

Original citation:

Brandes, Leif and Darai, Donja. (2017) The value and motivating mechanism of transparency in organizations. *European Economic Review*, 98 . pp. 189-198.

Permanent WRAP URL:

<http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/89330>

Copyright and reuse:

The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions. Copyright © and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners. To the extent reasonable and practicable the material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before being made available.

Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge. Provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page and the content is not changed in any way.

Publisher's statement:

© 2017, Elsevier. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>

A note on versions:

The version presented here may differ from the published version or, version of record, if you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher's version. Please see the 'permanent WRAP url' above for details on accessing the published version and note that access may require a subscription.

For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk

The value and motivating mechanism of transparency in organizations

Leif Brandes* Donja Darai^{†‡}

Final version: June 22, 2017

Abstract

The question how transparency in organizations affects performance has received considerable interest from researchers in management, psychology, and organization science. The widely held view is that transparency benefits organizational performance, because it reduces employee uncertainty. However, causal empirical evidence on the value of transparency and its motivating mechanism is still scarce. In this paper, we report the findings from an experiment, in which an agent has only probabilistic beliefs about the true state of nature and needs to choose costly effort that benefits the principal. The true state relates to his fixed-wage, which can either be high or low. The principal needs to decide whether to create informative transparency by disclosing the true state to the agent via a costly, fixed-form message. Our results show a considerable value of transparency: even if transparency involves the disclosure of 'bad news' (the low state), effort almost doubles relative to non-disclosure. Looking at the motivating mechanism, we do not find that transparency motivates primarily because it reduces uncertainty for the agent. Instead, we find that uninformative transparency that merely involves communication of already known facts is equally effective. Many principals, however, misperceive the value of transparency and disclose information too restrictively.

Keywords: transparency; non-monetary incentives; communication;
principal-agent relationship

JEL classification: D23; C91

*Author for Correspondence: Warwick Business School, University of Warwick, Scarman Road, Coventry, CV4 7AL, United Kingdom. Email: leif.brandes@wbs.ac.uk

[†]Department of Economics, University of Zurich, Blümlisalpstrasse 10, 8006 Zurich, Switzerland.

[‡]Present address: Universitätsstrasse 31, 8006 Zürich, Switzerland, Email: donja.darai@gmail.com

1 Introduction

Economists have long understood that the success of organizations depends on the effective coordination and motivation of their members (see the recent review by Gibbons & Roberts 2013). Traditionally, research in the area of motivation focused on the influence of monetary incentives on employee effort in principal-agent relationships (e.g., Holmstrom 1979). Over the last decade, however, interest in the effectiveness of non-monetary incentives such as respect, attention, job mission or the allocation of decision rights has been on the rise.¹ In this paper, we report on the findings from a controlled laboratory experiment on another, non-monetary incentive mechanism: the level of transparency in organizations.

The question how transparency in organizations affects performance has received considerable interest from researchers in management, psychology, and organization science. Schnackenberg & Tomlinson (2014) offer a comprehensive review of studies in these disciplines and define transparency as the "perceived value of intentionally shared information from a sender" (p. 5). This definition reflects on the authors' argument that at the heart of transparency there lies information disclosure, i.e., the timely provision of relevant information to *otherwise uninformed parties*, together with information accuracy and clarity. An emerging view is that transparency benefits organizational performance, because it contributes to trust in organization-stakeholder relationships (*ibid*). However, causal empirical evidence on the value of transparency for organizational performance is still scarce, because the effect of transparency in extant work is often confounded with other important success factors, such as the pre-existing level of trust in the work environment (Akkermans et al. 2004). The first goal of our paper is to address this gap in the context of employee motivation.

A widely held belief is that the value of transparency derives from the disclosure of

¹See Ellingsen & Johannesson (2007) on respect, Dur (2009) on attention, Cassar (2014) on job mission, and Charness et al. (2012) and Fehr et al. (2013) on the allocation of decision rights.

uncertainty-reducing information to employees. For example, a number of recent articles in the business press document considerable non-transparency in firms about changes in corporate policies, goals, visions, and financial results (e.g., CNN-Money 2013, WSJ 2012), and warn that such uncertainty exposure results in reduced employee commitment and productivity. Along similar lines, scholars in management and psychology interpret the disclosure of relevant information that helps employees to "understand and contextualize their workplace" (p.3) as informational fairness from managers (Collins & Mossholder 2014). Informational fairness in turn represents an important dimension of organizational justice (Bies 2001), which relates positively to employee trust (Cohen-Charash & Spector 2001) and performance (e.g., Reb et al. (2006), Ambrose et al. (2002), and Sklarlicki & Folger (1997)). While these are compelling explanations for the value of transparency, they largely neglect another, potentially motivating mechanism of transparency: the positive effects of interpersonal communication as a common vehicle for information disclosure.

Considerable evidence in economics demonstrates the broad behavioral impact of interpersonal communication in strategic interactions. In the context of a weak-link game, for example, Brandts & Cooper (2007) show that one-way communication from a manager is more effective than financial incentives alone in overcoming coordination failure between employees. More broadly, communication has also been observed to affect transfers in the dictator game (e.g., Andreoni & Rao (2011), Mohlin & Johannesson (2008), and Bohnet & Frey (1999)) and offers in the ultimatum bargaining game (Zultan 2012). Andreoni & Rao (2011), for example, find that communication from the receiver increases transfers, and conclude that this effect stems largely from heightened empathy of dictators. While receivers in Andreoni & Rao (2011) were allowed to make specific transfer requests from the dictator, Zultan (2012) reports that communication does not have to be 'strategic' to be effective: even when pre-play communication was restricted to topics other than the game itself, offers in the ultimatum bargaining game were higher than without pre-play

communication. Could it thus be that the interpersonal communication involved is the real driver behind the hypothesized value of transparency? The second goal of our paper is to address this question.²

Knowledge about the motivating mechanism is of great relevance for practitioners, because of its implication for the management of transparency in the workplace. For example, if the value of transparency derived primarily from the provision of uncertainty-reducing information, the timing of communication would be crucial: information disclosure would only be motivating, as long as the involved information had not started to diffuse within the organization. If, however, employees mainly responded to the interpersonal communication from managers, disclosure would actually be motivating beyond this point of information diffusion.

To achieve both our research goals, we design an experiment, which consists of a series of one-shot principal-agent games. In each iteration of the game a principal is matched with a different agent who needs to choose effort, which is costly for the agent and beneficial for the principal. The principal has an information advantage compared to the agent. That is, the principal knows the agent's exogenously assigned wage level prior to the agent's effort choice. Importantly, she also has the opportunity to disclose it to the agent via a costly, fixed-form message. Without disclosure, non-transparency prevails, which implies that the agent faces uncertainty about his wage level when choosing his effort: all he knows is that a random draw determines whether his wage level will be high or low and that both outcomes are equally likely.

This experimental condition, labeled *Informative Transparency*, allows us to measure the causal effect of transparency on performance, and to calculate separate values of trans-

²A growing literature discusses the positive association between empathy and trust (see e.g., Feng et al. (2004), Silvester et al. (2007), Williams (2007), and Williams (2012)). Accordingly, evidence in support of communication as the primary motivating mechanism would still be consistent with the view in Schnackenberg & Tomlinson (2014) that transparency improves performance through greater trust in organization-stakeholder relationships.

parency for the disclosure of the low and the high wage. While it is intuitive to assume that the disclosure of good news is more motivating than the disclosure of bad news, it is less clear whether the disclosure of bad news is motivating at all. We are unaware of previous research on this question. Furthermore, observing a series of one-shot interactions enables us to study the values of transparency when subjects gain experience. These values are of central interest for decision makers, because in most organizational contexts, both agents and principals are experienced with the setting.

In a control condition, labeled *Uninformative Transparency*, we remove one of the central components of the game: the principal's information advantage. Now, both the principal *and* the agent are always truthfully informed about the wage level. All other aspects of the *Informative Transparency* condition remain the same. In particular, the principal can still disclose the wage level to the agent via a costly, fixed-form message. However, it is common knowledge that such disclosure does not reduce uncertainty for the agent as there is no informational value of interpersonal communication. Comparing agent's effort choices across the two experimental conditions thus allows us to distinguish between uncertainty-reducing information provision and the interpersonal communication involved as the motivating mechanism behind the value of transparency.

Our experiment shows that transparency has a causal effect on agents' behavior, and that the value of transparency is considerable. In particular, we find a positive value of transparency for both, the low and the high wage. These findings support the existing notion from scholars in management, psychology, and organization science that transparency benefits organizational performance. However, counter to the prevailing view in these disciplines, we do not find that *Informative Transparency* increases organizational performance beyond what *Uninformative Transparency* does. The key implication of our study for transparency in organizations is thus that "It does not have to involve news to be motivating!" Turning to the information disclosure of principals, we show that many of them

misperceive the value of transparency, and fail to disclose everything they should. This lack of transparency does not resolve, but instead amplifies when principals gain experience with the interaction.

Besides having clear managerial relevance, the findings from our study add to existing knowledge in three different strands of literature. First, our study marks an important empirical contribution to the economic literature on incentives in organizations. Economists have only recently become interested in the performance implications of transparency in organizations. Jehiel (2015) provides the first analysis in a moral-hazard setting: he develops a principal-agent model, in which the principal has private knowledge about her monitoring technology, and the difficulty of the agent's task, with the opportunity for the principal to disclose them to the agent. Jehiel shows that the principal can strategically set the level of transparency to induce higher effort from the agent, and derives conditions under which it is optimal for the principal not to disclose all her private information to the agent. Our results complement Jehiel's work insofar as they provide new insights on the value and motivating mechanism of transparency in a different organizational setting.

Second, our study informs research on persistent productivity differences among seemingly similar enterprises. Gibbons & Henderson (2013) provide an extensive review of this literature and report that several studies in this area find a positive correlation between a firm's performance and its adoption of 'high-performance work systems'. Among these systems, communication, in particular, the sharing of information with employees in a timely manner, features prominently. Our findings extend this literature and show that communication can indeed have a causal effect on firm performance.

Third, our study extends the literature on communication in principal-agent relationships. Charness & Dufwenberg (2006) and Charness & Dufwenberg (2011) report that communication is effective in a setting with hidden action, and hidden information, respectively. Their settings differ from our setting, because they look at relationships, in

which the agent has an information advantage, while we look at relationships, in which the principal has an information advantage.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains our experimental design. Section 3 presents our empirical results, and Section 4 concludes.

