantly realist approach. Only two papers, from the field of geography, have employed discourse theory as a way of engaging with the performative aspects of the documents, exercises and topographies which ensued after the intervention of the 9/11 Commission. Martin and Simon (2008) analyse five strategy documents produced by the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS). They draw on post-Foucaultian discourse theory to argue that the DHS maintains a state of exception through the discursive construction and maintenance of continuous threat. This is realised virtually in time and space through the discursive articulation of ‘vulnerability’ and ‘preparedness’. In other words, within the DHS documents ‘future disasters are treated as real, despite the fact that their actual appearance in the world has not occurred’ (p. 286). Morrissey (2011) also uses one particular institutional site, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, as the unifying element in his exploration of the ‘discursive tactics’ used in calling for a long-term commitment of US forces to oversee American political and economic interests in the Middle East (p. 442). In so doing, he reveals the role of the “military-strategic studies complex” in advancing the ‘aggressive geopolitics’ of the USA and supporting its ‘imperial ambition’ (p. 459). Apart from these, no other studies have analysed the discourse and language which the

security services have used to reconstitute themselves in the wake of the *9/11 Commission Report*.

## **Methods**

Much has been made in recent literature (e.g. Baker, 2010; Baker et al., 2008; Baker and McEnery, 2005; Gabrielatos and Baker, 2008; Koteyko, 2014) of efforts to reconcile corpus and discourse analysis traditions. One the most sophisticated, Baker et al. (2008), applies a nine step model of corpus-assisted discourse analysis to study newspaper discourse dealing with refugees. [author(s)] (2013) offer a method combining corpus and discourse analysis procedures which reverses the usual quantitative then qualitative sequence; a set of representative texts are first analysed in detail ‘by eye’ to generate more intuitively powerful directions for whole corpus analysis. While sharing the concern of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) practitioners to encompass ‘some form of systematic analysis of text’ (Fairclough, 2010: p. 10) in order to recover purposes and ideologies that are implicit in discourse (Johnstone, 2002), our study applies techniques and insights eclectically and contingently so as to best explore insights provided by our target approaches. Working then within the broader field of critical discourse studies, we embrace a post-disciplinary perspective in which tools are applied flexibly and recursively as each investigative instance requires.

### *Data Collection*

In order to isolate investigable discourse relevant to the aims of this paper, we searched for documents created by US security agencies that are purposed towards communicating their recent objectives to the American public. In selecting such public-facing documents we aimed to provide a focus on texts generated by these actors for the purpose of projecting their post-reform identity to the world at large, thereby revealing features of this discursive construction of their social role. We identified web-pages constructed by new (e.g. the Department of Homeland Security, the National Counterterrorism Centre) and reformed (e.g. the FBI) agencies for the purpose of publicly explaining their contemporary functions. To mitigate researcher bias we selected institutions listed by the US National Archive as agencies with a Counter-Terrorism role. Links from this site (ALIC, n.d.) were then investigated systematically and webpages selected ‘by eye’ where their purpose (explaining

the aims and role of the organization, describing organizational history including recent reforms) matched our research aims. In order to avoid the collection of non-relevant data on useful pages, text was selected by hand. In the end 175 mostly short texts were prepared as a corpus (see Table 1).

[Table 1 near here]

### *Data Analysis*

Initially the texts were read extensively ‘by eye’, with attention paid to multi-modal features (images, logos, layout) of the web-pages from which they were extracted. In the next crucial stage a smaller number of core or ‘nuclear’ texts were identified which could form the basis of intensive qualitative analysis. A systematic Key Keywords (KKWs) procedure (Scott, 2006) was used to identify words found to be ‘key’ – disproportionately frequent when compared to a reference corpus- in the largest number of texts. After deriving a list of KKWs, an Excel Macro was coded to visually identify documents in which KKWs were most densely concentrated. These were held them to be statistically ‘typical’ for the corpus in terms of regularities of theme and language style. These “nuclear” texts were then analysed as whole documents, using a variety of manual, qualitative techniques that allowed us to investigate the discourse through the application of our chosen frameworks. While our intention at the start of analysis was to proceed inductively, applying discourse analytical tools contingently to recover useful insight, we returned increasingly frequently to the analytical framework of Functional Grammar. While not claiming to take a ‘critical’ perspective in itself, Halliday and Matthiessen’s (2004) view of language as essentially ‘functional’, i.e. a system of selections purposed towards the achievement of pragmatic purposes, furnished us with a means of usefully labelling elements in the clauses analysed. Identifying types of ‘processes’ (generally identified as ‘verbs’ in formal syntax) observed, as well as their relationship to associated participants (agents associated with verbs), proved particularly productive in terms of exposing noteworthy discourse phenomenon. The sections that follow set out these analytical observations and then embed them within the wider ranging purview of critical discourse studies.

