Talking to France: Radio Propaganda from 1940 to 1942

by

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History

The University of Warwick, Department of History

September 2016
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Acknowledgements

I am indebted to Warwick University and to the History Department for their support, which allowed me to undertake this fascinating project on propaganda during the Second World War. I would like to thank Christoph Mick, my thesis supervisor, for his support during these four years; without him the thesis would not have evolved in the way it did. I would like to thank Els Boonen, archivist at the BBC Written Archives Centre, Caversham, who – with the other staff – was most helpful in my research. She gave me insightful information on the letters and the BBC Monthly Report, and her expertise and guidance were of great help during my research time at the BBC WAC. I would like to thank Ms Aurélie Zbos and the staff at the Archives historiques de Radio France for allowing me to collect the information regarding the magazines of Radiodiffusion and Radio Paris. My thanks also extend to Ms Valérie Thépault, documentalist at the Institut National de l'Audiovisuel for helping me understand the archival system. I cannot forget all the other staff members who were extremely kind to me and supported me in my research during the long months spent at INA. I want to extend my thank to Ms Christine Barbier-Bouvet (responsable Inathèque), Anne Paris and Corinne Gauthier for helping me gain access to the indexed narratives of the numerous broadcasts listened at INA. I would like to thank the staff of the Service de la Mémoire et des Affaires Culturelles de la Préfecture de Police, who guided me in searching information relevant to my research. The same goes to the archivists of the Archives Nationales de Pierrefittes in Saint-Denis. Finally, I would like to thank all the staff members at The National Archives at Kew who helped me.

I am also very appreciative of Ms Aurélie Luneau, producer at France Culture, for her advice in my research while in Paris. I would like also to thank Gilles Morin, Research Fellow at the Centre d'histoire sociale du XXe siècle, who provided me with some interesting insight.

During my year conducting field research in Paris, I had the chance to reside with a French family in Saint-Denis who were extremely helpful and supportive of my research: Claire and Albin. Last but not least, I would like to thank my wife Echo for her unconditional support during these four years.

The responsibility for any mistakes is mine.
Abstract

The technology of wireless transformed societies and re-defined the nature of national and transnational communication when radio broadcasting to the public began in the early 1920s. This thesis focuses on the three main wartime radio stations (the BBC, Radiodiffusion and Radio Paris) broadcasting to and in France from June 1940 to November 1942. By studying the narratives of the broadcasting that lay at the heart of each radio station’s politics, motivation, propaganda and interaction with the population at large, the thesis will attempt to give these radio stations the recognition that they deserve in the historiography of wartime France, and, in doing so, make a major contribution to knowledge on radio propaganda.

This thesis goes beyond existing literature by offering a comparative analysis of radio propaganda messages, thus deepening the understanding of the evolution of broadcasts in the context of the complex political and social impact of the war on the French population. The narratives reveal the political rhetoric and the perceived social norms during the German Occupation, as well as the exercise of power, which may be taken for granted. For each radio station, a key theme is identified as the overarching basis for analysis: food and the impact of food policy on families for the BBC; youth and its idealised role in the construction of a New France for Radiodiffusion; and youth and its perceived role in a German-dominated New Europe for Radio Paris.

Written and audio archives in England and France were consulted as the principal source for the research conducted. This research is limited in that the conclusions drawn are largely dependent on the material available to researchers, material which is incomplete and often piecemeal.
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Copyright Acknowledgements

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Translations and Terminology

This thesis makes extensive use of material translated from French, in particular published broadcasts and its digitised version, including correspondence from the BBC Written Archives Centre, Caversham, the Prefects’ reports and Police reports from France, as well as secondary literature. I have used published English translations where available. In all other examples, the translations are my own, including those in quotation.

When referring to Pétain as the head of the state, the French term ‘Chef’ is used rather than its direct English translation of ‘Chief’ to preserve the authenticity of this respectable title (‘Chef’ means both a leader and the head of a kitchen in French).

French spelling is used in the thesis for French cities, towns, regions, arrondissements and départements, unless quoted from an English source.

I use the terminology employed at the time when referring to département and détachement. Several départements have since been renamed, for example, Loire-Inférieure is known today as Loire-Atlantique, and Charente-inférieure is known today as Charente-Maritime.
### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AA:</td>
<td>Anti-Aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFIP:</td>
<td>Agence Française d’Information de Presse (French Agency Press Information)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBC:</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDIC:</td>
<td>La bibliothèque de documentation internationale contemporaine (The International Contemporary Documentation Library)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNF:</td>
<td>Bibliothèque nationale de France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP:</td>
<td>certificat d’aptitude professionnelle (certificate of professional competence)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS:</td>
<td>Centre d’initiative sociale de Radio Paris (Social Initiative Centre of Radio Paris)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COSI:</td>
<td>Comité ouvrier de secours immédiat (immediate relief workers’ committee)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HONAFU:</td>
<td>Höhere Nachrichten Führer (Higher News Leader)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INA:</td>
<td>Institut national de l’audiovisuel (National Broadcasting Institute)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IS:</td>
<td>Intelligence Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LVF:</td>
<td>Légion des volontaires français (French Volunteer Legion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOI:</td>
<td>Ministry of Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OWI:</td>
<td>Office of War Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPF:</td>
<td>Parti populaire français (French Popular Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTT:</td>
<td>Postes, télégraphes et téléphones (Postal, telegraph and telephones)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PWE:</td>
<td>Political Warfare Executive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAF:</td>
<td>Royal Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RN:</td>
<td>Radiodiffusion Nationale (National broadcasting)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RNP:</td>
<td>Rassemblement National Populaire (National Popular Rally)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RVPS:</td>
<td>Royal Victoria Patriotic School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGJ:</td>
<td>Secrétariat Général à la Jeunesse (General Secretariat for Youth)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNI:</td>
<td>Syndicat National des Instituteurs (National Union of Teachers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOE:</td>
<td>Special Operations Executive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STO:</td>
<td>Service du travail obligatoire (compulsory work service)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFA:</td>
<td>Travailleurs Français en Allemagne (French workers in Germany)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction

Radio broadcasting was a technology new to the 20th century, although experiments in wireless transmission began decades earlier. The first radio news programme was broadcast in the USA in the early 1920s, pioneering national news broadcasting, various cultural genres, commercial sponsorship and acquainting the Americans with national broadcasting. American society during this period cannot fully be understood without considering the impact of radio on society and culture, not least because no other medium changed everyday lives so quickly and profoundly.\(^1\) It has been argued that radio is ‘the most important electronic invention of the century’\(^2\) because it changed the habits not only of Americans, blurring the boundaries between the private and public spheres,\(^3\) shaping not only individual but also collective identities, as well as cultural and political history.\(^4\)

In Britain and France, the technology of wireless transformed societies similarly, as both countries started radio broadcasting from 1922.\(^5\) However, it was not until the Second World War that radio became one of the primary mediums of communication used at an unprecedented scale by both the Allied and the Axis powers. Radio emerged as a new weapon to direct messages to a mass audience with clear political objectives and to fight psychological battles. It is also the first time in history, apart from the Spanish Civil War (1936-39),\(^6\) that the radio was used in a total war where countries mobilised all their available resources including the civilian population.

Radio broadcasting during the Second World War, however, has long been neglected by historians and little serious scholarly attention has been given to the

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3 Ibid.
4 Ibid., p. 7.
programmes and narratives of radio broadcasting in Europe. Today, we see the Second World War as a visual war through newsreels and films when, in fact, it was first and foremost a radio war to which millions listened.\(^7\) Radio penetrated the homes of millions and narrated the war to the listeners.\(^8\) Radio broadcast news, government ideology and propaganda, and played a crucial role in steering public opinion and propagating a heavy dose of patriotism.\(^9\) Listening to the radio became a national habit and a symbol of national unity,\(^10\) uniting the public behind the war effort. On the other hand, radio could also be associated with the dangers of mass-mediated politics, hypnotising its listeners ‘under the sway of irrational forces like fascism, communism’\(^11\).

The Second World War has been a difficult topic in French historiography; the rapid capitulation to Germany was a major blow to the confidence and self-perception of the French nation. For many decades, historiography on French war-time experiences focused on the French resistance, de Gaulle’s government-in-exile, the débâcle (or rout) in 1940, Vichy’s political role, the National Revolution with its implications for the population, and collaboration. Collaboration and Vichy are seen as a stain on French history, something ‘un-French’ and often marginalised. The period between 1940 and 1942 marked the defeat of France, the division of France into two zones, and the creation and evolution of Vichy. The impact and interaction between radio broadcasting and the society at large during this period has been generally under-researched. There were a multitude of players occupied with radio broadcasting: the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), the Radiodiffusion, radio of the Vichy government (RN), Radio Paris (the radio controlled by the German occupier), and Radio Sottens from Switzerland. There were also broadcasts from Radio Moscow and the Voice of America, an Office of War Information (OWI) transmission.\(^12\) In addition to these official channels, there were ‘black’ (or clandestine) radio stations broadcasting to France.\(^13\)

\(^{7}\) Douglas, *Listening In*, p. 10.
\(^{8}\) Ibid., p. 11.
\(^{9}\) Horten, *Radio Goes to War*, p. 3.
\(^{11}\) Ibid., p. xix.
This thesis focuses on the three main radio stations with the largest audience, the BBC, RN and Radio Paris. They broadcast from three different localities and with distinct political perspectives, but all claimed to represent the ‘true’ voice of the French. The thesis will attempt to give these three radio stations the recognition that they deserve in the historiography of wartime France by studying the narratives of their broadcasting, which lie at the heart of their politics, motivation, propaganda and interaction with the population at large. The potential audience of these stations was impressive. In France, it is estimated that 6.5 million wireless radio sets\textsuperscript{14} were in use during the war, and radio emerged as one of the main channels through which millions of people received news about the war and current affairs.

The thesis will make a major contribution to research on radio propaganda during the Second World War in France by giving a thematic overview of the evolution of broadcasts from these three radio stations broadcasting in and to France. I will focus on the first half of the war, from 25 June 1940, the date of the signing of the Armistice which marks the defeat of France, to 11 November 1942, when Germany invaded Vichy; this span has been chosen because the role of radio during this period has been, as mentioned above, largely neglected in existing historiography. In this period, France was divided into two main zones:\textsuperscript{15} the Occupied Zone and the Unoccupied Zone (Vichy). The division of territory had a profound impact on the beliefs and experiences of the French in a period of severe material shortage and moral distress.

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{13} Tim Brooks, British Propaganda to France, 1940-1944: Machinery, Method and Message (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), pp. 142-6.}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{15} Julian Jackson, France: The Dark Years 1940-1944 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. xxi (map 2 Occupied France), 246. To be precise, France was divided into six zones: the Unoccupied Zone (Vichy); the Occupied Zone; the zone attached to the German command in Brussels, Belgium (Nord-Pas-de-Calais départements); the ‘Forbidden’ or ‘Reserved’ Zone which include six départements and part of four others, stretching north to south from the mouth of the Somme to the Swiss border in the Jura; the Annexed Zone (Alsace and Moselle in Lorraine); and the Italian Zone from June 1940 to November 1942. The Coastal Zone was added from October 1941 (zone stretching from Spain to the Forbidden Zone along the coastal line).}
During this period, the intensity in broadcasting within and to France increased significantly as the various powers sought to influence, control and manipulate the minds and hearts of the French, who were disoriented and unsettled following the unexpected rapid defeat of the French army in 1940. It was not until the 1970s that historians started to research radio propaganda in France during the Second World War in earnest, and most publications are related to the BBC. One of the first publications was written by Asa Briggs, the BBC

historian, who gives a comprehensive account of the role of the BBC inside and outside of Britain in the context of the Second World War. His account offers an excellent overview of the BBC’s wartime operation. More recently, Tim Brooks\textsuperscript{17} demonstrates how propaganda was produced and delivered to France through different channels and media, including the radio, revealing how the British fought a psychological war against Nazi Germany. Martyn Cornick’s article\textsuperscript{18} provides a useful insight into the ways in which intelligence was collected, used and analysed by the BBC European Intelligence Department, using correspondence from listeners, news articles, opinions expressed during interviews, etc. and compiled into a monthly BBC intelligence report that monitored the shift in public opinion throughout the war years in France. While these publications focused on the ‘sender’ of the broadcasts, Crémieux-Brilhac,\textsuperscript{19} having served as secretary of the Free French Propaganda Committee during the war,\textsuperscript{20} discussed in his articles how the BBC French Service was perceived by the French, the role of the Free French, as well as public opinion and propaganda during the war.

There is relatively little known about the (German) Radio Paris and RN. Only a handful of writers have offered a comparative view of the operation of different radio stations. Tangye Lean who was associated with the BBC radio campaign in Europe during the war, gives useful information about the technical aspects (jamming, transmitters etc.) and the operation of the BBC and Radio Paris until 1942.\textsuperscript{21} Hélène Eck edited a book which contains a comparative study of the history of the BBC, RN and Radio Paris in broad strokes from pre-war to the end

\textsuperscript{17} Tim Brooks, \textit{British Propaganda to France, 1940-1944: Machinery, Method and Message} (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007).
of the war in 1945. Cécile Méadel gives a general background of Radio Paris but the focus is on Radio Paris’s music feature, the relationship between music and propaganda, and some key French music specialists who contributed to the creation and recording of the music programmes on Radio Paris. Among the existing historiography on radio propaganda, the actual narratives of the broadcasts were largely overlooked. The BBC was a powerful voice which became instrumental in the psychological battle against the Axis power as this ‘transnational broadcasting’ enabled the French to hear news and opinions regarding the conflict from the British point of view, counterbalancing the effect of the messages broadcast on RN and Radio Paris. With technological progress, the radio became the best means of communication as there was no border for the radio airwave, and the jamming of the BBC programmes did not result in a total failure to reach France due to the various concurrent wavelengths used. However, RN and Radio Paris had the advantage of broadcasting from within France and reception was unrestricted within its own territory for the targeted audience. If the BBC had moulded public attitudes and led public debate by its broadcasts to France, RN and Radio Paris also worked hard to influence people’s opinion by attracting listeners with a wide variety of programmes with both open and hidden political messages.

The Second World War was often called the ‘people’s war’. One of the BBC’s preferred ways of contributing to the war effort was by representing the concerns of the people and putting them in a wider context. Listeners’ responses to the BBC’s wartime broadcasting not only enabled ordinary peoples’ concerns, hopes, fears and aspirations to be voiced publicly, but they were also heard by the British government, thus influencing the subsequent evolution of propaganda policy. In contrast, RN and Radio Paris were more concerned with projecting legitimacy and disseminating information using the voices of authorities and ordinary people. In so doing they actively sought the participation of the public.

and constructed their preferred realities through the responses and voices of the participants. One of the main sources of my study are, therefore, the transcripts and recordings of radio broadcasts consulted in archives, alongside some which have been published.