2 Experimental design and procedure

2.1 Experimental conditions

Our experimental design consists of two experimental conditions, *Informative Transparency* and *Uninformative Transparency*, with the latter being the control condition. In both conditions, principals and agents interact with each other in a series of one-shot games. The series of games is a repetition of the same principal-agent game, where a principal and an agent interact with each other at most once. The game consists of two stages and in each stage the strategy method is used to elicit players' choices. We first discuss the *Informative Transparency* condition.

In the first stage of the game, a random draw determines the wage level of the agent. It is common knowledge that the realization of the wage w is either low ($w_L = 80$) or high ($w_H = 160$), and that both outcomes are equally likely. We can thus write the wage determination process as the lottery $L = (p_{w_L}, p_{w_H}) = (0.5_{w_L}, 0.5_{w_H})$, where p_w denotes the probability for wage level $w \in \{w_L, w_H\}$. Furthermore, it is clear that the principal has no influence on the outcome of this random draw.³ The principal has to submit two decisions before observing the outcome of the random draw. In particular, she needs to

³By abstracting from the question of responsibility for the wage level, our design excludes any potential for monetary gift-exchange between principal and agent. Experimental evidence by Charness (2004) shows that randomly determined wages do not lead to considerable misattribution. However, one of our practice questions before the experiment asks subjects about the principal's responsibility for the wage, to make sure that they are aware of the wage determination procedure. Another way to think about this aspect of our design is that the fixed-wage level stems from decisions made at a higher management level in the organization, or from external regulations such as a minimum wage.

decide for each possible wage level if she wants to disclose it to the agent by engaging in one-sided, costly communication. Such communication can only occur via a truthful, pre-defined, fixed-form message that also includes the outcome of the random draw.⁴

The justification for these three features of communication is as follows. First, we design communication to be costly to mirror managers' opportunity cost of communication in real-world settings. Second, we implement communication as a fixed-form, written message to keep the wording and communication styles constant across principals and wage levels. We also informed agents that principals have no influence on the style or content of the message nor have to type the message themselves. In consequence, communication cannot induce agent responses to real-effort from principals. Third, we restrict principals to truth-telling in our game, since we are not interested in studying principals' use of communication to outwit subordinates.

If the principal decides to establish transparency through information disclosure, denoted by $D = 1$, she incurs cost $c = 6$, otherwise, $D = 0$ and no costs arise. To cover communication costs, each principal receives an initial endowment of 10. The principal's set of disclosure strategies is given by $\{(0, 0); (0, 1); (1, 0); (1, 1)\}$, where for each strategy the first (respectively second) component indicates whether the low (respectively high) wage is disclosed or not. For example, if the principal selects the disclosure strategy $(1, 0)$, then the low wage is disclosed whereas the high wage is not.

In the second stage of the game, the agent needs to make three effort choices, depending on whether the principal disclosed the low wage, disclosed the high wage, or did not disclose the wage level. Under transparency, the agent needs to select an integer value from the set $\{0, \dots, 80\}$ for the low wage, and from the set $\{0, \dots, 160\}$ for the high wage, while under

⁴By including the outcome of the random draw, the message helps agents to understand the specific workplace situation that they are in, and explains the procedure that led to this situation. Transparency in our experiment is thus closely linked to the previously mentioned concept of informational fairness, because "procedures used to determine employee outcomes" (p.3) are a prominent type of relevant information that employees expect informationally fair supervisors to disclose (Collins & Mossholder 2014).

non-transparency, the agent is able to select any integer value from the set $\{0, \dots, 160\}$.⁵ The agent's payoff Π_A depends on his chosen effort level e , and the realization of the wage level w . In case of non-transparency, the agent's wage is given by the aforementioned lottery L . For the principal, the payoff depends on her disclosure decision D , and the agent's effort choice e , where each unit of effort is doubled by the experimenter. The associated payoffs for agents and principals, denoted by Π_A and Π_P respectively, take the form:

$$\Pi_A = w - e \quad \text{where} \quad w \in \{80, 160, L\}, \quad \text{and} \quad \Pi_P = 10 + 2e - 6D.$$

The *Uninformative Transparency* condition differs from the *Informative Transparency* condition insofar as the information advantage of the principal is removed. It is common knowledge that the agent also learns about the wage level, such that the principal's communication will not contain news for the agent. That is, even without information disclosure from the principal, the agent does not face uncertainty about his wage level. As in the *Informative Transparency* condition before, we use the strategy method to elicit players' choices. Accordingly, the principal needs to submit two disclosure decisions (one for each possible wage level), and the agent has to submit four effort choices, depending on the wage level, and whether the principal decided to disclose it. We design this condition to understand to which extent a positive value of transparency in the *Informative Transparency* condition is driven by the provision of uncertainty-resolving information. Note that, for both conditions, standard economic theory predicts that, in equilibrium, the agent will always choose zero effort since effort is costly. Anticipating this, the principal will never

⁵Throughout our experiment, it was common knowledge that agents could never lose money from their effort choice under non-transparency. If an agent had entered an effort level greater than 80 under non-transparency and ended up with the low wage, his implemented effort level was automatically reduced to 80. We let the computer accept each effort level entry between 0 and 160 in the decision-making stage of agents under non-transparency to prevent agents from finding out about their wage level by entering different transfer levels.

disclose the observed wage level considering it is costly to do so.⁶

2.2 Experimental procedure

The experiment was run in March 2016 in the experimental laboratory of a large University in Switzerland.⁷ In total, we conducted six sessions, of which we randomly allocated three to the *Informative Transparency* condition, and three to the *Uninformative Transparency* condition. In each session, subjects played at least nine iterations of the game as described in Section 2.1. To best preserve the nature of one-shot interactions and still allowing subjects to gain experience, we implemented a perfect stranger matching following the "no-contagion" protocol by Kamecke (1997). This procedure guaranteed that each of the $N/2$ agents interacted with any of the $N/2$ principals at most once.⁸

In total, we had 122 participants, which we randomly assigned to one of the two conditions. Each subject participated only once in the experiment. Upon arrival, subjects were randomly allocated to the roles of principals and agents. Throughout the instructions that subjects received we used neutral wording and referred to principals as "player B" and agents as "player A" (see Section E in the Web-Appendix for the instructions). Before the start of the experiment, subjects had to answer practice questions to make sure that they understood the experiment, and an experimenter read a summary of the instructions to the subjects to create common knowledge. After the experiment, we ran a short questionnaire to obtain subjects' sociodemographic information and motivation for their choices. On average, each session lasted about 80 minutes and earnings for subjects were around

⁶Our experimental design can also be interpreted as an extended dictator game with a positive efficiency parameter and a recipient's endowment. Similar games have previously been used to model manager-worker relationships, e.g., Falk & Kosfeld (2006).

⁷The experiment was computerised using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) and was organized and recruited for with the software hroot (Bock et al. 2014). Subjects were undergraduate and graduate students, excluding majors related to economics or psychology (see Table A.1 in the Web-Appendix for summary statistics by condition).

⁸For all sessions, our goal was to have at least 20 subjects to allow for ten iterations of the one-shot game. In one session, however, only 18 subjects showed up and thus played only nine iterations.

Table 1: Overview of experimental conditions

condition	number of sessions	number of subjects ¹	average earnings (CHF) ²
<i>Informative Transparency</i>	3	60	36.63
<i>Uninformative Transparency</i>	3	62	36.15
<i>N</i>	6	122	36.39

¹ Half were in the role of a principal and half in the role of an agent.

² Earnings include a show-up fee of CHF 22.50.

36 CHF (= 37 USD at the time of the experiment). Table 1 provides detailed information about the number of sessions and subjects, as well as average earnings per condition.⁹

As explained in the previous section, we use the strategy method to elicit choices for both players.¹⁰ Using the strategy method allows us to observe the disclosure strategy of the principal and the effort strategy of the agent. For each agent, we can thus elicit effort choices for the same wage with and without disclosure, and calculate a separate value of transparency for the low and for the high wage. In addition, we elicited beliefs for both players after they had made their decisions. Specifically, each agent had to answer if he believed that his principal would inform him about the low wage, about the high wage, and, for each wage level, how many of 100 principals would have informed their agent. Similarly, each principal had to answer how much effort she expected from her agent for each of the possible outcomes. To avoid any income effects we did not incentivize belief elicitation.

⁹Previously to our main experiment, we conducted a number of sessions with one-shot interactions. Because this experiment did not allow us to study the role of experience with the communication setting (which is a central characteristics of transparency in real-world organizations), we now refer to this earlier experiment as the secondary experiment. At the time of the main experiment, we decided to keep all decision-relevant parameters identical to allow comparisons across both experiments. However, to compensate participants for the longer session duration in the main experiment, we had to increase the show-up fee by CHF 12.50. We provide information on the secondary experiment in Section C in the Web-Appendix.

¹⁰The findings from Brandts & Charness (2011) suggest that treatment effects that are identified with the strategy method will also be identified using the direct response method. However, using the strategy method has the advantage that we can analyze decisions within subjects.

3 Results


We divide the discussion of our experimental results into three parts. In the first part, we focus on agents' effort choices in response to the level of transparency that the principal implements. In the second part, we discuss the value of transparency, and shed light on its motivating mechanism for organizational performance. In the third part, we focus on principals' decision to disclose information, and the factors that influence this decision.

3.1 Agents' Effort Choices

The left graph in Figure 1 shows agents' average effort choices across periods in response to the level of transparency that the principal implemented for the *Informative Transparency* condition. It can be seen that informational transparency has a causal effect on effort for both wage levels: average effort increases from 5.64 under non-transparency to 10.76 and 20.63 in response to disclosure of the low and high wage, respectively. A two-sided Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test shows that effort under non-transparency is indeed significantly different from effort under informative transparency for each of the two wage levels (low wage vs. non-transparency: $z = 4.16, p < 0.001$; high wage vs. non-transparency: $z = 4.64, p < 0.001$).

Next, we look at the results from the *Uninformative Transparency* control condition, in which disclosure by the principal does not provide news to the agent. The right graph in Figure 1 shows agents' average effort choices across periods in response to information disclosure in this condition, and reveals that agents' effort choices are consistently higher after information disclosure than after non-disclosure. Specifically, average effort increases from 6.59 to 11.09 and from 13.35 to 22.01 in response to disclosure of the low and high wage, respectively (two-sided Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test: low wage vs. non-transparency: $z = 4.55, p < 0.001$; high wage vs. non-transparency: $z = 4.62, p < 0.001$).

Figure 1: Average effort choices across periods in the *Informative Transparency* and *Uninformative Transparency* condition



Notes: Displayed are the means of agents' average effort choices across periods for different wages and transparency levels in the *Informative Transparency* (left) and *Uninformative Transparency* (right) condition.

