UNSPECIFIED (2004) The political economy of policy centralization: direct versus representative democracy. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 88 (3-4). pp. 799-817. ISSN 0047-2727

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Abstract

This paper analyzes policy centralization outcomes in a two-jurisdiction model of public good provision choices with heterogeneous policy preferences and intedurisdictional policy spillovers under two alternative political procedures, direct referendum and representative democracy. We show that policy centralization is more likely to occur if the choice to centralize is made by elected policyrnakers rather than by referendum. In these situations, centralized policies converge to the preferred level of the jurisdiction that least favours centralization, rather than to a compromise between the two jurisdictions' preferred levels. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
Journal or Publication Title:	JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
Publisher:	ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
ISSN:	0047-2727
Date:	March 2004
Volume:	88
Number:	3-4
Number of Pages:	19
Page Range:	pp. 799-817
Publication Status:	Published
URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/8894

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