For this thesis, the transcripts of broadcasts available at the BBC Written Archives, as well as those collated in Jacques Pessis’ books, form the basis of the source of the narratives, complemented by Maurice Schumann’s book, which focuses solely on the narratives of the Free French as broadcast by the BBC.\textsuperscript{27} The length of a BBC broadcast varies from a few lines (six lines minimum) up to a total of eight typed pages depending on the topic to be debated on the day,\textsuperscript{28} although the average size of a broadcast ranges from one to three pages.\textsuperscript{29} With regard to RN, a good selection of the narratives of Pétain’s speeches, via the wireless or otherwise, is available in Jean-Claude Barbas’s book;\textsuperscript{30} speeches vary in length from a few lines to a transcribed text of more than 250 lines.\textsuperscript{31} There is virtually no written record of the broadcast narratives of Radio Paris, although a pamphlet published during the war was uncovered which contains a small collection of Dr Friedrich’s speeches from 20 April to 6 July 1941.\textsuperscript{32}

Due to the extremely limited resources in written publications for the broadcast narratives of RN and Radio Paris, it soon became apparent that the only way of accessing the narratives was to listen to the digital recordings of the broadcasts which are available at the Institut national de l’audiovisuel (INA) in Paris. This may explain the absence of existing historiography in the study of these radios. Historians such as Aurélie Luneau\textsuperscript{33} and Kay Chadwick\textsuperscript{34} have used

\textsuperscript{29} BBC WAC, Jacques Duchesne, ‘Réflexions de Jacques Duchesne, 2 novembre 1941, \textit{Les Français parlent aux Français}, Service Français, 20:30-21:00 BST.
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., p. 19.
\textsuperscript{32} Dr Friedrich, \textit{Un journaliste allemand vous parle ...} (Paris: Editions LE PONT, 1942).
\textsuperscript{33} Luneau, \textit{Radio Londres}. 
narratives of broadcasts surrounding key events, but a systematic analysis of the narratives of the broadcasts is lacking. These narratives will help us to come to a deeper understanding of the evolution of broadcasts in the context of the complex political and social impact of the war on the French population. This thesis goes beyond existing literature by offering a comparative analysis of radio propaganda in France.

* 

In the following paragraphs I will discuss the methodology of the research and the problems I encountered. I will also explain some key concepts and discuss the peculiarities of radio propaganda.

Most of the digitised recordings of RN focus on Pétain’s speeches, ideology, and events in which he was involved. There are only a handful of other surviving radio programmes in which Pétain did not participate. I listened to a total of 199 indexed broadcasts, each containing recordings of various lengths with an average of two to three hours, with multiple clips of messages mingled together. The two main types of broadcasts available for public listening are live broadcasts – some of which may have been recorded for re-broadcasting at a later date – and broadcasts that were pre-recorded in studios and then put on air. I identified some 14 major themes among the available audio recordings covering a wide range of topics such as youth, PoWs, government, National Revolution, charity, French Empire etc., in a variety of genres such as news, interviews, and reportage taking place in the studio of RN, in a public or a business place. These themes recur; however, the intensity and focus of each changes over time depending on the priorities of the respective government behind the radio stations. There are also other ad hoc themes which appeared throughout, though sparsely.

Due to the limited and selective nature of the digital recording of the available broadcasts, to develop a better understanding of the structures and programmes of RN, it became imperative to analyse the broadcasting in conjunction with the information available in Radio National, RN’s radio magazine.

With regard to Radio Paris, I listened to a total of 468 indexed broadcasts, each containing multiple clips of messages of varying length with an average of

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35 Pétain, Discours aux Français, p. 21.
two to three hours, except for art and music programmes where the length could run up to six hours. Among Radio Paris’s available audio recordings of broadcasts, there are a large number of art, cultural and music programmes such as extracts of theatre plays, interviews with artists, live concerts, etc. From the available digital recordings I identified eight major recurring themes such as anti-British/anti-American propaganda, collaboration, youth, workers, communism and bolshevism, alongside a large number of other themes which appeared occasionally during the period of study covered, in a variety of forms such as news, interview, reportage and sketches taking place both within and outside of the studio of Radio Paris. I have also used Les Ondes, Radio Paris’s, magazine to supplement the information available on the recordings.

It transpires that the programmes of each radio station were multi-faceted, although it is possible to identify the evolution of the main political message surrounding various themes. When I started the project, I expected to find a few common themes linking the messages of the three radio stations. Historians have identified a number of significant themes for this period: the vast number of PoWs, shortages of food, the rise of the black market, the changing role of women, the impact of frequent changes of legislation and divided public opinion. After listening to a total of 667 indexed audio recordings from both RN and Radio Paris, and reading over a thousand broadcasts of the BBC, I cross-referenced the content of the broadcasts of the three radio stations and came to the conclusion that they focused on different issues in their broadcasts. Unsurprisingly, there were differences between the major themes of the BBC and that of RN and Radio Paris; while the BBC tended to focus more on giving timely news and the various aspects of the daily concerns of the French, the two radios broadcasting from France were much more obsessed with French youth and the future of France. I will therefore discuss the three radio stations in separate chapters, as there was not as much interaction between them as expected, and there was not one theme which preoccupied all of them. By analysing the stations separately, I will be able to link the radio stations with the political interests behind them: in the case of the BBC, the British government and the French government-in-exile of de Gaulle; in the case of RN, the Vichy government; and in the case of Radio Paris, the German government and the Occupation authorities in France. Each chapter will be structured chronologically as I show how the focus of the broadcasts and the
themes change, depending on the priorities of the respective station/government, the course of war and the general situation in wartime France and Europe.

Chapter 1 focuses on the BBC, discussing each year of 1940, 1941 and 1942, using ‘food’, one of the main preoccupations of the BBC’s messages to the French public, as an overarching theme, encompassing the discussion of the British blockade, restrictions on food (rationing, black market, family parcels), and their social and political consequences (housewives’ demonstrations, lack of calories for children, starvation, mortality rate and weight loss). By choosing ‘food’ as a leitmotiv, the BBC demonstrated good knowledge of the popular concerns of the French during this period, and used it as a lever to empathise with the French, to raise patriotic feelings and to put pressure on Vichy and the German authorities.

Chapter 2 deals with RN and follows a similar structure, with ‘youth’, one of the main preoccupations of Vichy, as the overarching theme, encompassing the expectations and social responsibility of French youth: giving birth as a patriotic duty, rejuvenation of youth via the various youth movements, and the role of education and sports in youth development. This is because the preoccupation of RN was to seek legitimacy for the Vichy government and to inspire the regeneration of the nation through the transformation of the youth.

In Chapter 3, Radio Paris, ‘youth’ is again the overarching theme, but the focus differs considerably from RN. Radio Paris expressed the German expectation of French youth (rural service, the future of youth, charity work, collaboration), youth events, public service (employment placements), and depicted French youth as victims of the Allied actions. ‘Youth’ was a crucial aspect of German propaganda, as the occupiers were looking for a supply of labour for the German war effort, and hence using youth to influence public perception of the future of France in a Europe dominated by Nazi Germany.

The thesis concludes by outlining how the narratives conveyed through these media evolved between 1940 and 1942, and how the focus of the propaganda shifted; to what extent and how the radio stations interacted; how the tone and emphasis in the narratives evolved; and how listeners and the public were involved in the production of these broadcasts.

The primary sources that I used in the thesis mainly originate from archives both in England and France. In England, I visited the BBC Written
Archives and consulted a large number of transcribed BBC broadcasts, the BBC Monthly Reports and correspondence from French listeners. I also visited the National Archives at Kew and consulted the reports of interviews of civilians arriving in Britain from abroad, which took place between 1941 and 1942 at the Royal Victoria Patriotic School (RVPS).

In France, I visited INA for the original digitised broadcasts of both RN and Radio Paris, and the Archives historiques de Radio France, where I obtained information about the two radio magazines, Radio National and Les Ondes, the periodicals about the history of RN, the BBC and Radio Paris (Cahiers d’Histoire de Radiodiffusion), reports about RN between 1940 and 1944, as well as wartime damage reports of French radio stations. I also consulted the archival materials at Le Service de la Mémoire et des Affaires Culturelles de la Préfecture de Police and obtained information about police reports and a handful of Radio Paris reports. Moreover, I visited the Pierrefitte Archives Nationales where I obtained information from a logbook of Radio Paris’s programmes from August 1940 to August 1941 and from August 1942.

This thesis studies the narratives of the broadcasts in both written form and in the form of audio recording. The use of narrative analysis in the study of social life and practices of power is well established in various disciplines, due to its focus on people and its ability to act as an interpretive device through which people represent themselves and their worlds to others at a certain point in time and place. In my research, the narratives of the broadcasts as well as the listeners reveal the political rhetoric and the perceived social norms during the German Occupation, as well as the exercise of power which may be taken for granted.

Using this approach, for each of the three radio stations I identified a key theme and a number of sub-themes which have common features that link the various narratives, and positioned the analysis of the narratives within the particular social and political context of the specific time period. This method has also enabled me to compare the data from one set of narratives to the other on the

36 The number of audio recordings of the wartime BBC French Service available at the BBC Sound Archives dated between 22.6.40 and 11.11.42 amounts to 27. This is the reason why I decided to use the BBC Written Archives as the volume of information is much greater.

basis of the various sub-themes,\textsuperscript{38} and to identify the evolution of the narratives over the period studied.

The narratives contained in the broadcasts are ‘real-world data’ which are neither edited nor sanitised, and therefore can be studied in their authentic format and content.\textsuperscript{39} The narratives capture the emotion of the moment, the concerns of both the authorities and the people and the evolution of radio propaganda in the context of historical events. This comparative analysis of radio propaganda in France using narratives is new in its approach.

I encountered a number of challenges and difficulties in collecting primary sources for this study. Radio historians in the USA struggled ‘with one of the spottiest, most ephemeral historical records in all of the mass media’,\textsuperscript{40} and the same is true for the study of these three radio stations in Europe. Study of the recordings and narratives of wartime radio was hindered by the lack of primary material, especially recordings and transcripts, and the difficulties in accessing relevant information. This was a time when radio programmes were not consistently recorded and preserved; as a result, there are now only a few recordings available which are often incomplete or of poor sound quality. The speed and accent of the speakers (for example, when pronouncing a name or place) and the environment in which the recording was made (for example, when it was a live reportage in a public place) add another layer of difficulty to the correct understanding of the broadcasts.\textsuperscript{41}

For the narratives of the broadcasts from the BBC, I used two different types of data source. The first data source is the original transcripts from the BBC Written Archives, where the work of official censorship remains visible. For example, words, group of words or entire passages are crossed out and appropriate corrections made to the original text. The transcripts are also accompanied by the speaker’s name, the date and time of broadcasting,\textsuperscript{42} and occasionally, the number

\textsuperscript{40} Douglas, \textit{Listening In}, p. 9.
\textsuperscript{41} For example, INA, Inventaire Disques, \textit{Interviews d’ouvriers français travaillant dans une usine à Berlin}, recorded on 25.02.1941, on Radio Paris (RP), 1941.
\textsuperscript{42} BBC WAC, ‘La chasse’, September 17, 20h30-21h00.
of days since France fell.\textsuperscript{43} From 1942, a stamp, ‘BBC Passed for Security’ appears on some of the transcripts.\textsuperscript{44} The benefit of using archival transcripts is that the information retrieved is not hindered by the quality of recording, although the narratives are limited to written words which are cut and dry. The second type of data source is the published transcripts, which are organised in chronological order but with very limited accompanying information; for example, the name of the presenter is sometimes missing, as is the time of the broadcasting and the name of the programme.

In terms of the audio recordings of RN and Radio Paris, each digital recording of the indexed broadcast is accompanied by a printed page of fact sheet as classified by the archivist, including the ‘title’ of the broadcast; the broadcasting date (a common feature on RN but appears only 16 times on Radio Paris); the duration of the recording; the themes of each individual broadcast (such as politics, teaching, social question, sports, etc.); the type of broadcast (such as reportage, interview, etc.); the speakers (if known); a descriptor with a few key words about the broadcast; the production company which created the programme; the date of the recording; and a summary of the content among other key factors. Information about the name of the programme from which the broadcasts originate, and the time of broadcasting, however, are largely missing, making it very difficult to map the broadcast to the programme schedule published in the radio magazines. Therefore, I decided to focus on the narratives of the broadcasts and how they served the propaganda agenda of the authorities behind it.

The depth of the summary of the content on the fact sheets, however, differs significantly between RN and Radio Paris. For RN’s broadcast, a detailed summary is available giving background information about a reportage, broken down into segments with a clear start and end time and a descriptor for each segment, making it easier to locate a particular segment of narrative once that indexed broadcast has been identified among all the un-indexed broadcasts in that clip. However, in the case of Radio Paris, the summary is much less informative with much shorter descriptions (three to five lines maximum), making it much

\textsuperscript{43} BBC WAC, Jacques Duchesne, ‘Réflexion de Jacques Duchesne’, samedi 22 mars 1941, \textit{Les Français parlent aux Français}, Service Français, 20h30-21h00 BST.
\textsuperscript{44} BBC WAC, Jean Marin, ‘Dépêche’, jeudi 20 août 1942, \textit{Quart d’Heure Français de Midi}, French Service, 12h00-12h15 BST.
harder to identify the indexed broadcast; in most cases, the whole broadcast must be heard before the listener can be certain that the correct segment has been included. Moreover, the information provided on the printed summary of RN and Radio Paris does not always match with the information on the audio recording. Where this is the case, an explanation is provided on the fact sheet; for example, the digitised version was produced from the inventory disk and certain segments of the audio recording were lost due to the disk being too degraded, but the fact sheet was not reproduced, resulting in the mismatch of information.\footnote{See some examples, INA, Fonds Vichy, disques de la BDIC, Pétain: visite de l’Hôtel-Dieu de Lyon, déjeuner avec les soeurs, recorded on 28.09.1941, on Radio Etat Français-Radiodiffusion Nationale; INA, Fonds Vichy, disques de la BDIC, Prises d’otages après l’assassinat d’officiers allemands, recorded on 22.10.1941, on Radio Etat Français-Radiodiffusion Nationale; INA, Fonds Vichy, disques de la BDIC, Discours aux scouts de France, recorded on 15.08.1942, on Radio Etat Français-Radiodiffusion Nationale; INA, Inventaire Disques, Offres d’emplois pour chômeurs, recorded on 17.08.1941, on Radio Paris (RP), 1941; INA, Inventaire Disques, Discours de Georges LAMIRAND à la jeunesse, recorded on 01.12.1941, on Radio Paris (RP), 1941; INA, Inventaire Disques, Reportage au centre d’apprentissage de Pantin, recorded on 01.01.1942, on Radio Paris (RP), 1942; INA, Inventaire Disques, Propagande en faveur de la relève, recorded on 20.10.1942, on Radio Paris (RP), 1942.}

Discrepancies on the date of a broadcast occur frequently, which add to the difficulties identifying the correct date of broadcasting. While the majority of the audio records were recorded and broadcast the same day, some broadcasts have a different date for recording and broadcasting.\footnote{When such a situation arises, I have noted it in a footnote.} RN displays both the recording and broadcasting dates on the archival fact sheet, however, by and large, Radio Paris only preserved the date of recording (the date of broadcasting only appeared 16 times). Given the inconsistent level of information, I decided to use the ‘date of recording’, as this information appears in the archival fact sheet of both RN and Radio Paris, to keep a parallel between the studies of the two radio stations.