Comparing effort levels across both conditions, we do not observe that effort levels are consistently higher after disclosure in the *Informative Transparency* condition than in this condition (two-tailed, Wilcoxon rank-sum test: low wage: $z = 0.34$, $p = 0.73$; high wage: $z = 0.52$, $p = 0.60$). Overall, our data from both conditions present clear evidence that the level of transparency has a causal effect on effort choices, making it an effective, non-monetary incentive device. We summarize the previous discussion in our first result:¹¹

Result 1 *In both conditions, transparency has a causal effect on effort.*

3.2 The value and motivating mechanism of transparency

To shed light on the value of transparency across time, and on its motivating mechanism, we calculate, for each agent, separately, the value of transparency for the high and for the

¹¹While we derived this result from agents' average effort choices across periods, Figure B.1 in the Web-Appendix actually shows that the causal, positive effect of transparency on effort is present in each individual period of both of our experimental conditions.

low wage. We then estimate variants of the following linear regression model:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Value of Transparency}_{i,w} &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{uninformativeTransparency}_i + \beta_2 \text{highWage}_{i,w} \\ &+ \beta_3 (\text{highWage}_{i,w} \times \text{uninformativeTransparency}_i) + \epsilon_{i,w}, \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

where we use the indices i and w to indicate dependence on the individual, and the wage level, respectively. This latter index w is required, because the regression model involves two observations for each agent i , one for the low wage, and one for the high wage. Our choice of indices is thus a direct implication of the strategy method, and the fact that each agent had to make separate effort choices, depending on the principal's disclosure decision and wage level.

In equation (1), *Value of Transparency* $_{i,w}$ is calculated as twice the change in effort from agent i through information disclosure for wage level w , minus the principal's disclosure cost. Accordingly, our analysis focuses on the value of transparency for the principal. In the *Informative Transparency* condition, this value is given by $2 * (e(D = 1)_{i,w} - e(D = 0)_i) - 6$, and in the *Uninformative Transparency* condition, it is given by $2 * (e(D = 1)_{i,w} - e(D = 0)_{i,w}) - 6$. That is, in the *Informative Transparency* condition the value is always measured based on changes in effort relative to effort under uncertainty, and in the *Uninformative Transparency* condition the value is measured based on changes in effort relative to effort under non-disclosure for the same wage. The variable *uninformativeTransparency* $_i$ indicates if agent i is in the *Uninformative Transparency* condition (or not), and *highWage* $_{i,w}$ is an indicator variable that equals 1 for agent i 's high wage observation, and 0 for his low wage observation. Finally, *highWage* \times *uninformativeTransparency* is an interaction term of *highWage* and *uninformativeTransparency*. To account for correlation across a subject's choices, we adjust standard errors for clustering

on the subject level.¹²

We estimate variants of equation (1) for three different measurements of the value of transparency: using average effort choices across all periods (Models 1 and 2), using only effort choices in period 1 (Models 3 and 4), and using only effort choices in period 9 (Models 5 and 6). These different measurements allow us to shed light on differences in the value of transparency as participants gain experience with the interaction. Table 2 reports the associated estimation results. In Models 1, 3, and 5, we only include *uninformative Transparency* as a regressor in the model. Accordingly, the Constant in these models measures the average value of transparency in the *Informative Transparency* condition across the low and high wage. We start our discussion of the estimation results with these three models.

Model 1 in Table 2 shows that there exists a significant value of transparency in the *Informative Transparency* condition: on average, disclosing the low and the high wage increases the principal’s payoff by about 14 points. While the value of transparency is about 7 points lower in the *Uninformative Transparency* condition, this difference fails to achieve statistical significance. Model 3 uses effort choices in period 1, and shows that the value of transparency is significantly lower by about 10 points in the *Uninformative Transparency* condition when participants are unexperienced with the communication setting.¹³ Model 5, however, shows that there is no longer a significant difference across conditions when using effort choices in period 9. Overall, we find that the value of transparency does not differ across conditions when participants have gained experience with the setting.

In Models 2, 4, and 6, we include all the other regressors from equation (1). Accordingly, the Constant in these models measures the value of transparency when disclosing the low wage in the *Informative Transparency* condition. Model 2 shows that both, the disclosure

¹²Because of the low number of sessions (6) in our study, we do not cluster standard errors on the session level.

¹³This finding is consistent with the results from the secondary experiment, in which participants played the game only once. We decided to move these results for the *Informative Transparency* and *Uninformative Transparency* condition to the Web-Appendix (see Table C.2), because they do not provide qualitatively different insights than the findings for period 1 in our main experiment.

of the high wage, and the low wage have a statistically significant positive effect on the principal's income. For the low wage in the *Informative Transparency* condition, the value of transparency is 4.241 and for the high wage it is 19.748. For the low wage, the value of transparency does not significantly differ in the *Uninformative Transparency* condition, but the significant negative coefficient on $highWage \times uninformativeTransparency$ shows that the value of transparency is lower for the high wage in the *Uninformative Transparency* condition. As we previously did not find a significant difference in effort choices after disclosure across both conditions, this result is driven by the significantly lower benchmark of non-transparency for the high wage in the *Informative Transparency* condition (compare Figure 1).

Results in Model 4 use effort choices in period 1, and show qualitatively the same results as in Model 2. The only notable exception is that the value of transparency for the low wage in the *Informative Transparency* condition is marginally insignificant ($p = 0.137$). However, as participants gain experience with the setting, we no longer observe a significant difference in the value of transparency across both conditions. In fact, when using effort choices for period 9, Model 6 shows that neither the coefficient for *uninformativeTransparency* nor the one for $highWage \times uninformativeTransparency$ is statistically significant.

Overall, we find clear evidence that the value of transparency is significantly positive for the disclosure of each wage level. This observation presents first causal evidence for the prevailing view in the management, psychology, and organization science literature. In contrast to this view, however, we do not find evidence that the value of transparency is primarily driven by the disclosure of uncertainty-reducing information to otherwise uninformed parties. While the value of transparency tends to be significantly lower in the *Uninformative Transparency* condition (which it should be according to the prevailing view) at the beginning of the experiment, the difference across both conditions is no longer statistically significant when participants gain experience with the setting.

Table 2: Value of Transparency in *Uninformative Transparency* vs. *Informative Transparency*

	Average across Periods		Period 1		Period 9	
	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Value of Transparency					
uninformativeTransparency	-6.954 (4.756)	-1.234 (2.916)	-9.960** (4.403)	-1.877 (3.368)	-6.594 (5.157)	-2.923 (2.960)
highWage		19.748*** (3.895)		21.133*** (5.095)		19.600*** (4.201)
highWage × uninformativeTransparency		-11.438** (5.023)		-16.166*** (5.570)		-7.342 (6.113)
Constant (β_0)	14.115*** (3.681)	4.241* (2.187)	14.767*** (4.403)	4.200 (2.789)	14.400*** (3.952)	4.600* (2.321)
F-Statistic	2.14	11.40***	5.12**	8.38***	1.63	10.02***
Pseudo R ²	0.02	0.14	0.05	0.17	0.02	0.13
N	122	122	122	122	122	122
Number of clusters	61	61	61	61	61	61

Robust standard errors in parentheses are corrected for subject clusters.

The Constant in Models 2, 4, and 6 measures the value of transparency for disclosure of the low wage in the *Informative Transparency* condition.

The p-values on the Constant in Models (2), (4), and (6) are 0.057, 0.137, and 0.052, respectively

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

We summarize these observations as follows:¹⁴

Result 2 *A significant, positive value of transparency exists for both, the low wage, and the high wage. The value of transparency is significantly higher for the high wage than for the low wage.*

Result 3 *As participants gain experience with the communication setting, there exists no difference in the value of transparency across conditions.*

Based on these results, we conclude that there exists a significant value of disclosing bad news and good news to agents, and that the value of transparency in organizations (where both agents and principals are experienced with the setting) is primarily driven by the interpersonal communication involved.¹⁵


3.3 Principals' Disclosure Behavior

In our discussion of the principal's disclosure behavior, we focus again on three different measurements: the median disclosure decision for each wage across periods, the disclosure decisions in period 1, and the disclosure decisions in period 9. Figure 2 displays the share of disclosing principals in the *Informative Transparency* and *Uninformative Transparency* conditions for the median disclosure decision, and shows three different disclosure strategies that principals choose: disclosure of only the high wage, of both wage levels, and of neither.

¹⁴Additional support for our results comes from estimation results for the variants of equation (1) in each of the remaining periods (displayed in Tables A.2 and A.3 in the Web-Appendix). In the simple regression specification with *uninformativeTransparency* as the only regressor, the associated coefficient is insignificant in periods 3 to 9. For the full specification, the coefficient on *highWage* \times *uninformativeTransparency* is insignificant in periods 8 and 9, and the Constant is statistically significant on the 10% level in all but one period (period 4).

¹⁵Looking at the differences in the average values of transparency between sessions, we find that the disclosure of good and bad news is consistently rewarded in all our sessions for the *Informative Transparency* condition (both in our main experiment, and in the secondary, one-shot experiment). That is, all these sessions show a positive value of transparency for both wage levels. For the *Uninformative Transparency* condition, the results are more mixed across sessions, such that the positive values of transparency are more pronounced in some sessions than in others.

Figure 2: Principals' disclosure decisions: median decision for each wage across all periods



Notes: The figures show the share of disclosing principals across wage levels in the *Informative Transparency* and *Uninformative Transparency* conditions.

Figure 2 shows that 47 percent of principals in the *Informative Transparency* condition disclose both wages. Another 47 percent disclose only the high wage, while the remaining 7 percent of principals choose not to disclose any wage level. This high degree of heterogeneity among principals shows that there exists considerable disagreement on the value of transparency. In view of our previous results on the value of transparency for the high *and* the low wage, Figure 2 thus reveals that 54 of the principals in our main condition disclose wage levels too restrictively, thereby reducing their profits. In the *Uninformative Transparency* condition, we find that principals' behavior is very similar as in our main condition where disclosure creates informative transparency. For example, 32 percent of principals still disclose both wages, while another 35 percent disclose only the high wage. Based on a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test we cannot reject the equality of both distributions ($p=0.77$).

Looking at the other two measurements, we find a very similar pattern. In Period 1, we find that 57 percent of principals in the *Informative Transparency* condition disclose both wages, and that another 33 percent disclose only the high wage. 10 percent of principals do not disclose any of the two wages. In the *Uninformative Transparency* condition, the shares

of principals who disclose both wages, only the high wage, and neither are 32, 48 and 19 percent, respectively. In period 9, 20 percent of principals in the *Informative Transparency* condition, and 50 percent in the *Uninformative Transparency* condition do not disclose anything. That is, experience with the situation makes principals less likely to disclose either wage.¹⁶ We summarize the previous discussion in our fourth result.

