‘IN HUMAN SHAPE TO BECOME THE VERY BEAST!’ –
HENRY MORE ON ANIMALS

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Introduction

‘[T]o expect and wish that there were nothing but such dull tame things in the world, that will neither bite nor scratch, is as groundless and childish, as to wish there were no Choler in the body, nor Fire in the universal compass of Nature’ (Antidote, 63). Animals play a crucial role in Henry More’s philosophy. Yet, this quotation from An Antidote Against Atheism expresses More’s main preoccupation in dealing with this subject: his view of animals cannot be restrained to the ‘childish’ hope or expectation that among animals, as with all other ‘things’ in the world, there are only innocuous, tame ones. For More, animals are not simply harmless companions for man, or useful resources, even if some of them can certainly be viewed as such, as discussed in the chapter from An Antidote featuring this quotation. Rather, More’s animals very often ‘bite’ and ‘scratch’: both metaphorically, because consideration of their presence in the order of the world leads More to consider possible challenges to his own arguments; and literally, because explaining the aggressive behaviour of certain creatures is crucial to More’s understanding of the structure of the universe.

This essay will consider the main issues at stake in More’s understanding of animals and of their place in the world. In particular it aims to show why the ‘untamed’ nature of some animals is for More a metaphysical problem that also reverberates on the levels of psychology and ethics. I shall argue that More’s interpretation of the role of animals is far more complex and nuanced than it has long being assumed, especially as a result of limiting the assessment of More’s position to the well-known statements in the correspondence with Descartes. This essay attempts to place More’s defence of animals in those letters in a larger context, in order to gain a more balanced and comprehensive view of More’s long-lasting interest in the human-animal differentiation.

In the correspondence between More and Descartes, the question about the existence of a soul in animals seemed to lead to a frontal opposition between their views: on the one hand the Cartesian belief that animals are fully explicable by reference to the functions of their bodies, and on the other More’s defence of the conception that animals are creatures endowed with souls. But while Descartes’ reasoning in these letters has been minutely examined,\(^1\)

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\(^1\) A famous interpretation is that provided by Cottingham, ‘‘A Brute to the Brutes?’: Descartes’ Treatment of Animals’, 551-9.
critics have tended to simplify More’s position. It has been assumed that More would have been particularly upset by Descartes’ famous statement that his theory of animal automatism absolves human beings ‘from the suspicion of crime when they eat or kill animals’. The ‘gentle and tender soul’ of Henry More, worried about the fate and exploitation of animals, has thus been more or less directly opposed to Descartes, portrayed as an unscrupulous advocate of a sort of ‘carnivorous liberation’. The focus on the More-Descartes exchange has led scholars to overlook that More’s view of animals had deeper roots than is apparent from his opposition to Cartesian automatism and its practical consequences. More himself was in fact firmly convinced that humans could, and even should, make full use of animals, and that their killing might be nothing more than a ‘Tragick-Comedy’ (Antidote, 188). How this belief in the human exploitation of animals could be combinable with the opposition to Descartes, becomes understandable only by considering More’s long-term engagement with the question about the place of animals in the world, a topic which remains problematic and at least partially unsolved throughout his work.

In this essay I concentrate in particular on three main aspects of More’s philosophy in which the position of animals appears noteworthy, in order to take the first steps towards a more comprehensive and balanced reconstruction of More’s view of animals. These are: 1) the role of animals in More’s critique of atheism, both as safeguard for the body-soul interaction and as proofs of divine providence in nature; 2) the problem of distinguishing between good and evil and that of explaining the existence of evil in the universe; 3) the issue of how to reach happiness. In all three areas, the focus of More’s interest swings from metaphorical to real animals, from beasts internal to man’s soul to both tame and ferocious ones that populate the external world. By following these three closely connected strands it is possible to grasp the elements of originality in More’s own reflection on animals, separating it from the overshadowing presence of the Cartesian opposition.

As I show in the first part of the essay, devoted to the role of animals in the critique of atheism, More’s argumentative strategy involves an eclectic approach to intertwining and adapting of sources. This is the case with his appropriation of Cardano’s explanation about the animals’ providential suitability for survival in nature. Furthermore, More’s approach to the topic of animals is remarkable because it develops on a complex variety of levels (cosmological, theological, ethical), which cannot be separated. The emphasis on the ethical consequences is especially noteworthy, and it has remained until now almost entirely

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2 Descartes to More, 5 February 1649 in Descartes, Philosophical Writings, vol. 3: The Correspondence, 366 (see also Œuvres, vol. 5, 279; and Correspondence, 53).

3 See Wilson, Ideas and Mechanism, 502. The portrait of More as gentle towards animals stems from Ward, The Life of Henry More (Parts 1 and 2), 58-9: ‘his Kindness went so low as to the very Beasts; Who had the least (he said) and worst of it. And he abhor’d that Cruelty and Stupidity of Temper with which over-many are apt to treat the Animals of whatsoever kind’.


unnotted by scholars. Finally, More’s treatment of animality does not avoid facing contradictions: his view of animal nature is not monolithic, but rather it develops and responds to theological and ethical questions that become compelling in his work. What emerges is a complex interpretation of animal nature that goes far beyond the simplistic opposition to Descartes in which More has been made to fit.