There are a large number of broadcasts from both RN and Radio Paris dated 1 January 1941 and 1942, which does not reflect the actual date of recording or broadcasting. Rather, this is an indicator that the date of recording and broadcasting was unknown to the archivist when they were indexed. The only way to estimate a more accurate date of broadcasting is by listening to the content and looking for information contained within the broadcast itself. Wherever possible, if a date of the recording is identified from the context of the audio recording, it is noted in an accompanying footnote. There are occasional errors in
the dates recorded by the archivist. For example, INA indexed on RN ‘Après la visite de Pétain à l’école de cadres de Gannat’ shows a ‘date of recording’ as 20.10.1941, when it was in fact recorded a year earlier.\textsuperscript{47} The indexed ‘Voyage du Maréchal Pétain à Chambéry (Savoie)’ shows a ‘date of recording’ as 01.01.1941 but it was recorded in September 1941.\textsuperscript{48} Where this is the case, I have explained the discrepancy in a footnote.\textsuperscript{49} In term of referencing the archival material, the ‘date of recording’ is used in this thesis to identify a document as it is one of the search criteria at INA, as well as the exact title of the broadcast which is listed in the footnotes.

Both RN and Radio Paris have preserved a sizeable number of audio broadcasts which makes it possible to study and compare the narratives as well as their evolution surrounding the themes and sub-themes that I identified; however, it is impossible to gauge the percentage of these broadcasts against the actual number of broadcasts during the period studied. The radio magazines have certainly helped in providing useful background information about the various programmes, the speakers, the key concern of a certain period, style of propaganda and broadcasting hours, but there are limitations here too. The radio magazines started much later than the radio broadcasting: Radio National was first published in May 1941 while Les Ondes was first published in April 1941 (although the first issue available in the archives of Radio France was dated 1942 and is only available on a disc). The schedule included detailed information for cultural programmes; for example, name of a play or a list of the songs and artists for a concert, but for other programmes, only the title of the programme was listed.

Before turning to the narratives of the different radio stations it is necessary to reflect on the role of radio in psychological warfare and propaganda. The study of propaganda in occupied France and Vichy as conveyed in the narratives of the broadcasts is the main focus of this thesis. Propaganda as a term

\textsuperscript{47} See L’Ouest-Eclair 22 octobre 1940, available online at http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k662136t.item (2 October 2015).
\textsuperscript{49} I have also highlighted such errors to the archivists to enable corrections to be made for future researchers.
had historically been associated with lies and falsehood, and this was particularly prevalent during the Great War.\(^{50}\) Modern propaganda in a technological society, however, is not just about lies and falsehood. Instead, it could encompass many levels of truths.\(^{51}\)

During the Second World War, both the Germans and the British recognised that lying must be avoided, and that facts must be accurate in their message to the public. Goebbels himself wanted the communiqués of the Wehrmacht to be as accurate as possible.\(^{52}\) There is, however, a distinction between facts themselves – which must stay true – and the intention, interpretation or the moral elements of those facts, which can be manipulated to serve the political purpose of the propagandists, and this distinction is key to analysing propaganda.\(^{53}\)

This distinction is necessary to comprehend the role played by the three radio stations. The European Services of the BBC enjoyed a reputation of truthfulness among its listeners. The BBC report of 21 February 1941 cited evidence originating from Northern France praising the BBC that ‘we hear the voice of truth, our France – you are “the voice of the Frank”.’\(^{54}\) Similar evidence was cited in subsequent reports that the French listeners had great faith in the veracity of the BBC. However, it is the interpretation of ‘true facts’ which reveals the political aim of the radio propagandists. As established in the report of 8 July 1940, the future role of the BBC lay in keeping the French on the British side, giving something more than ‘straight news’ if the BBC wanted to be an effective weapon.\(^{55}\)

For example, when the British bombed Paris and its suburbs in 1942, the fact is that the bombing took place, and all the three radios reported this fact, which is true. However, it is the intention and interpretation of this fact that marked the difference in the narratives of their broadcasts which served different propaganda aims and political purposes: while the BBC interpreted the event as a

\(^{50}\) Arthur Ponsonby, *Falsehood in War-Time* (London: Kimble & Bradford, 1940), p. 16.
\(^{52}\) Ellul, *Propaganda*, pp. v-vi.
\(^{53}\) Ibid., pp. 52-3.
\(^{54}\) BBC WAC, E2/186/4, 21 February 1941 (European Intelligence Papers).
\(^{55}\) BBC WAC, E2/186/2, 8 July 1940 (European Intelligence Papers).
necessity for a greater good, Radio Paris interpreted it as a murderous act, causing unnecessary suffering and loss of civilian life; RN started reporting on it in a matter-of-fact manner, in an attempt to preserve its perceived ‘neutrality’, although it soon changed as the war progressed.

In terms of the effects of propaganda, Welch argues that it serves the purpose of changing attitudes and ideas, but in a way that is more limited than widely believed. Instead, propaganda plays a more prominent role in reinforcing, sharpening and focusing existing trends and beliefs. Propaganda needs to appeal to the rational element in humans as ‘attitudes and behaviour are also the products of rational decisions’, and to be studied as an integral part of the whole political process. Jacques Ellul held a similar view, arguing that propaganda needs to be viewed as a sociological phenomenon ‘rather than as something made by certain people for certain purposes’. He categorised propaganda into ‘propaganda of agitation’, the subversive propaganda, and ‘propaganda of integration’, which is often more subtle, complex and aims at stabilising and unifying the society. These two types of propaganda could be observed in all the narratives of the three radio stations to a varied extent.

In term of measuring the effects of propaganda, Ellul rejects the idea that it can be measured using experiments that have been conducted with small groups or that can be replicated in a test tube. This is because propaganda, especially that of wartime, is a unique phenomenon which results from ‘the totality of forces pressing in upon an individual in his society’. The effects of propaganda can be studied using observation and logic but not statistics. Therefore, I will aim to evaluate the narratives of each radio station in the context of the totality of forces imposed on the French during the period of occupation. I will, therefore, establish evidence of public opinion from a range of secondary literature and qualitative data specific to each radio station.

Propaganda has its limitations, though. Ellul summarises the four main limitations of propaganda when used in a national context. It relies on the

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36 Welch, Nazi Propaganda, p. 2.
37 Ibid., p. 2.
38 Ellul, Propaganda, p. v.
39 Ibid., pp. 71-6.
40 Ibid., p. vii.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
framework of pre-existing attitudes which can only be modified very slowly. It cannot reverse or change the central psychological or sociological trends in that society (propaganda against progress or happiness). It must be compatible with facts or at least appear to be compatible with facts, not just be based on ideas. For example, Goebbels cleverly shifted his propaganda focus to the heroism of the German soldiers when reporting the battle of Stalingrad, rather than emphasising military merits, because it was a major military defeat.\(^{63}\) Moreover, the psychological effect of propaganda is largely time-bound: ‘the psychological action must be lasting and continuous’.\(^{64}\) Ellul also argues that propaganda to foreign countries is inevitably much less effective because of the propagandist’s psychological ignorance of the attitudes, interests and beliefs of his target, who in return display a spontaneous suspicion of anything that comes from the outside.\(^{65}\)

It is, therefore, evident that the BBC was facing an uphill battle from the outset: the broadcasts came from outside of the country and were thus subject to this additional limitation. In contrast, RN and Radio Paris were both broadcasting from within France and posed as the voice of France, albeit somewhat controversially, especially in the case of Radio Paris. The BBC attempted to address this limitation by using mainly French speakers and by tapping into the practical concerns of the public, making much more efforts to collect intelligence and monitor public opinion than RN or Radio Paris did.

Radio propaganda played a crucial role in executing the psychological warfare targeting the French during the period studied. Radio has a number of unique advantages, for example, the advantage of immediacy which meant the listeners would be made believe that they were participating in a course of great importance.\(^{66}\) By July 1940, the BBC had come to realise that radio broadcasting was their only means of addressing rapidly and effectively France and most of the rest of Europe\(^{67}\) due to its advantages over other conventional methods of communication. For example, leaflet-dropping by air was not considered cost effective due to the weight of the paper to be dropped, the number of sorties needed for the aircraft to drop the leaflets, the number of aircraft needed for the

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63 Ibid., p. 295.
64 Ibid., pp. 295-6.
65 Ibid., p. 296.
67 BBC WAC, E2/186/2, 8 July 1940 (European Intelligence Papers).
operation, the navigation skills which were required to drop the leaflets accurately, the experience of the aircrew, possibility of adverse weather, the fuel cost, the wear and tear of the aircraft and the risks for the crew members.\textsuperscript{68}

RN was the flagship radio station of Vichy administration, whose first priority was to seek legitimation. As soon as the Armistice was signed, RN acted as the voice of Vichy authority, and it had the difficult task of presenting itself as an independent French state in the context of limited political sovereignty, controlled environment and restricted freedom as imposed by the German authorities. The very nature of Vichy meant that it depended on radio as one of its main propaganda tools. Pétain’s heavy involvement with RN meant that he was able to establish a personal relationship with the public. ‘Travail, Famille, Patrie’ became the punchline used by radio propaganda to convince the French of the superiority of the new moral order and the movement of National Revolution, all for the revival and reconstruction of France back to its days of glory.\textsuperscript{69}

Goebbels, the mastermind of the German propaganda machine, also saw radio propaganda as an effective means to persuade those who had already been partially converted.\textsuperscript{70} He maintained that to be successful, the propagandist must know the individuals and their social groups well and possess the ability to unite people for the National Socialist movement:

The propagandist must understand not only how to speak to the people in their totality but also to individual sections of the population: to the worker, the peasant, the middle class ... he must be able to speak to different professions and to different faiths. The propagandist must always be in a position to speak to people in the language that they understand. These capacities are the essential preconditions for success.\textsuperscript{71}

Goebbels’s aim was reflected in both the organisation of Radio Paris and its choice of speakers. Radio Paris presented itself as a French radio, using mainly French speakers with a variety of good-quality programmes to keep its listeners

\textsuperscript{68} Brooks, \textit{British Propaganda to France}, pp. 38–41.
\textsuperscript{70} Welch, \textit{Nazi Propaganda}, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{71} Taylor, ‘Goebbels and the Function of Propaganda’, p. 38.
tuned in. Radio Paris was clearly a German-managed station but disguised as a voice for the French. There was a good balance between its propaganda message, news services and entertainment and cultural programmes. Radio Paris would have had more success in making the French believe in the new ideology of collaboration and the concept of New Europe if only Hitler’s policy towards France had been different.

To put my research on radio in the context of wartime France I will rely on a wide range of literature on the political and social history and the history of everyday life in France. Pierre Laborie analyses the evolution of French public opinion and identity crisis from 1936 to 1944, and how the sequences of events led to the culture of defeat and renouncement. Julian Jackson offers an interpretative synthesis of the history of France during the Second World War, including concerns about the decline of birth rate, the National Revolution, collaboration, propaganda, public opinion, education and youth movement throughout the period of Occupation. Richard Vinen, on the other hand, focuses on the social history of the German Occupation – the people themselves rather than the official and political aspects – using a wide range of individual experiences to depict the effect of the Occupation on ordinary people. Richard Gildea explores how the presence of German soldiers affected the lives of ordinary people and their communities, how the French exercised prudence and sought to better their lives throughout the occupation, keeping their options open and refraining from committing themselves firmly to collaboration or resistance. Robert O. Paxton focuses on Vichy’s ‘double agenda’ in pursuit of its own ideology about the National Revolution, and its attempt to negotiate with Hitler to accept Vichy as a partner in the construction of the new Europe.

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73 Eck, La guerre des ondes, p. 149.
As for the overarching themes of ‘food’, I rely on previous research. Dominique Veillon discusses in great depth issues surrounding food in France from 1939 to 1947, including the supply shortage and the restrictions, giving a comparative view of the towns and cities. Michel Cépède provides very detailed quantitative information regarding food supply and food requisitions as demanded by the occupier and the Vichy regime. Fabrice Grenard describes the underground economy of France, offering an intricate picture of the ways in which the black market worked and the political impact that resulted from it. He also discusses the limitations of the political influence over the French population and the supply problems created by Vichy, which led to the failure of Vichy both in terms of its ideology of National Revolution and its collaboration with the occupier.

The situation of the French youth during the war is also well researched. W. D. Halls offers a comprehensive account of the state of the youth from the Armistice to the end of the war, including the evolution of youth policies from the Third Republic, the new policies adopted by Vichy and the state of mind of the youth in response to the new policies. Pierre Giolitto gives a detailed account of the lived experiences of the youth in France using personal testimonies. Judith K. Proud focuses on Vichy’s propaganda using children and children’s images, offering an explanation as to the representation of children in the Vichy doctrine. The other aspect of research into French youth focuses on the promotion of the idea of working in Germany; for example, Milward discusses the important role of the French workforce, including young workers, in German wartime economy, which eventually became the core preoccupation of the leaders of the Third Reich as the Germans workers were sent to the front.

