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The Bases of (Im)politeness Evaluations: 
Culture, the moral order and the East-West debate

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To appear in East Asian Pragmatics, volume 1.

Abstract
Evaluation is an important aspect of (im)politeness and this paper explores it from an interdisciplinary perspective. It starts by considering the debate over the East-West debate in politeness theory and argues that both emic and etic approaches to research can contribute usefully to the deliberations. It then maintains that if we are to understand the impact of culture on people’s (im)politeness evaluations, we need to unpack the concept more thoroughly. It proposes that useful insights can be obtained from Haidt’s (e.g. Haidt and Kesebir, 2010) work on moral foundations and Schwartz’s (e.g. Schwartz et al., 2012) work on basic values. The paper ends by revisiting the East-West debate, discussing the potential impact of other factors such as beliefs and ideologies, and noting the ongoing uncertainties over levels and links between the various concepts explored. It urges pragmaticists and psychologists to engage more fully with each other to help address these challenges.

Keywords:
(Im)politeness evaluation; East-West debate; moral order; cultural values; beliefs.

1. Introduction

According to the blurb about the journal of East Asian Pragmatics on the publisher’s website, the journal aims to focus on “language use and interpersonal interaction within and across East Asian cultures” and to form a bridge between “pragmaticians (sic) from East Asian and Western countries.” This puts very explicit focus on east and west, and the notion of ‘culture’, which relates not only to national culture, but also to the cultures of all kinds of other groupings, including ethnic, minority and regional groups, as well as communities of practice. It is important, therefore, to take stock of our understanding of the impact of culture on interpersonal interaction, and in this paper we focus particularly on its relation to (im)politeness evaluations and what Haugh (2013) and Kádár and Haugh (2013) call the moral order. Our interpretation of the concept of morality is broad and is in line with that of the psychologists Haidt and Kesebir (2010), who regard it as a system that regulates social life through psychological processes such as values, virtues, norms, and practices.

It is now widely accepted that (im)politeness entails an evaluative judgement: we assess people to be polite or impolite, based on our interpretations of their behaviour/language. Our interpretations are not usually idiosyncratic, but rather relate to culturally-based expectations as to what is acceptable or unacceptable behaviour in the context in which it occurs. For example, suppose I do a big favour for a colleague at work and she does not thank me explicitly. If I think she ‘ought’ to have thanked me, I will evaluate her behaviour as impolite. Suppose I then tell another colleague about
her, and that person commiserates with me about her bad treatment of me. Three important things need to be noted from this hypothetical sequence of events. Firstly, I am making an evaluative judgement of the other person. Secondly, I am making the assumption that the second colleague shares my expectation that failure to express gratitude is impolite. Thirdly, our judgement of ‘impoliteness’ relates to an implicit standard of behaviour that we both share – our moral order conception.

It is quite possible, however, that people with different normative expectations may not evaluate the colleague’s behaviour in the same way. Gratitude can be shown in different ways, and so if I believe that gratitude is best conveyed not by words but by returning the favour later on, my evaluation of the colleague’s behaviour will be very different. So (im)politeness evaluations are inevitably closely associated with cultural norms and expectations.

However, culture is a slippery construct. Eelen (2001, 169) refers to it as “a rather ramshackle construction which looks solid from the outside, and is highly adaptable to cover all different kinds of observations, but is best not asked to carry too much practical explanatory burden.” This is not surprising for, as Bond, Žegarac and Spencer-Oatey (2000) point out, any differences identified in cross-cultural pragmatic research are typically simply attributed to ‘cultural difference’, without any attempt to unpack this further. However, we disagree with Eelen’s viewpoint that we should not try to dig deeper into the issue of culture and (im)politeness. We believe it is an important issue not only conceptually but also interpersonally. So in this paper we focus on (im)politeness evaluations and explore how, and to what extent, conceptualisations of culture in psychology and anthropology may yield insights into the underpinnings of the ‘moral order’ foundations of such assessments.

We start, though, by reviewing the cultural issue of the “East-West” debate in (im)politeness theory.

2. The East-West debate

For the last 30 years or so, there has been an ongoing debate around universal compared with culture-specific frameworks for conceptualising and analysing (im)politeness, with one perspective often being pitted against the other and with claims and denials that some perspectives are ‘Western-biased’ and not applicable to ‘Eastern’ interaction. For example, the Japanese linguists, Matsumoto (1989) and Ide (1989) criticised Brown and Levinson’s (1978/1987) (henceforth, B&L) classic model of politeness over the universality of its claims. Matsumoto questioned B&L’s concept of face-threatening acts, and argued that all utterances in Japanese are potentially face-threatening, because a Japanese speaker always needs to make choices on language form that convey information about the perceived relationship between the interlocutors. So even a simple utterance like ‘Today is Saturday’ could be perceived as impolite if an inappropriate speech style was chosen. She concluded that the motivation for politeness put forward in B&L’s model is unsuited to the Japanese culture and language.

On similar lines, Ide (1989) elaborated the concept of ‘discernment–volition’ as a critique of B&L (1987). She (1989) argued that a weak point in their universal model is its Gricean worldview, i.e. it relies on the idea that politeness comes into existence when the speaker flouts conversational maxims through the means-ends reasoning of individuals (i.e. that speakers use language in ‘strategic’ ways, in order to trigger a certain inference associated with politeness). Drawing from the Japanese emic meta-term wakimae (‘discernment’), Ide (1989) argued that, in Japanese, one’s behaviour tends to be judged as polite when one discerns the appropriate communal norm that
applies in the situation, and that this overrides individual rationality. She maintained that this differs from the strategic means-ends reasoning of individuals that dominate ‘Western’ conceptualisations of politeness (a process that Ide labelled as ‘volition’). As a representative example for the operation of ‘discernment’, Ide described the Japanese honorific registers, which, according to her definition, tend to be used in non-strategic ways, as the interactants follow societal norms in the use of a given register in Japanese. Thus Ide (1989, p.243) argued that the B&L model reflects a “Western eye biased by individualism and the Western academic tradition of emphasizing rationality.”

Shortly after this, two Chinese pragmaticists, Gu (1990) and Mao (1994), presented further criticisms of the B&L model. Gu (1990) argued that a) the B&L notion of ‘face’ is too simplistic to capture the Chinese culture-specific understanding of this concept, and that b) various aspects of Chinese politeness are formal and recurrent, and so they are neither ‘strategic’ in B & L’s sense, nor do they involve clearly negative or positive face-work (but rather an ambiguous amalgamate of the two). Mao (1994), in a similar vein to Gu, criticised the problematic nature of the concept of ‘face’ in B & L’s framework, by exploring the metapragmatic complexity of this notion in Chinese culture. The influence of Mao’s research might be illustrated by the fact that since the publication of his article, a variety of research papers have been devoted to the metapragmatic research of Chinese ‘face’ (e.g. Hinze, 2007; Ruhi and Kádár, 2011).