The purpose of the second quantitative analysis stage was to extend and check the veracity of our observations as they applied to the whole collection of texts. Quantitative corpus tools were used to check or identify further evidence for the phenomena corpus-wide; Keywords,

Key Keywords, concordance and collocation were consulted. This whole corpus data was therefore used to confirm, extend or disconfirm the pertinence of observations made locally in nuclear texts. An innovation in our analysis and presentation of keyword data is the use of tables which indicate most common senses and collocations. In the tables, given core keyword meanings have been identified by randomly reducing collocation samples to 10% of sample size, then identifying most typical senses by eye.

## Results

### *Exploration of Field*

Several features were observed in nuclear texts which provided evidence for the discursive construction of a new area of shared professional activity; these were later confirmed as corpus-wide phenomena. The first, most ubiquitous, and easily recoverable of these was the large numbers of clauses in which actors in the security enterprise were linked as *participants* to the same *processes* (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004), so as to construct a sense of widely shared, collective enterprise. In the following nuclear text passage, for example, multiple agents are actors in a common process:

Requirements can be issued<sup>1</sup> by the Intelligence Community, state and local law enforcement partners, or by the FBI itself. (#FBI~INTEL7)

This strategy of linking processes to lengthy lists of participants projects the sense that complex collaboration is an ongoing and typical feature of reformed security activity, achieved by transcending the limits of different agencies' conventional ambits. This strategy is most visible when the number of participants stretches the attentional resources of the reader.

Working with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, and other federal agencies, BJA, on behalf of the Office of Justice Programs, is coordinating counter-terrorism training efforts nationwide [...]. (#FBI/BoJ~TRAINING)

Preventing and Combating Serious Crime Agreements (PCSC): DHS, in collaboration with DOJ and the Department of State (DOS), has completed PCSC Agreements, or their equivalent with

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<sup>1</sup> Where functional grammar (Halliday, 1985) analysis is applied, process words are indicated by shaded boxes, with associated participants appearing in unshaded boxes. Other linguistic features will be highlighted using italics and (if a second rank of analysis is applied) underlining.

35 Visa Waiver Program (VWP) countries and two additional countries to share biographic and biometric information about potential terrorists and serious criminals. (#DHS~HOMELAND3)

In the second passage, the linking words ‘and’ and ‘with’ are repeatedly used to link two extensive groups of beneficiaries into a network of participants surrounding the procedure of a security arrangement. This passage also illustrates a second strategy deployed in the discourse - the selection, and concentrated deployment of lexis whose senses and associations establish collaboration as an underpinning, corpus-wide theme. Lexis denoting and connoting a sharing ethos (‘in collaboration with’, ‘completed agreements with’, ‘equivalent with’, ‘share information about’) appears with considerable density in this single sentence. Another nuclear text passage in which such lexis is deployed with considerable intensity is the following:

When *we share* this intelligence *with* our Intelligence Community and law enforcement *partners*, *we share* its benefits *with* them as well, enhancing the effectiveness of *our* homeland and national security efforts.

The ‘share [noun phrase] with’ phraseology is duplicated here deliberately, establishing a parallel between the intelligence-sharing described in the opening clause ( ‘[W]hen we share ...’) and the claim for its concomitant benefits ( ‘we share its benefits with them as well, ...’) in the second.

Looking at the whole corpus, evidence of lexical selection that constructs an ethos of ‘sharing’ is present in large numbers (see Table 2) of documents. Key-Keywords which are clearly connected to his theme are presented in the table, with typical senses/ top collocations indicated in the examples given. Concordance checking of Key-Keywords (typified by exemplars given in the table) confirm that the KKWs typically and frequently carry senses and connotations relevant to the connected ideals of sharing, collaboration and bridge building.

