Politics, decolonisation, and the Cold War in Dar es Salaam
c. 1965-72

by
George Roberts

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| Acknowledgements                  | 4 |
| Summary                            | 5 |
| Abbreviations and acronyms         | 6 |
| Maps                               | 8 |
| Introduction                       | 10 |
| Rethinking the Cold War and decolonisation | 12 |
| The ‘Cold War city’                | 16 |
| Tanzanian history and the shadow of Julius Nyerere | 20 |
| A note on the sources              | 24 |
| 1 – From *uhuru* to Arusha: Tanzania and the world, 1961-67 | 34 |
| Nyerere’s foreign policy           | 34 |
| The Zanzibar Revolution            | 36 |
| The Dar es Salaam mutiny           | 38 |
| The creation of Tanzania           | 40 |
| The foreign policy crises of 1964-65 | 43 |
| The turn to Beijing                | 47 |
| Revisiting the Arusha Declaration  | 50 |
| The June 1967 government reshuffle | 54 |
| Oscar Kambona’s flight into exile  | 56 |
| Conclusion                         | 58 |
| 2 – Karibu Dar es Salaam: the political geography of a Cold War city | 60 |
| Dar es Salaam                      | 61 |
| Spaces                             | 62 |
| News                               | 67 |
| Propaganda                         | 72 |
| Rumour                             | 76 |
| Intelligence                       | 83 |
| Conclusion                         | 86 |
| 3 – The inter-German Cold War in Dar es Salaam | 87 |
| Post-Arusha politics and the GDR   | 90 |
| *Ostpolitik in Afrika*             | 93 |
| The visit of von Hassel            | 99 |
| The invasion of Czechoslovakia and its aftermath | 101 |
| Tanzania reconsider its relations with the Eastern Bloc | 103 |
| ‘No recognition by the backdoor’   | 105 |
| Conclusion                         | 110 |
| 4 – Oasis of liberation? FRELIMO in exile and the assassination of Eduardo Mondlane | 113 |
| The liberation movements in Dar es Salaam | 114 |
| FRELIMO in the Cold War world      | 116 |
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Finally, thanks to my family and friends for all their support over a long journey.
Summary

This thesis uses the city of Dar es Salaam as a prism for exploring the intersection of the Cold War and decolonisation with political life in post-colonial Tanzania. By deconstructing politics in the city through transnational and international approaches, it challenges prevailing narratives of the global Cold War, African liberation, and the contemporary Tanzanian history. In the decade after Tanzania became independent in 1961, President Julius Nyerere’s commitment to the liberation of Africa transformed Dar es Salaam into a cosmopolitan epicentre of international affairs in Africa, on the frontline of both the Cold War and decolonisation. In shifting the focus away from superpower relations and the paradigm of the nation-state, this thesis shows how African politicians exercised significant influence over Cold War powers, but also how the global context pushed Nyerere’s government into increasingly authoritarian methods of rule. The political geography and public sphere of Dar es Salaam, as a ‘Cold War city’, provides an interpretative lens through which diverse but ultimately entwined narratives are understood. These include the international rivalry between East Germany and West Germany; the politics of the exiled Mozambican liberation movement, FRELIMO; the local experience of the global ‘1968’; and the course of elite politics in a critical period in the Tanzania’s recent history. This multilateral history is made possible by a multiarchival approach, to shed light on developments in Dar es Salaam from multiple, triangulated perspectives.
### Abbreviations and acronyms

The abbreviations and acronyms listed below cover the main text and footnotes, excluding the archival references, which are detailed in the bibliography. Non-English names are translated and the relevant state is mentioned where otherwise unclear.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>Auswärtiges Amt (Foreign Office) – FRG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAPSO</td>
<td>Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation – Soviet Union, GDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADN</td>
<td>Allgemeiner Deutscher Nachrichtendienst (General German News Agency) – GDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress – South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASP</td>
<td>Afro-Shirazi Party – Zanzibar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASPYL</td>
<td>Afro-Shirazi Party Youth League – Zanzibar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMZ</td>
<td>Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit (Ministry for Economic Cooperation) – FRG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>Chama Cha Mapinduzi (Party of the Revolution) – Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>Christlich Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union) – FRG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency – US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CID</td>
<td>Criminal Investigation Department – Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Commonwealth Office – UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COREMO</td>
<td>Comité Revolucionario de Moçambique (Revolutionary Committee of Mozambique)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAL</td>
<td>Direction Afrique Levant, MAE (Africa and Middle East Division) – France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAM</td>
<td>Direction Afrique Malagache, MAE (Africa and Madagascar Division) – France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>emb.</td>
<td>embassy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office – UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Mozambique Liberation Front)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDR</td>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HC</td>
<td>high commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KGB</td>
<td>Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security) – Soviet Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LNS</td>
<td>Liberation News Service – US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAE</td>
<td>Ministère des affaires étrangères (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) – France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MANU</td>
<td>Mozambique African National Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFAA</td>
<td>Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten (Ministry for Foreign Affairs) – GDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MfS</td>
<td>Ministerium für Staatsicherheit (Ministry for State Security, 'Stasi') – GDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNE</td>
<td>Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) – Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSZ</td>
<td>Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) – Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBC</td>
<td>National Bank of Commerce – Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEC</td>
<td>TANU National Executive Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUTA</td>
<td>National Union of Tanganyika Workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania – South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAIGC</td>
<td>Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIDE</td>
<td>Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado (International and State Defence Police) – Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA</td>
<td>People’s Liberation Army – Zanzibar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RENAMO</td>
<td>Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambique National Resistance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCCIM</td>
<td>Serviços de Centralização e Coordenação e Informação de Moçambique (Services for the Centralisation and Coordination of Information for Mozambique) – Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>SED</td>
<td>Sozialistiche Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity Party of Germany) – GDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Sozialdemocratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany) – FRG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STC</td>
<td>State Trading Corporation – Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWAPO</td>
<td>South West Africa People’s Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TANU</td>
<td>Tanganyika African National Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TASS</td>
<td>Tyelyegrafnoye agyentstvo Sovyetskogo Soyuza (Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAZARA</td>
<td>Tanzania-Zambia Railway Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBC</td>
<td>Tanzania Broadcasting Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPDF</td>
<td>Tanzania People’s Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPDF(Z)</td>
<td>Tanzania People’s Defence Force (Zanzibar)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TYL</td>
<td>Tanganyika Africa National Union Youth League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDENAMO</td>
<td>União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique (National Democratic Union of Mozambique)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDI</td>
<td>Unilateral Declaration of Independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMI</td>
<td>União Africana de Moçambique Independente (African Union of Independent Mozambique)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USARF</td>
<td>University Students African Revolutionary Front – Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USIA</td>
<td>United States Information Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USIS</td>
<td>United States Information Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UWT</td>
<td>Umoja wa Wanawake wa Tanzania (Tanzania Women’s Union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZANU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZAPU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African People’s Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZNP</td>
<td>Zanzibar National Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZPPP</td>
<td>Zanzibar and Pemba People’s Party</td>
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Introduction

When word that a revolution had broken out on the islands of Zanzibar reached Nairobi, sometime on 12 January 1964, the Polish journalist Ryszard Kapuściński immediately cancelled his plans. Eager to experience this breaking news first hand, he and forty fellow foreign correspondents hastily departed en masse on an evening flight to Dar es Salaam, the capital of Tanganyika. The following afternoon, Kapuściński headed back to the airport, but had no success in finding a flight to Zanzibar. The islands’ airstrip had been closed by the revolutionaries, who threatened to shoot down any aircraft attempting to land. Desperate for information – and a cold beer – Kapuściński headed for his usual watering hole, the New Africa Hotel, constructed in 1909 to host Kaiser Wilhelm II when he visited the then German colony. ‘Flowering shrubs, palm trees and tables with chairs scattered about invited relaxed conversation and lingering over a drink’, recalled a British visitor.1 The scene encountered by Kapuściński was rather more charged.

All of Africa conspires here these days. Here gather the fugitives, refugees, and emigrants from various parts of the continent. One can spot sitting at one table Mondlane from Mozambique, Kaunda from Zambia, Mugabe from Rhodesia. At another – Karume from Zanzibar, Chisiza from Malawi, Nujoma from Namibia, etc […] In the evening, when it grows cooler and a refreshing breeze blows in from the sea, the terrace fills with people discussing, planning courses of action, calculating their strengths and assessing their chances […] We, the correspondents, come by here frequently, to pick up something. We already know all the leaders, we know who is worth sidling up to. We know that the cheerful Mondlane talks willingly, and that the mysterious, closed Chisiza won’t even part his lips.

Two floors below, Kapuściński paid a visit to the Paradise nightclub – ‘jammed, crowded and noisy.’ ‘Customers are drawn here by the charms of a chocolate-colored Miriam, a beautiful stripper from the distant Seychelles.’ The club, however, had other attractions for Kapuściński. He searched out the owner, a Polish émigré from Łódź. Kapuściński wanted to know the whereabouts of Abeid Karume, leader of the Afro-Shirazi Party, whose members were said to have carried out the seizure of power. Had he left the mainland? His compatriot grinned: yes, Karume was in Zanzibar. Within hours, Kapuściński had spoken to Karume on the telephone and negotiated an air passage to the islands.2

1 Charles R. Swift, *Dar Days: The Early Years in Tanzania* (Lanham, MD: University of America Press, 2002), 2. Swift, a doctor, was less complimentary about the New Africa’s food: ‘thin and tasteless soup, a fish course with a wedge of lime, tough overcooked Tanzanian beef, naked boiled potatoes and a vanilla pudding as insipid as the soup.’

Introduction

En route to the airport, Kapuściński travelled down Nkrumah Street, along which were clustered the offices of various southern African liberation movements: the African National Congress of South Africa, the Mozambique Liberation Front, the Zimbabwe African National Union. Nestled among these unofficial embassies was an innocuous-looking building, the Canton Restaurant. Its Chinese cuisine ('Authentic and Genuine, 1st Floor Air Conditioned') was popular among the city’s political elite, particularly the liberation movement leaders. But according to a Rhodesian newspaper, the restaurant was a front for Chinese subversive operations in East Africa, which were run by a certain Ho Lin. An American embassy despatch claimed that Ho 'handles all commercial relations' for Beijing in Dar es Salaam and that the Canton 'offers an excellent meeting place outside of the official Chinese mission'.

Next door, the shelves of the Tanganyika Bookshop were piled high with Marxist periodicals and Swahili translations of Mao’s Little Red Book: ‘a Chicom front’, the same American report noted, ‘well-stocked with communist literature of all types.’ Alongside propaganda, it also reputedly distributed funds to the exiled guerrillas. The manager, Kao Liang, officially worked for the Chinese news agency, Xinhua. According to the South Africa expatriate journalist Colin Legum, Liang acted as a go-between for Chinese diplomats and their Tanzanian contacts. He had previously been expelled from India for ‘unjournalistic activities’, before becoming Beijing’s key man in eastern Africa.

Polish journalists, Zanzibari revolutionaries, African guerrillas, Marxist booksellers, Chinese intelligence agents, Seychellois strippers: Dar es Salaam was a hive of international activity. For centuries, the Swahili coast had been a vibrant meeting-place, where traders from the Indian subcontinent and the Arabian Gulf encountered the peoples of the African interior. Home to exiled liberation movement leaders, invited to the city by President Julius Nyerere, the capital of post-independence Tanganyika – soon to become Tanzania – was now an entrepôt where Cold War politics collided with the struggle for decolonisation in southern Africa. Through a study of political life in Dar es Salaam at this cosmopolitan ‘moment’, this thesis reconsiders existing narratives of superpower rivalry, anticolonial struggles, and Tanzanian national history. In doing so, it argues for more textured, interwoven understandings of Tanzania’s past and the international history of the late twentieth century.

4 SCCIM, 4 January 1967, enclosed in Deslandes to MNE, 28 January 1967, AHD, MNE, PAA 819.
5 Gordon to State Dept, 22 December 1964, NARA, RG 59, SNF 1964-6, Box 2688, POL 2-3 TANZAN.
6 ibid.
Rethinking the Cold War and decolonisation

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the historiography of the Cold War has undergone a significant and overdue renovation. Before 1989, scholars fixed their attention on diplomatic relations between the United States, the Soviet Union, and their respective allies. Although there were notable shifts in interpretations of the origins and nature of the Cold War, they addressed the superpower rivalry in a Euro-American context. The notable exception of Indochina aside, historians spent little time considering the impact of Cold War politics on the so-called ‘Third World’. This worldview reflected that of many leading politicians of the day. ‘History has never been produced in the South’, said Henry Kissinger. ‘The axis of history starts in Moscow, goes to Bonn, crosses over to Washington, and then goes to Tokyo’.⁸

While the superpowers remained locked in geopolitical and ideological struggle, the historical profession underwent a series of interconnected transformations. The rise of postmodernism and poststructuralism, with their interest in discourse and subjectivities rather than events and certainties, challenged long-held historiographical shibboleths. Postcolonial theory emerged from the process of decolonisation in Africa and Asia to cast new light on relationships between colonising and colonised peoples, questioning common assumptions about the distribution of power between Europeans and the rest of the world. Academic interest in the phenomenon of ‘globalisation’ prompted historians to rethink traditional geographic frameworks of inquiry. A predilection for studying the past through the paradigm of the nation-state, grounded in the experience of modern Europe, seemed inadequate in a world where national borders were increasingly permeable. ‘Global’, ‘world’, and ‘transnational’ histories emerged as alternatives, emphasising movements and processes which transcended conventional geographic boundaries.

If historians were slow to respond to this changing intellectual environment, diplomatic historians were especially recalcitrant. Before 1989, ‘the majority of historians of international relations continued to be preoccupied with the vicissitudes in the Cold War that coincided with their own lives’, notes Akira Iriye.⁹ But in a post-Cold War era in which world affairs are less haunted by the spectre of nuclear holocaust, these concerns no longer hold the same relevance. There is a growing appreciation of the need to shift the focus of the international history of the post-Yalta period away from the superpowers alone, to the global nature of their rivalry and its consequences for the rest of the world, especially in what is today termed the ‘global South’. At the turn of the century, Odd Arne Westad suggested the ‘Third World’ as a potential paradigm for a

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Introduction

‘New International History of the Cold War’, as a site of ‘hot’ proxy conflicts between the superpowers.  

Westad answered his own call in *The Global Cold War*, which draws upon an array of archive material to trace the expansion of the Cold War across the Third World, while tying it into a broader narrative framework. He stresses the ideological motivations underpinning American and Soviet policies, which manifested themselves in the often violent promotion of contrasting models of modernisation in the Third World, in order to prove the universal value of their respective systems to the newly independent states. Westad concludes that the superpowers ended up replicating the same interventionist strategies and neglect for human life that had characterised the behaviour of European colonialism in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Through a series of case studies – from Congo to Cuba, Vietnam to Angola, and Ethiopia to Afghanistan – he emphasises the need to pay heed to voices of Third World actors, sidelined in the *ancien régime* Cold War historiography.

Others had already begun to decentre the study of the Cold War from an exclusive focus on superpower diplomacy, but in capturing this historiographical *Zeitgeist*, Westad’s work fundamentally reoriented the direction of Cold War scholarship. His pluralising and globalising approach has quickly become something of a *lingua franca* for historians working in the field. ‘The splintered paradigm of “the global Cold War” now rivals the monolithic version of “The Cold War”’, write Joel Isaac and Duncan Bell. As the editors of a recent survey volume state, the Cold War ‘must be appreciated as global history, and as global history it reveals nuances, idiosyncrasies, and complexities obscured by more traditional accounts.’ The few dissenting voices who continue to frame the Cold War as a project of American foreign policy come mainly from neoconservative advocates of American interventions abroad or from an especially critical self-styled anti-American left. Both positions are unhelpfully parochial.

One key development in this new wave of historiography has been the appreciation that the history of superpower rivalry is closely entwined with that of another global metadynamic,

14 See for example, Anders Stephanson, ‘Cold War Degree Zero’, in Isaac and Bell (eds), *Uncertain Empire*, 19-49; Perry Anderson, ‘Imperium’, *New Left Review*, 83 (2013), 5-135. Odd Arne Westad sets out these arguments at greater length, before delivering a convincing riposte of his own, in ‘Exploring the Histories of the Cold War: A Pluralist Approach’, in Isaac and Bells (eds), *Uncertain Empire*, 51-59. It should be noted that, even by the standards of the wider discipline, the practice of Cold War history (and international history more generally) remains overwhelmingly dominated by North American and European scholars.
Introduction

decolonisation.\textsuperscript{15} Parallel to the revolution in Cold War studies, scholars have reassessed the ‘end of empire’. Early work understood decolonisation as \textit{either} an elite-negotiated European withdrawal from Africa and Asia \textit{or} an inexorable process driven by popular nationalist mobilisation in the colonial world. More recent scholarship adopts a more nuanced position, framing decolonisation as a dynamic empowered by global changes which affected both metropole and colony, while still allowing for the contingency of political actors.\textsuperscript{16} As the rise of postcolonial studies suggests, decolonisation was not conceived solely as ‘flag independence’, but a longue durée struggle against the legacies of colonialism which continues to the present day.

The crisis of the European empires, which in Africa stretched from the immediate aftermath of the Second World War to the collapse of apartheid in South Africa in 1994, opened up opportunities for external intervention in the continent’s affairs. Policymakers in China, the Soviet Union, and the United States sought to gain footholds in the post-colonial world, often interpreting politics as a zero-sum game of Cold War competition. African states also tried to exploit this rivalry to extract aid from the superpowers. The powerful doctrines of Marxism and Maoism were disseminated by Moscow and Beijing via educational programmes and propaganda campaigns, but could also be reformulated and appropriated to African political interests. The marketplace of international ideas and aid was not the exclusive domain of the Cold War powers. As Vijay Prashad shows in his counternarrative of history from the perspective of the ‘global South’, Third World states, politicians, and intellectuals challenged notions of a hegemonic order controlled by the superpowers. In Africa, ideologies like pan-Africanism, pan-Arabism, and African socialism articulated alternatives to Cold War binaries.\textsuperscript{17}

Seeking to escape what he has dubbed the ‘Cold War lens’, Matthew Connelly’s study of the transnational and international dimensions of Algeria’s fight for independence collapses traditional categorisations of superpower rivalry and decolonisation. Connelly deftly renders a narrative of the Algerian war from multiple perspectives, showing the limitations of French and American power in the region, and the extent of Egyptian influence. Inspired by Fernand Braudel’s concept of \textit{histoire totale}, he situates the National Liberation Front’s struggle in a changing structural international context, surveying the impact on it of such diverse dynamics as demographic change in North Africa, Paris’ diplomatic offensive at the United Nations (UN), and radio propaganda disseminated by the Voice of Cairo. Connelly posits that, contrary to conventional wisdom, policymakers in Paris

\textsuperscript{15} Leslie James and Elizabeth Leake (eds), \textit{Decolonization and the Cold War: Negotiating Independence} (London: Bloomsbury, 2015).
or Washington did not primarily interpret events in terms of East-West Cold War politics, but a broader collision between a developed ‘North’ and a developing ‘South’.18

No scholar has yet written as textured a history as Connelly for the international affairs of the sub-Saharan world, which continue to be studied largely through the ‘Cold War lens’. The majority of this historiography has been understandably drawn to the ‘hot’ conflicts on the continent, particularly in Congo and Angola. Piero Gleijeses’s unparalleled access to Cuban archives has enabled him to write detailed accounts of Havana’s interventions in Africa. From Che Guevara’s initial forays into Congo in 1964 to the Cuban offensive which pushed South Africa’s armed forces out of Angola in 1988, Gleijeses shows how Havana was not a ‘proxy’ of Moscow. Rather, Cuba was an assertive actor in its own right, prepared to risk Soviet wrath in a series of operations inspired by Fidel Castro’s revolutionary anticolonialism, rather than colder calculations of superpower rivalry.19 In her study of the Congo Crisis, Lise Namikas avoids overdependence on Western archival sources – a problem that afflicts several histories of the war20 – by using material from both sides of the Iron Curtain.21 Whereas studies based exclusively on Western archives or memoirs often overstate the centrality of the United States to Africa’s Cold War conflicts, these works grounded in multiarchival research emphasise the pluralities of power in the continent’s international affairs.

In these histories of the Cold War in Africa, the superpowers (plus, in Gleijeses’ case, Cuba) continue to occupy centre-stage. But just as historians have demonstrated how Africans shaped their experience of European colonialism, they exercised significant influence over the development of the Cold War in the continent. To label the conflicts in Angola or the Horn of Africa ‘proxy wars’ seems a lazy shorthand: in both conflicts, the belligerents’ interests and ideological positions far from mapped directly onto those of the superpowers. Instead, they used the Cold War environment for leverage in obtaining aid and arms. As Miles Larmer and Erik Kennes argue in their reassessment of the Katangese secession in Congo, African politicians could skilfully exploit the nexus of external interests brought together in the intersection of decolonisation and the Cold

20 See especially John Kent, *America, the UN and Decolonisation: Cold War Conflict in the Congo* (London: Routledge, 2010).
Introduction

War to further their own political ambitions. Rather than being conflicts imposed on Africa by external actors, Cold War crises were enmeshed with less-well understood local conflicts.

Moreover, this understandable preoccupation with ‘hot’ conflict overlooks the lower key, but constant presence of the Cold War in African political life in the era of decolonisation. As my thesis shows, the ‘Cold War’ was not just a set of geopolitical dynamics, but part of the political landscape within which African leaders struggled to establish authority in their post-independence states. The Cold War provided an ideological toolkit for assembling programmes of domestic reform, but also a rhetoric of fear which could be ranged against political rivals and appropriated to mobilise supporters. In her history of decolonisation in Guinea, Elizabeth Schmidt shows how the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain’s connections with the French Communist Party meant that, in both metropole and colony, independence was negotiated in a Cold War context. Working on post-colonial Kenya, Daniel Speich and Daniel Branch have shown how elites used Cold War categories to frame development policies and as political ammunition with which to denigrate opponents for being too sympathetic to a particular superpower bloc.

My thesis seeks to analyse this political ‘climate’ more closely, through the setting of Dar es Salaam, a ‘Cold War city’.

The ‘Cold War city’

The splintering of the Cold War as a field of study and the eclipse of the staid category of ‘diplomatic history’ by the more supple ‘international history’ opens up exciting avenues of inquiry, but also poses methodological problems. In 1937, Lucie Varga discussed the problems which the rise of Nazism posed to historians, who she accused of being ‘prisoners to old metaphors or theoretical biases’. ‘Et les anciennes clefs tournent mal dans les nouvelles serrures’: the explanatory ‘old keys’ of Marxism, religion, or liberalism seemed incapable of turning the ‘new lock’ of fascism. The challenge facing international historians today may not have as pressing political stakes as the annalistes’ efforts to account for the coming of the Third Reich. But a pluralised

22 Miles Larmer and Erik Kennes, ‘Rethinking the Katangese Secession’, *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 42 (2014), 741-61.
Introduction

twentieth century, understood from local, global, national, and transnational perspectives, is a daunting prospect to confront, with the old keys of diplomatic history clearly inadequate. ‘In the deluge of new work’, writes Jeremi Suri, ‘many scholars are swimming in an ocean of new sources and interpretations without anchors of insight for guidance and stability’.28

This thesis suggests that urban settings can serve as Suri’s ‘anchor of insight’ or a ‘new key’ à la Varga. In comparison with regional or global frameworks, the city represents a relatively digestible geographic unit for historical enquiry. By their very nature, cities present environments in which a range of actors and dynamics – local, national, transnational, international, and global – come together in a single locus. As sites of human interaction and exchange, city-based studies offer a means of analysing the intersection and cross-fertilisation of ostensibly separate narrative threads, to reveal complicated, entangled histories. To understand a complex phenomenon, observes Tony Judt, it must be pulled apart, but this separation risks falsifying the narrative; ‘its absence has a comparably distorting impact on something else.’29 Through the prism of the city, simultaneously geographically fixed but porous to movements of people, materials, information, and ideas, such entanglements can be addressed without lifting them from their immediate context.

The globalising dynamics created by the expansion of European empires in Africa and Asia from the nineteenth century onwards facilitated the emergence of cosmopolitan cities across the world. Tracking the migration patterns and urban geography of interwar Paris, Michael Goebel has shown how the physical fabric of the city furthered the spread of anticolonial nationalisms. He reveals how Vietnamese, Chinese, and Algerian expatriates came to conceive themselves as not only part of a wider anticolonial struggle, but also as distinct national communities. The urban milieu is critical to Goebel’s study: using French police files, he reconstructs a social environment of cafés and clubs in which such exchanges took place. He also stresses the importance of French interlocutors, especially the local Communist Party, in plugging these nascent movements into internationalist circuits of Marxist anticolonialism.30

After the collapse of the Grand Alliance in the aftermath of the Second World War, these networks of left-wing revolution were recast as part of the global Cold War struggle. As the subplots and entangled dynamics of Westad’s pluralised conception of the Cold War spread outwards from Europe, urban centres around the globe became key sites of geopolitical and ideological competition. Articles in a recent special issue of Urban History discuss the permeation of Cold War politics into the political, social, and physical fabric of cities on both sides of the East-West divide, as well as in the Third World. However, the contributors work from the distinct prism of ‘urban history’, seeking to inscribe the Cold War into the local in discussing the implementation of civil

29 Tony Judt and Timothy Snyder, Thinking the Twentieth Century (New York: Penguin, 2012), 43.
Introduction

defence plans in Baltimore, architecture in Belgrade, or post-earthquake urban planning in
Managua. Similarly, while there is a growing body of historiography on the city in Africa, it
remains largely socioeconomic or cultural in its interests. The ‘global turn’ has moved the urban
history of Africa away from narrow studies grounded in local or regional perspectives, but there
has been little attempt to situate the continent’s international history within an urban context.

Concerned primarily with high politics rather than local urban structures, this thesis takes the
city of Dar es Salaam not as its central focus of study, but as a landscape in which diverse national,
transnational, and international political dynamics intersected. I argue that major urban centres at
the periphery of the Cold War were transformed into ‘Cold War cities’, products of both
geopolitical realities and the mental anxieties that characterised much Cold War thinking. As the
epicentre of the superpower rivalry, Berlin is the most obvious example of this: the West German
eclave was a geostrategic flashpoint, but consequently also a politically-charged environment in
which radical politics and counterculture thrived. Mexico City was a key Cold War battleground in
Central America, caught between the hegemonic superpower to the north and the waves of
revolution and counterrevolution to the south. It became, Patrick Iber suggests,

a sort of Latin American version of Casablanca: a large city full of conflicting ideologies, with
agents from different countries spying on one another; peasant uprisings with big business
trying to control them; gun-running, drug-running, money-laundering; people hiding out, people
seeking the people hiding out; and every other permutation of a vast international struggle
imaginable.

The cinematic reference to wartime Casablanca – another city situated at the periphery of a global
conflict, with attendant grey areas between would-be enemies – captures a sense of atmosphere
similar to that of the ‘Cold War city’.

In Africa and Asia, the emergence of such cities was shaped by the collision between the Cold
War and decolonisation. The political cosmopolitanism of the Saigon captured in Graham Greene’s
novel The Quiet American, as a city caught between a French colonial fin-de-siècle, the fervour of
anticolonial struggle, and Cold War paranoia, represents a Southeast Asian example of this juncture.
In North Africa, Cairo and post-independence Algiers became regional foci of anticolonial dissent
and mobilisation. Presidents Gamal Abdel Nasser and Ahmed Ben Bella welcomed to their capitals

31 Matthew Farish and David Monteyne, ‘Introduction: Histories of Cold War Cities’, Urban History, 42
33 Laurent Fourchard, ‘Between World History and State Formation: New Perspectives on Africa’s Cities’,
34 Quinn Slobodian, Foreign Front: Third World Politics in Sixties West Germany (Durham, NC: Duke University
English translation. See also Patrick Iber, ‘Managing Mexico’s Cold War: Vicente Lombardo Toledano and
Introduction

liberation movements from sub-Saharan and Arab territories still under colonial occupation. The presence of guerrilla leaders ratcheted up the importance of these cities at an important geostrategic crossroads, between the southern flank of a divided Europe and the Arabian oilfields. The central role which Algeria and Egypt played in the non-aligned, pan-African, and pan-Arab movements contributed to a snowball effect, whereby their capitals became crucibles of Cold War politics, anticolonial revolution, and Third World solidarity.36

As the scenes depicted by Kapuściński at the New Africa Hotel suggest, Dar es Salaam occupied a similar place as a ‘Cold War city’ on the frontline of the liberation struggle in southern Africa. In his history of cultural politics in Dar es Salaam in the 1960s, Andrew Ivaska describes the city as a ‘nodal point’ between Tanzania and the world, ‘along competing and criss-crossing cosmopolitan networks that extend over long distances but are more bounded than the often vague concept of flows suggests’.37 My thesis transposes Ivaska’s concept of the city as a ‘node’ to the level of elite politics. Like Algiers and Cairo, Dar es Salaam hosted an array of guerrilla leaders, who were afforded refuge in the city by Nyerere. In the 1960s and early 1970s, the Tanzanian capital was a ‘Mecca’ of anticolonialism, simultaneously caught up in complex Cold War conflicts and domestic power struggles.38 These dynamics were brought together in Dar es Salaam’s vibrant public sphere and the clandestine happenings which took place in its offices, bars, and restaurants.

By interpreting these entangled narratives through an urban framework, they can be unpicked at a micropolitical level. Deconstructing monolithic entities – countries, governments, liberation movements, alliance blocs – allows an analysis of international politics through their local elaboration, highlighting issues of contingency and agency. Like Goebel, I heed Gregory Mann’s plea that ‘the specificities of particular places be brought to the fore, not only to ground research empirically but also to disaggregate and cast new light upon colonial and postcolonial circumstances’.39 This approach complicates existing international histories of both the Cold War and national liberation struggles in southern Africa. In elucidating points of friction in which the agency of especially African actors is revealed, it recalibrates our understanding of the distribution of power in the era of the Cold War and decolonisation.

39 Quoted in Goebel, Anti-Imperial Metropolis, 5.
Introduction

**Tanzanian history and the shadow of Julius Nyerere**

The use of the city as a framework of inquiry is intended to avoid defaulting to the unit of the nation-state. Yet Tanzanian politicians, often operating in a principally national (and indeed nationalist) context, occupy a central role in the history which follows. As a source of authority, permitting, limiting, and blocking the behaviour of Dar es Salaam’s diverse cast of political actors, the Tanzanian state exercised significant power over both national and international affairs in the capital. From the late 1960s onwards, as the sole legal political party in the country, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) presided over a far-reaching interventionist scheme of socioeconomic reform. Following Nyerere’s principle of ujamaa (loosely translated as ‘familyhood’), rather than Marxist doctrine, TANU pressed ahead with a programme of African socialism, most notably an ambitious plan to resettle the peasantry into collectivised villages. It is unsurprising that much of the historiography of post-independence Tanzania therefore focuses on the relationship between the state and society, especially in terms of the villagisation campaign.

This literature has developed in several stages.40 During the early ujamaa years itself, Tanzania attracted the interest of left-wing scholars from beyond the African continent, drawn by what Ali Mazrui called ‘Tanzaphilia’ – the intellectual allure of Nyerere’s efforts to build a non-aligned, socialist nation.41 Then, as the economic limitations of ujamaa socialism became clear, scholars dissected the reasons behind its failures. Those writing from a Marxist position identified ujamaa’s inability to ‘capture’ the peasantry or sufficiently transform the nature of the national economy.42 Others have located the shortcomings of ujamaa socialism in its ‘high modernist’ ambitions or an inherently authoritarian streak in ‘developmentalist’ government.43

As Priya Lal argues, these histories suffer from a misleading sense of teleology: that ujamaa was destined to fail, either because of fundamental flaws in Nyerere’s utopian visions, or because of an inherent impulse towards authoritarian government common to post-colonial Africa. Lal’s own history resituates ujamaa in a context that is both local and global – ‘between the village and the world’ – to assess not ‘what was wrong with Tanzanian socialism’, but to understand what it actually was.44 As memories of the economic hardships experienced during the ujamaa years recede in memory, historians have begun to explore its more enduring legacies, especially the emergence of

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Introduction

a genuine, stabilising national identity. While many of its neighbours remain plagued by ethnic strife or civil war, Tanzania has enjoyed a relatively peaceful history since independence. Treating ujamaa socialism as a flexible political discourse rather than a concrete socialist programme, historians have explored the deeper history of this national identity. Ivaska’s and Kelly Askew’s analyses of ujamaa’s cultural content, Emma Hunter’s history of democratic discourse, and the work of Ronald Aminzade and James Brennan on race and national identity all enrich our understanding of Tanzanian socialism. All stress how the discourse and practices of ujamaa were contested on multiple planes and rife with tensions. They also challenge the artificial division between colonial rule and ‘flag’ independence in 1961 by anchoring their histories in a past that extends back beyond the liberation struggle.45

However, there remains a significant blindspot in the history of contemporary Tanzania: the world of elite politics. In general, historians of Africa have avoided the matter of power struggles among post-colonial elites. The reasons for this may be sketched out briefly. The emergence of African history as a recognisable academic field in the 1950s and 1960s coincided with the development of social history in the Western academy, which eschewed narrative histories of ‘great men’ in favour of a ‘bottom-up’ study of the past. Among Africanists seeking to escape colonial paradigms, the study of high politics seemed a Eurocentric pursuit. Historians have renewed this trend into the twenty-first century, abetted by the postmodern or cultural turn. As Stephen Ellis observes, historians may also be dissuaded from studying Africa’s contemporary political history because its metanarratives are characterised by failure, in contrast to more positive histories of precolonial independence or colonial era resistance. Historians of Africa’s recent past thus lay themselves open to accusations of ‘Afropessimistic’ readings of the continent’s affairs.46 I suspect, too, that historians employed by state-funded African universities are understandably reluctant to confront subject matter that remains politically sensitive in the present.

This historiographical neglect of elite politics in Africa runs counter to the nature of contemporary political life in the continent. Although opinion polling suggests Tanzanian voters prioritise policies over personalities,47 political debate in both the mass media and on the street focuses overwhelmingly on the posturing and rhetoric of party leaders, at least at a national level. While parties’ manifestos can appear improvised and incoherent, their leaders draw enormous crowds to rallies. Newspapers bulge with salacious political gossip. These stories draw upon memories of past struggles, often involving the individuals (or their immediate family ancestors)

Introduction

still active in contemporary politics. Narratives of high politics therefore demand historiographical attention.

Moreover, the rich body of theoretical literature about the nature of the state in Africa invites historical investigation into those holding the levers of power. Many historians have borrowed Frederick Cooper’s concept of the ‘gatekeeper state’ as a tool for analysing the practice of both colonial and post-colonial government. In Cooper’s framework, the underresourced state is incapable of fully controlling a vast territory, and so instead seeks to control the ‘gate’ – usually the capital city, often on the coast – where it can regulate and extract rents from the inflow and outflow of capital. The ‘gatekeepers’ can then distribute aid, tenders, and tariff income along patronage networks, while retaining their own positions of privilege. Similar ideas of the control of resources at the political centre to maintain the support of kinship groups inform Jean-François Bayart’s influential idea of the ‘politics of the belly’. The struggle for control of the ‘gate’ – i.e. among a narrow elite – must therefore be central to an understanding of post-colonial politics in Africa.

In recent years, historians of eastern Africa have begun to meet this challenge. Branch’s punchy account of Kenyan politics since independence demonstrates the relevance of the recent past, frequently clouded by popular myth, for a society rent with ethnic tensions. Miles Larmer’s history of opposition politics in Zambia aims to ‘avoid the pitfalls of teleological meta-narratives of nationalism, modernisation and developmentalism’ by exploring schisms within the political elite. For Tanzania, Brennan has made a number of short but valuable interventions, which hint at the value of wider study, contextualised like Lal’s work on villagisation in an international context.

The need for further study of elite politics to provide an empirically-grounded historical counterweight to the popular narratives which thrive in Africa’s contemporary political environment are especially pressing in Tanzania. The memory of the country’s first president, Julius Nyerere, continues to cast a shadow over political life, years after his death in 1999. In the political mainstream, Nyerere’s moral reputation remains largely unimpeachable. Although dissenting voices can be heard, especially in the very particular circumstances of Zanzibar, they are marginalised.

50 Branch, Kenya.
Introduction

The *ujamaa* era is remembered as a ‘golden age’ of Tanzanian history, thrown into relief against a decadent, postsocialist present. Politicians of all stripes struggle over the memory of *Mwalimu*, ‘the teacher’, as an idealised symbol of moral propriety. The ruling *Chama Cha Mapinduzi* (Party of the Revolution, CCM) presents itself as the genealogical heir to its former leader, whereas opposition parties contrast Nyerere’s moral propriety against what they portray as a corrupt present-day leadership.

The totemic position occupied by Nyerere in Tanzanian society is reflected in historical scholarship, much of which assumes a particularly hagiographic tone. ‘Lionizing Nyerere remains the rule’, writes Marie-Aude Fouéré. Nyerere’s achievement in building a Tanzanian national identity synonymous with his own person has produced an intellectual tradition in which much locally written history assumes a national(ist) paradigm and unerringly returns to the figure of Nyerere. ‘Rather than unsettling the reigning interpretations of the Mwalimu-in-power era’, notes Fouéré, these histories ‘renew them in the present.’ These tendencies do not solely characterise Tanzanian scholarship. Paul Bjerk’s rather teleological history of Tanzania’s early years of independence maintains a focus on the figure of Nyerere. Centring his history around the concept of ‘sovereignty’, Bjerk presupposes the existence of an empty nation-state, to be filled and legitimised by Nyerere’s carefully sculpted nationalism, to a triumphant conclusion in 1964. This thesis suggests that the period after 1964 was no less politically contentious than the immediate post-independence years. In criticising these *Mwalimu*-centric narratives, I do not wish to deny the central role played by Nyerere in Tanzania’s post-colonial political history. Indeed, Nyerere’s name appears many times more frequently in the pages which follow than that of any other person, Tanzanian or otherwise. Yet, contrary to the impression sometimes given by scholars who are over-reliant on published anthologies of Nyerere’s speeches and writings, his was not the only voice in Tanzanian politics during the *ujamaa* years. Nor did he wield absolute power.

Instead, as this thesis shows, Nyerere’s authority was challenged by numerous Tanzanian political actors. Opposition came from multiple sources: ideological misgivings about *ujamaa*...
socialism, cynical political manoeuvring, and personal embitterment. Rather than being a benevolent philosopher-king, Nyerere was a political animal himself, prepared to resort to authoritarian means to suppress dissent and shore up his own position. As Larmer shows in his history of opposition in Zambia, paying attention to opposition at an elite level helps to disrupt the unilinear trajectories of nationalist, post-colonial histories. While historians of Tanzania have not ignored the extent of internal opposition to Nyerere’s government, they address it primarily with reference to resistance to the implementation of njamua policy, especially villagisation. By retaining a grassroots perspective, these histories permit the separation of Nyerere-as-president from the impact of his policies. Marrying a desire to fill a major historiographical gap with a need to counter the dominant nationalist narrative, my thesis therefore seeks to contextualise the extent and nature of Nyerere’s power within a more fluid history, cognisant of the existence of dissent and set in a context that looks beyond the nation-state, while appreciating its significance.

A note on the sources

To the list of suggested reasons for the relative paucity of historiography on high politics and international affairs in independent Africa should be added the difficulties presented by the ‘post-colonial archive’. In much of sub-Saharan Africa, the archives of the post-colonial state, which might be expected to form an empirical backbone of a history of politics after independence, remain inaccessible to researchers. A rich debate has developed about the nature of the ‘colonial archive’ (whether held in the former metropole or the post-colony), driven by anthropologists writing under the influence of postcolonial and poststructural theory. But until recently, scholars have had little to say about how such conceptual approaches to the colonial archive might translate to approaches into its post-colonial successor.

For all their nuances, arguments about the colonial archive accept as a fundamental premise that the archive – both the physical institution and the documents contained therein – is a political entity. Through its organisational structures and the form its holdings take, the archive shapes and delimits the possibilities of historical research and scholarship. The same holds true for the post-

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60 Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics*.
Introduction

colonial archive in Africa, albeit without the façade of orderliness which the colonial archive seeks to maintain. Where states have kept archives, they are often closed to researchers. In cases where record-keeping has been neglected, the archive remains only in an especially fragmented form – or does not exist altogether. The post-colonial archive has in many cases suffered from environmental damage, as a consequence of rainwater, termites, or war. Chronically underfunded archives can prove difficult for historians to navigate, as archivists struggle with the task of cataloguing and finding documents.

This destruction and disorganisation is connected to broader patterns of archival neglect in Africa, symptomatic of malignant political motivations. In a dynamic characteristic of a general suspicion of historical inquiry in Africa, stemming from its potential to challenge the authority of the state and its official narratives, gatekeeper regimes have denied scholars access to politically sensitive documents. As Achille Mbembe observes, as a repository of accumulated records – records of the state’s past – the archive forms a keystone of the state’s architecture of power. However, ‘the very existence of the archive constitutes a constant threat to the state. […] More than on its ability to recall, the power of the state rests on its ability to control time, that is, to abolish the archive and anaesthetise the past.’ This epistemological violence assumes a particular sharpness in the charged political context of sub-Saharan Africa. As Moses Ochunu recognises, archives become ‘weapons of postcolonial political warfare’, and thus can be deliberately mutilated (or muzzled). The state, concludes Omnia El Shakry – evocatively paraphrasing Mbembe – therefore ‘devours the past through either the material destruction of the archives or the presentation of a history purified of antagonisms and embodied in empty commemorative accounts.

The dead-end which the post-colonial archive frequently represents has pushed historians down two routes. Firstly, by preventing historians from consulting its own records, the post-colonial regime nudges them towards the colonial-era archive. As El Shakry notes with reference to the Middle East, ‘the obstruction of post-independence official state archives has tended to make the workings of the colonial state far more visible than the operations of the national states which succeeded colonial rule.’ This has contributed to a more general foregrounding of the better-documented colonial era, in which historians since the 1970s have searched for the roots of Africa’s

66 El Shakry, ““History without Documents””, 920.
67 El Shakry, ““History without Documents””, 923-24. For an instructive comparison, see Jeff Sahadeo, ““Without a Past There Is No Future”: Archives, History, and Authority in Uzbekistan”, in Antoinette Burton (ed), *Archive Stories: Facts, Fictions, and the Writing of History* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005), 45-67. Sahadeo observes that given the continuities in personnel between the ‘colonial’ period of Soviet occupation and the post-1991 independent state, the Uzbekistani authorities restricted access to Soviet-era documents to prevent researchers from exposés which had the potential to undermine contemporary nationalist narratives.
post-independence travails. While the difficulties of the archive are only one factor in this occlusion of the post-colonial past, the risk is that Africa’s history since independence (at least in terms of academic scholarship) will become marginalised, like the now relatively neglected field of the continent’s precolonial history.

The other response by historians has been the pursuit of alternative sources and histories of post-colonial Africa. In the case of Tanzania, historians have used the limiting holdings of the National Archives in Dar es Salaam and its regional branches to study the development and implementation of *ujamaa* socialism, especially the villagisation policy. Others have turned to oral histories, deftly recovering the voices of ‘the excluded’, as James Giblin puts it, in a deliberate turn away from state-centric histories that he argues reproduces European and colonial modes of thought and power. However, as an alternative means of capturing African voices, oral histories have clear limitations, especially when seeking to reconstruct complex political narratives. The specifics of time, place, words, and actions become only selectively embedded in memory and understandably lost and distorted with passing years.

While these histories have greatly illuminated our understanding of Africa’s recent past, a less welcome effect of the turn away from inaccessible state archives has been to insulate the ‘included’ (to invert Giblin’s expression) from the scrutiny of historians. The state’s control over what enters the archive and who may consult it, with little transparency in either process, therefore enables the maintenance of state-sponsored national narratives which are difficult to challenge with empirical evidence. In Tanzania, I was denied access to the party archives of CCM in Dodoma, a problem encountered by the vast majority of prospective researchers, but perhaps aggravated in my case by the close proximity of my visit to a general election. Making enquiries at the more researcher-friendly Zanzibar National Archives, I found that the years covered by the presidency of Abeid Karume – the period relevant for this study – represented a near total lacuna, with records essentially ceasing in 1964 and then only beginning again in 1972, the year of his death.

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Having established first that the post-colonial state is a ripe subject of historical inquiry, then that the state puts up barriers to prevent research into this past, to where does the historian of post-colonial Africa turn for source material? Jean Allman has looked for traces of evidence for her own subject, Nkrumah’s Ghana, in ‘shadow archives’ scattered around the world. “The postcolonial archive is not the easy and direct descendant of the colonial archive project’, she writes. ‘It is not a “national archive”. It does not reside in one place, or even two or three. It is a global, transnational archive.” My thesis therefore uses material drawn from sixteen archives, spread across eight countries. With the exception of snippets from the Tanzania National Archives, all of this research was conducted in archives based in Europe and North America, which mostly contained the records of national governments, especially foreign ministries.

In anticipating understandable objections to this methodology, I contend that the limitations of writing about Africa through state archives in the global North need not preclude a careful reading that permits the elaboration of the continent’s post-colonial politics. As Ellis suggests, the work produced by historians of pre-colonial Africa using the records of European explorers, missionaries, and traders can serve as a model for historians of post-colonial Africa, provided they ‘pay more than usual attention to the cardinal rules of gathering historical evidence.” While I accept that the judgements expressed within these documents represent a particular stratum of identities and interests (here almost exclusively white, university-educated males acting on behalf of governments, usually in diplomatic representations or foreign ministries), the basic data contained therein can be extracted and marshalled with reasonable security. These sources tend to focus on questions of elite politics, but this thesis is about elite politics; indeed, they provide a means of accessing the corridors of power of the post-colonial state, albeit one with a particular slant. Confidence in the data conveyed in them is enhanced by the multilateral, multiarchival approach adopted – unlike Bjerk’s work on the early years of independence in Tanzania, which in places depends largely on American diplomatic records. This permits a degree of triangulation by cross-referencing, elucidating at the same time the networks through which information was transferred in the ‘Cold War city’. At the same time, I am also aware that this defence is in part an exercise in straw man construction: this study is not purely one of Africans or Tanzanians, but also encompasses narrative strands in which non-Africans play leading roles.

73 Allman, ‘Phantoms of the Archive’, 126.
74 Of course, the holdings of archives in the global North are far from an unfiltered, verisimilar record of the documentation produced at the time, as the controversy over the ‘Hanslope files’ and violence at the end of Britain’s empire demonstrates. David M. Anderson, ‘Mau Mau in the High Court and the “Lost” British Empire Archives: Colonial Conspiracy or Bureaucratic Bungle?’, *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 39 (2011), 699-716; Caroline Elkins, ‘Looking beyond Mau Mau: Archiving Violence in the Era of Decolonization’, *American Historical Review*, 120 (2015), 852-68. More generally, these archives are subject to strict, often opaque, processes of selection and redaction. We should not, as Richard Aldrich warns, consider them as ‘an analogue of reality’: The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Secret Cold War Intelligence (London: John Murray, 2001), 6.
76 Bjerk, Building a Peaceful Nation.
The holdings of the archives of foreign ministries should not solely be regarded as a paper-trail of official communications. While telegrams and memorandums produced by diplomats and bureaucrats do form the bulk of the records, these archives continually turned up surprise inclusions. They were replete with verbatim transcripts of speeches, newspaper clippings, snippets of gossip, official Tanzanian government circulars, documents from other foreign ministries, press releases, propaganda pamphlets, and a variety of locally-produced ‘grey literature’. While I tracked down some in Tanzania, at the East African Collection at the library of the University of Dar es Salaam, it would be impossible to ascertain where the fragments preserved in the scrapbooks of Allman’s ‘postcolonial archive’ might otherwise be found. In toto, state archives constitute a filtered but illuminating record of the workings of foreign missions in Dar es Salaam, offering an insight into local politics and its public sphere as experienced and understood by diplomats.

One consequence of the ‘archival turn’ has been a raised awareness of the need to incorporate the ‘lived encounter’ of the historian with the archive into his or her work.77 My multiarchival approach involved continual disruption and adaptation, both in terms of travel and the research environment. Under the temporal and financial pressures of a PhD project undertaken at a British university, I moved through archives at a rapid pace: aside from the research in the UK, my fieldwork took less than nine months, plus a four-month stay in Tanzania.78 This problem was exacerbated by the multilingual demands of my research, which not only added an additional challenge to reading my sources, but complicated the navigation of the institutional architecture of different archives, which was based on different bureaucratic languages and cultures. Communicating my research interests to archivists, however helpful, proved difficult.

I began my research in the UK, where my permanent residence allowed me to make a large number of trips to the National Archives at Kew over a period of several months. Whereas the relevant holdings of other state archives are almost exclusively ‘one-way traffic’ – the records of diplomats in Dar es Salaam sent back to central government – the British files include policy debates within the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the input of other government departments, and the instructions sent out to the high commission in Tanzania. The records from 1965 to 1968, when Tanzania severed diplomatic relations with Britain, also contain copies of communications between the Canadian high commission in Dar es Salaam and Ottawa. As the previous colonial occupier, the British retained numerous contacts within the Tanzanian political establishment, including among Nyerere’s personal entourage.

78 I emphasise this only to acknowledge the pressures this put on a project of this type. My PhD project was more than adequately funded by a government scholarship and, as stated in the acknowledgements, the research abroad was made possible through a host of other bodies. Yet temporal and financial constraints still prevented me from making preliminary reconnaissance trips to these archives and limited the time I could spend in them.
I started my archival globetrotting with a month spent on the lesser-trodden path of the French diplomatic archives, split between Nantes and Paris – though I found little of relevance for this study in the latter location. The well-organised holdings at Nantes provide a Western perspective with a certain detachment from the American and British archives. Having backed out of the military arm of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), France appears less preoccupied by Cold War categories; its lack of real interests in Anglophone Tanzania gives its effusive diplomatic reportage a more distant feel. Of particular value for this study are the French consulate’s records from Zanzibar: plugged into a network of local informers, many of whom were of Comorian background, Paris’ representatives on the islands provided the richest source on Zanzibari politics in the Karume years.

The longest of my overseas archival excursions was a three-month trip to the United States, beginning with at the National Archives at College Park, Maryland. The records of the State Department contain substantially more information on Tanzania during the period of this study than any other which I consulted. They are invaluable as a source of precise details on political life in the country, especially through the American embassy’s weekly news digest, containing information that was omitted from the local press. Whereas the scholarship on the Zanzibar Revolution has highlighted the paranoia of American officials in East Africa and Washington, I found that a number of prominent diplomats were able to transcend Cold War categories to produce insightful commentaries on Tanzanian politics, especially ambassador John H. Burns and Thomas Pickering, who later served as ambassador to the UN. Beyond Washington, two months spent travelling around presidential libraries proved less productive. The Johnson Library in Austin contains illuminating material on the American response to the Zanzibar Revolution and act of union in 1964. I also used documents found there to shed light on the Johnson administration’s public relations tactics in Africa, plus presidential communications between Johnson and Nyerere about the Vietnam war. An expensive visit to the Nixon Library, nestled in deep Los Angeles suburbia, yielded little of note for the present study.

During two months in Berlin, I consulted the collections maintained by the two German states. Still in the process of declassification, the limited archives of the West German Auswärtiges Amt (Foreign Office) demonstrate Bonn’s overwhelming – and sometimes distorting – preoccupation with the activities of its East German rival in the Third World, which is the subject of chapter 3. More fruitful were the rather haphazard records of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Although the records are supposedly divided between the party archives of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands; SED), kept at the Bundesarchiv, and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs archives, housed at the present-day Auswärtiges Amt, the crossover between the two reflected the party’s overarching control over the apparatus of the GDR’s international relations. I also obtained access to the files relevant to Tanzania produced by the Stasi, the GDR’s security service, although the archive’s procedures limit the scope of research: the
prospective historian must leave the process of locating files in the hands of an archivist, and there is no finding aid.\textsuperscript{79} Couched in a dense Marxist-Leninist jargon which skewed perceptions of Tanzanian affairs, the GDR’s records reveal a very different set of political networks in Dar es Salaam to those found in Western archives. However, they should not be seen as indicative of communist policy more generally, nor as a surrogate for research in Soviet archives. Travelling east, through the aid of a translator I was able to consult the records of the Polish foreign ministry, although the holdings for Tanzania were limited to a handful of folios. I have also used a small number of translated Czechoslovakian intelligence documents.

I concluded my archival research with two months in the largely untapped Portuguese archives, where the documents are more heavily coloured by anticommunism than those of the other Western holdings I consulted. Although Tanzania did not maintain relations with Portugal due to its colonial policy, Lisbon took an active interest in Tanzanian affairs, due to the presence of several Lusophone liberation movements in the country, especially the Mozambique Liberation Front (\textit{Frente de Libertação de Moçambique}; FRELIMO). Without an embassy in Dar es Salaam, Lisbon sought to acquire knowledge on Tanzanian affairs by piecing together fragments of information. The buckle-bound files of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Overseas Ministry therefore contain a rich assortment of gossip and newspaper clippings, plus reports shared by their Rhodesian or South African allies, as well as informers within Tanzania.\textsuperscript{80} At the National Archives at Torre do Tombo, the files of the secret police (PIDE), mainly operating out of Mozambique, are not only valuable sources of information on FRELIMO leaders, but also – by triangulation against other sources – reveal the shortcomings of Portuguese intelligence, which remained strikingly ignorant of Tanzanian internal affairs.

This main body of evidence is supplemented by snippets from a number of non-state archives, which help to move the thesis away from solely a narrative concerned with state actors. The research papers of Graham Mytton, a doctoral student of communications in Tanzania in the period under study, provide interviews and insights into the world of the mass media in the late 1960s. The records of Reuters, the British news agency, elucidate relationships between the Tanzanian authorities and foreign correspondents. The Herbert Shore collection, at the remote environs of Oberlin College, Ohio, contains personal notes and ephemera relating to Eduardo Mondlane, the FRELIMO leader who occupies centre-stage in chapter 4.

My choice of archives was partly motivated by the spread of angles which they provide upon political life in Dar es Salaam, but it was also limited by other factors. Even before issues of archival access could be considered, linguistic barriers precluded further research in the Chinese and other Eastern Bloc archives. Time and money prevented work in the holdings of Australian and Canadian


Introduction

diplomatic archives. Similarly, the multiple possibilities for research in South Africa – in the collections gathered by the various Dar-based liberation movements, as well as the archives of the apartheid-era state – could unfortunately not be pursued.

In addition, this thesis makes use of the international and especially the Tanzanian press. I comprehensively surveyed the two main English-language newspapers in Tanzania during the period, the Nationalist and the Standard. As Ellis recognises, African newspapers – like any others – cannot be regarded as ‘journals of record’. The Nationalist was TANU’s official newspaper, while the Standard was nationalised by the government in 1970; ultimately the two were merged to form the Daily News in 1972. They occupied a grey area between official party or state propaganda and a controlled forum in which voices not entirely congruent with the government’s own programme were afforded space in print. Read critically, Tanzanian newspapers are not only a valuable source of ‘official’ news, but a keyhole through which broader political messages and conflicts can be understood. In many instances, what local newspapers do not contain are as instructive as the information which they do. As chapter 5 shows, the history of the Tanzanian press is bound up in broader questions of government management, radical politics, and the struggle for control in Dar es Salaam’s public sphere.

International correspondents and agency reporters, as I demonstrate, also played an important role as conduits of information between political actors in Tanzania. Through either the use of keyword searches for digitalised newspapers, or selective research focused on specific events or ‘tip-offs’ found in primary and secondary material, the domestic press is complemented by a wide range of international newspaper sources. These tend to reflect foreign tendencies to view developments in Dar es Salaam through the lens of Cold War rivalries. They also often perpetuate stereotyped, exoticised assumptions about ‘Africa’ – to a much greater extent than diplomats.

Finally, this thesis draws on the memories of contemporary actors themselves. In light of the inaccessibility of political archives in Tanzania, I carried out a series of interviews with prominent former Tanzanian politicians, ministers, bureaucrats, student leaders, and journalists in mid-2015. This is not the place for a treatise on the value and potential pitfalls surrounding conducting oral history in Africa. Given the microdiplomatic nature of much of my thesis, my subjects’ memories were rarely useful for corroborating my archival data or filling narrative blindspots, but rather their observations provided a sense of balance: the same Cold War dynamics which ring through foreign archives in many instances were not echoed by my interview subjects. A second form of ‘memory’ comes from both official organised oral histories, such as the American Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection, plus the memoirs of prominent actors. While Africa’s ‘memoir boom’ has yet

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to have made a major impact on Tanzania, those accounts that have been published generally fall into two camps: one consisting of largely uncritical paean to Nyerere, the other unremittingly hostile towards him.\(^{84}\)

As Allman identifies, the postcolonial archive – even before its supplementation with oral testimony, biography, and the press – is a complex, multilayered structure which challenges the historian to think beyond the categories of the nation-state. While the multiarchival approach used here is an attempt to analyse the intersection of decolonisation and the Cold War in Africa from the viewpoint of multiple interest groups, it also helps the historian to deconstruct local politics, which are shown to be embedded in broader international and transnational networks, involving state and non-state actors, plus those – like the liberation movements – operating in the grey area in between. This evidence is fragmentary, with all of the archival collections I have used replete with lacunae. Yet this should not be an insurmountable barrier for the historian. ‘Our talent is to be able, from piecemeal traces, to narrate a fleshed-out, elucidatory story’, writes Florence Bernault. ‘Our paradox is to use incomplete and fragmentary traces to understand broad patterns and timelines in a past that remains, by definition, unreachable […] If this interpretative art needs to be fueled by evidence, it hardly depends on the comprehensiveness of the record.’\(^{86}\)

This thesis starts by setting out a background narrative of the early years of Tanzania’s history. Beginning with Tanganyika’s independence in 1961, it shows how a series of regional crises shaped the political direction of the nascent state. In 1964, an army mutiny, revolution in Zanzibar, and the subsequent act of union all led to an intensification of Cold War politics in Dar es Salaam. Faced with a hostile international climate and a precarious domestic situation, Nyerere moved to shore up his own power by instituting a one-party state. The chapter ends with a reassessment of the Arusha Declaration of 1967, considering it in the context of domestic political machinations, rather than simply as an abstract statement of socioeconomic revolution.

The next chapter sketches out a political geography of Dar es Salaam. Taking a non-chronological approach, it explores the sites of political activity within the ‘Cold War city’, piecing together networks which both followed and cut across national and ideological divisions. It pays particular attention to the transmission of information around the city, through official media, propaganda, rumour, and ‘black literature’. This establishes a framework within which the following chapters can be understood, showing how they were linked together by their overlapping geographic milieux and interwoven intelligence networks.


\(^{85}\) See the discussion in Brennan, *Julius Rex*.

The remaining chapters form diverse narrative strands that are shown to be inextricably entwined. Chapter 3 examines the unfolding of the ‘inter-German Cold War’ in Dar es Salaam. The city became a propaganda battlefield as East Berlin strove for full recognition from Tanzania, while Bonn sought to limit the gains of its communist enemy. By scoping out to developments elsewhere, such as the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, then zooming into the networks through which German diplomats worked in Dar es Salaam, it shows how the dynamics of Cold War geopolitics were entangled with local Tanzanian affairs.

Chapter 4 focuses on the experience of FRELIMO and its leader, Eduardo Mondlane, in attempting to wage a liberation struggle from Dar es Salaam. As FRELIMO sought to further its war against the Portuguese through the support of various Cold War protagonists, it was gripped by an internal crisis that divided the movement along ethnoracial and ideological lines. Dissenters were aided by powerful members of the Tanzanian political establishment, who secretly aligned with Mondlane’s enemies to denigrate him in public and undermine his security. These schisms ultimately facilitated the assassination of Mondlane in 1969.

The final three chapters focus on Tanzanian political developments, set in the wider context of the Cold War and decolonisation in Africa. Chapter 5 uses local reactions to Cold War interventions in Vietnam and Czechoslovakia to show how the government channelled radical critiques of superpower ‘imperialism’ into nation-building rhetoric. It shows how Nyerere recognised the need to give space in Dar es Salaam’s political sphere to more radical voices, but also the need to muzzle them when their arguments damaged Tanzania’s international reputation and geopolitical interests.

Together, chapters 6 and 7 confront the political history of Tanzania in the years of ujamaa socialism: a series of controversial developments that are widely understood to be significant, yet almost devoid of historiographical attention. Faced by threats from both inside and outside his country, Nyerere’s regime took an authoritarian turn. By the end of 1972, the elite had been purged of opponents, declared or potential. Yet this was not a straightforward drive towards authoritarian rule, but a twisted path, contoured by individual decisions and entanglements, and characterised by openings, as well as the closure of, alternatives to the doxa of ujamaa.
Chapter 1

From *uhuru* to Arusha: Tanzania and the world, 1961-67

Tanganyika became independent from Britain on 9 December 1961. The former German colony had been run as a League of Nations mandate after 1922 and a United Nations (UN) trust territory since the Second World War. *Uhuru* – freedom – was attained after a protracted but peaceful struggle, waged through negotiation and the ballot box. The independence campaign was led by TANU, spearheaded by Julius Nyerere, a schoolteacher who had been educated at Makerere University in Kampala and the University of Edinburgh. Yet amid the euphoria of *uhuru*, Nyerere, initially as prime minister, then as president when Tanganyika became a republic in 1962, was deeply conscious of the challenges facing the country. As he wrote in the party newspaper, ‘[p]overty, ignorance, and disease must be overcome before we can really establish in this country the sort of society we have been dreaming of. These obstacles are not small ones, they are more difficult to overcome than any alien government.’

This chapter shows how in the early years of its existence the new Tanganyikan – and subsequently Tanzanian – government was confronted by a series of crises, stemming from the collision of Nyerere’s political principles with a domestic and international context shaped by decolonisation and superpower relations. Synthesising secondary material, this narrative provides an essential framework for understanding the various stands of inquiry which follow in subsequent chapters. It also explains how Dar es Salaam came to occupy a central position in the global Cold War and the struggle for African liberation. The closing sections of the chapter revisit the pivotal period in Tanzanian’s post-colonial history following the Arusha Declaration of February 1967, interpreted in light of its far-reaching effects on the country’s political affairs.

**Nyerere’s foreign policy**

While historians may overstate the extent of Nyerere’s influence over Tanzania’s domestic affairs, his domination of the country’s foreign policy is less contestable. In terms of both the institutional structure of decision-making and the charismatic presence which he assumed on the global stage, Tanzania’s approach to the outside world was the product of Nyerere’s bold foreign policy. The

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88 On Nyerere’s formative years, see Thomas Molony, *Nyerere: The Early Years* (Woodbridge: James Currey, 2014).

major TANU committees nor parliament exercised negligible direct influence over foreign affairs. At multilateral organisations like the UN or the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), Nyerere established himself as a statesman of a standing beyond that which would be expected of the leader of a poor nation like Tanzania.

Nyerere’s foreign policy rested on three mutually reinforcing pillars. The first was an unwavering commitment to the liberation of those African peoples still under white minority rule. At the Addis Ababa conference in May 1963, where heads of African states founded the OAU, Nyerere emphasised the continent’s duty to free those still under colonial oppression. African leaders, he argued should now view the continued occupation of Africa by any foreign power with the same gravity and in the same seriousness as each one of us would have viewed the occupation by a foreign power of a part of the country that he has the privilege and honour to lead. We can no longer go on saying that Angola is not free or that Mozambique is not free, etc., and that we are helping Angolans or Mozambicans to free themselves. Such statements are hiding the truth. The real humiliating truth is that Africa is not free; and therefore it is Africa which should take the necessary collective measures to free Africa.

Nyerere permitted exiled liberation movements to set up their headquarters in Dar es Salaam and training camps across the country. Dar es Salaam also became the seat of the OAU’s Liberation Committee, a coordinating organisation for supporting the guerrillas. This raised the political stakes of Cold War competition in the Tanzanian capital. Representatives of the communist powers attempted to build relationships with the movements, which were mostly left-leaning. The movements’ leaders, conscious of this competition for influence, sought to broker deals for aid and arms. Western governments tracked the guerrillas’ activities, concerned about the prospect of future Marxist governments in independent Africa. Agents of the white minority regimes – Portugal, Rhodesia, and South Africa – tried to infiltrate and disrupt these movements. These dynamics are explored in chapter 4.

