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Strategic Culture as a Constraint:

Intelligence Analysis, Memory and Organizational Learning in the Social Sciences and History

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1. Leveraging sources of Failure

In 2014 the intelligence community got the Ukraine wrong. It predicted that Putin would not take military action - largely because he would fear international condemnation. The moral obloquy of the international community, experts insisted, would cause him to hesitate. In short, intelligence analysts in the Western capitals committed the familiar error of mirror imaging, thinking about how their own policy makers, with very different cultural values and historical legacies, would play out the Ukrainian situation. They use their own assumptions and failed to immerse themselves in the cultural context of others.

This is a recurrent error. The last time Russian troops arrived in a neighbouring state, Western intelligence was also caught out. In 2008, Georgia was the flashpoint and the signs were similar, with Moscow issuing visas to ethnic Russians. But Western intelligence analysts did not believe that Putin would use force because they were again immersed in their own strategic culture and not that of their opponent. Damon Wilson, who was then overseeing Europe at the US National Security Council and who was also the lead manager at the White House for the Georgia crisis, was open and frank about the extent to which the intelligence assessments were off target. “Our analysts missed it on Georgia,” he said. Michael Hayden, perhaps America’s most distinguished former intelligence chief, has blamed a myopic mindset for these failings. He observes: “This is less a question of how many collection resources we throw at
Russia and more broadly about the analytic challenge of understanding Putin’s mind set.”

The problem of analysing “mind sets” is an old one. The events in Ukraine and Georgia are not entirely dissimilar to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the crushing of the Prague Spring, which Western intelligence also missed. In much the same way, Denis Greenhill, chair of the UK’s Joint Intelligence Committee, dismissed objective indicators of an impending invasion because he felt that the Russians would not stomach the international criticism that would follow hard on the heels of any military incursion. We now know that cultural expectations repeatedly constrain intelligence analysts and endless energy has been expended on trying to persuade them to “think outside the box”. This essay argues that while expectations of behaviour derived from our own strategic culture inevitably constrain our own thinking, careful attention to the strategic culture of our opponents might be helpful in predicting their behaviour, since they are also constrained by a range of historical baggage. In short, if as scholars increasingly believe, our opponents are constrained by something which Dan Reiter has elegantly termed the “weight of the shadow of the past”, then intelligence analysts have perhaps not done enough to leverage this to their advantage.

More recently, other scholars, including Keren Yarhi-Milo, have argued that we do not give enough attention to how leaders or their supporting staff think about the long-term intentions of adversaries. Again, using a historical case-study approach she suggests that we often see the intentions of adversaries through a prism derived from pre-existing beliefs, theories, and personal impressions, neglecting the professional analysis built on hard-won sigint or humint. This is perhaps because the intelligence bureaucracies that serve them tend to focus less on intentions and more on changes in the military capabilities of adversaries.

This essay reverses the lens and suggests that we can use the recent explorations of culture by historians and social scientists to our advantage in intelligence analysis. While no doubt our own pre-existing beliefs and assumptions, whether on the part of
our leaders or our analysts, are a weakness, for many of the same reasons, the pre-existing beliefs of our adversaries are a potential source of strength to us. If we see our opponents as mere rational actors then their scope of choice and range of action is wide. Once we consider the extent to which they are restricted by a range of norms, beliefs and most importantly meta-historical narratives that shape their strategic culture, their range of choice is somewhat narrowed. Moreover, the value of giving more attention to strategic culture is increased by the fact that fact that it is relatively static – to use Reiter’s analogy - the shadow does not move very often or very quickly.

There is a growing conviction that culture matters in international relations, even if we are still unsure of how to measure it. Since the 1990s, political science, political psychology, international relations and international history have all taken a growing interest in culture as a constraining factor for both decision-makers and analysts in the realm of international relations. The work is disaggregated and often labels similar concepts differently. Nevertheless, we have seen a range of fascinating and innovative work on strategic culture, the use of historical analogies by decision makers and the extent to which senior figures engage in social learning: deriving their expectations from a reified notion of the triumphs and tribulations of their own policy community in recent decades. To summarise this work - and perhaps to do it some violence – all these researchers suggest that policy-makers are creatures of habit and those habits are often influenced by recent salient historical experiences that over time become collective narratives. This process can also operate collectively within organizations and is often referred to as “corporate memory”.