[Table 2 near here]

A noteworthy item in this table is the prepositional keyword ‘across’, since closed set, functional items such as this are less frequently identified in such procedures. Baker (2006, pp. 127-128) notes that investigation of instances of grammatical keywords be investigated can reveal their functions in texts. In Table 3, a random sample (10%) of concordance instances of ‘across’ in the corpus indicates that while its use varies (in six cases it is used in phraseology projecting a sense of immense scale ; e.g. ‘across the country’, ‘across the globe’), its overall syntagmatic role is to construct permeable relations across organisational and geographical boundaries.

[Table 3 near here]

A third discursive strategy identifiable in the nuclear texts is the depiction of a collaborative process which bridges not only the boundaries between *institutions*, but also traverses a variety of non-organisational limits - spatial, political and organisational - for the sake of the new security enterprise. Linkage across regional, federal and international geographical boundaries, for example, is a common construction, as in the following:

Through close *federal* and *international* partnerships DHS works to ensure that resources and information are available to *state* and *local* law enforcement, giving those on the frontlines the tools they need to protect *local* communities. (#DHS~HOMELAND3)

The crossing of a different kind of conceptual boundary, that between (security) organisations and individuals, is depicted in the following:

BJA recognizes that it is the job of *law enforcement agencies and prosecutors* to bring terrorists to justice, but we also believe that every *citizen* can play a vital part in helping to prevent terrorism. Our role is to facilitate the ability of *citizens*, whenever possible and appropriate, to participate in terrorism prevention and preparedness efforts. (#BoJ~COUNTERTERRORISM)

Here both law agencies and individual citizens are identified as sharing responsibility for security. A further boundary which is constituted as being transcended is that between private and public fields of activity:

According to program director Daniel DeSimone, “DSAC bridges the information-sharing divide between the *public* and *private* sector” on the many security threats facing today’s businesses. (#FBI~DOMESTIC)

Through open lines of communication, DSAC ensures that key *senior private sector executives* and *senior government officials* share real-time, actionable intelligence. (#FBI~DOMESTIC)

The effect of language in such passages is to valorise the very activity of boundary permeation, regardless of the boundary kind: whether institutional, political or relating to differences in the authority and identity of actors involved. Through such language, portability, transcendence and permeability of operation in security work are established implicitly as discourse-wide values.

A fourth strategy, the use of the metaphor of architecture and building, is a further means of constructing this persistent theme in the nuclear texts:

Consistent with the direction the President has set for a robust information sharing environment, DHS continues to work with our homeland security partners *to build our architecture for information sharing*. (#DHS~HOMELAND3)

The term ‘architecture’ appears six times, distributed across five texts, and is deployed metaphorically to establish a sense of expansive design. The material process ‘build’ appears even more ubiquitously, in 24 documents, being used in most (24 out of 38) as part of a clearly articulated metaphor of construction, as in:

The goal, Corsi said, is to *build* collection and reporting capabilities [...](#FBI~INTEL4)

We *build* foreign counterterrorism capacity in the civilian sector and [...] (#BCT~TEN)

Apart from conveying associations of strength and safety, this metaphorical usage also creates the sense that the entities engaged with security are to be artfully combined, uniting as elements of a larger, new integrated structure.

The perlocutionary effect of language deployed within each of these four strategies is to challenge boundaries and project discursively the emergence of security as a single professional space. By dissolving institutional and other forms of delineation, the zone is opened up to constitute a unified field a setting increasingly occupied by operators no longer differentiated by their institutional provenance or scope of activity but increasingly homogenised and observant of common rules and practices. Whereas the strategies construct the ethos of field implicitly, as a force that is distributed across passages so as to impact on readers unconsciously, there are instances where this discursive goal emerges as an explicit proposition in the texts, for example:

Protecting the country from ever-evolving, transnational threats requires a strengthened homeland security enterprise that *shares information across traditional organizational boundaries*. (#DHS~HOMELAND3)