1. Animals as an Antidote Against Atheism

Descartes and More tacitly agree on one aspect: both seek to safeguard their respective interpretations of animals as a means to forestall critique of crucial parts of their philosophical systems. It could be argued that animals are simply a scapegoat in their exchange: for both of them the explanation of the animals’ ontological status reflects core assumptions of their respective philosophies, and in this sense it is not the nature of animals per se that is the focus of their interests. There is no real fight about animals: the contrast is elsewhere, and in fact More and Descartes contest two very different battlefields, which is why clear misunderstandings constantly occur in their letters. Nonetheless, it is through this contrast that each of them is forced to draw certain conclusions about their respective views on animal nature.

The reason why Descartes, in More’s words, ‘judges so severely of animals’ is to be found in Descartes’ conception of mind (mens) (Correspondence, 50). Descartes’ mind is responsible for both thinking and conscious feeling, and if it is true, as he writes to More, that it is only a prejudice that animals can think, then they must be deprived of sensation as well. Descartes’ theory about the animals’ lack of soul, or more precisely mind, can thus be even regarded as a by-product of the definition of mind. For More, on the other hand, defending the presence of souls in animals is part of his strategy to counter the supposedly atheistic conclusions of Cartesianism. First of all, assuming the existence of bodies completely independent from an ensouling principle would undermine More’s interpretation of the dualism of matter (passive) and spirit (active); it is the difference of body and soul that is the foundation of their necessary coexistence. As John Henry clearly puts it, ‘a theory of self-active matter’ (thus including animal-automata) appeared as ‘the only real threat to [More’s] philosophical programme’. More projects his anxiety onto Descartes’ reasoning, putting forward a very clear-cut and personal interpretation of the reasons for Descartes’ automata-theory: ‘I perceive clearly what drives you to hold that beasts are machines. It is simply a way

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8 On animals as self-movers see Des Chene, Spirits and Clocks, 13-4.
10 It is important to remember that for More both corporeal and spiritual substances are extended: see Gabbey, ‘Philosophia Cartesiana Triumphata: Henry More (1646-1671)’, 192.
of demonstrating the immortality of our souls'. According to More, Descartes chose to deprive animals of souls as a result of misjudging the theoretical options at his disposal for safeguarding the permanence of man’s soul after leaving the body, thus sacrificing the harmony of nature, in which everything, for More, is ensouled and alive. If the choice is between turning animals into ‘inanimate machines’ and seeing them as ‘bodies activated by immortal souls’, it is clear to More that the second option is the one which can preserve ‘universal animal life’. He believes that this latter interpretation of animal life does not endanger the differentiation between man and animals. Furthermore, viewing animals as ensouled is the opinion ‘established and approved’ by Plato and his followers. The exchange with Descartes reveals that arguing in favour of animal souls forms part of a consistent strategy that More develops in his other work: he employs animals as an ‘antidote against atheism’.

Even if More calls the automata-theory ‘unheard of until now’, in fact the possibility that animals might be lacking conscious sensation had already been debated several times by the time More wrote to Descartes in 1648. It had been suggested by Gómez Pereira in his Antoniana Margarita (1554), which also argues on the basis of polar-opposite options: either animals must endowed with souls capable of thinking and feeling, or they must lack both. This approach had been attacked by Tommaso Campanella in Del senso delle cose e della magia, where, not unlike More, he had pointed out how improbable such a theory would be. This provides a context in which to situate Descartes’ automata-theory: possibly an ‘atheistic’ threat, but certainly not as new as More seems to believe.

But More’s interpretation of the necessity of animal souls had also already been voiced before. His approach resembles that of the German philosopher Nicolaus Taurellus, another combatant against atheism. Taurellus had argued that animals simply must have souls, and in fact immortal ones. Yet, in order to maintain the crucial differentiation between human and animal soul, Taurellus postulated in his De vita et morte libellus (published 1586) that the animals’ souls cannot possibly persist after death, in contrast to man’s soul. The conclusion – as Bayle noted in his article on Taurellus in the Dictionnaire – does appear to be a philosophical salto mortale. Taurellus seems to want it both ways: that immortal souls inhabit all living creatures, and that man’s soul still is destined to a different afterlife. Taurellus ultimately justifies the non-persistence of animals’ souls by appealing to man’s use of the animals, thus shifting the focus from the ‘usefulness’ of their being ensouled to the practical employment of their bodies. He argues that man is destined to be happy and prosperous.