Academics working on intelligence failure like R.K. Betts are famous for their pessimism, often arguing that the benefits delivered by new techniques or organizational reform are likely to be modest. Other are even more gloomy, arguing that not only are intelligence analysts prisoners of their own assumptions, but also that academics cannot rescue them since they are similarly labouring in the La Brea tar pits of pre-conceptions and ‘prior-images’. This essay is more optimistic. It suggests that there is a wealth of interesting work that we might leverage here to assist with strategic estimates and that it is puzzling that we have not tried to harness it before in
a more programmatic way. Accordingly, it examines sets of different but related ideas about notions of strategic culture, historical analogies and social learning that have been developed by range of authors beginning with Robert Jervis, Jack Snyder, Richard Neustadt and Ernest May and then asks what they might contribute to intelligence analysis. Are ideas about strategic culture and historically shaped mind sets helpful tools when trying to think about how our enemy thinks? If historians and social scientists are increasingly convinced that strategic culture, corporate memory and allied concepts are an important factor in decision making, how might we deploy these ideas to improve our intelligence analysis?

Perversely, we may have overlooked the possibility of these ideas because there has been so much work on them. Over the last two decades, many different elements within the social sciences have attached considerable importance to the way in which we use our own recent history as a resource to achieve “policy learning”. Psychologists have produced sophisticated work on the way in which we obtain, organize and store information in order to develop conceptual frameworks about how the world works. Social anthropologists have done much the same thing, but tend to see these questions in terms of how cultural norms and group behaviours are created and then transmitted down the generations. Historians have also shown huge enthusiasm for memory studies over the last decade. Moving in much the same spirit, political scientists have been especially interested in how communities of policy makers learn, allocating a range of terms to this process that range from “organizational learning” and “political learning,” to “government learning,” and “social learning”. However, they have all tended to use different words and ideas to describe the same set of related phenomena.

While using different approaches and methodologies, they are nevertheless largely engaged in the same exercise and have come to similar conclusions. They are agreed that single decision-makers and also groups of decision-makers within government bureaucracies deploy collective experience, and especially shared historical narratives to assist their comprehension of complex events and to inform their response. Because of the breadth of this work and because scholars have tended to
utilise divergent concepts and methodologies, the importance of their overall findings has perhaps been underestimated by those working in the field of intelligence studies. This essay is necessarily brief and therefore focuses on the idea of “strategic culture”, using it rather broadly to capture a range of ideas about organizational and social learning from recent history and the related process by which policy makers use historical analogies and established narratives to frame their decisions.  

As early as 1976, Robert Jervis commented on importance of historical analogy as a key process by which policy makers understand challenging situations. Since then we have since seen extensive work that suggests that salient events in recent international history tend to shape the interpretation of incoming information. Not only do previous events offer a range of imaginable situations and causal explanations that inform their understanding of the world, they also constrain policy options. This latter aspect of constraint seems to offer us some purchase when attempting to forecast international events. Observations from strategic culture not only provide us in outline with the trajectories that are likely to appeal to leaders instinctively, but also suggest those which, while appearing rational in material terms, are nevertheless unappealing at a visceral level.

We need to give more attention to how our growing knowledge about strategic culture might be employed by intelligence analysts to avoid misperception. We also need to consider which of the many variants of these ideas are best suited to adoption by intelligence analysts. Most importantly, we need to ask how intelligence analysts might identify how and in what way their target subjects are learning from history in particular countries, how this is transformed into collective memory and in which ways they are constrained by the resultant strategic culture.

2. Snyder, Booth and the idea of Strategic Culture
Culture is rightly viewed as a slippery concept. Nevertheless, the notion of strategic culture now commands wide consensus, and if the behaviour of states is significantly shaped by strategic culture, then this is a potential source of insight into likely future courses of action. Some of the first systematic explorations of strategic culture were offered by Jack Snyder in 1977. In attempting to understand how Moscow thought about nuclear weapons, he suggested that we might consider how the total sum of ideas, conditioned behaviours and historic patterns of thought affected a national strategic community. Here he was reacting to the rational choice assumptions of game theorists. The implication was that a nation’s sense of its own politico-military experience over time was also important. For Snyder, strategic culture also conjured up the dangers of ethnocentrism - a feeling of ‘group centrality and superiority’ that contributed to a lack of intellectual challenge and which could potentially result in constraint within one’s own narrow military culture.