Result 4 *A large share of principals misperceive the value of transparency in both conditions, and fail to disclose both wages. Disclosure becomes less common when participants gain experience.*

To understand the reason for this observed lack of transparency, we studied principals' beliefs about the value of transparency in both conditions. Our goal was to see if these beliefs were consistent with the observed value of transparency in the previous subsection. To this end, we estimated a regression model inspired by Bellemare et al. (2010), in which we regressed a principal's disclosure decision on her expected value of transparency.¹⁷

For all three measurements (i.e., median disclosure decision, and disclosure decisions in period 1 and period 9), our results showed that the expected value of transparency was predictive for principals' decisions to disclose. To determine if principals' beliefs were indeed similar across conditions, we re-estimated equation (1) for principals' expected value of transparency. Comparing the associated results (displayed in Table B.1 in the Web-Appendix) to our results for the agents in Table 2, we found that principals had qualitatively correct beliefs about agents' behavior in period 1, and about their average behavior across periods. Perhaps surprisingly, however, we also found that gaining experience led to greater misperception of the value of transparency among principals. In particular, principals in period 9 underestimated the value of transparency when disclosing the low wage in the *Informative Transparency* condition, and when disclosing the high

¹⁶Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for period 1 and 9 both yield a p-value of 1.00, and thus cannot reject the equality of distributions across experimental conditions.

¹⁷See section B.2 in the Web-Appendix for the exact model specification and estimation results.

wage in the *Uninformative Transparency* condition. Additional analyses on the period level (displayed in Tables B.2 and B.3 in the Web-Appendix) showed that, in the clear majority of periods, principals misperceived the value of disclosing the low wage in the *Informative Transparency* condition.¹⁸ We summarize the previous discussion in our last result.

Result 5 *Principals' disclosure behavior is driven by their expectations about the value of transparency. As they gain experience, principals increasingly misperceive the value of transparency (particularly for the low wage).*

Why does experience not lead to better disclosure decisions of principals? We believe that the answer lies in a lack of feedback to principals paired with overly optimistic beliefs at the beginning of the experiment¹⁹: At the end of each period, the principal only learns the agent's effort choice that corresponds to her (non-)disclosure decision. What she does not observe, much like principals in the real-world, are the agent's effort choices for the states that she did not implement. A principal who is disappointed by the low effort choice of the agent after information disclosure may thus (wrongly) conclude that transparency has no value, and decide to save the cost of communication in the future.²⁰

4 Conclusion

In this study we report the findings from a controlled laboratory experiment on the value of transparency in organizations. Our focus lies on the motivating effect of information disclosure as one of the three key aspects of transparency (Schnackenberg & Tomlinson

¹⁸Additional support for this conclusion comes from the results in the secondary, one-shot experiment. As shown in Table C.3 in the Web-Appendix, principals in this experiment underestimated the value of transparency for the low wage in this condition right from the start.

¹⁹Tables B.2 and B.3 in the Web-Appendix show that principals' beliefs about the value of transparency are substantially revised downwards across periods, because estimated coefficients on the value of transparency decrease across periods.

²⁰We leave the important question about the effect of different feedback mechanisms on principals' disclosure decisions across multiple periods for future research.

2014), while keeping the other two aspects of information accuracy and clarity fixed. Our main result is that disclosure of good and bad information improves performance, and that transparency does not have to involve news to be motivating.

In spite of the substantial value of transparency that we observe in our experiment, we acknowledge that there may also be situations, in which transparency backfires. In a marketing context, for example, Mohan et al. (2015) find that cost transparency increases customers willingness to buy from a retailer as long as the disclosed information does not reveal the violation of fairness norms. In their study, willingness to buy from a retailer decreased when the disclosed information revealed the retailer's margin to considerably exceed the industry average (a likely signal for company greed and price unfairness). As the principal in our experiment did not have any control over the disclosed wage level for the agent, fairness considerations with regards to the message content (i.e., the allocated wage level of the agent) did not arise.

Relevant to practitioners, we replicate the well-established, real-world phenomenon of non-transparency in organizations (WSJ 2012, CNN-Money 2013, BusinessWeek 2000), and shed light on its origin. Specifically, we show that many individuals systematically misperceive the value of transparency, and that this misperception is amplified when subjects gain experience with the interactive situation. These results are of concern for decision-makers in real-world organizations, where the costs of non-transparency can be substantially higher than in our simplified two-player interaction: while not a possibility for subjects in our experiment, it is not uncommon for uninformed employees to eventually even leave the firm for the better. Or, as one Business Week article (BusinessWeek 2000) put it succinctly: "Keep Employees in the Dark, and They'll Go Where It's Light." At the same time, our results provide hope for practitioners, because they may find the disclosure of information that has already started to spread within the organization to be equally effective.

Acknowledgements

We thank Jörg Oechssler (the Editor), an Associate Editor, and an anonymous referee for their insightful comments and suggestions. We are also grateful to Björn Bartling, Nick Chater, Nigel Driffield, Ernst Fehr, Egon Franck, Holger Herz, Andrea Isoni, Armin Schmutzler, Frédéric Schneider, Matthias Sutter, Roberto Weber, seminar participants at Trier, Warwick and Zurich, and the conference participants at the International Meeting on Experimental and Behavioral Economics 2012 in Castellón, Mainz Workshop in Behavioral Economics 2012, Economic Science Association European Conference 2012 in Cologne, Experimental Science Association World Meetings 2013 in Zurich, and WK ORG 2015 in Zurich for helpful discussions and suggestions. Financial support of the Forschungskredit of the University of Zurich under the research grant 53220802 is gratefully acknowledged. The Forschungskredit of the University of Zurich was not involved in any of the following aspects of this research: study design, data collection, data analysis, data interpretation, the writing of the report, or the decision to submit this article for publication.

References

- Akkermans, H., Bogerd, P. & van Doremalen, J. (2004), ‘Travail, transparency and trust: A case study of computer-supported collaborative supply chain planning in high-tech electronics’, *European Journal of Operational Research* **153**, 445–456.
- Ambrose, M. L., Seabright, M. A. & Schminke, M. (2002), ‘Sabotage in the workplace: The role of organizational injustice’, *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes* **89**, 947–965.
- Andreoni, J. & Rao, J. M. (2011), ‘The power of asking: How communication affects selfishness, empathy, and altruism’, *Journal of Public Economics* **95**, 513–520.
- Bellemare, C., Bissonnette, L. & Kröger, S. (2010), ‘Bounding preference parameters under

- different assumptions about beliefs: A partial identification approach', *Experimental Economics* **13**, 334–345.
- Bies, R. J. (2001), Interactional (in)justice: The sacred and the profane, in J. Greenberg & R. Cropanzano, eds, 'Advances in organizational justice', Stanford University Press, pp. 89–118.
- Bock, O., Baetge, I. & Nicklisch, A. (2014), 'hroot-Hamburg registration and organization online tool', *European Economic Review* **71**, 117–120.
- Bohnet, I. & Frey, B. S. (1999), 'The sound of silence in prisoners' dilemma and dictator games', *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization* **38**, 43–75.
- Brandts, J. & Charness, G. (2011), 'The strategy versus the direct-response method: A first survey of experimental comparisons', *Experimental Economics* **14**(3), 375–398.
- Brandts, J. & Cooper, D. J. (2007), 'It's what you say, not what you pay: An experimental study of manager-employee relationships in overcoming coordination failure', *Journal of the European Economic Association* **5**, 1223–1268.
- BusinessWeek (2000), 'Keep employees in the dark, and they'll go where it's light', *Business Week* **January 14**.
- Cassar, L. (2014), 'Job mission as a substitute for monetary incentives: Experimental evidence', *Working Paper* .
- Charness, G. (2004), 'Attribution and reciprocity in an experimental labor market', *Journal of Labor Economics* **22**, 665–688.
- Charness, G., Cobo-Reyes, R., Jiménez, N., Lacomba, J. A. & Lagos, F. (2012), 'The hidden advantage of delegation: Pareto-improvements in a gift-exchange game', *American Economic Review* **102**(5), 2358–2379.

- Charness, G. & Dufwenberg, M. (2006), 'Promises and partnership', *Econometrica* **74**(6), 1579 – 1601.
- Charness, G. & Dufwenberg, M. (2011), 'Participation', *American Economic Review* **101**, 1211–1237.
- CNN-Money (2013), 'Note to executives: Your employees are in the dark', *CNN-Money* **April 30**.
- Cohen-Charash, Y. & Spector, P. E. (2001), 'The role of justice in organizations: A meta-analysis', *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes* **86**(2), 278–321.
- Collins, B. J. & Mossholder, K. W. (2014), 'Fairness means more to some than others: Interactional fairness, job embeddedness, and discretionary work behaviors', *Journal of Management* .
- Dur, R. (2009), 'Gift exchange in the workplace: Money or attention?', *Journal of the European Economic Association* **7**, 550 – 560.
- Ellingsen, T. & Johannesson, M. (2007), 'Paying respect', *Journal of Economic Perspectives* **21**, 135–150.
- Falk, A. & Kosfeld, M. (2006), 'The hidden costs of control', *American Economic Review* **96**(5), 1611–1630.
- Fehr, E., Herz, H. & Wilkening, T. (2013), 'The lure of authority: Motivation and incentive effects of power', *American Economic Review* **103**(4), 1325–1359.
- Feng, J., Lazar, J. & Preece, J. (2004), 'Empathy and online interpersonal trust: A fragile relationship', *Behaviour and Information Technology* **23**(2), 97–106.

