Union Black:
The Social and Spatial Mobility of African Caribbeans in Birmingham, UK

by

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To Sharon, my Wonderwall, the one who saved me
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Abstract

This thesis explores the impact that legislative changes have had on African Caribbeans competing in Birmingham’s market situations. It also assesses the extent to which educational and labour market success or failure might have influenced their contemporary spatial locations. A mixed methods approach is utilised to examine how the social class position, and spatial patterns, of the city’s African Caribbean population have changed since the early 1980s. The research provides a contemporary update of aspects of Rex and Tomlinson’s (1979) survey, and also Ratcliffe’s (1981) work, which was conducted in 1970s Handsworth.

Despite successive anti-discrimination legislation, passed between 1965 and 2010, racist practices in the education, employment and housing markets have persisted. African Caribbean social and spatial mobility are examined in the context of social, political and ideological changes influencing the equality agenda, particularly where racial inequality is concerned. Shifts in the educational and labour market status of Black Caribbeans are articulated using Marxian, Weberian and Bourdieusian notions of social classes: as position, as situation and as disposition, respectively. Social mobility is measured according to the progress African Caribbeans have made in their efforts to obtain higher educational capital, and the extent to which they have exchanged them for occupations in the upper tiers of the labour market.

African Caribbean spatial mobility is mapped between 1991 and 2011 and the movement of Birmingham’s Black population, from high to low deprivation urban spaces, is examined. Changes from renting to homeownership, are also analysed as indicators of improvement in Black Caribbean housing tenure. The critical race perspective, of interest convergence, is used to argue that the free market can be appropriated to ameliorate racism. However, it is also acknowledged that African Caribbean community organisations, and those sharing the same focal concerns, must pool their resources to achieve the aim of racial equity.
1. African Caribbean social and spatial mobility: A “race”\(^1\) analysis

This research analyses the extent to which legislation, policies and practices may have enabled or constrained the social class status and spatial mobility of Birmingham’s African Caribbean\(^2\) population. The period of investigation is between 1981 and 2014. The social mobility of Black Caribbeans is analysed by comparing their progression in the educational and labour markets against those of their White British, and Mixed White and Black Caribbean (MWBC) peers. Spatial mobility is mapped by comparing disparities in residential patterns between the same ethnic groups in Birmingham’s housing market.

The aim of this inquiry is to assess the extent to which legislative and social changes might have improved or inhibited the life chances of African Caribbeans, and to examine how they use their agency to negotiate the risk of immediate and future poverty.

Although previous commentators (Rex and Tomlinson, 1979; Ratcliffe, 1981, Taylor, 1993, Gillborn, 2005, Andrews, 2013) have examined the community

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\(^1\) Although “race” is a social construct and not a biological reality (Pilkington, 2003), racism has a tangible impact on the lives of Blacks actors who are pathologically labelled and Othered by virtue of their skin colour. Although the author may at times refrain from using ellipses to highlight the problematic meaning of “race”, its substantive reality is nevertheless acknowledged.

\(^2\) It is generally recognised that in 21\(^{st}\) century social and political discourses, the nomenclature category Black is used in reference to a range of different ethnic groups (Hayton and Paczuska, 2000: 19). However, Black, Black Caribbean, African Caribbean, Black British and Black Britons are used interchangeably to refer to peoples of African heritage – and in particular to Britons of Caribbean descent or origin. The term West Indian is used to make a distinction between Blacks born in the Caribbean – especially those who migrated to Britain in the post-war years – and their British descendants.
agency, educational attainment, occupational status and spatial locations of African Caribbeans as separate but related issues, their collective impact on contemporary Black social mobility has to some extent been overlooked. Taylor’s (1993) ethnographic work examined the economic positions of Birmingham’s West Indian and Jewish communities. However, most of the research data was gathered during the 1950s, by the Race Relations Group at Fircroft College of Adult Education (Stephens, 1956). Although the survey was specific to the situation of post-war West Indians, it was undertaken too early to include an examination of the social status of their British born children.

In the mid 1970s Rex and Tomlinson (1979), and Ratcliffe (1981) investigated the economic status, educational barriers, and residential positions of Birmingham’s Caribbean population. Rex and Tomlinson (1979: 294) suggested that discrimination would increase racial segregation and to ‘arrest the spiral of racism […], policies for a multi-racial, multi-cultural society must be developed’. They further argued that the persistence of racism would leave Black Caribbeans with little choice other than to rely on their community organisations to provide education and other life-changing resources (ibid, 1979). Ratcliffe’s (1981) interpretation of Rex and Tomlinson’s data examined the relationship between ethnicity and gender in market situations. In regard to the future status of the descendants of West Indians, Ratcliffe (1981: 306) noted that ‘much will depend on the degree of access which Blacks achieve in
relation to crucial commodities’. Ratcliffe’s observation is significant to this inquiry, particularly where the commodities of education, employment and housing are concerned. This is because the extent to which legislation may have enabled Birmingham’s Black Caribbeans to improve their access to these essential resources has not been examined in any detail since the mid-late 1970s.

The extent to which equality polices might constrain or enable social mobility is a key concern of this investigation. Social policies have no universal definition (Alcock, 2012). Nevertheless, they can be perceived as rules or regulations in which ‘the role of the State in relation to the welfare of its citizens [...] is concerned with the correction of malfunctions in the operation of society’ (Hill, 1996: 3). Legislation, specifically government Acts, are perceived in this thesis as the legal instruments that guide the development of policies in the public domain. Practice is regarded as their implementation, by social institutions, voluntary organisations and private companies, for the purpose of regulating actions.

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3 Commodities (Ratcliffe, 1981: 306) are perceived in the Marxian (1995, [1867]), sense as items of exchange and use-value. They are also viewed as symbolic capital, which is ‘simply the symbols of power’ (Bourdieu, 1979: 84) and social status. Both interpretations acknowledge that commodities are social capital. This research is concerned with educational, labour and housing market commodities.
The equalities agenda are supposed to protect the rights and welfare of citizens by alleviating the conditions that create inequality in market situations. However, despite appearing to promote equity, equality policies often fail to address existing social inequalities. This research assesses the extent to which legislation, policies and practices, implemented to regulate discrimination in the public and private sectors, have created a level playing field for African Caribbeans competing in the education, employment and housing markets.

It is widely acknowledged that West Indian immigrants were afflicted by discriminatory practices and policies in the labour and housing markets of the mid-twentieth century (Rex and Moore, 1967; Rex and Tomlinson, 1979; Ratcliffe, 1981; Sivanandan, 1981; Fryer, 1984). Nevertheless, it remains to be seen if the same barriers to social mobility still resonate for their contemporary descendants in Birmingham. Unlike their West Indian antecedents, African Caribbeans have had the opportunity to improve their labour market status by acquiring qualifications in the UK educational sector. Therefore, this investigation will examine the following in relation to the social status of Birmingham’s Caribbean population:

- the barriers that constrain the agency of Black community organisations and the factors that enable their mobilisation;
- changes in African Caribbean educational attainment and occupational status, and the extent to which their economic positions influence their contemporary spatial positions;
• the material conditions of the environments in which Black Caribbeans reside and the changes that have taken place in their housing tenure;
• the factors that influence the pattern of African Caribbean spatial movement and urban settlement;
• changes in Black Caribbean class positions and how they have been influenced by the implementation of policies in various market situations.

Class, space and housing as symbolic capital

The concept of class is crucial to this investigation. However, it is somewhat nuanced and what constitutes a class is often debated. Some commentators suggest that the concept of class is no longer capable of measuring the complex social divisions in contemporary capitalist societies (Giddens in Atkinson, 2007; Beck, 2007; 2013). Others contend that the notion is multi-dimensional and class positions should also indicate inter-heterogeneity and cultural dispositions (Waters, 1994; Bottero, 2004; Crow and Pope, 2008; Crompton, 2008; Bourdieu, 2010 [1984]). A social class is defined in this research as ‘occupants of the same position in a space [...] corresponding to their [...] material conditions of existence [...] and [...] relationally to other positions, as being above or below them’ (Bourdieu, 1987: 6). This position also acknowledges that: i) the concept of a social class is indeed hierarchical and multi-dimensional and; ii) analysing disparities between occupational classes is still a relevant
means of mapping labour market inequalities (Goldthorpe and Marshall, 1992; Smith, 2007; Crompton, 2008; Savage et al, 2013).

This research also conflates Weberian and Marxian class perspectives with Bourdieu’s concept, noted above. Weber’s view of a class situation (Weber in Morrison, 1995) may seem in opposition to Marx’s perspective of class as a position, as the former ‘is indicated by property and market relations’ whilst the latter is indicated by ‘mobility processes’ (Crompton, 2008: 72). However, both concepts add value to Bourdieu’s idea of class as a disposition influenced by cultural and symbolic capital⁴ (Bourdieu, 2010 [1984]). This is because market interactions determine class positions, and symbolic capital is often acquired as a result of competition in market situations.

Marx (1995, [1867]: 48) contends that class struggles make up the totality of all human relations in society. However, Weber takes the view that economic relations are not the basis of all social interactions. To Weber, status group interactions are distinct from economic class relations, as the former suggests that individuals act ‘as members of groups who share lifestyle, habits of taste and the pursuit of social esteem. This restricts status to activities related to

⁴ Bourdieu (2010, [1984]: 225) defines cultural capital as the taste, items and pursuits which distinguishes the middle-classes from their working-class counterparts. The objects of symbolic power relevant to this research are: higher education qualifications; occupations in the professional and managerial classes; and home ownership – particularly owner occupier status in environments recording low levels of material deprivation.
patterns of consumption’ (Morrison, 1995: 239). The nexus between taste and lifestyle, articulated by Weber above, is also a feature of the Bourdiesuan concept of a social class\(^5\) (Bourdieu, 2010 [1984]). This is because success or failure in market situations can inform disparities in lifestyles, whereas taste and differences in patterns of consumption are inextricably linked to status, and also to the Marxian notion of economic behaviour and class conflict. Thus, class positions, social status, patterns of consumption and taste, are to a great extent acquired by competing for lifestyle resources in market situations.

The Weberian class perspective also suggests that market situations are the ‘great means by which life-chances are dispensed in a modern urban-industrial society’ (Rex and Tomlinson, 1979: 24). This is demonstrated in the educational sector where qualifications tend to inform occupational positions and disparities in income. Moreover, home ownership can also influence class positions, as ‘differential control of property produces different market situations, and these market situations are [...] class situations’ (ibid, 1979: 3). Rex and Moore (1967) viewed ethnic competition for accommodation in Birmingham in the context of a Weberian struggle between housing classes.

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\(^5\) The notions of field and habitus are central components of Bourdieu’s understanding of class dispositions. Crossley (2001: 83) defines Bourdieu’s concept of habitus as ‘an active residue or segment of [an agent’s] past that functions within his [sic] present, shaping [...] perception, thought [...] action and [...] molding social practice in a regular way’. The Field constitutes the various social spaces in which the habitus operates and is reproduced. They are ‘constituted through competitive exchanges of the various resources, or goods that are deemed valuable within them, and their shape is that of the distribution of those goods’ (ibid, 2001: 86). As such, this inquiry takes the stance that the habitus of the middle-classes are reinforced in the fields of education, employment and certain sections of the housing market. These markets produce items of consumption via competition, which contribute to disparities in lifestyles and taste.
They revealed that the housing tenure of West Indian migrants was mainly constrained within the rental market. However, Ratcliffe (2004: 65) noted that their British born descendants were still ‘more likely than the general population to rent their property’. As Black Caribbean spatial positions have also been concentrated in some of the most deprived urban areas in Birmingham (Rex and Moore, 1967; Rex and Tomlinson, 1979; Ratcliffe, 1981; Taylor, 1993), the factors constraining and enabling their spatial movements are important to this investigation. Increasing levels of home ownership, over rental tenure, might indicate improvements in their social status. This is especially where African Caribbean settlement in low deprivation urban spaces is concerned.

The urban settlement patterns of post-war West Indian migrants were to some extent constrained by racism and low social capital, whilst enabled by labour shortages in specific industrial sectors (Rex and Moore, 1967: 100; Rex and Tomlinson, 1979: 88; Phizacklea and Miles, 1980: 46; Ratcliffe, 1981: 182; Pilkington, 2003: 110). Moreover, their settlement ‘appears to have filled a vacuum rather than created a space’ (Peach, 1968: 71). West Indians were a replacement population, occupying deprived inner-city areas vacated by the outward movement of White labour (ibid, 1968: 70-71). Moreover, not only did they ‘move to areas […] which the White population has been abandoning, but […] their arrival may accelerate White withdrawal’ (ibid, 1968: 90).
The inner-city regions of major British cities, such as Birmingham and London, absorbed the bulk of West Indian settlement (Peach, 1968: xv; Phizacklea and Miles, 1980: 55). Rex and Moore (1967: 20) refers to the urban spaces in which Black communities developed as “‘twilight zones’, that is areas where large, old houses, too good to be classified as slums, had become multi-occupied lodging houses’. To Burgess twilight zones are ‘Bad Lands’ (2008, [1925]: 75 [emphasis added]). They are effectively urban areas of high deprivation and poverty. The post-war Bad Lands of Birmingham were ostensibly populated by a diverse array of minority ethnic groups, which included West Indian migrants. In contrast to the Bad Lands of the city, Burgess (2008, [1925]) classifies desirable suburbs as Promised Lands, because they are the aspirational destinations of immigrants. This thesis uses the terms Promised Lands and Good Lands interchangeably in reference to the more affluent areas of Birmingham.

However, the author of this investigation also acknowledges that what constitutes Goods and Bads, particularly in relation to housing and location, is not a polarised dichotomy and is often subjective. There are various gradients between what is generally considered Good or Bad.

Caribbean migration declined following the 1971 Immigration Act (Rex and Tomlinson, 1979; Ratcliffe, 1981; 2004; Solomos, 2003). However, for almost

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6 The term Bad Lands is not used as a reference to areas defined by their levels of deviance. The expression is utilised to distinguish between urban spaces according to differences in material deprivation. The notion of Bad Lands as cultural Heart Lands is also discussed much later in this thesis.
seventy years\textsuperscript{7} the housing situation of West Indians, and their British born
descendants, has been a continual source of social tension – and a focal point
of political concern (Rex and Moore, 1967; Peach, 1968; Rex and Tomlinson,
1979; Ratcliffe, 1981; Fryer, 1984; Carter, Harris and Joshi, 1987; Taylor, 1993;
Solomos, 2003). If racism has ameliorated over time, then African Caribbean
spatial movements, from the high deprivation \textit{Bad Lands} to the low deprivation
‘\textit{Promised Lands}’ (Burgess, 2008 [1925]: 75 [emphasis added]) might be more
pronounced. However, it might be the case that the persistence of
discriminatory policies and practices, continue to disadvantage them and
constrain their spatial mobility. It is also possible that African Caribbeans may,
for various reasons, choose to reside in particular urban locations regardless of
improvements in their class status. Thus, it remains to be seen if the majority
of African Caribbeans in Birmingham continue to reside in high deprivation \textit{Bad
Lands} and if so why? This inquiry will map the contemporary settlement
patterns of African Caribbeans in Birmingham. It will also examine the factors
that influence their spatial transitions and competition in the housing market

\textbf{Ethnic class [ifications]}

The term African Caribbean (or Black Caribbean) was first used in the 1991
Census to describe Black British subjects of Caribbean origin or parentage
(Ratcliffe, 2004); it is an ethnic group identity. The concept of an ethnic group

\textsuperscript{7} Fryer (1984) maintains that African settlement in the UK can be traced back to the Roman
conquest of Britain.
is in some ways similar to that of a social class. A reason being is that there is no universal definition that adequately describes what constitutes an ethnic group (Ratcliffe, 2013: 304). Ethnic identities are transitory, situational and contingent upon shifting spatial and temporal contexts (Fenton, 2010: 7). They are constructed by ‘the interaction between individuals as socialised members of various collectivities and the circumstances of time and geographical space’ (Banton, 2011: 199). As such, ethnicity can also be thought of as transitional ideas about perception of Self and significant Others that are at times primordial, situational, diasporic and culturally hybrid (Ratcliffe, 2004: 28-29).

Implicit within the concept of an ethnic group are ideas of culture, which is often thought of as being synonymous with ‘difference [...] constituted from the “inside” [...] but also from the outside’ (Modood, 2013: 38). As such, notions of culture, ethnicity and skin colour are intrinsically linked and signify Otherness. In the context of twenty-first century social and political discourses, the application of ethnicity as a social label can also be an ‘ideological minefield’ (Ratcliffe, 1981: 58), as categories, such as African Caribbean and White British, reify notions of both cultural and racial differences. The intersectionality (Crenshaw, 1991) between ethnicity and culture are socially constructed in relation to ‘the ways in which we perceive and know our social world and the theories concerning what “exists”’ (May, 2001: 22). Therefore, ethnic group identities have to be understood in terms of their nuanced power relations, ideological construction and ascription.
In this inquiry Weber’s class concept of a status group, and Bourdieu’s understanding of a class as a collectivity sharing cultural and common interests in an arena of shared social interactions\(^8\) (see also Fenton, 2010: 91), underpins the idea of an ethnic group. Moreover, social classes and ethnic groups both have memberships, which are ‘identified by others as constituting a category distinguishable from other categories of the same order’ (ibid, 2010: 91).

However, a significant departure of the concept of ethnicity from a social class is that the former is often signified by skin colour (Miles, 1990: 56; Ballard, 1996: 3; Ratcliffe, 2013: 305).

Postmodern theorists (Rattansi and Westwood; Malik in Ratcliffe, 2013: 307) suggest that ethnicity is an essentialist concept and more regard should be paid to ideas of diversity over those of difference. Nevertheless, post-structuralism overlooks the macro and micro duality of ethnic categories as both political ascriptions and social identities, which are accepted and valorised by actors in the public sphere. In addition, social class and ethnic group identities also relate ‘to belonging and the perception of common interests’, (ibid, 2013: 307 [emphasis in original]) which inform social actions. Thus, it is both the political and social meanings of ethnicity that are significant to this investigation.

\(^8\) Both Weber and Bourdieu’s social class concepts have been outlined above.
Although ethnic categories are social constructions, they have the power to reify hierarchical notions of “race”.

This thesis also recognises the subjective meaning of ethnicity, in terms of how ethnic identities can empower social actors. Although ethnicity is a political and heuristic tool claiming to represent a particular ‘slicing of the social world’ (ibid, 2013: 307), it can also be self-imposed and analytically conceived ‘as part of a process of ethnic mobilisation’ and agency (ibid, 2013: 305). The use of ethnic categories in this research reflects ‘the complex dialectical relationship between various forms and levels of agency’ (Ratcliffe, 2004: 34) whilst seeking to avoid the type of zeitgeist reductionism, which overlooks how the past continues to shape the present and the future. Moreover, the main reason that socially constructed categories are necessary to the aims of this research is because, ‘those wishing to make sense of contemporary social relationships and structures of inequality have to resort to some form of descriptive categories’ (ibid, 2004: 34), in order to map disparities between and within social groups.

**Racial stratification in the here and now**

‘Class is vitally important, [but] it is not the whole story’ (interview with David Gillborn, 19th June 2013).
Gillborn’s observation above is of particular importance to this research, as class disparities cannot be examined outside of ethnic inequalities. Despite most areas of British society being stratified by racial divisions, the idea that we now live in a *post-race* society has gained increasing significance in contemporary sociological thought (see Dwyer and Bressey, 2008; Lazarus, 2011; D’Souza in Ikuenobe, 2013). *Post-race* theories promote the view that ‘in contrast to the “colour line” that defined the 20th century, the embodiment of “race” through skin colour is no longer an impediment to educational and economic opportunities’ (Mirza, 2015: 1). As a consequence, “race” research is generally deemed to be of little social or political significance.

The current political agenda promotes the idea of colour-blindness. This position reduces the significance of racial inequality, whilst focusing on integration, community cohesion and the single equality regime (Richardson and Munro, 2012), in which the nine protected characteristics of the Equality Act 2010 (HM Government, 2010) are central. The equality agenda, which was

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9 The stance taken in this investigation is that *post-race* theories tend to reduce the debilitating impact of racism and racial inequality. *Post*, as a prefix to “race”, suggests that racial discrimination no longer exists. Therefore, race inequity is generally viewed as having no more significance than other inequalities outlined in the Equality Act 2010 (EA2010). However, *post-race* positions overlook the ways in which institutional racism (Macpherson, 1999) and racist practices are normalised in contemporary society, and continue to block the life-chances and opportunities of individuals.

10 Mirza (2015) acknowledges the zeitgeist obfuscating claims of *post-race* perspectives.

11 This was a policy position adopted by John Major, who contended that policies which favoured a particular ethnic group created, rather than reduced, conflict (Gillborn, 2008a). The stance taken in this research is that the present Conservative government, like the previous Thatcher and Major regimes, continue to ignore the perpetuity of racial disadvantage and its debilitating impact on life-chances and opportunities.
previously the responsibility of the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE), now falls within the remit of the Equality and Human Rights Commission (CRE, 2007a: 59; Bloch, Neal and Solomos, 2013: 5). There is now a much wider equality agenda than that which was first imposed under Paragraphs 2.43-2.51 of the Race Relations Act 1976 (CRE, 2007a: 59). However, despite wider social tolerance, where difference and diversity are concerned, racism continues to reduce life chances and opportunities. Moreover, racial disadvantage and class inequalities often intersect and the examination of one position necessitates the consideration of the other. This is especially the case where the social and material situations of African Caribbeans are concerned.

The term post-race suggests that equality legislation has successfully neutralised inequity in the public domain, and individuals can compete for resources in market situations on equal terms. However, the position taken in this research is that the idea of a post-race society is aspirational, but nevertheless a myth. A key reason being is that ‘the effects of racial division continue to have a profound impact on society and politics’ (Lentin, 2008: 91), and individuals still experience social inequalities through the lens of their “race”. The racialised experiences of the generation who first entered the British educational system, en masse in the 1960s, is defined in this thesis as post-race. This is because they were educated during a period when racism was acknowledged as a persisting and debilitating issue (Troyna, 1992) and their experiences of racism were overt, direct and to a great extent
unprotected by legislation such as the 1968 and 1976 Race Relations Acts. In comparison, their contemporaries *supposedly* live in a *post-race* society.

“Race” is no longer considered to be as problematic and socially divisive as it was in the 1970s. This is despite the persistence of exclusionary practices in Britain’s major social institutions which privilege Whites whilst disadvantaging Blacks (Gillborn, 2005; 2014). Racial inequality is now viewed as one out of nine politically recognised inequalities within the current equality agenda (HM Government, 2010). Thus, a major aim of this research is to determine if legislation has substantively reduced racial discrimination in market situations for African Caribbeans in Birmingham, to the extent where we can now speak of a *post-race* society in a meaningful way.

**Goods, Bads and negotiating risk**

Analysing changes in class positions also necessitates an examination of how African Caribbeans negotiate risk to reduce the likelihood of poverty. The idea of risk in the current neo-liberal\(^{12}\) political climate contends that its management is the responsibility of individual decision-making ‘and validates the market as the primary mechanism whereby individuals secure personal security and well-being’ (Brodie in Beck, 2007: 685). In the context of

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\(^{12}\) Neo-liberalism is a way of organising capitalism. It is based on the principles of a small State and the absolute belief that free markets enable individual freedom and liberty by increasing choice and competition (see Sivanandan, 2013). Consequently, the reduction of the role of the State is supplemented by the view that commodities have to be acquired via competition in various markets.
contemporary Britain, ‘the means of life is mediated through the market’ (Curran, 2013: 57) and the concept of risk is associated with wealth differentials and the acquisition of commodities perceived as Goods and Bads (ibid 2013: 45)\(^\text{13}\). Within the context of this research, Goods and Bads are considered in terms of how acquiring particular forms of capital and life-changing resources reduces the risk of immediate and future poverty. The notion of Good and Bad education and occupations can be subjective. Nevertheless, this research makes a distinction between educational Goods, i.e. higher education qualifications and labour market Goods, which are high-income professional occupations. Educational Bads are perceived as qualifications with little economic value, and economic Bads are low-income, short-term occupations. Thus, intra and inter, ethnic and class, differences can be measured according to differentials in Goods and Bads between their members. Improvements in social status are achieved by obtaining Goods, whilst reducing the risk of acquiring Bads.

Ascertaining the age-stage at which Good commodities are acquired is also an important aspect of measuring and mapping social and spatial mobility. For example, GCSEs should be acquired at 16; A-levels at 18, university degrees by 21 – at the earliest – and labour market participation should commence by the time an individual is 24. Goods, in the form of educational capital (Bourdieu, 2010 [1984]) are the highest achievable grades at different levels of study.

\(^{13}\) Good Lands and Bad Lands have been articulated earlier.
**Good** GCSEs can be exchanged for places on A-level programmes leading to university. **Good** higher educational qualifications are subsequently exchanged for **Good** economic capital; i.e. employment in well-paid occupations. However, if educational **Goods** are not acquired at the *appropriate age-stage* then individuals enter the labour market much later and often have less economic value to employers. Consequently, time spent outside of the labour market, whilst individuals are at the *appropriate age-stage*, can have a detrimental impact on capital accumulation. It can also influence where individuals live and the type of housing tenure they acquire at different life-stages.

This research views occupations in the upper-tiers of the National Statistics Socio-Economic Classification (NS-SEC) Table, as the labour market **Goods** that drive social mobility. The professions in the NS-SEC *Classes 1 and 2* are generally perceived as reliable indicators of social class status. They tend to reduce the risk of immediate and future poverty by providing individuals with above average remuneration, and greater financial security than unskilled **Bad** jobs in the lower-tier NS-SEC occupations. As noted above, educational **Bads** are qualifications that do not allow either direct or indirect access to higher education and cannot be exchanged for economic capital (Bourdieu, 2010 [1984]).
Although spatial location and housing tenure can be a matter of Individual preference, where and how people live can be influenced by Good and Bad qualifications and employment. Weber argues that ‘the market distributes life chances according to the resources that individuals bring to it [and] assets only have value in the context of a market: hence, class situation is identified with market situation’ (Breen, 2004: 1-2). This understanding of the relationship between market situations, social class status and life-chances is suggestive of a hegemonic struggle. It is within this context that housing commodities gain increasing significance, as they are often the means by which security is obtained and the risk of generational poverty reduced. This inquiry will investigate the extent to which Black Caribbean settlement patterns have changed since 1991. This is both in terms of their contemporary locations, and how risk is reduced or increased by the different types of housing tenure they obtain.

Competition in the educational, labour and housing markets is perceived by this research as the process by which Goods are acquired to obtain upward social mobility and reduce the likelihood of poverty. The market is now the mediator in which opportunities to become socially mobile are contested and consequently denied to those with the least amount of capital (Sivanandan, 2013). Thus, success in the competition for resources can ultimately make ‘individual and generational mobility easy and typical’ (Weber in Smith, 2007: 87) by increasing one’s life-chances and opportunities. Nevertheless, ethnic
competition for Goods in market situations is not a straightforward process. As such, the extent to which social policies mediate fairness within contemporary markets is also a concern of this inquiry.

**Migration and discrimination**

Unlike their White European migrant predecessors, West Indians encountered different problems regarding integration (Rex and Moore, 1967: 109-110; Phizacklea and Miles, 1980: 57;). Their skin colour meant they were a highly visible minority and were unable to blend into British society in the same way that European migrants were able to (Allen, 1971; Taylor, 1993). In the late 19\textsuperscript{th} and early 20\textsuperscript{th} centuries, discrimination against Irish and Jewish migrants was based on perceived religious and racial differences (Allen, 1971: 57; Taylor, 1993: 17; Mason, 2000: 20; Douglas, 2002: 43). Although they were socially constructed as racial Others (Allen, 1971; Douglas, 2002), their skin colour was a significant factor in their subsequent integration. However, post-war immigration introduced a new dimension that was absent from previous labour flows: skin colour as a signifier of both cultural and racial Otherness (Phizacklea and Miles, 1980: 44).

In the immediate post-war years, West Indian entry and UK citizenship were to some extent facilitated by the 1948 British Nationality Act. The post-war
economy required a surplus workforce, and the Act was instrumental in appropriating the labour of Britain’s New Commonwealth subjects. However, successive Immigration Acts after 1962 regulated and reduced the flow of migrant labour from the Caribbean (Rex and Moore, 1967; Rex and Tomlinson, 1979; Ratcliffe, 1981; Fryer, 1984; Heath and Cheung, 2007). Immigration Acts were followed by race equality legislation, the first of which was the 1965 Race Relations Act (Ratcliffe, 2004: 148). Although the aim of successive race relations legislation has been to mediate racial equity in relationships between Britain’s White majority and the nation’s minority ethnic groups, the extent to which this aim has been achieved is debateable (ibid, 2004).

The post-war occupational positions of West Indians were to a great extent determined by their skin colour (Peach, 1968). Regardless of the employment skills acquired in their native Caribbean islands (Roberts and Mills, 1955; Rex and Moore, 1967: 109), West Indian labour was generally consigned to menial occupations in Britain’s declining manufacturing and production industries (Fryer, 1984: 374). The early Race Relations Acts did little to reduce racial discrimination in the public and private sectors (Ratcliffe, 2004). Private landlords routinely discriminated against West Indians (Sivanandan, 1981: 112; CRE, 1990: 5; CRE, 2007b: 1), as did their employers and White competitors in the labour market. Moreover, the colour bar (Gunter, 1954; Stephens, 1956; Taylor, 1993) also confined West Indian labour to low-paid “bad occupations” (Sivanandan, 1981: 113 [emphasis in original]).
West Indians were expected to take night shifts, denied overtime and constantly overlooked for promotion (Fryer, 1984: 374). Racist employment policies and practices often meant that they were used as a reserve army of labour (Castles and Kosack, 1973). West Indians were generally employed in areas where White labour was unavailable, and were more inclined to experience redundancy than their White peers (Gunter, 1954; Stephens, 1956; Fryer, 1984; Taylor, 1993; Solomos, 2003). Against this historical backdrop of discrimination, this research will establish the extent to which the occupational positions of African Caribbeans have changed. It will also assess if African Caribbeans are now accessing the skilled occupations that were previously denied to their West Indian antecedents.

**Community and agency**

Animosity against post-war Caribbean migrants culminated in racial conflict on the streets of Britain. Following the Notting Hill and Nottingham ‘race riots’ of 1958 (Fryer, 1984: 376; Ratcliffe, 2012: 7) West Indian reaction to racism increasingly took the form of political mobilisation. Sivanandan (1981: 118) notes that at the time ‘the two most popular organisations were the Co-ordinating Committee Against Racial Discrimination (CCARD) in Birmingham, and the Conference of Afro-Asian-Caribbean Organisations (CAACO) in London’. 
Other organisations such as *The British West Indian Association* (BWIA), *The West Indian Standing Conference* (WISC), and the more militant *Racial Action Adjustment Society* (RAAS), mobilised to combat racial discrimination and violence against Blacks (ibid, 1981). The agency of these groups was a political response to racist organisations such as the Smethwick based *Racial Preservation Society* (Midland News, 1965: 1)\(^{14}\), which viewed the presence of immigrants as a threat to the British way of life.

Political gains against discrimination, in labour and housing market situations, were contested from the bottom up (Sivanandan, 1981). The social and political struggles and campaigns of immigrant community organisations were instrumental in influencing legislative changes (Fryer, 1984: 385). The first anti-discriminatory legislation was the 1965 Race Relations Act (RRA1965) (Ratcliffe, 2004) and subsequent Acts were implemented with the *supposed* aim of reducing discrimination and promoting equality of opportunity. However, reducing the adverse effects of discriminatory practices in the education, employment and housing sectors has never been of major concern to successive governments (Ratcliffe, 1981: 286; Solomos, 2003: 79; Pilkington, 2003: 164). Solomos (2003: 106) has revealed that while some government policies have been successful in reducing direct forms of discrimination, they have had little impact on alleviating discriminatory practices in market situations. Thus, as political activism in the Black community has played an

\(^{14}\) Birmingham City Council Library Services.
important role in combatting discrimination and disadvantage, this research will analyse the contemporary agency of a few Black community organisations. It will also examine the barriers those community organisations experience in their efforts to obtain life-changing Goods for African Caribbeans.

**Education and exclusion**

Education is a vehicle of upward social mobility and is generally accepted as the building block of economic success and financial security. Entry to the professions of the middle-classes also requires evidence of attainment in higher education. However, historically, the educational market has been a site of exclusionary practices, in which Black pupils have encountered significant discrimination. During the 1960s, the education sector was used as a vehicle to embed policies aimed at assimilating the children of West immigrants into the perceived norms of British culture (Coard, 1971; Carby, 1982; Mirza, 2007).

Political ideologies influencing educational policies shifted from assimilation to integration and multi-culturalism in the 1970s (Troyna, 1992; Mirza, 2007). This was followed by the Conservative Government’s 1988 Education Reform Act, under which free market educational policies reduced State intervention and undermined the political focus on racial inequalities (Troyna and Carrington, 1990). After 1997, education policies focussed on ideas of social inclusion
under New Labour (Gillborn, 2008a). However, since 2010 the focus on educational inequity has been steadily eroded by the neo-liberal austerity policies of the Coalition and Conservative Governments. Nevertheless, despite successive ideological shifts in education policies, a constant theme has been the failure of the education system where the learning of Black Caribbean children is concerned (Plowden, 1967: 193: 32; Carby 1982: 198; Modood, 1997: 144; Mamon, 2004: 79; Gillborn, 2005: 494; Strand, 2008: 19; Amin et al., 2011: 34).

Although the Equality Act 2010 classifies disability as a contemporary inequality, it is not a major concern of this investigation. However, some of those who participated in this research and are identified by pseudonyms have more recently been diagnosed with dyslexia. In the context of this research, disability is only examined in terms of how it mediated the subjects’ educational experiences. It may well have been the case that under the assimilation policies of the 1960s, a few Black children – perceived as being educationally subnormal – may have had hidden cognitive disabilities, but there is no way of knowing with any certainty. However, in the 1960s and 1970, the comparatively poor literacy acquisition of some African Caribbeans reinforced the notion that ‘Black children on average have lower IQs than White children’

15 See Appendix i.: Table 1.1. Dyslexia is a reading disability (Nosek, 1997: 4). It is a lifelong hidden condition that sufferers are born with. Although dyslexics tend to have average, or above average, intelligence they are often taught to read using specific techniques and learning strategies. Famous dyslexics include Winston Churchill, Richard Branson, Leonardo Da Vinci, Michelangelo, Hans Christian Anderson, Lewis Carroll, William Butler Yeats and Thomas Edison (ibid, 1997: 3).
(Coard, 1971: 19). Where cultural deficiency was viewed as the explanatory factor of Black children’s relatively low educational attainment, White children who may have had similar cognitive impairments were seen by teachers as slow – rather than deficient – learners (ibid, 1971).

The issue of learning disabilities has gained increasing significance since the implementation of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (Ratcliffe, 2015) and the Special Education Needs and Disability Act (SENDA) 2001 (HM Government, 2001). All educational institutions now have a statutory duty to implement reasonable adjustments, so as not to disadvantage students with cognitive or physical impairments (ibid, 2001). Nevertheless, despite being acknowledged as a protected characteristic (HM Government, 2010; Acas, 2011), the existence of dyslexia as a biological and neurological condition is still contested (Nosek, 1997: 7). Although the educational experiences of some of those who participated in this research are not representative of all African Caribbeans, they nevertheless provide an insight into how disability compounded racism in the 1970’s education sector. Their narratives of racial disadvantage are used as a backdrop against which to assess the contemporary progress made by Black students, and to ascertain the extent to which racism might still be a major factor in their general educational experiences.
As educational qualifications influence the occupational status of individuals (Ratcliffe, 1981; 2004), this research will also examine higher education participation as a factor of social mobility. It has already been established that despite successive race and equality legislation, implemented from 1965 onwards, African Caribbeans are not fulfilling their potential in the English education sector. However, little is known regarding the extent to which Black Caribbeans in Birmingham have increased their contemporary higher education participation, in comparison to their White peers. This is particularly the case with regard to their access to the elite universities (Shiner and Modood, 2002). As argued previously, age is also a crucial factor of upward social mobility. Therefore, Black Caribbean higher education participation is compared to that of their White British counterparts, within the 18-24 age-range cohort. Analysing educational change will to some extent indicate if legislation, policies and practices have constrained or enabled Black Caribbean access to higher education Goods, and facilitated their entry into the professional occupations.

**Summary**

If African Caribbeans are still obtaining *Bad* qualifications, acquiring *Bad* occupations and residing in *Bad* residences in *Bad* urban spaces, then their predicament warrants investigation. This is especially as – if the above is

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16 For more detailed accounts see: Rhamie and Hallam (2002); Graham and Robinson (2004); Mamon (2004); Strand (2008); Boyle and Charles (2011).
indeed the case – the immobility or stagnation of their social status increases the risk of trans-generational poverty. Moreover, current neo-liberal policies undermine State intervention in the distribution of resources, whilst promoting the free market as the means by which they can be obtained (Ratcliffe, 2015). This effectively means that there is a real risk that the State’s equality agenda will be undermined by free market politics and as a consequence persisting forms of racial inequality will be overlooked.

The research questions

The following questions are central to the investigation of African Caribbean social and spatial mobility:

i. What impact have changes in legislation, policies and practices had on the operational capacity and agency of Black Caribbean community and religious organisations in Birmingham?

ii. How are the education and labour market experiences of African Caribbeans in Birmingham mediated by their gender and ethnicity?

iii. To what extent does legislation, allied to policies and practices, enable or constrain African Caribbean social mobility in market situations?

iv. What shifts have taken place in the spatial patterns of Birmingham’s African Caribbean population over the past thirty years?
v. How have thirty years of social change impacted on the social mobility of Birmingham’s African Caribbean population?

The following chapter examines the historical relationship between Jamaica and Britain. The aim is to highlight the nexus between Empire, industry, unfree and free labour, and how they in turn relate to the Black British presence (Hobsbawm, 1967; Black, 1991; Harris, 2008). Since the 17th century ideas of ‘White Superordination and Black subordination’ (May and Cohen, 1974: 112) have been reinforced by economic relations, in which the social status of Blacks has been constructed and constrained by a combination of legislative and social processes (Edwards, 1988; Walvin, 2001). The chapter also explains how natural and economic disasters in Jamaica influenced internal and external migration (Black, 1991; Chamberlain, 1999). An account is also provided of how restrictions in immigration legislation initially directed Caribbean labour towards South and North America, and then Canada, before redirecting it towards Britain (Fryer, 1984; Black, 1991).

Chapter Two reveals that Britain was not necessarily the primary destination of choice for the majority of West Indian migrants. It also articulates how low financial capital, racism and discriminatory practices restricted the labour market participation of newly arriving migrants to the lower tiers of the economy (Gunter, 1954; Stephens, 1956; Sivanandan, 1981; Taylor, 1993). Not
only did discrimination constrain the post-war social mobility of Caribbean 
migrants, to some extent it also concentrated the bulk of their spatial 
settlement within the inner-city *Bad Lands* of Birmingham and other major 
cities in Britain (Peach, 1968).

Chapter Three justifies the ‘mixed-methods’ (Venkatesh, 2013: 3) approach 
used in this research. Ethnographic fieldwork provided a first-hand account of 
the impact that legislation, policies and practices have had on the 
contemporary agency of Black Caribbean organisations. By observing and 
questioning the Black community’s political, educational and religious leaders, 
some of the barriers and factors constraining and enabling their agency was 
identified. Audio-visual equipment was also used to record the narratives of a 
small sample of African Caribbean subjects and their experiences of 
competition in the educational, labour and housing markets. Combining 
observation with technological resources, produced rich meaningful accounts 
of some of the barriers African Caribbeans in Birmingham encounter in their 
day-to-day struggles to improve their social situation.

National and Birmingham data, from the 1991, 2001 and 2011 Censuses, were 
analysed to compare, contrast and map ethnic differences in labour and 
housing market positions. The datasets identified changes in the material 
conditions of the ethnic groups surveyed in this research. The aim of utilising
this method was to establish if African Caribbeans had improved their occupational and housing situations, or if they still maintained similar labour market and spatial positions as their West Indian antecedents. Datasets from the Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA) are also used in a similar way to the Census datasets. They provided an overview of changes in African Caribbean access to educational Goods. Educational, labour market and housing data are also examined against political and legislative changes. The aim is to determine what, if any, impact they may have had on the social status of African Caribbeans.

The following chapter examines the agency of Black Caribbean community groups and religious organisations. This is particularly in terms of their contemporary operational capacity and the capability they have to obtain life-changing resources for their supporters. The ways in which organisations in the Black community have mobilised in the past, to fight against racism and discrimination, is widely documented (Sivanandan, 1981; Fryer, 1984; Rex and Tomlinson, 1979; Ratcliffe, 1981; 2004). Black grassroots organisations have successfully introduced and delivered supplementary educational programme (Andrews, 2013). This included operating Saturday and Summer Schools in Black communities, to address the failure of mainstream education. However, it remains to be seen if they have developed their capacity, in line with social and political changes, to obtain educational resources and labour market assistance for their supporters in the community.
Chapter Five highlights the importance of education as an enabling resource of African Caribbean social mobility. The impact of educational policies is assessed in terms of the extent to which they may have reduced discriminatory practices in the education sector. Although racism undoubtedly blocked higher education opportunities for the majority of Black Britons of Caribbean parentage (Coard, 1972; Carby, 1982), it remains to be seen if that is still the case for subsequent generations. The past-race narratives of African Caribbeans are examined against data of the progress made by their contemporary peers in the supposedly post-race educational market. Differences between the rates at which African Caribbeans and their White British counterparts are accessing higher education institutions, and disparities in their degree outcomes from particular universities, are also examined.

The Russell Group participation of African Caribbeans from Birmingham is also important to this research. Russell Group universities are generally considered to be the Premier League higher education institutions and their degrees tend to have more economic value (Which? University, 2014). Moreover, the age at which students participate in higher education is also a crucial factor of upward social mobility. As noted earlier, the likelihood of occupational progress is maximised if individuals enter the labour market at the earliest opportunity, after leaving university. Moreover, workers tend to have more economic value
to employers, if they obtain the right skills at the appropriate age-stage (Ratcliffe, 1981).

Changes in the occupational status of Black Caribbeans are examined in Chapter Six. The aim is to determine the extent to which higher educational \textit{Goods} is being exchanged for economic \textit{Goods} in the higher-tier NS-SEC classes. The industrial sector favoured male labour, and the demise of manufacturing and production industries may well mean that African Caribbeans have new opportunities in the expanding service sector. Unemployment is also compared by gender and between ethnic groups, as is routine occupations. This indicates if African Caribbeans are improving their social status by climbing the occupational ladder, and also if their contemporary forms of employment differ from those in which their West Indian antecedents were employed.

The proceeding chapter examines changes in African Caribbean spatial patterns and housing tenure. Housing positions are often informed by the income and occupational status of their owners. Post-war West Indians in Birmingham had a tendency to rent rather than purchase their accommodation, and their communities have developed within some of the most deprived areas in the city (Rex and Tomlinson, 1979; Ratcliffe, 1981; 2004). Therefore, there is a need to examine the extent to which the current housing tenure, and spatial
locations of the descendants of West Indians, are informed by improvements in their occupational status.

The concluding chapter draws the data together and answers the research questions. The findings are analysed in relation to aims of the thesis to establish if African Caribbeans in Birmingham have improved their social class status and spatial positions. This final part of the research outlines the main issues faced by the Caribbean population. Threats and opportunities, to their future class and spatial positions, are also identified based on an overall examination of the data.
2. Empire, slavery, migration and ethnic competition

Britain was the major post-war destination of choice for many West Indian labour migrants (Rex and Moore, 1967; Peach, 1968; Rex and Tomlinson, 1979; Ratcliffe, 1981; Sivanandan, 1981; Fryer, 1984; Taylor, 1993; Solomos, 2003). However, to understand why they chose to come to the UK, and not the U.S., Canada or some other European nation State, it is necessary to examine the relationship between Britain, its former colonial Caribbean subjects and Empire. This chapter will articulate how the following factors have influenced the contemporary social status of African Caribbeans:

- the exploitation of slave labour and free labour, and their relationship to Britain’s economic development;
- the role of transnational legislation and policy in facilitating and restricting the global distribution of West Indian labour;
- the extent to which racial discrimination in the post-war labour and housing markets constrained the social status and spatial mobility of West Indian migrants;
- the contribution that Black community organisations have made to social and political changes;
- ideological shifts in policy, and their impact on the educational attainment and social status of the descendants of West Indian migrants.
Jamaica is used as a case study, to illustrate the UK’s former colonial power in the West Indies. The island is important to any examination of the social and spatial mobility of Birmingham’s African Caribbean population, in more ways than one. The majority of West Indian migrants came from Jamaica in the early post-war years (Peach, 1968), and in the 1950s and 1960s they developed communities in Birmingham (Gunter, 1954; Rex and Moore 1967; Rex and Tomlinson, 1979; Ratcliffe, 1981; Taylor, 1993). However, it is not generally recognised that Britain’s relationship with the West Indies, and Birmingham’s ties with the Caribbean, go back much further than Commonwealth migration (Black, 1991; Harris, 2008). The Black presence in post-war Britain can only be understood by appreciating the relationship between Empire, slavery in the Americas\textsuperscript{17}, the factors influencing Caribbean migration and their impact on the industrial development of Britain. Therefore, to write about the material conditions of African Caribbeans in the context of 21\textsuperscript{st} century Britain, ‘without also saying something about the West Indies [...], is unreal’ (Hobsbawm, 1969: 20).

**Slave labour, free labour and Britain’s economic development**

The Spanish and Portuguese amassed fortunes from trafficking Africans in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries (Black, 1991). However, it was Britain that

\textsuperscript{17} Prior to the United States Declaration of Independence in 1776, the West Indies was incorporated into the territory referred to as the Americas. What is now known as the United States, and what was formerly defined as the West Indies, constituted a substantial part of Britain’s colonial Empire.
transformed the slave trade\textsuperscript{18} into a highly lucrative business\textsuperscript{19} (Williams, 2005 [1944]). In the 1660s, Britain gained overall control of the Americas from Portugal and Spain\textsuperscript{20} and by 1670 Jamaica ‘was officially ceded to England by the Treaty of Madrid’ (Black, 1991: 39). Richardson (1992: 70) notes that by the end of the seventeenth century ‘the English had become the largest traffickers in slaves in the Western world’. Despite acquiring the label of troublesome during the seventeenth century, due to its numerous slave revolts, Jamaica was revered as ‘the biggest [and] the richest’ (Walvin, 2001: 221) of Britain’s colonies in the West Indies.

The capital generated from slavery, in Jamaica and Britain’s other Caribbean colonies, contributed to financing England’s industrial revolution\textsuperscript{21}. Williams (2005, [1944]: 54-55) contends that between 1714 and 1773 Jamaica ‘was as

\textsuperscript{18} Exchanging human beings for inferior items of consumption can hardly be defined as a trade in any real sense of equal commercial exchange, see Isichei (1977). However, the forced migration and enslavement of Africans is often referred to as the slave trade.

\textsuperscript{19} The main feature that distinguished Trans-Atlantic chattel slavery, from contemporary forms of human trafficking is that under laws created in Britain and passed in the Americas, ‘African slaves had been reclassified between the years 1600 and 1700, from human beings [...] to items of trade under the Navigation Act’ (Edwards, 1988: xviii [emphasis in original]). Hence, African slaves were classed as non-human commodities. The legal reduction of human beings to items of property denied them any lawful rights and facilitated the exploitation of their labour for hundreds of years.

\textsuperscript{20} The first West Indian islands claimed by the British were ‘St Kitts and Barbados in 1624, followed by Nevis in 1628, and Antigua then Montserrat in 1632’ (Black, 1991: 33). Although British ships first landed in Jamaica in 1643, it was not until 1655 that the Spanish relinquished all claims to the island.

\textsuperscript{21} There is not enough room in this thesis to articulate the nexus between Britain’s domination of chattel slavery, the spread of its Empire and the nation’s subsequent industrial development and global economic supremacy. For more detailed debates see Eltis and Engerman (2000) Williams (2005, [1944]), especially Chapter 3; Hobsbawm (1969), especially Chapters 1-3; Derry and Blakeway (1969); Isichei (1977); Harris (2008). See also Graeber (2006), regarding the role of slavery in transforming the capitalist modes of production from an agricultural to an industrial base.
valuable as New England’. Hobsbawm (1969: 58) also acknowledges that until the 1790s all of Britain’s raw materials were provided by its colonies in the West Indies. The exploitation of slave labour was maintained by laws passed in Britain that classified Africans as commodities (Edwards, 1988). Marx (1995, [1867]: 51) contends that ‘commodities are things, and therefore without power of resistance against man’. However, humans classified as commodities and producing the raw material needed to manufacture the commodity of sugar, resisted their inhumane situation. Rogozinski (1999: 160) notes that prior to the Haitian revolution, Jamaica had the most slave uprisings and ‘more rebellions than all the other British colonies put together’. Despite numerous slave insurrections, the British economy grew as a result of subsidiary trades that were to some extent supplemented by the production of sugar (Black, 1991; Williams, 2005 [1944]).

During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the growth of Birmingham in the UK can be attributed to the city ‘supplying the various Goods that merchants required for the “African Trade”: guns, fetters, shackles, chains, brassware and so on’ (Harris, 2008: 74-75). A number of England’s port, shipbuilding and textile manufacturing cities such as London, Liverpool,  

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22 See the tables of imports and exports between Britain and its colonies in Williams (2005, [1944]: 226).

23 See also Hobsbawm (1969) and Williams (2005, [1944]).

24 See UCL (2015), for an analysis of how London’s stock exchange, and the city’s development as an international centre of commerce and finance, was made possible by reinvesting and redirecting the profits made from chattel slavery. UCL (2015) provides evidence of how financial institutions, including Barclays and Lloyds, developed as a result of their involvement in chattel slavery.
Lancaster, Bristol, Newcastle and Sheffield, also developed their economies as a result of their relationship with the slave trade (Harris, 2008; Hobsbawm, 1969). Nevertheless, the expansion of the UK’s industrial base had tragic consequences for enslaved Africans in Jamaica. Williams (2005, [1944]: 121) reveals that between 1780 and 1787, in the initial stages of Britain’s economic modernisation, some ‘fifteen thousand slaves died of famine’ in Jamaica. However, British industrial production, driven by exports and imports from its overseas colonies, continued to expand at an average rate of over 30 per cent throughout the 1800s and 1900s (Hobsbawm, 1969: 68).

In 1807 the abolition of slavery increased the cost of sugar, a reason being was that plantations could no longer appropriate slave labour to facilitate production (Black, 1991). Emancipation also created agricultural labour shortages, as freed slaves looked for paid work and better living conditions (ibid, 1991: 116-117). After 1846 the British Parliament equalised the tariff on sugar, which resulted in the decline of Jamaican rum, coffee and sugar exports to Britain. The West Indian banks, which were responsible for financing the export of raw materials to Britain, collapsed as the price of sugar fell (ibid, 1991: 118). Many Jamaican plantations subsequently fell into ruin, which created a domino effect of massive unemployment in both the rural and urban economies. In 1850 a combination of disease and natural disasters decimated Jamaica’s population. Black (1991: 118) notes that the resulting poor sanitary conditions and cholera outbreaks caused by earthquakes, claimed the lives of
some ‘32,000 people [...] or about one in every thirteen of the population’. By the early twentieth century, Emancipation combined with natural and economic disasters\textsuperscript{25}, influenced the movement of free labour out of Jamaica and towards South America. Panama was a major destination, where migrant Jamaican labour was appropriated on the railway and Canal Zone\textsuperscript{26}.

**Migration and immigration legislation**

Migration is often perceived as ‘a combination of “push factors”, impelling people to leave their areas of origin, and “pull factors”, attracting them to certain receiving countries’ (Castles and Miller, 2003: 22). Push and pull factors are macro explanations for migration. They include ‘low living standards, lack of economic opportunities, political repression [...], demand for labour [and] good economic opportunities’ (ibid, 2003: 22). The push and pull factors of Caribbean migration during the 1930s, were high population growth, lack of economic opportunities and periods of demand for surplus labour outside of the islands (Black, 1991). Peach (1968: 92) argues that the above factors are ‘permissive, rather than dynamic’. Although ‘they allow migration to take place; they do not cause it’ (ibid, 1968: 92), and post-war Caribbean migration

\textsuperscript{25} See Black (1991), esp. Chapter 18.

\textsuperscript{26} Black (1991: 145) also notes, ‘the first wave of migration to Panama was in the 1860s to help build the railway there’. The American sponsored building of the Panama Canal also attracted Jamaican labour during the 1900s. Up until the 1930s, the developing banana industry in Costa Rica and Honduras influenced significant Jamaican migration and settlement. There was also available work on the sugar and coffee plantations of Cuba from 1930 up until the start of the War (ibid, 1991: 146). This demonstrates that the main destination of pre-war Caribbean migration was South America and the Spanish speaking Caribbean.
was also ‘reacting [...] to a single external stimulus’ (ibid, 1968: 93): the overseas demand for labour. As between 1860 and 1930 the majority of foreign labour in Panama came from Jamaica (Black, 1991: 145), the construction of the Panama Canal\textsuperscript{27} could be perceived as an external stimulus that influenced the island’s pre-war labour flow.

North America was also a labour destination for Jamaican migrants in the early twentieth century. This was due to its geographical proximity, and the 1924 Johnson-Reed Immigration Act, which facilitated the flow of surplus West Indian labour (ibid, 1991). Under the Act, Jamaicans who migrated to America did not require a passport (ibid, 1991: 146). However, following the 1952 McCarran-Walter Immigration Act, ‘85 per cent of the 154,277 visas available annually, were allotted to individuals of Northern and Western European lineage’ (US Department of State Office of the Historian, 2012). This created a process of exclusion, which restricted the flow of West Indian labour to US territories in favour of European migrants (Fryer, 1984: 373). The McCarran-Walter Act also protected the American workforce from unwanted foreign competition, by creating a labour certification scheme for overseas employment applicants. For a period, Canada then became the major destination of Caribbean migration until changes to its immigration policies stemmed the influx of West Indian labour (Black, 1991: 147).

\textsuperscript{27} See Footnote 26.
Although the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act restricted the flow of Caribbean labour to the US, UK legislation facilitated its redirection. The 1948 British Nationality Act enabled New Commonwealth immigration by granting British passports to West Indians (Fryer, 1984; Heath and Cheung, 2007). Fryer (1984: 373) notes that ‘their British passports gave them the right to come to Britain and stay [...] for the rest of their lives’. Although Britain was experiencing labour shortages in specific industrial sectors following the War (Fryer, 1984; Heath and Cheung, 2007), it was not until 1954 that the scale of migration from the West Indies to Britain markedly increased (Peach, 1968; Castles and Kosack, 1973). In 1956 London Transport organised a recruitment campaign in the Caribbean, urging West Indians to apply for jobs in the transport industry (Mason, 2000; Ratcliffe, 2004). There was also a demand for West Indian nurses in the newly created National Health Service (Peach, 1968: 94; Bryan, Dadzie and Scafe, 1985; Mason, 2000; Ratcliffe, 2004: 50; Heath and Cheng, 2007: 510). However, West Indians were ‘destined to fill vacancies for which there was either insufficient White labour available or which White workers were insufficiently willing to fill’ (Peach, 1968: 94). West Indians were effectively a reserve army of labour (Castles and Kosack, 1973), a replacement workforce for indigenous British workers, some of whom were suspended or sacked because of their involvement in industrial action (McKenley, 2001).
Heath and Cheung (2007: 511) suggest that the majority of Jamaican migrants had ‘low levels of skill and human capital’. Castles and Kosack (1973: 95) also argue that Jamaican skills were not on par with those of British workers. The report by Roberts and Mills (1955), which Castles and Kosack refer to in an effort to substantiate their claim, reveals quite the opposite. Roberts and Mills’ (1955) report reveals that the Jamaican Government was worried by the skills drain caused by UK emigration, and the British Colonial Office wanted to identify the economic skills of the migrants so they could distribute their labour accordingly. If the majority of Jamaican immigrants entering Britain were as unskilled as the above commentators suggest, their emigration would not have been a major concern to the Jamaican Government.

Roberts and Mills (1955) reveal that some Jamaican emigrants, albeit relatively few, were doctors, lawyers, teachers, engineers and members of other highly skilled professions. However, it should also be acknowledged that the majority were not professional workers. Most male migrants were aged between 25 and 29 and either skilled or semi-skilled. Some of the migrants’ skills documented by Roberts and Mills (1955) included telephone operators, telegraph clerks, bakers, cabinet-makers, painters, printers, potters, cooperers, jewellers, shoemakers and various types of building contractors. Fryer (1984: 374) notes that ‘of the men who came here, a mere 13 per cent had no skills; of

\(^{28}\) See Roberts and Mills (1955).
\(^{30}\) Roberts and Mills (1955) note that by 1953 a fifth of Jamaica’s male working-age population had emigrated to the UK.
the women, only 5 per cent’. The majority of female Jamaican migrants were aged 20 to 24 and were also skilled, mainly as dressmakers, tailors, nurses (Ratcliffe, 2004) and cloth [sic] designers (Roberts and Mills, 1955). Marx (1995, [1867]) would have described the Caribbean migrants as artisans. Their skills-set would have complemented the guilds and crafts of Britain’s industrial manufacturing and production base. However, only a relative few would have acquired employment where they could use their skills. Most West Indian migrants had to accept low-skilled, low-paid and unattractive but available work (Fryer, 1984).

Heath and Cheung (2007), and Castles and Kosack (1973), also overlook two things: i) migration is a relatively expensive affair and the Jamaican Dollar has always been of significantly less value than British Sterling. This suggests it would have been extremely difficult for unskilled workers to earn enough to pay for their journey to the UK. ii) The family networks of West Indians were a rich source of human capital and a major agent of migration (Chamberlain, 1999). There is a tendency for proponents of macro theories of migration to reduce the importance of micro factors. Consequently, the Caribbean family, and its importance as a key agent in the migration process, is generally overlooked. Craig-James (in Chamberlain, 1999: 253) uses the term ‘indigenisation’ to define the ways in which Caribbean social and cultural networks are sustained abroad and linked by human capital. Kinship ties in
Britain reinforced indigenisation by providing valuable support for newly arriving migrants.

Chamberlain (1999: 259) argues that migrants ‘went as collaterals to join siblings, cousins, uncles and aunts’ who had arrived much earlier in Britain. The extended family, which is a popular family structure in the Caribbean, also enabled young females to migrate and return remittances. Relatives cared for the children of migrants until they either returned or paid their children’s fare to join them in their new countries (ibid, 1999: 258). It should also be recognised that decisions to migrate are not always rational and calculated acts, ‘making money (by no means synonymous with labour migration), adventure, travel, education, escape and love’ were some of the reasons West Indians migrated (ibid, 1999: 255). Although Jamaicans have historically migrated to North and South America\(^{31}\), there has also been a tendency to migrate between rural and urban economies. Migration has been a way of life in Jamaica since Emancipation, and not just a response to external economic stimuli as some commentators suggest (Peach, 1968). The importance of family ties demonstrates that, contrary to Heath and Cheung’s (2007) suggestion, Jamaicans had significant levels of human capital which they appropriated to good effect\(^{32}\).

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\(^{31}\) See Footnote 26 and earlier in the chapter above.

\(^{32}\) For further examples of how West Indians appropriated their human capital see Chapter Seven.
European and West Indian surplus labour

Castles and Kosack (1973: 444) contend that the post-war ‘discrimination against coloured immigrants [...] is very similar to the hostility against White immigrants – notably the Irish and Jews – in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries’\(^{33}\). However, skin colour rather than cultural differences was the distinguishing feature between European and West Indian migration (Phizacklea and Miles, 1980). Although New Commonwealth immigration was a response to Britain’s need for surplus labour (Fryer, 1984), the demand for Black workers only materialised because Europeans could not fill the necessary shortages (Castles and Kosack, 1973; Castles and Miller, 2003).

Following the War, the Ministry of Labour campaigned in Ireland for replacement labour (Castles and Kosack, 1973: 29). Although an estimated 350,000 Irish workers were recruited between 1946 and 1959, the bulk of labour from overseas consisted of foreign citizens and former European soldiers who had served under British command. There were approximately ‘460,000 foreigners […], the largest group were the 115,000 Poles who came in under the Polish Resettlement Scheme’ (ibid, 1973: 29). In addition to recruiting former Ukrainian, German and Italian prisoners of war, the Ministry of Labour also obtained the services of 90,000 European Volunteer Workers (EVWs) (Castles and Miller, 2003: 69). However, EVWs faced considerable hostility

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\(^{33}\) For more detailed accounts of the politicalised and, to some extent, racialised experiences of Jewish and Irish UK migrants see Allen (1971); Taylor (1993) and Douglas (2002).
from British workers and ‘the restrictions imposed on EVWs were so severe [...] some observers [...] refer to the system as one of “institutionalised discrimination”’ (Castles and Kosack, 1973: 30). Britain’s economy relied on EVWs until the late 1940s and early 1950s, when the supply of White surplus labour began to dry up.

Despite Britain’s need for surplus labour, only ‘a trickle of West Indian workers’ entered the UK between 1948 and 195334 (Fryer, 1984: 373). However, from 1954 onwards West Indian immigration became a source of social and political concern (Carter, Harris and Joshi, 1987). Correspondence between the Colonial Office’s Research Department and the British Government, States that between ‘1948-53 net emigration from Jamaica to the United Kingdom averaged less than 600 year’35. However, a 1954 Savingram36 from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the British Treasury, expressed concern that the majority of migrants entering Britain were Jamaicans. It was thought that West Indians were ‘arriving at the rate of about 1000 a month’37. Stephens (1956: 7) notes that ‘at the end of 1955 there may have been about […] 50,000 to 60,000’ West Indian migrants in Britain. In terms of gender ratio, Peach (1968:41) contends that of the 26,441 West Indians arriving in 1956, 58.1 per cent were male.

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34 This is also noted earlier. Despite the implementation of the 1948 British Nationality Act, West Indian immigration did not substantially increase until 1954.
35 See Roberts and Mills (1955).
36 A Savingram is a ‘British Diplomatic Service term for a relatively low priority message sent telegraphically, rather than by the less economical diplomatic bag’ (Macrofox, 2015).
37 See Roberts and Mills (1955).
According to Peach (1968) West Indian labour was unevenly distributed across the UK. The areas of high demand for surplus labour were ‘London and the south-east, the combined eastern and southern region and the south-west’ (ibid, 1968: 64). Although a high proportion of West Indians settled in London, they were over-represented in the Midlands and North Midlands where labour shortages were only moderate (ibid, 1968: 66). The 1961 Census reveals that in England and Wales the total number of West Indians was 171,796 and, ‘London and Birmingham were the main centres of coloured immigration’ (ibid, 1968: XV). Birmingham, a city that developed its industrial economy by indirectly supporting the slave trade (Hobsbawm, 1969; Williams, 2005 [1944]; Harris, 2008), attracted significant West Indian labour. It is ironic that a hundred and fifty years after Emancipation Birmingham would appropriate the free labour of the descendants of slaves, whose unfree labour had contributed to the city’s prosperity.