12 More to Descartes, 11 December 1649, translated in Correspondence, 51. On this see also Gabbey, ‘Philosophia Cartesiana Triumphata’, 217.
13 Correspondence, 51. On animal souls according to Plato see Carpenter, ‘Embodying Intelligence: Animals and Us in Plato’s Timaeus’.
14 On Gómez Pereira’s position see Muratori ‘Between Machinery and Rationality: Two Opposing Views on Animals in the Renaissance – and Their Common Origin’. In a letter to Mersenne Descartes denied knowledge of Gómez Pereira’s work (Descartes to Mersenne, 23 June 1641, in Œuvres, vol. 3, 386).
15 See Campanella, Del senso delle cose, 19. On Campanella’s views about animals see Ernst, ‘L’analogia e la differenza. L’uomo e gli animali in Campanella’.
16 On Taurellus’ position on animals see Muratori ‘Seelentheorien nördlich und südlich der Alpen: Taurellus’ Auseinandersetzung mit Cesalpinos’ Quaestiones peripateticæ’.
17 Taurellus, De vita et morte libellus, G3v: ‘Nam animae brutarum animantium nequaquam a morte supersunt’.
(‘felix’) in all eternity (‘in aeternum’), while ‘animals are made for the sake of man’.  
Therefore, even if the souls of animals are created immortal, they do not persist after death because their function is concluded when their support of humans terminates.

More had come to a conclusion similar to that of Taurellus by employing the crucial distinction between the immateriality and the immortality of animal souls. In the Appendix to the Antidote, More claims that the ‘Souls in Brutes’ are ‘really distinct from their Bodies’, and yet that this does not imply assuming that they must be immortal as well, if by ‘immortality’ one understands ‘a capacity of eternal life and bliss after the dissolution of their Bodies’ (Antidote (Appendix), 171).  

By stating that animal souls are immaterial and yet not immortal, More safeguards the idea of an afterlife for the human soul only, without having recourse to Taurellus’ *deus ex machina*, who ultimately intervenes to deprive animal souls of immortality.

The argument regarding usefulness plays a crucial role also in More’s defence of the existence of immaterial animal souls. Animals have a crucial function in the harmony of the world: their ‘usefulness’ is an ‘argument of divine providence’. This is in fact for More so ‘obvious and familiar’ as hardly to require any arguments at all: one need only to look at the way in which certain animals are perfectly suited for supporting certain human activities, such as the shepherd, his flock and his dog. The perfect coordination of animals and humans is not accidental, but a clear sign of providence, which has planned such a perfect cooperation (Antidote, 62). Animals are in fact designed primarily for such forms of cooperation: they assist humans with anything that they may need, from hunting to the most important thing of all, namely as providers of food. For More, being eaten is the sheep’s *raison d’être*, thus its useful existence becomes an argument in favour of divine providence.

Despite More’s optimism that the harmony of certain animal-human collaborations is a strong argument in favour of divine providence and thus against atheism, More is conscious that awkward questions arise if one considers more deeply the many ways in which humans and animals interact. To begin with, there are certain features of animals which do not seem to be particularly useful to humans. More refers at this point to Girolamo Cardano and his famous example of the camel’s humps in *De subtilitate*: for Cardano, the shape of the camel’s back indicated that animals are not made for man, but are designed in such a way that they can enjoy their own lives – lives that according to Cardano, and against the Aristotelian tradition, can even be called happy, *beatae*. Cardano thus offers to More a completely alternative view of nature, which More summarizes as follows:

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18 Ibid., G4v: ‘Animalia vero bruta propter hominem facta sunt’.
19 But see also Antidote, (Appendix), 178: ‘Onely we will adde, That if the Souls of Brutes prove immortal (which the best Philosophers have not been averse from) the Tragedy is still less horrid’.
20 The same argument is used in the case of plants: Antidote, 59.
21 For a thorough discussion of More’s engagement with Cardano see Hutton, ‘Henry More and Girolamo Cardano’.
But Cardan will by no means have this the design of Nature, but that this frame of the Camel’s body is thus made for his own convenience: For he being a Creature that lives and seeks his food in waste and dry Desarts, those Bunches he would have Receptacles of redundant Moisture, from whence the rest of his body is to be supply’d in a hard and tedious time of drought; and that his Legs being very long, he ought to have Knees behind and a knob beneath, to rest his weary limbs in the wilderness [...]. (Antidote, 72)

The contrast between More and Cardano’s views of nature is not simply theoretical: what is important to note is the fact that Cardano can account for phenomena which necessarily must remain mysterious if one aims to explain the lives of animals only by reference to their usefulness to humans. While the camel’s hump might be a relatively easy case to explain, there are many creatures whose usefulness for humans is not immediately evident, and which even pose a danger to human beings.