The second pillar of Nyerere’s foreign policy was a commitment to non-alignment, as a rejection of a Cold War order which he regarded as a source of neocolonial intervention into African affairs. Addressing the UN in December 1961, Nyerere emphasised that Tanganyika did ‘not have feelings of enmity toward any peoples in the world.’ This did not mean equidistance from either superpower bloc, but refraining from adopting foreign policy positions purely out of Cold War sympathies. ‘Internationally, we believe that we have entered a world riven by ideological dissension’, Nyerere said in New York. ‘We are anxious to try to keep out of these disputes, and are anxious to see that the nations of our continent are not used as pawns in conflicts which very often

do not concern them at all.’ He welcomed the friendship of any nation (except the white minority regimes), regardless of its ideological orientation, provided aid came with no political conditionalities attached.

Finally, Nyerere was a committed pan-Africanist. He believed that the continent’s shared sense of ‘African-ness’ could help to form a common front against neocolonial predations and the vicissitudes of the global economy to which the independent states were exposed. ‘Indissoluble African Unity is the stone bridge which would enable us all to walk in safety over this whirlpool of power politics’, he wrote, ‘and enable us to carry more easily the economic and social loads which now threaten to overwhelm us.’ He consequently believed in the need for a ‘United States of Africa’. In 1963, he played an instrumental role in the foundation of the OAU, bringing together the so-called ‘Casablanca’ and ‘Monrovia’ blocs. At a regional level, he drove forward plans for federation in East Africa. Although these never came to fruition, in June 1967, Kenya and Uganda joined Tanzania in establishing the East African Community (EAC), which involved the creation of a common market with shared institutions.

The Zanzibar Revolution

While mainland Tanganyika’s path to independence was relatively stable, the situation in Zanzibar was more volatile. Political life in the archipelago was characterised by a racial cosmopolitanism, the consequence of centuries of involvement at the apex of Indian Ocean trade networks and the slave trade. Tensions between socioeconomic groups, loosely formed around contested and fluid ethnic identities, were exacerbated as much by the work of Zanzibari intellectuals as the stratifying impact of British colonial rule. In the years leading up to independence in December 1963, known as the zama za siasa, or ‘Time of Politics’, elections were characterised by outbreaks of violence and shifting partisan alignments, as the elite jostled for power. As Jonathon Glassman has shown, local polemicists injected their racial rhetoric with the language of the Cold War, invoking superpower dei ex machina to whip up fears and mobilise support.

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94 Bjerk, Building a Peaceful Nation, 194-98.
95 The Zanzibar archipelago consists of the islands of Unguja (often referred to as Zanzibar) and Pemba.
97 Glassman, War of Words, 270-73.
In the pre-uhuru elections held in July 1963, a coalition of the Zanzibar National Party (ZNP), which was perceived to be dominated by the wealthier landowning class of Arab descent, and the Zanzibar and Pemba People’s Party (ZPPP) won a majority of seats in the National Assembly. However, the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP), which had a support base mainly among the African population, won a majority of the popular vote. The ZNP-ZPPP government cracked down on the activities of opposition groups, restricted the freedom of the press, and dismissed African members of the bureaucracy and police force.

On 12 January 1964, the ZNP-ZPPP government was overthrown in a violent revolution, led by militant members of the Afro-Shirazi Party Youth League (ASPYL). The sultan fled into exile. Thousands of the Zanzibaris, mostly of Arab descent, were killed in racial pogroms. Perhaps a third of Zanzibar’s Arab population died or were forced into exile. Shortly after the seizure of power, Abeid Karume, the ASP’s leader, was installed as Zanzibar’s president, at the head of a governing Revolutionary Council.

Although the ASP’s pre-independence rhetoric had depicted its ZNP rivals as being a proxy of the communist powers, the revolutionary regime set about a comprehensive programme of socialist reform. Among its chief proponents were two committed Marxists, Abdallah Kassim Hanga, the vice-president, and Abdulrahman Mohamed ‘Babu’, the minister for external affairs and trade. Hanga was a radical member of the ASP, who had been educated in the Soviet Union. Babu had moved in far-left circles in London, where he had studied in the 1950s, and was close to China. After being imprisoned by the British on charges of sedition, Babu led his supporters in splitting from the ZNP in June 1963 to form the radical Umma party. While ZNP members, a handful of these Umma cadres had received military training in Cuba. Babu was not involved in the 12 January putsch, but he and his Umma comrades quickly asserted their influence on the revolutionary regime. Babu believed that they transformed a ‘lumpen uprising’ into a ‘popular, anti-

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99 The exact number remains impossible to ascertain, bound up in the controversial memory politics surrounding the revolution. Roman Loimeier presents a range of figures, between the ‘minimal’ (as claimed by Babu himself) and 70,000. “Memories of Revolution”: Zur Deutungsgeschichte einer Revolution (Sanzibar 1964), *Afrika Spektrum*, 41 (2006), 178-79
100 Burgess, Race, 1.
imperialist revolution'.


106 Quoted in Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions*, 57, 58-59.


January, Nyerere called for British help. The following morning, British commandos seized control of the barracks, to little resistance.\(^{110}\)

Like events in Zanzibar, the origins of the mutiny lay not in communist subversion, but grievances with the decolonisation settlement. The mutineers were disaffected by low pay, poor living conditions, and the government’s decision to retain white European officers within the army, rather than fully embrace a policy of Africanisation. While the government struggled to regain control of the situation, its discovery of documents appearing to connect the mutineers with a broader coup plot, involving trade union leaders, pushed Nyerere into calling for the British military intervention.\(^{111}\) Putting a gloss on a situation that revealed the fragility of the Tanganyikan government, Paul Bjerk claims that Nyerere’s response to mutiny was a demonstration of his brilliant statesmanship, a ‘spectacle of power by a sovereign head of state, exercising authority both within the nation and as a member of the international community.’\(^{112}\) Yet the resort to military intervention from the former colonial occupier was a major embarrassment to Nyerere, who described ‘a week of most grievous shame for our nation’.\(^{113}\)

Moreover, the scarring effects of the mutiny continued to be visible in Nyerere’s policy for years to come. After the mutiny, Nyerere set about consolidating the hold of the party over the apparatus of the state. He disbanded the Tanganyika Rifles and replaced it with the Tanzania People’s Defence Force (TPDF), which was closely tied to TANU. To minimise the potential for the army to develop into a rival power bloc, service was limited to three years. Brigadier Mrisho Sarakikya, a Nyerere loyalist, was appointed head of the armed forces.\(^{114}\) The government dissolved the Tanganyika Federation of Labour, the main trade union, and established the National Union of Tanganyika Workers (NUTA), a state-affiliated umbrella organisation.\(^{115}\) In February, Nyerere began the process of turning Tanganyika into a formal one-party state, which was officially promulgated with the 1965 constitution. In late 1964, TANU introduced a system of dividing urban communities into ten-house ‘cells’, as a means of monitoring grassroots politics.\(^{116}\) Rather than being the masterclass in statecraft that Bjerk suggests, the mutiny therefore revealed to Nyerere the weakness of his government and prompted TANU to extend its control over the political system.


\(^{112}\) Ibid., 131.

\(^{113}\) Quoted in Parsons, *1964 Army Mutinies*, 132.

\(^{114}\) Ibid., 164-69.


The creation of Tanzania

On 23 April 1964, Tanzanian radio suddenly announced that Nyerere and Karume had signed an act of union, which brought together the mainland with Zanzibar to form the state that later became the United Republic of Tanzania. Although there had been secret discussions between the two governments since the revolution in January, the announcement came as a surprise. Under the constitutional arrangements, Zanzibar would cede control of several powers, including its foreign and defence policy, to a union government based on the mainland, but maintain control of most of its own internal affairs. Introducing the bill, Nyerere explain that the union was motivated by pan-African sentiment. ‘There is no other reason’, he said. ‘It is an insult to Africa to read cold war politics into every move towards African Unity […] We do not propose this Union in order to support any of the ‘isms of this world.’ Immediately afterwards several Zanzibaris, including Babu and Hanga, took up positions in the new union government.

No matter has been more fiercely debated in the history of contemporary Tanzania than the act of union. Buying into Nyerere’s public rhetoric, some argue that the union was the realisation of his genuine pan-Africanism. Others present it as a Cold War conspiracy, in which Nyerere and the United States engineered the union to crush the Zanzibar Revolution. While this view is most often heard from Zanzibaris disenchanted by the status quo today, it can also be found in the historiography. Amrit Wilson, collaborating with Babu, depicts the union as an example of American imperialism in the Third World and castigates Nyerere as its marionette. Neither the ‘pan-African’ or the ‘Cold War conspiracy’ argument receive much support from the archival record. As Ethan Sanders has shown, American documents demonstrate that union was not initiated by the West, though it came with Washington’s approval.

Between these two poles, the scholarly literature largely accepts that the union was a product of clandestine collusion between Nyerere and Karume, each concerned about the political fate of Zanzibar. Still rattled by the mutiny, Nyerere feared that Zanzibar’s radical leftward shift would invite unwelcome Cold War politics to the East African coast, including the possibility of an American intervention. He threatened to withdraw 300 Tanganyikan policemen from Zanzibar, who had been dispatched to the islands on the request of Karume after the coup. Karume had

117 The full legal framework is explained in Shivji, Pan-Africanism, 94-97.
118 Quoted in ibid., 83.
122 Bjerk, Building a Peaceful Nation, 213-27.
his own reasons for pursuing the union. Babu, Hanga, and the other radicals in the Revolutionary Council were consolidating their hold on government, especially with the arrival of vast amounts of communist aid. Anxious to maintain his grasp on power, Karume exchanged Zanzibar’s autonomy for security, glossed with a pan-African veneer.

The union sailed through the Tanganyikan parliament, but its passage in Zanzibar was mired in legal opacity. The articles were never formally ratified by the Revolutionary Council, but merely discussed. Some of its members were unwilling to cede the islands’ autonomy: one former Umma cadre, Khamis Ameir, later claimed that he had argued that the articles should be put before the people of Zanzibar in a referendum. Hanga made an impassioned plea in favour of the union; he and Twala had been among the few Zanzibaris who were involved in the negotiations.

Babu’s immediate reaction is difficult to ascertain. When the act of union was signed, he was in Indonesia, negotiating a triangular trade agreement that also involved the GDR. Babu first received notice about the union on 23 April, on a stopover in Pakistan en route back to East Africa. He immediately hastened his return. Speaking to the press first in Karachi and then while transiting through Nairobi, Babu gave his vague support for the union, although eyewitnesses thought he was putting on a ‘brave face’. In his later writings, following personal conflicts with both Karume and Nyerere that are explained below, Babu was deeply critical of the union. He believed that Nyerere had caved in to American pressure to derail the Zanzibar Revolution. Other accounts suggest that Babu was initially supportive of the union, as a means of giving him a wider arena to realise his socialist goals. In the weeks immediately after the revolution, he had been involved in discussions about a potential East African federation with Tanganyikan representatives. However, the deliberate timing of the signing of the act to coincide with Babu’s absence, plus evidence that Kambona and Hanga pressed ahead urgently with preparations, suggests that both Tanganyikan and Zanzibari negotiators felt that Babu was a likely obstacle to the union.

The impact of the transfer of Zanzibari politicians to the mainland government has been largely overlooked by historians. Babu became minister of state in the directorate of planning, part of the
president’s office; Hanga became minister of industry, mines and power.\textsuperscript{130} Former members of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the paramilitary wing of the banned Umma party, were also moved to the mainland. Those historians who do comment on the impact of the revolutionaries on the position of the unified government do so rather reductively, assuming a causal connection between Babu and Hanga and Tanzania’s turn towards Beijing, explained below.\textsuperscript{131}

Certainly, Babu provided a radical voice within the cabinet over the following years. He played a crucial role in facilitating the deepening of Tanzania’s relationship with China, which welcomed the union as an opportunity to extend its influence to the mainland.\textsuperscript{132} Yet the \textit{ujamaa} project that Nyerere later embarked upon with the Arusha Declaration in 1967 ran counter to Babu’s own ideological inclinations. In his first position in the directorate of planning, Babu was sandwiched between two less radical ministers of state, Amir Jamal and Nsilo Swai, all immediately responsible to Nyerere.\textsuperscript{133} Babu’s efforts to push \textit{ujamaa} down a more leftward path ultimately had little impact.

The case of Hanga is more clear-cut. Addressing parliament in July 1964, Hanga outlined an economic strategy which emphasised the need for large-scale farming and the development of heavy industry, redolent of the Soviet Five Year plans of the 1930s.\textsuperscript{134} These calls for Stalinisation received no sympathy from Nyerere, nor the Soviet Union: a Tanzanian delegation to Moscow in August 1964 experienced a cold reception. The Soviet authorities rejected any involvement in major infrastructure or development projects.\textsuperscript{135} This response reflected Soviet disillusionment with sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1960s, as post-colonial African leaders proved hostile to Moscow’s often intrusive approach and narrow conceptions of revolutionary development.\textsuperscript{136} In a cabinet reshuffle in November 1964, Hanga was moved to the less influential position of minister for union affairs.\textsuperscript{137}

The most enduring consequence of the transfer of Babu and Hanga to the union government was the residual ties they maintained with their supporters in Zanzibar. As the regime there descended into what Babu later described as ‘one of the worst bungling and tyrannical petit-bourgeois despotisms in Africa’, he and Hanga became increasingly embittered with Karume, who

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{130} The other Zanzibaris who were given positions in the first union government were Aboud Jumbe (minister of state in the first vice-president’s office), Hassan Moyo (minister of justice), and Idrisa Abdul Wakiil (minister of information and tourism). Shivi, \textit{Pan-Africanism}, 84-85.
\item \textsuperscript{131} Burgess, ‘Mao in Zanzibar’, 224; Glassman, \textit{War of Words}, 293; Aminzade, \textit{Race}, 98.
\item \textsuperscript{132} Aaltofer-Ong, citing the memoirs of Zhou Boping, a Chinese diplomat: ‘Old Brothers’, 86. Cf. Alaba Ogunsanwo, who argues that China did not support the union, but treated it as a \textit{fait accompli} and so moved pragmatically to support Nyerere: \textit{China’s Policy in Africa} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 137.
\item \textsuperscript{133} Wilson, \textit{Threat of Revolution}, 66; Carlucci to Dept State and US emb., Dar es Salaam, 2 May 1964, NARA, RG 59, SNF 1964-6, Box 2691, POL 15-1 TANZAN.
\item \textsuperscript{134} Henry Bienen, \textit{Tanzania: Party Transformations and Economic Development} (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970), 221-22. Al Noor Kassem, a civil servant in Hanga’s ministry, recalls how Nyerere had placed him there ‘to help look after Hanga’. Nyerere himself vetted Hanga’s budget speech, which suggests it was even more radical than the final version Hanga presented to parliament. Kassem, \textit{Africa’s Winds of Change}, 45.
\item \textsuperscript{135} Pratt, \textit{Critical Phase}, 159-60.
\item \textsuperscript{136} Jeremy Friedman, \textit{Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World} (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015), 82-83.
\item \textsuperscript{137} Leonhart to State Dept, 5 November 1964, NARA, SNF 1964-6, Box 2691, POL 15-1 TANZAN.
\end{itemize}
continued to perceive the radical ministers as a threat to his own authority.138 These entanglements created a political headache for Nyerere, whom Karume regularly pressured into taking action against the ‘exiles’ on the mainland. As chapters 6 and 7 show, the embroilment of Babu and Hanga in Zanzibari affairs would play a major role in Tanzania’s political struggles in the ujamaa years.

More generally, the nature in which the act of union was passed meant it became a permanent source of friction in Tanzanian politics. ‘Whatever complex mix of motives impelled various actors,’ writes Ronald Aminzade, ‘the reality is that the process of unification was accomplished in a top-down, undemocratic manner. This meant that the Union was sure to be an ongoing source of conflicts and that the creation of a unified nation would remain more of an aspiration than a reality.’139 While arguments about the legality of the act itself seem largely obsolete given that the ASP had seized power through unconstitutional means and then proceeded to rule with scant respect for any law after the union, the matter continues to be a major bone of contention in present-day Tanzania.140 Nyerere’s union government never gained the authority it sought over Zanzibar. Although the Marxist drift of Karume’s regime was brought to heel, principled socialism gave way to racial oppression and despotism. The union dynamic was, the Economist reflected, akin to a python which had swallowed its prey, but had failed fully to digest it.141

The foreign policy crises of 1964-65

In the aftermath of the upheavals of early 1964, Tanzania experienced a series of political crises with major Western powers, each demonstrating the dangers inherent in the dynamic created by the intersection of the Cold War and African decolonisation. The first was a complex diplomatic struggle involving both German states. Babu’s decision to recognise East Germany during the ‘Hundred Days’ of the Zanzibar Revolution had a far-reaching impact. Under the terms of the so-called Hallstein Doctrine, Bonn refused to maintain diplomatic relations with any state which recognised the GDR. Having been initially assured by the revolutionary regime that it would not open relations with the GDR, the West Germans had been dismayed by subsequent developments. Bonn therefore welcomed the act of union, especially when Nyerere announced that all embassies on the islands would be closed. However, the East Germans – and their Zanzibari partners, including Babu – were unwilling to concede the gains they had made. This placed the union government in a dilemma, in which Nyerere’s non-aligned stance was challenged by the particularities of the ‘German question’. Affording equal recognition to the GDR would represent a

138 Babu, ‘1964 Revolution’, 244.
139 Aminzade, Race, 103.
140 Glassman, War of Words, 292-93; Fouéré, ‘Recasting Julius Nyerere’.
neutralist position on paper. But in reality, it would be interpreted as major gesture of friendship towards the Eastern Bloc, thereby inviting Cold War politics into Tanzania and jeopardising its good relations with Bonn.142

The period of Anerkennungsdiplomatie (‘diplomacy of recognition’) which followed proved divisive, both in terms of Tanzania’s external relations and within the country. Ministers who had been involved in negotiating aid packages from West Germany, such as Paul Bomani and Austin Shaba, baulked at upsetting a donor partner, prompting a serious crisis within the cabinet.143 Nyerere eventually offered a compromise. In February 1965, the government announced that the GDR would be permitted to maintain its representation in Zanzibar, downgraded to the level of a consulate, but would only be allowed a low-status consulate-general in Dar es Salaam. This did not constitute official recognition. The GDR reluctantly accepted the deal. However, Bonn reacted by withdrawing a team of military advisors from Tanzania. In response, Nyerere declared that Tanzania would forgo all aid agreements already reached with Bonn, worth around $32.5 million. Since independence, West Germany had been the country’s third largest bilateral aid donor.144 As Nyerere later wrote, ‘we had to choose whether to become a puppet state of Germany in return for any charity she cared to give us.’145 Although relations between Tanzania and West Germany deteriorated, Nyerere demonstrated the priority he afforded to non-alignment over economic concerns: he would not be blackmailed in the name of Cold War interests. Yet his principled foreign policy, which was intended to keep Tanzania aloof from Cold War tensions, ultimately had the opposite effect. As chapter 3 shows, Anerkennungsdiplomatie in Tanzania did not end in 1965. Instead, the presence of East and West German representations turned Dar es Salaam into a key battlefield in this Cold War subplot, as the icy tensions played out across the Berlin Wall were transposed to the Tanzanian capital.

As Tanzania became caught up in the triangle of Anerkennungsdiplomatie, its relations with Washington were jolted by two controversies that demonstrated the pervasive influence of Cold War politics in post-colonial Africa. In November 1964, the Tanzanian ambassador to Congo brought a clutch of photocopies back to Dar es Salaam. They appeared to be letters sent by an official at the American embassy in Leopoldville to a mercenary, offering him financial support for


143 Pratt, Critical Phase, 140-41.
144 Ibid., 133, table 7. Some existing West German aid projects continued, but no new agreements were signed.
From *uhuru* to Arusha

a Portuguese-backed coup to topple the Tanzanian government. Nyerere was on vacation at the time and entrusted the issue to Kambona, his foreign minister. Rather than calmly summoning the American ambassador, as Nyerere might have done, Kambona chose to print the incendiary text of the letters in full in the *Nationalist*, the TANU newspaper, before making the accusations official at a press conference.\footnote{On the ‘letter plot’, see Pratt, *Critical Phase*, 144-47; Bjerk, *Building a Peaceful Nation*, 236-46.}

The American ambassador, William Leonhart, quickly concluded that the letters were poor forgeries. Addressing a mass demonstration on his return to Dar es Salaam, Nyerere sought to defuse the situation, by challenging the Americans to show that the letters were untrue and asking for sympathy. What other reaction, he pointed out, could be expected from Tanzania, given the threat posed by Portugal and Washington’s own hostility towards his country since the Zanzibar Revolution? In December, Nyerere publicly announced that he had accepted an American statement that the letters were fakes, although he did not offer a full apology. The letters’ origins remain shrouded in mystery. One source has claimed that they were forged by the Czechoslovakian secret services as part of an anti-American disinformation campaign in Africa. Bjerk, citing tenuous evidence in the Portuguese archives, argues that Lisbon intended to frame Kambona, by deliberately feeding him documents that would be revealed to be forgeries, in order to smear him as a communist sympathiser.\footnote{Bjerk, *Building a Peaceful Nation*, 237, 239-40. Cf. James R. Brennan, ‘Intelligence and Security: Revolution, Espionage, and the Cold War in Tanzania’, unpublished paper in author’s possession, 33-34.}

Two months after the ‘letter plot’, the United States was at the centre of another scandal in Tanzania. On 15 January 1965, the Tanzanian government suddenly announced the expulsion of two American diplomats: Frank Carlucci, consul in Zanzibar, and Robert Gordon, deputy chief-of-mission in Dar es Salaam. The origins of the affair were innocuous. Discussing the appropriate American response to the first anniversary of the Zanzibar Revolution over the telephone, the pair felt that simple statement of congratulations from Carlucci alone would be insufficient, and that ‘bigger guns’ were needed – a reference to a potential visit to Zanzibar by the under-secretary of state for Africa, G. Mennen ‘Soapy’ Williams. A Stasi-trained Zanzibari intelligence officer, listening in on the conversation, interpreted the figurative expression literally and believed he had uncovered an American plot against the Karume regime. Both Carlucci and his assistant in Zanzibar at the time, Don Petterson, have alleged that the tape had been doctored by the East Germans. On this occasion, Nyerere seemed genuinely convinced that the threat was real. However, he made clear that any plot was a private matter involving two rogue officials and that neither the State Department nor Leonhart were implicated. Yet if his aim here was to prevent the further
deterioration of relations with Washington, Nyerere failed, as the Tanzanian ambassador was swiftly expelled from the United States.¹⁴⁸

The crisis over decolonisation in Rhodesia occasioned a rupture with Britain far worse than the disputes with West Germany and the United States. As Britain withdrew from Africa in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the white minority in the settler colony of Rhodesia refused to concede power. The collapse of the Central African Federation in 1963 pushed white Rhodesians into an increasingly reactionary stance. On 11 November 1965, Prime Minister Ian Smith issued a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), whereby Rhodesia cut its ties to London without making concessions to racial equality. The bold rhetoric with which Harold Wilson’s Labour government responded in Britain was not matched by coercive action, which was limited to the enforcement of economic sanctions.¹⁴⁹

UDI provoked uproar in Tanzania. The banned Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) had previously joined the exiled liberation movements in Dar es Salaam. In early December, the OAU committed all its member states to breaking off diplomatic relations with Britain if it did not crush the rebellion and pave the way for majority rule by 15 December. When the ultimatum expired, Tanzania was one of nine African states to sever its relations with London. As with the German imbroglio, the decision came at a severe cost, as Britain froze a £7.5 million loan. This was later cancelled after Tanzania announced in 1967 that it would cease to pay pensions to British expatriates who had worked for the Tanganyikan government prior to independence. Nyerere remained steadfast to the principle of ‘no independence before majority African rule’.

In a move characteristic of Nyerere’s tempered diplomacy, the break in formal relations did not mean an end to contact between Britain and Tanzania. Nyerere kept open communication channels to the Wilson government via Malcolm MacDonald, London’s special representative to East Africa. In January 1968, each of the other eight African states resumed relations with Britain. As this African front crumbled, Nyerere decided to return to the negotiating table and formal diplomatic ties were resumed in July. However, to avoid the appearance of having caved in for economic reasons, Nyerere’s volte face was not accompanied by the resumption of pensions to former government employees. Britain responded by cancelling all aid and technical assistance to Tanzania.¹⁵⁰ The Rhodesian question remained a touchstone in Anglo-Tanzanian relations up to Zimbabwean independence in 1980. British diplomats in Dar es Salaam warned that any sign of

¹⁴⁸ Various American officials have given different accounts of the exact words used – some suggesting ‘more ammunition’ was the phrasing. Brennan, ‘Intelligence and Security’, 38-41. On the ‘phone tap’, see Bjerk, Building a Peaceful Nation, 246-49.
concession to the Smith regime was inimical to London’s interests in Tanzania. A Rhodesian settlement ‘unfavourable to African opinion’, the high commissioner reflected in 1968, would end Nyerere’s relatively good relations with the West, ‘a situation which Communist Governments (particularly Peking) would relish as a success scored by them without effort on their part.’

By early 1965, Tanzania had therefore become embroiled in diplomatic rows with its three largest donors of bilateral aid, including the world’s foremost superpower and two of its closest allies. These incidents show how Nyerere’s principles of non-alignment and African liberation, articulated as a commitment to a more just global order, brought him into direct conflict with countries with quite different ambitions. The two German states pursued their own national agenda. The United States, rattled by the immediate memory of the Zanzibar Revolution, as well as events in Congo, interpreted local affairs in almost exclusively Cold War terms. Britain’s attention was devoted to smoothing the rocky process of decolonising its most intransigent settler community. While in the period since independence Tanzania had gradually weaned itself off an overwhelming reliance on external aid, the cuts in donor support from West Germany and especially Britain forced Nyerere to rethink his development strategy.

The turn to Beijing

The disputes with Britain, the United States, and West Germany demonstrated to Nyerere that attempting to maintain his chosen course of foreign policy – non-alignment plus anti-colonialism – in a Cold War environment required a diversification of Tanzania’s sources of aid. A Canadian military mission was employed to train the new TPDF. The Nordic countries also provided technical expertise. Support from these smaller states was understandably limited, however. For all its claims to the leadership of the progressive states, the Soviet Union showed little generosity, with any loan agreements tied to strict economic conditions. Communist China, on the other hand, represented a powerful donor partner, more sympathetic towards Tanzania.

The Sino-Soviet split of the early 1960s led to intense competition between the former communist allies for influence among the decolonising states in Africa. As Jeremy Friedman argues, whereas Moscow propounded an ‘anti-capitalist’ revolution grounded in the origins of the October Revolution among an urban industrial workforce, Beijing’s own historical experience led it to frame its own revolutionary visions in distinctly anti-colonial terms. The experience of China, a fellow poor, non-white, Third World state, chimed with the leaders of post-colonial states. ‘Mao’s identification of the Third World as the united international proletariat battling against imperialism’,

152 Pratt, Critical Phase, 166.
153 Ibid., 157-58, 162.
154 Friedman, Shadow Cold War.
writes Odd Arne Westad, ‘was attractive for many Third World communists and left-wingers.’ Once the disastrous industrialisation policy of the ‘Great Leap Forward’ had been abandoned, Mao’s refocused attention on rural development and mass mobilisation appealed to African leaders.155

Through a mixture of pragmatic donor politics and a degree of ideological confluence, by the end of the 1960s Tanzania had become China’s main partner in Africa. While relations between China and Tanganyika existed before the union with Zanzibar,156 they quickly deepened afterwards, facilitated by Babu’s presence in the government. In June 1964, Babu accompanied second vice-president Rashidi Kawawa to Beijing, where the Tanzanian delegation received a warm welcome. Kawawa returned with a £16 million aid package. In February 1965, another trip to Beijing by Babu paved the way for an official state visit by Nyerere.157 Nyerere was impressed by what he saw. ‘If it were possible for me to lift all the ten million Tanzanians and bring them to China to see what you have done since the liberation, I would do so’, he said.158

The most consequential development of Nyerere’s trip was China’s tacit agreement to support the construction of a railway between the port at Dar es Salaam and the copperbelt of landlocked Zambia, which was hemmed in by the laager of white-minority rule. This problem was exacerbated by Rhodesia’s UDI. In September 1967, China, Tanzania, and Zambia signed a tripartite agreement, under which Beijing pledged an interest-free $415 million loan to fund the 1,860 kilometre-long TAZARA railway.159 Work began in 1970 and was completed in 1974. Some 30,000-40,000 Chinese workers were involved: an enormous figure, but well short of the grossly distorted estimates offered by some Western observers at the time. Blending a major modernisation project with the spirit of anticolonialism, as Jamie Monson argues, the railway was part of China’s drive to become a superpower while remaining a member of the Third World.160

The announcement of the railway agreement revived the spectres in the West which had been conjured up by the revolution in Zanzibar three years earlier. The Wall Street Journal cautioned that ‘the prospect of hundreds and perhaps thousands of Red Guards descending upon already troubled Africa is a chilling one to the West.’161 Diplomats in Dar es Salaam were disturbed by the activities of their Chinese colleagues. ‘The Chinese are hostile, arrogant, secretive and clannish interlopers in what was until recently a western preserve’, wrote the British high commissioner in 1970. ‘They are dedicated to supplanting us in it.’162 By 1971, Beijing was Tanzania’s largest bilateral aid partner.163

155 Westad, Global Cold War, 162.
156 See Altorfer-Ong, ‘Old Comrades’, 97-118.
157 Ibid., 123-32.
158 Quoted in Burgess, ‘Mao in Zanzibar’, 224.
159 The acronym stands for the Tanzania and Zambia Railway Authority, the railway’s administrative body.
161 Quoted in ibid., 6.
162 Phillips to Stewart, 1 April 1970, UKNA, FCO 31/690/2.
163 Monson, Africa’s Freedom Railway, 29.
Conscious of the need to maintain both his reputation as a non-aligned leader and the confidence of non-communist donor states, Nyerere continually asserted that Tanzania was not a Chinese puppet. He and Kenneth Kaunda, president of Zambia, had sought – and would have preferred – Western support for the railway, but none was forthcoming. Nyerere bristled at the accusation that he was contradicting his own non-aligned stance. ‘Unfortunately money has taken up a position. There is Red Money and there is Blue Money – all the money in this world is either Red or Blue. I do not have my own Green money, so where can I get it from? I am not taking up a Cold War position.’\(^{164}\) As subsequent chapters demonstrate, Nyerere took care to not antagonise the other superpowers, concerned that any criticism might be construed as further evidence of Chinese influence.

Much of the literature written during the Cold War on China’s role in Tanzania (and Africa more widely) reflects the politics of the era.\(^{165}\) Often high in detail, but low in analysis and Sinocentric in focus, it frames China’s involvement in Africa in terms of superpower rivalries.\(^{166}\) These accounts find echoes in some recent work, which rather simplistically seeks to provide a historical context for a renewed Chinese ‘scramble for Africa’.\(^{167}\) More productively, historians have relocated the study of Sino-Tanzanian relations, to study not just its geopolitical aspects, but the shared ideological connections between the two states. Whereas one earlier book described these as ‘tenuous at best’,\(^{168}\) more textured accounts based on archival research show how ujamaa drew inspiration from the Chinese experience, especially its emphasis on rural development, frugality, and disciplined labour. Rather than being a Cold War construct, this relationship was underpinned by Afro-African solidarities, founded on the shared experience of colonial oppression and common economic underdevelopment.\(^{169}\)

\(^{164}\) Quoted in Altorfer-Ong, ‘Old Comrades’, 211.

\(^{165}\) For an overview, see Jessica Achberger, ‘The Dragon Has Not Just Arrived: The Historical Study of Africa’s Relations with China’, *History Compass*, 8 (2010), 368-76.


\(^{168}\) Hutchison, *China’s African Revolution*, 100.

From *uhuru* to Arusha

**Revisiting the Arusha Declaration**

On 5 February 1967, following a meeting of its National Executive Committee (NEC), TANU issued a major party document. ‘The policy of TANU is to build a socialist state’, it boldly opened.170 The tone was polemical:

> We have been oppressed a great deal, we have been exploited a great deal and we have been disregarded a great deal. It is our weakness that has led to our being oppressed, exploited and disregarded. Now we want a revolution – a revolution which brings to an end our weakness, so that we are never again exploited, oppressed, or humiliated.171

To escape the constraints of a global economy that was weighted in favour of the wealthier states of Europe and North America, the Arusha Declaration called upon Tanzanians to build a state which was ‘self-reliant’ – a flexible principle with multiple meanings – rather than dependent on foreign aid or investment.172 The Declaration eschewed emphasis on industrial growth in preference for agricultural development. This principle would later underpin a campaign of mass resettlement of the peasantry into centralised *ujamaa* villages, as outlined in ‘Socialism and Rural Development’, another policy paper published the following September.173

The Arusha Declaration represented the codification of Nyerere’s public rhetoric since *uhuru*, rendering the principles of *ujamaa* into a political manifesto. It was initially drafted by Nyerere and Kawawa. The ‘Arusha Resolution’ which concluded the document, later formalised as a ‘leadership code’, set out limitations on the economic activities of TANU and government leaders. They could not ‘be associated with the practices of capitalism and feudalism’, hold shares or directorships in private companies, or own houses for renting out to others.174 This reapplied language which had been previously used in both official and popular discourse to criticise economic ‘exploiters’ in the upper echelons of Tanzanian society.175 However, in affirming Tanzania’s commitment to socialism, the Arusha Declaration also set a radical tone for the extension of state control of the ‘commanding heights’ of the economy. In the following days, Nyerere announced a raft of nationalisation measures. All commercial banks in the country were brought under government control, along with a number of multinational firms and import-export houses, either through wholesale nationalisation or the state’s acquisition of a majority share.176

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171 Ibid., 235.
175 Brennan, *Taifa*, 159-95.
The Arusha Declaration was a landmark moment in Tanzanian history. In his global history of the Third World, Vijay Prashad describes Arusha as a ‘bombshell’.177 The effect was electrifying: thousands of Tanzanians joined marches and demonstrations in support of the Declaration. As Emma Hunter argues, the Arusha Declaration – and especially the president’s personal association with it – became a banner under which Tanzanian nationalism rallied, guided by the figure of Nyerere.178 However, on the plane of high politics, the fallout was characterised as much by ideological and personal schisms as unity. As Lionel Cliffe recognises, the Arusha Declaration sent ‘shock waves’ through the political elite, but this is ‘scarcey acknowledged’ in either official statements or scholarship.179 The tensions which accompanied the ratification of the Declaration by TANU are attested to in the political science literature, but without access to archival material, this analysis does not move beyond the level of abstraction.180

These tensions were pregnant in the origins of the Arusha Declaration itself. Nyerere conceived it from a position of weakness rather than strength. By 1967, it was apparent that the prospects for continued economic growth in both the agrarian and industrial sectors were poor. A growing urban work force, swelled by numbers of young Tanzanians with secondary education, maintained expectations that the current structure of the economy could not meet. In rural areas, *uhuru* had brought little material progress to the peasantry.181 While the government outwardly projected a united front, there were cracks among the leadership. ‘There is no party at all’, Babu told the East German consul-general in October 1966. ‘There are only large groups and small groups and individuals with different and often contradictory attitudes to the same problems’.182 Events elsewhere in Africa, especially the coups in Ghana and Nigeria in 1966, heightened Nyerere’s sense of anxiety. The foreign policy crises of 1964-65 had occasioned disputes with three of the country’s main donor states. Foreign investment in Tanzania had also proved disappointing.

Internal discontent mounted. There was growing criticism of a governing class – the *wabenzi*, ‘those who own Mercedes-Benz’ – that appeared to be profiting from the fruits of independence, while the masses suffered. A confrontation between Nyerere and students of University College, Dar es Salaam, epitomised these tensions. In November 1966, the students staged a demonstration in which they declared their unwillingness to participate in a proposed programme of compulsory

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179 Lionel Cliffe, ‘Political Struggles around the Adoption and Implementation of the Arusha Declaration’, in Jeanette Hartmann (ed.), *Re-Thinking the Arusha Declaration* (Copenhagen: Centre for Development Research, 1991), 107. Cliffe bemoans the tendency to consider the politics of Arusha only in abstract terms. “Tanzania seems to have class forces, policies and programmes but no personalities, no debates and no in-fighting. Admittedly, accounts of some African countries never go beyond this level of gossip but the reverse image is as sterile as this one is superficial”, he writes (106). Yet, Nyerere aside, his own analysis makes reference to just one such ‘personality’ – Kambona.
182 Fischer, 28 October 1966, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/970, 17-19.
National Service for all university graduates. Pointing to the high salaries that civil servants and politicians earned, the students claimed that they were being unfairly treated while the ruling classes made no sacrifice to the nation. Nyerere reacted angrily. ‘You are demanding a pound of flesh; everybody is demanding a pound of flesh except the poor peasant’, he railed. Although the student demonstrators were subsequently rusticated, the disparities between the privileged few and the poorer masses which their demands had highlighted pushed Nyerere into action.

The principle of ‘self-reliance’ stressed in the Arusha Declaration was a response to the economic underdevelopment of Tanzania. However, the proposed solution to the question of economic injustices within the country, the ‘leadership code’, was more problematic. TANU members were reluctant to adhere to the restrictions on their ability to earn income from houses or shares. The leadership rules dominated debate at a meeting of the NEC to discuss the text of the Arusha Declaration in January 1967. Cognisant of this opposition, Nyerere added nationalisation to the Arusha package to sweeten the pill of the leadership code to the TANU elite: this was Nyerere’s ‘intellectual coup’. Unlike the new leadership rules, which mainly affected the African members of the party and political elite, the nationalisations were popular measures that targeted mainly European- and Asian-owned businesses. Under the influence of the NEC, the Arusha Declaration took on a more radical appearance than Nyerere had initially planned. As he subsequently stressed, self-reliance, rather than nationalisation, was initially intended to be the main thrust of the document.

Opposition to the Arusha Declaration among the political elite came from multiple sources. Several more radical ministers and party members thought Arusha socialism was ideologically misplaced. Babu opposed the spree of nationalisations, arguing that a longer preparation time was required. On 22 February, he was switched from the position of minister for commerce and cooperatives to the less economically-sensitive role of minister for health. Kambona and his close ally, Dennis Phombeah, informed Eastern Bloc officials that Babu had been moved due to his failure to draw up a list of foreign firms for nationalisation, as instructed by Nyerere. Undeterred, Babu warned the East African Central Legislative Assembly in Nairobi in May against overreliance on agricultural exports, which were vulnerable to fluctuations in the global marketplace. East Africa

183 Quoted in Pratt, *Critical Phase*, 234.
184 Coulson, *Tanzania*, 222.
185 Hartmann, ‘Arusha Declaration Revisited’. There is corroborating archival evidence that Nyerere was reluctant to introduce the nationalisation measures. In October 1966, Babu told Eastern Bloc diplomats that Nyerere had expressed his concern in a recent cabinet meeting regarding a speech about nationalisation which President Nasser had made to the Tanzanian parliament. ‘Nasser has given me a great headache’, Nyerere reportedly said. ‘Our people will also want [nationalisation], but how can I do that?’ Fischer, 15 October 1966, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/970, 1-2.
186 Lessing to Kiesewetter, 14 February 1967, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/970, 58-69.
187 Brzezinski to Spasowski, 18 March 1967, MSZ, DV, 1967, 57/70 W-5; memcon (Schüssler, Phombeah), 7 March 1967, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/963, 333-37. A Portuguese report argued the polar opposite: Babu had been replaced to calm Western fears, after he obstructed commercial relations with Western businesses: adjunct-secretary for national defence, 9 June 1967, AHD, MNE, PAA 821.
could not afford to become a region of ‘banana republics’ and therefore had to develop its heavy industry.\textsuperscript{188}

Other voices challenged Nyerere from the left. At a TANU special conference to discuss the implications of Arusha in March, Joseph Kasella Bantu suggested a radical programme of action, including the nationalisation of all property and the development of an ideologically-committed vanguard party. Nyerere rejected the idea.\textsuperscript{189} Interviewed in 	extit{Jeune Afrique}, Kambona stated that there was no such thing of ‘African socialism’, only an undefined ‘scientific socialism’ – though he made it clear that this did not mean doctrinaire Marxism-Leninism. Like Bantu, Kambona called for the establishment of an avant-garde TANU party, capable of ‘leading the masses towards socialism.’\textsuperscript{190}

Seeking to dampen this leftist foment within Tanzania and calm Western fears, Nyerere used a set-piece speech in Cairo in April to set clear distance between 	extit{ujamaa} and Soviet-style Marxism. Criticising the ‘theology’ of socialism, he stated that

\begin{quote}
we have the peculiar position where leaders grappling with existing problems are denounced, or approved, on the grounds that they are – or are not – acting in accordance with the book – or one person’s interpretation of the book [...] I think that this idea that there is one ‘pure socialism’, for which its recipe is already known, is an insult to human intelligence.\textsuperscript{191}
\end{quote}

Other discontent with the Arusha Declaration predictably stemmed from the conditions of the leadership code. Some felt that the terms had been imposed unjustly, without warning; to dissent in public would have been political suicide. The election of 1965 had demonstrated that standing MPs were far from safe in their seats, under the highly competitive politics of one-party democracy. One former MP told an interviewer in 1988 that the conditions were like ‘someone holding a sharp knife to one’s side in such a way that it could not be pulled away without getting hurt.’\textsuperscript{192} Bibi Titi Mohamed, a veteran of the independence struggle, resigned as head of the Tanzania Women’s Union (\textit{Umoja wa Wanawake wa Tanzania}, UWT) and from the TANU Central Committee. At the time, she publically ascribed her decision to back pains; rumour speculated that she did not want to give up her private properties.\textsuperscript{193} Kambona’s radical critique of 	extit{ujamaa} socialism may also have been camouflage for his more self-interested objections: according to the Polish embassy, he had three houses in Tanzania and large sums of money stashed away in European bank accounts.\textsuperscript{194}

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\textsuperscript{188} ‘Heavy industry the only way for East Africa – Babu’, \textit{Standard}, 20 May 1967, 3. \\
\textsuperscript{189} Pratt, \textit{Critical Phase}, 246. \\
\textsuperscript{190} Oscar Kambona, ‘“Il n’y a pas de socialisme africain...”’, \textit{Jeune Afrique}, 23 April 1967, enclosed in Burns to State Dept, 23 April 1967, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2512, POL 2 TANZAN. \\
\textsuperscript{191} ‘The Varied Paths to Socialism’, in Nyerere, \textit{Freedom and Socialism}, 301-2. \\
\textsuperscript{192} Quoted in Tripp, \textit{Changing the Rules}, 174. \\
\textsuperscript{193} Wilson to Scott, 13 June 1967, UKNA, FCO 31/157/29; In an interview with a historian in the 1980s, Bibi Titi made no mention of this injury. Instead, she claimed her opposition to the Arusha Declaration was caused by concerns about its hasty and undemocratic formulation. Susan Geiger, \textit{TANU Women: Gender and the Making of Tanganyikan Nationalism, 1953-1965} (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1997), 172-73. \\
\textsuperscript{194} Brzezinski to Dept V, MSZ, 9 September 1967, MSZ, DV, 1967, 57/70 W-5.
\end{flushleft}
The June 1967 government reshuffle

On 7 June, Nyerere announced a major cabinet reshuffle. As a consequence of disputes between the government and NUTA, Michael Kamaliza was replaced as minister for labour. Kassim Hanga was dropped as minister for union affairs, almost certainly due to pressure placed on Nyerere by Karume, with whom Hanga had experienced a troubled relationship since the union three years earlier. Babu switched position again, becoming minister for lands, settlement, and water development. Ministers Paul Bomani (economic affairs and planning), Derek Bryceson (agriculture and cooperatives), and Amir Jamal (finance) all kept their cabinet posts.

The retention of Bryceson, Bomani, and Jamal in portfolios with key economic responsibilities demonstrated Nyerere’s concern to prioritise competent administration over political revolution. Bomani had privately expressed disquiet over the principles of Arusha socialism, telling the journalist Judith Listowel that ‘Julius is out of his mind’ and that ‘we will not live under a crazy Nyerere dynasty’. Bomani and Jamal were committed to increasing production through private capital investment. Nyerere himself had recognised the need to maintain the confidence of external investors when he brought a swift end to the post-Arusha swathe of nationalisations to prevent an exodus of foreign capital. In a speech in August, Nyerere clarified that overseas aid and investment was still welcome, ‘where it acts as a catalyst for Tanzanian activity.’ To have revolutions just for the sake of having them is to commit a deception on our people, Jamal reminded parliament. The reshuffle reassured Western onlookers. The French ambassador’s snap judgement was that Nyerere had placed in key economic positions men ‘who were not suspected of colluding with extreme-left subversion’ and ‘capable of inspiring confidence after the caprices of the Arusha Declaration.’

However, the most significant change in the reshuffle was Kambona’s relegation to the position of minister for local government and rural development. Kambona promptly resigned from both his new government role and as secretary-general of TANU, citing ill health. The previous year, Kambona had travelled to the Netherlands for treatment for high blood pressure. However, by mid-1967 he was cured. Rather, the marginalisation of Kambona stemmed from intra-party feuding, the circumstances of which remain murky. In September 1965, he had been transferred from the powerful role of minister for external affairs, when Nyerere brought the

195 Stuart to CO, 8 June 1967, UKNA, FCO 31/157/20; Lessing to Stibi, 3 August 1967, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/963, 351-67.
196 Quoted in Brennan, ‘Julius Rex’, 468. Bomani was a long-time and trusted acquaintance of Nyerere, the pair having studied together at Tabora Boys High School. Molony, Nyerere, 133.
197 ‘The Purpose is Man’, in Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, 322.
199 Naudy to MAE-DAL, 12 June 1967, CADN, 193PO/1/2 A5.
200 Millar to State Dept, 13 June 1967, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2513, POL 2 TANZAN.
portfolio under his own control. Kambona was believed to be locked in a power struggle with Kawawa and, through his associations with Hanga, also to have incurred the wrath of Karume.\footnote{Lessing to Stibi, 3 August 1967, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/963, 351-67; Brzezinski to Dept V, MSZ, 9 September 1967, MSZ, DV, 1967, 57/70 W-5.}

Nyerere’s cabinet reshuffle flushed differences into the open. On 11 June, Kambona – flanked by Hanga – addressed 10,000 of his constituents in Morogoro, where he made veiled criticisms of Nyerere’s authoritarian tendencies and claimed part-authorship of the Arusha Declaration.\footnote{‘Kambona tells why he resigned’, \textit{Standard}, 12 June 1967, 1; Wilson to Scott, 13 June 1967, UKNA, FCO 31/157/29. Kambona’s speech was not reported in the \textit{Nationalist}, the TANU newspaper.} The \textit{Nationalist} printed an anonymous article, described by an American diplomat as a ‘doctrinaire socialist harangue’, which was understood to be the work of Babu. It jarred with the coverage of a speech by Nyerere in the same issue of 19 June, entitled ‘No Bible for Development’, which reiterated the line of his Cairo address.\footnote{Millar to State Dept, 20 June 1967, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2513, POL 2 TANZAN; [A. M. Babu], ‘Trade, aid and nation-building in Tanzania’, \textit{Nationalist}, 19 June 1967, 2, 5.} Debates in parliament witnessed heated clashes and the budget passed by just 69 votes to 37 – a low turnout for an assembly of over 200 members.\footnote{Burns to State Dept, 8 July 1967, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2513, POL 2 TANZAN.} A wild ‘bazaar rumour’ in Dar es Salaam held that a coup was being hatched by Kambona, Kamaliza, Hanga, and Babu. The British lent this little credence, but its existence was indicative of the anxieties that gripped the elite.\footnote{Wilson to Scott, 13 June 1967, UKNA, FCO 31/157/29.}

In mid-July, these simmering tensions boiled over. On 21 July, the government announced that Eli Anangisye and Hamisi Salumu, formerly Hanga’s bodyguard,\footnote{A Stasi source said that the charge against Salumu of trying to subvert the Zanzibar army was fabricated, and was simply designed as a warning to Hanga. MfS, 18 September 1967, BStU, MfS, HV A, no. 227, 105-12. The Canadian high commissioner felt the Hanga-Salumu connection was ‘remote’, as the latter had ceased to be the former’s bodyguard two years previously. McGill to under-secretary for external affairs, 24 July 1967, NARA, RG 59, BAA, OEA, Tanzania and Zanzibar, 1963-75, Box 2, POL 15 TAN.} had been placed in detention because of subversive activities, confirming rumours that had been circulating for a number of days. Anangisye was a disaffected and hot-headed MP, who had been sacked as the secretary-general of the TANU Youth League (TYL) in March after he was involved in an attack on the recently-nationalised General Bank of the Netherlands, in which a portrait of the Dutch Queen Juliana was defaced.\footnote{The incident was particularly embarrassing for Nyerere, given that the Dutch government had only recently given Tanzania £100,000 in aid towards a fish processing plant. Schlegel, 5 April 1967, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/970, 115-16.} Although the exact circumstances surrounding these arrests are hazy, it seems that on 15 July Nyerere called a meeting of MPs at State House. He warned them that neither opposition to the Arusha Declaration nor the spreading of rumours would not be tolerated. Anangisye then went immediately to Lugalo barracks on the outskirts of Dar es Salaam, where he reportedly tried to incite troops in agitating against the government.\footnote{‘MP detained on rumours accusation’, \textit{Times}, 19 July 1967, 5; ‘Two subversives detained’, \textit{Nationalist}, 22 July 1967, 1; ‘Tanzania MP is accused of subversion’, \textit{Times}, 22 July 1967, 3. The government maintained a
Oscar Kambona’s flight into exile

With his room for manoeuvre narrowing, Kambona fled Tanzania. Driving north, he made his way to Nairobi, from where he flew on to London. The Tanzanian government maintained its silence until 1 August, when it stated that Kambona had fled to Nairobi ‘with much money’ and without paying his income tax. On 10 August, Kambona gave an interview to a correspondent of the Standard, a privately owned Tanzanian newspaper. He alleged that there was a plot to remove Nyerere, involving the upper echelons of the Tanzanian security services and army. Nyerere responded by calling Kambona a liar. ‘Anybody who believes in this talk of conspiracy can well believe that his parents are donkeys’, he told a demonstration. ‘If you accept these lies you can well accept anything’. The pair thus started a verbal spat which ran on intermittently over the following years.

The government painted its opponents in the tones of the Cold War. In an editorial published shortly after the announcement of the arrests of Anangisye and Salumu, the Nationalist piggybacked on a speech made by Nasser in Cairo to mark the anniversary of the Free Officers’ Coup, in which the Egyptian president warned against the neocolonial threat to Third World revolution. ‘Wananchi [citizens] must beware’, the editorial stated. ‘The imperialists may try to use local “politicians” to lure you with money.’ Kambona was rumoured to have been in the pay of Moscow: the American embassy reported that Soviet diplomats exhibited ‘considerable agitation’ during the crisis. In May, Lady Chesham, an MP and Nyerere confidante, told the director of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in Tanzania that the president had proof that Kambona was receiving money from the Soviet Union. ‘We finally got him’, she said, indicating that ‘Nyerere was going to take some strong action against Kambona.’ Her prescient words and privileged position vis-à-vis the president suggests Nyerere harboured genuine fears about Kambona’s connections with the Eastern Bloc.

On 18 August, Hanga was dismissed from his position as vice-president of Zanzibar. No explanation was given. Phombeah’s services as a civil servant were ‘terminated’ by the government complete silence until 17 July, when it was forced to respond to Standard journalists after Anangisye had been seen at a police station. Burns to State Dept, 18 July 1967, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2513, POL 2 TANZAN

209 ‘Three more detained’, Nationalist, 26 July 1967, 1. The three arrested were Wynn Jones Mwambo, who had served as Kambona’s chief of protocol when the latter was foreign minister and also headed a small intelligence unit answerable to him; Juma Zangira, who had also been a member of this team; and K. Geugeu, a former TANU administration secretary, who the American embassy said played a ‘court jester’ role among Kambona’s followers. Burns to State Dept, 25 July 1967, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2517, POL 29 TANZAN.

210 Burns to State Dept, 2 August 1967, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2517, POL 30 TANZAN.


212 ‘There is no conspiracy’, Nationalist, 14 August 1967, 1, 8.


214 Burns to State Dept, 25 August 1967, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2513, POL 2 TANZAN.

215 Butterfield to Burns, 24 May 1967, NARA, RG 59, BAA, OEAA, Tanzania and Zanzibar, 1963-75, Box 2, POL 15-1 TAN.
on 29 August. By September, both had joined Kambona in exile in London. Ahmed Rajab, a journalist working for the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and former pupil of Hanga, who had been a schoolteacher in pre-revolutionary Zanzibar, recalled being introduced to both Kambona and Hanga at their apartment. According to Rajab, Hanga believed that he could safely return to Tanzania, since he had done nothing wrong – apparently ignorant of the damage done to his reputation by his association with the disgraced Kambona.216

Hanga returned to Tanzania on 21 December, after a short stay in Conakry, where his wife lived. He claimed that he had been sent to Tanzania as an emissary by the Guinean president, Sékou Touré, in an attempt to patch-up the split between Kambona and Nyerere.217 Just ten days after his return to Tanzania, Hanga was placed in detention, alongside Kambona's two brothers, Otini and MATTiYA. Otini Kambona’s newspaper, *Ulimwengu*, was banned at the same time. Announcing the arrests, the party press stated that while constructive criticism of the government was welcome in Tanzania, unconstitutional attempts to change it were not.218

The detention of Hanga pressed Kambona into a fresh assault on Nyerere from London. On 4 January 1968, he issued a statement in which he accused the government of using preventive detention to muzzle opposition, describing Hanga’s imprisonment without trial as ‘a bleak chapter in the history of Tanzania.’ Kambona said that he had exercised restraint since fleeing to London, ‘in the hope that sober counsel would be brought to bear, and so a halt be called to the dangerous situation which sheer dictatorship and dogmatism have brought about. Unfortunately, reason has now given way to emotional spasm and fear has become a spur to reckless action.’ Nyerere, he alleged, was ‘hiding behind a façade of democracy while quietly building himself into a dictator.’219

In a speech to mark the anniversary of the Zanzibar Revolution, Nyerere responded with a blistering attack on Kambona, whom he branded ‘a traitor to Tanzania and Africa’, a ‘thief’, and a ‘prostitute’.220

At the same rally in Dar es Salaam, Hanga, under police guard, was paraded before the crowd. Nyerere called him an ‘idiot’, who had not accomplished anything as a minister. This humiliation followed another speech Nyerere had given in Zanzibar earlier in the day, where he claimed that Hanga had been detained after he started muttering that he had been called back by the TPDF(Z) to lead a coup.221 In an unconvincing interview with a *Standard* journalist, Hanga denied any

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218 ‘Gov’t won’t tolerate subversive activities’, *Nationalist*, 1 January 1968, 8; Burns to State Dept, 5 January 1968, NARA, RG 59, CFPS 1967-9, Box 2513, POL 2 TANZAN.
220 ‘Kambona a thief, lackey’, *Nationalist*, 13 January 1968, 1, 8; ‘Hanga brought before rally’, *Standard*, 13 January 1968, 1, 3.
wrongdoing. He appeared astonishing oblivious to the implications of both his and Kambona’s decisions to flee the previous year.222

Conclusion

A year on from the Arusha Declaration, Nyerere had re-established his authority over the political situation in Tanzania. The demands imposed by the leadership code had catalysed existing frictions, which ran along ideological and personal faultlines, into intra-party feuding. As the American embassy concisely surmised in late August 1967, Nyerere had taken advantage of the post-Arusha public outpouring of nationalist fervour ‘to move against many of the more extreme elements in Tanzanian politics’, sidelining Babu, imprisoning Anangisye and Hanga, and forcing Kambona into exile. Important economic positions remained in the hands of trusted allies, like Paul Bomani, Bryceson, and Jamal.223 Nyerere’s relationship with key institutions, especially the TPDF and the security services, remained strong.

However, high-profile political casualties of this consolidation of power – Kamaliza, Bibi Titi, and especially Kambona – remained at large. As chapter 6 shows, they would later form the core of a genuine plot to overthrow Nyerere. Hostilities between Hanga and Babu on the one hand, and the Karume regime in Zanzibar on the other, would also have major repercussions, as would Babu’s discontent with the ideological premises of Arusha socialism. In domestic politics, the events of 1967 therefore represented a decisive turning-point, clearing the ground of immediate political threats to the regime, but simultaneously sowing the seeds of vendetta among a future opposition.

Yet while there had been a substantial transformation in Tanzania’s internal affairs since independence, its foreign policy had remained remarkably consistent.224 Some early commentators have argued the schisms with the West in 1964-65 and the move towards China suggested a complete rethinking of the country’s external affairs.225 This is a teleological reading of developments, however, ignoring the fact that as a small state, Tanzania’s actual foreign policy activity was on the whole necessarily reactive. Nyerere’s responses to various crises were consistent with the principles that had characterised his rhetoric since independence and which were then

223 Burns to Dept State, 28 August 1967, LBJL, NSF, CF, Box 100, Folder 6, 15.
224 Emma Hunter, ‘Julius Nyerere’, in Steven Casey and Jonathon Wright (eds), Mental Maps in the Era of Détente and the End of the Cold War, 1968-91 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 87-88. Okwudiba Nnoli also argues that the principles of Tanzanian foreign policy remained the same, but that the Arusha Declaration represented a change in strategy for achieving its goals, namely self-reliance: Self-Reliance and Foreign Policy in Tanzania: The Dynamics of the Diplomacy of a New State (New York: NOK, 1978).
formally elaborated in the Arusha Declaration.²²⁶ There was no ‘revision’ in Nyerere’s foreign policy, although the events of 1964-5 certainly consolidated his belief in non-alignment, attuned to a Cold War environment.²²⁷ The turn towards China was largely pragmatic, even if there were genuine ideological affinities between Maoism and ujamaa.

Paul Bjerk argues that Nyerere’s idealism, present in the language of pan-Africanism and anticolonial liberation, ‘masks the fundamental realism of his thinking and Tanganyikan policy’.²²⁸ Yet the actual policies which Nyerere’s principles occasioned led to rifts between Tanzania and powerful foreign states. They therefore damaged rather than improved the country’s prospects in the short term. If the future which Nyerere imagined was in his country’s best interests, the belief that it could be realised through his chosen means was distinctly idealistic: Bjerk’s interpretation thus becomes a victim of his own theoretical paradigm.

The abstract frameworks of political scientists, writing without access to archival records, also oversimplify the complexities of the situation in Tanzania. Nyerere was not the sole actor in Tanzania’s relations with the rest of the world, but had to contend with rival ideological stances and personal ambitions. The resulting clashes took place in Dar es Salaam, transformed into a hive of political activity by Nyerere’s own foreign policy stances, plus the impact of the Zanzibar Revolution and the union. By the late 1960s, the city was thronged with liberation movement leaders, diplomats pursuing Cold War aims, a radical intelligentsia attracted by the allure of ujamaa, and a host of journalists and intelligence operatives who followed them. Dar es Salaam was a city on the frontline of global politics: the next chapter explores how these manifested themselves on a micropolitical scale.

²²⁷ Pratt, *Critical Phase*, 129.
Chapter 2

Karibu Dar es Salaam: the political geography of a Cold War city

In 1969, a Guardian journalist came to Dar es Salaam, on the trail of the guerrilla fighters. Like Kapuściński, he was struck by the international cosmopolitanism that characterised the terrace bar at the New Africa Hotel.

Sit at one of the tables […] order your cup of tea or your glass of fresh lime, and even before it arrives you will be approached by a ragged young man in a patched khaki shirt. He carries a stock of little books bound in red plastic; you pay your three shillings and join the global fraternity of those who own a copy of the Thoughts of Chairman Mao. […] Turn then, as I did on the occasion I bought my own copy of the Mao book, to your table companion and brief yourself on the realities of Tanzania – and Africa – today. In my case it was an alert, youngish man who heads one of the 47 diplomatic missions now operating in Dar.229

Five years on from Kapuściński’s visit, the New Africa – and the city of Dar es Salaam – still sat at the epicentre of international politics in sub-Saharan Africa.

This chapter sets out the political geography of post-independence Dar es Salaam and its public sphere.230 The previous section provided a temporal context to post-colonial Tanzanian history; here, the aim is to anchor these narratives in a sense of space, to establish a structural gauze through which the narrative strands which follow can be understood. These overlapping political spaces in Dar es Salaam include physical places like the New Africa, but also less material formations: state institutions, media organs, and networks of communication within (and going beyond) the city. These structures were not static, but contoured by local actors, as well as developments outside of Tanzania. The colour and atmospherics of this descriptive tour d’horizon of the Tanzanian capital are also intended to provide the reader with a sense of immersion, permitting an imaginative leap back to a vibrant but unrecoverable past, to understand better the nature of a ‘Cold War city’.

230 The term ‘public sphere’ is used here and throughout in the loosest sense possible, to refer to non-private forms of communication and interaction in Dar es Salaam. An unfortunate consequence of the translation of Jürgen Habermas’ seminal work, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit: Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der burgerlichen Gesellschaft (Berlin: Luchterhand, 1962), as The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere has been to endow the term with a prescriptive and often unhelpful meaning.
Dar es Salaam

From its origins as a sleepy Swahili fishing village, Dar es Salaam had become a throbbing metropolis by the time of the Arusha Declaration. Between 1957 and 1967, it almost trebled in size, from 93,363 to 272,821 inhabitants. This population was overwhelmingly young: 78 per cent was under the age of 35. The port city was the country’s cultural, economic, and political hub. In 1967, Dar es Salaam handled 63 per cent of Tanzania’s export crops. It was also a city of dramatic contrast. Though dwindling in numbers by the late 1960s, the Asian population lived in the well-do-to neighbourhood of Upanga and the city centre, while along the thoroughfares leading out of town sprung up insalubrious shanties like Buguruni and Ubungo. The latter earned the moniker *Uwanja wa Fisi* (‘Field of Hyenas’) because of the thriving local trade in illicit alcohol and prostitution. As a consequence of colonial-era urban planning, many Europeans, including foreign diplomats, lived in the leafy suburb of Oyster Bay, which abutted the slum settlement of Msasani.231

Nyerere and his government were aware of the potential dangers of urban disorder. Dar es Salaam was the home of the Tanzanian ‘gatekeeper state’, but by the same logic was the only physical site where power could conceivably be seized, as the mutiny of 1964 demonstrated. Like the British colonial administration, the post-independence government was attuned to the demands of Dar es Salaam’s youthful population, the destabilising potential of strikes and riots, and the need to contain the city’s racial frictions between Africans and Asians. There was therefore a wider concern with urban order that stretched beyond the realpolitikal struggles among the elite upon which this thesis focuses. While Nyerere grounded his socialist vision in an idealistic image of rural Tanzania, the urban population was treated with suspicion and sometimes hostility. Urban-rural divides cut to the bone of *ujamaa* socialism, which emphasised agricultural transformation over heavy industrialisation, and portrayed Dar es Salaam’s poor as a parasitical lumpenproletariat, sucking blood from the national project.232 There were regular purges of the unemployed, as the government attempted to assert its control over urban space.233

These tensions did not solely revolve around socioeconomic conceptions of Tanzania’s socialist future, but also involved a confrontation between Nyerere’s ‘national culture’ and the tropes of globalised modernity which flourished in the more permissive urban society of Dar es Salaam. As Andrew Ivaska has shown, elements of Western culture, such as miniskirts and jazz music, were


portrayed as a corrupting influence on the city’s young population and contrary to the ‘African’ traditions that formed the cultural spine of *ujamaa* socialism. ‘It was this “decadent city” that was the target of nearly all of TANU’s “cultural initiatives”’, writes Ivaska, ‘which, in an era of *ujamaa* ideology celebrating the rural, had the effect of producing the ugly foil against which a countryside of boundless productivity could be conjured up.’

The inclusive rhetoric of Nyerere’s visions of the nation – or *taifa* – under *ujamaa* socialism also set him on a collision course with deeper racial animosities between Tanzanians of African and Indian descent. The latter formed Dar es Salaam’s business community and *rentier* class. They remained socially aloof from the African population, which regarded them as ‘exploiters’ who resisted incorporation into the *ujamaa* family. Although Nyerere sought to avoid the racialisation of Tanzanian socialism, the disjuncture between *ujamaa*’s egalitarian principles and the class-based faultlines in Dar es Salaam, which split the urban population along racial lines, eventually forced the president’s hand. As the chapter 6 explains, in testing political and economic circumstances in 1971, the National Assembly passed the Building Acquisition Act. This nationalised all buildings worth over 100,000 shillings and not primarily occupied by their owner. However, while Dar es Salaam’s Asian population halved in size between 1962 and 1973, a small elite remained on favourable terms with the TANU party-state, which was reliant on Asian business connections for financial capital to drive forward the *ujamaa* project.