**Occupational discrimination and spatial segregation**

Birmingham is the second city of the UK, ‘the heart of the West Midlands conurbation [and] the largest single focus of coloured immigration outside greater London’ (Jones, 1976: 89). The city was an industrial powerhouse in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Harris, 2008), when the factories of

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38 See earlier in the chapter above.
Matthew Boulton, William Murdoch and James Watt were major sources of employment in Handsworth’s Soho area (Harris, 2008). It was during Britain’s industrial decline, in the mid-twentieth century, that West Indians were employed in Birmingham’s manufacturing and production sector (Rex and Moore, 1967; Peach, 1968; Rex and Tomlinson, 1979; Ratcliffe, 1981; Taylor, 1993). In voting terms, Birmingham is divided into districts known as wards, with the outer-ring suburbs generally offering better material conditions and quality of life than the inner-city areas (Rex and Tomlinson, 1967; Jones, 1976; Flett, Henderson and Brown, 1979; Henderson and Karn, 1984). In the 1950s and 1960s West Indian settlement was mainly concentrated in the inner and middle-ring regions of the north-east and north-west parts of Birmingham (Flett, Henderson and Brown, 1979; Jones, 1976). Some of the wards occupied by the Caribbean population were designated as Clearance Areas (City of Birmingham, 1961: 69).

Handsworth, like Ladywood, was also an urban Bad Land. It was regarded as ‘a symbol of [...] West Indian settlement [...] and [...] one of Britain’s race relations capitals’ (Rex and Tomlinson, 1979: 70). The ward lies outside of the City Centre in the north-west corridor of Birmingham. Although a large West Indian community developed in the area during the 1960s (Rex and Tomlinson, 1979; Ratcliffe, 1981), Handsworth was a deteriorating inner-city area with high levels of material deprivation. It is a short distance away from Aston, Stockland Green
and Oscott\textsuperscript{39}. The Soho part of the ward has a border with Sandwell and Smethwick, which was a site of ethnic conflict in the 1960s (Solomos, 2003; Ratcliffe, 2004)\textsuperscript{40}. Handsworth has more material deprivation than the ‘\textit{Promised Land}’ of the outer-ring suburbs (Burgess, 2008 [1925]: 75 [emphasis added]). During the 1960s, West Indians comprised 8.4 per cent and 10.5 per cent of the respective total populations of Handsworth and Soho (Rex and Tomlinson, 1979: 74). When West Indians settled in Handsworth the ward was already deteriorating (Rex and Tomlinson, 1979; Ratcliffe, 1981). Their arrival also coincided with a decrease in the city’s indigenous population (Peach, 1968: 96); a number of White residents moved outward to less deprived areas located on the periphery of the city (Flett, Henderson and Brown, 1979). As migrants generally arrive at their destination with little financial capital, it is not surprising that West Indians settled in Twilight Zones (Rex and Moore, 1967), such as Handsworth, and started ‘at the foot of the occupational [...] and [...] residential ladder’ (Peach, 1968: 97).

It is usually the case with migrants that as they improve their occupational status and accumulate more capital, they might move out of the inner-city \textit{Bad Lands} and acquire accommodation in the suburban \textit{Good Lands}. However, West Indians had few opportunities to improve their social status and acquire spatial mobility by accumulating capital via high-income occupations. Their age and circumstances made education an unlikely option, and despite their artisan

\textsuperscript{39} Chapter Seven highlights the significance of these wards in regard to housing.

\textsuperscript{40} See Birmingham Archives (N.D.): MS 2141/7/12.
skills\textsuperscript{41} discriminatory employment practices constrained West Indians within the lower-tiers of the labour market (Sivanandan, 1981; Fryer, 1984). Stephens (1956: 6) reveals that in 1956 Birmingham, there were approximately 15,000 migrant workers, the majority of whom were West Indians. He concedes that although the managers of employment exchanges tried to match the qualifications of Black workers with appropriate employment, some employers were reluctant to take on migrant labour. Racial discrimination in the labour market erected a glass ceiling under which West Indian workers could only go ‘thus far and no further’ (Peach, 1968: 95).

Constraining Black labour to low-status occupations also enabled the government to maintain low levels of remuneration, which created a \textit{false consciousness}\textsuperscript{42} amongst the White working-class. Although Black labour was mainly appropriated ‘in the dirty ill-paid jobs that White workers did not want’ (Sivanandan, 1981: 3), they blamed their meagre wages and poor working conditions on the presence of their Black working-class counterparts. White workers overlooked the role of the State in the perpetuity of their class situation. To some extent government policy facilitated the employment of West Indians, as they ‘like British workers in most trades, were covered by the Notification of Vacancies Order under which they could only be taken on with

\textsuperscript{41} See Roberts and Mills (1955).
\textsuperscript{42} Marx (1995, [1867]) uses the term false consciousness in reference to how the working-class overlook their class interests by succumbing to divisions created by the capitalist class. In the context of Black and White workers above, the White working-class prioritise the commonality of shared skin colour with the ruling class, over and above the labour market oppression and exploitation they share with their Black working-class counterparts.
the permission of the Ministry of Labour’ (Stephens, 1956: 11)\textsuperscript{43}. Thus, employment legislation enabled West Indians to enter the labour market and facilitated the exploitation of their labour. However, it did not protect them from the racist practices of White employers and workers.

Gunter (1954) reveals that during the 1950s, the wages of West Indian transport workers in Birmingham were so low they had little choice other than to work overtime. However, in a major Birmingham factory they had ‘money extorted from them by a foreman for the privilege of working overtime’ (ibid, 1954: 7 [emphasis added]). Stephens (1956) also acknowledges the ambivalence of unions and that Black workers had little protection from discriminatory employment practices. Although most unions recognised that ‘the coloured people coming to England are British subjects only seeking a means of existence which is denied them in their place of birth’ (ibid, 1956: 17), they also took the stance that foreign labour constitutes ‘a danger to the workers of this country’ (ibid, 1956: 17).

A major obstacle to the employment of West Indians in Birmingham was the prevalence of a colour bar in the 1950s\textsuperscript{44}. The colour bar was also implemented

\textsuperscript{43} See Chapter Seven
\textsuperscript{44} For a detailed account of the impact of Birmingham’s colour bar on West Indian workers see, Stephens (1956).
in pubs and clubs. Gunter (1954: 6) notes ‘one of the most disheartening colour bars to arouse public concern was the refusal of the City Transport Department to employ coloured [sic] drivers or conductors’. Birmingham’s Transport Department justified its support of the colour bar by suggesting: Black workers were not capable of issuing bus tickets correctly; spouses would not allow female conductresses to work late night shifts with Black workers; and White employees would simply refuse to work with Blacks (ibid, 1954: 6). Many employers also shared the view of the Transport Department and were reluctant to employ West Indians alongside White women. Stephens notes (1956: 12) there were concerns regarding ‘the employment of coloured men among White girls or [...] fears [...] that [...] the recruitment of British workers will be affected’ (ibid, 1956: 12). Black workers were also the victims of discriminatory redundancy policies, as ‘some firms adhered to the practice of “last in, first out”’, which automatically favoured the job security of White workers over immigrants (ibid, 1956: 15). As racism constrained the labour market status of West Indians in Birmingham, it could also be argued that their low-waged occupations confined their spatial positions to the deprived inner-city Bad Lands.

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45 Birmingham City Council Library Services.
46 This was not a new phenomenon. May and Cohen (1974: 115) note that ‘sexual competition [...] and [...] competition for employment’ were two of the four causes of racial “riots” in Cardiff and Liverpool during 1919.
Black community organisations as agents of political change

The 1954 report of the government’s Welfare Liaison Officer expressed concern regarding rising immigration, and the lack of national resources to accommodate new migrants\(^\text{47}\). However, it also acknowledged the way in which the established Jamaican community in Birmingham provided support for their peers\(^\text{48}\). The *British West Indian Association*, the *Afro-West Indian Club*, the *West Indian Social Club* and the *Consultative Committee for Coloured People*\(^\text{49}\) all provided information, advice and guidance to new Caribbean migrants arriving in Birmingham. However, despite appropriating their human capital to develop a support network for their fellow migrants, West Indians were constantly fighting against a backlash of racism amplified by their increasing presence.

In 1958 there were “race” riots in London’s Notting Hill, Nottingham and also as far north as Middlesbrough (Fryer, 1984: 376-385; Ratcliffe, 2004: 50). Public concern over immigration in Birmingham also led local Tory MPs to lobby Parliament. The combination of political and social anxieties influenced the introduction of the 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act (Fryer, 1984: 381; Solomos; 2003: 57; Ratcliffe, 2004: 51). The Act was the first post-war legislation aimed at restricting immigration from non-White Commonwealth

\(^{47}\) Public Record Office (2008).

\(^{48}\) Ibid.

\(^{49}\) Ibid.
countries (Rex and Moore, 1967; Rex and Tomlinson, 1979; Ratcliffe, 1981; Fryer, 1984). Although the legislation did not impose a formal ban on Caribbean immigration, it introduced a voucher system ‘structured in such a way that it could easily be used to tailor migrant cohorts in future years’ (Ratcliffe, 2004: 51). Solomos (2003: 57) notes that between 1962 and 2002 there were ten successive pieces of legislation implemented to control immigration, whereas in the same period there had only been three Race Relations Acts.

In addition to providing support, Black community organisations also mobilised to defend West Indians against racism. Gillborn (2005: 486) argues that ‘in England [...] virtually every major public policy meant to improve race equity has arisen directly from resistance and protest by Black and [...] minoritised communities’ [emphasis in original]. Workplace protests, street campaigns and demonstrations organised by Black community organisations (Sivanandan, 1981; Fryer, 1984), influenced the passing of the 1965 Race Relations Act (RRA1965). The Act was supposed to outlaw ‘direct discrimination in places of “public resort”’ (Ratcliffe, 2004: 148). However, its remit did not extend to prohibiting discrimination in the education, labour and housing markets. The Race Relations Board (RRB) was also established to investigate cases of racial discrimination. Two days after it was formed the RRB was overwhelmed by the

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50 See Solomos (2003).
‘barrage of complaints alleging racial discrimination’ in Birmingham. The Coordinating Committee Against Racial Discrimination (CCARD), a Birmingham based Black community organisation, identified four cases of discrimination made against public houses in Birmingham. In addition, the Birmingham branch of the West Indian Standing Conference questioned the effectiveness of the RRB, stating that it was unable to deal with indirect forms of discrimination. This was evident in the way that Birmingham’s colour bar continued, despite the RRA1965 and the RRB.

In September 1965, the Evening Mail and Despatch, reported complaints lodged with the RRB against three pubs and a factory in the Smethwick area. Following political pressure in which the Campaign Against Racial Discrimination (CARD) was instrumental, a second Race Relations Act was introduced in 1968 (Sivanandan, 1981; Ratcliffe, 2004). In contrast to its 1965 predecessor the remit of the 1968 Race Relations Act (RRA1968) was more extensive. The Act outlawed discrimination in all areas, which included the housing, education and labour markets (Ratcliffe, 2004). However, the RRA1968 did not eliminate racial discrimination, as legislation only sets out an agenda that government has to take the lead in enforcing. The persistence of racist practices in the educational market was a source of concern for Black

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51 Birmingham City Council Library Services.  
52 Ibid.  
53 Ibid.  
54 Ibid.
organisations and a focal point of their mobilisation. The Race Relations Act 1976 (RRA1976) was the last full piece of legislation implemented to address racial discrimination. The RRB and the Community Relations Commission were amalgamated to form the new Commission for Racial Equality (CRE). The Act introduced the definitions of direct and indirect forms of discrimination, to outlaw policies and practices that ‘had a disproportionately negative impact on minorities’ (ibid, 2004: 150). Solomos (2003; 83) argues that the RRA1976 was ‘the government’s recognition that the majority of Black immigrants were “here to stay” and that policies had to be based on recognition of this fact’. This was especially as a new-generation of British-born Blacks was emerging, who could not be defined as either West Indians or immigrants in the same way as their parents (Rex and Tomlinson, 1979; Ratcliffe, 1981; see also Fryer, 1984: esp. Chap. 12).

**Racism and dispersal policies in the housing market**

Rex and Moore’s (1967) Sparkbrook survey highlighted the need for effective legislation to reduce housing discrimination. They revealed how Birmingham City Council’s housing policy arbitrarily discriminated against West Indians, by extending the five-year period that immigrants had to wait before they could go on the social housing register (ibid, 1967: 101). Consequently, many West

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55 Black community organisations have been particularly active in the education of Black children and highlighting the failings of the mainstream education sector. For a detailed account of the relationship between the agency and mobilisation of Black organisations, and the history of the supplementary educational programme in the UK, see Andrews (2013).
Indian families had little choice other than to live in over-crammed rooms rented from private sector landlords (ibid, 1967: 102). The treatment meted out to West Indians by Birmingham City Council contrasted to that given to White applicants, who could ‘go on the register at any time’ (ibid, 1967: 26). Rex and Moore (1967: 27) were not ‘able to prove that Birmingham City Council operates a discriminatory policy which keeps coloured [sic] people off its estates’. However, they suggested that the City’s Housing Officers were concentrating West Indians in ‘slum-clearance areas’ (ibid, 1967: 26), such as those in Ladywood.

In May 1968, Birmingham City Council attempted to reduce the burden on education, welfare and housing resources by dispersing Black tenants throughout the city (Flett, Henderson and Brown, 1979). The dearth of resources in the city was viewed as a consequence of the ‘presence of 82,000 West Indians and Asians in Birmingham’ (ibid, 1979: 290). Thus, dispersal policies had the dual aim of reducing the burden on public services in areas with a high West Indian concentration, whilst supposedly facilitating ‘integration by spreading Black people thinly amongst the White population’ (ibid, 1979: 291). This was effectively a racialised practice whereby ‘in any block of flats or maisonettes and in any street [...] a maximum of one in six properties could be allocated to Blacks’ (ibid, 1979: 293; see also Rex and Tomlinson, 1979: 142). However, the Council operated its dispersal policy covertly. It did not become public knowledge until after being terminated in
1975 (Flett, Henderson and Brown, 1979). Dispersal housing practices were also influenced by the actions of White Ladywood residents, who sought to undermine the Council’s decision to house two Black families in one of 12 maisonettes situated on their estate (ibid, 1979; see also Henderson and Karn, 1984). In addition to the support received from Ladywood’s White residents, the dispersal policy was also backed by the Government.

The Institute of Race Relations Report, the Cullingworth Report and the Report of the Select Committee on Immigration and Race Relations, all supported the policy of dispersing West Indians (Flett, Henderson and Brown, 1979: 292). The Reports suggested that dispersal was not just a means of reducing the burden on education and welfare provisions, it was also a way of avoiding racial conflict by integrating the Black community and improving housing standards (ibid, 1979). However, the Council provided little evidence to support such claims. By the time the RRB’s ruling had outlawed Birmingham’s dispersal policy in 1975, it had contributed to West Indian disadvantage and ethnic inequality by forcing ‘Black tenants into the worst estates’ (ibid, 1979: 306) within the inner-city wards. This policy constrained the spatial positions of West Indians, who were unable to purchase their own properties, within Birmingham’s Bad Lands.

Despite the passing of the RRA1976, discrimination in the housing market continued. Evidence of racial discrimination in Birmingham’s private housing
sector can be found in the Commission for Racial Equality’s (CRE) (1990) Report. It revealed that 26 per cent of private landlords in Birmingham discriminated against potential Black tenants. The figure for Birmingham was more than five times greater than the national average (ibid, 1990: 18). This demonstrates the laissez-faire stance of government where racial equality is concerned. Although equality legislation is implemented with the supposed aim of reducing racial discrimination in the public sector, there is no real political will to enforce it.

Assimilation and the education of African Caribbeans

Understanding the impact that education policies have had on improving the life-chances of Black Britons is important to this research\(^{56}\). This is because educational \textit{Goods} \(^ {57}\) are generally a key determinant of occupational positions, which provide the means by which individuals can improve their social status (Bourdieu, 2010 [1984]). Whereas West Indians experienced direct

\(^{56}\) Previous research, in which the social status of minority ethnic groups has been analysed (i.e. Rex and Tomlinson, 1979; Ratcliffe, 1981; Heath and Cheung, 2007), have used the terms \textit{first and second (or next) generation} in reference to the descendants of West Indian immigrants. Despite acknowledging that the majority of children of West Indian parentage were born in Britain, the Swann Report (1985: xvii) also classified them as West Indians. This inquiry takes the view that although those labels are generally applied with the best of intentions they reify Otherness, as they overlook the national identity of British born Blacks in favour of their primordial descent. The implication of first and second-generation labels is that the primary identity of Black Britons is constructed by referencing their skin colour to a geographical space outside of the UK. The consequence of this ascription is that regardless of successive generations having been born in Britain, the descendants of West Indian subjects will never be perceived as belonging to the nation. The British born descendants of Irish, Australian or Eastern European immigrants are not classified in the same way as the descendants of West Indians. For example, Ed Miliband – the former leader of the Parliamentary Labour Party – is the British born son of Polish immigrant parents. However, he is not Othered by the labels of first, second or next generation Polish immigrant.

\(^{57}\) The educational qualifications required by the professions and high-income occupations, as opposed to those that have little economic value.
discrimination in the labour and housing markets (Rex and Moore, 1967; Rex and Tomlinson, 1979; Ratcliffe, 1981; Sivanandan, 1981, Fryer, 1984), their children encountered racism in the educational sector. Therefore, it is important to assess i) the extent to which equality policies in the educational system may have facilitated African Caribbean access to educational Goods, and ii) if African Caribbeans have been able to climb the occupational ladder by exchanging their educational Goods for economic capital.

Since the British born children of West Indian immigrants first entered UK schools in the 1960s, there have been several ideological shifts in educational policies. In the late 1960s, policy initiatives focused on utilising the education sector as a vehicle to assimilate Black children into the perceived social norms of British culture (Rex and Tomlinson, 1979: 28-29). Assimilation is essentially a ‘flattening process’ (Troyna, 1992: 68), in which Black children were taught to be culturally similar to their White counterparts. It was presented as the political solution to concerns about the learning needs of Black children, which were perceived as being distinctly different to those of their White counterparts.

The general consensus in the 1960s was that Britain’s inner-city schools would be unable to accommodate Black children (Coard, 1971; Carby, 1982), and that ‘teachers were as ill equipped and unprepared for the cultural impact of Black
immigration, as other parts of British society’ (McKenley, 2001: 317). In 1963 the Ministry of Education (MoE) published *English for Immigrants*, which emphasised the need for schools to assimilate West Indians into British culture. However, its premise was that ‘black pupils should be treated as “trainee Whites”’ (Troyna and Carrington, 1990: 9). General guidelines were provided in the MoE Pamphlet N.43 for an “administrative procedure” to deal with [the] sudden influx into schools’ (Carby, 1982: 186). In a similar way to the housing dispersal policy outlined above, the *Department for Education and Science* (DES) *Circular* recommended bussing Black children to facilitate their assimilation (Carby, 1982: 186). The educational policy of dispersal reinforced the notion that too many *immigrant children* in any single school would *contaminate* the education of their White counterparts.

During 1966, the *Birmingham Planet* conveyed local anxieties regarding the number of West Indian and Asian children in local schools. In reference to Wattville Road and Westminster Road schools in Handsworth, the newspaper stated that if the advice of the Ministry of Education was implemented, both schools would be ‘ripe for dispersal’

60. However, only Sandwell LEA adopted the dispersal policy in the West Midlands (Troyna, 1992: 68). The *Birmingham*

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58 This was an educational policy that legitimated dispersing Black children, by bussing them out to other schools, see also Mirza (2007).
59 The Conclusion of the *Plowden Report* (1967, 32: 193) also reiterates that LEAs have the option of dispersing *immigrant* children, if their presence in a school exceeded a certain level, so as not to ‘interfere with the ability of other children to learn’ (ibid, 1967, 32: 193), see also Rex and Tomlinson (1979: 177).
60 Birmingham City Council Library Services.
Planet also suggested ‘Birmingham dare not risk dispersing [...] coloured pupils in Handsworth across the outer circle road to Perry Barr and [to] other schools that have [...] an upward trend in their immigrant ratio’\(^61\). Thus, the media amplified the fear of what this research defines as cultural contagion, which could only be avoided by enforcing social and spatial distance between the indigenous and immigrant populations.

Carby (1982: 184-185) notes that although West Indians and their British born children spoke only English, the perceived Black problem was expressed in terms of numbers\(^62\), and language deficiency (Mirza, 2007). The Caribbean dialect\(^63\) was defined as a foreign language in the 1971 survey conducted by the National Foundation for Educational Research (NFER). Moreover, the perceived inferiority of West Indian culture and the idea of a Caribbean language were considered causal factors in the ‘culturally induced backwardness of immigrant children [affecting] assessment of ability and actual school performance’ (Carby, 1982: 188). Consequently, the conflation of both factors led to a significant number of Black children being labelled backward and placed in schools for the educationally sub-normal (ESN) (Coard, 1971; Troyna, 1984; 1988).

\(^{61}\) Ibid.

\(^{62}\) Carby refers to the perception that there were too many immigrant children in schools and not enough educational resources. Political and social anxieties regarding immigration and the perceived problem of numbers, prior to the 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act, is articulated by Peach (1968). See also Carter, Harris and Joshi (1987).

\(^{63}\) West Indian patois is English. Patois can be described as Creole English, a legacy of slavery and colonialism. Some words are the remnants of the various tribal languages of African slaves. However, it can in no way be considered as a foreign language. The words are pronounced with a strong Caribbean dialect, which differs between urban and rural areas. Caribbean patois also has regional variations. The tone and pronunciation alters slightly between different English speaking Caribbean islands.
Troyna and Carrington, 1990). McKenley (2001: 318) reveals, ‘by 1970 a culture of “blaming the victim” was in place with regard to the education of immigrant pupils’. The children of West Indian immigrants were denied an education because of the pathological assumptions constructed around their culture, and reinforced by teachers (Coard, 1971; Troyna and Carrington, 1990).

During the mid 1970s, ‘there was a gradual shift of emphasis in educational policy’ (Mason, 2000: 69), along with the acceptance that assimilation legislation had failed (McKenley, 2001: 320). Lord Bullock’s 1975 DES report signalled the demise of monocultural policies in favour of multicultural education (MCE) (Carby, 1982: 199;Troyna, 1992: 69). The educational paradigm shifted to incorporate ideas of diversity and cultural difference. However, these changes were only superficial.

**Multicultural and antiracist education**

During the mid-1970s and early 1980s, the State implemented MCE policies with the supposed aim of ameliorating the persisting problem of racism in education. However, MCE merely ‘tinkered with educational techniques and methods [...] leaving unaltered the racist fabric of the educational system’ (Institute of Race Relations in Troyna, 1992: 75). MCE policies focused on ‘the ethnic and cultural lifestyles of Black pupils, rather than the wider political
culture in which their life chances were to be determined’ (Troyna, 1992: 74). Ethnic differences were celebrated in terms of sport, Caribbean food, music and art, rather than focusing on the racism experienced by Black children in wider society. MCE policies utilised ‘discursive deracialisation’ (Reeves in Troyna, 1992: 72) in which “race” is the elephant in the room. The methods appeared to ‘speak purposely to their audiences about racial matters, while avoiding the overt deployment of racial descriptions, evaluations and prescriptions’ (ibid, 1992: 73).

The MCE idea of promoting cultural diversity within schools was to display materials from the immigrant countries of Black children in the classroom, whilst teaching pupils West Indian songs and stories (Select Committee on Race Relations in Carby, 1982: 194). However, assimilation policies had entrenched the idea that West Indians and their British born children were culturally and intellectually deficient. Thus, despite its benign appearance MCE policies subtly reinforced the idea of a pathological Black culture, because the notion of West Indian backwardness was never challenged.

MCE’s focus on culture, rather than common shared academic aspirations between different ethnic groups, suggested that the talents of Black children lay outside of the educational paradigm. Consequently, teachers generally accepted that Black children were unlikely to do well in subjects such as English
or Maths, which required higher order cognitive skills. Instead, MCE gave credence to the idea that the abilities of Black children were naturally suited to non-academic activities that had no direct economic value (Mason, 2000: 71). This reified the notion that White children were naturally intelligent, whereas the attributes of their Black peers lay in their physical prowess. It consequently became the practice of teachers to steer Black children towards low skilled occupations, whilst their White peers were groomed for the professions and higher managerial occupations (Troyna and Carrington, 1990).

The agency of Black parents, and protests by their community organisations, were responsible for the 1979 ‘committee of inquiry into the education of minority ethnic children’ (Gillborn, 2005: 486). However, the government continued to adopt a laissez-faire approach, where policies promoting cultural diversity were concerned. Local Education Authorities (LEAs) were instructed to develop their own interpretation of MCE policies, which was problematic for those that had a comparatively small minority ethnic population (Troyna, 1992: 74). Not all LEAs thought it necessary to implement MCE policies. However, because of the failure of MCE approaches, some LEAs in areas with a disproportionally high Caribbean population – such as Birmingham and Brent – adopted antiracist education (ARE) policies (ibid, 1992: 81; see also Ratcliffe, 2004: 78). In short, ARE encapsulated the realisation that colour-blind educational policies were not as effective as those that challenged racist ideas. In contrast to MCE, ARE policies were about ‘taking racism seriously’ (Mason,

Regardless of differences in educational policy approaches, Black children continued to be marginalised, problematised and excluded, all of which impacted on their educational attainment (Mamon, 2004). Concerns that the education system was failing Black children influenced the mobilisation of Black parents, supported by their community organisations. Although there was no effort by government to provide a truly inclusive curriculum, funding was obtained through ARE policies to develop Black educational programmes. The Black Studies programme was an example of ARE initiative aimed at raising the educational attainment of Black children (Rex and Tomlinson, 1979: 186). The programme, however, was not embedded in the curriculum taught at William Murdoch Secondary School in Handsworth. Ratcliffe (2004: 78) notes, ‘the new teaching material was essentially tacked onto the existing curriculum. It […] tended to be seen as supplementary, rather than integral to the existing syllabus’ (emphasis in original). However, Birmingham’s Chief Education Officer personally intervened and ended the course, after receiving a series of complaints, including some from teachers at the school (ibid, 1979). It could be argued that the main reason for the failure of MCE policies was their lack of political support from central Government.
Birmingham’s Black Churches supported the educational needs of African Caribbean children in their Sunday School programmes (Rex and Moore, 1967; Rex and Tomlinson, 1979; Ratcliffe, 1981). Black community organisations also provided supplementary education in Saturday Schools. However, despite the combined efforts of parents and supporters, Black children in secondary schools continued to be excluded at disproportionately high rates (Mirza, 2007). In 1979 the *Commission for Racial Equality* (CRE) investigated ‘national concerns about the number of Black pupils who were being suspended from school’ (Troyna and Carrington, 1990: 33). Birmingham was the focus of the CRE’s inquiry because of the city’s large African Caribbean population and the high rate of Black pupils being excluded from school. The CRE revealed that between 1974 and 1980 ‘black pupils were four times as likely as their White peers to be suspended from secondary school’ (ibid, 1990: 33-34). Being disproportionately excluded placed Black children at a distinct disadvantage to their White peers (McKenley, 2001: 320). Leaving school without acquiring any educational *Goods* did more than just restrict their labour market participation, it also constrained their subsequent housing situation and social mobility. Meaningful and secure employment is often unattainable without educational *Goods*, and low income occupations can also increase dependency on social housing.
Lord Rampton’s 64 1981 Interim Report, acknowledged both institutional and individual racism (Taylor, 1986; Mason, 2000; Ratcliffe, 2004) as causal factors in the underachievement 65 of West Indian children. It emphasised the need to change social attitudes and perceptions, in order to provide equality of opportunity and a ‘harmonious multi-cultural society’ (Taylor, 1986: 68). Lord Swann’s Report also acknowledged the problem of institutional racism and would be the last to focus specifically on ethnic inequity in the education sector. The 1988 Education Reform Act (ERA1988) reduced the focus on racial disadvantage, whilst introducing the principles of the free market to the education sector (Troyna and Carrington, 1990). Competition within an educational market supported the idea that disparities in ethnic attainment were perceived as consequences of individual failings based on differences in ability and aspirations (Troyna, 1992). The transformation of the educational landscape into a market reinvented pupils and parents as consumers. Allowing educational institutions to compete for funding was seen as a means of raising standards, whilst also reducing State intervention.

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64 Anthony Rampton was commissioned to produce the 1981 Interim Report: West Indian Children in Our Schools, see Mamon, 2004. However, he resigned due to disagreements with the Thatcher regime, who appointed him. His report implicated structural and individual racism as causal factors in the educational underachievement [sic, see below] of West Indian children. Lord Swann was appointed in Rampton’s wake. See Taylor (1986: 69); and Ratcliffe (2004: 80). Swann’s 1985 report was entitled Education For All.

65 The concept of underachievement is misleading when used in the context of the education of West Indian children. Mason (2000: 66) argues that it ‘appears to refer to the difference between results that might have been expected and those that were actually achieved’. However, the term overlooks that exam expectations were in some cases measured by teachers according to the ethnicity of pupils, rather than their assessed or actual abilities. See also Troyna (1984) and Troyna and Carrington (1990).
From marketisation to social inclusion and a single equality regime

Hardy and Veiler-Porter (1992: 102) argue that the ERA1988 cannot be examined ‘in isolation but as part of a systematic programme of change’, which encompassed the privatisation of all State assets, including social housing and deregulation of the labour market. Promoting competition within an educational market, where institutions had ‘relative independence from local authorities […] for curricula matters’ (Mason, 2000: 75), enabled the Conservative Government to adopt a laissez faire approach to the provision of education. The major school reforms included ‘a compulsory national curriculum […] and the proportion of time devoted to each subject’ (ibid, 2000: 75). There was also a shift from O-level examinations to GCSE entries and more assessed work. The ERA1988 created an A*-C economy, which was supported by School League Tables. Schools were ranked according to the number of pupils who obtained good A*-C GCSE grades (Ratcliffe, 2004: 83). Higher achieving schools attracted more consumers and more funds from the funding formula policy, which rewarded schools for each pupil enrolled. However, the dominant theme of marketisation is the notion of raising educational standards, ‘placing a premium on […] subjects […] in the school tests and leading to increased selection and separation of students’ (Gillborn, 2005: 494), based on perceived differences in their academic ability.

66 The A*-C economy and educational triage are concepts originally used by Gillborn and Youdell (2000).
The ERA1988 first promoted the idea of *British values*, whereby the teaching of English, British History and Christianity in Religious Studies, were viewed as core components of the new curriculum. In addition, educational autonomy under the Act was supposed to make schools more responsive to the needs of pupils, parents and the local community. However, time constraints meant that the teaching of additional curriculum content, such as studies related to multiculturalism, were significantly reduced or removed. Moreover, as schools gained autonomy and responsibility for their finances, many were able to cite financial constraints to opt out of multicultural or anti-racist studies (Ratcliffe, 2004). Consequently, the educational needs of African Caribbean children became secondary to those of the school in the educational market.

Gillborn (2005: 494) notes that ‘of the five principal ethnic categories monitored continuously since the late 1980s, only one group – Whites – have enjoyed consistent year-on-year improvement’. The educational reforms, which began with the ERA1988, has seen Black students fall further behind their White peers in terms of the acquisition of A*-C Grades. The disparity between White and Black pupils in 1989 was 12 percentage points, but by 2004 it had increased to 20 percentage points (ibid, 2005: 494). Consequently, Black children are perceived as a risk to the school’s success and its capacity to acquire funding to the extent where, ‘some schools have sought to limit [...] and to expel disproportionate numbers of Black students’ (ibid, 2005: 495). What is also worth noting here is that both male and female Black students have high
rates of school exclusions, in comparison to their ethnic peers of the same gender. The perception that Black pupils will fail leads to a self-fulfilling prophecy of low educational expectations. Black children in lower streams are sometimes entered for exams where the highest obtainable Grade is D (ibid, 2005: 496). As a consequence of being unable to obtain educational Goods within the A*-C economy, they are often unable to progress onto A-Level courses that allow students to access universities.

John Major’s Conservative Government promoted a Colour-blind policy approach. This is a one-size fits all educational model in which policies are supposed to address the needs of citizens equally, regardless of differences in their social status. However, the notion of Colour-blindness was effectively ‘an obstinate refusal to consider ethnic diversity despite a wealth of evidence that minorities are not sharing equally’ (Gillborn, 2008a: 715 [emphasis in original]).

The Further and Higher Education Act 1992 (FHEA1992) (UKPGA, 1992) – which enabled polytechnics with over 55 per cent of their students enrolled on higher education courses to acquire university status – was passed during Major’s term as Prime Minister. Allowing colleges to acquire university status might have facilitated African Caribbean higher education participation, as there is evidence to suggest they have more difficulties than their White counterparts accessing red brick universities (Shiner and Modood, 2002). However, The FHEA1992 did nothing to end elitism between former polytechnics and their contemporaries.

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67 See Chapter Four.
pre-1992 counterparts, as the distinction between new and old university degrees was reinforced by selection in the labour market. Although the FHEA1992 improved access to universities, it did not necessarily guarantee improved employment opportunities. Students from the more prestigious red brick institutions ‘tend to go on to the best-paying jobs’ (Dorling, 2016). This suggests that degrees from old universities are perceived by employers as having a higher status than those from their new counterparts.

Stephen Lawrence, a 19-year-old African Caribbean A-level student, was murdered in South-East London by White racists in 1993. Although John Major was Prime Minister when he was killed, it was Tony Blair’s government that commissioned the Macpherson inquiry into his murder. The resulting report heralded a significant shift in race policy and how racial inequality is monitored, particularly within public sector organisations. The Macpherson Report (1999) accused the police of institutional racism and led to the passing of the 2000 Race Relations Amendment Act (RRAA2000). The Macpherson Report recommendations also imposed a duty on all public-sector bodies to monitor ethnic inequalities, in order to reduce the likelihood of racial discrimination. Educational institutions are now required to collate data relating to the ‘participation, retention and achievement’ of socially disadvantaged groups (Learning Skills Council, 2001: 3) and to promote race equality. New Labour
promoted education\(^{68}\) as the vehicle for social inclusion (Gillborn, 2008a). Although New Labour did not displace the marketisation policies of the previous Conservative government, its policies focused on widening participation into higher education as a means of tackling social exclusion and poverty.

Between 1991 and 2001 ethnic disparities in educational attainment had increased significantly, with both ‘black boys and girls […] lagging far behind their peers’ (Mamon, 2004: 88). This was especially the case in Birmingham, where the gap in attainment between Black children and their White peers widened greatly between 1998 and 2001 (ibid, 2004: 87). The RRAA2000 led to the introduction of Equality and Diversity Impact Measurements (EDIMs) in education, to monitor ethnic inequalities and various forms of social disadvantage (Learning and Skills Council, 2001). However, as discussed above in relation to the role of government where MCE and ARE policies were concerned, New Labour did not impose a national directive that standardised EDIMs.

Although New Labour spoke of social exclusion, their actions supported the colour-blind policies of the previous government (Gillborn, 2008a). Educational institutions were only required to have a system in place to monitor racial

\(^{68}\) *Education, education, education* was the slogan adopted by New Labour during their 1997 election campaign.
discrimination and other forms of inequalities. Consequently, learning institutions have adopted a tendency to collate inequality data in an arbitrary manner without taking actions to address identified problems. Moreover, under the Data Protection Act 1998 student information is protected, which makes it difficult to identify how educational establishments respond to issues where inequity is identified. This creates a paradox in which public sector organisations are obligated to record ethnic discrimination, but are not duty-bound to release the data for public scrutiny. As the data are not in the public domain it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of equality policies. Consequently, disparities in ethnic attainment can appear to be a consequence of variations in ability – highlighted by competition in the educational market – rather than factors such as institutional discrimination that are often reinforced by the individual prejudices of teachers (Troyna and Carrington, 1992; Ratcliffe, 2004; Gillborn, 2008a).

Since 2010, when the Conservative and Liberal Democrat Coalition Government replaced New Labour, “race” has been reconstructed as a protected characteristic under the 2010 Equality Act (EA2010). The idea of race as one of nine protected characteristics, is the latest ideological shift in educational policy. The specific public sector duties of the RRAA2000 now fall within the remit of the EA2010 (UKPGA, 2014), which promotes a single equality regime (Richardson and Monro, 2012) and reinforces the notion that racial inequalities are no different to other forms of inequalities. The nine protected
characteristics in the EA2010 are: *age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, pregnancy and maternity, race, religion or belief, sex and sexual orientation* (UKPGA, 2014: Part 2, Chap. 1: Section 4). The Act also conflates ethnicity, or national origin, within the idea of a racial group (ibid, Part 2, Chap. 1: Section 9.1). Although it reinforces the duty to monitor racial inequality, it appears that ‘the more things change the more they stay the same’ (Mirza, 2007: 1). This is because the relative de-emphasis of “race” in policy approaches is problematic to those afflicted by racism, particularly in the key sites of education, employment and housing. Pears (2013) contends that despite the passing of the EA2010 ‘Black communities are proportionally worse off in almost every single area of society: redundancies, unemployment [and] education’.

**Conclusion**

Jamaica’s relationship with Empire articulates how historical and contemporary legislation have enabled the exploitation of Black labour, and to some extent constrained the social status of Black British subjects. Laws passed by the British in the seventeenth century, and implemented in the Americas, classified Africans as items of property: chattel. Denying slaves their rights as humans inhibited their social status and legitimated the idea of Black servitude. After Emancipation, and up until the twentieth century, US immigration legislation enabled the movement of free Black labour between South and North America.
However, the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act (US Department of State Office of the Historian, 2012) favoured European workers over their Black counterparts. The Act was also instrumental in redirecting the flow of labour from the Caribbean. Immigration restrictions to the US made Canada a viable option for migration, until Canadian legislation also constrained immigration from the Caribbean. From chattel slavery in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, to Emancipation in the nineteenth century and free labour in the twentieth century, the labour of Caribbean subjects has been exploited for European benefit. The combination of natural disasters, an education system that only few could afford (Black, 1991) and a dearth of economic opportunities, influenced Jamaican migration and contributed to the material deprivation of the majority of Caribbean subjects.

Migration was not a new phenomenon where Jamaica was concerned. However, what was new about the outward flow of post-war Jamaican labour was the direction of travel towards Britain. Moreover, Caribbean migration was not solely influenced by economic factors as personal circumstances and individual reasons have also played their part. The 1948 British Nationality Act facilitated the entry and settlement of West Indian surplus labour by providing Commonwealth citizens with British passports (Fryer, 1984). Many of the major UK cities that attracted Caribbean migrants had developed their economic infrastructure with capital accumulated indirectly from slave labour (Hobsbawm, 1969; Williams, 2005 [1944]). Birmingham profited from slave
labour, prior to and during the industrial revolution (Harris, 2008), and in the 1950s and 1960s the city benefitted from the exploitation of the West Indian workforce (Rex and Moore, 1967; Rex and Tomlinson, 1979; Ratcliffe, 1981). Caribbean migrants obtained work in Birmingham’s foundries and factories, and acquired housing in deteriorating urban spaces vacated by the White population (Taylor, 1993). However, discriminatory employment and housing policies and practices constrained their social and spatial mobility to particular forms of work and in specific urban spaces of high material deprivation (Sivanandan, 1981; Phizacklea and Miles, 1982; Fryer, 1984).

The need to obtain economic and housing Goods, as a means of improving one’s social status, has been noted by previous commentators (Rex and Moore, 1967; Rex and Tomlinson, 1979; Ratcliffe, 1981). Therefore, the education, employment and housing markets are key sites of conflict in the competition for life-changing resources. West Indians continued to be over-represented in semi-skilled and unskilled occupations during the mid-1970s (Rex and Tomlinson, 1979: 146). Ratcliffe (1981: 298) also noted that in line with the occupations of their parents ‘relatively few West Indians […] have obtained White collar occupations’. However, it may be the case that African Caribbeans are accessing the higher income occupational positions that were previously denied to their parents. On the other hand, the persistence of racism might still be constraining their opportunities in the contemporary labour market.
Ratcliffe (1981: 308) argued that robust anti-discriminatory policies would be necessary to reduce future labour market inequalities. Moreover, ‘much will depend on the success of policy makers in tackling overt racism’ (ibid, 1981: 308) to ensure the ‘easy and typical’ (Weber in Smith, 2007: 87) occurrence of Black Caribbean social mobility. Black organisations have contributed to the passing of race equality legislation designed to reduce discrimination, in the market situations where ethnic groups compete for vital commodities (Ratcliffe, 2004). However, it remains to be seen if the decreasing focus on “race” in contemporary equality legislation has reduced the agency of African Caribbean religious and political groups, and the power they have to obtain resources for their supporters. Conflating “race” with other protected characteristics⁶⁹ might also suggest that racist practices and racial disadvantage, are harder to ameliorate than they were in the past.

The problem of discrimination in the public housing market has shifted since the mid-1960s and 1970s (Rex and Moore, 1967; Rex and Tomlinson, 1979). In comparison to the West Indian residents of 1960s Sparkbrook (Rex and Moore, 1967), more of the Council’s housing stock has been allocated to West Indians and their children (Rex and Tomlinson, 1979; Flett, Henderson and Brown, 1979). However, ‘there has arisen a de facto type of segregation and even a tendency towards making ghettos of certain areas’ (Rex and Tomlinson, 1979:

⁶⁹ See the 2010 Equality Act.
Thus, there is a need to ascertain if African Caribbeans have increased their presence in Birmingham’s *Good lands*, or if they continue to reside in *Bad Lands* such as Handsworth. As space and particular types of tenure are salient factors of spatial mobility, it is also important to establish if African Caribbeans are reducing their future risk of poverty by becoming owner-occupiers. The importance of choice and constraint in the housing market also has to be assessed. This is in terms of whether the urban concentration of the Caribbean population is constrained by discriminatory practices, or if their contemporary settlement patterns are a consequence of other factors.

The ideological shift in educational policies – from assimilation, to multiculturalism, to anti-racism, marketisation and social inclusion – represented one policy failure after another where the education of Black children is concerned. The ERA1988 transformed the educational landscape into a market (Troyna and Carrington, 1992), in which African Caribbean pupils are perceived as *ethnic liabilities* in the competition for *Goods*. This is particularly the case given that, after 1988, educational institutions had to compete for funding, whilst achieving attainment and retention targets. Sivanandanan (in Christian, 2005: 340) maintains that the exclusion of Black children became an automatic consequence of marketisation:
‘When you have an educational system which puts a premium not on
the educability of the child but on the price of its education, the
challenge to the teacher is the financial cost of keeping it [the child]
in, not the human cost of keeping it out’.

In comparison to other ethnic groups, African Caribbeans have a higher rate of
school exclusion, which has been the case since the 1960s (Christian, 2005: 328;
Gillborn, 1997: 66). Bourdieu (2010, [1984]) also notes the importance of
acquiring educational Goods at the expected age. This is particularly important
in regard to the acquisition of higher education capital, which allows individuals
to enter the labour market at the earliest opportunity and obtain occupations
with more income and security than less skilled work in the lower tiers of the
economy. Moreover, young highly qualified workers have more economic
value to employers than their equally qualified but older counterparts. This
demonstrates how school exclusions can block the life-chances of African
Caribbeans. Early exit from the educational system condemns African
Caribbeans to early entry into the labour market, but without the requisite
skills needed to take advantage of opportunities for occupational progression.

As can be seen above, much has been documented regarding the social and
political struggles of Caribbean peoples in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s (Rex and
Moore, 1967; Rex and Tomlinson, 1979; Ratcliffe, 1981; Sivanandan, 1982;
Phizacklea and Miles, 1982; Fryer, 1984; Carter, Harris and Joshi, 1987; Taylor, 1993; Solomos, 2003). However, there is a dearth of analysis regarding the impact that equality policies, earned through years of struggle against racial discrimination, may have had on improving the life-chances of Black Caribbeans. This is particularly as the RRA1976 and the RRAA2000 have been superseded by the EA2010, which views all forms of inequity equally. The aim now is to address that oversight by mapping and analysing changes in the social status and spatial mobility of Black Caribbeans. However, before this inquiry can proceed, it is necessary to justify the methods employed in this research.
3. The researcher as gatekeeper and insider

This research analyses the social class and spatial mobility of African Caribbeans by mapping changes in their educational, labour and housing market positions, and comparing them to those of their White British and Mixed White and Black Caribbean (hereafter referred to as MWBC) peers. Despite the passing of successive race and equality legislation (Ratcliffe, 2004) West Indians, and their British born descendants, have experienced considerable discrimination in market situations\(^{70}\). Thus, variations in the social status of African Caribbeans are also analysed vis-à-vis the impact of legislative change. The differential access that African Caribbeans have to life-changing goods is also compared to those who identify as MWBC. This is because prior to the introduction of the Mixed ethnic category in the 2001 Census, both groups may well have shared the same ontological status.

A ‘mixed-methods’ (Venkatesh, 2013: 3) approach was employed to examine the factors influencing Black Caribbean spatial and social mobility. They consisted of the following:

- ethnographic fieldwork;
- semi-structured interviews recorded with audio-visual devices;
- Census Area Statistics Tables and aggregated data;
- Small Area Statistics Micro-data (SAM);

\(^{70}\) See Chapter Two.
• Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA) datasets and tables;
• Higher Education Information Databases for Institutions (HEIDI) tables;
• an Index of Multiple Deprivation.

The ethnographic fieldwork took place in Birmingham’s African Caribbean community between 2010 and 2014. The observational elements required participation in weekly community meetings over the duration of the research, participation in four African Liberation Day (ALD) events and approximately 15 seminars organised by African Caribbean organisations. Thirteen interviews were conducted, seven of which were with African Caribbean adults, of both genders (see Appendix ii.: Table 1.1). The seven subjects were participants in a three-year community educational project based in Hockley and hosted by a company called ACFAS (African Caribbean Further Advancement Society).

Hockley is near to Handsworth and Smethwick, where some of the participants lived. The wards are also major enclaves of post-war Caribbean settlement in Britain and have been sites of racial conflict on different occasions71. In addition, Handsworth has also been the focus of previous research, in which ethnic competition in market situations was examined (Rex and Tomlinson, 1979; Ratcliffe, 1981; Taylor, 1993).

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71 The Black community clashed with members of the National Front (NF) when the latter marched through Handsworth during the 1977 Ladywood bye-election (Ratcliffe, 1981). There were also violent confrontations between the Black community and the police in Handsworth during 1981 and 1985, see Ratcliffe (2004) and also Solomos (2003) for a wider debate on the causes of urban disturbances during the 1980s. West Bromwich was a site of racial conflict between Black migrants and their European Voluntary Worker (EVW) counterparts in the 1940s, see Chapter Seven. During the 1960s there were also violent confrontations between the West Indian and White communities of Smethwick, also see Chapter Seven. In 2011 the Lozells area was the scene of ethnic tensions, which also erupted in violence, see Chapter Four.
It was difficult to find potential participants who met the criteria and were located in a single place. The criteria for inclusion in the research was that the subjects must have been born during the 1960s and educated in the UK. The age of the subjects is important because it identified them as belonging to the first generation of Black children educated in British schools (Coard, 1971; Carby, 1982). Moreover, the period between the mid 1960s and early 1980s is also significant in regard to various ideological and political changes in equality policies, particularly in the education sector. The author heard about ACFAS by word-of-mouth. It was the only Black-led community educational organisation with a cohort of Black adults. Thus, the seven African Caribbean respondents, mentioned above were selected as part of a convenience sample (Smith, 1991). The sample size is extremely small, and as such the research is not attempting to make a generalisable statement.

According to Bryman (2001: 99), the snowball method of obtaining a sample focuses ‘upon or reflect relationships between people’. Immersion in the African Caribbean community allowed the author to build relationships with individuals who were able to signpost him to others whose work was relevant to the aims of the research. It was by this means that the author heard of ACFAS and subsequently developed a rapport with the organisation’s female Project Manager (PM), who wished to remain anonymous. She became a
gatekeeper and provided access to the organisation’s Black Caribbean learners who matched the research criteria. By chance, a few of the research participants just happened to be dyslexic. The community project ACFAS was delivering at the time involved providing dyslexia assessments for adults with non-specific learning difficulties. The PM maintained ACFAS’s statutory duty towards safeguarding when considering the suitability of participants to be interviewed. In the context of educational settings, learners with cognitive disabilities are protected under the Safeguarding and Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 (Independent Safeguarding Authority [ISA], 2014) and the 2010 Equality Act (EA2010). Before the author was allowed to interview the subjects, they were in the first instance evaluated by the PM. She discussed the aims of the research with the subjects and obtained their consent to pass their contact details to the author.

Those selected to be interviewed initially received a text from the author, asking when it would be suitable to call them. Those who responded were contacted by phone and the research was explained to them. Seven ACFAS learners agreed to participate as long as they could remain anonymous. It was therefore agreed that they would all use pseudonyms. Consent to use audio-visual recording equipment was also obtained during the telephone dialogue. After the author made initial contact, the PM then arranged mutually convenient dates and times when the interviews could take place at ACFAS.
Four out of the seven interviews were conducted at ACFAS, whilst the remaining three took place in the participants’ homes.

The narratives of five dyslexic subjects attending ACFAS were used in this research, alongside two who had no hidden disabilities. Although Disability is not the focus of this research, it is nevertheless concerned with social disadvantage and the factors that influence it. None of the dyslexic participants had their disability identified in mainstream education. Their biographies are examined to explore how disability and racism intersected their experiences of schooling in the 1970s and early 1980s. Their narratives also provided valuable insights into the meanings they attach to their perceptions of self, and their lived experiences of competition in the educational, housing and labour markets. The narratives of the subjects are also analysed against quantitative data of their contemporaries in the education, labour and housing markets. The aim of this approach is to examine if the current equality agenda may have contributed to reducing the impact of racism in the above market situations, or if the contemporary experiences of African Caribbeans still resonate with those of the previous generation.

The remaining six interviews were conducted with Black Caribbean community leaders and a White British Professor of Sociology, whose research focuses on ethnic inequalities in education. The community organisations were selected
by a mixture of haphazard sampling, ‘because they [...] fortuitously presented themselves’ (Smith, 1991: 147) and snowball sampling. This is because as noted above, contacts in the Black community often directed me to relevant others. The community leaders were of different social classes and members of religious and community based Black organisations. Their qualitative data provided a first-hand account of the factors constraining and enabling their agency, and how legislative change has impacted on the capacity of their organisations to support the needs of the African Caribbean community.

The demographic data used in this research was obtained from revised datasets used in the 1991, 2001 and 2011 national Censuses. The data captured national and local employment, and housing characteristics, of the three ethnic groups featured in this research. Datasets from HESA and HEIDI were also used to capture ethnic differences in educational attainment. An Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) established material disparities between the various Lower Super Output Areas (LSOAs) in Birmingham’s 40 wards. A critical analysis of the methods, and the problems that arose in relation to their usage, now follows.

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72 Super Output Areas (SOAs) are geographical spaces ‘small enough to identify problems within wards but large enough to avoid the dangers of breaching confidentiality’ (Birmingham City Council, 2013: 1).
African Caribbean demography and geography

Ratcliffe (1981: 56) argues that although ‘Census data tells us little about the precise quality of life enjoyed by Britain’s citizens [...], they do undoubtedly provide an impressionistic overview’ of disparities in their material conditions. Census data is used in this inquiry to distinguish changes in ethnic occupational and spatial positions during different decades. By analysing trends in the data between 1991 and 2011, it is possible to identify improvements, stagnation and regression in the employment and housing positions of African Caribbean, White British and MWBC ethnic groups. Therefore, we can ‘learn a great deal about the present position of minority groups and also about the problems which may be faced by future generations’ (ibid, 1981: 60).

Birmingham has a total of forty areas that for political purposes are classified as wards. However, the city had thirty-nine wards in 1971; forty-two in 1981 and in the national Censuses of 1991 and 2001 Birmingham had thirty-nine wards. Boundary changes are responsible for the variations in ward sizes, the last of which was in 2004. Boundary changes can create ontological problems in relation to understanding what exists (May, 2001). For example, in the 1971 National Census Birmingham came under the County of Warwickshire. However, in 1974 the city’s boundaries changed when Birmingham became

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73 Census Area Statistics on the Web (CASWEB) (2014) and ONS (2014).
part of the Metropolitan County of the West Midlands. Birmingham’s Local Authority also redrew the boundary of the Soho ward in 1982. The restructuring of the Soho ward was significant in terms of the statistical representation of the Caribbean population in Birmingham. This is because ‘the new ward of Soho (just like the old Soho) had the largest minority population’ in Birmingham. Therefore, boundary changes give the appearance that the ethnic populations residing in the affected areas have increased or reduced in size.

**Ethnicity as identity and social category**

There are hermeneutic (May, 2001: 15) problems in the use of ethnic Census classifications, which are caused by changes in the political meanings of what are effectively socially constructed categories. For example, African Caribbean is an adaptation of the Black-Caribbean ethnic classification, which refers to the same group. The category was first used in the 1991 Census when Question 11 asked respondents to select their ‘ethnic group’ (Ratcliffe, 1996: 5). A political argument for the inclusion of a question regarding the ethnicity of individuals was the concern that ‘accurate statistics were a necessary prerequisite in any

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74 When Birmingham’s boundary was extended in 1981 the Sutton wards were incorporated into the city. The 1981 National Census records the new Sutton wards as Sutton Coldfield No. 1, No. 2 and No. 3 respectively. Although All Saints, Deritend, Gravelly Hill, Newtown, Rotton Park, Saltley and Stechford, were all recorded as Birmingham wards in 1981, they were renamed or reconstituted by the boundary changes in 1982. As a result of these changes the new wards of Bartley Green, Bournville, Hodge Hill, Kingsbury and Nechells were created.  
75 Birmingham City Council (1981): Paragraph 5 of the Appendix.
attempt to measure the extent of racial discrimination’ (Ballard, 1996: 10). Ratcliffe (1996: 7) notes there were two key arguments behind the introduction of the question: the need to assess the effectiveness of the 1976 Race Relations Act; and to overcome the problem of using a question to do something it was not designed for. Prior to 1991 British born Black children were classified according to the Caribbean origin of their West Indian parents (Owen, 1995: 2), which made their epistemological and ontological status somewhat problematic. This problem was demonstrated in the Handsworth survey of Rex and Tomlinson (1979), and Ratcliffe’s (1981) interpretation of their data. The researchers were unable to use Census data to gather information on the children of West Indians and resorted to using data from the Birmingham Statistics Office, in order to identify them in a meaningful way (Rex and Tomlinson, 1979: 322).

Despite the political arguments, which suggested the question on ethnic origin in the 1991 Census was justified as a means of monitoring racial inequalities (Skellington, 1996: 32), Ballard (1996) notes that the purpose for which it was intended has been generally overlooked. This has generated underlying fears that the use of ethnicity data is more ‘concerned with identifying members of Britain’s visible minorities’ (ibid, 1996: 8) than material inequalities. Moreover, the use of ethnic categories has to some extent reinforced notions of Otherness based on physical differences. As a consequence, ethnicity is often used as a reference to “race” (Ballard, 1996: 3; Ratcliffe, 1996: 3), and although the
Census attempts to portray ethnicity as a non-racial classification, it reifies skin colour as the primary and distinguishing feature of an ethnic group (Ballard, 1996: 12).

Ballard (1996: 13) contends that in the 1991 and 2001 Censuses, the White ‘majority were implicitly being invited to identify themselves as members of a physically distinctive racial category’. This suggests that Whiteness equates to Britishness, whereas the Black category is Othered by the way that it can be further deconstructed into sub-categories of Black African or Black Other (Ratcliffe, 2004: 37-38). For those who subscribe to the Black-Caribbean category, this reduces any sense of belonging to the nation (Ballard, 1996: 12). Moreover, the ethnic question, along with its parental birthplace predecessor, constructs the national identities of Black Britons according to their putative ancestral origins. This overlooks that fact that those labelled as African Caribbean are, in most cases, British by birth.

Shifting notions of individual concepts of self can also blur the ontological meanings behind ethnic categories. This is because social actors may switch allegiance from one classification to another, or indeed may not subscribe to any of them. This is demonstrated with the introduction of the Mixed ethnic category in the 2001 Census (Ratcliffe, 2004). Although the ethnic classification did not exist in the 1991 Census, there have always been people of mixed
ethnicities. As highlighted earlier, some who may have subscribed to the Black Caribbean category in 1991 might have switched allegiance to the MWBC group in 2001. Moreover, in 2011 they could see themselves as Mixed, White or even Black Caribbean. There are individuals of Black and White parentage, whose skin colour and physical appearance identifies them in the first instance as White. Such individuals may not see themselves as either Black or Mixed, and might subscribe to the White category. Nevertheless, individuals can also socially accept their inclusion to a particular ethnic category, and valorise particular characteristics as substantive and tangible signifiers of their group membership. Therefore, even though the distinction between ethnic categories can be ideologically problematic ‘the labels they deploy are almost universally accepted, or at least recognised, by those to whom they are intended to refer’ (ibid, 2004: 39).

Higher education attainment and participation

University degrees provide evidence that individuals possess the knowledge and skills required by the professions. This research views higher educational capital as Goods that can be exchanged in the labour market for economic capital (Bourdieu, 2010 [1984]), which in turn reduces the risk of long-term financial insecurity. As educational qualifications are often a prerequisite of social mobility, African Caribbean access to higher education (H.E.) is significant
to this inquiry. Data from HESA and HEIDI were used to create the following tables:

- the annual national distribution of first-year full-time student participation by gender, 2003-2013;
- White British and Black Caribbean 18-24\textsuperscript{76} aged student populations as a percentage of their national 18-24\textsuperscript{77} population, 2003-2013;
- the national distribution of First Class Honours and Second Class First Division Degrees between White British and Black Caribbean students, 2003-2012;
- White British, Black Caribbean and MWBC Birmingham students accessing national universities, 2007-2013;

Comparisons between the 18-24-age ethnic cohorts are important because it is the age-stage\textsuperscript{78} in which there is a normative expectation that H.E.

\textsuperscript{76} The 18-24 data are based on revised estimates from the 16-24 HESA data. HESA acknowledges that there are relatively few students who might access universities at the age of sixteen. Bearing this in mind the data was revised to provide a more valid picture of the majority of White British and Black Caribbean students accessing universities nationally.

\textsuperscript{77} The national 18-24 aged populations were calculated from their respective ethnic group Census populations, see Appendix ii.: Tables 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4.

\textsuperscript{78} See Chapter One.
participation will take place. Eighteen is the most common age-stage of those entering university nationally. For students studying in full-time State education this would suggest two years of post-16 studies, in a college or sixth-form centre, to acquire three A-levels. Bourdieu (2010, [1984]: 75) acknowledges that, ‘one of the mediations through which cultural capital is transformed into educational capital is speed of progress through the system’. As individuals are generally expected to acquire H.E. Goods by the time they are 24, it can be considered as the normative age when post-higher education labour market participation is expected to commence. Therefore, those acquiring university degrees by the age of 24 will be within the optimum age-range, in which there is a higher probability that intergenerational social mobility will occur in a way that seems ‘easy and typical’ (Weber, 1920 in Smith, 2007: 87). This is because the earlier that economic activity takes place, after acquiring H.E. Goods, the sooner it is that individuals may gain upward social mobility.

The higher education participation of Black Caribbean children, born in Birmingham during the 1960s and 1970s, preceded the statutory duty to collate national ethnicity data to monitor social inequalities\textsuperscript{79} (Learning Skills Council, 2002; Paragraph 6: 2; Berkeley, 2014: 6). Nevertheless, as noted earlier, the educational experiences of the research subjects are captured in narratives and compared to the data of their contemporaries. It is also difficult to obtain

\textsuperscript{79} See Chapter Two.
educational data regarding MWBC participation even after the Mixed ethnic category was formally introduced in the 2001 Census (Ratcliffe, 2004). The Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA) tends to conflate all Mixed ethnic groups into a single category. However, national HESA datasets was used to map the H.E. participation of African Caribbeans and White British students from 2003. The data available for MWBCs is only applicable to Birmingham from 2007-2013 in this thesis.

Due to administrative changes in the way that ethnicity data are collated it is not possible to make meaningful comparisons prior to 2007. Therefore, ethnic differences in the H.E. participation of Birmingham students is analysed between 2007 and 2013 using HESA datasets. HESA lists 162 UK higher education institutions, 24 of which belong to the Russell Group. As these institutions are considered to be in the Premier League of universities (Which? University, 2014; Guardian, 2014), it is important to ascertain the rate at which Birmingham's African Caribbean students are accessing old and new universities (Shiner and Modood, 2002) over the years. HEIDI datasets also provide national ethnic differences of students obtaining First Class and Upper Second Class Degrees in Russell Group universities.

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80 See Appendix iii.
81 Shiner and Modood (2002: 209) argue that ‘ethnic minority candidates are filtered into the new university sector’. These are universities created after the 1992 Higher Education Act and are not considered as prestigious as their old or Red-Brick counterparts, see Chapter Two.
The 18-24 White British and Black Caribbean student populations were calculated as a percentage of their national 18-24 populations using the Censuses of 2001 and 2011\(^{82}\). There is no way of knowing the exact population variation between the Censuses. They were therefore estimated on the basis of interpolations from 2001 and 2011 Census data. HEIDI data, for first class honours and second class first division degrees awarded, were also estimated\(^{83}\). The number of degrees awarded were divided by the respective student populations in the same 3-year cohorts\(^{84}\). Although the totals are approximate rather than accurate, they nevertheless provide a heuristic picture of the distribution of degrees between African Caribbean and White British students.

Examination of the participation of full-time students is significant to this inquiry. Their mode of study would suggest they are younger than their part-time peers, and their age-stage is significant to improving their social status for the reasons outlined above. Comparing changes in the percentages of Black Caribbean and White British 16-24 populations accessing university in recent years, will reveal the extent to which African Carolinians are widening their participation in higher education. This analysis will also indicate if Carolinians are acquiring the academic Goods that are necessary to obtaining employment in the high-income occupations.

\(^{82}\) See Table 5.2.
\(^{83}\) See Figures 1.5 and 2.5.
\(^{84}\) See also Table 5.2.
Changes in educational legislation are also analysed alongside variations in university participation by ethnicity and gender. There is no way of establishing for certain the extent to which legislative change may have facilitated or constrained Black Caribbean H.E. access. However, its potential influence on gender differences, and participation and attainment by ethnicity, is assessed. Thus, analysing the relationship between legislation, policy and practice, and the ways in which they might have influenced university access and attainment, will address the question:

- To what extent does legislation enable or constrain African Caribbean social mobility in the context of competitive market situations?

Comparing educational progress to labour market participation, and assessing whether African Caribbeans are exchanging H.E. Goods for economic Goods, will also address:

- How are the education and labour market experiences of African Caribbeans in Birmingham mediated by their gender and ethnicity?

**The hierarchical occupational structure and labour market participation**

As noted earlier in this thesis, occupational change can reflect variations in income and lifestyle, which defines class as a combination of position, situation (Marx and Weber in Morrison, 1995) and disposition (Bourdieu, 2010 [1984]). Variations in the labour market positions of African Caribbeans are examined
between 1991 and 2011, and compared to those of their White British counterparts, to determine if their class status has changed. Data for MWBCs are also included from 2001. This method will establish if African Caribbeans are still employed in similar occupations as their West Indian antecedents; it will also facilitate the examination of the role that legislation, policies and practices might have played in constraining or enabling their employment situations. Although Census datasets are designed for their reliability, they do not provide a true picture of the barriers African Caribbeans encounter in labour market situations. Therefore, semi-structured interviews were also used to capture the lived-experience of the research subjects.