More is conscious of the fact that Cardano’s view of nature allows for more flexibility in understanding natural diversity and especially the relation between humans and animals. He thus tries to integrate Cardano’s conception of nature with his own, softening the crucial difference between them: ‘But I should not determine this to either alone, but take in both Causes, and acknowledge therein a richer design of Providence, that by this Frame and Artifice has gratifl’d both the Camel and his Master’ (Antidote, 72). More twists Cardano’s argument and claims that the camel’s hump serves two purposes at once: it is convenient for the camel and convenient for the man who wants to ride the camel. He even reinforces the point by stating that: ‘if there be either Fear or Enmity in some Creatures for which we cannot easily discern any reason in respect of themselves, yet we may well allow of it as reasonable in regard of us, and to be to good purpose’ (Antidote, 82). Thus the notion of divine providence even appears to be strengthened by allowing space for Cardano’s less anthropocentric view of nature within More’s own: since it would be problematic to assume that nature designed animals in certain ways only for their own good, More needs to demonstrate that what is best for the animals is also, and especially, best for man.

More’s providential harmony is not openly anthropocentric, and yet, unlike in Cardano’s view of nature, every creature has its own assigned place that leaves no room for doubt about its function. Tame creatures are obviously easier to fit into providence’s design than wild ones, which not only are not useful to man, but even endanger him. The latter represent a serious problem within a conception of the universe as a perfectly balanced and harmonious unity, conceived as such by God. More’s unease with the subject is obvious: in An Antidote he mentions the case of such wild creatures in passing, between a discussion of the usefulness of animals as sources of food and a comment on the nature of one of the animals most useful to man, namely the ‘generous horse’, which ‘is so fitly made for us, that we might justly claim a peculiar right in him above all other Creatures’ (Antidote, 63-4). With regard to all those beasts that do not seem to be as fitly made for us as the horse, More needs to envision useful applications of their existence as well. He calls the animals that live outside of human society ‘rebels’, but still aims at including even such wild creatures back within the safe territory of ‘usefulness’ and ‘pleasantness’:

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23 See Menely, The Animal Claim: Sensibility and the Creaturely Voice, 111, where the author quotes from the Appendix to An Antidote in which More discusses the ‘false principle, That the World was made for man alone’ (see Antidote [Appendix], 178).
But as for those *Rebels* that have fled into the *Mountains* and *Deserts*, they are to us a very pleasant subject of Natural History; besides we serve our selves of them as much as is to our purpose; and they are not only for Ornament of the Universe, but a continual Exercise of Mans Wit and Valour when he pleases to encounter. *(Antidote, 63)*

More presents here three main arguments in favour of the usefulness of wild beasts: first, these creatures are, quite simply, an intriguing literary and scientific subject, and thus stimulate human curiosity and interest; second, they can be useful in certain (indirect) ways, and to the extent that man can benefit from them; third, fighting or hunting them could be useful to humans for proving their own courage. As weak as this reasoning might appear, More’s aim is to show that it is possible to conceive how these creatures can be useful as well. The notion that the ‘rebels’ ‘fled’ to inhospitable places, such as mountains and deserts, may allude to the Biblical ideal of an original, peaceful relationship of man and the animals. The use of the verb ‘to flee’ denotes in any case the sense of a crisis, which is apparent on a purely geographical level. More stresses the distant location of these creatures in order to point out their exceptionality: wild animals do not usually live close to human communities, but rather inhabit places where humans don’t usually dwell. The geographical ‘displacement’ is thus another element that More employs in order to downplay the danger posed by creatures that are aggressive to humans.

In this context it is relevant that More should again contradict and at the same time integrate Cardano, when he states that ferocious animals are not simply an ‘Ornament of the Universe’. This is the expression that Cardano had used in *De subtilitate* when presenting the theory that even the tiniest and seemingly most useless of animals, such as the fly, have their place in the universe: Cardano’s universe is a place in which each creature lives for its own sake, aspiring to its own type of happiness, each of them an ornament of the world in its own way. More, for his part, uses the same expression to suggest that the presence of animals as ‘ornaments’ of nature could itself be interpreted as a useful service, but that there are even stronger ‘utilitarian’ interpretations, such as viewing fierce animals as a test for human ‘Wit and Valour’. Once more, Cardano is skilfully included and adapted by More to his own purposes.

It is at this point in the argument that More asserts that ‘to expect and wish that there were nothing but such dull tame things in the world, that will neither bite nor scratch, is as groundless and childish’. Yet, he does attempt as far as possible to tame the wild creatures, too, and to include them within one frame of reference. But the ‘wrath of wild beasts’ – an expression More uses in *Divine Dialogues* – threatens to unsettle the view of a providentially ordained cosmos, as indeed More’s careful integration of Cardano has shown.

