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Trial incentives in sequential litigation

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Bernhardt, Dan and Lee, F. Z. X. (2015) Trial incentives in sequential litigation. American Law and Economics Review, 17 (1). pp. 214-244. doi:10.1093/aler/ahu012

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahu012

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Abstract

We analyze when and why trials can emerge in equilibrium when a defendant may face future plaintiffs. An initial trial serves as an experiment that the defendant can run to induce subsequent potential plaintiffs to learn about their chances of winning. The initial case may go to trial when a favorable trial outcome for the defense can deter potential future plaintiffs from filing lawsuits. Possible future meritless lawsuits further raise the attraction of an initial trial. We also derive the impact of the plaintiff's bargaining power and the heterogeneity in the body of future plaintiffs.

Item Type: Journal Article
Subjects: K Law [Moys] > KN Common Law, Private Law
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Complex litigation, Trials, Dispute resolution (Law)
Journal or Publication Title: American Law and Economics Review
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISSN: 1465-7252
Official Date: March 2015
Dates:
DateEvent
March 2015Published
22 August 2014Available
31 January 2014Accepted
Volume: 17
Number: 1
Page Range: pp. 214-244
DOI: 10.1093/aler/ahu012
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Access rights to Published version: Restricted or Subscription Access

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