The occupational schema used to reveal differences in class positions changed in the 2001 Census, from those based on the Registrar General Social Classes, to the National Statistics Socio-economic Classifications (NS-SEC). According to...

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85 The manufacturing and production industries that employed a significant number of West Indians, in the 1950s, 60s and early 70s have declined (Phizacklea and Miles, 1980). However, similar types of occupations in the contemporary labour market are viewed as precarious work (Standing, 2011), which are low-paid, short-term and unskilled routine occupations.

86 The Registrar General’s Social Classes (RGSC) were the means by which differences in class positions, according to occupation and industry, were first measured in the 1911 Census (Rose, 1995). The variables were also used to quantify disparities in the mortality, fertility and marriage rates of the upper, middle and working-classes (ibid, 1995). In 1990 the RGSC was renamed Social Class based on Occupation (SC) (ibid, 1995). It was then superseded in 1994 by the National Statistics Socio-economic Classification (NS-SEC) (Rose, 1995; Rose and Pevalin, 2001: 4). Between 2000 and 2010 the NS-SEC were mapped to the Standard Social Occupations Classifications 2000 (SOC2000) and then the Standard Occupational Classification 2010 (SOC2010), which are basically catalogues of occupations listed within their hierarchical employment classes (Rose and Pevalin, 2010). SOC2010 is now the most commonly used occupational catalogue, in which occupations are ranked according to the level of skill they require. A major criticism of the RGSC, and its SC successor, is that it overlooked how female participation in the labour market has changed since the 1970s. Consequently, it ‘failed to describe adequately the individual class situation of women’ (Crompton, 2008: 67). In addition, the RGSC and SC did not take into account the economic contribution of the retired, or acknowledge the long-term unemployed. These omissions influenced a review of the schema in the 1990s, which subsequently led to the creation of the NS-SEC (ibid, 2008: 64).
the Office for National Statistics (ONS) (2010:3) the NS-SEC differentiates ‘positions within [...] different labour market situations and work situations’. In this respect a labour market situation is concerned with ‘income [...] , economic security [...] and advancement’ (ibid, 2010: 3). However, an individual’s work situation is defined by their location within the hierarchical employment structure and their relative autonomy as a worker.

There are eight analytic classes in the NS-SEC, seven of which consist of a variety of occupations that are hierarchically classified in SOC2010, according to their technical complexities. *Class 1* represents the highest level of skilled employment, whereas *Class 8* is allocated to the unemployed. The *Higher Managerial, Administrative and Professional Occupations of Class 1*, also contain two sub-groups87. The NS-SEC is examined over Census periods, nationally and in the context of Birmingham by ethnicity and gender. It facilitates the examination of labour market hierarchies, between the high-income professions and the low-income unemployed and allow changes in social status to be mapped over time. Census datasets were used to construct the following Tables:

- social class based on occupation by ethnicity, Birmingham and national, 1991;

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87 The two Class 1 sub-groups have been aggregated in the Tables used in Chapter Six of this research.
• socio-economic classifications by ethnicity, for ages 16-74, Birmingham and national, 2001-2011;
• socio-economic classifications by ethnicity and gender, for ages 16-74, Birmingham and national, 2001-2011;
• Birmingham socio-economic classifications by ethnicity and gender, for ages 16-74, 2001-2011;
• national socio-economic classifications by ethnicity, for ages 25-49, 2001-2011;
• socio-economic classifications by ethnicity and gender, for ages 25-49, Birmingham and national, 2001-2011.

The National Census occupational data, for ages 25-49 in 2001, was not available via ONS. Although the dataset was obtained from the UK Data Service Small Area Micro-data (SAM), the population sample was one fifth. It therefore would have to be multiplied by twenty to provide a more accurate correlation to the ONS data for those aged 25-49 in 2011. In addition to the datasets, occupational and legislative changes are also examined alongside the narratives of African Caribbean subjects in employment situations, to answer the following question:

• To what extent does legislation enable or constrain African Caribbean social mobility in the context of competitive market situations?
This research is also concerned with the ways in which the educational and economic situations of African Caribbeans are also differentiated by gender, and the extent to which opportunities are influenced expectations of progress at particular age-stages. Analysis of the combination of the educational and labour market data will answer the question:

- How are the education and labour market experiences of African Caribbeans in Birmingham mediated by their gender and ethnicity?
- How have thirty years of social change impacted on the social class mobility of Birmingham’s African Caribbean population?

**Spatial distribution in Good Lands and Bad Lands**

As argued earlier, mapping demographic movement from the inner-city Bad Lands to the suburban ‘Promised Land’ (Burgess, 2008 [1925]: 75 [emphasis added]) can sometimes reveal improvements in social status. This is because spatial movements and settlement are often enabled or constrained by exchanging educational capital for labour market capital (Bourdieu, 2010 [1984]). However, that is not always the case, as there are a number of choices and constraints that can influence where individuals live. Nevertheless, quality of life is often linked with class status. Therefore, this research utilises the 2010 Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD2010) to establish the existing levels of poverty and disadvantage in Birmingham’s wards.

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88 See Chapter One.
Until 2010, Peter Townsend’s Index of Deprivation (TID) was one of the main means by which social scientists compared material disparities in urban spaces (Hick, 2015: 164). However, Townsend’s Index has been criticised because of its “mismatch” between low income and material deprivation’ (ibid, 2015: 164). It is now acknowledged that there are several indicators of poverty overlooked by the TID. Spicker (1999) argues that poverty has twelve clusters of meaning, most of which overlap. More recently, the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC, 2015) has identified twenty indicators of poverty that, like Spicker’s (1999) definitions of poverty, also intersect. Nevertheless, the TID was used to map material deprivation, prior to the introduction of the IMD2010.

The TID measures deprivation at ward level in the 1991 and 2001 Censuses using a ‘composite score based on four variables: unemployment, overcrowding, non-car ownership and non-home ownership’ (UK Data Service, 2015). However, the IMD2010 is able to distinguish deprivation at lower super output area level (LSOA), which is the smallest geographical measurement. In comparison to the four variables used in the TID, the IMD2010 measures deprivation in seven domains. Disparities in income; employment; health and disability; education, skills and training; barriers to housing and services; crime and also living environment are incorporated into the measure. This method
was employed because, as argued above, revealing material disparities between LSOAs can indicate the quality of life of those who reside there.

England has 32,482 Super Output Areas (SOAs), the sizes of which vary according to the density of the population in each area (Birmingham City Council, 2013). The populations of SOAs can range from 1,000 to 3,200 individuals. Birmingham has ‘641 SOAs [...] over half (61%) are ranked in the most deprived 25% in England’ (ibid, 2013: 5). The city’s 641 SOAs are further divided into 3,127 LSOAs, each of which consist of about three hundred people. There are 33,307 postcodes\(^\text{89}\) in Birmingham of which 526 are non-residential. The remaining 32,781 residential postcodes are divided unequally between Birmingham’s forty wards. Each ward has a number of SOAs containing several different postcodes. The various deprivation scores for each of the seven domains, and in each of Birmingham’s 641 SOAs, were obtained from ONS datasets. They were then applied to Birmingham’s residential postcodes and their corresponding LSOAs.

Birmingham’s 3,127 LSOAs either nestle within or straddle the boundaries of wards; they also generally have different levels of material deprivation. This is an example of an ecological fallacy, which basically asserts that disproportionate levels of poverty and disadvantage can exist within the same

\(^{89}\) See Appendix iv.
ward. These pockets of deprivation are demonstrated in the Edgbaston area of Birmingham. Some LSOAs in the ward have high levels of poverty and the majority of housing is council owned. However, within the same ward also exists some of the most expensive privately owned property in the city, which are situated in areas of low deprivation.

Census datasets along with the IMD2010 were used to construct the following Tables:

- the distribution of White British and Black Caribbeans aged 16-74 in low and high deprivation Birmingham wards, 1991;
- the distribution of different types of housing tenure in low and high deprivation Birmingham wards, 1991;
- the distribution of White British, Black Caribbean and MWBC populations aged 25-49 in low and high deprivation Birmingham wards, 2001 and 2011;
- the household reference person of White British, Black Caribbean and MWBCs, aged 16 and over and also aged 25-49, and their housing tenure in low and high deprivation wards in Birmingham, 2001 and 2011;
• the household reference person of White British, Black Caribbean and MWBCs, aged 25-49, and their housing tenure in their respective Birmingham Hinter Lands\textsuperscript{90} in 2011;

• the IMD scores of the respective ethnic Hinter Lands, Good Lands and Bad Lands and the educational qualifications of those aged 16-74 residing in them.

The ethnicity categories of the groups that are the focus of this research have remained the same in the Censuses of 2001 and 2011. They are therefore used to map ethnic changes in the acquisition of housing tenure and spatial settlement between 2001 and 2011. Consequently, the 1991 Census can only be used as a starting point to make heuristic comparisons between White British and Black Caribbean ethnic groups. This is especially as MWBC data were not included until 2001. Combining the use of the IMD2010 with the Census ethnic population datasets made it possible to map the spatial settlement patterns of African Caribbeans, and also identify the levels of deprivation in the areas in which they are now concentrated. Comparing differences in the urban concentration of the three ethnic groups will to some extent indicate how the material situation and social status of African Caribbeans have changed over time. This will in turn indicate if they have achieved upward social mobility and enable the following questions to be answered:

\textsuperscript{90} The notion of ethnic Hinter Lands is articulated in Chapter Seven.
• What shifts have taken place in the spatial patterns of Birmingham’s African Caribbean over the past thirty years?

• How have thirty years of social change impacted on the social mobility of Birmingham’s African Caribbean population?

Ethics

This research is guided by the ethical principles of the Social Research Association (SRA). Where obligation to subjects is concerned, undue intrusion must be avoided, informed consent must be obtained, misleading must not occur, confidentiality must be maintained and interests protected (SRA, 2003). According to Bryman (2001: 479) ethical considerations in sociological research are also concerned with: ‘whether there is harm to participants; whether there is a lack of informed consent; whether there is an invasion of privacy; whether deception is involved’ (emphases in original). The major ethical tension in this investigation was the problem of negotiating the space between ‘deontology and consequentialism’ (May, 2001: 60). This can be interpreted as decisions made to use sociological methods that do not violate ethical boundaries, against the dilemma of using those that lead to their infraction.

The quantitative methods in this investigation are essentially deontological. Bryman (2001) contends that the methods employed in deontological research
do not compromise the four ethical concerns identified above. However, working within an ethical framework, in which scientific rules guide the construction of knowledge, can sometimes constrain research to an essentialist understanding of the social world (Restivo, 1983: 5). In this sense, ethical principles can be perceived as paradigms that restrict knowledge to the level of ‘discursive accomplishments’ (Knorr, 1981; Woolgar, 1981 in Restivo, 1983: 7).

Nevertheless, research has to be guided by standards within a framework. The Census, HESA and HEIDI datasets used in this research are anonymous and do not breach confidentiality or invade the privacy of individuals. They reveal national and local variations between African Caribbean, White British and MWBC ethnic groups by gender, age, occupation, spatial location, economic activity and educational qualifications. This deontological approach operationalises the ethnic subjects of this research as objects, whereby differences in their access to Goods and Bads are examined empirically.

Analysing differences between the material conditions of ethnic groups as statistical data, enables the researcher to maintain a degree of detachment (May, 2001: 10). The anonymity involved in data analysis does not allow attachments to be formed, which assists the process of maintaining objectivity. Moreover, as no interaction takes place between the researcher and subjects, the issue of harm to participants does not arise. In addition, as secondary data are freely available in the public domain, lack of informed consent, deception and invasion of privacy are not methodologically problematic. The data used to
construct the IMD were first made available in 2010 by the Office for National Statistics (ONS), and supports the above ethical principles. Although the IMD data consists of postcodes, the ONS have developed Samples of Anonymised Records (SARs) that do not reveal the identities of individual residents. The same process is used in the construction of Census datasets. Therefore, the use of these methods was consistent with a deontological approach, as they did not breach any ethical principles.

Working within ethical guidelines can sometimes be problematic. This is especially the case where ethnographic methods are concerned. In contrast to the deontological approach, consequentialism posits that sociologists have to consider the context of their research and the circumstances in which they find themselves. Ethical boundaries can be violated, but only if the ends of the research justify the means. Therefore, it is important that the researcher reflects on ‘the situation […] and […] the consequences of their act’ (ibid, 2001: 61). Schensul et al. (1999) suggest that the methods used by ethnographers should not be viewed as being external to the sociologist. This is because the researcher is the primary tool of his/her investigation (ibid, 1999: viii). For this reason, the use of secondary data posed fewer problems than the qualitative methods; this was because the latter demanded interaction and engagement.
Audio visual equipment was utilised to record the interviews of subjects participating in the research. The fieldwork consisted of participant observation, deployed during meetings, activities and educational seminars. However, during the course of the research there were times when the fieldwork was more inclined towards consequentialism, because of the element of deception. This tension arose from the author’s need to control information regarding the research and from his position as a researcher (Goffman, 1963). It was thought that the actors, who presented themselves at the various events he attended, might not accept him if they knew his presence was guided by academic research. Thus, the author had to consider ‘the routine cycle of restrictions he [sic] faces regarding social acceptance [...] by [...] managing information about himself’ (ibid, 1963: 91).

There was a certain apprehension that in revealing the part of his social identity, which was most relevant to the situation, the author would be ‘discredited’ (ibid, 1963: 83) in the eyes of his research subjects. Consequently, they might not perform in the way they normally would. Thus, for the purpose

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91 White researchers, who descend on the Black community, are generally viewed with suspicion. It is believed their research only serves to further White interests rather than those who they seek to observe. Bini Brown, the leader of the African Caribbean Self-Help Organisation (ACSHO) (see further on in this chapter), refused Rex and Tomlinson’s (1979) request for an interview during their Handsworth research. However, that did not stop them writing about him, his organisation and its members from a position that suggested they had inside knowledge (ibid, esp. Chapter 8). Their subterfuge still rankles with ACSHO and others in the Black community. The general consensus is that the researchers misrepresented and undermined ACSHO’s cause for their academic agenda, which was of no benefit to the African Caribbean community. For a critique of Rex and Tomlinson’s (1979) speaking position in relation to their Handsworth study see Back and Solomos (1993). Although Rex and Tomlinson (1979) accused some of their subjects of creating myths (Back and Solomos, 1993), it appears that it was they who were guilty of myth-making where information regarding ACSHO was concerned.
of maintaining validity, the author decided to manage information about himself, as ‘a [...] strategy of the discreditable person is to handle his [sic] risks by dividing the world into a large group to whom he [sic] tells nothing and a small group to whom he [sic] tells all’ (ibid, 1963: 95). Hence, there were relevant others who were aware of the author’s reasons for participating in the various activities, organised by African Caribbean organisations. However, there were also individuals present who presumed that he was there solely to support their interests. Although the author was aware of this misconception, he did nothing to correct it.

**Reflexivity**

Young (2013: 51) argues that ‘ethnographers cannot hide behind their work. Their visibility surfaces in the course of reading an ethnography, as the reader asks “Who is the author of this work?”’ Moreover, Khan and Jerolmack (2013: 10) also maintain that ‘there is something jarring about authors referring to themselves in the third person’, which is something I have been guilty of until this point. I have referred to myself as *the author* in an effort to maintain objectivity. However, I now find that in justifying the qualitative methods of this research, I am unable to sustain the same form of detachment as I have previously demonstrated. In discussing the relevance of qualitative data, I am no longer dealing with *objects* of social classification; I am now concerned with *subjects* and interpreting the meanings they attach to their actions, which is not
a neutral process. Problems arose during interviews and observational fieldwork, because my subjects and I share the same ethnic identity. Therefore, in discussing why the qualitative approaches I adopted were appropriate for the aims of this inquiry, it was also important for me to analyse my connections and relationships with them. This also meant examining methods of neutralisation, so that I might not have an adverse influence on the actions and responses of those whom I observed and interviewed.

Although I grew up in the community where my fieldwork was based, it has been a number of years since I lived in Handsworth. Nevertheless, my skin colour, culture, ethnic identity, and also my social and intimate relationships identified me as a member of the African Caribbean community. The idea of informal sponsorship’ (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995: 60) posits that gatekeepers are necessary for researchers to enter the world of those whom they investigate. However, that is not always the case. Researchers can also be insiders who already have access to their subjects. This was the case with this research, as ‘the community viewed me as an insider’ (Islam, 2000: 35): someone who is also one of their own, because I share the same ethnic identity and similar lived experiences of growing up in the same urban space. I employed what I define as an eversion technique to my ethnographic fieldwork, which is in essence researching from the inside outwards. Outsiders, in ethnographic research, generally encounter problems of access. After gaining access they then immerse themselves in the world of their subjects. Eversion is
the obverse, because as an insider I am to a great extent already immersed in
the world of my subjects.

When researchers also have insider status, there are tensions that must be
negotiated in the process of maintaining objectivity. Nevertheless, there are
also privileges that come with insider status, as ‘minority scholars [...] face less
distrust, hostility and exclusion from minority communities’ (ibid, 2000: 42).
However, despite sharing the same African Caribbean identity as my subjects, I
was also conscious of my differences. My education, occupation and current
spatial location reflected my middle-class habitus, and also signified my
outsider status in the eyes of my working-class subjects. Although my skin
colour provided me with acceptance and invisibility in the settings of my
subjects, it was sometimes difficult to negotiate the space between my class
and ethnicity. This was because my middle-class habitus was so far removed
from the environment of my mainly working-class subjects.

A major tension of insider status is not so much the problem of getting in, but
of getting out when the research is over. Were it not for my research I would
have very little reason to regularly enter the social worlds of my subjects.
Therefore, it was important that I was honest with them so as not to leave a
vacuum of bad feelings behind me. They had confided in me, and welcomed
me into their homes and organisations. I did not want to nurture any feelings
of resentment or give them cause to feel that I had betrayed their trust or
exploited them for my own interests. My objective was to empower my
subjects by capturing their lived experiences and organisational struggles,
which would otherwise have been invisible. As I also shared their focal
concerns, it was crucial to nurture a relationship based on mutual respect, truth
and trust.

African Caribbeans, particularly those who are politically engaged in the Black
community, might view the academic world as a space that underpins
dominant discourses of Whiteness\(^{92}\). Mistrust can therefore be aroused by
acknowledging the power that researchers have to falsify knowledge, as a
means of furthering their own interests\(^{93}\). As a consequence, Black researchers
are sometimes perceived as \textit{sell-outs}, who betray their community for the
rewards of Whiteness\(^{94}\). Therefore, ‘just as my insider status gave me access to
particular discourses, it also made others difficult to explore’ (ibid, 2000: 50).
The tension in this duality surfaced during a meeting I attended at the African
Caribbean Self-Help Organisation (ACSHO) in Handsworth. One of the former
Directors of Harambee (Rex and Tomlinson, 1979; Ratcliffe, 1981; 2004) was
suspicious of my presence and consistently advised ACSHO’s members to be
careful about what they said in front of me. On one occasion, he accused me of

\(^{92}\) This understanding of Whiteness locates ideas of White superiority ‘in the economic and
political dominance of White people over Black people in Britain’s colonial past’ (Carrington

\(^{93}\) See Footnote 91.

\(^{94}\) In my case the rewards of Whiteness could be perceived as a PhD.
being a *police informer*. Thus, even though the African Caribbean community accepted me as an insider – because of my shared ethnic identity and ties within the community – I also incurred suspicion because of my middle-class, outsider academic status. The inherent duality of this position meant ‘I would be the [...] ambassador and possibly the traitor to the community’ (Islam, 2000: 35).

Hammersley and Atkinson (1995: 16) note that ‘the orientations of researchers will be shaped by their socio-historical location, including the values and interests that these locations confer upon them’. Throughout my fieldwork I had to consistently examine the relationships of power that existed between my subjects and I. Moreover, I also had to consider my position as one who shares the same social and historical connections (Back and Solomos, 1993). Therefore, it was important to acknowledge, deconstruct and scrutinise the empathy and racial markers that I have in common with my subjects. For example, I share the same African Caribbean heritage. My Jamaican parents came to the UK to improve their life-chances and opportunities. Like my subjects, I am also a native of the city of Birmingham. I was born in Marston Green in the 1960s, which at that time was part of Solihull. I also belong to the first generation of British-born Black children to enter the English education sector. I grew up in Handsworth and attended local schools. However, unlike many of my peers, and the majority of research participants, I have obtained educational *Goods* from two of the elite Russell Group Universities.
Despite being a Brummie, I know what it means and feels like to be classified, declassified, constructed, reconstructed and labelled as a member of a visible minority. At different stages in my life I have been a West Indian; a Jamaican; a second-generation immigrant; a Negro; an IC3; a coloured; a Black; an Afro-Caribbean, and an African Caribbean. Each form of ascription, be it political, social, polite or abusive, is connected – overtly, covertly, explicitly, implicitly, indirectly or directly – to the colour of my skin. Therefore, I have experienced the same sense of societal disengagement, exclusion and discrimination incurred by many of my subjects. I am in the first instance perceived in relation to my skin colour, and socially constructed according to the pathological connotations surrounding my Blackness and African heritage. As a consequence, who I am seems to matter less than what my skin colour signifies I am supposed to be. As such, any sense of belonging to the city or nation of my birth is only of secondary concern. It is in this way that racialised identities have the effect of transforming those who are ascribed by them into ““simulacra” […], multiple identical images with no original’ (Baudrillard in Garner, 2007: 22). In researching the disadvantages faced by members of my community and ethnic group, I am acutely aware that my values are always simmering below the surface. Sociological research should be an objective process. Therefore, acknowledging that I share the same racial markers and Otherness as my subjects reinforces the importance of appropriating a reflexive strategy.
Whilst conceding that research cannot be completely value free (May, 2001: 47), I nevertheless also realise the necessity to utilise a radical type of reflexivity (Gunaratnam, 2003). This means reflecting on the similarities and disparities between how my subjects and I are socially situated and to acknowledge how my ‘research is entangled with wider social and historical relations, [that] involves the ideological construction of the subjects’ (ibid, 2003: 7). This form of self-analysis is crucial when researching from the inside. It is important to recognise that my subjects and I share historical similarities, which tend to influence the way in which wider society perceives us collectively. However, individually, there are also major points of departure, particularly in relation to our opposing class dispositions. Understanding and negotiating this dual tension is crucial to maintaining an objective focus.

**The presentation of subjects in *eversion* ethnography**

Although it is difficult to make any ‘hard-and-fast-distinction between ethnography and other sorts of qualitative enquiry’ (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995: 2), the main idea behind ethnographic research is that the researcher tries to understand ‘the routine ways in which people make sense of the world’ (ibid, 1995: 2). The ethnographic fieldwork of this research took place between 2010 and 2014. The fieldwork required me to participate ‘overtly or covertly, in
people’s daily lives for an extended period of time, watching [...], listening [...], asking questions – in fact, collecting whatever data are available’ (ibid, 1995: 1). Although I did not immerse myself in the day-to-day lives of my subjects, I visited them in their homes and interacted with them in social settings that were focal points of political activism in the Black Caribbean community. These settings were spaces of agency and mobilisation, where issues of discrimination, empowerment and cultural affirmation were contested and represented.

My *eversion* approach used mixed qualitative methods, consisting of semi-structured interviews and participant observation in various private and public settings. The data was captured in hand-written notes and through the use of audio-visual recording equipment. Islam (2000: 40) argues, ‘it is critical that researchers explore descriptive life histories. Such a method uncovers the conceptual framework of respondents’. Interviews and observation were the preferred qualitative methods, as they enable researchers to interpret how subjects make sense of their social worlds. Although the data collection took various forms I also acknowledge that in ethnographic fieldwork, ‘the researcher is the primary tool for collecting primary data’ (Schensul et al., 1999: viii) and therefore has to utilise whatever method comes to hand.
I used a semi-structured interview schedule, which was recorded simultaneously on a Flip Video Recorder and also a Sony Voice Recorder to capture the ‘disruptions and continuities’ (Islam, 2000: 39) in the biographies of my respondents. I had to ensure, that as far as it was possible, my presence was not influencing the participants to respond in a way they thought conformed to my expectations of what they ‘ought to be’ (May, 2001: 47) saying. Moreover, analysing ‘the disconnect between […] narratives and actions’ (Khan and Jerolmack, 2013: 12) is crucial to the production of knowledge, as ‘the meanings and significance of the accounts gathered through interviews vary depending on the characteristics of the participants’ (ibid, 2013:9). Thus, understanding how ambiguities can occur during interviews made it important to maximise validity. This was done by firstly encouraging the respondents to relax by engaging in an informal dialogue prior to asking questions. This tactic was used to overcome the Hawthorne Effect. They soon forgot about the presence of the camera, and the interview was generally over before they were aware it had started.

Establishing an initial rapport, prior to asking questions, also facilitated the observation of thick descriptions (Geertz, 1994) of the subjects and their surroundings. I could observe actions and behaviour in the subjects’ natural social settings, and make comparisons of ‘interview accounts with observed activity’ (Khan and Jerolmack, 2013: 18). Whilst playing back the recordings I could also uncover hidden meanings and inaccuracies by watching the reactions
and body language of my subjects whilst listening to their responses. Thus, I was able to assess whether the research subjects might be performing to my perceived expectations (Goffman, 1963), rather than recalling the true order of events in their narratives.

The interviews took place in the homes of subjects, the buildings used by community organisations, their places of work and educational centres. They were conducted wherever the respondents felt most comfortable to talk and it was convenient. The narratives captured rich, meaningful data regarding their educational experiences and also their housing and employment situations. I did not mention racism directly when questioning the participants about their experiences of competition in market situations. As noted above, this was because I wanted them to recall and define their experiences of discrimination without feeling they were being led to say what they thought I might want to hear. However, in describing their experiences it was obvious that some of the interviewees had encountered racism, but they did not always ‘name their experiences as racism’ (Islam, 2000: 40 [emphasis in original]). On the other hand, some of the subjects were only too aware of how their experiences were intersected by racism.

During the course of my fieldwork, there were times when people ‘felt comfortable making […] racist statements […] because it was assumed that I
would share these views’ (ibid, 2000: 47), or at least understand them because we shared the same ethnic identity. However, I had to make it clear that I did not agree with such statements. Although my actions might have had the effect of making my subjects modify their behaviour, I did not think it would be wise to compromise my ideological position. I had to consider that if I did not make a stance by challenging racist expressions, then my inertia was actually condoning racism.

Although the power of researchers in the production of knowledge cannot be overlooked, it must also be recognised that the research process also provides opportunities for respondents to use it to promote their own agenda. Interviewees may use the situation as a forum to project an image of how they see themselves, which is not necessarily how others might see them. Therefore, the combination of observation and audio-visual recordings reinforced the research’s validity. This is because ‘standard ethnographic practice presumes that observations will […] permit ready validation of speech’ (Khan and Jerolmack, 2013: 17). However, subjects may distort validity by presenting an image that is inaccurate and driven by unrelated interests. This might happen when the interviewee is aware of the impact that communicating their image in a certain way, and for a particular audience, can have.
Interviews can be a form of ‘social signalling’ (ibid, 2013: 17) for respondents, in which the researcher has to consider how knowledge is constructed and contested as they toggle ‘between speech and everyday behaviour’ (ibid, 2013: 17). Goffman (1959: 3) refers to this process of social interaction as inference. This is when actors perform a conscious form of sign activity in which they give off signals that feign expectations. In the context of an interview this can occur when the subjects see themselves as having a social status that warrants particularistic behaviour. This process of inference can highlight discontinuities with previous actions, observations and knowledge gained from relevant Others. Thus, it is important to recognise that ‘disengagement in the interviewing process is not [...] a realistic possibility, but a process that is constructed after the event’ (May, 2001: 134). Open questioning – to unpack meaning and dispel inaccuracies – assisted by audio-visual recording equipment are valuable tools in this process. As noted above, their combined use can be deployed to carefully analyse inconsistencies after the interaction has taken place. The use of technological tools in my eversion ethnography, alongside the examination of HESA and Census data, enabled me to address the question:

- How are the education and labour market experiences of African Caribbeans in Birmingham mediated by their gender and ethnicity?
Eversion and agency in the Black community

African Caribbean community organisations have contributed to legislative changes in the public domain, where life-changing goods are obtained via competition in various markets (Sivanandan, 1981; Fryer, 1984; Ratcliffe, 2004; Gillborn, 2005; Andrews, 2013). Therefore, I wanted to understand the barriers they have encountered in recent years, in their efforts to provide support for those whose interests they represent. It was necessary to see the world through the eyes of various Black community leaders to assess the impact that contemporary changes in legislation have had on their agency.

Without first-hand knowledge, it is difficult to understand the external and internal factors that might constrain or enable the operational capacities of organisations. This form of knowledge can only be brought to the surface by observation, asking questions and engaging in dialogues. However, it must also be acknowledged that legislation, policy and practices do not always constrain social agency as human action – or more precisely, inaction – can also be contributory factors. This is why observing the relationship between efficacy and operational capacity, is an appropriate method of ascertaining the barriers and drivers of community action.
The African Caribbean Self-Help Organisation (ACSHO) is a politically focused African Caribbean community group. Its agency has featured in the analyses of previous researchers (Rex and Tomlinson, 1979; Ratcliffe, 1981; 2004) who have never met any members of the organisation\textsuperscript{95}. My shared ethnic identity and community affiliations facilitated access to ACSHO. I was able to participate in their meetings and take part in the events they organised on behalf of the African Caribbean community\textsuperscript{96}. I was granted permission to interview and record ACSHO’s leader, Bini Brown, on the condition that I:

‘Tell it like it is’ (Bini Brown, 20\textsuperscript{th} August 2013, Birmingham).

This meant not using pseudonyms when referring to the organisation and providing a valid account of their struggles against racism and discrimination. My \textit{eversion} technique allowed me to provide a first-hand, inside-out account of the impact that legislative change has had on the agency of a prominent African Caribbean organisation.

\textsuperscript{95} See Footnote 91.
\textsuperscript{96} The weekly meetings of ACSHO were held each Tuesday evening and chaired by their leader Bini Brown. They started at 7 p.m. and ended at 10 p.m. ACSHO organised various national and community events. Some of them, such as African Liberation Day, were held annually. I helped out in a small way at the African Liberation Day events by handing out tickets, leaflets and covering the duties of ACSHO members, when they took breaks. I also attended other meetings of various community groups. Some of them were organised by the community’s Black Churches and affiliated organisations. For example, Excell 3 (see below) held seminars in the community to generate support for their application for a Free School. In addition, I often attended the bi-monthly meetings of UBL [United in Building Legacy] a multi-function community action group. The organisation has several constituent bodies that specialises in providing Black Caribbeans with support in specific areas i.e. educational, legal, youth and religious work. Religion was used as a force for social change. Bishop Joe Aldridge of UBL organised meetings of the various religious groups in the community to discuss ways of working together to benefit African Caribbeans generally.
Over the years that I attended ACSHO’s weekly meetings I witnessed the barriers they faced trying to provide social assistance for the African Caribbean community. Bini involved me in some of the African Liberation Day (ALD) events the group organises on an annual basis, and after a while some of the organisation’s members forgot the primary purpose of my presence, which created a personal moral dilemma. By failing to remind them of my academic outsider status my actions could be interpreted as deceit. However, knowing that I was highlighting barriers and inequalities in the Black community, which would have otherwise been invisible, soothed my conscience. Although I often felt as if I was betraying those who trusted me, I was also aware that as an academic I was able to empower them and give their agency a voice.

It should not be overlooked that ‘research is a two-way process’ in which the researcher must not see ‘people in the [...] process as simply sources of data’ (May, 2001: 21). Thus, I offered ACSHO something in turn for my acceptance. I helped out at their community functions, and wrote letters on their behalf when requested97. Thus, I was able to witness first-hand how ACSHO differed from other African Caribbean community organisations. I was also able to understand how they perceived other Black organisations, how they perceived themselves and how others perceived them.

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97 See Appendix v.
There are a variety of different groups that utilise an array of networks to support the needs of Birmingham’s African Caribbean community. United in Building Legacy (UBL)\textsuperscript{98} is one of them. The Chair of the organisation is GK, who was a former member of ACSHO. Birmingham City Council employs him in a prominent administrative position; he is also a senior member of the Caribbean community’s Council of Black Led Churches. Like ACSHO, UBL also has a political focus. However, unlike ACSHO their focal concerns revolve around the social progression of Black Britons, rather than Pan-African ideology. That is not to say they are not concerned with Pan-Africanism, only that it is not their primary concern. UBL is segmented into sub-divisions to facilitate their agency. The sub-groups focus on supporting specific needs of the Black community, in legal, educational and other relevant contexts.

Rosemary Campbell-Stephens is an educationalist and leader of the education sub-division of UBL. She, like the Chair of the organisation, is also a former member of ACSHO. I met Rosemary during one of the educational seminars that she organised on behalf of her organisation. When we met, she was gathering community support for an application to open the first African Caribbean Free School in Birmingham. Free Schools come under the remit of the 2010 Academies Act (AA2010) and are effectively schools that are free from local education authority (LEA) control.

\textsuperscript{98} See Footnote 96.
I was impressed by the hard work and sheer determination Rosemary invested in her effort to set up a Free School, and she subsequently became my gatekeeper. As a result, I was able to attend UBL’s meetings and assess how their efforts were progressing in relation to setting up a Free School. Although Rosemary was aware of my research, and that I was analysing the agency of UBL in relation to their aims, she did not share her knowledge with the other members. Rosemary was not attempting to deceive her colleagues; she genuinely trusted my intentions and believed that my research was useful to the Caribbean community and necessary in terms of documenting the struggles they encountered. If my presence at a UBL meeting were ever challenged, I was prepared to divulge my research and its aims. However, the situation never arose. Rosemary gave me permission to interview her, and to use her name in my research. She considered her work for the community to be of vital importance and encouraged its documentation.

I also utilised my inside status and contacts in the community to attend the meetings of another African Caribbean group called Excell 3. One of their former members, Dr Tony Talburt, is a friend of mine, and it was he who told me about Excell 3’s bid for a Free School. Excell 3 is a faith based African Caribbean community group that focuses on the education and spiritual needs

99 See Footnote 96.
of the community. The organisation is led by an African Caribbean female, Dr Cheron Byfield, who I was introduced to by Tony. Excell 3 and UBL pooled their organisational resources in an effort to obtain State funding to set up a Free School. I was subsequently invited to Excell3’s Free School meetings, regarding the progress of their application, by both Cheron and Rosemary. Cheron granted me permission to video record their community meeting, which was held at the New Testament Church of God (NTCG) and to use her name and details of her organisation in my research.

Derek Webley is Bishop of the NTCG in Lozells. Bishop Webley is the former Chair of the Independent Police Complaint Commission and a prominent member of the African Caribbean community. The Council of Black Led Churches is a very powerful organisation in the African Caribbean community and its leaders are highly respected. Bishop Webley has featured in local and national News and current affairs programmes. He has been courted by the media, in his role as a community leader and also in his former position working alongside West Midlands Police. I have known Bishop Webley since we were teenagers in the African Caribbean community and I know Bishop Jackson through my mother-in-law, who is a member of the NTCG. It is my insider knowledge of the NTCG that allowed me to obtain interviews with them. Both bishops allowed me to refer to them by name in my research, and Bishop Webley gave his permission to film our dialogue. I asked him about the political
and social barriers obstructing the agency of the Church and what are the main issues confronting the African Caribbean community today.

As higher education qualifications are *Goods*, and factors of social mobility (Bourdieu, 2010 [1984]), I also needed an informed perspective from outside of the African Caribbean community, to assess the impact that contemporary educational policies have had on reducing ethnic inequalities. I obtained the views of Professor David Gillborn, the Director of the Centre for Research in Race and Education (CRRE), based at the University of Birmingham. Professor Gillborn is also acknowledged as one of the UK’s leading researchers of ethnic inequalities in education. I interviewed him in his office at the University and recorded his views on the impact that legislative changes have had on African Caribbean educational attainment.

The aim of the various qualitative methods used to gather data in the African Caribbean community was to answer the following question:

- What impact have changes in legislation, policies and practices had on the operational capacity and agency of Black Caribbean community and religious organisations in Birmingham?

The interview conducted with Professor David Gillborn, the narratives of various African Caribbean subjects and the use of quantitative data, are analysed against social and political changes to address the question:
• To what extent does legislation enable or constrain African Caribbean social mobility in the context of competitive market situations?

Summary

The quantitative methods used in this research enabled me to examine African Caribbean progress in the educational and labour markets. They also allowed me to map changes in their spatial positions, and compare them against those of their White British and MWBC counterparts. Variations in the educational attainment, labour and housing market positions of Black Caribbeans in Birmingham, were examined alongside changes in equality legislation, policies and practices. The aim of this approach was to explore if changes in the equality agenda have constrained or enabled African Caribbean social mobility.

The qualitative methods outlined above were employed to generate primary data of the barriers community groups and educationalists faced in their day-to-day struggles against racial inequality, and their efforts to support the Caribbean community. The methods also enabled me to understand how legislative change impacted on the agency of organisations fighting for equity, and the factors that influence the contemporary social status of Birmingham’s Caribbean population.
4. From the politics of collectivism to free market individualism

The role played by African Caribbean organisations in the development of community supplementary educational programmes has been outlined earlier\textsuperscript{100} and extensively documented elsewhere (Rex and Tomlinson, 1979; Andrews, 2013). However, it is important to understand if Black organisations are still capable of effectively securing education, and other resources crucial to achieving upward social mobility, for their supporters. This is especially as the free market politics of neo-liberalism\textsuperscript{101} now undermines the collective action of organisations in favour of the kind of agency that is informed by free market individualism. Where the examination of Black agency in this chapter is concerned, neo-liberal ‘individualism, presented as personal freedom, not only undermines a sense of solidarity [...] but militates against any sort of collective action or social movement. In exchange, neo-liberalism offers [...] a make-good private enterprise (Sivanandan, 2013: 7). This chapter will:

- assess the contemporary operational capabilities of Black Caribbean community organisations;

\textsuperscript{100} See Chapter Two.
\textsuperscript{101} As noted in Chapter One, neo-liberalism supports the reduction of the State, particularly the rolling back of its powers to mediate equality in the public domain by implementing social policies. The tenets of neo-liberalism encourage ‘the abolition of regulations that interfered with the free play of the market’ (Sivanandan, 2013: 2). In a neo-liberal society individuals are granted the autonomy to ‘sink or swim by his/her own efforts, irrespective of whether they were stranded on the shores of unemployment, disability, old age or just poverty’ (ibid, 2013: 2).
• identify some of the legislative barriers African Caribbean organisation face in their efforts to obtain educational resources and labour market assistance for their supporters;
• establish how social and political changes influence community action, inaction, opportunities and disadvantages;
• examine how effectively Black organisations mobilise and the relationship between their self-sufficiency and agency.

Although African Caribbean organisations lack formal power, they operate in the urban community space that Shukra et al (2004: 33) refer to as the ‘transitional sphere’ of informal political participation, also known as ‘the alternative public sphere’ (emphases in original). It is within the urban landscape of the transitional community sphere that Black organisations have been able to mobilise, ‘inform, direct and respond to developments’ (ibid, 2004: 33), which have in turn empowered their supporters and influenced social change (Sivanandan, 1982; Andrews, 2013). The contemporary operational capacities of the New Testament Church of God, ACSHO, ACFAS, UBL, Excell 3 and – to a small extent – ACFAS and Kajan are examined in this chapter. The aim is to establish how effectively these organisations navigate the transitional sphere, to secure educational resources and labour market assistance for African Caribbeans.
The New Testament Church of God (NTCG)

The NTCG is a member of the body of UK Christian institutions known as the Council of Black Led Churches, which consists of a number of Protestant Christian churches, of various denominations. The leadership, and the majority of the congregations, are of Caribbean and African heritage. Bishop Derek Webley is the leader of the NTCG in Lozells. He is a 53-year-old African Caribbean, who is married with four children and lives a few miles away from his church. There are two local branches of the NTCG: the larger branch is situated in Lozells and there is a smaller church a short distance away in Hockley. The Hockley church is known as The Rock and it is led by Bishop Jonathan Jackson. He is a 45-year-old African Caribbean, who lives in the Sandwell area with his wife and their two children. I know both Bishops personally. Bishop Webley, like myself, grew up in Handsworth. My mother-in-law is also a senior member of the congregation of Bishop Jackson’s church in Hockley.

Although the majority of the NTCG’s congregation is Black, there are also a few White members of both genders who attend the weekly Sunday services. Approximately 75-80 per cent of the church’s members are females. Despite its
patriarchal structure\textsuperscript{102}, Bishop Webley acknowledges that female members play a very important role in the church’s operations:

‘The women are far more energetic, vibrant and drive the church’ (Bishop Webley, 23\textsuperscript{rd} April 2013, Birmingham).

Most of the NTCG’s congregation is aged between 25-55 and its membership includes a substantial number of elders. The majority of its members are married and live within a 10-mile radius of the church, in the Handsworth, Handsworth Wood, Perry Barr and Great Barr areas.

The activities of the Black Churches are well known in the African Caribbean community. At different stages in their lives, most of the research participants had some involvement with one of the local Black Churches. However, only a few claim to be religious and just one of the seven research subjects from ACFAS\textsuperscript{103} was dismissive of the work carried out by the church. The majority of the participants were familiar with the NTCG, in either Lozells or Hockley. The Lozells branch tends to be better known, due to its size and its historical relationship with the elderly members of Handsworth’s West Indian community.

\textsuperscript{102} The NTCG is governed by the Canon Law of the Anglican General Synod, which at the time did not allow females to become Bishops. The Synod changed Canon Law on November 17\textsuperscript{th} 2014 and as a result female Bishops can now be ordained.

\textsuperscript{103} See Chapter Three
The NTCG: Social policy and financial autonomy

The Lozells branch of the NTCG is situated on the corner of Lozells Road and George Street, near to the boundary between Handsworth and Lozells. The church is an imposing building, which has recently undergone a major refurbishment. The frontage now incorporates a substantial modern extension, which compliments the original Victorian structure. There are two entrances: the original Victorian access on George Street and the new entrance on Lozells Road. The weekly Sunday services are very popular and well attended by both young and older members of the African Caribbean community. The tithes (individual contributions) collected from members, and those attending services each week, help the church to generate its own finances. The recent renovation has also increased the seating capacity of the Lozells NTCG, to the extent where it can comfortably accommodate several hundred people on two seating levels.

In recent times the church has presided over more funerals than weddings. The Lozells NTCG is the main church of choice for Black funerals in North-West Birmingham. Funerals also generate finances for the church. There is a children’s nursery adjacent to the George Street side of the church, which belongs to the NTCG. The nursery was built during the church’s renovation. Although African Caribbean females are its main consumers, the nursery is
operated as an independent business and is also used by non-members. The nursery indirectly assists African Caribbean parents to access the labour and educational markets, by providing a childcare facility for their children during the working week. Some of the funds acquired by the nursery contribute towards the activities and running costs of the church. Therefore, the policy of Childcare Tax Credits subsidises the NTCG’s nursery service and indirectly assists the church to maintain its financial autonomy.

The power and agency of the NTCG

The NTCG’s agency is not compromised by fear of sanctions from external sponsors. Financial independence allows the NTCG to act autonomously where the interests of the church and the Black community are concerned. Thus, the church can be both proactive and reactive as the need arises; it is able to respond ad hoc to unforeseen situations without the need for prior consultation with other organisations. In many ways, the church’s relationship with death prepares it for this worldly action. Bereavement is often unpredictable, as death is the most unforeseen, unplanned and disruptive of

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104 At the time of writing nursery places are funded by the Government’s policy of Tax Credits. They enable single parents who are working 16 or more hours to claim a maximum of £122.50 a week, to cover childcare fees for one child; parents with two children can apply for up to £210 (Gov.UK, 2014). Discretionary Learner Support Grants for childcare are also available to parents over the age of 20 – and studying on a full-time programme at a further education college (ibid, 2014). Unemployed parents can also obtain some form of childcare assistance. Tax Credits fund 570 hours of free childcare per year for children between the ages of 3 and 4 (ibid, 2014).
life’s events. Therefore, the church always expects to contend with unexpected circumstances.

The shooting of Mark Duggan, by London’s Metropolitan Police in 2011, was the catalyst for a series of disturbances\textsuperscript{105} in many of Britain’s cities, which the national media labelled “race” riots (Independent, 2011). When the civil unrest spread to Birmingham the Lozells NTCG became a focal point for Black Caribbean mobilisation. Meetings were held at the Lozells church as the disturbances in the city developed. The NTCG organised street marches in which the Caribbean community politicised their plea for an end to the disturbances. Local TV and radio stations covered the street protests, which were led by Bishop Derek Webley\textsuperscript{106} (ibid, 2011).

I attended a community meeting organised at short notice that took place at The Rock in Hockley, on the Saturday following a night of major unrest in the city during August 2011 (NTCG, 2011a; b; c). The meeting was in response to concerns in the African Caribbean community they were being blamed for the

\textsuperscript{105} I am conscious that some sociologists might use the term riots, to describe the actions I refer to as civil unrest or disturbances. By labeling collective urban disturbances as riots, there is a danger that sociologists can inadvertently depoliticise the actions of those who are involved in such events. Moreover, the underlying social causes of the actions of individuals are also overlooked.

\textsuperscript{106} Bishop Webley is well known to the media. He was a member of the West Midlands Police Authority (WMPA) for thirteen years before being elected as its Chairman. However, his position was abolished in November 2012 and subsequently replaced by the new office of Police and Crime Commissioner for the West Midlands. Although Bishop Webley was one of a number of candidates who contested for the new office, his campaign was unsuccessful. The late Bob Jones was elected as the first Crime Commissioner. However, he died in July 2014.
disturbances\textsuperscript{107}, by certain sections of the national and local media. The community meeting was organised by Mandesa Gordon. She is a female African Caribbean journalist who at the time was working as a presenter for BBC Radio WM in Birmingham. Although Mandesa arranged the meeting quite quickly, a significant number of African Caribbeans attended. The 600 seats on the lower level of the church were full, as were the aisles and corridors. Dr Robert Beckford, an African Caribbean academic who at the time was attached to the University of Warwick, chaired the meeting. The panel consisted of a mixture of young and elderly local community activists, the Labour politician Yvonne Mosquito, Professor Gus John and Bishop Derek Webley\textsuperscript{108}. Although the meeting was organised by a BBC journalist, and invitations were extended to the mainstream local and national media, they were conspicuous by their absence. The media’s disinterest indicated that the community’s mobilisation, in response to their concerns about media demonisation, was not considered

\textsuperscript{107} The media initially attempted to present the disturbances as ‘race riots’, and blame Black Caribbeans for the criminal element. Bias newspaper and TV coverage painted a picture of pathological Blacks stealing from hardworking Asian businesses. The media’s lies and exaggeration culminated in reports indicating that an African Caribbean male was driving the car, which tragically killed three young Asian men in the Winson Green area. However, it was later established that the driver was a local White youth. He was charged with murder, but later acquitted. In contrast to the media coverage of Black males as perpetrators and aggressors, little attention was paid to their status as victims. The night prior to the Winson Green incident, an African Caribbean driver was beaten unconscious by Sikh vigilantes outside of the Guru Nanak Gurdwara Sikh Temple on Smethwick High Street. The victim was dragged out of his vehicle and assaulted with a variety of weapons. Although the incident was covered on television and reported in the local newspapers, no one was arrested. Local TV crews also recorded masked and armed Asian gangs, roaming the city’s streets during the disturbances. Although their actions were illegal the assailants were portrayed as Asian businessmen, defending their properties from Caribbean attacks. For a discussion on the racist nature of the media’s coverage of the unrest, see Wadsworth (2012).

\textsuperscript{108} Both Dr Robert Beckford and Professor Gus John have very high profiles in the academic community. They have published a range of literature documenting issues specific to the black community. Robert Beckford has also starred in a succession of programmes for Channel 4. Gus John’s (1970) analysis of Handsworth featured in the later work of Rex and Tomlinson (1979). The meeting at The Rock was filmed and excerpts were uploaded to YouTube (NTCG, 2011 a; b; c).
to be of any significant news-value (Wadsworth, 2012). Apparently, a peaceful gathering between different sections of the African Caribbean community did not conform to the more popular news stories being circulated at the time of Black criminality and gun violence (McCarthy, 2014).

The meeting itself provided substantive evidence of how quickly the church could mobilise the Black community in response to a perceived crisis. The gathering at The Rock also demonstrated that any member of the Black community could utilise the church as a resource – regardless of the way in which they perceived religion. I found out about the meeting via a text message, others had received emails and the majority of those who attended heard about it by word-of-mouth. Although the lines of communication were effective in gathering and galvanising support, the lack of media attention meant that the actions of the community had no wider political impact outside of the transitional sphere. Therefore, it was difficult to assess exactly how the Caribbean community benefitted from the meeting at The Rock. Mandesa and Robert gathered the email addresses of many of those who participated in the meeting, including myself. However, like everyone else, I did not receive any further communication. I asked Bishop Jackson what actions had resulted following the meeting at The Rock and exactly what had been achieved. He told me that the role of the NTCG in mobilising the Caribbean community during the disturbances had been noticed by David Cameron. Not long after
the meeting he had been contacted by the Government through Derek Bailey\textsuperscript{109} and invited to 10 Downing Street to form part of a Government think tank\textsuperscript{110}. The rationale was to utilise the informal power of the church in the transitional sphere, to reduce the potential for further national unrest.

An initial meeting at 10 Downing Street was quickly followed by two more. However, momentum waned and political support was subsequently retracted as it became clear that the nation had returned to its normative State of calm. I asked Bishop Jackson if any actions had surfaced as a consequence of the meeting at The Rock, which enabled the African Caribbean community to address the problem of media scapegoating. He told me:

‘People just weren’t interested when they saw there was no money to be made. It was a case of “what’s the hustle”? When they saw there wasn’t one, they soon lost interest’ (Bishop Jackson, 10th October 2013, Birmingham).

\textsuperscript{109} Dr Derek Bailey is an African Caribbean who also grew up in the Handsworth area. The local media generally seek his views on crime and the Black community, whenever African Caribbeans are the focus of the media’s gaze. In 2007 the former Home Secretary, John Reid, gathered together members of the UK’s Black communities to address the national problem of escalating gun crime (Metro, 2007). Bailey was selected to represent the West Midlands area. He was provided with a formal position, which made him appear to have valuable insider knowledge on local gangs and gun crimes. However, the gangs that he is supposed to have expert knowledge of do not know him.

\textsuperscript{110} The Cinnamon Network, a Christian charity, and the Lighthouse Project were also part of the think tank. The idea was to form a partnership with the Council of Black Led Churches, aimed at reducing the risk of further unrest and conflict between communities.
Bishop Jackson’s comment would appear to imply that an element of individualism exists within the Black community. However, this should not be interpreted as meaning that the level of self-interest in the Black community exceeds that of other ethnic groups. Individualism is not specific to any group; it effects all communities, particularly those who are most afflicted by material deprivation. Bishop Jackson views racism as the root cause of hardship and generational poverty, and a major concern for African Caribbeans. He told me that material deprivation nurtures a sense of immediacy in the Black community. In the eyes of the poor time is often viewed as an unaffordable commodity. Consequently, actions are not perceived as beneficial unless they are achieved in the short-term and can be translated into material gain. Bishop Jackson’s analysis to some extent explained why African Caribbeans – whose lived-experiences are defined by poverty – might prioritise actions that could acquire material Goods immediately, over agency that might achieve long-term gains.

**Politics in the mainstream sphere and the NTCG**

The Black Churches, more than perhaps any other African Caribbean community organisations, have been able to skilfully negotiate the political terrain between the transitional sphere and the mainstream political sphere (Shukra et al., 2004). Perhaps the most famous international example is that of Martin Luther King, who engaged with the politics of US society without ever
holding a public office. Certain sections of the African Caribbean community are distrustful of the police. Therefore, it came as no surprise that some were suspicious of Bishop Webley’s role within the Police Authority. I spoke to a supporter of the Michael Powell Campaign\textsuperscript{111}, who told me that Bishop Webley did little to promote the interests of the African Caribbean community when their concerns conflicted with those of the police. He explained that although Bishop Webley had appeared on television several times to support Asian concerns regarding the police erecting surveillance cameras in the South Birmingham area\textsuperscript{112}, he did very little to highlight the Black community’s concerns regarding Mikey Powell’s death in police custody.

After his unsuccessful campaign to become the city’s first Crime Commissioner, Bishop Webley is no longer involved in local politics and told me that he no longer has any political aspirations. He regards the Ministry and the fight for social justice as his major concerns. Although \textit{saving souls} is the primary business of the church, Bishop Webley suggested that some of the younger members of the Black community might be beyond redemption.

\textsuperscript{111} Mikey Powell was a childhood friend from Handsworth. He died in the custody of West Midlands Police in 2003 (see Palmer, 2009). At the time of his arrest he was suffering with mental health problems. His mother called for the police to assist her in restraining him because his behaviour was erratic. However, during his arrest the police assaulted him and then ran over him with their car; Mikey died a few minutes later whilst in police custody. It is an issue of grave concern for his family, and the wider Caribbean community, that no police officer was charged or even disciplined as a result of Mikey’s death.

\textsuperscript{112} See Ferguson, (2010).
'I think they have lost their moral compass to a large degree. I’m not even certain if some of them have moral compasses anymore. If they do, then it’s set at such a low level that it just doesn’t kick in. I think the acceptance by some that they can pull a gun and shoot another person [...] is unacceptable' (Bishop Webley, 23rd April 2013, Birmingham).

Despite acknowledging that some young gang members lack moral regulation, Bishop Webley utilised their backing during his campaign for the Office of Police and Crime Commissioner (Brady, 2011). Nevertheless, appropriating support from all sections of the community is precisely what politicians do when the need arises. Moreover, politics is about power and in the context of political action, votes can be viewed as Goods. It should also be acknowledged that Bishop Webley’s campaign facilitated the political participation of groups lacking formal power and labelled as hard-to-reach. Therefore, regardless of those who might be suspicious of his relationship with the police, his engagement with disaffected and socially excluded sections of the Black community might be viewed in the future as the catalyst that influenced a new generation of Black political agency.

At times the tensions between Bishop Webley’s social identities (Goffman, 1963) as Christian, Police Authority Chair and Black community leader, were evident during our interview. He acknowledged the view of those who thought
his Police Authority role was incompatible with being a representative of the African Caribbean community. However, Bishop Webley balanced public opinion alongside the church’s belief of peaceful integration and providing spiritual guidance without prejudice. He argued that Jesus also believed in change through political action. Therefore, it is understandable that Bishop Webley would be concerned with effecting change through the politics of the transitional sphere, and promoting the interests of all communities. He viewed his role as Chair of the Police Authority as representing the wider interests of all ethnic groups:

‘When I was Chair of the West Midlands Police Authority I was representing the community of the West Midlands, the public, the citizens of the West Midlands. I was not representing the African community, the Caribbean community. I was there for the West Midlands as a whole’ (Bishop Webley, 23rd April 2013, Birmingham).

Although all humanity is equal in the eyes of God, social disadvantage is distributed disproportionately in this world. African Caribbeans incur greater levels of poverty, discrimination, and exclusionary practices in market situations than most ethnic groups (Berthoud, 1999; Clark and Drinkwater, 2007; Dorling, 2009; Garner and Bhattacharyya, 2011; Tackey, Barnes and Khabhaita 2011).

Although Bishop Webley acknowledges that the Black community has concerns and challenges that are specific to its members, the inclusive ideology of the church may be counterproductive to their predicament. The NTCG, like other
Black Churches, has a majority Black congregation. However, its leaders do not necessarily speak purposefully of the disadvantages their supporters experience. This is especially when the material situation of African Caribbeans is compared to those of other ethnic groups.

**Education and the NTCG**

The NTCG at The Rock began free Saturday School sessions in the aftermath of the Birmingham disturbances. Although the lessons take place at both churches, the Saturday School programme at the Lozells Road church was established a few years earlier. The Saturday Schools are aimed at secondary school pupils who are preparing for their GCSEs. There are teachers in the NTCG’s congregation who volunteer to support the church’s philanthropic aims. Despite being open to everyone, the majority of pupils who use the church as an educational resource are from the African Caribbean community.

Bishop Jackson believes that education has the power to increase life-chances and reduce the risk of future poverty. He and Bishop Webley adopt a Weberian Protestant Ethic approach\textsuperscript{113} to social progress. They see material success as the end reward of a culmination of moral regulation, self-determination and

\textsuperscript{113}Rex and Moore (1967: 182) also noted the emphasis West Indians placed on material acquisition, through spiritual development, self-determination and hard work. Nevertheless, they significantly underplayed the church’s influence on Black political agency.
protracted effort. In a similar way to the US Civil Rights Movement, Both Bishops believe that spiritual inner strength is necessary to obtain moral guidance and success in the *earthly world*. They view racism as a sin, but also understand that all sins can be overcome by a combination of prayer, self-belief, faith in the power of God and social action. However, an *earthly obstacle* to the educational agency of the church is the SafeGuarding Vulnerable Adults and Children Act 2006 (ISA, 2014), which stipulates that the Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) should vet everyone undertaking regulated activities with children. According to the legislation, education is a regulated activity. Thus, the church has to complete the necessary registration process and submit the required fees, to ensure that everyone who have contact with children have DBS clearance. This places a financial constraint on the educational agency of the church, because of the time and cost involved in vetting potential teachers who wish to support their Saturday School programme.

Bishop Webley told me of his concerns that some members, who may have committed minor criminal offences, when they were much younger, would be automatically barred from assisting the church to perform regulated activities. Bishop Jackson has managed to overcome this problem by only using members who are also teachers, as their DBS clearance is renewed every three years by their State employers. Bishop Webley acknowledges that the contemporary church is not exempt from the legislative framework within which all registered
companies have to operate. As well as DBS regulations, the church also has to comply with financial legislation applicable to the management of charities, health and safety legislation and public compliance orders in relation to the use of its buildings.

One of the major strengths of the NTCG is its power to appropriate its human capital in the transitional sphere. Many of the church’s members work in the professions and have senior positions in NGOs, mainstream educational establishments, employment agencies and the city’s local authority. The members organise weekly surgeries where African Caribbeans are signposted to agencies that are relevant to their educational, employment or housing needs. Short courses in, health and safety, first aid, business ethics and business start-up programmes, are delivered by the church’s professional members. The NTCG also has several social outreach programmes, which includes refuge for female victims of domestic abuse. There are also different Ministries within the church. There is a Youth Ministry, which is led by its younger members, and Women, Children and Men’s Ministries. However, the church does not directly provide educational qualifications, housing or employment Goods. The NTCG’s nursery is the only direct contribution the church makes towards facilitating the labour market participation of African Caribbean parents.
The African Caribbean Self-Help Organisation (ACSHO)

ACSHO is probably the oldest active African Caribbean community group in Birmingham. It was founded on August 1st 1964 in Leonard Road, Handsworth. The organisation has a Pan-African agenda, which is concerned with the liberty and self-determination of the Black “race”. ACSHO acknowledges the existence of “races” as a biological reality. Its members consider the idea of racial groups to be of more significance than contemporary notions of ethnicity. Where the NTCG is inclusive, and seeks to embrace all within the sacred canopy of religion, ACSHO is exclusive and is only concerned with supporting the needs and interests of African heritage people. The group’s political ideology, where ideas of “race” are concerned, is quite similar to elements of the Black Panther movement and the Nation of Islam in the 1960s and 1970s.

The organisation’s headquarters is in Heathfield Road, Handsworth, a few hundred metres from the Lozells branch of the NTCG. The local Caribbean community refers to ACSHO’s headquarters as 104, after its address: 104 Heathfield Road. There are three properties on the 104 Heathfield Road plot, all of which belong to the organisation. One of the houses is a listed building and a former residence of the local industrialist James Watt. The three Georgian and Victorian buildings are nestled between a primary school and a row of 1950s semi-detached houses. The building used by ACSHO’s as its

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114 ACSHO makes no distinction between Africans born in the continent and Blacks of African heritage born in the diaspora.
headquarters is highly distinctive and was formerly a Victorian mansion. It is set back from the main road and has a spacious drive in front of it. The perimeter walls have been built in a style that is reminiscent of ancient Egyptian architecture. High wrought iron gates, and iron railings mounted between pyramidal pillars, protect the driveway and entrance to the building.

Although Christianity has been practiced in Africa since at least the fourth century A.D. (Brooks, 1995), ACSHO view it as a European religion. A number of the members I have met practice African Spiritualism. Unlike the NTCG, ACSHO is not concerned with integration or building bridges between communities. Their mission is to liberate African minds from negative European influences. As a Pan-African organisation, the agency of ACSHO transcends the local concerns of the Caribbean community. They locate the discriminatory experiences of African Caribbeans in Birmingham within the wider context of a global struggle against racism and White oppression.

ACSHO does not provide information to the public regarding its membership, the gender of its members, or any details concerning its organisational structure. I was told that this was because the organisation has been constantly scrutinised by the British Security Services since the 1970s. I am unable to refute or confirm that claim. Although a current member of the
organisation is a lawyer, ACSHO does not appear to have as many professional and NGO members as the NTCG. There is a hardcore membership of individuals who are mainly over fifty and have been in the organisation since its heydays in the 1970s and 1980s.

When I interviewed the research participants that I met through ACFAS, only one of the female subjects actually knew anything about ACSHO. Although she had no direct dealings with the organisation, she lived quite close to ACSHO’s headquarters and walked past it on a daily basis. Bini Brown is the leader of ACSHO. When I interviewed him he was 66 years old. Bini was born in St Andrews, Jamaica and came to Britain aged 11 in 1959. He is a father, grandfather and lives with his partner near the organisation’s base in Heathfield Road.

**Legislation and financial autonomy**

One of the ways in which ACSHO generates its income is by renting different parts of its buildings to Black groups and businesses, some of which are female organisations. There is also a motor vehicle repair shop that is based on the premises, which uses a large part of the car park. A space in the main building is also rented to a group of African Spiritualists. However, the rent accrued

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115 See Chapter Three.
from external organisations is not enough to cover the full cost needed to repair the ageing buildings. Unlike the newly renovated NTCG in nearby Lozells, the headquarters of ACSHO has not undergone any major refurbishment for several years. The main building has attractive Victorian features, including Milton tiled and parquet flooring, and high ceilings finished with period cornices. However, its upkeep has steadily declined over the years and it currently requires major restoration. Whilst the NTCG has obtained a large mortgage from a mainstream bank, ACSHO has been unable to secure grants from British Heritage or the National Lottery to repair its listed building. Bini Brown believes it is because ACSHO is viewed as a subversive organisation. That might indeed be the case. However, ACSHO’s financial predicament might be a consequence of its inability to provide evidence of due diligence and the way that the organisation is perceived by potential sponsors.

Since 2001, the political agenda of successive governments have been concerned with community cohesion and reducing disparities between social groups that can lead to parallel lives (Cantle, 2002: 1). In addition, the 7/7 London bombings have increased the political emphasis on promoting community cohesion, as a means of reducing the danger of religious extremism. Consequently, organisations with an agenda that is specific to a single ethnic group can be viewed as being in opposition to the principles of community

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116 According to KPMG (2012: 1) ‘due diligence is the process used to assess the appropriateness of potential or intended recipients of a grant [...] to protect charities when making grants or other payments to third parties’.
cohesion. As ACSHO refuses to compromise its Pan-African interests, potential sponsors might view their political ideology as a form of extremism. This is especially as the core principles of community cohesion are ‘tolerance; respect for differences and inter-group co-operation’ (ibid, 2002: 13), which are not necessarily the focus of ACSHO’s concerns.