Criticisms have not been limited to B&L’s model, though. For instance, Intachakra (2012) maintains that the ‘classic’ frameworks of Lakoff (1973) and Leech (1983) as well as B&L (1978/1987) all fail to account adequately for the ‘rapport-oriented’ rationality of many Eastern languages/cultures. Other researchers have drawn attention to language/culture-specific characteristics, suggesting that some aspects of (im)politeness may be core in one language/cultural group but not necessarily in another. For instance, Pan and Kádár (2011) argue that a basic criterion for an utterance to be treated as genuinely polite in Chinese interaction is its affective value and so they maintain that the Chinese concept of qing, which can be roughly translated as ‘affection’, ‘feeling’ or ‘sentiment’, is a core feature of politeness in Chinese. Along the same lines, Haugh (2005) argues that ‘place’ is a key concept for accounting for politeness in Japanese:

> ... politeness in Japanese arises primarily from acknowledging the place of others, or compensating for impositions on that place, rather than trying to compensate for possible impositions on the individual autonomy of others.

> Haugh, 2005, 45

Yet other researchers (e.g. O’Driscoll 1996; Usami, 2002; Pizziconi, 2003, 2011; Fukada and Asato, 2004; Chen, He & Lu, 2013), on the other hand, have maintained that there are no fundamental differences between Eastern and Western politeness. For example, Usami (2002) and Fukada and Asato (2004) each provide evidence that there is more variation in individual choice of language forms in Japanese than Ide (1989) and Matsumoto (1989) allow for. Similarly, Chen et al. (2013) found parallels in the requesting behaviour of Japanese, Chinese and American respondents, indicating that while there may be differences at one level, there are some fundamental similarities at another level.

In fact, none of the protagonists of a similar position argue that Eastern and Western politeness are identical or deny any culture-specific differences. For as Leech (2007, 170) maintains, both an absolute universalist position as well as a completely relativist position are equally untenable. While
the basic operational principles of ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ politeness may be similar, what is needed is to tease out the points of difference and the points of commonality without any preconceived viewpoints. This new journal offers an excellent opportunity to further this agenda.

To understand better how this might take place, it is helpful to consider the concepts of emic and etic. Very roughly speaking, etics are concepts, behaviours and items that cut across cultural groups (i.e. are pan-cultural), while emics are concepts, behaviours and items that are meaningful within a community, but are not necessarily shared across other communities (i.e. are culture-specific). However, the distinction is more complex than this, as we discuss in the next section.

3. Emic and etic perspectives

The terms emic and etic were first coined in the 1950s by the descriptive linguist, Kenneth Pike (1967), drawing on the distinction between phonetics and phonemics. They were subsequently reinterpreted by the anthropologist Marvin Harris (1964), and since then, as Table 1 illustrates, they have been used in a number of different ways by different people. The conceptualisations have been highly contested, with one theorist’s interpretation often being challenged by others.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Emic</th>
<th>Etic</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pike 1967:37</td>
<td>The &quot;emic viewpoint results from studying behavior as from inside the system&quot;</td>
<td>The “etic viewpoint studies behavior as from outside of a particular system and as an essential initial approach to an alien system.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harris, 1976:331</td>
<td>“Operationally, emic refers to the presence of an actual or potential interactive context in which ethnographer and informant meet and carry on a discussion about a particular domain. This discussion is deemed productive to the extent that the ethnographer discovers principles that represent and account for the way in which that domain is organized or structured in the mental life of that informant.”</td>
<td>“The operational meaning of etics, in contrast, is defined by the logically nonessential status of actor-observer elicitation. Interaction between anthropologist and actors is deemed productive only to the extent that principles of organization or structure that exist outside of the minds of the actors have been discovered. These principles may in fact be contrary to the principles elicitable from the actors themselves with respect to the manner in which they organize their imaginations, concepts, and thoughts in the identified domain.”</td>
</tr>
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<td>Willis 2007, p.100</td>
<td>&quot;The emic approach looks at things through the eyes of members of the culture being studied. What is valid or true is what members of the culture agree on.&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;The etic approach uses structures or criteria developed outside the culture as a framework for studying the culture. [...] Etic constructs are accounts, descriptions, and analyses expressed in terms of the conceptual schemes and categories that are regarded as meaningful and appropriate by the community of scientific observers.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yin 2015, p.16-17</td>
<td>&quot;an emic perspective attempts to capture participants' indigenous meanings of real-world events&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;an etic perspective represents external meanings, typically those of the researcher, or others outside of the cultures or institutions being studied&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Differing interpretations of etic and emic
As can be seen from Table 1, a number of contrasts can be identified:

- Cultural participant – scientific observer
- Insider perspective – outsider perspective
- Culture-internal orientation – culture-comparative orientation
- Emergent conceptualisation – pre-existing conceptualisation

Whatever one’s viewpoints on these contrasts, we would argue as follows: If this journal is to form a bridge between “pragmaticians (sic) from East Asian and Western countries”, as it aspires to, a culture-comparative orientation will be important. This will require both emic and etic perspectives to be included in the research that is undertaken and reported. As J. K. Hall (2002) points out, the two need to work hand in hand:

The real value of this distinction in my opinion is understanding how the etic and emic levels can work together to help us learn about our own and other cultures. Compilations of emic observations can help create etic frameworks that in turn can be used to discover and compare emic differences and similarities across cultures. Thus, emic-level findings can help to expand and refine etic knowledge, and etic frameworks can help to discover and enlighten emic concepts.

Hall, 2002, 67

Within pragmatics, sometimes the interconnections between the concepts of emic/etic and first/second order politeness can be confusing, in that both can make reference to the participant and the analyst. We therefore attempt to illustrate their interconnections in Figures 1 and 2 below. We follow Harris’ (2001) conceptualisation of emics as including the participants’ unconscious as well as conscious conceptualisations and interpretations of behaviour and language use. Moreover, we take a research procedure perspective rather than a participant perspective. (For further discussion, see Eelen, 2001; Haugh, 2012; Kádár and Haugh, 2013.)

![Figure 1: Emic research as the starting point](image-url)
In this article, we attempt to outline existing work in other disciplines on etic perspectives on culture, as it particularly pertains to (im)politeness evaluations and the moral order, since this has frequently been either ignored within politeness theory or dismissed without careful examination. Our aim is to stimulate discussion on the foundations to people’s judgements and the ways in which culture may affect them.

4. (Im)politeness evaluations, norms and the moral order

It is widely accepted now that while it is important to study (im)politeness from a behavioural or language use point of view, a vital complementary focus is the evaluative judgements that people make about the behaviour. As Kádár and Haugh (2013) point out, this entails some kind of normative frame of reference. In other words, when we judge a person to be polite or impolite, we draw on our conceptions of polite and impolite behaviour in the context concerned, and these conceptions in turn are based on our normative anticipations as to what we expect people to do or say in that context. Here it is useful to draw a distinction that the social psychologist, Robert Cialdini (2012), has made between two types of norms: descriptive norms and injunctive norms. Descriptive norms refer to what is typically done or what is ‘normal’, while injunctive norms refer to what is typically approved of or disapproved of by members of a social group. In terms of (im)politeness evaluations, it is injunctive norms that are particularly relevant and, as Cialdini points out, they constitute the moral rules of the group. Sometimes the two types of norms are congruent and sometimes they are not. Of course, norms are only norms. It is important to remember that people
do not necessarily follow either type of norms, as a range of individual and contextual factors influence how closely people adhere to the norms.