- Fischbacher, U. (2007), ‘z-tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments’, *Experimental Economics* **10**, 171–178.
- Gibbons, R. & Henderson, R. (2013), What do managers do?, in R. Gibbons & J. Roberts, eds, ‘The Handbook of Organizational Economics’, Princeton University Press, chapter 17, pp. 680–731.
- Gibbons, R. & Roberts, J. (2013), Economic theories of incentives in organizations, in R. Gibbons & J. Roberts, eds, ‘The Handbook of Organizational Economics’, Princeton University Press.
- Greiner, B. (2015), ‘Subject pool recruitment procedures: organizing experiments with orsee’, *Journal of the Economic Science Association* **1**(1), 114–125.
- Holmstrom, B. R. (1979), ‘Moral hazard and observability’, *Bell Journal of Economics* **10**, 74–91.
- Jehiel, P. (2015), ‘On transparency in organizations’, *Review of Economic Studies* **82**, 736–761.
- Kamecke, U. (1997), ‘Rotations: Matching schemes that efficiently preserve the best reply structure of a one shot game’, *International Journal of Game Theory* **26**, 409–417.
- Mohan, B., Buell, R. W. & John, L. K. (2015), ‘Lifting the veil: The benefits of cost transparency’, *Working Paper, Harvard Business School*.
- Mohlin, E. & Johannesson, M. (2008), ‘Communication: Content or relationship?’, *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization* **65**, 409–419.
- Reb, J., Goldman, B. M., Kray, L. J. & Cropanzano, R. (2006), ‘Different wrongs, different remedies? reactions to organizational remedies after procedural and interactional justice’, *Personnel Psychology* **59**, 31–64.

- Schnackenberg, A. K. & Tomlinson, E. (2014), 'Organizational transparency: A new perspective on managing trust in organization-stakeholder relationships', *Journal of Management* .
- Silvester, J., Patterson, F., Koczwane, A. & Ferguson, E. (2007), '"Trust me...": Psychological and behavioral predictors of perceived physician empathy', *Journal of Applied Psychology* **92**(2), 519–527.
- Sklarlicki, D. P. & Folger, R. (1997), 'Retaliation in the workplace: The roles of distributive, procedural, and interactional justice', *Journal of Applied Psychology* **82**, 434–443.
- Williams, M. (2007), 'Building genuine trust through interpersonal emotion management: A threat regulation model of trust and collaboration across boundaries', *Academy of Management Review* **32**(2), 595–621.
- Williams, M. (2012), 'Building and rebuilding trust: Why perspective taking matters', *Working Paper, Cornell University* .
- WSJ (2012), 'What your employees don't know will hurt you', *Wall Street Journal* **February, 27**.
- Zultan, R. (2012), 'Strategic and social pre-play communication in the ultimatum game', *Journal of Economic Psychology* **33**, 425–434.

Web-Appendix

A Tables

Table A.1: Summary statistics for the main experiment

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
<i>Informative Transparency</i>					
age	23.833	6.209	18	58	60
male	0.517	0.504	0	1	60
siblings	0.85	0.36	0	1	60
student	0.933	0.252	0	1	60
swiss	0.667	0.475	0	1	60
<i>Uninformative Transparency</i>					
age	23.403	4.927	19	46	62
male	0.435	0.5	0	1	62
siblings	0.820	0.388	0	1	61
student	0.952	0.216	0	1	62
swiss	0.710	0.458	0	1	62

Table A.2: Value of Transparency in *Uninformative Transparency* vs. *Informative Transparency* (Period 2-5)

	Period 2		Period 3		Period 4		Period 5	
	OLS (1)	OLS (2)	OLS (3)	OLS (4)	OLS (5)	OLS (6)	(7)	(8)
	Value of Transparency							
uninformativeTransparency	-10.710** (4.748)	-3.606 (3.690)	-6.482 (4.750)	-1.467 (2.888)	-5.380 (5.150)	1.634 (3.267)	-6.127 (5.679)	-0.471 (3.704)
highWage		18.400*** (4.712)		18.933*** (4.208)		20.867*** (4.162)		20.667 (4.194)
highWage × uninformativeTransparency		-14.206** (5.556)		-10.030* (5.638)		-14.028** (6.014)		-11.312* (6.045)
Constant (β_0)	15.000*** (3.751)	5.800* (3.179)	12.933*** (3.631)	3.467* (2.071)	13.767*** (3.726)	3.333 (2.246)	14.933*** (4.108)	4.600* (2.617)
F-Statistic	5.09**	6.76***	1.86	8.89***	1.09	10.73***	1.16	10.25***
Pseudo R ²	0.06	0.14	0.02	0.13	0.01	0.11	0.01	0.11
N	122	122	122	122	122	122	122	122
Number of clusters	61	61	61	61	61	61	61	61

Robust standard errors in parentheses are corrected for subject clusters.

The Constant in Models 2, 4, 6 and 8 measures the value of transparency for disclosure of the low wage in the *Informative Transparency* condition.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.3: Value of Transparency in *Uninformative Transparency* vs. *Informative Transparency* (Period 6-8)

	Period 6		Period 7		Period 8	
	OLS (1)	OLS (2)	OLS (3)	OLS (4)	OLS (5)	OLS (6)
	Value of Transparency					
uninformativeTransparency	-4.600 (5.460)	0.391 (3.302)	-6.363 (4.948)	-0.445 (3.032)	-5.882 (5.191)	-1.948 (2.977)
highWage		19.467*** (4.294)		18.933*** (4.170)		19.867*** (4.258)
highWage × uninformativeTransparency		-9.983* (5.936)		-11.837** (5.764)		-7.867 (5.922)
Constant (β_0)	13.600*** (3.859)	3.867* (2.184)	13.267*** (3.807)	3.800* (2.234)	14.333*** (4.099)	4.400* (2.339)
F-Statistic	0.71	9.24***	1.65	8.88***	1.28	10.98***
Pseudo R ²	0.01	0.10	0.02	0.11	0.01	0.13
N	122	122	122	122	122	122
Number of clusters	61	61	61	61	61	61

Robust standard errors in parentheses are corrected for subject clusters.

The Constant in Models 2, 4, and 6 measures the value of transparency for disclosure of the low wage in the *Informative Transparency* condition.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$


B Additional evidence from the main experiment

In this section, we provide additional evidence from our main experiment on the dynamics in agents' effort choices (Section B.1) and principals' beliefs and disclosure decisions (Section B.2).

B.1 Dynamics of agents' effort choices

While we derived Result 1 in the paper from agents' average effort choices across periods, Figure B.1 actually shows that the causal, positive effect of transparency on effort is present in each individual period of both our experimental conditions.

Figure B.1: Mean effort choices in each period in the *Informative Transparency* and *Uninformative Transparency* conditions



Notes: Displayed are mean effort choices (across subjects) in each period for different wages and transparency levels in the *Informative Transparency* (left) and *Uninformative Transparency* (right) condition.

For example, mean effort choices in the first period of the *Informative Transparency* condition (left) are 23.83, 13.27, and 8.17 (from top to bottom in the graph). In the ninth period, the corresponding values are 20.43, 10.63, and 5.33.²¹ Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank tests confirm that effort after disclosure is significantly different from effort without disclosure in both periods (period 1: low wage vs. non-transparency: $z = 3.63$, $p < 0.001$; high wage vs. non-transparency: $z = 4.46$, $p < 0.001$; period 9: low wage vs. non-transparency: $z = 4.22$, $p < 0.001$; high wage vs. non-transparency: $z = 4.39$, $p < 0.001$). In the *Uninformative Transparency* condition (right), mean effort choices in the first period are 26.35, 19.71, 13.58, and 9.42 (again, from top to bottom in the graph). In the ninth period, the corresponding values are 20.74, 10.77, 9.65, and 5.81. Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank tests confirm again that effort after disclosure is significantly different from effort without disclosure in both periods (period 1: low wage vs. non-transparency:

²¹We focus on the ninth period, because this is the last period that all our participants completed. See also footnote 8 in the paper.

$z = 4.41, p < 0.001$; high wage vs. non-transparency: $z = 4.49, p < 0.001$; period 9: low wage vs. non-transparency: $z = 4.24, p < 0.001$; high wage vs. non-transparency: $z = 4.41, p < 0.001$).

B.2 Principals' beliefs and disclosure decisions

In this subsection, we provide details on our regression model and estimation results for principals' beliefs and disclosure decisions. As mentioned in the paper, we base our analysis on a regression model inspired by Bellemare et al. (2010), and assume that each principal compares her expected payoffs under disclosure ($E_i(\Pi_{D=1})$) with those under non-disclosure ($E_i(\Pi_{D=0})$):

$$E_i(\Pi_{D=1}) = \beta(4 + 2E_i(e_{D=1})) + \epsilon_{i,D=1} \quad (2)$$

$$E_i(\Pi_{D=0}) = \beta(10 + 2E_i(e_{D=0})) + \epsilon_{i,D=0}, \quad (3)$$

where the principal always has an endowment of 10, but information disclosure leads to costs of 6. In addition, $E_i(e_{D=1})$ and $E_i(e_{D=0})$ denote the principal's beliefs about agent effort in response to disclosure and non-disclosure, respectively.²² To allow for suboptimal choices by principals we always include an error term ($\epsilon_{i,D=0}$ and $\epsilon_{i,D=1}$). Under the assumption that both error terms follow independent Normal distributions, we can estimate the probability to disclose information by means of a binary Probit model:

$$Prob(D = 1) = \phi_\epsilon(\beta(2(E_i(e_{D=1}) - E_i(e_{D=0}) - 6))) \quad (4)$$

Accordingly, a principal will disclose her information if the expected value of transparency is positive. Model 1 in Table B.1 shows the associated results when using the median beliefs and disclosure decisions across periods. We see that the expected value of transparency is indeed predictive for principals' decisions to disclose. Looking at Models 3, and 5, we observe the same result when analyzing principals' behavior in periods 1 and 9.

To determine if principals' beliefs are indeed similar across conditions, we regress the expected value of transparency on characteristics of the situation (paralleling our approach in equation (1) of the paper for the agents). In particular, we want to know if the wage level and being in the *Informative Transparency* condition have predictive power for a principal's expected value of transparency. Models 2, 4, and 6 in Table B.1 address this question, and use the disclosure of the low wage in the *Informative Transparency* condition as the omitted category. In Models 2 and 4, we find a significant positive expected value of transparency of 5.200 and 5.733 when disclosing the low wage in the *Informative Transparency* condition, respectively. At the same time, we observe a significant positive expected value of transparency for the disclosure of the high wage in this condition, and that this value is significantly lower in the *Uninformative Transparency* condition (as indicated by the significant negative coefficient on $highWage \times uninformativeTransparency$).

²²Recall that we elicited principals' beliefs after their communication decisions.

Comparing these results with our results for the agents in Table 2 in the paper, we find that principals have qualitatively correct beliefs about agents' behavior in period 1, and about their average behavior across periods.

Perhaps surprisingly, however, we find that principals misperceive the value of transparency when they gain experience. Model 6 shows that by period 9, principals underestimate the value of transparency when disclosing the low wage in the *Informative Transparency* condition (as indicated by the insignificant coefficient of 0.733 on the Constant), and when disclosing the high wage in the *Uninformative Transparency* condition (as indicated by the significant, negative interaction term in this model). To shed further light on principals' beliefs, we estimated the full regression model separately for each of the nine periods. The results, displayed in Tables B.2 and B.3 in this Web-Appendix, show that the coefficient on the Constant is significantly positive only in the first three periods. That is, in the clear majority of periods, principals misperceive the value of disclosing the low wage in the *Informative Transparency* condition.