These socioeconomic and cultural tensions played out among the general population on the streets of Dar es Salaam, but their significance in the realm of high politics should not be underestimated. As explained in chapter 5, the TANU Youth League’s defence of the ‘national culture’ overlapped with its role in local protest against distant Cold War interventions. The denigration of the urban population was the analogue of the rural focus of *ujamaa* socialism, but it also represented an articulation of a distrust of the urban masses that traced its roots back to colonial government. This fear shared much common ground with concerns about external threats to the post-colonial state which seemed omnipresent in the ‘Cold War city’.

**Spaces**

The conduct of Tanzania’s official relations with the rest of the world was the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which operated out of a former colonial administrative building on Dar

234 Andrew Ivaska, “‘Anti-Mini Militants Meet Modern Misses”: Urban Style, Gender and the Politics of “National Culture” in 1960s Dar es Salaam, Tanzania’, *Gender History*, 14 (2002), 592; see also Ivaska, *Cultured States*.

es Salaam’s waterfront. Unlike other ministries, it had no colonial predecessor: under British rule, Tanganyika’s ‘foreign policy’ – to the extent that any existed – fell under the remit of the Colonial Office in London. Post-colonial African governments had to construct foreign ministries from scratch, and on tight budgets. When Paul Rupia joined the Ministry in 1963, he had just one colleague in the Division of African Affairs – a young Benjamin Mkapa. By 1970, the Ministry had some 480 employees, but their lack of experience and education remained an issue. As a Tanzanian study published in 1981 stated, since independence, ‘the main problem facing the Ministry has been the inadequacy of qualified, specialized and experienced manpower to handle effectively the various aspects of external relations which have continued to grow in complexity’. 

In 1969, an American diplomat expressed his frustration with Tanzania’s ‘minuscule’ Foreign Ministry, which was ‘often plagued with changes of personnel’. However, the lengthy report on these movements which followed demonstrated the importance which foreign diplomats attached to cultivating contacts within the Ministry, as they jostled with Cold War rivals for information and influence.

The real locus of power in Tanzanian foreign affairs was not the bureaucracy, but President Nyerere. As the previous chapter showed, he set the tone and agenda for Tanzania’s interaction with the rest of the world. The party apparatus, the cabinet, and parliament did little more than rubber-stamp foreign policy. Chartered by the upheavals of 1964-65 and concerned by the power-seeking activities of his foreign minister, Oscar Kambona, in September 1965, Nyerere tightened his grip on foreign affairs. Between 1965 and 1972, he appointed a ‘minister of state for foreign affairs’, working directly under the president and without the status of a cabinet minister. Nyerere’s statesmanlike position on the continental and global stages demanded total control over foreign affairs.

As a result of Nyerere’s non-alignment and especially the presence of the liberation movements, Dar es Salaam became a major hive of diplomatic activity in Africa. At the start of 1968, there were forty-seven states with some form of official representation in the city. ‘Dar es Salaam is a real United Nations, as much as the UN Plaza in New York’, wrote Jack Matlock, the deputy chief of mission at the American embassy in 1969. ‘No-one is riding particularly high, and everyone watches...”

236 The department was originally called the Ministry of External Affairs, before changing its name in October 1965 to fall in line with the terminology used in the majority of African states. Fullerton to Hobden, 24 November 1965, UKNA, DO 213/103/63.
237 Interview with Paul Rupia, central Dar es Salaam, 3 August 2015.
239 Pickering to State Dept, 2 July 1969, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2515, POL 15-1 TANZAN.
240 The following states had diplomatic representation in Dar es Salaam in January 1968: Algeria, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Burundi, Canada, China, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, France, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mali, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Rwanda, Somalia, Soviet Union, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom, United States, Yugoslavia, and Zambia.
everyone else – civilly for the most part.\textsuperscript{241} The French ambassador, André Naudy, emphasised the vibrant diplomatic scene and the opportunities it presented. The ‘number and variety’ of missions, he wrote, ‘makes Dar es Salaam a particularly fruitful observation point and meeting places […] full of interest and possibilities.’\textsuperscript{242} In 1966, his American counterpart, John H. Burns, noted that the telegram volume passing through the embassy was comparable to that of Bonn – a city on the Cold War frontline in Europe.\textsuperscript{243}

The political geography of this diplomatic scene mapped onto Cold War divisions. Western representations were clustered around the city centre. The American, Australian, French, and West German missions were all located in the National Bank of Commerce (NBC) Building, near the Askari Monument, a memorial to the Tanzanian dead of the First World War. The Canadian high commission, which also housed the British Interests Section after Tanzania cut relations with London in 1965, was nearby on Independence Avenue, the city’s main commercial thoroughfare. To the north, the communist embassies, plus a smattering of representations from radical non-aligned states like Algeria and Indonesia, were scattered along Upanga Road, earning it the nom de guerre ‘Red Boulevard’.\textsuperscript{244}

These arrangements mirrored the intra-bloc networks of cooperation in the city. A group of Anglophone diplomats had monthly lunch meetings to share information and coordinate policy.\textsuperscript{245} Eastern Bloc representatives worked closely together, under Soviet supervision. Between the alliance blocs, however, Third World intermediaries played important roles. In the aftermath of the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Soviet Bloc lent on the North Vietnamese chargé d’affaires to explain the necessity of the ‘help-measures’ to the outraged Tanzanian government. The North Vietnamese often also relayed information and views from the Chinese embassy to Eastern European diplomats.\textsuperscript{246}

However, these Cold War divisions could never be completely maintained. Despite the city’s size, its expatriate community remained small. The white population was essentially isolated from all but the elite tip of the local population by differences of culture and language. Diplomats of various nationalities and ideological shades therefore mixed relatively freely, especially on the circuit of official receptions, often hosted by embassies to celebrate national days. These were far from devoid of Cold War tensions. The Portuguese received reports that the Chinese attempted to exploit these parties to sow discord among the Cubans and Soviets,\textsuperscript{247} while the French ambassador

\textsuperscript{241} Matlock to State Dept, 24 November 1969, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2514, POL 2 TANZAN.
\textsuperscript{242} Naudy, January 1971, CADN, 193PO/1/48 ADM7.
\textsuperscript{243} Burns to Dobyns, 11 April 1966, NARA, RG 59, BAA, OEAA, Tanzania & Zanzibar, 1963-75, Box 1, POL 2 TANG-US.
\textsuperscript{244} Schroeder to AA, 26 August 1965, PAAA, NA 13473.
\textsuperscript{245} See memcon (Johnston, Wilson, Stuart, Hearder, Pickering), 25 October 1967, NARA, RG 59, BAA, OEAA, Tanzania & Zanzibar, 1963-75, Box 2, DEF 2 ZAN.
\textsuperscript{246} Lessing to Kern, 23 September 1968, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/970, 514-16.
\textsuperscript{247} General chief of staff, General Secretariat for National Defence, 14 September 1968, AHD, MNE, PAA 821.
expressed concern that Western diplomats became ‘submerged’ at receptions by representatives of the ‘revolutionary’ countries.  

The guests present at these gatherings were drawn from far more cosmopolitan circles than the elites of Tanzanian officialdom and the diplomatic corps. Take one colourful scene, described by Burns in 1966:  

Looking anything but proletarian in white dinner jacket, with decorations, Soviet Ambassador Andrei Timoshenko received 300-400 guests at Karimjee Hall at a reception commemorating the October Revolution. [...] Attendance was one of the most heterogeneous of the year, including, beside the standard diplomatic and Government faces, local staffs of western Embassies, freedom fighters, Indian business leaders and an assortment of unidentified celebrants who gave the vodka bar an active play.  

Among these guests prowled journalists, hungry for gossip. When Robert Carl Cohen visited Dar es Salaam in mid-1969, he witnessed ‘situations which make the average spy film look like a kindergarten vaudeville’. Trying, somewhat naively, to pass off as an American tourist, Cohen observed that it ‘seemed like every other cat that sidled up to me was convinced that I was there for something other than sightseeing’. The Tanzanian establishment became concerned about the potential for leakages of information and subversion at diplomatic functions. In December 1964, the government issued a notice informing all officials that they had to gain permission from the their head of department before accepting invitations and then submit a report on the reception immediately after.  

The cosmopolitanism of the diplomatic reception was the more official manifestation of the vibrant political mélange that characterised Dar es Salaam’s clubs, restaurants, and bars. As the examples of the New Africa Hotel and the Canton Restaurant suggest, these sites of ‘political socialising’ were concentrated loci of information exchange and interpersonal connections. Each would have its particular clientele. The Tanzanian elites met at the Selander Bridge Club or the Leaders’ Club. The liberation movement leaders ate regularly at the New Zahir Restaurant on Mosque Street, where Che Guevara was also a regular customer during his four month stay in Dar es Salaam between 1964 and 1965. Other guerrilla fighters met at the waterfront Dar es Salaam Club, a formal colonial establishment, where they rubbed shoulders with their communist...

248 De Bourdeille to MAE-DAL, 4 May 1965, CADN, 193PO/1/24 AII1.  
249 Burns to State Dept, 15 November 1966, NARA, RG 59, SNF 1964-6, Box 2688, POL 2 TANZAN.  
251 Othman, 8 December 1964, enclosed in Miles to Aspin, 9 January 1965, UKNA, DO 213/103/21. The notice was, ironically, passed to the British high commission by an expatriate bureaucrat.  
252 Interview with Sylvester Barongo, central Dar es Salaam, 15 June 2015.  
253 Interviews with Mohammed Said, Magomeni Mapipa, Dar es Salaam, 8 July 2015; and Paul Rupia, central Dar es Salaam, 3 August 2015.
sponsors, or at Etienne’s, a restaurant run by a Frenchman, who was said to have collaborated with the Nazis and fled to Tanzania after the fall of the Vichy regime. A stone’s throw away, next to the Cuban embassy on Upanga Road, was the Palm Beach Hotel, where Abdulrahman Mohamed Babu, the Marxist politician, held court. “The Palm Beach was Babu’s hideout – he was always there”, recalled Mohammed Said, an activist in local Muslim politics. There Babu might be joined by fellow leftists from the Nationalist staff and communist diplomats who often dropped by for a beer after finishing the day’s work in the nearby Eastern Bloc embassies.

The government sought to regulate these spaces. The local elite tried to exclude ordinary residents of Dar es Salaam from their social institutions. After independence, barriers which had previously prevented Africans from entering certain establishments were removed, but then selectively resurrected by post-colonial governments to exclude the non-elites. The Dar es Salaam Club, a prominent Tanzanian Asian businessman recalled, was ‘for the holy of the holies. The likes of me couldn’t go near the building’. When one Tanzanian MP questioned the right of one hotel to exclude customers who were not wearing ties, he was told that ‘it would be a disgrace if people were allowed to walk into hotels wearing vests.’ As Justin Willis notes, such establishments played ‘an important part in elite networking across East Africa; these were places of meetings and deals, and mere membership of them gave access to power and authority.’ This exclusivity delineated spaces of power within the city and contributed to the concentration of elite political debate within a small circuit of establishments.

Another key locus of Tanzanian politics in the years of Arusha socialism was the university, set in the green hills north-west of the city. University College (renamed the University of Dar es Salaam in 1970, when it became independent from the University of East Africa) was far removed from the noise of the city centre, but became a site of confrontation between TANU’s nation-building imperatives and students’ own visions and expectations of Tanzania’s future. By the late 1960s, the ‘Hill’ had emerged as a hotbed of radical politics in Africa. A permissive academic environment and the allure of Nyerere’s philosophy attracted an influx of Marxist and leftist intellectuals from outside Tanzania. Leaders of the liberation movements regularly addressed the

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254 General Division of Political Affairs and Internal Administration, MNE, 18 August 1965, AHD, MNE, PAA 527.
257 Interview with Mohammed Said, Magomeni Mapipa, Dar es Salaam, 8 July 2015.
258 Interview with Sir Andy Chande, Oyster Bay, Dar es Salaam, 1 July 2015.
students, as did representatives of the Marxist Left, like Babu and the Cuban ambassador.\textsuperscript{261} As chapter 5 explains, the organisation of students into a far-left revolutionary group which criticised \textit{ujamaa} socialism ultimately led to a government crackdown on this radicalism. Nonetheless, the University continued to be, Ivaska argues, ‘a place where students were exposed to connections with cosmopolitan networks, cultures, discourses, and movements that were often nonnational in scope and impact.’\textsuperscript{262} It sat at the centre of a set of transnational networks that formed a radical Dar es Salaam counterculture, comprising far left politicians, diplomats, guerrilla leaders, anti-apartheid activists, and an Afro-American diaspora.\textsuperscript{263}

\textbf{News}

At the centre of the city’s public sphere stood the Tanzanian media. In the 1960s, most Tanzanians received news from the world beyond their immediate community through the radio. Low literacy rates, especially outside of Dar es Salaam, made radio broadcasts the primary means of communication between the central government and the predominantly rural population. Prior to independence, foreign services such as Radio Cairo had provided an alternative feed of news and political invective to the colonial Tanganyika Broadcasting Corporation (TBC). However, the nation-building spirit which followed \textit{uhuru} encouraged a turn to the TBC, as an ‘African’ rather than foreign voice.\textsuperscript{264} In 1965, the government formally conscripted national radio to these efforts. The TBC was nationalised, brought under the auspices of the Ministry of Information, Broadcasting and Tourism, and renamed Radio Tanzania Dar es Salaam.\textsuperscript{265} The External Service – broadcasting out in foreign vernaculars – became a vital communication path to those Africans still under colonial rule to the south.

Radio ownership in the late 1960s was particularly high in Dar es Salaam. One survey found that four in five inhabitants listened to the radio on a regular basis, versus around half of the population outside of the capital. However, unlike the print media, the radio’s news sources were restricted to the Tanzanian Information Service’s press releases. Events might therefore be reported in the press, but delayed or omitted altogether in Radio Tanzania’s news coverage. When Kambona became

\textsuperscript{261} Interview with Juma Mwapachu, Oyster Bay, Dar es Salaam, 12 June 2015.
\textsuperscript{262} Ivaska, \textit{Cultured States}, 126.
involved in a war of words from exile with Nyerere in 1968, Radio Tanzania did not mention the issue for three days. For local political debate, albeit in its officially monitored guise, we must turn to the press.

At the time of the Arusha Declaration, there were four daily newspapers in circulation in Dar es Salaam. Two were published in Swahili, Uhuru ('Freedom') and Ngurumo ('Thunder'). Ngurumo was the most popular newspaper in Tanzania, boasting a print run of 40,000 at its peak. It specialised in local news, particularly salacious gossip about the wealthy elite. For the world of high politics and international affairs, the city's educated classes turned to the news-heavy English-language dailies, the Nationalist and the Standard. In addition, there were a host of weekly publications, including the trade union newspaper, Mfanyakazi ('The Worker'). Nairobi's Daily Nation was also distributed in Tanzania. For reasons of language proficiency, only the English-language newspapers are used systematically here. However, given the focus of this thesis, it also makes sense to concentrate on the Nationalist and the Standard, since they were the primary print sources of information available to both local elites and non-Tanzanian diplomats, journalists, and liberation movement fighters living in Dar es Salaam.

The Nationalist, like Uhuru, was owned by TANU. Founded in April 1964, it struggled to gain a large readership and was dependent on government subsidies for its survival. In its early years, the newspaper gained a reputation for a wild, radical editorial line, which gave way to moderation in April 1966 when Ben...
67) and Brendon Grimshaw (1967–70), and around seventy percent of its readership was either Asian or European.\footnote{Haji to Mytton, 31 July 1967, MP, ICS 115/1/2.} When the South African revolutionary Frene Ginwala was appointed editor in 1970, the \textit{Standard} took a distinctly radical turn; these events are covered in chapter 7.

Newspaper editors were conscious of the expectation that they should support the government and its nation-building policies. In 1967, Ridley explained that the \textit{Standard} could ‘aid the country’s progress best by keeping people informed about Tanganyika [sic], Africa, and indeed the world’. As the people of Tanzania had to ‘conscript all their forces and energies’ for Nyerere’s war against poverty, the \textit{Standard} should be dedicated to this effort.\footnote{Graham Mytton, interview with K. J. N. Ridley, 26 November 1967, MP, ICS 115/1/1.} Mkapa stated that the job of the \textit{Nationalist} was to re-educate the elite, to ‘disinherit’ Tanzanians from colonialism. ‘The role of the paper is to help define and then build these attitudes, only then can the right action take place.’\footnote{Graham Mytton, interview with Benjamin Mkapa, 3 November 1967, MP, ICS 115/1/4.} This still left room for criticism of the government, but it was mostly confined to the vibrant ‘letters to the editor’ pages or concentrated on socio-cultural issues, rather than challenging the state on explicitly political grounds. This explains why the government committed large subsidies to propping up the two TANU newspapers. According to one estimate, this amounted to 7 million shillings between 1965-66 and 1968-69 – equivalent to a third of the entire state grant to Radio Tanzania.\footnote{Mytton, \textit{Mass Communication}, 95.}

The printed press played a central role in Dar es Salaam’s public sphere. Newspaper culture was an important marker of urban life. Roughly half of the newspapers sold in Tanzania were distributed in the capital.\footnote{Sturmer, \textit{Media History}, 110.} A survey of the city’s inhabitants in 1968 found that 44 per cent claimed to read a newspaper every day; this figure fell to 33 per cent in Arusha, and 8 per cent in the provincial town of Kigoma.\footnote{Ibid., 119.} These differences were the consequence of the difficulty of transporting newspapers across a country with poor logistical infrastructure,\footnote{Mytton, ‘Tanzania’, 92.} as well as the higher literacy rates in the capital, which were perhaps twice that of the national figure. As Ivaska writes, these disparities in terms of print circulation and literacy figures ‘combined to make regular newspaper reading overwhelmingly characteristic of Dar es Salaam.’\footnote{Ivaska, \textit{Cultured States}, 32.}

In Dar es Salaam’s press culture, orality was as significant as literacy. Groups of men would congregate on street corners and around newspaper stands to listen to others reading and discussing the stories of the day. In her case-study of late colonial Uganda, Luise White identifies newspaper reading as a ‘social event’: ‘[v]irtually all newspapers were read by more than one person, and many more were read aloud, translated, summarized, amended, and made fun of by a variety of audiences. Even newspapers written in languages that required years of schooling to read could be
read out loud in a few minutes to illiterates.\textsuperscript{280} As Jonathon Glassman has shown in the case of Zanzibar before independence, the oral dissemination of newspapers and pamphlets in coffee shops and \textit{mabaraza}\textsuperscript{281} was an important site of identity formation and politicisation.\textsuperscript{282} Therefore, Ivaska argues, ‘[o]nce public readings and street-corner discussions of newspapers are factored in, one can conclude that newspapers and the stories, opinions, arguments, gossip, and tales of the town they contained were a vital component of public culture in Dar es Salaam’.\textsuperscript{283}

If the consumption of newsprint was a localised phenomenon in Dar es Salaam, its production was an internationalised affair. The presence of a large foreign press pack in the city was a reflection of its position at the frontline of international affairs in Africa and an important contribution in itself to the cosmopolitanism of the urban public sphere. The international news agencies were a staple feature of the press corps. Mirroring the strong Eastern Bloc diplomatic presence in Dar es Salaam, there were a number of communist news bureaux in the city: the Soviet agencies TASS and Novosti, East Germany’s Allgemeiner Deutscher Nachrichtendienst (ADN), the Czechoslovakian service Četeka, and the Polish Press Agency. In addition, Havana’s Prensa Latina and the Chinese agency Xinhua maintained offices in Tanzania.\textsuperscript{284} There was often little distinction between local journalist, foreign correspondent, and agency representative. The same writer could wear multiple hats. J. B. Thomson, a New Zealand-born journalist, recalls that every European staff member of the \textit{Standard}’s editorial team was also working for a foreign establishment. Bill Ottewill wrote for the \textit{Times}; David Martin for the United Press agency, the BBC, and \textit{Time} magazine; and Thomson himself for the Associated Press and \textit{Newsweek}.\textsuperscript{285}

The outlet of choice for the Tanzanian media was the British agency, Reuters. In 1965, its local correspondent estimated that his firm provided up to eighty per cent of the foreign news material supplied to the \textit{Nationalist} and \textit{Standard}.\textsuperscript{286} Conversely, material from the communist agencies was less popular. The \textit{Standard} editor said that Reuters was essentially the only agency the newspaper used. Other press agencies sent ‘a lot of bumf, but most of it goes in the waste-paper basket’.\textsuperscript{287} Likewise, the chief news editor of Radio Tanzania emphasised that Reuters was used ‘above all for world news’, TASS and Četeka were taken ‘but not used much’, while the Chinese agency material

\textsuperscript{281} (sing: \textit{baraza}): literally the stone seats outside Swahili houses; used in a more abstract sense to refer to informal discussion groups.
\textsuperscript{283} Ivaska, \textit{Cultured States}, 32-33.
\textsuperscript{285} Thomson, \textit{Words of Passage}, n.p.
\textsuperscript{287} Graham Mytton, interview with K. J. N. Ridley, 26 November 1967, MP, ICS 115/1/1.
‘goes straight in the bin’.

In 1969, the French ambassador noted that the Četeka telex machine at Radio Tanzania was out of use and observed that ‘Tanzania shows a lot of revulsion towards using information coming from Eastern agencies.’

Some African editors were uneasy with this reliance on a Western sources for their news, however. In January 1966 – just before Mkapa replaced Markham as editor – the Nationalist attacked Western news agencies for spreading ‘pernicious propaganda’ to make Africans ‘the intellectual slaves of the Capitalist press’.

The distributing function of the international news agencies ran parallel to the collection of local stories for dissemination elsewhere in the world. Here, the Tanzanian Ministry for Information played a critical intermediary role. Every morning, diplomatic representations in Dar es Salaam could collect government press releases from the ministry’s offices on the corner of Azikiwe and Makunganya streets, just across the road from the NBC building, which housed several Western embassies. The ministry also negotiated contracts with the international agencies, thereby providing some ‘gatekeeper’ control over inward flows of information into the Tanzanian media. However, efforts to create a local Tanzanian news agency failed. Despite Oscar Kambona, then foreign minister, signing an agreement with Četeka in 1964, it was not until 1976 that Tanzania founded the Shihata News Agency.

Journalists and agency correspondents were key actors in the city’s internationalised political networks. The truffle-hunting nature of the journalists’ profession, operating independently from the official protocol which ostensibly restricted diplomatic activity, made them valuable gatherers of intelligence. The Reuters correspondent in Dar es Salaam explained in October 1964 that he had ‘managed to establish a fairly effective collection of contacts at such places as the airport, the police departments, embassies and within government.’

This was particularly true in the case of the communist correspondents, who were often undercover intelligence officers. According to the French embassy, the Četeka representative in Dar es Salaam ‘seems to belong to the secret services and plays a very active role here.’ A Portuguese intelligence report identified the same man as an intermediary between the African liberation movement leaders and Eastern Bloc diplomats. Such activities were not immune from criticism. In 1967, a Chinese propaganda pamphlet called TASS ‘a smokescreen for the KGB’ and claimed that Novosti had ‘managed to unwind its slimy tentacles throughout the revolutionary countries of Africa’.

289 Naudy to MAE-DAL, 5 August 1969, CADN, 193PO/1/26 AII22.
291 Mtoi to Staes, 11 November 1969, TNA, 593, IS/P/120/59/283.
293 Ibid., 347.
294 Naudy to Information and Press Department, MAE, 7 November 1967, CADN, 193PO/1/11 K1.
295 General Division of Political Affairs and Internal Administration, MNE, 18 August 1965, AHD, MNE, PAA 527.
While the political role of the communist news correspondents was scarcely hidden, American and British diplomats also milked their media connections for information. In 1973, the British high commission reported that the Reuters correspondent was ‘cooperative and tries to get for us any material we require from the liberation movements’.297 The insider knowledge provided by David Martin, a Standard journalist with access to Nyerere, was highly valued by Western diplomats. William Wilson, who served as the head of the British Interests Section in Tanzania during severing of relations after Rhodesian UDI, recalled that Martin had ‘excellent access to State House’ and often brought ‘morsels of information’.298 One former member of the Tanzanian Ministry for Foreign Affairs told me that Martin ‘had lived here long enough and been in close contact with the leadership here to know what the [government’s] position would be. He could anticipate what the reaction would be on any particular issue.’299 Although it largely goes unmentioned in the diplomatic record, there was doubtless a quid pro quo arrangement in these relationships between the local authorities, press, and embassies. Tanzanians could test the political waters by tactically channelling information through correspondents, which journalists could then exchange with diplomats or other foreigners for material which they could then feed back to local elites.

To compound the blurring of the boundary between press and politics in Dar es Salaam, the Tanzanian government contained several men with journalistic experience. Babu cut his political teeth writing for anticolonial publications while a student in London in the 1950s and later served as the Xinhua’s Zanzibar correspondent prior to the revolution.300 He wrote a weekly column on international affairs for the Nationalist, under the alias ‘Pressman’.301 Stephen Mhando, the minister of state for foreign affairs between 1968 and 1970, had previously been on the editorial board of the Nationalist and Mfanyakazi. Mkapa himself later moved into government, serving as foreign minister in the late 1970s, and eventually becoming the third president of Tanzania in 1995.

Propaganda

State-sanctioned media was not the only source of information available in Dar es Salaam. All of the Cold War protagonists engaged in propaganda activities in the city. These were situated at various points on the spectrum between subtle, ‘soft’ propaganda to unapologetic broadsides against other states or ideologies. While most studies of Cold War propaganda have focused on communications across divided Europe, the peoples of the post-colonial Third World were viewed as ripe targets for influence by the superpowers. Although Africans often proved sceptical of this

297 Kellas to Brinson, 30 October 1973, UKNA, FCO 26/1389/1.
298 Wilson to Dawbarn, 10 March 1972, UKNA, FCO 31/1312/3.
300 Altorfer-Ong, ‘Old Comrades’ 54, 65-68.
Karibu Dar es Salaam

propaganda, its indirect effect in Dar es Salaam was to inculcate the city’s public sphere in the language of the Cold War.

All of the major embassies produced regular information bulletins, which were distributed to ministries and the press. These were accompanied by a kaleidoscopic range of newspapers and magazines, sometimes translated into Swahili. The communist representations were particularly active in this field. In October 1964, the Chinese embassy published the first issue of *Vigilance Africa*, which could be purchased for a pittance from the Tanganyika Bookshop. It contained articles in English and Swahili, and described its purpose as being for ‘scientific socialism and African unity against colonialism and imperialism.’ The US embassy called it ‘violently anti-American’. Among its writers was Nsa Kaisi, the Marxist staff member at the *Nationalist*, who appeared in a by-line photograph ‘complete with Cuban type hat’. In 1968, Novosti began to produce a similar Swahili newspaper, *Urusi Leo* (‘Russia Today’). It was expressly arraigned against China rather than the West. ‘We have much Chinese political literature here condemning Moscow’, said its Tanzanian ‘reporter’. ‘We want to give the public the true picture of what the Soviets stand for and what is the real picture of what Peking stands for in Africa’. Several members of the *Nationalist* staff were also involved in producing *Urusi Leo*. This communist propaganda was available from front organisations, like the Tanganyika Bookshop, and also distributed by the embassies. Salim Msoma, who later became a senior bureaucrat, told me that as a student he would often visit the Chinese and Soviet embassies to collect Marxist literature. Another university student, Juma Mwapachu, recalled reading Castro and Guevara in newspapers available from the Cuban embassy.

The communists did not have a monopoly on foreign propaganda material in Tanzania. In 1965, the Johnson administration launched *Topic* magazine, which contained a mixture of articles on American and African society, and was aimed at Africa’s cultural, professional, student, and youth leaders. *Topic* appears to have been an immediate success, the United States Information Agency (USIA) concluded in 1968, noting that there was a high demand for copies and that the Soviet Union was now ‘disseminating a number of obvious imitations’. Cultural institutions like the

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302 Gordon to State Dept, 5 December 1964, NARA, RG 59, SNF 1964-6, Box 1561, CSM TANZAN; Gordon to State Dept, 22 December 1964, NARA, RG 59, SNF 1964-6, Box 2688, POL 2-3 TANZAN; see also Strong to State Dept, 24 August 1965, NARA, RG 59, SNF 1964-6, Box 428, PPB TANZAN. *Vigilance Africa* appears to have ceased publication in 1966.

303 Belcher, 28 June 1968, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 393, PPB TANZAN.

304 Interview with Salim Msoma, Oyster Bay, Dar es Salaam, 2 July 2015.

305 Interview with Juma Mwapachu, Oyster Bay, Dar es Salaam, 12 June 2015.

British Council, the West German Goethe Institute, and the United States Information Service (USIS) maintained public libraries, stocked with literature friendly to the Western cause.

Although difficult to assess, the impact of radio broadcasting was probably more significant than written propaganda, at least in terms of reaching a mass audience. Just as Radio Cairo had provided an alternative voice to local or metropolitan radio under colonialism, foreign radio broadcasts represented a different source of news, opinion, and entertainment to state-controlled media.\(^{307}\) Unlike the printed press, as a transnational form of propaganda broadcast from abroad, radio was almost impossible for governments to regulate. Surveys conducted in the late 1960s found that foreign radio was immensely popular, with the vast majority of Tanzanians regularly tuning in to none-Radio Tanzania stations. Three in five listened to Voice of Kenya and perhaps almost a third to the BBC. Voice of America and Deutsche Welle, which had a relay station in Rwanda, also attracted significant audiences.\(^{308}\) The Cold War powers sought to exploit this demand: by the late 1960s, communist states were broadcasting fifty-seven hours of programming in Swahili per week.\(^{309}\)

Another means of capturing the airwaves was to provide material for Radio Tanzania, although this became more problematic as the government tightened its control after 1965. Noting that radio was the most important form of communication in Tanzania, one East German diplomat bemoaned that despite the presence of a GDR radio correspondent in Dar es Salaam, it had no success in working with Radio Tanzania, which preferred material from the BBC and Reuters.\(^{310}\) By the end of the decade, even the BBC was struggling to have its news and programming accepted, especially after a redefinition of Radio Tanzania’s policy in 1970, which saw the English Service closed and all domestic broadcasting produced in Swahili.\(^{311}\)

Fearful of the city becoming a Cold War battleground, the government sought to crack down on the more blatant and aggressive examples of foreign propaganda in Dar es Salaam. In May 1966, a circular declared that ‘[t]he Government of Tanzania will take serious note and exception to the circulation of publications in which accounts of the political views of a foreign country contain attacks upon a third state’ with which Tanzania had friendly relations.\(^{312}\) But the Tanzanian government’s policing of such activities was highly inconsistent. Chinese, North Korean, and North Vietnamese representations appeared free to attack the United States and its allies with few restrictions. In particular, American complaints about propaganda that savaged Washington’s intervention in Vietnam largely fell on deaf ears, as chapter 5 explains.

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\(^{307}\) Brennan, ‘Radio Cairo’.

\(^{308}\) Sturmer, *Media History*, 127-28. These figures should be treated with caution. The exception of Voice of Kenya aside, the figures collected by the two surveys cited by Sturmer for each foreign station vary significantly.

\(^{309}\) USIA, ‘Country Programs – Africa’, 2 February 1968, LBJL, Marks Papers, Box 18.

\(^{310}\) Junghanns, 1 November 1968, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/964, 231-41.

\(^{311}\) Phillips to Grey, 23 August 1971, UKNA, FCO 26/746/2.

\(^{312}\) Tanzanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 21 May 1966, enclosed in BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/957, 234.
The forms which propaganda took extended beyond the written or spoken word. Photographic exhibitions, dance troupes, and football teams all travelled to Dar es Salaam in an attempt to foster cultural relations with the Tanzanian people. Film was an especially powerful medium of communication. Whereas in 1964, news of the America intervention to defeat the Stanleyville rebels in Congo had provoked attacks on USIS libraries in Bujumbura and Nairobi, film showings of the Apollo moon landings proved a major local propaganda coup in Dar es Salaam. ‘Apollo was boffo’, reported an American diplomat.

Mobs besieged the space shot open house at the USIS Library, showing a degree of enthusiasm in their desire to get inside usually typical only of those in other lands who have wanted to burn down USIS offices. On launch night, the crowds had to be controlled by police, but after the first few hours of push and crush, attendance at the exhibit settled down to a constant flow-through even during the small hours of the morning.313

The ‘soft propaganda’ effect of independently produced foreign film became a focal point of cultural conflict between the government, cinemagoers, and foreign powers. Gary Burgess observes that as the socialist project in revolutionary Zanzibar constricted cultural expression, young people found some escape through the ‘anonymity of the crowd’ and the ‘exotic images on the screen’. The Tanzanian government was particularly concerned about the corrupting influence of Hollywood film on its nation-building efforts, which rejected the individualism and consumerism that characterised Western productions.314 In non-aligned Tanzania, the Cold War content characteristic of such films also risked offending potential donor countries. In 1965, shortly before a planned trip by Nyerere to the Soviet Union, the government censors banned the showing of the James Bond thriller, *Goldfinger*. Over the next two years, a string of espionage films – *The Prize, Mission Bloody Mary, The Spy Who Came in from the Cold*, and *Super Seven Calling Cairo* – met the same fate. Whereas under colonialism the censorship board had elaborated paternalistic explanations for its decision-making, the post-colonial state was more secretive, justifying these bans only by describing them as unsuitable for the ‘national interest’.315

Explicit communist propaganda films fared no better. Cinema attendance figures in Zanzibar declined in the late 1960s, when Karume insisted that Chinese propaganda documentaries replace Indian and Western productions, despite making the showings free.316 An in-house screening at the Chinese embassy in Dar es Salaam of the *Anti-China Atrocities of the New Tsars*, a ‘documentary’

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313 Pickering to State Dept, 25 July 1969, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2514, POL 2 TANZAN. Footage of the Apollo 11 mission was also shown at Dar es Salaam’s open-air cinema: see Laura Fair, ‘Drive-In Socialism: Debating Modernities and Development in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania’, *American Historical Review*, 118 (2013), 1087.
316 Ibid., 507.
produced after the Sino-Soviet border clashes of 1969, made little impact. The Chinese hosts were reportedly disappointed by the reactions of their guests, who laughed loudly at a scene in which Chinese fishing boats were sunk by Soviet forces. However, the Chinese did succeed in preventing the screening of an MGM film, *The Shoes of the Fisherman*, which featured a Russian pope interceding to prevent a war between the communist superpowers.317

What effect did all this propaganda have? Gauging the real impact of any form of media is a perennial difficulty for any historian. Nonetheless, the Zanzibari cinemagoers’ response to Chinese film demonstrates that African audiences were not passive absorbers of propaganda; rather, they were actors in the cultural Cold War in their own right. Propaganda targeted at receptive groups, such as the Marxist literature lapped up by students, was probably more successful. At an elite level, the government maintained the power to clamp down on (or turn a blind eye to) the intrusion of superpower rivalry into the public sphere. This moderation was only partially successful, however. The cumulative effect of this steady drip of propaganda was the suffusion of Tanzanian political discourse with the language and tropes of the Cold War. In no genre was this more evident than that of rumour.

Rumour

On 15 November 1964, Nyerere addressed an audience of 45,000 people at the Jangwani Grounds in Dar es Salaam. He sought to dampen the popular foment which Kambona had whipped up through his ‘exposure’ of the ‘letter plot’, outlined in the previous chapter. At the same time, Nyerere issued a warning to the crowd:

Someone has told me that we should now call Dar es Salaam ‘Rumorville’. Rumors are always rife in Dar es Salaam to the extent that not three days pass without rumors being spread, especially in the shopping areas […] The difficulty is that there are rumor experts and professors here in Dar es Salaam […] Someone has whispered to me that some of your leaders thoughtlessly talk in bars about government affairs. This is a very bad thing. I say before the masses it is a very serious thing, and I do not want to see anyone brought to me and accused of such a thing. […] There are already enough troubles in our country. We are surrounded by enough dangers, and we do not want to have more trouble from among ourselves.318

317 Hart to Bryan, 6 October 1969, UKNA, FCO 31/441/17; Naudy to MAE-DAL, 9 September 1969, CADN, 193PO/1/27 AII24. The Tanzanian press made little mention of the film, probably because of an imminent visit by Nyerere to the Soviet Union. The British high commission observed that the attendees were given copies of the *Peking Review* as they left the screening and that, around the same time, a pamphlet entitled ‘Down with the New Tsars!’ appeared in Dar es Salaam bookshops.

The ‘Rumourville’ moniker stuck. Foreign observers routinely referred to the city being engulfed in rumour and political gossip. ‘Dar-es-Salaam remains one of the most difficult capitals in Africa in which to get firmly based information’, admitted the respected *Africa Confidential* at the peak of the political crisis of mid-1967. ‘We have ourselves run the gauntlet of rumour-mongering charges, while attempting to reflect what was being said in Dar.’* Rumour both drew succour from the city’s propaganda-filled public sphere and provided the conditions in which such media thrived. A recurrent feature was its Cold War rhetoric, which could be used to undermine political enemies, while also providing Nyerere’s government with a mobilising discourse by which it could bolster its authority.

The prevalence of rumour was in part a consequence of Tanzania’s movement towards a more authoritarian form of government over the course of the 1960s. ‘The postcolonial city is the disinformed city’, writes Alessandro Triulzi: authoritarian governments, monopolising the media and seeking to control urban space, deprived Africans of the free flow of information. In Tanzania, this did not mean simply the government control of print and radio media. In 1967, one MP floated the idea in parliament of creating a place alike London’s Hyde Park Corner, where citizens could freely share their views about politics. He was shot down, the idea branded an act of ‘hooliganism’.

As Jean-Noël Kapferer recognises in his seminal study of rumour, restrictions on political freedoms and government secrecy create a ‘frustrated demand for information which encourages contraband and an informational black market’. The gatekeeper state could control above-ground media, but its sluices were never watertight. Salim Ahmed Salim, a diplomat who later held numerous top positions in the Tanzanian government, the UN, and the OAU, expressed this view when I interviewed him. ‘Rumourmongering’, he said, was a problem of a fairly closed society. When everything is done transparently and openly, the rumourmongers don’t have much to benefit, but when things are done in a clandestine manner, however genuine, it gives them ammunition to create stories, to fabricate stories.

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319 I consciously refrain from making a definition of ‘rumour’ here. Scholars’ attempts to define the term invariably become either too restrictive or unhelpfully loose. Moreover, the ambiguous nature of the concept itself is a fundamental feature of its actual manifestation. As Luise White notes, the ‘rumour’ and ‘gossip’ are both flexible and contingent concepts; their meaning dependent on the context and individuals involved. ‘Labels that foreclose this latitude of credibility may not be worthwhile’. However, White does make an important distinction between rumour and gossip: ‘[t]he power of any particular piece of gossip lies in the importance of the contradictions it reveals; the power of a rumor lies in the contradictions it brings together and explains’. White, *Speaking with Vampires*, 58, 70.


324 Interview with Salim Ahmed Salim, Masaki, Dar es Salaam, 29 August 2015.
Yet rumour is not necessarily counterhegemonic, as Glassman emphasises in his analysis of politics in late colonial Zanzibar: it can be used by elites to muster and direct support. Furthermore, a simple government-versus-governed dichotomy is an inadequate framework here, even and especially under Tanzania’s one-party state. With options for challenging Nyerere in public limited, dissident politicians could stir unrest and uncertainty by injecting rumour into political life, playing on the city’s reputation as a hotbed of rumour.

As the term ‘Rumourville’ implies, the urban setting of Dar es Salaam was a fundamental feature of the culture of rumour. The sheer size and density of the city’s population enabled the rapid spread and mutation of rumour. On the street corner, the bus, and the baraza, what Africanists have dubbed radio trottoir (‘pavement radio’) overlapped with the ‘official’ media of print and radio. In his Jangwani speech, Nyerere explicitly referred to the role of ‘shopping areas’ and ‘bars’ – physical sites where the arm of the state was more restricted by the informal mixing of crowds. This fear of the subversive potential of the city was congruent with ujamaa’s anti-urban animus. ‘Idlers’ and ‘loafers’ were criticised not only for their laziness, but also for their tendency to gossip. In April 1966, Nyerere warned a large crowd at the National Stadium about the danger rumour posed to the nation’s development, making unfavourable comparisons between the capital and provincial cities.

If you are in Tabora you talk about tobacco and its price, if you are in Mwanza you talk about cotton and what its price will be, if you are in Mweru you talk about cashew nuts […] but in Dar es Salaam they talk about people […] When we began TANU here in 1954 I told my companions that our country will not flourish if the headquarters is in Dar es Salaam and Dar es Salaam is rotten […] If the headquarters is rotten it will corrupt people from other parts.

Nyerere’s invocation of places of perceived moral laxity, particularly drinking holes, echoes the findings of Benjamin Koerber’s study of rumour in Egyptian political culture. He observes that three men accused of supposed rumormongering in Cairo in 1953 were identified by a tribunal as working at a cigarette stall – a ‘topos invested with dark associations of social and moral promiscuity.’ In Dar es Salaam, this concern was transposed from the market in Kariakoo and the city’s more insalubrious beer bars to the cosmopolitan, wealthier clientele who met at upmarket hotels, restaurants, and embassy receptions.

The content and spirit of Dar es Salaam’s political culture of rumour was rooted in the Cold War. Africa’s experience of the early years of independence had demonstrated the vulnerability of the post-colonial state to external intervention. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was widely held responsible for the assassination of the Congolese prime minister, Patrice Lumumba, in 1961.

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325 Glassman, War of Words, 237.
327 Quoted in Brennan, Taifa, 171.
while on the eve of the ‘letter plot’ of 1964, the American military backed a South African-led assault on Stanleyville, where the Simba rebels claimed to be fighting as the heirs to Lumumba’s legitimate Congolese government. Memories of European colonialism and the contemporary danger posed by its perceived American successor constituted a history that alarmed Third World leaders. Nyerere, an African socialist and an ally of the guerrilla movements, had reason to be more fearful than most.

In these circumstances, the effect of the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana in February 1966 was predictable. Like Lumumba, Nkrumah was a poster-boy of pan-Africanism; like Nyerere, he had struck out on a progressive development strategy, although Nkrumah had dabbled more in the aid-seeking politics of Cold War clientelism. Rumours of a potential coup circulated in Dar es Salaam. Three ‘moderates’ within the cabinet – Paul Bomani, Amir Jamal, and Nsilo Swai – cancelled a visit to Kampala to participate in talks about East African integration.329 The American ambassador, John H. Burns, returned from an upcountry visit to find the city in ‘a high state of edginess’ with an ‘audible buzz.’ ‘The decibel count has especially increased since Ghana’, he wrote, ‘which had much the sharpest impact here than any of the recent coups’.330 A British diplomat thought the effects of the coup in Accra were ‘undoubtedly more in the realm of talk than in action’.331 Other local observers were less sure. Ridley, the Standard editor, told the American counsellor that he now anticipated a coup in Cairo, followed by another in Dar es Salaam, articulating a rival ‘domino theory’ that imagined a series of military putsches backed by the United States against progressive African governments.332 A police investigation, presumably carried out on Nyerere’s orders, found no evidence of any coup plot in preparation in Tanzania.333 Nonetheless, the cacophony of rumour that greeted the fall of Nkrumah demonstrated how the dangers posed by the Cold War weighed heavily on the imagination of Tanzanian elites.

The Cold War also provided a rhetoric which Tanzanians appropriated to denigrate political rivals. In December 1967, a pamphlet signed by the ‘Revolutionary Committee of the TANU Youth League’ was circulated in Dar es Salaam. ‘Our country and our beloved Mwalimu are in great danger!’ it began. ‘Imperialists and their bootlickers here have formed a perfidious conspiracy to divert our country from its socialist way’. It listed a host of supposed American ‘spies’ in Tanzania, ‘plotting against our nation and revolution’. This was made possible by ‘traitors in Tanzania who are working hand in glove with the mad dogs of the CIA!’ It singled out the minister of health and housing, Austin Shaba, for special treatment.

329 Dawson to Scott, 1 March 1966, UKNA, DO 213/103/68.
330 Burns to Meagher, 26 March 1966, NARA, RG 59, BAA, OEAA, Tanzania and Zanzibar 1963-75, Box 1, Burns Correspondence.
331 Dawson to Scott, 1 March 1966, UKNA, DO 213/103/68.
332 Memcon (Ridley, Millar, Papps), 4 March 1966, NARA, RG 59, BAA, OEAA, Tanzania and Zanzibar 1963-75, Box 1, POL 23-9 TANG.
333 Papps to State Dept, 19 March 1966, NARA, RG 59, SNF 1964-6, Box 2688, POL 2.
Minister Shaba! Tell us how many dollars you have received from your disloyalty from America and transferred to your bank abroad? Can you deny that you have transformed your house into a hornets [sic] nest where American spies can come and plot their evil deeds?\textsuperscript{334}

Shaba was considered among the most pro-Western of the cabinet ministers, but the wild charges received short shrift from the Tanzanian establishment. The government quickly denounced the leaflet as ‘stupid’, ‘disgraceful’, and ‘bogus’. An official in the Ministry of Housing told the American ambassador that Nyerere was convinced it was the work of the East Germans.\textsuperscript{335} The front pages of the \textit{Nationalist} and \textit{Standard} announced a police appeal for public cooperation in finding the authors.\textsuperscript{336} The GDR, for its part, thought that there was some truth in the allegations.\textsuperscript{337} In another case of a Tanzanian leader being accused of collaborating with the CIA, the chairman of the university branch of the TYL, Juma Mwapachu, was toppled at a meeting in September 1968. The charge was baseless. The Americans described it as ‘no more than an effort to use [the] worst possible term in student lexicon.’\textsuperscript{338} The circumstances of the Cold War thus provided an instrumental language for pursuing private rivalries via the medium of rumour and innuendo.

The pamphlet which accused Shaba of collaborating with the United States was characteristic of the ‘black literature’ which circulated around Dar es Salaam. These publications represented a confluence of rumour, print culture, and Cold War dynamics. As Koerber explains, one response to rumour available to government is to ‘entextualise’ it: that is, set out an ‘official’ version of the rumour, thereby establishing greater control over its content.\textsuperscript{339} However, the same tactic can be used by those seeking to undermine the authorities. The written word, observes Nils Bubandt, has a ‘testimonial authority that oral rumors do not have’.\textsuperscript{340} Further, the fixed form of the printed word allows the mass distribution of a duplicated text, preventing the mutation of rumour as it travels. In Dar es Salaam, the mailing of letters and pamphlets to key elites – politicians, bureaucrats, newspaper editors, ambassadors – ensured that the message reached its target, bypassing the distorting nodes of Kariakoo or the \textit{baraza}.

If the error-strewn mimeograph slandering Shaba can be regarded as the cruder end of the black literature scale, a magazine entitled ‘Revolution in Africa’ was far more professional in style. ‘To those who still doubt the extent of communist subversion in Africa’, began a \textit{Standard} editorial in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{334} Enclosed in Burns to State Dept, 7 December 1967, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 1511, CSM TANZAN.
\item \textsuperscript{335} Burns to State Dept, 13 December 1967, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 1511, CSM TANZAN; Burns to State Dept, 15 December 1967, NARA, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2512, POL 2 TANZAN.
\item \textsuperscript{336} Burns to State Dept, 11 December 1967, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 1511 CSM TANZAN.
\item \textsuperscript{337} Lessing to Kern, 18 December 1967, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/970, 372-73.
\item \textsuperscript{338} Burns to State Dept, 14 September 1968, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2515, POL 13 TANZAN; interview with Juma Mwapachu, Oyster Bay, Dar es Salaam, 12 June 2015.
\item \textsuperscript{339} Koerber, ‘Aesthetics and Politics of Rumor’, 61-62.
\end{itemize}
March 1965, ‘we recommend you read the first edition of “Revolution in Africa”’. The magazine claimed to be published in Albania – Stalin Boulevard, Tirana – and had an unmistakably pro-Chinese line. One article accused Nyerere of being ‘naïve’ for denying the existence of class struggles in Africa and of talking ‘nonsense’ with his ‘mythical references the family, the clan, and the tribe.’ Another article, written by a Chinese colonel, stated that ‘Babu and his shrewd cadres are now in position to take control of a united front in Tanzania as they did in Zanzibar.

The following day, the Nationalist rounded on the Standard. It questioned the wisdom of publishing these sorts of subversive extracts. The French ambassador assumed that the Standard must have been cleared by State House to publish the text from ‘Revolution in Africa’. He therefore concluded that Nyerere was beginning to realise that the presence of the Zanzibari Marxists in his government was ‘more dangerous than useful’, and so had permitted the editorial to broadcast indirectly his concern about communist subversion in Tanzania. But TANU’s Nationalist had also received the magazine and yet declined to run the story. In fact, the West German embassy reported that the Tanzanian cabinet had held a lengthy meeting at which it considered banning the Standard. Meanwhile, the Chinese embassy released a statement describing ‘Revolution in Africa’ as an ‘out-and-out forgery’. At a press conference, a representative called it a ‘gross machination, as any intelligent person would realise’, and attributed it to an imperialist plot to denigrate China’s reputation in Africa. The magazine’s origins remained a mystery.

The subversive quality of rumour, black literature, and their tendency to embroil Tanzania in Cold War struggles concerned Nyerere, as his ‘Rumourville’ speech made clear. In May 1966, he gave the press the details of seventeen people accused of ‘rumour-mongering’. Their names were published in the Nationalist and repeated prior to every news bulletin on Radio Tanzania for the next few days. Nyerere claimed that certain unnamed ambassadors were also sources of rumour. The Nationalist stated that ‘people abroad’ had ‘resorted to a campaign of international rumour-mongering to discredit our leader […] Having failed, they will now try to set one leader against another.’ The American embassy was sceptical about the accusations, which it felt were solely attempts to settle personal grudges. However, Nyerere’s decision to channel these rivalries into a

341 De Bourdeille to MAE-DAL, 29 March 1965, CADN, 193PO/1/27 AI124. The quotes from the Standard editorial are re-translations from this French report; the original copies of the Standard could not be consulted for this date. The pamphlet was also distributed in Kenya and Zambia, where President Kaunda called in the Chinese ambassador to ask why he had been subject to an attack within it. Hutchison, China’s African Revolution, 275; F. R. Metrowich, Africa and Communism: A Study of Successes, Set-backs and Stooge States (Johannesburg: Voorstrekkerpers, 1967), 186-87.
343 De Bourdeille to MAE-DAL, 29 March 1965, CADN, 193PO/1/27 AI124.
344 Schroeder to AA, 25 March 1965, PAAA, B34, 606.
345 De Bourdeille to MAE-DAL, 6 April 1965, CADN, 193PO/1/27 AI124.
346 ‘Mwalimu exposes rumour-mongers’, Nationalist, 16 May 1966, 1, 8.
348 Burns to State Dept, 17 May 1966, NARA, RG 59, SNF 1964-6, Box 2693, POL 23 TANZAN.
broader campaign against rumourmongers reflected his how his confidence had been shaken by the Ghana coup.

Nyerere’s decision to attack foreigners and internal enemies of the nation for seeking to undermine the government was entirely consistent with his approach to foreign affairs and security matters. As chapter 5 shows, Nyerere and TANU invoked the threats of neoimperialism and superpower rivalry to rally the population around a nation-building project that fed back into the broader concepts of unity and self-reliance underpinning njamana socialism. However, these tactics only compounded Dar es Salaam’s reputation as a hotbed of rumour. That the government deemed it necessary to intervene in the matter revealed its concern at the level of speculation and suggested its vulnerability. Nyerere did not identify the rumours in question: to do so would have only afforded them more credibility. His intervention did though recognise their existence, as well as that of those who spread them. The Zanzibari journalist Ahmed Rajab has identified this phenomenon in the political culture of Nairobi.

You rise with rumours and go to bed with rumours. In between you read the dailies. Banner headlines on the front page deny the main rumour. Down the page, ‘rumour-mongers’ are warned. As always the reports never question the existence of the species. In fact, the incessant warnings portray the species as a busy-body bent on ‘creating chaos’, ‘disturbing the peace’, or ‘confusing the wananchi’ (the ordinary citizens). It certainly alarms the dispensers of warnings. Or so it seems.349

The consequence was a smoke-and-mirrors effect of uncertainty and insecurity. Nyerere’s biographer and Time correspondent William Edgett Smith observed that ‘a sort of free-flowing paranoia sometimes seems to hang suspended in Dar es Salaam’s heavy air.’350 In 1971, the French ambassador identified an ‘atmosphere often devoid of trust […] Suspicion is the rule’.351

The Cold War acted as an incubating context in which rumour was conceived, spread and understood. Bubandt argues, with reference to Indonesia, that the Cold War furthered the rise of modern conspiracy theory. ‘The intrusion of paranoia into reason’, he suggests, ‘is the effect of a conspiratorial Cold War social thought’.352 This characterised not only McCarthyist purges or Stasi surveillance, but also the capitals of vulnerable Third World nations like Tanzania. In other words, rumours only engulfed Dar es Salaam because of the pre-existing Cold War paranoia upon which they played. As Glassman reminds us, ‘[r]umors cannot be fed to a crowd as one force-feeds a goose’; they ‘will take hold only if they echo fears and convictions already in place.’353 The relationship between the rumour and these ‘convictions’ is a vicious circle, however: the former

352 Bubandt, ‘Rumors’, 810.
353 Glassman, War of Words, 232.
reinforces the latter, deepening the reservoirs of fears upon which the rumour draws. The urban environment of Dar es Salaam amplified this effect further: rumour thus became a key ingredient in the pressure-cooker atmosphere of a Cold War city.

**Intelligence**

Amid these networks of personnel and information lurked operatives from the world’s intelligence agencies. As the Cold War pushed into the Third World with the retreat of European colonialism, the CIA, KGB, and the agencies of the superpowers’ respective allies extended and consolidated their intelligence networks. In Africa, Richard Aldrich observes, the division between diplomatic and secret activities was also not as sharp as elsewhere, with intelligence officers able to gain the ears of local politicians and officials.354 African capitals proved fertile ground for gathering intelligence about matters beyond the continent: in Bamako, Mali, the United States discovered in 1966 that China had plans to test a hydrogen bomb.355 They were also, as demonstrated, suited to misinformation campaigns. As documents smuggled out of Russia by the former KGB archivist Vasili Mitrokhin show, the KGB attempted to plant seeds of doubt in the minds of Africa’s post-colonial elites through forged letters and pamphlets, triggering the expulsion of various Chinese operatives – although, as will be shown, these efforts could sometimes backfire.356 Moreover, the CIA’s perceived role in coups and assassinations across the Third World inscribed a fear of its ‘hidden hand’ into the imaginations of post-colonial elites and provided a common reference point for condemnations of American ‘neoimperialism’.

Cognisant of the information traffic passing through Dar es Salaam, the city became a major centre for intelligence-gathering. When a new American ambassador was being briefed in Washington ahead of taking up his post in 1965, the CIA made it clear to him that increasing the number of intelligence operatives in Tanzania was among ‘their top priorities in Africa’.357 The Cold War antagonists sought to infiltrate each other’s local networks. Junior and Tanzanian staff were viewed as prime targets, though often Africans proved far less malleable than external powers anticipated. The Portuguese, who relied on a mixture of Rhodesian intelligence and its own informers, believed that a secretary at the Novosti press agency was passing information to the Chinese embassy.358 In April 1966 – amid the jumpiness that followed the coup in Ghana – the American ambassador reported that there had ‘recently been a crude attempt by some of our “chers collegues” to “recruit” two members of our clerical staff’, who had laughed off the advances and

357 Interview with John H. Burns, FAOHC.
duly informed the senior staff. 'We do not worry about a single individual here', wrote Burns, 'but I mention this as an example of the sort of atmosphere we work in.'

Nyerere and his government regarded such subversive activity as a threat to Tanzania’s sovereignty. In particular, they believed that agents working for the Portuguese, Rhodesians, and South Africans were attempting to infiltrate the guerrilla movements and destabilise the Tanzanian government. As later chapters will show, this belief had some justification. After independence, the local intelligence services were run by the Tanganyika Special Branch, which formed part of a regional network including Britain’s former colonies, as well as those territories in British Africa which were yet to gain independence. Nyerere broke up the Tanganyika Special Branch in October 1963, having realised that the post-colonial arrangements left his country with intelligence links to not only MI5, but also the Southern Rhodesian government. The decision was preceded by the expulsion of a number of South Africans and Rhodesians, including a number of ZAPU members, who were accused of spying for South Rhodesia. The Special Branch was replaced by a domestic ‘Security Service’ and an ‘Intelligence Service’, which worked abroad. The focus of security quickly shifted from external to internal enemies of the TANU party-state, especially following the mutiny and the union with Zanzibar in 1964.

Yet, fanned by a government press that regularly merged Cold War threats with internal opposition, concern about foreign subversion remained paramount. In particular, all Chinese activities in Dar es Salaam were cast under a veil of secrecy by the authorities. For example, in 1969 a Nigerian student, Cornelius Ogunsanwo, was arrested and detained in what he described as ‘inhumane and animalistic conditions’ – for thirty-nine days. He had arrived in Dar es Salaam to conduct doctoral research on the Chinese presence in Africa. The incident aroused minor dissent in the Tanzanian media: the Standard called the ‘current air of spurious discretion’ as ‘unnecessary and immature’. This paranoia, accompanied by traces of xenophobia, was also evident when the TANU Youth League called a march in 1971 in protest against the planned construction of a Hilton Hotel in central Dar es Salaam. The TYL argued that the proposed site of the hotel, close to institutions such as State House, ‘would pose a serious security risk to the nation as our enemies would pour in [sic] Tanzania under the cover of tourists.

The government’s fear about clandestine activity in Dar es Salaam – both homegrown and imported – led to the establishment of a massive counter-subversion apparatus. In late 1965, the American embassy discovered from an expatriate technician working at the central post office that there were over two hundred tapped telephone lines in the city, including those belonging to

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359 Burns to Dobyns, 11 April 1966, NARA, RG 59, BAA, OEAA, Tanzania and Zanzibar, Box 1, Burns Correspondence.
361 Hutchison, China’s African Revolution, 267-68.
foreign diplomats and some cabinet ministers. The intelligence services do not appear to have been solely concerned with eavesdropping on their known enemies. When Nasser made a state visit to Dar es Salaam in September 1966, a British telephone engineer discovered some ‘stray wires’ in the vicinity of the hotel where the Egyptian delegation were staying. After tying these up, he was later hauled in front of the security services and found out that he had destroyed the connections which they had laid for the purpose of eavesdropping on the Egyptians’ telephone conversations.

These government operations, plus the threat posed by rival foreign intelligence agencies, meant that diplomats in Dar es Salaam exercised significant care when discussing sensitive issues. Precaution became a matter of routine, especially after the ‘phone-tapping’ incident of 1965. In January 1966, Burns, the American ambassador, held a meeting with the Australian high commissioner, Hugh Gilchrist, who immediately unplugged the telephone. Gilchrist explained that he ‘usually operated under the assumption that everything he said was being listened to by someone other than the person with whom he was speaking.’ Burns held his own team meetings at his residence, rather than the embassy – a ‘security nightmare’ – and refrained from dictating classified communications.

Tanzanian surveillance also extended to the streets, bars, and hotels of Dar es Salaam. In 1969, a disgruntled former TANU apparatchik, R. A. Swai, telephoned a junior American diplomat, George Roberts. The pair arranged to meet at the Kilimanjaro Hotel. There, Swai said that he was ‘fed up’ with the government, Nyerere’s dominance of TANU, and the direction of Arusha socialism. His motive for the meeting was self-centred, however: he sought a job in business, ideally with an American firm investing in Tanzania. Roberts’ account of the meeting is revealing.

The telephone at my house is tapped, and the arrangements for this meeting were made over the telephone. When I arrived at the Kilimanjaro, a Police Field Forces Unit Microbus was parked across City Drive behind the Hotel, and the table next to us just outside the mezzanine bar was occupied by a young, well-dressed African who was alone. He and Swai were the only Africans at the bar. Although he could easily watch us, he could not hear what we were saying unless the table between Swai and myself was bugged.

Soft-spoken dissent, contact networks between Tanzanians and foreigners, government surveillance, and paranoia: the anecdote offers a snapshot of the daily political grind in Cold War Dar es Salaam.

363 Millar to State Dept, 30 November 1965, NARA, RG 59, SNF 1964-6, Box 2693, POL 23-7 TANZAN.
364 Dawson to Scott, 1 October 1966, UKNA, FO 371/190203.
365 Burns, 14 January 1966, NARA, RG 59, BAA, OEAA, Tanzania and Zanzibar, Box 1, Burns Correspondence.
366 Burns, 11 April 1966, NARA, RG 59, BAA, OEAA, Tanzania and Zanzibar, Box 1, Burns Correspondence.
367 Pickering to State Dept, 11 July 1969, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2514, POL 2 TANZAN. R. A. Swai was the younger brother of Nsilo Swai, who had previously served as a government minister.
Conclusion

Atmospherics report: Climate overheated, agitated and steamy even by Dar-es-Salaam standards, owing no doubt to coincidence [of the] OAU Ministerial [Conference in] Nairobi, TANU Convention [in] Dar-es-Salaam, FRG imbroglio, UK-Rhodesian consultations and uneasy peripheries to North and South.\(^{368}\)

The American ambassador’s despatch from March 1965 exemplifies Dar es Salaam’s position at the intersection of a plethora of local, regional, continental, and global developments. His language is also instructive. The city’s political spaces were as much mental as physical, the site of cold fronts and rising pressures, as reflected in his meteorological metaphor.

This chapter has offered a tour d’horizon of Dar es Salaam’s political and public sphere, moving from government ministries to embassy receptions, agency correspondents to newspaper editors, and unidentified rumourmongers, intelligence officers, and fabricators of black literature. These political sites and actors were bound up in a series of overlapping conflicts, which ranged from local struggles over urban life to government attempts to tackle the subversive threat latent in Dar es Salaam’s streets and bars. Interspersed with these conflicts were imported Cold War rivalries from beyond Africa’s borders and liberation movement politics which, as chapter 4 will show, spilled over into Tanzanian affairs. Central to this environment were the politics of information, disinformation, and misinformation. Press, propaganda, and rumour all fell back on a series of tropes which brought together the entwined dynamics of decolonisation and the Cold War. The government attempted to control this public sphere, but with difficulty.

*Karibu Dar es Salaam,* welcome to Dar es Salaam.

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\(^{368}\) Leonhart to State Dept, 5 March 1965, NARA, RG 59, SNF 1964-6, Box 2688, POL TANZAN.
Chapter 3

The inter-German Cold War in Dar es Salaam

In late January 1969, a pamphlet entitled ‘China and the Devil Slaves’ dropped into the in-trays of politicians and journalists in Dar es Salaam. According to its title page, it was written by Walter Markow, an East German Africanist, ‘assisted by Stephen Mhando’, who was Tanzania’s minister of state for foreign affairs. The publisher was named as the German-African Society in the German Democratic Republic. The pamphlet began:

Why do the Chinese, when they talk among themselves, always refer to the Africans as the “devil slaves?” Because for many centuries they have regarded the Africans as inferior beings. Beings suitable only for slavery, or to be sterilised, or to be wiped off the face of the earth.

The bizarre tract offered a batch of ‘historical’ examples to back up these wild accusations. Characteristic of much of the ‘black literature’ circulating at the time in Dar es Salaam, the pamphlet raised several questions. Was it a genuine East German production? Or was it a false-flag forgery by their West German counterparts? Why the attack on China? And why did it claim the co-authorship of a senior figure in the supposedly non-aligned Tanzanian government?

This chapter explores how Tanzania became a battlefield in a key Cold War subplot, the global struggle waged between the two German states. Left out in the cold by the West, the GDR turned to the non-aligned (and in many instances decolonising) states of the Third World for international recognition and the sense of legitimacy it craved. The West German response was the so-called ‘Hallstein Doctrine’, which asserted that Bonn would sever diplomatic relations with any state that recognised the government of the ‘Soviet-Occupied Zone’. From a German point of view, this zero-sum game came to be the overriding factor in the two states’ foreign policies. ‘We judge almost every foreign event primarily from the standpoint of whether it increases or diminishes the isolation of the Zone’, said Karl Carstens, Bonn’s deputy minister for foreign affairs, in 1965.