Nowhere are the strategies deployed more intensively more than in documents describing ‘fusion centers’, intelligence-sharing units newly established to promote collaboration between a wide range of security actors. Fusion centres are constituted in the nuclear document “Unifying Intelligence Fusion Centers” (#FBI~UNIFYING) as sites of intensive, varied collaboration where participants’ originating identities are submerged within their shared role as intelligence sharers. The discourse constructing the phenomena of fusion centres presents them as models of integrated security activity. The sense that they represent successful

experiments, whose ethos of convergence is to be emulated elsewhere, is strongly present in the following:

These centers, usually set up by *states* or *major urban areas* and run by *state* or *local* authorities, are often supported by *federal* law enforcement, including the FBI. (#FBI~UNIFYING)

What is most noticeable in the second sentence is the sheer diversity of the identities and scope of agencies ('major urban areas', 'states', 'state or local authorities', 'federal law enforcement', 'FBI').

As a neologism, the term 'fusion center' itself synthesises core meanings concerning their idealised purpose; 'center' constructs the notion of a point of common convergence; while 'fusion' contributes the association of an identity-erasing, homogenous new space.

### *Intelligence as Discursive Formation*

While evidence for the construction of an emerging security field was located across several of the nuclear texts, close reading of those documents also discovered language and logic consistent with our second putative theoretical approach; that the intensity of post 9/11 reforms has given rise to an emerging discipline, or *discursive formation*, centred on procedures for analysing intelligence. One nuclear text in particular, "Intelligence Overview" (#FBI~INTEL7), explains the new role of, and procedures for processing of intelligence in the reformed FBI regime. An early passage projects a powerful sense that the FBI has ushered in a new intelligence regime which is historically distinct from its earlier formation:

*Traditionally*, the FBI has derived intelligence primarily from cases. As a national security organization, we *now* use intelligence to develop a comprehensive understanding of the threats we face. Analysts examine intelligence gleaned through cases and combine it with publicly available information about an area's infrastructure, economy, and other statistics. (#FBI~INTEL7)

The terms 'traditionally' and 'now' delineate past from present constructions of practices surrounding intelligence. No longer to be 'derived' - casually and organically as the product of ordinary FBI activity 'cases' - intelligence is now subject to multiple processes ('used', 'examined', 'gleaned' and 'combined') as an industrialised resource. The passage deploys the term 'intelligence' repetitively, both to project the force of the word's new centrality, and

to avoid the use of a synonym (information, data, etc. ) that does not carry the same sense of systematic, disciplined processing.

In the same core document, we perceive that, not unlike Foucault's (1970) account of the emerging 19<sup>th</sup> century natural sciences, the presently ascendant discipline of intelligence is increasingly being constituted through the development of new procedures for classification and categorisation of knowledge. This particular nuclear text enumerates a complex set of procedures by which information is requested, collected and shared in a systematic, uniform fashion . It begins with the issuing of formalised requests for specific intelligence , referred to as "Requirements", by any security actor; police, local and state enforcement, as well as agencies like the FBI. Such requests are 'consolidated' and prioritised by specialised analysts. Efforts are made to address the requirement via reference to existing information; where this is insufficient special squads are dispatched to collect necessary new intelligence. At the core of such interlocking activity lies (it can be assumed) a cross-institutional database that imposes uniform protocols and categories. In the language of these passages, the notion of intelligence *as data*, entered, recovered and rigorously collated across a powerful, widely-shared *database*, is extended to the enterprise of security as a whole. Procedures, whether amenable to machine or human operation, require information to be consistently categorised, captured and processed so as to lend them disciplinary authority.

Also consistent with the theme of disciplinary emergence is the document's enumeration of highly-defined, expert roles for its operators:

The FBI's *special agents, surveillance specialists, language specialists, and intelligence and financial analysts* are all intelligence collectors. *Forensics experts* at the FBI Laboratory, *computer scientists* at Regional Computer Forensics Laboratories, and *fingerprint examiners* working on scene in Iraq and Afghanistan all contribute to the FBI's intelligence collection capabilities as well. (#FBI-INTEL7)

In this passage the first, identifying clause ('The FBI's special agents ...') deliberately dissolves distinctions between support staff members and special agents who now "*are all intelligence collectors*". At the same time, however, 'support' roles in both sentences are enumerated more precisely, distinguished by the character of their collection role. Actors' relationships with procedures for collections and processing, now determine their designation.