In exploring (im)politeness evaluations, we need to consider two issues: a) since norms are associated with social groups, we need to ask which group’s norms are being drawn on; and b) since attributions of politeness or impoliteness are based on evaluations, we need to consider the foundation for the judgements.

In terms of the first issue, Kádár and Haugh (2013) maintain that the norms of all types and sizes of groups can act as a frame of reference for (im)politeness judgements, ranging from relatively small, closed networks such as families or close friends, through medium-sized groups such as workplace employees, to large, rather diffuse groups such as geographical regions or whole countries. They propose that the various group norms – the localised norms, the community of practice/organisational or other group-based norms, and the societal norms – are reflexively layered or nested one within the other. Clearly this brings ‘culture’ centrally into (im)politeness evaluation, because the norms of groups can be regarded as a cultural phenomenon, at least for those who regard patterns of ‘practices’ as key elements of culture (e.g. see Moran, 2001 and section 5 below).

Norms give rise to expectancies and injunctive norms appeal to a moral order. In other words, when behaviour or language use is associated with an injunctive norm, it is judged to be good/bad, appropriate/inappropriate, impolite/polite, and so on. Moreover, since norms are associated with groups, presumably different groups may have different ‘moral orders’ which may coincide or differ from broader social norms. Thus Kádár and Haugh (2013) argue as follows:

> Invoking the moral order can also involve explicitly casting participants as either members relative to this moral order, and thus insiders, or as non-members, who are inevitably seen as taking an outsider perspective on it. Attributing an insider versus outsider perspective on the moral order can be highly consequential for how understandings of politeness, impoliteness and so on develop in interaction, because what participants can be held accountable for can be traced, in part, to perceptions of the moral order and the (perceived) status of participants vis-à-vis that moral order.

Kádár and Haugh, 2013, 124–5

But what are the bases on which people make their moral judgements? This is an angle that pragmatists like Kádár and Haugh have rarely addressed (but see Kádár and Marquez Reiter, 2015, for a pragmatics-based attempt in this area), and yet this is of fundamental importance for a theory of (im)politeness, especially when considering (im)politeness across cultures. Here researchers working in moral psychology and social justice, most notably Jonathan Haidt, can offer some interesting insights. Haidt and his colleagues (e.g. Haidt and Graham, 2007; Haidt and Kesebir, 2010; Graham, Nosek, Haidt et al., 2011) propose that there are five universal foundations to morality: authority/respect, ingroup/loyalty, harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, and purity/sanctity. Table 2 gives a brief explanation of each of these categories.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moral Foundation</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ingroup/loyalty</td>
<td>Concerns related to obligations of group membership, such as loyalty, self-sacrifice, and vigilance against betrayal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authority/respect</td>
<td>Concerns related to social order and the obligations of hierarchical</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
relationships, such obedience, respect, and the fulfilment of role-based duties.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moral Foundation</th>
<th>Concerns</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Harm/care</td>
<td>Concerns for the suffering of others, including virtues of caring and compassion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairness/reciprocity</td>
<td>Concerns about unfair treatment, cheating, and more abstract notions of justice and rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purity/sanctity</td>
<td>Concerns about physical and spiritual contagion, including virtues of chastity, wholesomeness, and control of desires.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Moral foundations according to Haidt (from Haidt and Kesebir, 2010, 822)

The first two moral foundations are concerned with relational links: group membership and hierarchical relations. The third and fourth moral foundations are concerned with our treatment of others. The fifth moral foundation is concerned with our personal morality. In a sense then, the moral foundations components are predominantly relational. Despite the differences from frameworks used within politeness theory, there are obvious synergies in certain elements, such as issues of power (Authority/respect), cost/benefit and reciprocity (Fairness/reciprocity). In fact, though, each is relevant to evaluations of (im)politeness and rapport, and each could underpin a group’s injunctive norms. This is even valid for purity/sanctity, which could play a key role in explicit moral evaluations, in the course of which people metapragmatically evoke morality and/or its lack.

Haidt and Graham (2007) point out that cultural groups can vary in the extent to which they emphasise (i.e. construct, value and teach) each of these moral foundations, such that some of the foundations are more important within some social groups than others. In line with this, Haidt and Kesebir (2010) report that political liberals and political conservatives in the USA hold different viewpoints with regard to the various moral foundations. In other words, Haidt and his colleagues regard these five elements of the moral domain as universally available (i.e. they offer an etic framework) but are variably developed and manifested among different cultural groups (i.e. they have emic manifestations).

Interestingly, even though Kádár and Haugh (2013) link the moral order closely to sociocultural groups or relational networks, and even though they devote a whole chapter to discussing culture and politeness, they do not explore the potential interconnections between culture and the moral order (although Kádár ventures into this theme, to some extent, in his 2013 monograph dedicated to rituals). For instance, what underlying values and beliefs influence people’s moral order judgements and thus what similarities and/or differences might there be in the instantiation of the moral order across different contexts and different cultural groups? It is essential for us to explore questions such as these if we are to deepen our understanding of what the moral order entails and how cultural factors may affect it. First, though, we need to explore some key questions about culture.

5. **Key questions about culture**

There are numerous definitions of culture, with little consensus among the wide range of definitions that have been proposed (Apte, 1994). In this paper, we roughly follow Spencer-Oatey’s (2008) definition:

Culture is a fuzzy set of basic assumptions and values, orientations to life, beliefs, policies, procedures and behavioural conventions that are shared by a group of people, and that
influence (but do not determine) each member’s behaviour and his/her interpretations of the ‘meaning’ of other people’s behaviour.

Spencer-Oatey 2008, 3

This definition raises two fundamental questions:

a. Where does culture ‘reside’ – in individuals, and/or in groups, and in what kinds of groups?
b. What are the different ways in which culture can be manifested in those individuals and/or groups?

In cross-cultural pragmatics, as Eelen (2001) points out, researchers have frequently equated cultural group with language group (e.g. Gu, 1990; Olshtain, 1989) or with nation (e.g. Blum-Kulka et al., 1989; Watts, 1989) and sometimes they have associated it with ethnic group (Nwoye, 1992). In empirical studies, especially in 1980s and 1990s, it was rarely questioned which type of cultural group was being studied. More recently, though, it has become a much more contentious issue, not least because of the risk of stereotyping and essentialising members of the larger groups. There has been a move towards studying smaller groups, such as workplace teams, but as Holmes, Marra, and Vine (2011) explain, as well as Kádár and Haugh (2013), the cultures of these smaller groups are nested within larger groups, such as organisations and the broader society. Thus, as Chao and Moon (2005) point out, “An individual’s unique collage of multiple cultural identities yields a complex picture of the cultural influences on that person” (p.1128). They refer to this as a cultural mosaic, with people’s cultural identities comprising numerous ‘cultural tiles’. Within each individual, their ‘tiles’ exert different degrees of influence in different contexts in dynamic and complex ways and in interaction with their personality and other aspects of their individual characteristics.