In the following chapters the thesis will discuss the historiography and the narrative of the broadcasts of the three radio stations, the BBC, RN and Radio Paris, in a chronological order.
Chapter 1 The BBC

1.1 The foreign-language service of the BBC

Historical context

The BBC, located at Bush House in London, began to broadcast a new service, the British Empire Service, in English and on short-wave addressed to the British Empire, including Australia, New Zealand, India, East and Southern Africa, Canada and the West Indies, from 19 December 1932. The purpose was to bring together the scattered parts of the British Empire. By the late 1930s, the BBC had to consider broadcasting in foreign languages as a desperate response to the imminent threat posed by anti-British propaganda aired across borders by German and Italian radio stations. The top priority was to broadcast in Arabic, in order to counter the anti-British propaganda spread by Radio Bari, an Italian radio station broadcasting in Arabic in Egypt and Palestine. This was achieved on 3 January 1938. Shortly afterwards, the BBC added broadcasting services in Spanish and Portuguese because Britain’s commercial interests in Latin America was being threatened by the presence of overseas broadcasters set up by Germany, Italy, France and Holland. French, German and Italian were added in September 1938 during the Munich crisis.\(^1\) At that time, the BBC was facing a lack of both transmitters and competent staff to broadcast news bulletins in more than a few languages, and more importantly, whether propaganda was ‘a good thing’ was being discussed both within and outside the BBC.\(^2\)

Prior to the breakout of the war, due to the uncertainty of the situation, neither the BBC nor the government was clear about how their relationship would work. On 28 July 1939, a statement was made at the House of Commons that the Government did not intend:

‘to take over the BBC in war time’, but ‘would treat broadcasting as we treat the Press and other methods of publicity, the Press and the films, and …

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leave the BBC to carry on … with a very close liaison between the Ministry of Information and the Broadcasting Corporation, with definite regulations as to how the work should be carried on.\(^3\)

In the meantime, a Memorandum of the Ministry of Information (MOI) indicated that it intended to have a ‘Director of Radio’ in the Ministry, implying that the government did intend to take over the BBC. This confusion was later clarified but the post of ‘Director of Radio Relations’ was nonetheless created to oversee the tempo and content of radio broadcasting.\(^4\)

On 1 September 1939, when Germany attacked Poland, the question as to why there was only one home radio programme, a question posed as early as spring 1938, remained unresolved.\(^5\) The British government was reluctant to communicate news through radio waves. McMillan, the first Minister of Information,\(^6\) expected the BBC to broadcast only the authoritative information given by the Ministry, ‘implying that the BBC was ‘independent’ only as to … the lighter parts of its programmes’.\(^7\) The MOI was particularly concerned that the BBC should not be allowed to harm the interest of the press by making early announcements ahead of them. Despite assurance from the BBC that its desire to provide constant news coverage throughout the day was based on the national interest rather than to compete with the press, their reassurance to McMillan and the press was brushed aside. During this period, the BBC news releases were delayed and broadcasting was held up on several occasions. This improved in October 1939 but it was not before December that the pattern of wartime broadcasting in Britain took shape.\(^8\)

As to its overseas services to France, from September 1939 there was an expressed demand from French listeners to provide them with the time and wavelengths of broadcasting to France, because the French station, RN, had failed to broadcast proper news. In November 1939, the British consul in Nantes stated that the BBC broadcast at 21h00 became more popular among the French as the BBC news bulletins were found more interesting and more thorough than the RN.

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\(^3\) Sir Samuel Hoare quoted in Briggs, *The History of Broadcasting in the UK*, p. 91.
\(^5\) Ibid., pp. 92-3.
\(^6\) Ibid., p. 82.
\(^7\) Ibid., p. 100.
\(^8\) Ibid., pp. 101-2.
The good reputation of the BBC French service began to spread.\textsuperscript{9} It was at that time that the BBC Empire Service became the BBC Overseas Service.\textsuperscript{10}

Noel Newsome, former employee at the \textit{Daily Telegraph}, joined the BBC in September 1939 as an assistant at the Overseas News. In December, he became the European News Editor, responsible for the Central News Desk. In December 1941, he was appointed Director of European broadcasts.\textsuperscript{11} France and Germany were the two ‘giants’ at the BBC foreign-language section. Each foreign-language section had its own editor and its own staff. The French team was headed by Darsie Gillie, former correspondent at the \textit{Morning Post} in Paris, who was genuinely keen to look at France in an unbiased way. All foreign-language sections were dependent on the supply of news coming from the Central News Desk,\textsuperscript{12} the role of which was to gather and prepare stories in English for the regional news editors. Within the limits prescribed by the directives, each foreign-language section was free to produce its own programmes the way it wanted. Once the news was received by the regional news editors, they would make news bulletins which had to be approved by the Central News Desk prior to broadcasting, subject to censorship. This approach was set up to ensure consistency, and to avoid having identical regional news bulletins or conflicting stories. This practice was not entirely foolproof, though, as it did not prevent the broadcasting of news which would later be proven inaccurate, although it is remarkable that there were few complaints relating to the inaccuracy of the BBC European News.\textsuperscript{13}

The invasion of Norway on 9 April 1940 marked a turning point for the BBC. The MOI did not engage much during the Norwegian campaign, and rumour started spreading due to the lack of official information from both the MOI and the Admiralty. When the Supreme War Council made a decision to withdraw from Norway on 27 April, the information was not communicated to the BBC, nor was the BBC invited to the special briefing attended by the editors of

\textsuperscript{9} Luneau, \textit{Radio Londres}, p. 27.
\textsuperscript{10} Seul and Ribeiro, ‘Revisiting Transnational Broadcasting’, p. 368.
\textsuperscript{13} Brooks, \textit{British Propaganda to France}, pp. 29, 185.
national newspapers a few days later. After the event, the BBC was left to face criticism which should have rightly been directed elsewhere. Newsome complained on 5 May that the government had tried, in the last stages of the campaign,\textsuperscript{14} to use the European News Service to ‘throw dust in the eyes of the enemy’\textsuperscript{15} while totally disregarding telling the truth to the listeners:

Owing to the fact that our treatment of the campaign was based on the assumption that it would be carried on, a false picture of the true situation was inevitably created and as inevitably has had a damaging effect on our reputation abroad for reliability. I cannot but resent most strongly … that we were used as a blind tool.\textsuperscript{16}

In this instance, the BBC never stood a chance to defend its position to tell the truth as it never had a full picture of the whole situation. The BBC might have seen itself as ‘the entirely innocent victim of strategic needs’,\textsuperscript{17} but this was not the conclusion drawn by the government from the campaign in Norway. Some Cabinet members saw the BBC as ‘an enemy within the gates’.\textsuperscript{18} The lack of leadership and planning on the behalf of the government led the BBC to become the scapegoat for the failure for news coverage over the campaign of Norway. Shortly after, the political landscape changed further when Germany invaded the Low Countries on 10 May 1940;\textsuperscript{19} Churchill replaced Chamberlain as the wartime Prime Minister and a government of national unity was created.\textsuperscript{20}

The Blitzkrieg in the Low Countries and France brought another blow to the reputation of the BBC due to the fast movement of German troops but also due to the censorship system which was in place within the BBC. As a result, Germany was often able to provide more up-to-date news in its propaganda regarding the progress of the war without using dramatic effects.\textsuperscript{21} As the BBC Intelligence report of 8 July 1940 stated: ‘Lately, however, Hitler’s predictions

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\textsuperscript{14} Briggs, \textit{The History of Broadcasting in the UK}, p. 196.  \\
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., p. 197.  \\
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.  \\
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.  \\
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.  \\
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., p. 198.  \\
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., p. 204.  \\
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., p. 203.
\end{flushright}
have come true while those of the Allies have not, and this has greatly damaged the prestige of British news.'

The report also recommended that, following the events of Norway and France, the BBC would need more than ‘straight news’ if it wanted to win the propaganda war in Europe. Colonel Buckmaster, future leader of the French section of the Special Operations Executive (SOE), wrote: ‘We needed to establish full confidence in the BBC so that when the time comes, the French patriots would accept without question or murmur any directive which would be launched on its wavelength.’ A consensus emerged that the best propaganda would be that which appeared the most sincere and truthful. A similar view was shared by de Gaulle.

The BBC’s reputation regarding truthfulness was again put into question during the Battle of Britain as the British communiqués were not always truthful in reporting the number of planes shot down on both sides. However, they were more accurate than the German communiqués. At least, the BBC did not fear bad news by hiding the truth. As Pierre Bourdan, an editor at Havas Agency in London in June 1940 who later became one of the most prominent speakers at the BBC, stated, ‘the news tonight is bad, this is a bad period to pass, but all will end well, the German victory is impossible’.

Crémieux-Brilhac argues that the first listeners turned to the BBC because of their patriotic obstinacy, but more often out of curiosity. However, it was proven very quickly that the British would survive the Battle of Britain and that the war would go on. As Jean Marin, former reporter at Le Journal in London, said, ‘during the first 6 or 8 months, it probably mattered little what we said at the microphone, the essential was that a voice is heard: it was enough to prove that England still existed’.

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22 BBC WAC, E2/186/2. 8 July 1940 (European Intelligence Papers).
23 Ibid.
24 Crémieux-Brilhac, ‘Le rôle de la radio’, p. 3.
25 Ibid.
26 Eck, La guerre des ondes, p. 65.
28 Ibid., p. 367.
Despite the issues and constraints, it was estimated by the Vichy radio monitor in early 1941 that the BBC was thought to have a daily audience of 300,000 listeners – a low estimate, argues Stenton. As the war progressed, the estimation at the end of 1942 showed that the daily audience grew tenfold.\textsuperscript{32} Throughout this period, the BBC took a huge risk by insisting on news integrity due to the repeated military failures and setbacks of the Allies until the end of 1942. Both France and Britain believed that final victory could only be achieved through their trust in their own veracity and they were proven right in the end.\textsuperscript{33}

Further organisational changes were made at the BBC from late 1941. Ivone Kirkpatrick was appointed as Controller of European Services in October 1941, which triggered a full separation of the BBC’s foreign services into two distinct groups: European and Overseas.\textsuperscript{34} In March 1942, Bruce Lockhart was appointed the new Director-General of the Political Warfare Executive (PWE), and he moved to Bush House and set up his office on the floor above that of Kirkpatrick, Newsome and the BBC’s European Service. Kirkpatrick joined Lockhart’s Executive Committee in March 1942\textsuperscript{35} and, in his own words, ‘had successfully changed the whole situation’\textsuperscript{36} in June 1942 at the BBC by strengthening internal communication, improving liaison procedure with formal and informal talks, and by managing to remove ‘the whole cumbrous and highly paid Programme staff appointed by Salt’,\textsuperscript{37} the Director of European Services then.\textsuperscript{38}

Kirkpatrick was the middle man between Lockhart and Newsome. He continued working on propaganda but cared very little about the PWE. Led by Newsome, the Director of European Broadcasts, there was now a substantial degree of independence in the BBC’s selection and presentation of news. This was not always well perceived: some of the news items broadcast by the BBC led to protests by the PWE or the Foreign Office after the event, with orders for future prohibition, although they were not very effective. The directives were prepared

\textsuperscript{33} Eck, \textit{La guerre des ondes}, p. 65.
\textsuperscript{34} Briggs, \textit{The History of Broadcasting in the UK}, p. 342; Seul and Ribeiro, ‘Revisiting Transnational Broadcasting’, p. 368.
\textsuperscript{35} Briggs, \textit{The History of Broadcasting in the UK}, pp. 417-18.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., p. 418.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., p. 260.
solely by Newsome in daily news conferences attended by a wide range of staff, and this resulted in a sense of immediacy and speedy broadcast of daily news operation. It was a matter of pride for all BBC personnel to put the news on the air in the shortest possible time once it had been collected from the Central News Desk.\textsuperscript{39}

From 1941, the BBC acted as a ‘weapon of action’ with regard to giving on air the full name and addresses of the collaborators and denunciators. The BBC did so for it knew that it was in accord with the majority of public opinion in France as expressed in anonymous listeners’ letters.\textsuperscript{40} With the changes implemented by the new management of the BBC, it became even more active, especially when Pierre Laval, Prime Minister of France, declared on Radio Paris on 22 June 1942 that he wished for a German victory. Schumann’s response was unambiguous: ‘Even before he uttered this sentence, Laval expelled himself from France. Even before he uttered this sentence, Laval sentenced himself to death.’\textsuperscript{41} Other events were orchestrated by the BBC, for example the demonstrations of 1 May and 14 July 1942.\textsuperscript{42} As a response to an incident which took place on the French national holiday, 14 July 1942, where several people were shot dead by machine guns, and another six or so were injured, including a 15-year-old boy whose thigh was pierced by a bullet, the BBC launched another appeal on 16 July 1942 calling for the people of Marseille to attend the funeral of the two women who were shot dead, Mrs Simon and Mrs Krebs. The BBC announced that the funeral would be held on Friday at 14h00 and called the population to attend the funeral with ‘silence and dignity!’\textsuperscript{43}

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., pp. 418-21.
\textsuperscript{42} Crémieux-Brilhac, ‘Le rôle de la radio’, p. 3.
more specific watchwords executable within hours and, in these circumstances, affect the opinion for sure'.

The BBC also referred to German atrocities in its radio broadcasts on numerous occasions, reporting the execution of French hostages and the persecution of Jews. The BBC did not hesitate to report such incidents as these would serve as a reminder to the French of the cruelty of the occupiers. With regard to RN, among the surviving broadcasts, very few were of such a nature.

In a broadcast following the execution of 50 Frenchmen as the result of the murder of two German officers, Pétain expressed his frustration at the situation, and stressed that no fighting against the occupiers was allowed following the Armistice. He stated that foreign powers were responsible for radicalising the French to kill the German officers, and called for the population to denounce the criminals. French lives would be at risk if they followed the advice of foreign powers such as messages transmitted via the wireless. As for Radio Paris, the emphasis of their broadcast regarding the execution of the French is on the German authorities’ ‘unwillingness’ to subject the peaceful French population to further summary executions for crimes they did not commit or approve of; their justification for carrying out these executions - which were deemed lawful according to The Hague Convention outlining the Laws and Customs of War on Land - and their condemnation of the Jews speaking on the French and American radio stations for encouraging such reckless actions. The purpose was to appease

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46 INA, Fonds Vichy, disques de la BDIC, Après le bombardement de Brest par la RAF, recorded on 01.01.1941, sur la Radio Etat Français-Radiodiffusion Nationale; INA, Fonds Vichy, disques de la BDIC, Prises d’otages après l’assassinat d’officiers allemands, recorded on 22.10.1941, on Radio Etat Français-Radiodiffusion Nationale.
47 INA, Fonds Vichy, disques de la BDIC, Prises d’otages après l’assassinat d’officiers allemands, recorded on 22.10.1941, on Radio Etat Français-Radiodiffusion Nationale
48 INA, Inventaire Disques, Conférence du Docteur Schlottmann sur la politique anglaise, recorded on 01.12.1941, on Radio Paris (RP), 1941.
the French while giving a stern warning of the consequences of following the instructions of foreign powers.

Despite these warnings, the actions and advice of the BBC against the occupiers would increase exponentially until ‘Operation Torch’ in November 1942 with the Allied landing in North Africa. In response to that, the Germans executed ‘Case Anton’, resulting in the invasion and occupation of the Unoccupied Zone. For the first time since the Armistice, the whole of France was reunited. As Schumann declared on the BBC the same day: ‘by breaking the monstrous border which he had built in the vain hope of dividing, against itself, the indivisible France, the enemy accomplishes a lunatic but symbolic gesture; he decrees, against himself, total union for total war’.  

**Propaganda in France after June 1940**

The BBC had made no plans for propaganda in advance of the war because no one had expected the rapid defeat of France and hence the need to engage in subsequent events. As a result, the propagandists had to wait until the Armistice to prepare themselves for further actions. As Goebbels, the Reich Minister of Propaganda, stated the day after the Armistice, ‘future historians will have to take especially into account the 4th weapon, the weapon of propaganda’.

