Bernhardt, Dan and Lee, F. Z. X. (2015) Trial incentives in sequential litigation. American Law and Economics Review, 17 (1). pp. 214-244. doi:10.1093/aler/ahu012

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Abstract

We analyze when and why trials can emerge in equilibrium when a defendant may face future plaintiffs. An initial trial serves as an experiment that the defendant can run to induce subsequent potential plaintiffs to learn about their chances of winning. The initial case may go to trial when a favorable trial outcome for the defense can deter potential future plaintiffs from filing lawsuits. Possible future meritless lawsuits further raise the attraction of an initial trial. We also derive the impact of the plaintiff's bargaining power and the heterogeneity in the body of future plaintiffs.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	K Law [Moys] > KN Common Law, Private Law
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Complex litigation, Trials, Dispute resolution (Law)
Journal or Publication Title:	American Law and Economics Review
Publisher:	Oxford University Press
ISSN:	1465-7252
Official Date:	March 2015
Dates:	Date Event March 2015 Published 22 August 2014 Available 31 January 2014 Accepted
Date of first compliant deposit:	12 January 2017
Volume:	17
Number:	1
Page Range:	pp. 214-244
DOI:	10.1093/aler/ahu012
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access

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