As a result of this complexity, and since members of these cultural groups are not homogeneous in their display of cultural patterns or norms, a fundamental issue with regard to cultural groups, and especially for large groups, is the difficulty of establishing cultural boundaries. Here, an analogy drawn by Žegarac (2007) between culture and epidemics can be helpful. He points out that just as epidemics entail diseased individuals, so cultures must have representations in the brains/minds of individuals. Yet when an epidemic spreads, the interaction between people and the environment means that individuals are afflicted to varying degrees, with some individuals maybe escaping completely. This variation among individuals does not stop medical experts from classifying an outbreak as epidemic; the key is the proportion of the population who are affected. The same is true for cultural groups. There is no need to require homogeneity among all members in their behavioural norms or patterns in order for them to be classified as a cultural group. However, there does need to be a certain degree of shared patterning or norms across the members.

So this brings us to the next question: what are the patterns that are shared? Pragmaticists have usually just focused on the linguistic/behavioural features they are interested in researching, such as apology strategies or small talk. However, from a conceptual point of view we can dig deeper than this. Moran (2001), drawing on the world-readiness standards for learning languages drawn up by the American Council on the teaching of foreign languages (ACTFL, nd), distinguishes three ‘levels’ of culture: products, practices and perspectives, which we paraphrase in Table 3.
These are the ‘concrete’ or ‘codified’ aspects of culture. They include physical objects such as buildings, clothes, furniture, equipment, and how they are arranged (e.g. interior design of a room). They also include less tangible aspects, such as the language code – the words, sounds and grammar of a language.

These are the regularities of behaviour that we display, such as driving on the left side of the road, and shaking hands or bowing when we meet someone new. They include our common patterns of speaking – the ways in which we use the words, sounds and grammar of our language, such as how we typically introduce people or engage in small talk. These practices reflect the rules, conventions and norms of the social group in which we are interacting.

These are the deep-seated and often unconscious attitudes, values and beliefs that we hold about life, such as respect for elders, the need for modesty, and the importance of independence and self-sufficiency.

| Products | These are the ‘concrete’ or ‘codified’ aspects of culture. They include physical objects such as buildings, clothes, furniture, equipment, and how they are arranged (e.g. interior design of a room). They also include less tangible aspects, such as the language code – the words, sounds and grammar of a language. |
| Practices | These are the regularities of behaviour that we display, such as driving on the left side of the road, and shaking hands or bowing when we meet someone new. They include our common patterns of speaking – the ways in which we use the words, sounds and grammar of our language, such as how we typically introduce people or engage in small talk. These practices reflect the rules, conventions and norms of the social group in which we are interacting. |
| Perspectives | These are the deep-seated and often unconscious attitudes, values and beliefs that we hold about life, such as respect for elders, the need for modesty, and the importance of independence and self-sufficiency. |

Table 3: Levels of Cultural Patterns

Products and practices are the visible or directly observable components of culture, while perspectives are hidden and need to be inferred, as indicated by the widely-used metaphor of the iceberg (E. T. Hall, 1976).

In this paper, we focus on the perspectives (i.e. the deeper aspects of culture) that people draw on when making their (im)politeness evaluations and that are therefore a key source of the moral order. So in the next section we explore the interconnections between the deep roots of culture, the moral order, and (im)politeness evaluations of behaviour and language use.

6. The deep roots of culture: moral foundations and basic values

Academics from a range of disciplines have devoted a great deal of research attention to the ‘hidden’ aspects of culture. Traditionally the focus has been on fundamental assumptions and basic values, with key work in this area being carried out by anthropologists (e.g. Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck 1961), psychologists (e.g. Schwartz 1992; Schwartz et al. 2012), and organisational behaviour/management scholars (e.g. Hofstede 1980/2001; House et al. 2004). More recently, there has been an increased interest in culture as beliefs. Some large scale studies have explored social axioms across cultures (e.g. Leung et al. 2002; Bond et al. 2004), and there have been calls for more work on culture and religious beliefs (e.g. Tarakeshwar et al. 2003; Saucier et al. 2015).

In this section, we explore (im)politeness evaluations and the moral order, using Haidt’s (Haidt and Graham, 2007; Haidt and Kesebir, 2010; Graham, Nosek, Haidt et al., 2011) moral foundations framework as the organising principle. We inter-relate concepts in politeness theory with this approach and consider whether basic values can yield further insights into the sources of moral evaluations (cf. Boer & Fischer, 2013). We present some authentic (im)politeness-related encounters/incidents that involve Chinese and non-Chinese participants to help illustrate our arguments.

6.1 The moral order of relational links: Perspectives on groups

Participant relations within pragmatics, as well as within politeness theory, have traditionally been conceptualised in terms of power and distance, perhaps because of the focus on dyadic interaction.
In terms of relational links, B&L (1978/1987) gave central place to the individual’s rights to personal preserves, freedom of action and freedom from imposition, through their concept of negative politeness. Yet as explained in section 2, pragmaticists such as Matsumoto (1988) and Ide (1989), challenged this viewpoint, arguing that in Japanese society, the key issue is not individual freedom but ‘occupying the proper place’ in society. Matsumoto (1988, 407) quotes the anthropologist Lebra to explain this:

By proper-place occupancy I mean one’s awareness of the place assigned to one in a social group, institution, or society as a whole; one’s capacity and willingness to fulfil all obligations attached to that place; and one’s claim to recognition of that place by others.

Lebra, 1976, 67; cited by Matsumoto, 1988, 407

This is a perspective taken up subsequently by Haugh (2005, 2007).

Ide (1989) maintains that the sense of proper place is determined by B&L’s (1978/1987) weightiness variables, power (P), distance (D) and rank (R). We would argue that this is only part of the picture. More fundamentally, it relates to people’s underlying perspectives on the interrelationship between individuals and groups. This is an aspect that has rarely been explored in depth in pragmatics, and yet has frequently emerged as a variable in social psychological and anthropological research.

The anthropologists Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961) argued that people throughout the world all face a number of core human issues that they need to resolve, and that there are limited core solutions to these problems. The five core problems that they identified, along with the main possible solutions, are shown in Table 4 (see Hills, 2002, for a helpful account).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core Issue</th>
<th>Possible Solutions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary orientation to time</td>
<td>Focus on the Past (emphasis on maintaining traditions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Focus on the Present (emphasis on achieving best solution for current situation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Focus on the Future (emphasis on planning ahead)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship to the environment</td>
<td>Subjugation to nature (belief that humans should submit to higher forces &amp; not try to control them)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Harmony with nature (belief that humans should control what they can but also live in harmony with nature)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mastery over nature (belief that humans can and should control the forces of nature)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of human nature</td>
<td>Basically evil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mixture of good and bad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Basically good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship among people</td>
<td>Lineal (preference for hierarchical relations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Collateral (emphasis on consensus within extended group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Individualistic (emphasis on the individual or individual families within the group who make decisions independently from others)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode of human activity</td>
<td>Being (acceptance of the status quo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Being-in-becoming (preference for transformation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Doing (preference for direct intervention)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck’s (1961) Cultural orientation framework

Here we can see that ‘relationship among people’ is identified as one of the fundamental issues that every social group needs to handle and that the issue of group vis-à-vis the individual is a key one. This relates to one of the most frequently mentioned dimensions in cross-cultural psychology, individualism–collectivism (e.g. Hofstede, 2001; Triandis, 1995). Oyserman, Coon, and Kemmelmeier
identify the core characteristic of individualism as individuals functioning independently of each other, and the core characteristic of collectivism as group members being bound and mutually obligated to each other. Although there is now a lot of debate about the details of the construct of individualism–collectivism (e.g. Fiske 2002; Miller, 2002), the variability it tries to account for is of fundamental relevance to politeness theory and the moral order. It addresses issues such as how independent people generally like to be in their actions, how obligated they feel towards the needs of others, and who are encompassed in those mutual obligations.

