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A network game of dynamic traffic

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Cao, Zhigang, Chen, Bo, Chen, Xujin and Wang, Changjun (2017) A network game of dynamic traffic. In: 18th ACM conference on Economics and Computation (ACM EC’17) , Cambridge, MA, 26-30 Jun 2017. Published in: EC '17 Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation pp. 695-696. ISBN 9781450345279. doi:10.1145/3033274.308510 ISSN 2167-8375.

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Official URL: http://doi.org/10.1145/3033274.3085101

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Abstract

We study a network congestion game of discrete-time dynamic traffic of atomic agents with a single origin-destination pair. Any agent freely makes a dynamic decision at each vertex (e.g., road crossing) and traffic is regulated with given priorities on edges (e.g., road segments). We first constructively prove that there always exists a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) in this game. We then study the relationship between this model and a simplified model, in which agents select and fix an origin-destination path simultaneously. We show that the set of Nash equilibrium (NE) flows of the simplified model is a proper subset of the set of SPE flows of our main model. We prove that each NE is also a strong NE and hence weakly Pareto optimal. We establish several other nice properties of NE flows, including global First-In-First-Out. Then for two classes of networks, including series-parallel ones, we show that the queue lengths at equilibrium are bounded at any given instance, which means the price of anarchy of any given game instance is bounded, provided that the inflow size never exceeds the network capacity.

Item Type: Conference Item (Paper)
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HE Transportation and Communications
Q Science > QA Mathematics
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School > Operational Research & Management Sciences
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Traffic congestion -- Mathematical models
Journal or Publication Title: EC '17 Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
Publisher: ACM
ISBN: 9781450345279
ISSN: 2167-8375
Official Date: 5 May 2017
Dates:
DateEvent
5 May 2017Available
20 April 2017Accepted
Page Range: pp. 695-696
DOI: 10.1145/3033274.308510
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Access rights to Published version: Restricted or Subscription Access
Date of first compliant deposit: 6 May 2017
Date of first compliant Open Access: 8 May 2017
Funder: Guo jia zi ran ke xue ji jin wei yuan hui (China) [National Natural Science Foundation of China] (NSFC)
Grant number: 11601022, 11531014 and 11471326
Conference Paper Type: Paper
Title of Event: 18th ACM conference on Economics and Computation (ACM EC’17)
Type of Event: Conference
Location of Event: Cambridge, MA
Date(s) of Event: 26-30 Jun 2017
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