While historians have made good use of archives in Berlin to trace the course of Anerkenndiplomatie in Tanzania, the story often ends with the establishment of the East German consulate-general and Nyerere’s rejection of West German aid in 1965. However, this was only the first chapter in a longer narrative. Dar es Salaam became the first capital in sub-Saharan Africa to house both West and East German diplomatic representations. Both sides sought the support of their respective blocs: the West Germans from their NATO allies, with their embassies clustered

369 ‘China and the Devil Slaves’, enclosed in Burns to State Dept, 20 March 1969, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 1511, CSM TANZAN.
371 Quoted in Gray, Germany’s Cold War, 3.
around the city centre; their counterparts from among the communist embassies dotted along Upanga Road (‘Red Boulevard’).

The inter-German rivalry in the Third World always involved a third party. In the aftermath of the Zanzibar Revolution and the act of union in 1964, Tanzania became embroiled in the German dispute, as the discussion of Anerkennungsdiplomatie in chapter 1 showed. Fighting their own Cold War in Tanzania, representatives of both German states had to negotiate the local political jungles of Dar es Salaam. At the same time, Tanzania fought to maintain a non-aligned position, detached from either Cold War alliance bloc. Tanzania occupied an anomalous position within the framework that the Hallstein Doctrine should have established: it is therefore an instructive test-case of the dynamics of the global inter-German rivalry.

Tanzania’s own approach to foreign affairs meant that Dar es Salaam was a particularly valuable asset in the GDR’s Third World policy. As a key non-aligned state in Africa, Tanzania had potential to influence other states in the region should it decide to recognise the GDR. Representation in Dar es Salaam also gave the GDR access to the exiled liberation movements based in the city, especially FRELIMO. By the same token, Bonn’s reputation in Tanzania was damaged by its continued military and political support for FRELIMO’s enemies, the Portuguese. The GDR made this a centrepiece of its propaganda campaign in Africa, claiming it as evidence that West Germany had not escaped from its colonial and fascist past.372 As a memorandum drawn up by the International Relations Division of the SED in December 1968 put it, Tanzania represented a ‘key point in the GDR’s foreign policy towards sub-Saharan Africa’.373 The consequence of these dynamics was that both states became obsessively preoccupied by the other’s activities in Dar es Salaam, with reports on ‘West Germany’ or the ‘Soviet Occupied Zone’ dominating diplomatic despatches home.

The two German states thus fought a bitter propaganda war across Dar es Salaam, utilising and contributing to city’s rumour-filled public sphere. This ranged from glowing reflections on the East German socialist paradise or the West German economic miracle, through subtler stories placed in the local press, to libellous pamphlets like ‘China and the Devil Slaves’. Both sides fought for influence among the local press. The GDR found sympathy among the staff at the Nationalist and its sister publication Uhuru. When Mhando was removed from his position as managing editor of the newspapers in 1966, the GDR bemoaned the decision as an attempt by Nyerere to curb the radicalism of the party press.374 The West Germans lamented the greater resources which the GDR pumped into its Dar es Salaam propaganda campaign. After visiting Tanzania in March 1967, one

373 International Relations Division, SED, 4 December 1968, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/958, 176-82.
federal minister expressed his concern at the ‘well produced’ handouts distributed by the East German consulate-general and Bonn’s incapability of mounting a comparable operation.375

The dark arts of propaganda could backfire, however. In December 1965, the West German embassy complained to the Tanzanian government about a pamphlet entitled ‘Brown Book: War and Nazi Criminals in West Germany’. The *Braunbuch* accused the West German president, Heinrich Lübke, of having as a Gestapo agent directed the construction of a concentration camp during the Second World War. When the West Germans received no reply to their complaint, they approached the Tanzanian ambassador in Bonn, demanding that Gottfried Lessing, the East German consul-general, be declared *persona non grata*. Nyerere ordered the Ministry for Home Affairs to ban the booklet. According to information the West German embassy obtained from the Indonesians (who had good relations with the Eastern Bloc representations in Dar es Salaam), the government tried to pull in around one thousand copies of the pamphlet from circulation – an indication of the size and expense of such propaganda operations. Lessing was hauled before the Tanzanian authorities and severely reprimanded.376 Shortly afterwards, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued its circular banning attacks on third party states in Tanzania. ‘We will have to be more cautious and reserved from now on’, wrote an East German diplomat, tellingly.377

East German aid remained concentrated in Zanzibar, but as the *Anerkennungspolitk* saga showed, full recognition could only be achieved by negotiation with a more circumspect union government. Talks in late 1965 over long-term aid, technical assistance, and trade agreements came to little, despite the involvement of A. M. Babu.378 By the turn of 1967, the GDR believed it had made little ground in mainland Tanzania. The Stasi observed that the measures taken by West Germany in response to the creation of the GDR consulate-general in Dar es Salaam had been a success in terms of the Hallstein Doctrine. No other African state had established official ties of any sort with the GDR since, while Bonn had been ‘gradually and quietly improving its relations with Tanzania’.379

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375 Leber to Brandt, 21 March 1967, PAAA, NA 6408.
377 Scholz to Foreign Information Division, MfAA, 1 June 1966, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/957, 230-33.
Post-Arusha politics and the GDR

The GDR greeted the Arusha Declaration with quiet optimism. The Weltanschauung set out by Nyerere may not have been congruent with communist doctrine, but the East Germans welcomed the nationalisation measures, revolutionary language, and Marxist undertones of the Declaration. The Stasi enthused that Nyerere, under the influence of left-leaning governments in Guinea, Mali, and the United Arab Republic, had decided that capitalism would not serve the interests of the Tanzanian masses. Even more important, the Stasi believed, were events in Zanzibar. ‘The fact is that without the existence of the Zanzibar Revolution, the present developments on the mainland would have been unthinkable.’ The political windfall for the GDR also seemed favourable. From Mhando, then editor of the trade union newspaper Mnyakazi, the GDR received reports that Nyerere was privately more favourable than generally believed towards raising the status of the East German representation in Dar es Salaam.

In response, GDR ratcheted up its propaganda activities in Dar es Salaam. The East German news agency, the ADN, introduced a Swahili-language bulletin. The consulate-general recognised that given official criticism of West Germany’s ‘revanchism, militarism, and neocolonialism’ was difficult, the news agency might have greater room for manoeuvre. It also pointed out to Tanzanian bureaucrats a series of articles appearing in the West German press which were critical of the Arusha Declaration. In June, the West Germans complained about the circulation of a ‘Grey Book’ in Dar es Salaam by ‘agents of the Soviet Occupied Zone’. West Germany claimed that this pamphlet was ‘a conglomeration of forged documents, distorted quotes and data which are designed to bolster false charges against German personalities.’

Lessing determined that Tanzania’s long-term objective must be to strengthen its relations with the socialist states. He therefore sought to forge links with ‘progressive politicians’ among the Tanzanian élite. Lessing singled out Oscar Kambona as a potential ally, plus the two leading Zanzibari Marxists in the union government, Kassim Hanga and Babu. Hanga and Kambona had been long acquainted with the GDR, which both had visited in 1962. Hanga had come to East Berlin in his capacity as general-secretary of the ASP, prior to Zanzibar’s independence. An East German journalist noted that ‘he did not shrink from describing himself as a communist.’ Kambona had been introduced to the GDR by Oginga Odinga, the Kenyan socialist, as part of ‘a general scheme recently agreed upon by progressive forces in East Africa to establish at Party level

382 Fischer to Press Division, MfAA, 6 April 1967, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/970, 121.
384 FRG emb., Dar es Salaam, to Tanzanian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 7 June 1967, PAAA, B34, 717.
385 Lessing to Kiesewetter, 14 February 1967, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/970, 58-69.
good working relations with Communist parties in socialist countries." When Peter Spacek, a correspondent for the ADN and Neues Deutschland, moved from Zanzibar to Dar es Salaam in 1965, he was instructed to make contact with Kambona, who was deemed to have been always in favour of improved relations with the GDR.

Having aligned itself with what it perceived to be Tanzania's 'left', the GDR's standing in the country was severely damaged by the political turmoil which followed the Arusha Declaration. In the immediate aftermath of the June ministerial reshuffle, the development expert Martin Breetzman cautioned from East Berlin that while Arusha socialism presented new opportunities to the GDR, the cabinet changes had strengthened the position of those with 'right-wing, pro-capitalist' views. By September, Babu had been marginalised and Kambona and Hanga had taken flight to London. Even worse, the rumour that the GDR had been paying Kambona, whether true or false, was a severe blow to its reputation.

The fundamental flaw in the GDR's approach was the ideological lens through which it interpreted local affairs in Tanzania. The left-right spectrum was a distinctly European construction, with its apogee in the interwar politics of Berlin and Paris, which had been recast along the bipolar lines of the Cold War order. Nyerere's attempts to break free from these restrictions through a non-aligned African socialism should have been a warning that such distinctions were unsuitable for interpreting Tanzanian politics. Moreover, personal ambition often relegated ideology to secondary concerns. At its weakest, Marxism or Maoism was little more than an emancipatory language of protest rather than a theoretical basis for political action.

The GDR therefore looked to a Tanzanian 'left' for political support. Its diplomats made a series of misjudgements about the ideological inclinations of certain Tanzanians. As we have seen, Kambona may have been a radical, but he was also deeply opportunistic and caught up in a personal rift with Nyerere. The example of Eli Anangisye is instructive here. He was a close contact of the GDR, which was impressed by his impassioned rhetoric about African liberation and militant activism as secretary-general of the TYL. Reporting Anangisye's arrest in July, Spacek described him as 'the archetypal ultra-left-wing revolutionary'. However, a former student leader doubted

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387 Odinga to secretary of the Central Committee, SED, 2 April 1962, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/957, 5. Kambona, accompanied by Dennis Phombeah, met GDR representatives in East Berlin in April 1962: Foreign Policy and International Relations Division, MfAA, 16 April 1962, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/956, 7-9.

388 Peter Spacek, 'Die Anfänge in Sansibar und Dar es Salaam', in van der Heyden and Benger (eds), Kalter Krieg, 174-75.


390 Academics have not been immune from this predilection to separate out Tanzanian politics into ideological categories. See for example Aminzade's division of the elite into 'Marxist-Leninists' and 'social democrats' in Race, 147. Tordoff and Mazrui hint at the danger present in applying the Eurocentric political spectrum to Tanzanian politicians, stating that it might be 'artificial to categorise them' [...] according to the concepts of Right and Left, except in the loose sense in which these terms are often used in Swahili, namely “Siasa ya pole” and “Siasa ya kali” – roughly translated as "the politics of slow change" and “the politics of radical change”: 'Left and Super-Left', 439.

391 Spacek, 3 August 1967, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/963, 349-50.
that Anangisye was ‘ideologically left’, but rather ‘just a young, hot-headed patriot, who did not agree with certain policies of the state, particularly in terms of foreign policy’. Communist diplomats were not alone in making such judgements: a West German diplomat stated that ‘Anangisye must be described as extreme-left’. But unlike their Western counterparts, the GDR compounded these ill-considered judgements by associating itself with the likes of Kambona and Anangisye.

Even before the wave of arrests and Kambona’s flight into exile, the GDR was reconsidering its position in Tanzania. On 17 July, Lessing cautioned against working with the ‘so-called left’, which was disparate and disorganised group of individuals, lacking both political talent and constructive alternatives to *ujamaa* socialism. Given these shortcomings, he stated, ‘in our further work here, it is important to change our stance towards Babu.’ The response from East Berlin was scolding. On 23 August, the head of the Africa Division of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (*Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten*, MfAA) wrote that the GDR’s ‘close contacts’ were ‘too oriented to one side’, with ‘the danger of political damage to the GDR.’ Lessing rejected this criticism, claiming that the consulate-general had other friendly connections among the local elite. He also argued that the GDR had distanced itself from Kambona once he had lost his government positions and his ‘adventurous line’ became clear.

However, this last claim was not wholly correct. Between early April and 6 July, Lessing travelled to East Germany to attend the SED’s Seventh Party Congress. In his absence, the GDR’s junior diplomats in Dar es Salaam maintained public contacts with the extremist fringe of the local political scene. After Anangisye was dismissed as TYL secretary-general, Lessing had instructed his colleagues to break off contacts with him. Yet in the consul-general’s absence, one subordinate, Hans Fischer, maintained close relations with Anangisye. On 4 July – less than a fortnight before Anangisye was arrested – the pair had dined together in a public place. In another colourful episode, Fischer bumped into Babu at the Palm Beach Hotel, the Zanzibari’s *baraza* of choice. An alcohol-fuelled evening ended with Fischer accompanying Babu to the home of a South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) leader, where they stayed drinking until the early hours. When Lessing found out about these escapades, Fischer narrowly escaped being sent back to East Germany.

The GDR sought to extricate itself from these entanglements in the messy fallout from the Arusha Declaration. According to Czech intelligence, in November 1967, Kambona and Hanga attempted to travel from Guinea back to London via Berlin, where they wished to meet with an MfAA representative. However, the Stasi intervened to return the duo to Britain via Paris instead.

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392 Interview with Juma Mwapachu, Oyster Bay, Dar es Salaam, 12 June 2015.
393 Pagensterrt to AA, 5 August 1967, PAAA, NA 6407.
394 Lessing to Kiesewetter, 17 July 1967, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/970, 165-69.
396 Lessing to Kiesewetter, 17 July 1967, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/970, 165-69.
The East Germans then informed Karume about their actions, presumably to demonstrate that they had severed their ties with the two disgraced politicians. However, this was a case of damage limitation. The events of the mid-1967, with which the GDR had been ‘guilty by association’ were a major setback, especially given the growing Chinese presence in Tanzania: in September, the first tripartite agreement on the TAZARA railway was signed.

If at first glance the Arusha Declaration had therefore represented grounds for optimism for the GDR, by the end of 1967 the outlook was more pessimistic. Although a paper high on Marxist jargon produced by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in January 1968 accepted that the Arusha Declaration ‘forms a favourable foundation for the struggle of progressive forces for non-capitalist development in Tanzania’, it coldly stated that ‘the conception of socialism does not comply with modern science’ and so ‘will not lead to the construction of a socialist society’. A report submitted by Lessing in March predicted that development would be slow on the mainland, where the most progressive influence would come from Zanzibar, where the GDR continued to extend its aid commitments. All the same, he realised that the prize of full diplomatic recognition could only be won in Dar es Salaam.

**Ostpolitik in Afrika**

In October 1967, a new West German ambassador presented his credentials to President Nyerere. Herbert Schroeder, the outgoing head of mission, had held the post since 1962. According to the French ambassador, with whom he shared premises on Azikiwe Street, Schroeder had ‘maintained an insufferable obsession’ about the GDR’s presence in Dar es Salaam, which ‘certain representations from the Eastern countries’ had encouraged by ‘throwing oil on the fire’. Referring back to Nyerere’s rejection of West German aid, the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* argued that there was little to be gained by ‘crying over spilt milk’ and suggested that the change in ambassador was an opportunity for improving Bonn’s relations with Tanzania.

Schroeder’s successor was Norbert Hebich, who made a very different impression. His views on East Germany were remarkably relaxed. Shortly after his arrival in Dar es Salaam, Hebich made a courtesy call on the dean of the diplomatic corps, who was coincidentally the Soviet ambassador, Andrei Timoschenko. Hebich told Timoschenko that he accepted that there were essentially two German states and that the Hallstein Doctrine in its present form was unsustainable. He said that

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397 Rivat, 16 November 1967, ABS, HSR, 12234.
398 Africa Division, MfAA, 5 January 1968, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/964, 1-17.
399 Lessing, 11 March 1968, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/958, 7-16; Helmut Matthes, ‘Zur Entwicklung außenpolitisch Grundlagen’, 74-76.
401 Naudy to MAE-DAL, 14 March 1967, CADN, 193PO/1/25 AII3.
he had to follow Bonn’s strict instructions to not attend diplomatic functions at which the GDR was also represented, although he personally disagreed with this protocol.\textsuperscript{403} In his own account of the meeting sent to the Auswärtiges Amt, Hebich stated his intention to attend such functions ‘without regard to the GDR’s presence, so as to not leave the field open and thereby not yield ground.’\textsuperscript{404} The GDR consulate-general’s early impression was that Hebich was ‘significantly more flexible and adroit than Schröder, who was not very popular among the Tanzanian side.’\textsuperscript{405}

Hebich’s arrival came at a time when the basic tenets of West German foreign policy were going through something of a revolution. In December 1966, the Christian Democratic Union (\textit{Christlich Demokratische Union}, CDU) and the Social Democratic Party (\textit{Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands}, SPD) formed a ‘grand coalition’ government in Bonn. The SPD’s Willy Brandt became foreign minister. A former mayor of Berlin, Brandt looked for an impasse out of a Cold War order based on mutual deterrence. He sensed a grassroots desire for a more progressive foreign policy. Rather than isolate the communist regimes, he sought to reach out to Eastern Europe, building connections through trade negotiations across the Cold War divide. In a Europe stalemated by nuclear standoff, Brandt believed that opening dialogue with communist societies would spread Western consumerism and liberal values to the East. In Brandt’s vision, writes Jeremi Suri, ‘Bonn would induce the Kremlin and its satellites to dig their own grave.’\textsuperscript{406} Brandt’s new Eastern Policy – \textit{Neue Ostpolitik} – involved compromising the principle of cutting relations with states that recognised the GDR. In January 1967, West Germany resumed diplomatic ties with Romania. A year later, it reopened relations with Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{407}

For the participants in the triangular East German-West German-Tanzanian relationship, Bonn’s new policy contained a mixture of opportunity and danger. From Tanzania’s perspective, the waters of the Hallstein Doctrine, muddied by the implications of the \textit{Anerkennungsdiplomatie} saga, were disturbed once more. As an advocate for world peace and the relaxation of superpower tensions, Nyerere welcomed Brandt’s endeavours towards détente. Tanzania’s support for self-determination in Africa and the spirit of pan-African unity which it claimed to underpin the Tanganyika-Zanzibar union also made it favourable to any policy leading to reunification in Germany. ‘We were the United Republic of Tanzania’, the country’s ambassador to Bonn at the time told me. ‘So as a country which seeks to unite its people […] we welcomed the efforts of Willy Brandt.’\textsuperscript{408} The possibility that the diffusion of tensions in Europe might lead to a weakening of the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Lessing to Kiesewetter, 14 October 1967, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/970, 275-76.
\item Hebich to AA, 9 November 1967, PAAA, B34, 717.
\item GDR consulate-general, Dar es Salaam, 14 November 1967, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/963, 409-23.
\item For a brief historiographical overview on \textit{Ostpolitik}, see Sarotte, \textit{Dealing with the Devil}, 185-87.
\item Interview with Anthony Nyakyi, Masaki, Dar es Salaam, 28 July 2015.
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Hallstein Doctrine also renewed hopes that the suspended aid arrangements, which Bonn had partially withdrawn and Tanzania totally rejected in 1965, might be revived.

Whereas previously West Germany’s foreign policy had been based on upholding the Hallstein Doctrine, now it sought to rally global opinion behind détente in Europe. Brandt believed that a relaxation in Cold War tensions over the Berlin Wall would free up West German resources to support development in Africa. Unlike the Hallstein Doctrine, which was ostensibly a rule governing Bonn’s relations with the whole world, Ostpolitik was grounded in the geopolitical situation in Eastern Europe. Yet the overlapping nature of the two positions, embodied by Bonn’s establishment of relations with Romania and Yugoslavia, meant they became enmeshed, thereby ‘globalising Ostpolitik’, as Sara Lorenzini puts it. This global dimension was problematic for West Germany: diplomatic concessions to the GDR in the Third World would reduce Bonn’s bargaining power in Europe. The Hallstein Doctrine was therefore required as ‘political cover’ for Ostpolitik. Brandt’s initiative thus presented West Germany with the possibility of rebuilding its relations with Tanzania via the resumption of capital aid, but at real political risk.

For the GDR and its sympathisers, the thaw provided precedents which lent themselves to the argument that the Hallstein Doctrine no longer applied. In March 1967, Hanga told the GDR that in the light of Bonn opening diplomatic relations with Romania, the Hallstein Doctrine was ‘absolutely meaningless’. In September, a senior bureaucrat in the Tanzanian Ministry for Foreign Affairs told Lessing that the government was receptive to the GDR’s stance towards West Germany, which ‘only formally maintains the Hallstein Doctrine and no longer believes in it.’ On the other hand, Eastern European policymakers feared that Ostpolitik represented a tool with which to split the socialist bloc. Moscow responded to Brandt’s early overtures by demonstrating greater solidarity with East Germany. The Soviet Union sent a memorandum in March 1967 to selected non-aligned leaders, including Nyerere, warning them of the ‘neocolonial’ nature of the Hallstein Doctrine, which it described as ‘an expression of great power policy’, in the same mould of Second Reich imperialism and Hitler’s fascism.

In these circumstances, Hebich’s arrival in Dar es Salaam gave West German policy in Tanzania a liberalising shot in the arm. In his first lengthy despatch to the Auswärtiges Amt in December 1967, Hebich set out the case for bringing Tanzania in from the cold. He expressed concern at East Germany’s expanding local presence at the same time as more West German technical experts were being withdrawn: ‘even if we cannot expand our field, we should at least defend the territory we

409 Lopes, West Germany, 16.
412 Gray, Germany’s Cold War, 200.
413 Lessing to Kiesewetter, 27 February 1967, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/970, 94-97.
415 Gray, Germany’s Cold War, 201.
have already required. ‘The new orientation of our Ostpolitik must have been noticed by the Tanzanian government,’ Hebich observed, given the questions he was receiving about the current status of the Hallstein Doctrine. The establishment of the EAC incentivised deepening economic relations, especially as an association agreement with the European Economic Community was under negotiation (and was signed in July 1968). Hebich argued that the Hallstein Doctrine was outdated. Just as Yugoslavia was considered a special case in the communist world, so Tanzania should be treated as such in Africa. Hebich recommended ‘a broad-minded policy towards Tanzania, which in the long-term will give us greater freedom of manoeuvre to defend our interests than the present insistence on barely tenable standpoints.’

Hebich’s call for the revival of full ties with Tanzania divided opinion in Bonn. In March, the Auswärtiges Amt prepared a lengthy report on West German-Tanzanian relations, in response to a request made by Kai-Uwe von Hassel, the federal minister for displaced persons, refugees, and war victims. Although the report’s authors agreed that there was some merit in renewing development aid, they provided a string of counterarguments. New aid for Tanzania would be at the expense of states which had greater respect for West German interests. Tanzanian policy was increasingly anti-Western, as its stance on Rhodesia, relations with the communist world, and the ‘radical role’ it played at the UN all showed. The country was becoming a ‘military bastion for Red China’ and did nothing to stop the GDR’s propaganda campaign against West Germany. The report also highlighted the underlying danger that providing new capital aid would encourage other African countries to institutionalise contact with the GDR. The document chimes with Rui Lopes’ observation that the Auswärtiges Amt at this time exhibited an overriding concern for Cold War geopolitics and a profound scepticism towards post-colonial African states.

These divisions persisted at a conference of West German ambassadors to sub-Saharan Africa held in Abidjan in March-April 1968. There, as Lorenzini notes, ‘the clash between the old thinking of the diplomatic establishment and the more open attitude of the new political leadership became manifest’. Brandt told the meeting that the priority of West German relations in Africa was to drum up support for Bonn’s stance on the German question, which would then be linked to development assistance. He did not mention the Hallstein Doctrine. In contrast, the secretary of state, von Scharpenberg, used his concluding speech to restate West Germany’s commitment to the Hallstein Doctrine. He even claimed that Bonn’s policy towards Tanzania had been a success, contrary to Hebich’s own impression.

416 Hebich to AA, 8 December 1967, PAAA, NA 6408.
417 Von Hassel had a personal interest in Tanzania, having been born there in 1913, during the final years of German colonial rule in East Africa.
418 Wever, 8 March 1968, PAAA, NA 6408.
419 Lopes, West Germany.
Sensing a relaxation in Bonn’s stance, by the time of the Abidjan conference Tanzania had already put out diplomatic feelers to West Germany. On 5 March 1968, Amir Jamal, the pro-business minister for finance, called on Hebich. He broached the subject of West Germany’s reopened relations with Yugoslavia and Romania, and mentioned he was considering tagging a visit to Bonn on to the end of a meeting of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development in Paris the following month. Hebich maintained the government’s line that Ostpolitik was West Germany’s own concern and that it reserved the right to distinguish between ‘friendly’ and ‘less friendly’ states.421 But the problem of defending ad hoc policy that seemed to contradict the axioms of the Hallstein Doctrine was apparent. On the Tanzanian side, there was a clear willingness to re-engage with West Germany in the search for the aid required to drive forwards its socialist policies.

In Dar es Salaam, the GDR noted an intensification of West German activity. Lessing reported that there seemed to have been a ‘change in tactics in the West German attitude towards Tanzania. It must therefore be reckoned that a rethinking process [Umdenkungsprozeß] is taking place.’422 The GDR exhibited a hypersensitivity to West German propaganda activity. On 2 February, Nairobi’s East African Standard ran a story critical of communist aid projects in Zanzibar.423 This followed a motif in which the West Germans were believed to insert stories into Kenyan newspapers that were then distributed in Tanzania, where the left-leaning local press was resistant to such tactics.424 By June, the West German embassy (or the ‘German embassy’, as its name plaque provocatively read) was distributing a Swahili-language news bulletin, imitating the East German initiative in 1967.425

The GDR feared that Ostpolitik’s peace-building appearance masked Bonn’s real intention of spreading discord among the Eastern Bloc. It was concerned by the local manifestation of Ostpolitik in Dar es Salaam, as West German representatives went on a microdiplomatic offensive to construct relationships with their Eastern Bloc counterparts. The consulate-general highlighted West Germany’s policy of ‘bridge-building’ (Brückenschlag) in Tanzania, in which Hebich was cultivating ties with Czechoslovakian, Hungarian, Polish, and Bulgarian diplomats in an attempt to isolate the GDR.426 Lessing stressed to his Eastern Bloc colleagues in Dar es Salaam the dangers these meetings represented.427 In Moscow, Pravda condemned the shift in West German Afrikapolitik set out by Brandt at Abidjan as a ‘neocolonial intrigue’, designed to deepen the continent’s dependence on the capitalist world.428

421 [unclear], 5 March 1968, PAAA, NA 6408.
422 Lessing to Kiesewetter, 12 February 1968, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/963, 428-34.
424 Kiesewetter to Axen, 12 February 1968, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/958, 3.
425 Zielke to Fischer, 5 June 1968, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/963, 441-44.
427 Lessing to Kiesewetter, 9 April 1968, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/964, 107-16.
On the other hand, the weakening of the Hallstein Doctrine, implicit in Bonn’s opening of relations with Belgrade and Bucharest, offered the GDR hope for improving relations with Tanzania. In early 1968, the consulate-general used the example of Yugoslavia in both printed material and a string of meetings with government officials to make the case for full recognition of the GDR by Tanzania. However, Lessing was disappointed by the lack of a concrete Tanzanian response to these initiatives, blaming it on Western pressure. The consulate-general asserted that it had been unable to fully eliminate the Tanzanian government’s illusions about Ostpolitik and the entry of the SPD into the coalition government. ‘Bonn’s demagogic efforts to demonstrate a conversion in its Ostpolitik are not seen through.’ This concern underlines that Ostpolitik was perceived by East Berlin less an opportunity than a threat to its unique position among sub-Saharan states in Tanzania.

The GDR responded by intensifying the propaganda war. It continued to attack West German policy towards Portugal and South Africa. This predictable line found favour among the Tanzanian press. A Nationalist article in April made unfounded accusations that 17,000 West German troops were fighting in Mozambique and 2,000 ex-Wehrmacht officers were training South African forces. In his pseudonymous column in the Nationalist, Babu sarcastically mocked a report on the Abidjan conference which he had read in a West German embassy handout, the Bulletin, quoting Brandt as saying that ‘[n]early all African states follow and welcome Bonn’s policy of detente, its policy towards Eastern Europe and its policy of peace.’ The Auswärtiges Amt believed it was ‘probably inspired by the “Soviet Occupied Zone” consulate-general’ and submitted a formal protest about both articles to the Tanzanian ambassador in Bonn. In doing so, it perceived the unlikely hand of the GDR in an article that was characteristic of Babu’s general hostility towards Western ‘imperialism’ – another indication of the Federal Republic’s tendency to view developments in Tanzania through a Germanocentric prism.

On 5 July, Hebich handed Nyerere a protest note, which catalogued purported GDR attempts to slander West Germany in its news bulletins. Nyerere told Hebich that the West Germans had his full support on the matter. He had long found the GDR’s propaganda activities disagreeable and had warned the consulate-general about its behaviour. Nonetheless, he thought that the GDR was ‘slapping itself in the face’ with its crude propaganda and ‘showing its inferiority complex’. After all,

429 Lessing to Kiesewetter, 11 March 1968, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/970, 431-35; Lessing, 3 April 1968, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/970, 439-42.
430 Lessing to Kiesewetter, 11 March 1968, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/970, 431-35; Zielke, 4 April 1968, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/970, 443-47.
432 ‘NATO’s tentacles are all over Africa’, Nationalist, 16 May 1968, 3.
434 Hebich to AA, 3 May 1968, PAAA, NA 6408; Frank, 24 May 1968, PAAA, NA 6408.
435 See chapter 5.
the GDR had built the Berlin Wall, which sent out a stronger message than any propaganda. Nyerere affirmed that he would not recognise the GDR, which he thought did not represent the people of the ‘Zone’ and was merely a Soviet puppet. He also said that the GDR’s position in Zanzibar was slipping, since the Karume regime was tiring of its ‘pushy and schoolmasterly attitude’.

The visit of von Hassel

The various strands of the localised inter-German struggle in Dar es Salaam were brought together by the visit of von Hassel, the West German minister who had previously floated the idea of restarting capital aid to Tanzania. After touring the country and holding a private interview with Nyerere, on 9 August von Hassel called a press conference at the West German embassy. The report in the more radical Nationalist predictably dwelt on von Hassel’s insistence that Bonn would not support the southern African liberation movements. However, the Standard cited von Hassel as claiming that Nyerere had told him that Tanzania would never recognise East Germany. The West German embassy told its American colleagues that von Hassel had been ‘too enthusiastic’ in his account of his audience with Nyerere, although its gist was consistent with Hebich’s own recent meeting with the president.

Von Hassel’s visit took place amid a propaganda cyclone. Just prior to his arrival, a pamphlet entitled ‘Outlook from the Pamirs’ was circulated in Zanzibar and Dar es Salaam. The booklet was a vicious assault on China. It drew comparisons with Hitler’s Germany, alleged Beijing planned to create an ‘Asiatic Reich’, and described Mao as the ‘Socialist Genghis Khan’. This followed a visit by Nyerere to China and North Korea in June. Shortly afterwards, two anonymous Swahili pamphlets appeared in Dar es Salaam, the former criticising the government in quite temperate terms, the latter a scurrilous personal attack on Nyerere. The American ambassador reported that the president was ‘furious’ and was considering taking libel action if the authors could be identified.

436 Hebich to AA, 6 July 1968, PAAA, NA 6408.
437 ‘Bonn will not assist liberation movements’, Nationalist, 10 August 1968, 1; ‘FRELIMO aid claim denied: German minister gives assurances’, Standard, 10 August 1968, 5; Burns to State Dept, 16 August 1968, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2513, POL 2 TANZAN; MfAA, 26 September 1968, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/964, 219-25. I found no record of the Nyerere-von Hassel meeting in the West German archives.
438 MfAA, 26 September 1968, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/964, 219-25; Burns to State Dept, 20 March 1969, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 1511, CSM TANZAN, which encloses a copy of ‘Outlook from the Pamirs’. A subsequent investigation by the State Department found that the pamphlet’s text was partly based on articles appearing in the 27 September and 4 October 1967 issues of Literaturnaya Gazeta, a Soviet literary journal. Rogers to US emb., Dar es Salaam, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 1511, CSM TANZAN.
439 Burns to State Dept, 8 August 1968, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2513, POL 2 TANZAN, which encloses translations of both pamphlets.
Suspicion immediately fell on the GDR – an indication of their track record for propaganda in Tanzania. The consulate-general thought that ‘Outlook from the Pamirs’ was the work of Western intelligence agencies seeking to denigrate the GDR ahead of von Hassel’s trip. In response, the consulate-general prepared a series of counterpropaganda articles in its Swahili-language newspaper, Urafiki (‘Friendship’). East Berlin also instructed its consulate in Zanzibar to prepare a memorandum for the Karume government, distancing the GDR from the pamphlet and explaining that its timing was no coincidence. Although the Swahili pamphlets were generally regarded as the work of the exiled Kambona and his supporters, the rumours which had connected Kambona with communist money in 1967 meant that the GDR again fell under the spotlight. Hebich considered the GDR’s involvement unlikely, but understandably did nothing to dampen the gossip.

By the time the GDR submitted its aide-mémoire in Zanzibar, the union government had already intervened in the affair. On 13 August, the Nationalist carried an editorial entitled ‘Hands Off’, which explicitly warned the Eastern Bloc against interfering in Tanzanian affairs. ‘We did not fight against the Western colonialists to become the playthings of any Eastern country’, it stated. Dar es Salaam, as the East Germans put it, was transformed into a ‘real rumour-mill’ (Gerüchtemacherei). American and British diplomats believed that the author was Nyerere himself. Communist and Western observers alike felt that it was directed at the GDR. Rashidi Kawawa, the second vice-president, insisted to Lessing that it neither targeted the GDR nor was connected with von Hassel’s visit. However, the Yugoslavian ambassador was told by the Tanzanian Ministry for Foreign Affairs that the article was aimed at the GDR and the Soviet Union.

Taken together with the interview with Hebich on 5 July, the ‘Hands Off’ episode demonstrated Nyerere’s fundamental animosity towards the GDR. He resented its presence in Zanzibar, which was a destabilising factor in fragile intra-union relations. Further, the German question itself and the difficulties of resolving the dilemma within the framework of non-alignment deprived Tanzania of much-needed aid – a problem which Nyerere seemed now more inclined to blame on East Berlin than on Bonn. According to the Soviet embassy, Nyerere had complained in government circles that ‘thanks to the GDR we have harmed our relations with the richest state in Europe’. A Stasi report on the ‘attitude of Tanzania towards the GDR’, compiled prior to von Hassel’s visit, recognised this problem. It observed that Nyerere had resolved that it was not in his interest to

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440 MfAA, 26 September 1968, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/964, 219-25.
441 Hebich to AA, 21 August 1968, PAAA, NA 6410.
443 MfAA, 26 September 1968, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/964, 219-25.
444 Burns to State Dept, 16 August 1968, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2513, POL 2 TANZAN; Phillips to Stewart, 2 January 1969, UKNA, FCO 31/442/17.
445 MfAA, 26 September 1968, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/964, 219-25.
446 Ibid.
raise the diplomatic status of the GDR in Tanzania, because of the inevitable Western backlash and the loss of Bonn’s economic aid.\footnote{MfS, 20 June 1968, BStU, MfS, HV A, no. 131, 259-60.} Whereas in 1965, Nyerere had acted on principle, a combination of the experience of the GDR’s ‘co-habitation’ with West Germany in Tanzania and the need for aid now pushed him away from East Berlin.

**The invasion of Czechoslovakia and its aftermath**

Brandt’s *Ostpolitik* was not the only attempt to recalibrate the glacial Cold War situation in Central Europe. In Czechoslovakia, Alexander Dubček’s regime sought to meet rising domestic discontent with a programme of liberal reform. But the ‘Prague Spring’ of 1968 spiralled out of control, as the lifting of censorship led to calls for deeper democratisation. On the night of 20-21 August, a coalition of Warsaw Pact forces invaded Czechoslovakia. The Prague Spring was brought to a swift conclusion.

The invasion of Czechoslovakia may have reasserted Soviet control over Eastern Europe, but it was a public relations disaster for Moscow. As Suri notes, ‘while Mao Zedong’s followers waved a “little red book” pledging power to the masses, the Kremlin could only offer the so-called “Brezhnev Doctrine” – a commitment to use force in defence of the political status quo.’\footnote{Jeremi Suri, ‘The Promise and Failure of “Developed Socialism”: The Soviet “Thaw” and the Crucible of the Prague Spring, 1964-1972’, *Contemporary European History*, 15 (2006), 156.} The headlines and editorials in the Tanzanian press screamed outrage. On 23 August, a demonstration led by university students ended with stones being thrown at the Soviet embassy: among the protest’s leaders was Tanzania’s minister of state for foreign affairs, Chediel Mgonja. The government issued a tersely-worded statement condemning the invasion. ‘The Government of the United Republic of Tanzania opposes colonialism of all kinds, whether old or new, in Africa, in Europe, or elsewhere’, it concluded.\footnote{Tanzania deplores occupation’, *Nationalist*, 22 August 1968, 1. The Tanzanian reaction to the invasion of Czechoslovakia is considered in more detail in chapter 5.}

Czechoslovakia), which carried the defiant statements of politicians in Prague. Having kept a low profile immediately after the invasion, the GDR distributed pamphlets to government officials in September on the 'Counterrevolutionary Developments in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic'. A Chinese embassy bulletin carried a statement from Zhou Enlai, who compared the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia to ‘fighting dogs’. The Czechoslovakian crisis opened up many of the rifts that Hebich’s localised Ostpolitik had already tried to exploit in Dar es Salaam. Over a month after the invasion, Lessing informed East Berlin that there had been no contact between Yugoslavian and Warsaw Pact diplomats since 21 August. This was more than a symbolic blow: the Yugoslav embassy had been an important source of local political intelligence for the GDR, given the shared non-aligned position of Belgrade and Dar es Salaam. Nicolae Ceaușescu’s Romania had not participated in the invasion. On arrival in Tanzania on 23 September, Bucharest’s new ambassador made a thinly-veiled attack on the Soviet Union, calling for respect for ‘independence, sovereignty, and non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states.’ The Czechoslovakian chargé d’affaires maintained his support for the Dubček government and broke off contact with his Warsaw Pact colleagues. According to Lessing, he demonstrated an ‘extraordinary kleinbürgerlich-opportunistic’ attitude and did all he could to slander the other socialist states. These discords among the Eastern Bloc were believed to have been exploited by the West. In December, the Stasi concluded that ‘reactionary forces’ had used Tanzania’s position on Czechoslovakia to increase their influence over Nyerere and encourage greater cooperation with the West.

With the GDR’s stock at a low, Hebich made a fresh pitch for increased West German engagement with Tanzania. The invasion of Czechoslovakia, he wrote to the Auswärtiges Amt, had induced an ‘overdue correction in Tanzania’s stance towards the Eastern Bloc’, with consequences favourable to Bonn. Hebich set out the case for restarting a full capital aid programme. Nyerere was a strong, responsible leader, who had held to his position on the non-recognition of the GDR. The main barrier to improved relations with Tanzania was no longer the faltering Hallstein Doctrine, but Bonn’s stance on southern Africa – a problem aggravated by East German propaganda. He urged Bonn to spell out the West German attitude towards Portugal and South Africa more persuasively. ‘Nothing more should stand in the way of a full normalisation of economic and political relations’, he stated.

452 Enclosed in NARA, RG 84, Dar es Salaam, UCSF, 1965-75, Box 9, POL 27.
453 Zielke, 23 September 1968, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/970, 514-16.
454 Naudy to MAE-DAL, 1 October 1968, CADN, 193PO/1/27 AII27.
455 Lessing to Kiesewetter, 24 September 1968, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/964, 209-18.
456 Lessing to Kiesewetter, 27 August 1968, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/970, 508.
457 MfS, 10 December 1968, BStU, MfS, HV A, no. 139, 247-54.
458 Hebich to AA, 24 October 1968, PAAA, NA 6408.
Tanzania reconsiders its relations with the Eastern Bloc

On 1 November 1968, Mhando replaced Mgonja as minister of state for foreign affairs. Mgonja was a personal favourite of Nyerere, but he had developed a reputation for incendiary outbursts. His behaviour during the Czechoslovakia demonstration, when he had led protestors over the wall of the Soviet embassy, proved an embarrassment too far. He was moved to the Ministry of Health.461

Mhando was another Nyerere loyalist and his experience within the TANU leadership stretched back to the origins of the independence struggle. More significant, however, were his connections to the GDR. Between 1961 and 1963, Mhando had taught Swahili in Leipzig, where he had married an East German. On his return, he had served as the managing editor of the TANU newspapers, the Nationalist and Uhuru, and later of the trade union weekly, Mßnyakazi (‘The Worker’), which often carried GDR propaganda. According to the American ambassador, Mhando was a ‘crook’ with a ‘long history of communist contacts’, noting also that he had past associations with Kambona.462 The coldest response to the appointment predictably came from the West Germans: the GDR consulate-general reported that Hebich had not paid a courtesy visit to the new minister – and that Mhando’s response had been to ignore an invitation from the ambassador to dine at his residence.463

The appointment of Mhando boosted the GDR’s hopes for improved relations with Tanzania. Horst Schlegel, the ADN correspondent, proved a valuable intermediary. ‘Comrade Schlegel has good connections with Mhando. He can call on him at any time without an appointment’, wrote Wolfgang Zielke, who was briefly head of mission following Lessing’s recall to East Germany in November 1968.464 In late November, Schlegel chanced on Mhando in a Dar es Salaam nightspot. ‘Does it strike you that I am a friend of the GDR?’ asked Mhando. He invited Schlegel for an off-the-books meeting. Through Schlegel, the consulate-general channelled a series of questions about GDR-Tanzanian relations to Mhando, who promised to put them before Nyerere. Mhando assured Schlegel that Tanzania sought deeper ties with East Germany and that an improvement of Tanzania’s relations with socialist states would naturally take place as the Czechoslovakian crisis faded from memory.465

The damage done to the reputation of the socialist bloc in Tanzania by the invasion of Czechoslovakia does not seem to have been lasting, at least among government circles. By the end of the year, relations with Moscow had recovered sufficiently to permit a Soviet naval visit to

461 The French embassy had little doubt that the change had taken place at the request of the Soviet Union. Naudy to MAE-DAL, 5 August 1969, CADN, 193PO/1/26 AII22.
462 Burns to State Dept, 2 November 1968, NARA, RG 59, CPFP 1967-9, Box 2516, POL 15-1 TANZAN.
463 MßAA, 5 December 1968, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/964, 262-63.
464 ibid. Lessing later became the East German ambassador to Uganda. In 1979, he was killed in violence following the overthrow of Idi Amin by a Tanzanian invasion. Kilian, H fallstein Doctrine, 226.
Tanzania – the first since the days of Tsarist rule.466 In December 1968, Nyerere informed the Hungarian ambassador that all Tanzanian ministers had been briefed that measures must be taken to improve relations with socialist states, because otherwise the goals of the Arusha Declaration could not be realised. He said that the response to the crisis in Czechoslovakia had been a demonstration of the underlying moral logic behind Tanzania’s foreign policy, but that case was now closed.467 Nyerere told Timoschenko that the reaction to events in Czechoslovakia ‘belonged to the past’ and that Tanzania was interested in an improvement in relations with Bloc. He intended to make a trip to Moscow in April or May 1969, having postponed the visit in September 1968.468

Nyerere’s position here was consistent with the motif of his foreign policy: diversifying Tanzania’s sources of aid, so as to both maximise donor income in his drive to modernise its economy along the lines of Arusha socialism and also maintain his credibility as a non-aligned leader. These two strands of thinking – one economic, the other political – were mutually reinforcing. Nyerere was sensitive to claims that he was too sympathetic to China, especially after the huge TAZARA loan and the decision taken in February 1969 that, on the expiration of arrangements with Canada at the end of the year, Tanzania would accept military aid from Beijing alone.469 This alarmed observers in both the East and West. The CIA believed that the Tanzanian Ministry of Defence was especially pro-China. In January 1970, it cautioned that China’s growing role in the military ‘could eventually pose a serious threat to Nyerere’s hold on power or his use of it.’470

Nyerere publicly dampened talk of Chinese political influence in Tanzania. In May 1969, he told an AFP reporter that ‘we are a stubborn people. The Chinese will learn that if they want to control us they will get into trouble.’471 Speaking in Dar es Salaam at a preparatory meeting ahead of the 1970 Non-Aligned Conference, Nyerere noted that the rise of China had complicated the Cold War: ‘the so-called “Iron Curtain” has become less solid, and whether a “Bamboo Curtain” exists or does not exist, the People’s Republic of China does exist. The “Power Game” has become three-sided, and those wishing to stand outside it have further complications to deal with.’472 Continuing to work with the Soviet Bloc was an essential aspect of a triangular balancing act between the three superpowers, while also keeping open channels of foreign aid.

The appointment of Mhando was part of this strategy. According to one former Tanzanian diplomat, the new minister used his background to maximise aid connections with Eastern

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467 MFIA, 16 December 1968, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/964, 264-65.
468 Zielke, 3 January 1969, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/970, 577-80.
469 MFIA, 24 February 1969, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/964, 355-56.
471 ‘Tanzania stubborn – Nyerere’, Standard, 7 May 1969, 1; see also Pratt, Critical Phase, 250-51.
Europe.\(^{473}\) It was on this basis that a GDR delegation sent to attend the anniversary of the Zanzibar Revolution in January 1969 perceived the olive branches offered by Nyerere and Mhando to the Bloc as being grounded in ‘tactical-pragmatic considerations’, rather than ideological inclination.\(^{474}\) Later that month, Mhando told Schlegel that Nyerere had given the all-clear to the conclusion of government-level agreements between the GDR and Tanzania.\(^{475}\) Shortly afterwards, Mhando circulated a note to all Tanzanian ministries informing them of the decision.\(^{476}\) In April, Mhando arranged a meeting between Erich Butzke, the new East German consul-general,\(^{477}\) and Nyerere – the first audience the GDR had obtained with the president since August 1967. Although nothing of substance emerged from the interview, it was another indicator of the GDR’s rehabilitation, which owed much to Mhando’s cooperation.\(^{478}\)

These were the circumstances in which ‘China and the Devil Slaves’ appeared. ‘The inclusion of Stephen Mhando in the forgery is regarded as the first official reaction among imperialist circles to his appointment as minister of state’, wrote Schlegel.\(^{479}\) Butzke told Mhando that the pamphlet was clearly a West German production, like ‘Outlook from the Pamirs’. Mhando informed Schlegel that Nyerere himself regarded it as ‘nonsense’ and did not think the GDR was behind it.\(^{480}\) The only public word on the matter came from a TASS correspondent, who filed a story describing the pamphlet as a ‘provocation’ by West German ‘revanchists’.\(^{481}\) Investigations undertaken by diplomats in Dar es Salaam and State Department officials in the United States produced more questions than they did answers.\(^{482}\) The episode serves as a prime example of Dar es Salaam’s dirty Cold War propaganda wars and their complicating effects on politics in the city.

‘No recognition by the backdoor’

Over the first half of 1969, the Grand Coalition in Bonn became increasingly divided over the direction of Ostpolitik in light of events in Czechoslovakia. At the same time, the GDR won a flurry

\(^{473}\) Interview with Paul Rupia, central Dar es Salaam, 3 August 2015.
\(^{475}\) Schlegel, 25 January 1969, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/970, 601.
\(^{476}\) Information Division, MfAA, 10 March 1969, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/958, 238.
\(^{477}\) Butzke had previously served as the head of the MfAA’s Latin America Department. Posadowsky-Wehner to FRG emb., Dar es Salaam, 29 January 1969, PAAA, NA 13473.
\(^{478}\) Butzke, 10 April 1969, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/954, 260-65; Information Division, MfAA, 11 April 1969, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/958, 241.
\(^{479}\) Schlegel, 4 February 1969, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/958, 208.
\(^{480}\) Butzke, 7 February 1969, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/958, 210-13.
\(^{481}\) Matlock to State Dept, 18 April 1969, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 1511, CSM TANZAN.
\(^{482}\) A West German diplomat told an American counterpart that the pamphlet was part of a fantastical double-bluff operation, in which the GDR deliberately produced a forgery so crude that it would be assumed to be a plant by West Germany. But he also said that he could not be ‘100 percent sure’ that it had not been a West German production. When experts in the State Department analysed both ‘Outlook from the Pamirs’ and ‘China and the Devil Slaves’, they found the paper and staples used were manufactured in North Korea. Burns to State Dept, 20 March 1969; Rogers to US emb., Dar es Salaam, 18 April 1969: both in NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 1511, CSM TANZAN.
of diplomatic victories. In April and May, Iraq, Cambodia, and Sudan all announced their recognition of the GDR. Iraq and Sudan had already severed relations with West Germany due to Bonn’s support for Israel in the Six Day War of 1967, but the situation in Cambodia demanded a stronger response. Ultimately, Brandt’s split government chose to ‘freeze’ diplomatic relations with Phnom Penh, rather than fully break them.\footnote{Gray, Germany’s Cold War, 205-12. Cambodia ended this impasse by unilateraly breaking relations with the FRG in June.} Buoyed with optimism, at a press conference in Dar es Salaam on 16 July, Butzke said that the key reason for the string of recognitions was Third World states’ realisation of ‘the undisputable reality that there are two sovereign German states.’\footnote{‘G.D.R. envoy explains recognition’, Standard, 17 June 1969, 5.}

At the same time as Mhando was advancing the GDR’s cause in Tanzania, West Germany’s Afrikapolitik came under increased criticism in Tanzania. In September 1968, a consortium of firms known as Zamco came to an agreement with the Portuguese government to construct the Cahora Bassa dam, a massive hydroelectric scheme in northern Mozambique. The contract was signed a year later. Zamco included five West German companies and its credit was guaranteed by Brandt’s government. To African eyes, West Germany’s participation in the project confirmed its collusion with Portuguese colonialism.\footnote{Lopes, West Germany, 108-14.} In April 1969, the OAU expressed its frustration over the intransigence of the white minority regimes in its ‘Lusaka Manifesto’, which criticised unnamed European states for supporting the Portuguese war effort.\footnote{Ibid., 17-18.} Addressing the UN in September, Mhando made a sweeping attack on Bonn’s military and financial aid to Portugal.\footnote{Ibid., 54n22.}

The low point in public relations between West Germany and independent Africa came in the aftermath of the Portuguese-backed mercenary invasion of Guinea in November 1970.\footnote{See chapter 6.} Sekou Touré’s regime alleged that there had been a West German hand in the attack, which aimed to overthrow a government that was supporting the liberation movement in Guinea-Bissau. A West German inquest into the contents of a white paper issued by Conakry on the invasion found that the evidence it contained was ‘contradictory’, ‘obviously absurd’, and ‘ludicrous’. The report argued that the GDR had fabricated the West German connection to the mercenary operation to blacken Bonn’s reputation further.\footnote{Lopes, West Germany, 26-27.} In Dar es Salaam, Hebich confronted the Ministry for Foreign Affairs about the appearance of articles repeating such allegations in the Standard.\footnote{Memcon (Namfua, Hebich), 19 February 1971, PAAA, NA 13465.} Regardless of the truth behind the accusations, West Germany’s continued good relations with Portugal damaged Bonn’s standing in Africa. As Rui Lopes shows, Brandt’s government uneasily maintained its ties with Lisbon, wary that destabilising the unity of the NATO bloc would jeopardise the success of détente in Europe and thus prioritising Ostpolitik over Afrikapolitik.\footnote{Lopes, West Germany.}
Yet while West Germany attracted bitter public criticism in Tanzania, the two states quietly worked to improve their relationship. As the Anerkennungskrise crisis faded from memory and West Germany sought to develop its image in the Third World as a modern welfare state, a theme expounded by Brandt at Abidjan, Tanzania continued to explore the possibilities of renewed aid from Bonn. ‘You live in a rich country’, Nyerere half-joked with a group of West German journalists in April 1969, ‘and therefore it would be good if you could give us a little more of your money!’

The following October, a team led by Jamal tagged a trip to Bonn onto the end of a aid-seeking tour in Scandinavia. The delegation discussed the potential for West German aid for Tanzania’s second five-year plan, to be announced in 1970.

Jamal’s negotiation partner, Erhard Eppler, proved a key intermediary in re-establishing this aid relationship. Whereas Brandt subordinated West Germany’s Afrikapolitik to the overriding concern of Ostpolitik, Eppler prioritised the question of Third World development. In October 1969, the same month that Brandt became chancellor following the SPD’s strong performance in the federal elections, the West German government announced its adoption of the recommendations of the World Bank’s Pearson Commission as the basis of a new development policy. In contrast to the Auswärtiges Amt, Eppler’s Ministry for Economic Cooperation (Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit, BMZ) was critical of Bonn’s ties to Lisbon. In October 1970, Eppler used a German newspaper interview to condemn NATO’s policy towards Portugal. ‘How much longer will the Portuguese tail still be allowed to wag with the NATO dog?’, he said. During his first visit to Tanzania in 1969, Eppler was impressed by Nyerere’s vision of a self-reliant Tanzania. On a personal level, he struck up a close relationship with both Nyerere and Jamal. Thereafter, Eppler sought to increase West German aid to Tanzania. He recalled that at each federal budget, there would be a dispute between the BMZ and the Auswärtiges Amt: the latter demanded an increase in support for the Brazilian junta and a cut to aid to Tanzania; Eppler argued vice-versa.

However, the greatest barrier to the GDR’s recognition in Tanzania was not the latter’s resurgent relations with Bonn, but Nyerere’s own hostility to East Berlin. The president’s views of East German activities in Zanzibar were distinctly negative. Far from the islands being a showcase for ‘actually existing socialism’, by the end of the 1960s the Karume dictatorship presided over a

492 Timmerman to AA, 29 April 1969, PAAA, NA 6408.
496 Quoted in Lopes, West Germany, 122.
closed society devoid of political freedom and wracked by self-induced economic strife. The GDR’s development projects fell flat, especially a flagship housing scheme, which proved unsuitable for African purposes. The authorities also tired of the GDR’s over-assertive behaviour, preferring the more frugal and less pushy approach taken by China. Through ineptitude, arrogance, and their own version of fiscal responsibility, they [the GDR] have largely brought about their own decline, although, no doubt, abetted by the Chicoms’, an American diplomatic report concluded June 1970. The GDR’s relations with Zanzibar reached a nadir days later, when the Karume regime expelled the East German consul. This soured relationship strengthened scepticism on the mainland about cooperation with the GDR.

Nyerere was steadfast in his resistance to elevating the GDR’s diplomatic status. The Stasi gloomily reported that in leading political circles in Dar es Salaam, it was widely held that Nyerere had no readiness to recognise the GDR. In June 1969, Mhando wrote to Nyerere, suggesting that the GDR be invited to send a ministerial-level delegation to the Saba Saba trade fair, held annually in July to commemorate the founding of TANU. Mhando argued that following decisions taken by Cambodia, Iraq, and Sudan to recognise the GDR, the gesture would be a symbolic means of demonstrating the GDR’s ‘improved status’. Mhando passed Nyerere’s terse response to the East Germans.

Steve: I am going by protocol. I want there to be no misunderstanding on the German matter. We do not recognise the GDR. Certainly, the day will come when we recognise it. I don’t know when. But at the moment we do not recognise it. What does ‘improved status’ mean? The decision over whether the GDR will be recognised or not will be taken in Tanzania and not in Cambodia or Sudan. And there will be no recognition by the backdoor.

Later in the year, on a tour of Eastern Europe, the reports which filtered back to East Berlin about Nyerere’s comments on the German question offered the GDR little encouragement. Playing to his audiences in Budapest and Moscow, Nyerere said that he supported the recognition of the GDR in principle, but did not want to be the first African state to do so. The Polish embassy in Budapest reported that Nyerere was also concerned about Tanzania’s present level of economic dependence on other states for aid. Seeking to placate Eastern European opinion, Nyerere therefore tied the
question of recognition to Tanzania’s own economic development, encouraging further aid. More revealingly, in non-aligned Belgrade, Nyerere told Tito that there was no possibility of any change at the present time.

The contrasting fortunes of the two German states in Tanzania were demonstrated by a comparison of two ministerial visits to the country in early 1970. In March, Eppler paid a five-day visit, which took place against a backdrop of criticism of West German policy towards Portugal and South Africa. The previous month, the West German embassy had been forced to publicly defend itself against remarks made by Bhoke Munanka, a minister of state, when opening a meeting of the OAU Liberation Committee in Dar es Salaam. Munanka described West German participation in the Cahora Bassa scheme as a ‘slap in the face’ of Africa. Upon his arrival in Tanzania, Eppler was handed a bitterly-worded open letter to Brandt from FRELIMO. At a press conference, Eppler faced fierce questioning from local journalists.

Despite this onslaught, Eppler’s trip was a qualified success. Tanzania and West Germany agreed to establish a framework for regular bilateral consultations and Eppler made clear Bonn’s commitment to assist Tanzania with the implementation of the second five-year plan. He accompanied Nyerere in inaugurating an agricultural training and research centre, which had been supported by a $4 million West German grant. The Tanzanian authorities refrained from mentioning the issue of Cahora Bassa. In an emerging theme in his conduct of foreign policy, Nyerere sought to isolate pragmatic questions of aid from Tanzania’s belligerent anticolonial stances. While the West Germany’s public image continued to suffer in Tanzania, relations between the two countries deepened through the early 1970s via the partnership between Eppler and Jamal.

The following month, Otto Winzer, the GDR’s foreign minister, also visited Dar es Salaam. During his brief stay, he signed agreements on trade and technical cooperation. Facilitated by Mhando, they represented the first intergovernmental agreements between Tanzania and the GDR. Nyerere praised the GDR for its support for the liberation struggles in southern Africa. Winzer also met representatives of the liberation movements, who, according to a lengthy interview

506 Information Division, MfAA, 21 October 1969, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/958, 531.
508 Lopes, West Germany, 20.
511 Ross to State Dept, 31 March 1970, NARA, RG 59, SNF 1970-3, Box 2616, POL 2 TANZAN.
512 Lopes, West Germany, 22.
513 Kilian, Hallstein-Doktrin, 224-25.
he gave to the *Standard*, confirmed their appreciation for the GDR’s aid.\footnote{GDR policy: Otto Winzer speaks, *Standard*, 26 April 1970, 4, 6.} Although the visit received little press in Tanzania, the East German state media gave it extensive coverage.\footnote{‘DDR-Außenminister in Tansania’, *Neues Deutschland*, 10 April 1970, 1-2; ‘Otto Winzer bei Julius Nyerere’, *Neues Deutschland*, 11 April 1970, 1-2; ‘Zusammenarbeit mit Tansania wird vertieft’, *Neues Deutschland*, 11 April 1970, 2; ‘Große Aufmerksamkeit für Winzer-Besuch in der VRT’, *Neues Deutschland*, 11 April 1970, 2.}

However, in terms of furthering the GDR’s overriding ambition in Tanzania – full diplomatic recognition – Winzer’s visit had no tangible success. Immediately before his arrival in Tanzania, Winzer had visited Mogadishu, where he had secured recognition of the GDR from Siad Barre’s pro-Soviet regime. West Germany subsequently refused to pledge any new aid to Somalia.\footnote{Lorenzini, ‘Globalising Ostpolitik’, 230.} The *Standard* cried foul, pointing out that while Bonn insisted on the separation of economic and political policies towards Portugal and South Africa, in Somalia it was using economic pressure for political ends.\footnote{Editorial, *Standard*, 4 June 1970, 1.} Yet the Tanzanian government remained unsympathetic to Winzer’s demands. According to the French ambassador, in a private meeting with Nyerere, Winzer had pleaded for recognition. The only response he received was Nyerere’s vague acceptance of a surprise invitation to visit the GDR, which did not come to fruition.\footnote{Naudy to MAE-DAL, 23 April 1970, CADN, 193PO/1/26 AII23. Kawawa visited the GDR in October 1971.}

Prior to the GDR delegation’s arrival, Heibich had given a demarche to the Tanzanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which he warned that any signal that Tanzania was preparing to recognise the GDR might disrupt relations between the two German states amid ongoing intergovernmental talks. The demarche also stated that since Brandt perceived the talks as an early step towards German reunification, by recognising the GDR, Nyerere would be harming the German people’s cause for self-determination. The dismissal of Mhando as minister of state for foreign affairs in October 1970 further weakened the GDR’s cause. The move was widely foreseen, since for some time Babu had attended OAU and UN meetings in Mhando’s place. The French ambassador gave several reasons for his departure, among them an alcohol problem and occasional ‘scandalous’ behaviour. Yet he noted that there were political reasons too: having initially been appointed to stabilise Tanzania’s relationship with Eastern Europe, Mhando had overstepped his remit, and now appeared a threat to Nyerere’s intention to build aid relationships across all superpower blocs.\footnote{Naudy to MAE-DAL, 10 November 1970, CADN, 193PO/1/11 K1.}

**Conclusion**

Brandt’s ambitions eventually ran into the constraints of the bipolar order in Europe. The Soviet Union was wary of loosening its control over the GDR, especially after the crisis in Czechoslovakia. West German *Ostpolitik* took a conservative turn and aimed at stabilising the Cold War system.
rather than transforming it. The Moscow Treaty, signed by West Germany and the Soviet Union in August 1970, acknowledged the permanence of East-West divisions in Europe, including the inter-German ‘frontier’. In the ‘Basic Treaty’ of December 1972, the two German states recognised each other’s sovereignty.

Brandt’s Ostpolitik froze over the Cold War order in central Europe by representing a de facto Western acceptance of the status quo behind the Iron Curtain. But in finishing off the Hallstein Doctrine, it opened up new possibilities for both German states in the Third World. After the signing of the Basic Treaty, a deluge of Third World states immediately opened full diplomatic relations with the GDR. On 21 December 1972, Tanzania formally recognised East Germany. However, to present this as a ‘victory’ for the GDR would be misleading: as William Glenn Gray concludes, ‘East Germany did not “win”; its rival threw in the towel.’

The GDR’s efforts to gain recognition from Tanzania were damaged by its own behaviour in the country. While Tanzania continued to support GDR membership at the UN, its shoddy aid programme and intrusive approach in Zanzibar discouraged Nyerere from testing the waters of full recognition. The GDR’s reputation was also tarnished by its associations – real and rumoured – with the ‘opponents’ of the Arusha Declaration. The GDR’s attacks on West Germany’s policy in southern Africa gained the sympathies of the radical press, but did little to advance its own cause. On the other hand, the West Germany’s more reliable offers of aid proved attractive. Once the aftereffects of the Anerkennungsdiplomatie dispute had worn off, West German development assistance returned as a major pillar of Tanzania’s external aid, facilitated by the close relationship between Eppler and Jamal. Brandt and Nyerere also established a strong understanding: both emerged as strong critics of north-south divisions and headed international commissions into the widening inequality gap.

The opening of Tanzanian-East German relations did not bring an end to the inter-German Cold War rivalry in Dar es Salaam. The propaganda wars continued to be a major worry for especially Western German diplomats. But the overriding Anerkennungsdiplomatie dynamic was no longer an issue. In Tanzania, the GDR strengthened its support for African liberation movements in the final stages of the fight against white minority rule. Freed from the constraints of the Hallstein Doctrine, West Germany could maximise its influence in the Third World as a donor state. Ultimately, the level diplomatic playing field created by spillover effects of Ostpolitik favoured West Germany, whose aid offers were superior to those of the relatively impoverished GDR.