2. The Wrath of Beasts: Animals and the Problem of Evil

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24 Cardano, *De subtilitate*, 550a: ‘Quaeres, cui tandem usui musca? […] Respondeo, animal ipsum ut specie ipsa manet, et per se solum, et ad ornatum mundi esse, et omnia sibi necessaria, non solum ad vitam, sed ad beatam vitam sortitum esse’.
In *Divine Dialogues* (1668) the character Hylobares expresses directly the same concerns raised in *An Antidote* about the sheer existence of wild beasts. Hylobares, who defends the view of materialism, asks: ‘do not these [the rage of the elements, the wrath of wild beasts, and several monstrosities of creatures] discover some malignancy in the Principles of the World, inconsistent with so lovely and benign an Author as we seek after?’ (*Divine Dialogues*, 240). Ferocious animals are not only a dilemma with respect to the harmony and usefulness of nature for man: they are also a problem for theodicy. Their fierce opposition to man’s life, expressed by the word ‘wrath’, prompts Hylobares to ask whether they could embody a principle of evil at work in the universe, together with other unpleasant things occurring in nature. Hylobares, who poses questions from a sceptical perspective (but whose scepticism is ultimately overcome at the end of *Divine Dialogues*) thus reopens the discussion on the usefulness of animals that More had presented in *An Antidote*, opposing the view that everything in nature is oriented to the benefit of man. From being an antidote against atheism, animals thus threaten to become just the opposite: a proof that there is no providence in nature, and even that a force of evil might be present in it.

In *Enchiridion ethicum* More defines ‘evil’ as follows: ‘But, on the other side, whatever is ungrateful, unpleasant, or any ways incongruous to any Being which hath Life and Perception, is evil. And if it finally tend to the destruction of that being, it is the worst of evils’ (*Account of Virtue*, 21). The wild rebels inhabiting mountains and deserts are certainly unpleasant to man; moreover, since they even attack man, often with the intention of killing him, they can be considered an instance of evil. In the same text More even appeals to the Hermetic tradition when arguing that in a sense all brutes are evil, emphasizing the ontological distance between animals and humans: ‘For tho all Depravity be, according to Trismegistus, inbred, and connatural to Brutes, yet in Reality the same is quite contrary to human Nature’ (*Account of Virtue*, 5-6).

More’s approach to animals, then, is characterized by two conflicting tendencies. First, he uses animals to argue in favour of the existence of a divine providence, and in this respect he emphasizes their pleasantness and usefulness. Animals are ‘good’ for man, in direct or indirect ways. This same perspective emerges in the words of Philotheus (i.e. Ralph Cudworth) in *Divine Dialogues*, echoing directly the same vocabulary that More had used in the chapter on the usefulness of animals in *An Antidote*: ‘for the Wrath of Beasts, it has nothing more diabolicall in it than natural Choler and the flames of Fire, which do no more hurt than the pure beams of the Sun passing through a pure Glass, whose figure onely makes them burn’ (*Divine Dialogues*, 242-3). The images of the choler in the body and the fire in nature are recalled here in order to suggest that there might be no ‘evil’ animals at all: even the negative, violent and unpleasant sides of nature have an important function to fulfil. What this function might be, in the case of animals, is not always evident, yet by subsuming the ‘wrath of the beasts’ under the same category as choler and fire, More makes two crucial claims: that nothing unpleasant is intrinsically evil, and, indirectly, that everything hostile has its function in the economy of the whole.

But More also develops a different conception, according to which animals do pose a serious danger, and appear to resist reduction to a more or less necessary feature of the

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universe. The fiercest animals are those than man carries within himself: this animality is an immediate element of connection to the world of real animals, and is portrayed by More as being seriously dangerous, if not appropriately controlled. ‘Animal life’ is the world of passions, and even if ‘all Passions (properly so call’d) are in themselves Good’ (Account of Virtue, 78), against the Stoic approach, yet some passions that humans share with animals are in fact ‘blind instincts of nature’, which by definition lie beneath the level of conscious and rational operations (Explanation, 46). Like a beast, such instincts need to be restricted and controlled. The entire universe in fact is permeated by a blind instinct for self-preservation, but in humans beings the presence of the mind ultimately gives direction to such impulses (Explanation, 36).

Already in the early philosophical poem Psychidia Platonica (1642) More had used the representation of wild beasts to express both the deep relation between human and animal life and the need for man to overcome his own bestiality. In the part titled Psychozoia, the journey of Mnemon, an individual human soul is significantly accompanied by various creatures, that he then leaves behind on his way to the ultimate goal of achieving truth: man and the animals share part of life’s journey, but there are levels that only the former can reach. Indeed all types of animals are found in the land of Beiron, which – as More explains – signifies ‘the brutish nature, or brutallitie’. More describes this place of brutality as populated by ‘foul’ and ‘fair’ creatures and ‘fair’ ones, representing respectively ‘holy virtues’ and ‘deceit’.26 This is a way of classifying animals which will recur throughout More’s work, together with the metaphorical association between animals and certain forms of behaviour or the use of animals to describe the brutal aspects of life that we share with them.