Following the Armistice, the propagandists at the BBC had a difficult task when targeting France as they had to differentiate their approach towards the Occupied and Unoccupied Zones. In the Occupied Zone, they could attack the authorities without any restraint but in the case of the Unoccupied Zone, Maréchal Pétain, the Head of the Vichy government, was a hero of Verdun in 1916 and widely perceived as a father figure by the French. Apparently, he wanted to save France again. Discrediting Pétain risked to backfire.  

Following the fall of France, it became apparent that France controlled by Germany could become a threat to Britain and it had to be neutralised as soon as possible. The BBC’s intelligence report of 8 July 1940 states that:

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50 BBC WAC, Maurice Schumann, 11 Novembre 1942, French Service.
52 Crémieux-Brilhac, ‘La France libre et la radio’, p. 73.
54 Ibid., p. 4.
The weight of anti-British propaganda in France will henceforth be enormous. The long-term effectiveness of volume in propaganda has been repeatedly emphasised in these reports … and it will require a skilful and determined use of all British propaganda resources to create an effective fifth column on our side in France.\(^{55}\)

The propagandists understood that any attempt to eliminate this threat without the French population’s consent for British actions in France was doomed to fail. Britain’s military actions in France would inevitably cause material destruction and death among civilians. Propaganda would need to explain and justify the actions of the British, provide accurate news on the progress of the war and the British war effort. The French had to be reassured that Britain would not surrender and that finally victory would be attained. By helping the Allies, it would be beneficial to the French as well, as France would have herself restored. Finally, British propaganda had to promote de Gaulle and the Free French as an independent body representing the ‘true’ France against Hitler and Vichy. British propaganda would have to appeal to French goodwill and understanding in order to achieve this objective.\(^{56}\)

From the very first day, the British leaders had the idea of creating a fifth column in France\(^{57}\) to oppose the Germans when the time was right, because France was viewed as ‘the most important British propaganda target in Europe’.\(^{58}\)

The urgent need for propaganda directed towards the French was again highlighted in BBC’s report dated 5 August 1940, stating that if British policy as conveyed by the BBC did not present a more attractive and convincing picture than Hitler’s new order effectively to Europe, the British propaganda front would turn into a ‘Sedan gap’.\(^{59}\)

During the summer and autumn of 1940, the reorganisation of the BBC’s service to France was part of the reorganisation of its Overseas Service which was still incomplete at the time. In this period of German advance in Europe, Newsome had inspired his team with his strong, forward-looking views and

\(^{55}\) BBC WAC, E2/186/2, 8 July 1940 (European Intelligence Papers).
\(^{56}\) Brooks, *British Propaganda to France*, pp. 4-5.
\(^{57}\) Crémieux-Brilhac, ‘Le rôle de la radio’, p. 2.
\(^{58}\) Brooks, *British Propaganda to France*, p. xvii.
\(^{59}\) BBC WAC, E2/186/2, 5 August 1940 (European Intelligence Papers).
feelings, and adopted an aggressive approach rather than a defensive one in broadcasting.\textsuperscript{60} The need for such propaganda was highlighted again in BBC’s report dated 30 September 1940 which pinpointed French sense of betrayal:

\textit{Great Britain is still accused of indifference to French sufferings, of ‘stabbing France in the back’ at Oran; she is taken to task for her unpreparedness, for her past leniency towards Germany, for having ‘wished that Frenchmen should be killed in her defence’} \textsuperscript{61}

The role of the BBC was now to counter this sentiment by presenting a more positive image of Britain \textsuperscript{62} in their daily broadcast to France.

**Challenges**

During the first months of the war, the BBC’s development of its foreign broadcasting was slow, largely because of a shortage of transmitters.\textsuperscript{63} Given the shortages of men and materials, building transmitters proved to be an essential but difficult task, especially since there was ‘a war of transmitters’ with Germany. In September 1939, Germany had a total of eight transmitters of 100 kilowatts, whereas Britain operated a total of 24 transmitters, of which five were of 100 kilowatts or more and 13 were short-wave transmitters. As additional transmitters were built, it resulted in the steady increase of broadcasting time to France from 17.5 hours weekly broadcast in September 1940 to 28 hours by September 1941 and 35.5 hours by September 1942.\textsuperscript{64}

The synchronisation of the transmitters was another issue faced by the BBC. There were concerns regarding the sole long-wave transmitter from Droitwich, which was suspended between September 1939 and November 1941 for fear of being used by the Luftwaffe as a homing beacon, although its operations finally resumed\textsuperscript{65} when ‘three additional transmitters were built’.\textsuperscript{66}

\textsuperscript{60} Briggs, \textit{The History of Broadcasting in the UK}, p. 257.
\textsuperscript{61} BBC WAC, E2/186/3, 30 September 1940 (European Intelligence Papers).
\textsuperscript{62} Brooks, \textit{British Propaganda to France}, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{63} Briggs, \textit{The History of Broadcasting in the UK}, p. 176.
\textsuperscript{64} Ibid., p. 64; Brooks, \textit{British Propaganda to France}, p. 53.
\textsuperscript{65} Brooks, \textit{British Propaganda to France}, p. 53; Briggs, \textit{The History of Broadcasting in the UK}, p. 65.
\textsuperscript{66} Brooks, \textit{British Propaganda to France}, p. 53.
During the bombing of Britain, some of the programmes broadcast on their medium waves were ‘off the air most evenings for part of the time’, and two simultaneous programmes of the European service were reduced to one. However, with the increase of power and the number of transmitters being built, ‘the BBC could be heard across France’. By 1945, the BBC operated 121 transmitters, while the Germans had only 50.

The jamming of the BBC’s foreign-language programmes represented a serious threat to the BBC broadcasts to France. To solve this problem, the BBC resorted to broadcasting ‘each programme on half a dozen wavelengths simultaneously’. The listener’s job was to choose the wavelength which was least affected by jamming. As an enthusiastic listener of the BBC stated, ‘Quand les Allemands nous brouillent, les Français se débrouillent’ (When the German jam us, the French manage), and this was proven accurate in the end.

Another challenge was the decline in working radio sets in private possession in France. In 1940 approximately 6.5 million radio sets were owned by the population including the unlicensed ones. As the war progressed, to keep the radio in working order became a constant problem because spare parts were difficult to get, and even when they were found, the price on the black market was exorbitant. It was estimated that an average of seven to eleven people would have had to gather around a single radio set to directly listen to BBC’s live broadcasts. However, a large proportion of the French population had regular access to second-hand information from the BBC as they learned about broadcasts from family, colleagues, neighbours and friends.

Programmes and broadcasters

Darsie Gillie, the BBC French Regional Editor, was ‘instrumental in shaping the French service, selecting its broadcasters, promoting its independence and helping...
it become capable of challenging German propaganda’. 76 Most broadcasters were French and used pseudonyms to avoid reprisal against family members in France whereas the administrative staff were mainly British.77

The BBC had a number of programmes which became popular during the war years. *Ici la France* was created on 19 June 1940 on the orders of Churchill, as a programme that would speak the truth. It was first broadcast at 20h30 for 15 minutes, then increased to 30 minutes from 30 June 1940. *Ici la France* was renamed *Les Français parlent aux Français* on 6 September 1940.78 The team of *Les Français parlent aux Français* were largely reporters, not professional broadcasters; however, they were inspired by pre-war French private radio stations and included serious comments, reports, songs and slogans in the programme.79 Wit, pace and humour were used to win the hearts of their audience in France.80

Concurrently, Churchill decided to give voice to de Gaulle in the aftermath of Mers-el-Kébir by providing him with a five-minute slot to broadcast to France each day which he could use as he saw fit. The programme, *Honneur et Patrie*, was launched on 18 July 1940 with Maurice Schumann as spokesman throughout the duration of the war.81 In 1941, this programme received five additional minutes at noon. This was not much considering that the total duration of daily broadcast by BBC French Services reached 2h30 per day in September 1940 and five hours in September 1942.82

The evening structure of French broadcast was renewed on 18 July 1940 and would remain practically the same until 1944. The evening broadcast would now start at 20h15, with the *BBC French service news* for 10 minutes, followed by *Honneur et Patrie* for five minutes, during which de Gaulle spoke 67 times and Schumann more than a thousand times. There was also the appearance of René Cassin,83 professor at the Faculty of Law of Paris and legal adviser to General de Gaulle, who spoke more than 100 times at the BBC before leaving for Algiers in

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76 Ibid., p. 28.
77 Ibid.
79 Crémieux-Brilhac, ‘Le rôle de la radio’, p. 3.
This was followed by Les Français parlent aux Français which became the flagship programme of the BBC French Service during the war. The programme was created and led by Michel Saint-Denis, known as Jacques Duchesne, for four years. He was joined by Pierre Maillaud, aka as Pierre Bourdan, who spoke three to four times per week commenting on political and military affairs from 1940 to July 1944. Les Français parlent aux Français became so popular that in 1942 eight daily broadcasts were made available to the listeners using eight short wavelengths, a medium wave and a long wave as powerful as that of Radio Paris.

Les trois amis, hosted by Bourdan, Jean Marin and Jean Oberlé, was also a very popular talk show in France because listeners could listen to several views on a specific topic. Jean Marin, aka Yves Morvan, was a reporter of the newspaper Le Journal. He was in the corridor next to de Gaulle’s studio when de Gaulle recorded his message on 18 June 1940. The following day, he volunteered to work for the BBC French section and became, on the same evening, the first editor at the microphone. He worked there until June 1943. Oberlé, who decided to join the Free French, wrote editorials and sketches but also the slogan ‘Radio-Paris ment, Radio-Paris ment, Radio-Paris est allemand’ (‘Radio Paris lies, Radio Paris lies, Radio Paris is German’), which was broadcast on 6 September 1940. The BBC monthly report of 8 April 1941 reported a statement from an Englishman who left France in February that this slogan had ‘practically knocked out Radio Paris for a year’. Finally, Georges Boris rejoined de Gaulle on 19 June 1940 and was one of the main speakers talking about the food situation in France.

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84 Pessis, La Bataille de Radio Londres, p. 60.
85 Brooks, British Propaganda to France, p. 60.
87 Ibid., p. 59.
88 Pessis, Les Français parlent aux Français 1941-1942, p. VI.
91 BBC WAC, E2/185. 8 April 1941 (European Intelligence Papers).
From 1941, a weekly programme called *Courrier de France* started with Brunius, aka Jacques Cottance, a poet and cineaste, as its speaker.\(^{93}\) His programme consisted of reading letters from listeners sent from France ‘to build up a sense of contact with the audience’.\(^{94}\) Letters from listeners were used in the broadcasts to encourage the listeners to continue listening to the BBC in case their letter was acknowledged on air. More importantly, it showed that the listeners’ voices were heard and that the BBC valued their opinion.\(^{95}\)

The BBC French Service had two principal English speakers during the war. William Pickles, Professor at the London School of Economics and specialist in French affairs, who was associated with Henri Hauck,\(^ {96}\) a socialist union member and director of Labour of Fighting France, hosted the daily broadcasts at 6h15 for three years;\(^ {97}\) the other was Ernest Bevin, the Minister of Labour.\(^ {98}\) Popular programmes were repeated throughout the day. Shortly after noon, there was a rebroadcast of *Honneur et Patrie* from the previous evening, including extracts from *Les Français parlent aux Français*, which was repeated at 16h15, 18h15 and 00h30.\(^ {99}\) The increase in the number of broadcasting hours gave the French more opportunities to pick up BBC programmes. Listening at night at home was probably most favoured by the French as there was a reduced risk of them being caught.

**Sources of information**

It soon became clear that in order to influence the situation in France, the British needed to obtain a constant flow of information to keep a finger on the pulse of public opinion. The BBC’s European Intelligence Department, which was set up by Sir John Lawrence, was tasked with analysing and assessing all forms of evidence regarding the listening conditions and the various reactions of listeners in Europe, with Emile Delavenay as its Assistant European Intelligence Director throughout the war. Intelligence was gathered mainly from four different sources:

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\(^{93}\) Ibid., p. 60.
\(^{94}\) Cornick, ‘The BBC and the Propaganda War’, p. 329.
\(^{95}\) Ibid., p. 322.
\(^{99}\) Pessis, *Les Français parlent aux Français 1941-1942*, pp. VI-VII.
French newspapers obtained via the British embassy in Lisbon, the extensive listening of the radio broadcasts of Radio Paris and RN in Caversham and Evesham, the correspondence arriving at the BBC, and interviews with people arriving from France. The information was then compiled into the BBC Monthly Intelligence Report and communicated to the BBC’s news and programme staff.¹⁰⁰

Correspondence from listeners was an important source of information for the BBC, as they originated from various parts of France and came from different segments of the French population. They were written by teenagers, women, veterans, well-educated professionals and other groups.¹⁰¹ Most correspondence from the Occupied Zone came from the départements along the demarcation line or from Paris and its surroundings. Once in the Unoccupied Zone, the letters could finally be sent out through the French postal system.¹⁰² However, Vichy had imposed a postal censorship which opened between 320,000 and 370,000 letters a week to monitor people’s opinion in France.¹⁰³ On average, around 80 to 120 letters reached the BBC each month until November 1942. The number of letters fell considerably thereafter and never recovered. Despite that postal censorship imposed by Vichy, not all letters were opened. After all, it was the censors’ decision as to what to do with the letter, if intercepted. Letters were also smuggled out of the country,¹⁰⁴ given to acquaintances, or passed on to British Embassies in neutral countries.¹⁰⁵ The majority of the letters came from the Unoccupied Zone.¹⁰⁶

R. Silvey, then head of the BBC Listener Research, questioned how much value should be given to the correspondence as evidence. He expressed his views regarding domestic correspondence about the Home Service:

The question is not simply whether the points of view … can be assumed to be shared by others who remain silent- it is a safe bet that this is always

¹⁰¹ Ibid., pp. 322-3; Cornick, ‘Fighting Myth with Reality’, p. 84.
¹⁰² Brooks, British Propaganda to France, p. 108.
¹⁰⁴ Brooks, British Propaganda to France, p. 108.
¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 111.
so- but rather how widely they are shared; how many of the silent majority think the same way … Granted that the letters are a sample … the difficulty is that there can be nothing in the letters themselves to throw light on the size or nature of this larger whole. To be sure, letters often include the words, ‘everybody agrees with that’ … but this isn’t evidence … no one knows what any letter or bunch of letters is a sample of.\textsuperscript{107}

Silvey’s statement is equally applicable to the correspondence received from France. It is true that the views expressed in the letters may be genuine, shared by a large number of people who were unwilling or unable to write their views or, if they did, perhaps, their letters never reached the BBC. Those who wrote the letters must have belonged to the most vocal group, knowing that their letters might incriminate them for their actions. It would also seem unlikely that those who took the risk to write these letters would falsify their content voluntarily; however, it is possible that, at times, some writers exaggerated the information given without having any intention of deceiving the reader.\textsuperscript{108}

The BBC’s approach to airing feedback from the listeners also had its limitations. The conclusion drawn from listeners’ correspondence always had to struggle with a time lag as it could take months for a letter to arrive. This posed a dilemma for the BBC as it had to decide whether the issues and opinions expressed in the letters remained newsworthy by the time the letters arrived or whether the information was outdated. From these letters and other sources of information, the BBC gathered intelligence about local events which may not have been reported by the press or other media – for example, the spontaneous housewives’ demonstration – and stayed relevant to the concerns of the French.