Perhaps the main source of ACSHO’s revenue is the annual African Liberation Day (ALD) celebration, which the group organises. Between 2010 and 2014 I volunteered to help the organisation with its ALD events. People come from all over the country to support them. In 2012 ALD was held at a Birmingham City Council owned venue in Camp Lane, Handsworth. Despite utilising the Camp Lane venue for a number of years, the Council informed the organisation that it would no longer be able to use it after 2012. ACSHO subsequently obtained the use of other venues in Aston and Handsworth to deliver ALD. The organisation rent spaces for Black entrepreneurs to set up their stalls at the ALD events. A variety of culturally themed products are sold: from literature to ornaments and clothing. Most of the stall holders appeared to be Rastafarians or Pan-Africanists. Although there were a few younger people who attended the event, the average age of most of the participants would probably have been about forty. The majority of young people attending ALD appeared to be the children of stallholders, rather than independent supporters. Nevertheless, ACSHO do have certain speakers at their events who are capable of attracting

117 For a detailed account of the Government’s reductionist view of community cohesion and its disregard of the underlying causes of social inequality, see Ratcliffe (2012).
and engaging with a younger audience\textsuperscript{118}. In addition to ALD, ACSHO host a number of Pan-African events throughout the year, including Kwanzaa\textsuperscript{119}, which attract speakers from Africa and America. They also have a shop based at the organisation’s headquarters, which sells a range of organic products and African Caribbean foods.

During the 1970s and early 1980s, the organisation was able to financially sustain itself from income generated by using the basement of their Heathfield Road premises as a club. However, it is no longer functioning. Loss of income from the closure of the club, has reduced the operational capabilities of ACSHO and has had a detrimental impact on its self-sufficient status.

‘The club, like other clubs and pubs in the community, became problematic because the youths used to smoke ganja, fight and stuff like that, outside of the premises. The youths started to rob people out there in the streets at gunpoint. Police kept coming in the place and the clientele just disappeared’ (Bini Brown, 20\textsuperscript{th} August 2013, Birmingham).

\textsuperscript{118} Dr Amon Rashidi was one of the overseas speakers who attended ALD in 2012. He is an African American rapper, teacher and philosopher, who was formerly a gang member and now hosts a US radio station. Rashidi gives lectures and organises seminars about the dangers of involvement with guns, drugs and gangs. He is an example of the range of international academics and activists who headline ALD events. Asher Kwesi, the Nile Valley Historian, is also a popular speaker, along with former ZANU, ANC and MPLA freedom fighters.

\textsuperscript{119} A Pan-African cultural and family holiday, similar to Christmas, which is celebrated each year between December 26\textsuperscript{th} and January 1\textsuperscript{st}, see Karenga (2008).
Heathfield Road is near to the Handsworth/Aston boundary, which has been the subject of territorial disputes between the Burger Bar Gang of Handsworth and the Johnson Crew of Aston. The central location of the club, in the heart of the transitional sphere (Shukra et al, 2004), formerly attracted regular customers. However, the community is not what it once was. The police and Birmingham City Council are reluctant to grant licenses to sell alcohol to establishments in areas with high levels of criminality. ACSHO’s location in a part of the community that is at the centre of local gang rivalry makes it highly unlikely that they would ever be granted such a license. Thus, the risk of crime, and high levels of social deprivation in the locality, now contribute to the financial instability of the organisation.

**Education and ACSHO**

The concern of African Caribbean parents, that their children were *unlearning*\(^{120}\) because of racist practices in Birmingham’s education sector, influenced ACSHO to set up what was arguably the country’s first Saturday School programme in 1967\(^{121}\). Their agency was to some extent enabled by the 1968 Report of the Kerner Commission (Rex and Tomlinson, 1979, Ratcliffe, 1981; Ratcliffe, 2004). Although the Report overlooked the failings of the education system where Black children were concerned, it recommended that

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\(^{120}\) See the narrative of Subject B in Chapter Five.

\(^{121}\) See Andrews (2013)
they should be engaged during the school summer holiday (Rex and Tomlinson, 1979: 187). During the 1970s, Birmingham City Council consented to ACSHO and Harambee using Grove Lane and Heathfield Road schools in Handsworth to host their Summer School programme. The schools were successful and over-subscribed and the syllabus aimed to engage Black children with aspects of their history, which were omitted or reduced in the ethnocentric State curriculum.

Bini Brown contends that it was only after James Hunte’s intervention in 1982, that Birmingham City Council provided ACSHO with a grant to support the delivery of the Saturday School programme. However, in real terms, the grant was equivalent to two pence for every child who attended. If it were not for West Indian parental support, the work of the Saturday and Summer Schools would not have been possible. My parents paid for my brother and I to attend the Summer Schools, which were run like their mainstream counterparts, with structured lessons, a timetable, break times, dinner times and a school trip at the end of the programme. However, the ways in which we were taught were significantly different to State education. Blacks, as active rather than passive

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122 The recommendations were not a benign attempt to redress an identified imbalance in the State education of Black children, but rather a means of reducing the potential risk of social disorder during the long hot summers of the 1970s. Thus, the Report’s recommendations reified the assimilationist notion of cultural deficiency (see Chapters Two and Five of this thesis), as it implied that Black children were potentially troublesome.
125 James Hunte used to live on Leonard Road in Handsworth and died in Barbados in 2012. He was the Independent candidate for the Ladywood constituency and also the father of my sister-in-law. He is pictured on the cover of Rex and Tomlinson’s (1979) work. For further details on his political career, see the Birmingham Post (2012).
agents, were made visible in the Summer School curriculum. Black history was not just reduced to ideas of slavery and the *glorious* Empire\textsuperscript{126}. The lessons conveyed the rich history of the African continent before the human degradation of Trans-Atlantic Slavery\textsuperscript{127}. It enabled us to understand how reductionist State education was in regard to the teaching of history, literature, the Arts and geography. The Summer School programme ended in the 1980s. it is a testament to the teachers and pupils that there were never any serious disciplinary issues\textsuperscript{128}.

ACSHO, like the NTCG, has also been adept at appropriating its human capital as a resource in the transitional sphere. For several years ACSHO utilised the services of the local community to assist with the delivery of its Summer and Saturday Schools. Andrews (2013: 100) reveals that he was allowed to teach on ACSHO’s supplementary education programme, after turning up and asking if he could help. However, as highlighted above in the case of the NTCG, contemporary safeguarding policies specify that adults who come into contact with children for regulated activities must now have DBS clearance. Therefore, the organisation is no longer able to legally utilise volunteers in the African Caribbean community as it used to. Health and safety legislation also creates additional legal problems regarding the operation of Saturday Schools.

Although ACSHO still has a learning environment, under current legislative

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{126} See Andrews (2013).
\textsuperscript{127} See Chapter Two.
\textsuperscript{128} This is in contrast to the systematic exclusion of Black children in State schools, see Chapter Five.
\end{flushright}
requirements it is not fit for purpose because of the repair and renovation work needed to the property. This highlights how safeguarding, and also health and safety policies, constrain the agency of ACSHO. The inability to deliver their educational programmes effectively denies the organisation a vital source of revenue.

Like Bishops Webley and Jackson, Bini Brown is equally concerned with the lack of moral regulation amongst some of the younger members of the African Caribbean community. He is also frustrated with the contemporary shift in the mindset of the Black community. This is in terms of a shift from collective action, towards what he sees as nihilism and individualism:

‘The first generation that was born here didn’t listen to their parents and now some of the present generation are doing the same. Some of these people in the community who say, “the youths need help”, don’t really understand that some of them are just plain criminals. They work with the system to oppress their own people. When you can gun down your own people over money, you have a sick mind. You don’t have the facility of capable thinking. Education is the only hope we have of turning around that kind of sick mentality’ (Bini Brown, 20th August 2013, Birmingham).
Bini’s statement above suggests that although West Indian immigrants valorised education\textsuperscript{129}, the educational discrimination experienced by their British born children have narrowed opportunities and widened the social exclusion of the present generation. It is within the context of marginality that criminality might appear to be an option for a few individuals.

\textbf{Reaching the community}

In the 1960s, 1970s and the early 1980s ACSHO was more used to the community reaching out to them, rather than the other way around. This is demonstrated in the example of supplementary education above, when the group acted in response to the concerns of Black parents (Andrews, 2013). Their historical agency has always been based on the knowledge that the organisation occupies a prominent position within the community, and its door is always open to supporters. However, religion has much more of a mass appeal than Pan-African politics, which is one of the reasons that the church is able to attract a much wider audience. The NTCG uses social networks and websites to inform, mobilise and attract new members, whereas ACSHO are to some extent distrustful of most forms of modern social media. Even where they do use contemporary technology, ACSHO’s equipment, and human capital, are often unreliable:

\textsuperscript{129} \textit{See Chapters Two and Five.}
‘We have an Internet radio station called Bantu Radio, but it keeps crashing because the presenters come and go. People say that they are fed up of working with old computers, but we have to keep patching them up because we haven’t got the money to buy new ones’ (Bini Brown, 20th August 2013, Birmingham)

In years gone by ACSHO reached its supporters by way of literature sold at various venues. Its activities were documented in the organisation’s PA (Pan-African), Jomo and Harambee magazines. They also had a newspaper called The African. Insufficient funding now constrains their capability to produce new literature. Nevertheless, ACSHO acknowledges how important it is to utilise the Internet effectively to reach their supporters in the community.

I have witnessed a number of people attending ACSHO’s weekly meetings, who require support for a variety of ad hoc issues and projects. However, they have been mainly for individual concerns that are unconnected to education, employment or housing. For example, West Indian pensioners from the Merry Hill Allotment Association enlisted ACSHO’s support to petition against Birmingham City Council hiking the rent of the Black Patch allotments. Another example is that of a local political activist, who sought ACSHO’s assistance to bolster his election bid for the Office of Police and Crime.

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130 Black Patch is an area that straddles the Winson Green, Smethwick and Handsworth wards, see Chapter Seven.
Commissioner,\textsuperscript{131} Some of ACSHO’s members also have properties in Africa. The organisation’s meetings are sometimes used as a forum for visiting Africans, who wish to raise awareness of opportunities to purchase property, land and resources on the continent. From time to time, different female organisations also attend the meetings to generate support for various projects. One such organisation comprises of Rastafarian females (some of whom have PhDs), who have bought small diamond mines in Africa and actively encourage members of the African Caribbean community to invest in their project.

During 2011’s summer of unrest, various groups and individuals visited ACSHO, hoping the organisation would take a lead in voicing their concerns regarding the negative portrayal of the African Caribbean community by the media\textsuperscript{132}. I listened to Bini as he spoke to a group of females and tried to articulate the disturbances, and the actions of the media, within the wider context of global

\textsuperscript{131} This office was unsuccessfully contested by Bishop Derek Webley.
\textsuperscript{132} I noticed that the female groups who visited ACSHO were more militant and forthright than their male counterparts. A number of groups were concerned that the media were martyring three Asian youths, who were tragically killed in the Winson Green area during the height of the disturbances, whilst the Caribbean community was being demonised. It seemed common knowledge in the African Caribbean community that at least two out of the three Asians who died were also involved in drug dealing. I spoke to two African Caribbean males who visited ACSHO during this period. They were social workers who at some stage had been appointed to mentor two of the young Asian men following their conviction for drug offences. The mentors came to ACSHO to voice their concerns that the media were overlooking the drug convictions of their former mentees. A local female journalist also visited ACSHO and brought a visual recording of the disturbances in Birmingham City Centre. I watched the film in which she spoke to several masked men with foreign accents, who were playing an active role in looting and destroying property. They Stated that their actions were retribution for British military intervention in their respective Middle East nations. Although the recording was provided to the local media, they completely ignored it and instead preferred to blame the Caribbean community for the unrest.
racism. Needless to say, the females were not impressed. In contrast to ACSHO’s inaction the NTCG busied itself by mobilising support for street protests, which caught the attention of the media\textsuperscript{133}. I understand that ACSHO’s agency is mainly concerned with liberating the minds of its supporters from racism in the here and now. However, their brand of global Pan-Africanism can give the impression that the organisation is out of sync with its supporters’ local and immediate interests, particularly in a time of crisis.

Although the views of ACSHO are as uncompromising as ever, its present operational capacity has to some extent been curtailed by the absence of a proactive and energetic younger generation. This is in contrast to the NTCG. I attended meetings at The Rock, during the same period when groups and individuals were visiting ACSHO expecting the organisation to take a lead supporting the immediate interests of the community. Several young members of the NTCG were present at The Rock. Despite their youth they confidently articulated how proud they were to be members of their church. They also expressed their discord at being portrayed as gangsters by the media, when in reality they were hardworking young pupils, college and university students.

Bini recognises how crucial it is for the continuity of ACSHO that the organisation engages the younger generation in the politics of the transitional sphere. However, unlike the NTCG’s Youth Ministry, ACSHO does not have a

\textsuperscript{133} See earlier on in this chapter.
specific programme concerned with nurturing young African Caribbeans so that the organisation is able to effectively develop.

UBL, Excell 3, ACFAS and Kajan: Funding and autonomy

Community cohesion policies have gained increasing significance, particularly with the potential risks incurred by terrorism and rising religious fundamentalism. However, the focus has shifted from New Labour’s education strategies, aimed at integrating communities (Cantle, 2002), to those promoting British values to prevent radicalisation (HM Government, 2011; DfE, 2014). Nevertheless, both political ideologies have specific implications where the funding needs of African Caribbean organisations are concerned. Those whose aims are concerned with ‘perceptions of British foreign policy, racism, discrimination, inequalities’ and inadequate opportunities for social mobility, are considered vulnerable to radicalisation (HM Government, 2011: 27). This is especially if those groups appear to reject the values of mainstream society (ibid, 2011). As the Pan-African concerns of ACSHO might appear to fall within the Prevent remit of Government they will consequently be denied funding, as financial assistance might be viewed as a means of increasing their ability to radicalise others.

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134 See the Coalition Government’s Prevent Strategy (HM Government, 2011 [emphasis in original]).
135 In this context, mainstream society could be interpreted as a euphemism for White society.
Where the aims of integration are concerned, the Government supports local strategic partnerships (LSPs) that do not prioritise the needs of a single group, but instead ‘consider plans and funding applications specifically to address community cohesion in their area’ (Cantle, 2002: 28). This is one of the ways in which the neo-liberal agenda fragments collective interests in favour of individualism (Sivanandan, 2013). Paradoxically, Black organisations that publicly oppose Pan-African ideology might be eligible to apply for some of the millions of pounds available, to fight radicalisation in the transitional sphere (HM Government, 2011). Therefore, modifying mono-ethnic ambitions, in favour of an integrationist-inclusive approach, might increases the chances of success when Black organisations compete for funding. Adjusting how the interests and aspirations of organisations are presented in particular contexts, is sometimes necessary. However, it can be viewed as a form of “minstrelization”, whereby the stigmatised [...] ingratiatingly acts out before normals [...] the [...] bad qualities imputed to his [sic] kind’ (Goffman, 1963: 110 [emphasis added]) to achieve their intended aims. Minstrelization is, in other words, a Faustian compromise that stems from the realisation that perception and presentation are key elements when organisations compete for sponsorship. *Playing the integration game* to gain an advantage in the market, by appearing to demonstrate that perceived bad qualities have been identified and corrected, is to a little extent examined below.
The leader of United in Building Legacy (UBL) is an African Caribbean Christian, who I shall hereafter refer to as GK\textsuperscript{137}. UBL use offices within a building that is located in Handsworth and owned by the City Council. From the meetings I attended it appears that the majority of UBL’s membership is male. However, the most charismatic member of UBL is a female named Rosemary Campbell-Stephens\textsuperscript{138}, who grew up on a road adjacent to where my family lived in Handsworth. Rosemary is head of UBL’s educational division and was previously a headmistress, OFSTED Inspector and school governor. During the period my fieldwork was conducted she was a self-employed Leadership Consultant. Rosemary describes UBL as a political/social advocacy group. Their role is to bring together Black organisations for specific purposes, beneficial to the African Caribbean community.

None of the research participants from ACFAS had ever heard of UBL, which is perhaps not surprising. Most of the work that Rosemary undertakes for UBL involves networking, rather than direct action in the transitional sphere. She moves in academic and political circles and is a confidant of the MP Diane Abbott. However, she is also very close to her roots in the Black community. One of Rosemary’s greatest skills is her ability to negotiate the space between the transitional sphere and the mainstream political arena.

\textsuperscript{137} See Chapter Three. 
\textsuperscript{138} Ibid.
I mentioned earlier that I was formally introduced to Rosemary during the time she was mobilising support in the community for a Free School application\textsuperscript{139}, which is a process that is ultimately decided by Government. Free Schools are effectively Academies. They were initially the idea of New Labour (Gillard, 2007), but have increased in prominence since the Coalition Government passed the Academies Act 2010 (AA2010) (UKPGA, 2010). The 1988 Education Reform Act (ERA) introduced free market principles into the education sector\textsuperscript{140}, which provided parents and pupils with more choice, and subsequently led to the creation of the AA2010. Some suggest Free Schools are a waste of taxpayers’ money and contribute to increasing class inequalities between children (Gilbert, 2012), whilst others argue that private sector sponsored education encourages selection by stealth (Gillard, 2007; Gillborn, 2013).

Unlike Academies – which are public/private partnerships (Gillard, 2007) – Free Schools encourage private sector intervention, as non-government organisations (NGOs) and various interest groups can apply to open a Free School. Although they are funded by the State, Free Schools are to a great extent exempt from local education authority control. They are able to set their own curriculum and entry criteria without government interference. Rosemary understood that the AA2010 provided an opportunity for Caribbean parents to empower themselves to overcome educational inequalities in State

\textsuperscript{139} ibid.
\textsuperscript{140} See Chapter Five.
schools. The Free School policy could be used to embed Black Studies\textsuperscript{141}, and anti-racism education into the mainstream curriculum. It was also a means to rectify the failings of State education, where the learning of Black children was concerned. Although it might be possible to appropriate the AA2010 to empower African Caribbeans, according to Professor David Gillborn the legislation can also entrench racism:

‘Black kids did worse in academies than they did in similar State schools. That raises a set of questions about what happens in academies that depresses the achievement of Black kids. The Government’s own assessment of academies, which is one of their flagship educational programmes, suggests that academies are actually bad news for Black students. Yet the policy has been rolled out nationally with absolutely no safeguards in place to make sure that the situation gets better. That [the Academies programme] is a perfect example of how racism operates in education policy without any clear conscious racist intent’ (Professor David Gillborn, 19\textsuperscript{th} June 2013, Birmingham).

Although Free Schools and Academies fall under the AA2010, Gillborn suggests that academisation will provide no benefits for Black students. However, the relative autonomy that Free Schools have regarding setting their curriculum, is the aspect of empowerment that Rosemary was seeking to appropriate.

\textsuperscript{141} See Rex and Tomlinson (1979).
Rosemary initially intended to apply for a Free School working with just UBL as the sole applicant. However, she subsequently decided it was more prudent to support Excell 3’s application. This was because a joint bid, which pooled the skills and resources of the Black community, would stand a greater chance of being successful. In the build-up to their second Free School application, Dr Cheron Byfield, the leader of Excell 3, held a meeting at the NTCG where she presented her plans for her organisation’s *King Solomon International Business School* (KSIBS). She introduced a White neuroscientist, named Dr Roy Paget, who outlined what he referred to as a *scientific* method that he had pioneered to raise the attainment of children studying Maths. I was told that Dr Paget was not involved in Excell 3’s initial application, but his services had subsequently been enlisted. It appeared as if the initial aspiration of opening a school, which focussed on raising the educational attainment of Black children, was being overlooked in favour of a more inclusive approach. I know that some

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142 Excell 3 is a Christian based educational organisation led by Dr Cheron Byfield, a female African Caribbean academic. Their Christian sponsors are, like the NTCG, members of the Council of Black Led Churches. The organisation is based in a building they own, which is located at the Scot Arms Junction of Perry Barr and Great Barr. The work of the organisation was first brought to my attention by Dr Tony Talburt, who is a friend of mine. He was a member of Excell 3 when they submitted their first bid for a Free School and he also worked with Excell 3’s education consultancy company: Black Boys Can. However, it was Rosemary who introduced me to Cheron. She allowed me to attend Excell 3’s meetings where they went over the administrative details of their bids, and those organised at the NTCG in Lozells to generate parental support. The meetings at the NTCG was extremely well-attended. They demonstrated how much the community supported Excell 3’s endeavours and also provided evidence of the extent to which African Caribbeans valued education, but was disaffected with their children’s chances of success under the present State system. Although Excell 3 submitted three Free School applications – the first of which was in 2010 – only the final King Solomon Business School bid in 2013 was successful. In each subsequent application, they were forced to scale down their plans and the cohort size. They initially planned for a school supporting children between the ages of 5-19, which would also have a nursery provision. However, the successful application is for a school of a very moderate size, which will only have 200 pupils. As noted above, Rosemary agreed to support their application in favour of the one UBL was intending to submit. At the time, Excell 3 was modifying their rejected second application to take into account feedback received from the Department for Education.
members of Excell 3, particularly those involved in Black Boys Can\textsuperscript{143}, are highly proficient in Maths. I am also aware of several Black teachers in the community who teach Maths in State schools. Therefore, the introduction of Dr Paget appeared to support an alternative agenda.

In the context of the neo-liberal educational market, Whiteness can be seen as cultural capital in terms of acceptance and respectability. This is because the presence of Whiteness can signify ‘shared expectations of behaviour on the part of minority groups, a belief that one is part of a tradition [...] that will produce intended outcomes in particular situations’ (Garner, 2007: 59). This understanding of Whiteness in market situations tends to suggest that the credibility of Black organisations is considerably enhanced if Whites are involved in their operations. Therefore, Whiteness can denote power, eligibility and the right to distribute \textit{Goods} without question in the context of competing for State funding.

Whilst interviewing some of the research participants at ACFAS I noticed that their Maths teacher and Admin Assistant were both White. I asked ACFAS’ Project Manager (PM) if their employment was a conscious attempt to procure White sponsors and enhance the credibility of the organisation to outsiders.

She told me that the organisation’s Maths tutor was a former PhD student at

\textsuperscript{143} Black Boys Can (BBC) is a partner organisation of Excell 3, which focuses on raising the attainment of Black boys studying in State education.
Oxford University, who had a nervous breakdown in his final year. In addition, the Admin Assistant was the only candidate interviewed who was proficient in the skills required for her post:

‘Where am I going to find an ex-Oxford University student and someone with [name of Admin Assistant] experience, who are willing to work for what we are paying them? We interviewed Black, White and Asian candidates: whoever met the person specs. A lot of Black people apply for jobs where they are the best candidates, but fail to get it simply because of the colour of their skin. [names of Maths tutor and Admin Assistant] were the best candidates we interviewed, and that’s why they’re here’ (ACFAS PM, 10th May 2014, Birmingham).

The PM’s justification for employing ACFAS’ White staff is an excellent example of equal opportunities in practice. However, as she noted above, Blacks who are equally qualified as Whites often encounter racial discrimination in the labour market.\(^{144}\) Employing a minimum number of Black workers can be a means by which White organisations comply with legislative requirements.\(^{145}\) However, employing Black workers does not necessarily provide Black organisations with the level of credibility derived from having White employees. This is particularly the case when Black organisations are

\(^{144}\) See Chapter Six for data regarding this statement.
\(^{145}\) This is often the case with Race Relations legislation, see Ratcliffe (2004).
competing in a very competitive market, which is argued above in the case of Excell 3.

In March 2014 Excell 3 held a meeting at Carrs Lane Methodist Church in the City Centre, to thank the Black community for supporting its successful third Free School application bid. Information was also provided to the community regarding the timeline for the opening of the new school. Dr Paget no longer appeared to be part of Excell 3’s plans. However, Cheron did introduce a number of White academics and business people, who were now involved with the administration and curriculum delivery of the KSIBS. This may not necessarily be a good thing. If White professionals are involved in decision-making at an operational level, but are not prepared to prioritise Black interests, the direction taken by the school might be in conflict with the aims and aspirations of the parents who supported the project. Consequently, there could be a risk that the education of Black children becomes secondary to individual career interests, market concerns and Government targets. This demonstrates the problem of financial dependency in the neo-liberal educational market, and how Whiteness is a signifier of symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 2010 [1984]). Although Excell 3 tried to utilise the AA2010 to support Black Caribbean interests, the organisation’s application was refused
State funding until its plans for the KSIBS conformed to the perceived norms of so-called *British values*\(^\text{146}\).

Whilst working with Excell 3, Rosemary was also involved with Kajan’s\(^\text{147}\) successful Studio School\(^\text{148}\) bid. Kajan school received £2.5m from the Government to set up their catering Studio School. However, unlike KSIBS, they had very few White sponsors. In April 2014, the school was served with a closure notice just a year after opening. The Government withdrew the school’s funding because it had not reached its enrolment target, as ‘fewer than 75 people had registered to study [...] from September’ of 2014 (BBC News 2014). The difference between success, with White support and failure where

\(^{146}\) The idea of so-called *British values* comes under the 2002 Education Act’s spiritual, moral, social and cultural development of children (DfE, 2014). The notion is now appropriated by Government to underpin notions of Whiteness and White supremacy in the educational market, whilst Othering the culture of minority ethnic groups. Excell 3 had two applications for a Free School refused before the third was accepted. However, each application became increasingly focused on White interests and less concerned with the educational attainment of Black children. Ideas of racial inequality in education, and the need for Black teachers to deliver a curriculum that did not discriminate against African Caribbean pupils, were slowly eroded. What emerged in its place was a more market-led approach to education, which involved White business professionals rather than Black academics. Although Excell 3 is affiliated with the Black Churches, the Government only approved the organisation’s application after a number of concessions. A major compromise was that the KSIBS had to be incorporated into the Christian Woodhouse Schools, which is a White-led religious organisation. This suggests that Excell 3’s vision of Free School conflicted with the Government’s idea of *British values*, which appears to promote a ‘normalised and taken for granted’ (Gillborn, 2005: 486) notion of White supremacy whilst overlooking the perpetuity of racial inequality.

\(^{147}\) Kajan is an African Caribbean vocational educational organisation, which specialises in training local students to work in the catering industry. They were based in Witton Road in Aston at the time of writing.

\(^{148}\) Studio Schools also come under the AA2010 and were launched in September 2010. They are similar to Free Schools, as they are also funded directly by the Government and to a great extent are free from local education authority control. They are aimed at the 14-19 cohort and ‘address the growing gap between the skills and knowledge that young people require to succeed, and those that the current education system provides’ (Studio Schools Trust, 2011). Their main focus is the development of work-based vocational skills demanded by local businesses.
it appears to be invisible, demonstrates how difficult it is for Black community educational organisations to prioritise the needs of their supporters in the contemporary educational market. It also reveals how the market can steer the direction of the agency of Black organisations. This is especially if they have to rely on State funding or support from private sponsors, that do not share the interests of their supporters in the transitional sphere.

ACFAS closed in September 2014 because it was no longer able to acquire funding. The organisation fell victim to the problem of match funding, which constrains the agency of not-for-profit organisations that operate on the same basis as charities (Cantle, 2002: Para. 5.5.3: 39). ACFAS was originally set up to address the specific educational disadvantage encountered by members of the Black Caribbean community. However, like Excell 3, ACFAS also had to make compromises to obtain sponsorship. It was previously declined funding for several projects, because its remit was too specific to the needs of one community. As a consequence, ACFAS had to modify its educational aims and provide an inclusive educational provision for all communities to access. Although ACFAS adapted the way in which it presented its interests regarding the Caribbean community, the organisation’s inability to financially sustain itself was the cause of its eventual demise.

The political ideology of community cohesion overlooks the impact that
structural inequality has on persisting disadvantages (BRAP, 2004). No consideration is given to the impact of racial discrimination, and class inequalities, in which Black and minority ethnic (BME) ‘communities experience a more pronounced deprivation’ (ibid, 2004: 8). The fate of ACFAS highlights the problem of grassroots interventions, which can only be funded if they support the aims of community cohesion. Although the material needs of African Caribbeans are specific to their ethnic group, they have to be shared by other communities in order to receive State or private sector investment. What is also problematic for African Caribbeans is that the level of poverty they generally experience makes it difficult for them to self-fund projects that could empower them.

Conclusion

The organisations featured in this chapter do not provide their supporters with housing or direct employment. Their contribution to African Caribbean social mobility is assessed by the capacity they have to obtain educational Goods and provide labour market assistance. The issue of funding is of major concern to all the Black organisations I have engaged with during this research. Financial capital is the common and dominant theme constraining their agency and organisational capacity. Although there has been an African Caribbean presence in Birmingham and the UK for over sixty years (Sivanandan, 1981;
Fryer, 1984), it seems that few Black organisations have financial autonomy.

Bini Brown told me:

‘There were 27 groups in this community, all of which were funded by the State and grant aid. They couldn’t put up political posters in their office or make political statements. ACSHO was never in that position. Even if you gave us a grant, like Saturday School, you can’t tell us what to teach. If you want to tell us what statements to make, then keep your damn money’ (Bini Brown, 20th August 2013, Birmingham).

Self-sufficiency has to be the ultimate aim of any organisation. However, increasingly more Black organisations will share the same fate as ACFAS and Kajan unless they develop the capacity to generate their own finances. Excell 3 is due to open their Free School in 2016. However, it remains to be seen if they have compromised the interests of their community in order to secure Government funding. Although the targets set by Government might constrain their immediate agency, Excell 3 must develop strategies in the future to generate income to free KSIBS from the yoke of State funding and private sector interests. Although UBL continues to play an important role in bringing together Black organisations and championing specific causes, it relies on the City Council for premises. As such, UBL would find it difficult to challenge the
Council, if its agenda conflicted with the needs and interests of the Black Caribbean community\textsuperscript{149}.

Out of the organisations I have observed during this research, those associated with the Council of Black Led Churches appear more adept at appropriating the transitional sphere as a resource to engage with the free-market. However, The NTCG is far from perfect. Its inclusive ideology is problematic in terms of addressing the specific disadvantages faced by its supporters in the Black Caribbean community. ACSHO is more capable of articulating the specific needs of African Caribbeans. However, ACSHO has not developed new strategies, to address the persistence of racial disadvantage, in the contemporary market sites of struggle. The church’s message of religious love and unity, tends to overlook that the needs of the Black community are specific

\textsuperscript{149} In 2012 I attended a meeting at UBL’s base, the Grassroots Centre, which is situated on the corner of Soho Road and Thornhill Road in Handsworth. The meeting was organised by GK, who had invited along various religious and political Black organisations, as well as local Black politicians. He used the meeting as a platform to argue that the organisations in attendance should allow UBL to represent their collective interests, which would effectively mean that he would be recognised as the official leader of Birmingham’s Black community. Needless to say, his argument did not go down very well. In October 2014, I attended a meeting chaired by Councillor James McKay at the City’s Town Hall. The meeting was officially entitled “A Big Conversation with the African Caribbean Community”. Several representatives of the African Caribbean community, including GK, were present. It was supposed to be a dialogue of how best the Council could support the Caribbean community within the present climate of austerity and cuts in Council services. However, it was effectively a means of generating evidence that the Council was engaging with the city’s communities, under the Government’s community cohesion strategy (Cantle, 2002: Para. 2.16: 11). A number of those who attended were not pleased with the patronising and dismissive way in which Councillor McKay attempted to avoid the questions he was asked. However, what I found even more concerning was the silence of GK. It appears that he had a conflict of interest: he is employed by the City Council and he depends on them for the premises in which his organisation is based. This illustrates how the agency of Black organisations can be compromised if they are not financially independent. Although GK has ambitions to be recognised as the leader of the Black community, he is unable to represent their interests if they conflict with those of the City Council that provides his organisation with its premises.
and not necessarily valorised by all who profess to share the same faith. This is demonstrated above in the case of Excell 3 and its KSIBS. It remains to be seen if organisations such as ACSHO, which have not diluted their message of Black liberation, will be able to appropriate the free-market to serve the interests of its supporters. This inquiry now moves forward to assess the past-race experiences of African Caribbeans in Birmingham schools, against the higher education progress made by their contemporaries in a supposedly post-race society.
5. **Education, ideology and racial inequality**

This chapter examines the educational experiences of African Caribbeans alongside changes in education policies, practices and political ideologies. The aim of this approach is to establish the extent to which equality legislation in the education sector may have improved or inhibited the educational attainment of African Caribbeans. Access to higher education is a means of increasing one’s life-chances (Bourdieu, 2010 [1984]). Therefore, a further aim of this investigation is to determine if educational policies might have played a part in reducing the barrier of racial discrimination, which blocked opportunities and impeded the social mobility of the children of West Indian immigrants.

The experiences of the first generation of Black children to enter the British educational sector are the primary focus of this research. However, there is a dearth of data regarding their educational attainment. This is because the statutory duty to record ethnicity data is a relatively recent phenomenon (Macpherson, 1999; Ratcliffe, 2004). Therefore, data highlighting the contemporary educational situations of African Caribbeans are examined against the narratives of those who were first ‘schooled in Babylon’ (Carby, 1982: 183), to determine if their experiences of discrimination resonate with the present generation. This chapter will:
• analyse African Caribbean schooling under different phases of educational policies;

• identify some of the various disadvantages that have dissected the educational experiences of African Caribbeans in Birmingham;

• explore the narratives of African Caribbean subjects against sociological debates, educational policies, higher education (H.E.) and school exclusion data;

• highlight ‘disruptions and continuities’ (Islam, 2000: 39) between the lived experiences of African Caribbean subjects and the current situation of their contemporary peers in the educational market;

• examine differences in the age and rate at which African Caribbeans in Birmingham are accessing H.E.;

• assess the relationship between potential social mobility, age and ethnic participation in Russell group and other universities.

Many observers have noted the importance of education to social mobility (Rex and Tomlinson, 1979; Ratcliffe, 1981; 2004; Carby, 1982; Troyna, 1992; Mason, 2000; Shiner and Modood, 2002; Bourdieu, 2010 [1984]). The education sector should represent ‘a ladder, the successful scaling of which will permit pupils to enter the competition for employment and social rewards on equal terms’ (Mason, 2000: 68). However, academic success is not always ‘easy and typical’ (Weber, 1920 in Smith, 2007: 87) for everyone competing in the educational market. This has certainly been the case for Black Caribbeans. Their
educational experiences have been mediated by racism and the type of material deprivation that is often a consequence of their general working-class status.

The *past-race*\(^{150}\) educational experiences of African Caribbeans have been well-documented (Carby, 1982; Coard, 1971) and one would think that between the passing of the 1976 Race Relations Act (RRA1976) and the 2010 Equality Act (EA2010), legislation would have ameliorated discrimination in the education sector. This is especially as the current equality agenda seems to imply that racial inequalities are not significantly greater, than those of the eight other protected characteristics\(^{151}\). If that is indeed the case, and racism in the educational market is no longer a major barrier to African Caribbean social mobility, then 21\(^{st}\) century *post-race*\(^{152}\) equality policies may actually be playing a discernible role in reducing ethnic discrimination.

To establish if racism in education continues to constrain African Caribbean social mobility, it is important to recognise that the education system must be viewed as segments of a whole, rather than as separate tertiary entities (McCLean in Troyna 1984: 154). Although the transition from one educational age-stage to another can appear fragmented, it is a joined-up process that

\(^{150}\) See Chapter One for a brief discussion of the reality of *past-race* and the myth of *post-race*.


\(^{152}\) See Chapter One for a brief discussion of what I define as *post-race* legislation.
often determines labour market success. Thus, it is important to analyse the ubiquity of racial discrimination in each educational stage, and its impact on achieving academic Goods. What now follows is an examination of the past-race educational experiences of the research subjects. Their narratives are analysed against social, political and legislative changes, and also data relating to their contemporaries in the post-race educational market.

**Past-race experiences of assimilation**

During the mid-1960s the Labour Government produced a White Paper, viewed by some as ‘a “Little England policy” [...] in respect of immigration control’ (Solomos, 2003: 59). The report outlined the need to continue Commonwealth immigration, whilst integrating migrants through various assimilation policies\(^{153}\). As a consequence of policies supporting integration via assimilation many Black children were labelled educationally sub-normal (ESN) and transferred to *special schools*\(^{154}\), which were generally reserved for children with behavioural problems.

Coard (1971: 44) contends that in 1967 West Indian children made up 75% of the total population in UK ESN schools. This figure is also supported by DES data which reveals that in January 1971 ‘of the 5,500 immigrant children in

\(^{153}\) See Chapter Two for an outline of assimilation policies.

\(^{154}\) See Coard (1971) and also Carby (1982).
special schools, 70% were of West Indian origin’ (McKenley, 2001: 319). There can be little doubt of the devastating long-term effects of ESN practices. At the very least ESN Schools disrupted the education of Black Children and, at worst, destroyed their life chances and aspirations for a positive future. The practice of referring Black children to ESN schools limited their labour market opportunities, and consequently constrained their social mobility (Coard, 1971: 5).

Subject A is a fifty-five-year-old African Caribbean male, who lives with his wife in Erdington, Birmingham. He was born in Jamaica and came to live with his parents in Bradford during 1969, when he was ten. He first attended a mainstream State school, but after a few months he was referred to an ESN school by his teachers. As a result, he did not have the opportunity to obtain any educational qualifications and is currently employed as a security guard. He enjoys his job, but thinks he could have improved his current occupational position if he had received a normal State school education. Subject A refers to the ESN School as a boarding school\textsuperscript{155}. He told me that the majority of the pupils at the State school he attended were White. The entire teaching staff were also White.

\textsuperscript{155} There was a reluctance on the part of Subject A to refer to his former school as one for the educationally sub-normal. However, he is not deluding himself about the type of school that it actually was. The teachers who referred him described the ESN School to his parents as a boarding school. The embarrassment of not being educated in a “normal” school, and how the ESN School was sold to his parents, probably explains why he still refers to it as a boarding school.
Subject A’s teachers referred him to an ESN school following a playground fight. They met with his parents and used the incident to convince them that he was isolating himself from other pupils and having problems integrating\textsuperscript{156}. His parents signed the documents that sanctioned his referral, because they believed the teachers were acting in their son’s best interests. Within a few months of arriving in the UK, Subject A was removed from the safety and security of his family environment and placed in the care of the State. In hindsight, he realises his parents made a big mistake. However, he also concedes that the teachers deceived them, by making them think they were doing what was best for him. Each time his parents visited him at the ESN School they asked him if he wanted to come home. However, he consistently refused:

‘My parents always gave me the choice to come home. But when I went to the boarding school I made friends for the first time in this country. I told them that I liked the school because I had made some friends’ (Subject A, 10\textsuperscript{th} August 2013, Birmingham).

\textsuperscript{156} Coard (1971: 13-14) defines three forms of teacher biases, which influenced the ESN School referral of West Indian children: cultural bias; middle-class bias; and emotional-disturbance bias. Subjects A was a victim of all three. His status as a new immigrant would have made him susceptible to cultural bias. He would also have been subjected to the middle-class prejudice of his teachers. The shock of “sudden removal from the West Indies to a half-forgotten family and into an unknown and generally hostile environment” would also have emotionally disturbed him (ibid, 1971: 14).
Unfamiliarity with the culture of his new country increased the value Subject A placed on friendships. He thought that leaving the ESN school would also mean having to make new friends in another State school. He decided that staying at the school was a better option than having to endure the alienation he had experienced in mainstream State education. Looking back, he now understands how the ESN school constrained his life-chances. He told me that the teachers spent most of their time trying to control\textsuperscript{157} the other children. The ESN regime was designed to keep the kids active and physically engaged so they would be easier to manage. The curriculum revolved around sports, art and athletics, with no emphasis on academic development. The activities suggested that Black children would thrive in an environment in which \textit{real} learning was insignificant: a ‘basketball and steel bands approach’ (Fryer, 1984: 389) to education. No consideration was given to the impact that a non-academic curriculum would have on the future life-chances of the children and how it would limit their labour market opportunities.

Subject D recalled how racism intersected (Crenshaw, 1991) her school experiences in 1960s Britain. She is fifty-five years old and left Jamaica when she was seven. Subject D was diagnosed with dyslexia in 2013 and finished secondary education without obtaining any qualifications. She currently lives

\textsuperscript{157} \textit{Control} was used as a euphemism, meaning the teachers tried to stop the pupils from stealing, fighting and running away.
with her adopted daughter in the Smethwick area\textsuperscript{158}, not far from where she grew up. Subject D had difficulty adjusting to British culture, and remembers how her Jamaican accent\textsuperscript{159} and skin colour signified her Otherness. She has since lost all vestiges of her Caribbean patois and now speaks in a broad Black Country dialect. Subject D grew up in a very tight-knit family unit. She maintains that her kinship bonds protected her from racism, inside and outside of school. She and her siblings often fought with the local White children in the streets and school playground. The fights were almost always triggered by racist taunting.

Subject D’s West Indian culture, compounded with her undiagnosed dyslexia, contributed to racialised assumptions about her supposed \textit{backwardness}\textsuperscript{160} in school. However, such assumptions overlooked the impact of Empire on the Jamaican education system and how it contributed to the poverty of former slaves and their descendants\textsuperscript{161}. Black (1991) contends that one of the legacies of slavery in Jamaica was the lack of a standard education system on the island. It was not until 1973 that the Jamaican Government introduced a free education policy (ibid, 1991: 138). Subject D recalled her school experiences and feelings about England:

\textsuperscript{158} See Chapter Seven for an account of the politics of racism, immigration and housing in 1960s Smethwick.
\textsuperscript{159} See footnote 63 in Chapter Two.
\textsuperscript{160} See Carby (1982): Chapter Two.
\textsuperscript{161} See Black (1991) in Chapter Two.
‘England? I just didn’t like it! It was alien to me. I didn’t go to school when I was in Jamaica. My grandmother kept me and we lived in the country. When I came here I couldn’t spell my name; I didn’t know my A, B, C or anything’ (Subject D, 1st May 2014, Birmingham).

Although cultural differences were used to explain the poor educational attainment of Black children in the 1960s, the idea of West Indian culturally induced backwardness162, is reductionist. Subject D’s academic attainment was constrained by what was an unrecognised disability at the time, which was compounded by her late entry into the British educational system. Her family could not afford to educate her in Jamaica. Therefore, poverty was also a factor in her educational disadvantage.

Racism intersected the educational experiences of Subjects A and D. However, their narratives depart regarding the ways in which they dealt with racial discrimination. Subject A was oblivious to how wider structural racism was linked to the agency of his teachers and their individual prejudices. Moreover, his parents were also unaware that the teachers saw them as part of his perceived problem. Assimilation policies viewed West Indian culture, and its reproduction within the family structure, as pathological (Carby, 1982). Therefore, Subject A’s playground fight, lack of interaction with other pupils

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162 This was cited in the NFER Report (Carby, 1982) as an explanation of the comparatively low attainment of West Indian [sic] children. See Chapter Two.
and failure to integrate into the school culture, only served to confirm his teachers’ expectations of his supposed cultural *backwardness*.

Subject A wanted acceptance and to *fit into* the ESN school culture. However, to Subject D resisting racism – in the playground and on the streets – was about maintaining rather than *losing* her identity (Troyna, 1992: 67). She understood that racism connected her school to Britain’s alien culture. Contrary to Subject A, her family provided a canopy and stable environment that sheltered her from racism, which reinforced – rather than relinquished – her social identities, as both Black and Jamaican. Therefore, despite the assimilationist ideologies which constructed West Indian family structures as pathological (Parekh, 1992: 97), the kinship bonds of Subject D defended her against the alienation she experienced inside and outside of school.

In the 1960s and 1970s the politics of immigration increased public concern of the perceived problem of cultural differences between indigenous and minority ethnic children in English schools (McKenley, 2001: 314). Local Birmingham newspapers contributed to the moral panic\(^\text{163}\) by stating that 33 per cent of

\(^{163}\) The concept of a moral panic was first used by Stan Cohen (2002) [1972]) to explain how the media amplifies issues of public concern to reinforce social control. Moral panics create a deviance amplification spiral. For example, public concern regarding deviance leads to increasing media coverage of the issue in question. The political classes respond by tightening legislation in an effort to control the source of concern. The process then becomes cyclical: political reaction further amplifies public feelings regarding the threat of deviance, which leads to more media attention and increasing social control. Every moral panic has a folk devil [i.e. a group that becomes a scapegoat for the perceived social problem]. Labels are attached to the
minority ethnic children, in any given school, should be enough to trigger the dispersal policy\textsuperscript{164}. Between 1968 and 1974, Subject B attended a primary school in Handsworth. She is fifty-one-years old, dyslexic and a mother of four children. She left school without gaining any academic qualifications. Subject B attended a primary school in the 1960s that was the focus of local media concerns about immigration\textsuperscript{165}. Her primary school had a non-White cohort that was 80\% of its total pupil population\textsuperscript{166}. Therefore, according to national policy directives her school was deemed “ripe for dispersal”\textsuperscript{167}. Subject B recalled an incident involving a teacher and her sister at the primary school they attended:

‘A teacher told my elder sister, in front of the class, that she was dirty and that Black people did not know how to wash themselves’

(Subject B, 1\textsuperscript{st} May 2014, Birmingham).

Coard (1971: 18) acknowledges that the racial prejudice of ‘a teacher can seriously affect the performance of a child’. To some extent the assimilation ideologies of the time contributed to normalising the notion that other cultures were inferior and legitimated teacher racism. What the narratives of the

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{164} Birmingham City Council Library Services Archives.  
\textsuperscript{165} ibid.  
\textsuperscript{166} Birmingham City Council Library Services Archives.  
\textsuperscript{167} ibid (1966: 5).}
research subjects above demonstrate is that the racism of teachers could not be separated from the context of public opinion, and the issue of immigration that dominated the political and social landscapes of that time.

The educational policy of dispersing minority ethnic children was never implemented in the city of Birmingham\(^{168}\). However, to some extent the racist and discriminatory attitudes of Subject B’s teachers would have been reinforced at the time by the actions of neighbouring Sandwell LEA\(^ {169}\). Her statement below also provides an insight into why Subject A’s parents did not question the decision made by his teachers to refer him to an ESN School. It appears that some West Indian parents were ignorant of the racism their children were experiencing in State education:

‘They sent us to school and they expected the teachers to be teaching us. But were they? Our parents took it at face value that if they sent us to school we would learn. I think that because of the teachers some of the Black kids unlearned’ (Subject B, 1\(^{st}\) May 2014, Birmingham).

Britain was revered as the mother country in the British Caribbean (Fryer, 1984); it was packaged and sold to West Indians as the land of hope and

\(^{168}\) See Chapter Two.

\(^{169}\) West Bromwich Local Education Authority implemented the policy of bussing minority ethnic children (Troyna, 1992: 68). Although the south of West Bromwich borders Handsworth in northwest Birmingham, the region falls under the Borough of Sandwell.
dreams (Taylor, 1993). They valorised the British education system (Chamberlain, 1999: 255; Fryer, 1984: 374) and implicitly trusted teachers to teach without prejudice. Although Caribbean migrants had direct experience of racism in the housing and labour markets (Rex and Moore, 1967; Rex and Tomlinson, 1979; Ratcliffe, 1981; Sivanandan, 1981; Fryer, 1984; Taylor, 1993), they overlooked its existence in the education sector. Some Black parents naively believed that White teachers were unaffected by racism. They also failed to recognise how racial discrimination would constrain their children’s education and subsequent life-chances.

**Past-race experiences of multiculturalism and anti-racism**

Although multicultural education (MCE) policies should have been implemented in all British schools in the mid-1970s, they were only deployed in some local education authority areas that had a disproportionate representation of Black children. The idea behind these polices was to integrate, rather than assimilate, minority ethnic children into British society (Troyna, 1992). MCE strategies aimed to reduce ethnic disparities in educational attainment, and overcome discrimination, by allowing children to learn about and respect other cultures (ibid, 1992: 69). However, they did not directly address the problem of racism within the education sector. Whilst MCE appeared to celebrate cultural diversity, middle-class White teachers still expected Black children to fail. Therefore, MCE policies ignored ‘the influence
of social class on attitudes, beliefs and behaviour’ (Troyna and Carrington, 1990: 2). The ‘rotten apple theory of racism’ (Henriques, in Troyna and Carrington, 1990: 3) underpinned the delivery of MCE teaching. This is the idea that racism stems from individual prejudices, and is not embedded within structural and institutional processes and practices. Thus, celebrating cultural diversity by teaching children about ‘saris, samosas and steel bands’ (Troyna, 1992: 74), subtly reinforced rather than challenged the racism of previous assimilation policies.

MCE celebrated cultural diversity by emphasising the competence of Black children’s musical or athletic abilities, over their academic integrity. This was evident in the school experiences of Subject E, a dyslexic forty-nine-year-old male who lives alone in Handsworth Wood and also left school without any qualifications. His teachers’ idea of multicultural education meant focusing on what they assumed he was good at: i.e. sport and specifically boxing in his case. He won a boxing trophy during his first year at secondary school. His Headmaster asked him to bring it into school so that he could present it to him during the assembly:

‘By doing that he gave me a character reference in front of the whole school [it] made everyone fear me’ (Subject E, 16th October 2012, Birmingham.).
Although his teachers were unaware he was dyslexic, they realised he had serious difficulty reading, writing and spelling\textsuperscript{170} difficulties. However, they viewed his poor academic development as normative, whilst \textit{celebrating} his athletic capabilities. Despite Subject E’s learning difficulties, his Headmaster often took him out of lessons to show potential parents the school’s facilities. No consideration was given to the adverse impact that interrupting his education would have on his immediate attainment and future employment prospects. Although extra tuition may well have helped Subject E to develop cognitive strategies to cope with his dyslexia, his teachers assumed he was not \textit{naturally} academic.

Some White teachers make stereotypical assumptions about Black pupils, which are reinforced in their day-to-day practices and interactions with them (Green in Troyna, 1984: 157). In most instances, Black pupils were ‘generally seen as boisterous, aggressive, unable to concentrate for long periods and more interested in non-academic pursuits’ (ibid, 1984: 157), which was demonstrated with Subject E. Although MCE promoted cultural diversity as the solution to racism, teachers continued to assume that cultural differences \textit{explained the problem} of Black educational attainment. The MCE emphasis on sport and the arts, over \textit{real} education, was in many ways quite similar to the ESN school curriculum (Coard, 1971).

\textsuperscript{170} For a detailed analysis of dyslexia, as a cognitive condition, and its reading, writing and spelling symptoms, see Nosek (1997).
I have stated above that some Black parents were unaware of the consequences that racism in the educational sector would have on their children’s life-chances. However, it should also be noted that most had ‘a deep-rooted mistrust of the system’ (Troyna and Carrington, 1990: 38). To some extent their concerns about the disproportionately high number of Black children referred to ESN schools influenced the conception of the *Committee of Inquiry into the Education of Children from Ethnic Minority Groups* (ibid, 1990: 33). The Committee’s specific focus was the educational and attainment needs of minority ethnic children, and especially those of West Indian parentage. Although the Committee’s 1981 Rampton Interim Report\(^1\) acknowledged the problem of institutional and individual racism in the education sector, its 1985 Swann successor nevertheless reified the notion of cultural differences to explain ethnic disparities in educational attainment.

The Swann Report (1985) suggested that the comparatively low rates of educational attainment amongst West Indian children could be explained by their tendency to protest, whereas South Asians kept ‘their heads down’ (DES, 1985 in Troyna and Carrington 1990: 47). Anti-racist education (ARE) was adopted by equality proponents, who were unhappy with the cultural deficit

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\(^1\) The Rampton Report ‘called for the collection, analysis and use of valid and reliable statistics’ (Parekh et al., 2002: 145) where the educational attainment of African Caribbean children was concerned, something which was only implemented several years later. Despite references to cultural differences, the Swann Report nevertheless conceded there was a need for more Black teachers and racial awareness training (R.A.T.), see also Chapter Two.
model used in the report to explain ethnic differences in educational attainment. Whereas MCE portrayed ‘racism as [...] intolerance [...] which stems from an individual’s irrationality and ignorance’, ARE recognised that ‘racism [...] is lodged squarely in the policies, structures, practices and beliefs of everyday life’ (ibid, 1990: 2-3). Policies supporting supplementary schools and the Black Studies programmes\(^\text{172}\) (Andrews, 2013) were created under ARE initiatives. However, ethnic inequalities in mainstream State schools continued. Parekh (in Troyna and Carrington, 1990: 43) notes that since 1976 ‘the percentage of Afro-Caribbean children failing to take O and CSE level examinations [...] increased’. Although African Caribbeans obtaining five or more higher grades also increased from under two per cent to over four per cent by 1986, their grades were ‘only half as good as the Whites’ (ibid, 1990: 43).

What the above analysis reveals is that despite ideological shifts in educational policy, ‘the more things change, the more they appear the same’ (Mirza, 2007: 1). The British education sector systematically failed Black children regardless of assimilation, MCE or ARE policy approaches. The narratives above also demonstrate that teachers overlooked individual and institutional discrimination in the education of Black children. They failed to identify the Special Educational Needs (SENs) of some Black pupils and took the view that their learning deficiencies was a consequence of their culture. In the 1980s the

\(^{172}\) See Chapter Two.
political right took the stance that for too long schools ‘have been treated as instruments for equalising rather than instructing children’ (Troyna and Carrington, 1990: 36). The then Conservative Government set out to reform the education sector, and restore fundamental ‘educational principles [...]’, expedited through the Education Reform Act 1988’ (ERA1988) (ibid, 1990: 82). The ERA1988 (HM Government, 1988) was the instrument used to transform the educational sector into a market, encouraging individualism, choice and competition.

The reputations of teachers are to a great extent influenced by the success or failure of their pupils in the educational market. In the pre-1988 education sector, competition between pupils was regulated by an educational triage173. This is a three-stage process in which the teacher’s time and attention are resources to be allocated effectively. In stage one, those with the ability to succeed receive little of the teacher’s time. In stage two, those who are precariously positioned between success and failure receive support, to ensure they do not fail. In stage three, those viewed by the teacher as failures are ignored.

Subject C was only too aware of the educational triage. He is a fifty-one-year-old grandfather and artist, who is also dyslexic and lives alone in a two-
bedroomed house in Handsworth that he also uses as a studio. Despite his artistic talent, he left secondary education without acquiring any qualifications:

‘They had a curriculum to follow and they didn’t have time for you. In my day it was like [...] yoh! You didn’t learn that! You’re not quite on the ball! We’re on the next page now! We’ve moved on! And that was it’ (Subject C, 6th August 2013, Birmingham)

Ratcliffe (2004: 79) notes that teachers had effectively been trained to see Black educational failure as normative. Therefore, in the context of the classroom where time is often the enemy, Black children were unwanted *Bads* in the post-1988 education system. Their perceived inability to learn was seen as a metaphor for failure. Therefore, teachers might observe their low attainment and ‘not question its existence’ (ibid, 2004: 79). Sivanandan (2013: 3) notes that within the marketplace of the market State ‘men and women are consumers, not producers’. Consequently, in the post-1988 education sector, where the success of schools is increasingly measured by the attainment of its pupils, teachers might employ practices to off-load children they view as toxic *consumers* in the educational market.
Policies and practices of educational exclusion

The Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) revealed that between 1974 and 1980 a pattern of discrimination existed within Birmingham State schools, whereby teachers referred a disproportionate number of Black children to educational guidance centres or suspension units (Troyna and Carrington, 1990). There is also evidence that Black Children of both genders were over-represented in school exclusions, during the academic year 1986-7, within the Inner London Education Authority (ILEA) (ibid, 1990). The disproportionate exclusion of Black children in State education is a national phenomenon that has continued into the twenty-first century.

School exclusion policies are guided by the Education Act 1996 (EA1996); the Education Act 2002 (EA2002); and the Education and Inspections Act 2006 (EIA2006) (DfE, 2012a: 14). The EA1996 places a statutory duty on local authorities to arrange suitable educational provision for children who have been excluded from school. The EA2002 defines the appeals process regarding permanent exclusions, whilst the EIA2006 places the responsibility on governing bodies to arrange suitable education for children who have been excluded for a fixed period. The Acts do not constrain the power of teachers to exclude children; they only define the parameters within which permanent and fixed period exclusions operate.
In the academic year 2009-10 ‘Black Caribbean pupils were nearly four times more likely to receive a permanent exclusion than the school population as a whole’ (DfE, 2012a: 4). Their MWBC peers, are three times more likely to be permanently excluded than their White British counterparts (ibid, 2012a: 32). Fifty-eight per cent of children of any White background attained five or more A*-C grade GCSEs in 2010-2011, which is in line with the national average of 58.2% (DfE, 2012b: 3). This compares to only 54.3% of children of any Black background. Moreover, only the Travellers of Irish Heritage/Gypsy/Roma ethnic group had a lower GCSE attainment than Black Caribbean children and their MWBC counterparts in the academic year 2010-2011 (ibid, 2012b: 4). This disparity in GCSE attainment is significant. If Good educational qualifications are not acquired at secondary school level, then the chances of higher education participation at the appropriate age-stage are low. Consequently, early entry into the labour market and subsequent opportunities for social mobility are also limited.

There were 5,740 exclusions in English schools during the academic year 2009-10, of which 28% were girls (DfE, 2012a: 22). Eighty-seven per cent of permanent exclusions occurred in secondary schools (ibid, 2012a: 13). Most pupils were excluded in years 9 and 10, when they are aged 13 and 14.

174 Specifically, A*-C grade GCSEs.
175 See Chapter Two for a brief discussion of Bourdieu’s (2010, [1984]) idea of the normative age-stage of educational success.
respectively (ibid, 2012a: 21). Exclusions in Years 9 and 10 are particularly significant, because it is the age-stage where pupils are being prepared for their GCSE entries. It is also the start of the process where schools attempt to obtain the highest possible position in Ofsted’s School League Tables. As permanent exclusions occur more frequently during this time, and proportionately more Black children are excluded than any other ethnic group, it could be argued that some schools might adopt the practice of excluding them to support their position in the A*-C economy. What is also significant is that ‘the majority of pupils who are excluded have either Special Educational Needs [SENs], are eligible for Free School Meals or are Black Caribbean [...]. Only 15.8% of pupils permanently excluded did not have any of these characteristics’ (ibid, 2012a: 21).

The DfE data above indicates that class and disability also mediate the educational experiences of Black children. Moreover, regardless of gender, Black children from low-income families with SENs are permanently excluded more so than other pupils (ibid, 2012a: 34-38). This demonstrates that discrimination, disability, poverty and ethnicity continue to resonate in the contemporary educational experiences of African Caribbeans, in much the same way as they did in the narratives of the research subjects above.

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176 Gillborn and Youdell (2000); Gillborn’s concept of Rationing is also referred to by Ratcliffe (2004: 83).
The main reason for the fixed period school exclusions of Black pupils is physical assault against another pupil (ibid, 2012a). This accounted for approximately 27% of their exclusions in comparison to just over 17% for White pupils who committed the same offence. However, persistent and disruptive behaviour is considered to be the most serious cause of permanent exclusions (ibid, 2012a: 16) and is the major offence committed by the majority of excluded White pupils. Approximately 25% of White pupils are permanently excluded for persistent and disruptive behaviour in comparison to 16% of Black pupils (ibid, 2012a: 18). This shows that in comparison to their White peers, Black pupils are punished disproportionately. They have higher rates of school exclusions, despite committing offences that are deemed to be less serious than those committed by their White peers.

As a consequence of being permanently excluded from school, a number of Black pupils are denied the opportunity to compete for GCSE Goods at the appropriate age-stage\(^{177}\). Thus, the insidious impact of racism in the contemporary education sector is just as devastating on the life-chances of Black children, as it was in the 1960s and 1970s. It is also recognised in the secondary education sector that ‘being a pupil with any level of Special Educational Needs (SENs) provision has a stronger effect on the odds of being excluded than gender, Free School Meals (FSMs) eligibility or ethnicity’ (ibid, 2012a: 22). In comparison to other ethnic groups, Black Caribbeans, and

\(^{177}\) As noted much earlier, 16 years of age is the appropriate age-stage during which individuals are normatively expected to acquire the GCSE Goods on offer.
MWBC pupils record the highest levels of FSMs and SENs characteristics (ibid, 2012a: 38-41). Thus, when poverty is intersected by disability – as was the case in the *past-race* experiences of some of my research participants – the likelihood of school exclusion increases for African Caribbeans in the contemporary educational market.

The majority of the subjects in this research did badly in the education sector during the 1970s and 80s. The data regarding school exclusions (DfE, 2012a; 2012b) also suggest that Black children continue to be disproportionately discriminated against in secondary education. However, what now follows is an examination of the position of those educated in the 1990s, to distinguish if they are accessing higher education at the *appropriate 18-24 age-stage*. University education was not always a realistic option for British Blacks educated in the 1970s (Carby, 1982). However, if their contemporaries are increasing their higher education participation at the right age, they might also be improving their chances of upward social mobility at the earliest opportunity.

**Participation, discrimination and the distribution of Goods**

Where the free-market policies of the Conservative Government overlooked inequalities in education (Gillborn, 2005), New Labour promoted social
inclusion (Levitas, 1998) with the proposed aim of reducing material disadvantage. The Macpherson Report (1999), which highlighted institutional racism as a factor in the social exclusion of African Caribbeans, was a key driver behind New Labour’s equality policies. Their 2003 White Paper, *The Future of Higher Education* (TLRP, 2008) outlined new reforms to widen the higher education (H.E.) participation of socially disadvantaged groups by reducing ‘attainment, aspirations, application and admission’ barriers to university (DfES, 2003: 5; DfES, 2006). African Caribbeans generally experience more economic disadvantage in comparison to the White majority (Dorling, 2009; Gillborn, 2013). Therefore, widening participation policies presented an opportunity to reduce the risk of trans-generational poverty, by obtaining university degrees that could be exchanged for economic capital (Bourdieu, 2010 [1984]).

For the reasons outlined in Chapter Three it is not possible to make any meaningful comparisons between ethnic group data for students prior to 2007. However, the following is a heuristic contrast of the national H.E. participation of Black Caribbean and White British 18-24 year olds, and the distribution of their H.E. *Goods*. Table 5.1 below reveals that in the academic years between 2003 and 2013 females had a higher rate of H.E. participation than their male

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178 New Labour did not attempt to reverse Thatcher’s marketisation of the education sector. The ideology of social inclusion was conceived as ‘a “third way” distanced both from the free-market and [...] social democracy’ (Levitas, 1998: 33).

179 See Chapter Two.

180 See Rhamie and Hallam (2010).

181 See Appendix iii., for a more detailed explanation from the HESA.
counterparts. As education often provides a route into skilled employment, this trend could be explained by the long-term decline of industrial work and the rise of occupations in the service sector, which provide more opportunities for female employment (Fawcett, 2013). Despite New Labour’s political demise in 2010, the trend of higher female participation in H.E. has continued.