The representation of the land of brutes, Beiron, commences a broader reflection that More expands in later works, combining the references to animals as symbols with consideration about their real, unsettling presence within human life. From Psychidia Platonica onwards, establishing the connection between human and animal behaviour leads More to place within the human being that ‘unpleasantness’ that he considers to be a sign of evil. All creatures, More concedes, behave similarly when it comes to the blind instincts of survival and procreation: the reason is that God has implanted in all beings (not just in man) an irresistible impulse towards life, in the form of radical and natural affections. Furthermore, if blind impulses are shared by all creatures, it needs to be explained whether and how divine providence has harmoniously combined the animals’ instinctual striving with similar blind pursuit in men. In Enchiridion ethicum More describes the presence of animal impulses in man as follows:

Natural and Radical Affections are not from our selves, as the result of free Thinking or Speculation. [...] they are by God, whom we call Nature’s Parent, given and implanted in us, as early as Life itself: such I mean, as are in particular the pleasure of Eating and Drinking; which Nature, doubtless, bestowed upon all living Creatures, not only for the Continuance of Health, but as grateful Exercise of the Faculties of Life. (Account of Virtue, 55)

26 More, ἨΨΥΧΩΔΙΑ Platonica, or A Platonickall Song of the Soul, Book 1.67-8, pp. 33-4. For an overview see Nicolson, ‘More’s Psychozoia’.
More, unlike Cardano, cannot maintain that each creature pursues its own life, even at the expense of others, for the instincts must be purposefully directed. Yet animality, shared by all creatures, implies ‘evil’ in the form of mutual usurpation. Such impulses towards self-preservation could clash with each other, as is evident in the fact that many animals, including man, have a desire to eat each other. In *Divine Dialogues*, Philotheus expresses an anxiety about the consequences of this ‘multidirectionality’ in nature: ‘so every animal would satisfy its own craving appetite, though it were by the devouring of all the world beside. This every Sparrow, Titmouse or Swallow would doe’ (*Divine Dialogues*, 239). Yet Philotheus’ examples serve the purpose of underlining that this is the impulse of animals, rather than man: animals are again compared to the fire that would burn the entire forest, if not properly controlled.27 Once more, it is wild animals that embody at its strongest this evil, ravenous impulse: as Hylobares puts it, God himself seems to have implanted in the wild creatures a ‘law of cruelty and rapine’. Yet, since man partakes in ‘animal life’ and its impulses, it remains to explain why he can be considered any different from the animals, especially given that he is directly involved in the food chain, and, like wild animals, assaults other creatures to gain food. It is not by chance that this objection regarding man’s association with the beasts of prey is put into Hylobares’ mouth: ‘it looks very harshly and cruelly that one living Creature should fall upon another and slay him, when he has done no wrong’ (*Divine Dialogue*, 238). Metaphorically, the same fire also burns inside the human being, but without burning the forest. ‘But this is the thing we sweat at’, declares Hylobares, ‘to make the phenomena of the world correspond with so excellent a principle’, namely with God as the principle of good (*Divine Dialogue*, 232).

The discussion in *Divine Dialogues* develops to resolve the doubts raised by Hylobares, as Philotheus declares that ‘what-ever Evil there is in the World, it is to be charged upon the incapability of the Creature, not the envy or oversight of the Creator’ (*Divine Dialogue*, 232). The clash between good and evil is thus no real clash at all, as even blind impulses must be at a deep level coordinated by providence. Philotheus ultimately argues not only that man is entirely justified in eating other creatures, thus behaving like a wild beast without being one, but he also suggests that there is a hidden harmony in this approach: animals would multiply fast if not eaten, and starving would be worse for the animal than becoming food.28 Most importantly, man is released from the burden of being ‘evil’ when behaving like wild animals, because there is ‘no more wickedness in devouring Brutes than to swallowing Gulfs of the Sea or devouring Fire’ (*Divine Dialogues*, 239). This position is remarkably similar to that of Descartes, who had pointed out to More that his interpretation of animal nature had freed man from feeling guilty when slaughtering animals (*Œuvres*, vol. 5, 279). While Hylobares had placed man in the unpleasant company of animals, subject to the ‘law of

27 *Divine Dialogues*, 239: ‘As the Fire will burn if it take hold, though to the consumption of a whole Forest, notwithstanding the Wood never did the Fire any hurt’.

28 Ibid., 238: ‘Judge then what this foolish pity of ever sparing them would bring upon men. They would multiply so fast, that they would die for famine and want of food.’ Interestingly, these are arguments still used today in discussions of vegetarianism: see for instance on the ‘interests of farmed animals’ in Milligan, *Beyond Animal Rights: Food, Pets and Ethics*, Chap. 2.
cruelty', More, with Philotheus, separates man from the rest, accusing Hylobares of imagining 'Brutes as if they were Men' (*Divine Dialogues*, 238).

In *Enrichiridion Ethicum*, too, More emphasizes that nature cares for the preservation of mankind (*Account of Virtue*, 63). But one might ask whether the preservation of the race of mankind is in accordance with the preservation of all other species as well. Instances of animals attacking or even eating humans might be seen as proof that this is not the case: they can thus be included in the picture only as marginal cases, mistakes in an otherwise harmoniously functioning whole. This is indeed the view put forward in *Divine Dialogues* in answer to Hylobares’ speculation about the malignity that might be present in the creation.