Snyder argued that the Soviet military exhibited a preference for the pre-emptive or offensive use of force and the origins for this could be found rooted in a Russian history of insecurity and authoritarian control. Moreover, he argued that because of the sources of strategic culture were about the way in which history was socialized into a distinctive mode of strategic thinking, then it was reasonable to assume that strategic culture was semi-permanent, or at least changed only slowly. Despite these intriguing ruminations, Snyder eventually came to cast doubt on the value of cultural explanations, insisting that cause and effect were so distant that it would be difficult for political scientists to demonstrate any linkage in a rigorous way.

Ken Booth was less anxious about deploying strategic culture. In a classic monograph penned in 1979, he related both strategic culture and ethnocentrism to the problem of “groupthink” with its subliminal tendencies towards bureaucratic consensus. He argued that while ethnocentrism does not automatically lead to groupthink, it increases the likelihood that groupthink will occur, with the desire for consensus overriding realistic appraisals of alternative ideas and courses of action. In other words, he suggested that culture can act as a constraining factor. Booth asserts that ethnocentrism and groupthink work in tandem to produce stereotyped
images of the 'outgroups' and a tendency for collective judgements to be self-confirming and therefore riskier than would otherwise be the case. Intriguingly, although much of what Booth argued had an obvious importance for intelligence analysis and strategic assessments, the thrust of the debate over strategic culture in international security has ignored its value to intelligence analysis and has instead focused on action and reaction cycles. Equally, Colin Gray describes strategic culture as modes of thought that relate to behavioural patterns with respect to the use of force which derive from national historical experience, but without any comment on the utility of this in forecasting. Instead, these notions have become caught up in a complex methodological debate about how far it is possible to use the concept rigorously in the world of academe, rather than in generating national estimates.

Booth was actually deploying the notion of intelligence and culture in two senses, one of them specific and one of them more general. In the specific sense, some of these issues about the impact of culture upon perception had already been raised by other researchers alongside Robert Jervis. Indeed, as early as 1973, Antony Marc Lewis, who had run a foreign area studies programme within the CIA, argued that internal Vietnam War case-studies showed conclusively that 'hidden cultural assumptions crippled the CIA's ability to perform its advisory functions'. Over the next decade, the revered area studies specialist Adda Bozeman became an evangelist for 'cultural understanding' as a prerequisite for both improved net assessment and for strategic thinking. Bozeman also argued that shared beliefs, assumptions, and modes of behaviour, derived from common experiences and accepted narratives and historical traditions influence collective decisions in the security realm. Since then, numerous in-service training programmes for intelligence analysts have sought to address the problem of our own cultural confinement and established assumptions amongst analysts. The importance of cultural awareness and “tribal” intelligence has also been periodically rediscovered in the context of counter-insurgency, although academic anthropologists are understandably unnerved by the eager embrace of the intelligence community.
More importantly, Booth was also using the idea of strategic culture in a general sense to capture the idea of a world-view. What we might call a fundamental cognitive orientation. Culture certainly constrains how intelligence institutions relate to a globalising world, what tasks they should perform and what we think intelligence might be, but it also constrains our opponents and their range of action. In this wider sense, we are all potentially prisoners of the ethnocentric dungeon. Moreover, while there is an emerging consensus that we need to take account of culture in the study of national security policy, it has not yet impacted upon realm of national intelligence communities. Philip Davies is one of the few academics who have deployed the idea of culture in the context of intelligence, comparing the British and American analytic systems. Arguably, the idea of culture has the potential to take us further in the realm of intelligence, explaining the role of institutionalised norms and values that countries associate with their intelligence communities, together with their place in the national psyche. Escaping the cycle of pessimism, can we perhaps become conscious and strategic users of strategic culture to achieve our intelligence goals.

Admittedly, there are problems with some of the early ideas around strategic culture. Although their claims were modest, suggesting only that strategic culture tends to inform certain strategic behaviours, or that strategy is only partly produced by culture, it remains hard to tell which parts of decision-making are most effected by strategic cultural factors. Nor do they explain why particular modes of strategic behaviour are more salient at particular moments. There was little attempt to consider how strategic culture transmitted over time, between different sections of government, and whether it changed appreciably through transmission. Meanwhile, in the 1980s other researchers working in cognate areas, but not necessarily describing their research as an investigation into “strategic culture”, were nevertheless working on these problems and connecting them to other ideas about learning from history.