*Procedures* for collection are also introduced using a similar strategy of deliberate enumeration and precise specification:

Intelligence is collected through activities such as *interviews, physical surveillances, wiretaps, searches, and undercover operations.* (#FBI~INTEL7)

More subtle, but nevertheless telling evidence of the presence of an emerging discursive formation is the title, of the web-page where this and numerous (38) other FBI corpus documents are accessed. This label, “Intel-Driven FBI”, establishes the common theme that newly technologized procedures for intelligence-processing now comprise the core of FBI activity. Also revealing is the neologism, ‘Intel’ (recurring 13 times, across 15 texts) itself. The abbreviated jargon term also projects a sense of technologization and specialist knowledge within the discourse of the web-pages.

Looking further at the wider corpus, the application of corpus, keyword tools reveal a class of words that relate to the theme (Baker, 2006; Scott, 2004) of regularised and uniformly-disciplined intelligence processing. It is noticeable that in Table 3, ‘intelligence’ is identified as the most important collocate of each keyword, and analysis of the words in context confirms their frequent semantic association with the theme of an emerging disciplinary rigour. The two items ‘training’ and ‘program’, most frequently describe educational procedures deployed to enhance, standardize and technologize procedures for information processing. Consistent with the phenomenon of an emerging discursive formation, the keyness of these two terms suggests a theme of education to inculcate expertise pedagogically and standardise disciplinary activity surrounding intelligence. The frequent collocation of ‘resources’ with ‘intelligence’, meanwhile, evidences its construction in the texts as an asset, and even (as we shall discuss below) a form of professional capital.

Further whole corpus evidence that the term ‘Intelligence’ itself has developed new senses peculiar to the emerging discipline can be obtained by comparing its use in our documents to that found in a general (COCA) American English reference corpus.

[Figure 1 near here]

One trend that can be perceived in Figure 1 is the reverse order of preference for *gathering* and *collecting* in each corpus; in the COCA, members of the GATHER lemma are more highly ranked than those for COLLECT; in our corpus COLLECT is the more highly collocated

lemma. A basis for the ‘dispreferment’ of gathering processes in our corpus can be glimpsed in the following :

Within the US intelligence community, Pepper said, “the FBI is no longer seen as just a law enforcement agency but also a national security intelligence entity. And in the intelligence community, we are one of the few agencies that not only have the responsibility to gather intelligence, but to act on it as well.” (#FBI~INTEL4)

The notion of ‘gathering’ here seems to have acquired a somewhat negative semantic prosody, associated with the practices of casual accumulation and local storage of intelligence that characterised the organisation’s previous much-criticised regime. Looking at concordance data for ‘gather’ it is noticeable that in 11 instances where it does appear it is frequently paired with another process term (‘gather and share’ intelligence (twice), ‘gather, analyze, and disseminate’, ‘gather and analyze’) that further processing is involved, e.g.

TEDAC coordinates the efforts of the entire government, from law enforcement to intelligence to military, to gather and share intelligence about these devices. (#FBI~TERRORIST)

The passage also showcases the preference for processes of *sharing* that is evident in the same collocation data. Intelligence is no longer constructed as a resource merely to be gathered (stored statically and not shared). Both passages above indicate that, corpus-wide, intelligence has become a resource that requires co-ordinated, expert treatment only. This requirement, we argue, is the historical impetus towards the constitution of the Intelligence as a new discursive formation.

## **Discussion**

This study has analysed the language and discourse of a substantial corpus of webpages harvested from the US security services. Our analysis has revealed an array of lexis through which the US security services construct themselves within two domains: a social and organisational domain, which we have referred to as a ‘field’ (after Bigo, 2008; Bourdieu, 1972, 1980) and a technological and epistemological domain which could be referred to in normal parlance as a ‘discipline’, but which Foucault proposed naming a ‘discursive formation’ (1972). In what follows we suggest a structural homology appears to emerge from the ‘principles’ (after Bernstein, 2000) which are articulated through the discursive construction of US intelligence as both a ‘discipline’ and a ‘field’. Our analysis suggests that

this discursive construction articulates the principle of *combination* with regard to structure (i.e. *together with* rather than separate from, and opposed to division); and the principle of *collectivism* with regard to function (i.e. *working alongside* rather than working apart from, and opposed to individualism). The analysis has also revealed several discursive strategies which can be mapped onto three of the characteristics of what Bourdieu (1972, 1980), and later Bigo (2008), describe as a ‘field’ : firstly, in relation to the structuration of spaces or positions for agents; secondly, in relation to the forms of, and distribution of, capital; and thirdly, in relation to the dominant ways of thinking within the field. The strategies identified as consistent with this final characteristic, we will argue, also support the conceptualisation of security activity as a discursive formation.