521 Suri, Power and Protest, 226.
522 Kilian, Hallstein-Doktrin, 226. Matthes notes that the negotiations were not smooth and Tanzania only agreed to upgrade the GDR’s consulate-general to an embassy after some discussion. Tanzania did not open an embassy in East Berlin until 1976. ‘Zur Entwicklung außenpolitischer Grundlagen’, 74.
523 Gray, Germany’s Cold War, 5.
Nyerere’s position on East Germany encapsulated his broader Cold War foreign policy, especially after the crisis years of 1964-65. His commitment to nonalignment pushed him into appointing Mhando as foreign minister, as a counterweight to fears that he was becoming too close to Beijing. But although this brought incremental gains for the GDR, Nyerere retained control over major foreign policy decisions. Juggling the implications of developments in Europe, such as Brandt’s Ostpolitik and the invasion of Czechoslovakia, as well as in Tanzania, like the political fallout from the Arusha Declaration and the protest at the Soviet embassy, Nyerere thus maintained a steady course, true to his principles but pragmatic in intentions.
Chapter 4

Oasis of liberation? FRELIMO in exile and the assassination of Eduardo Mondlane

At around ten o’clock on the morning of 3 February 1969, Dr Eduardo Mondlane pulled up his car outside 201 Nkrumah Street, Dar es Salaam. The address housed the offices of FRELIMO, the guerrilla movement fighting Portuguese colonialism beyond Tanzania’s southern frontier. Mondlane was FRELIMO’s president. He collected his mail and drove to the beachfront villa of an American friend in the upmarket suburb of Oyster Bay. Mondlane preferred to work there, away from the noise and heat of Nkrumah Street. He sat down with coffee and sifted through his post. Unwrapping a parcel bearing stamps from Moscow, Mondlane saw that it was a rare French translation of the turn-of-the-century Russian Marxist, Georgi Plekhanov. He went to flip through the pages. When Tanzanian police arrived on the scene minutes later, they found Mondlane’s remains spattered across the room, ripped apart by a parcel bomb.525

The liberation movements were the essential stimulus to Dar es Salaam’s emergence as a ‘Cold War city’, an aspect of the independence struggles in southern Africa which has been overlooked by historians. In contrast, Meredith Terretta’s study of Cameroonian nationalists and Jeffrey Ahlman’s work on Algerian, South African, and Zimbabwean exiles, have shown how the liberation movements which flocked to Accra after Ghana’s independence became enmeshed in local politics. According to Ahlman, the southern African exiles’ own experiences pushed Nkrumah into adopting a more radical foreign policy and away from his conviction in a ‘Ghanaian’ model of peaceful decolonisation.526 Rather focusing exclusively on the liberation movements, Terretta and Ahlman reveal how the experience of exile in Africa was a two-way interaction, shaping the politics of both freedom fighters and their hosts.

Another fruitful approach adopted in several recent histories of contemporary Africa utilises assassinations as cracks through which to prise open the murky networks of transnational and international politics in the era of decolonisation. Investigative histories of the two highest profile deaths in the Congo Crisis – the murder of Patrice Lumumba and the mysterious plane crash which killed the UN secretary-general Dag Hammarskjöld – have elucidated complex issues of contingency and agency that cross-cut narratives centred on the nation-state.527 Like Susan

Oasis of liberation?

Williams’ book on Hammarskjöld, this article does not offer a full explanation of Mondlane’s assassination. Rather, by setting FRELIMO’s struggle in the cosmopolitan political landscape of Dar es Salaam in the late 1960s, it shows how the movement was riven with tensions, caught up in Tanzanian affairs and the twin metadynamics of international affairs at the time, decolonisation and the Cold War.

The liberation movements in Dar es Salaam

‘Since Tanganyika became independent in December 1961, Dar es Salaam has become the main centre for African “liberation movements”,’ wrote a British diplomat in 1963. The city, as ‘the end of the escape route for refugees from South Africa and Mozambique, has become a hive of African nationalist activity and could pose a serious threat to the future of the remaining countries and territories of southern Africa still under white rule.’ The array of liberation movements in the Tanzanian capital included those locked in struggle against Portugal, Rhodesia, and South Africa, plus a number of Malawian exiles, groups representing the Indian Ocean island colonies of Comoros and Seychelles, and a heterogeneous number of Afro-American activists. The OAU Liberation Committee headquarters was located in Dar es Salaam, where the port was a major conduit for arms arriving from the communist world and radical African states like Algeria. In training camps scattered around the country, guerrillas received training from the Eastern Bloc, China, and Cuba. Radio Tanzania also carried political programmes produced by the liberation movements and broadcast in vernacular across southern Africa.

The presence of the liberation movements in Dar es Salaam was the main attraction for the international press corps that became based in the city. The guerrilla leaders’ desire for global exposure meant they were willing interviewees, plugged into the city’s political networks, as the anecdote from Kapuściński which opened this thesis shows. ‘The steady news for a journalist in this interesting and important base was the work of the freedom-fighters’, recalled J. B. Thomson, a New Zealander who worked for the Standard and as a stringer for the Associated Press and Newsweek magazine. The liberation movements’ press releases were a staple of the local media, which carried their grossly exaggerated figures of enemy casualties.

In Dar es Salaam, the liberation movement leaders mixed with representatives of foreign powers. The elevated status which they were accorded by the Tanzanian government meant that the guerrilla leaders were often invited to cocktail parties and embassy receptions. In 1965, the

528 Miles to Sandys, 5 November 1963, UKNA, DO 213/123/1.
530 Thomson, Words of Passage, n.p.
British high commissioner told the Foreign Office that it would be ‘surprised to see the extent to which exiles and representatives of the various liberation movements circulate in diplomatic social circles here. They are to be seen at practically every National Day party or big reception.’

Towards Western diplomats, they acted more discreetly. ‘You had to keep it fairly low key because these liberation groups didn’t want to be seen talking to you too much, and they didn’t want the Tanzanian Government to become too concerned’, recalled one American official. The guerrilla leaders would therefore quietly slip into parties a few hours after they had started.

While Nyerere welcomed the liberation movements to Tanzania, their presence posed dangers to his government. The movements themselves could be fractious, destabilising local affairs. They also brought the risk of subversion by or direct reprisals from the forces of white minority rule. Following the mutiny in 1964, Nyerere limited the number of representatives per liberation movement in Dar es Salaam to four. Surplus officials, the British high commission reported, were to move to ‘a more remote place than the capital, where they would be less able to stir up trouble, and conversely, where foreign diplomats would be less able to subvert them.’ Nyerere was concerned about the influx of arms into the country, especially when the communist powers delivered weapons directly to the movements, rather than through the coordinating body of the OAU Liberation Committee. As demonstrated by the case of Potlako Leballo and the Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC), explained in chapter 6, Nyerere’s opponents also made attempts to recruit disaffected guerrilla leaders into plotting against the regime. The Tanzanian attitude towards the liberation movements was therefore ambivalent. ‘Sometimes we were referred to as ‘revolutionaries’ and at others as “Wakimbizi” (refugees, or, more literally, runaways’), recalled Ben Turok, the Africa National Congress (ANC) activist.

Western alarm at the support which the liberation movements received from the communist world was heightened by the impoverished conditions in which their members often lived. With only a few exceptions, noted a British diplomat, the movements are ‘normally very short of money and have considerable difficulty in making ends meet. Their leaders often have only the clothes they stand up in and live in single rooms or squalid boarding houses.’ The Canadian high commissioner described the groups as mostly ‘ineffectual coalitions of pathetic, half-educated exiles living off the charity of their African brothers and expending their energies largely in extravagant propaganda.’ This rather jaundiced view of the liberation movements mirrored the tone of the more conservative Western press. Describing Dar es Salaam as ‘a pistol pointing at the heart of...
Oasis of liberation?

African troubles’, a Sunday Telegraph correspondent portrayed an ‘African Beggars’ Opera spectacular’, in which ‘guerillas from most troubled African States scheme together in little offices and jam the bars.’ Interpreting local politics through equally crude Cold War assumptions, the Americans also feared the subversive effects of the liberation movements on Tanzania. ‘Nyerere came to power as one of the promising, British-trained African moderates’, set out the CIA in January 1967, ‘but his desire to re-make Africa around him is making him a captive of Communists and other extremists.’

**FRELIMO in the Cold War world**

FRELIMO was created in 1962 from the merger of three separate Mozambican groups which had converged on Dar es Salaam in 1961: the Mozambique African National Union (MANU), the National Democratic Union of Mozambique (União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique, UDENAMO), and the African Union of Independent Mozambique (União Africana de Moçambique Independente, UNAMI). Nyerere was keen to prevent the fragmentation of the liberation struggle in Mozambique, especially as independent Congo fractured along ethnic-political lines and the Zimbabwean liberation movement split into two rival organisations. FRELIMO was more than a fighting force: it provided relief for refugees from offices scattered across southern Tanzania; operated a school in Dar es Salaam, the Mozambique Institute; and produced a glossy propaganda brochure, *Mozambique Revolution*. Many contemporary observers believed that FRELIMO was the best organised of the Dar es Salaam-based liberation movements. In 1965, the Canadian high commissioner described it as ‘perhaps the only such organization in Africa which is now carrying out substantial operations designed to subvert and eventually overthrow a government under European control.’

President Eduardo Mondlane headed a twenty-man Central Committee. Born in Mozambique in 1920, Mondlane studied at university in Johannesburg, where he was expelled after a year, and Lisbon, before moving to the United States, where he obtained degrees from Oberlin College and Northwestern University. When Mondlane was elected the first president of FRELIMO in 1962, he was teaching Anthropology at Syracuse University. Shortly after, he resigned his position and

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538 CIA Briefing, January 1967, CREST, CIA-RDP79T00827A000600030001-0.
539 On MANU, see Joel das Neves Tembe, ‘*Uhuru na Kazi*: Recapturing MANU Nationalism through the Archive’, Kronos, 39 (2013), 257-79.
541 McGill to under-secretary of state for external affairs, Ottawa, 8 November 1965, UKNA, DO 213/102/133.
moved to Dar es Salaam with his white American wife, Janet, who organised the Mozambique Institute.

Mondlane’s political outlook could be described as a form of grassroots socialism, attuned with a conservative pragmatism that recognised the pitfalls of global politics. Initially, he preferred a peaceful approach to independence, negotiated through fora like the UN. However, in the face of Portuguese intransigence, Mondlane decided there was little alternative to armed struggle. The war began on September 1964. Mondlane believed that victory over Portugal could be achieved only with the cooperation of the peasantry in liberated areas of northern Mozambique. This was owed in part to his understanding of both Mao Zedong and the experience of the Vietcong guerrillas.543

Mondlane was adept in promoting FRELIMO’s cause by using the opportunities provided by the cosmopolitan surroundings of Dar es Salaam, especially the presence of the global media. ‘The most notable and refreshing African liberation figure I reported on was Eduardo Mondlane’, remembered Thomson. ‘He had his own press network and when he wanted particular cover he would use journalists from outside to ensure better, more broad acceptance and coverage.’544 Mondlane’s engaging character and debonair style drew foreign admirers. An American doctor, who was well acquainted with Mondlane, recalled the scene at an Israeli independence day celebration held at the Kilimanjaro Hotel in May 1967.545

Before we left I took notice of Eduardo. He was in his element, for he enjoyed the adulation he received and also the forum. Standing a head higher than almost everyone else, he was surrounded by admirers hanging onto his every word. […] That evening I did not join the 25 or 30 people crowded around him, but his booming voice and precise rhetoric carried throughout much of the noisy gathering.546

Largely due to Mondlane’s leadership, FRELIMO was the only Dar es Salaam-based liberation movement to receive aid from all three superpowers: he was an expert chameleon in attracting foreign support in the divided Cold War world. Other European states also made valuable contributions, especially the social-democratic governments in the Nordic countries. Initially, FRELIMO’s connections to the communist world were strongest with China, which Mondlane first visited in 1963.547 Chinese military instructors and arms soon began arriving for FRELIMO. Uri Simango, Mondlane’s deputy, was the closest of FRELIMO’s inner circle to Beijing. Simango’s
Maoist sympathies were well known. He was a familiar face at the Canton Restaurant, a short walk from the FRELIMO offices on Nkrumah Street.548

As the 1960s wore on, FRELIMO developed stronger ties with the Soviet Bloc, at Beijing’s expense.549 This reflected a growing irritation among African states and guerrilla movements at China’s inflexible approach to bilateral relations—a trend to which the Tanzanian government was an exception. The Soviet Union harboured initial doubts about Mondlane’s ideological position and connection with the United States. It was more impressed with FRELIMO’s secretary for foreign affairs, Marcelino dos Santos, a genuine Marxist-Leninist.550 Like Mondlane, dos Santos had studied abroad. At the Sorbonne, dos Santos associated with groups of Francophone Marxists and radicals, including Aimé Césaire, Leopold Senghor, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Albert Camus.551

After Mondlane’s requests to visit the Soviet Union in 1963 were rebuffed, a letter from dos Santos to the Soviet Union’s Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO) produced a breakthrough. Mondlane travelled to Moscow in 1964 and 1966, returning on both occasions with promises of military aid and training. FRELIMO delegations also received aid from Czechoslovakia and East Germany. Over the course of the 1960s, the feeling rose in the Eastern Bloc that Mondlane was coming over to their cause. In November 1966, he met representatives of the GDR’s AAPSO in Berlin. The GDR concluded that Mondlane had moved to the left, under the steady influence of colleagues such as dos Santos and Samora Machel, an Algerian-trained revolutionary and FRELIMO’s director of military affairs. Mondlane complained to the East Germans about the treatment of a FRELIMO delegation in Beijing and China’s ‘divisive’ intentions in the Third World.552 Meanwhile, China began to support a rival organisation to FRELIMO, the Zambia-based Mozambique Revolutionary Committee (Comité Revolucionário de Moçambique, COREMO).553

The presence of the African liberation movements in Dar es Salaam posed a dilemma for the West. Washington and London expressed concern about their leftist inclination. Some cited this as reason enough for steering clear of the guerrillas altogether. Others argued that it was in the West’s interest not to lose touch with potential governments-in-waiting, to prevent them from slipping directly into the hands of Beijing or Moscow. We do not wish to find ourselves entirely isolated from and out of sympathy with the rebel movements if and when they come to obtain a share in

550 Ibid., 102-5.
553 Jackson, ‘China’s Third World Policy’, 399-400. On COREMO, see Cabrita, Mozambique, 39-41.
power’, argued one Foreign Office official.\textsuperscript{554} In the case of FRELIMO, this problem was eased by Mondlane’s ability to strike a good rapport with Western diplomats. ‘Mondlane is one of the most cultured and intelligent Africans in Dar es Salaam – a potential Kaunda, Nyerere or Adu’, wrote the British high commissioner to Tanzania.\textsuperscript{555}

FRELIMO’s relationship with Britain and the United States was complicated by Cold War geopolitics. Unlike the pariah states of Rhodesia and South Africa, Portugal was a key NATO ally of Britain and the United States, especially given the strategic importance of the Azores air base. Encouraged by African leaders like Nyerere, whom he twice invited to the White House, in 1961 President John F. Kennedy experimented with a more critical stance towards Portuguese colonialism at the UN and announced that Portugal’s use of NATO military hardware would be restricted to the northern hemisphere. In response, Salazar threatened to prevent the United States from renewing its soon-to-expire lease on the base. Kennedy backed down.\textsuperscript{556}

Nonetheless, Washington provided covert support for FRELIMO. While a student in the United States, Mondlane developed a lasting friendship with Wayne Fredericks, who became assistant secretary of state for Africa under the Kennedy administration.\textsuperscript{557} Via Fredericks’ introduction, in February 1963 Mondlane met Robert Kennedy, the attorney general, and Averill Harriman, under-secretary of state, in Washington. Both recognised that Mondlane represented the best chance for a negotiated settlement in Mozambique and a counterweight to more radical elements within FRELIMO. Aid was discussed: ‘fifty grand to keep the lid on his people and also stay on top’, as one official put it. Shortly after, the CIA channelled $60,000 to FRELIMO via the African-American Institute in New York. $99,700 followed from the Ford Foundation to the Mozambique Institute.\textsuperscript{558} Elsewhere in the United States, Mondlane courted support from various civil society groups, including the National Council of Churches, the National Urban League, the American Committee on Africa, and black colleges and universities across the country.\textsuperscript{559}

Despite FRELIMO’s openness to support from Beijing and Moscow, Western observers trusted Mondlane’s claims that he obtained arms from the communist powers simply because he could not do so from the West. ‘We would dearly love to use American, British and Belgian weapons’, Mondlane told Colin Legum of the Observer in 1967, but lamented that they were only available to

\textsuperscript{554} Foster to Stewart, 14 January 1964, UKNA, FO 371/176592.  
\textsuperscript{555} Fowler to Chadwick, 4 October 1965, UKNA, DO 213/17/3.  
\textsuperscript{557} José Manuel Duarte de Jesus, Eduardo Mondlane: Um homem a abater (Coimbra: Almedina, 2010), 184.  
\textsuperscript{558} Schneidman, Engaging Africa, 44-46; Stephens ‘People Mobilized’, 155-64. This funding was withdrawn following President Kennedy’s assassination, a development which Telepneva argues contributed to FRELIMO’s turn towards Eastern Europe: ‘Sacred Duty’, 138. According to a former CIA operative, Mondlane knew about the true source of the funds: ‘Notes from Herbert Shore’s conversation with Pat Murphy, 28 June 1979’, OCA, HSC, Subgroup II, Series 6, Box 2, Microfiche 6.  
\textsuperscript{559} Stephens, ‘People Mobilized’, 214-45.
Oasis of liberation?

the Portuguese. ‘What are we supposed do’ he asked, ‘if, apart from the Africans, only the Communists will train and arm us?’ In Washington, the National Security Council accepted this logic. At a 1967 meeting of the 303 Committee, which was responsible for overseeing the United States’ covert operations, former ambassador to Tanzania William Leonhart argued that Mondlane was ‘a force for moderation’ and that by supporting FRELIMO, ‘we would reindorse Mondlane’s pride and affection for the USA, buy some investment in stability for the movement and keep a better watch on the direction of struggle.’

Whereas maintaining public relations with the liberation movement leaders was impossible for the Western powers, the grey areas incumbent in political life in Dar es Salaam provided an environment for monitoring their activities. In 1964, the Foreign Office concluded that ‘links with the liberation movements’ were ‘valuable and useful’, as long as they were informal and discreet. These contacts did not go unnoticed by Lisbon. In 1966, Salazar sent a letter to Prime Minister Harold Wilson, criticising the reception given to ‘terrorist chiefs’ by the British high commission in Dar es Salaam. But provided such liaisons remained discreet, Portugal had few grounds for complaint. Given Lisbon had no diplomatic representation in Tanzania, to do so would have acknowledged the presence of their subversive agents in its capital.

The situation was more problematic for London when Mondlane visited Britain. The FRELIMO president was eager to meet his supporters among Britain's anticolonial lobby. He made at least four trips to the country: twice in 1965, once in July 1967, and in March 1968. On the occasion of this final visit, the Portuguese ambassador wrote to the British foreign and commonwealth secretary, George Brown, even before Mondlane had arrived in London. Given the friendly relations between Britain and Portugal, ambassador Manuel Rocheta expected that ‘Her Majesty’s Government will not countenance the provision by any organisation in the United Kingdom of a platform for the conduct of subversive propaganda’ by someone who was responsible for ‘dastardly acts of terrorism’ in Mozambique. Rocheta was told that since the Mondlane had broken no laws, the British government would not interfere with his activities. Britain ‘had a long tradition of encouraging people to come and criticise our own Empire,’ Rocheta was reminded, and was ‘unlikely to change this practice.’ After Mondlane’s arrival in London on 6 March, Portugal’s foreign minister, Franco Nogueira, claimed that Mondlane was negotiating with the British government for the recognition of FRELIMO as Mozambique’s government-in-exile and expressed his ‘surprise and regret’ at Britain’s position. The Foreign Office did however

562 Foster to Stewart, 14 January 1964, UKNA, FO 371/176592.
564 Rocheta to Brown, 27 February 1968, UKNA, FCO 25/270/38.
judge it worthwhile arranging a meeting with Mondlane: a significant decision, even if it was a secret encounter with a junior minister at a London hotel.\textsuperscript{567}

On 10 March, Mondlane suddenly cut short his planned two-week trip and returned to Dar es Salaam. An official at the Anti-Apartheid Association, which had organised the visit, told the \textit{Times} that the reason ‘must have been something pretty urgent. He got this cable from Dar es Salaam and caught the first plane back.’\textsuperscript{568}

The reasons for Mondlane’s hasty departure soon became apparent. While Mondlane canvassed for aid and political support overseas, FRELIMO appeared to be cracking apart from within.

\textbf{FRELIMO and its discontents}

Like many of the liberation movements, FRELIMO was an unhappy family. Its early years were plagued by splits, as the leaders of the parties which were subsumed into the unified movement under Mondlane resented their reduced status. By the late 1960s, the main opposition to Mondlane within FRELIMO was clustered around the figure of Lazaro Kavandame. He was a Makonde, an ethnic group which straddled the Mozambican-Tanzanian frontier. Waves of Makonde had migrated northwards into Tanganyikan territory over the preceding centuries, with influxes in 1922 and 1933, as they fled exorbitant Portuguese taxes. Some were involved in the Tanganyikan independence struggle and later set up MANU – originally the \textit{Makonde} African National Union. As the forerunners of FRELIMO, MANU’s members felt slighted at their displacement by the likes of Mondlane and dos Santos, who were from southern Mozambique.\textsuperscript{569}

Class differences mapped onto these ethnic divisions. Most Makonde were poorly educated: Kavandame did not speak Portuguese. Many held low-paid jobs on sisal plantations in Tanzania. The Central Committee leadership, on the other hand, was generally well educated. Some of its members had studied overseas. Unlike other, poorer liberation movement leaders, Mondlane lived in comfort in Dar es Salaam’s upmarket suburb of Oyster Bay. This drew criticism from FRELIMO’s rank-and-file, who lived in crowded dormitories or training camp barracks. ‘Mondlane’s dogs eat better than we do’, grumbled one member. This image was not helped by Mondlane’s American connections or his intellectual demeanour.\textsuperscript{570}

However, this class divide did not produce a more revolutionary approach among the Makonde. Rather, while Mondlane, dos Santos, and Machel increasingly stressed the need for a ‘People’s War’ and the social transformation of the liberated territory, Kavandame and the so-called ‘Council of

\textsuperscript{567} Merry to Le Quesne, 11 March 1968, UKNA, FCO 25/270/41.
\textsuperscript{570} Pickering to State Dept, 30 March 1968, NARA, RG 59, CFPPF 1967-9, Box 2513, POL 2 TANZAN.
Elders’, which represented a rival authority to the Central Committee, espoused a narrow, racially-defined nationalism which saw the elimination of white rule in Mozambique as an endgoal in itself. They were deeply hostile to white members of FRELIMO, like Janet Mondlane. Dos Santos – a *mestiço* with a white, Jewish, South African wife – also fell under suspicion. The dual forces of socialism and nationalism, which had glued together so many other liberation coalitions elsewhere in Africa, were thus uncoupled.

Mondlane’s connections with the United States were subject to continual rumour in Dar es Salaam, a city rife with anti-American animosity, whipped up by the radical press. In May 1967, a member of the Liberation Committee told a Polish diplomat that he was convinced Mondlane was working for the Americans.571 These rumours were encouraged by the embarrassing case of Leo Milas, who was FRELIMO’s first publicity secretary, having been invited to Tanzania from the United States by Mondlane. He was expelled from the movement in August 1964, after Mondlane found that he was actually an American, named Leo Clinton Aldridge.572

These differences were drawn upon by rival leaders to further their own personal interests. Kavandame’s rejection of social revolution in liberated Cabo Delgado stemmed mainly from his own investment in the status quo. He and the chiefs working underneath him ran the province much like the Portuguese had done, extorting produce from the peasantry and, with the connivance of the local Tanzanian authorities, taking a cut from cross-border trade.573 At the same time, FRELIMO’s military campaign in Mozambique stalled. After making initial inroads in 1964-65, a Portuguese counteroffensive pushed back the guerrillas. FRELIMO fighters found it difficult to hold on to liberated territory. Despite the publication of wildly exaggerated Portuguese defeats and casualties in the Tanzanian press, the number of FRELIMO dead and lack of progress contributed to the growing resentment towards Mondlane.574

As Michel Cahen cautions, historians should not seek to explain the crisis that followed via strict categories. He notes that issues of class, ethnicity, and ideological stances towards the Cold War powers all contributed to schisms, aggravated by the ‘internal democratic centralism’ that prevented public disagreement among the FRELIMO cadres. There was not a ‘simple crisis’, but rather ‘tensions at the crossroads of numerous, varied factors, without the possibility of democratic control.’575 These splits did not go unnoticed by the Portuguese, nor by other foreign powers with a stake in FRELIMO. In mid-1967, the Portuguese secret police (PIDE) reported that Chinese agents were cultivating an opposition faction to Mondlane among Mozambican workers of

571 Brzezinski to Department V, MSZ, 19 May 1967, MSZ, DV 1967, 57/70 W-5.
Oasis of liberation?


Furthermore, the same international media circuits which Mondlane skilfully exploited to publicise FRELIMO’s cause could also be used as cover for Portuguese-sponsored subversion. The E. D. O’Brien Organisation was a London-based public relations firm, with connections to the right-wing press and Conservative ‘Monday Club’ politicians, which was hired by the \textit{Estado Novo} to brighten Portugal’s image in Britain. It was founded by Edward Donough ‘Toby’ O’Brien, a former \textit{Daily Telegraph} journalist who had worked on British anti-Nazi propaganda efforts during the Second World War. While its main objective was ostensibly to encourage tourism to Portugal, it also had more subversive purposes. In 1965 and 1967, Patrick Orr, a British freelance journalist, twice travelled to East Africa on behalf of the O’Brien Organisation. During his first trip, Orr successfully ‘gained a measure of Mondlane’s confidence’ and also made a contact, a European woman who worked for a typing agency in Dar es Salaam, who was disgruntled at having to process FRELIMO publications, despite having ‘no love for Mondlane and his gang.’\footnote{O’Brien to Rocheta, n.d. [c. January 1968], AHD, MU, GM, GNP, RNP/0331/03865.} In mid-1967, Orr travelled to Mozambique, which led to a number of articles in the British media ‘disproving’ Mondlane’s claims to control a fifth of the country and stressing the extent of communist influence in FRELIMO.\footnote{Mondlane to Houser, 5 June 1968, OCA, HSC, Subgroup II, Series 2, Box 2.} The extent to which these activities had any success is difficult to ascertain, yet they demonstrate how FRELIMO’s enemies, both in Lisbon and among supporters of white minority rule elsewhere, could use Dar es Salaam’s media networks for intelligence-gathering purposes.

The crisis of 1968

These tensions spilled over into open unrest in 1968. Mondlane’s hasty return to Dar es Salaam from London was prompted by trouble at the Mozambique Institute. At the centre of the crisis was Mateus Gwennjere, a Roman Catholic priest. Mondlane initially supported Gwennjere when he fled to Tanzania as a refugee from Mozambique in August 1967. Gwennjere was fast-tracked into FRELIMO’s leadership and represented the movement at the UN General Assembly. ‘Well, we were cooking our own goose’, Mondlane ruefully reflected in a retrospective letter to George Houser, a friend and head of the American Committee on Africa, an anticolonial pressure group.\footnote{Mondlane to Houser, 5 June 1968, OCA, HSC, Subgroup II, Series 2, Box 2.} Gwennjere began openly to criticise FRELIMO’s education policy. He tapped into discontent at the Mozambique Institute regarding the lack of scholarship opportunities to study abroad and the

\footnote{Secretary-general for national defence, 16 August 1967, TT, PIDE, SC, SR 337/61, NT 3051, 1º pt., 776-77.}
leadership’s insistence that students spend time fighting at the front, to foment opposition to Mondlane. Encouraged by Gwenjere, the students called for the removal of the Institute’s white teachers. The ensuing stand-off resulted in the temporary closure of the Institute and reached a climax when a FRELIMO party, including Machel, raided the student dormitories on the night of 6 March.\footnote{Cabrita, Mozambique, 53-54; Michael G. Panzer, ‘The Pedagogy of Revolution: Youth, Generational Conflict, and Education in the Development of Mozambican Nationalism and the State, 1962-1970’, Journal of Southern African Studies 35 (2009), 803-20; Mondlane to Houser, 5 June 1968, OCA, HSC, Subgroup II, Series 2, Box 2; Mondlane to Mwangira, 2 April 1968, OCA, HSC, Subgroup II, Series 6, Box 2, Microfiche 1.}

Weeks later, FRELIMO was convulsed by more violence. On 6 May, a group of Mozambicans forcibly closed the FRELIMO offices at 201 Nkrumah Street. When FRELIMO’s leadership succeeded in getting the offices reopened on 8 May, the following day the group of Makonde returned, armed with clubs and machetes. In the ensuing violence, one member of the Central Committee was fatally wounded. At the time, Mondlane was in Mozambique with representatives of the Liberation Committee.

At a press conference, Simango blamed the unrest on underground Portuguese activities. He claimed that he did not recognise any of the eighteen men arrested and that none was a FRELIMO member.\footnote{Burns to State Dept, 11 May 1968, NARA, RG 59, CPF 1967-9, Box 2515, POL 13 TANZAN.} In a public statement on 26 May, Mondlane largely concurred: two of the men were former members who had deserted FRELIMO over a year ago, the rest were unknown to the leadership.\footnote{Mondlane, press statement, 26 May 1968, OCA, HSC, Subgroup II, Series 4, Box 1.} These claims were rejected in a letter from the Makonde-dominated FRELIMO ‘Council of Elders’, printed in the Tanzanian trade union newspaper Mfanyakazi. The letter accused Simango of conspiring against Mondlane, but then of shying away from cooperation with the Elders when they sought his cooperation in forcing new presidential elections. It also criticised Mondlane’s ‘contemptuous designs’ in refusing to work with the Elders and reopening the office.\footnote{Müller to Africa Division, MfAA, 13 July 1968, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/948, 23-29.}

Gwenjere was also at the heart of this latest disturbance. In a letter to Houser, Mondlane stated that Gwenjere had lobbied the Tanzanian civil service and the Liberation Committee to shut the FRELIMO offices and order elections. When this proved unsuccessful, Gwenjere encouraged members of his church, who were mostly Makonde, to first close the offices and then attack the reopened premises. After the fracas, the Tanzanian government arrested a number of Mozambican refugees in Dar es Salaam, among them Gwenjere, with the intention of removing them from the capital.\footnote{Mondlane to Houser, 5 June 1968, OCA, HSC, Subgroup II, Series 2, Box 2.} On 27 May, a Portuguese informer in Tanzania reported that ‘at any moment now, there will be an attempt on the life of Dr. Mondlane to assassinate him. He will be extremely lucky if he escapes or save [sic] his life from this attempt.\footnote{Director, PIDE, to director-general of political affairs, MNE, 7 November 1968, AHD, MNE, PAA 569.}’

In these circumstances, Mondlane bowed to Kavandame’s demands that FRELIMO hold a Special Congress in July, at which Kavandame and Gwenjere hoped to topple the leadership.
Kavandame wanted it to be held in southern Tanzania, where his support base was strongest. Instead, Mondlane decided to hold the meeting on liberated Mozambican soil. Fearing an anti-Makonde plot, Kavandame and his supporters boycotted the Congress, at which Mondlane and dos Santos strengthened their positions. The former was re-elected president, beating Simango in a secret ballot. The Congress passed a programme that transformed FRELIMO into a more centralised ‘vanguard party’.\footnote{Cabrita, Mozambique, 56-57; Opello, ‘Pluralism’ 76.}


Ostensibly a publishing house, Aginter provided cover for guns-for-hire and far-right extremists bent on protecting Portugal’s Estado Novo through violent means. Aginter was connected to Operation GLADIO, NATO’s stay-behind network of sleeper cells in western Europe after the Second World War. Originally intended to coordinate resistance in the event of a Soviet invasion, GLADIO instead became associated with groups that carried out false-flag terrorist attacks across Europe, which were blamed on left-wing extremists in order to whip up anti-communist sentiment and bolster conservative governments.\footnote{Daniele Ganser, NATO’s Secret Armies: Operation GLADIO and Terrorism in Western Europe (London: Frank Cass, 2005); José Manuel Duarte de Jesus, A guerra secreta de Salazar em África. Aginter Press: Uma rede internacional de contra-subversão e espionagem sediada em Lisboa (Alfragide: Dom Quixote, 2012).}

Leroy’s work in Tanzania was part of Operação Zona Leste, a series of Aginter interventions against Portugal’s enemies in Africa. An Italian intelligence officer told journalist Frederic Laurent that ‘Leroy’s job of intoxication consisted of giving false information to the leaders of FRELIMO and of creating discord among them by playing on their personal rivalries’.\footnote{Laurent and Sutton, ‘Assassination’, 138.}

Concerned by the splits within FRELIMO, Nyerere made a rare direct intervention into liberation movement politics. In August he brought Mondlane and Kavandame together in Mtwara, southeastern Tanzania, but the latter refused to compromise. Instead, Kavandame pushed ahead in his attempt to set up a rival Makonde nationalist movement. He was deluded enough to think that Nyerere would support him, on the grounds that Tanzania was already providing assistance for the Biafran separatists in Nigeria. In December, Paulo Kankhombe, a FRELIMO representative sent to implement the reforms agreed on in July, was murdered in Cabo Delgado. On 3 January 1969, the
FRELIMO Central Committee suspended Kavandame from his duties as provincial secretary.\(^{590}\)

Kavandame responded, with the backing of the TANU regional chairman in Mtwara, by calling for further talks among the leadership and for Mondlane to stand trial.\(^{591}\)

### Mondlane’s enemies in Tanzania

These divisions within FRELIMO were not purely a Mozambican affair, but also involved Tanzanians pursuing their own agendas in destabilising Mondlane’s position. Given FRELIMO’s dependence upon Tanzania as a base from which to train troops and direct its war effort, the relations between the movement’s leadership and the Tanzanian government were an essential factor in Mondlane’s ability to hold his movement together. But the longer the liberation movements were based in Dar es Salaam, the more they became ‘domesticated’ and entangled with local political frictions. In FRELIMO’s early years, Mondlane was able to fall back on his good relations with the Tanzanian leadership, especially Nyerere and Kambona, to remove dissident members.\(^{592}\) In 1967, he told Kingunge Ngombale-Mwiru, the director of Kivukoni College, TANU’s ideological school in Dar es Salaam, that FRELIMO was ‘very close to President Nyerere, we are very close to Rashidi Kawawa. When we have any problem, we go to them, and our problems are solved.’\(^{593}\) Kawawa’s Second Vice-President’s Office was responsible for the liberation movements’ security. But after Kambona fled into exile in 1967, those Tanzanians tasked with overseeing the guerrillas’ security were less inclined towards Mondlane.

Among these officials was Lawi Sijaona, who was tasked with refugee matters as minister of state in Kawawa’s office. A British pen-portrait described Sijaona as ‘a vigilante, fanatical and lacking in humour’.\(^{594}\) Like Kavandame, Sijaona was of Makonde background – a reminder of the artificiality of the colonial border at Tanzania’s southern frontier. As the Portuguese military governor reported from Mozambique just days before Mondlane’s assassination, a ‘crisis which was initially an internal FRELIMO issue seems to have been generalised by Makonde connections.’\(^{595}\)

Hostile to Tanzania’s Asian commercial class, Sijaona shared Kavandame’s antipathy towards Mondlane on the same anti-white, racial grounds.\(^{596}\) The American embassy also believed that Sijaona resented the manner in which Mondlane frequently bypassed him in preference for dealing directly with Kawawa.\(^{597}\)

\(^{590}\) Funada-Classen, *Origins*, 257.
\(^{592}\) Cabrita, *Mozambique*, 12, 17.
\(^{593}\) Interview with Kingunge Ngombale-Mwiru, Victoria, Dar es Salaam, 26 August 2015.
\(^{594}\) Hart to Holmes, 6 June 1969, UKNA, FCO 31/434/18.
\(^{596}\) Burns to State Dept, 28 March 1969, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2513, POL 2 TANZAN.
\(^{597}\) Burns to State Dept, 10 May 1968, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2515, POL 13 TANZAN.
Sijaona divided his time between his ministerial responsibilities and his role as chairman of the TYL, which became closely associated with Maoist practices. Its ‘Green Guards’, wearing shirts in the TANU colours, were consciously modelled on their Chinese counterparts. Sijaona himself had visited China as early as 1963 – before the establishment of Beijing’s close relationship with Tanzania – and accompanied Nyerere on another trip in 1968. These sympathies gave him common ideological ground with Simango, who was reportedly dissatisfied at FRELIMO’s deepening relations with the Soviet Bloc.

Sijaona and senior civil servants in Kawawa’s office actively sought to undermine Mondlane. After the trouble at the Mozambique Institute, Mondlane attempted to clear rebellious students from the school by ordering its closure and for the students to be sent to rural camps. In Kawawa’s absence, Sijaona countermanded Mondlane’s order – until Kawawa returned and overruled his deputy. Similarly, on 29 May the Tanzanian government expelled three white Portuguese teachers from the Mozambique Institute and gave them three days to leave the country. A FRELIMO official told the East Germans that the decision was again taken in the absence of Kawawa, suggesting the hand of Sijaona. On this occasion, when Kawawa returned, he did not overturn the order, but merely extended the deadline for the teachers’ departure. According to Helder Martins, a white Portuguese doctor and FRELIMO’s director of health services, who was among the expelled teachers, Sijaona was closely associated with Gwengere. Martins further alleges that Sijaona and Gwengere were supported by the West German embassy in Dar es Salaam, seeking to counter East German influence over FRELIMO. In August, Mondlane himself told the GDR consul-general that Gwengere had close relations with a junior West German diplomat in the city.

The very institution that was supposed to provide Mondlane’s security deliberately failed to do so. On 26 April, despite opposition from Sijaona, Mondlane won Kawawa’s agreement for a round-up of FRELIMO deserters and dissidents in Dar es Salaam. However, these measures were never implemented. Subsequently, an embarrassed Kawawa was forced to defend his office against accusations made in Mfanyakazi that the attack on the FRELIMO headquarters could have been prevented by adequate police protection.

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599 Burns to State Dept, 28 March 1969, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2513, POL 2 TANZAN.
600 Müller, 5 June 1968, BA, SAPMO, DZ 8/163.
602 Burns to State Dept, 9 and 10 May 1968, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2515, POL 13 TANZAN.
603 Müller, 5 June 1968, BA, SAPMO, DZ 8/163. Kawawa subsequently attacked Mfanyakazi in parliament for false reporting. He questioned why the weekly newspaper had published this particular edition on Friday rather than Saturday as usual and criticised it for using a Tanzanian police source, rather than the Ministry of Information. ‘Mfanyakazi taken to task by Kawawa’, Nationalist, 11 May 1968, 1, 4.
Oasis of liberation?

the Makonde ethnic background of both the minister and the assailants. Mondlane also informed the East German consul-general that an internal Tanzanian investigation had found that many of the false accusations about him emanated from the Second Vice-President’s Office, alleging that Sijaona was collaborating with the Chinese. In a retrospective after Mondlane’s death, the GDR regretted the presence of ‘reactionary elements’ within the Tanzanian state apparatus, including Sijaona and George Magombe, the executive secretary of the OAU Liberation Committee. Similarly, two days after the assassination, Czechoslovakian intelligence reported that ‘[s]ince December 1967, Tanzania has unleashed a systematic campaign to paralyse the progressive FRELIMO leadership’, naming Sijaona among the culprits. Sijaona and Magombe oversaw the failed talks between Mondlane and Kavandame in Mtwara in August 1968, suggesting that the former still – at that point – retained Nyerere’s trust.

In October, Sijaona was moved from the Second Vice-President’s Office in a cabinet reshuffle. Mondlane claimed to the British that this was the result of his petitioning of Sijaona’s superiors. This may have played its part in Nyerere’s decision to move Sijaona to the less politically-charged position of minister for health, but there were other motives, as set out in the following chapter. Nyerere had tired of Sijaona’s antics as chairman of the TYL, especially his involvement in a raucous demonstration against the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Parallel to the obstructive activities of the Second Vice-President’s Office, radicals among the Tanzanian press seized on the unrest in FRELIMO to make a series of attacks on Mondlane. The day after the fight at 201 Nkrumah Street, a Nationalist editorial contemplated the reasons behind the divisions within FRELIMO and other liberation movements. It criticised ‘some leaders’ for not respecting individual members. ‘As a result of such non-observance of the constitutional rights of ordinary members,’ it stated, ‘conferences are never called to allow for members to exercise their right to choose their leaders or to endorse their trust in the existing ones.’ On 27 May, the newspaper carried extracts from a speech made in Dar es Salaam by President Karume. At a rally to mark Africa Liberation Day, Karume criticised the guerrilla movements for being more preoccupied with issuing news bulletins than liberating their territory. He called on the ir leaders to reject the bribes of ‘the very imperialists we are fighting’ and desist from befriending people whom they ‘fully well knew were enemies’.

In response to Karume’s warnings, the Nationalist delivered a brutal attack on the liberation movements. It accused certain unnamed leaders of living ‘luxuriously in air conditioned bungalows

604 Wilson to Scott, 21 October 1968, UKNA, FCO 45/174/7.
605 Jesus, Eduardo Mondlane, 325.
608 ‘Tanzanie-Mozambique: Nouvelle du FRELIMO’, TT, PIDE, SC, SR 337/61, NT 3051, 1º pt., 456-57. This appears to be a Portuguese translation from a French intelligence report.
609 Wilson to Scott, 21 October 1968, UKNA, FCO 45/174/7.
610 ‘Fracas at Frelimo offices’, Nationalist, 10 May 1968, 1.
in independent African countries at a time when their own people are suffering from untold colonial cruelties.’ Like Karume, the newspaper claimed that the freedom fighters were fraternising with their ‘imperialist’ enemies. ‘It is not rare in Dar es Salaam for example to see a freedom fighter locked in heavy drinking bouts with strange faces of white men’, it continued, warning that ‘our brothers should be extra careful about such guises which the agents of the enemy may employ, through drinks, diplomatic parties or cheap bribes.’612 This attitude towards the liberation movements predated the unrest in FRELIMO in 1968: the previous December, the Stasi noted that the guerrillas were ‘increasingly seen as “salon parasites” [Salonschmarotzer] in Dar es Salaam.’613 Such latent feeling was brought to the boil by the violent incidents concerning FRELIMO.

The extent of the opposition to Mondlane among the Tanzanian establishment was revealed again when, on 23 November, the Nationalist reported on a visit he had made to Nairobi. It claimed that, at a private dinner there, Mondlane had briefed a group of Americans, who were in Kenya to attend the Ford Foundation-sponsored ‘American-African Dialogue’ meeting. Some of them had connections in the State Department. The Nationalist repeated rumours that the CIA had penetrated FRELIMO. Mondlane claimed that he had been in Kenya to meet President Kenyatta and had met the Americans by chance.614

Information passed to the British high commission in Dar es Salaam by a Zimbabwean liberation movement leader, who had spoken to Mondlane on his return flight from Nairobi, suggested that Mondlane’s discussion with the Americans was more organised than he admitted.615 The group had included Wayne Fredericks, who had left the State Department the previous year. Fredericks observed that Mondlane seemed frustrated by the splits within FRELIMO. Mondlane claimed that he had been in Kenya to meet President Kenyatta and had met the Americans by chance.616

Regardless of Mondlane’s honesty about his dealings in Nairobi, the Nationalist’s selective use of information was another demonstration of its hostility towards him. The article was written by Nsa Kaisi, described by the American embassy as the Nationalist’s ‘leading Marxist true believer’. While condemning Mondlane’s meeting with the Americans, Kaisi neglected to mention that Joseph Nyerere, brother of the president, had also been in attendance. It was also odd that the Nationalist had based its article on a story from the Daily Nation, a Kenyan newspaper which had been banned in Tanzania the previous month, having long been attacked by the Nationalist as a vehicle of ‘imperialist’ propaganda.617

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615 Hobden to Holmes, 30 November 1968, UKNA, FCO 45/174/25.
616 Schneidman, Engaging Africa, 102-3.
617 Pickering to State Dept, 29 November 1968, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2513, POL 2 TANZAN. On the banning of the Daily Nation, see chapter 5.
Oasis of liberation?

Houser, who attended the meeting in Nairobi and then travelled onwards to Dar es Salaam, noted in a letter to the editor of *Newsweek* magazine that the incident and the *Nationalist* reports had produced ‘a great deal of flak’. Houser spoke to President Nyerere about the situation. Nyerere considered the *Nationalist*’s articles ‘ridiculous’, but added that ‘we don’t censor everything that goes into the paper.’618 Private criticism of Mondlane was heard elsewhere in government circles. In December, the minister of state for foreign affairs, Stephen Mhando, told Horst Schlegel, the ADN correspondent, that Mondlane should fight in Mozambique rather than ‘sitting around in Dar es Salaam’. He said that the Nairobi meeting confirmed Mondlane’s close proximity to the United States.619 Mondlane’s continued associations with Western diplomats in Dar es Salaam did not help his cause. While the East Germans acknowledged that Mondlane and FRELIMO were moving closer to the Eastern Bloc, they noted he maintained close relations with American diplomats, especially an attaché, Philip Potter – who was a CIA agent.620

With FRELIMO fractured, its Tanzanian hosts distrustful or even openly hostile towards him, and Dar es Salaam agog with gossip, Mondlane began to fear for his safety. He was rumoured to have asked Nyerere in mid-December to expel Gwenjere from Tanzania in connection with the murder of Kankhombe. According to the French embassy, Nyerere flatly refused. A number of Gwenjere’s supporters were arrested, however, and when the priest approached to police to request their release on 28 December, he too was placed under detention, though all were released on 6 January.621

In mid-January, Portuguese intelligence in Mozambique reported that the crisis inside FRELIMO was worsening due to the conflict between Kavandame and Mondlane. They observed that Dar es Salaam was ‘swarming with people from all around, completely out of control and causing the FRELIMO leadership serious concerns.’622 Amid this unrest, Mondlane travelled to Khartoum, where he attended a ‘Conference of Solidarity with the Patriots of South Africa and the Portuguese Colonies’, organised by the Soviet AAPSO. As the headquarters of all six liberation movements involved, Dar es Salaam would have been the natural venue for the conference, but Tanzania refused to be involved due to its close relationship with China. Mondlane’s participation in the meeting, at which Chinese representatives were distinctly unwelcome, suggested the severance of his ties with Beijing.623

618 Houser to Osborne, 31 December 1968, OCA, HSC, Subgroup II, Series 6, Box 2, Microfiche 3. Elliot Osborne, the *Newsweek* editor, had actually been present at the Nairobi meeting. Houser seems to have been oblivious to this in his letter: Schneidman, *Engaging Africa*, 103.
619 Schlegel, 5 December 1968, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/964, 262-63. On the relationship between Mhando and Schlegel, see chapter 3.
620 Müller, 5 June 1968, BA, SAPMO, DZ 8/163; ‘Notes from Herbert Shore’s conversation with Pat Murphy, 28 June 1979’, OCA, HSC, Subgroup II, Series 6, Box 2, Microfiche 6.
Oasis of liberation?

On 1 February, Mondlane met officials from the Second Vice-President’s Office. He expressed concern about the threat posed to him by Kavandame and his Tanzanian supporters, especially Sijaona.624

Two days later, Eduardo Mondlane was dead.

Who killed Eduardo Mondlane?

The Tanzanian Criminal Investigation Department (CID) took up the murder case. It soon identified the Soviet stamp on the parcel as a forgery.625 The remnants of the device – plus two other identical bombs encased in further Plekhanov volumes, addressed to dos Santos and Simango in the following weeks and intercepted by the police – were sent to London for analysis by Scotland Yard. Through Interpol, they found that the batteries in the detonators had been manufactured in Osaka, Japan, and sold by a firm in Lourenço Marques (present-day Maputo). The police believed that the bomb had been constructed in Mozambique and then inserted into Mondlane’s mailbag by a FRELIMO member in Dar es Salaam.626

The assassination has never been satisfactorily explained. Despite concluding its investigation in May 1969, the CID kept silent for three years. In February 1972, Radio Tanzania announced that the police knew who had killed Mondlane, but refused to name him, as he was a Portuguese resident in Mozambique.627 David Martin published a story in the Observer, which used insider information from the Tanzanian police to establish the technical specifics involvement in the bombing. Again, no culprit was revealed.628

More recently, historians have blended oral testimony with archival research to address the unresolved crime.629 Yet no smoking gun has been found. As Duarte de Jesus observes, both the Soviet Union and China might have had vested interests in eliminating Mondlane, as the moderate tip of a movement lurching to the left.630 A British embassy official in Moscow noted that ‘the Russians may not be altogether sorry to lose Dr. Mondlane’, given his connections with the United States and the likelihood of him being succeeded by a more radical figure. But as the official then pointed out, Mondlane’s presumed successor as vice-president, Simango, was more inclined to

624 Cabrita, Mozambique, 58.
625 Burns to State Dept, 15 February 1969, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2354, POL 30 MOZ. Reflecting the atmosphere of rumour, the postmark was initially reported at the time as being from West Germany: see for example Fuller to Wilson, 12 March 1969, UKNA, FCO 45/177/13. In his memoirs, Alexander Dzasokhov, general-secretary of the Soviet AAPSO, notes that the parcel bore stamps from Pyongyang; see José Milhazes, Samora Machel: Atentado ou Acidente? (Lisbon: Alêtheia, 2010), 43.
626 Burns to State Dept, 13 and 15 February 1969, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2354, POL 30 MOZ.
627 Jesus, Eduardo Mondlane, 345.
628 David Martin, ‘Interpol solves a guerrilla whodunit’, Observer, 6 February 1972, 4
629 Jesus, Eduardo Mondlane, 317-87; Cabrita, Mozambique, 58-62; Cahen, ‘La “fin de l’histoire”’, 211-16. While based on extensive multiarchival research, the inconsistent and unclear referencing style of Jesus’ account made it difficult to re-trace the documentation he cites.
630 Jesus, Eduardo Mondlane, 367-68.
Beijing than Moscow. As we have seen, there were already suspicions that the Chinese had sought to foment discontent among Makonde workers in Dar es Salaam. However, the broad consensus is that the plan was hatched by the Portuguese, with the collaboration of Africans to transport the bomb to Tanzania.

Lisbon was taken off guard by the assassination. An Overseas Ministry report concluded that although the turmoil arising from Mondlane’s death represented a short-term advantage to Portugal, the long-term consequences of a more revolutionary FRELIMO were far more disadvantageous. The Financial Times’ correspondent in Lisbon noted that ‘while there was obviously no sorrow felt about the rebel leader’s death, there was also trepidation about possible implications.’ One Portuguese intelligence source in Lourenço Marques told the American consul of a fear that an extremist turn within FRELIMO might lead to the beginning of a terrorist campaign against the urban population of Mozambique.

The PIDE also distanced itself from the crime. An internal report did not try to disguise the PIDE’s distaste for Mondlane as Washington’s ‘pretty boy’, whose ‘sandcastle’ had been undermined by ‘sly’ Chinese diplomacy. It concluded that the responsibility for his death – together with the unrest within FRELIMO over the previous year – lay entirely with Beijing. The report is characteristic of the lens through which the PIDE interpreted politics in Tanzania, blurred by clumsy Cold War brushstrokes, as Cahen notes. In a conversation with a French diplomat in Lourenço Marques, the director of the PIDE in Mozambique speculated about the possible perpetrators, including the CIA, China, disaffected Makonde, and a fantastic conspiracy involving Nyerere and Hastings Banda, the Malawian president. ‘To this list, you may add the Portuguese, si vous les voulez’, he remarked, conscious that Portugal would be the prime suspect.

Even if we accept this denial as genuine, the absence of ‘official’ PIDE participation does not preclude the involvement of Portuguese agents, via the clandestine Aginter Press network. As the British high commissioner in Dar es Salaam recognised, ‘it is not unknown for PIDE to indulge in un-coordinated activities and not always with the greatest consideration being shown to Portuguese national interests.’ Several sources have claimed that the bomb was assembled by Casimiro Monteiro, a Goan-born explosives expert and Aginter operative. Monteiro had fought for Franco during the Spanish Civil War, for Hitler with the Division Azul on the Eastern Front, and murdered...
the Portuguese opposition leader Humberto Delgado in Spain in 1965. He later assisted the anti-communist Mozambique National Resistance (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana; RENAMO) against FRELIMO in post-independence Mozambique’s civil war. Monteiro was first named as a participant in the assassination plot by Martin in 1975. This has been corroborated by two PIDE agents and a Rhodesian intelligence officer, though there remains scepticism as to whether their stories can be trusted.\footnote{Dalila Cabrita Mateus, \textit{PIDE/DGS na guerra colonial, 1961-1974} (Lisbon: Terramar, 2004), 172-73; Jesus, \textit{Eduardo Mondlane}, 347; Cahen, ‘La ‘fin de l’histoire’”, 213n85.} Aginter also had connections with Jorge Jardim, a Mozambique-based businessman who enjoyed a strong relationship with Salazar himself. Although Jardim himself denied all responsibility, the editor of the \textit{Noticias da Beira} noted he was present in the newspaper’s office on the day of Mondlane’s assassination and waited several hours for ‘important news’ to arrive.\footnote{Mateus, \textit{PIDE/DGS}, 172.}

The question of Mozambican involvement also remains unclear. The logistics of delivering the bomb from Lourenço Marques to Dar es Salaam must have required some African collaboration. However, no consensus has emerged. Substantial space would be needed for a full exploration of the multifarious allegations and refutations that continue to mark a sub-strand in the memory wars entangled with Mozambique’s post-independence travails.\footnote{Victor Igreja, ‘Politics of Memory, Decentralisation and Recentralisation in Mozambique’, \textit{Journal of Southern African Studies} 39 (2013), 313-35; Cahen, ‘La ‘fin de l’histoire’”.}

The CID’s prime suspect was Kavandame. The CID chief for the Coast Region, Edward Manikam, told the American embassy that, while conducting investigations a week after the assassination, he had encountered Kavandame in Mtwara, where the Mozambican was sheltered by the local TANU chairman. In response to Manikam’s questions, Kavandame gave inconsistent and incomplete answers.\footnote{Memcon (Manikam, Pickering), 24 March 1969, enclosed in Burns to State Department, 27 March 1969, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2354, POL 30 MOZ. The close relationship between Kavandame and the local TANU chairman is also attested to in PIDE reports that pre-date the assassination. Regional Military Headquarters, Mozambique, 25 January 1969, TT, SCCIM/A/20-7/30, 42-43.} In March, he defected to the Portuguese. The other main suspect was Silvério Nungu, an official at FRELIMO’s headquarters with access to Mondlane’s mail. Arrested by the Tanzanian police while also trying to defect to Mozambique, Nungu officially died of a hunger strike in prison. Simango later claimed he was executed.\footnote{David Martin, ‘Interpol solves a guerrilla whodunit’, \textit{Observer}, 6 February 1972, 4.}

Aginter Press documentation uncovered by Italian intelligence implicates Simango in Mondlane’s assassination.\footnote{Laurent and Sutton, ‘Assassination’, 138.} Simango denied any involvement, claiming that he had come perilously close to opening the book, only to notice that it was in French, a language he could not read.\footnote{Burns to State Dept, 13 February 1969, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2354, POL 30 MOZ.} Suspicion of Simango largely stems from his activities after the death of Mondlane. Under FRELIMO’s constitution, the vice-president should have taken over the leadership of the movement. However, doubts about Simango’s loyalty led the Central Committee to establish a
Oasis of liberation?

‘Council of the Presidency’ in April 1969, in which he shared power with dos Santos and Machel. The latter pair developed into a stronger faction. In November, Simango published a pamphlet entitled ‘Gloomy Situation in FRELIMO’ which accused Machel and dos Santos of murder, tribalism, and nepotism, and demanded they resign and be put on trial. Simango was expelled from FRELIMO and subsequently joined COREMO. In May 1970, the Central Committee abolished the triumvirate and appointed Machel as president, with dos Santos as vice-president. After Mozambique gained its independence in 1975, Simango was brought before a kangaroo court. At a show trial in Nachingwea in southern Tanzania in April 1975, he was forced to read a ‘confession’ of his guilt at betraying FRELIMO. Simango was sent to a ‘re-education camp’ and eventually murdered in 1978 to prevent him from falling into the hands of RENAMO rebels in Mozambique.

Few members of FRELIMO’s leadership have escaped suspicion. Oscar Cardoso, the former head of PIDE, has accused Joaquim Chissano (then chief of security for FRELIMO, later president of Mozambique) of collaborating with Monteiro. In his memoirs, Mondlane’s secretary, Sérgio Vieira recounts a grand conspiracy in which the parcel-bomb was transferred to Dar es Salaam via Portuguese agents in Malawi and Mozambicans in Tanzania, including Nungu and Gwenjere. Vieira also claims that Kavandame and Simango knew of the assassination plan in advance. Martins places Gwenjere at the centre of the plot, but asserts that it was only made possible by co-conspirators inside FRELIMO.

Finally, there is the question of Tanzanian complicity. The fact that the inquiry into Mondlane’s death was carried out under the auspices of the Second Vice-President’s Office raises doubts about its transparency. Martins believes that Sijaona was ‘undoubtedly’ involved. According to Manikam, the CID was assisted in its investigation by the Chinese, who were opposed to Mondlane and friendly with Sijaona. The potential implication of senior members of Tanzania’s state and security apparatus may also explain why the CID’s findings have never been released.

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647 Mateus, *PIDE/DGS*, 172. In an interview with a Mozambican reporter in 2014, Chissano was forced to deny any involvement in the assassination: “Não era só a Mondlane que queriam matar”, *Dossiers & Factos*, 20 January 2014, 3-5.


651 Memcon (Manikam, Pickering), 24 March 1969, enclosed in Burns to State Department, 27 March 1969, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2354, POL 30 MOZ.
Conclusion

In *The Struggle for Mozambique*, published posthumously in 1969, Mondlane warned against the dangers of factionalism within FRELIMO. The enemy, he argued,

may use a member of the main organization to try to spread dissent, so as to bring over a section of the membership. The complexities of motive behind divisive conduct makes it the more difficult to guard against: individual neuroses, personal ambitions, real ideological differences are muddled up with the tactics of the enemy secret service.652

Mondlane’s assessment was more astute than much of the scholarship about him. The early historiography of contemporary Mozambique portrayed FRELIMO as waging a bold struggle against its internal and external enemies. These histories, usually written by scholars sympathetic to FRELIMO’s ideological cause, especially after its full conversion to Marxism-Leninism under Machel, often lionise the figure of Mondlane and glorify the revolution.653 They do not deny the schisms within the movement, but integrate them into a heroic narrative, which mirrors official discourse propounded by FRELIMO after independence. In this, the progressive proto-state led by first Mondlane and then Machel overcomes Kavandame’s backward, parochial tribalism, then joins forces with the oppressed peasantry of Mozambique to drive out the Portuguese colonialists.654 Similarly, scholarship on Tanzania’s role in southern Africa’s liberation struggles tends to eulogise Nyerere as an anticolonial visionary and omit references to local involvement in schisms within the movements.655

Building on more recent scholarship which questions these obfuscating binaries and Marxist teleologies, this chapter has demonstrated how the micropolitics of FRELIMO in its Dar es Salaam exile was rife with splits and tensions. These did not only take place within the movement’s leadership, but overlapped with centrifugal dynamics among a range of local actors in the ‘Cold War city’. While Mondlane skilfully used Dar es Salaam’s position as a centre of international political activity in sub-Saharan Africa to attract material aid and public support, the same

environment was used by FRELIMO's enemies to subvert the movement. Despite having the backing of Nyerere, there were limits to the security this provided. Tanzanian politicians and journalists, sharing ideological, racial, and ethnic affinities with Mondlane’s opponents, attacked FRELIMO's leader, eroding his support base. As the following chapter shows, the forces which drove Tanzanian opposition to Mondlane’s leadership were part of a broader set of political dynamics, which sought to appropriate Cold War developments elsewhere in the world to a campaign of national mobilisation. At the same time in 1968 that Makonde dissidents were ransacking the FRELIMO offices, students and youth were engaged in their own struggles against superpower imperialism on the streets of Dar es Salaam.
Chapter 5

Tanzania’s ‘68: press, protest, and the Dar es Salaam public sphere

‘Many astrologers have predicated a near-doom for the world in 1968’, wrote ‘Pressman’ in his first Nationalist column of the new year. He listed a lengthy series of crises: the economic exploitation of the developing world, the war in Indochina, liberation struggles in Africa, and the conflict in the Middle East. ‘When the astrologers make their dismal forecasts what they are really saying is that a clash between the people and imperialism (and its lackeys) is drawing nearer and nearer. One does not need to be an astrologer to make this prediction’, concluded Pressman – nom de plume of A. M. Babu.656

The events of the year which followed might even have surprised Babu himself. 1968 was the year of the protest. From Berkeley to Berlin, Cairo to Kinshasa, students and youths took to the streets. While their demands were diverse, their anger shared a common target: an unjust global status quo, dominated by the superpowers, secured by their allies, and upheld by ruling elites. In Dar es Salaam, the escalation of the conflict in Indochina and the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia provoked mass demonstrations and furious newspaper editorials. Analysing these protests enables an exploration of the dynamics of Dar es Salaam’s public sphere, which brought together internationalist rhetoric with the imperatives of nation-building, embedded in internal rivalries among the Tanzanian elite.

For some time, the historiography on ‘1968’ remained strikingly underdeveloped. As Arif Dirlik argues, the events of the year became discredited, ‘partly because of their own degeneration into a mindless radicalism in the face of political repression that allowed few alternatives, and partly because the victory of global capitalism has successfully recast in a negative light the efforts of an earlier age to hold it in check.’657 However, working through paradigms of global and transnational history, scholars recently have embarked on a serious reassessment of the 1960s. Their work stresses the interconnected nature of the protest movements, which drew upon shared imaginaries, symbols, and world-views to challenge established authorities.658 While ‘1968’ may still first conjure to mind images of Parisian barricades or tanks in Prague, historians now recognise the central role occupied by the so-called ‘Third World’ in the protest movements. This was not confined to the conflict in Vietnam, but involved broader critiques of the widening socioeconomic gulf between the West and the post-colonial world. But the ‘Third World’ did not exist solely in the protestors’ imaginations. In West Germany, for example, African, Asian, and Latin American students were

656 [A. M. Babu], ‘Significance of 1968’, Nationalist, 5 January 1968, 1.
important agents in propelling Third World causes into the public sphere, to demonstrate how political capital could be made from transgressive demonstration. Moreover, protest was not confined to Europe and North America, but took place across the Third World itself, including post-colonial Africa.

Although historians often make reference to the global or transnational dimensions of 1968, they tend to do so passively rather than critically. As Victoria Langland argues in her study of student protest in Brazil, historians ‘have tended toward noting the international context without integrating it into the local narrative of 1968’. She therefore calls on historians to ‘examine how contemporaneous beliefs, fears, and suspicions about such connections affected the course of local events’. Heeding Langland’s advice, this chapter analyses Tanzania’s experience of the long ‘1968’ to demonstrate how distant events were understood locally and enlisted into TANU’s nation-building project.

The common denominator of most studies of the 1960s consists of a confrontation between entrenched government and a discontented radical movement in search of an alternative future. While the former were usually successful in retaining control, they did so only through the employment of violence. The early work on sub-Saharan Africa points in the same direction. In 1969, calls for university reform in Congo were brought to a bloody halt when the army shot dead scores of protestors in Kinshasa. That same year, Ethiopian students mobilised against Emperor Haile Selassie. Despite a government crackdown, the protestors of 1969 became the Marxist-Leninist student groups which were instrumental in toppling the imperial regime five years later.

In Tanzania, the opposite occurred. Far from challenging the government, the protestors who took to the streets and far-left journalists writing in local newspapers proclaimed their dedication to TANU and the Arusha Declaration. Working through party structures, an internationalist critique of superpower interventions in Czechoslovakia and especially Vietnam was channelled towards the need for self-reliance and vigilance: youth mobilisation against ‘imperialism’ and ‘neocolonialism’ represented a commitment to, rather than a rejection of, the TANU regime. While there were pockets of student discontent, they were small-scale and successfully portrayed by the government as attempts to disrupt the njamoa revolution. However, like the power struggles which followed the Arusha Declaration and preceded Mondlane’s assassination, the mobilisation of youth and the act of protest in Tanzania were enmeshed in local political networks. While radicals and demagogues were at certain times useful for Nyerere, at others they overstretched their remit. When youth

659 Slobodian, Foreign Front.
660 Christiansen and Scarlett (eds), Third World.
662 Suri, Power and Protest, 211.
groups or journalists challenged Nyerere’s authority or risked damaging Tanzania’s international image, the president moved decisively to remove potential rivals and extend state control over the media.