Table 5.1: National Annual Distribution and Gender Participation of All Home Domiciled First Year Full-Time Students by Gender.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Academic year</th>
<th>Total 1st Year FT Participation</th>
<th>Female Totals</th>
<th>Female Participation [%]</th>
<th>Male Totals</th>
<th>Male Participation [%]</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003/04</td>
<td>320290</td>
<td>174040</td>
<td>54.33</td>
<td>146250</td>
<td>45.66</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004/05</td>
<td>320865</td>
<td>175875</td>
<td>54.81</td>
<td>144990</td>
<td>45.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005/06</td>
<td>339930</td>
<td>186410</td>
<td>54.83</td>
<td>153520</td>
<td>45.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006/07</td>
<td>325550</td>
<td>178825</td>
<td>54.93</td>
<td>146725</td>
<td>45.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007/08</td>
<td>338720</td>
<td>186530</td>
<td>55.06</td>
<td>152175</td>
<td>44.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008/09</td>
<td>361425</td>
<td>203130</td>
<td>54.85</td>
<td>167195</td>
<td>45.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009/10</td>
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<td>200810</td>
<td>54.69</td>
<td>166325</td>
<td>45.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010/11</td>
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<td>215325</td>
<td>55.09</td>
<td>175510</td>
<td>44.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011/12</td>
<td>354080</td>
<td>197955</td>
<td>55.90</td>
<td>156115</td>
<td>44.09</td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004-06</td>
<td>518,535</td>
<td>3,754,922</td>
<td>13.79</td>
<td>9,110</td>
<td>50,678</td>
<td>17.98</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005-07</td>
<td>519,405</td>
<td>3,790,138</td>
<td>13.66</td>
<td>9,630</td>
<td>51,561</td>
<td>18.68</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006-08</td>
<td>515,155</td>
<td>3,825,352</td>
<td>13.45</td>
<td>10,005</td>
<td>52,445</td>
<td>19.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-09</td>
<td>540,630</td>
<td>3,860,567</td>
<td>14.00</td>
<td>11,085</td>
<td>53,328</td>
<td>20.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-10</td>
<td>570,215</td>
<td>3,895,782</td>
<td>14.60</td>
<td>12,195</td>
<td>54,211</td>
<td>22.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009-11</td>
<td>581,115</td>
<td>3,930,997</td>
<td>14.76</td>
<td>12,050</td>
<td>54,095</td>
<td>22.27</td>
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<td>3,966,212</td>
<td>15.01</td>
<td>12,030</td>
<td>55,978</td>
<td>21.49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Ethnic group population totals estimated on the basis of interpolations from 2001 and 2011 Census data.

182 The 18-24 data are based on revised estimates from age 16-24 data.
Table 5.2 above indicates that between 2003 and 2013, a higher proportion of African Caribbeans in the 18-24 age-range accessed H.E. than their White British counterparts. However, Table 5.1 above indicates that African Caribbean university participation is being driven by female students. Although the propensity for African Caribbean H.E. participation is higher than that of their White counterparts at the appropriate age-stage, it is not matched by the grade of qualifications they acquire.

Figures 1.5 and 2.5 below provides a heuristic comparison of national differences between First Class and Second Class Degrees acquired by Black Caribbean and White British 18-24 university students nationally. There is considerable disparity between African Caribbeans and their White counterparts gaining first and second class first division degrees. Black and White students must have the required A-level entry grades in order to be accepted by the university of their choice. Therefore, it is difficult to see why students entering different universities with similar qualifications leave with such a wide disparity in their final grades.
**Figure. 1.5**

National White British and Black Caribbean Distribution of First Class Honours Degrees: 2003-2012*

Sources: Higher Education Statistics Agency [HESA], (2014); Higher Education Information Database for Institutions [HEIDI], (2014).

**Figure. 2.5**

National White British and Black Caribbean Distribution of Second Class First Division Degrees: 2003-2012*

Sources: Higher Education Statistics Agency [HESA], (2014); Higher Education Information Database for Institutions [HEIDI], (2014).

* Averages based on interpolations from student ethnic group H.E. population data (see Table 5.2 above).

The Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) (2014) reveal that ‘female students are more likely to achieve an upper second, or higher, than male students with the same prior educational attainment’. Therefore, Figures 1.5 and 2.5 suggest that Black females have consistently outperformed their
male counterparts since New Labour’s widening participation policies were implemented in 2003. The disparity in first and second class degrees, between Black and White university students, cannot be explained by political change. It might be indicative of discriminatory practices within universities.\(^{183}\)

Although “race” is a protected characteristic under the 2010 Equality Act (EA2010), there is evidence to suggest that racial discrimination continues to be a cause for concern in higher education. Research by the HEFCE (2014) reveals that despite achieving the same BBB grades at A-level, there is a great deal of ‘variation in degree outcome for students from different ethnicities’. Overall, 53% of Black\(^{184}\) students entering university with the same required entry grades as their ethnic counterparts gain a first or upper second Class degree. This is in comparison to 72% of White students (ibid, 2014). UCAS data supports Table 5.2 above by revealing that there are more university applications made by Black teenagers than their White counterparts (Coughlan, 2014). Thirty-nine per cent of Black teenagers applied for a university place in comparison to 31% of their White peers (ibid, 2014). However, research by the London School of Economics suggest, ‘ethnic minority candidates were less likely to be offered places than their similarly qualified white counterparts’

\(^{183}\) Strand (2008) implies the same in regard to schools and differences in the education of middle-class Black and White boys.

\(^{184}\) It must be noted here that the HEFCE is referring to data that conflates all Black ethnic groups into a single category.
Noden, Shiner and Modood (2014) reveal that, in comparison to their White British counterparts, Black Caribbeans received three fewer places per 100 applications at Russell Group universities. This is despite Black students being more likely than their White counterparts to seek admission into the elite universities and less likely to apply to the ‘lower ranking institutions’ (ibid, 2014: 3). On average 71% of applications made by White applicants result in the offer of a place. Shiner (in Sellgren, 2014) acknowledges that even when age and A-level qualifications are taken into account the ‘chances of receiving an offer varies, according to [...] ethnicity, [...] type of school [...] and family background’. Consequently, in comparison to their White peers, more Black students have to depend on the UCAS clearing process to enter the elite universities rather than relying on straightforward admissions (Noden, Shiner and Modood, 2014: 1).

The above observations suggest that discriminatory practices are embedded in the selection processes of some higher education institutions. However, to attribute them solely to racism might be an oversimplification, as it should not

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185 I have discussed the significance of Russell Group universities to social mobility in Chapter Three. In terms of labour market outcomes, some employers would valorise first and second class Goods from Russell Group institutions, more so than they would those from their other, new and former polytechnic counterparts (see also Shiner and Modood, 2002).
be overlooked that the education sector is a competitive market situation. Students develop labour market skills in universities, therefore they are commodities in a transition between the education and employment sectors. In the current climate of economic austerity, universities might view African Caribbean students as high-risk *Bads*: they are effectively, *toxic commodities*. The success rate of universities is documented in league tables and also assessed by value-added measures, such as how many students find employment after completing their course. In historical economic downturns Blacks have often been last-in and first-out\(^{186}\). Universities also recognise that in times of recession it is more difficult for Blacks to find employment\(^{187}\). Thus, limiting the enrolment of Black students, might be a strategy employed by universities to negotiate the risk of acquiring a low league table position.

The social class of applicants might also be a clandestine factor when universities are *sifting and sorting* through student applications. Noden, Shiner and Modood (2014: 7) reveal, ‘candidates from lower social class groups were less likely to receive offers than their more privileged counterparts’. Therefore, as African Caribbeans are more likely to reside in working-class areas, with high levels of material deprivation, they might also be subject to class discrimination in the higher education admission processes. Their social class status, and comparatively lower levels of income than their middle-class counterparts, might also be perceived as a risk to the attainment and success of particular

The higher education experiences of non-White students are also mediated by the prejudices of their White peers. Black, international and other non-White students at the University of Oxford have set up a social media site called *I, Too, am Oxford* (2014) to demonstrate how racism mediates their day-to-day academic experiences\(^{188}\). The site was inspired by the stance against racism taken by Black students at the University of Harvard, USA. Oxford students have filmed themselves using storyboards to emphasise how they are ‘made to feel different and Othered from the Oxford community’ (ibid, 2014), during their daily interactions with White students and teachers. Students at other Russell Group and higher education establishments have also adopted the practice of Internet protest. This demonstrates that despite the prevalence of anti-discriminatory policies, subtle and overt forms of racism still exist within the education system. Moreover, universities do not exist in a vacuum. Therefore, the views of White teachers and students are undoubtedly informed by racist perceptions and practices in wider society, just as they were in the 1960s and 1970s when most of the participants of this research entered the education sector.

\(^{188}\) A student at the University of Warwick tweeted a photo of racist slurs that had allegedly been written on bananas she bought, by a student sharing her accommodation (Guardian, 2016). The victim complained that Warwick took no action until the photo went viral on social media.
Gender differences in the national and local educational market

Despite the widening participation policies implemented by New Labour, Black Caribbean males were under-represented in H.E. (House of Commons, 2009: 7). This trend continued after 2010 under the Coalition Government. Tables 5.3; 5.4 and 5.5 below reveal that between 2007 and 2013 a total of 117,623 Black Caribbean, White British, and MWBC\textsuperscript{189} students, of all ages residing in Birmingham, have accessed 161 universities nationally. Regardless of ethnic differences, the H.E. participation rate of females have consistently remained higher than that of males. When the data for the three ethnic groups are compared, Birmingham’s African Caribbean females have the highest proportional gender representation in H.E. whilst their male counterparts have the lowest.

\textsuperscript{189} As noted in Chapter Three, prior to 2007 in most cases HESA and HEIDI conflate the data for all Mixed ethnic groups into a single category. The MWBC data for Birmingham students has been provided by HESA on request.
Table 5.3: White British Birmingham Students Accessing National Higher Education Institutions*.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Academic Year</th>
<th>No. of Students</th>
<th>Female Students</th>
<th>Male Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007/08</td>
<td>15444</td>
<td>9246 [59.86%]</td>
<td>6198 [40.13%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008/09</td>
<td>16104</td>
<td>9727 [60.40%]</td>
<td>6377 [39.59%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009/10</td>
<td>16877</td>
<td>10127 [60.00%]</td>
<td>6750 [39.99%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010/11</td>
<td>16949</td>
<td>10131 [59.77%]</td>
<td>6818 [40.22%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011/12</td>
<td>16937</td>
<td>10021 [59.16%]</td>
<td>6916 [40.83%]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 5.4: Black Caribbean Birmingham Students Accessing National Higher Education Institutions*.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Academic Year</th>
<th>No. of Students</th>
<th>Female Students*</th>
<th>Male Students*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007/08</td>
<td>2469</td>
<td>1811 [73.34%]</td>
<td>658 [26.65%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008/09</td>
<td>2627</td>
<td>1879 [71.52%]</td>
<td>748 [28.47%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009/10</td>
<td>2706</td>
<td>1925 [71.13%]</td>
<td>781 [28.86%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010/11</td>
<td>2600</td>
<td>1859 [71.49%]</td>
<td>741 [28.49%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011/12</td>
<td>2621</td>
<td>1860 [70.96%]</td>
<td>761 [29.03%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012/13</td>
<td>2380</td>
<td>1681 [70.63%]</td>
<td>699 [29.36%]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 5.5: MWBC Birmingham Students Accessing National Higher Education Institutions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Academic Year</th>
<th>No. of Students</th>
<th>Female Students</th>
<th>Male Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007/08</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>425 [71.18%]</td>
<td>172 [28.81%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008/09</td>
<td>702</td>
<td>489 [69.65%]</td>
<td>213 [30.34%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009/10</td>
<td>755</td>
<td>539 [71.39%]</td>
<td>216 [28.60%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010/11</td>
<td>807</td>
<td>566 [70.13%]</td>
<td>241 [29.86%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011/12</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>546 [66.58%]</td>
<td>274 [33.41%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012/13</td>
<td>855</td>
<td>552 [64.56%]</td>
<td>303 [35.43%]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The respective differences between female and male H.E. participation have remained stable over time: White British 60/40; Black Caribbean 70/30 and MWBC 65/35. Although MWBCs are the smallest group in terms of their national population size, the females have a higher proportional gender representation than their White British peers. However, what is problematic for Black Caribbean social mobility is the comparatively low number of males who are accessing H.E. This is a worrying trend for upward social mobility, as
university participation is generally acknowledged as a means of improving one’s occupational status.

Without acquiring H.E. Goods, the potential for social mobility is reduced for Black males. However, there has been a marginal increase in male university participation in the last six years, which cannot be easily explained. This is particularly as the increase applies to males across all three ethnic groups. If New Labour’s widening participation policies facilitated the increase of more working-class students into H.E., then post-2010 austerity measures may have affected them more adversely than their middle-class counterparts. This might be particularly so for single female parents from disadvantaged backgrounds.

Tables 5.3; 5.4 and 5.5 above relate to all ages. However, one of the ways in which New Labour’s Widening Participation policies facilitated H.E. access for female parents, who were outside of the appropriate age-stage of university access, was by providing free childcare places. By 2008, 1,035 Sure Start Children’s Centres had been established nationwide, and by 2010 they had increased to 3,500 (DfES, 2006: 7). Sure Start childcare provisions were established in some of the country’s most deprived areas. Rhamie and Hallam (2010: 166) have noted that African Caribbeans often live in ‘inner-city areas characterised by poverty and high unemployment’. Moreover, according to Platt (2011: 12) there are ‘higher rates of lone parenthood amongst Black
Caribbeans’, which in turn exposes them to a higher risk of poverty. Thus, free childcare provisions might have benefited socially disadvantaged Black females by allowing them to access employment and education. Childcare policies, and those that reduced university admission fee (TLRP, 2008), could also have contributed to facilitating the higher education participation of African Caribbean females who experience poverty. However, it must also be noted that poverty transcends ethnicity and therefore it is not unique to Back females. All females who experience the same class disadvantages may well have benefitted from New Labour’s widening participation policies.

Since the Coalition Government came to power in 2010, a total of 281 Sure Start Centres have been closed as a direct result of their austerity policies (4Children, 2012: 5). In addition, over 60% of the remaining Sure Start Centres are operating on decreased budgets (ibid, 2012: 10). The current neo-liberal\textsuperscript{190} target culture which rationalises cuts as a means of maximising outcomes and market efficiency, leaves Sure Start Centres with little choice other than to ‘deliver more for less’ (ibid, 2012: 5). Whilst childcare provisions have been reduced, Sure Start Centres have had to increase relationship counselling and parental advice services (ibid, 2012: 6) to balance their books. This represents a paradigm shift from previous State funded family services.

\textsuperscript{190} See Footnotes 12 in Chapter One and Footnote 101 in Chapter Four, for explanations neo-liberalism and how it supports the reduction of State intervention in market situations.
The increase in advocacy services, at the expense of practical assistance for poor families, supports the victim-blaming perspective of neo-liberalism. It suggests that those afflicted by poverty are to blame for the circumstances in which they find themselves. Although Sure Start nurseries still operated in areas of high material deprivation after 2010, the reduction of free childcare services following the election of the Coalition Government could have constrained the H.E. participation of a number of working-class females. Austerity policies might also account for the marginal increase in the university participation of African Caribbean males. Suggestions that Black families have high rates of single female parents\(^1\), indicate that the H.E. access of males – unlike their female counterparts – might not have been restricted by policy changes, which reduced the entitlement to free childcare.

**Birmingham: Gender, age, Russell Group and other institutions**

Tables 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8 below highlight differences in higher education participation between the three Birmingham ethnic groups nationally and in Russell Group universities. All females have a higher female representation of 18-24 students accessing Russell group institutions. However, when the gender representations are compared between the ethnic groups, the disparity between African Caribbean females and their male counterparts is the greatest.

\(^1\) This is Platt’s (2011) view, which is highlighted earlier.
There is an almost even gender split between White British males and females in Russell Group universities. The difference between MWBCs is approximately 60/40 in favour of females, whereas for African Caribbeans it is about 70/30. The data reinforces my earlier point regarding the potential social mobility of African Caribbeans. The high gender disparity in the top universities increases the likelihood that Black females will have better employment prospects than their male counterparts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annual Intakes</th>
<th>National Intakes</th>
<th>Total Russell Group Students</th>
<th>Russell Group Students [%]</th>
<th>Female Russell Group Students</th>
<th>Male Russell Group Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-08</td>
<td>8,601</td>
<td>3504</td>
<td>40.74</td>
<td>1993 [56.87%]</td>
<td>1511 [43.12%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-09</td>
<td>8,778</td>
<td>3758</td>
<td>42.81</td>
<td>2135 [56.81%]</td>
<td>1623 [43.18%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009-10</td>
<td>9,211</td>
<td>3798</td>
<td>41.23</td>
<td>2169 [57.10%]</td>
<td>1629 [42.89%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-11</td>
<td>9,310</td>
<td>3767</td>
<td>40.46</td>
<td>2165 [57.47%]</td>
<td>1602 [42.52%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011-12</td>
<td>9,537</td>
<td>3756</td>
<td>39.38</td>
<td>2112 [56.23%]</td>
<td>1644 [43.76%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012-13</td>
<td>8,981</td>
<td>3617</td>
<td>40.27</td>
<td>2015 [55.70%]</td>
<td>1602 [44.29%]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 5.7: Birmingham Black Caribbean 18-24 Students’ National and Russell Group H.E. Participation by Gender: 2007-2013.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annual Intakes</th>
<th>National Intakes</th>
<th>Total Russell Group Students</th>
<th>Russell Group Students [%]</th>
<th>Female Russell Group Students</th>
<th>Male Russell Group Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-08</td>
<td>1,121</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>19.00</td>
<td>155 [72.76%]</td>
<td>58 [27.23%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-09</td>
<td>1,214</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>18.86</td>
<td>154 [67.24%]</td>
<td>75 [32.75%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009-10</td>
<td>1,295</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>19.61</td>
<td>182 [71.65%]</td>
<td>72 [28.34%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-11</td>
<td>1,268</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>17.98</td>
<td>174 [76.31%]</td>
<td>54 [23.68%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011-12</td>
<td>1,245</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>15.50</td>
<td>136 [70.46%]</td>
<td>57 [29.53%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012-13</td>
<td>1,228</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>14.90</td>
<td>123 [67.21%]</td>
<td>60 [32.78%]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 5.8: Birmingham MWBC 18-24 Students’ National and Russell Group H.E. Participation by Gender: 2007-2013.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annual Intakes</th>
<th>National Intakes</th>
<th>Total Russell Group Students</th>
<th>Russell Group Students [%]</th>
<th>Female Russell Group Students</th>
<th>Male Russell Group Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-08</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>18.63</td>
<td>53 [67.08%]</td>
<td>26 [32.92%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-09</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>23.00</td>
<td>78 [69.64%]</td>
<td>34 [30.35%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009-10</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>21.24</td>
<td>77 [69.99%]</td>
<td>33 [30.01%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-11</td>
<td>558</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>20.25</td>
<td>69 [61.06%]</td>
<td>44 [38.94%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011-12</td>
<td>577</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>16.64</td>
<td>54 [56.24%]</td>
<td>42 [43.76%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012-13</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>17.21</td>
<td>67 [63.80%]</td>
<td>38 [36.20%]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 5.9 below highlights differences in Birmingham students accessing H.E. between 2007 and 2013. It can be seen that out of the total H.E. participation of White students, almost a quarter are attending Russell Group institutions. In contrast, less than a tenth of Birmingham’s Black Caribbean university
students attend the elite universities, whilst Russell Group participation is also higher for their MWBC counterparts. As noted above, African Caribbeans have a higher proportional representation of 18-24 year-olds accessing universities outside of the Russell Group. However, they also have the highest rate of university participation in the 35-49 age-range, which is outside of the appropriate age-stage.

Table 5.9: Birmingham H.E. Students and Their National and Russell Group Distributions: 2007-2013.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>H.E. Student Totals</th>
<th>Total in Russell Group Universities</th>
<th>Total in Other Universities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White British</td>
<td>97,684</td>
<td>22,200</td>
<td>75,484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>[22.73%]</td>
<td>[77.27%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>15,403</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>14,103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td></td>
<td>[8.43%]</td>
<td>[91.56%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MWBC</td>
<td>4,536</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>3,921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>[13.56%]</td>
<td>[86.44%]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some of the students at the higher end of the 35-49 age-range, and those in the 50 and over category, would belong to the same generation as the subjects interviewed for this research. Racism might have blocked H.E. opportunities for them at the normative age-stage. However, their current participation suggests that university access might be the means by which they are negotiating the future risk of poverty, in a political climate dominated by austerity policies. Acquiring H.H. Goods might also be the only means that might allow them to climb the occupational ladder in their current employment. Nevertheless, only heuristic assumptions can be made regarding the comparatively high representation of Black university students from Birmingham in the 35-49 age cohort.
Table 5.10 below reveals that two thirds of White British Birmingham students, who are within the appropriate 18-24 age-range, are studying at the prestigious Russell Group institutions. In comparison to less than half of their Black peers. Although MWBCs have a comparatively smaller demographic population\(^{192}\), three quarters of those in the 18-24 age-range are studying at Russell Group universities. This suggests that in comparison to their White counterparts, there is a comparatively lower potential for social mobility amongst Black Caribbeans. I reiterate that their future social status is even more precarious considering the disparity between Black males and females attending universities nationally, and the higher rate of females studying at Russell Group institutions.

Table 5.10: Birmingham H.E. Students and Their National, Russell Group and Age-Range Distributions: 2007-2013.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>All Students in H.E. 18-24 [%]</th>
<th>All Students in H.E. 25-34 [%]</th>
<th>All Students in H.E. 35-49 [%]</th>
<th>All Students in H.E. 50+ [%]</th>
<th>18-24 Students in Russell Group Unis.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White British</td>
<td>55.75</td>
<td>22.54</td>
<td>16.51</td>
<td>5.15</td>
<td>14,805 [66.69%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Caribbean</td>
<td>47.85</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>25.35</td>
<td>4.77</td>
<td>634 [48.77]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MWBC</td>
<td>69.97</td>
<td>19.64</td>
<td>9.32</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>458 [74.47%]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


192 See Appendix ii.
In the academic year 2011/12, Government policy raised student fees from approximately £3,000 to £9,000 (Universities UK, 2013: 26). Prior to that the Coalition Government also abolished Educational Maintenance Allowances (EMAs) in 2011. EMAs were a Widening Participation policy designed to bridge inequalities in income, between middle-class and working-class students, by providing funds to purchase extra resources. New Labour’s EMA policy was supposed to benefit working-class students ‘from a lower socio-economic background’ (Kiely, 2014). This would have included African Caribbeans as ‘75% of Britain's minority communities live in 88 of Britain's poorest wards’ (ibid, 2014).

The hike in university tuition fees, and abolishing the EMA grant, has contributed toward the disadvantage faced by Black undergraduates (ibid, 2014). In terms of income and the relationship between Black Caribbean students and poverty, new proposals to privatisate students’ loans would more than double the current interest rate on university fees (Kiely, 2014). If the policy is implemented ‘black students could become even more excluded from higher education. Moreover, Black and female graduates [...] take longer to pay off their student debts, due to persistent discrimination in employment’ (ibid, 2014). Shifting the debt collection of university fees, from the State to the market, is problematic for working-class African Caribbeans. Although H.E. participation is about rationalising risk, the immediate gains of a university degree might be suppressed by the burden of future debt and poverty.
Although class and poverty conflate to constrain the achievement of African Caribbeans in the contemporary educational market, the reduction of racial discrimination is much more of a problem. Its detrimental impact on their education and subsequent life-chances is being overlooked by both Government and academics. Ideas of class disparities incorporate Whiteness, whereas racism is specific to Blackness. This is acknowledged by Professor David Gillborn, who contends:

‘Part of the problem is trying to get funding for critical “race” research. This is a field where the funding is not there. It’s often seen as being too political, too specialist. This is a time where if you use the word “race” people kind of turn their noses up and say “Really! That’s rather crude isn’t it”. The discourses that circulate have material consequences and this myth of White underachievement has had some very material consequences. Ethnic minority achievement groups have been closed in some local authorities. In other local authorities, the money is being directed to White kids. The Government thinks that “race” isn’t an issue anymore’ (Professor David Gillborn, 19th June 2013, Birmingham).

The Centre for Research in Race and Education (CRRE), which is led by Professor Gillborn at the University of Birmingham, is the only university based research centre in the country that explicitly focuses on issues and problems revolving
around race in education. However, it is not a separate department within the university with its own building, offices or rooms. It is a virtual, rather than physical, entity that exists without Government funding. The centre is Professor David Gillborn. Wherever he is located, that is where the CRRE can be found. Birmingham University is struggling against the tide to raise the profile of “race” on the political agenda. However, the difficulty of obtaining funding suggests there is a lack of political will to ameliorate racial inequality. It also indicates that the long-term future of developing research, to standardise anti-racist practices in the education sector, might be limited.

Conclusion

This chapter has articulated the perpetuity of Black educational disadvantage, despite several political and ideological changes. Integration through assimilation policies in the 1960s and 1970s, influenced the practice of ESN school referrals (Coard, 1971; Carby, 1982). MCE policies of the 1970s failed to directly address the problem of racism. They subtlety contributed to the perception that the comparatively low educational attainment of Black children was normative and that they were naturally athletic, rather than academic (Troyna, 1984; 1992). Despite the implementation of ARE policies in the late 1970s (ibid, 1992), and an increased focus on community learning to address the inadequacies of the ethnocentric curriculum, Black children continued to do less well than their ethnic peers in State education. The narratives of the
research subjects reveal how racism mediated their educational experiences, and the ways in which poverty disability reinforced the notion that Black culture was pathological.

Competition in the classroom between students, and outside of the school between similar institutions, has always existed within the education sector. However, the marketisation of education introduced by the ERA1988 is a new phenomenon. Although the Rampton Interim Report (1981), its Swann (1985) successor and the Macpherson Report (1999) all acknowledged the existence of institutional racism as a factor in the educational attainment of Black children, it was ignored by the market philosophy of the Conservative Government in favour of colour-blind educational initiatives (Gillborn, 2005). Policies and practices of school exclusion have continued under New Labour and its Coalition successor (DfE, 2012a; 2012b). However, following the introduction of New Labour’s widening participation policies in 2003, there is evidence of increasing H.E. access, particularly where African Caribbean females are concerned. Despite improving their university participation, Black Caribbeans have a comparatively lower presence in Russell Group universities. There is also evidence to suggest they are being discriminated against in the university selection process and also in terms of degree outcomes. Black pupils are viewed as toxic consumers in the GCSE market, whereas their university peers are seen as toxic commodities in the transition between the educational and labour markets.
Despite “race” being a protected characteristic under the EA2010, it seems that teachers continue to arbitrarily discriminate against Black students who they view as high-risk Bads. This is especially when notions of racial inferiority are compounded with myopic middle-class assumptions of the perceived inadequacies of students from working-class backgrounds. Nevertheless, the factor that differentiates the past-race educational experiences of African Caribbeans, from those of their contemporaries, is the way in which the market has replaced State intervention as the perceived mediator of fairness. Disparities in market situations are no longer considered to be consequences of material inequalities, but are instead perceived as evidence of individual cultural or moral failings. Things have changed, but on the other hand they have also remained the same (Mirza, 2007). The politics of difference has come full-circle where victim-blaming is concerned. Ideas of cultural differences, which formerly explained Black educational failure in the 1960s and 1970s, are now reified within the educational market in which competition for success blurs the impact of external factors such as racism and material inequalities.

As increasing H.E. participation is an indicator of social mobility, then the future might be promising where African Caribbean females are concerned. However, the same cannot be said for their male counterparts. Out of the three ethnic groups in this study, Black males have the lowest proportional rate of university
participation. They also have poorer degree outcomes than their female counterparts. Despite the barrier of institutional racism in the educational experiences of African Caribbeans, they are accessing H.E. at the appropriate age-stage of 18-24 and at a proportionally higher rate than their White peers. However, it remains to be seen if the marketisation of education, and the burden of increasing financial risks incurred by student debt, is going to have an adverse impact on those currently in H.E. The decision between a university education, certain debt and the likelihood of employment, which may not have potentially rewarding prospects, is something the next generation of African Caribbeans will have to contemplate. The extent to which their current gains in the H.E. sector is being exchanged for economic capital (Bourdieu, 2010 [1984]), is examined in the following chapter.
6. Penalties, privileges and labour market competition

The previous chapter examined how educational legislation, policies and practices may have constrained or enabled the social mobility of African Caribbeans, by restricting or facilitating their access to academic Goods. Despite the negative educational experiences of the British born children of West Indian migrants, their contemporaries have been able to participate in higher education. However, high rates of school exclusions – and comparatively low academic attainment – have reinforced the perception that the present generation of African Caribbeans are toxic consumers in the secondary education sector (DfE, 2012a). Exclusionary practices in universities also suggest they are viewed as toxic commodities in higher education (Shiner and Modood, 2002). African Caribbean organisations continue to appropriate the transitional community sphere (Shukra et al., 2004) to support the educational needs of Black children. However, financial constraints have placed limits on their agency and organisational capacity.

The education and employment markets are key sites of struggle for life-changing resources. However, unlike the education sector, the labour market is at the vanguard of competition for the forms of symbolic capital which signify status and success (Bourdieu, 2010 [1984]). Not everyone who is successful in the labour market would have acquired higher education capital. Nevertheless
‘there are strong links between educational success and labour market success’ (Heath and Cheung, 2006: 3). As the most typical means of improving one’s social mobility is by acquiring educational *Goods* and exchanging it for economic capital in the labour market (Bourdieu, 2010 [1984]), this chapter will:

- examine the barriers African Caribbeans experience obtaining and sustaining meaningful employment;
- assess the role of policies and practices in constraining or facilitating changes in their occupational positions;
- map changes in the National Statistics Socio-economic Classifications (NS-SEC) of African Caribbean between 1991 and 2011;
- establish if the occupational status of Black Caribbeans has improved, stagnated or deteriorated over time, and how their employment positions differentiate by age and gender.

Regardless of whether paid employment is full or part-time, only skilled labour can generate the necessary level of income to enable upward social mobility. Remuneration within the skilled occupations reduces insecurity and minimises the risk of poverty. Hence, occupations in the NS-SEC professional and higher managerial employment classes193 can also be perceived as labour market *Goods*. The professions provide more opportunities for economic progression,

193 See Chapter Three
allow social actors to improve their class situation, increase life-chances and enhance inter-generational upward social mobility.

Age is also a crucial factor of social mobility. Individuals are expected to acquire educational Goods at an expected age-stage and then enter the labour market at the earliest opportunity. As such, the age-range of 25 to 49 is significant to the analysis of upward social mobility. Twenty-five is the approximate age when individuals might be expected to enter the labour market after higher education. At the other end of the spectrum, as individuals approach 50 (and the lower one is positioned within the occupational structure), there is the expectancy of diminishing economic returns. Age diminishes the duration of an employee’s working life and, in some occupations, prospects for promotion might also be reduced. Hence 25-49 is the optimum age-stage in which workers are expected to take advantage of labour market opportunities, to improve their economic status.

During the 1950s and 1960s the unskilled, low-waged occupations of West Indians could have been explained by their status as newly arriving migrants (Peach, 1968). Moreover, racism, discriminatory employment policies and practices, constrained West Indian labour to the lower tiers of the economy (Rex and Moore, 1967; Rex and Tomlinson, 1979; Ratcliffe, 1981; Sivanandan, 194

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194 See Chapter Five
1982; Phizacklea and Miles, 1984; Taylor, 1993). Ratcliffe (1981: 237) notes that, ‘in a fiercely competitive labour market Blacks who enter directly from British schools will have the edge on those who have grown up in a very different society’. However, that was not necessarily the case for those who first entered the British education system (Coard, 1971; Carby, 1982).

The majority of my research subjects left school and entered the labour market at the end of the 1970s. This was during the time when Rex and Tomlinson’s (1979) research, and Ratcliffe’s (1981) interpretation of their survey, was conducted. Ratcliffe (1981: 234) highlighted the over-representation of West Indian males in the lower tiers of the economy, and that relatively few ‘were being promoted into responsible positions’. In comparison to post-war migrants, the labour market positions of the Caribbean population in the late 1970s indicated there was ‘little evidence of improved social mobility […] if anything the reverse is the case’ (ibid, 1981: 235). Although African Caribbeans are now accessing higher education\(^\text{195}\), it remains to be seen what – if anything – has changed regarding their previous and contemporary occupational positions. It also needs to be established if they are exchanging their educational capital for economic capital (Bourdieu, 2010 [1984]).

\(^{195}\)ibid.
Economic Bads: Risk and precarious work

Standing (2011: 7) contends that ‘we need a new vocabulary, one reflecting class relations in the global market system of the twenty-first century’, to describe those employed in the lower tiers of the labour market. The term precariat (ibid, 2011) defines the situation of nascent workers in the contemporary service, information and technology sectors. Whereas working-class labour was exploited in long-term, low-paid work, in the post-war industrial and manufacturing economy, their contemporary counterparts are engaged in short-term, insecure employment with few contractual rights. Precarious employment is often mediated through agencies, rather than directly by employers. Consequently, precariat workers might have several employers in a relatively short space of time. Agency work also erodes employment rights, and increases the risk of poverty in the long-term. Subject F epitomises the work ethic and spirit of the precariat. She left school without any academic Goods and entered the labour market in the early 1980s. Her employment experiences have been constrained to various forms of precarious work. However, she has not given up hope of obtaining long-term employment and financial security from a regular income.

Subject F was fifty-three years old when I interviewed her. Her father was a former shop floor worker at Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI): a large British chemical manufacturing company. Her late mother was a factory worker. She
was referred to a secondary school for children with behavioural problems by her primary school teachers and subsequently left school without any qualifications:

‘Yeah, I’ve had quite a few jobs on the side [laughs]. I worked at the Birmingham Post and Mail, I’ve worked in the food business; I’ve done nights at McDonalds, I’ve worked at a printer – printing shoe soles, I worked for this company making curry patties, but their pay cheques always bounced. I did screen printing as well. I’ve had lots of jobs. Lots’ (Subject F, 1st May 2014, Birmingham)

By on the side Subject F meant working whilst claiming benefits. She often worked without a contract, and was paid by cheque or received cash-in-hand payments. These forms of remuneration made it easier for her employers to exploit her labour in the short-term. However, she did not complain, because she also claimed welfare benefits whilst working. The only permanent work she has ever had was with the Birmingham Post and Mail, which she left because of problems with childcare.

Although Subject F realises that claiming benefits whilst working is illegal, she insists that she has little choice. The only work she can get does not guarantee

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196 Subject F is dyslexic; however, her disability was only diagnosed in 2013. The circumstances of her ESN referral is in some ways similar to that of Subject A (see Chapter Five). Her parents also believed the teachers were acting in their daughter’s best interests. They were told that the ESN school would be more appropriate for her needs.
her a regular wage, and those that did could only do so in the short-term. She had previously stopped claiming benefits after finding a job. However, her employment only lasted a few weeks and she then had to sign on again. Her claim took so long to process that she got into debt and could not afford to pay her rent, household bills or provide for her son. Although she was not employed when I interviewed her, she admitted that if she did find a job she would continue to claim benefits:

‘I’m on Jobseeker’s Allowance, plus I get Child Benefit and Child Tax Credit. I have to pay my rent, the concierge charge\textsuperscript{197}, then there’s gas, electricity and water. I couldn’t afford to do all that – and have enough to live on – for what they would give me to work full-time. I’d love a full-time job, but I don’t want to be in debt again’ (Subject F, 1\textsuperscript{st} May 2014, Birmingham)!

Subject F’s situation is a common predicament of the precariat. Standing (2011: 144) notes that welfare claimants take risks by applying for jobs that are short-term and ‘give up benefits that may have taken months to obtain in the first place’. When precarious work is the only employment option available, welfare benefits function as a \textit{comfort blanket}. However, they should be an economic safety net to protect the poor whilst they are out of work. Subject F’s lack of qualifications and skills condemn her to low-wage labour, which pays

\footnote{\textsuperscript{197} ‘Concierge charge’ might be slightly misleading. However, those were the words used by Subject F to refer to the communal costs she shares with other tenants in her maisonette, for the cleaning and maintenance of shared spaces.}
less than the welfare benefits she is forced to claim. Moreover, the minimum wage\textsuperscript{198} that she would earn is not enough to meet her basic material needs.

Beck (2000: 81) argues that contemporary Western societies are undergoing a paradigm shift in which ‘a new kind of capitalism, a new kind of economy, a new kind of global order’ creates new forms of insecurity and employment risks. Unlike the old manufacturing and production industries, which offered a high degree of financial security in low-paid, long-term masculine work, contemporary employment is short-term, insecure and often feminised. The distinction between gendered work in the modern service sector has become blurred, and is to some extent viewed as symmetrical. This is noticeable in the way that male labour is sometimes commodified in emotion work (Hochschild, 2003), whilst females are employed in work that was traditionally seen as masculine. Examples of this anomaly is demonstrated in the care sector and the security industry. The increase of female consumers in the retail sector and night-time economy has intensified the demand for their labour as security personnel. The only requirement of employment in the security industry is a license, which is obtained by completing a three-day course\textsuperscript{199}. The minimum

\textsuperscript{198} The minimum wage was £6.50 per hour when Subject F was interviewed. It rose to £7.20 in April 2016.

\textsuperscript{199} The Private Security Industry Act 2001 regulates the security sector. Those who are unemployed can obtain licenses by having their courses paid for by their local Jobcentre. Although State sponsorship might appear to be a benign act, it is effectively an attempt to create low-paid and high-risk, employment opportunities for the long-term unemployed, whilst reducing their welfare needs in the short-term.
skills requirement makes the vocation appealing to those who left education without any academic *Goods*.

The growth of employment in the care sector has been a consequence of different factors. For example, increased longevity has contributed to the expanding ageing population and there has been a rise in the number of children referred to social services (Cracknell, 2010; DfE, 2014). The decline in traditional semi and unskilled industrial work (Standing, 2011) has also created new forms of employment in the care sector for males. Care work is often mediated through agencies and involves short-term contingent labour. Workers are contracted to employment agencies, rather than to the place where they actually work. Consequently, these employment arrangements are precarious and increase the risk of future poverty. Contingent workers are often unable to rely on a regular salary. Therefore, they cannot make any long-term plans in regard to their future.

Despite being a qualified carpenter, fifty-five-year-old Subject A explained to me how his recent labour market participation was constrained to agency work in the care sector. He had previously worked for thirteen years as a shop fitter. However, his employer’s organisation was taken over by a company that subsequently made him redundant:

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200 This is short-term work that often becomes available due to unforeseen circumstances, which result in a sudden demand for labour in a specific sector.
'I signed up with four or five different agencies for two years. They sent me here, there and everywhere. The jobs only lasted for a day or two and they were mainly cleaning and care work. I lost count of the amount of jobs I applied for. One of the agencies phoned me one morning; they told me there was security work available the same day at a hospital car park. I had never done anything like that before, but I gave it a try’ (Subject A, 10th August 2013, Birmingham).

Subject A described his period of agency work as a crisis in his masculinity. Soon after he was made redundant his wife became the main breadwinner and he never knew if he would be working from one day to the next. Standing (2011: 18) argues ‘the precariat is defined by short-termism, which could evolve into a mass incapacity to think long-term’. This was indeed the case for Subject A, who confided that he often felt depressed because of his inability to find secure employment. The insecurity generated by agency work subjected him to the four A’s of ‘anger, anomie, anxiety and alienation’ (ibid, 2011: 21).

Although Subject A successfully applied for his current security job when it was advertised directly by the NHS, prior to that he experienced feelings of anxiety. This was mainly because he did not know how long his employment would last. He told me that he often turned his anger inwards and blamed himself for letting his family down. Lack of a regular income changed his lifestyle, forcing him to endure a hand-to-mouth existence. He became alienated from his wider circle of family and friends, as he simply could not afford to socialise.
Subject D is now 55 years old. After leaving school without any academic
Goods she began working for a plastics factory in 1976. At 18 she was made
redundant and then found work with a large vehicle manufacturer. When she
was 20 she began working for Birmingham Social Services as a home-helper.
She worked on a rota basis, in which she cared for elderly residents and carried
out cleaning and cooking duties in different residential homes. She stopped
working in the care sector in the late 1980s when National Vocational
Qualifications (NVQs) became a prerequisite of her employment. Since then
she has worked for a number of agencies as a cleaner and school dinner lady.
Gilchrist and Kyprianou (2011: 8) note that ‘for second generation [...] people,
ethnic networks can be beneficial in terms of employment’. This is
demonstrated below in the case of Subject D, whose friendship network has
provided her with information regarding potential employment in the security
industry:

‘I still get work in the residential homes sometimes, but now the
agencies only employ me to do the cleaning, because I haven’t got
the qualifications. I tried to get the NVQs, but the course was
difficult because of my dyslexia. In those days you used to cook,
clean and care for the residents. You didn’t need a qualification; you
just knew what to do! I haven’t heard from the agencies for a while.
My friend got an SIA badge\(^\text{201}\) and she’s had lots of work since. She

\(^{201}\) A Security Industry Authority license, which sanctions employment in the security industry.
said the training course was easy, so I’m going to try it’ (Subject D, 1st May 2014, Birmingham).

The idea of risk ‘presupposes decisions, [...] and negotiable standards of shared rights and duties, costs and compensation’ (Beck, 2000: 95). When risk is applied in the context of the labour market, Subject D’s unqualified status is potentially hazardous in relation to the tasks she used to perform for Social Services. Although nothing has changed regarding her capability to perform her former labour responsibilities, her employment agency now has a duty of care that is shared equally with its partner organisations. Interactions with vulnerable service users are defined as regulated activities. As such, Subject D’s employment agency have a statutory duty to ensure employees are appropriately trained. A complaint can incur serious financial consequences for employers if they are deemed liable for harmful or potentially hazardous actions undertaken by their employees.

Subject D is now forced to accept less money and worse conditions of employment for the same work she performed under the security of an employment contract. Moreover, she no longer has the stability of a regular income. Her predicament demonstrates the way in which precarious work now

202 The Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act (2006) lists actions that constitute regulated activities between vulnerable service users, providers and their agents (HM Government, 2006). See also Chapter Four.
involves a high risk of insecurity regarding remuneration. This is especially as employment agencies are increasingly reverting to the use of zero hour contracts ‘whereby somebody is given a contract but left unsure how many hours, if any, they will be required to work or how much if anything they will be paid’ (Standing, 2011: 36).

Subject D’s employment situation also demonstrates how economic and legislative changes can constrain the labour market participation of the precariat. Although she has no academic Goods Subject D was always able to find employment, until work in the manufacturing and production sectors disappeared. Legislation, which promotes the acquisition of qualifications as a means of regulating risk in the labour market, has now become a barrier to her employment. When Subject D worked for Social Services she had to lift patients out of their beds, which was similar to the heavy lifting tasks allocated to West Indian nurses in the post-war labour market (Bryan, Dadzie and Scafe, 1985). However, the increasing focus on managing risk in the service industry means that she now requires qualifications to perform tasks, which she formerly took for granted203. The narratives of Subjects A and D demonstrate how the risk of poverty is intensified by short-term, low-paid, insecure, precarious work, in the new global economy.

203 Manual handling legislation came into effect in 1982 and was subsequently updated in 2002 (HSE, 2012).
Class positions in the occupational structure

Racism mediated the educational experiences of the subjects of this research, and for many of them dyslexia\textsuperscript{204} was also a barrier to their educational attainment. Therefore, it is not surprising that their subsequent labour market misfortunes would be a consequence of their negative experiences of school in \textit{Babylon} (Carby, 1982). However, in recent times African Caribbeans are obtaining higher education (H.E.) \textit{Goods}, which are the prerequisite capital of the professions\textsuperscript{205}. Nevertheless, for inter-generational social mobility to be ‘easy and typical’, H. E. success must translate into labour market participation at the earliest opportunity (Weber, 1920 in Smith, 2007: 87). The extent to which this transition is occurring can be assessed by comparing changes in the occupational positions of the present Caribbean population to those of their White counterparts in the same economic sectors.

Table 6.1, below, highlights the differences between the 1991 Registrar General Social Class (RGSC) schema, based on occupations, and the 2001 and 2011 NS-SEC version:

\textsuperscript{204} Although dyslexia is now recognised as a hidden disability, and is a protected characteristic under the EA2010, its significance as a barrier to educational attainment was widely overlooked in the latter part of the previous century (Nosek, 1997).

\textsuperscript{205} See Chapter Five.
Table 6.1: The Registrar General Social Classes\textsuperscript{206} and the National Statistics Socio-Economic Classifications 2001 and 2011.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Professional Occupations</td>
<td>1. Higher Managerial and Professional Occupations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Managerial and Technical</td>
<td>2. Lower Managerial and Professional Occupations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Skilled Occupations (Non-manual)</td>
<td>3. Intermediate Occupations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Skilled Occupations (Manual)</td>
<td>4. Small Employers and Own Account Workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Partly Skilled Occupations</td>
<td>5. Lower Supervisory and Technical Occupations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Unskilled Occupations</td>
<td>6. Semi-routine Occupations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7. Routine Occupations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8. Never Worked and Long-term Unemployed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CASWEB (2015); (ONS 2015).

A major difference between the RGSC and the NS-SEC is that the latter distinguishes between ‘service relationship, […] labour contract and […] intermediate working regulations’ (ONS, 2010a: 3) in employment. The high-income occupations of the NS-SEC have a service relationship, which is more pronounced in Class 1 and weaker in Class 2. They are also the occupational classes that have greater opportunities for career progression and long-term security. In contrast, the labour contract is characteristic of Class 7 occupations, where workers exchange their labour for a fixed salary calculated by time worked (ONS, 2015). The intermediate occupations in Class 3 combines both the labour contract and service relationships, whereas Class 4 consists of the self-employed. Therefore, the occupations in Classes 1, and 2 can be viewed as labour market Goods, because of the level of skill they require and their potential to earn a higher income than those in Classes 5, 6 and 7, which represent high-risk economic Bads. Technical, Routine and Semi-routine employment are generally associated with declining production activities,

\textsuperscript{206} Although the RGSC occupational classes were used in the 1991 Census, they were renamed Social Class Based on Occupation in 1990 (Rose, 1995).
which provide very little financial security and have limited opportunities for long-term career progression. A number of occupations in Classes 3 and 4 are involved in consumption activities. Paradoxically, it could mean that they have more security and the potential to earn a high income. However, it could also be the case that they are precarious activities with little financial stability.

Although the NS-SEC is an improvement on the occupational schema of the RGSC, it is nevertheless far from flawless. Crompton (2008) suggests that the divisions between categories are arbitrary. For example, a large business might only have two more employees than a similar sized organisation that is classified as small (ibid, 2008; ONS, 2010a: 8). Thus, despite the occupational and organisational similarities of such establishments, those employed by them would fall in different NS-SEC classes (Crompton, 2008: 68). The NS-SEC is also supposed to be a reliable indicator of health outcomes based on quality of life, which is predicted by income and occupational skill level. However, Classes 4 and 8 (Small Employers and Own Account workers, and Never Worked and Long-term Unemployed, respectively) are incompatible with the idea of an employment hierarchy derived on that basis (ibid, 2008: 67). This is because Class 4 employees can be relatively successful, despite a lower level of skill and without having a regular service contract. Accountants, high-income entrepreneurs and relatively low-income newsagents can all fall within NS-SEC Class 4. Moreover, in regard to Class 8, highly educated individuals can have long-term illnesses, which leaves them unable to work. Consequently, despite
their high skill level, they can be classified as *Never Worked and Long-term Unemployed*.

Occupations in the service, information, technology and communication sectors respond to the rapidly changing needs of the global market. This makes it increasingly problematic to assign them into a distinct class bracket. As the NS-SEC reflects modern changes in the economic base, classical Marxian and Weberian notions of class – as position, situation and status\textsuperscript{207} within an occupational hierarchy – are still relevant indicators of social mobility. However, the contemporary notion of a social class has to be more nuanced to reflect the fetishism of modern consumption, and also the new modes of production in cultural, technological and intellectual capital. Bourdieu’s (2010 [1984]) notion of cultural capital, and the conceptualisation of class as a habitus\textsuperscript{208}, can add meaning to the NS-SEC classifications. Where the NS-SEC can capture changes in social mobility, and occupational disparities between ethnic groups, Bourdieu’s (2010, [1984]), notions of habitus and field can reveal the significance of cultural dispositions in class actions. The concept of field also provides an understanding of the social structures in which the agency of actors operates. This is to some extent demonstrated in the narratives of the labour market experiences of the research subjects.

\textsuperscript{207} See Morrison (1995).
\textsuperscript{208} I have argued earlier (see Chapter Three) that where Marx sees class as a social position and Weber interprets class as a social situation (Morrison, 1995), to Bourdieu (2010, [1984]) class also incorporates a disposition.
Changes in the occupational structure have to some extent resulted in upward and downward shifts in the reclassification of labour. Occupations once classified as unskilled may now be categorised as semi-skilled or even technical, whilst work formerly viewed as skilled might now fall within the unskilled category. Moreover, ‘many jobs labelled as “services” [...] are in fact productive activities’ (Crompton, 2008: 85). Therefore, African Caribbean labour may still be exploited in similar types of unskilled occupations to those that existed in the 1970s\textsuperscript{209}. Moreover, skilled occupations that formerly incorporated various forms of unskilled tasks may now be segmented. This is demonstrated in the case of Subject D above. Her heavy lifting duties in the care sector was formerly part of the tasks carried out by nurses, which is a skilled profession (Bryan, Dadzie and Scafe, 1985). Therefore, changes in the occupational structure also suggest that caution is necessary when mapping transitions in the employment positions of African Caribbeans. However, it should also be acknowledged that NS-SEC labour market positions provide a heuristic insight of material disparities between ethnic groups. As the occupational class structure is hierarchical it can be a reliable indicator of differences in resources between ethnic groups, based on income variations.

\textsuperscript{209} See Rex and Tomlinson (1979); Ratcliffe (1981); Taylor (1993).
Ethnicity and occupational class positions: 1991

This inquiry now proceeds to map African Caribbean social mobility by identifying and comparing changes in their past and contemporary occupational positions. Although ‘employment is not the only determinant of life-chances’ (ONS, 2010a: 3), occupational status is nevertheless a significant factor. As the White British population are the majority ethnic group, their NS-SEC Class positions are the yardstick against which those of African Caribbeans are compared. If Black Caribbeans are indeed improving their social status, then one would expect to see a narrowing gap between them and their White British peers in the same occupational classes. Moreover, the unemployment rates of African Caribbeans should also be proportionate to those of their White British counterparts. The 1991 Census is the preferred analytical starting point, as it was the first Census in which ethnic categories were used. It also followed the Handsworth inquiries of Rex and Tomlinson (1979) and Ratcliffe (1981)210. Rex and Tomlinson (1979) examined the economic positions of West Indians and their British born children, the latter are the same generation as those who participated in this research. However, as noted above, only tentative comparisons can be made between the 1991 Census and later versions.

210 As noted earlier, Ratcliffe (1981) reinterpreted Rex and Tomlinson’s (1979) data. His work highlighted gender differences between ethnic groups in Birmingham’s labour market.
Table 6.2 below reveals that the national representation of working-age White Britons employed in the high-skilled *Class I Professional Occupations* in 1991, was over two and a half times greater than that of their Black Caribbean counterparts. In Birmingham, the disparity was much higher. Although White Britons had higher proportional representations in *Classes I and II*, the gap between them and their Caribbean peers was much closer in the latter occupational class. However, what is more problematic for Black Caribbean social mobility is their higher national and local proportional representations in the manual, partly skilled and unskilled occupations. The data demonstrates that the occupational positions of Black Caribbeans in 1991 is similar to what it was in the 1970s (Rex and Tomlinson, 1979; Ratcliffe, 1981; Taylor, 1993). It is noticeable that the bulk of Black Caribbean workers are concentrated in manual and partly-skilled occupations.

Table 6.2: 16 and Over Social Class Based on Occupation by Ethnicity, 1991 [%].

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Professional Occupations</td>
<td>4.88</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>1.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Managerial and Technical</td>
<td>29.08</td>
<td>25.44</td>
<td>24.54</td>
<td>23.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Skilled Occupations (Non-manual)</td>
<td>23.72</td>
<td>22.52</td>
<td>24.19</td>
<td>17.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Skilled Occupations (Manual)</td>
<td>21.12</td>
<td>22.48</td>
<td>22.80</td>
<td>23.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Partly Skilled Occupations</td>
<td>15.39</td>
<td>20.01</td>
<td>17.73</td>
<td>25.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Unskilled Occupations</td>
<td>5.72</td>
<td>7.70</td>
<td>5.73</td>
<td>7.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>n = 100%</em></td>
<td>2,006,023</td>
<td>20,507</td>
<td>30,142</td>
<td>1,703</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ethnicity, gender, age and occupational class positions: 2001 and 2011

Unlike its 1991 predecessor, the 2001 National Census captured the employment data of MWBCs. Tables 6.3 and 6.4 below reveal national and local occupational disparities by ethnicity and gender in 2001 and 2011. African Caribbean national representations in Class 1 occupations in 2011 has deteriorated from what it was in 2001. However, in Birmingham there is a marginal improvement in their positions within the same occupational class. Tables 6.3 and 6.4 also reveal that in 2011 MWBC national representations in Class 1 occupations have decreased, whilst their positions in the same occupational class in Birmingham has slightly improved. There is only a marginal difference between White British and Black Caribbean national and local representations in Class 2 occupations. However, the biggest national disparities between them are in Classes 4 and 8. This indicates that relatively few Black Caribbeans are self-employed and, more significantly, a higher proportion of them are unemployed. Out of the three ethnic groups MWBCs have the highest rate of unemployment, which is three times higher than their White counterparts.

211 As noted in Chapter Three, this ethnic group is ontologically significant in relation to changes in the social status of Black Caribbeans. Prior to the introduction of the MWBC category in 2001, members of this group may have classified themselves as Black or even White. This affects the validity of previous data pertaining to both Black Caribbeans and White British ethnic groups.
Table 6.3: 16-74 Socio-Economic Classifications by Ethnicity, 2001 [%].

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Higher Managerial and Professional Occupations</td>
<td>10.80</td>
<td>7.73</td>
<td>6.84</td>
<td>9.69</td>
<td>5.06</td>
<td>4.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Intermediate Occupations</td>
<td>12.60</td>
<td>16.13</td>
<td>13.28</td>
<td>13.01</td>
<td>15.44</td>
<td>13.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Small Employers and Own Account Workers</td>
<td>9.30</td>
<td>4.95</td>
<td>5.31</td>
<td>6.28</td>
<td>3.42</td>
<td>3.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Lower Supervisory and Technical Occupations</td>
<td>9.85</td>
<td>8.41</td>
<td>8.80</td>
<td>10.19</td>
<td>8.80</td>
<td>7.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Semi-routine Occupations</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>17.25</td>
<td>18.64</td>
<td>17.79</td>
<td>19.10</td>
<td>20.42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n = 100% 24,744,617 326,562 72,705 332,468 25,909 4,741


Table 6.4: 16-74 Socio-Economic Classifications by Ethnicity, 2011 [%].

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Lower Managerial and Professional Occupations</td>
<td>22.17</td>
<td>22.75</td>
<td>18.79</td>
<td>20.44</td>
<td>20.31</td>
<td>17.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Small Employers and Own Account Workers</td>
<td>9.87</td>
<td>6.71</td>
<td>7.23</td>
<td>6.98</td>
<td>5.20</td>
<td>5.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Semi-routine Occupations</td>
<td>15.41</td>
<td>17.43</td>
<td>18.03</td>
<td>17.67</td>
<td>19.91</td>
<td>19.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Routine Occupations</td>
<td>12.41</td>
<td>13.08</td>
<td>13.59</td>
<td>14.30</td>
<td>15.93</td>
<td>12.78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n = 100% 34,758,320 441,914 191,707 432,640 34,954 10,272


Table 6.5 below reveals that the national difference between White British and Black Caribbean females in Class 1 occupations is quite marginal. In contrast, White British male representation in the same professions is approximately two thirds more than that of their Black Caribbean counterparts. Table 6.6 (also
below) reveals that by 2011 the position of Black Caribbeans is deteriorating in Class 1. Their proportional representation has reduced from two thirds and is about half that of their White peers. The position of Black Caribbean females in Class 1 has also decreased in 2011, but not noticeably so.

Table 6.5: 16-74 National Socio-Economic Classifications by Ethnicity and Gender, 2001 [%].

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Higher Managerial and Professional Occupations</td>
<td>15.05</td>
<td>9.68</td>
<td>8.84</td>
<td>6.26</td>
<td>6.08</td>
<td>4.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Intermediate Occupations</td>
<td>6.29</td>
<td>8.46</td>
<td>7.92</td>
<td>19.58</td>
<td>22.60</td>
<td>18.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Small Employers and Own Account Workers</td>
<td>12.91</td>
<td>8.49</td>
<td>8.05</td>
<td>5.45</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>2.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Lower Supervisory and Technical Occupations</td>
<td>13.70</td>
<td>12.40</td>
<td>12.02</td>
<td>5.74</td>
<td>5.06</td>
<td>5.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Semi-routine Occupations</td>
<td>10.67</td>
<td>15.84</td>
<td>15.33</td>
<td>21.18</td>
<td>18.43</td>
<td>21.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Routine Occupations</td>
<td>14.01</td>
<td>15.79</td>
<td>17.26</td>
<td>10.48</td>
<td>6.99</td>
<td>10.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n = 100%</td>
<td>12,883,625</td>
<td>149,412</td>
<td>34,836</td>
<td>11,860,992</td>
<td>177,150</td>
<td>37,869</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.6: 16-74 National Socio-Economic Classifications by Ethnicity and Gender, 2011 [%].

<table>
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<tr>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Higher Managerial and Professional Occupations</td>
<td>14.66</td>
<td>7.67</td>
<td>7.10</td>
<td>6.60</td>
<td>6.29</td>
<td>5.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Lower Managerial and Professional Occupations</td>
<td>21.44</td>
<td>16.66</td>
<td>16.60</td>
<td>23.98</td>
<td>27.95</td>
<td>20.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Small Employers and Own Account Workers</td>
<td>14.49</td>
<td>10.65</td>
<td>10.49</td>
<td>5.98</td>
<td>3.35</td>
<td>4.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Lower Supervisory and Technical Occupations</td>
<td>11.77</td>
<td>10.68</td>
<td>9.73</td>
<td>4.56</td>
<td>4.06</td>
<td>4.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n = 100%</td>
<td>16,917,381</td>
<td>203,209</td>
<td>94,898</td>
<td>17,840,939</td>
<td>238,705</td>
<td>96,839</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Between 2001 and 2011, Black Caribbean female representation in Class 1 occupations has remained in line with their White counterparts. They have also maintained a higher national representation than White British females in Class 2 occupations. Class 2 occupations consist of employment in Levels 4, 5 and 6 of the SOC2010 (Rose and Pevalin, 2010: 8-9). They range from National Government Administrative Occupations at the top of Level 4, to Caring and Personal Services at the bottom of Level 6. Nurses and care workers are examples of professions located towards the bottom of Level 6. The dominant representation of African Caribbean females in Class 2 occupations seems to indicate they are improving their class status. However, it is difficult to tell exactly which occupations they are accessing. They could be concentrated in the lower tier Caring and Personal Services within Level 6 of the SOC2010, rather than the higher tier Government and Related Organisations; and Administrative and Finance Occupations of Level 4 (ibid, 2010). Therefore, there could still be a tendency for Black females to choose nursing as a profession, just as they did in the 1970s (Ratcliffe, 1981).

The national difference between White and Black females in Class 8 has remained stable between 2001 and 2011. However, there are comparatively more African Caribbean females employed in routine employment over the same period. Unemployment amongst MWBC females has remained constant between 2001 and 2011, at approximately three times higher than their White
counterparts. Tables 6.7 and 6.8 below reveal that in contrast to their female peers, Black Caribbean males in Birmingham have a higher representation in routine employment. There are also less Black Caribbean males employed in Class 1 occupations in 2011. The disparity between Black Caribbean males and their White counterparts in Class 8 is marginally less in 2011 than it was in 2001. However, the 2011 representation of Black males in Class 2 occupations is almost six times less than in the previous decade. During the same period, White British males and females have increased their representation over their Black Caribbean counterparts in the Class 3 Intermediate Occupations. However, Birmingham’s Black Caribbean females have improved their representation in Class 1 and 2 in 2011.
Table 6.7: 16-74 Birmingham Socio-Economic Classifications by Ethnicity and Gender, 2001 [%].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NS-Sec Classes</th>
<th>White British: Males</th>
<th>Black Caribbean: Males</th>
<th>MWBC: Males</th>
<th>White British: Females</th>
<th>Black Caribbean: Females</th>
<th>MWBC: Females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Higher Managerial and Professional Occupations</td>
<td>13.11</td>
<td>6.23</td>
<td>5.07</td>
<td>6.04</td>
<td>4.07</td>
<td>3.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Lower Managerial and Professional Occupations</td>
<td>20.98</td>
<td>13.96</td>
<td>14.02</td>
<td>25.10</td>
<td>28.05</td>
<td>17.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Intermediate Occupations</td>
<td>6.52</td>
<td>6.87</td>
<td>7.44</td>
<td>19.90</td>
<td>22.64</td>
<td>18.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Small Employers and Own Account Workers</td>
<td>9.27</td>
<td>5.57</td>
<td>5.21</td>
<td>3.09</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>1.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Lower Supervisory and Technical Occupations</td>
<td>14.39</td>
<td>12.86</td>
<td>10.42</td>
<td>5.72</td>
<td>5.37</td>
<td>5.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Routine Occupations</td>
<td>15.09</td>
<td>18.58</td>
<td>17.72</td>
<td>11.34</td>
<td>9.62</td>
<td>11.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n = 100%

171,330 11,835 2,110 161,138 14,074 2,631


Table 6.8: 16-74 Birmingham Socio-Economic Classifications by Ethnicity and Gender, 2011 [%].

<table>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Higher Managerial and Professional Occupations</td>
<td>12.47</td>
<td>5.36</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>6.39</td>
<td>4.53</td>
<td>3.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Intermediate Occupations</td>
<td>7.98</td>
<td>7.36</td>
<td>8.69</td>
<td>21.77</td>
<td>19.33</td>
<td>17.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Small Employers and Own Account Workers</td>
<td>10.78</td>
<td>8.34</td>
<td>7.90</td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>2.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Lower Supervisory and Technical Occupations</td>
<td>11.88</td>
<td>10.43</td>
<td>8.45</td>
<td>4.74</td>
<td>4.10</td>
<td>4.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Routine Occupations</td>
<td>15.87</td>
<td>20.12</td>
<td>15.45</td>
<td>12.82</td>
<td>12.48</td>
<td>10.35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n = 100%

208,923 15,768 4,901 223,717 19,186 5,371


Class 3 occupations fall within Level 7 of the SOC2010 (Rose and Pevalin, 2010: 8). They include clerical, administrative, technical, auxiliary, engineering and service occupations (ONS, 2010a: 8), which all require specific skills. In regard
to the social mobility of Black males between 2001 and 2011, it is problematic that they are losing ground to their White peers in this occupational class, whilst increasing their representation in routine occupations. In contrast, Black females have practically closed the gap with their White counterparts in Class 7 occupations, between 2001 and 2011, to the extent where there is only a nominal difference between them. Routine employment requires fewer skills and consist of the types of precarious occupations that are familiar to the majority of participants in this research. Over the same period, Black Caribbean females have marginally reduced their rate of unemployment in comparison to that of their White female peers. In comparison, MWBCs had approximately three times the rate of unemployment as their White British peers. Although the unemployment rate of MWBC females was still quite high in 2011, it is down by approximately a sixth from 2001.