The large majority of the letters came from friendly listeners, although there had been examples of unfriendly ones.\textsuperscript{109} In one anonymous letter, the writer questioned the BBC speakers about the risks they incurred in their studio compared to the risks facing all those in a place where the population suffered enormously. The anonymous writer concluded that the jingles and songs were not

\textsuperscript{107} Brooks, \textit{British Propaganda to France}, p. 109.
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{109} For example, in BBC WAC, E2/186/3, 2 September 1940 (European Intelligence Papers).
enough to make the French feel better.\textsuperscript{110} The discontent displayed in the letter does not necessarily indicate that the writer was against the Allies; rather it was an expression of deep frustration about the situation in which he found himself.

Another piece of evidence is provided by interviews with people arriving from Europe who were vetted at the RVPS by the British intelligence services. A wide range of people were interviewed, among them politicians, journalists, experts in problems of broadcasting, military personnel of all ranks, scholars, writers, diplomats, bankers and businessmen, British or Franco-British repatriates, Breton and Norman fishermen, Irish priests and English female students, French people returning to London after their release from Oflag (a prisoner of war camp for officers), some SOE agents, or Intelligence Service (IS) agents.\textsuperscript{111} After the interview, information regarding the situation in Europe was passed on to different bodies, including the BBC, for their broadcast.\textsuperscript{112} Names were also communicated to Delavenay and his staff, who would then make contact and ask whether they would be interested in being interviewed again by the BBC’s Intelligence Department. A total of some 511 interviews were conducted by the BBC’s Intelligence Department between 1940 and 1944, with each interviewee invited to complete a questionnaire. Cornick believes that these interviews offered a more balanced view than the other sources of public opinion in France.\textsuperscript{113} The report compiled by Delavenay in June and July 1940 showed the British government that the French were listening to the BBC, despite the jamming, and that there existed an independent French opinion which could be studied. This convinced the government to invest in more transmitters.\textsuperscript{114} Delavenay also believed that his department had helped to give the British government a more realistic and balanced view of the changes in French public opinion since the Armistice, including how the Vichy regime was perceived and the attitudes towards the British.\textsuperscript{115}

\textsuperscript{110} For example, BBC WAC, Anonymous letters from France (1361-1496), Saint-Etienne, 25 septembre 1942 (1373).
\textsuperscript{112} Nicholas Atkin, \emph{The Forgotten French Exiles in the British Isles, 1940-44} (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), p. 48; Cornick, ‘Fighting Myth with Reality’, p. 78.
\textsuperscript{113} Cornick, ‘The BBC and the Propaganda War’, p. 323.
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid., p. 343.
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., p. 324.
1.2 The year 1940

Rationale on the study of food as a vehicle for studying the narratives of the BBC broadcasts

Among the wide variety of French topics discussed by the BBC, I have decided to focus on the coverage of food provision and food shortage. Getting hold of food was a daily challenge in France. Talking about food raised interest as it addressed the concerns of BBC listeners, making the BBC’s broadcast ‘personal’ and relevant. Furthermore, the raw materials, finished products and food resources from France played a key role in supporting Germany’s war effort, so German needs took priority over the needs of the French population – a fact which many French resented bitterly. Discussions about food, food shortage, and the French love of food could be used as a psychological weapon to counteract German propaganda.

It is widely acknowledged that the provision of food was one of the primary concerns of the French during the war years as food became scarce in the markets, towns and cities. The lack of food itself was a significant factor in the perception of the Occupation as the French population believed they knew who was responsible for food shortage. The ‘Ravitaillement général’ (or ‘general supply’), an institution responsible for setting up the overall plan for the collection and distribution of food and coupons and to monitor offences, was introduced in France in September 1940 and remained in place until the late 1940s. It was unpopular among the public from the beginning and throughout the Occupation period. The provisional governments and the first governments of the Fourth Republic did not succeed in reconciling the French with it because their policy was closely linked to the politics of the Vichy regime and German occupation.

Germany’s policy towards food in France was unambiguous. Hitler’s vision as expressed in Mein Kampf shaped his policy towards France. In his book, Hitler expressed that he viewed France as the first military power on the European Continent, having no serious rival to oppose it and therefore, a powerful

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117 Ibid., pp. 199, 215.
118 Kris and Speier, German Radio Propaganda, p. 217.
France would be a danger to Germany. He considered that France’s political aim was to balkanise Germany, which was necessary to safeguard her dominant position in Europe, and to prevent the establishment of a unified power in Germany. Hitler believed that Germany would be in a stronger position to win the war by requisitioning most of France’s raw materials and finished products, including food and wine. His vision was rigorously implemented by the German authorities in France. For example, on 5 and 6 August 1942, Field Marshal Hermann Göring, Hitler’s right-hand man, summoned the Reichskommissars for the occupied territories as well as the military commanders to the Air Ministry in Berlin to discuss the food situation in France. Göring’s declaration at this meeting was a strong testimony to the political climate at that time. He declared:

Moreover, the French population is so stuffed with food that it is really a disgrace. I saw villages where they paraded with their long white bread under their arms. In small villages, I saw baskets full of oranges, dates from North Africa. Yesterday someone said. ‘This is true, the normal food of these people comes from the black market and barter, the ration card is only an extra.’ That is the secret of the cheerfulness of the people in France. Without it, they would not be so cheerful.

Göring continued by expressing his view of collaboration between the Germans and the French, declaring:

Collaboration, it’s only M. Abetz who does that, not me. The collaboration of ‘messieurs les Français’, I see it only this way: that they hand over all they can until they can give no more: if they do so voluntarily, I will say that I collaborate; if they eat up everything themselves, then they do not collaborate. We need the French to realise it.

Ibid., p. 220.
Ibid., p. 78.
Following Göring’s policy concerning food and collaboration, which he vividly expressed at a time when there was a severe food shortage in French towns and cities, it does not come as a surprise that hunger and suffering dominated the lives of urban French throughout the war. The German authorities tried systematically to exploit the food resources in France.

Food was undoubtedly important for military purposes. The military strategy of ‘blitzkrieg’ did not always allow sufficient food to be brought forward for the troops on the field. As a result, the troops had no other option but to live off the land. People in the rural areas of both Normandy and Brittany suffered particularly from the occupiers’ purchases as the Germans had a significant presence there. As was common practice that throughout the Occupation, the Germans made their purchases without rationing cards.\(^{124}\)

The Occupation of France was a recurring theme in BBC broadcasts. Maurice Schumann spoke on 3 September 1940 in the name of the Free French in London, blaming Hitler as the sole person responsible for the loss of their land, freedom and liberties. He declared:

*We only had the choice between dishonour, the road to servitude, and the struggle for the defence of our land, our homes, and our liberties. And this terrible dilemma is imposed by Hitler himself on to us, by carrying out what he wrote in Mein Kampf, the great confession that he has always refused to deny: ‘My main aim is to isolate and to crush our mortal enemy, France’.*\(^{125}\)

Food supply, food shortage and the black market were discussed in numerous occasions in BBC broadcasts, acknowledging the concerns and discontent of the French, instilling pro-British sentiments, giving information on the broader picture of the situation of food supply in various parts of France, calling for passive and later, active resistance towards the occupier. To assert the credibility of the broadcasts, the BBC used a number of sources originating from neutral countries as well as from Vichy and Germany. It is impossible to say how

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many broadcasts overall discussed this topic as many broadcasts have not survived the war or are still buried in the BBC Written Archives which are catalogued in chronological order and are not topic specific. The discussions on the subject of food did not have a regular time or occur in a specific programme. It all came down to the subjects to be debated on a particular day, as well as whether the radio presenters received information from France – letters, for example – or whether the BBC Monthly Intelligence Report had reported on food shortages. Subject to the above constraints and limitations, 8 broadcasts were identified in 1940, 33 in 1941, and 13 in 1942 which were connected to the topic of food in a broad sense. Each varied in length: some were just a few lines, as in the *Nouvelles de France* by Chevrier; others made up the entire programme. This includes nine original broadcasts from the BBC Archives which supplement the book compiled by Pessis. These broadcasts are a relatively small sample but nonetheless rich and varied. They give valuable information about how the BBC viewed ‘food’ as a link to people’s hearts and minds, especially to youth and families.

**Economic exploitation and the destruction of France**

In the police report from 22 July 1940 the food supply was a major topic. There were some signs of improvement. A week previously, railway services had partly resumed and the supply of food to wholesale businesses at the Halles Centrales had improved. These factors contributed to a more regular supply for retailers, easing the long queues of buyers near the shops. A number of retailers who had previously closed their shops had now re-opened their businesses. Nearly 50 per cent of commercial establishments were now open for business in the Paris area, with more retailers requesting to re-open their shops. Some retail establishments such as Félix Potin and Julien Damoy were open in Paris and its suburbs; however, they had tremendous difficulties replenishing the stock of their local shops, largely due to the lack of rolling stock and restrictions on fuel supply. Consequently, horse-drawn carriages had to be put back into service, only partly making up for the lack of motor transport. The report also detailed the difficulties

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127 Le Service de la Mémoire et des Affaires Culturelles de la Préfecture de Police (PP), 22W1, 22 Juillet 1940 (Police Report).
of businesses in obtaining certain food products in Paris and suburbs due to the lack of an adequate commercial transport system.\(^{128}\)

The year 1940 was marked by German requisitions, the implementation of food ration cards and food priority cards, a ban on hunting, the progressive deterioration of food supply, and hunger. The Prefect’s report of 31 July stated that the German authorities had announced a new regulation regarding rail transport: the rolling stock carrying passengers and travelling between the Occupied and Unoccupied Zones were to be suspended except for the 15 daily trains carrying refugees, as well as trains exclusively for administrators travelling back to the Occupied Zone, and postal trains. Freight trains, as well as passenger trains from Toulouse, Clermont-Ferrand and Lyon to Paris were virtually all cancelled.\(^{129}\) As Gildea argues, ‘integrating France into their war economy meant the systematic requisition of agricultural as well as industrial goods’.\(^{130}\) There is evidence that the German policy of exploiting French economic resources was executed in the following order: looting and pillage executed by Göring, the seizing of stock, and finally the purchasing of all the goods available on the market with their strong mark.\(^{131}\)

Monetary policy was part of the economic exploitation, particularly with the severe inflation of the French franc. As Göring revealed during a conference in Berlin about the food situation in August 1942, ‘The franc does not need to have more value than some paper reserved for a certain usage. Only then will France be hit as we want.’\(^{132}\) It is likely that Göring, who was in charge of economic policies for all occupied territories, would have had this in mind as early as 1940. The French Franc was devaluated significantly to merely a third of what it was worth prior to the war.\(^{133}\) The Armistice also meant the French were responsible for the upkeep of the German army, the cost of which was estimated

\(^{128}\) Ibid.

\(^{129}\) La France dans la Deuxième Guerre mondiale- Edition des rapports du Militärbefehlshaber Frankreich et des Synthèses des rapports des préfets, 1940-1944 (edited reports), available online at http://www.ihtp.cnrs.fr/prefets/ (17 June 2013). In order to access to the individual reports, it is necessary to look at the date of each individual report from the main website.

\(^{130}\) Gildea, Marianne in Chains, p. 112.

\(^{131}\) Mouré, ‘Food rationing and the black market in France’, p. 272.

\(^{132}\) Delarue, Trafics et crimes sous l’occupation, p. 79.

by the Germans at 20 million marks per day, with a fixed exchange rate which represented a significant over-evaluation of the mark.\textsuperscript{134}

The exploitative German occupation policy was taken up by the BBC. François Quilici, speaker at the BBC, pointed out to his listeners that collaboration would eventually lead to the destruction of France. He quoted from Hitler’s \textit{Mein Kampf}: ‘When I want to destroy a country, I will use its nationals who, by ambition and cowardice, will act more doggedly than my army and my police.’\textsuperscript{135}

Quilici explained that the systematic looting and attempts to starve the French were part of the Nazis’ aim to destroy France, but he also claimed that the German authorities would, in time, facilitate the return of the refugees back to the Occupied Zone in order to save the harvest.\textsuperscript{136}

In the same broadcast, Quilici declared that a strong mark would create difficulties for French families and inevitably lead to food price increases. Food products would become less and less affordable. It would lead families to despair and people to revolt against such an unbearable situation. Quilici predicted that the authorities would suppress the rebellion in blood. The Germans hoped, continued Quilici, that the French would have no other choice but to turn to the foreign leader (Hitler) for help as no one else would be there to lead them. However, the French nation would eventually thwart the German plot because Hitler did not understand the tenacity of the French people in suffering. Moreover, the French should be warned that Vichy’s objective was to undermine French patriotism for the benefit of the occupiers.\textsuperscript{137}

Quilici’s style of a dramatic ending to his broadcast as well as the technique of repeating the key message during the broadcast would soon become the common feature of a motivational speech by BBC speakers to keep the momentum alive among the ever-increasing number of BBC listeners, stressing the French final victory over the oppressors and their allies, and that any act of collaboration would be detrimental to the French people.

\textbf{British blockade and the risk of famine}

\textsuperscript{134} Jackson, \textit{France: The Dark Years}, p. 169.
\textsuperscript{135} François Quilici, ‘La Haute Cour’, 1 août 1940, in \textit{Les Français parlent aux Français 1940 - 1941}, p. 80.
\textsuperscript{136} Ibid., pp. 80-1.
\textsuperscript{137} Ibid., p. 81.
Following the intensive German propaganda surrounding the British blockade against France, there was a spike of BBC broadcasts countering these propaganda efforts and justifying the blockade. The broadcasts reveal how the BBC responded to the attack of Radio Paris, the collaborators and the ‘fools’ who blamed the British for the blockade and believed that food shortage in France was a result of the blockade.

On 16 September, Boris spoke positively of the blockade to the French population. He drew a parallel between the current war and the Great War, explaining that during the Great War, the blockade was imposed upon their elders and themselves in the North and East regions of France. The French accepted the blockade then because they understood it could act as a powerful weapon against the enemy and it would eventually lead France to victory. Now, when the Germans, their agents or those ‘fools’ spoke to the French about the blockade, their purpose was to turn the French against the blockade and in doing so, repudiate their chance for freedom. The French were as courageous as the heroic people of Norway and the Netherlands whose government had not capitulated. Norway and the Netherlands also suffered from the blockade as much as France but the population had accepted it, understanding that this was the price to pay for freedom.138

Not only did Boris use patriotic appeals and historical arguments to persuade his audience, he also defended the British blockade rigorously as a military action which had proven effective in the last war. Those French who believed that the British blockade was an action against France and was to prevent the French from having access to food were ‘fools’. Boris’s broadcast was inspired by the BBC Monthly Intelligence Report of 2 September, which concluded that Radio Paris was disconcerted at the number of people who would not hide their support for the British blockade. Even those who had to collaborate because they felt they had no other choice may be secretly hoping for a British victory.139 This intelligence report written in the early years of the war saw signs that the French supported the British blockade and hoped for a future British victory.