Arusha socialism, vigilance, and the TANU Youth League

Historians of post-colonial East Africa have recognised that youth, just like gender, ethnicity, and class, represents a fruitful analytical prism for understanding processes of social and political transformation after independence. Gary Burgess and Andrew Burton argue that the recruitment of youth by patriarchal states was a vital component of their nation-building projects. However, the transformative effects of decolonisation and rapid urbanisation destabilised existing generational relationships, resulting in struggle between nationalist elites and the youths they sought to conscript.665 Andrew Ivaska shows how cultural conflict played out in Dar es Salaam not only between the TANU state and young Tanzanians, but also among youth groups possessing contrasting conceptions of a post-colonial modernity.666 Burgess identifies similar cultural frictions in Zanzibar, noting the emphasis that the ASP placed on disciplining a revolutionary youth through the promotion of a nationalist ethic.667

On the mainland, over the course of the 1960s the TYL came to occupy a central position in the party-state’s nation-building practices and efforts to root out enemies of the taifa. The TYL was established in 1956, as not only a means of enlisting young Tanzanians in the liberation campaign, but also to provide a mechanism for exerting top-down control over them. After independence, the movement assumed key security functions within the state apparatus. In 1963, the government wound up the colonial Special Branch security forces. The more informal structures which replaced it were manned by inexperienced TYL cadres. When the Tanganyika Rifles were disbanded after the mutiny of 1964, recruits to the new TPDF were scrutinised by the TYL.668

The Arusha Declaration continued this practice of foregrounding the youth as key actors in Tanzania’s national revolution. Thousands of young Tanzanians undertook marches from across the country to Dar es Salaam in support of Arusha socialism. On the first anniversary of the Declaration in 1968, TYL cadres returned to the capital for an inaugural ‘National Youth Festival’, at which they played sports fixtures and were addressed by senior party figures. The Nationalist

666 Ivaska, *Cultured States*.
lauded the TYL’s commitment to the nation. It acclaimed the youth’s refusal ‘to be taken in by the stupid machinations of corrupt political mercenaries who had wanted to subvert them’. The youth were both the embodiment of the principles of *njamaa* and the force through which the revolution was to be realised.

This adulation contrasted sharply with the disappointment shown at the students who had protested at the government’s decision to make participation in non-military National Service compulsory for university graduates in October 1966. At State House, the students had read out their petition of demands to Nyerere, who responded angrily by rusticating 412 demonstrators, including around two-thirds of the Tanzanian student body. Various TANU bodies, including the TYL, organised counterdemonstrations in Dar es Salaam. The *Nationalist* stated that Tanzania ‘will be built by steeled youths, vigilant and dedicated to hard work, nursed in the problems of their country.’ Soon afterwards, a TYL branch was set up at the university, as the government tightened its control over the student body.

As Ivaska shows, the TYL played a central role in the marshalling of urban space in Dar es Salaam during the 1960s. Outwardly the TYL modelled itself on Chinese practices: its uniformed members were known as ‘Green Guards’ and many adhered to Maoism, at least on the level of crude sloganeering. But this worldview represented less an internationalist streak in the TYL’s outlook than an attempt to appropriate the language and symbols of the Chinese experience to Tanzania’s national revolution. As Nyerere sought to anchor *njamaa* socialism in the rural communitarianism of a romanticised African past, the TYL sought to defend the traditional values of the ‘national project’ against the decadent cosmopolitanism of Dar es Salaam. Switching the focus from the cultural to the political plane, this chapter demonstrates how distant Cold War interventions were understood, digested, and reapplied within a national frame of reference. Working in conjunction with the ideologues on the editorial staff of the *Nationalist*, student and youth demonstrators seized on examples of imperialism abroad to reaffirm their commitment to the Tanzanian nation.

**Vietnam**

On 16 October 1967, Nyerere delivered a major foreign policy address to the TANU National Conference at Mwanza. After setting out the basis of Tanzania’s non-aligned foreign policy, the president turned to the conflict in Vietnam. Nyerere described Vietnam as ‘probably the most vicious and all-enveloping war which has been know to mankind’. ‘The USA must recover from the delirium of power’, he said, ‘and return to the principles upon which her nation was founded.’

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671 Ibid.
Nyerere called for an ‘immediate and unconditional’ end to the American bombing of North Vietnam and for a peace settlement on the basis of the Geneva Agreements of 1954.672

While Nyerere had never hidden his views about the Vietnam war, his Mwanza speech represented an unusually vocal intervention. As a figure commanding significant respect across Africa, Nyerere’s shift in tone concerned the American embassy. At a lunch gathering, diplomats from Australia, Britain, Canada, and the United States suggested potential options for pushing Nyerere to take a more amenable line. These included the use of Singapore’s prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew, as an intermediary and encouraging Malaysia to open an embassy in Dar es Salaam as a counterweight to Chinese, North Korean, and North Vietnamese influence and propaganda.673

For the United States’ enemies in Tanzania, Vietnam was fertile territory. Although attacks on states with which Tanzanian government had friendly relations had been banned in 1966, the rules were enforced unevenly. In November 1967, a touring Chinese dance group had given a performance of a politically-inspired ‘ballet’, which depicted the ‘heroic Vietcong’ triumphing over ‘American aggressors’. ‘The patron of the group was obviously Kawawa, whose Chicom proclivities are generally recognized’, wrote John H. Burns, the American ambassador.674 The following month, Burns complained to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the North Vietnamese were allowed to show anti-US ‘atrocity films’ at the university, while Tanzanian censors had prevented USIS from showing an information film about the historical context of the conflict.675 These incidents accompanied a steady drip of printed Chinese and North Vietnamese propaganda. After the Ministry of Foreign Affairs made no discernible effort to clamp down on the flouting of its own ban, Burns raised the issue with Nyerere himself. Nyerere acknowledged the problem and said that the perpetrators would continue to be admonished, although he accepted this had hitherto made little impact.676 It was clear that the government could (or would) do little about the situation, in part because officials responsible for the policing of propaganda were prepared to turn a blind eye to the activities of Beijing and its allies.

By this time, Nyerere had extended a hand to the United States in his own peacemaking efforts. On 2 January 1968, he wrote directly to President Lyndon B. Johnson. In conciliatory tones, Nyerere conveyed the dangers of escalating conflict in Southeast Asia and his belief that North Vietnam genuinely desired peace. Nyerere called on the United States to live up to the responsibility which superpower status conferred upon it. ‘No one really doubts that American could bomb North Vietnam out of existence and exterminate all of its people’, he wrote. ‘The real question now is whether the United States of America is powerful enough to be able to talk with the small nation

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673 Memcon (Johnston, Wilson, Stuart, Heander, Pickering), 25 October 1967, NARA, RG 59, BAA, OEAA, Tanzania and Zanzibar 1963-75, DEF 2 ZAN; Burns to State Dept, 3 November 1967, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2515, POL 15-1 TANZAN.
674 Burns to State Dept, 20 November 1967, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 1511 CSM TANZAN.
675 Burns to State Dept, 8 December 1967, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 1511 CSM TANZAN.
676 Burns to State Dept, 5 January 1968, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2517, POL TANZAN-US.
which has defied it, and bring those talks to a conclusion which means peace for the unhappy
Vietnamese people and relief to the rest of the world.\textsuperscript{677}

Nyerere’s olive branch caught Washington by surprise. Burns had assumed that Nyerere’s
previous silence on Vietnam stemmed from the ‘tacit recognition that there was by now nothing
either [side] could say to change the other’s mind’ on the issue. He thought that the letter contained
an implicit offer from Nyerere to act as an intermediary. With the Sino-Tanzanian relationship at its
height, Nyerere’s ‘credentials in communist Asia’ seemed to the ambassador an asset worth
pursuing.\textsuperscript{678} Burns pressed Washington to send a special spokesman to Dar es Salaam to deliver
Johnson’s response in person to Nyerere, arguing that the latter had ‘set the stage for an exchange
which could have a lasting impact on our understanding with him and our future relations’.\textsuperscript{679}

However, Dean Rusk, the secretary of state, deemed a written reply from Johnson sufficient.\textsuperscript{680}
Johnson’s letter recapitulated Washington’s position in Vietnam: it was willing to end the bombing
campaign and pursue peace talks if there were sufficient guarantees that the North Vietnamese
would not exploit a truce to its military advantage.\textsuperscript{681}

On receipt of Johnson’s letter on 19 January, Nyerere immediately summoned Burns. Nyerere
revealed that the previous month he had written to Pope Paul VI, after hearing that Johnson would
visit the Vatican en route from Saigon to the United States. Making reference to conversations held
with a North Vietnamese diplomat in Dar es Salaam, Nyerere told the Pope of his belief that Hanoi
was genuinely committed to ending the war, in the hope that this would influence Paul VI in his
discussions with Johnson.\textsuperscript{682} (The record of the meeting in Rome on 23 December shows that
Nyerere’s advice fell on deaf ears: the Pope warned Johnson that North Vietnam would not cease
its military activities while it retained the support of great powers.)\textsuperscript{683} In a further exchange of
letters, both presidents largely restated the positions they had previously set out.\textsuperscript{684} This short-lived
diplomatic opening had no lasting consequence. However, it demonstrated Nyerere’s commitment
to constructive diplomacy and a sympathetic, if firm, understanding of the American position in
Indochina – in stark contrast to the stance taken by protestors on the streets of Dar es Salaam and
the Nationalist’s radical journalists.

For protestors across the world in 1968, Vietnam represented the anti-imperial cause par
excellence: a poor but defiant Third World people, fighting a war that stemmed directly from its
anticolonial liberation struggle against the armies of the world’s most formidable superpower. Ho

\textsuperscript{677} Nyerere to Johnson, 2 January 1968, LBJL, NSF, SHSC, Box 52, Tanzania, 19m.
\textsuperscript{678} Burns to State Dept, 3 January 1968, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2517, POL US-TANZAN.
\textsuperscript{679} Burns to State Dept, 4 January 1968, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2517, POL US-TANZAN.
\textsuperscript{680} Rusk to US emb., Dar es Salaam, 5 January 1968, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2517, POL US-
TANZAN.
\textsuperscript{681} Johnson to Nyerere, 15 January 1968, LBJL, NSF, SHSC, Box 52, Tanzania, 19b.
\textsuperscript{682} Burns to State Dept, 19 January 1968, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2517, POL US-TANZAN.
\textsuperscript{683} Memcon (Johnson, Paul VI), 23 December 1967, FRUS, 1964-68, vol. 12, doc. 310.
\textsuperscript{684} Nyerere to Johnson, 20 January 1968, LBJL, NSF, SHSC, Box 52, Tanzania, 18a; Johnson to Nyerere, 28
February 1968, LBJL, NSF, SHSC, Box 52, Tanzania, 16.
Chi Minh became an icon of global revolution. Students in Western Europe and North America looked to Vietnam for inspiration in their own domestic struggles. In Tanzania, a post-colonial Third World state, the response to the suffering in Indochina was cast not just sympathetically, but also empathetically.

There were strong institutional connections between the Tanzanian government and Vietnamese representatives. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam maintained a diplomatic mission in Dar es Salaam, which was given full embassy status in 1970. Local newspapers carried front-page photographs of visiting Vietnamese delegations, accompanied by soundbite quotations from Tanzanian officials. ‘The people of Tanzania are immensely encouraged by the staunchness and bravery of the Vietnamese people in standing as the greatest pillar of liberation in modern times’, read a message from TANU to Ho during ‘Solidarity with Vietnam Week’ in March 1968. In May, Tanzania welcomed the North Vietnamese vice-minister for foreign affairs, Hoang Van Loi. A visiting North Vietnamese trade union delegation received a $2,800 donation from its TANU-affiliated counterpart.

In 1968, the situation in Vietnam was rarely absent from the pages of the Nationalist. The newspaper’s stable of radical and Marxist journalists ensured a regular flow of bitterly anti-American editorials. Following the Tet Offensive, Babu proclaimed the imminence of ‘a complete American defeat in Vietnam’, which would represent ‘the end of America’s imperialist arrogance’. In March, Nsa Kaisi wrote a vitriolic feature article acclaiming the ‘heroic struggle’ of the Vietcong and condemning the ‘most criminal war of aggression in history waged by the United States imperialists against the Vietnamese people’.

These frequent attacks on the United States’ policy in Vietnam drew the American embassy’s ire. On 31 March, still reeling from the shock of the Tet Offensive, Johnson announced the de-escalation of the bombing of North Vietnam. Nyerere commented that, while hardly the total cessation that he sought, this was at least ‘something’. Caught between following the president’s line and its own more hostile inclinations, the Nationalist declined to pass editorial comment. Instead, it published a photograph of Johnson wishing farewell to troops departing San Francisco for Vietnam, accompanied by a particularly graphic caption which claimed that Johnson had shown [sic] more death and tears around the world than any other American or imperialist head of state in post war history. Under his leadership the American aggression attained new heights.

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685 Ross to State Dept, 17 January 1970, NARA, RG 59, SNF 1970-3, Box 2616, POL TANZAN.
687 ‘Vietnamese mission in Dar’, Nationalist, 27 May 1968, 1; ‘Vietnamese people on the eve of decisive victory’, Nationalist, 4; Burns to State Dept, 14 June 1968, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2513, POL 2 TANZAN.
688 Burns to State Dept, 14 June 1968, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2513, POL 2 TANZAN.
691 Pickering to State Dept, 5 April 1968, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2513, POL 2 TANZAN.
and Pentagon steel heads trampled on the sovereignty of several millions of the people of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Faced by an inevitable ignominious defeat of his policies at home and abroad, Mr. Johnson announced over the week-end, while shading [sic] crocodile tears, that he "is not going to stand for re-election" for the American Presidency, above grim faced Johnson is saying goodbye to his dead warranted Vietnam bound aggression troops.692

The American embassy decided to challenge the government over this unfavourable coverage. Setting out that since the Nationalist was an official TANU publication and Tanzania was a one-party state, and that Nationalist was therefore a government newspaper, the United States submitted a note to the Foreign Ministry on 16 April, seeking clarification regarding whether the caption accompanying the photograph of Johnson reflected government policy.693 Although the embassy received what Burns described as a ‘testy, unresponsive note’ in reply, he also observed a near silence over Vietnam in the weeks which followed. The American embassy received word that Nyerere himself had intervened in the situation, ordering the press to avoid Indochina while delicate talks took place to determine the venue of a peace conference.694

Tanzania’s youth also made regular gestures of solidarity with the Vietnamese. On 20 April, the TYL donated 634 cartons of tinned beef to the ‘youth and people of Vietnam’ in their ‘just struggle against imperialist aggression’. The TYL chairman, Lawi Sijaona, said that the contribution denoted ‘the will and determination of the Tanzanian Youth to support the youth and the people of Vietnam in their just struggle’.695 Kingunge Ngombale-Mwiru, who became the TYL’s secretary-general in 1970, recalled how he had close relations with the North Vietnamese diplomats in Dar es Salaam. ‘I learned quite a lot about the Vietnamese and the way they were facing the giants of the world – the Americans’, he told me. ‘We were opposed to American aggression in solidarity with the Vietnamese people’.696

On 20 July, the TYL held a march in Dar es Salaam to mark the fourteenth anniversary of the signing of the Geneva Agreement, the first public demonstration since the students’ protest in 1966. It was organised by the University College branch of the TYL, encouraged by Mkapa, and led by its chairman, Juma Mwapachu. Between 100 and 150 Tanzanians participated in the demonstration, which first listened to speeches outside the American embassy. They waved placards bearing slogans such as ‘In every grave will rise a raging ricefield’, ‘Johnson assassin’, ‘Long live Uncle Ho and the heroic people of Vietnam’, and ‘Marekani washenzi’ (‘Americans are savages’).

A TYL delegation asked to meet Burns. The ambassador refused to do so in the presence of what he described as ‘a Roman Circus presentation’ of reporters, photographers, and sound men, and so the demonstrators settled on delivering their ‘Note of Protest vs U.S. Imperialist Aggression

692 ‘LBJ won’t seek re-election’, Nationalist, 2 April 1968, 1, 4.
693 Pickering to State Dept, 19 April 1968, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2513, POL 2 TANZAN.
694 Burns to State Dept, 3 May 1968, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2513, POL 2 TANZAN.
696 Interview with Kingunge Ngombale-Mwiru, Victoria, Dar es Salaam, 26 August 2015.
in Vietnam’ to a junior diplomat. The note called for the unconditional withdrawal of ‘Yankee and their satellite troops from South Vietnam’, condemned the use of napalm, and ‘utterly abhorred the bestiality and callousness like castration, disembowelment, cutting of [sic] women’s breasts committed in the name of American democracy and western civilisation.’ Singing songs in praise of Ho and Nyerere, the protestors departed for the North Vietnamese mission, where they handed over a note of solidarity declaring that ‘the Vietnamese fight was their fight’ and that ‘the Tanzanian youths would not hesitate to volunteer when called upon by the youths of Vietnam.’

Czechoslovakia

A month later, the protestors were back on the streets of Dar es Salaam. This time they directed their anger not at Washington, but at Moscow. The Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia on the night of 20-21 August sparked outrage around the world. Hitherto largely preoccupied with struggles in the Third World, the ’68 demonstrators now recast their spotlight of protest onto the Soviet Union. Having loudly proclaimed itself the enemy of imperialism, Moscow’s crushing of the Prague Spring suggested it was no less a neoimperial power than the United States and its allies. As an editorial in the Standard reflected, ‘had the Soviet leaders been agents of Western imperialism they could hardly have done a better job of demolishing the Moscow image.’

The Tanzanian government’s response to the invasion, as quoted in chapter 3, was stern, accusing the Soviet Union of acting as an imperialist power and showing complete disregard for the UN Charter. Nyerere himself wished to go beyond this simple statement, but recognised the danger of a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union, especially given the suspicions regarding Dar es Salaam’s relationship with China. In June 1968 in Beijing, he had restated his admiration for Mao and China’s socialist transformation. Nyerere asserted that he had ‘no reason to believe that friendship between Tanzania and China will not continue indefinitely, and grow stronger as time passes.’ At a banquet held in Nyerere’s honour, Chinese premier Zhou Enlai outraged Eastern Bloc diplomats by remarking that Moscow and Washington had invented ‘nuclear colonialism’. Representatives of the Soviet Union, other Warsaw Pact states, and Mongolia walked out of the dinner in protest.

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697 This account of the protest is based on ‘Militant youth protest against US’, Nationalist, 22 July 1968, 8; Burns to State Dept, 20 July 1968, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2513, POL 2 TANZAN; Burns to State Dept, 20 July 1968, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2516, POL 23 TANZAN; Naudy to MAE-DAL, 23 July 1968, CADN, 193PO/1/31 AI132;
Back in Dar es Salaam, on the morning of 23 August, student groups assembled outside the Soviet embassy. They were joined by members of other TYL branches, including Lawi Sijaona and Chediel Mgonja. Sijaona was a minister of state in the second vice-president’s office and also the chairman of the TYL. Mgonja was the minister of state in the president’s office, with responsibility for foreign affairs. Over 2,000 people attended the demonstration. This, the American embassy reported, made the Vietnam protest in July look like ‘something that took place in a phone booth’.

The protestors chanted and waved placards emblazoned with slogans such as ‘To hell with the Warsaw Pact’ and ‘Russians are Hitler’s hench men’. Student leaders read out speeches. Then the demonstration took an unexpected turn. Led by Sijaona and Mgonja, protestors jumped over the walls of the compound. They pelted the building with torn-up scraps of Soviet propaganda and thrust a note of protest through a steel grill to the diplomats holed up inside. Stones were thrown and there were reports of smashed windows. In a brief moment of alarm, the protestors pounded on the roof of a car bearing diplomatic registration plates and carrying the Soviet flag, which had chosen an unfortunate moment to pass through the embassy gates. The East German consulate-general expressed its concern that, despite the presence of the police, the protestors were allowed to remain inside the embassy walls for so long, and little attempt was made to stop the barrage of paper and stones. After twenty minutes, the crowd moved on to the nearby Czechoslovakian embassy, where the chargé d’affaires gratefully accepted a letter of solidarity.701

The ideological challenge posed by the Soviet intervention to progressive politicians and intellectuals around the world was most strongly felt by doctrinaire communists, given Moscow’s claims to have intervened in Czechoslovakia in defence of Marxism-Leninism. Salim Msoma, a university student, recalled the ‘confusion and bewilderment’ felt among his contemporaries, many of whom were uncertain at participating in the demonstration.702 On the day of the protest, the radical University Students African Revolutionary Front (USARF) called the invasion a ‘revisionist betrayal of international socialism as envisaged by Karl Marx and Lenin’. A statement signed by Yoweri Museveni, the USARF chairman and future president of Uganda, argued that ‘the revisionist clique in Moscow has been steadily corroding the fundamental tenets of Marxism-Leninism’. ‘Russian aggression: the highest state of imperialism’, read one placard, paraphrasing Lenin.703 These views were echoed in the Nationalist by Babu, who accused the Soviet Union and its

701 This account of the protest is based on ‘Massive protest march’, Nationalist, 24 August 1968, 1, 8; ‘Angry students, TANU youths in demonstration’, Daily Nation, 24 August 1968, 24; Pickering to State Dept, 23 August 1968, NARA, RG 59, Czechoslovakian Crisis Microfilm, Reel 2; Naudy to MAE, 24 August 1968, CADN, 193PO/1/27 All 27; Lessing to Kiesewetter, Kern, and Schüssler, 24 August 1968, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/964, 190-91; Lessing to Kiesewetter, 27 August 1968, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/964, 183-85; Burns to State Dept, 30 August 1968, NARA, RG 59, CPFP 1967-9, Box 2513, POL 2 TANZAN; ‘Czechoslovakia: its impact on independent Africa’, CIA, October 1968, NARA, CREST, CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030018-7; interview with Juma Mwapachu, Oyster Bay, Dar es Salaam, 12 June 2015.
702 Interview with Salim Msoma, Oyster Bay, Dar es Salaam, 2 July 2015.
703 ‘Massive protest march’, Nationalist, 24 August 1968, 1, 8
allies as ‘proceeding from a deep-seated and dangerous conception’ that they were ‘the appointed defenders of socialist development if not in the world, then in Eastern Europe.’

The Tanzanian press reacted bitterly to the invasion of Czechoslovakia. It presented the situation as analogous to the Biafra conflict in Nigeria. Earlier in the year, Nyerere had taken the surprising step of recognising the Biafran separatists, who were engaged in a civil war against the Federal Military Government. The support provided by Moscow to Lagos was therefore a pre-existing bone of contention in Tanzania’s relations with the Soviet Union. The demonstrators of 23 August made the comparison explicit. ‘What are the Russians looking for in Biafra?’, asked one placard. ‘Hands off Biafra, down with Russian aggression’, read another. Babu preferred to highlight London’s role in supporting Lagos. Describing the British intervention as resulting in ‘the virtual genocide of a people’, Babu reminded his readers that ‘as we shudder at the invasion of Czechoslovakia let us not forget the indirect invasion of the Biafran people.’ 

Editorials in the Nationalist also made reference to the ‘traitor’ Moïse Tshombe, who had led the Katangese secession in Congo, and the dead Lumumba. Czechoslovakia, a European crisis with global resonance, was thus ‘Africanised’ and closely tied to the provocative foreign policy adopted by the Tanzanian government.

More generally, the Czechoslovakian crisis was presented as symptomatic of a global pattern of superpower imperialism. The press drew explicit parallels between the superpowers’ interventions in Indochina and Czechoslovakia. On 24 August, a Nationalist editorial reminded readers that ‘this is not the first time that an aggressor has tried to camouflage his act in vain distortion’. Babu wrote that ‘[t]he horror of intervention in Czechoslovakia should remind us of the continuing horror and the larger scale of destruction of property, extermination of human life, and abuse of the dignity of a people, which describes the American oppression and occupation of Vietnam.’ 

Two months later at the UN General Assembly, Paul Bomani, the minister for economic affairs and development planning, followed an attack on the United States in Vietnam with an equally scathing verdict on the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

In contrast, Nyerere’s response to the invasion was characterised by the same calmness which he had shown in his dialogue with the United States over Vietnam. On 24 August, Moscow instructed the Soviet embassy in Dar es Salaam to approach Nyerere and inform him about the ‘difficult decision’ which it had been forced to take in intervening in Czechoslovakia. The following

704 [A. M. Babu], ‘The so-called world’s policemen’, Nationalist, 23 August 1968, 4. Oddly, Babu reportedly told the North Vietnamese chargé d’affaires that he welcomed the invasion. Lessing to Kieswetter, 24 September 1968, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/964, 209-18.
705 [A. M. Babu], ‘The so-called world’s policemen’, Nationalist, 23 August 1968, 4.
708 [A. M. Babu], ‘The so-called world’s policemen’, Nationalist, 23 August 1968, 4.
709 Speech by Paul Bomani to the UN General Assembly, enclosed in Zielke to Africa Division, MfAA, 16 November 1968, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/964, 249-61.
Tanzania’s ‘68

day, Nyerere received the Soviet chargé d’affaires, G. A. Samsonov, and the counsellor, Arkadi Glukhov. While Samsonov explained the Soviet rationale, Nyerere listened in silence. Glukhov described how Nyerere seemed shocked, but contained his ‘strong feelings’ through ‘extreme self-control’. While he rejected the Soviet explanation, citing the overriding authority of the UN Charter and the principle of national sovereignty, Nyerere remained cool.710

The next morning’s edition of the Nationalist ran a leader entitled ‘Pity the ambassador’. Diplomatic observers at the time detected the hand of Nyerere himself in the editorial, a fact later confirmed by the Tanzanian ambassador to Moscow.711 Without naming states or individuals, it sympathised with the ‘poor Ambassador’, whose duty it was to convey to his host government the views of his own, no matter how preposterous. ‘If his Government tells him it has decided that in future the sun will rise in the West and set in the East then he must go solemnly to the Head of his host Government and report the decision’, it sardonically stated. While references were also made to Vietnam and Rhodesia, the editorial was clearly aimed at the Soviet Union. The demonstration at the Soviet embassy had embarrassed Nyerere, as explained below. The article was therefore a message to Moscow, bitterly mocking its ‘indefensible’ party line, while taking the heat away from the ambassador. An anti-Soviet demonstration by NUTA, the party-affiliated trade union, planned for 27 August, was also called off.712 As chapter 3 showed, relations between the Soviet Union and Tanzania quickly recovered, because of Nyerere’s concern not to alienate potential aid donors nor appear too close to Beijing.

Internalising the international struggle: anti-imperialism and nation-building

As the growing body of historiography on ‘1968’ shows, demonstrators and activists were inspired by developments in the Third World. Yet they understood these events through local experiences and reapplied the lessons they learned from them in local contexts. In Western Europe, protestors expressed their anger not only at their own governments’ complicity in what they believed to be neocolonial interventions in the Third World, but also used these same critiques to attack the status quo at home. In Tanzania, the same dynamics of understanding, appropriation, and redeployment took place – minus the anti-government animus. The Tet Offensive and the end of the Prague Spring were contextualised and presented in terms relevant to Africans. Moreover, Tanzanian youth leaders and intellectuals interpreted distant superpower interventions in terms that fed into the language of ujamaa and nation-building.

710 Glukhov, ‘Fateful August’, 43.
711 Burns to State Dept, 30 August 1968, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2513, POL 2 TANZAN; Naudy to MAE-DAL, 1 October 1968, CADN, 193PO/1/27 AIH27; Phillips to Stewart, 15 January 1969, UKNA, FCO 31/432/21; Glukhov, ‘Fateful August’, 47.
At face value, the language of the TYL suggested a movement committed to socialist, anti-imperialist internationalism. The Tanzanian youth frequently emphasised that the shared neocolonial enemy gave them a common cause with the Vietnamese. Opening an exhibition of photographs on the conflict in June 1968, Sijaona stated that ‘[w]e believe that imperialism is a global phenomenon. The struggle against it is and must therefore be global. Vietnam is only one theatre where this struggle is going on.’\(^{713}\) Similarly, TANU’s external affairs secretary told a visiting North Vietnamese delegation that ‘no matter what distance separates our two countries and two peoples, your struggle is our struggle’.\(^{714}\)

However, this internationalist rhetoric was channelled into more parochial concerns. The invocation of imperialist threats elsewhere was consistently cited as evidence that Tanzanians must close ranks against the enemies of the ujamaa revolution. Tanzanian commentators depicted the country’s socialist project as under threat from not only external enemies, but also their internal collaborators. ‘We are at war says the Arusha Declaration,’ wrote Babu in January 1968, ‘and we must show in our work that we are engaged in a war against exploiters of all shades and their accomplices.’\(^{715}\) Addressing a TYL meeting in September, Sijaona called on its members ‘to frustrate the devilish machinations of the neo-colonialist agents who want us to deviate from the correct line of the Arusha Declaration and return to the era of “man-eat-man”’.\(^{716}\)

The resurfacing of Kambona in London in January 1968 was presented by the Tanzanian press as a prime example of the ‘imperialist enemy’ at work. The reaction from the party press in Dar es Salaam was predictable: ‘This Man is a Liar’, led the banner headline in the Nationalist.\(^{717}\) Babu drew connections between Kambona and a wider ‘imperialist’ offensive against Arusha socialism. ‘Last week saw a desperate attempt by a former Tanzanian Minister at diverting the course of a [sic] socialist development in this country’, he wrote. ‘This attempt to confuse the people by a mere imperialist lackey should serve to heighten the revolutionary consciousness of the workers, peasants, students and civil servants.’\(^{718}\)

Czechoslovakia and Vietnam were therefore portrayed as a national call-to-arms for Tanzanians to defend the ujamaa revolution. Local polemics called for ‘vigilance’, which became a nation-building watchword. On 26 July 1968, Karume cautioned a group of National Servicemen about the dangers posed by imperialists, who sought to corrupt the minds of Tanzania’s youths. The Nationalist threw its support behind the vice-president’s warning. It claimed that ‘nearly all bookshops and bookstalls in Tanzania and other African countries are flooded with reactionary anti-people magazines, books and other propaganda materials intended for poisoning the minds of

\(^{713}\) ‘Sijaona slates US on Vietnam’, 5 June 1968, Nationalist, 8.
\(^{714}\) ‘TANU supports Viet people’, Nationalist, 7 June 1968, 8.
\(^{715}\) [A. M. Babu], ‘We are at war against forces of reaction’, Nationalist, 12 January 1968, 4.
\(^{716}\) ‘Smash enemies of socialism’, Nationalist, 30 September 1968, 1, 8.
\(^{717}\) ‘This man is a liar’, Nationalist, 5 January 1968, 1, 8.
\(^{718}\) [A. M. Babu], ‘We are at war against forces of reaction’, Nationalist, 12 January 1968, 4.
the youth'. After citing examples of the neocolonial hand at play elsewhere in the world – Cuba, Vietnam, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Angola – the article concluded that it was ‘the revolutionary duty of each and every Tanzanian youth […] to totally repudiate imperialist subversion wherever it rears its ugly head.”

Similarly, the Nationalist responded to the invasion of Czechoslovakia by declaring it ‘another warning to the people of Tanzania’ that they must be ‘vigilant’ and should not ‘relax guard because some [peoples and nations] have asserted their friendship and solidarity.” Interpreting Cold War interventions as acts of imperialism, radical Tanzanians articulated a worldview that provided further evidence for the need for self-reliance, as a defence against neocolonial predation.

Paradoxically, the internationalist rhetoric that enabled these connections between Cold War crises elsewhere and 

ujamaa socialism was representative of an inward turn in Tanzania’s political outlook. As Priya Lal recognises, while Nyerere continued to play a prominent role on the world stage, his internationalist concerns were displaced by nationalist priorities. ‘In a world in which African countries held the status of second-class citizenship’, she writes, ‘Nyerere and his TANU colleagues became increasingly preoccupied with protecting whatever fragile scraps of sovereignty Tanzania did possess – from within as well as without.”

It is striking that in terms of numbers, the largest protest of 1968 was brought about not by distant superpower interventions, but a threat much closer to home. In September, claims made by Malawi’s president, Hastings Banda, to segments of Tanzanian territory brought 10,000 protestors onto the streets of Dar es Salaam, though the rhetoric of the demonstrators again tied the issue to a broader ‘imperialist’ enemy.

The consequential authoritarian shift in Tanzania’s domestic policy included the consolidation of the TYL, which fiercely defended a Tanzanian ‘national culture’ and was hostile to foreign influence in the country. When in December 1968 the University Students’ Union tried to arrange a Pan-African Students Conference in Dar es Salaam, the Nationalist accused it of challenging the TYL’s ‘exclusive right and power to speak for the entire youth of the nation in both internal and international affairs’. ‘Those who oppose this fact are enemies of the Tanzanian Youth’, the newspaper stated, ‘and the youth will not hesitate to smash them.”

The state-backed dominance of the TYL was confirmed by the experience of USARF. Encouraged by a constellation of radical academics, especially from outside of Africa, a small but vocal group of students formed USARF in November 1967. The organisation held seminars, teach-ins, and reading groups; invited prominent leftist intellectuals, such as Samir Amin, Angela Davies,

722 ‘Put gunboats on L. Nyasa – NUTA’, Nationalist, 27 September 1968, 1, 8; Burns to State Dept, 27 September 1968, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2513, POL 2 TANZAN.
723 ‘Youth organisation’, editorial, Nationalist, 18 December 1968, 4.
and C. L. R. James to give lectures; and published a journal, Cheche.\textsuperscript{724} Although the basic causes of revolution and African liberation were common to both movements, USARF’s internationalist Marxism was at odds with the TYL’s nationalist commitment to \textit{njamaa} socialism. Jenerali Ulimwengu joined the university in 1969. He recalled that although in some areas of agreement, the two organisations ‘fused’ – for example, in the Czechoslovakia protest – there was always a ‘dynamic of tension’ brought about by the ‘dichotomy’ between student internationalism and TYL nationalism.\textsuperscript{725}

The TANU leadership felt threatened by USARF’s theoretical criticisms of \textit{njamaa} socialism. According to the editor of Cheche, USARF was ‘too independent; too outspoken; and too often stated the facts as they were.’\textsuperscript{726} In 1970, the magazine carried an extended essay by Issa Shivji, a precocious law student. ‘Tanzania: The Silent Class Struggle’ was a damning Marxist critique of Arusha socialism, which Shivji argued had led only to ‘the triumph of a bureaucratic bourgeoisie’.\textsuperscript{727} In November, Nyerere banned both USARF and Cheche. He reasoned that since the TYL was a ‘revolutionary organisation’ with a monopoly on political activity in all Tanzanian educational institutions, USARF was redundant. It was subsumed into the TYL, which excluded all non-Tanzanian students, among them Museveni.\textsuperscript{728} Under the TANU regime, youth politics – even when engaging with distant events – were to be dedicated to the practice of building the nation through the institutions of the one-party state.

\begin{flushleft}
\textbf{Challenging the ‘imperialist’ press}
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The response of the Tanzanian government to the perceived threat from radical student dissent was paralleled by an authoritarian turn in its policy towards the national press. At the same time that Dubček was dismantling censorship in Prague, the TANU party-state took a firmer grasp of Dar es Salaam’s ‘above-ground’ public sphere. As in the case of the crackdown on independent student organisation, the regime’s constriction of the free press took a dual track: top-down government control, plus a popular campaign waged through the party’s media and youth wing that sought to monopolise political discourse in the name of the \textit{taifa}.

To many Tanzanians, the Standard was an unwelcome remnant of colonial rule. The newspaper, which outsold the Nationalist, was staffed entirely by foreigners. It was owned by the Nairobi-based East African Standard Group until 1968, when the Lonrho conglomerate of mining interests

\textsuperscript{724} Cheche, Swahili for ‘spark’, consciously evoked the title of Iskra, a newspaper founded in 1900 by revolutionary Russian \textit{émigrés}, including Lenin.
\textsuperscript{725} Interview with Jenerali Ulimwengu, Oyster Bay, Dar es Salaam, 18 August 2015.
\textsuperscript{727} Shivji’s essay was later published as \textit{Tanzania: The Silent Class Struggle} (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1973).
\textsuperscript{728} Ivaska, ‘Movement Youth’, 205.
bought it out. In the aftermath of the Arusha Declaration and the sweeping nationalisation measures of foreign interests, criticism of the *Standard* grew. When Nyerere addressed a crowd in Dar es Salaam in February 1967, a voice called for the newspaper to be brought under public ownership. ‘Can you edit it?’ shouted back Nyerere, highlighting the shortage of experienced journalists at the time.\(^{729}\) Although the *Standard* generally supported the government line, it lacked the nationalistic fervour of the TANU press and was not averse to moderate criticism. In January 1968, it even published several letters to the editor expressing sympathy for Kambara.\(^{730}\)

In May 1968, the government brought a surprise ‘Newspaper Ordnance (Amendment) Bill’ before parliament. This empowered the president to close down any newspaper when he considered it in the public interest to do. The bill was inspired partly by the difficulties encountered by the government when it had shut down Otini Kambara’s *Ulimwengu* in December 1967. Lacking legal tools for closing the newspaper, the regime had banned it on a spurious technicality related to its registration. Introducing the bill in parliament, the minister for information and tourism, Hasnu Makame, defended the measures as vital for national security against foreign subversion. He argued that the freedom of the press could be abused, to ‘express subversive ideas with the intention of hindering the development of the country.’\(^{731}\)

The bill was received with hostility. Concerned about its consequences for the trade union paper, *Mjinyakazi*, Michael Kamaliza criticised the government for not making clear the grounds upon which the president would ban a publication. Lady Chesham, a European close to Nyerere, told parliament that the bill ‘smells of Fascism’ and expressed her ‘great fear of the future and the future generations of Tanzania if the power to muzzle and kill the Press is in the hands of the Office of the President.’\(^{732}\) One MP spoke of his concern that while Nyerere could be trusted with such powers, his successors might not be so responsible.\(^{733}\)

When the house adjourned the debate on the evening of 2 May, there was some doubt that the bill would pass. The next day, Kawawa made a decisive intervention. Appealing to threats from imperialist ‘enemies’ of the nation, the second vice-president rounded on the *Standard* and its foreign owners. Kawawa claimed that ‘capitalists are using newspapers as weapons for influencing the people’. He noted that the *Standard* had recently reported that Tanzania had acquired missiles and that such false stories might be seized on to justify an attack from outside. Kawawa argued that the bill was intended to prevent ‘intrigues and designs by the imperialist press to subvert our people and their aspirations.’\(^{734}\) His speech rallied support for the bill, which passed by 107 votes to 19.

\(^{729}\)*Sturmer, Media History*, 120.

\(^{730}\)*Kyaluzi Tibesigwa, letter to the editor, Standard, 10 January 1968, 2; George Ntabaro, letter to the editor, *Standard*, 29 January 1968, 2.

\(^{731}\)*Quoted in Mytton, Mass Communication*, 106.

\(^{732}\)*Quoted in Aminzade, Race*, 168.

\(^{733}\)*Mytton, Mass Communication*, 106.

\(^{734}\)*Quoted in Aminzade, Race*, 168.
with 6 abstentions and 51 members absent. The latter included, the Standard reported, some of the law’s ‘strongest critics’.735

The confrontation continued in the pages of the Standard itself. On 4 May, a front-page editorial stressed that it respected the rule of parliament and had never ‘wittingly published anything which could be termed undesirable’ to the nation interest. It asked for clarification for what Makame had meant by ‘undesirable’. The newspaper likened the bill to ‘a pistol pointed at the head: the victim never knowing when the trigger will be pressed.’736 The government chewed over the matter for a week, before issuing a scathing response. In the Standard, A. A. Riyami, the director of the information services, challenged the entire premise of the original editorial. He claimed that Makame had not used the word ‘undesirable’. ‘This appears to be your own invention’, he wrote, ‘or, perhaps, you have been let down by a poor translation.’ His tone was uncompromising and deeply sarcastic: ‘[a]ny responsible newspaper would understand what is “subversive” material and what is not.’ Riyami concluded by reaffirming the government’s commitment to freedom of expression.737

The authoritarian streak in the Tanzanian government’s treatment of the press was in evidence again in October, when it banned Kenya’s Nation Group of newspapers.738 The decision was announced soon after the Daily Nation published a story about unrest in the Arusha region.739 Like the Standard Group, the Nation Group was under non-African ownership – in this case, the Aga Khan. The Daily Nation responded indignantly, pointing out that in June, editors and publishers representing newspapers from across to world had come to Kenya for the annual conference of the International Press Institute. ‘With newspapers censored, suppressed or muzzled in so many parts of the world (Czechoslovakia and South Africa are examples that spring easily to mind), it is sad indeed that the bright image recorded in Nairobi four months ago has been so quickly tarnished’, reflected the Daily Nation.740 In a tit-for-tat response, in January 1969 the Kenyan government banned the sale of the Nationalist, after the newspaper published an ‘extremely hostile and irresponsible article’ about student protests in Nairobi. Taking a swipe at the Nationalist’s Marxist and Maoist sympathies, a Kenyan government statement declared that it was ‘not prepared to

735 ‘Press ban bill passed’, Standard, 4 May 1968, 1, 3.
736 ‘Comment’, Standard, 4 May 1968, 1.
738 Information Services Division, Ministry of Information and Tourism, 19 October 1968, MP, ICS 115/1/3.
739 Norris to UK HC, Dar es Salaam, 22 October 1968, UKNA, FCO 31/432/4; Stewart to UK HC, Dar es Salaam, 23 October 1968, UKNA, FCO 31/432/5.
Tanzania’s ‘68

accept lessons on democracy’ from a newspaper ‘whose pre-occupation is with clichés and slogans borrowed from foreign countries.’

When the *Standard* displayed scepticism about the purpose of Operation Vijana, a campaign against ‘indecent dress’ described in greater detail below, the TYL turned on the newspaper. On 2 January, ‘the standard bearer of reaction’ – as the *Nationalist* described its rival – ‘got a rude shock’. Shouting ‘slaughter! slaughter!’ TYL cadres marched from their headquarters in Lumumba Street to the *Standard* offices near the Askari Monument. They demanded to speak to the editor. When he refused to appear, the youths lit a bonfire of copies of the *Standard*. The TYL’s secretary general, Moses Nnauye, read out a statement on behalf of the ‘sons and daughters of the workers and peasants of Tanzania’, who constituted ‘the most dynamic vanguard of Tanzania’s revolution’. Nnauye condemned the newspaper’s ‘subversive activities’ and vowed ‘a life-and-death struggle’ for its ‘liquidation’. The *Standard* had been founded by ‘colonial interests’ and ‘always stood for the oppression and exploitation of the African by foreign finance monopolies.’

A fortnight before, in his ‘Pressman’ column, Babu had called a *Standard* editorial on Operation Vijana ‘a blatant sermon in anti-Tanzanianism, racism and subversion’, which symbolised ‘the notorious mission of that imperialist newspaper against the people of this country’.

Although the moment of anti-*Standard* militancy soon passed, the underlying notion of a newspaper owned and staffed by Europeans in socialist Tanzania remained problematic. In early 1969, there were whisperings of an impending nationalisation. In April, the *Standard*’s editor, Brendan Grimshaw, confirmed to Burns that the government intended to take over the newspaper, although the decision was not formally made until the following year. On 5 February 1970, its front page announced the *Standard* was ‘appearing for the first time as the official newspaper of the Government of Tanzania’.

There was a marked chasm between Nyerere’s cool diplomacy and the feverish language of anti-imperialism which greeted events in Czechoslovakia and Vietnam, as well as local targets like the

**Political ventilation and the purpose of protest**

741 ‘Kenya bans TANU paper’, *Standard*, 1 February 1969, 1. The Nation Group of newspapers were unbanned on 5 February 1970, the same day on which the government announced the nationalisation of the *Standard*.


744 Burns to State Dept, 4 April 1969, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 393, PPB TANZAN.

Tanzania’s ‘68

Standard. At times, the actions and words of the radical groups within the TANU apparatus embarrassed the president. His ‘Pity the ambassador’ editorial in the Nationalist implied his disappointment with the behaviour of the protestors at the Soviet embassy, especially the involvement of two government ministers. In conversation with Burns in November 1968, Nyerere said that he had been ‘stunned’ by Mgonja’s and Sijaona’s antics. ‘We still have a lot of growing up to do’, he remarked.\footnote{Burns to State Dept, 13 December 1968, NARA, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2517, POL US-TANZAN.} He was also aware of the problems arising from the provocative stance adopted by the Nationalist. When Burns raised the issue with him, Nyerere laughed and said that ‘that newspaper’ was responsible for more diplomatic complaints than anything else in Tanzania.\footnote{Burns to State Dept, 5 January 1968, NARA, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2517, POL US-TANZAN.}

Why did Nyerere and the TANU leadership tolerate the activities of the TYL and the members of the Nationalist staff? Although calls for ‘vigilance’ and dedication to nation-building may have been welcomed, their more radical views often clashed with Nyerere’s efforts to anchor Tanzanian political discourse to njamaa socialism. Since the government subsidised the production of the Nationalist, it could doubtless have exercised far greater control over its editorial line.\footnote{Tordoff and Mazrui, ‘Left and the Super-Left’, 438.} Indeed, Nyerere did intervene on occasion, by writing a leading article (as, for example, he had also done so in the case of the ‘Hands Off’ editorial) or ordering silence on Indochina during sensitive negotiations regarding future peace talks. But in general, the president was content to give the newspaper a relatively free rein.

In part, this was because that despite being associated with the TANU party-state, the TYL and the Nationalist were removed from central government. The TYL provided an outlet through which the country to register its outrage at examples of superpower imperialism without bringing State House into direct conflict with Washington, Moscow, or their allies. When assessing the Vietnam demonstration of 20 July, the French ambassador recognised that given the low turnout in numbers, the most significant aspect of the protest was that ‘it was authorised by the government – the newspapers suggested at its wish – and perhaps discreetly encouraged in certain circles close to power. We know that it is hardly the habit of the Tanzanian regime to permit demonstrations of this type.’ The French report noted the irony that just two hours before the demonstration, Burns had signed an agreement under which the United States would give a $13 million loan to cover the construction of a road connecting Tanzania and Zambia – the American counterpunch to the Chinese-funded TAZARA project.\footnote{Naudy to MAE-DAL, 23 July 1968, CADN, 193PO/1/31 AII32.} Tanzania’s politics-blind aid policy permitted such behaviour, but the use of the TYL still allowed brazen protest to coexist with the acceptance of development aid.

Likewise, when Juma Mwapachu, who was at the time chairman of the university branch of the TYL, explained to me the sequence of events that led to the Czechoslovakia protest, he emphasised Nyerere’s concern not to endanger Tanzania’s relationship with Moscow.
Mwalimu again called me to say, look, Juma, you have to lead a youth demonstration against the Soviets. Everyone wondered at that time how a country that was very close to the Soviet Union or to the socialist countries could actually undertake that. But Mwalimu was very clever. Instead of using state authority to say, ‘we don’t agree with you’, he allowed the youth movement to perform that particular task […] When I met Mwalimu, he was basically saying that the state would protest against the Soviets for the invasion of Czechoslovakia. But we had a kind of relationship, and didn’t really want to be seen to be formally doing that, and so we want you, the youth in this country, to lead this protest. But for us, even though we were protesting against the Soviets, we were actually supporting the state, we were like agents of the state. It was not spontaneous on our part. It was very much state-driven.

The protestors who took to the streets elsewhere in the world did so to condemn the superpower interventions in Vietnam and Czechoslovakia, but also the Cold War order which they felt their own national government was sustaining. Superpower interventions and the global order were also the target of demonstrators in Dar es Salaam, but – critically – the Tanzanian government was not. Nyerere’s regime made clear its position on Vietnam and Czechoslovakia, while ujamaa socialism was firmly aligned against a Cold War world-system that perpetuated inequalities between the wealthy North and the poor South. Government and demonstrators shared the same perspective. This permitted the recruitment of student and youth protestors to express Tanzanian discontent with Cold War interventions elsewhere, without provoking diplomatic tiffs with the superpowers.

However, when government ministers or journalists in a party-owned newspaper launched into crude anti-American tirades that did little to help Tanzania’s standing in the global order, this logic collapsed. Tanzania’s policy of accepting aid from all sources, provided no strings were attached, discouraged against needlessly provoking potential donors. Yet vocal members of the Tanzanian elite were unlikely to accept being muzzled by the government. Some, such as Babu, thought that Nyerere’s ujamaa socialism was ideologically misdirected. Others sought more intense Africanisation and were hostile to the wealthy Asian business class. Allowing radical journalists and hot-headed politicians off the leash on matters of foreign policy therefore represented a form of ‘political ventilation’ in Dar es Salaam’s public sphere, channelling passions outwards, rather than at the party-state.

The American embassy became wearily attuned to this dynamic. In December 1967, Burns challenged an official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs over the content of ‘Pressman’s Commentary’ and received a wry smile. The official privately told him that ‘Pressman’ was a ‘foolish person who wrote a lot of meaningless material, but whom the government felt should be allowed to express himself in print from time to time as a kind of cathartic exercise.’ Nyerere judged it preferable to have Babu inside his government, with a weekly opportunity to vent his
Tanzania’s ‘68

spleen under a pseudonym in the Nationalist, than attack the principles of ujamaa socialism from the outside.

By March 1969, Burns felt he understood the situation. In a lucid critique of politics in Tanzania – among the best produced by any foreign diplomat in the archives I consulted, though still carrying patronising undertones – he identified the reason Nyerere kept figures like Mgonja and Sijaona in government, as well as members of the Nationalist staff at the party newspaper.

Their speechmaking and editorial writing are good prods and stimuli, but there is also the equally, if not even more important advantage that by giving them jobs and a platform, Nyerere keeps them out in the open where they can be seen, where they have opportunities to work off their neurosis in public, and where they can mature through having to live with their mistakes. He also realizes that if he cast them out of the establishment, he would not only lose their usefulness as goads and gadflies, but he would also run the risk of having them plot against him.752

Already unnerved by the spate of coups in late 1960s Africa, Nyerere had been further shaken by the events of 1967. His dispute from Kambona had created a powerful enemy in exile. A one-party state necessitated the maintenance of unity at the top, which required the toleration of powerful individuals who occasionally (or even consistently) stepped beyond the party line.

‘Argue Don’t Shout’ and the demise of Lawi Sijaona

However, Nyerere’s patience was finite. Even when writing his report on ‘The Nationalist and other radicals’, Burns recognised that the success of the president’s technique of rhetorical bloodletting had been at the expense of Tanzania’s image abroad.753 In July 1968, an expatriate Nationalist staff member, Belle Harris, told a researcher that Nyerere and other ministers were concerned about what the newspaper said, especially when it was ‘rude’ to other countries and endangered aid relations.754 Soon after the Czechoslovakia demonstration, Mgonja and Sijaona were moved to less politically sensitive ministerial roles in more technocratic institutions. Mgonja became minister for education and Sijaona was appointed minister of health and housing. In Belgrade in October 1969, Mgonja’s successor, Stephen Mhando, acknowledged to William Leonhart – then Washington’s ambassador to Yugoslavia, but formerly to Tanzania – that his country still had its ‘radicals and extremists’, but they had now been placed in jobs where they were ‘buried bureaucratically but effectively’.755

752 Burns to State Dept, 31 March 1969, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2513, POL 2 TANZAN.
753 Burns to State Dept, 31 March 1969, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2513, POL 2 TANZAN.
754 Graham Mytton, interview with Belle Harris, 10 July 1968, MP, ICS 115/1/4.
755 Leonhart to State Dept, 17 October 1969, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2514, POL 7 TANZAN.
Sijaona’s change of ministries marked the beginning of a lengthy tussle with Nyerere that became enwrapped in the politics of protest. Sijaona had long occupied a central role in the TYL. In 1956, he became the organisation’s first secretary-general. Though he relinquished the position in 1960, Sijaona continued to be a dominant force within the movement’s ranks. In September 1967, he assumed the role of chairman and began to exercise de facto leadership, despite Joseph Nyerere, the president’s brother, serving as its secretary-general. But as the previous chapter established, while minister of state at the second vice-president’s office, Sijaona actively undermined the security of Eduardo Mondlane, whom Nyerere greatly respected. Sijaona’s connections with Lazaro Kavandame cast his loyalties under suspicion. His hostility towards non-Africans, combined with a volatile temper, also dismayed Nyerere. His reputation was further damaged by his past associations with Kambona.756

On 3 October 1968, the TYL announced its plans for ‘Operation Vijana’, a campaign against ‘indecent dress’.757 The wearing of miniskirts or tight trousers was deemed antithetical to Tanzania’s ‘national culture’ – TANU’s reclamation of an African heritage which had been trampled on by colonialism and risked corruption by the influence of a decadent cosmopolitan modernity. Sijaona emphasised that the enforcement of the ban would be concentrated on Dar es Salaam, since ‘the people whose minds have been enslaved by dehumanising practices are confined into the urban areas’.758 After the introduction of the ban in January 1969, TYL members patrolled the streets of the capital in search of any sartorial impropriety.

By this stage, there were palpable tensions between Nyerere and Sijaona. The TYL’s militancy, epitomised by the language which accompanied Operation Vijana, posed a threat to the authority of the TANU leadership. The British high commission reckoned that the anti-miniskirt campaign was intended to bolster Sijaona’s position within the party. ‘As a self-appointed custodian of youthful morals he aims to distract attention away from past indiscretions’, it noted.759 Nyerere himself reined in the TYL during Operation Vijana, by ordering that cadres involved must carry identification cards, wear uniforms, and only carry out arrests with police assistance. These restrictive measures meant that the campaign soon fizzled out.760

In March 1969, Nyerere convened a surprise meeting of TANU’s Central Committee in Mwanza. TANU announced in public that the meeting had only discussed the issue of candidate selection for party district chairmanships. However, its unexpected nature and the fact that it was the first of its kind held out of the capital led to much speculation in Dar es Salaam about Sijaona’s position.761 The CID’s regional chief confided in an American diplomat that Sijaona was under

756 Burns to State Dept, 4 April 1968, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2513, POL 2 TANZAN; Hart to Holmes, 6 June 1969, UKNA, FCO 31/434/18; Brennan, ‘Youth’, 210-11.
757 See Ivaska “‘Anti-Mini Militants’”; Ivaska, Cultured States.
758 Quoted in Ivaska, Cultured States, 62.
759 Hart to Holmes, 6 June 1969, UKNA, FCO 31/434/18.
760 Burns to State Dept, 31 March 1969, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2513, POL 2 TANZAN.
761 Burns to State Dept, 4 April 1969, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2513, POL 2 TANZAN.
surveillance by the security services, who were amassing evidence against him. On 29 March, Sijaona organised a TYL rally in Dar es Salaam, where he expressed support for the Vietnamese cause and promised ‘that the imperialists and particularly the United States imperialists, who are the rampant abomination inflicting death tears on humanity, are bound to meet with an ignominious defeat.’ The American embassy considered it an attempt by Sijaona ‘to wrap himself in an issue which is popular with some segments of Tanzanian society and therefore make it difficult for Nyerere to attack him directly.’

Sijaona responded to the wave of public enthusiasm in Tanzania that greeted the Apollo moon landing in July by launching another attack on the United States. At a procession at the university, the language of protest reached a new level of vehemence. Sijaona shouted ‘slaughter Nixon’. Mkapa told the TYL members that the United States was ‘bestial’ and connected the situation in Indochina to the national revolution in Tanzania, claiming that ‘what is happening in Vietnam today should be a greater reminder to us of the nature of imperialism and we should heighten our vigilance for Africa is the next theatre of aggression and plunder.’ Among a clutch of virulently anti-American editorials in the Nationalist, Kaisi produced a photo essay which contrasted the success of the moon landings with the conflict in Vietnam.

This spate of attacks elicited renewed American complaints to the Foreign Ministry. At a party at the Israeli embassy, the chargé d’affaires, Thomas Pickering, brought up the issue with Daniel Mfinanga, the ministry’s chief of protocol. When Pickering mentioned Sijaona’s name, Mfinanga ‘winced’, but agreed to a more official meeting, at which Mfinanga distanced the government from the activities of the TYL. Given the organisation was ‘specifically for children (watoto)’, he asserted, ‘some of its actions were inclined to be childish (utoto) and had to be overlooked’. He also suggested that Sijaona was not acting in his ministerial capacity, but as chairman of the TYL, and so his views did not reflect those of the government, which sincerely believed Nixon was working for peace in Indochina.

His patience exhausted by such antics, Nyerere issued a pamphlet entitled ‘Argue Don’t Shout’, in which he called for a more mature attitude from his government towards international affairs. After recapitulating the principles of Tanzania’s foreign policy – liberation, non-alignment, self-reliance – he rounded on the emotional strain among many of his spokesmen. ‘Of course’, he observed,

it is much more difficult to present a reasoned argument than to shout slogans like “imperialism”, “communism”, or “racism”, and there is sometimes less immediate emotional

762 Memcon (Manikam, Pickering), 24 March 1969, enclosed in Burns to State Dept, 27 March 1969, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2354, POL 30 MOZ.
764 Burns to State Dept, 4 April 1969, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2513, POL 2 TANZAN.
766 Memcon (Mfinanga, Tunze, Mwandanji, Pickering), 24 July 1969, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2517, POL US TANZAN.
satisfaction. But temper tantrums are the reaction of children; adults who speak for their country should have better control over themselves.\textsuperscript{767}

These scolding words were not popular among Nyerere’s target audience. One member of the \textit{Nationalist} staff, speaking in passing to an American embassy officer, described it as ‘nonsense’ and that Tanzania would sap its ‘revolutionary vitality’ if it failed to stand up to ‘imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism’.\textsuperscript{768} The schism between Nyerere’s measured foreign policy and the radical ideologues was clear.

As the following chapter sets out, the discovery of a coup plot orchestrated by Kambona in October 1969 increased President Nyerere’s suspicion of rivals within Tanzania. In April 1970, Joseph Nyerere resigned at the TYL’s secretary-general, after being outmanoeuvred by Sijaona and Mgonja. Concerned about its militancy, in 1971 President Nyerere slashed the TYL’s funding. The situation came to a head in August 1971, when the TANU leadership introduced a new age limit of 35 for the movement’s leaders, which would have excluded the 43-year-old Sijaona. The TYL’s biennial conference, dominated by elders, rejected the proposal. When Ngombale-Mwiru, a senior TYL cadre, told Nyerere of the decision, the president was furious. He fell back on the TANU leadership: the party’s Central Committee ruled in Nyerere’s favour and Sijaona was stripped of his role. In the 1970s the TYL continued to act as a body for political mobilisation in Tanzania, but became more subservient to the TANU leadership.\textsuperscript{769}

\textbf{Conclusion}

Babu began 1969 in characteristic fashion. In his \textit{Nationalist} column, he surveyed events of the previous year, dwelling especially on the American setbacks in Vietnam. Decrying imperialism as the ‘number one enemy’, he declared that

the people of Tanzania – particularly the youth – must raise their vigilance against the people’s enemies here and abroad. The people must fearlessly expose the enemies, rout them out and move forward to socialism under the banner of the Arusha Declaration […] Let us all resolve to make 1969 the year of imperialist doom.\textsuperscript{770}

The combination of damning assault on ‘imperialism’ and exhortation to fight its enemies in building the nation on the home front was a fitting finale: ‘Pressman’s Commentary’ did not appear


\textsuperscript{768} Pickering to State Dept, 1 August 1969, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2512, POL 2 TANZAN. The pamphlet had been passed to the American embassy prior to its wider dissemination by a ‘close confidant’ of Nyerere (probably Joan Wicken).

\textsuperscript{769} Brennan, ‘Youth’, 211-12; interview with Kingunge Ngombale-Mwiru, Victoria, Dar es Salaam, 26 August 2015.

Tanzania’s ‘68

in future editions of the Nationalist. Although I have found no explanation, public or private, for its cessation, it seems unlikely that the decision was made without Nyerere’s approval.

Whereas protestors in the West, the Soviet Bloc, and other Third World countries questioned the authority of the state, Tanzania’s experience of ’68 resulted in a bolstering of the national government. While an element of transnational and international exchange was present in Tanzania’s engagement with developments in Vietnam and Czechoslovakia, they were largely interpreted in African and especially national terms. Since the government was unwilling to go beyond sober condemnation of superpower interventions, radical journalists and student protestors were mandated with expressing local anger. Attacks on ‘imperialism’ fed into a national discourse emphasising the need for vigilance and unity in order to fulfil the revolutionary goals set out by ujamaa socialism. Herein lies another essential difference between the European or North American ‘68ers and the protestors in Dar es Salaam: while the former articulated a ‘counterculture’ to the political mainstream, the Tanzanian youth rallied around the banner of the ‘national culture’ which Nyerere and TANU espoused. These nation-building tasks were entrusted to the TYL, which was assigned a monopoly over popular mobilisation.

Providing space for protest – whether on the streets of Dar es Salaam or in the pages of the Nationalist – allowed potential troublemakers to direct their frustrations and ambitions outwards, rather than inwards at the regime. There were limits to this freedom, however. Having been bitten hard by the foreign policy crises of 1964-65, Nyerere did not want to alienate potential donor states. As Mhando told Leonhart in Belgrade in 1969, Tanzania was more interested in its domestic issues than in quarrelling with foreign powers. While remaining true to their core principles, especially non-alignment and African liberation, Nyerere and his government were now ‘less inclined to look for opportunities to antagonize countries which might wish to help them.’

Nyerere also feared the dangers inherent in potential rivals establishing power bases within the state apparatus. Enmeshed in multiple political controversies, Sijaona became locked in a struggle with Nyerere, in which the president ultimately demonstrated the decisive quality of his own authority within the party-state.

Finally, one striking feature of the Tanzanian presentation to superpower interventions in Vietnam and Czechoslovakia was the conspicuous absence of the term ‘Cold War’. Rather than interpret developments through the lens of an ‘East versus West’ ideological and geopolitical dichotomy, the dividing line was drawn between the weak and the powerful. The United States was a wealthy superpower, Vietnam was a poor ex-colony; the Soviet Union was a big state, Czechoslovakia was a small state. Local intellectuals, journalists, students, and politicians articulated an alternative global vision to the Eurocentric metanarrative of Cold War competition. Instead, they deplored American and Soviet interference beyond their own borders as a continuation of the

771 Leonhart to State Dept, 17 October 1969, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2514, POL 7 TANZAN.
same imperialist practices under which Africans had previously suffered, and which continued to obstruct Tanzanian development after independence. They echoed Nyerere’s own worldview, which, as the obstacles posed to Tanzania by the structural inequalities of the global economy became clear, was increasingly concerned with what are today termed North/South divisions.\textsuperscript{772}

Chapter 6
Politics in the time of *ujamaa*, part one: openings

On the third anniversary of the Arusha Declaration in February 1970, Nyerere made a radio broadcast to the nation. He praised Tanzania’s leadership for embracing the spirit of *ujamaa*, but warned against any relaxation. “The feudalists and capitalists know that their hopes of defeating our socialist policies by using TANU and Government leaders have been very much reduced’, he claimed. ‘You will notice that I said reduced, not ended: the appetite of a hyena does not end as long as he sees a bone.”

Over the half-decade which followed the Arusha Declaration, Nyerere ground down the opposition to and within his government. Ultimately, the ‘hyenas’ included not just those who rejected the principles of *ujamaa*, like Oscar Kambona, but other internal threats, especially from the Marxist left. As previous chapters have demonstrated, while the government preached the need for unity – *umoja* – the leadership of the TANU party-state contained divisions along ideological, political, and personal faultlines. Faced by a mixture of external threat and internal dissent, Nyerere moved to eradicate domestic opposition and shore up his authority in Tanzania.

While existing narratives of Tanzania’s shift towards authoritarian government abound, they overwhelmingly focus on the centrepiece of the *ujamaa* reforms, the villagisation campaign, at the expense of political feuding at Frederick Cooper’s ‘gate’. References to schisms among the elite are rare. This chapter and the one which follows therefore seek to plug a gap in the history of post-colonial Tanzania. After his flight to London in 1967, Kambona told a press conference that he would ‘take the lid’ off Tanzanian politics. The Nationalist confidently welcomed his proposal. ‘Tanzania will be very pleased if he “takes the lid off” our politics’, an editorial stated. ‘We have no fear. We have nothing to hide.’

Taking up the Nationalist’s challenge, this chapter and the next set out a detailed narrative of politics in the *ujamaa* years. While the prism here is in part distinctly Tanzanian, the city of Dar es Salaam continued to serve as a nodal ‘gate’ between the mainland and the islands, the rural interior and the rest of the world, the national and the international.