One feature of relational links that is often associated with individualism–collectivism is the distinction between in-groups and out-groups, and the extent to which people distinguish sharply between these groups. Again, this is an important issue for (im)politeness evaluations, as Kádár and Haugh (2013) explain:

Attributing an insider versus outsider perspective on the moral order can be highly consequential for how understandings of politeness, impoliteness and so on develop in interaction, because what participants can be held accountable for can be traced, in part, to perceptions of the moral order and the (perceived) status of participants vis-à-vis that moral order.

Kádár and Haugh, 2013, 124–5

Here work by the psychologist, Shalom Schwartz, is of relevance as he has developed one of the most rigorous and increasingly influential value-based frameworks of recent years. We introduce his model here not only because it includes values pertinent to in-groups and out-groups, but also because it depicts other values that are relevant to the moral order underpinning (im)politeness evaluations and which we will refer to in subsequent sections.

Schwartz defines basic values as “trans-situational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in the life of a person or a group” (Schwartz et al., 2012, 664). He maintains that the values he proposes are likely to be universal because they are grounded in one or more of three universal requirements of human existence: human needs as individual biological organisms; human needs for coordinated social action; and the needs of groups for survival and welfare. His framework is particularly valuable in that it is one of the few that can be applied at the individual level. Moreover, one of its unique features is that the values he proposes are represented not as a set of discretely different ones but rather as a circular continuum of related motivations, as shown in Figure 3. An analogy with colours may help explain this: just as one colour merges into another, so one value gradually shifts to another.
In an interesting study, Schwartz (2007) investigated how people’s basic values relate to the “inclusiveness of their moral universe”. He found that individuals both within a given society, as well as across different societies, show considerable variation in the breadth and inclusiveness of their moral universes. A broad moral inclusiveness is associated with the value universalism, and a narrow one with benevolence. He then found that this variation was also associated with people’s attitudes towards immigration: the broader their inclusiveness, the more positive their attitudes were.

These differences in the scope of people’s moral universe are then likely to impact significantly on their (im)politeness evaluations. A personal example from the first author illustrates this point.

Example 1

This incident took place in the 1980s, when Helen was working in Shanghai. It was a time when many goods were in short supply. One Saturday morning Helen went to a local store to buy some yoghurt and some milk. There were two long queues for each of these items and she joined the queue for yoghurt. As she gradually waited her turn, she began to realise that by the time she had bought her yoghurt and lined up again for milk, the milk would all have been sold out. As it came almost to her turn to buy her yoghurt, she noticed that one person ahead of her had bought both yoghurt and milk – the assistant had simply reached over for a bottle of milk. So when Helen was served, she also asked for a bottle of milk in addition to the yoghurt. Immediately the assistant shouted at her, clearly unwilling to sell her the milk. Others in the queue started shouting back and there was a great commotion.

Eventually the assistant reached for a bottle of milk and sold Helen both the yoghurt and the milk. However, when she was about to give Helen her change, she looked at Helen in disgust and then deliberately threw her change on the floor.

Helen was extremely taken aback by the incident but through reflection and discussion with others realised the source of the problem. The other customer who had bought both yoghurt and milk was a friend of the shop assistant and everyone else in the queue realised that the assistant had allowed this because of ‘in-group relations’. When Helen asked for both items, the shop assistant scolded her because as an outsider, she was not entitled to...
this special treatment. Other people in the queue were aware of this and so no one else asked for both items. However, when the assistant shouted at Helen, these other people jumped to Helen’s defence, arguing that the assistant should also give Helen preferential treatment, because of the Chinese custom of being hospitable to foreign visitors. The assistant eventually agreed to do so, but threw Helen’s change on the floor to convey her annoyance and reluctance at having to do so.

From this incident, we can see clearly the impact of in-group/out-group relational links on polite and impolite behaviour. Helen did not expect the in-group/out-group distinction to influence customer service in a shop, yet both the shop assistant and the people in the queue clearly did so (despite their interpreting the scope somewhat differently). This led to differing evaluative judgements by all three: Helen, the shop assistant and the members of the queue.

At a cultural group level, many would argue that even though connections (guanxi) are important in all societies, they are particularly salient in China and more broadly in East Asia. It seems that the gap between in-group (nei, known in Japanese as uchi) and out-group (wai, soto in Japanese) is traditionally large in East Asia in comparison with many other societies, and that the interactional rules of appropriate behaviour differ for ‘in-group’ and ‘out-group’ members (see Pan, 2000). In other words, in Haidt’s terms (Haidt and Graham, 2007; Haidt and Kesebir, 2010), there are differences in the societies’ ingroup/loyalty moral foundations.

6.2 The moral order of relational links: Perspectives on hierarchy

The power relations of participants are an important element of pragmatic theory and central to most (im)politeness models, including those of B&L (1978/1987), Leech (1983, 2014), and Spencer-Oatey (2008). B&L point out that the prevalence of status differentiation or of egalitarianism can vary across societies, and research by Spencer-Oatey (1997) reports cross-cultural differences in this respect with regard to one type of role relationship. However, there has been little or no work within pragmatics to explore the moral order underpinning such tendencies. This is in contrast to research by anthropologists and psychologists who have studied this issue extensively.

As shown in Table 4 above, Kluckhohn and Strotbeck (1961) identified the establishment of hierarchical relations is one way of dealing with the fundamental issue of ‘relationship among people’. Extensive research has been carried out by social and organisational psychologists into people’s basic values and people’s attitude to hierarchy (equality/inequality) has repeatedly emerged as an issue of difference. For example, Hofstede (2001), House et al. (2004) and Schwartz (e.g. 1992; with Bardi, 2001) all identify power (variously labelled as power distance or simply power) as a fundamental dimension of value variation across both individuals and societies. House et al. (2004, 30) define the construct as follows: “Power distance: the degree to which members of a collective expect power to be distributed equally.”

Clearly, if individuals, or groups of individuals, hold power distance values such as this, they may evaluate behaviour that challenges or fails to uphold their preferences as being impolite or inappropriate. The following example from Pan and Kádár (2011,108–109) illustrates how differing beliefs about hierarchical relations can affect perceptions of politeness and appropriateness.
Example 2: Hierarchical relations

The U.S. Census Bureau were planning an important national survey and needed to send out a letter in advance to tell people about the upcoming survey and to encourage them to participate. This letter needed to be sent out in different languages and so the Bureau commissioned a study to check the accuracy and cultural appropriateness of the wordings of the translated letters. One of the translated languages was Chinese and twenty-four recent Chinese immigrants, who varied in age, educational level, gender, and length of stay in the U.S.A., were selected to participate in the study. In an interview setting they were asked to comment on and evaluate the translation of the letter to see if it was clear and easy to understand. They were also asked to comment on the cultural appropriateness of the terms and expressions used, including levels of politeness. The letter was signed by the U.S. Census Bureau director.

