The political economy of policy centralization: direct versus representative democracy
UNSPECIFIED. (2004) The political economy of policy centralization: direct versus representative democracy. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 88 (3-4). pp. 799-817. ISSN 0047-2727Full text not available from this repository.
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(03)00017-3
This paper analyzes policy centralization outcomes in a two-jurisdiction model of public good provision choices with heterogeneous policy preferences and intedurisdictional policy spillovers under two alternative political procedures, direct referendum and representative democracy. We show that policy centralization is more likely to occur if the choice to centralize is made by elected policyrnakers rather than by referendum. In these situations, centralized policies converge to the preferred level of the jurisdiction that least favours centralization, rather than to a compromise between the two jurisdictions' preferred levels. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions|
|Journal or Publication Title:||JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS|
|Publisher:||ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA|
|Official Date:||March 2004|
|Number of Pages:||19|
|Page Range:||pp. 799-817|
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