The deaths of Kassim Hanga and Othman Shariff

By 1968, four years after the revolution and union with Tanganyika, Zanzibar had sunk into an economic and political malaise. In contrast to Nyerere’s flexible policies of self-reliance on the mainland, Karume’s regime pursued genuine economic autarky. Despite a boom in clove prices, the government hoarded foreign exchange and preferred to develop local agriculture, which led to food

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shortages. Racial persecution of Zanzibaris of Arab and Comorian descent continued. Racial persecution of Zanzibaris of Arab and Comorian descent continued.775 Africans benefitted from the land redistribution which followed the revolution, but their everyday freedoms were significantly curbed. Zanzibaris were prevented from travelling to the mainland. The Stasi-trained security forces clamped down on any signs of dissent.776 One Tanzanian I interviewed compared Karume’s Zanzibar to Macias Nguema’s Equatorial Guinea or ‘Papa Doc’s’ Haiti.777 Another Zanzibari academic describes the narrowness of political space on the islands as being like communist Albania and Romania.778 This opacity encouraged rumours of coup plots, which continued to fester in Zanzibar after the revolution. Although Babu had been transferred to the mainland and his party banned, talk of a residual network of Umma cells on the islands persisted.779

While Karume retained a dominant public presence in Zanzibari politics, power became increasingly concentrated in a cabal of hardliners. They included Seif Bakari (member of the Revolutionary Council, chairman of the ASPYL, and political commissar in the army), Said Natepe (vice-chairman of the ASPYL), and Yusuf Himidi (commander of the armed forces). As leaders of the ASPYL, these men had played a leading role in the seizure of power in 1964, after disagreeing with Karume’s policy of nonviolent opposition to the incumbent ZNP-ZPPP government. Indeed, Karume initially owed his position to Bakari and his supporters, who had summoned him from Dar es Salaam to serve as the figurehead of the revolutionary regime. Only in the following weeks did Karume consolidate his personal rule.780 Like their TYL colleagues on the mainland, the ASPYL became close to the Chinese, from whom they imbibed the rhetorical and performative repertoire of Maoism, to Western concern.781

Relations among the Zanzibari leadership were fractious. In October 1966, Saleh Saadalla, Zanzibar’s minister for public works and communications, attempted to shoot Karume at a meeting of the Revolutionary Council. He was incarcerated and later ‘disappeared’.782 The following September, heated exchanges among the Revolutionary Council broke into open violence, after which the ASP secretary-general, Thabit Kombo, required medical care.783 In early 1969, Natepe was secretly imprisoned for a month after daring to criticise Karume’s orders to suppress slogans

777 Interview with Salim Msoma, Oyster Bay, Dar es Salaam, 2 July 2015.
779 See for example US consulate, Zanzibar, to State Dept, 28 June 1968, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2516, POL 23-9 TANZAN.
780 Burgess, ‘Remembering Youth’, 34-35.
781 Ross to State Dept, 10 June 1970, NARA, RG 59, SNF 1970-3, Box 2617, POL 15-1 TANZAN; Burgess, ‘Mao in Zanzibar’.
782 Burgess, Raw, 129-30.
783 French consulate, Zanzibar, 26 September 1967, CADN, 193PO/1/12 Z1.
attacking the West. In Zanzibar’s opaque politics, news of these confrontations remained solely the subject of rumour.

On 22 August 1969, Bakari chaired a meeting of the upper ranks of Zanzibar’s police and armed forces, which discussed the alleged subversion of officers by conspirators from the mainland. Those present adduced that a plot had been conceived to overthrow the Karume government. Karume then travelled to Dar es Salaam, where he asked Nyerere to transfer Kassim Hanga, Othman Shariff, and Ali Mwinyi Tambwe to Zanzibar. Since being released from preventive detention in December 1968, Hanga had been living quietly in one of Kambona’s properties in Dar es Salaam. Shariff had served as Tanzania’s first ambassador to Washington immediately after the union of 1964. The following year, he was recalled to Tanzania in the fallout from the ‘phone tapping’ plot. Shariff was subsequently accused of plotting against the Zanzibari regime and briefly imprisoned, until Nyerere negotiated his transfer to the mainland and release. In 1969, Shariff was working as a veterinary officer in Iringa, central Tanzania. Tambwe was a Zanzibari of Comorian descent, who had held a senior position in TANU prior to Tanganyika’s independence and later served as deputy minister for foreign affairs in Zanzibar. At the time of his arrest, he was working as a director of Continental Ore, a private firm specialising in precious metals.

Nyerere initially refused to grant Karume’s request, but when the latter returned with ‘evidence’ of a plot involving the subversion of Zanzibari army officers, the former acquiesced. On 1 September, the Standard reported the trio’s arrest. Zanzibar’s police commissioner, Eddington Kissassi, and attorney-general, Wolfgang Dourado, immediately refuted the story. There were rumours of further arrests, but no official announcement from the government on either the islands or mainland. ‘Whether the plot was genuine, concocted, or a mixture of both, [the Zanzibar] government is at least acting as if it has nipped it in the bud’, remarked the American consulate.

The arrest of Hanga alarmed the Soviet Union. While there is no indication that Moscow had a hand in any plot, its diplomats were worried about their potential implication via their associations with Hanga, whose pro-Soviet inclinations were well known. He had studied at Lumumba University in Moscow and had a Russian wife of partial African descent. In the pre-revolution years, Karume and Hanga had shared a close relationship, but friendship became enmity after 1964,

785 Matlock to State Dept, 1 September 1969, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2516, POL 23-9 TANZAN; Naudy to MAE-DAL, 15 September 1969, CADN, 193PO/1/12 Z1; Clayton, Zanzibar Revolution, 133.
786 On 1 October, Hans Ries, the American vice-president of Continental Ore, flew into Dar es Salaam to investigate Tambwe’s circumstances and discussed the arrests with Mark Bomaní, the attorney-general. Ries later reported the conversation to the American embassy. According to Bomaní, Karume gave assurances to Nyerere that the prisoners’ safety would be protected. Bomaní also implied that the ‘evidence’ Karume had provided was not entirely convincing. Matlock to State Dept, 2 October 1969, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2517, POL 29.
787 Matlock to State Dept, 2 September 1969, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2516, POL 23-9 TANZAN.
788 Haught to State Dept, 26 September 1969, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2516, POL 23-9 TANZAN.
Politics in the time of *ujamaa* I

*inter alia* because Hanga had visited Saadalla in prison after his arrest. In October 1968, the Soviet embassy in Dar es Salaam had reportedly given Hanga financial assistance upon his release from preventive detention. Hanga, the British high commission believed, was Moscow’s ‘bought man’.

The Soviet Union therefore had grounds for concern. Its representatives feared that their connections with Hanga might lead to their further marginalisation in Tanzania, especially in Zanzibar, where Chinese influence was growing at the expense of the Eastern Bloc. Indeed, the first news to reach Washington about the arrests came – via the French consulate in Zanzibar – from a Soviet diplomat. At a private dinner with his American counterpart on 11 September, the Soviet consul, Stephen Rogov, asked about the arrests. Rogov’s unusually direct inquiry suggested to Jack Matlock that Moscow was worried. Reports reached the British that the Soviet ambassador in Dar es Salaam had leant on the Czechoslovakians to extract Hanga from his fate in Zanzibar, by offering to provide Hanga with medical aid in Europe. The Czechoslovakian ambassador Mikulas Surina had defiantly maintained a pro-Dubček stance even after the crushing of the Prague Spring and seemed an unlikely partner for Soviet cooperation. He refused the Soviet request, in the belief that Moscow was trying to rope him into the plot.

The Zanzibar regime finally broke its silence at a mass rally on 26 October. Addressing a crowd marked by a high turnout of policemen and soldiers, Major Lazaro X. William set out the alleged coup conspiracy and gave the names of the conspirators, four of whom had been sentenced to death. In his own speech at the end of the rally, Karume preempted criticisms of the lack of due judicial process, by arguing that the courts system represented the inherited vestiges of British colonialism – though he then claimed that the executions were also justified under colonial law, which stipulated the death penalty for treason. ‘Those whom you have slaughtered, have been slaughtered’, Karume told a baying crowd. The names of those executed were not given, although it

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789 Burgess, Race, 130.
790 Haught to State Dept, 26 September 1969, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2516, POL 23-9 TANZAN.
792 French consulate, Zanzibar, 25 August 1969, CADN, 193PO/1/12 Z1; Matlock to State Dept, 27 August 1969, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2516, POL 23-9 TANZAN.
793 Memcon (Rogov, Matlock, Haught), 11 September 1969, enclosed in Matlock to State Dept, 26 September 1969, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2517, POL 29 TANZAN.
794 Hobden, 14 November 1969, UKNA, FCO 31/437/113.
was generally assumed that they included Hanga and Shariff. At another rally on 2 November, an ASPYL spokesman encouraged Nyerere to treat those arrested on the mainland in the same way.

The news of the executions took the Tanzanian government by surprise. When the American chargé d’affaires called on Mark Bomani on 27 October, the attorney-general ‘made no effort to hide his consternation’. Bomani claimed that he had no knowledge of the death sentences before the previous day’s rally and that the special court in Zanzibar had no legal basis. The Canadian high commission reported that General Mrisho Sarakikya was angry at not only the executions, but the role played by TPDF(Z) officers in the affair. According to Sarakikya, Nyerere himself was ‘furious’. Tellingly, the TANU press offered no comment.

This sense of embarrassment on the mainland was felt by Maurice Foley, parliamentary under-secretary at the FCO, when he visited Tanzania shortly after the announcement of the executions. He pointed out to Nyerere the problems which might arise from the ‘external presentation’ of these events. Nyerere was evasive on the Zanzibari ‘conspiracy’: he affirmed that there had been a plot against Karume’s regime, but did not think it had posed a genuine threat. In Zanzibar, Foley found Karume defiant, claiming he had evidence of links between the plot against his government, Kambona, and a number of non-Tanzanian co-conspirators, including Kwesi Armah, a Ghanaian who had served in Nkrumah’s government. Stephen Mhando, the minister of state for foreign affairs, accompanied Foley to Zanzibar. Mhando told Foley that in private talks he had made Karume aware of the likely backlash to the executions from the outside world.

Nyerere’s mistake in handing the prisoners over to Karume was ammunition to his conservative critics in the West. In the Times, Roy Lewis accused Nyerere of failing to protect Shariff, whom it was claimed had been personally assured of his safety by the president. Referring to the Cold War spectre of China, Lewis wrote that the union, far from restoring Zanzibar to normality, appears to be spreading Zanzibar’s arbitrary rule to Tanganyika. The importance of the Chinese in Zanzibar, and now in building the Tanzania-Zambia railway, may afford some explanation. Whatever the wider issues, the story of Othman Shariff is a miserable comment on conditions in island and mainland alike.

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795 Biesel to Naudy, 27 October 1969, CADN, 193PO/1/12 Z1; Haught to State Dept, 28 October 1969, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2517, POL 29 TANZAN. The full translated text of Karume’s speech is enclosed in Hobden to Holmes, 7 November 1969, UKNA, FCO 31/437/111. On the ‘dismantling of the judiciary’ in Zanzibar, see Shivji, Pan-Africanism, 110-12. The Zanzibar government gave no confirmation of the executions of Hanga and Shariff until 1975, when President Aboud Jumbe told a British television crew that the pair (and others) ‘have paid the price of revolution… They are dead, yes.’ Quoted in Fouéré, ‘Reinterpreting Revolutionary Zanzibar’, 687 n49.

796 Biesel to Naudy, 2 November 1969, CADN, 193PO/1/12 Z1.

797 Matlock to State Dept, 27 October 1969, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2517, POL 29 TANZAN.

798 Matlock to State Dept, 31 October 1969, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2517, POL 29 TANZAN.

799 UK HC, Dar es Salaam, to FCO, 31 October 1969, UKNA, FCO 31/437/100.

How could Nyerere’s condemnations of executions in Rhodesia or South Africa be taken seriously, when even murkier extrajudicial killings were taking place in his own backyard? The crisis surrounding the deaths of Hanga and Shariff also exposed the weakness of Nyerere’s authority over Zanzibar. The Times article, observed a British diplomat, ‘reflected well the President’s inability to bring himself to the point of grasping nettles’. Spurred into action, Nyerere and several union ministers held a series of meetings with Karume, whom they told was embarrassing Tanzania in front of the world. This intervention seemed to have some effect. At a far calmer rally on 8 November, in the presence of Mhando, Karume avoided the topic of the plot altogether and confined his speech solely to the advent of Ramadan.

The episode also demonstrated the relative weakness of Karume’s position in Zanzibar. The driving force behind the arrests had been the faction led by Bakari and Natepe, which brought together the authority of the Revolutionary Council, the coercive power of the army, and the grassroots strength of the ASPYL. A member of the Revolutionary Council, Hafidh Suleiman Almasi, later claimed that the executions were ordered by Bakari’s faction, with few dissenting voices. In an indication of his weakness, Karume told Foley that he had not held a public trial of the plotters, since the Revolutionary Council ‘could not afford to wait, but had to act’. Much later, Babu argued that Karume – his bitter enemy – had been hostage to the Bakari clique. ‘On several occasions when I visited Zanzibar Karume himself would complain to me about the viciousness of this committee and how helpless he was in the circumstances’, wrote Babu. Hanga and others were thus ‘killed in the name of Karume’, rather than on his orders.

Given the perception of Chinese influence within the ASPYL, the United States noted the role played by Bakari and Natepe in the executions with alarm. The fact that this faction could gain enough support within the Revolutionary Council to present Karume with a ‘fait accompli’, reflected the American consul, ‘is disturbing evidence of ChiCom potential to wield influence in Zanzibar political affairs’. The Americans were concerned that the discord between mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar might lead to the dissolution of the union. The strong Chinese presence on the islands was perceived as a potential threat, should the Zanzibar regime snap the leash that tethered it to Nyerere’s moderating influence. The United States was unnerved by reports from

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801 Much later, Nyerere’s decision to transfer Hanga and Shariff to Zanzibar drew criticism from Tanzanians. In an interview in 1995, Babu said that ‘Nyerere was a weak person as far as Zanzibar was concerned. He wanted to win over Karume at any circumstances […] He sent people to Zanzibar and they were killed there, like Hanga and others.’ A. M. Babu, ‘I Was the First Third World Minister to Recognise the GDR’, in Othman (ed.), Babu, 48-49. Shivji makes a similar criticism, accusing Nyerere of overlooking Karume’s excesses in order to hold together the union: Pan-Africanism, 115.

802 Hobden to Holmes, 8 November 1969, UKNA, FCO 31/437/107.

803 Haught to State Dept, 9 November 1969, NARA, RG 59, CFPP 1967-9, Box 2517, POL 29 TANZAN.

804 Haught to State Dept, 15 November 1969, NARA, RG 59, CFPP 1967-9, Box 2517, POL 29 TANZAN.

805 Interview with Muhammad Yussuf, Stone Town, Zanzibar, 13 July 2015.

806 UK HC, Dar es Salaam, to FCO, 31 October 1969, UKNA, FCO 31/437/100.


808 Haught to State Dept, 15 November 1969, NARA, RG 59, CFPP 1967-9, Box 2517, POL 29 TANZAN.
figures close to Nyerere that, even before the arrests and executions, he was weighing up the pros and cons of breaking the union. Washington therefore welcomed an approach by Séan MacBride, the international chairman of Amnesty International, who was considering relaying his concerns to Nyerere about human rights abuses in Zanzibar. The United States believed that outside pressure might encourage Nyerere to deal with the deteriorating condition of Zanzibar more forcefully, whereas to let the matter drift risked a situation whereby Nyerere would determine that the liabilities of the union outweighed its benefits.809

The mainland coup plot and treason trial

These calls for greater transparency and justice in Tanzania were sharpened by developments in Dar es Salaam which paralleled events in Zanzibar. In August and September 1969, there were rumours of discontent among the armed forces. On a tip-off from exiled Portuguese communists in Algeria – who had connections with FRELIMO representatives moving between Algiers and Dar es Salaam – the GDR warned of an imminent period of stasis within the army.810 Amid these murmurs, Nyerere told a military parade at the National Stadium that there were two types of soldier: the one who fights for the nation, the other who fights for money alone.811

On 11 October 1969, while Nyerere was on a state visit to Moscow, Radio Tanzania reported that six people had been arrested for activities ‘not conducive to good order’. They included Michael Kamaliza, the former NUTA secretary-general and minister for labour, and Bibi Titi Mohammed, the former secretary-general of the UWT. Four TPDF officers were detained, although their names were not made public.812 The following day, the Kenyan Sunday Post claimed that Gray Mattaka, the former news editor of the Nationalist, had been arrested while disembarking a flight at Nairobi airport the previous weekend and then handed over to the Tanzanian authorities, although it later came to light that Mattaka had been arrested a month earlier, on 6 September.813 The armed forces and police in Dar es Salaam were placed on full alert.814

Tanzanian intelligence had been tracking Oscar Kambona’s movements since his flight to London in 1967. From late 1968 onwards, they detected a coup plot in the making, involving a group of army officers loyal to Kambona, plus Bibi Titi and Kamaliza, both of whom already bore grudges against Nyerere. Bibi Titi, a long-time Kambona ally, had resigned from her role as head of the UWT in 1967 due to ‘back trouble’, which many took as a coded rejection of the leadership rules attached to the Arusha Declaration. Bibi Titi was also embittered by the marginalisation of the

809 Matlock to State Dept, 3 November 1969, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2517, POL 29 TANZAN.
810 Sedlaczek to Kiesewetter, 6 August 1969, BA, SAPMO, DY 30/IV A 2/20/964, 403.
812 Matlock to State Dept, 11 October 1969, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2517, POL 29 TANZAN.
813 Matlock to State Dept, 13 October 1969, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2517, POL 29 TANZAN.
814 Matlock to State Dept, 23 October 1969, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2517, POL 29 TANZAN.
Politics in the time of *ujamaa*

East African Muslim Welfare Society, of which she was vice-president.\(^{815}\) Kamaliza had been dropped as minister for labour in the post-Arusha fallout in 1967 and then was replaced as secretary-general of TANU earlier in 1969. Prior to leaving the country on 28 September 1969, Nyerere was fully aware of the conspiracy, but unconcerned by it. According to information received by the Canadian high commission (potentially from Sarakikya), the president felt that it presented no immediate danger. The Canadian source reported that Nyerere first heard of the arrests via a BBC radio news bulletin in Moscow and was furious at the breach of his orders.\(^{816}\)

After the crackdowns which followed the mutiny and the abolition of multipartyism, the Tanzanian government had become increasingly reliant on the Preventive Detention Act of 1962 as a means of control, exemplified by the cases of Anangisye and Hanga.\(^{817}\) Here, circumstances cautioned otherwise and prompted Nyerere to hold a public trial. The scandal of the Zanzibar executions had brought Nyerere’s international image into question. To simply imprison his enemies without charge or fair trial would also have substantiated Kambona’s accusations that Nyerere was establishing a dictatorship in Tanzania. However, the nature of Tanzanian law, which defined ‘treasonable offences’ as involving some recourse to violence, presenting a sticking point: the evidence amassed by the authorities amounted to a plot confined to paper. In March 1970, the government hastily amended the penal code to include such offences as ‘deposing the president by unlawful means’. The trial therefore took place under retrospective legislation, which contravened the UN Declaration of Human Rights.\(^{818}\)

The treason case was brought before court in Dar es Salaam on 8 May 1970, although the trial did not begin until 1 June. Alongside Bibi Titi, Kamaliza, and Mattaka there were four other defendants: John Dunstan Lifa Chipaka (referred to as ‘Chipaka’), a former opposition leader in the multiparty period and cousin of Kambona; his brother, Captain Eliya Lifa Chipaka (‘Lifa’); Lieutenant Alfred Millinga; and Colonel William Chacha. The first three had been arrested in the round-up in October; Chacha had lately been serving as a military attaché at the Tanzanian embassy

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815 Mohamed Said, *The Life and Times of Abdulwahid Sykes (1924-1968): The Untold Story of the Muslim Struggle against British Colonialism in Tanganyika* (London: Minerva Press, 1998), 270-315. Said also suggests that Bibi Titi lost her parliamentary seat in the 1965 general election due to ballot rigging (318), but makes no mention of the coup plot or her imprisonment. Interviewed by Geiger in 1988, Bibi Titi claimed that there was some government-led foul play to turn her constituents against her. Geiger herself suggests that Bibi Titi’s defeat owed more to her neglect of constituency matters due to her UWT and TANU responsibilities: *TANU Women*, 169-71.

816 The reason for the arrest order being made – by the second vice-president, Kawawa – is unclear. One American hypothesis suggested that intelligence gathered from Mattaka after his arrest prompted Kawawa to act. A British explanation, put forward on the back of evidence cited at the trial, posited that the key moment had been Kambona’s decision to tell Leballo that the coup plot had been called off, at which point the Tanzanian security services lost their connection with the plotters and therefore decided to act. Matlock to State Dept, 31 October 1969, NARA, RG 59, CFPF 1967-9, Box 2517, POL 29 TANZAN; Hart to Holmes, 3 April 1971, UKNA, FCO 31/971/8.


818 Ewans to Le Tocq, 23 February 1971, UKNA, FCO 31/971/7.
Politics in the time of *ujamaa*

in Beijing, until he was summoned back to Dar es Salaam and arrested in April 1970.819 Kambona was initially also named among the accused. However, under Tanzanian law he could not be tried in absentia. After some deliberation, the Tanzanian authorities decided against requesting his extradition from Britain and his name was not included when the formal charges were announced.820

Space here precludes a full retelling of the twists, turns, accusations, and counter-accusations of the trial itself, which lasted seven months. In his opening statement, the attorney-general, Mark Bomani, set out the case for the prosecution. He alleged that Kambona had been plotting the overthrow of Nyerere since his flight into exile in 1967. Mattaka and Chipaka were soon recruited into his conspiracy; they had produced a pamphlet entitled *Ukueli* ('Truth') in July 1968, which contained ‘seditious passages and defamatory allegations’ about Nyerere. *Ukueli* accused the president of being a ‘madman’, an ‘exploiter’, and a ‘thief’. It claimed Nyerere hoarded money in a Swiss bank account, enjoyed funding from the CIA, and worked in cahoots with the Asian business elite in Tanzania.821 The other plotters were later roped into a plan which involved the overthrowing of Nyerere’s regime, to be replaced by a government headed by Kambona. Much of the proceedings involved an assessment of the veracity and meaning of various letters, which had been sent among the accused and had been seized by the authorities following the arrests in October.822

It quickly emerged that despite this slew of written evidence, the prosecution’s case rested mainly on the testimony of Potlako Leballo, the acting president of the PAC, a rival South African liberation movement to the more established ANC. Leballo claimed that Mattaka had approached him in March 1969 in Nairobi, informing him about the coup plot and asking for the PAC’s cooperation, in return for a favourable relationship with a post-Nyerere government. Leballo immediately reported the approach to the Tanzanian authorities, who instructed him to continue to cooperate with the plotters as an intelligence-gathering mole. Leballo served as the key intermediary between Kambona in London and the conspirators in East Africa. After Mattaka’s arrest, Kambona told Leballo, whom he now suspected of being an informer, that the plot had been called off. However, the plans for the coup were not abandoned, as Kambona maintained a dialogue with his supporters in Tanzania.823

The prosecution’s reliance on Leballo’s evidence was problematic on several grounds. In legal terms, the role he had played in disingenuously cooperating with the plotters opened him up to charges that he had been acting as an agent provocateur of the state, entrapping the conspirators. As the chief justice, P. T. Georges, recognised, Leballo was ‘an enthusiastic agent who revelled in

819 Ross to State Dept, 11 April 1970, NARA, RG 59, SNF 1970-3, Box 2618, POL 23 TANZAN.
820 Ewans to Le Tocq, 23 February 1971, UKNA, FCO 31/971/7.
823 Ross to State Dept, 25 June 1970, NARA, RG 59, SNF 1970-3, Box 2618, POL 29 TANZAN.
Politics in the time of ujamaa

his role’ and so ‘his evidence has to be examined with care’. Leballo’s circumstances also brought his credibility as a witness into question. Even by the standards of the liberation movements based in Dar es Salaam, the PAC was a fractious organisation. Although recognised by the OAU Liberation Committee, it lacked the infrastructure or support base of the ANC. Leballo’s leadership was divisive and caused a series of expulsions and desertions from the party in 1967-68. Leballo therefore had a vested interest in collaborating with the Tanzanian authorities, which, after his starring role in the treason trial, he fell back on to suppress resistance within the PAC.

During the trial, Leballo was subject to multiple character assassinations. In its cross-examination, the defence presented Leballo as a greedy, venal individual, who had been charged with offences of fraud in South Africa. This image chimed with accusations previously levelled at Leballo by his critics within the PAC. A report from a dissident faction within the movement, submitted to the OAU Liberation Committee in November 1967, alleged that ‘truthfulness is not one of his attributes’ and that ‘Leballo’s lying and inconsistency go hand in hand, and this has embarrassed the PAC as a whole.’ Delivering his judgement on the treason trial in January 1971, Georges echoed this assessment. Leballo, he said, was ‘given to swagger’ and had ‘the capacity of convincing himself that that which he believes to be true is in fact true.’

In order to protect Leballo’s security, Bomani initially asked for his cross-examination be held in camera. When Georges rejected this request, the Tanzanian government ordered the local press to give Leballo’s turn on the witness stand only perfunctory coverage. The only journalist permitted to report on this part of the trial was the local Reuters correspondent, who was told by the director of information that he could file fully ‘with the exception of anything that reflected discreditably on Leballo’. This blackout contrasted with coverage of the rest of the trial, which dominated Dar es Salaam’s newsprint over the second half of 1970. The lengthy transcripts carried by the press often included vocal criticism of Nyerere and the government from the defendants. Chipaka stated in his testimony that ‘this might be my last chance to talk, and I want my children to come and read these things’. He then accused Nyerere of presiding over a dictatorship, with no freedom of the press.

Leballo’s involvement represents further evidence of the extent to which the liberation movements were enmeshed in Tanzania’s domestic affairs. An OAU Liberation Committee official told an American embassy employee that Leballo had informed him that other liberation movement members had been approached by Kambona and his co-conspirators. These included

826 Quoted in Lodge, Black Politics, 122.
828 Hutchison to General Manager, 6 July 1970, RA, Box 157B.
members of the ANC and ZAPU, plus Sam Nujoma, the SWAPO president. None of these men, Leballo alleged, had reported the approaches to the Tanzanian government nor rejected the advance out of hand.830 Kambona was said to have tapped-up Oliver Tambo, the leader of the ANC’s ‘external mission’, who also failed to notify the Tanzanian authorities of such advances. Stephen Ellis suggests that this may have triggered a Tanzanian decision to suddenly close down an ANC training camp at Kongwa in July 1969, ostensibly on the grounds of national security, since the camp was ‘a lucrative hunting ground for enemy agents’.831 Still wilder rumours reached Lusaka, where a ZANU official claimed that FRELIMO members, including Marcelino dos Santos, were implicated in the conspiracy, together with Mzwai Piliso, an ANC official who had received financial support from Moscow for an anti-Nyerere plot. American diplomats afforded these reports no credibility, but their mere existence is another indicator of the destabilising consequences of competition among the Dar es Salaam-based liberation movements.832 Exemplifying the subversive potential of these rivalries, there were reports that Frene Ginwala, the Standard editor and an ANC supporter, was supplying evidence to the defence lawyers, which they redeployed in court to denigrate Leballo’s character: an employee of a government newspaper was seeking to undermine a state prosecution of Tanzanians charged with treason.833

The trial proceedings showed how, in contrast to 1964-65, Cold War politics no longer provided an overarching framework through which local developments in Tanzania were interpreted. There were admittedly references in the trial to Western attempts to subvert local politics: there was some concern at the American embassy when Prisca Chiombola, a USIS employee and niece of Kambona, was placed in detention and then summoned as a witness for the prosecution. Leballo also alleged that money had been transferred to Kambona via USIS channels. Another state witness made the wild allegation that American and British diplomats in Nairobi had provided the plotters with support, but this gained little traction. Rather, the actors in a home-grown plot were all Africans reputedly involved were dragged into the plot by Tanzanian connections. The diplomatic spat with Nigeria over Tanzania’s recognition of Biafra allegedly led Lagos to provide secret support to Kambona. In a statement given to police while he was under preventive detention (and which he then repudiated in court), Mattaka said that the Nigerians had furnished Kambona with £5,000 to support the plot.834 The proceedings demonstrated that the threat to the Nyerere regime came not via some unseen Cold War *deus ex machina*, but networks of discontented Tanzanians and exiled liberation movements operating outside of the immediate context of superpower rivalry.

830 Ross to State Dept, 18 August 1970, NARA, RG 59, SNF 1970-3, Box 2618, POL 23 TANZAN.
832 Troxel to State Dept, 9 May 1970, NARA, RG 59, SNF 1970-3, Box 2618, POL 23 TANZAN; Ross to State Dept, 12 May 1970, NARA, RG 59, SNF 1970-3, Box 2518, POL 23 TANZAN.
833 Ross to State Dept, 18 August 1970, NARA, RG 59, SNF 1970-3, Box 2618, POL 23 TANZAN.
834 Kreisberg to State Dept, 22 September 1970, NARA, RG 59, SNF 1970-3, Box 2618, POL 23 TANZAN.
Politics in the time of *ujamaa*

Georges delivered his verdict on 30 January 1971. Four of the accused were found guilty of treason and conspiracy: Mattaka, Bibi Titi, Chipaka, and Lifa. Kamaliza and Chacha were acquitted of treason, but convicted of the lesser offence of misprision. Millinga was acquitted on all charges. Georges’ judgement was not without criticism for the government, however. He expressed his hope that ‘this trial would be the beginning of an era in which preventive detention as a deterrent would be less frequently used, and the courts would be accepted as places where all persons suspected of criminal activities would be tried and dealt with.’

Foreign onlookers were generally impressed by the proceedings. A British report concluded that ‘one has to give Nyerere a little credit for stomaching a trial of this nature, which meant that some whom he suspected could not be booked at all [...] Certainly he has succeeded in pointing up the contrast to Zanzibar – and many other African states as well.

This rather uncritical acceptance of the court’s ruling was revealed to be hollow when the defendants took their protest to the East African Court of Appeal – and obtained a number of victories. Although the Court of Appeal agreed that a conspiracy had existed, it questioned the legitimacy of the case brought forward by the prosecution. In particular, the court noted that despite Georges’ sceptical treatment of Leballo, several of the convictions were wholly dependent on his ‘tainted evidence’. The judges therefore acknowledged that Mattaka’s activities had been ‘highly suspicious’, but acquitted him on the grounds that there was no other ‘positive evidence’ than Leballo’s testimony. The court also upheld appeals made by Kamaliza and Chacha. Bibi Titi’s appeal was allowed on one count, but dismissed on two others. The appeals of both Chipaka brothers were dismissed. Having been freed on technical grounds – a reflection of the ineptitude of the prosecution – Mattaka was immediately re-arrested by the government and kept in preventive detention. Ultimately, the requirements of justice, intended to present a positive image of Tanzania to the outside world, were overridden by the party-state’s prioritisation of national security.

**The Guinean invasion and the Ugandan coup**

On the night of 22-23 October 1970, in the midst of Tanzania’s treason trial, a force of undercover Portuguese forces, mercenaries, and local opponents of Sekou Touré’s regime invaded Guinea-Conakry from neighbouring Guinea-Bissau. *Operação Mar Verde* sought to free Portuguese prisoners of war and destroy the assets of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde.

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835 Quoted in Ewans to Le Tocq, 23 February 1971, UKNA, FCO 31/971/7.
837 ‘Mattaka *v.* The Republic’.
838 Ayres to Holmes, 28 July 1971, UKNA, FCO 31/981/16.
Politics in the time of ujamaa I

(Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde, PAIGC), which had been given shelter in Conakry. The invaders also unsuccessfully tried to stage a coup to overthrow Touré. Although Portugal denied any involvement, the invasion sparked international outrage, especially in Africa.

As a state which provided a base for multiple liberation movements, Tanzania had particular cause for fear. The dangers inherent in housing the guerrillas were fresh in the memory after the assassination of Mondlane, which had been followed by another parcel-bombing at the FRELIMO offices in July 1970. Nyerere sent a personal message to Touré, conveying Tanzania's shock at and sympathy for 'the dastardly invasion of Guinea by foreign mercenaries'. At an emergency cabinet meeting held on 23 October, Tanzania pledged 10 million shillings in assistance to Guinea. Two days later, the TYL staged a pre-office hours march from Lamumba Street to Luthuli Road, where Kawawa addressed the crowd from the balcony of the Guinean embassy. In a sabre-rattling speech, he described the invasion as 'further evidence of imperialist barbarism and an attempt to reconquer our continent.' Kawawa called on the nation to remain watchful and warned Portugal against perpetrating similar acts against Tanzania. 'Let them cross the Ruvuma into Tanzania and they will see', he said. 'Let them land in Dar es Salaam and they will see.' The invasion proved a justification for the mantra of vigilance which the government, the TYL, and the press had routinely extolled over the previous years.

It was in this spirit that in January 1971 Nyerere travelled to Singapore for a Commonwealth Conference. He went with an explicit agenda: to rally opposition to Britain's proposed sale of arms to South Africa. 'Let the Commonwealth members sit together and work out our different problems', read a document Nyerere circulated among attendees, 'without considering the needs or desires of this non-member – South Africa – whose basic doctrine of faith and every action, is a denial of everything the Commonwealth stands for.' As part of the so-called 'Mulungushi Club', Nyerere sought to form a common front against 'arms to South Africa' with the presidents of Uganda and Zambia, Milton Obote and Kenneth Kaunda. However, on 25 January, the Mulungushi campaign was abruptly derailed: in a move that echoed the fall of Nkrumah in 1966, General Idi Amin had overthrown the absent Obote in a military coup.

Developments in Kampala sent shockwaves through political circles in Dar es Salaam. For all the fury that had accompanied the Portuguese intervention in Conakry, Guinea was situated in distant West Africa. Uganda, on the other hand, shared a common border with Tanzania and was a member of the EAC. The Nationalist condemned the 'rightest, reactionary coup' as 'the saddest and

839 Lopes, West Germany, 25.
843 "The war is also ours" – Kawawa', Standard, 25 November 1970, 1; 'We are ready to die and kill for freedom – Kawawa', Nationalist, 25 November 1970, 1, 8.
most shameful thing that could befall Uganda, East Africa, and Africa as a whole.\footnote{Uganda coup', editorial, Nationalist, 26 January 1971, 4.} In Nyerere’s absence, Kawawa called an emergency meeting of the cabinet.

Obote immediately returned to East Africa from Singapore, touching down first in Nairobi. The Kenyan government, which had never warmed to Obote, sought to prevent his possible return to Uganda. Under virtual house arrest at Nairobi’s Panafric Hotel, Obote received a telephone call from Kawawa, who invited the deposed president to Dar es Salaam. On 26 January, after arriving with all the trappings of a state visit at the airport, Obote held a press conference at State House. He insisted he would return to Uganda, denied that Amin had popular support, and accused Israel of engineering the coup. Nyerere himself cut short a state visit to India, arriving back in Dar es Salaam on 28 January, to a rapturous popular reception.\footnote{‘Obote accuses Israel of coup’, Nationalist, 27 January 1971, 1, 8; David Martin, General Amin (London: Faber and Faber, 1974), 49-53; Kenneth Ingram, Obote: A Political Biography (London: Routledge, 1994), 138.}

The Tanzanian response to the Ugandan crisis was complicated by the close relations between Nyerere and Obote. Aside from a common stance on issues of African liberation, the two presidents shared socialist convictions. There were shades of the Arusha Declaration – symbolically, if not substantively – in Obote’s ‘Common Man’s Charter’ of October 1966, which set out a theoretical basis for removing inequalities via the redistribution of wealth. Nyerere had supported Obote’s ‘Move to the Left’, under which the Ugandan government proposed the nationalisation of key sectors of the economy. However, whereas after the mutiny of 1964, the Tanzanian army had been reconstructed as a politicised arm of the state, Obote had bought off Uganda’s armed forces to maintain their fragile loyalty. The ‘Common Man’s Charter’ therefore threatened the privileged position of a nouveau-riche military, thus paving the way for the coup.\footnote{Michael F. Lofchie, ‘The Uganda Coup – Class Action by the Military’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 10 (1972), 19-35; Parsons, 1964 Army Mutinies.}

Given this close relationship with Obote, Nyerere chose to back his friend, rather than recognise the Amin regime as the legitimate government of Uganda. On his return from India, Nyerere asserted that Tanzania continued to regard Obote as the president of Uganda. ‘We do not recognise the authority of those who have killed their fellow citizens in an attempt to overthrow the established government of a sister republic’, a statement read.\footnote{‘Uganda people back Obote’, Standard, 29 January 1971, 1.} Yet by 1971, the military coup was commonplace in Africa, and Nyerere had not refrained from recognising usurping juntas before. His decision to reject Amin’s claims to power and provide shelter for Obote in Tanzania was a crass move, born from an impulsive desire to assist a friend.

The matter of non-recognition was complicated by the Uganda’s and Tanzania’s common membership of the EAC. The regional trade bloc depended on cooperation between all three member-states, especially their heads of state. Deploying a mixture of moral condemnation and claims that Amin lacked democratic legitimacy, Nyerere declared that he would not work with
Amin. ‘How can I sit on the same table with a killer?’, he told a mass rally at the Jangwani Grounds on 30 January. ‘Jomo [Kenyatta] is speaking for the people who elected him. I am speaking for you. Whom will Amin be representing? I cannot sit with murderers.’ Nyerere stressed he sought continued cooperation among the EAC member-states, but his arguments rested on vague claims of regional brotherhood that were at odds with the unfolding realpolitikal situation in East Africa. Tanzania’s support for Obote was not matched by Kenya. As part of a tour of regional capitals in an attempt to solicit support, Obote, accompanied by Kawawa, met President Kenyatta in Mombasa. According to David Martin, Kenyatta promised to help Obote, but this never translated into action.

Meanwhile, Tanzanian military activity hinted at a possible attempt to restore Obote by force. Between 1 and 4 February, Western diplomats in Dar es Salaam relayed sketchy reports about movements of troops and vehicles to the Ugandan frontier in northwest Tanzania, from Nachingwea in the south, where they were stationed in order to counter a potential Portuguese invasion. While this might purely have represented a precautionary reaction to any threat from Uganda, Horace Phillips, the British high commissioner, thought that Nyerere may have had more aggressive intentions. Splicing together knowledge of a visit by the Somali foreign minister to Tanzania with that of an unpublicised trip by Obote to Sudan, Phillips believed that Nyerere had attempted to establish a joint alliance of progressive states with Khartoum and Mogadishu. Phillips attributed the abrupt cessation of these military movements on 4 February to his own communication to Nyerere that day that Britain intended shortly to recognise the Amin regime. ‘What would have been for him action against a rebel regime in support of a legitimate president thus suddenly assumed the character of an attempted overthrow of an internationally recognised government’, Phillips determined.

Tanzania’s refusal to recognise the Amin regime contrasted with the position adopted by Britain. London’s relationship with Obote had deteriorated as a result of the ‘Move to the Left’, which threatened to nationalise the assets of British firms operating in Uganda. The alignment of Obote’s views on British arms sales to South Africa with those of Nyerere and Kaunda also caused disquiet in London. While there is no documentary evidence to suggest that Britain played a hand in the coup, London welcomed Amin’s seizure of power as an ultimately misplaced guarantee against the appropriation of British business interests in Uganda. As the former colonial power, the question of Britain’s recognition or non-recognition of Amin’s regime set the tone for the

850 Martin, General Amin, 53-54.
851 Phillips to FCO, 8 February 1971, UKNA, FCO 31/1032/3. Martin suggests that Nyerere was both unhappy by an excessively assertive statement issued by the Somali government and also possibly influenced by a message from Zhou Enlai. The Chinese prime minister argued that Tanzania’s position might be construed as interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state and that there was a risk of British troops stationed in Kenya coming to Amin’s defence. General Amin, 55-56.
international community. Despite Nyerere’s urgings, on 5 February Britain announced its recognition of the Amin government. The Nationalist condemned the decision as ‘one more insult to Africa’. Britain’s swift recognition of the military regime in Kampala, together with rumours of Israeli involvement in the coup itself, fuelled allegations in Tanzania that Amin’s seizure of power was a neocolonial conspiracy to smash anti-imperialism in Africa. A TYL statement issued on the day after the coup declared that it had been ‘engineered by imperialism and international Zionism in collaboration with servile internal reactionary forces opposed to the Common Man’s Charter’. Subsequent press commentary suggested that the putsch was part of a calculated imperialist plot to sever a geopolitical alliance of socialist African states.

Perhaps the greatest danger posed by Amin’s treasonable act is that it is designed to break Africa’s only remaining progressive axis. There is an axis of progressive states that runs right from Cairo through Khartoum to Dar es Salaam and Lusaka. The intention of the imperialists is to break this axis from the middle, thus isolating the north from the south and making it ‘easier’ for them to ‘reconquer’ us.

The idea of a pan-continental assault on progressive government and African liberation leant for support on the experience of Guinea. From the authorities and the media, Tanzanians were told that imperialism was on the march. ‘Imperialism is on an all-out offensive to reconquer Africa’, warned the Nationalist. ‘This counter-revolutionary trend will not only be attempted in Guinea or Uganda; it will be tried elsewhere.

This vitriolic language sought to mask a pervasive atmosphere of fear and unrest. ‘The commotion produced by the Ugandan rebellion is of exceptional gravity’, wrote the French ambassador. A sober Standard editorial reflected that ‘[w]e are all concerned. For if a gun toting soldier in Kampala is allowed to get away with undermining everything we are trying to build up – is there any security for any one of us?’ Nyerere’s bullishness also betrayed his own anxiety. ‘I can be assassinated, but there will never be a coup d’état’, he told the Jangwani rally. ‘This [an assassination] is possible because it can be done by any maniac, but not a coup d’état in

853 Phillips to FCO, 29 January 1971, UKNA, FCO 31/1028/22; Phillips to FCO, 3 February 1971, UKNA, FCO 31/1028/73.
858 Desparmet to MAE-DAL, 9 March 1971, CADN, 193PO/1/1 A1.
859 Editorial, Standard, 1 February 1971, 1.
Politics in the time of *ujamaa* I

Tanzania. His hubris echoed that of Obote, who had once stated, ‘I am perhaps the only African leader who is not afraid of a military takeover.’

**To the left? The politics of Mwongazo**

The Ugandan crisis took place against the backdrop of a deteriorating economic situation in Tanzania. After a burst of growth which followed the Arusha Declaration, the economy had plateaued by 1970. The State Trading Corporation (STC), a bloated parastatal, responded to shortages of consumer goods by importing them in huge quantities. This led to a drain of foreign exchange and Tanzania became faced with a balance of payments crisis, as a trade surplus of 135 million shillings in 1967 became a deficit of 519 million shillings by 1970. The political crisis over Uganda prompted Nyerere to call an emergency meeting of the TANU NEC, which convened in Dar es Salaam on 13 February.

The behind-closed-doors NEC meeting was unusually long, lasting a whole week. It was also particularly fractious. Paul Bomani, the minister of commerce, told the British high commissioner that he and others had criticised Nyerere’s handling of the Ugandan situation – some accusing the president of endangering the EAC, others calling for Tanzania to leave the Commonwealth or sever its ties with Britain again. The regional commissioner for Morogoro, Joseph Namata, overstepped the mark in his opposition to the president, threatening – Kambona-style – to ‘blow the lid off the Uganda affair’. Nyerere reasserted his control by instantly suspending Namata and exposing him to charges relating to the illegal poaching of elephants, which the president had previously suppressed. A Stasi report noted a widening split among the ‘progressives’ and the ‘reactionaries’. The latter group, including Bomani, Derek Bryceson, and Amir Jamal, was responsible for Tanzania’s increased use of aid from ‘imperialist’ states and the World Bank, to the progressives’ dismay. The Uganda coup had exacerbated these pre-existing divisions, which had led to the left wing demanding the establishment of a special committee for economic affairs, independent from the cabinet and filled with only those educated in socialist countries, the Stasi reported.

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863 Phillips to FCO, 22 February 1971, UKNA, FCO 31/1031/250.
865 MiS, 16 February 1971, BStU, MiS, HV A, no. 178, 38-42.
A more significant – and even more contentious – task set before the NEC was the agreement of a landmark party document, Mwongozo or the ‘Guidelines’.866 Announced by Nyerere on Radio Tanzania on 21 February, then printed in full in the local press the following day, Mwongozo represented an ideological intensification of TANU’s position, as established by the Arusha Declaration.867 They were drafted by Kingunge Ngombale-Mwiru, the TYL secretary-general, with assistance from other leading politicians, including Kawawa and Babu. Importantly, this was the first major party document that did not directly bear the stamp of Nyerere himself. Mwongozo affirmed the role of TANU in leading the Tanzanian revolution as a Leninist vanguard party, which had long been advocated by TYL leaders, including Ngombale-Mwiru, Lawi Sijaona, and Chediel Mgona. ‘For the first time in the history of our glorious Party, its vanguard role has been given new, definite and concrete expression’, enthused the Nationalist. ‘The Party and the Party alone shall exercise the vanguard role of leading Tanzania’s revolution.’868 In addition, Mwongozo provided for the creation of a people’s militia, a demand which had been frequently been made by the TYL since the Arusha Declaration.869 This was on the recommendation of Ngombale-Mwiru, who had been despatched to Conakry to witness the Guinean response to the mercenary invasion.870 In 1967, Nyerere had fiercely resisted calls for similar change; in 1971, hemmed in by mounting crises at home and abroad, he compromised with the radical faction within TANU.871

The imprint of events in Conakry and Kampala on Mwongozo was clear. The NEC meeting in Dar es Salaam was addressed by both Obote and the Guinean ambassador.872 One paragraph was dedicated to the Guinea invasion, another to the Uganda coup. The ‘big lesson’ of Guinea was the threat to African regimes which were committed to equality and supportive of liberation movements. ‘For similar reasons the imperialists may attempt to attack Tanzania one day.’ Regarding Uganda, Mwongozo said that the coup showed how instead of bringing down revolutionary governments by direct invasion, imperialism prefers to employ local stooges to achieve its goals. ‘The people must learn from the events in Uganda and those in Guinea that although imperialism is still strong, its ability to topple a revolutionary government greatly depends on the possibility of getting domestic counter-revolutionary puppets to help them thwart the revolution’, the section concluded. Critically, while Mwongozo emphasised that the responsibility for

869 Lal, African Socialism, 95.
871 See Kasella Bantu’s call for the creation of a vanguard party shortly after the Arusha Declaration in chapter 1.
Politics in the time of \textit{ujamaa}

‘liberating Uganda’ lay with Ugandans alone, Tanzania had a duty to aid its ‘brothers’ in their efforts, essentially setting it on a war footing with Amin.\footnote{\textit{The Dar Declaration}, \textit{Standard}, 22 February 1971, 1, 3, 7.}

\textit{Mwongozo} did little to calm the leadership’s post-Uganda nerves. Phillips, the British high commissioner, noted a ‘distinct sense of uncertainty and malaise within the leadership and the country’\footnote{Phillips to Le Tocq, 7 April 1971, UKNA, FCO 31/968/7.}. His French counterpart detected ‘many indications that the Tanzanian leaders have been – and are – afraid. They are afraid of their own army, afraid of senior bureaucrats, afraid of foreigners, afraid of the wealthy bourgeoisie in which they see the accomplices of an elusive and omnipresent imperialism.’\footnote{Desparmet to MAE-DAL, 9 March 1971, CADN, 193PO/1/1 A1.} The army established checkpoints around strategic sites in Dar es Salaam.\footnote{Hollender, 7 April 1971, PAAA, MfAA, C 759/74, 28-29.} The city again swirled with rumour. As Phillips observed, although ‘the content of 95\% of these rumours can be dismissed […] the existence of them cannot be.’\footnote{Phillips to Le Tocq, 7 April 1971, UKNA, FCO 31/968/7.}

In an attempt to calm the foment, Nyerere convened another meeting of the NEC. He tactically chose to hold it in Kigoma, near the border with Burundi, between 16 and 20 March. This was, as Phillips recognised, ‘to put it about as far away from the capital – and cocktail gossip – as possible.’\footnote{Phillips to Le Tocq, 5 May 1971, UKNA, FCO 31/968/9.} The NEC discussed in detail problems surrounding the implementation of the \textit{ujamaa} villagisation programme and sketched out arrangements for the creation of a militia, as provided for in \textit{Mwongozo}.\footnote{Ross to State Dept, 24 March 1971, NARA, RG 59, SNF 1970-3, Box 2616, POL 2 TANZAN.} More significantly, it provided for the nationalisation of all houses worth over 100,000 shillings and not primarily occupied by their owner, which was quietly passed into law by parliament. This was a radical but popular move, since it largely targeted an Asian rentier class which urban African Tanzanians had long considered enemies of the \textit{taifa}. It had originally featured on the draft of \textit{Mwongozo}, before being scrapped out of fear that it would appear insensitive at the same time as Amin was turning on his own Asian population in Uganda. The decision ran counter to Nyerere’s long-standing opposition to racialism; it indicated the weakness of his position, ground down by economic frustrations and foreign policy misjudgements.\footnote{Brennan, \textit{Taifa}, 190-92; Brennan, ‘Debating the Guidelines’, 15; Aminzade, \textit{Race}, 225-27.}

While few suggested that Nyerere’s position as president was under threat, many questioned whether he had full control of Tanzania’s political direction. At a grassroots level, a clause in \textit{Mwongozo} which criticised the behaviour of exploitative factory managers was invoked by urban workers to launch a series of wildcat strikes, which had been circumscribed with the creation of NUTA in 1964. In less than eleven months between the promulgation of \textit{Mwongozo} and the end of 1971, 15 strikes were called, involving 11,403 workers, with the the consequent loss of 31,915 man-
Politics in the time of *ujamaa*

days of work. These figures far outstripped those for the six-year 1965-70 period, in which 74 strikes involved 9,308 workers at the cost of 26,518 man-days.\(^{881}\)

The frictions between workers and the authorities mirrored tensions on the plane of high politics. The majority of Western European diplomats in Dar es Salaam, the Stasi felt, believed that Nyerere had responded to pressure from the Marxist faction of TANU to radicalise *ujamaa* socialism in order to not be ‘overtaken by the left’. ‘The key point was to give people the impression that socialism in Tanzania had taken a great leap forward’.\(^{882}\) By the time TANU delegates gathered in Dar es Salaam in September for the biennial party conference, more moderate cabinet ministers had reportedly tendered their resignations. Among them was Amir Jamal, the minister of finance, whom the Stasi understood had only reversed his decision after Nyerere persuaded him that it would have negative effects on Western investment in Tanzania.\(^{883}\)

**Conclusion**

In February 1970, Nyerere attended a relaxed question-and-answer session with students at the university. The discussion covered a variety of topics – Zanzibar, non-alignment, scientific socialism, the EAC. One student mentioned several ‘disturbing recent events in Tanzania’ which seemed ‘very curious and rather unusual in this country’. He cited the assassination of Mondlane and the coup plot, in addition to the theft of a police armoury, a bank robbery in Tanga, and the sabotage of the oil pipeline to Zambia. ‘It is not highly probable that all these incidents have a common cause and aim?’, he asked the president.\(^{884}\)

Nyerere laughed away the idea. Yet the line of questioning hinted at deeper fears about instability in Tanzania and the atmosphere of uncertainty in Dar es Salaam. The splits among the elite which followed the Arusha Declaration continued to have repercussions. While Nyerere continued to speak enthusiastically about the pan-African bond which brought together the mainland and the islands, Zanzibar was increasingly an embarrassing blot on his government’s record. A stuttering economy, the Portuguese threat, and a new enemy-at-the-gates in Uganda – a creation of Nyerere’s rash diplomacy – pushed the TANU leadership left. Like the Arusha Declaration, the political *levée en masse* of *Mwongozo* electrified Tanzanian nationalist and anticolonial sentiment. But, like Arusha, it also released forces which challenged Nyerere’s control. As the next chapter shows, in tackling these multiple threats to the government’s security, the TANU party-state turned increasingly to the architecture of authoritarianism.

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\(^{881}\) Shivji, *Class Struggles*, 134-36.

\(^{882}\) The original German, ‘*großen Sprung nach vorn*’, corresponds to Mao’s ‘Great Leap Forward’, suggesting that the Stasi viewed *Mwongozo* and the measures which followed as following a Chinese, rather than Eastern European, model.


\(^{884}\) Hart to Bishop, 5 March 1970, UKNA, FCO 31/685/2.
Chapter 7

Politics in the time of *ujamaa*, part two: closures

As the previous chapter showed, in early 1971, a combination of internal pressures and external threats led Nyerere to compromise with the more radical wing of TANU. *Mwongozo* was framed as a decisive step forward in the Arusha revolution. However, the workers’ strikes and ruptures among the elite that it occasioned unsettled Nyerere’s hold on power. Equally, the treason trial had left several of Nyerere’s internal critics locked up, but Oscar Kambona remained at large, colluding with Tanzania’s more powerful enemies abroad. This chapter demonstrates how in a series of political interventions, Nyerere reconsolidated his authority in Tanzania. In marginalising potential rivals and tightening TANU’s grasp over public debate, Nyerere and his supporters virtually wiped out opposition among the elite. They drove forwards an *ujamaa* programme based on ‘decentralised’ government and a more aggressively enforced villagisation policy. By late 1972, the endpoint of this thesis, Nyerere had finally mopped-up the messy political fallout from the Arusha Declaration five years before.

The February 1972 government reshuffle

The radicalising spirit of *Mwongozo* continued at the TANU conference in September 1971, where delegates unanimously approved the ‘Guidelines’. The party’s left wing gained in confidence. On the tenth anniversary of Tanzania’s independence in December 1971, A. M. Babu wrote an article for London’s *Financial Times*, in which he argued that the country was on the verge of an economic revolution. Criticising post-colonial governments and the international donor community for perpetuating underdevelopment in Africa, Babu asserted that Tanzania was beginning to cut these dependency ties by focusing on an internal structural transformation of its economy. The TANU conference, Babu believed, had marked a ‘decisive shift’ in Tanzania’s development strategy, with the ‘acceptance of the basic premise of the new school of thought – that development stems from within and not from outside’. Babu later wrote that he had thought at the time that Tanzania was ‘on the way towards restructuring our economy from colonial to an internally integrated and independent national economy’.

Babu’s hopes proved misplaced. On 17 February 1972, Nyerere announced an unprecedented reshuffle of central government. ‘Some of these changes are on a familiar pattern, but others – especially as regards Ministers – are more unusual for Tanzania’, he said in a radio broadcast.

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ministers were moved out of the cabinet to become regional commissioners. Moreover, three senior figures, who had held cabinet portfolios in the union government since its formation, were dropped altogether: Babu, Derek Bryceson, and Paul Bomani. Amir Jamal remained in the cabinet, but was transferred to the Ministry of Commerce and Industries, where he was tasked with clearing up the chaos at the STC.887

The relocation of senior ministers to regional commissioners was not unexpected. Since the TANU conference in September, the government had committed itself to decentralising administration to the regions, in order to implement the Arusha programme more efficiently. The decentralisation proposals had been drawn up under guidance from an American consultancy, announced by Nyerere in December 1971, and rubber-stamped by the NEC a month later.888 Nyerere’s choice of new regional commissioners, who included Chediel Mgonja and Lawi Sijaona, was carefully calculated. As the American embassy reported, they were ‘young, active, ideologically strong socialist, hard-driving men likely to shake things up and get them moving more quickly.’889 At the same time, Nyerere’s decision moved several of his more radical ministers out of Dar es Salaam. This prefigured the official rolling-out of the decentralisation programme in July.890

Both Bomani and Bryceson lost their positions after profound disagreements with Nyerere. Pro-business and friendly to the West, Bomani’s longevity in the cabinet had seemed anomalous, but Nyerere had entrusted him with vital economic posts which the president sought to keep away from more radical politicians. However, Bomani had openly criticised the president’s reaction to the Uganda coup, accepted Mwongozo with unease, and opposed the nationalisation of private property.891 Shortly afterwards, he was appointed Tanzania’s ambassador to Washington. As a white Tanzanian of European descent, Bryceson’s continued presence in government was also unusual, especially as the racial edge of populist ujamaa politics sharpened in the post-Arusha years. His departure owed to disagreements with Nyerere over the government’s increasingly authoritarian approach towards rural resettlement and the crushing of local farming cooperatives and workers’ trade unions.892

The case of Babu is more complicated – and more significant, given later events. When the reshuffle was announced, Babu was leading a delegation to the OAU Council of Ministers in Addis Ababa. To learn about his dismissal in such a manner, Babu later recalled, was ‘embarrassing and

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887 ‘Govt reshuffle to give more power to the people’, Standard, 18 February 1972, 1; ‘Mwalimu’s speech’, Standard, 18 February 1972, 1, 5.
890 Coulson, Tanzania, 300-2.
891 Desparmet to MAE-DAM, 29 February 1972, CADN, 193PO/1/2 A5.
892 Interview with Ian Bryceson, central Dar es Salaam, 31 May 2015.
humiliating. Babu subsequently sought to put a positive gloss on his fall from power. In a letter to the *Standard*, he argued that the relegation of senior ministers to the backbenches – ‘an injection of more than thirty years’ accumulated experience in government business’ – would strengthen the government, since the ex-ministers would be able to scrutinise it more closely in parliament. But Babu’s public expression of his lack of bitterness towards the government suggested insecurity as much as loyalty. ‘It is curious that he thought this was necessary’, remarked the French ambassador, wryly.

Some commentators have accused Nyerere of being swayed by pressure from Karume in axing Babu. Interviewed in 1995, Babu claimed that Nyerere had caved in to Karume’s long-standing demands for him to be removed from the union government. Others have pointed to the sacking of Ali Sultan Issa and Badawi Quallatein, two former members of Babu’s Umma party, from the Zanzibari government the day after Nyerere’s announced reshuffle as evidence of a wider plot. However, the roots of Babu’s dismissal more likely lay in ideological disagreements with Nyerere. As seen in chapter 1, Babu had misgivings about the Arusha Declaration, which he felt failed to provide for the structural transformation of the Tanzanian economy. While he had viewed *Mwongozo* as a moment for potential change, he also harboured concerns at a fresh wave of nationalisations of wholesale trade. He argued at a meeting of the TANU Central Committee that ‘the state should not become a seller of bread and butter’, but invest in large-scale farming and industry. Shortly after his dismissal, Babu told Jenerali Ulimwengu, a journalist then working for the *Standard*, that his downfall was due to political differences with Nyerere, rather than the influence of Karume. The two explanations are not incompatible: Nyerere, concerned about the shift to the left following *Mwongozo*, may have been tipped into action by the arrival of a delegation from Zanzibar. Regardless, in replacing Babu, Nyerere removed from government the only member of the political elite capable of sustaining a genuine intellectual challenge to ujamaa socialism.

The February 1972 government reshuffle was therefore a clinical political move which confidently reasserted Nyerere’s authority after the wobbles of the previous year. The ‘most compelling fact which emerges from these changes is [the] demonstration of Nyerere’s power to make important decisions without internal consultation or deliberation’, concluded the American

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895 Desparmet to MAE-DAM, 29 February 1972, CADN, 193PO/1/2 A5.


898 Quoted in Wilson, *US Foreign Policy*, 135; see also A. M. Babu, ‘Twenty Years after the Arusha Declaration’, in Othman (ed.), *Babu*, 44-46.

899 Interview with Jenerali Ulimwengu, Oyster Bay, Dar es Salaam, 8 August 2015.
embassy. In one fell swoop, Nyerere removed three discontented ministers from the upper echelons of power and dispersed their radical colleagues into the provinces, where they could zealously enforce the policies of *ujamaa* at a distance from the febrile politics of Dar es Salaam. The shift of power towards the regional commissioners was further confirmation of the party’s grasp of the state apparatus, which had been signified by *Mwongozo*. Those left within an emasculated cabinet and central bureaucracy, the Polish ambassador noted, comprised ‘specialists and people hitherto unengaged in political games’. ‘In our place were appointed some very junior and inexperienced technocrats’, wrote Babu in his draft memoirs, ‘whose only qualification for such senior appointments was their total and uncritical loyalty to Nyerere personally.

**The crisis of the union**

While Nyerere tightened his grip over politics on the mainland, the situation in Zanzibar deteriorated further. Inefficient administration and crude policies aimed at achieving economic self-sufficiency led to shortages of goods, while the elite continued to enrich itself. In early 1972, Karume transferred an account at the Moscow Narodny Bank in London, containing around £25 million in foreign exchange from clove exports, from the Revolutionary Council to his own name. Visible signs of material wealth became equated with a political threat to the regime. As Seif Sharif Hamad recalls, ‘people were arrested for possessing a tube of Colgate toothpaste. If you were caught owning toothpaste, you were obviously involved in smuggling since that sort of thing was not available in the state shops.’ In June 1971, the Zanzibar government introduced a rationing system, which was only accessible for those carrying ASP membership cards. Writing in the *Standard* in September, Philip Ochieng quoted a number of Zanzibaris who spoke of their experience of empty markets, soaring prices, and bread queues forming in the middle of the night. Both the Zanzibari and union authorities should be advised, Ochieng concluded, ‘that we are dealing with human beings, and we cannot sacrifice humans at the altar of political considerations and narrow minds.

As the appearance of such a frank assessment of Zanzibar in a state-owned newspaper suggests, there was a growing friction between the mainland and island governments. In September 1970, four girls of Iranian descent, aged between 14 and 20, were forced into marriages with senior officials.

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900 Ross to State Dept, 25 February 1972, NARA, RG 59, SNF 1970-3, Box 2617, POL 15-1 TANZAN.
901 Witek to Wilski, 20 February 1972, MSZ, DV 1972, 44/75 W-1.
903 ‘Why £25 million Zanzibar account was switched’, *Observer*, 2 June 1972, 7.
Politics in the time of *ujamaa* II

government figures, causing revulsion in East Africa and beyond. The story attracted interest in the Western press, which again highlighted the tension between Nyerere’s support of liberation in southern Africa with his inability to guarantee basic human rights at home. The union government’s public response was to permit the publication of articles and letters in the *Standard* condemning Karume’s behaviour. A column signed by ‘Msemakweli’ (‘Speaker of the Truth’) called on Tanzania to respect the basic rights of its own people. It declared that ‘[i]f we denied our own citizens the right to choose whom to vote for, where to live, or even whom they should marry, we would be guilty of the grossest hypocrisy.’ Tanzania was a signatory to the UN Charter on Human Rights because, Msemakweli concluded, ‘we cannot demand […] national ethics in other countries which we would deny to our own citizens.’

On the level of high politics, the relationship between Zanzibar and Dar es Salaam continued to sour. According to information obtained by the French consulate through its network of Comorian sources in Zanzibar, in April 1971 the Revolutionary Council travelled en masse to Dar es Salaam, where they asked Nyerere to cease all intervention in Zanzibari affairs and take on a purely ceremonial role there as union president. Relations between Nyerere and Karume broke down completely. Nyerere used an intermediary, Bhoke Munanka, his chief personal assistant, when conducting relations with his first vice-president. By early 1972, the future of the union seemed more precarious than at any point since 1964.

The assassination of Abeid Karume

At around 6.30pm on 7 April 1972, as the sun set over the Indian Ocean, Karume was at the ASP headquarters at Darajani, Stone Town. He was playing *bao* – a popular Swahili board game – with Thabit Kombo, the ASP secretary-general, and Ibrahim Saadalla, another party grandee. Suddenly, a grey Peugeot pulled up outside. A man armed with a submachine gun jumped out, entered the building, and sprayed bullets into Karume, killing him instantly. Saadalla was also shot dead; Kombo survived, though he was seriously injured. The assassin and four accomplices took flight in two cars, passing by the ASPYL headquarters en route, with the intention of also killing Seif Bakari, should he have been present there at the time.

910 Biesel to Desparmet, 25 May 1971, CADN, 193PO/1/13 Z3.
912 Accounts of the assassination plot are difficult to verify. The account in this paragraph and those that follow represents a synthesis of the existing literature and contemporary diplomatic reports. Rozario to Desparmet, 12 April 1972, CADN, 193PO/1/13 Z2; ‘Karume's father was haunted by father's ghost’, *Flamingo* (January 1973), enclosed in CADN, 193PO/1/12 Z1; Clayton, *Zanzibar Revolution*, 151-53.
As the assassins fled the scene, Aboud Jumbe, the minister of state in Karume’s office, was passing the party headquarters and noticed a great deal of commotion. Having found Karume dead at the Lenin Hospital, Jumbe telephoned Nyerere. He later recalled how the union president gave the impression that he had already heard the news. Over Radio Zanzibar, Jumbe announced that a curfew had been imposed. The streets of Stone Town, usually lined with bread queues, emptied. Meanwhile, the police had tracked down the driver of Peugeot some fifteen kilometres north of Zanzibar Town. Under torture, he admitted that the assassins were former members of the Umma party.