The situation in Birmingham is more nuanced where Black Caribbean, and MWBC, males are concerned. The disparity in unemployment representations between White British and Black Caribbean males is slightly less than it was in 2001. However, despite having a lower representation in routine employment in 2011, MWBC male representation in Class 8 is three times greater than that of their White peers. Moreover, their unemployment situation is worse than it was in the previous decade. Although there were proportionally two and a half times more White British males employed in Class 1 in 2001, in comparison to their MWBC counterparts, the disparity between their representations
marginally decreased by 2011. Class 2 representations between the same ethnic groups in 2011, have reduced to half of what it was in the previous decade. The national data in Tables 6.5 and 6.6 above also reveal a different trend to the Birmingham data. MWBCs males have improved their representation in Class 2 occupations, whereas their situation has deteriorated in respect of Class 1. Moreover, their propensity for unemployment has also increased and it is still approximately four times higher than that of their White British peers.

Table 6.9 below reveals the national 25-49\textsuperscript{212} age representations of African Caribbeans, and their MWBC counterparts in Class 1 and Class 2 occupations, have deteriorated between 2001 and 2011. African Caribbeans also have over twice the representation of their White British peers in Class 8, and the numbers have increased over the decade. MWBCs have approximately three time the representation of their White British peers in Class 8 and that position has hardly changed from 2001 to 2011. Out of the three ethnic groups there are proportionally more White British workers employed as routine workers in 2001. However, by 2011 there was very little difference between them and Black Caribbeans in this class, whereas MWBCs have significantly increased their representation in Class 7. Black Caribbeans have the highest proportional

\textsuperscript{212} As noted earlier and argued in Chapter Five, the optimum age-stage of upward social mobility is between the ages of 25 and 49. It is usually the case that by their late 40s, most individuals would have achieved their highest labour market position. Thus, if educational capital is to be exchanged for economic capital at the earliest opportunity, then the process should commence whilst actors are in their early to mid-twenties.
representation in the Intermediate Occupations. However, all the data above suggests that females, rather than males are driving this position. Changes in the top and bottom NS-SEC classes, between 2001 and 2011, suggest that nationally African Caribbeans are not improving their occupational status in the crucial 25-49 age-range.

Table 6.9: 25-49 National Socio-Economic Classifications by Ethnicity, 2001*-2011 [%].

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Lower Managerial and Professional occupations</td>
<td>27.41</td>
<td>27.58</td>
<td>25.24</td>
<td>26.71</td>
<td>25.85</td>
<td>21.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Small Employers and Own Account Workers</td>
<td>8.80</td>
<td>5.16</td>
<td>5.54</td>
<td>9.85</td>
<td>6.83</td>
<td>8.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Lower Supervisory and Technical Occupations</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>7.95</td>
<td>9.23</td>
<td>7.56</td>
<td>6.18</td>
<td>6.96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n = 100% 733,497 11,423 4,961 14,445,436 230,498 109,725


*The 2001 data is calculated from a five per cent sample of Census Anonymised Records Small Area Microdata (SAM).

The national gender data for the 25-49 age-range reveals significant employment differences between males and females. Tables 6.10 and 6.11 below highlight the general trend of higher female national representation in Classes 1 and 2. Proportionally more Black Caribbean females are obtaining employment within the higher occupational sectors of the labour market, in comparison to their male counterparts. Although the representation of Black females in Class 8 is practically double that of their White female counterparts, there are proportionally fewer of them in Class 7. Black females also have a
higher representation than White females in Class 2 and there has been little variation in their Class 1 positions between 2001 and 2011. This supports the data above, which suggests that females are doing better in this age-range than their male counterparts.

### Table 6.10: 25-49 National Socio-Economic Classifications by Ethnicity and Gender, 2001 [%].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Higher Managerial and Professional Occupations</td>
<td>17.10</td>
<td>12.58</td>
<td>11.63</td>
<td>7.84</td>
<td>7.62</td>
<td>7.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Lower Managerial and Professional Occupations</td>
<td>25.46</td>
<td>20.89</td>
<td>22.18</td>
<td>29.48</td>
<td>32.83</td>
<td>27.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Intermediate Occupations</td>
<td>6.06</td>
<td>8.49</td>
<td>7.68</td>
<td>19.27</td>
<td>24.62</td>
<td>18.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Small Employers and Own Account Workers</td>
<td>12.26</td>
<td>9.23</td>
<td>8.38</td>
<td>5.15</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>3.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Lower Supervisory and Technical Occupations</td>
<td>14.10</td>
<td>11.98</td>
<td>12.72</td>
<td>5.68</td>
<td>4.79</td>
<td>6.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Routine Occupations</td>
<td>12.65</td>
<td>13.87</td>
<td>13.28</td>
<td>9.08</td>
<td>5.04</td>
<td>6.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n = 100%</td>
<td>376,551</td>
<td>5,017</td>
<td>2,304</td>
<td>356,946</td>
<td>6,406</td>
<td>2,657</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 6.11: 25-49 National Socio-Economic Classifications by Ethnicity and Gender, 2011 [%].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Lower Managerial and Professional Occupations</td>
<td>24.43</td>
<td>20.84</td>
<td>19.55</td>
<td>28.98</td>
<td>30.14</td>
<td>24.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Intermediate Occupations</td>
<td>7.79</td>
<td>10.54</td>
<td>8.57</td>
<td>21.42</td>
<td>23.74</td>
<td>18.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Small Employers and Own Account Workers</td>
<td>13.80</td>
<td>10.55</td>
<td>11.90</td>
<td>5.89</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>4.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Routine Occupations</td>
<td>12.15</td>
<td>13.93</td>
<td>15.35</td>
<td>7.60</td>
<td>5.06</td>
<td>9.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n = 100%</td>
<td>7,214,314</td>
<td>106,313</td>
<td>53,672</td>
<td>7,231,032</td>
<td>124,185</td>
<td>56,053</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.12 below for Birmingham also reveals that Black Caribbean females are improving their social mobility more so than their male peers in the 25-49 age-range. Although White males have more than double the representation of their Black Caribbean peers in Class 1 occupations, Black females is approximately a third lower than their White British counterparts. The disparity between White and Black females in Class 8 is also similar to that in Class 1. In comparison, their male counterparts have more than double the rate of unemployment of their White peers. Although Black Caribbean females have a higher representation than their White counterparts in the Routine Occupations, the gap between them is marginal in comparison to the 20 per cent higher representation of African Caribbean males over their White peers. There is also a greater proportion of Black females than White females employed in Class 2 occupations.

Table 6.12: 25-49 Birmingham Socio-Economic Classifications by Ethnicity and Gender, 2011 [%].

<table>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Higher Managerial and Professional Occupations</td>
<td>14.82</td>
<td>6.68</td>
<td>5.93</td>
<td>9.80</td>
<td>6.53</td>
<td>4.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Lower Managerial and Professional Occupations</td>
<td>22.22</td>
<td>17.08</td>
<td>17.67</td>
<td>27.72</td>
<td>29.30</td>
<td>23.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Intermediate Occupations</td>
<td>8.74</td>
<td>9.10</td>
<td>8.70</td>
<td>21.49</td>
<td>22.38</td>
<td>18.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Small Employers and Own Account Workers</td>
<td>11.01</td>
<td>8.64</td>
<td>9.36</td>
<td>3.51</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>3.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Lower Supervisory and Technical Occupations</td>
<td>10.41</td>
<td>9.08</td>
<td>8.32</td>
<td>4.34</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>4.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n = 100%</td>
<td>91,299</td>
<td>7,722</td>
<td>2,886</td>
<td>92,269</td>
<td>9,806</td>
<td>3,166</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regardless of their gender, Black Caribbeans, and MWBCs, have higher proportional representations than their respective counterparts have in *Semi-routine Occupations* in Birmingham. However, the disparity between White and Black females is marginal. In line with the national data, MWBCs have the highest representations in *Class 8*, which is almost three times higher than their White peers. In contrast the proportion of their female counterparts in the same occupational class is twice as high as that of White British females.

Overall, the 25-49 age-range data indicates that the occupational status of Black Caribbean females is gradually improving, as their employment positions are similar to those of their White female peers. Their representation in *Classes 1 and 2* also suggest that as Black females are getting older their employment opportunities and income are increasing in a normative way. This facilitates the process in which social mobility can, to some extent, become ‘easy and typical’ (Weber in Smith, 2007: 87), as they might be exchanging their educational capital for economic capital. However, the comparatively higher representations of their male counterparts in the lower NS-SEC occupations clearly indicates their social status is deteriorating. Whereas Black females are increasing their acquisition of labour market *Goods*, Black males are procuring more economic *Bads*. 
Labour market penalties and discouraged workers

Heath and Cheung’s (2006) analysis of ethnic competition in the labour market conflates the data of first and second-generation immigrants\(^{213}\). They argue that Black Caribbeans can be perceived as ‘discouraged workers’ (ibid, 2006: 10 [my emphasis]). This is because ‘difficulty in obtaining work [...] might discourage some workers eventually from even looking for work’ (ibid, 2006: 10). Out of the three ethnic groups analysed in this research, MWBCs have the youngest population. Their relative youth suggests they might not yet have developed the requisite skills needed for particular types of employment. This may also explain their comparatively high rates of unemployment. However, the prevalence of racial discrimination in the labour market might still be discouraging unemployed Black Caribbeans from engaging in the competition for economic Goods.

Heath and Cheung (2006: 2) suggest that ‘unequal treatments on the grounds of race or colour’ are examples of ethnic penalties experienced by Black

\(^{213}\) In Chapter Two I argued that applying the label of second-generation immigrants to British-born Blacks reifies racism. This is because it implies that Whiteness constitutes Britishness, whereas Blackness is perceived as Otherness. This racialised Othering overlooks the commonality of a shared British national identity. The epistemological problem of the label is epitomized in the way that White children of Irish parentage are referred to as British, rather than second-generation Irish. Moreover, Ed Miliband, the former leader of the Labour Party – whose Polish and Belgian parents speak English as a second language – has never been labelled as a second-generation Polish or Belgian immigrant. However, children born in the UK of Jamaican parentage, who may never have been to the Caribbean, are classified as second-generation immigrants. This is despite their English-speaking parents originating from an island that was ruled by Britain for hundreds of years (Black, 1991). The common denominator of identity, in the examples of the Irish and Miliband above, is their Whiteness.
Caribbeans in labour market situations. Heath and McMahon (1997, in ibid, 2006: 5) define ethnic penalties as, ‘the disadvantages that ethnic minorities experience in the labour market compared with British Whites of the same age and human capital’. Therefore, such penalties might account for net differentials in labour market Bads: i.e. disparities in unemployment, income, and occupational positions, between ethnic groups. Nevertheless, evidence of ethnic penalties does not explain why they occur in the first place (ibid, 2006: 20). Structural inequalities in the employment sector, such as gender discrimination and institutional racism, are macro-level factors of ethnic penalties. However, the example of Subject G also highlights the micro-level choices and constraints that can discourage labour market participation.

Subject G is a forty-three-year-old African Caribbean female who lives with her seven-year-old daughter and mother in a council owned property in Newtown, Birmingham. It is a working-class area with a high proportion of social housing. She has two children: her son, who she had at 16, is 27 and lives in Bristol. Subject G left school without any qualifications, she has never worked and has always lived with her mother. Her habitus has been constructed around notions of motherhood, within the field of the family:

‘I just see myself as a mum; someone who’s trying to do her best.
I’ve never worked or thought about going to college. I just went through life as a mother, taking care of my son and then later on I
had my daughter. I get Disability Living Allowance for my seven-year-old daughter who has Type 1 diabetes, so I can’t really work. It’s really difficult living off benefits, but I have to be there for my daughter’ (Subject G, 8th August 2013, Birmingham).

To many African Caribbean females their families are social capital, providing ‘values [...] and resources [...] they can access [...], which [...] are the result of collective and socially negotiated ties and relationships’ (Reynolds, 2006: 1088). However, Subject G’s unemployed status is a gender penalty, which is a consequence of her family attachments. She is unable to work because she cares for her diabetic daughter. Moreover, her decision to raise her children without the support of a male partner can also be viewed as a ‘non-marriage penalty’214 (Gottfried, 2013: 241). Unemployed lone-parent females often have to exist on welfare payments and live in households that have below the accepted minimum standard of income (Padley, Valadez and Hirsch, 2015: 18). The escalating cost of nursery care also constrains their labour market participation. Since 2010, ‘Britain’s poorest families are having to find substantial sums to make up the shortfall between part-time childcare costs, and the maximum amount [...] they can claim under working tax credits’ (Hill and Adams, 2015), which further compounds their welfare dependency.

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214 Patriarchy is to some extent a feature of Japanese society. Successful male executives are supported in the private domain by their “stay-at-home wives” (Gottfried, 2013: 241), whilst unmarried females incur institutional disadvantages.
Reynolds (2006: 1094) contends that Caribbean families are historically resilient, as they are able to ‘modify and reconfigure themselves to suit the specific social and political context’, which is to some extent demonstrated by Subject G. Her responsibility as a carer discourages her labour market engagement, whilst incurring a poverty penalty. Although her ‘emotion work’ (Hochschild, 2003: 7) is undertaken within the private context of her home, it does not translate into economic capital. Therefore, it is not considered as real work. Subject G’s domestic responsibilities highlight how the relatively high unemployment rates of Black Caribbean – and other precariat – females might not just be a consequence of ethnic penalties in the labour market. Lifestyle choices and family constraints might also incur gender penalties, which discourage their labour market participation. Thus, the NS-SEC Class 8 status of Black females can be a consequence of structural and political changes affecting the labour market, and the dearth of available employment opportunities for unskilled workers (Standing, 2011). However, the employment status of females can also be influenced by their attachments in the domestic sphere.

**Whiteness as privilege and social capital**

Bourdieu (2010 [1984]) contends that the middle-classes maintain their dominant social positions by accumulating and exchanging three forms of capital: i) educational capital; ii) economic capital; and iii) cultural capital.
Bourdieu defines cultural capital as the knowledge, tastes and pursuits which distinguishes the middle-classes from their working-class counterparts. However, Bourdieu overlooks that Whiteness is also a form of capital; it denotes power and bestows privileges by virtue of individuals sharing the same skin colour. Whiteness is therefore ‘a kind of social currency’ (Jacobson, 1998: 11). Hage (2000, in Garner, 2007: 51) also concedes that ‘Whiteness [...] can be exchanged for Anglo culture’. Therefore, the disposition – or habitus – of Whiteness is also Goods, which can be commodified in labour market interactions. Whiteness maintains the power to ‘invent and change the rules […] , transgress them with impunity; and […] define the “Other”’ (ibid, 2007: 14). Thus, in the Bourdieusian sense, Whiteness is a fourth type of social capital that can be appropriated in economic relations. However, Whiteness is not unique to the middle-classes, as it is skin colour that signifies membership and the power to exercise its rights and privileges. It could therefore be argued that in the context of labour market competition, the White working-classes can exchange their Whiteness for economic capital.

Tables 6.3 and 6.4 above reveal that between 2001 and 2011 nationally, White British and MWBCs have had higher national representation than African Caribbeans in Class 4 Occupations. The idea that Whiteness can give its members advantages in economic situations might explain this phenomenon.

Although anti-discriminatory policies, such as the Equal Pay Act 1970, the Sex

\footnote{The middle-classes exchange university degrees for occupations in the higher tiers of the NS-SEC. Their leisure and cultural pursuits often reflect their high income status.}
Discrimination Act 1975, The Race Relations Act 1976 (and its 2000 Amendment) and the Equality Act 2010, apply to both the private and public sectors, they are difficult to monitor – and therefore regulate – within the private sector. The occupations in Class 4 are those in Levels Eight and Nine of the SOC2010, which includes the self-employed (Rose and Pevalin, 2010: 8-9).

Class 4 is to some extent representative of the petite bourgeoisie in an occupational hierarchy: i.e. small and medium sized self-employed businesses and individuals, competing to provide a range of services for larger companies or directly to consumers. Class 4 occupations might appeal to Black workers with low level educational capital, as ‘there are no formal academic entry requirements, though some GCSE grades can be an advantage’ (ONS, 2010b: 214). Moreover, the occupational skills required are often learned within the workplace. This also means that employers would have to invest time and capital in their employees, in order to maximise the growth and development of their businesses.

Small, independent organisations often deal face-to-face with their consumers and are conscious of how they perceive racial Others. Consequently, Class 4 employers might choose not to employ – or restrict the numbers of – Black workers, because of the negative way they are generally perceived by their customers.216 They might instead employ more MWBCs who they might see as

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216 Taylor (1993: 120) highlights how employers perceived West Indian workers in the 1950s. Although racial discrimination might not be as pronounced in the contemporary labour
being more similar\textsuperscript{217}. Moreover, MWBCs may also commodify their Whiteness and exchange it for economic capital in business transactions with White consumers. Class 4 employers might also validate decisions to restrict the number of Black employees by referring to market factors, rather than attributing their judgment to personal prejudices. This is not a new phenomenon. In the 1950s Birmingham’s Transport Department justified the colour bar on Black workers by citing their ineptitude, and that their presence would cause resentment amongst White workers\textsuperscript{218}. Although it is no longer easy for public sector employers to racially discriminate in the same manner, the same equality duties that apply to small organisations are more easily circumvented in the private sector.

Garner (2007: 47) argues that Whiteness bestows social privileges upon White people, whereas ‘it impacts negatively on people of colour’. The power of Whiteness is reinforced through a racial contract, in which ‘all Whites are beneficiaries [...]’, though some Whites are not signatories to it’ (Miles, 1997 in Garner, 2007: 25). The racial contract is a ‘set of formal, informal or meta-agreements between’ those who are identified by the racial marker of their skin colour as being White (ibid, 2007: 25). As such, White consumers might also

\textsuperscript{217}I have argued in Chapter Three that not all MWBCs see themselves as Black. Moreover, their social networks will also contain Whites as both friends and relatives. Therefore, they might be more successful operating self-employed businesses than their Caribbean counterparts, because they are able to attract a wider range of consumers.

\textsuperscript{218}See Chapter 2 (Gunter, 1954).
appropriate their Whiteness as a commodity in business interactions. Whiteness can expedite transactions involving goods and services, and facilitate the flow of capital between those who have the same physical and cultural markers. Although Blacks might have a business that provides the same service as their White competitors, White consumers may choose not to use them. As the majority of the UK’s population is White British they represent the dominant provider of market services and they are also the major consumer group. In contrast, African Caribbeans are a minority population and their businesses are often based in areas of high social and material deprivation, which are populated by low-income consumers. Therefore, the limited spending powers of their customer base constrains the growth of African Caribbean businesses. This highlights how Blackness is conceived as Bads in economic relations and incurs sanctions in the form of limited opportunities. This explanation might account for the perpetual dearth of self-employed Black workers and businesses.

**Whiteness as a labour market class habitus**

Heath and Cheung (2006: 66) contend that labour market ‘prejudice tends to rely on stereotyping, on the basis of irrelevant visible characteristics such as skin colour’. Although racial prejudice influences ethnic disparities in occupational class positions, it is often overlooked in its analysis. In 2013 the West Midlands had the highest number of people nationally who admitted to
being racially prejudiced (NatCen Social Research, 2014). Moreover, the
*Personal Services and Supervisor* occupations, which consist of the kinds of
face-to-face consumer services that are predominant in NS-SEC *Class 4*, also
recorded a high degree of racial prejudice amongst its workforce (ibid, 2014).
This suggests that racial discrimination remains a persisting problem for Black
workers trying to improve their occupational status, despite the passing of the
RRA1976, RRAA2000 and the EA2010. However, public sector organisations
tend to offer more protection against racial discrimination than those in the
private sector. This is because the RRA1976, and its 2000 Amendment, was
never regulated as rigorously in the private sector as it was in the public sector
(Heath and Cheung, 2006).

Whiteness also advantages White workers, in the lower tiers of the economy,
where the competition to improve one’s occupational status is fiercest. White
workers in the *Semi-routine and Routine Occupations* of *Classes 6 and 7* can
create spaces of White privilege in which their habitus is reproduced by
practices in the field of work\(^\text{219}\) (Bourdieu, 2010 [1984]). This is also
people think you are your work […] Black people think that my work is just what
I have to do to get what I want’. The proximity of Blacks in the workplace can
make White workers feel that their working-class habitus is being
compromised.

\(^{219}\) Bourdieu (2000, [1984]) defines the habitus as a class disposition and field are the social
spaces (or structures) in which the habitus is reproduced.
The feeling of not wanting to be seen as “White trash or a Chav” (Garner, 2007: 75 [emphasis added]) can facilitate hegemonic Whiteness. White workers might perceive they have fallen to the bottom of the social ladder, because they share the same occupational status as racially subordinated Others. As such, the daily visibility of Black Others in the workplace reaffirms what it feels like to be White trash (ibid, 2007). This collective sense of social inadequacy can sometimes reproduce a habitus of White supremacy (Gillborn, 2005). In the context of the workplace this can be expressed by appropriating spaces to advantage White workers, whilst disadvantaging their Black counterparts. This can also have the effect of discouraging (Heath and Cheung, 2006) Blacks to apply for vacancies in places of employment where they form a highly visible minority.

The unavailability of work in Birmingham, which demands specific skills, might to some extent account for the comparatively high rate of Black Caribbeans employed in the Semi-routine and Routine Occupations. However, it does not explain why some might be discouraged from applying for unskilled employment – and as a consequence contribute to the unemployment statistics of those in Class 8. In the 1950s Birmingham had a colour bar policy in private and public sector workplaces (Gunter, 1954; Taylor, 1993). Although the colour bar has been officially outlawed by successive Race Relations Acts (Ratcliffe,
2004), subtle exclusionary practices might be covertly operating within the field of paid employment.

Subject E became a victim of workplace violence, for invading a space that represented the ‘psychological wages of Whiteness’ (Garner, 2007: 27). This idea maintains that Whites believe they have a higher social status than Blacks, which demands preferential treatment in every social situation. Subject E started working in a Birmingham car production plant in the early 1990s. However, he was unaware of the workplace’s racial contract, which underpinned the psychological wages of Whiteness. White workers designated specific spaces of the factory as zones of White privilege. Although there were no physical markers demarcating boundaries, it was generally accepted that a shop floor apartheid existed. White workers benefitted from this practice by excluding Black workers from using the facilities in their racialised space:

‘I was really green when I first started working there. I didn’t realise what was going on. Me and this White kid started at the same time and we worked together on the production line. After breaks and lunch I would go looking for him in the area that he hung out. The guys ’round there used to give me funny looks. I got the vibe that I weren’t welcome. I just ignored it! I could tell it was a racial thing, but I’ve always had White friends and I’m the type of person who gets on with everyone. I just thought that once they got to know me, all the dirty looks would stop. I had no idea, none at all! I didn’t
know how serious they felt about me, until things started to happen’

(Subject E, 16th October 2012, Birmingham).

At first his locker was broken into and human excrement was left inside. Then his work clothes went missing, only to turn up in the toilet soaked in urine. Gollywogs, and other derogatory racial caricatures, were left by his workstation with the words “nigger” and “fucking coon” written on them next to his name. He nevertheless persisted in entering the space of White privilege. White workers would deliberately bump into him, and ask him, ‘Since when were niggers allowed ‘round here’? The racist bullying, intimidation and threats, escalated each time he reported them to his manager. A few days after Subject E complained that he was the target of racial discrimination, he was called to his manager’s office. His manager told him that his complaint had no substance, and that he must stop causing trouble by going into areas where he had no business:

‘It just got worse and worse! I turned into a nervous wreck. I couldn’t eat, I couldn’t sleep, but I had to go there every day because I needed the job. I even stopped going to their areas, but they kept on harassing me. Each incident I told the manager about just made things worse and nothing was ever done. The final straw was when they left a note in my locker telling me that I would be dead before the end of the week. When I went to the manager’s office and showed him the note, he said that I must stop harassing people! That was it for me. I had nowhere else to turn, so I thought I’m going
Subject E tried to commit suicide in his manager’s office by repeatedly stabbing himself with a screwdriver. He was taken to hospital by ambulance and never returned to his job. However, he received financial compensation albeit a derisory amount. His labour market experiences of racism have *discouraged* him from seeking paid work. He has not worked since leaving his job in the car plant. During our interview, Subject E showed me his self-inflicted wounds. The scars are deep and have disfigured his body. His injuries are an embodiment of the psychological trauma of racism. Although it is many years since he left hospital, he takes anti-depressants daily and does not feel that he is capable of holding down a full-time job. His narrative demonstrates how racism reinforces White privilege. Subject E’s colleagues and manager were signatories of the racial contract. Their White privilege allowed them to appropriate symbolic spaces, which organised working relationships in a racial hierarchy. Despite his employer’s legal duty to outlaw racial discrimination\(^{220}\), Subject E did not feel protected by legislation. His experiences reveal how easy it is for private sector organisations to flaunt race legislation, and how difficult it is for employees to invoke the law for protection.

\(^{220}\) As outlined in the 1976 (and its 2000 Amendment) Race Relations legislation.
There is no simple explanation as to why Black Caribbeans, and MWBCs, have three and four times the representation of their White peers in NS-SEC Class 8. Black Caribbeans may consciously avoid seeking employment in organisations where they believe the psychological wages of Whiteness regulate working relations. However, it might not be the fear of workplace racism that discourages them from applying for particular forms of employment. They might see employment applications as a futile exercise if they believe that White applicants would take priority over them, because of the colour of their skin colour. The statutory duty of organisations to monitor inequalities requires job applicants to enter their ethnicity on application forms. However, this process is a double-edged sword for minority ethnics. Blacks applicants might be selected for interviews by organisations that have no intention of employing them, just so that it appears as if they are fulfilling their statutory duties. Employers can also hide behind bureaucratic administration procedures and disregard the applications of minority ethnic candidates for reasons that appear to be legitimate.

African Caribbeans employed in the public sector, ‘might be more successful in larger firms, which have more formal recruitment and promotion procedures’ (Heath and Cheung, 2006: 53). Not only does the public sector offer better employment security than the private sector, there are also more females employed within it: 22 per cent compared to 12 per cent of males (Fawcett Society, 2013: 8). As highlighted above, Black Caribbean females have a higher
rate of participation in Classes 1 and 2 than their male counterparts. The professions in those Classes can include employment in the Public Administration, Education and Health sectors, which are in theory more rigorously regulated by equality legislation (Heath and Cheung, 2006: 52). Therefore, it is possible that policies, which encourage institutions and organisations to monitor diversity and equality, may have facilitated the occupational status of African Caribbean females in public sector employment.

Although the introduction of the Equality Acts in 2006 and 2010, has to some extent downplayed the significance of racial inequality on life chances and opportunities, Black Caribbean females continue to have better occupational positions than their male counterparts. However, the Fawcett Society (2013) reveals that the austerity measures of the present government, which includes moving more jobs from the public to the private sector, will have a detrimental impact on the career progression of all females. This is especially as ‘the private sector tends to offer women reduced pay prospects [...] in lower paid work [...], part-time work’ (ibid, 2013: 5). Moreover, although the gender pay gap may have narrowed, females in different employment sectors still earn on average between 15-49 per cent less than their male counterparts (Revesz, 2016), and their occupational progress has practically ‘ground to a halt since the recession’ (Fawcett, 2013: 5). Nevertheless, despite these structural obstacles, African Caribbean females – in Birmingham and nationally – have improved their occupational status over the past two decades.
Conclusion

In the 1970s and 1980s racism mediated the employment experiences of Black Britons, just as it had for their West Indian forebears. However, routine work in the manufacturing and production industries was to some extent long-term. It provided Black males with the security of contractual employment and a regular wage, which enabled them to negotiate the immediate risk of poverty. However, masculine industrial occupations have to a great extent vanished, which creates new risks for Black males in the contemporary labour market.

Tertiary labour in the new global economy is often precarious; much of it is low-paid, short-term and offers very little financial security. Employment agencies mediate, negotiate, exploit and sanction the contractual rights of workers. Legislation also regulates the suitability of workers to engage in particular forms of risk related employment activities. There is no gendered division of labour in the modern economy, and individuals are encouraged to participate in areas that were previously gender specific. Black females have made the most of available opportunities within the new modes of production in services, information and technology. However, their male counterparts, who are now forced to compete with them for similar types of employment, are regressing rather than progressing on the occupational ladder.
The higher education attainment of Black females might explain why they have a greater proportional representation in the professional occupations, than their male counterparts. However, government intervention to reduce the role of the State and bring increasingly more public services in line with the private sector, has implications for the future employment prospects and working conditions of African Caribbean females. If Black females are in high-income positions, they are more likely to be employed within the public sector. However, a number of them are still employed in routine private sector occupations, which traditionally pay lower salaries. It is also increasingly difficult to monitor the effectiveness of anti-discriminatory legislation in the private sector. Therefore, the gradual erosion of public sector employment creates emerging risks for the social mobility of both Black males and females. This is because the principles of free market capitalism, which supports the idea of reducing policy interventions, will make workplace racism and gender inequality increasingly difficult to detect, monitor and regulate within private sector employment.
7. Social change and spatial transition: Space – the final frontier

This chapter will examine how the spatial patterns of Birmingham’s African Caribbean population have changed. The aim is to establish how variations in the urban movements of African Caribbeans, between 1991 and 2011, relate to their social mobility. In previous chapters I revealed some of the disadvantages encountered by African Caribbeans in the educational and labour markets, which have generally constrained their occupational status and income. As homeowners generally acquire property by translating educational and economic Goods into residential capital\(^{221}\), the nexus between education and employment is significant. This is especially as financial capital can influence choices and constraints regarding urban locations and differences in housing tenure.

Racial discrimination and low financial capital mediated the housing constraints of post-war West Indians (Rex and Moore, 1967; Flett, Henderson and Brown, 1979). To some extent exclusionary practices also confined them to the bottom of the housing ladder (Rex and Tomlinson, 1979). Moreover, the British born descendants of West Indian migrants have tended to rent, rather than purchase, housing (Ratcliffe, 2004)\(^{222}\). As adjustments in housing tenure and

\(^{221}\) I make a distinction between residential capital and property capital. In the case of the latter, individuals might own property that they do not necessarily reside in (i.e. commercial property).

\(^{222}\) See Chapter One.
spatial positions often reflect changes in social class status, this investigation
will now:

• examine the relationship between migration, labour market policies and
  the post-war settlement patterns of West Indians;
• compare the material characteristics of the urban spaces in which the
  ethnic groups surveyed in this research are concentrated;
• map ethnic group spatial transitions and ascertain the age-stage in
  which home ownership is more pronounced;
• identify differences in ethnic group tenure and how they compare over
  time and space;
• establish the nexus between education, employment and spatial
  location;
• analyse the lived experiences of African Caribbeans, and the influence of
  social and political changes on their relationship with the housing
  market.

In the 1950s and 1960s, the communities of West Indians were constrained
within the high deprivation Bad Lands\textsuperscript{223} of Britain’s major cities, such as
London, Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool, Bristol, Nottingham, Derby and
Sheffield (Peach, 1968). Areas with a high concentration of Black residents

\textsuperscript{223} I reiterate that I do not use the term Bad Land pejoratively; it is merely an objective label
relating to the physical environment and not necessarily how social actors feel about the
spaces they reside in. I also argue that Bad Lands can be perceived as cultural Heart Lands, by
members of the communities that reside within them.
have also been labelled as ghettos\(^{224}\) (Peach, 1968; Rex and Tomlinson, 1979; Phizacklea and Miles, 1980; Peach, 1996). This was the case with Handsworth in North-West Birmingham, a *Bad Land* where accommodation was to some extent available – if not always relatively cheap (Ratcliffe, 1981: 62). Rex and Tomlinson (1979:70) acknowledged Handsworth was significant to ‘West Indian settlement in Birmingham and [to] Black immigrant settlement in Britain as a whole’. The name of Handsworth was synonymous with Caribbean culture in Britain, and a euphemism for Black resistance against White racism and racial inequality\(^{225}\).

The majority of subjects who participated in this research grew up in or near Handsworth, between the 1960s and 1980s, in houses acquired by their West Indian parents. In the 1960s and 1970s Handsworth, like Sparkbrook in the South of the city, was perceived as a ‘Twilight Zone’ (Rex and Moore, 1967: 31). The area has numerous Victorian houses, and large period properties, which were formerly homes for wealthy factory owners and their servants. Cross and Johnson (in Owen and Johnson, 1996: 231) note that Birmingham’s ‘largely

\(^{224}\) Peach and Rossiter (1996: 114) argue that the term ghetto ‘is too often infected by the looseness of everyday discourse and a variety of pejorative connotations linking urban decay with the alleged moral/cultural identity of the residents of such areas’. Nevertheless, they also concede that a ghetto is ‘a residential district which is almost exclusively the preserve of one ethnic or cultural group’ (ibid, 1996: 114). Anderson (2012) refers to the “iconic ghetto”, which is the stereotypical image that wider society attaches to the notion of a ghetto. This definition has its roots in chattel slavery and is signified by skin colour. As such, wherever Blacks are their skin colour reifies the image of the iconic ghetto. This demonstrates the way in which the term “ghetto”, and ideas of what constitutes it, is contested.

\(^{225}\) An example of the syncretic between Handsworth and the Caribbean community and their culture was the reggae band Steel Pulse. The band originated from Handsworth and supported Bob Marley and the Wailers during their European tour. Steel Pulse’s 1978 album, *Handsworth Revolution*, was a critically acclaimed international hit.
Victorian terraced housing was built to accommodate the burgeoning proletariat of the industrial revolution’. Handsworth’s deterioration started in the early 20th century, and gathered pace as production and manufacturing work declined, which also triggered the outward movement of indigenous labour (Rex and Tomlinson, 1979). By the time that West Indian migrants arrived in Birmingham in the late 1950s and early 1960s, many properties in Handsworth were in a State of disrepair and undesirable to many of the local White population. Nevertheless, the houses were located near to the existing industries experiencing labour shortages and sizeable enough to cater for West Indians and their families226.

On the surface, residential locations can appear to be a result of class differences driven by differentials based on ‘poverty, low status work, unemployment and so on’ (Ratcliffe, 1996: 16). However, notions of “race” and culture might also inform spatial movements, social positions and urban concentration. Those with enough financial capital might relocate to increase the social distance227 between them and dissimilar Others, whilst also reaffirming cultural ties in the process. As such, the politics of difference where

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226 Areas of early post-war West Indian settlement, such as Handsworth in Birmingham, Brixton and Notting Hill in London, Moss Side in Manchester, Toxeth in Liverpool and St Paul’s in Bristol all have an abundance of deteriorating Victorian and Edwardian properties.

227 Social distance, as defined by Park (1924: 339), is ‘an attempt to reduce to something like measurable terms the grades and degrees of understanding […] which characterise personal and social relations generally’. As such, social distance also incorporates spatial distance between ethnic groups, which can be calculated by using the Index of Dissimilarity (ID). According to Peach and Rossiter (1996: 111) the ID ‘measures the proportion of a group which would have to shift its area of residence in order to have the same distribution as the group with which it is being compared’.
‘race’, ethnicity and class are concerned, often intersect any examination of disparities in spatial positions. Moreover, the material characteristics of the environments in which African Caribbeans reside might also reveal something about their contemporary class status. Housing is symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 2010 [1984]), and an important aspect of social mobility. Moreover, property values are often determined by location. Thus, houses in the most desirable locations are also symbolic of hierarchical social positions. Therefore, competition for housing can be considered as a class situation within a market, where the demand for property often exceeds the supply. However, it is also important to note that for West Indians and their descendants, the housing market has been much more than just competition in a market situation; it continues to be a significant site of conflict in their struggle against racial adversity.

Mixing the unmixables

The 1948 Nationality Act granted passports and British citizenship to Commonwealth subjects (Fryer, 1984; 372; Pilkington, 2003: 35), a number of

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228 Rex and Moore (1967) posited the Weberian inspired idea of housing classes (see also Rex and Tomlinson, 1979 and Ratcliffe, 1981) as property owning status groups, which is distinct from the Marxian understanding of bourgeoisie and proletariat class relations formed from an economic base (Marx, 1867 in McLellan, 1999). As such, members of housing classes can be conceived as ‘persons whose standard of life, rights of property, accumulation and profession conferred social prestige and privilege’ (Weber in Morrison, 1995: 228).

229 The “mixing of the unmixables” was a term used in a memo by a Government official, R.H. Bindloss CBE, in which he recommended the separation of West Indian and White labour in State run hostels (Searle, 2013: 55).
whom arrived in Britain on the *Empire Windrush*. Despite the Birmingham Gazette’s headlines of ‘work – but no homes’ (Searle, 2013: 46), which highlighted the perceived national problem of housing the *Windrush* labour force, the entry, employment and settlement of many early Caribbean migrants were regulated by policies controlling the issue of work permit (ibid, 2013)

Records indicate that ‘the Ministry of Labour initially accommodated the *Windrush* immigrants in air raid shelters, in London’s Clapham South. The closest labour exchange was on Coldharbour Lane in Brixton’ (ibid, 2013: 61). As the Brixton Labour Exchange issued work permits, and generally assigned employment locally, many *Windrush* migrants settled in the area. Immigrants also travelled north to Birmingham and other cities in search of work. The example of Brixton, in which Caribbean settlement was constrained within the vicinity of Government labour exchanges, can also be applied to Handsworth in the northwest of Birmingham. The Handsworth Labour Exchange was on Soho Road and is where migrant workers obtained their work permits.

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230 The Empire Windrush docked in Tilbury, Essex during June of 1948. There were 492 migrants on board, most of who were Jamaican (ibid, 2013). The *Windrush generation* is a phrase often used to describe the first major influx of post-war Caribbean migrants (Wambu, 1998).

231 Peach (1968) notes that Birmingham was the largest post-war centre of West Indian settlement outside of London.

232 The 1961 Census reveals that in comparison to other immigrant groups, Handsworth had a large West Indian population (Ratcliffe, 1981: 60). See also Rex and Tomlinson (1979).

233 See Taylor (1993) for an account of racist employment practices undertaken by labour exchange officials in Birmingham.
Handsworth was also within walking distance of the Black Patch\textsuperscript{234} area of Winson Green in the Soho ward, which contained a significant number of foundries\textsuperscript{235}. Thus, the need to obtain work permits from labour exchanges, and their proximity to industries with labour shortages, were significant factors in the early settlement patterns of West Indians.

Policies regulating the operation of State hostels also influenced the early settlement patterns of Black post-war migrants. In the late 1940s, Ministry of Labour hostels accommodated both Jamaican\textsuperscript{236} and European Voluntary Workers (EVWs). In Birmingham, there were National Service Hostels Corporation (NSHC)\textsuperscript{237} properties located in Winson Green, Highgate, and also in the Causeway Green area of West Bromwich (ibid, 2013: 48). Many of the EVWs, perceived the hostels as spaces of White privilege\textsuperscript{238}. As such, the presence of Black workers was generally frowned upon. Many of the EVWs also envied the British citizenship of Black workers, because their own European

\textsuperscript{234} Black Patch is nothing to do with “race” or ethnicity. It is the name of the area connecting Handsworth, Winson Green and Smethwick. The name was probably derived from the factories and foundries that once dominated the area, of which only a few still remain.

\textsuperscript{235} I speak from my own experience here. The first house my parents bought was on Queens Head Road in Handsworth during 1964. Queens Head Road is opposite Rookery Road and near to the railway line that separates Handsworth from Black Patch (Rex and Tomlinson, 1979: 73; Ratcliffe, 1981: 9). The foundry horns used to sound each evening to signal the end of work. A few minutes later our road would teem with hundreds of workers walking back to their homes. Part of that area, known locally as “top Handsworth”, borders West Bromwich.

\textsuperscript{236} In the early years of post-war migration, the majority of Caribbean labour migrants were from Jamaica (Peach, 1968).

\textsuperscript{237} The NSHC was set up in 1941 by Ernest Bevin, the Minister for Labour and National Service. At first it supported the short-term housing needs of workers employed away from their homes. However, ‘after the War the main function of the NSHC was to provide accommodation for both British and migrant workers employed on important reconstruction work’ (Searle, 2013: 45-46).

\textsuperscript{238} I have articulated this concept previously in Chapter Six; see also Gillborn (2005).
work permits restricted their labour. Searle (2013: 45) contends that the alien status of Polish workers kept them within ‘undesirable sectors of employment. This status clearly differentiated them from West Indian arrivants who, as British citizens, were exempt from such controls’.

In August 1949 simmering racial tensions erupted in violence when Polish EVWs attacked Jamaican residents in the Causeway Green hostel. Despite the antagonism of EVWs and local residents, Caribbean communities later developed in Causeway Green. They also emerged in nearby Handsworth and Smethwick, where labour shortages in specific industrial sectors remained high. West Indian labour was not just confined to semi and unskilled occupations. By 1955 a ‘Caribbean intelligentsia of practicing professionals especially in medicine [...] with predominantly White clients’ (Taylor, 1993: 112) was established in Birmingham. Many nurses and medical students also trained at

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239 The 1958 “race” riots in Notting Hill and Nottingham have been widely documented (Sivanandan, 1982; Fryer, 1984; Pilkington, 2003; Solomos, 2003). However, they were preceded by a number of less known racist attacks against Jamaicans, several of which occurred during the 1940s in various NSHC hostels throughout Britain. The main instigators of these attacks were Polish European Voluntary Workers (EVWs), although some Irish workers were also involved. From 1946 onwards, racist attacks on Jamaican workers were also reported in NSHC hostels in Hertfordshire, Leeds, Pontefract, Derbyshire and Nottingham (Searle, 2013: 47). The Causeway Green violence was used to justify subsequent government legislation reducing the quota of West Indian migrants – staying in any single hostel – to 10 per cent of a hostel’s total capacity. The rationale was that fewer West Indian residents would reduce the potential for violence (ibid, 2013: 55). Fighting in the Causeway Green Hostel continued throughout the night and escalated into the neighbouring streets of West Bromwich and – in some cases – inside the gardens and homes of local residents (ibid, 2013). Every available policeman in the Sandwell area was dispatched in an attempt to contain the violence. Although West Indians were the victims of assault by EVWs, they were portrayed by the media as the cause of rioting in West Bromwich. The media amplified the concerns of local residents, who were worried that the increasing presence of West Indian migrants in the area would lead to more violence and social unrest (ibid, 2013).

240 The research of Roberts and Mills (1955) (see also Chapter Two) puts to bed the myth that the majority of Caribbean migrants were unskilled labourers.
Birmingham’s Queen Elizabeth Hospital. In addition, there was an emerging West Indian artisan aristocracy, in which carpenters and joiners were prominent (ibid, 1993).

Social tensions revolving around ‘race’, immigration and housing surfaced again in Sandwell\(^{241}\) during the 1964 Smethwick by-election, in which the Conservative’s Peter Griffiths and Labour’s Patrick Gordon Walker were the main contenders (Solomos, 2003). Griffiths exploited the concern of local White residents, who blamed Labour’s policy of continuing Commonwealth immigration for the influx of migrants in Smethwick\(^{242}\). Local anxieties were amplified by national perceptions of incompatible cultural differences between the host and guest populations. Some of Smethwick’s White residents set up pressure groups\(^{243}\) aimed at preventing Sandwell Local Authority from allocating social housing to West Indian and Asian families. The focus of their campaign was to keep Smethwick White by ensuring that only White families were allocated housing in specific roads.

\(^{241}\) West Bromwich and Smethwick are part of the Sandwell area.

\(^{242}\) The same was also true for the White residents of Sparkbrook (Rex and Moore, 1967: 200).

\(^{243}\) One such group was called “The Five Fighting Housewives of Marshall Street Smethwick”. The group held a meeting with Richard Crossman, the Minister for Housing in 1965. They presented him with a petition opposing his decision to refuse Smethwick Council a loan of £4,175.00. Smethwick Council wanted to buy two houses in Marshall Street and allocate them to White families, to ‘prevent it [Marshall Street] from becoming a ghetto’ (Express and Star, 1965).
The Conservative Party won the by-election using Griffiths’ slogan: “if you want a nigger neighbour vote labour”\textsuperscript{244}. The idea of a housing apartheid, proposed by the residents of Smethwick, attracted international attention. Malcolm X visited Smethwick during the height of racial tensions in February 1965 (Street, 2008; Jeffries, 2014). His support reinforced solidarity between the racism experienced by African Americans and immigrant groups in the UK, particularly local Pan-Africanists\textsuperscript{245}. Despite growing racial tension, and increasing racial discrimination in the Sandwell and Birmingham housing markets, Caribbean communities in the city and surrounding areas continued to flourish.

\textbf{Translating cultural and social capital into residential capital}

It was against the above backdrop of racial adversity in the 1960s, that Rex and Moore (1967) conducted their Weberian\textsuperscript{246} study of ethnic competition for housing in Birmingham’s Sparkbrook. They revealed how difficult it was for

\textsuperscript{244} The 1964 Smethwick by-election preceded Enoch Powell’s notorious Rivers of Blood speech, which was in 1968 at Birmingham’s Britannia Hotel. Powell delivered his racist proclamation of the impact that continued immigration would have on Britain and its native White population (Ratcliffe, 1981; Solomos, 2003). The Britannia Hotel is located in Birmingham City Centre, a short distance from Handsworth and Smethwick, and only a few miles away from West Bromwich.

\textsuperscript{245} Searle (2013: 47) notes that ‘the Universal African Improvement Association (reminiscent of Marcus Garvey’s Universal Negro Improvement Association, which was founded in 1914), was operational in Birmingham during the late 1940s. The African Caribbean Self-Help Organisation (ACSHO) (Rex and Tomlinson, 1979; Ratcliffe, 1981; 2004) was also established in Handsworth during 1964, a year before Malcolm X’s visit to Smethwick. ACSHO also supports Pan-Africanism, the idea of a concerted universal Black struggle against racism, which is similar to the political views held by Malcolm X.

\textsuperscript{246} Weber viewed classes as operating in three distinct categories: i) market situations; ii) actions arising from shared interests and also iii) historical ideas of class struggle, which have their origins in antiquity, but are more pronounced in modern economic relationships based on waged labour (Weber in Morrison, 1995: 233).
West Indians to obtain mortgages from the main banks, many of which took the view that ‘English birth is a necessary qualification for a mortgage’ (ibid, 1967: 105). Moreover, it was also difficult to rent housing as ‘no Blacks, no dogs, no Irish was the landlords’ slogan of the day’ (Mirza, 2006: 144). In their efforts to obtain finance for mortgage deposits, many West Indians lost money invested with disreputable loan companies. However, despite the adversities they encountered in the 1950s and 1960s, from mainstream landlords, lenders and backdoor credit agencies, West Indians appropriated their cultural and social capital to support their housing needs.

Sterling (1995: 654) notes West Indians ‘were able to “beat the system” by finding alternative ways of acquiring quick credit for [...] access to housing’. The informal cultural banking system of West Indians was called the Partner, which consisted of weekly handouts (or hands)\textsuperscript{247}. Each hand was used to purchase expensive items, such as cars, mini-buses, furniture and – most significantly – to place deposits on houses. The Partner system depended heavily on socio-cultural communal ties: where the participants (or throwers) trusted other throwers to contribute their share each week, and everyone trusted the ‘banker’ to hold onto their money and distribute it accordingly. The size and durations of Partners varied. Some consisted of 100 throwers and lasted over a year, whilst others were formed for three or four months with a typical membership of ten to twelve (ibid, 1995: 656).

\textsuperscript{247} The phrase “draw my hand” was used by members when it was their turn to collect their share of the Partner.
Only the banker is required to know each member of the Partner personally. The banker is the organiser and most important person in the Partner. Sterling (1995) notes that bankers, and the majority of members in the Partner, were generally females. The gender of the banker is quite significant. This is because the role of female West Indian migrants, in exchanging their cultural capital to accumulate financial capital to purchase property, has tended to be overlooked. Bourdieu (2010, [1984]: 258) maintains that an essential component of cultural capital is ‘the qualities of friends, through which ethical dispositions are more directly expressed’. It was often the case that the banker came from a family of good standing in the Caribbean and was a highly trusted friend – who knew most of the throwers before they arrived in England\textsuperscript{248}. Potential members heard of a Partner by word-of-mouth. The Black Churches\textsuperscript{249} were instrumental in sustaining the community and friendship networks through which Partners were formed. However, membership could

\hspace{1cm}\textsuperscript{248} Sterling (1995: 656) supports this observation. However, I also write from my own experience. My parents were involved in a Partner, through my mother. The banker was an elderly Jamaican lady who was employed in Birmingham as a seamstress. However, my mother’s father trained her as his Junior Accounting Clerk, in Jamaica. My grandfather, Jonathan Harvey, was the Book keeper for the Bounty Hall Estate in Trelawney where the banker and her family came from. When she died in 1970 her daughter, who was familiar to all the throwers, became the new banker. Thus, kinship ties formed in Jamaica maintained the Partner system in the UK.

\hspace{1cm}\textsuperscript{249} The power of the Black Churches, as edifices of social solidarity to combat racism, sustain Black networks and mobilise its Caribbean congregation, is overlooked by Rex and Moore (1967), and also Rex and Tomlinson (1979). They viewed the religious disposition of West Indians as a “theodicy of disprivilege” (i.e. the Weberian notion that religion justifies this-worldly suffering). They did not take into consideration that Black Churches perform much more than just religious functions for their members. They are also focal points for cultural defence and political agency.
only be sanctioned by the banker. It was her responsibility to be aware of everyone’s integrity, employment status and capability to contribute weekly.

If someone had an urgent financial need, and wanted to draw their hand before it was due, they had to obtain permission from the banker. She would then inform the other throwers of her decision. The group’s collective conscience was galvanised by their common experiences of racial adversity in their new country. Therefore, no one complained if unforeseen circumstances meant that someone’s financial need took priority over their own. Moreover, the members were only too aware that a situation could arise where they might also need to draw their hand earlier than planned. Thus, central to the success of the Partner was friendship with the banker and absolute trust in her moral judgement. Partners also used their hands to pay for family members to join them in their new country. This was the case for both of Subjects A and D:

‘Everybody was in a Partner in those days. That’s the only way you could send for people. Partner money brought me here, and my cousin too’ (Subject D, 1st May 2014, Birmingham).

‘My parents were in a partner. Dad told me that’s how they bought their house and sent for me. My wife is in one with some of the church sisters, but it is only small. There are five or six members. I’m not sure what they throw, because I don’t get involved. It’s a woman thing, you know’ (Subject A, 10th August, 2013, Birmingham)!
Twenty members contributing £20.00 per week would mean a different thrower drawing a hand of £400.00 each week, until the Partner finished. When the Partner started again the person who came in last would have the first hand. In large Partners two throwers would draw their hand weekly. A hundred members would yield £2000 per week, which would be shared equally between two different throwers. The more throwers involved, the larger the weekly hand. Therefore, the Partner network in the Black community, literally turned friendship bonds into capital; it paid dividends to know people who you could trust. The importance of the Partner system in transforming Caribbean tenure from renting to home ownership is acknowledged by Sterling (1995: 657) who notes, ‘it was not difficult to see how the early migrants were able to accumulate enough savings to facilitate the purchase of a “clearance house” in the late 1950s’. Clearance houses were often located in slum areas (Rex and Moore, 1967). Nevertheless, owning the roof over their heads reduced the risk of poverty and provided newly arriving West Indians with security and stability in an alien country.

Although there was a system of informal borrowing that existed in rural areas of Jamaica, the Partner system was unique to the UK. As crops in the Caribbean (i.e. sugar cane, rice etc.) were only harvested annually, people in the countryside borrowed money from landowners and wealthy businesspeople to
make ends meet until harvest time. Money was often borrowed without interest, on the basis of the integrity of the individual, their ability to repay the loan and their kinship ties with the lender. These bonds of social attachment, which developed over generations in the Caribbean, provided the infrastructure of the Partner system in the UK. However, the fundamental difference was that the Partner system functioned on collective, shared cultural and social – rather than individual – interests.

The development of the Partner system in the UK demonstrates how West Indians appropriated their collective social networks, and exchanged their cultural capital for residential Goods in Britain’s Bad Lands. Inner-city areas in which Caribbeans settled, like Handsworth, Brixton, Moss Side, Toxeth and Bristol’s Saint Paul’s, were also cultural Heart Lands: i.e. urban spaces of cultural defence, in which Caribbean networks and social bonds were able to flourish with minimal interference from external agents. It could be argued that the Partner system would never have developed without the exclusionary practices that to some extent isolated West Indians and constrained their social and spatial mobility. Although in the 1950s and 1960s West Indian employment was generally low paid (Fryer, 1984), it was nevertheless secure enough to guarantee they could maintain their financial commitments to the Partner250.

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250 Taylor (1993: 112) noted that although the work was hard in the 1950s West Indians ‘could earn real good wages, especially with the overtime [...] because of the boom’.
Although the Partner system still exists, it is no longer as influential as it once was. The breakdown of cultural ties within the Black communities, and the precarious nature of work, make it difficult for some members to sustain their payments. The gradual decline in West Indian migration following the 1971 Immigration Act – and fragmented ties between the present generation and their extended families in the Caribbean – have also weakened the cultural and kinship networks that were the backbone of the Partner system. In addition, changes in social policies have to some extent made the Partner system less significant, as a means of obtaining loans and large amounts of capital. Following the 1968 and 1976 Race Relations Acts discrimination and exclusionary practices have been outlawed in various markets, which includes housing (Ratcliffe, 2004: 135). Consequently, African Caribbeans can now obtain mortgages and loans more readily than West Indians could in the 1950s and 1960s.

Promised Lands and cultural Heart Lands

In mid-1970s Birmingham, the Bad Lands (or Caribbean Heart Lands) were still located in the northwest corridor of the city, such as Handsworth, Soho and the surrounding areas (Rex and Tomlinson, 1979; Ratcliffe, 1981; Taylor, 1993). My inquiry now moves forward to establish if the present Birmingham Caribbean population remains concentrated in the same geographical terrain, and to
identify some of the choices and constraints that influence their movement and settlement patterns. The 1991 Census is the preferred starting point, as it was the first to include a question on ethnic identity. However, as with the employment data in the previous chapter, the 1991 Census can only provide a heuristic snapshot of spatial disparities between ethnic groups. Unlike the Censuses of 2001 and 2011, ethnicity data in the 1991 Census are not comparable.

An environment’s material deprivation is often a good indicator of the quality of life experienced by those who reside there. Thus, it is conceivable that as individuals accumulate more financial capital they might move from high deprivation Bad Lands to low deprivation Good Lands. Table 7.1 below reveals the three Birmingham wards recording the lowest levels of deprivation in 1991. The Sutton wards appear to be the urban Promised Lands, due to their low levels of material deprivation. Residential housing in these environments might not necessarily be the most expensive. However, in terms of quality of life in 1991, Sutton Four Oaks, Sutton Vesey and Sutton New Hall offered the best overall standard of living in Birmingham. Table 7.1 also highlights the spatial division between Birmingham’s White British and Black Caribbean ethnic groups. The three Sutton wards contained the highest concentration of White

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251 I refer to Burgess’ (2008, [1925]) term of Promised Lands [emphasis added] to describe the low deprivation spatial locations that new migrants, with limited social and financial capital, might aspire to live in when their situation has improved.
British residents in any of Birmingham’s wards. However, by comparison, their Black Caribbean counterparts had a much lower representation.

Table 7.1: Distribution of 16-74 Aged White British and Black Caribbean Populations in the Lowest Deprivation Birmingham Wards [1991].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Townsend Index Score</th>
<th>White British</th>
<th>Black Caribbean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sutton Four Oaks</td>
<td>-3.8792</td>
<td>4.07%</td>
<td>0.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sutton Vesey</td>
<td>-3.0696</td>
<td>3.81%</td>
<td>0.46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sutton New Hall</td>
<td>-1.3734</td>
<td>4.19%</td>
<td>0.43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mean = 4.34</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>n = 449416</td>
<td>n = 29667</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Total ethnic group population in Birmingham’s thirty-nine wards.

Table 7.2 below highlights the high levels of deprivation in the wards where the majority of Birmingham’s Black Caribbeans resided in 1991. They are the same Bad Lands that attracted West Indian settlement in the 1950s and 1960s (Rex and Tomlinson, 1979; Ratcliffe, 1981; Taylor, 1993). However, the high levels of deprivation in these wards contrast starkly with the low levels in the predominantly White Sutton areas. Tables 7.1 and 7.2 reveal that in 1991 the wards with the highest concentration of Blacks and Whites also had polarised levels of deprivation. Thus, the low deprivation Sutton wards, and the high deprivation areas of Soho, Handsworth, Ladywood and Aston, could be perceived as ethnic enclaves specifically because of their ethnic spatial clustering.

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252 I earlier referred to Peach and Rossiter’s (1996: 114) view that the term “ghetto” does not necessarily imply material deprivation. A ghetto can be defined as an urban space that is mainly dominated by a single ethnic group. In comparison to other Birmingham wards those in Sutton have a high White British concentration. Thus, they can be perceived as ghettos, or “White ethnic enclaves”, because they are urban spaces in which the cultural habitus (Bourdieu, 2010 [1984]) of Whiteness is reproduced.

253 Spatial clustering (Peach, 1968) (like the term ghetto above) is too often used to refer to the urban spaces in which minority ethnic groups are over-represented. However, this suggests that unlike other minority ethnic groups, Whites have an even spatial distribution. However,
Table 7.2: Distribution of 16-74 Aged White British and Black Caribbean Populations in High Deprivation Birmingham Wards [1991].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Townsend Index Score</th>
<th>White British</th>
<th>Black Caribbean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soho</td>
<td>8.5916</td>
<td>1.27%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handsworth</td>
<td>8.8138</td>
<td>0.97%</td>
<td>9.83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ladywood</td>
<td>9.0820</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>7.39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aston</td>
<td>11.4373</td>
<td>1.57%</td>
<td>9.01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean = 4.34</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total (n = 100%)*

*Total ethnic group population in Birmingham’s thirty-nine wards.


Although property values are influenced more so by location than type, analysing differences in tenure can provide a meaningful insight into the character of neighbourhoods during 1991. Tables 7.3 and 7.4 below reveal differences between types of housing tenure in Birmingham’s Good Lands and Bad Lands. There are much higher levels of owner occupation in the low deprivation wards, than there are in their high deprivation counterparts. This suggests that Black Caribbeans residing in the wards in Table 7.4 may not be homeowners. Moreover, the comparative dearth of owner occupation, when compared to the high levels of social renting, also suggests that those in the high deprivation wards have less economic, financial and social capital than their Sutton counterparts. Hence, the high concentration of Black Caribbeans in Birmingham’s 1991’s Bad Lands, compounded with their low levels of owner occupation, suggests that their spatial and social mobility has changed very little since Rex and Tomlinson’s Handsworth survey in the mid-1970s. I articulated above how West Indians used the Partner system to purchase as demonstrated above with the wards of Sutton, that is not the case. Whites are generally under-represented in environments in which minority groups are over-represented. As such, urban spaces of White clustering could also be perceived as their cultural Heart Lands.
clearance houses. Although the condition of such houses did very little, if
anything, to improve the social status of their proprietors, ownership – rather
than renting – provided West Indian families with stability and security.

Table 7.3: Types of Tenure and their Distribution in Low Deprivation Birmingham Wards [1991].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Mortgage/Loan/Shared Ownership</th>
<th>Rent: Housing Association</th>
<th>Rent: Local Authority</th>
<th>Total n = 100%*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sutton Four Oaks</td>
<td>78.05</td>
<td>7.44</td>
<td>14.52</td>
<td>5,056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sutton Vesey</td>
<td>81.06</td>
<td>5.70</td>
<td>13.24</td>
<td>4,683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sutton New Hall</td>
<td>62.94</td>
<td>9.53</td>
<td>27.53</td>
<td>4,976</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Excludes forms of tenure other than those considered in the table above.

Table 7.4: Types of Tenure and their Distribution in High Deprivation Birmingham Wards [1991].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Birmingham Ward</th>
<th>Mortgage/Loan/Shared Ownership</th>
<th>Rent: Housing Association</th>
<th>Rent: Local Authority</th>
<th>Total n = 100%*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soho</td>
<td>37.83</td>
<td>19.33</td>
<td>42.84</td>
<td>5,324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handsworth</td>
<td>38.09</td>
<td>27.47</td>
<td>34.44</td>
<td>4,881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ladywood</td>
<td>17.27</td>
<td>16.99</td>
<td>65.75</td>
<td>7,094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aston</td>
<td>14.14</td>
<td>14.07</td>
<td>71.78</td>
<td>7,290</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Excludes forms of tenure other than those considered in the table above.

Imagining desired lands: 2001-2011

The analysis of ethnic group spatial movements now includes examining
material differences, between and within wards at Lower Super Output Area

Whereas I continue to use the TID to calculate deprivation in 2001, the preferred method of analysis for the relevant Tables denoting 2011 is the more current ONS Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) 2010. There are seven indicators of overall deprivation in the IMD 2010: Education, Skills and Training; Employment; Income; Barriers to Housing Services; Living Environment; Crime and Health. Deprivation scores in the 2011 Tables aggregates the seven indicators to present an overall multiple deprivation score.

Material deprivation in 2011 is examined at Lower Super Output Area (LSOA), which is the smallest geographical measurement. However, caution has to be applied when using LSOAs to establish deprivation in a given ward. Each ward will have several postcodes containing a number of LSOAs. The LSOAs tend to have different levels of deprivation. They can sit within
Tables 7.5 and 7.6 below reveal that in 2001 and 2011 the Sutton wards retained the lowest levels of deprivation in Birmingham. The city also underwent boundary changes in 2004, and increased the number of its wards, from 39 to 40. As a result, there is an additional Sutton ward: Sutton Trinity. The Handsworth ward also became East Lozells and East Handsworth. There are 641 LSOAs in Birmingham’s 40 wards, each recording different levels of deprivation. Handsworth shares the B20 postcode with Lozells and Handsworth Wood. However, Handsworth Wood has lower overall levels of deprivation than Lozells and Handsworth. The Handsworth Wood area has an abundance of privately owned detached and semi-detached properties built between the 1930s and 1950s, which are similar to those in the more affluent wards of the city. However, property prices in Handsworth Wood are to some extent relatively low because of its proximity to Handsworth and Lozells. Consequently, it is not necessarily the type of housing that determines market prices, but location, location, location.

The same postcode area or intersect them within the same ward. This is demonstrated in the case of Ladywood. Part of the B15 postcode of Ladywood comes under Edgbaston, which has the lowest levels of overall deprivation outside of the Sutton wards. However, parts of Ladywood also share the B12 Postcode with Sparkbrook, which has the highest level of overall deprivation in Birmingham. Moreover, when the crime domain of the IMD is analysed separately, the B15 postcode of Ladywood has the highest deprivation level in the city. Tables recording deprivation in 2011, highlight both the lowest and highest deprivation levels in a given ward. This is because there is no way of knowing in which LSOA actors reside, as some wards may only have pockets of high deprivation. Therefore, the members of the ethnic groups surveyed may not necessarily live in the most deprived part of a ward.

Lozells was the scene of social disturbances (more commonly referred to as “riots”) in 1985 and 2011. In Chapter Four, I outlined the agency of the New Testament Church of God in mobilising the community for a peaceful resolution.
Table 7.5: Distribution of Ethnic Populations Aged 25-49 in Low Deprivation Birmingham Wards [2001].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Townsend Index Score</th>
<th>White British</th>
<th>Black Caribbean</th>
<th>MWBC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sutton Four Oaks</td>
<td>-2.66</td>
<td>3.70</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sutton Vesey</td>
<td>-2.24</td>
<td>3.80</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>1.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sutton New Hall</td>
<td>-1.18</td>
<td>4.83</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>1.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mean = 5.45</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total [n = 100%]*</td>
<td>216,495</td>
<td>19,920</td>
<td>3,084</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Total ethnic group population aged 25-49 in Birmingham’s thirty-nine wards.