If a field is habitually a site of struggle and competition between the agents which occupy it (Bourdieu 1972, 1980), the security field which is constituted within these documents is one in which this struggle appears to be under a process of being reconfigured by and through discourse. The widespread use of conjunctions and conjunctive phrases to yoke different entities together within complex noun phrases and position them as actors in relation to a range of processes across the corpus, discursively (re)constitutes the field as a *field of forces*. In this respect, the language used serves to realise the expansion and consolidation of ‘a certain homogeneity found in these agents’ bureaucratic interests, their similar ways of defining a potential enemy and gathering knowledge on this enemy through diverse technologies and routines’ (Bigo, 2008, p. 23). To support this, lexis is selected and deployed whose senses and associations establish collaboration as an underpinning, corpus-wide theme. Moreover, language is used that references these collaborations as occurring across a variety of institutional and topological boundaries. This suggests to us that the field is being constituted here as a *traversal field*. While Bigo (2008, pp. 27-31) conceives of traversality as being the property of transcending national borders (c.p. also Vaughan-Williams, 2009), we suggest that the permeability of the field of US security is constituted as operating both across institutional boundaries within the nation state as well as, not so much straddling, but dissolving the boundaries between different nation states:

...this field of (in)security...is effectively defined by the space that these agencies occupy as national players, but also by the transnational networks of relations that they have formed in a space larger than their own spaces, the cyclical defining point of which is its tendency to enlarge itself incessantly due to its refusal to recognise boundaries, whether they are geographical or cultural (Bigo, 2008, p. 28).

In this respect, the metaphorical representation within our corpus of the field of security as a form of architecture in conjunction with the ubiquitous deployment of the material verb 'build' to describe a number of intelligence procedures conveys the sense of it (re)establishing its own networks and framings. Here, the neologism 'fusion centre' is a particularly distinctive phrase designating just such a space, in which traditionally discreet entities are incorporated and repositioned through the discursive construction of the field.

The legitimation of the different forms of capital which circulate within the field (either between agents or between sub-fields) and its accumulation is often the site of *struggles within a field* (Bigo, 2008, pp. 23-5), either between sub-fields or between individual agents within the field (Bourdieu, 1972, 1980). The salience of the concept of 'intelligence' across our corpus, and the specific linguistic contexts in which it is deployed (as revealed by our qualitative analysis above), suggests that this is being constituted not just as the field's epistemological 'stuff', but also as its pre-eminent form of social capital. Intelligence emerges not just as a possibly novel form of symbolic goods which is accorded value within the security field, but is accumulated by agents and sub-fields as 'informational capital', (which we take as a specific modality of 'social capital' (Bourdieu 1994, pp. 7-8). Analysis of our corpus has suggested that this exchange of informational capital between agents and subfields, realized most typically by the process 'share', is constructed as the pre-eminent mode of activity which takes place within the current formation of the security field. We also suggest (after Bigo 2008, pp. 25-6) that this accumulation and exchange of informational capital in turn legitimises the *field* itself, placing it in a position of *domination* in relation to other social fields within the state, and authorizing it to 'monopolize the power to define... legitimately recognised threats, such as the 'war on terror' (*ibid*, p. 25).