That night, the security forces combed Stone Town, searching out men with Umma connections. Among those arrested were Ali Sultan Issa and Badawi Quallatein, the Zanzibari ministers who had been dismissed in February. Scores were summarily shot dead; hundreds more – perhaps as many as 1,100 – were rounded up in subsequent days and placed in detention. After the assassination of Karume, there was ‘general relief in the country’, recalled Seif Sharif Hamad, today an opposition politician in Zanzibar, and so the Revolutionary Council ‘began a campaign of arrests, to replace celebration with fear.’

Although telecommunications between Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar had been severed, rumours began to circulate in the capital that Karume had been killed by an aggrieved Arab. Anxious to maintain his grasp on events on the islands, early on the morning of 8 April Nyerere despatched Kawawa and John Malecela, the foreign minister, to Zanzibar to discuss the situation with the Revolutionary Council. When the second-vice president returned, Nyerere called an emergency cabinet meeting. At 1pm, Radio Tanzania announced that Karume had been assassinated and called on Tanzanians to remain calm and avoid rumour-mongering. Reports reached the American embassy that Nyerere’s advisors were urging him to intervene directly and seize the opportunity to take control of the Zanzibari government.

At a press conference on 11 April, held in the same building where Karume had been gunned down four days beforehand, Jumbe was announced as president of Zanzibar (and thereby also first vice-president in the union). Jumbe himself later stated that he had been anointed as Karume’s successor immediately after the assassination, when Bakari had instructed him to take the chair at an emergency meeting of the Revolutionary Council. But others, including the Zanzibari scholar Haroub Othman, have pointed out that since Bakari was widely considered Karume’s heir

913 According to an interview Jumbe gave to Shivji. ‘The tone with which Jumbe narrated Nyerere’s reaction was to convey the message that Nyerere already knew.’ Pan-Africanism, 121.
914 Burgess, Raw, 134.
917 Phillips to FCO, 8 April 1972, UKNA, FCO 31/1291/1.
918 Ross to State Dept, 8 April 1972, NARA, RG 59, SNF 1970-3, Box 2617, POL 15-1 TANZAN.
919 Ross to State Dept, 9 April 1972, NARA, RG 59, SNF 1970-3, Box 2617, POL 15-1 TANZAN.
920 Kuniholm to State Dept, 11 April 1972, NARA, RG 59, SNF 1970-3, Box 2617, POL 15-1 TANZAN.
921 Shivji, Pan-Africanism, 121, 143-44. Shivji himself expresses scepticism about Jumbe’s claims.
apparent, the appointment of Jumbe is evidence of a direct intervention of Nyerere in the succession process.\textsuperscript{922} In any event, the swift succession prevented the opening up of a power vacuum in Zanzibar, which would have represented a common danger to Nyerere and the Revolutionary Council.

In Dar es Salaam, news of the assassination was kept to the bare minimum by the government. The \textit{Standard} was instructed to ‘play Zanzibar down’.\textsuperscript{923} This inevitably triggered a spate of rumour. Some contemplated whether a foreign hand was involved – perhaps the Soviet Union, concerned about mounting Chinese influence in Zanzibar? Others suggested that the plot may have had Nyerere’s blessing. ‘There was a lot of speculation that maybe Karume had been stopped in his tracks because he wanted to breakaway from the union’, recalled Juma Mwapachu.\textsuperscript{924} Certainly, the gut reaction of most observers was that the assassination of Karume and his replacement by Jumbe would strengthen Nyerere’s position. ‘Having supported for so many years, in the name of African unity, the caprices and tantrums of his embarrassing first vice-president, Monsieur Nyerere has finally been compensated for his patience’, reflected the French ambassador.\textsuperscript{925}

The government’s public response was limited to vague allegations that the assassination had been perpetrated by ‘imperialists’. The unsympathetic reaction of the British press to Karume’s death came under attack from Radio Tanzania, which reminded listeners that the Zanzibar Revolution had ended a British-Arab alliance which had ‘dehumanised, sucked dry and stripped of dignity’ the islands’ African population.\textsuperscript{926} The local media also carried a Zanzibari government statement which criticised Kenyan newspapers, especially the Lonrho-owned \textit{East African Standard}, for engaging in ‘journalism in its lowest form and the dregs of the gutter press’.\textsuperscript{927} Addressing a rally held in Dar es Salaam under torrential rain on 16 May, Kawawa emphasised that ‘Africa is for Africans’ and that if the imperialists ‘think they will come back here to recolonize us, then they are cheating themselves.’ Providing further evidence of the imperialist threat, three days beforehand the TPDF had shot down a Portuguese aircraft which it claimed had bombed an \textit{ujamaa} village near the

\textsuperscript{922} Othman also suggests that Nyerere argued that, in light of the role of TPDF officers in the assassination, to appoint Bakari, a colonel himself, would have given the impression of an army coup. Haroub Othman, ‘Political Succession in Zanzibar’, in Saida Yahya-Othman (ed.), \textit{Yes, in My Lifetime: Selected Works of Haroub Othman} (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota, 2014), 181. Seif Sharif Hamad recalls that such was Bakari’s lack of respect for Jumbe, Nyerere later arranged for Bakari to be moved to the union government, in order to strengthen Jumbe’s position in Zanzibar. Burgess, \textit{Race}, 212.

\textsuperscript{923} Ayres to Holmes, 19 April 1972, UKNA, FCO 31/1291/26.

\textsuperscript{924} Interview with Jenerali Ulimwengu, Oyster Bay, Dar es Salaam, 18 August 2015; interview with Juma Mwapachu, Oyster Bay, Dar es Salaam, 12 June 2015. Such rumours persist today, as Seif Sharif Hamad suggests in his memoirs. Burgess, \textit{Race}, 211-12.

\textsuperscript{925} Desparmet to MAE-DAL, 17 April 1972, CADN, 193PO/1/13 Z2.


\textsuperscript{927} Phillips to FCO, 18 April 1972, UKNA, FCO 31/1291/24.
Mozambican border. ‘We want to show the Portuguese aggressor that when we hit back, we really hit hard’, Kawawa told the crowd.928

Although reliable news about developments in Zanzibar was difficult to come by in Dar es Salaam, the French consulate’s network of contacts on the islands revealed the identities of the assassination team. All five were former members of the Umma party. Karume was assassinated by Humud Mohammed, an Arab and a lieutenant in the TPDF. Humud was motivated by pure vengeance, since his father – also an army officer – had been killed while in detention during the early months of the revolutionary regime.929

The involvement of Umma cadres in the assassination naturally meant that suspicion fell on Babu. According to Babu himself, at Karume’s funeral on 10 April, Zanzibar’s commissioner of police, Eddington Kissassi, told the Algerian deputy secretary-general of the OAU, Mohamed Sahnoun, ‘we are going to get Babu, dead or alive’. Passing through Dar es Salaam after departing Zanzibar, Sahnoun sent a message to Babu, advising him of the threat.930 Babu later recalled that ‘security people’ were beginning to trace his movements. ‘I realised then that something was going wrong.’931 Shortly afterwards, the American embassy picked up reports that Babu had expressed to several journalists in Dar es Salaam his fear about being made a scapegoat for Karume’s assassination. Around the same time, he urged David Martin to publish a story in the Observer, which would make clear that the assassins were motivated purely by revenge.932 Babu also attempted to speak to Nyerere, but the president declined to meet him.933

At 3am on 14 April, the Tanzanian police arrested Babu and placed him in preventive detention. ‘My house was surrounded by the para-military police, armed to the teeth, and in typical Gestapo tradition, banged my door in the name of the law and order, walked in, arrested and handcuffed me, with loaded sub-machine guns pointed at my head’, wrote Babu, in a letter smuggled out of prison.934 Former members of the PLA were also imprisoned on the mainland. There was no mention of the arrests in the local press and the government remained silent, even when pressed by foreign correspondents.935 The prisoners were not released until 1978.

929 The others involved were named as Hamada Mohammed Ali (Comorian origin, TPDF captain), Said Abdallah (Arab origin, TPDF corporal), Ali Khatib Chwaya (Arab origin, the driver), and Kanga Alawe Ali Juma (African origin, accountant at the People’s Bank of Zanzibar). Rosario to Desparmet, 12 April 1972, CADN, 193PO/1/13 Z2.
930 Wilson, Threat of Liberation, 85. The information comes from a letter Babu wrote to the UN Commission on Human Rights from prison in 1975.
932 Ross to State Dept, 14 April 1972, NARA, RG 59, SNF 1970-3, Box 2617, POL 15-1 TANZAN.
933 Wilson, Threat of Liberation, 85.
935 Wilson, Threat of Liberation, 86. Reports did however appear in the Kenyan press.
Politics in the time of *ujamaa* II

The exact course of events which culminated in the assassination is unlikely ever to be clarified. However, triangulation of various sources – the prosecutor’s report, oral testimony, and foreign archival documents – permits the establishment of some firm ground. Over a period stretching back to 1968, Umma networks split between Zanzibar and the mainland planned to overthrow Karume. This group held intermittent meetings in Dar es Salaam, particularly at Babu’s favourite drinking-hole, the Palm Beach Hotel. After Babu, Quallatein, and Ali Sultan Issa lost their government offices in February 1972, the plotters accelerated their plans. They stole a large cache of weapons from an armoury in Zanzibar, which was later found by the police at Humud’s house in the Shangani quarter of Stone Town. The plotters intended to seize key installations around Zanzibar Town, capture Karume, and then force him to announce his resignation on the radio. Babu would be named president: the prosecution described a stash of portraits bearing his image found in the home of one of the plotters, to be distributed after the coup.

Babu and other plotters based on the mainland were expected to arrive in secret by boat on 6 April, the night before the planned seizure of power. They never arrived, possibly fearing that the authorities had noticed the missing weapons after the head of the armed forces, Yussuf Himid, returned from a visit from the GDR, where he had been receiving medical care. In the absence of Babu, the plotters reconvened at Humud’s house to discuss the plan of action. Recognising that the stolen weapons – should they be found – were incriminating in themselves and, in the case of Humud, driven by pure revenge, the conspirators present then took matters into their own hands.

Mindful of the fate of Hanga and Shariff, Nyerere resisted requests for Babu and his former Umma colleagues to be extradited to stand trial in Zanzibar. After some preparation, the case opened in Zanzibar in May 1973, when eight-one defendants were charged with treason. Under the system of the ‘People’s Courts’, the accused were denied legal aid. The prosecution’s case largely depended on the testimonies of the defendants themselves, many of which were obtained

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937 Interview with Muhammad Yussuf, Stone Town, Zanzibar, 13 July 2015. Ali Sultan Issa outlines a plot along the lines that follow, which he claims are based on discussions he had with other Umma members while in prison, though he denies any foreknowledge. Burgess, *Race*, 136-37.
938 ‘Zanzibar: facts surrounding Karume’s assassination’, 2 November 1972, TT, PIDE, SC, SR 5419/62, NT 3299, Serviços de Zanzibar, 31. The document is written in English and marked ‘SA’, suggesting it was compiled by a South African source. Critically, it was produced before the prosecution set out its case in May 1973 and contains details not included in Dourado’s report. I am thankful to James Brennan for bringing this document to my attention. The Portuguese businessman (and friend of both Salazar and Caetano) Jorge Jardim made vague claims in his memoirs that he played a hand in the assassination, in a plot to restore the Sultan. Given the identity and ideological stance of the Umma plotters, the involvement of Jardim seems fanciful. José Freire Antunes, *Jorge Jardim: Agente secreto* (Venda Nova: Bertrand Editora, 1996), 378-79.
939 Rozario to Naudy, 11 April 1972, CADN, 193PO/1/12 Z1.
940 There is some dispute as to when the government discovered when the arms were missing, which Babu’s defenders have seized upon to suggest inconsistencies in the prosecution’s account. Chase, ‘Zanzibar Treason Trial’, 28-29.
941 The best account of the trial is Chase, ‘Zanzibar Treason Trial’. Chase’s article should however be treated with some scepticism. It was originally published as a pamphlet by the Zanzibar Trial Fund, established to support the defendants’ case from London. The reprinted version cited here is from *Review of African Political Economy*, an academic journal sympathetic to the Marxist left in Africa.
through torture: one defendant described the interrogation room as ‘an abattoir, splashed with human blood’. Babu and the other seventeen who were detained on the mainland were tried in absentia, contrary to union law. In an indication of the shift away from the ideological politics of the revolution, the prosecution sought to denigrate the characters of the accused – especially Babu – by highlighting their Marxist beliefs. Khamis Abdallah Ameir recalled that Dourado, the prosecutor, asked him, ‘[d]o you know what Marx said, religion was the opium of the people? ’Am I accused of being a Marxist or of killing the president?’ Khamis replied. In total, forty-three of the defendants were found guilty of treason and sentenced to death, including Babu.

Nyerere’s detention of Babu was a pragmatic, if partial solution to multiple political dilemmas. The decision not to extradite Babu avoided the public relations disaster which would have followed his almost certain execution in Zanzibar. Although the Zanzibari authorities were unhappy, the imprisonment of Babu on the mainland at least prevented an absurd situation whereby he could have freely criticised developments from afar, while his co-accused stood trial. After his release, Babu said that he knew that Nyerere realised that ‘the whole thing was a made up story’, but did not want to embarrass the Zanzibar authorities while trying to stabilise the union.

Nyerere always claimed to have acted in Babu’s own interests. Immediately after Babu was arrested, Nyerere rang Ngombale-Mwiru, whom Babu had assisted in drafting Mwongozo, to tell him about the news. ‘He explained what had happened to my friends’, Ngombale-Mwiru told me. ‘He said, “they will be safe here” […] it was better than risking other consequences.’ The African-American activist Amiri Baraka, who had previously met Babu in the United States, asked Nyerere himself about the situation. The president replied that he thought Babu was guilty, but would not hand him over for fears about his safety. When Nyerere found out that Zanzibari interrogators had tortured the Umma members imprisoned on the mainland, the president immediately ordered them to stop. Having already removed Babu from office in the 1972 government shake-up, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that by imprisoning Babu (rather than let him flee into exile), Nyerere closed off another potential source of dissent. After his release from prison on 1978, Babu became a vocal critic of Nyerere and ujamaa socialism, among an exiled African left in Europe and North America.

Babu publically denied any involvement in a plot to overthrow Karume. ‘I did not know anything about it. I only heard the news on the radio’, he told an interviewer, the day after his

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942 Quoted in Chase, ‘Zanzibar Treason Trial’, 24; see also Burgess, Race, 134-35.
943 Quoted in Wilson, Threat of Liberation, 91.
944 The figure was later reduced to twenty-four death sentences on appeal to the High Court. Chase, Zanzibar Treason Trial, 31.
945 ‘Lucky 13 free in anniversary amnesty’, New African, June 1978, 27-28; see also Shivji, Pan-Africanism, 123.
946 Interview with Kingunge Ngombale-Mwiru, Victoria, Dar es Salaam, 26 August 2015.
948 Wilson, Threat of Liberation, 87-88.
949 See for example, Babu, African Socialism; Babu, ‘Twenty Years after the Arusha Declaration’.
release from prison. His draft memoirs gloss over it. Among friends and acquaintances, Babu mostly remained tight-lipped. But one Zanzibari, who met him while studying in the United States in 1980, told me that Babu talked to him about Karume’s assassination at length. Babu said that he knew about the plan in advance and confirmed that the intention was to arrest Karume and force him to resign over the radio.

From a mainland perspective, the net result of the assassination of Karume was the silencing of Babu and the coming to power of a more pliant president in Zanzibar. The Jumbe regime quickly improved living conditions in the islands, by using the foreign exchange from clove exports to relieve food shortages. Jumbe restructured the party apparatus of the ASP to take power away from the Revolutionary Council. In December 1972, he told the ASP’s first conference for ten years that ‘leaders should seek to serve the people, not to dominate others’. The relationship between the mainland and Zanzibar was consolidated in 1977 by a new constitution, which provided for the merger of the ASP and TANU to form CCM.

Frene Ginwala and the Standard

As explained in chapter 5, faced with the contradiction of a foreign-owned newspaper that proved unpopular with the more militant wing of TANU, in February 1970 Nyerere nationalised the Standard. In a statement which accompanied its first issue under new ownership, Nyerere set out the government’s rationale.

In accordance with the Arusha Declaration, it is clearly impossible for the largest daily newspaper in independent Tanzania to be left indefinitely in the hands of a foreign company. In a country committed to building socialism, it is also impossible for such an influential medium to be left indefinitely in the control of non-socialist, capitalist owners. The reasons for Government’s [sic] decision to acquire the “Standard” are thus both nationalistic and socialistic; we want Tanzanians to have control of this newspaper, and we want those Tanzanians to be responsible for the people as a whole.

However, Nyerere stressed that although the Standard would be expected to support the government’s policies, it would also be free to attack their implementation and ‘acts of individualism’. The newspaper, he wrote, ‘will be guided by the principle that free debate is an

951 Interview with Salim Msoma, Oyster Bay, Dar es Salaam, 2 July 2015; interview with Jenerali Ulimwengu, Oyster Bay, Dar es Salaam, 8 August 2015.
952 Interview with Muhammad Yussuf, Stone Town, Zanzibar, 13 July 2015.
953 Quoted in Chase, ‘Zanzibar Treason Trial’, 22.
954 Shivji, Pan-Africanism, 144-80.
Politics in the time of *ujamaa* II

essential statement of true socialism*. The *Standard*’s commitment was to the *res publica*, rather than the government. The French ambassador suggested that Nyerere wanted to use the *Standard* to correct the ‘often doctrinaire and extremist’ position of the *Nationalist* and highlight problems within the government. ‘Whatever the cause’, wrote André Naudy, ‘Nyerere will add a new lever of power to those which are already concentrated in his hands’.

Given that the government acquisition of the *Standard* was partly justified on ‘nationalistic’ grounds, Nyerere’s choice of a foreign editor seemed odd. In late 1969, he invited Frene Ginwala, a South African ANC supporter of Asian descent, to Dar es Salaam. Following the Sharpeville massacre in 1960, Ginwala had joined Oliver Tambo in establishing the ANC’s ‘external mission’ in exile. From Dar es Salaam, she had edited the movement’s magazine, *Spearhead*. Ginwala served on the editorial board of the Algiers-based journal *Révolution africaine*, worked as a stringer for the British newspaper, the *Guardian*, and was rumoured to be a member of the South African Communist Party. However, in 1963 Ginwala was declared *persona non grata* in Tanzania, after becoming embroiled in local disputes. According to street gossip, she was romantically connected with a government minister, Nsilo Swai. Another story held that she had clashed with Sijaona. A third suggested she appeared too close to an unnamed foreign government.

Nyerere’s appointment was therefore a radical move, especially given the eclectic editorial staff which Ginwala assembled. She recruited Richard Gott, a British national who had written on revolutionary movements in Latin America, to the position of foreign editor. Other members of staff included Iain Christie, who developed a close association with FRELIMO; Tony Hall, another ANC supporter; Rod Prince, the former editor of *Peace News*; and Philip Ochieng, a talented young Kenyan columnist. Ginwala committed the newspaper to a polemical approach: in the reborn *Standard*’s first editorial meeting, she stated that there was ‘no such such thing as objectiveness’.

The newspaper’s editorial line was similar to Mkapa’s *Nationalist*, but took a more internationalist slant. Andy Chande, a Tanzanian Asian businessman who remained on the board of the *Standard* after its nationalisation, recalled that on the centenary of Lenin’s birth in April 1970, the newspaper published a supplement so bulky that it was ‘jettisoned into the gutters of the city in such numbers by so many of our over-loaded delivery boys that it caused a blockage in Dar es Salaam’s drainage system’. Ginwala and Gott sought to diversify the *Standard*’s news sources. Ginwala took on communist news from Xinhua and Tass, while Gott made use of Cuba’s *Prensa 955*


Chande, *Knight in Africa*, 141-42.
Politics in the time of *ujamaa* II

Latina and the Liberation News Service (LNS), a Harlem-based underground agency which connected the American New Left into global circuits of counterculture and revolution.\(^{960}\)

The sharp anti-Western tone adopted by the *Standard* predictably led to confrontations with diplomatic representations in Dar es Salaam. The editorial team, remarked Chande, was ‘packed with political and ideological nitroglycerine’.\(^{961}\) In November 1970, the newspaper published a pair of articles by Walter Rodney, in which the Guyanese academic extolled the practice of the kidnapping of diplomats and the hijacking of civilian aircraft as a form of revolutionary violence.\(^{962}\)

The prickly British high commissioner, Horace Phillips, responded by writing two letters to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, inquiring as to what place such articles had in a government newspaper.\(^{963}\) Someone – presumably a ministry employee – leaked the note to Ginwala, who replied in turn through an editorial in the *Sunday News* on 13 November. The leading article accused Phillips of ‘gross interference in the internal affairs of Tanzania’ and suggested that the letter was part of a British attempt to distract attention from the Conservative government’s consideration of resuming the supply of arms to South Africa.\(^{964}\) There were rumours in Dar es Salaam that Phillips would be recalled to London, which the high commissioner dismissed as the invention of David Martin, then working as a stringer for the BBC.\(^{965}\) Indeed, an article in the *Guardian* – without a byline, but likely to have been written by Martin – expressed surprise that Phillips had taken up the issue at all, given his good relations with Nyerere, and correctly suggested that the letters had been sent without consulting London.\(^{966}\)

The day after the editorial appeared in the *Sunday News*, Phillips expressed his disquiet over lunch at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His hosts, who included the minister of state, Israel Elinewina, appeared embarrassed by the episode. They had contacted Ginwala to express their concern, but the editor had merely replied that she had acted as such ‘to make the position clear’.\(^{967}\)

At a reception shortly after, Phillips challenged Ginwala, who responded that the editorial was an attempt to establish her right to publish as she wished. When Phillips reported this conversation in an audience with Nyerere himself, the president ‘raised his eyebrows in incredulity’ and stressed...

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\(^{961}\) Chande, *Knight in Africa*, 141.


\(^{963}\) Phillips to Katikaza, 5 and 6 November 1970, enclosed in Phillips to FCO, 9 November, UKNA, FCO 31/700/12.


\(^{965}\) Douglas Home to UK HC, Dar es Salaam, 8 November 1970, UKNA, FCO 31/700/10; Phillips to FCO, 9 November 1970, UKNA, FCO 31/700/12.


\(^{967}\) Phillips to FCO, 9 November 1970, UKNA, FCO 31/700/12.
that the matter would have no impact on relations between Britain and Tanzania. The high commissioner left with the impression that Nyerere felt that Ginwala had overstepped the mark.968

A similar confrontation took place in March 1971, when another Standard editorial launched a savage attack on Washington, criticising its policy towards Africa, racial discrimination in the United States, and the war in Vietnam.969 Earlier in the month, ambassador Claude Ross had complained to Nyerere about the general presentation of the United States as an ‘imperialist’ power in the Tanzanian press.970 Through the LNS, the Standard also reproduced a statement made by the Black Panthers in New York, which the newspaper connected to Mwongozo’s call for Tanzanians to establish ‘fraternal and revolutionary relations’ with Americans fighting against racial discrimination.971 Tiring of these assaults, Ross followed Phillips in expressing his concern to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Ross accepted the officials’ assurance that the article did not represented the government’s views, but argued that it would raise doubts about Tanzania’s non-aligned foreign policy. The editorial, Ross thought, was ‘indistinguishable in tone, content, and general animus from what might have appeared in Moscow and Peking’. The embarrassed officials promised they would speak to Nyerere about the matter.972 Ross subsequently noted that the negative coverage of the United States quietly fell away. A Tanzanian MP told American diplomats over dinner that State House had instructed the press to avoid explicit criticism of Washington.973

On 12 June, the president summoned local newspaper and radio editors to State House, where he lectured them over their ‘inaccurate’ reporting. His words were reported verbatim in the press. In a tone redolent of ‘Argue Don’t Shout’, he ridiculed the excessive use of terms like ‘imperialism’, ‘stooge’, and ‘puppet’. This ‘nonsense’, he said, was ‘becoming something of a disease in Tanzania […] It is almost getting to a position where I am afraid to use the word ‘imperialism’ once in a two hour question and answer session, because it will be presented with such headlines that the people will imagine I talk about nothing else’.974 Ross noted that Nyerere’s intervention came shortly after a Standard editorial had misrepresented the president’s views on the Paris negotiations over peace in Vietnam, describing the talks as ‘the US’s search for an honourable, but cowardly, retreat’. According to Joan Wicken, Nyerere’s personal assistant, the president had summoned Ginwala the day after the story’s publication and rebuked her. The Americans believed that this was the third time in two weeks that Nyerere had done so.975

Ginwala’s troubles were not limited to her relationship with the president. A cabal of editorial staff at the Standard schemed for the full Tanzanianisation of the newspaper, as Nyerere’s initial

969 Ross to State Dept, 29 March 1971, NARA, RG 59, SNF 1970-3, Box 2619, POL TANZAN-US.
970 Ross to State Dept, 10 March 1971, NARA, RG 59, SNF 1970-3, Box 2619, POL TANZAN-US.
972 Ross to State Dept, 30 March 1971, NARA, RG 59, SNF 1970-3, Box 2619, POL TANZAN-US.
973 Ross to State Dept, 13 May 1971, NARA, RG 59, SNF 1970-3, Box 2619, POL TANZAN-US.
975 Ross to State Dept, 17 June 1971, NARA, RG 59, SNF 1970-3, Box 433, PPB TANZAN.
mission statement had set out. They capitalised on the wave of racial invective that accompanied the Buildings Act of 1971, which cast Asians like Ginwala as enemies of the *ujamaa* state.\footnote{Philip Ochieng, *I Accuse the Press: An Insider's View of the Media and Politics in Africa* (Nairobi: Initiatives, 1992), 130-32.} The *Standard*’s criticism of the National Development Corporation, the parastatal that owned the newspaper, was also resented by the local establishment.\footnote{Ayres to Holmes, 4 August 1971, UKNA, FCO 31/992/4.} In a first move against foreign staff, on 1 July, Gott, Hall, and Prince were all given three months’ notice.\footnote{Ewans to Holmes, 8 July 1971, UKNA, FCO 31/992/1.}

The breaking point for Nyerere arrived when the *Standard* delivered a scathing attack on the government of Gaafar Nimeiry in Sudan. On 19 July 1971, Nimeiry was briefly toppled from power in a left-wing coup. After being relieved by loyal troops, he then carried out a violent purge of the Sudanese Communist Party.\footnote{Robert O. Collins, *A History of Modern Sudan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 100-2.} A *Standard* editorial written by Gott on 29 July accused Nimeiry of a ‘senseless witch hunt of people whose only crime is to share an ideology with countries like the Soviet Union and China’. It condemned the Sudanese president for practicing ‘a form of ideological intolerance which in Africa has been hitherto the preserve of Mr. Vorster and Mr. Houphouet-Boigny’, the moderate Ivorian leader who had controversially entered into a dialogue with South Africa.\footnote{Editorial, *Standard*, 29 July 1971, 1.} The article was published weeks before Nimeiry was scheduled to visit Tanzania. While Nyerere could not have approved of the purges, geopolitical circumstances meant that he was reluctant to criticise Nimeiry. The recently established dictatorship in Uganda threatened both Sudan and Tanzania, which were among the few African states not to recognise Idi Amin’s regime.\footnote{David Martin, ‘Nyerere dismisses an editor’, *Guardian*, 2 August 1971, 3.} Ginwala, Gott, and the other foreign editorial staff were relieved of their jobs. Sammy Mdee, a Tanzanian who had led the anti-Ginwala bloc among the *Standard* staff, was appointed as the new editor.\footnote{‘Tanzanian editor takes over at “The Standard”’, *Sunday News*, 1 August 1971, 1.} The Ginwala experiment thus came to a swift end: a ‘free’ state-owned newspaper run by internationalist foreigners proved incompatible with predominant nationalist ideological forces and Tanzania’s geopolitical priorities.

Within a year, the *Standard* ceased to exist. In April 1972, it was merged with the *Nationalist* to form the *Daily News*, which became the sole English-language newspaper published in Tanzania. Mkapa was named as the new managing editor. The first edition of the *Daily News* set out that in a socialist country, the press must act as a ‘collective mobiliser, collective educator, collective inspirer and an instrument for the dissemination of socialist ideas […] Like all true revolutionary activities, such a task for the press begs of no liberalism.’\footnote{Editorial, *Daily News*, 26 April 1972, 4.} The *Daily News* was far more subservient to the party than the *Standard*. Jenerali Ulimwengu joined the newspaper at the time of its formation, soon after graduating from the University of Dar es Salaam. Two years later, he was dismissed. ‘The reason I was removed,’ Ulimwengu told me, ‘was because I was perceived as not being totally...
compliant with the party line, seen to be a bit too radical.\textsuperscript{984} Ochieng came under similar pressure from the authorities for his left-wing views and tendered his resignation in January 1973.\textsuperscript{985} The lively content of the \textit{Nationalist} and the \textit{Standard} under Ginwala was thus subsumed into a monotonous organ of the party-state.

\textbf{Oscar Kambona, Tanzania’s enemies, and the June 1972 bombings}

While Nyerere fought fires within Tanzania, he remained concerned by threats from the country’s enemies abroad. After the failure of the coup plot of 1969, Oscar Kambona had sought out new avenues for usurping the Nyerere regime. In 1970, he was introduced to Jorge Jardim, the Mozambique-based businessman who, as shown in chapter 4, was implicated in the assassination of Mondlane. Jardim, in close contact with Portuguese prime minister Marcelo Caetano, identified Kambona as a potential figurehead to overthrow Nyerere and then cast FRELIMO out of Tanzania. With the consent of the South African minister of defence, P. W. Botha, Jardim established \textit{Opera\c{c}\~{a}o OK}. This planned the formation of a Tanzanian government-in-exile and military forces which would infiltrate southern from bases in Mozambique. In June 1971, Jardim began to channel funds to Kambona, which reached $8.4 million by the end of the year and $42.4 million by the time of the Carnation Revolution in 1974.\textsuperscript{986}

Kambona also turned to Nyerere’s newly established \textit{bête noire} in Uganda, Idi Amin. In March 1971, a group of exiled Kambona supporters in Kampala asked Amin for aid to liberate Tanzania ‘with the mercy of god from the hands of communism.’ According to Jardim’s biographer, the Portuguese businessman also had a hand in facilitating this meeting.\textsuperscript{987} On 6 April, \textit{Ngurumo} reported that Kambona himself was currently in Uganda.\textsuperscript{988} In the anxious climate which followed the Uganda coup, the appearance of such rumours in the Dar es Salaam press stoked fears of an anti-Nyerere alliance between his most outspoken Tanzanian critic and his most dangerous opponent abroad. The day after the \textit{Ngurumo} story, Kambona published a letter in the \textit{Guardian} – a newspaper usually staunchly pro-Nyerere – in which he accused Nyerere of crushing the party in merging it with the apparatus of the state. On this occasion, Nyerere declined to respond to Kambona’s criticism.\textsuperscript{989}

A more serious indication of the threat facing Nyerere came in October 1971, when Godfrey Binaisa, a Ugandan lawyer, approached the American embassy in Kampala. Binaisa had previously

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{984} Interview with Jenerali Ulimwengu, Oyster Bay, Dar es Salaam, 18 August 2015.
  \item \textsuperscript{985} Ochieng, \textit{I Accuse the Press}, 162.
  \item \textsuperscript{986} Antunes, \textit{Jorge Jardim}, 371-72.
  \item \textsuperscript{987} Quoted in ibid., 373.
  \item \textsuperscript{988} Ross to US emb., Kampala, 6 April 1971, NARA, RG 59, SNF 1970-3, Box 2618, POL 29 TANZAN; see also Martin, \textit{General Amin}, 181.
  \item \textsuperscript{989} Oscar Kambona, ‘TANU head quit because of State power over party’, \textit{Guardian}, 7 April 1971, 4; Brennan, \textit{Julius Rex}, 471.
\end{itemize}
defended several of the accused in the treason trial in Tanzania. He explained that a plot had been prepared, involving groups in Britain and Tanzania, to overthrow Nyerere. The Ugandan foreign minister, Wanume Kibedi, had been informed of these plans. Binaisa asked Ross whether they might arrange a cover job for Kambona – perhaps with an American oil firm – in order to permit his passage to Uganda. Although Ross immediately rejected the idea, the United States did not warn the Tanzanian government about the plot. ⁹⁹⁰

Further evidence of Kambona’s deepening relationship with Portugal was provided by a propaganda stunt on 9 December 1971. Two aircraft, flying north from Mozambique, dropped pamphlets written in English and Swahili over the Saba Saba fairground in Dar es Salaam, where crowds had gathered to celebrate Tanzania’s Independence Day. The leaflet was an open letter to Nyerere from Kambona, in which the latter attacked the president’s ‘shameful’ record since independence. ‘The Party and the Militia are under oppressive control of a tyrannical minority working against people’s interest and welfare’, Kambona wrote. ‘In this tenth anniversary of independence Tanzania faces a stage of near civil war’. Kambona implored Nyerere to call free elections and declared his willingness to return immediately to Tanzania to stand as a candidate. ⁹⁹¹

While the government maintained a public silence about the pamphlets, security in Dar es Salaam was visibly increased. The police established checkpoints on the city’s major road arteries and placed a night guard on the Selander Bridge. The impunity with which the aircraft had infiltrated Tanzanian airspace was an embarrassing reflection on the country’s defence capabilities. Although neither explicitly mentioned the incident, Nyerere and Kawawa both made speeches in the following days which criticised those ‘bad leaders’ and ‘self-seekers’ who sought to derail Tanzania’s socialist revolution. An editorial in the Standard said that the party and government were ready to ‘listen to genuine complaints and grievances’, and that ‘those who have chosen to indulge in murmuring, rumour, grumbling or leaflets have done so not for want of ways to get their views heard. They have chosen the latter in order to feel free to distort facts to suit their own sinister ends’. ⁹⁹² On 16 December, Edward Sokoine, the minister of state in the second vice-president’s office, broke the government’s silence on the pamphlets at a regional TANU meeting in Dar es Salaam. He said that citizens should be on guard against attempts to subvert them and that the leaflets were intended to foment discontent. ⁹⁹³

The leaflet drop gave rise to an exceptional spate of wild rumours in Dar es Salaam, including stories that various officials had disappeared or been arrested, that Nyerere was gravely ill, that a

⁹⁹⁰ Ferguson to State Dept, 1 October 1971, NARA, RG 59, SNF 1970-3, Box 2618, POL 23 TANZAN.
⁹⁹³ ‘Be alert to our enemies’ manoeuvres – Sokoine’, Standard, 17 December 1971, 1; Ross to State Dept, 17 December 1971, NARA, RG 59, SNF 1970-3, Box 2618, POL 23 TANZAN.
Politics in the time of *ujamaa* II

British warship had been seized by the Tanzanian navy, that a coup was imminent. ‘There is no doubt that there is a jittery atmosphere here and if this is what Kambona wished to achieve by the leaflet raid, then he seems to have succeeded’, noted the British high commission. The assassination of Wilbert Klerru, the regional commissioner for Iringa, by disaffected locals on Christmas Day furthered a sense of disquiet. Klerru’s role in the local implementation of *ujamaa* villagisation had met widespread resent.

In June 1972, just as Nyerere was bringing Zanzibar to heel, Tanzania’s enemies moved from paper-based propaganda to state-sponsored terrorism. At 2.10am on 12 June, residents of Upanga and Oyster Bay were woken by an explosion, followed by another blast fifteen minutes later. Daybreak revealed damage to supporting pillars of the Selander Bridge, the main artery into the city centre from the northern suburbs, closing it to traffic. An electricity pylon had also been brought down, which caused a power cut for several hours.

At 5am, a third explosion occurred, when a bomb wrecked a car owned by a Swiss expatriate worker. Another car bomb went off at 3.25pm, on Independence Avenue, the city’s main commercial thoroughfare. This, the British high commission reported, caused ‘near pandemonium among shoppers’. Later that evening, at 7.15pm, a car belonging to a junior member of staff at the British high commission exploded. Although there were no casualties, the scattergun effect of the bombings elicited anxiety among the city’s population. An emergency meeting of TANU’s regional branch on 13 June decided that the militia should be deployed to guard industrial premises and residential areas. The *Daily News* decried the architects of the bombing as ‘enemies of our revolution and the African revolution’. The explosions were not just ‘acts of destruction’, but had a ‘political purpose’, to ‘deflect us from our chosen path of revolution, of total liberation of the African in Tanzania and on the Continent. They aim to create an atmosphere of insecurity, of fear, of panic.’

The security services calculated that on the night before the explosions the three bombed cars had all been parked outside the same apartment block near the Selander Bridge. A fourth device was found attached to another vehicle there, primed to explode several days later. According to a junior Tanzanian diplomat at its London embassy, a further seven bombs were found under the Selander Bridge, with fuses set for a two-week delay. The Tanzanian police established that the bombs were of a ‘NATO make’, which suggested a potential Portuguese hand. In Dar es Salaam, the usual rumours abounded, with much speculation about the role of Kambona. Although the government had no evidence linking Kambona to the attacks, his brothers – who had been released

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994 Ewans to Dawbarn, 4 January 1972, UKNA, FCO 31/1285/6.
995 Ayres to Holmes, 5 January 1972, UKNA, FCO 31/1285/7.
996 The account of the bombings in this and the subsequent paragraph is drawn from ‘Five bomb blasts in Dar’, *Daily News*, 13 June 1972, 1; Savage to Holmes, 14 June 1972, UKNA, FCO 31/1285/21.
998 Hart to Holmes, 9 August 1972, UKNA, FCO 31/1285/32.
999 ‘Dar bombs are of “Nato” make, say police’, *Daily News*, 14 June 1972, 1.
Politics in the time of *ujamaa* II

in an amnesty in February, along with Anangisye and Bibi Titi – were re-imprisoned as a precautionary measure.\(^{1000}\) Some made connections between the bombings and a second drop of pro-Kambona leaflets, which had taken place on 31 May over provincial cities in Tanzania.\(^{1001}\)

After the end of apartheid, members of the South African special forces claimed responsibility for the bombings. The Lisbon-Pretoria axis had hoped to undermine the Nyerere regime by demonstrating the militancy of Kambona’s supporters. ‘There was a need to stage incidents on an escalating basis to, hopefully, stir the fires of insurrection’, writes military historian Peter Stiff in his exposé of the operation. A crack squad of troops travelled to Dar es Salaam by submarine, paddled into the city by canoe, and planted their devices on Selander Bridge and a series of vehicles. Stiff’s account suggests that the explosives attached to the car which detonated on Independence Avenue was originally intended to have been affixed to the British high commissioner’s car.\(^{1002}\)

Although Nyerere claimed to be unconcerned by the bombings, telling one inquirer that this was not the way a coup would take place in Tanzania, foreign observers testified to a heightened sense of insecurity in Dar es Salaam over the following weeks. The British high commission reported that certain areas were ‘bristling with armed soldiers in combat dress, who have not hesitated to stop, search and pick up quite innocent passers-by, particularly those with white faces’.\(^{1003}\) Connections were made by the Zambian state press – and relayed by its Tanzanian equivalent – between the Dar es Salaam bombings and a recent parcel-bomb attempt on the life of Kaunda.\(^{1004}\) Elsewhere in Africa, Tanzania’s enemies gloated. The Zairean newspaper *Elima* set to the bombings against a backdrop of the assassinations of Mondlane and Karume, as evidence of a ‘serious malaise, to which the leadership in Dar es Salaam must provide an urgent solution’. If not, *Elima* warned, Tanzania would ‘lose its reputation as an island of stability in an African ocean boiling over’.\(^{1005}\) According to Portuguese representatives in Kinshasa, Mobutu’s Zaire was also rumoured to be subject of an inquiry by Tanzanian security forces regarding relations between its ambassador in Dar es Salaam and one of Kambona’s principal agents in the city.\(^{1006}\)

The June bombings provided substance to the language of vigilance which had dominated the government’s rhetoric since independence and especially since the Arusha Declaration. By sheltering the liberation movements, Tanzania had created enemies in Lisbon and Pretoria. Exploiting circumstances of domestic unrest – itself entwined with events in Guinea and Uganda – Portugal and South Africa aimed to destabilise Tanzanian politics. Through the weapons of propaganda and terror, forces committed to maintaining white minority rule in southern Africa

\(^{1000}\) ‘Titi and Kambona brothers freed’, *Standard*, 7 February 1972, 1; Hart to Holmes, 9 August 1972, UKNA, FCO 31/1285/32.
\(^{1003}\) Ewans to Holmes, 11 July 1972, UKNA, FCO 31/1285/28.
\(^{1005}\) Enclosed in Portuguese emb., Kinshasa, to MNE, 22 June 1972, AHD, MNE, PAA 821.
\(^{1006}\) Gozaga-Ferreira to PAA, MNE, 30 November 1972, AHD, MNE, PAA 821.
sought to use Dar es Salaam’s reputation as a hotbed of rumour to foment opposition to Nyerere. In Kambona, they found an opportunistic and desperate collaborator, who articulated a critique of Nyerere that was rooted in local discontent with the implementation of the *ujamaa* programme.

The matter was aggravated by the fact that the Tanzanian security services (and their British colleagues) had lost track of Kambona in late 1971, when he had left London and had last been seen in Rome. In the aftermath of the bombings and leaflet drops, Tanzanian intelligence became increasingly obsessed by his whereabouts. In September, Emilio Mzena, the director of the intelligence services, arranged a meeting with the British overseas police advisor to Tanzania. ‘Time and time again during our conversation Mzena harked back to Kambona and his alleged machinations’, the advisor reported. Around this time, according to David Martin, the Tanzanian government also received dubious reports that a former British army officer had drawn up plans for a joint Ugandan-Portuguese invasion of Tanzania, including the involvement of Kambona.

Border clashes between Tanzania and Uganda had flared up on several occasions since the coup in Kampala, and each side regularly accused the other of plotting an invasion. Then, on 17 September 1972, around one thousand armed supporters of Obote crossed from Tanzania into Uganda, with the secret backing of Nyerere. Amin responded by bombing Tanzanian cities near the border and the invading force was quickly routed. To avoid a wider conflagration, Amin and Nyerere eventually signed a peace settlement, brokered by Somalia’s president, Siad Barre. The Mogadishu Agreement stated that both sides must withdraw ten kilometres behind the border and refrain from supporting forces hostile to the other’s regime.

Kambona was eventually spotted in Lisbon in November 1972, accompanied by Jardim. The American embassy in Lisbon received advanced copy of the text of an interview with Kambona filed to a British newspaper. Kambona explained how Portugal had established and trained an armed group, which infiltrated southwestern Tanzania from bases in Mozambique. The unnamed journalist described Kambona as ‘obviously nervous over the fact his cover had been broken’. On 4 November, the *East African Standard* ran an interview with Kambona, datelined London, much of which was then repeated in the Tanzanian press. The *Daily News* reported that Kambona’s appearance in Lisbon ‘only lends weight to the belief held by many progressive people that he is anti-Tanzania.’

Having been rumbled, Kambona’s Portuguese contacts offered him a platform for setting out a scathing criticism of Nyerere. In December, Lisbon’s *Diario Popular* published a three-part interview

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1007 Macoun to Holmes, 12 September 1972, UKNA, FCO 31/1285/34.
1008 Martin, *General Amin*, 181.
1009 This short summary simply sketches out a complex story: see Martin, *General Amin*, 170-210.
1010 Post to State Dept, 3 November 1972, NARA, RG 59, SNF 1970-3, Box 2618, POL 29 TANZAN.
Politics in the time of *ujamaa II*

with Kambona, supposedly conducted ‘clandestinely along the coast of the Mediterranean.’ The series was syndicated in the *Notícias da Beira*, a Mozambican newspaper owned by Jardim. Kambona described Tanzania as a police state, governed by a paranoid regime which had sold out to China. He argued that the struggle against white minority rule, which he had supported so fervently as chairman of the OAU Liberation Committee, had achieved nothing and should be abandoned. But his words were not backed by any effective action. Despite continuing to scheme with the Portuguese until the collapse of the *Estado Novo*, Kambona’s attempts to undermine the Nyerere government fell flat.

**Conclusion**

In the *ujamaa* years, dissent among the political elite was first marginalised, then shut down altogether. Formulated amid a deteriorating economic situation and the shock of the Ugandan coup, *Mwongezw* momentarily suggested a leftward shift in Tanzania’s political direction. Yet this aperture was soon closed up, as Nyerere reasserted control through a programme of decentralisation and an increasingly dogmatic enforcement of villagisation. Frustrated by the peasantry’s reluctance to resettle into *ujamaa* villages, TANU adopted a more coercive strategy. ‘To live in villages is an order’, stated Nyerere in November 1973.

By the end of 1972, Nyerere’s main critics were mostly in exile, in prison, or neutralised by their exclusion from the inner circles of government. The Karume assassination might have split an already fractured union; instead, the Jumbe regime proved more amenable to improving relations between the mainland and the islands. The failed Umma plot also provided an opportunity to remove the remaining vestiges of Marxist dissent among the political class, especially through the imprisonment of Babu. In control of the media, the government prevented little more than rumour seeping out into the public sphere. The 1970s were not a time of absolute stability: in early 1974, the government quashed an incipient coup plot among disaffected members of the armed forces, which took place against a background of lengthening bread queues. But the intra-governmental tensions of the post-Arusha period, rife with the politics of personality and ideology, gave way to an administration manned by apparatchiks committed to realising the goals of *ujamaa* socialism as envisaged by Nyerere.

This growing authoritarianism was both influenced and justified by external threats confronting Tanzania. Whereas previously references to a vague ‘imperialist’ nemesis served as a source of nation-building rhetoric, the events of the early 1970s demonstrated that these enemies were very

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1012 Van Oss to State Dept, 13 December 1972; Knight to State Dept, 13 January 1973; both in NARA, RG 59, SNF 1970-3, Box 2618, POL 29 TANZAN.
1013 Quoted in Eckert, ‘Julius Nyerere’, 231.
1014 See Desparmet to MAE-DAM, 25 February 1974, CADN, 193PO/1/1 A1.
real. Instead of fabricated American ‘letter plots’ or misinterpreted phone taps, Tanzania now faced enemies prepared to conspire with an exiled opponent to the regime, to spread propaganda and even bomb Dar es Salaam. The Portuguese and South African threat, rooted in Nyerere’s principled support for African liberation, was supplemented by the dangerous Idi Amin – a problem of Nyerere’s own making.

Although scholars have explored the authoritarian bent of *ujamaa* socialism in detail, they have rarely done so with direct reference to competition among the political elite. More generally, while the Tanzania media retains an obsession with elite politics, few publications are prepared to revisit these controversial episodes in an era which is celebrated as a golden age of Tanzania’s history, juxtaposed against a neoliberal present characterised by corruption and moral failure. Biographies of Nyerere tend to skate over issues like the coup plot or the use of preventive detention. This problem has been most acute in Zanzibar, where the state of the union continues to dominate local politics. Such debate often descends into memory wars over the *zama za siasa*, the revolution, and the ‘dark years’ under Karume.¹⁰¹⁵ The brief existence of the newspaper *Dira* demonstrates the constraints on political freedom for the practice of history on the islands. Established in 2002, this Zanzibari weekly challenged hegemonic narratives of the revolution and the Karume years.¹⁰¹⁶ *Dira* was banned by the government after just a year in press, for ‘undermining peace and security by selectively digging up parts of the Zanzibar history.’¹⁰¹⁷ In one sense, then, the purpose of this chapter has been simply to lay out a narrative of high politics in the critical period in Tanzanian history which followed the Arusha Declaration. The diplomatic documents which form the bedrock of this narrative may present the viewpoint of the foreign observer, but as primary source material they represent a means whereby the distortions of contemporary politics can be at least partially cast aside.

A history which emphasises the degree of opposition among the political elite also allows for a more nuanced understanding of the Nyerere years. On the one hand, an analysis of internal divisions and factionalism within the TANU party-state militates against the Mwalimu-worship that characterises not just hagiography, but also some serious academic works. By understanding that *ujamaa* (socialism) did not necessarily equal *umoja* (unity), Nyerere’s achievements and the scope of his authority become more clearly defined and thus take on greater meaning. On the other hand, the focus on high politics offers an antidote to the teleological interpretations of the rise and fall of *ujamaa* socialism articulated by historians concerned with development practices. Like those which preceded it, this chapter has emphasised the importance of individual agency and political contingency, in which domestic and foreign affairs were intertwined. *Ujamaa* was not an inexorable

¹⁰¹⁶ Fouéré, ‘Reinterpreting Revolutionary Zanzibar’. *Dira* did not however publish detailed stories about the deaths of prominent politicians, such as Hanga, Shariff, and Twala.
¹⁰¹⁷ Quoted in ibid., 683.
Politics in the time of *ujamaa II*

descent into economic disaster or authoritarian rule. Developments like *Mwenge* show how political space could be opened up, then sealed up again. Rather, *ujamaa* socialism was negotiated in a complex political environment, in which Nyerere may often have been the dominant individual, but never the sole or omnipotent actor.
Conclusion

Arriving Kapuściński-style today, a visiting journalist would encounter a very different Dar es Salaam. No longer a ‘Cold War city’, the sprawling metropolis is now characteristic of a postsocialist Africa’s urban landscape. Caught up in the throws of globalisation, the effects of neoliberalism have rendered the gulf between rich and poor starker than ever. Where once diplomats and spies played out games of Cold War politics, now workers for non-governmental organisations jostle for influence in the congested development sector. Ramshackle liberation movement offices have been replaced by gleaming skyscrapers. The bar at the rebuilt New Africa Hotel – a grey, concrete eyesore – is now not propped up by guerrilla leaders, but businessmen working for multinational corporations, seeking to break into a growing African market. Major Western embassies no longer occupy premises among the noise of the city centre, but are protected in highly securitised compounds. This is a consequence of the nature of Tanzania’s new breed of enemies: rather than South African recce forces, terrorist danger in the city comes from Islamic extremism, as Al Qaeda’s bombing of the American embassy in 1998 demonstrated.

The changes in this urban environment are bound up in the transformation of Tanzania’s political economy since the demise of ujamaa socialism. Despite massive injections of aid from the Nordic social democratic governments and especially the World Bank, ujamaa socialism failed to produce the expected growth in rural production. Between 1975 and 1983, the standard of living for the average Tanzanian fell by half. These difficulties were not unlike those faced by many African states, particularly after the first oil crisis in 1973. However, while other leaders caved in to the demands of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for structural adjustment reform in the early 1980s, Nyerere stubbornly refused to comply with his potential creditors. Eventually, faced by mounting internal pressure and the withdrawal of financial lifelines from donor partners, in 1985 Nyerere chose to stand down as president. This ushered in a new era of neoliberal reform, especially after the end of the Cold War. The fall of the one-party systems in Eastern Europe also came as a critical blow to the embattled TANU party-state, leading to the reintroduction of multiparty democracy in 1992.

These developments were not purely the result of structural economic failures, but exacerbated by two dynamics set in motion by Nyerere’s somewhat Pyrrhic ‘victory’ over his internal opponents. First, ujamaa became increasingly dogmatic in approach and authoritarian in implementation. The switch from voluntary to enforced villagisation alienated vast sections of the peasantry, upon which the rural revolution depended. On an elite level, the elimination of

1018 Cooper, Africa, 179.
dissenting voices deprived *ujamaa* of the oxygen it required for its own rejuvenation.\textsuperscript{1020} In 1972, William Tordoff and Ali Mazrui noted with prescient alarm that ‘[Nyerere] alone has emerged as a creative political theorist, and there seems to be a dearth of creative socialist thought among Tanzanians.’\textsuperscript{1021} This was not entirely correct: creative thought was present, for example at the university or among the pro-*Mwongozo* wing in TANU, but was crushed by Nyerere. The ideological and political divisions which characterised the period discussed in this thesis did not return until the internal conflicts surrounding the structural adjustment reforms.

Second, Nyerere’s greatest foreign relations mistake culminated in a critical blow to an already faltering *ujamaa* project. The feud with Uganda brought about by his non-recognition of Amin rumbled on throughout the 1970s. On a regional level, the war-of-words fuelled an expensive arms race. Nyerere’s refusal to compromise with Amin hastened the demise of the EAC, which eventually collapsed in 1977 amid an acrimonious dispute between Tanzania and Kenya. When a Ugandan barracks mutiny the following year spilt over into a haphazard invasion of northwest Tanzania, Nyerere took the opportunity to unleash a counteroffensive. This drove Amin into exile in April 1979 and – after two years of instability – eventually returned Obote to power. However, ‘victory’ came at a high financial cost, further depleting Tanzania’s foreign exchange reserves and thus contributing to its turn to the IMF.\textsuperscript{1022}

At the same time as the *ujamaa* revolution stalled, Dar es Salaam lost its centre-stage position in African international politics. The Carnation Revolution in Lisbon in 1974 and the subsequent negotiation of independence in Portugal’s colonies meant an end to exile for several Dar es Salaam-based liberation movements. It also ended the Portuguese military threat. The frontiers of the struggle against white minority rule moved south, with Lusaka and Luanda becoming new hotspots of Cold War and anticolonial politics. The authoritarian impulses of the TANU party-state sucked much of the vitality out of the cosmopolitan political scene of the late 1960s in Dar es Salaam, especially at the university.

Over the course of the 1970s, the Cold War paranoia of foreign powers in Tanzania faded away. As other post-colonial African states succumbed to plagues of military coups, Tanzania appeared a model of stability. Even as Nyerere continued to act as the leading spokesman for African liberation, the United States and Britain came to regard him as a reliable if stubborn negotiating partner, especially in the Rhodesian endgame. After the end of the war in Indochina, the United States experienced an improvement in its relations with Tanzania. China’s retreat from the Third World from the mid-1970s eased not only Western fears, but also those of the Soviet Union.

\textsuperscript{1020} As Prashad notes, this was true of many Third World regimes, especially those which attempted to toughen national identities through mass mobilisation campaigns, Tanzania being a prime example. *Darker Nations*, 139-40.

\textsuperscript{1021} Tordoff and Mazrui, ‘Left and the Super-Left’, 436.

Conclusion

Moscow’s relationship with Tanzania improved: when the TPDF invaded Uganda in 1979, it did so using Soviet arms. By the mid-1970s, the perceived threat no longer came from Cold War interventions, but from Tanzania’s continental enemies, South Africa and Uganda.

This local détente in Dar es Salaam was encouraged by Nyerere’s own foreign policy. After the ‘crises’ of 1964-65, Nyerere sought not only to diversify Tanzania’s sources of aid, but also to disconnect political disputes from economic agreements. Irritated by the GDR and recognising the potential of West German aid, he looked to rebuild Tanzania’s donor relationship with Bonn. Although cognisant of the domestic propaganda value to be reaped from attacking superpower ‘imperialism’ abroad, he refrained from allowing issues like Vietnam or Czechoslovakia from affecting his own diplomatic endeavours. Conscious of the negative implications in some quarters of Tanzania’s close relationship with Beijing, Nyerere sought to maintain a balanced public image, for example by appointing the pro-Eastern Bloc Stephen Mhando as minister for state for foreign affairs in 1968.

Over time, Nyerere’s experience of Cold War politics and Tanzania’s development struggle led him to see non-alignment in primarily economic terms. While Nkrumah had once urged Africans, ‘seek ye first the political kingdom’, Nyerere realised that political freedom required economic ‘self-reliance’, as the Arusha lexicon put it. ‘The real and urgent threat to the independence of almost all the non-aligned states thus comes not from the military but from the economic power of the big states’, he told a preparatory conference of non-aligned states in Dar es Salaam in 1970. ‘It is poverty which constitutes our greatest danger, and to a greater or lesser extent we are all poor.’

In the 1970s, Nyerere was at the forefront of calls for a ‘New International Economic Order’, which set out to redress the needs of the developing world. While others interpreted global politics in terms of East-West divides, Nyerere concentrated on the inequalities between what became known as the global ‘North’ and the global ‘South’.

This thesis explicitly set out to write about independent Tanzania without becoming transfixed by the ideas and politics of Nyerere himself. However, in doing so, it has provided a context within which the extent of Nyerere’s power and influence can be better assessed. Both in domestic politics and especially in foreign affairs, Nyerere still emerges as a dominant figure. It is unavoidable at times to write about ‘Nyerere doing this’ or ‘Nyerere deciding that’. The causes of African liberation and non-alignment became inscribed into national foreign policy. Ibrahim Kaduma, who became foreign minister in 1975, told me that Nyerere rarely provided instructions on foreign affairs to him, since the principles were so well established that even a student could have represented Tanzania at the OAU.

1025 Interview with Ibrahim Kaduma, Makongo, Dar es Salaam, 23 July 2015.
Conclusion

Yet Nyerere’s authority did not go unchallenged. During the *ujamaa* years, his ideological position and presidential authority were opposed by numerous other Tanzanian politicians. The Arusha Declaration, held as a *lieu de mémoire* around which Tanzanian nationalism became organised, created ruptures as well as unity.1026 Mostly glossed over or sanitised in the national narrative, the fallout from Arusha had major repercussions in creating a host of local enemies to the *ujamaa* project. Government policy was not dictated by Nyerere, but contested among an elite fighting for influence over the direction of the state. The two major party initiatives of the era – the Arusha Declaration and *Mwongozo* – were both thrashed out against a background of impending crisis. In 1967, Arusha catalysed rumbling tensions within TANU into open dissent. In 1971, the party’s left succeeded in turning it into a vanguard organisation, triggering a second bout of instability. Finally, Nyerere exercised little control over Karume in Zanzibar. The improvised union of 1964, driven by dynamics rooted in Cold War ideological politics, if not direct superpower intervention, essentially insulated a despotic regime which Nyerere was reluctant to confront. When Karume was assassinated in 1972, Nyerere seized the moment to bring the islands to heel and imprison the one true ideological threat to his authority on the mainland, Babu.

The more radical impulses among the Tanzanian political elite were not necessarily detrimental to TANU’s nation-building and socialist project. As chapter 5 showed, polemics voiced by the TANU Youth League and the party press located the struggle for *ujamaa* in a broader international context. This provided the government with a means of attacking acts of ‘imperialism’, while avoiding direct confrontation with powerful states at an official level. It also channelled frustrations outwards, rather than inwards. The benefits of mass mobilisation came with the negative side effect of politicians building up rival power bases within the country. Attempting to resolve this dilemma, Nyerere chose to nullify such dangers by tethering troublesome parts of the political apparatus closer to the party-state.

Rather than situate Tanzanian politics in a narrow, nationalist framework, this thesis has analysed their entanglement with a set of broader, cosmopolitan dynamics which came together in Dar es Salaam. The city became a focal point of superpower rivalry in sub-Saharan Africa, especially given the close – though often exaggerated – relationship between Tanzania and China. But a focus on tripartite superpower politics masks the series of sub-plots to the global Cold War that played out in Tanzania, among them the GDR’s struggle for recognition in the non-aligned world. Splits in Tanzanian politics presented opportunities for Cold War powers to gain influence among the local elite, even if Nyerere himself clung to a steadfast non-aligned position. But the labyrinthine world of Tanzanian politics also resisted the normative Cold War categorisations through which outside onlookers attempted to interpret developments. As more archive material become available to historians, particularly in Eastern Europe and the former Third World, new

Conclusion

multilateral and multilingual histories will shed further light of the complexities of the Cold War in Africa.

The Cold War was not the sole outside influence on politics in Dar es Salaam, where it clashed with the other metadynamic of the international history of the second half of the century, decolonisation. Most obviously this involved the liberation of those African still under white minority rule. As the case of Mondlane and FRELIMO shows, the activities of the liberation movements were embedded in the political life of Dar es Salaam, becoming embroiled in Cold War rivalries and Tanzanian affairs. Nyerere’s advocacy of African liberation, rooted in political principle, came with political capital on the continental stage, but also introduced a destabilising factor into local affairs.

Decolonisation also had a broader meaning. Tanzania made a distinction between ‘flag independence’ and true uhuru, which required the country’s emancipation from an unjust global economic order weighted against the former colonised world. It was this problem which Arusha socialism and non-alignment sought to address. Tanzanians became suspicious of outsiders, portrayed in the press as subversive threats to the njamama project. The response was an increasingly assertive Tanzanian nationalism that left little space for political dissent. Superpower interventions in Africa and the rest of the world were followed intently by the local media, but they were then articulated through the language of anticolonialism rather than that of the Cold War.

The urban lens represents a means of reconciling these diverse, yet interconnected global dynamics and their collision with national politics, here in Dar es Salaam. The city constituted a terrain upon which people, ideas, money, and especially information circulated among cosmopolitan networks. Disaggregating these constellations to the level of individuals and factions reveals matters of agency and contingency. In particular, this thesis has sought to foreground African individuals in shaping and disrupting narratives of Cold War politics and anticolonial liberation. The porous framework of the city allows African histories to move beyond the parochialism of the nation-state, while not denying the significance of powerful post-colonial elites.

Through this analysis of Dar es Salaam, the Cold War in Africa emerges less as a diplomatic struggle, but a key feature of a landscape which left a major imprint on politics in the era of decolonisation. Scholarship that concentrates on superpower relations often dissects the Cold War in terms of neat chains of decision-making, traceable via paper trails in metropolitan archives. Seen from Dar es Salaam, the messy elaboration of this high diplomacy on the ground suggests a more complicated story. The Cold War was the ideological and political fuel for many of the conflicts within the Tanzanian political elite, as Marxism and Maoism of varying shades clashed with Nyerere’s own njamama vision. While the Zanzibar Revolution was not directly a product of the Cold War, the pro-communist drift of the islands’ foreign policy pushed Nyerere into brokering the union with Karume. The improvised arrangements came to cause a significant headache for the
mainland government – and continue to do so today, as the union remains a politically fraught issue in contemporary Tanzania.

The Cold War provided potential allies to Tanzania, but also numerous potential enemies. Real or imagined, they gave rise to an insidious political climate, pregnant with threat. This had a corollary in in the global North, where the fear of imminent nuclear holocaust loomed large over public life. In Africa, the concern was not mass annihilation, but a fear for the loss of the independence which the continent’s nation-states had only recently obtained. Dar es Salaam became a ‘Cold War city’, rife with rumour which echoed the contemporary fears of post-colonial African elites. In this light, Nyerere’s announcement in 1972 that the capital would be moved to Dodoma, a dusty provincial town in central Tanzania, was unsurprising. Although entirely in keeping with the anti-urban animus of *njamaa*, it was also consistent with Nyerere’s anxieties about foreign subversion in his capital.1027

The politics of *njamaa* were thus very much a product of the Cold War, and as the Cold War recedes into history memory, so too does Tanzania’s socialist era. The early signs of a post-Nyerere epoch are beginning to emerge. Much of the research for this thesis was carried out against the backdrop of Tanzania’s fiercely contested 2015 election. Nyererite rhetoric predictably loomed large over campaigning: one minor opposition party consciously evoked the spirit of *njamaa* by issuing a ‘Tabora Declaration’. Infighting within the labyrinthine apparatus of *Chama cha Mapinduzi* (Party of the Revolution; CCM – formed by the merger of TANU and the ASP in 1977) left Tanzania’s ruling party wounded by a bitter factional split. After a leading candidate for CCM’s presidential nomination, Edward Lowassa, was spurned by rival groups, his decision to join a new opposition coalition triggered a number of high profile defections. Among those who decamped to the ostensibly pro-free market opposition was Kingunge Ngombale-Mwiru, the Marxist architect of *Mwongozo* forty-four years previously.1028 CCM ultimately held strong and won another election, but its unprecedented, messy fallout hints at change on the not-so-distant horizon.

These disputes are shaped by the contemporary neoliberal environment, dominated by moneyed backers moving in the political shadows, but, as this thesis has shown, divisions among the elite have a much deeper history. As the generation of Tanzanians brought up in the *njamaa* years grows old, an acknowledgement of the realities of politics under Nyerere, characterised by friction as well as unity, offers a more nuanced past to the ‘golden age’ presented by prevailing nationalist narratives.

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