2. Richard Neustadt and Ernest May

Even while the first debates on strategic culture were developing, two Harvard scholars, Richard Neustadt and Ernest May, had begun to run courses on the uses of
history for decision-makers. Neustadt and May were not expressly researching strategic culture, but they were nevertheless rather interested in the impact of socialized historical analogies on decision-making and the way in which government communities used these events as symbols. Both had personal experience of policy, having served in different parts of the government at an earlier stage of their careers: Neustadt for John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson and May for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Their famous book that captured insights from their activities – *Thinking in Time* - contains a number of discussions on intelligence (and indeed covert action) but has been rather neglected by intelligence studies specialists.35

Neustadt and May made significant claims. They asserted that policy-makers use history as a tool - but use it badly. They are constrained rather than liberated by it, tending to use lazy analogies drawn from a vernacular history that is based on assumptions and received wisdom. As such history misleads policy-makers by creating a number of fixed reference points. Nevertheless, Neustadt and May were optimists and asserted that, if deployed correctly, history can serve as a powerful analytical tool for government officials. They accepted that history can both inform and mislead those seeking to create assessments of current events. But they were also confident that it could reveal a complex matrix of events and their causes seen within the frame of their societal context as part of a process of understanding the personal approaches of individuals and the recent histories of particular organizations.36

Their principle source of anxiety was that officials seemed to know little about the cultural and historical context of the events they were engaged with. As a result they tended to draw incorrect lessons from history by using incomplete or inappropriate analogies that were often simplistic. Their case studies were based on recent issues in government affairs including the Korean War, the Americanization of the Vietnam War in 1965, the Bay of Pigs, the Mayaguez incident, and the Anglo-American Skybolt missile controversy. They used these case studies to identify several pathologies including an overdependence on “fuzzy analogies” both for intelligence analysis and for policy advocacy. This was linked to a lack of attention to the historical evolution of the issue in the past and stereotyped suppositions about the foreign decision makers.
involved. Some of these observations had already been identified by Irving Janis in her important 1972 study of “Groupthink”.  

Their most important prescription was locating issues, individuals, and organizations in their proper historical and geographical context. They argued that events should be inspected and seen within a stream of time. This should sharpen the decision maker's appreciation of continuities and changes. Furthermore, since the future emerges from the past, this process allows decision-makers to employ the predictive value of the past in shaping the future. The arguments that Neustadt and May made for this mildly predictive aspect of history have been overlooked. The exercise of culturally and historical locating the opponent seeks to increase an understanding of how key actors are likely to view the issue and how this constrains them. To accomplish this, a decision maker should take into account factors such as generation, significant life events, gender and race.

Neustadt and May's most compelling example of the way in which the United States deployed a strategic culture informed by the recent past was set out in their analysis of Lyndon B. Johnson and the expansion of the war in Vietnam. When his security advisers considered committing American ground forces they “did so with faith buttressed by remembered victories”, after all the United States had always won when deploying significant military power. Recent limited wars, for example Korea, had resulted in the opponent negotiating for peace. “Affinities for the remembered past gave certain options added weight and at the same time tended to exclude others.”

3. Dan Reiter and policy learning

Throughout the 1990s, ideas of strategic culture and how they might be applied to international relations were refined by Alastair Iain Johnston and Colin Gray. This resulted in a complex debate about just how far these ideas could be operationalized by political scientists or modelled using numbers. Moving in parallel to this debate
were other efforts to draw on social psychology and learning theory which seemed to offer an alternative conceptual framework to traditional realism. Whereas realism proposed that states mostly behave in response to changes in the level of external threat, those drawing on learning theory suggested that states make policy congruent with lessons drawn from important historical experiences that linger in the memory. In contrast to Neustadt and May, who used anecdotal and discursive evidence, researchers like Dan Reiter used more formal small-N comparison to compare the predictions of realism and learning theory, using as his case study its ability to forecast the alliance choices of minor powers. Reiter showed that learning from history and the use of analogies by decision-makers was the dominant factor in explaining alliance choices by states, while power, represented here by variations in the degree of external threat, was a less important factor.41