More harmonizes conflicting, ‘evil’ impulses in nature, but he underlines that a conflict does take place within man between such animal instincts and the higher realm of intellectual activity:

Hence it appears that all the animal Instincts and Impulses do belong to the Region of Nature, and are but imperfect Shadows and Footsteps of the Divine Wisdom and Goodness […] And these are those Rudiments and Primordials, against which, by the help of a more pure and Celestial Light, we do contend, as often as they invade the Limits of the Superior Law. (*Account of Virtue*, 37)

The animals – here in the shape of animal instincts – tend to trespass and occupy areas that should not belong to them: the ‘superior law’, the ‘intellectual life’. This conveys the image of a humanity under siege from the attacks of animality. In a passage which is resonant of Cartesian debates, More marks the distance between the reign of blind animality from that of rational humans by reporting an episode of dissection on a dog. The fact that the instinct of preserving the species is the main, blind force in animals, can be ‘wonderfully seen in the dissection of living Bitch with Whelps, for if you but hurt any of the young ones in her sight, she barks, and is greatly disquieted, but if you reach them towards her mouth she forgets her own condition, and falls with a tender kindness to the licking of them in the midst of all her Torments’ (*Account of Virtue*, 37). More represents the behaviour of animals as automatic in the sense of being pre-programmed by nature, and indeed the world itself is described as an Automaton in *Divine Dialogues* (*Divine Dialogues*, 227). The presence of evil in nature is thus considered overcome by mechanicism.

3. Animality as a ‘Poor Ingredient of Solid Happiness’

Taming the animals’ aggression through providence requires a distinction between man and all other creatures. This establishes a clear hierarchy between what is ‘good’, and bad, for the animals, and what is ‘good’, and bad, for man: the lives of animals and the life of man are not on the same level, even if they share a level of life in accordance with nature’s providential plan. From this basis, More proceeds to pin down an important difference between humans and animals: this consists in the happiness of their respective lives. In *Enchiridion ethicum* More states that ‘One Good may excel another in Quality, or Duration, or in both. This is self-evident; yet it may be illustrated from this absurdity, that otherwise one Life would not be better, nor one sort of Happiness greater than another: so as Gods, Angels, Men, Horses and the vilest Worm would be happy alike; which none but a mad man can fancy’ (*Account
of Virtue, 21-2). More’s conclusion is not supported by positive arguments, but rather through contrast with the absurdity of the opposite conclusion: there must be a qualitative hierarchy of good, otherwise the happiness of the vilest creature, such as a worm, might be practically comparable with that of much higher ones, such as man. Further, in Enchiridion ethicum More returns to this point, comparing instances of animal and human happiness: ‘For what concerns Bodily Endowments, we may venture to say that Strength and Agility are more the Happiness of the Bull and of the Squirrel than of Man’ (Account of Virtue, 164). The happiness of the animals thus rests heavily on their use of their bodies: they can be called ‘happy’ if their bodily endowments are able to unfold properly, for instance with regard to agility in the case of the squirrel, or the pleasure of hunting for wild animals. More even envisages that herbivores might generate double happiness: they enjoy themselves while feeding on ‘the fruit of the earth’, and become enjoyment for their predators.29 In the case of humans, who are called no less than ‘fellows citizens with God’, the pursuit of happiness is more complex, and More insists on the fact that for humans there is no happiness without virtue (Account of Virtue, 172). Ultimately, human happiness is the sharing of virtue: ‘There is no Man can truly be happy, but he that has attained to share in that, which must make every Man happy’ (Account of Virtue, 90).

Animal and human happiness therefore denote very different experiences: the former is centred on the body, the latter on the exercise of virtue. Yet, both humans and animals share the experience of living in a body, and animals, in the form of passions and instincts, metaphorically inhabit the human soul as well. Therefore the apparently simple opposition between the different ways in which animals and human can be happy in fact stimulates a very difficult question: to what extent does happiness for man also depend on the body? In other words, what is the influence of external conditions on man’s pursuit of happiness? Even if More states that the bodily endowments are per se ‘but a poor Ingredient of solid Happiness’ (Account of Virtue, 165), they are nevertheless an essential ingredient for achieving happiness. The reason is that happiness is connected with pleasure, and that there can be no pleasure when the body is suffering. Health, therefore, is necessary for complete happiness.

Seen from this angle, the level of happiness that animals enjoy can be considered as a requirement for the properly human experience of happiness as virtue as well. As More puts it in Enchiridion ethicum:

As to the preceding Words that are annexed to the definition of Happiness, namely, That it was made perfect by external Comforts: How could this otherwise be? For since Happiness consists in that Pleasure, which good men take in the Sense of Virtue, and a Conscience of Well-doing, no man can possess this Happiness, if any pain be so intense upon him as to distract the Mind, and extinguish all present Sense of Pleasure. Whence it plainly follows, that we must not lie under acute Diseases, or want the Food that is needful. (Account of Virtue, 9-10)

