Time-consistent policy and politics: does voting matter when individuals are identical?
Anderberg, Dan and Perroni, Carlo. (2003) Time-consistent policy and politics: does voting matter when individuals are identical? BE Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Vol.3 (No.1). Article 3. ISSN 1935-1682
WRAP_Perroni_Time_Consistent.pdf - Requires a PDF viewer such as GSview, Xpdf or Adobe Acrobat Reader
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1101
We consider the implications of a lack of policy commitment when policies are chosen through a political process and individuals are ex-ante identical. We show that politics, by allowing ex-post distributional tensions to shape policy, can make it possible to sustain non-trivial equilibria in which the commitment problem is alleviated or fully eliminated. How effective politics can be at countering collective commitment problems in homogeneous groups depends on the nature of the political process and on the extent to which private choices are public information.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Subjects:||J Political Science > JC Political theory|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Voting research, Taxation, Game theory, Economic policy -- Political aspects, Political science -- Philosophy|
|Journal or Publication Title:||BE Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy|
|Publisher:||Berkeley Electronic Press|
|Official Date:||13 March 2003|
|Page Range:||Article 3|
|Access rights to Published version:||Open Access|
Akerlof, G.A. (1980) ‘A theory of social custom, of which unemployment may be one consequence.’ Quarterly Journal of Economics 94, 749-775.
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