Table B.1: Principals' communication decisions and beliefs

	<u>Median across Periods</u>		<u>Period 1</u>		<u>Period 9</u>	
	Probit (1)	OLS (2)	Probit (3)	OLS (4)	Probit (5)	OLS (6)
	D=1	expected value of transparency	D=1	expected value of transparency	D=1	expected value of transparency
Expected value of transparency	0.021*** (0.005)		0.008*** (0.003)		0.017*** (0.006)	
uninformativeTransparency		-4.748 (2.921)		-4.443 (4.173)		-2.991 (2.526)
highWage		17.600*** (3.319)		39.333*** (4.551)		13.333*** (3.341)
highWage × uninformativeTransparency		-10.406*** (3.799)		-27.075*** (5.876)		-8.753** (3.745)
Constant	-	5.200** (2.413)	-	5.733* (3.689)	-	0.733 (2.032)
Wald χ^2 / F-Statistic	14.59***	15.59***	9.46***	29.65***	7.07***	9.15***
(Pseudo) R ²	0.22	0.24	0.13	0.38	0.12	0.19
N	122	122	122	122	122	122
Number of clusters	61	61	61	61	61	61

Probit regressions report marginal effects; Robust standard errors in parentheses are corrected for subject clusters.

The Constant measures the value of transparency for disclosure of the low wage in the *Informative Transparency* condition.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.2: Principals' communication decisions and beliefs (Period 2-5)

	<u>Period 2</u>		<u>Period 3</u>		<u>Period 4</u>		<u>Period 5</u>	
	Probit (1)	OLS (2)	Probit (3)	OLS (4)	Probit (5)	OLS (6)	Probit D=1	OLS expected value of transparency
Expected value of transparency	0.007** (0.003)		0.013*** (0.003)		0.006* (0.004)		0.008*** (0.003)	
uninformativeTransparency		-1.467 (3.200)		-5.108 (3.748)		-3.308 (3.527)		-1.389 (3.427)
highWage		26.400*** (4.449)		27.733*** (4.950)		22.333*** (4.635)		18.333*** (3.921)
highWage × uninformativeTransparency		-20.400*** (4.831)		-17.282*** (6.246)		-17.753*** (6.595)		-9.366** (4.578)
Constant	-	5.467** (2.631)	-	8.333*** (3.140)	-	2.533 (2.857)		3.067 (2.685)
Wald χ^2 / F-Statistic	5.58**	15.34***	9.20***	13.11***	3.01*	8.94***	6.47**	12.53***
(Pseudo) R ²	0.08	0.24	0.20	0.22	0.07	0.17	0.05	0.17
N	122	122	122	122	122	122	122	122
Number of clusters	61	61	61	61	61	61	61	61

Probit regressions report marginal effects; Robust standard errors in parentheses are corrected for subject clusters.

The Constant measures the value of transparency for disclosure of the low wage in the *Informative Transparency* condition.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

∞

Table B.3: Principals' communication decisions and beliefs (Period 6-8)

	<u>Period 6</u>		<u>Period 7</u>		<u>Period 8</u>	
	Probit (1) D=1	OLS (2) expected value of transparency	Probit (3) D=1	OLS (4) expected value of transparency	Probit (5)	OLS (6) expected
Expected value of transparency	0.009** (0.003)		0.020*** (0.006)		0.024*** (0.006)	
uninformativeTransparency		-5.344 (3.342)		-3.585 (3.248)		-3.667 (3.209)
highWage (d)		15.600*** (3.676)		14.600*** (4.535)		13.867*** (3.612)
highWage × uninformativeTransparency		-7.794* (4.368)		-7.632 (5.014)		-8.125** (3.917)
Constant	-	3.667 (2.664)	-	3.133 (2.829)	-	1.667 (2.874)
Wald χ^2 / F-Statistic	6.40**	10.44***	10.55***	9.19***	18.33***	11.94***
(Pseudo) R ²	0.07	0.17	0.20	0.15	0.23	0.17
N	122	122	122	122	122	122
Number of clusters	61	61	61	61	61	61

Probit regressions report marginal effects; Robust standard errors in parentheses are corrected for subject clusters.

The Constant measures the value of transparency for disclosure of the low wage in the *Informative Transparency* condition.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

C Evidence from the secondary experiment

C.1 Experimental Procedure

Besides the main experiment that we discuss in the paper, we also conducted a one-shot version of the experiment in October 2011, run in the same experimental laboratory as the main experiment.²³ As in the main experiment, we used the strategy method to elicit choices for both players, and we also elicited players' beliefs.

In addition to the *Informative Transparency* and *Uninformative Transparency* conditions, this experiment included one additional control condition, which we refer to as *Passive Agent*. In this condition, we introduced an external random device for the agent's effort selection. That is, the agent could not choose effort himself. Instead, his effort was determined by a lottery, where each outcome $e \in \{0, 5, 10, 25, 50\}$ had the same probability to occur, namely 20%. The realized outcome was binding for both players and thus also relevant for their payoffs. In spite of agents' inability to select their effort choice, agents were always represented by real subjects. As in the other experimental conditions, principals had to submit two disclosure decisions, one for each wage level. By comparing disclosure decisions of principals across this condition and the *Informative Transparency* condition, we could determine if principals used disclosure to influence agents' effort levels, or whether they regarded disclosure as a social norm.

In total we had 178 participants, which we randomly assigned to one of the three conditions. Each subject participated only once. Upon arrival, subjects were randomly allocated to the roles of principals and agents. Throughout the instructions that subjects received we used neutral wording and referred to principals as "player B" and agents as "player A" (see Section E in this Web-Appendix for the instructions). Before the start of the experiment, subjects had to answer practice questions to make sure that they understood the experiment, and an experimenter read a summary of the instructions to the subjects to create common knowledge. After the experiment, we ran a short questionnaire to obtain subjects' sociodemographics and motivation for their choices. In total we conducted nine sessions, of which each lasted on average about one hour. Average earnings for subjects were around 24 CHF (= 26.64 USD at the time of the experiment). Table C.1 provides detailed information about the number of sessions and subjects, as well as average earnings per condition.²⁴

²³The experiment was computerised using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) and the subjects were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner 2015). Subjects were undergraduate and graduate students, excluding majors related to economics or psychology (see Table D.1 in this Web-Appendix for summary statistics by condition).

²⁴In addition to the sessions listed in Table 1 we ran a pilot session with 20 subjects. In this session, we included the show-up fee in the wages, i.e., the agent received either 130 or 210 points and the principal received 60 points as fixed wages. Subsequently, we decided to separate the show-up fee from the wages to make it simpler for subjects. We also conducted two experimental sessions, in which the principal could not communicate with the agent. Instead a random draw determined if the agent was informed about his wage level. Because Schnackenberg & Tomlinson (2014) emphasize the role of *intentionally shared* information for transparency, this condition is irrelevant for our discussion of the value and motivating mechanism of transparency in organizations.

Table C.1: Overview of experimental conditions

condition	number of sessions	number of subjects ¹	average earnings (CHF) ²
<i>Informative Transparency</i>	4	80	24.24
<i>Uninformative Transparency</i>	4	76	24.06
<i>Passive Agent</i>	1	22	23.35
<i>N</i>	9	178	23.88


¹ Half were in the role of a principal and half in the role of an agent. The number of subjects in our study reflects on our goal to have 80 subjects in the *Informative Transparency* and *Uninformative Transparency* condition –which help determine the value of transparency– and about 20 subjects in the *Passive Agent* – which helps to study subjects’ motivations.

² Earnings include a show-up fee of CHF 10.

C.2 Results for the agents in the *Informative Transparency* and *Uninformative Transparency* condition

The left graph in Figure C.1 shows agents’ effort choices in response to the level of transparency that the principal implemented for the *Informative Transparency* condition. We see that effort is considerably higher with transparency about the low and the high wage, than under non-transparency. Specifically, average effort increases from 9.95 under non-transparency to 14.62 and 28.12 in response to disclosure of the low and high wage, respectively. A two-sided Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test shows that effort under non-transparency is indeed significantly different from effort with transparency for both wage levels (low wage vs. non-transparency: $z = 2.97$, $p = 0.003$; high wage vs. non-transparency: $z = 4.88$, $p < 0.001$).

Figure C.1: Effort choices in *Informative Transparency* and *Uninformative Transparency* condition in the secondary experiment



Notes: The panel displays agent effort across wage levels and transparency levels in the *Informative Transparency* condition (left) and the *Uninformative Transparency* condition (right).

The right graph in Figure C.1 reveals that agents' effort choices in the *Uninformative Transparency* condition are consistently higher after information disclosure than after non-disclosure. Specifically, average effort increases from 8.29 to 11.21 and from 15.53 to 18.92 in response to disclosure of the low and high wage, respectively (two-sided Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test: low wage vs. non-transparency: $z = 4.48$, $p < 0.001$; high wage vs. non-transparency: $z = 4.18$, $p < 0.001$). Comparing effort levels across both conditions, we observe that effort levels are consistently higher after disclosure in the *Informative Transparency* condition than in this condition, although we only find a significant difference in effort for the high wage (two-tailed, Wilcoxon test: $z = -1.85$, $p = 0.064$; low wage: $z = -1.20$, $p = 0.230$).

Estimation results for variants of equation (1) are displayed in Table C.2. Model 1 shows that the value of transparency is significantly lower by 16.5 points in the *Uninformative Transparency* condition than in the *Informative Transparency* condition. As the value of transparency in the latter condition is 16.85, this suggests that there is no positive value of transparency in the *Uninformative Transparency* condition. In Model 2, we include the other explanatory variables from equation 1. Accordingly, the agent's effort change in response to disclosure of the low wage in the *Informative Transparency* condition serves as the omitted category. We see that the results in Model 2 mirror our findings for period 1 in the main experiment.

Table C.2: The Value of Transparency in *Uninformative Transparency* vs. *Informative Transparency*

	OLS (1) Value of Transparency	OLS (2) Value of Transparency
uninformativeTransparency	-16.534*** (4.510)	-3.508 (3.318)
highWage		27.000*** (3.762)
highWage × uninformativeTransparency		-26.053*** (4.028)
Constant (β_0)	16.85*** (4.294)	3.350 (3.079)
F-Statistic	13.44***	19.38***
R ²	0.11	0.25
N	156	156
Number of clusters	78	78


Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for subject clusters.