Table 7.6: Distribution of Ethnic Populations Aged 25-49 in Low Deprivation Birmingham Wards [2011].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Lowest LSOA IMD Score</th>
<th>Highest LSOA IMD Score</th>
<th>White British</th>
<th>Black Caribbean</th>
<th>MWBC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sutton Four Oaks</td>
<td>3.83</td>
<td>22.12</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sutton Vesey</td>
<td>5.61</td>
<td>16.99</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>1.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sutton New Hall</td>
<td>5.46</td>
<td>31.03</td>
<td>3.11</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sutton Trinity</td>
<td>3.63</td>
<td>42.02</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mean = 37.32</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Mean = 37.32</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total [n = 100%]**</td>
<td>187,348</td>
<td>18,366</td>
<td>6,334</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The Mean represents the average score of the aggregated seven IMD domains in Birmingham’s 641 LSOAs.

** Total ethnic group population aged 25-49 in Birmingham’s forty wards.


Where possible, the Tables above compare the 25-49 age-range. This is considered the optimum age-stage when actors might be socially mobile. By the time they are 25, individuals may have completed higher education and entered the labour market. However, as they approach 50, opportunities for progression in the labour market are generally – but not always – diminishing. Declining economic opportunities might also mean individuals have less financial capital for spatial mobility. As such, urban aspirations might be modified to fall in line with an individual’s age and income. Moreover, individuals might be more inclined to marry and, in some cases, start families.
between the ages of 25 and 49. Thus, housing and quality of environment – particularly in relation to health and education outcomes – may have increasing significance during this age-stage. However, decisions to change environment\(^{258}\) could be influenced by any single or combination of choices and constraints.

If improvements in African Caribbean spatial mobility were apparent – according to how their urban movements compare to those of the White British population – then one would expect to see them increasing their concentration in the low deprivation wards. One would also expect to see a lower representation of African Caribbeans in high deprivation wards. When differences between White British and Black Caribbean ethnic representations, between 2001 and 2011, are compared in Tables 7.5 and 7.6 above, African Caribbeans have slightly increased their proportional representation in three of the low deprivation Promised Lands of Sutton. The same is also true for their MWBC peers.

Tables 7.7 and 7.8 below reveal ethnic representations in Birmingham’s high deprivation Bad Lands, between 2001 and 2011. In comparison to the proportional representation of their White counterparts, African Caribbeans

\(^{258}\) In reference to what she defines as White flight, Neal (2002: 446) notes that ‘specific distillations of this [phenomenon] can be seen in migration from urban to rural areas – 4,900 people leave cities in England each week “because of the attraction of rural idyll [and] because of perceived urban decay”’.

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have a lower presence in Soho. However, in the same period they have increased their proportional representation in Handsworth, which could be a result of boundary changes in 2004. There are also decreases in Caribbean concentration in Aston and Ladywood. Paradoxically, the White British population has more than tripled its representation in Ladywood. This could be explained by Ladywood’s proximity to the City Centre and its recent gentrification, which has made certain sections of the ward more attractive to professionals. Ladywood demonstrates the problem of labelling entire wards as being deprived, when deprivation might be significantly low in some LSOAs, whilst higher in others. Therefore, certain parts of the ward can be conceived as both Bad Lands and Good Lands.

Table 7.7: Distribution of Ethnic Populations Aged 25-49 in High Deprivation Birmingham Wards [2001].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Townsend Index Score</th>
<th>White British</th>
<th>Black Caribbean</th>
<th>MWBC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soho</td>
<td>12.35</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>9.06</td>
<td>5.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handsworth</td>
<td>13.54</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>7.09</td>
<td>2.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ladywood</td>
<td>10.71</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>6.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aston</td>
<td>16.31</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>8.94</td>
<td>5.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total [n = 100%]*

Table 7.8: Distribution of Ethnic Populations Aged 25-49 in High Deprivation Birmingham Wards [2011].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Lowest LSOA IMD Score</th>
<th>Highest LSOA IMD Score</th>
<th>White British</th>
<th>Black Caribbean</th>
<th>MWBC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soho</td>
<td>33.95</td>
<td>74.60</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>8.65</td>
<td>4.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lozells and East Handsworth</td>
<td>39.87</td>
<td>62.88</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>7.18</td>
<td>2.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ladywood</td>
<td>21.77</td>
<td>61.68</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>5.66</td>
<td>5.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aston</td>
<td>37.92</td>
<td>64.86</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>6.40</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Mean = 37.32*</td>
<td>Mean = 37.32*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total [n = 100%]**

*The Mean represents the average score of the total 641, LSOAs in Birmingham and not that of the 40 wards.

Part of Ladywood is quite close to Birmingham City Centre, the finance capital of the West Midlands. Rosemary Campbell lives in this affluent region of Ladywood, which has undergone significant redevelopment in recent years. Her apartment is just a few minutes’ walk from the bars, clubs and restaurants, located alongside the wharfs at the back of Broad Street. The area is an integral part of Birmingham’s night-time economy. Rosemary was bought up in a house owned by her parents, off Churchill Road, in bottom \(^{259}\) Handsworth:

‘It was a huge Victorian house, the kind that I couldn’t afford to buy now; five-bedrooms, three reception rooms, a large kitchen, with a plot of land at the back. Houses like the one we lived in on Saint Peters Road have been turned into flats’ (Rosemary Campbell, 29\(^{th}\) May 2013, Birmingham).

She bought her first house in Bearwood, which is in Sandwell and close to the Soho area of Birmingham. Her choice to purchase in that area was influenced by financial constraints:

‘Bearwood had cheaper houses that I could afford. There wasn’t any other reason. I could afford to live there on a teacher’s salary. I now

\(^{259}\) When I [the author] was nine my family moved from Queens Head Road, in top Handsworth, to Churchill Road in bottom Handsworth. The ward is divided by Handsworth Park. Bottom Handsworth lies between the Park’s Hamstead Road entrance and Birchfield Road. In contrast, top Handsworth starts from the Park’s Grove Lane entrance and stretches north-west toward Sandwell and West Bromwich.
live in Birmingham City Centre. I’ve bought an apartment there because basically it’s good for commuting. It’s B16, but as my husband keeps saying to me, “That’s Ladywood! So don’t bother get thinking you’ve got an apartment in the City Centre. It’s Ladywood”!

When we pay our car insurance it’s definitely Ladywood, but it’s behind Broad Street. So that’s where we are’ (Rosemary Campbell, 29th May 2013, Birmingham)!

Rosemary admits to making mistakes where property is concerned. She regrets not talking her mother out of selling the family home when her father died. Although her apartment is in a desirable location, she gave me the impression that if it was possible she would gladly exchange it for a rambling Victorian property in Handsworth. Having grown up in Handsworth I empathise with Rosemary and remember the area we knew as a cultural Heart Land. However, like Rosemary I also realise that the Handsworth we reminisce about no longer exists. Our version of Handsworth is now an imagined community260, which will always have a special place in our imaginations. However, it is no longer part of our day-to-day reality. Although Rosemary might wish to go back to her roots, she is also an astute businesswoman who realises the impracticalities of the idea, particularly in terms of its financial implications. The logic of the market

260 Benedict Anderson’s (1991, [1983]) notion of an imagined community in some ways supports my idea of a cultural Heart Land. Anderson defines imagined communities in terms of the idea of nationhood formed on commonalties such as language (ibid, 1991: 44). Although social attachments and cultural ties might have originated in a specific geography, the sense of belonging which forged them tends to transcend the boundaries of time and space. Moreover, the notion of community embodies a sense of common identity and a space in which social bonds are allowed to develop and flourish.
dictates that a property in Handsworth be a *Bad* investment, in comparison to her present urban location.

Rosemary’s narrative demonstrates that the material deprivation of an environment does not necessarily influence decisions involving spatial movement. The desire to reside in particular spaces can overlook the housing market logic that dictates where capital should be invested to maximise potential gains. High deprivation *Bad Lands* can also be considered as desirable *Heart Lands* in which the pursuit of happiness reaps cultural, rather than financial, rewards. Rosemary has all the symbolic educational and economic capital of middle-class success. However, she does not find the thought of living in the *Bad Lands* where she grew up unappealing. Therefore, spatial positions are not always reliable indicators of social status or class dispositions.

Unlike Rosemary, only three of the ACFAS subjects I interviewed were homeowners. Subject A had a mortgage on a house in Erdington that he shared with his wife. Subject D inherited a house in Smethwick where she lives – mortgage free – with her adopted daughter. Subject E bought a flat in Handsworth Wood – with the financial compensation received from his previous employers. They told me about their *Desired Lands*: the places they would choose to live if money was no object. None of the research subjects mentioned anything about social class. However, they considered notions of
ethnicity, family and intimate attachments to be important. Subject A liked where he lived in Erdington, which was also the area that Subject G, currently living in Newtown, also desired to live:

‘At the moment I’m quite settled and all right where I am. I just go from home to work, work to home, home to church’ (Subject A, 10th August 2013, Birmingham).

‘I like Erdington because it’s mixed. There’s a good mixture of Black, White and Asian, and everyone seems to get on’ (Subject G, 8th August 2013, Birmingham).

‘I’ve thought about this, only just recently in fact. I’d more than likely live in Great Barr or maybe Harborne. I’m fed up of Smethwick and I’d just like a change of area. My friend isn’t well and she lives just off the Wolverhampton Road. If I could afford to I’d buy a house in Harborne to be near her, so I could help her out a bit more’ (Subject D, 1st May 2014, Birmingham).

Subjects B, C and F rent social authority, and private, housing. However, in a similar way to Subjects, A, G and D above, their ideas of Desired Lands are not necessarily influenced by indicators of deprivation. Nevertheless, their spatial positions are constrained by their financial situation:
'I’d move near my brother in Handsworth Wood if I could, but I can’t afford a house there and I can’t get a transfer. The housing association has changed the criteria. It used to be only those who are over 50 could get somewhere in Handsworth Wood, but now they’ve changed it so you have to be over 60’ (Subject B, 1st May 2014, Birmingham).

'I wouldn’t live in Birmingham because I’ve got to the age where I feel that I need to be out in the open air. I need to be living in the country or down by the coast. I’m in that zone now. Where I’m living now is affecting my quality of life’ (Subject C, 6th August 2013, Birmingham).

'I like being close to my family really. I’ve never thought about living far from them. I used to visit my friend in Chelmsley Wood and it’s so dead there, so dry. If you want something around here [Handsworth] the shops are open twenty-four hours a day. I really like it where I live now. I’m all right here’ (Subject F, 1st May 2014, Birmingham).

For Subject F, Handsworth is both her cultural Heart Land and Desired Land. She has lived there all her life and finds the thought of living elsewhere inconceivable. Only Subject E desired to live in the Promised Lands of Sutton. However, his desire was not influenced by ideas of high or low deprivation. He grew up in Erdington, which is near to Sutton. After leaving home he lived in Sutton with his girlfriend. However, he does not have enough capital to
purchase a property there. The above narratives demonstrate that work, culture, kinship attachments, financial constraints and lifestyle choices, are major concerns in the spatial movement and settlement patterns of Black Caribbeans.

Housing tenure in Good Lands and Bad Lands

Tables, 7.9, 7.10 and 7.11 below reveal differences in housing tenure of the Household Reference Person (HRP), in the Sutton Good Lands, between 2001 and 2011. African Caribbeans increased their home ownership in Sutton Four Oaks and Sutton New Hall, relative to the same tenure of their White peers. They have also reduced their local authority tenure in all the Sutton wards. If home ownership is an indicator of upward social mobility then the housing tenure of Black Caribbeans, between 2001 and 2001 in Sutton’s Good Lands, suggest that their social status is improving.

In most cases the privately rented tenure of African Caribbeans in Sutton has increased. However, it is difficult to draw conclusions from the data to ascertain why that is the case. The decision to rent privately could be a consequence of agency or necessity. Individuals may rent in Sutton because it is their area of choice, or may live there because they have been unable to obtain Council accommodation elsewhere. Moreover, the private housing
market is not as stringently regulated as the public sector. Therefore, there is a suggestion that tenants in private accommodation might endure worse housing conditions than their peers renting local authority accommodation. However, African Caribbeans renting privately in Sutton could have housing that is comparable to either the best or worst forms of accommodation in the area. Their housing condition could depend on the environment of the LSOA they live in and also the moral conscience of their landlord. Moreover, African Caribbeans who wish to rent privately may also be deterred by the discriminatory practices of private landlords. Some may refuse applications of Black tenants\textsuperscript{261} if the demand for housing in particular areas is high.

In comparison to their White British counterparts, MWBCs have a decreasing rate of privately rented tenure in Sutton New Hall. They may also be the victims of discrimination but, similarly to their Black peers, it is difficult to say with any certainty. MWBC spatial mobility also shows variation, in comparison to that of their White British counterparts. Their home ownership has decreased in Sutton Four Oaks, but increased in Sutton Vesey and Sutton New Hall. Their pattern of home ownership and local authority tenure is quite similar in the same Sutton wards.

\textsuperscript{261} Landlords may overlook applications from Black tenants if they believe that their economic situation is precarious. They may also discriminate against them on the ground of colour, see CRE (1990). Landlords might also view the presence of Black tenants as an outward sign of depreciation, which can potentially deter White tenants. In the context of the US, poverty is synonymous with minority ethnic groups. Anacker (2010: 58) argues that ‘appreciation in neighbourhoods is impacted by concentrated poverty, the largest negative impact on housing values of all characteristics considered’.
Tables 7.9, 7.10 and 7.11: Household Reference Person [HRP] of Ethnic Groups Aged 16 and Over and their Tenure in Low Deprivation Birmingham Wards.

Table 7.9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>White British Owner Occupied*</th>
<th>White British Social Rented**</th>
<th>White British Private Rented***</th>
<th>Total [n = 100%]****</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sutton Four Oaks</td>
<td>88.96</td>
<td>84.19</td>
<td>7.85</td>
<td>7.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sutton Vesey</td>
<td>88.04</td>
<td>83.38</td>
<td>7.30</td>
<td>6.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sutton New Hall</td>
<td>83.04</td>
<td>83.68</td>
<td>12.58</td>
<td>7.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sutton Trinity</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>78.02</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Owned outright/Mortgage-loan/Shared ownership.
**Local authority/Other social rent.
***Private landlord/Letting agency.
****Excludes forms of tenure other than those considered in the table above.

Table 7.10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>MWBC Owner Occupied*</th>
<th>MWBC Social Rented**</th>
<th>MWBC Private Rented***</th>
<th>Total [n = 100%]****</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sutton Four Oaks</td>
<td>63.64</td>
<td>66.27</td>
<td>36.36</td>
<td>25.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sutton Vesey</td>
<td>79.61</td>
<td>72.08</td>
<td>17.11</td>
<td>11.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sutton New Hall</td>
<td>65.08</td>
<td>73.28</td>
<td>29.63</td>
<td>14.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sutton Trinity</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>56.00</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>31.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Owned outright/Mortgage-loan/Shared ownership.
**Local authority/Other social rent.
***Private landlord/Letting agency.
****Excludes forms of tenure other than those considered in the table above.

Table 7.11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>MWBC Owner Occupied*</th>
<th>MWBC Social Rented**</th>
<th>MWBC Private Rented***</th>
<th>Total [n = 100%]****</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sutton Four Oaks</td>
<td>50.00</td>
<td>41.86</td>
<td>50.00</td>
<td>25.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sutton Vesey</td>
<td>60.98</td>
<td>60.00</td>
<td>24.39</td>
<td>15.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sutton New Hall</td>
<td>54.29</td>
<td>63.89</td>
<td>45.71</td>
<td>25.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sutton Trinity</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>40.35</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>31.58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Owned outright/Mortgage-loan/Shared ownership.
**Local authority/Other social rent.
***Private landlord/Letting agency.
****Excludes forms of tenure other than those considered in the table above.

Tables 7.12, 7.13 and 7.14 for 2011 below, reveal the extent to which the majority of Sutton tenure in Tables 7.9, 7.10 and 7.11 can be attributed to their
25-49\textsuperscript{262} aged HRP. Only about a third of White British HRPs are aged 25-49. However, over 50 per cent of Black Caribbean HRPs in Sutton are between the ages of 25 and 49. Regardless of ethnic group differences, the majority tenure type in Sutton is owner occupied. Therefore, the comparatively higher rate of African Caribbean homeowner HRPs, aged 25-49, reinforces the data above that highlights their improved status in Sutton’s *Good Lands*. Moreover, the data also indicates they are achieving upward social mobility within the appropriate *age-stage*. However, it must also be noted that the actual number of African Caribbean owner-occupiers is comparatively small. Furthermore, in comparison to some of Birmingham’s other wards, there are relatively few African Caribbeans – and MWBCs – living in Sutton.

\textsuperscript{262} The total tenure (n) of the different ethnic group HRPs, aged 25-49 in each Sutton ward in Tables 7.12, 7.13 and 7.14, are calculated as a percentage of those in Tables 7.9, 7.10 and 7.11.

Table 7.12

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>White British Owner Occupied*</th>
<th>White British Social Rented**</th>
<th>White British Private Rented***</th>
<th>Total [n = 100%]****</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sutton Four Oaks</td>
<td>77.31</td>
<td>5.78</td>
<td>16.92</td>
<td>3,133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sutton Vesey</td>
<td>75.75</td>
<td>4.65</td>
<td>19.61</td>
<td>2,948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sutton New Hall</td>
<td>77.95</td>
<td>6.17</td>
<td>15.88</td>
<td>2,821</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sutton Trinity</td>
<td>87.81</td>
<td>14.25</td>
<td>24.88</td>
<td>3,581</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Owned outright/Mortgage-loan/Shared ownership.
**Local authority/Other social rent.
***Private landlord/Letting agency.
****Excludes forms of tenure other than those considered in the table above.

Table 7.13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Black Caribbean Owner Occupied*</th>
<th>Black Caribbean Social Rented**</th>
<th>Black Caribbean Private Rented***</th>
<th>Total [n = 100%]****</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sutton Four Oaks</td>
<td>67.27</td>
<td>27.27</td>
<td>5.45</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sutton Vesey</td>
<td>64.95</td>
<td>14.43</td>
<td>20.62</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sutton New Hall</td>
<td>65.48</td>
<td>16.68</td>
<td>17.86</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sutton Trinity</td>
<td>43.82</td>
<td>40.41</td>
<td>15.73</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Owned outright/Mortgage-loan/Shared ownership.
**Local authority/Other social rent.
***Private landlord/Letting agency.
****Excludes forms of tenure other than those considered in the table above.

Table 7.14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>MWBC Owner Occupied*</th>
<th>MWBC Social Rented**</th>
<th>MWBC Private Rented***</th>
<th>Total [n = 100%]****</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sutton Four Oaks</td>
<td>44.83</td>
<td>24.14</td>
<td>31.04</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sutton Vesey</td>
<td>52.78</td>
<td>19.44</td>
<td>27.78</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sutton New Hall</td>
<td>69.23</td>
<td>26.92</td>
<td>3.85</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sutton Trinity</td>
<td>30.00</td>
<td>33.33</td>
<td>36.67</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Owned outright/Mortgage-loan/Shared ownership.
**Local authority/Other social rent.
***Private landlord/Letting agency.
****Excludes forms of tenure other than those considered in the table above.

Tables 7.15, 7.16 and 7.17 for 2001 and 2011 below, highlight changes in ethnic tenure in Birmingham’s Bad Lands, and are compared to those of White British HRPs. In comparison to the Sutton Good Lands, there is a lower level of owner occupation for all three ethnic groups. The home ownership representations between White British and Black Caribbeans are quite similar, and greater than
those of MWBCs. However, there are pronounced differences in privately rented tenure. In Sutton, African Caribbeans are more inclined to be homeowners. However, in some Bad Lands they rely more on local authority housing than their White counterparts and are also less inclined to rent privately, which is not the case where Ladywood is concerned.

**Table 7.15**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>White British Owner Occupied*</th>
<th>White British Social Rented**</th>
<th>White British Private Rented***</th>
<th>Total [n = 100%]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soho</td>
<td>39.66 38.43 43.31 37.40 17.03 24.17 2,325 1,837</td>
<td>42.25 34.71 41.12 44.47 16.63 20.82 1,780 994</td>
<td>31.40 26.34 59.22 58.17 9.38 15.49 3,497 1,401</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handsworth</td>
<td>42.25 34.71 41.12 44.47 16.63 20.82 1,780 994</td>
<td>38.17 28.90 49.67 24.31 17.53 46.79 5,255 6,706</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ladywood</td>
<td>32.81 28.90 49.67 24.31 17.53 46.79 5,255 6,706</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Owned outright/Mortgage-loan/Shared ownership.
**Local authority/Other social rent.
***Private landlord/Letting agency.


**Table 7.16**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Black Caribbean Owner Occupied*</th>
<th>Black Caribbean Social Rented**</th>
<th>Black Caribbean Private Rented***</th>
<th>Total [n = 100%]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soho</td>
<td>38.09 37.68 54.73 46.09 6.58 16.23 2,158 1,996</td>
<td>38.25 30.95 54.73 46.09 6.58 16.23 2,158 1,996</td>
<td>25.03 32.40 72.22 62.33 2.74 5.27 2,333 1,707</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handsworth</td>
<td>38.25 30.95 54.73 46.09 6.58 16.23 2,158 1,996</td>
<td>38.71 31.71 58.18 48.39 7.01 10.76 2,333 1,707</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ladywood</td>
<td>22.80 18.68 72.22 69.03 4.71 12.29 1,719 1,253</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aston</td>
<td>25.03 32.40 72.22 62.33 2.74 5.27 2,333 1,707</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Owned outright/Mortgage-loan/Shared ownership.
**Local authority/Other social rent.
***Private landlord/Letting agency.


**Table 7.17**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>MWBC Owner Occupied*</th>
<th>MWBC Social Rented*</th>
<th>MWBC Private Rented*</th>
<th>Total [n = 100%]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soho</td>
<td>20.92 18.42 70.66 57.89 8.38 23.68 167 266</td>
<td>20.56 14.21 65.42 64.48 14.02 21.31 107 183</td>
<td>11.68 11.94 78.68 76.62 9.64 11.44 197 201</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handsworth</td>
<td>20.56 14.21 65.42 64.48 14.02 21.31 107 183</td>
<td>10.94 12.50 80.86 64.88 8.20 22.62 256 336</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ladywood</td>
<td>11.68 11.94 78.68 76.62 9.64 11.44 197 201</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aston</td>
<td>11.68 11.94 78.68 76.62 9.64 11.44 197 201</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Owned outright/Mortgage-loan/Shared ownership.
**Local authority/Other social rent.
***Private landlord/Letting agency.


In comparison to White Britons, the number of African Caribbeans renting privately in Ladywood has almost trebled between 2001 and 2011. Moreover,

The ward of Handsworth became East Handsworth and Lozells after boundary changes in 2004
Black Caribbean local authority tenure has practically doubled in the same period. Nevertheless, Ladywood is an urban anomaly, as there are Good Lands and Bad Lands within the ward. The area has changed dramatically since it was surveyed in the 1970s (Rex and Tomlinson, 1979; Ratcliffe, 1981). As noted above, gentrification has improved some of Ladywood’s LSOAS, whilst other parts of the ward remain highly deprived. This is problematic for the analysis of African Caribbean spatial and social mobility, because there is no way of knowing in exactly which LSOAS they are residing in.

As noted by Ratcliffe (1996) above, disparities between owned and rented tenure in Birmingham’s Good Lands and Bad Lands could be a consequence of income differentials and poverty. However, it is difficult to determine if the contemporary increase in Black Caribbean local authority tenure in Ladywood is a result of individual choice or structural constraints. The dispersal policy, implemented by the City Council between 1968 and 1975, is an example of how the settlement patterns of those who rely on social housing can be constrained by structural processes. The Council adopted a practice which denied ‘access for Blacks to certain Council dwellings [and dispersed] Black tenants across the city’ (Flett, Henderson and Brown, 1979: 290). Although the Council’s dispersal policy only became public knowledge after it ended in 1975, it was defended as a benign means of reducing minority ethnic clustering in specific areas, whilst spreading ‘Black people thinly amongst the White population’ (ibid, 1979: 291).
Where dispersal policies were formerly used with the *supposed* aim of aiding racial integration, allocating social housing to minority ethnic groups in *cultural specific zones*\(^{264}\) can facilitate the contemporary consumption of culture.

Moreover, the Council might attempt to contain disadvantaged working-class communities in areas where their activities and interests do not conflict with those of the middle-classes. On the other hand, the rise in Black Caribbean local authority tenure in Ladywood, relative to that of White Britons between 2001 and 2011, could also be an example of de facto segregation. Ladywood has a large stock of social housing, near to Birmingham’s historical African Caribbean cultural *Heart Lands*. Therefore, it could be argued that Black Caribbeans might choose to settle in high deprivation LSOAs, such as those in Ladywood, to reaffirm friendships, kinship and cultural attachments.

Tables 7.18, 7.19 and 7.20 for 2011 below reveal that in comparison to their White counterparts in Birmingham’s *Bad Lands*, there are more Black

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\(^{264}\) I use this term to refer to urban spaces in which the cultural pursuits of minority ethnic groups are appropriated for the wider market. *Cultural specific zones* could also be viewed as a “cosmopolitan canopy” (Anderson, 2004). These are social spaces of cultural convergence, in which different ethnic groups interact and act civil towards each other. The Birmingham Carnival (formerly known as the Handsworth Carnival) commodifies Caribbean culture for the benefit of the city’s economy. It used to be held in Handsworth park, but was recently moved to Perry Barr, which also has a high concentration of African Caribbeans. Another example of the spatial commodification of culture is the ward of Sparkbrook. The Ladypool Road area has several Asian restaurants and is often referred to as Birmingham’s *Balti Belt*. The City Council promotes the culture of minority ethnic groups, for attracting tourism and as consumption activities for the middle-classes, to demonstrate Birmingham’s diversity and multiculturalism.
Caribbeans in the 25-49\textsuperscript{265} age-range who are renting social housing. This shows that there is still a tendency for Black Caribbeans to rent rather than buy in the areas where they are highly concentrated\textsuperscript{266}. Approximately a third more Blacks than Whites are dependent on social housing and the figure is slightly higher for MWBCs. The White British population also tend to have a higher rate of privately rented tenure. This is not easily explained. It could mean that the \textit{Bad Lands} are viewed by Whites as Zones of Transition (Burgess, 2008 [1925]; Rex and Moore, 1967), in which they appropriate the private market to satisfy their short-term housing needs until they have acquired enough financial capital to relocate. However, the high rate of private housing rented by Whites in Ladywood, in comparison to the other \textit{Bad Lands}, suggests that they could be professionals residing in the more desirable LSOAs near to the City Centre.

There are much lower rates of African Caribbeans, and MWBCs, renting in the private housing market. This could indicate that they still face discrimination from private landlords, which was the case in the late 1980s\textsuperscript{267}, or that they cannot afford to rent privately.

\textsuperscript{265} I have argued previously that the 25-49 age-range is significant for social mobility (see Chapters Four and Five). Post-university labour market participation should have commenced by age 24. However, by the time most individuals reach their late forties their economic value is diminishing. Opportunities for career progression and promotion are often mediated by age. Employers see more value in highly-qualified employees whose labour is more easily appropriated by the use of flexible contracts, which often offer less employment security and a lower wage (Standing, 2011). The proportion of African Caribbeans aged 25-49, who are renting social housing in low deprivation areas, suggests that their spatial settlement and housing tenure are constrained by poverty.

\textsuperscript{266} See Ratcliffe (1981; 2004).

\textsuperscript{267} See CRE (1990).

Table 7.18

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>White British Owner Occupied*</th>
<th>White British Social Rented**</th>
<th>White British Private Rented***</th>
<th>Total [n = 100%]****</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soho</td>
<td>34.06</td>
<td>35.34</td>
<td>30.61</td>
<td>781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lozells and E. Handsworth</td>
<td>25.77</td>
<td>49.02</td>
<td>25.21</td>
<td>357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ladywood</td>
<td>29.07</td>
<td>17.71</td>
<td>53.22</td>
<td>4,156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aston</td>
<td>21.00</td>
<td>62.40</td>
<td>16.60</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Owned outright/Mortgage-loan/Shared ownership.
**Local authority/Other social rent.
***Private landlord/Letting agency.
****Excludes forms of tenure other than those considered in the tables above.

Table 7.19

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Black Caribbean Owner Occupied*</th>
<th>Black Caribbean Social Rented**</th>
<th>Black Caribbean Private Rented***</th>
<th>Total [n = 100%]****</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soho</td>
<td>25.90</td>
<td>53.07</td>
<td>21.03</td>
<td>1,027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lozells and E. Handsworth</td>
<td>17.07</td>
<td>66.83</td>
<td>16.11</td>
<td>832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ladywood</td>
<td>15.13</td>
<td>69.87</td>
<td>15.00</td>
<td>760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aston</td>
<td>21.02</td>
<td>70.95</td>
<td>8.03</td>
<td>747</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Owned outright/Mortgage-loan/Shared ownership.
**Local authority/Other social rent.
***Private landlord/Letting agency.
****Excludes forms of tenure other than those considered in the tables above.

Table 7.20

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>MWBC Owner Occupied*</th>
<th>MWBC Social Rented**</th>
<th>MWBC Private Rented***</th>
<th>Total [n = 100%]****</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soho</td>
<td>18.65</td>
<td>57.51</td>
<td>23.83</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lozells and E. Handsworth</td>
<td>7.14</td>
<td>69.64</td>
<td>23.21</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ladywood</td>
<td>14.78</td>
<td>63.04</td>
<td>22.17</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aston</td>
<td>6.92</td>
<td>81.54</td>
<td>11.54</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Owned outright/Mortgage-loan/Shared ownership.
**Local authority/Other social rent.
***Private landlord/Letting agency.
****Excludes forms of tenure other than those considered in the tables above.
Ethnic Hinter Lands

Individuals generally relocate at different stages in their lives, often in search of their idea of a *Promised Land*. However, as their circumstances change, ideas of what constitutes *Promised or Desired Lands* are often modified accordingly. Some might relocate to neighbourhoods, which they believe reflects their improved labour market status, whilst others might move to maintain family and friendship attachments. However, some urban transitions may end in a *Hinter Land* rather than a *Promised Land*. Unlike *Good Lands* and *Bad Lands*, *Hinter Lands* are not defined by their polarised level of deprivation. I refer to them as the geographical spaces in which the ethnic groups surveyed in this research have increased their representations in more recent times. Thus, in another sense *Hinter Lands* may also perceived as new ethnic enclaves\(^\text{268}\).

Between 1991 and 2011, there has been a gradual outward movement of the Black Caribbean population from Birmingham’s *Bad Lands*. This has also coincided with improvements in their status as homeowners. Since 2001 more African Caribbeans have purchased properties in the Sutton *Good Lands*. However, the majority of their 25-49 aged HRPs now reside in *Hinter Lands*. These wards have the highest concentration of ethnic group HRPs analysed in this research. Apart from Oscott\(^\text{269}\), the *Hinter Lands* of White Britons are not

\(^{268}\) See Footnote 252.

\(^{269}\) Oscott has a proportionately high number of both White British and African Caribbean HRPs in comparison to the remainder of wards in Birmingham that are neither *Good or Bad Lands*. 
the same wards as those predominantly populated by African Caribbeans. In contrast, the *Hinter Lands* of MWBCs are mainly a mixture of wards populated by both White British and African Caribbean ethnic groups. For example, Stockland Green and Perry Barr are African Caribbean and MWBC *Hinter Lands*, whereas both White British, and MWBCs, have Longbridge in common and Shard End is unique to MWBCs.

Tables 7.21, 7.22 and 7.23 below reveal that the majority of White British *Hinter Lands* are located in the south of Birmingham. In each ward the main tenure of White Britons is owner occupation, followed by local authority and privately rented housing. Bournville is a conservation area with a number of primary schools rated Outstanding by OFSTED. The Bournville Trust operates the majority of social housing in the area and has an excellent reputation as a landlord. The predominance of good schools and desirable social housing might account for the parity between social and privately rented tenure; it might also explain why families and couples between the ages of 25 and 49 might be attracted to Bournville.

Table 7.21

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>White British Owner Occupied*</th>
<th>White British Social Rented**</th>
<th>White British Private Rented***</th>
<th>Total [n = 100%]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Longbridge</td>
<td>60.90</td>
<td>24.90</td>
<td>14.20</td>
<td>4,245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northfield</td>
<td>61.80</td>
<td>24.73</td>
<td>13.47</td>
<td>3,971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bournville</td>
<td>61.60</td>
<td>18.53</td>
<td>19.87</td>
<td>3,890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oscott</td>
<td>70.53</td>
<td>10.50</td>
<td>18.97</td>
<td>3,373</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Owned outright/Mortgage-loan/Shared ownership.  
**Local authority/Other social rent.  
***Private landlord/Letting agency.  
****Excludes forms of tenure other than those considered in the table above.  

Table 7.22

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Black Caribbean Owner Occupied*</th>
<th>Black Caribbean Social Rented**</th>
<th>Black Caribbean Private Rented***</th>
<th>Total [n = 100%] ****</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Longbridge</td>
<td>46.76</td>
<td>45.32</td>
<td>7.91</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northfield</td>
<td>38.36</td>
<td>54.11</td>
<td>7.53</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bournville</td>
<td>41.48</td>
<td>40.00</td>
<td>18.52</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oscott</td>
<td>77.24</td>
<td>10.27</td>
<td>12.50</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Owned outright/Mortgage-loan/Shared ownership.  
**Local authority/Other social rent.  
***Private landlord/Letting agency.  
****Excludes forms of tenure other than those considered in the table above.  

Table 7.23

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>MWBC Owner Occupied*</th>
<th>MWBC Social Rented**</th>
<th>MWBC Private Rented***</th>
<th>Total [n = 100%] ****</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Longbridge</td>
<td>32.28</td>
<td>51.18</td>
<td>16.54</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northfield</td>
<td>32.93</td>
<td>57.32</td>
<td>9.76</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bournville</td>
<td>27.96</td>
<td>41.92</td>
<td>30.11</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oscott</td>
<td>59.57</td>
<td>25.53</td>
<td>14.89</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Owned outright/Mortgage-loan/Shared ownership.  
**Local authority/Other social rent.  
***Private landlord/Letting agency.  
****Excludes forms of tenure other than those considered in the table above.  

The proportional representations of Black Caribbeans who privately rent in Bournville, indicates that the area might attract them for the reasons outlined above. In comparison to their White British peers there are proportionately less Black Caribbeans homeowners. However, there is a good deal of parity between those who own their properties and those who rent social housing.
This is also the case for Longbridge, which has more local authority housing than Bournville. There is also a higher tendency for African Caribbeans to rent in Northfield, which also has a significant amount of Council housing stock.

When Black Caribbean and White British representations are compared in Oscott, which is in north Birmingham, there are proportionately more Black Caribbeans who own their homes and they rent less social and private housing. In contrast, MWBCs are more dependent on local authority tenure. Apart from in Oscott, they have the highest proportion of local authority housing and privately rented accommodation. The other ethnic groups proportionally have more owner occupation in their respective *Hinter Lands*. The data suggests that the reliance MWBCs place on renting, could mean they generally experience the worst housing conditions.

Oscott is close to the Sutton wards\(^\text{270}\). If Sutton is the *Desired Land* of individuals residing in north Birmingham, then Oscott might be a temporary stop in their urban sojourn. However, the main direction of travel for White Britons is not north, but rather southbound: where the Longbridge, Northfield and Bournville wards are situated.

\(^{270}\) See Appendix vi.
Tables 7.24, 7.25 and 7.26 below, reveal the Black Caribbean *Hinter Lands*, which are invariably located towards the north of Birmingham. This contrasts to the southern locations of their White British counterparts. There is no easy way to account for this anomaly, suffice it to say that Black Caribbeans might be more inclined to move into areas that are closer to their cultural *Heart Lands* for a number of reasons. When Black Caribbean and White British tenure is compared, it can be seen that African Caribbeans have a proportionately higher level of home ownership. However, they generally depend more on local authority housing than the private rental market. The comparatively higher level of Black Caribbean local authority tenure suggests they still have a tendency to rent their accommodation, which was noted by Ratcliffe (2004) above. Although Shard End is a MWBC *Hinter Land*, they have lower levels of owner occupation in the ward than their African Caribbean and White British counterparts. Moreover, MWBCs also have a higher propensity to rent local authority housing in Shard End than in other wards.

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271 Shard End is also included, but it is a MWBC Hinter Land.

Table 7.24

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>White British Owner Occupied</th>
<th>White British Social Rented</th>
<th>White British Private Rented</th>
<th>Total [n = 100%]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perry Barr</td>
<td>69.44</td>
<td>5.72</td>
<td>24.84</td>
<td>1695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockland Green</td>
<td>53.73</td>
<td>16.37</td>
<td>29.90</td>
<td>2535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handsworth Wood</td>
<td>38.82</td>
<td>22.69</td>
<td>38.49</td>
<td>595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oscott</td>
<td>70.53</td>
<td>10.50</td>
<td>18.97</td>
<td>3,373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shard End</td>
<td>48.93</td>
<td>39.07</td>
<td>12.00</td>
<td>4118</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Owned outright/Mortgage-loan/Shared ownership.
**Local authority/Other social rent.
***Private landlord/Letting agency.
****Excludes forms of tenure other than those considered in the table above.


Table 7.25

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Black Caribbean Owner Occupied</th>
<th>Black Caribbean Social Rented</th>
<th>Black Caribbean Private Rented</th>
<th>Total [n = 100%]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perry Barr</td>
<td>72.27</td>
<td>9.31</td>
<td>18.42</td>
<td>494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockland Green</td>
<td>57.99</td>
<td>19.90</td>
<td>22.11</td>
<td>588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handsworth Wood</td>
<td>39.50</td>
<td>32.60</td>
<td>27.90</td>
<td>681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oscott</td>
<td>77.24</td>
<td>10.27</td>
<td>12.50</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shard End</td>
<td>48.22</td>
<td>42.69</td>
<td>9.09</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Owned outright/Mortgage-loan/Shared ownership.
**Local authority/Other social rent.
***Private landlord/Letting agency.
****Excludes forms of tenure other than those considered in the table above.


Table 7.26

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>MWBC Owner Occupied</th>
<th>MWBC Social Rented</th>
<th>MWBC Private Rented</th>
<th>Total [n = 100%]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perry Barr</td>
<td>53.95</td>
<td>18.42</td>
<td>27.63</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockland Green</td>
<td>39.02</td>
<td>21.34</td>
<td>39.63</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handsworth Wood</td>
<td>23.39</td>
<td>41.13</td>
<td>35.48</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oscott</td>
<td>59.57</td>
<td>25.53</td>
<td>14.89</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shard End</td>
<td>25.93</td>
<td>64.02</td>
<td>10.05</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Owned outright/Mortgage-loan/Shared ownership.
**Local authority/Other social rent.
***Private landlord/Letting agency.
****Excludes forms of tenure other than those considered in the table above.


The Stockland Green ward is a *Hinter Land* for both African Caribbeans and MWBC ethnic groups. It is also the area in which Bishop Webley of the New Testament Church of God\(^{272}\) lives with his family. Table 7.27 below reveals that

\(^{272}\) See Chapter Four.
although the levels of deprivation in some Stockland Green LSOAs are comparable with Bournville, the less desirable areas are comparable to the poorest parts of Ladywood. However, properties in north Birmingham tend to be cheaper than those in the south of the city. Therefore, in view of African Caribbeans’ occupational positions,²⁷³ affordable housing might account for their concentration in the north of Birmingham. However, there are also other factors influencing the spatial settlement patterns of African Caribbeans.

Table 7.27: Index of Multiple Deprivation Scores in Ethnic Hinter Lands [2011].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Lowest LSOA Score</th>
<th>Highest LSOA Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Longbridge</td>
<td>23.91</td>
<td>60.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northfield</td>
<td>16.73</td>
<td>56.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bournville</td>
<td>16.74</td>
<td>52.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oscott</td>
<td>17.58</td>
<td>51.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perry Barr</td>
<td>17.11</td>
<td>40.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockland Green</td>
<td>16.77</td>
<td>61.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handsworth Wood</td>
<td>15.45</td>
<td>52.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shard End</td>
<td>24.54</td>
<td>61.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mean = 37.32</strong></td>
<td><strong>Mean = 37.32</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


I asked Bishop Webley why he chose to live in Stockland Green:

‘Educational reasons! Bromford Junior and Infant School was considered to be a very good school and a number of children who left there went onto grammar school. When we enquired how we could get our children into that school, we were told we had to be living in the catchment area. My eldest daughter went there then got a place at Sutton Girls’ School’ [a grammar school] (Bishop Webley, 23rd April 2013, Birmingham).

²⁷³ See Chapter Six.
Being able to purchase property near high achieving schools is an example of how the Black middle-classes can appropriate their economic ‘capital in defence of their interests and those of their children, in a society pervaded by White Privilege’ (Vincent, et al., 2012: 263). Material deprivation was not a factor in Bishop Webley and his wife’s decision to purchase a property in Stockland Green. However, proximity to successful schools made it an ideal location to fulfil their children’s educational needs. This suggests that schooling, and the immediate and long-term costs of living, can be of more significance than how the area is generally perceived. Moreover, the case of the Webleys demonstrate that there is not necessarily a correlation between the social class of individuals and their spatial location. Although Webley’s daughter has done well in her schooling, Table 7.28 below reveals that approximately a quarter of the overall population of Stockland Green have no educational Goods. Moreover, only a little over 10 per cent of residents have a degree or higher qualification.

Table 7.28 below highlights differences between the number of educational qualifications in Good Lands, Bad Lands, and Hinter Lands. The Good Lands of Sutton Four Oaks has the least amount of residents without any qualifications, in comparison to approximately a third of those living in the Bad Lands of Aston and Soho. However, the number of residents without any educational qualifications in the White Hinter Lands of Longbridge and Northfield are similar
to those living in Stockland Green. Although the Black *Hinter Land of Oscott* is near to Sutton, the population without any qualifications is similar to the *Bad Lands* of Aston and Soho. As noted above, the majority of housing in Sutton is owner occupied and, as can be seen in Table 7.28, the population in those *Good Lands* has a relatively high ratio of A-levels and degrees, when compared to no educational qualifications. This suggests that the Sutton residents have exchanged their educational capital for economic capital (Bourdieu, 2010 [1984]), and translated it into residential capital.

Proportionately, the Aston and Soho *Bad Lands* have a higher concentration of African Caribbeans than Sutton, and in contrast most of the population is unqualified and likely to be in social rented housing. Although Ladywood has been theorised as a *Bad Land* in previous analyses\(^{274}\), it is now something of an anomaly. Not only does the ward have the lowest level of residents without any educational qualifications, it also has more residents with degrees and higher academic *Goods* than any other Birmingham ward. There is no way of knowing exactly in which Ladywood LSOAs these highly qualified individuals reside. However, the data demonstrates that regardless of disparities in material deprivation within Ladywood’s LSOAs, the gentrification of the area near to the city centre has attracted a professional middle-class\(^{275}\). Their educational qualifications, occupation, income and residential capital mean that the ward can no longer be referred to as a *Bad Land* in any substantive

\(^{274}\) See Rex and Moore, 1967; Rex and Tomlinson, 1979.

\(^{275}\) This is also evident in extracts from the narrative of Rosemary Campbell above.
sense. The narratives of Rosemary Campbell and Bishop Webley, in the respective contexts of Ladywood and Stockland Green, demonstrate that housing choices are not necessarily informed by material deprivation.

Table 7.28: Educational Qualifications of Residents Aged 16-74 Living in Birmingham’s Good Lands, Bad Lands and Hinter Lands [2011].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>No Qualifications</th>
<th>1-4 O-levels / CSE / GCSE</th>
<th>5+ O-levels / CSE / GCSE (Grade A*-C)</th>
<th>2+ A-levels / 4+ AS levels</th>
<th>Degree&amp; Higher Degree**</th>
<th>Qualifications n = 100%***</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sutton Four Oaks</td>
<td>11.60</td>
<td>23.16</td>
<td>31.86</td>
<td>17.33</td>
<td>16.04</td>
<td>28371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sutton Vesey</td>
<td>12.25</td>
<td>24.41</td>
<td>30.42</td>
<td>16.81</td>
<td>16.11</td>
<td>27787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sutton New Hall</td>
<td>14.98</td>
<td>26.19</td>
<td>29.68</td>
<td>15.18</td>
<td>13.96</td>
<td>24789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sutton Trinity</td>
<td>14.11</td>
<td>25.76</td>
<td>29.73</td>
<td>15.69</td>
<td>14.71</td>
<td>27898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soho</td>
<td>32.83</td>
<td>27.13</td>
<td>18.20</td>
<td>9.94</td>
<td>11.89</td>
<td>21771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lozells and E. Handsworth</td>
<td>34.96</td>
<td>25.68</td>
<td>18.12</td>
<td>9.63</td>
<td>11.61</td>
<td>21779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ladywood</td>
<td>8.07</td>
<td>19.63</td>
<td>26.24</td>
<td>20.97</td>
<td>25.09</td>
<td>42103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aston</td>
<td>31.19</td>
<td>24.90</td>
<td>20.32</td>
<td>13.45</td>
<td>10.13</td>
<td>24574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Longbridge</td>
<td>27.83</td>
<td>31.66</td>
<td>22.74</td>
<td>9.55</td>
<td>8.23</td>
<td>21767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northfield</td>
<td>24.42</td>
<td>31.13</td>
<td>24.32</td>
<td>10.90</td>
<td>9.22</td>
<td>23579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bournville</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>22.83</td>
<td>27.17</td>
<td>17.03</td>
<td>17.34</td>
<td>30590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oscott</td>
<td>30.15</td>
<td>33.10</td>
<td>21.22</td>
<td>8.09</td>
<td>7.44</td>
<td>20168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perry Barr</td>
<td>22.54</td>
<td>30.28</td>
<td>23.60</td>
<td>12.43</td>
<td>11.15</td>
<td>20457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockland Green</td>
<td>25.99</td>
<td>29.02</td>
<td>22.12</td>
<td>10.96</td>
<td>11.91</td>
<td>21228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handsworth Wood</td>
<td>22.21</td>
<td>25.48</td>
<td>23.67</td>
<td>13.39</td>
<td>15.25</td>
<td>24507</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** For example, BA; BSc; MA; PGCE; PhD.
***Includes no qualifications and excludes vocational qualifications and others not considered in the table above.

Housing policy and poverty

The housing policy introduced in April 2013, which is more commonly referred to as the Bedroom Tax, can potentially increase the risk of debt and poverty for those who depend on local authority accommodation. This is especially the case for African Caribbeans – and other tenants – in the 25-49 age-range whose
children have left home. The Under Occupancy Tax\textsuperscript{276} penalises Council tenants for having unoccupied [bed]rooms. Tenants are encouraged to obtain smaller properties, if they are unable to pay the additional cost incurred for having unused bedrooms. Although, theoretically, relocation appears to be the solution to the risk of debt, in practice the answer is not so straightforward. Many of Birmingham’s post-war properties, built after the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act, were built for families, rather than single person occupancy (Municipal Dream, 2015). Consequently, one and two-bedroomed Council accommodation can be difficult to obtain (Wilcox, 2014). Local Authority tenants, who are unemployed and claim housing benefit, can only choose one out of three options: pay the Under Occupancy Tax, relocate or incur debt. However, tenants who are employed, and whose income exceeds a specified threshold, are denied housing benefit and therefore unaffected by the bedroom tax\textsuperscript{277}.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[\textsuperscript{276}] The Under Occupancy Tax is the formal title of the Bedroom Tax.
\item[\textsuperscript{277}] It should be noted here that regardless of their employment status, not all African Caribbeans have the middle ‘class resources’ that Bishop Webley above was able to activate for the benefit of his family (Vincent, et al, 2012: 272). As articulated in Chapter Six, unemployment and various forms of flexible working arrangements, such as zero-hour contractual employment and different types of precarious labour, makes it difficult for working-class African Caribbeans to reduce the long-term risk of poverty in the short-term. Consequently, when all the variations of the labour market ‘are considered, the outcome is insecure working lives’, the instability of which increases the risk of debt and poverty (Standing, 2011: 36). I have previously argued (see Chapter Six) that precarious employment is particularly problematic for many working-class actors aged 25-49, as their employment options tend to diminish when they are over fifty. A number of females can be perceived as belonging to the precariat class of workers (Fawcett Society, 2013). They might supplement their rent with housing benefit if they are employed for less than 16 hours per week. However, relocating to reduce the risk of debt incurs additional problems. Moving out of the area – and further away from work – increases the likelihood of unemployment and future poverty.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
The bedroom tax also creates competition between older tenants, who have relied on local authority housing for a number of years, against younger individuals who may be entering the housing market for the first time. As the demand for social housing is greater than its supply, need is determined by the amount of points applicants accumulate (Birmingham City Council, 2009). The Council refers to this market situation of housing allocation as the ‘Birmingham Choice Based Letting Scheme’ (Birmingham City Council, 2010). Eligible applicants are encouraged to visit the Council’s website each week and place up to three bids for suitable accommodation. Bids can also be placed using Smart TVS, text messaging and an interactive voice recognition service. When a property becomes available a shortlist is made up of six successful bidders, who are then invited to view it. Allocation is decided by the Council and determined by assessing the applicant’s points against their specific housing needs.

A lack of suitable Local Authority housing sometimes means that those who can least afford it have to rely on the private housing market. Wilcox (2014: 34) notes landlords now incur additional expenses as a result of ‘increased […] rent collection […], arrears management, welfare advice and support to tenants, management of transfers and exchanges, repair and short-term void costs’. Private landlords might increase the cost of renting their properties, in order to
cover the cost of expenses, which could subsequently place tenants in rent arrears. However, court costs and other expenses incurred in the process of eviction are expensive and often difficult to retrieve. The rising cost of rent in the private housing market, combined with the implementation of the Under Occupancy Tax, creates risk and insecurity for African Caribbeans. The combination of both factors could have the effect of not just displacing the Black community, but also weakening their support networks and kinship attachments.

Subject F falls into the category of unemployed, over fifty and being a single parent with a spare bedroom. She told me about the financial burden imposed on her by the Bedroom Tax. She has a three-bedroom apartment in a Local Authority maisonette. Her eldest son left home a number of years ago and she currently lives with her youngest son, who is twelve. She has no educational Goods and has only ever worked in precarious employment. Subject F was born in Handsworth and has lived there all her life. All her family live in the area and her son goes to a local school. Therefore, she does not consider moving to be an option:

‘I’m struggling at the moment because I have to pay the Bedroom Tax. It’s really hard; as soon as I get my money I have to pay my bills, but the Bedroom Tax comes first. I pay £18.50 a week, £37.00 every fortnight. I don’t get any extra money but since it [the Under
Occupancy tax] came out I have to find £74.00 extra every month, or else they’ll take me to court. I’ve even got problems buying [her son’s] school clothes and giving him lunch money. The Bedroom Tax has to be paid before all that’ (Subject F, 1st May 2014, Birmingham).

Subject F sees the risk of incurring debt imposed by the bedroom tax as a serious concern. However, she is unable to find a solution through employment. Although she worries about finding money for bills, food and school clothing for her son, her labour market participation is constrained by ‘mother-ism’ (Joshi in Reynolds, 2006: 113). This means that she is not just held back by her childcare responsibilities, but also the negative attitude employers have toward single-mothers with young children.

Subject C is also affected by the Bedroom Tax. He has been living in the same three-bedroomed Council house in Handsworth for 20 years, which he formerly shared with his partner and their daughter. However, she left him several years ago, taking their daughter with her. He claims housing benefit and is registered as unemployed. He supplements his benefits by working as a freelance artist:

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278 Joshi (in Reynolds, 2006) contends that employers are reluctant to employ single mothers. Due to their childcare responsibilities, bosses often view them as unreliable and a potential risk. Some employers also think that single mothers might have more children, for which they will receive maternity leave and be paid for pregnancy related absences. As pregnancy is a protected characteristic under the Equality Act 2010, there are employers who might avoid employing single mothers rather than risk infringing employment law.
'I can’t even afford to drive a car; I can’t do nothing! It’s all bills, bills, bills! If I could afford a car it would be easier to get around...do an exhibition. But I can’t see how I could maintain one [a car] with all the pressure the Government is putting on...it’s just a constant struggle’ (Subject C, 6th August 2013, Birmingham).

The situations of Subjects C and F demonstrates the disproportionate gender impact that the Bedroom Tax can have on women, whose social identities are intersected by motherhood, class and their labour market status. Unlike Subject C, the labour market participation of Subject F is constrained by childcare responsibilities. Employment is her only way out of the impending threat of debt imposed by the Bedroom Tax, and only full-time work could generate enough income to pay her rent and living expenses. If she were working she would be entitled to benefits that would supplement some of her childcare costs279. However, full-time employment would also mean she risks losing her entitlement to Council Tax Support, (Barry-Born, Bushe and MacInnes, 2015). Thus, reducing one risk of housing debt potentially exposes her to another.

279 See Chapter Five.
Conclusion

During the 1960s and 1970s, the main areas of West Indian settlement in Birmingham were in *Twilight Zones* located in the north of the city. These so-called *Bad Lands* included areas such as Handsworth, Smethwick, Ladywood and Soho. Housing policy restricted the volume of Local Authority housing allocated to West Indians. Policies and discriminatory lending practices (Rex and Tomlinson, 1967) also made it difficult for West Indians to obtain mortgages. Yet despite the discrimination they encountered, both socially and in the housing market, West Indians appropriated their cultural capital to generate the financial capital they required to become homeowners.

It is important to acknowledge that changes in tenure and spatial positions do not necessarily reflect improvements, stagnations or deteriorations in social status. Although some West Indians became owner-occupiers in the 1960s and 1970s, the areas in which they generally lived were deprived. More recently, middle-class African Caribbeans may choose to either rent or buy housing in low deprivation environments, because it satisfies their individual needs. However, African Caribbeans may also choose to purchase properties in high deprivation areas to reinforce intimate and cultural ties. Nevertheless, there has been a gradual increase in African Caribbean owner occupancy in low deprivation areas between 2001 and 2011. This tends to suggest there is an upward trend in both spatial and social mobility, particularly as these changes
are taking place within the 25-49 age-stage. It must also be noted that the number of Black Caribbean HRPs living in the low deprivation Good Lands is relatively small in comparison to their White British counterparts. However, the data does reveal that the Caribbean population is moving away from their former cultural Heart Lands, which still remain Zones in Transition (Rex and Moore, 1967).

Ladywood, however, is something of an anomaly and can no longer be referred to as a Bad Land. Certain LSOAs in the ward, which are in close proximity to the City Centre, have undergone significant gentrification. Urban renewal has increased the prices of property in the area, making Ladywood a des res location for prospective purchasers – and private landlords. In contrast, other parts of Ladywood are highly deprived and have a significant volume of Local Authority housing. As LSOAs can overlap it is difficult to establish the difference between the number of African Caribbeans living in the low deprivation parts of Ladywood, in comparison to its more affluent areas. This demonstrates that the social class status of individuals cannot necessarily be distinguished by analysing their spatial locations. The data above suggests that the material deprivation of a ward is not the primary concern of African Caribbeans homeowners. The middle-class narratives of Rosemary Campbell and Bishop Webley reveal that the level of material poverty in any given ward is not necessarily important to African Caribbeans. Factors, such as the proximity to work and schools, are often of more significance.
The majority of African Caribbeans who own their own homes are not living in Birmingham’s Bad Lands or Good Lands, but are settling in Hinter Lands located in the north of the city. The higher propensity to own, rather than rent, housing in the Hinter Lands to some extent indicates that African Caribbeans may be moving into areas that are more affluent than their cultural Heart Lands. However, the higher levels of material deprivation in those environments, in comparison to the so-called Good Lands, appear irrelevant. Maintaining cultural ties seems to be of more significance than notions of social status when relocating to particular areas. This is indicated by the proximity of African Caribbean Hinter Lands to their cultural Heart Lands in the north of Birmingham.

There is evidence to suggest there is a growing African Caribbean property owning housing class (ibid, 1967) in Birmingham. However, the situation of their unemployed working-class counterparts, who rely on Local Authority housing, is fraught with risk. The Under Occupancy Tax can leave African Caribbeans susceptible to the risk of debt and force them into the private housing market, which tends to be more expensive and often has worse housing conditions. Housing risks, in regard to instability and poverty, are more pronounced amongst those in the upper end of the 25-49 age-range – who are unemployed and have a spare bedroom. Full employment is one way of
negotiating the risk of debt. However, the option of precarious employment, particularly for those with low educational capital, might not provide enough income to meet both their housing and living expenses.
Since the 1960s, the social and political struggles of West Indians and their descendants have contributed toward major legislative changes (Rex and Tomlinson, 1979; Ratcliffe, 1981; 2004; Sivanandan, 1981; Fryer, 1984; Macpherson, 1999; Parekh et al., 2002; Gillborn, 2005). However, the impact that legislation may have had on ameliorating inequality in market situations, to create a level playing in which African Caribbeans might increase their social mobility in Birmingham, has not been examined in any detail since the late 1970s (Rex and Tomlinson, 1979; Ratcliffe, 1981). This research has contributed to rectifying those omissions. I have articulated the relationship between Empire and the Black British presence in Birmingham. The agency of Black Caribbean organisations has been explored in terms of their operational capacity to obtain life-changing resources for their community. I have also examined how the experiences of Birmingham’s Caribbean population, in education, labour and housing market situations, are mediated by age, class, gender and ethnicity. This investigation has attempted to assess the impact that changes in legislation, policies and practices have had on the contemporary social and spatial mobility of African Caribbeans in Birmingham.

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280 The title of this chapter is taken from the 1976 song “War ina Babylon”, sung by Max Romeo and the Upsetters, and produced by Lee “Scratch” Perry in Kingston, Jamaica.
During the seventeenth century Britain was the major European player in the business of human trafficking, in which Africans were forcibly migrated and subsequently enslaved in the Americas (Black, 1991; Williams, 2005 [1944]). Slavery was legitimatized by the British Navigation Acts, and under Parliamentary law Africans were classified as chattel: property with no legal rights or social status (Edwards, 1988). For hundreds of years slave laws regulated practices of racial segregation in the Americas. They normalised notions of Black servitude and White domination, and sustained the hierarchical order of labour relations. Between the 17th and 19th centuries, Jamaica was the most prosperous of Britain’s overseas’ colonies. Slave labour, and the island’s natural resources, significantly contributed to Britain’s global economic domination (Williams, 2005 [1944]; Hobsbawm, 1969; Black, 1991; Walvin, 2001). However, the combination of natural disasters and British mercantilism ruined Jamaica’s post-emancipation economy (Black, 1991) and influenced successive labour flows (ibid, 1991).

In the nineteenth century Jamaicans migrated between the countryside and the island’s capital in search of work. In the twentieth century, South America, and much later the mainland US and Canada, also became labour destinations.

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281 Although Britain imposed legislation to regulate racial segregation, and deny the human rights of Africans to facilitate the exploitation of slave labour, slave laws created in England had no jurisdiction outside of the Americas. See Van Cleve (2006), regarding the case of the slave Somerset who escaped from his master whilst visiting England and could not be reclassified as a slave under British law.
for Jamaican migrants (Black, 1991). However, US and Canadian, immigration legislation restricted Caribbean labour whilst facilitating the influx of European workers (Fryer, 1984; Black, 1991; US Department of State, Office of the Historian, 2012). As a consequence, the flow of Jamaican labour was redirected to Britain (Fryer, 1984). However, despite the 1948 British Nationality Act, which granted British passports to Commonwealth citizens (ibid, 1984), Caribbean migration did not significantly increase until the mid 1950s (Peach, 1968).

Most post-war Commonwealth migrants were Jamaicans (ibid, 1968), and the majority of them settled in Britain’s decaying inner cities. West Indian communities subsequently developed near to Labour Exchanges (Searle, 2013), that assigned them low-paid work in economic areas experiencing labour shortages (ibid, 2013). Thus, policies influencing the allocation of labour contributed to the growth of Birmingham’s Caribbean community in Handsworth (Rex and Tomlinson, 1979). The ward was near to the foundries and factories of Black Patch282 and Smethwick and Handsworth also had a Labour Exchange on Soho Road. Thus, the role of Birmingham in the exploitation of Black labour had transcended time and space. The city had benefitted from the unfree labour of Africans in its Caribbean colonies, as the majority of guns, implements and chains that were used to maim, fetter and

282 See Chapter Seven.
kill slaves were made in Birmingham’s foundries (Hobsbawm, 1969; Harris, 2008). A hundred years after Emancipation the free labour of West Indian slave descendants was exploited in low paid, menial labour in Birmingham’s manufacturing and production industries.

It is widely documented how the social mobility of post-war West Indian migrants was constrained by exclusionary policies and practices Rex and Moore, 1967; Rex and Tomlinson, 1979; Phizacklea and Miles, 1980; Ratcliffe, 1981; Fryer, 1984; Taylor, 1993) that influenced their acquisition of what I have characterised as Bads (Curran, 2013). West Indian labour was exploited in menial work (Gunter, 1954; Phizacklea and Miles, 1980; Fryer, 1984; Taylor, 1993) and their settlement was generally confined to high deprivation urban spaces, where they formed a replacement population for socially mobile White workers (Rex and Moore, 1967; Peach, 1968). Poverty and prejudice also restricted the housing choices of newly arriving Black migrants, many rented rather than purchase their accommodation (Rex and Moore, 1967; Rex and Tomlinson, 1979; Ratcliffe, 1981; 2004). However, unlike their West Indian predecessors, British born Blacks have had the opportunity to acquire Goods – in the form of UK educational qualifications – to improve their social and spatial mobility. Moreover, equality legislation from the Race Relations Act 1965 (RRA1965) to the Equality Act 2010 (EA2010), should have ameliorated the forms of discrimination that blocked the social mobility of their
This inquiry has examined if Birmingham’s African Caribbean population has been able to exchange educational Goods for labour market Goods (Bourdieu, 2010 [1984]), how those market situations might influence their spatial mobility and the extent to which fairness in competitive processes is mediated by social policies.

The 1991 Census data provided a heuristic snapshot of the occupational positions of African Caribbeans leaving school in the late 1970s and 1980s. However, Census datasets for 2001 and 2011 revealed a more accurate picture of their labour market status, spatial positions, housing tenure, and also those of their contemporaries. HESA and HEIDI data mapped changes in Black Caribbean educational capital. Narratives, documenting the past-race experiences of a sample of African Caribbeans living in Birmingham was examined in the context of social and political changes. The lived-experiences of first generation Black Britons were also scrutinized alongside data highlighting the current situation of their contemporaries in the higher education sector. Ethnic group comparisons, in relation to class, gender and age differences, were explored in the educational, labour and housing markets, to ascertain how African Caribbeans negotiate the contemporary risk of poverty. I now conclude this research by pooling the data and answering the
main questions of my investigation, which were highlighted earlier and are repeated below:

i. What impact have changes in legislation, policies and practices had on the operational capacity and agency of Black Caribbean community and religious organisations in Birmingham?

ii. How are the education and labour market experiences of African Caribbeans in Birmingham mediated by their gender and ethnicity?

iii. To what extent does legislation, allied to policies and practices, enable or constrain African Caribbean social mobility in market situations?

iv. What shifts have taken place in the spatial patterns of Birmingham’s African Caribbean population over the past thirty years?

v. How have thirty years of social change impacted on the social mobility of Birmingham’s African Caribbean population?