The first paragraph of the letter stated:

Dear Resident:
The U.S. Census Bureau is conducting the American Community Survey. A Census Bureau representative will contact you to help you complete the survey. I would appreciate your help, because the success of this survey depends on you.

This beginning paragraph was translated into Chinese as follows:

尊敬的居民：

美国人口普查局正在進行一項「美國社區調查」。一位人口普查局的服務代表會與您聯繫，幫助您填寫該調查問卷。我們非常感謝您的幫助，因為本項調查的成功取決於您的支持。

The Chinese translation of this paragraph contains several linguistic politeness features: the use of an honorific term zunjing de 尊敬的 ('honourable') in the salutation, the use of the formal and polite second person pronoun nin 您, an expression of appreciation (women feichang ganxie nin de bangzhu 我們非常感謝您的幫助, 'We are extremely grateful to you for your help'), and dependence on the other (yinwei ben xiang diaocha de chenggong qujue yu nin de zhichi 因為本項調查的成功取決於您的支持, 'because the success of this survey depends on your support').

The Chinese speakers’ interview comments on the wording of this first paragraph are very revealing in terms of perception of politeness. They stated that the letter was written in too polite a tone and sounded unnatural in Chinese. They commented that the director of a government agency would not normally thank the people, or show open appreciation. Some of them even laughed when they read this paragraph and said that U.S. government was ‘too polite’. In other words, they thought the Census Bureau Director had the authority to be more directive and should have worded the letter in that way. Yet if the English version of the letter had been more directive, instructing the American recipients to participate in the survey, this would almost certainly have been regarded as disrespectful and impolite by the English-speaking Americans.
This example, therefore, illustrates how differing beliefs about normative hierarchical relations and about the rights of those holding institutional power to give instructions to the general public, can influence perceptions of (im)politeness.

6.3. The moral order of relational conduct: Perspectives on care and consideration

B&L (1978/1987) argue that it is usually in people’s best interests to maintain the face of others, because if they do not, others may threaten their face in return. Some scholars (e.g. Schmidt 1980), however, have commented that this is an overly pessimistic and paranoid view of human social interaction, and others have criticised it for its strategic rationalism. Intachakra (2012), for example, maintains that Lakoff (1973), Leech (1983) and B&L (1978/1987) all assume a ‘means-to-end’ rationality, but fail to account adequately for a very different approach – a ‘rapport-oriented’ rationality. He expounds the Thai emic concept of KKJ, which can be very roughly translated as ‘heart/mind’, and explains that it entails being considerate to others, being aware of their feelings and desires, and being concerned for their peace of mind. So in his view, a theory of politeness needs to incorporate a ‘caring for others’ perspective.

This resonates with the moral foundation that Haidt and his colleagues (e.g. Haidt and Graham, 2007; Haidt and Kesebir, 2010; Graham, Nosek, Haidt et al., 2011) label as ‘harm/care’. This type of morality entails concern for the suffering of others, including the virtues of caring and compassion. Such an orientation is closely associated once again with Schwartz’s basic values of ‘benevolence – caring’ and ‘universalism – concern’, which he probes with the following questionnaire items (Schwartz et al. 2012, 688, male version):

Benevolence – caring:
- It’s very important to him to help the people dear to him.
- Caring for the well-being of people he is close to is important to him.
- He tries always to be responsive to the needs of his family and friends.

Universalism – concern:
- Protecting society’s weak and vulnerable members is important to him.
- He thinks it is important that every person in the world have equal opportunities in life.
- He wants everyone to be treated justly, even people he doesn’t know.

So it seems feasible that people and/or societies who attach great importance to these values of care will be more likely to display a ‘rapport-oriented’ rationality than those who attach less importance to them. However, as discussed in section 6.1, the range of people who are encompassed in such displays of care can vary, depending on whether they hold strong values for both benevolence and universalism or whether they hold strong values only for benevolence.

A cultural group’s emphasis on benevolence and/or universalism is often reflected in metadiscourse comments on appropriate behaviour. There has been a national level debate on this in China in recent years, following a now infamous case in 2011 in which 18 people failed to help a young toddler who had been run over by a car and was lying seriously injured in the street. The concerns led to the country’s first “Good Samaritan law” coming into effect in Shenzhen in August 2013, which
demonstrated a fresh effort by the government to change public attitudes towards helping others.\(^1\) It seems that individuals in all societies typically feel a responsibility to help members of their in-group, but the extent to which they demonstrate care and consideration for ‘outsiders’ can vary significantly according to their moral foundations. This is supported by two metapragmatic studies conducted by Kádár and Márquez-Reiter (2015) and Ran and Kádár (forthcoming) on ‘bystander intervention’.

6.4 The moral order of relational conduct: Perspectives on fairness

Several politeness models incorporate the notion of fairness but do so rather implicitly. For example, B&L (1978/1987) propose the concept of weightiness, including the concept of rank (R) or degree of imposition, while Leech (1983) refers to a cost/benefit scale. Spencer-Oatey (2008), on the other hand, mentions it more explicitly, proposing equity as a sociopragmatic interactional principle. She defines this as a fundamental belief that people are entitled to consideration from others, and she suggests it has two components. The first is cost/benefit – the principle of keeping costs and benefits roughly in balance through the principle of reciprocity – and the second is autonomy/imposition – the principle of keeping levels of imposition and autonomy roughly in balance, again through the principle of reciprocity.

This is not an aspect of politeness theory that many people have discussed in depth, and is also not a clear element of Schwartz’s basic values. It could be argued that the values of ‘benevolence – caring’ and ‘universalism’ are essential for the fair treatment of others, but they do not incorporate the notion of reciprocity. An example from Xing (2002) can help illustrate the importance of this moral foundation for assessments of (im)politeness.

Example 3

A British engineering company had sold equipment to China and afterwards hosted a 10-day delegation visit from the customers. The costs of hosting the visit were included in the sales price and a tradition had arisen that any money remaining in the budget at the end of a visit would be given to the visitors as personal ‘pocket money’. However, this particular trip was fraught with problems throughout. The delegation was dissatisfied with the initial welcome meeting, cancelled all the training sessions and insisted on 10 days of sightseeing. On the final day, when they were each handed their ‘pocket money’ in an envelope, they opened the envelopes in front of their hosts, counted the money and the argued that it was not enough. They insisted on seeing an itemised list of the host company’s costs for the visit and argued for two hours over specific details.

The British manager responsible for the practicalities of the visit was extremely annoyed and commented afterwards as follows: “off the record, they haven’t any ethics, you know they had no due respect for their hosts.” The Chinese visitors, on the other hand, believed they were being cheated over the amount of ‘pocket money’ they were due and that they therefore had the right to insist on it being recalculated. One forcefully commented as follows to the interpreter:

You just tell him. Is it so easy to bully us Chinese, so easy to fool us? This money is what we have been saving out of our mouths. We’ve been eating instant noodles every day just to save some money and now they have grabbed it. How unreasonable is that?