29 See Antidote (Appendix), 178: ‘all these Creatures that are thus a prey to others are their sport and sustenance, and so pleasure others by their death, as well as enjoy themselves while they are yet in life and free from their enemy.’
The reference to the importance of food reminds one of the discussion about nutrition as a potential conflict point between contrary blind instincts in nature: ‘external comforts’, for instance in the form of impediments to man’s bodily health, play a crucial role in the unfolding of more refined types of human happiness. Quite simply, there can be no happiness at all in the absence of bodily pleasure. This leads to posing another question: since interaction with other creatures is a major source of pleasure and displeasure (animals can provide food, or can be a physical threat), then can animals actually prevent humans from being happy? Once again, animals threaten to creep into the territory of humanity, this time endangering what is properly human: the use of the mind, which leads to virtuous happiness. Indeed one of the principal ways in which the mind can be ‘distracted’, as More puts it, is by the interference of the animals within his soul, that is to say the passions. When this happens, man recedes into the territory of animality, sinking into sensation and losing sight of rationality, thus abandoning everything that is distinctly human:

As for those Men who throw off all Distinction of Things Honest and Vile; who have no other Sense than that of the Animal life; who consider only for themselves, be it Right of Wrongs […] They enjoy no more Liberty than the Brutes, whose Appetite is necessarily ty’d down to the greater Good. For they have but one single Principle of Acting, and ‘tis but one sort of Object that is before their Sense. (Account of Virtue, 187)

The border between humanity and animality appears to be permeable: by conceding to the force of the appetites, man becomes an animal, unable to make use of reason. But while animals are always limited to one type of (instinctual) behaviour, humans tie themselves down by giving preference to sensation, to the animal life, over the higher levels of human life. ‘Alas, how deplorable is it, that man should ever value himself upon such an affinity with the Beast! Nay, in human shape to become the very Beast!’ – exclaims More at the beginning of Enchiridion ethicum (An Account of Virtue, 29).

The force of animality is here displayed in its entire strength: the siege on humans is twofold, in the outside world (where man is dependent on animals for acquiring many external comforts essential for attaining pleasure and thus happiness), as well as in the world inside. Their role is not only that of providing contrast for human life to emerge in its full providential centrality, but also, and more radically, that of constantly challenging the border on which humanity itself is constructed, letting its fragility come to the surface. Despite the pleasurable sights of pre-established harmony that More presents in the chapter ‘On the Usefulness of animals’ in An Antidote against Atheism, the development of his own arguments with regard to man’s relation to animality forces him to complicate and problematize this picture.

4. Conclusion: The Message of the Animals

A famous passage from Divine Dialogues highlights and sums up this crucial and yet discomforting role of animals in More’s works. It concerns a visionary dream reported by Bathynous, a character who is presented as being doctrinally very close to More’s own views.

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30 See Divine Dialogues, 359, on ‘philosophical happiness’, defined as ‘a very small accession to that Moral Happiness, which is common to all men’.
Bathynous’ vision takes place in an area inhabited by animals: a wood. He recalls that while he was walking he felt the need to rest, surrounded by the humming of bees and the chirping of birds. Yet, while the body rested, his mind was wide awake and experienced the vision of a ‘messenger of God’ who approached him. The messenger gave Bathynous two keys, a silver and a golden one, each providing access to a treasure. The first treasure was a scroll containing the image of the Copernican universe, ‘The true system of the world’. The second was another scroll containing 12 sentences, of which the first one read ‘the measure of providence is the divine goodness.’ Yet, Bathynous could only read half way through because a pair of animals – two donkeys – suddenly disturbed the vision:

[by] that time I had got through the sixth Aphorism, there had come up two Asses behind me out of the Wood, one on the one side of the Tree, and the other on the other, that set a-braying so rudely and so loudly that they did not onely awake, but almost affright me into a discovery that I had all this while been but in a Dream. (Divine Dialogues, 492)

The figures of the donkeys have been variously interpreted. Crocker suggested that they could stand for what he calls ‘two inveterate opponents of More’s vision of truth: ‘opinion’ or prejudice, and sensuality’. Among the famous readers of Divine Dialogues were the physicists Wolfgang Pauli and Markus Fierz, who also speculated about the meaning of what they call ‘More’s dream’ in an exchange of letters. Fierz, whose interest for More even led him to write a ‘historical study’ of the Cambridge Platonist, proposed to Pauli that the donkeys could represent the Dionysian element interrupting Platonic contemplation. Pauli agreed that the interruption of the donkeys signifies the battle between Good and Evil, and the fact that God’s goodness does not stand in contrast with the existence of evil – but ironically ends by admitting that his ‘sympathy in More’s dream is fully on the side of the two donkeys.’

I want to suggest that the donkeys might stand in the scene as nothing less and nothing more than what they simply are: as animals. The donkeys distract, disrupt and problematize a perfect vision by bringing the dreamer back into his body, into the real world, reminding him that the main difficulty remains that of combining wisdom with the limitations of embodiment. The ambiguous power of the animals (both internal and external ones) in More’s works consists precisely in this: they must be subdued and yet often subdue, remaining throughout disquieting presences that refuse to be reduced to pleasant and tame creatures, and instead insist on biting and scratching the surface of any philosophical argument.

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