Reiter argued that social psychology and organization theory allows us to create a general theory of learning from the past in international politics. His underlying question was really the broader problem of how decision-makers cope with uncertainty. One common response by decision makers, he asserts, is to draw lessons from past experiences to address difficult choices. Psychologists talk about this in terms of knowledge structures, or “schemata”, which provide mental frameworks within which data are organized for storage and retrieval. These schemata lend structure to experience, determine what information will be encoded or retrieved from memory, affect the speed of cognition, and facilitate problem solving. Management scientists working on organization theory deploy a similar concept called “analogue reasoning”. Here, an individual uses analogies to draw parallels with past events to illuminate new problems and challenges. Organization theorists have placed more emphasis on the idea of learning, suggesting that organizational behaviour is ultimately “history dependent”. Some have suggested that organizations are most likely to change old ways of thinking and behaving after serious failures, while success promotes complacency and convergence. Both perspectives suggest that unless there is a major failure, historically constructed beliefs tend to persist, and established policies become semi-permanent, despite the reception of new information that might sit awkwardly with received wisdom. This is because organizations tend to grow collective
interpretations of history that become widely accepted.\textsuperscript{42} Those in organisation studies were moving in parallel with researchers into strategic culture who also suggest that these phenomena are semi-permanent or at least slow to change.\textsuperscript{43}

4. Yuen Foong Khong and war by analogy

Many of the findings of Reiter’s work were echoed by contemporaneous work by Yuen Foong Khong. In his book \textit{Analogies at War} he showed how analogies are used by decision makers to “help” define the nature of the problem. The way in which policy-makers do this tends to highlight the similarities between historical narratives while downplaying their differences. Khong argues that new events tend to be assimilated into pre-existing structures in the mind because of the limited cognitive capacities of human beings. Again, this approach borrows from the work of psychologists, deploying the idea that a schema is a generic concept stored in memory and may refer to objects, situations, events, or sequences of events and people.\textsuperscript{44}

It is clear that analogies are often misused by decision-makers. Like Neustadt and May, Khong is fascinated by Lyndon B. Johnson’s 1965 decision to escalate US involvement in Vietnam. He uses this episode to show that one notable problem with analogies is their persistence, even when they are shown to be erroneous. Precisely because analogies are not precise and have more the status of myths and stories, they are malleable and need not fit in every detail. Therefore, decision-makers can dismiss evidence against the analogy as being a one-off occurrence and still cling to their false analogy. Senior policy-makers are sometimes inclined to construct facts to fit their analogy, instead of seeking an analogy that fits the facts. Ease of recall is vital to adhesion within a policy community, hence more recent situations with more superficial similarities to the present case are most often invoked.\textsuperscript{45}

All the above authors and commentators seem persuaded that historical events and experiences, together with the ‘lessons’ and analogies which policy makers draw from them, exert an important impact upon policy thinking and behaviour. Many of their
findings derive from cognitive psychology, from which a wide range of scholars of foreign policy analysis have borrowed from significantly since 1990. Cognitive psychologists consider the tendency to analogize to be an activity common to all human beings, and a process which is necessary in order to make sense of the world around us. Confronted with bewildering complexity and structural uncertainty, we need cognitive 'short cuts' which allow us to process information efficiently. It is only natural that large volumes of new information must be matched to existing categories, schemas and familiar narratives. It is a basic human instinct to try to learn from our own memories and to ask the question: 'Have I seen this before - and what did I learn from similar experiences last time?'

Rather alarming evidence suggest that policy-makers are strongly influenced by narratives and stories even when they are fictional. Popular culture and especially television series and films that focus on national security can quickly become signifiers and short-hand in debates amongst policy-makers about future action. We know that film and television drama is often used in political discourse and “24”, the popular counterterrorism drama made in the years after 9/11 has fulfilled this role over the last decade. The series “24” is not only a frequent reference point in major daily newspapers, it has also been used as a short-hand in government to indicate different options and preferences in counter-terrorism. In other words, fictional narratives can also operate as powerful analogies, in the same way that real historical narratives operate in political discourse. Intelligence analysts need to be sensitive not only to the major historical reference points that influence foreign leaders, but also their favourite navigation points in terms of popular culture.46