283 See Chapter One.
What impact have changes in legislation, policies and practices had on the operational capacity and agency of Black Caribbean community and religious organisations in Birmingham?

Black community and religious organisations in Birmingham have never provided housing for their supporters, or long-term employment with opportunities for career progression. Their main contribution to social mobility has been their capacity to deliver education as a resource in the community (Rex and Tomlinson, 1979; Ratcliffe, 1981; Andrews, 2013). However, over the past thirty years there have been significant shifts in legislation. This is particularly in regard to how the equality agenda has changed since the Race Relations Act 1976 (RRA1976), and the increasing marketisation of education (Richardson and Monro, 2012; Sivanandan, 2013; Gillborn, 2013;2014). I have examined the agency of African Caribbean organisations in the context of these changes. My aim was to establish the factors that have constrained or enabled their capacity, to continue providing education and labour market assistance for their supporters.
The politics of difference, in which the interests of African Caribbeans converged\textsuperscript{284} in the struggle against racial discrimination in the 1970s and 1980s, is no more. The EA2010, which has superseded the RRA1976 and the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 (RRAA2000), articulates ideas of difference in terms of protected characteristics. “Race” is still included, but so too are other inequalities such as gender, disability, and also marriage and even pregnancy, amongst others. Consequently, “race” and racial equity is no longer at the forefront of the political agenda and therefore is not considered to be of major concern. Moreover, individualism now occupies the political centre ground where notions of collectivism once flourished (Sivanandan, 2013). Although racism continues to impede life-chances and opportunities, racial discrimination is now much more insidious. I have argued that the political right views racial inequality as collateral damage: an unfortunate, but unavoidable, consequence of competition in market situations. Therefore, like all contemporary social problems racial inequality is politically articulated as individual failing, rather than the result of structural processes that are beyond the individual’s control. Neo-liberalism is now the dominant political discourse. Hence, the invisible hand of the free market shapes the politics of the transitional community sphere (Shukra et al., 2004), in which African Caribbean organisations operate.

\textsuperscript{284} Interest-convergence and interest-divergence are perspectives of critical race theory expounded by Derick Bell (Gillborn, 2013). Interest convergence contends that ‘advances in racial justice must be won through political protest and mobilisation that create a situation where [...] taking some action against racism becomes the lesser of two evils’ (ibid, 2013: 479 [emphasis in original]). Interest-divergence, however, asserts that notions of racial difference are manipulated to maintain the status quo of White supremacy in social, political and economic relations (ibid, 2013).
Mirza (2007: 1) argues that ‘the more things change the more they remain the same’, which summarises my assessment of ACSHO’s capacity for action within Birmingham’s Black Caribbean community. Although time has moved on, the organisation has to a great extent stood still. The persistence of racism indicates that Pan-Africanism is still as relevant today as it ever was.\textsuperscript{285} However, the means ACSHO employs to achieve its aim of liberating the minds of peoples of African heritage are not easily measured. The organisation’s agency is also constrained by a chronic shortage of capital. It appears ill-equipped for what I refer to as \textit{the long-game of community advocacy}.\textsuperscript{286} Community organisations, which do not possess the necessary capital to develop their capacity for action, have little option other than to obtain private sector investment or charitable sponsorship. The rise of the free market, to the detriment of Government intervention, has effectively changed the rules of political engagement in the transitional sphere. In order to continue \textit{playing the game} of community politics, African Caribbean religious and grassroots organisations have to comply with legislation implemented to reduce various forms of risk in the market society (Sivanandan, 2013).

\textsuperscript{285} Rex and Tomlinson (1979) argued that due to the persistence of racism, and exclusionary practices in UK society, Pan-Africanism would have increasing importance in developing a Black identity. There has been little substantive change in regard to reducing racial inequality since their Handsworth survey.

\textsuperscript{286} I argue that Black community organisations have to adopt long-term strategies, which take into consideration social and political changes, in order to achieve goals that are impossible to attain in the short-term. For example, liberating the minds of African peoples and overcoming racial disadvantage are long-term goals, the success of which have to be measured in the short-term by setting milestones to indicate progress at different stages.
During the 1970s and 1980s ACSHO mobilised community support to deliver its supplementary educational programmes (Andrews, 2013). Community education was used to address the failings of the ethnocentric State curriculum, and the systematic exclusion of Black children (ibid, 2013). The Black community also made modest financial contributions to the education of their children, which reduced ACSHO’s operational costs. However, legislative change now constrains the organisation’s agency. ACSHO has not developed safeguarding policies and procedures, where the protection of children is concerned (HM Government 2006). As a consequence, the labour of volunteers from the Black community can no longer be effectively appropriated for regulated activities287. The organisation is unable to ensure its staff have Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) clearances, as all organisations working with children now have a statutory safeguarding duty towards their care. This require employees, regardless of whether they are paid or volunteers, to acquire a DBS certificate. Moreover, rooms that could potentially be utilised as classrooms might not meet health and safety regulations (HSE, 2011; OFSTED, 2013), and would therefore be deemed unfit for educational purposes.

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ACSHO is also reluctant to apply for funding that would help the organisation to achieve its community objectives. However, I understand why. The organisation is proud of its independent status, and does not wish to compromise its aims by having to prioritise the politics of potential sponsors. Nevertheless, ACSHO operates in the public sphere and therefore it has to comply with statutory requirements regarding financial due diligence. ACSHO has been operating since 1964, and must file annual accounts and enlist the services of registered accountants. However, the secrecy surrounding the organisation makes such information difficult to obtain. Even if ACSHO decided to seek public sector investment, its specific racial aims and secret organisational structure would more than likely deter potential sponsors.

ACSHO’s exclusive Pan-African objectives does not conform to the Government’s ideas of a single equality regime or community cohesion. Nevertheless, a major strength of the organisation is its ethnic specific interests. This contrasts with the inclusive ideology of the Black church, which sees itself as providing religion for all, rather than prioritising the spiritual and material needs of African Caribbeans. Although legislation undoubtedly erects barriers to ACSHO’s agency, they are by no means insurmountable. All of the above legislative constraints can be interpreted as the organisation’s failure to

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288 ACSHO are not willing to compromise their aim of liberating the minds of the Black community, nor is it interested in helping other ethnic groups.
289 See HM Government (2010); Cantle (2002).
comply with statutory requirements. Thus, it can be argued that ACSHO’s reduced operational capacity over time cannot wholly be attributed to legislative changes alone. Some of the barriers encountered by the organisation are a result of decisions made by individuals within the organisation.

The continuity of Black community organisations to a great extent depends on their capacity to recruit young members. Although Pan-African ideology has lost some of its appeal to young Black males and females, that is not necessarily the case with religion. Due to its flourishing young membership, the Black church has continuity within the community. This contrasts with ACSHO whose mainly male membership is – as far as I could see – substantially over the age of forty. Although most UBL\textsuperscript{290} members are affiliated with the Black church, the meetings I attended did not have any young people present. This might be explained by the fact that the majority of UBL’s members are employed in the professions. Members below the age of twenty-four are therefore excluded by default. This is because the professional occupations, in which UBL members are employed, generally require a university degree followed by a few years climbing the occupational ladder. Nevertheless, UBL actively engages with young people in the Black community. For example, the

\textsuperscript{290} United in Building Legacy (UBL) is a Black organisation led by GK MBE, who is employed in a senior position within Birmingham City Council, a Christian and also an ex-member of ACSHO. The organisation’s members are all employed in professional occupations and most of them are connected to the Black Churches (see Chapter Four).
organisation’s legal professionals deliver projects that raise awareness of young people’s rights, particularly if they are stopped and searched by the police.

Financial self-sufficiency is the major barrier constraining the agency and operational capacity of the Black organisations I observed. Moreover, cuts in public spending, mediated through various austerity policies\textsuperscript{291}, makes it increasingly difficult for many community organisations to obtain financial support. It is now practically impossible to obtain funds through the public purse, or from NGOs or State agencies, to cover the costs of acquiring premises. Although UBL’s members are in well-paid occupations, the organisation does not own any property and their meetings are held in a building owned by Birmingham City Council\textsuperscript{292}. The same cannot said be said for ACSHO. Despite considerable financial difficulties over the years, the organisation has managed to hold on to its imposing headquarters in Handsworth.

\textsuperscript{291} Since 2010, the neo-liberal agenda has been driven by austerity measures in the form of cuts to public spending (Sivanandan, 2013), by both Coalition and Conservative Governments.

\textsuperscript{292} See Chapter Four.
The New Testament Church of God (NTCG) owns a few properties in the community. I cannot be certain if the Rock in Spring Hill is owned outright or has a mortgage. Nevertheless, the NTCG Rock does own outright an older and much smaller church, which is situated a few hundred yards away from the current building in Spring Hill. Although they no longer hold services there, it is still used for various activities. The NTCG in Lozells has had a major and costly refurbishment, for which it had to obtain a mortgage from one of the major banks. However, it has also invested in a nursery adjacent to the Church, which brings in additional finances. Property ownership is crucial for stability in the short-term and security in the long-term; it also provides Black organisations with a point of contact and presence in the community. Having access to their own buildings means that Black organisations can mobilise their supporters without interference from outside agencies. However, not owning the property in which they are based can reduce their capacity for action. This is especially the case if their organisational interests conflict with those of their landlords.

293 The nursery is not for the exclusive use of African Caribbeans or members of the NTCG. However, it does provide valuable childminding assistance for Black parents — especially females — who participate in education and the labour market. See Chapter Four.

294 This was demonstrated during the 2011 disturbances in Birmingham (see Chapter Four).

295 I have highlighted this problem in Chapter Four, using the example of the UBL leader GK, who appeared unable to challenge the City Council because it provides his organisation with their premises.
Since the Education Reform Act 1988 (ERA1988) the powers of LEAs have been gradually eroded (Troyna, 1992), to the extent where they can now no longer build new schools. However, the Government is encouraging private sector involvement to create more Academies and Free Schools under the 2010 Academies Act. Excell 3’s successful application for a Free School to some extent demonstrates the possibilities for empowerment that lie within contemporary legislation. The organisation’s foresight is also highlighted by the announcement in the March 2016 Conservative Budget to convert all primary and secondary schools into Academies by 2020 (Cook, 2016)

The King Solomon International Business School (KSIIBS) opened in September 2016. However, the finished product is quite different from that which was originally envisaged by Excell 3. Indeed, on the surface it might appear that

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296 In Chapter Four I outlined Excell 3’s Free School application, which received substantial support from UBL’s Rosemary Campbell-Stephens. Rosemary emigrated to Jamaica with her husband in late 2015 and received an OBE in the 2016 New Year’s Honours List. Excell 3 generated support for their Free School application by organising meetings in the Caribbean community, with Black parents who were concerned about their children’s education in State schools. As noted in Chapters Three and Four, the majority of the meetings were held in the New Testament Church of God in Lozells.

297 The Government announced in the 2016 Budget that it intends to impose academisation on all schools within six years, see Unison (2016). However, on May 6th 2016 the Government made a political U-turn. It has now decided to use the DfE as its vehicle ‘to force schools in “underperforming” local authorities to convert to academy status’ (Adams, 2016). Local authorities that run successful schools will be able to decide if academisation is best for them. 298 The school’s website portrays a Christian educational institution with a multi-ethnic pupil cohort. This is in stark contrast to the vision of a Black led school, which was first sold to African Caribbean parents at the pre-application meetings. Although there are still a number of Black academics involved with KSIIBS, the school’s Principal is White, and so is one third of the Board of Governors (King Solomon International Business School, 2016). None of the present White members of the school were at the pre-application meetings I attended (See Chapter Four).
the organisation’s aims have to a great extent been compromised. However, appearing to adopt the perceived virtues of Whiteness might be a strategy employed to play the long-game of community advocacy. It is said that he who pays the piper calls the tune. Consequently, Black organisations that engage in the market without their own capital sometimes have to dance to the tune of the piper. Free School legislation might seem emancipatory. However, financial dependency increases the risk of interest-divergence and State ideological enslavement. As ACSHO is only too well aware, accepting State funding compromises Black Caribbean organisations to the extent where they often have to relinquish their ethnic specific objectives. Despite “race” being a protected characteristic under the EA2010, and the evidence that clearly indicates African Caribbean children experience discrimination in schools, the Government is more concerned with promoting British values than it is about ameliorating racial inequity in education.299

299 Since New Labour’s 2002 Education Act (EA2002), increasingly more religious organisations have been encouraged to sponsor Academies (Gillard, 2007). However, in the aftermath of the 2013 Trojan Horse affair in Birmingham (BBC News, 2015; Robinson, 2015), the Government added the caveat of “British values” from the EA2002, which pertains to the spiritual, moral, social and cultural development of children (DfE, 2014). On the surface this appears to be an attempt to promote so-called Christian, liberal democratic principles to regulate the behaviour of private sector organisations appropriating the Academies Act 2010. Nevertheless, British values are not necessarily about subordinating cultural differences that are sometimes promoted in non-Christian religious beliefs, it is a pseudonym for Whiteness and White interests. This is demonstrated in Chapter Four in the case of Excell 3. Although Excell 3 is a Christian organisation, and despite “race” being a protected characteristic under the EA2010, the organisation was at first not allowed to open a Free School. By refusing Excell 3’s Free School application, the Government used symbolic violence (Bourdieu, 2010 [1984]) to deny the organisation the opportunity to address the problem of racial inequality in State education. Excell 3’s application was only granted when it conceded to forego its specific ethnic interests in favour of the Government’s vision of British values.
Racism has been a persistent factor in the comparatively low attainment of Black children studying at CSE, O-level and GCSE level (Swann, 1985; Troyna and Carrington, 1990; Gillborn and Youdell, 2000; Gillborn, 1997; 2005; 2008; 2013). However, the problem is now much wider and systematically entrenched in the present educational market than it was in previous years.

Although the existence of institutional racism has long been acknowledged as a social reality by both the 1981 Rampton and 1985 Swann Reports (Mamon, 2004), and subsequently by Macpherson (1999), there has been no political will to ameliorate its debilitating impact in the education sector. Academies and Free Schools are now being encouraged by Government to deliver the English Baccalaureate (E. Bacc.), which might eventually replace GCSEs. However, Gillborn (2013: 483) contends that ‘the government’s own data suggest that Black students do not draw equitable rewards from attending academy schools’.

The DfE (in ibid, 2013) reveals that roughly 20 per cent of students take examinations in the subjects required for E. Bacc. entry (English, Maths, two Sciences, a modern/ancient foreign language and a Humanities subject). Moreover, teachers tend to enter those who they consider to be the most proficient. This has consequences for Black students, who tend to be
perceived by White middle-class teachers as toxic consumers\textsuperscript{300}. The International Baccalaureate is part of the KSIBS curriculum, which suggests the school could take one of two directions: I) Black children are indiscriminately selected for the E Bacc. based on their ability; or II) they are overlooked and become the victims of symbolic violence\textsuperscript{301} (Bourdieu, 2010 [1984]). If the KSIBS takes the latter approach it would reinforce the perception that Black students are not as intellectually competent as their White counterparts (Coard, 1971; Carby, 1982; Gillborn, 2016). The evidence does suggest that the E. Bacc. assessment can potentially compound the current disadvantages experienced by Black pupils. However, only time will tell if that will indeed be the case.

Considering the original aims behind Excell 3’s Free School application, it could be argued that the contract between the organisation and the Government is an educational Faustian pact. Excell 3 had to make concessions, which appear to overlook the interests\textsuperscript{302} of Black children. The organisation had to

\textsuperscript{300} I have argued that teachers view Black pupils in the educational market as toxic consumers who are too hot to handle. African Caribbean children are generally perceived as posing a significant risk to the retention and success targets of White middle-class teachers, because of their general level of educational attainment and cultural Otherness, see Chapter Five.

\textsuperscript{301} In this context, symbolic violence is denying Black children the opportunity to acquire educational capital.

\textsuperscript{302} Gillborn (2013: 477) contends that ‘moments of racial progress are won when White power holders perceive self-interest in accommodating the demands of minoritised groups’. Considering the Government’s myopic view of race equality, it seems highly unlikely that racial progress will be achieved without interest-convergence on the part of Black Caribbean organisations, and their supporters. I take the view that African Caribbeans will have to prioritise and address their own needs without compromising them.
prioritise the needs of the educational market, which maintains the status quo of White privilege and White supremacy (Gillborn, 2005; 2008a; 2016).

Therefore, whilst the KSIBS is a step forward in the right direction, it might also be two steps backward because of Black interest-divergence. The vision of a Black led school was sold to African Caribbean parents. However, after two unsuccessful applications it was clear that the Government would not consent to the school if its leadership team was entirely Black.

The case of KSIBS demonstrates the ambiguity of the market State (Sivanandan, 2013). Applications for Free Schools are encouraged from interest groups, within the context of the free market. However, the State intervened to reject Excell 3’s applications, because they were too specific to the needs of Black Caribbean children. Excell 3’s initial rejection by the Government highlights how Whiteness is a form of capital. It can be exchanged for Goods in market situations, whereas Blackness is conceived as Bads. It remains to be seen if the KSIBS will be able to maintain their original aims and prioritise the learning needs of African Caribbean children. State dependency could shift the school’s focus from the attainment of Black Caribbean pupils to prioritising survival in a competitive educational market.

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303 Hundreds of parents signed a petition that formed part of Excell 3’s Free School application, in which they provisionally consented to their children attending the organisation’s school.
The supposedly “laissez-faire” market State\(^{304}\) is here to stay. It is not going to roll-back and re-assert the State’s former policy agenda, particularly where racial equity is concerned. Therefore, prospects for the future empowerment of African Caribbeans will to a great extent depend on how effectively their organisations appropriate legislation and engage with the private sector. Moreover, the agency and interests of African Caribbean community groups risk being compromised, if they enter the free market without having first accumulated their own capital. Previous equality policies and reports (i.e. those of Scarman and Macpherson) have been implemented or commissioned after major protests (Sivanandan, 1981; Fryer, 1984; Parekh et al., 2002; Solomos, 2003). However, as the market becomes increasingly dominant, so too does State control over the movement of citizens and their freedom to mobilise\(^{305}\). Consequently, there will be fewer opportunities in future for protests that might influence the State to converge its interests with those of African Caribbeans. Black community organisations have to be aware of the different ways in which individualism erects barriers to their collective interests and impedes mobilisation. Black Caribbean community and religious organisations possess limited capital and political power. Therefore, interest-convergence must take the form of accumulating and pooling finances and organisational assets, to collectively challenge racial inequality.

\(^{304}\) Sivanandan (2013) argues that the notion of the laissez-faire market State is a myth. This is because State intervention imposes legislation, which dismantles the public sector whilst allowing private enterprise to flourish.

\(^{305}\) New police powers to disperse groups in public spaces are documented in the Anti-Social Behaviour Crime and Policing Bill, see Home Office (2013).
The Caribbean community in Birmingham has had very little political representation in recent years. In 2012 Bishop Webley and Desmond Jaddoo\textsuperscript{306} unsuccessfully campaigned for the post of West Midlands Police and Crime Commissioner, and in March 2016 Yvonne Mosquito was suspended from her position as Deputy of that office\textsuperscript{307}. The African Caribbean population in Birmingham is considerably smaller in size than their White, Indian and Pakistani counterparts\textsuperscript{308}. Moreover, the Caribbean population is now displaced throughout Birmingham’s wards, and they are no longer the majority ethnic group in their Traditional \textit{Heart Lands}\textsuperscript{309}.

The spatial movement of the African Caribbean community is also problematic in terms of their political representation and empowerment. Their low numbers in any given ward makes it practically impossible for them to elect someone from their ethnic group who is capable of articulating their interests. Consequently, the Black vote by itself does not carry any significant political

\textsuperscript{306} See Chapter Four.
\textsuperscript{307} See Birmingham Mail (2016). There is a video featuring Desmond Jaddoo, in which he articulates the problem of interest divergence regarding the concerns and political representation of Birmingham’s Caribbean community, embedded on this website.
\textsuperscript{308} ONS Census data reveals that Birmingham’s 2011 Caribbean population is considerably smaller in size than their White British, Indian and Pakistani counterparts. Moreover, all the other minority ethnic groups highlighted in Table 3.5, apart from African Caribbeans show increases in their population sizes between 2001 and 2011.
\textsuperscript{309} See Chapter Eight.
sway. This ultimately leads to specific Black concerns being secondary to those of larger ethnic groups. This contemporary dilemma is very different to the 1950s and 1960s, when the West Indian population had a significantly larger national representation (Peach, 1968). The political situation has also changed since the late 1970s in Birmingham, when James Hunte was successfully elected as an independent Parliamentary candidate\textsuperscript{310}. As African Caribbeans in Birmingham have no voice in the mainstream political sphere, there is a risk that the ethnic inequalities they experience are overlooked by both White British or South Asian politicians. This highlights how \textit{interest divergence} is just as problematic for the mainstream political representation of Birmingham’s Black Caribbeans, as is the lack of financial independency amongst their community organisations.

\textbf{How are the education and labour market experiences of African Caribbeans in Birmingham mediated by their gender and ethnicity?}

\textbf{[and]}

\textbf{To what extent does legislation, allied to policies and practices, enable or constrain African Caribbean social mobility in market situations?}

I have examined narratives of first generation Black Britons, against educational and labour market data, which map changes in the positions of their

\textsuperscript{310} See Rex and Tomlinson (1979) and also Chapter Four.
contemporary Birmingham peers. This comparative approach has enabled me to identify continuities and departures in their experiences of ethnic and gender discrimination over time. I have argued in support of Bourdieu (2010, [1984]) and Weber (1920 in Smith, 2007: 90) that the probability for African Caribbean social mobility increases by exchanging educational capital for economic capital and ‘from the relative control over goods […], skills and their income-producing uses within a given economic order’ (emphasis added). However, to optimise the probability of increasing one’s life-chances, the process by which university Goods is traded for labour market Goods must take place within what I refer to as the appropriate age-stage.

Regardless of gender differences, racial discrimination continues to block educational and economic opportunities for Black Caribbeans. Nevertheless, African Caribbean females have been more successful than their male counterparts in their efforts to obtain symbolic capital in the education and labour markets. Policies and practices have played an ambivalent role in the success of Caribbean females. Moreover, this research has highlighted that social mobility is neither ‘easy or typical’ (ibid, 2007: 87), for Black Caribbean competing in the contemporary market society (Sivanandan, 2013). Improving their social status is not an elementary process, achieved by simply acquiring

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311 I define university, educational and H.E. Goods as First Class and Second Class First Division degrees, see Chapter Five. Economic, or labour market Goods are the high-income professions in NS-SEC Classes 1 and 2, see Chapter Six. 312 See Chapters Three and Five for in-depth explanations.
and exchanging Goods. A major consequence of social change is the way in which the old wine of racism is now mediated through the new bottle of neoliberalism. The shift from an interventionist to, what appears to be, a laissez-faire market State (ibid, 2013) has downplayed the perpetuation of racial discrimination. It has also reduced the importance of implementing policy to eliminate inequalities in market situations.

The 1968 Race Relations Act (RRA1968) was the first piece of legislation to extend the scope of anti-racist legislation to the education sector (Ratcliffe, 1981; 2004). However, as noted earlier and above, subsequent educational policies that were supposedly implemented to integrate the immediate descendants of Caribbean migrants, often resulted in practices of dispersal and referrals to schools for the educationally sub-normal (ESN) \(^{313}\) (Coard, 1971; Carby, 1983). The disproportionate exclusion of Black children in State schools is a phenomenon that has persisted from the late 1960s to the present (Troyna and Carrington, 1990; CRE, 1997; DfE, 2012a). This suggests that past-race practices of racial discrimination resonate with the contemporary experiences of African Caribbeans. The only real difference is that Black children who are now excluded from State education are sent to pupil referral units (DfE, 2015), rather than to ESN Schools. Moreover, what is also problematic for the future life-chances and employment opportunities of African Caribbeans is that,

\(^{313}\) See the research subjects' narratives in Chapter Five.
regardless of gender, Black pupils are being expelled at the *age-stage* when they should be preparing for their GCSEs (DfE, 2012a).

Without *good*\textsuperscript{314} grade GCSE qualifications, African Caribbean children will not be able to access the A-level courses that provide the most typical route into universities. Furthermore, they will also not be able to enter the labour market at the *appropriate age-stage* to facilitate their upward social mobility\textsuperscript{315}. LEAs can no longer build State schools, and their powers are being eroded by Government in favour of private sector intervention. Nevertheless, LEAs still have a statutory duty for the educational welfare of permanently excluded school children. This duty has been imposed under the 1996 and 2002 Education Acts and also the Education and Inspections Act 2006 (ibid, 2012a). However, Academies are exempt from the financial penalties State institutions incur for excluding pupils (Gillard, 2007)\textsuperscript{316}. Therefore, under the increasing marketisation of education, the practice of permanently excluding Black children seems set to continue\textsuperscript{317}. This is particularly as the evidence

\textsuperscript{314} These are specifically A*-C grades.

\textsuperscript{315} I have argued that the highest level of educational qualifications must be obtained at the appropriate, or expected, age-stage to facilitate early entry into the labour market and subsequent opportunities for social mobility through employment progression, see Chapters Five and Six.

\textsuperscript{316} See also DfE (2015), Paragraph 9; Section 181.

\textsuperscript{317} See BBC (2012).
suggests that teachers generally view Black children as what I refer to as toxic consumers.  

Government policies now encourage private sector investment in Free Schools, which have complete autonomy over their management and operational procedures. The curriculums of these schools are often tailored to support the interests and pursuits of middle-class children, whose parents generally have more financial and symbolic capital than their Black working-class counterparts. Free Schools can also exclude children within their catchment area, because they have the autonomy to set their own entry criteria. Thus, despite “race” being a protected characteristic under the current equality agenda (Richardson and Monro, 2012), the intersectionality of racial discrimination and class disadvantage persists. The only thing that has changed is how they are now reproduced and legitimated by the insidious practices of schools, within the culture of competition in the educational market.

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318 ibid, also see Chapter Five.
319 ibid. Free Schools and Studio Schools were created under the 2010 Academies Act and are free from LEA control.
320 Although schooling appears to be free, the cost of learning resources and equipment, necessary for the study of specific subjects, can be problematic for children from a poor background. They might also be unable to afford extra-curricular activities, such as overseas trips, that could develop their cultural capital (Bourdieu, 2010 [1984]).
321 Only Gypsy Roma Travelers have lower GCSE attainment than Black Caribbeans (DfE, 2012b). If transfer to a Free School depended on predicted GCSE exam grades, some African Caribbean children might be refused entry based on their anticipated achievement.
There are more African Caribbean females progressing into higher education than their male peers\textsuperscript{322}. The majority of Black Caribbean females are also accessing university at the appropriate age-stage. This is positive for their social mobility, as it enables them to compete on equal terms with their ethnic counterparts for subsequent labour market opportunities. The national trend of higher female university participation may have been influenced by New Labour’s policies after 2003. However, it is difficult to assess the extent to which they may have benefitted African Caribbean females specifically. Policies, such as Sure Start, may have enabled older Black females with children to participate in higher education. Nevertheless, they do not account for the success of their younger counterparts, particularly in Birmingham.

Between 2007-2013, almost half of Birmingham’s higher education students, were within the appropriate age-stage\textsuperscript{323}. However, out of the three ethnic groups surveyed Black Caribbean students have the highest 35-49 age-range in H.E. institutions\textsuperscript{324}. Moreover, over half the total of Black students from Birmingham attending Russell Group universities are outside of the 18-24 age group\textsuperscript{325}. The high number of African Caribbean students outside of the

\textsuperscript{322} See Chapter Five and DfE (2012a).
\textsuperscript{323} See table 5.10.
\textsuperscript{324} ibid.
\textsuperscript{325} ibid.
appropriate age-stage is problematic for their inter-generational social mobility. Russell Group students have better career prospects than their counterparts in other H.E. institutions. However, older workers are generally perceived as having less economic value to employers. Younger workers are mainly healthier, prepared to be more flexible, and often accept lower wages than their older counterparts who tend to have more responsibilities and financial commitments. Although age is a protected characteristic\textsuperscript{326} only those in particular age groups, such as the elderly, are protected from discrimination. Therefore, it can be a quite subtle and often overlooked practice. Consequently, there is no way of knowing with any certainty if high rates of unemployment amongst African Caribbeans is a consequence of age, rather than “race” discrimination. It could be the case that older Black Caribbeans may have H.E. degrees but are unable to exchange them for economic capital. Nevertheless, “race”, more so than age discrimination, might explain the comparatively high rates of Black Caribbean unemployment in Birmingham. For example, MWBCs have a higher representation of 16-24 year-olds\textsuperscript{327}. However, they also have the highest rates of unemployment out of the three ethnic groups surveyed in this research.

Although New Labour policies might have facilitated access to universities, there is no evidence to suggest that they have actually reduced racial

\textsuperscript{326} See HM Government (2010).
\textsuperscript{327} See Appendix ii.: Table 3.4 and also Chapter Six.
inequalities within the higher education sector. Black students entering universities with the same qualifications as their White counterparts generally leave with lower degree grades\textsuperscript{328}. This suggests they may be encountering racial discrimination within universities. Shiner and Noden (2014: 9) initially revealed that regardless of class or gender differences, Black Caribbeans ‘tend to target lower-ranking or middle-ranking institutions than elite institutions.’ This observation is to some extent supported by Table 5.9 for Black Caribbean Birmingham students. In comparison to their ethnic counterparts, they have a higher proportional representation of students in universities outside of the Russell group.

Other H.E. institutions do not acquire as much funding as their Russell Group counterparts, and therefore do not have the same level of available resources (Havergal, 2015). However, the comparatively lower Russell Group applications by African Caribbean students do not necessarily suggest a lack of ambition on their part. Noden, Shiner and Modood (2014) reassessed the original position of Shiner and Noden (2014) and revealed that elite universities discriminate against Black Caribbean applicants. Consequently, African Caribbeans in Birmingham may also concede that it is unlikely they will be offered a place in a Russell Group institution, because of the \textit{locked-in}

\textsuperscript{328} See Figures 1 and 2 in Chapter Five.
inequality (Gillborn, 2008b) within the education system. Thus, it appears that the exclusionary selection processes of elite universities (Shiner and Modood, 2002), and discriminatory practices within them, may have contributed towards discouraging (Heath and Cheung, 2007) Birmingham’s Black students from applying.

The persistence of racial discrimination in universities has recently been acknowledged by the former Prime Minister David Cameron. He has suggested imposing a ‘transparency duty’ with the aim of ‘tearing down the barriers at elite universities’ (Gov. UK, 2016). Shiner and Noden (2014: 3) also note that ‘more needs to be done to improve access, particularly to the most selective institutions’. However, David Cameron’s statement overlooks how discriminatory practices in the secondary education sector reduces the likelihood of university participation for Black Caribbean children. This is particularly the case where Russell Group applications are concerned. As noted above, GCSEs at Grade C or higher must first be acquired, in order to obtain the various A-level and Level 3 qualifications that are needed to enter universities at the appropriate age-stage. Therefore, it is not just the

329 This is the idea that racism is embedded into the processes and practices of the education system to such an extent that it is inevitable.
330 I have argued in Chapter Six that racism and discriminatory practices in the labour market may have contributed to discouraging Black Caribbeans from applying for jobs where they would constitute a highly visible minority. In much the same way, African Caribbeans may think that applying for a place in an elite university is an exercise in futility.
331 See also Grove (2015).
exclusionary practices of universities that is a barrier to the higher education participation of African Caribbean students (particularly Black males), but also their high rate of permanent school exclusions. Thus, it is not new legislation that is required, but rather the political will to sanction institutions that transgress their statutory duties under the *existing* equality agenda. Imposing heavy fines on educational establishments, that discriminate against Black Caribbean pupils, applicants and students, is a means by which the market could be appropriated to reduce inequalities and mediate fairness.

In contrast to their female counterparts, African Caribbean males appear to be regressing rather than progressing in market situations. As noted above, in comparison to their female peers there is a growing disparity in their higher education participation and they are not faring as well in the labour market. In Birmingham between 2001 and 2011, there has been a decline in the number of Black males employed in the high-income *Class 1* occupations, whereas the exact opposite is the case in respect of their female counterparts. Gender differences in the labour market positions of Birmingham’s African Caribbean population are also reflected nationally. What is also a concern for their social mobility is the employment differences in the crucial 25-49 age-range. Both nationally and in Birmingham, Black females are improving their occupational status in this age-range, whereas the position of their male counterparts is

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332 See Chapter Five and DfE (2012a).
deteriorating\textsuperscript{333}. This is not just in terms of their occupational positions in the higher-tiers of the labour market, but also their increasing representation in \textit{Routine Occupations} and amongst the \textit{Never Worked and Long-term Unemployed}\textsuperscript{334}.

The narrative of Subject E\textsuperscript{335} highlights how workplace racism can \textit{discourage} some Black workers from applying for positions where they are form a visible and distinct minority. Moreover, the decreasing concern of the State in neutralising labour market discrimination suggests there is little hope that the situation of Black males will be improved by the Government implementing new legislation, or enforcing existing policies. Thus, the future social mobility of Caribbean males will rely on their own agency, rather than in the hope that equality policies will somehow mediate fairness on their behalf. As highlighted above in the case of Black community organisations, African Caribbeans – and particularly Black males – have to appropriate the free market to cater for their immediate and long-term material needs. This might be achieved by improving their position within self-employed NS-SEC \textit{Class 4} occupations.

\textsuperscript{333} See Tables 6.9; 6.10; 6.11 and 6.12. 
\textsuperscript{334} ibid. 
\textsuperscript{335} See Chapter Six.
National disparities in the proportional representations of African Caribbeans and their White British counterparts in the *Small Employers and Own Account Workers Class* have remained virtually stagnant between 2001 and 2011. However, the slight but noticeable improvement in Birmingham\(^{336}\) indicates that increasingly more African Caribbean males are self-employed. However, the problem they face is somewhat similar to that encountered by Excell 3 above, in terms of negotiating and overcoming ideas of Whiteness and White hegemony in the consumer market. African Caribbeans have a much smaller consumer base in Birmingham, when their population size is compared to the combined Asian ethnic populations and the larger White majority\(^{337}\). Thus, most Black businesses can only flourish by appealing to the wider population of consumers, who have the benefit of choice in a saturated service industry. However, the logic of the market, which presupposes that consumers will purchase the best available service at the lowest price, might not necessarily apply where notions of cultural identity are concerned.

Crossley (2001: 83) interprets Bourdieu’s (2010, [1984]) notion of habitus as social practices, which ‘function below the threshold of consciousness [...] beyond the reach of introspective scrutiny’\(^{338}\). As such, there are hidden social practices that influence the construction of a hegemonic White cultural

\(^{336}\) See Tables 6.5; 6.6; 6.7 and 6.8.
\(^{337}\) See Table 3.5 in Appendix ii.
\(^{338}\) See Chapter One.
habitus. This suggests that cultural dissimilarity might influence the majority White consumer group to overlook Black businesses in favour of White companies who they perceive as culturally similar. Fanon (in Garner, 2007: 19) also contends that ‘the construction of a White identity [is] based on a number of assumptions about human agency’, which also highlights the significance of how Others are socially constructed. The negative media portrayal of Blacks (ibid, 2007) to some extent reinforces the notion they lack the skills and competency needed for particular economic services. Therefore, a problem that Black entrepreneurs have, in appealing to the wider market, is how they are perceived by the gaze of the dominant White majority. There are no easy solutions to this age old problem. However, it is possible that if the economic gap between Black males and females continues to increase it could have a detrimental impact on the future of their ethnic group and cultural identities.

Intimate relationships are often formed in public spaces, such as educational institutions and places of employment where opportunities exist for gender interactions. However, the relative dearth of Black males in universities and the professions reduces the likelihood of Black females having opportunities to form intimate relationships with them. This observation is supported by ONS (2014: 8) data revealing that the ‘16-24 age-group have the highest rates of inter-ethnic relationships’, which is the appropriate age-stage when higher education Goods is being obtained and exchanged for labour market capital.
Moreover, the most common inter-ethnic relationships – outside of those within the different White ethnic groups – were those between MWBC and White British, followed by Black Caribbean and White British (ibid, 2014). This suggests that the increase of social distance (Park, 1924) in public spaces between Black Caribbean males and females is leading to a disparity in their lifestyles and relationships. Consequently, the structure of Caribbean families appears to be undergoing gradual, but significant, long-term change – and not necessarily just in terms of the growth of lone-parent matriarchal families.

The acute increase in the MWBC population might be evidence of the gradual cultural and ethnic assimilation of African Caribbeans. Between 2001 and 2011 the national Black Caribbean population increased by approximately six per cent, whereas their MWBC counterparts increased by 84 per cent. Over the same period in Birmingham there has been a decrease of less than one per cent in those identifying as African Caribbean. In contrast, the MWBC population has increased by 58 per cent and have a much younger 16-24 age population. Although there are increasingly more Black Caribbeans forming intimate partnerships with White Britons, it is difficult to establish whether the data is being driven by a growing trend in relationships between Black females and White males, or Black males and White females.

See Appendix
The role that legislation might have played in ameliorating cultural differences between Blacks and Whites, to a level where – in some instances – they appear to be only *skin deep*, cannot be established with any certainty. Successive changes to the equality agenda might have ameliorated intolerance and gradually adjusted public attitudes. It might also be the case that the growth of inter-ethnic relationships is the result of several years of geographical proximity, between Blacks and Whites. Nevertheless, there does seem to be a correlation between the improving social mobility of African Caribbean females, the rise of inter-ethnic relationships and the increase of the MWBC population. If there is indeed a growing trend of more African Caribbean females forming intimate partnerships with White British males, then better life-chances and increasing opportunities for Black women might be incurring a cultural penalty, in the form of gradual ethnic assimilation. Further research is necessary to examine the impact that differences in social status, between Black males and females, is having on the changing structure of African Caribbean families.
What shifts have taken place in the spatial patterns of Birmingham’s African Caribbean population over the past thirty years?

The relationship between social and spatial mobility is not necessarily a straightforward one, as there are a myriad of choices and constraints that influence where individuals live. It cannot be taken for granted that individuals will move from high deprivation *Bad Lands* to low deprivation *Good Lands* (Burgess, 2008 [1925]) as their material situation and social status improves. Nevertheless, the spatial patterns of post-war West Indian migrants were to a great extent influenced by constraints, rather than choices. These included, but were not limited to: their family networks in the UK; the proximity of labour exchanges; discriminatory practices in the private and public housing markets; their low-income occupations; and the availability of affordable housing, capable of accommodating their families (Rex and Moore, 1967; Rex and Tomlinson, 1979; Ratcliffe, 1981; Fryer, 1984; Taylor, 1993; Chamberlain, 1999; Searle, 2013). A combination of these factors influenced the growth of African Caribbean communities in urban spaces, which I also refer to as their cultural *Heart Lands*. The majority of Birmingham’s African Caribbean population is still located in the north of the city\(^{340}\). However, over the past thirty years there has

\(^{340}\) I emphasise that these areas had the *largest* African Caribbean populations, as there were also sizeable Black communities in the south of the city, see Gunter (1954) and Rex and Moore (1967).
been a gradual outward movement from their cultural *Heart Lands* to areas I define as *Hinter Lands*\(^{341}\).

If the low deprivation *Good Lands* of Birmingham’s Sutton wards can be considered as *Promise Lands* (Burgess, 2008 [1925]), where minority ethnic groups might aspire to live as they accumulate financial capital, then the housing situation of the Caribbean population is gradually improving.

Ratcliffe (1981; 2004) revealed that, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, African Caribbeans had a tendency to rent rather than purchase their housing. However, Census data for Birmingham, between 1991 and 2001, indicates a gradual increase in the numbers of Black Caribbeans opting to purchase their own properties. The proportional increase of African Caribbean homeowners in the Sutton wards is on a par with their White British counterparts. Moreover, they are improving their homeownership in the crucial 25-49 age stage\(^{342}\). This suggests a possible correlation between African Caribbean social mobility – in terms of improvements in occupational status – and spatial mobility, regarding changes in tenure and the acquisition of housing in low deprivation environments. However, the gender of the Household Representative Person (HRP) is unknown, as is their marital status. Therefore, it cannot be established

\(^{341}\) See Chapter Seven.
\(^{342}\) I reiterate that twenty-five is the approximate age at which higher education often ends and labour market participation commences.
how many Black homeowners in the Sutton wards are the male heads of African Caribbean families, single males or if they are unmarried females.

Due to limitations in the Census HRP data it is also difficult to establish if there is a correlation between the improved labour market positions of Black females and changes in the contemporary spatial patterns of African Caribbeans. It could be the case that as Black females are improving their occupational status they are also increasing their position as homeowners. Moreover, correlations between African Caribbean spatial patterns and changes in household structures cannot be determined from the data. One reason is that someone identifying as the Black Caribbean HRP could be in a relationship, or living with a partner, who is of a different ethnic origin. Therefore, it could indeed be a case of *one step forward and two steps backward* in regard to both the social and spatial mobility of African Caribbeans. Data that indicates improvements in their spatial situation, as a consequence of better labour market opportunities, might also be indicative of their ethnic and cultural assimilation

In one sense, the contemporary spatial patterns of African Caribbeans suggest improvements in their social status, but in another they are also problematic to any meaningful understanding of exactly where Birmingham’s contemporary
Caribbean community is spatially situated. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Caribbean community was mainly located in the low deprivation Bad Lands – or cultural Heart Lands – of Handsworth, Lozells and neighbouring wards in north Birmingham (Rex and Tomlinson, 1979; Ratcliffe, 1981). However, that is no longer the case. African Caribbeans are increasing their representation in areas I define as ethnic Hinter Lands. In these new Hinter Lands, the main housing tenure of African Caribbeans is that of homeowner. The African Caribbean Hinter Lands, like their Heart Lands, are also located in the north of Birmingham. This suggests that proximity to their traditional ethnic enclaves might be an important factor of their cultural habitus and a significant influence on their spatial patterns. In contrast to the African Caribbean Hinter Lands, there is a higher tendency to rely on social housing in their traditional Heart Lands\textsuperscript{343}, particularly for those in the crucial 25-49 age-stage\textsuperscript{344}.

The narratives of Rosemary Campbell and Bishop Webley highlight that the outward movement of African Caribbeans may not necessarily influenced by ideas of low and high deprivation, or even class considerations. However, education and work are major factors in spatial transitions. The majority of Blacks homeowners, in the wards identified as African Caribbean Hinter Lands, are in the 25-49 age-stage. This again suggests that they are purchasing properties at an age that is important for inter-generational social mobility to

\textsuperscript{343} See Table 7.16.  
\textsuperscript{344} See Table 7.19.
occur, and when work, family and schools are major considerations. Changes in
the spatial patterns of African Caribbeans also indicate a correlation between
improved labour market positions and homeownership. However, as
highlighted in the context of the Sutton wards above, there is no way of
establishing the gender, or family structures, of the homeowners.

African Caribbeans are moving into areas where they form a comparatively
small minority of the population in those wards, and their status as
homeowners disperses them even further. As their social status improves,
and they can afford to purchase properties, African Caribbeans are being
dispersed by the individual choices they are able to make in the housing
market. However, the spatial mobility of the majority of African Caribbeans is
constrained by their poverty and reliant on social housing. Consequently, the
disparity between choice and constraint – in terms of financial independence
and State dependence – will be increasingly problematic for the African
Caribbean community.

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345 Although the majority of African Caribbeans tend to reside in the north of the city (see
Appendix vi.), they still have a smaller overall population than some ethnic groups in
Birmingham. Moreover, whilst other ethnic groups have increased their populations in
Birmingham only those of African Caribbeans, and their majority White British counterparts,
have actually decreased in size (see Appendix ii.: Table 3.5).
346 See Tables 7.16 and 7.19.
As home ownership is beyond the reach of most individuals in the market society, ‘and the lack of social housing, combined with a cap on housing benefits, means councils are beginning to “decant” people away from their communities’ (Sivanandan 2013: 4), the Caribbean community might now be viewed as an *imagined community* (Anderson, 1991 [1983]). Thus, the idea of an African Caribbean community might now be seen in terms of people sharing cultural bonds of attachment, rather than as a population located in a specific geographical space. The spatial shift from *Heart Lands* to *Hinter Lands* is problematic for Black Caribbean mobilisation and as consequences for interest convergence. This is because it will be increasingly difficult for the disparate Caribbean population to address the persisting problem of racism, which impacts on them as a collective.

In the past, geographical proximity facilitated the growth of community networks, which West Indians appropriated to overcome racist practices. The Partner system\(^\text{347}\) is an example of how they used their cultural capital (Bourdieu, 2010 [1984]), to obtain deposits for mortgages, when the banks refused them loans. However, African Caribbeans can no longer rely on their community networks in the same way as their West Indian predecessors, and they still have a high tendency to rent social housing in their traditional *Heart*

\(^{347}\) See Chapter Seven.
Despite the Race Relations Act 1976 (RRA1976) outlawing discrimination in the public and private housing markets, precarious employment (Standing, 2011), bad credit rating and the constant risk of debt construct barriers for African Caribbeans wishing to obtain mortgages. As noted by Sivanandan (2013) above, housing benefit cuts can break up communities, but they also increase the risk of poverty for those at the higher end of the 25-49 age spectrum. The Bedroom Tax is detrimental to those with adult children who no longer live with them. The policy disperses African Caribbeans, by forcing them to find smaller accommodation that is often outside of their communities, or incur the risk of debt from unaffordable rents. The duality of the spatial positions of Black Caribbeans is another example of one step forward and two steps backward, where their spatial mobility is concerned. Individual gains are offset by the fragmentation of the Black community, whilst the spatial mobility of those residing in their cultural Heart Lands appear to be constrained by increasing debt and poverty.

348 Lands. This is even more pronounced for those between the ages of 25-49, which suggests they are still generally trapped in a cycle of poverty.

See Table 7.16.

See Table 7.19.
How have thirty years of social change impacted on the social mobility of Birmingham’s African Caribbean population?

The title of this chapter invariably sums up the situation regarding the social mobility of Birmingham’s African Caribbean population in the past thirty years. There has been progress in the acquisition of Goods. However, they have also been offset by major setbacks in the acquisition of Bads, particularly with regard to differences in social mobility between genders. The nation State, in which legislation, policies and practices were supposed to maintain fairness in the public sphere, is no more. The new economic arena is ‘the marketplace [in which] men and women are consumers not producers’ (ibid, 2013: 3). Policies now aim to give free reign to private interests and activities that promote consumption, individualism and competition. The marketplace, and not the liberal State, is now viewed as the great leveler. Consequently, equality and social equity will not be delivered by State intervention, but by engaging with the free market. To quote Mirza (2007: 1) once again, ‘the more things change the more they remain the same’. Racism continues to be the major barrier to African Caribbean social mobility. However, it is no longer the overt racism, which in the past stipulated ‘no Blacks, no dogs, no Irish’ (Mirza, 2006: 144) or ‘if you want a nigger neighbour vote Labour’ (Fryer, 1984: 382).
Racism is now much more insidious and subtle. It is hidden within the vicissitudes of the free market and bubbles below the surface in competitive market situations for life-changing Goods. Where the supposed aim of social policies was to create a level playing field, the market State has dismantled the progress made under several years of equality legislation (Ratcliffe, 2015). The contemporary market society legitimates the biological turn (Gillborn, 2016), reminiscent of the assimilation and cultural deficiency models of the late 1960s. This position justifies non-State intervention under the pretext that polices cannot alter natural differences in intellect or ability. Thus, it is not surprising that African Caribbean social mobility is viewed in terms of one step forward and two steps backward. Little has really changed.

The findings of this research reinforce the importance that accumulating and translating educational Goods has for social mobility. However, the main difficulty encountered by community and mainstream educational organisations in the past thirty years, is financial autonomy to support the learning needs of African Caribbeans and challenge racism in the labour market. In the context of community education, the demise of ACFAS and Kajan350 demonstrates the devastating consequences of financial dependency. State funding has provided the KSIBS with security in the short-term, but it remains to be seen if it will flourish in the long-term. Although mainstream

350 See Chapters Four and Five.
educational institutions are key sites of conflict in the struggle against racism, the debilitating impact of racial discrimination is now overlooked in both political and academic circles.

By David Gillborn’s own admission, university are finding it difficult to attract funding for “race” research. H.E. institutions are caught up in a competitive educational process to develop courses that attract consumers, and are ranked according to the position they attain in the Research Excellence Framework (REF). Moreover, as racial inequality is no longer at the forefront of the political agenda, most universities are not concerned with “race” research. Therefore, fewer universities will be concerned about developing courses that focus specifically on racial inequality. This will have future consequences for African Caribbean social mobility, as racial discrimination will be increasingly examined in isolation from wider structural processes that cause it. Thus, the social reality of the impact that racial discrimination and discriminatory practices have on individuals will be questioned and consequently overlooked. This position is reminiscent of the 1970s, in which the rotten apple theory (Troyna and Carrington, 1992) of racism was used to

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351 This information was given to me during an interview with David Gillborn (19th June, 2013).
352 Students are also commodities in a transitional process that shifts from one market to another, i.e. from the educational to the labour market. See Chapter Five.
353 The REF is the competitive process by which universities are ranked according to their research work.
explain its persistence. Racism was articulated in terms of individual prejudice, rather than as a consequence of failings by the State. Little has really changed.

As noted above, material gains made by African Caribbeans in Birmingham have to some extent been neutralised by Bads. This is particularly where gender differences in social mobility are concerned. The position of African Caribbean females has improved from what it was in the late 1970s. They are negotiating the risk of poverty by accumulating more H.E. and labour market capital. However, their male counterparts have comparatively poorer educational and labour market outcomes. Sveinsson (2012: 4) reveals that ‘for every one African Caribbean male undergraduate at a Russell Group university, there are three African Caribbean males aged 18–24 in prison’. Moreover, ‘African Caribbean men comprise 7 per cent of 18–24 year-old prisoners, but 0.1 per cent of Russell Group undergraduates’ (ibid, 2012: 4). It is indeed a case of one step forward and two steps backward.

Although the proportionate representation of Birmingham’s African Caribbean females in the top tier occupations of the NS-SEC is on a par with their White British counterparts, it is difficult to establish the exact direction their careers
are taking. In the late 1970s there was a tendency for Black females to enter the nursing profession (Ratcliffe, 1981), which is still classified as a skilled occupation. However, further research is needed to ascertain if Black females are progressing into the financial, commercial, administrative and technological occupations, which are generally the better-paid sectors of the contemporary labour market.

After almost seventy years of a Black Caribbean presence in Birmingham, it is difficult to explain why there is a dearth of self-sufficient Black businesses and community organisations in the city. In the early post-war years, there was no anti-discrimination legislation, and the work most West Indians could generally obtain was menial and low-paid (Fryer, 1984). However, during the late 1950s and 1960s, a number of self-sufficient Black organisations and businesses flourished in Birmingham’s inner-city areas (Sivanandan, 1982). This suggests that there is more to the current material situation of Birmingham’s Caribbean community than the perpetuity of racism, “race” legislation reductionism or increasing private sector intervention in the public sphere. However, the contemporary factors that constrain Black entrepreneurial agency, and what that entails for the future social mobility of African Caribbeans, is an area that warrants further research.
I reiterate that financial self-sufficiency is crucial to African Caribbean agency in their struggle for social mobility. Although society has changed, the same old inequalities, which blocked the status of Black Caribbeans in the past, persist. There are no solutions to racial discrimination, which might create a level playing field in market situations, that will be provided by the State. African Caribbeans have to develop new strategies to maintain the same aims of social justice and equity. Moreover, maintaining their African Caribbean ethnic identity and community networks, is fundamental to future strategies that seek to challenge racial inequality. David Gillborn quoted the late Stuart Hall while explaining to me how the monolithic problem that is racism can be overcome:

‘You struggle where you are. In your teaching, you try and make a difference. In your political work, you try and make a difference. In your writing, you try and make a difference. You do what you can, work with other people, and sometimes you can change the world’ (Professor David Gillborn, 19th June 2013, Birmingham).

It is indeed important to struggle where you are. However, I argue that for the struggle to be effective it must be a joined-up process in which interests converge for the common cause. What is needed now is not a politics of
difference, but a new politics of convergence that links direct action in the transitional community sphere (Shukra et al., 2004) to the mainstream political arena. The aim of interest convergence in this sense is not about influencing the creation of new legislation. On the contrary, it is about exerting collective political pressure to appropriate existing legislation, as a means of changing discriminatory practices and ameliorating racial inequality. Where the politics of neo-liberalism promotes self-interest, and difference is used to fracture collectivity (Sivanandan, 2013), the politics of convergence must promote the collective interests of the Caribbean community.

The struggle against racism, which is the major barrier to social mobility in market situations, can only be won if community groups, their supporters and political activists work together with mainstream institutions and academics who are also trying to make a difference. “Race” reductionism, in the politics of the market, steers academic research away from racial inequality to less contentious issues that attract more funding. This suggests that in order to have the academic freedom to write and research issues, which are not necessarily in the interests of financial sponsors, race researchers might have to relocate to the transitional community sphere (Shukra et al., 2004) in the long-term. However, State disengagement also reinforces the need for the Black community to be financially autonomous. The Caribbean community must seek empowerment by sponsoring and directing the research of
academics, who have the political platform to highlight the structural factors that perpetuates racism and constrains their social mobility. Thus, interest convergence would enable the struggle against racial inequality to transcend the transitional sphere and embed itself in the mainstream political arena. African Caribbeans still face the same old barriers in the competition to increase their life chances and opportunities. However, the politics of the contemporary sites of struggle are no longer mediated by social policies; they are instead legitimated by market forces.
## Appendix i.

### Table 1.1: The Research Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name/Pseudonym</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Homeowner</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subject A</td>
<td>African Caribbean</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Parent residing in Erdington with wife; employed as a security guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject B</td>
<td>African Caribbean</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Physically incapacitated parent residing in Aston with daughter; unemployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject C</td>
<td>African Caribbean</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Parent residing alone in Handsworth; self-employed artist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject D</td>
<td>African Caribbean</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Parent residing with adopted daughter in Smethwick; agency worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject E</td>
<td>African Caribbean</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Unemployed former car factory worker; living alone in Handsworth Wood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject F</td>
<td>African Caribbean</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Unemployed parent residing in Handsworth with her son</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject G</td>
<td>African Caribbean</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Unemployed parent residing in Newtown with her mother and daughter [her daughter has a hidden disability]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACFAS Project Manager</td>
<td>African Caribbean</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Details withheld by request</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bishop Jackson</td>
<td>African Caribbean</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Parent residing with wife and children in Halesowen, Administrative Bishop of the New Testament Church of God [NTCG] Brookfield [A.K.A. The Rock]; Member of the National Executive Council of the NTCG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Race</td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>Status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professor David Gillborn</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Professor of Critical Race Studies; Director of Research, Director of the Centre for Research in Race &amp; Education [CRRE]; Editor-in-Chief of Race Ethnicity and Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rosemary Campbell-Stephens</td>
<td>African</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td>Former resident of Ladywood; recently emigrated with her husband to Jamaica; former Head Teacher and OFSTED Inspector; currently the Director Principal at National College for Educational Leadership, Ministry of Education, Jamaica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Right Reverend Derek Webley</td>
<td>African</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td>Parent residing with wife and children in Stockland Green; former Chairman of the West Midlands Police Authority; Former District Bishop for the New Testament Church of God [NTCG]; currently the National Secretary/Treasurer of the National Executive Council of the NTCG</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix ii.

Table 3.1: National Ethnic Populations and their 16-24 Cohorts in the 2001 Census.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White British</td>
<td>44,679,361</td>
<td>4,646,652</td>
<td>10.39% [10%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Caribbean</td>
<td>5,61,246</td>
<td>60,614</td>
<td>10.79% [11%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed MWBC</td>
<td>2,31,424</td>
<td>36,796</td>
<td>15.89% [16%]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2001 Census, [Key Census Area Statistics, Commissioned Tables]; Birmingham City Council (2005).

Table 3.2: National Ethnic Populations and their 16-24 Cohorts in the 2011 Census.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White British</td>
<td>45,134,686</td>
<td>5,099,416</td>
<td>11.29% [11%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Caribbean</td>
<td>5,94,825</td>
<td>71,972</td>
<td>12.09% [12%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed MWBC</td>
<td>4,26,715</td>
<td>90,297</td>
<td>21.16% [21%]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 3.3 Birmingham’s Ethnic Populations and their 16-24 Cohorts in the 2001 Census.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White British</td>
<td>6,87,406</td>
<td>81,501</td>
<td>11.85% [12%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Caribbean</td>
<td>47,831</td>
<td>5,596</td>
<td>11.69% [12%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed MWBC</td>
<td>15,644</td>
<td>2,875</td>
<td>18.37% [18%]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 3.4: Birmingham’s Ethnic Populations and their 16-24 Cohorts in the 2011 Census.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White British</td>
<td>5,70,217</td>
<td>79,052</td>
<td>13.86% [14%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Caribbean</td>
<td>47,641</td>
<td>5,580</td>
<td>11.71% [12%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed MWBC</td>
<td>24,720</td>
<td>5,528</td>
<td>22.36% [22%]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 3.5: Ethnic Group Population* Changes in Birmingham Between the 2001 and 2011 Censuses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Census Year</th>
<th>White British</th>
<th>Black Caribbean</th>
<th>White &amp; Black Caribbean</th>
<th>Indian</th>
<th>Pakistani</th>
<th>Bangladeshi</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>641345</td>
<td>47831</td>
<td>15644</td>
<td>6206</td>
<td>55749</td>
<td>20836</td>
<td>5106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>570217</td>
<td>47641</td>
<td>24720</td>
<td>29991</td>
<td>64621</td>
<td>144627</td>
<td>32532</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The eight ethnic groups in Table 3.5 make up the majority of Birmingham’s total population.
Hi Dennis
Thank you for returning the signed contract. The cost for you will be £10, including VAT. When your data has been extracted and is ready to send to you I will send you a form on which you can record your card details, or I can give you a contact number for Customer Services who will take your payment.

As for your other questions:
The standard registration population began in 2000/01 superseding the standard HE population and looked at all students registered during the academic year. Prior to this the student population was calculated as those active on 1 December of each academic year. Changing the count meant that coverage of students on non-traditional academic year patterns and short courses would be significantly improved and the population would split the student experience into 'years of programme of study'.
The HESA session HE population has been derived from the HESA Student Record. It includes all higher education enrolments active at any point in the academic year 1 August to 31 July except:
(i) dormant students (those who have ceased studying but have not formally de-registered)
(ii) incoming visiting and exchange students
(iii) postdoctoral students
(iv) students studying for the whole of their programme of study outside of the UK.
(v) Training and Development Agency for Schools (TDA) Student Associates Scheme (SAS) and Subject Knowledge Enhancement (SKE) student instances,
and from 2007/08 students on sabbatical.
In 2007/08 the Standard registration population was amended in 2007/08 to incorporate the same exclusions as the session population plus writing-up students.
Qualification aim and level of study information is derived from the course aim of the student. From 2007/08 onwards, course classification was substantially revised to align with the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) and Bologna frameworks.
JACS coding is the system used to define subject areas, this was implemented in 2002/03 and amended in 2007/08.
There were many changes made to the student data set in 2007/08 and the quality of data subsequently is far superior to earlier years. Later years of data are by far the best to use for time series analysis, particularly for the collection of ethnicity data.
Your data should be ready for you in 20 working days (6 February) at the latest.
I hope the notes are helpful, it's a very complicated area!
Best wishes
Alison

From: Hamilton, Dennis [mailto:Dennis.Hamilton@warwick.ac.uk]
Sent: 09 January 2014 11:32
To: Alison Thompson
Subject: RE: HESA Data Enquiry 35234 - Data specification and quotation

Hi Alison

https://pod51036.outlook.com/owa/

05/07/2014
Appendix iv.

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D.G. Hamilton

From: Gill Cottew <Gill.Cottew@birmingham.gov.uk>
Sent: 29 November 2013 09:06
To: dennis.hamilton@warwick.ac.uk
Subject: Postcodes
Attachments: Non-white.pdf; Ethnic groups by Ward.xls

Hi Dennis,

The ONS postcode directory lists 33307 unit postcodes allocated to Birmingham although this includes a number which are points only and have no population attached.

I have attached a table showing the ethnic breakdown by ward from the 2011 Census and a map of the distribution of the non-white population in the city. I hope this will help.

Gill

Gill Cottew | Planning & Growth Strategy | Development Directorate | Birmingham City Council
Tel. 0121-675-9270 | email: gill.cottew@birmingham.gov.uk
Address: 1 Lancaster Circus Queensway, Birmingham B4 7DJ

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Appendix v.

ACSHO
104 Heathfield Road
Handsworth
Birmingham
B19 1HJ

30th November 2011

Maurice Andrews & the Harambee Committee
C/o Maurice Andrews Solicitors
180-182
Soho Hill
Hockley
Birmingham
B19 1AG

Reference: 200 Hamstead Road, Handsworth

Dear Maurice Andrews and the Harambee Committee

We are writing this letter to formally raise our concerns regarding the forthcoming sale of the property referenced above. We are of the opinion that the property, which was formerly used as a youth hostel, is currently being marketed at a price that is well below its value. We are also concerned that the sale of the building will represent the loss of a substantial community asset. Furthermore, selling the property will consequently compound the social disadvantage faced by the African community in Birmingham.

It has been suggested to us that the sale of the Hamstead Road property is necessary. We have been told that the money generated from selling the hostel will be used to develop two of Harambee’s other properties in Handsworth: the Linwood Road nursery and the Grove Lane book shop. However, it is not clear to us how selling a sizeable Victorian property at a significant loss, will enable the proposed development to take place.

The African community requires a strong familial infrastructure capable of providing our disenfranchised young people with security and stability. Over
the years the Hamstead Road hostel has supported the emotional well-being, and individual welfare, of a substantial number of homeless and vulnerable young people. If it were not for the Harambee Hostel, those young adults would have been placed in the care of Birmingham Social Services and dispersed throughout the West Midlands.

The loss of a very important family support service will have a negative impact on the social, intellectual, physical and emotional development of our young people. Those who have a difficult relationship with their families will no longer be able to access the support and shelter provided by the hostel. As a consequence, an increasing number of young African men and women could find themselves in danger of failing in the education sector. Without the necessary support and guidance, provided by their family or a surrogate provision, young Africans are also in danger of getting caught up in the criminal justice system.

We propose a meeting in order that those who are involved in the sale of the hostel, can publicly explain their plans and soothe our concerns regarding the loss of a vital community asset. We would like clarification regarding the following questions:

- Has the Harambee committee exhausted all possible options regarding how the building could be utilised to provide a service to the community, whilst also being self-sufficient?
- If the building has to be sold why is it not being marketed at its correct value, particularly in these times of austerity?
- How will the funds acquired from the sale of the building be spent?
- What are the costs and overheads involved in any project that will receive the funds from the sale of the former hostel?

We welcome your timely and urgent response regarding all of the matters outlined above.

Yours sincerely

On behalf of ACSHO
(African Caribbean Self-Help Organisation)
Appendix vi.

Map 1

Birmingham Location Map

Areas shaded are mainly residential; information derived by Birmingham City Council from aerial photography. Electoral ward boundaries and road lines are derived from Ordnance Survey mapping and are subject to Crown Copyright. The purpose of the map is to provide a geographical context for thematic maps illustrating 2001 Census data.

Source: Birmingham City Council (2004).
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