Throughout the corpus, the discursive construction of 'intelligence' links conceptualisations of security as both a field and discipline. It refers neither solely to the dominant ways of thinking to which security operatives conform in order to participate within their field, nor does it refer only to the technologies which are being mobilised in order to yield data. Intelligence emerges rather as a synthetic construct, occupying a semantic space which is *both* a way of thinking *and* a technology producing knowledge. In particular, the range of material processes to which intelligence is subjected (e.g. 'used', 'examined', 'gleaned', 'combined') suggests the operationalization of a complex technology upon knowledge in order to yield a synthesis which can inform the action of security agents. Previously it has been suggested that the 'study of man' realised in an interface between biology, economics

and ‘philology’ (or what we would call linguistics) was constituted as a ‘science’ (Foucault 1970, 1972), which required a distinct modality of – ‘archaeological’ - investigation. On the basis of our analysis, we suggest that the discursive formation brought about by the expanded capacity of computers to manipulate large quantities of data (relating to the population of the nation state and the establishment of large agencies inhabited by cadres of professionals educated to high levels in languages, linguistics, psychology, politics and information technology) has brought together a novel, and possibly ominous, modality of the ‘sciences of man’.

In conclusion, we would suggest that the principles of combination and collectivism, revealed by our analysis of the language and discourse of documents harvested from the US security services, constitute an emergent way of thinking, or ‘doxa’ within the field ( Bigo 2008, p. 26; Bourdieu 1972, 1980). The same principles have been shown to operate with respect to security as we have reconceived it as an emerging discursive formation. The discursive outworking of these principles may well mark a shift in the boundaries between what is ‘thinkable’ and what is ‘unthinkable’ within the field (after Bernstein, 2000). It may also simultaneously reveal something of the character of the categories and roles of the discipline whose emergence we have proposed in this paper.

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[blinded]

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Table 1 :US security agency webpage corpus by agency

<i>Agency</i>	<i>Number of Texts</i>	<i>Running Words</i>
BCT State	6 files	4,404
Department of Homeland Security	62 files	22,566
FBI	82 files	46,527
Federation of American Scientists (FASA)	2 files	284
National Counter-terrorism Centre	8 files	3,238
Office of Director of National Intelligence	6 files	3,492
FEMA	7 files	1,359
Treasury	2 files	49,851
Total number of files	175	131,721

Table 2 : Top Key Keywords in the US security agency webpage corpus (top collocations in bold)

Ranking	Key keyword	n /175 texts	% of texts	frequency
19	partners	33	20	122
<i>During our investigations, we get a great deal of investigative support from our state, <b>local</b> [32 in 21 texts], and federal partners (#FBI~THREATS2)</i>				
40	working	23	14	65
<i>According to Markus in Berlin, it's working closely <b>with</b> [35 in 28 texts] our foreign partners. (#FBI~INTEL)</i>				
48	joint	19	11	57
<i>There are 104 FBI <b>Joint</b> [42 in 23 texts] Terrorism Task Forces around the country (#FBI~NATIONAL)</i>				
61	sharing	17	10	60
<i>Terrorism-related <b>information</b> [69 in 38 texts] sharing across the intelligence community has greatly improved. (#DHS~INFORMATION3)</i>				
68	across	15	9	42
<i>They enable a shared <b>intelligence</b> [14 in 11 texts] base across many agencies. And the only way to accomplish that is through cooperative intelligence sharing across borders. (#FBI~SHARING)</i>				

Table 3: Keyword list exposing technology themes in US security agency webpage corpus: typical senses/ top collocations (in bold) are indicated for each.

N	Key word	Freq.	Concordance example typifying most frequent collocation and use
9	ANALYSIS	26	NCTC also provides USG agencies with the terrorism <b>intelligence</b> analysis and other information they need to fulfill their missions. (#FBI~INTEL7)
15	TRAINING	19	After the attacks, we quickly stood up our first College of Analytical Studies, which has since evolved into <b>Intelligence</b> Training, offering basic and advanced training for FBI analysts (#FBI~INTEL11)
16	PROGRAM	18	Nowhere is that more apparent than in our <b>intelligence</b> analyst program. (#FBI~INTEL3)
22	PRODUCTS	15	[...] JCAT collaborates with other members of the <b>Intelligence</b> Community to research, produce, and disseminate counterterrorism intelligence products for federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial government (SLTT) agencies [...] (#NATIONALCC~THEJOINT)
27	RESOURCES	15	Set strategic direction and priorities for national <b>intelligence</b> resources and capabilities. (#DNI~ABOUT3)

Figure 1: Comparison (COCA versus our corpus) of collocation orders for **Intelligence**