139 BBC WAC, E2/186/3, 2 September 1940 (European Intelligence Papers).
In the same broadcast, Boris asserted that the Germans had created a smart and barbaric plan to starve France, to steal its wealth and to reduce it to misery regardless of what German propaganda might be saying. The split in France between the wealthy Northern and Western areas and the poor regions of the South was evidence of how the Germans wanted to prevent the wealthy regions producing an agrarian surplus from supplying the poor regions.\textsuperscript{140}

Boris’s statement was not made without evidence. According to the Prefect’s report of 29 August, the French \textit{départements} of the Nord and Pas-de-Calais which accounted for one third of the total sugar production in France, were attached to Belgium.\textsuperscript{141} This resulted in a significant reduction of the total sugar production in France. Moreover, the implementation of the demarcation line enabled the Germans to have total control over the movement of people, food and goods between the two zones of France.

Boris continued his broadcast with identifying the real reason behind the food shortage. Food had become scarce, he asserted, because the Germans seized it and kept it for themselves. They appropriated the harvest from the farmers and they purchased it in shops with their artificially over-valued marks. Defending the blockade, Boris stressed that there was no doubt that the French knew the truth regarding the blockade. It was dangerous, he warned his audience, to listen to those who claimed or promised that the products coming from overseas would not end up in the hands of Germany. It was because of Germany that the French were being condemned to famine and despair. He also reminded his listeners of Hitler’s \textit{Mein Kampf}. The only salvation for France was the defeat of Germany; a defeat which the courageous British had heralded.\textsuperscript{142}

Boris was a persuasive speaker, using simple and clear language and developing his arguments logically and progressively. There could be little doubt, after listening to his broadcasts, that Germany wanted to bring down France. His listeners could link the broadcast to their daily experiences with the shortage of certain food available in their local shops. It was believable that foodstuffs from

French colonies may have been diverted towards Germany. Boris stressed repeatedly that the French had Britain as their strong ally and this alliance would bring the defeat of Germany in the end. This broadcast took place the day after the end of the Battle of Britain, which ended with a decisive victory for the British Royal Air Force. Boris used this victory to demonstrate the determination of Britain to continue the fight against the Axis powers. France should have faith in the British determination to finally defeat the Axis.

Another example of broadcasts discussing the British blockade was the one made by Jean Marin on 25 October. The broadcast was made the day after Pétain’s meeting with Hitler in Montoire-sur-le-Loir, at a time when Pétain’s prestige was at its highest. Until then, the listeners of the BBC had denounced Vichy and their inability to tackle food shortage, but Pétain was largely left out of any criticism. Therefore, the BBC had to be careful when attacking Vichy and its policies to avoid any negative repercussions for criticising Pétain. As one listener wrote:

*Food scarcity and other difficulties are blamed on the Government; food queues, those ideal ‘grumbling centres’, indulge in dangerous comparisons between the plenty of the good old days of Blum and the severe rationing under the Marshal.*

(L’Avenir, quoted by France, 2.11)

In his broadcast, Marin spoke of a rumour suggesting that one of the arguments that had persuaded Maréchal Pétain to meet with Hitler was the prospect of famine in France, an argument cleverly presented by Laval, described as a ‘corrupted politician’. Marin admitted that famine was an impending threat; however, he asserted that Germany was exclusively to blame. Germany had stolen France’s stocks and harvests, and imposed a rigorous blockade between the two zones. Germany had knowingly created the current state of affairs by keeping hundreds of thousands of French peasants as prisoners of war so that they could continue to blackmail France. Defending the British blockade, he said ‘Contrary

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144 BBC WAC, E2/186/4, November 1940 (European Intelligence Papers).
to Germany, England does not impose its blockade against France for the purposes of conquest and oppression; it is a lesser evil for the greater good: the liberation of France.’

Marin had cleverly separated Pétain from his Vichy administration. He blamed Laval for tricking Pétain into meeting Hitler using the prospect of famine as a lever. This way, the French would not feel that any personal attack had been made on the hero of Verdun. Meanwhile, the BBC had collected much evidence of French support for the British blockade. Most of the letters from the listeners were very similar in nature, accepting the British blockade as a means to defeat Germany. For example, one listener wrote ‘In my village the people are almost glad to go hungry. “It means the British blockade is working” … “and that is what really matters. Let the English win first, we will eat afterwards”’ (South-West France, 15.9).

The BBC concluded that these listeners who chose to write to them to express their support for the British blockade may be only a few, but they could be potential leaders of opinions, through whom ordinary Frenchmen’s irritation and frustration about food shortage could be diverted against the occupier.

**Food rationing and price control**

Prior to the war, France was considered a self-sufficient country in terms of agriculture but this changed following the Occupation. An early warning sign of hard times to come was heralded by Albert Chichery, the Minister of Agriculture and Supply, as early as 8 July when he announced that all French people would have to accept rationing at some point.

Due to the lack of supply of certain food items, it was anticipated that food prices would rise if there was no price control in place. As highlighted in the Prefect’s report of 29 August, the German authorities had placed great importance on a stable wholesale price. The desire to stabilise retail prices was also expressed on 20 June by a decree of the military authorities prohibiting any price increase and published in the *Vobif* (Verordnungsblatt des Militärbefehlshabers in

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146 BBC WAC, E2/186/3, 28 October 1940 (European Intelligence Papers).
147 BBC WAC, E2/186/4, November 1940 (European Intelligence Papers).
Frankreich) on 4 July 1940. The offenders would be subject to fines and imprisonment by the French courts.\footnote{La France dans la Deuxième Guerre mondiale - Edition des rapports du Militärbefehlshaber Frankreich et des Synthèses des rapports des préfets, 1940-1944 (edited reports), available online at \url{http://www.ihtp.cnrs.fr/prefets/} (17 June 2013).} Despite the decree, food shortages were soon driving up prices beyond the cap imposed by the authorities. The police reported on 22 July that following their investigation, they had compiled a total of 263 dossiers on illegal price increases, involving shops selling fruit and vegetables, cheese, butter, meat and other foodstuffs.\footnote{PP, 220W1, 22 Juillet 1940 (Police report).} From that moment on, dossiers on illegal price increases and prosecution of offenders became a recurring feature in the police reports throughout the period of this study.

When the ration card system was rolled out on 23 September,\footnote{Grenard, ‘Les implication politiques du ravitaillement’, p. 200.} the civilian population resented the quantity of foodstuffs allocated to them by rationing, especially daily essentials such as bread and meat which were both in short supply. The BBC made a number of broadcasts explaining to the French population the situation in each zone and how the unification of food rationing in both zones worked to the advantage of the Germans, making the Vichy government the scapegoat of their policy.

On 27 September, Boris stated that, in response to the dissatisfaction voiced by the people, the press and the government of Vichy that those in the Unoccupied Zone were given less amount of ration as compared to those in the Occupied Zone, the Germans had agreed that a limited amount of meat and sugar could be transported across the demarcation line so that a unified rationing system would apply to both zones. This would appear to be the right thing to do but in fact, it had the consequence of making the Vichy government the scapegoat of cuts in food rationing. The Germans had restored to Vichy its authority to oversee the rationing in both zones. Instead of increasing the food rationing, Vichy had to reduce the amount of food rationing in both zones to achieve a unified rationing system, inflicting new hardships on the population of both zones.\footnote{George Boris, ‘Le nouveau rationnement’, 27 septembre 1940, in Les Français parlent aux Français 1940 -1941, pp. 238-9; George Boris, ‘Les privations: blocus ou pillage Allemand?’, 16 septembre 1940, in Les Français parlent aux Français 1940 -1941, p. 215.}

Through analysing and rationalising the situation of food rationing in both zones, Boris conveyed the message that although the Vichy government appeared
to be in charge of the rationing system in the whole of France, they had no real authority in determining the amount of food available to the French population. The German occupiers had total control of the amount of food which they took for their war effort and what remained was not sufficient to feed the French population. This was the real reason why the French were subject to rationing and starvation. As Kingston stated, by collaborating with the Germans, a large amount of foodstuffs such as wheat, vegetables, butter, and live animals such as cattle, were requisitioned by the Germans resulting in less food being available to the French. It was similar with the supplies arriving regularly from the colonies to Marseille.\(^{154}\) In the meantime, the stocks of grocery products were dwindling. In a report dated 23 September, the decrease of stocks was already noticeable, due to a number of factors: the frequent and heavy requisitioning imposed by the occupying authority; the inadequacies and inefficiency in the means of transportation; and the difficulties of bringing food from one département to another, making it harder to replenish the stocks in the stores. The shortage in food supply was exacerbated by the pricing policy, as there was less incentive for the provincial producers to supply Paris.\(^{155}\) For example, in a report dated 21 October, it was noted that French eggs had become scarce on the markets due to the season. Prior to the war, French eggs would have been supplemented by Moroccan eggs, which would have been shipped to Marseille. Unfortunately, the quantity arriving in Marseille was not enough to re-supply the market. Moreover, with the capped price for eggs in Paris and the transport cost, the traders would have made a loss by transporting the eggs to Paris.\(^{156}\) As a result, it would not have been financially viable for the traders to sell on the Paris market.

In the same broadcast, Boris went on to discuss the detailed amount of food rationing for some essential foods, and why it was inadequate. Boris argued that a daily ration of 325g of bread was low for the French, because ‘bread is much more the staple food for the French than it is for the Germans’.\(^{157}\) The French were entitled to buy 420g of meat per week while the Germans were entitled to 500g; the French were entitled to 500g of sugar per month as opposed

\(^{154}\) Kingston, ‘Broadcasts in French’, p. 211.

\(^{155}\) PP, 220W1, 23 septembre 1940 (Police report).

\(^{156}\) Ibid., 21 octobre 1940.

\(^{157}\) George Boris, ‘Le nouveau rationnement’, 27 septembre 1940, in Les Français parlent aux Français 1940-1941, p. 239.
to 1kg for the Germans; the French were entitled to 100g of fat a week as opposed to 285g for the Germans.\footnote{Ibid.}

The figures that Boris quoted were largely in line with the information from other sources, although there were slight deviations; for example, the ration for bread was reported as 350g per day elsewhere rather than 325g.\footnote{See for example, PP, 220W1, 9 septembre 1940 (Police report).} However, it had been noted that despite the quantity of food available, the quality of food was another area of discontent. For example, Diamond argues that when bread was available in shops, it ‘was always of poor quality’.\footnote{Hanna Diamond, \textit{Women and the Second World War in France 1939-1948: Choices and Constraints} (Harlow: Editions Pearson Education Limited, 1999), p. 52.} The meat ration supplied was 360g a week with bones, and it was justified by the amount of requisition demanded by the authorities, which amounted to 10,000 cattle per month and 20,000 pigs per month for canning, as stated in the Prefect’s report dated 28 October.\footnote{La France dans la Deuxième Guerre mondiale - Edition des rapports du Militärbefehlshaber Frankreich et des Synthèses des rapports des préfets, 1940-1944 (edited reports), available online at http://www.ihp.cnrs.fr/prefets/ (17 June 2013); BBC WAC, Anonymous letters from France (241-249), 16 mars 1941 (247).}

Boris interpreted the provision of food rationing as a representation of what Hitler had often expressed: France was an inferior country; hence its citizens would receive less food as they were inferior to the Germans. Vichy had boasted that they received certain assurances from the Germans that they would only draw the necessary amount of grain from the Occupied Zone to make bread for their troops, and the necessary amount of meat. The reminder would come from Germany. If that was true, how could a country like France, which had been self-sufficient, suddenly be reduced to such a level of deprivation? Only German atrocities and looting could explain the reasons behind the food shortage. The Vichy government had given various reasons to explain the food shortage such as the destruction of war, foot and mouth disease, poor harvests, etc., but these were not satisfactory explanations. If there was a food shortage in France, it was due to the German occupation which emptied the resources from the country. Their sinister task was accomplished when they ordered the French to settle with and to share among themselves what was left.\footnote{George Boris, ‘Le nouveau rationnement’, 27 septembre 1940, in \textit{Les Français parlent aux Français 1940-1941}, p. 239.}
In this broadcast, Boris accused Germany and the Vichy government openly and firmly of causing the food shortage, and encouraged the French not to believe in the explanations of either the German or Vichy authorities. German looting and requisitioning of French resources were the main reason for food rationing, and the amount of food rationing reflected the perceived inferiority of the French. As Grenard argues, the amount of food rationing was decided by Dr Reinhardt, head of the agricultural section, who made sure that the French rations were lower than that received in Germany. Under this rationing system, the French were entitled to only 1,500 calories a day when 2,500 were needed to sustain a normal life.163

A further broadcast made by Boris in October demonstrated a deepened debate about the real cause of food shortage in France. The broadcast covered a range of topics, but the section relevant to food shortage was made in response to the statement of Dr Walther Darré, the Minister of Agriculture in Germany, who blamed the food shortage in France on the poor organisation of French agriculture, stating that it would be the fault of France alone for not being able to feed its population during the coming winter.165

Boris stated that Darré was said to have congratulated himself for the food situation in Germany because the German had ‘potatoes … sugar, and even more butter than last year’.164 Darré did not explain where this new abundance came from; however, there were millions of people in France who knew. Darré positioned himself as an agricultural specialist and blamed the food shortage in France on the poor organisation of French agriculture, stating that it would be the fault of France alone for not being able to feed its population during the coming winter.165

Boris’s point is that the Germans were feeding on France, looting its rich resources, and showed no remorse, compassion or empathy. Boris presented Darré’s statement as facts, thus creating a powerful rhetoric to instigate hostility among the listeners towards the Germans. He did not state to whom Darré’s message was addressed, the time, the date, and the medium used to communicate it. From the context of the broadcast it would seem that the statement was addressed to Germany, to showcase the success of his department in securing food for the Germans, and it is conceivable that this information may have been

165 Ibid.
obtained through monitoring the radio broadcast in Germany. However, from 1941 the BBC became more conscious and consistent as to the source of their information so that the listeners could judge the veracity of it.