One of the delegation members, though, was conscious of the negative impression their challenges might convey and listed the different relational-management issues they needed to consider:

One thing is that we shouldn’t leave people saying that we are stingy, second, we shouldn’t give the impression of being too weak, but in addition we should be a bit friendlier.

Here we can see clearly that people’s interpretations of fairness and reciprocity influenced participants’ sense of rights to negotiate/argue as well as their evaluations of the (im)politeness/appropriateness of such behaviour. Interestingly, it seems that both British and Chinese upheld the same moral foundation of fairness/reciprocity, yet held differing views as to what actually counted as fair. This raises a fundamental question that we return to in section 7.3: what kinds of association there are between values, (im)politeness evaluations and behaviour and what other factors or underlying perspectives may play a role.

6.5 The moral order of personal conduct: Perspectives on wholesomeness

B&L (1978/1987) identify face as the key feature of their model of politeness, with ‘positive face’ as a particularly important element. They define positive face as “the positive consistent self-image ... claimed by interactants” (p.61), and the desire that others appreciate and approve of those self-images. One of Mao’s (1994) criticisms of B&L’s concept of face is that it fails to capture the Chinese concepts of face, as reflected in the terms liăn and mìanzi. He explains these two Chinese conceptions of face as follows: mìanzi stands for prestige or reputation, while liăn refers to a good moral reputation. The latter thus seems closely associated with the Haidt’s moral foundation of purity/sanctity.

An example from Hinze (2012, 22) illustrates this.

Example 4

A non-Chinese construction company wanted to make some adjustments to a contract with a Chinese company, claiming that the current specifications had only been discussed with the Chinese party’s technical personnel, not with their commercial personnel. The Chinese party disputed this claim and maintained that all relevant parties had been involved. A junior Chinese negotiator suggested they might compromise, but a more senior negotiator refused to do so, arguing his case on moral uprightness grounds:

不, 我们不准备作出任何让步。他们在规格上撒谎。如果他们自己不要脸，那我们就不用给他们留面子。
No. We are not going to offer any concessions. They are lying about the specifications – if they don’t want liàn, we should not give them liǎnmiàn.

Here we see that the senior Chinese negotiator treated lying as a loss of liàn (moral face), and this is clearly related to Haidt’s moral foundation of purity/sanctity.

What values then may underpin this moral foundation? In fact, a number of the basic values identified by Schwartz (Schwartz et al., 2012) could be subject to impoliteness evaluations if wholesomeness is breached or impropriety is displayed in excess. In Example 4, the concern was a breach of honesty. On other occasions, different values might be threatened. For example, in June 2015 a group of young Westerners were arrested by the Malaysian authorities for posing naked and urinating on a sacred mountain, Mount Kinabalu. Local village people believe that the souls of the dead rest in this mountain and so for them this was a major insult, showing great lack of respect for their traditions. The young people’s behaviour was thus judged to be offensive because of lack of purity/sanctity, and in Schwartz’s terms, the moral basis to this evaluation was breach of the value ‘tradition’, which Schwartz defines in terms of maintenance of traditional customs, values or beliefs.

7. Discussion

7.1 The East-West debate revisited

Having explored (im)politeness in relation to Haidt’s five moral foundations, we now consider whether we can gain any new insights into the East-West debate.

Firstly, we can see that Japanese (im)politeness (as argued by Ide, 1989; Matsumoto, 1989; Haugh, 2005) is closely associated with two of Haidt’s moral foundations: in-group/loyalty and authority/respect. These seem to be particularly important in Japanese society and seem to underlie Japanese concerns for wakimae (‘discernment’) and for ‘place’. They are of comparatively lesser importance in English-speaking societies, such as the UK and the USA, and this can partly explain why East and West politeness can operate differently.

Secondly, these two moral foundations (in-group/loyalty and authority/respect) also underpin Chinese and Japanese concepts of face in that, as Mao (1994) argues, face in both Chinese and Japanese has a strong public, communal aspect. For instance, Mao explains face in Japanese as follows:

After being introduced to someone, the speaker may say the following, or some variation of it: “Dooza yorosiku onegaisimasu”, which is literally translated as “I ask you to please treat me well/take care of me” (Matsumoto, 1988: 409). In uttering this sentence, the speaker is implicitly making a direct request or an unveiled imposition. Yet, the speaker is not trying to mitigate the imposition that such a direct request usually entails by way of the politeness marker ‘please’; nor is the speaker stroking the partner’s positive face by showing some sign of intimacy. Rather, the speaker is expressing deference by humbling him- or herself and placing him- or herself in a lower position (Matsumoto, 1988: 409-410). Deferent imposition, Matsumoto explains, “enhance[s] the good self-image (that is, the ‘face’) of the

addressee” since “the acknowledgement of interdependence is encouraged” in Japanese society (1988: 410). To the extent that speakers are successful in achieving the goal of acknowledging the current interdependent relationship, they enhance the partner’s face as well as their own.

Mao, 1994, 467

Again, this contrasts strongly with concepts of face in English-speaking societies, which are much more individually (or sometimes group) focused, and with much less emphasis on relational face.

Thirdly, the Chinese face concept of liān, as depicted by Mao (1994), is closely associated with the moral foundation of purity/sanctity. Chinese people’s liān face is tied to a good moral reputation and if anything happens to undermine this reputation, that person (and close associates) will lose face. Of course, this is also true to some extent in Western societies, but people would not immediately label any such reputation damage as a loss of face.

Fourthly, Intachakra (2012) argues that Thai politeness is strongly influenced by the ‘heart’. He introduces an aspect of Thai politeness called kʰwːrnɡːtɕaj (KKJ) which he explains as giving central place to the metaphor of the heart, with symbolic value accorded to ‘feelings’, ‘states of mind’ and ‘emotions’. He argues that KKJ makes explicit reference to a speaker’s concern for the feelings, peace of mind, convenience and/or benefit of others, in contrast with mainstream politeness theorisation in which the focus is on the speaker attending to the other person’s image, sense of worth and/or reputation. Intachakra further maintains that Thai people aim not so much to avoid face-threatening acts, which challenge someone’s personal image, sense of worth and/or reputation, but rather to avoid ‘heart-threatening’ acts which may damage people’s feelings. He proposes that while it would be premature to argue that KKJ is a universal phenomenon, it “may be known under a separate terminological guise or given a higher or lower priority in their respective systems of politeness.”(p.632) This claim fits well with our thesis, as KKJ seems to be underpinned by the moral foundation of harm/care. In Haidt’s framework, this is a universal moral foundation, but its relative importance probably varies across cultural groups.

We would argue, therefore, that Haidt’s etic framework of moral foundations can help us make sense of the different foci and emphases of (im)politeness concerns in different languages and cultures.