The constant in Model 2 measures the value of transparency for disclosure of the low wage in the *Informative Transparency* condition. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

C.3 Principals' Disclosure Behavior

Figure C.2 shows the share of communicating principals across the *Informative Transparency* and *Uninformative Transparency* conditions. We observe all four possible disclosure strategies for principals: disclosure of only the low wage, of only the high wage, of both wage levels, and of neither.

Figure C.2: Principals' disclosure decisions



Notes: The figure shows the share of communicating principals across wage levels in the *Informative Transparency* and *Uninformative Transparency* conditions.

In the *Informative Transparency* condition, 50 percent of principals disclose both wages. Another 30 percent disclose only the high wage, while another 10 percent disclose only the low wage. The remaining 10 percent of principals choose not to disclose any wage level. Principals' behavior in the *Uninformative Transparency* condition is very similar. For example, 40 percent of principals still disclose both wages, while another 30 percent disclose only the high wage. Based on a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test we cannot reject the equality of both distributions ($p=0.779$).

The similarity of principals who disclose wages across conditions raises the relevant question if a fixed share of the population views disclosure as a social norm. Our *Passive Agent* control condition allows us to address this question. Recall that in this condition, the agent has no influence on the resulting effort choice. Instead, a random device selects an effort level from the set $\{0, 5, 10, 25, 50\}$ with equal probability. We find that this variation of the game changes principal behavior dramatically: disclosure breaks down almost entirely in this condition, as reflected in 91 percent of non-communicating principals.²⁵

Model 1 in Table C.3 shows estimation results for equation (4). We see that the expected value of transparency is predictive for principals' disclosure decisions. Model 2 shows the results when regressing the expected value of transparency on different wage

²⁵These findings are based on observations in one session, in which only 1 out of 11 principals disclosed the low wage. While the number of observation is small, the evidence is highly suggestive.

levels and experimental conditions. We observe that principals expect a positive value of transparency for disclosure of the high wage, and that this value is expected to be lower in the *Uninformative Transparency* condition. In contrast to the findings for period 1 in the main experiment, the results for Model 2 show that principals already underestimate the value of transparency for disclosure of the low wage in the secondary experiment. Overall, however, the results are consistent with our conclusions from the main experiment.

Table C.3: Principals' communication decisions and beliefs

	Probit (1) D=1	OLS (2) expected value of transparency
Expected value of transparency	0.004*** (0.001)	
uninformativeTransparency		-0.276 (4.486)
highWage		38.250*** (3.835)
highWage × uninformativeTransparency		-27.303*** (5.126)
Constant		2.750 (3.581)
Wald χ^2 / F-Statistic	8.52***	37.85***
(Pseudo) R ²	0.04	0.27
N	156	156
Number of clusters	78	78

Probit regressions report marginal effects; Robust standard errors in parentheses are corrected for subject clusters. The Constant measures the value of transparency for disclosure of the low wage in the *Informative Transparency* condition.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

D Tables for the secondary experiment

Table D.1: Summary statistics for the secondary experiment

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
<i>Informative Transparency</i>					
age	22.7	6.852	18	75	80
male	0.375	0.487	0	1	80
siblings	0.887	0.318	0	1	80
student	0.949	0.221	0	1	79
swiss	0.8	0.403	0	1	80
<i>Uninformative Transparency</i>					
age	21.867	2.84	18	36	75
male	0.421	0.497	0	1	76
siblings	0.893	0.311	0	1	75
student	0.973	0.163	0	1	74
swiss	0.697	0.462	0	1	76
<i>Passive Agent</i>					
age	21.091	3.054	18	29	22
male	0.318	0.477	0	1	22
siblings	0.773	0.429	0	1	22
student	1	0	1	1	22
swiss	0.682	0.477	0	1	22

E Instructions

The original instructions were in German. This Appendix reprints a translation of the instructions used in the *Informative Transparency* condition and in the *Uninformative Transparency* condition of the main experiment and the secondary, one-shot experiment. The instructions for the additional control condition (*Passive Agent*) in the secondary experiment follows the same structure and is available upon request from the authors. Note that the instructions use the neutral words 'player A' and 'player B' instead of the words 'agent' and 'principal' used in the text.

E.1 Instructions for the main experiment

Welcome to today's experiment. This experiment helps to analyze individual decision making. Your earnings in this experiment depend on your decisions, the decisions of other participants and random draws. Your income and expenses during the experiment will be calculated in terms of points. The exchange rate is **5 points = CHF 1**.

Independent of the decisions during the experiment, each participant receives 50 points = CHF 10. At the end of the experiment, your total points will be converted into CHF, and will be paid to you **in cash**. The payment occurs **anonymously**. No other participant will receive information about your payment.

Please keep in mind that you are not allowed to ask questions aloud or talk to other participants during any time of the experiment. If you do not comply with this rule, you will be immediately excluded from the experiment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. We will come to your seat to answer your questions.

Timing of the experiment:

1. You will read these instructions and answer the control questions. The control questions shall only assert that every participant understood the instructions.
2. The experiment will be performed 10 times. That is, the experiment consists of 10 rounds. However, you will only receive the income from one randomly selected round.
3. At the end of the experiment the computer will select one round of the experiment at random to determine your payment. Each round has the same probability of being selected. You should therefore decide in every round as if it is the one relevant for your payment.
4. After the experiment you will be requested to fill out a short survey. You will receive your payment subsequently. Your payment consists of your income from the selected round, the 50 points that you receive independent of all decisions made in the experiment, and a bonus of CHF 12.50 that all participants are receiving in addition at the end of the experiment.

Please keep in mind that all numerical examples in these instructions have been chosen randomly, and do not represent any hints or suggestions for your decision during the experiment.

The Experiment

Upon arrival, we randomly assigned the roles of "player A" and "player B" to each participant. **You are player A.**²⁶ Please note, that your role remains the same across all 10 rounds of the experiment. At the beginning of each round of the experiment, the computer will randomly match participants into groups of two. Each group consists of one player A and one player B. You will be matched with a new player B in each round of the experiment. Thus, you will never interact with a specific player B more than once in the experiment.²⁷ You do not have any interactions with members of other groups in a round. **No participant knows his or her matched partner. Your identity and decisions remain completely anonymous at each moment of the experiment.**

Course of each Round of the Experiment

At the beginning of each round, every player A receives either 80 or 160 points. Whether player A receives 80 or 160 points will be determined by a random draw in each round. The probability for 80 points is 50% and the probability for 160 is also 50%: For each group, the computer will draw a random number from the interval $[0, 1]$. Each number in this interval has the same drawing probability. If the drawn number is less or equal to 0.5, then player A receives 80 points. Otherwise player A receives 160 points.

Independent of player A's points, Player B always receives 10 points at the beginning of a round. In addition, player B is always truthfully informed about player A's number of points.

[Uninformative Transparency:

Player A is **always** informed about his points. **In addition, player A can be personally informed about his points by player B.** Player B can **only truthfully** inform. By informing, player B incurs **costs of 6 points.**]

[Informative Transparency:

Player A does not know how many points he has. **He can only be informed about his points by player B.** Player B can **only truthfully** inform. By informing, player B incurs **costs of 6 points.**]

Player A: Decision

Each player A needs to decide how many points to transfer to player B in his group. Only integer values are feasible. Player A cannot transfer more points than he actually owns. The experimentalist doubles each point that player A transfers to player B. Each point

²⁶For player B, this sentence read: **You are player B.**

²⁷For player B, the sentences contained "player A" instead of "player B".

that player A transfers reduces player A's income by **one** point, and increases player B's income by **two** points. In addition, each player A needs to estimate whether player B is going to inform him personally, and how many players B out of 100 will inform.

Player B: Decision

Before player A makes his decision, player B needs to decide whether to personally inform player A about his points. Player B can **only inform truthfully**. By informing, player B **incurs costs of 6 points**. If player B decides to personally inform player A, player A receives the following message:

Hello player A
I just learned that the random draw is X. Thus you received Y points.
I wanted to make sure that you personally receive this information from me.
Kind regards,
Player B

If player B decides against personal information, player A receives the following message:

Player B decided not to inform you personally.

Once player B has made her decision, she needs to estimate the average number of points that all player A will transfer. Player A's and player B's income are calculated as follows:

Player A's income:
random draw ≤ 0.5 : **80 - (transfer to player B)**
random draw > 0.5 : **160 - (transfer to player B)**

Player B's income:
 $10 + 2 * (\text{transfer from player A}) - \text{information costs}$

[Examples to illustrate the calculation of both players' income (in points)]

Each round of the experiment consists of two stages:

Stage 1 Player B needs to decide whether she wants to inform player A about his points. Afterwards, player B needs to give her estimate.

Stage 2 Player A needs to decide how many points to transfer to player B. In addition, player A gives his estimates.

Following this general part of the instructions, players A and B received different versions of the instructions, as described in the following.

[Player A's specific instructions (Informative Transparency):

Note that you as player A need to determine your transfer choice **before you know which random number has been drawn and whether player B informs you personally**. At the time of your decision you do not know whether

1. you received 80 points and have been informed by player B.
2. you received 160 points and have been informed by player B.
3. you are not informed about your points.

This implies that you have to make **three decisions** in each round: For each of the three possible cases you have to decide how many points you want to transfer to player B.

Note that you **cannot incur a loss** if you choose to transfer more points than you actually received (case 3). In this case, your transfer choice will be automatically replaced by your total number of points. Example: You are not informed about your points and transfer 90 points to player B. In case that you only received 80 points, your transfer will be automatically reduced to 80 points.

You also need to give your estimates **before you know which random number has been drawn**. That is, at the time of your estimation, you do not know whether

1. you received 80 points.
2. you received 160 points.

This implies that you need to give **two estimates for each of these cases** in each round: For each possible case you need to estimate whether you will be informed by the player B in your group, and how many out of 100 player B will inform their player A.

You will enter your choices into the software as follows:

[Screenshot (Decision)]

[Screenshot (Estimation)]

]

[Player B's specific instructions (Informative Transparency):

Note that you as player B need to make your decision **before you know which random number has been drawn**. At the time of your decision you do not know whether player A

1. received 80 points.
2. received 160 points.

This implies that you have to make **two decisions** in each round: For each of the two possible cases you have to decide whether you want to personally inform player A about his points.

You also need to give your estimates **before you know which random number has been drawn**. That is, you need to give an estimate for each of the following cases

1. Player A received 80 points and has been informed by player B.
2. Player A received 160 points and has been informed by player B.
3. Player A is not informed about his points.