5. Can we usefully use strategic culture in analysis?

Policy-makers, even more than normal human beings, live in a complex world, but only have a limited amount of time to analyse the events around them. Moreover, under time pressure, there are only a finite number of words to communicate their ideas and options. Historical analogies, even narratives derived from popular culture,
provide useful mental and verbal shortcuts – functioning as symbols perhaps. Moreover, as humans, we also deploy stories to legitimate our activities. Accordingly, during a crisis, intelligence analysts could do worse than ask what stories our opponents are using to frame current events. We also need to ask, are we aware of all of the significant “Baggage” that comes with each analogy in terms of resulting action or inaction?

The advantage of looking at strategic culture is that it is fairly stable and for the most part shifts slowly. Only catastrophic failure triggers major shifts in these policy navigation points. This is because it is related to long-term conceptions of a country’s own history and identity. This strategic continuity is further reinforced by the inertia and self-interest of bureaucracies. So forecasters might well start with the assumption that the future range of options that are considered, and those quickly dismissed, is often similar to past events of the same type, even if they are decades apart. Recent research suggest that this is especially true where leaders perceive past policy success in events of the same type within living memory. Admittedly strategic culture is more about constraint and paths not taken, in other words it is most useful in telling us what our opponent will not do, or is unlikely to do, because they are bound by the foreign policy traditions and received wisdoms of the country in question. Nevertheless, closer attention to strategic culture should also allow intelligence analysts to reject the notion that states will just behave as rational actors and choose the most efficient strategy. More importantly, thinking about strategic culture will also help us to reject the assumption our opponents will behave much like us, a mistake that we seem to have made with both Georgia and the Ukraine.47

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Notes and References

Goodman, "The Dog That Didn"t Bark," 529–51. See also Benjamin, Five Lives in One, 212-3; Andrew, Secret Service, 498.

Reiter, “Learning, Realism, and Alliances,” 490-526.

Yarhi-Milo, ‘In the Eye of the Beholder,” 7-51. See also Yarhi-Milo, Knowing the Adversary; Rezk, Western Intelligence and the Arab World.


The path-breaking book was Neustadt and May, Thinking in Time. More recently see Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich; Reiter, Crucible of Beliefs.

The first reference to “corporate memory” in the intelligence context is Thomas, “The Evolution of the JIC System,” in Andrew and Noakes (eds.) Intelligence and International Relations, 232.

See for example Betts, Enemies of Intelligence.


Some have even talked of a “memory boom” in history, see Lebow, "The future of memory," 25.

See for example Goldgeier, "Psychology and security", 137-166.


Raymond Williams famously defined culture as one of the three most complex words in the English language, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society, 87, 90.

Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture, 8-9.


See Booth reply to Snyder in Booth, “The Concept of Strategic Culture Affirmed,” in Jacobsen, (ed.), Strategic Power: The United States of America and the USSR. The most important discussion of ethnocentrism in the security context remains Booth, Strategy and
Ethnocentrism. The same year marked the appearance of Edward Said’s cultural analysis of ethnocentrism, *Orientalism.*

18 The classic statement of groupthink is Janis, *Victims of Groupthink,* 3-4.


20 Booth took little interest in intelligence studies, despite his location at Aberystwyth, one of its main centres of academic study.


25 Bozeman, “Political Intelligence in Non-Western Societies,” in Godson (ed.) *Comparing Foreign Intelligence.*

26 Bozeman, *Politics and Culture in International History.*

27 Ethnocentrism in analysis is explicitly address in Johnston, *Analytic Culture in the US Intelligence Community,* 73-84.


29 Culture is rarely deployed in this sense in discussions of intelligence, but see Bonthous, “Understanding intelligence across cultures,” 7-34.


31 Davies deploys an organizational view of intelligence culture see, “Intelligence culture and intelligence failure in Britain and the United States”, 495-520.

32 Kackman, *Citizen Spy: Television, Espionage, and Cold War Culture.*


35 Neustadt and May, *Thinking in Time.*

36 Ibid.

37 Janis, *Groupthink: psychological studies of policy decisions and fiascos.*

38 Neustadt and May, *Thinking in Time,* 212-231.

39 Ibid. p.137.
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