7.2 Moral foundations and deep roots of culture: beliefs and ideologies

In section 6, we considered the extent to which Haidt’s moral foundations can be related to people’s underlying basic values, such as those specified by Schwartz (1992; Schwartz et al. 2012). Two of his values, notably universalism and benevolence, seem to be particularly influential in affecting in-group/out-group attitudes, which in turn seem to affect moral order evaluations associated with care/consideration and with fairness. However, the relevance of other basic values is less clear. For example, while Schwartz includes power in his framework, it is focused on an individual’s personal desire for power and status, rather than the more relational concept of power distance (Hofstede, 2001; House et al., 2004). So might there be other, deep culture perspectives that throw further/greater light on (im)politeness evaluations and moral foundations?
During the last 10-15 years, a number of cross-cultural psychologists have turned their attention to aspects of deep culture other than values. For example, a number of cross-cultural psychologists (e.g. Leung et al., 2002; Bond et al., 2004) have been exploring social axioms. However, they concern ‘how the world works’ rather than evaluative judgements (Leung et al. 2002) and do not seem particularly illuminating. Another possibility of particular relevance to issues of moral order is religious beliefs.

Saucier et al. (2015), on the basis of their findings from a large scale study, have recently argued that more research needs to be carried out into religious beliefs. These researchers conducted a ‘survey of world views’, collecting data from nearly 9000 respondents in 33 countries and incorporated measures of a very wide range of variables, including values, social axioms, and religious beliefs and practices. They found that some of largest variations across nations in effect size were for religious beliefs and practices, and so they recommend that it would be particularly helpful for future studies to “focus on beliefs connected to religion (or the metaphysical), and especially on practices and behaviors that reflect the everyday impact of religion on persons” (p.63).

Nearly all (if not all) religions and ideological systems comprise not only beliefs about god and human nature, but also include prescriptions about how people should behave. Saroglou (2011) proposes an etic framework for considering the interconnections between culture and religion, arguing that the following four religious dimensions are universally present across contexts: believing, belonging, bonding and behaving. All four of these aspects have clear connections with Haidt’s moral foundations. Here we illustrate this with two of Haidt’s moral foundations, care and fairness/reciprocity.

With respect to Christianity, there are repeated admonitions in the Bible, in both the Old Testament and the New, to treat other people with care, fairness and justice. Interestingly, however, in the New Testament it does not include reciprocity. Jesus teaches that while people should treat others with kindness and justice, they should not seek to gain anything in return. Nor should they reciprocate any lack of care by others. For instance in his famous Sermon on the Mount he taught as follows:

You have heard that it was said, “Eye for eye, and tooth for tooth.” But I tell you, Do not resist an evil person. If someone strikes you on the right cheek, turn to him the other also. And if someone wants to sue you and take your tunic, let him have your cloak as well. [...] Love your enemies, do good to them, and lend to them without expecting to get anything back.

The Bible: Matthew, 5, 38–40; Luke 6, 35

It is worth noting that this sense of unconditional kindness and justice is relatively unique to Christianity: although it is present to some extent in some other religions (e.g. Buddhism), it is completely alien, for example, to traditional Chinese culture. Due to the Confucian notion of xiào (‘respecting parents/elder’), in Chinese morality one must take revenge if one’s parents/older relatives/family/group are hurt by someone else, and it is a complete loss of face (liàn – i.e. someone’s ‘moral face’) if no revenge attempt is made. In his impressive monograph, Madsen (1984) describes the way in which revenge – up to the present day – is being integrated into moral (meta)discourses in rural China.
It is pertinent to emphasise two points here. Firstly, ‘religion’ is not necessarily limited to religious belief (Bellah, 1991): although many societies, following historical changes, claim to be ‘secular’, it is often the case that religious concepts continue to influence people’s behaviour irrespective of the fact that people may regard themselves as non-believers. A recent study by Kádár and De La Cruz (2016) has addressed this issue by exploring the role of acting as a ‘good Samaritan’, and evaluations triggered by failing to act in this role, in the highly secular North American society. This links with the second point: even if people do not display such behaviour, they may still make (im)politeness evaluations in accordance with them.

Religious beliefs, such as Judaism, Christianity and Islam, can be regarded more broadly as ideologies. So another direction for exploring deep culture perspectives associated with moral foundations and (im)politeness would be to examine salient evaluative attitudes in a given ideology towards certain types of interpersonal relationship; for example, the relationship between strangers in Judeo-Christian ideology and that between higher-ranking and lower-ranking (e.g. teacher-disciple, father-son) in Confucianism.

7.3 Uncertainties over levels and links

Throughout this paper, we have regarded (im)politeness evaluations as occurring at the interactional level and argued that something deeper underlies them. However, as can be seen from Figure 3 above, Schwartz identifies face as a basic value, probing it with the following questionnaire items (Schwartz et al., 2012, 687, male version):

Face:
- It is important to him that no one should ever shame him.
- Protecting his public image is important to him.
- He wants people always to treat him with respect and dignity.

So this raises the question: is face a ‘deep level’ concept that underpins (im)politeness evaluations or is it an ‘interactional level’ concept that guides or influences interpersonal interactions and assessments? Or are there multiple levels? As mentioned above, Schwartz defines basic values as “trans-situational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in the life of a person or a group” (Schwartz et al., 2012, 664). This notion of ‘principles’ has resonances with Spencer-Oatey and Jiang’s (2003) concept of ‘sociocultural interactional principles’ (SIPS), but it is unclear how similar or different they are, or the potential synergies between them.

Other concerns over levels and links are expressed by Fischer and Schwartz (2011: 1140):

Values are abstract constructs. The attitudinal and behavioural implications associated with a value may depend on the context and may differ across societies. Many intercultural conflicts or misunderstandings involve situations where either (a) the same or similar values map onto different attitudes and behaviors or (b) particular attitudes and behaviors are mapped onto different values. [...] Consider an example of how a particular behaviour may map onto different values. Kissing a nonrelative on the cheek when meeting in public may

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3 This is a new addition and was not included as a value in earlier iterations of his framework.
be construed as showing “respect,” “friendship,” and “equality” or as violating “tradition,” “decency” and “honor.” Which mapping occurs depends on the social and cultural context.

So much more research is needed into the factors that influence (im)politeness evaluations and the moral order, including what they are and how they interconnect.

7.4 Limitations

Within the scope of this paper, there are a number of aspects that we have not been able to explore. For example, we have not discussed the impact that emotional factors have on evaluation and how they may link with or be distinct from rational evaluations. Similarly, we have not considered the impact of intentionality nor the changes that may occur over time in people’s moral order conceptions. More research and analysis is clearly needed in all these areas. In addition, further research is needed into possible alternative/additional frameworks that could underpin people’s moral evaluations. These are likely to include different types of beliefs and ideologies. There is clearly a rich agenda for further research.

8. Concluding comments

In this paper we have considered (im)politeness evaluation from an interdisciplinary perspective, examining it with the help of psychological concepts and frameworks on moral foundations and basic values. We have argued that pragmatists can gain valuable insights into the East-West debate, and more broadly into intercultural (im)politeness evaluation, by taking both an etic (top-down) as well as an emic (bottom-up) approach. We have also argued for the relevance of Haidt’s moral foundations framework for considering (im)politeness evaluations and the moral order. However, we have noted that there is a need for much greater clarity on the factors that influence moral foundations and (im)politeness evaluations, including what they are and how they interconnect, and we maintain that this is an important area for future research. We urge pragmatists and psychologists to engage more fully with each other and contribute their respective concepts and insights to helping address this challenge.

References

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