For each possible case you have to estimate in each round how many points all players A will on average transfer to player B.

Note that player A **cannot incur a loss** if he chooses to transfer more points than he actually received (case 3). In this case, his transfer choice will be automatically replaced by his total number of points. Example: Player A is not informed about his points and transfers 90 points to player B. In case that player A only received 80 points, his transfer will be automatically reduced to 80 points.

You will enter your choices into the software as follows:

[*Screenshot (Decision and Estimation)*]

]

[*Player A's specific instructions (Uninformative Transparency)*]:

Note that you as player A need to determine your transfer choice **before you know which random number has been drawn and whether player B informs you personally**. At the time of your decision you do not know whether

1. you received 80 points.
2. you received 80 points and have been personally informed by player B.
3. you received 160 points.
4. you received 160 points and have been personally informed by player B.

This implies that you have to make **four decisions** in each round: For each of the four possible cases you have to decide how many points you want to transfer to player B.

You also need to give your estimates **before you know which random number has been drawn**. That is, at the time of your estimation, you do not know whether

1. you received 80 points.

2. you received 160 points.

This implies that you need to give **two estimates for each of these cases** in each round: For each possible case you need to estimate whether you will be informed by the player B in your group, and how many out of 100 player B will inform their player A.

You will enter your choices into the software as follows:

[*Screenshot (Decision)*]

[*Screenshot (Estimation)*]

|

[*Player B's specific instructions (Uninformative Transparency)*]:

Note that you as player B need to make your decision **before you know which random number has been drawn**. At the time of your decision you do not know whether player A

1. received 80 points.
2. received 160 points.

This implies that you have to make **two decisions** in each round: For each of the two possible cases you have to decide whether you want to personally inform player A about his points.

You also need to give your estimates **before you know which random number has been drawn**. That is, you need to give an estimate for each of the following cases

1. Player A received 80 points.
2. Player A received 80 points and has also been personally informed by player B.
3. Player A received 160 points.
4. Player A received 160 points and has also been personally informed by player B.

For each possible case you have to estimate in each round how many points all players A will on average transfer to player B.

You will enter your choices into the software as follows:

[*Screenshot (Decision and Estimation)*]

|

Following the specific parts of the instructions, players A and B received again identical versions of the instructions, as described in the following.

In each Round:

At the end of each round each player will be shown the random draw for her group, as well as the relevant decision by player A, and her final points on the computer screen.

End of the experiment:

At the end of the experiment the computer will randomly draw one of the 10 rounds with each round having the same probability of being drawn. The round that has been drawn and is relevant for payment, as well as your income from that round will be shown on the screen at the end of the experiment.

[4 Comprehension Questions]

E.2 Instructions one-shot Experiment

Welcome to today's experiment. This experiment helps to analyze individual decision making. Your earnings in this experiment depend on your decisions, the decisions of other participants and random draws. Your income and expenses during the experiment will be calculated in terms of points. The exchange rate is **5 points = CHF 1**.

Independent of the decisions during the experiment, each participant receives 50 points = CHF 10. At the end of the experiment, your total points will be converted into CHF, and will be paid to you **in cash**. The payment occurs **anonymously**. No other participant will receive information about your payment.

Please keep in mind that you are not allowed to ask questions aloud or talk to other participants during any time of the experiment. If you do not comply with this rule, you will be immediately excluded from the experiment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. We will come to your seat to answer your questions.

Timing of the experiment:

1. You will read these instructions and answer the control questions. The control questions shall only assert that every participant understood the instructions.
2. The experiment will be performed once.
3. After the experiment you will be requested to fill out a short survey. You will receive your payment subsequently.

Please keep in mind that all numerical examples in these instructions have been chosen randomly, and do not represent any hints or suggestions for your decision during the experiment.

The Experiment

Upon arrival, we randomly assigned the roles of "player A" and "player B" to each participant. **You are player A.**²⁸ At the beginning of the experiment, the computer will randomly match participants into groups of two. Each group consists of one player A and one player B. You do not have any interactions with members of other groups. **No participant knows his or her matched partner. Your identity and decisions remain completely anonymous at each moment of the experiment.**

²⁸For player B, this sentence read: **You are player B.**

At the beginning of this experiment, every player A receives either 80 or 160 points. Whether player A receives 80 or 160 points will be determined by a random draw. The probability for 80 points is 50% and the probability for 160 is also 50%: For each group, the computer will draw a random number from the interval $[0, 1]$. Each number in this interval has the same drawing probability. If the drawn number is less or equal to 0.5, then player A receives 80 points. Otherwise player A receives 160 points.

Independent of player A's points, Player B always receives 10 points at the beginning of the experiment. In addition, player B is always truthfully informed about player A's number of points.

[Uninformative Transparency:

Player A is **always** informed about his points. **In addition, player A can be personally informed about his points by player B.** Player B can **only truthfully** inform. By informing, player B incurs **costs of 6 points.**]

[Informative Transparency:

Player A does not know how many points he has. **He can only be informed about his points by player B.** Player B can **only truthfully** inform. By informing, player B incurs **costs of 6 points.**]

Player A: Decision

Each player A needs to decide how many points of his endowment to transfer to player B in his group. Only integer values are feasible. Player A cannot transfer more points than he actually owns. The experimentalist doubles each point that player A transfers to player B. Each point that player A transfers reduces player A's income by **one** point, and increases player B's income by **two** points. In addition, each player A needs to estimate whether player B is going to inform him personally, and how many players B out of 100 will inform.

Player B: Decision

Before player A makes his decision, player B needs to decide whether to personally inform player A about his points. Player B can **only inform truthfully**. By informing, player B **incurs costs of 6 points**. If player B decides to personally inform player A, player A receives the following message:

Hello player A
I just learned that the random draw is X. Thus you received Y points.
I wanted to make sure that you personally receive this information from me.
Kind regards,
Player B

If player B decides against personal information, player A receives the following message:

Player B decided not to inform you personally.

Once player B has made her decision, she needs to estimate the average number of points that all player A will transfer. Player A's and player B's income are calculated as follows:

Player A's income:
random draw ≤ 0.5 : **80 - (transfer to player B)**
random draw > 0.5 : **160 - (transfer to player B)**

Player B's income:
 $10 + 2 * (\text{transfer from player A}) - \text{information costs}$

[Examples to illustrate the calculation of both players' income (in points)]

The experiment consists of two stages:

Stage 1 Player B needs to decide whether she wants to inform player A about his points. Afterwards, player B needs to give her estimate.

Stage 2 Player A needs to decide how many points to transfer to player B. In addition, player A gives his estimates.

Following this general part of the instructions, players A and B received different versions of the instructions, as described in the following.

[Player A's specific instructions (Informative Transparency):

Note that you as player A need to determine your transfer choice **before you know which random number has been drawn and whether player B informs you personally**. At the time of your decision you do not know whether

1. you received 80 points and have been informed by player B.
2. you received 160 points and have been informed by player B.
3. you are not informed about your points.

This implies that you have to make **three decisions**: For each of the three possible cases you have to decide how many points you want to transfer to player B.

Note that you **cannot incur a loss** if you choose to transfer more points than you actually received (case 3). In this case, your transfer choice will be automatically replaced by your total number of points. Example: You are not informed about your points and transfer 90 points to player B. In case that you only received 80 points, your transfer will be automatically reduced to 80 points.

You also need to give your estimates **before you know which random number has been drawn**. That is, at the time of your estimation, you do not know whether

1. you received 80 points.
2. you received 160 points.

This implies that you need to give **two estimates for each of these cases**: For each possible case you need to estimate whether you will be informed by the player B in your group, and how many out of 100 player B will inform their player A.

You will enter your choices into the software as follows:

[*Screenshot (Decision)*]

[*Screenshot (Estimation)*]

]

[*Player B's specific instructions (Informative Transparency)*]:

Note that you as player B need to make your decision **before you know which random number has been drawn**. At the time of your decision you do not know whether player A

1. received 80 points.
2. received 160 points.

This implies that you have to make **two decisions**: For each of the two possible cases you have to decide whether you want to personally inform player A about his points.

You also need to give your estimates **before you know which random number has been drawn**. That is, you need to give an estimate for each of the following cases

1. Player A received 80 points and has been informed by player B.
2. Player A received 160 points and has been informed by player B.
3. Player A is not informed about his points.

For each possible case you have to estimate how many points all players A will on average transfer to player B.

Note that player A **cannot incur a loss** if he chooses to transfer more points than he actually received (case 3). In this case, his transfer choice will be automatically replaced

by his total number of points. Example: Player A is not informed about his points and transfers 90 points to player B. In case that player A only received 80 points, his transfer will be automatically reduced to 80 points.

You will enter your choices into the software as follows:

[*Screenshot (Decision and Estimation)*]

]

[*Player A's specific instructions (Uninformative Transparency):*

Note that you as player A need to determine your transfer choice **before you know which random number has been drawn and whether player B informs you personally.**

At the time of your decision you do not know whether

1. you received 80 points.
2. you received 80 points and have been personally informed by player B.
3. you received 160 points.
4. you received 160 points and have been personally informed by player B.

This implies that you have to make **four decisions**: For each of the four possible cases you have to decide how many points you want to transfer to player B.

You also need to give your estimates **before you know which random number has been drawn**. That is, at the time of your estimation, you do not know whether

1. you received 80 points.
2. you received 160 points.

This implies that you need to give **two estimates for each of these cases**: For each possible case you need to estimate whether you will be informed by the player B in your group, and how many out of 100 player B will inform their player A.

You will enter your choices into the software as follows:

[*Screenshot (Decision)*]

[*Screenshot (Estimation)*]

]

[*Player B's specific instructions (Uninformative Transparency):*

Note that you as player B need to make your decision **before you know which random number has been drawn**. At the time of your decision you do not know whether player

A

1. received 80 points.
2. received 160 points.

This implies that you have to make **two decisions**: For each of the two possible cases you have to decide whether you want to personally inform player A about his points.

You also need to give your estimates **before you know which random number has been drawn**. That is, you need to give an estimate for each of the following cases

1. Player A received 80 points.
2. Player A received 80 points and has also been personally informed by player B.
3. Player A received 160 points.
4. Player A received 160 points and has also been personally informed by player B.

For each possible case you have to estimate how many points all players A will on average transfer to player B.

You will enter your choices into the software as follows:

[*Screenshot (Decision and Estimation)*]

]

Following the specific parts of the instructions, players A and B received again identical versions of the instructions, as described in the following.

End of the experiment:

At the end of the experiment each player will learn the random draw for her group, as well as the relevant decision by player A, and her final points.

[4 Comprehension Questions]