In December, shortly after Laval was removed from Vichy government, Boris re-visited the topic of price control and made a measured criticism of Pétain. He stated that Maréchal Pétain, who always acted and thought for the French, made the mistake of trusting a crook. Vichy told the people that everything was under control; however, this was contrary to the truth. Vichy had made the mistake of hiding the true economic and financial situation ever since the government took power six months previously. Vichy rejected the risk of inflation and asserted that the franc would remain strong and prices would not fluctuate, and they were mistaken. Certain food items which were subject to price control became scarce in France, and this was because if any of these products were sold at the fixed price, they would be sold at a loss. Boris quoted an example from a week-old newspaper of Marseille stating that no meat was available because the maximum price imposed was too low; an increase of price was finally authorised to rectify the meat shortage. In fact, Mr Spinasse, a Vichy collaborationist, explained that the industrialists were offered three choices: they could either ‘go to jail for illegal price hikes, or sell at a loss, or close their factories.’

The meat situation in Marseille was one which was replicated in other regions of France: food shortage as the result of price control. In fact, the situation was gloomy at the end of the year, although hope for a better future remained alive. According to a letter from a listener in Paris which was read out on the BBC

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166 I did not find any evidence of Darré’s speech in secondary literatures printed in English or French and it would be beyond the scope of this thesis to search for such evidence in German archives. However, Darré was a high-ranking Nazi official. In one of his secret speeches made in early May 1940, he referred to France as a ‘wretched nation [that] deserves no other fate’ and the French as ‘greedy pleasure-seekers and rotters’. For more information, see Darré, Richard Walther, “Secret Nazi Speech: Reich Minister Darré discusses the world’s future under German rule”, Life Magazine (December 9, 1940), pp. 43-4; available online at https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=QUoEAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA43&source=gbs_toc_r&cad=2# v=onepage&q&f=false (8 June 2016). It is conceivable that he may have made a speech which was detected by the British intelligence to use against Germany, although the BBC speaker did not disclose the source of their information and so it is not possible to verify the content.


168 Charles Spinasse, a socialist involved in Le Rouge et le Bleu, a collaborationist French weekly magazine founded in Paris in 1941.

on 21 December: ‘The machine crushed us. But God will not abandon us. We hope everything from England, from America, from you especially. We do not consider France as vanquished, but as sold.’

To put this into context: in the early stages of the war, reporting about supply problems was not the priority of BBC broadcasts to France, nor did it dominate the scheduling of the broadcasts. The BBC had not yet considered food supply as a key issue and the main aim of their programmes was to inform the listeners of military news and to denounce Vichy as an illegitimate government. This situation would change with the introduction of Courrier de France, a weekly programme which first appeared in January 1941, highlighting the disastrous consequences of the Vichy policy of food supply. Intelligence regarding the food situation was collected diligently from letters sent by French listeners to the BBC. Subsequently, the BBC broadcasters devoted several of their programmes to the issue of rationing, looting, requisitioning and levies by the occupiers, as well as the despair and suffering of the French. As Léon Werth, a refugee in the Vosges region, wrote in his diary on 26 March 1941, ‘Some French do not even expect anything at all except that tomorrow would succeed today and that the meat and the bread would miraculously come back in abundance on the table.’ As the war progressed, it became more difficult to find food in France as the Germans needed to requisition ever more to sustain their military advance. From 1941, the BBC became more determined to keep the French informed about the situation of food supply as well as the distribution of food, using food as a psychological weapon against the occupier and Vichy administration.

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172 Briggs, The History of Broadcasting in the UK, p. 446.
1.3 The year 1941

The British blockade and public health

The discussion of food shortages in France became one of the BBC’s main preoccupations in 1941. In January, Pickles spoke about the delivery of vitamins, condensed milk and baby clothes from the American Red Cross to the French in the Unoccupied Zone, easing the pressure on food supply which had worsened due to the British blockade.

Pickles stressed that the British blockade was not meant to wage war on civilians, but to prevent the German government from using raw materials and extracting them for their war effort. In fact, the British government had tried its best to alleviate the situation: it permitted the entry of a cargo sent by the United States loaded with concentrated vitamins, so that it could be distributed in the Unoccupied Zone by the American Red Cross. Pickles asked the French to help the American Red Cross distribute the vitamins, and not to let this valuable cargo fall into the hands of the enemy. If, and only if, the French children were receiving these vitamins, the French would have the assurance that other ships would follow suit. The vitamins from the Red Cross, he continued, were different to the Ersatz or artificial vitamins given by the Germans which replaced the real food that had been stolen from the French to feed the German army and German people. Compared to the vitamins from the Red Cross, the Ersatz vitamins had no real value for children because they were fabricated in chemical factories and were not extracted from plants or animals.\(^{175}\)

The debate regarding the British blockade was not new, although the focus of the debate had shifted. The German authorities and the Vichy government continued to blame food shortages on the British blockade for preventing commodities, particularly those from the French colonies, from reaching France. The British wanted to prevent any foodstuffs from being diverted to Germany, but the blockade had not stopped trade between North Africa and Marseille.\(^{176}\) As Jackson explains, the blockade did not stop trade completely because the British lacked the resources to do so. It was noted that during the first three months of

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1941, ‘only eight out of 108 French ships passing through the Straits of Gibraltar were intercepted’. Moreover, the American government decided that supplies to France would transit via French North Africa, so that ships should not be blocked if Vichy was giving an assurance that the supplies would reach the French population. Roosevelt’s idea was to show British and American goodwill to Vichy, in order to bring it back to the Allied side to fight Germany. Admiral Leahy, the American ambassador to Vichy France, was in charge of building a consensus between Pétain and Roosevelt against Germany, using General Weygand, who had been appointed Vichy’s proconsul in North Africa in September 1940 as ‘a cornerstone around which to build a policy of resistance towards Germany’. The British were not convinced of Roosevelt’s strategy; however, they could not prevent it.

It was important to stress relentlessly on the radio that the British government’s decision to permit certain cargo shipments to arrive in France was made to help the vulnerable people in France. The listeners would have the impression that the British cared for their wellbeing, and were thus more inclined to develop faith and trust in them rather than in those who ‘stole their steak’. As Mouré points out, malnutrition was a major concern for the French from 1941, leading to an increased number of tuberculosis and diphtheria cases, higher mortality rates for the infants and the elderly, ‘anemia and vitamin deficiencies, weight loss and stunted growth for children and adolescents’.

Pickles also acknowledged in his broadcast the suffering of German civilians during the preparation for war as the result of Nazi leadership. Göring told the German people that they had the choice between butter and guns. In the end, Göring decided for them. Butter and fat almost completely disappeared from German households- they were used to feed the German war industries instead of German children. The Allies had no intention of exposing either German children or the children of the British Allies to famine.

177 Jackson, France: The Dark Years, p. 177.
178 Ibid.
179 Ibid., p. 152.
180 Ibid., p. 177.
181 Ibid.
182 Mouré, ‘Food rationing and the black market in France’, p. 263.
183 Ibid.
Pickles was well aware of the autarky policy that the Nazis attempted to implement in Germany in the 1930s. One of Goebbels’ main propaganda aims was the control of consumption to prevent severe shortages.\textsuperscript{185} The ultimate aim of Nazi autarky policy was to achieve self-sufficiency to counter the memory of the ‘hunger blockade’ imposed on Germany during the Great War.\textsuperscript{186} Therefore, during the pre-war years, the German civilian population including children had to endure wartime propaganda. Nonetheless, this policy was doomed to fail as there was no rationing in force and imported goods were available on a large scale. This showed the limitations of the Third Reich’s control over its population: propaganda was powerless when its message became unpalatable.\textsuperscript{187} Pickles drew a parallel between the ‘hunger blockade’ of Germany during the Great War and the current British blockade of France. The purpose of both was to prevent Germany from having access to resources which could aid its war efforts. The ultimate aim was to defeat Nazi Germany. He made it clear that despite being at war with Germany, the British had no intention of hurting any children, German or French. Using this example, he stressed his argument again, that the British government was permitting the entry of Red Cross cargos to help the children of the Unoccupied Zone, and it would now be up to Vichy and the people to stand up and help the Red Cross distribute the goods to the people and prevent them from being directed to the Germans.

The day after Pickles’ broadcast, Boris spoke on the air about the blockade and called for French action. The blockade was currently imposed on four countries: Norway, Denmark, Holland and France. All these countries were wealthy and well-fed prior to the war but since the German occupation the people in these countries were all suffering from food shortages due to German requisitioning. German propaganda announced itself that the German population was better fed this year than last year.\textsuperscript{188} Dr Robert Ley, the head of the Reichs Labour Front,\textsuperscript{189} claimed that an inferior race needed less food. As the French

\textsuperscript{186} Jill Stephenson, ‘Propaganda, Autarky and the German Housewife’, in David Welch (ed.), \textit{Nazi Propaganda: The Power and the Limitations} (London and Canberra: Croom Helm, 1983), p. 120.
\textsuperscript{187} Ibid., pp. 137-8.
\textsuperscript{189} Milward, \textit{The New Order}, p. 162.
already knew, Germany took control of French rail and road transport, preventing necessary foodstuffs from reaching urban areas. Once goods were unloaded from a ship in Mediterranean ports, both the Germans and Italians were on the scene to requisition the supplies.\footnote{Georges Boris, ‘Le pillage Allemand en Europe’, 14 janvier 1941, in \textit{Les Français parlent aux Français 1940-1941}, p. 616.} Despite the clear evidence that food shortages in France were caused by Germany, German propaganda continued to insist that the British blockade was responsible for the lack of food. The French, Boris continued, needed now to put pressure on the Vichy government not to agree any further concessions or demands from Germany.\footnote{Ibid.}

Mme Paris, another speaker at the BBC, stressed in February that the French knew what was happening. They were aware that boats originating from North Africa were searched by the German and Italian commissions as soon as they arrived in the port. Barely 20 per cent of their cargos were released to the French. France did have the ability to feed her 40 million people, thanks to her rich soil, something that the Germans envied, but now France had lost control of its wealth.\footnote{Mme Paris, ‘Les raisons d’un blocus’, 6 février 1941, in \textit{Les Français parlent aux Français 1940-1941}, p. 699.} As she put it:

\begin{quote}
I saw these German soldiers rushing into shops taking everything that could be eaten. I saw the empty shops after the passage of these locusts: God, the Germans had long lost the habit of such purchases, of seeing such abundance of meat, fruit! Here is the sole victory that Hitler has offered to his people. This ‘colossal’ booty offers to the winners. Then, afterwards, the leitmotif that attempt to justify their pre-emptive right: ‘the race of the conquered countries and the inferior, they need less food’.\footnote{Ibid., p. 700.}
\end{quote}

The two broadcasts were made about a month apart, delivering a clear message based on evidence. It was not difficult for Boris to prove that the British blockade was not to blame for the food shortage: he referred to the misery of all countries under German occupation, the heavy requisitioning and looting, the racial justification that France as an inferior race to Germany needed less food, the German control of the transport system which resulted in uneven access to
essential foodstuffs, and the Axis’ seizure of cargos upon their arrival in Mediterranean ports. He challenged the French population of the Unoccupied Zone to put pressure on the Vichy government as this was the only way to prevent any further erosion of living conditions. He called on the French to resist German demands.

Mme Paris complemented the argument by presenting a witness account, with both figures and emotions. The wartime BBC had always presented its broadcasts with figures, when available, to reinforce the validity of its statement and to support its arguments. Presenting facts and figures served a dual purpose: to emphasise the facts, and to have a more dramatic effect on the listeners. In this broadcast, the figure of 20 per cent was in fact an estimate provided by a listener, which might have been highly subjective, although not necessarily so. The reliability of such figures would largely depend on where the information came from; for example, a worker at the port might give a more accurate estimate than an observer. The issues of superior and inferior races were highlighted consistently in these broadcasts. It became the new leitmotiv of the BBC to refer to German racial ideas to explain why the French received less food than the Germans. Given the reputation of the Nazis for their anti-Semitic policy, an easy link could be made by the listeners themselves whether any inferior race would eventually be subject to a similar fate, and what choices would they have?

The narratives of these three broadcasts demonstrate a unified message from the BBC speakers: the British blockade was for the benefit of the French population and the real enemy was the Germans, regardless of their propaganda. In fact, the British blockade was further eased in March when the British government decided to grant ‘navicerts’ to American ships to sail to French Mediterranean ports and Algeria. The Rockefeller Foundation started to ship condensed milk and vitamins to provide essential nutrition to French children. However, this additional supply was not sufficient to reverse the trend of malnutrition. A report of the Institut de Recherches d’Hygiène in Marseille concluded that ‘in the first half of 1941, it was estimated that 40 per cent of adolescents aged between twelve and nineteen had lost three kilogrammes in

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weight’. Dr Bézançon, specialist in Public Health, stated that ‘the mortality rate of children between the ages of one and nine years has increased by 29 perc. in Paris’. The medical and healthcare professionals also highlighted the disturbing progression of tuberculosis due to malnutrition and to the worsening of basic hygiene, such as lack of soap and water heaters. 

195 Ibid.
197 PP, 220W5, 6 octobre 1941 (Police report).
Apart from the British blockade, there were other factors contributing to the lack of calories in France. Insufficient wages was one of them. A French economist reported in June that the minimum wage needed for a worker to buy sufficient food for his family to live on for a month was 1,200 francs. Many French workers earned less than 1,000 francs a month, only part of which could
be used to purchase food as they had to meet other essential costs such as ‘rent, coal, clothing and footwear’.198

As an unnamed speaker of the BBC asserted on air, the daily ration of intake in calories decreased from 1,307 calories in November 1940 to 1,134 in June 1941, and the calorie intake had continued declining since that date. The speaker acknowledged that the figures were theoretical because full rations were impossible to obtain due to the lack of supply in the shops. Even the equivalent of 1,000 calories per day on ration cards was impossible to get. To supplement the diet, it became necessary to find non-rationed products. The quantities of food arriving on the markets were insufficient, stock level was poor, and with the little left to the French, the Germans would still help themselves before everybody else was served. Only the well-off could afford the luxury of buying on the black market because it would cost an additional 30 to 40 francs per day to obtain enough food to reach 2,400 calories per day, money which the vast majority of the French did not have.199

The winter of 1940-41 marked the beginning of difficult times for housewives, who had to start looking at other ways to buy the much-needed food for survival. By the spring of 1941, food became so expensive that in the Occupied Zone, a growing number of leaflets condemned the anti-social Vichy policy where ‘the rich will always find ways to shop on the black market, while workers are condemned to the most appalling misery’, and the looting policy by the occupier.200 However, this situation was not going to attract much sympathy from the occupier. An article published in September 1941 in the Zeitschriften-Dienst, a weekly newsletter for magazine editors to be distributed to the German soldiers, reminded them how much better their lives were now as compared to the past. German people suffered as much hardship in the 1920s in terms of child malnutrition, food and the income required to live on. German soldiers should remember the situation in Germany in the 1920s when the enemy took away the dairy cattle, causing the death of hundreds of thousands of German babies; they should remember the amount of food rationing soldiers’ families had to live on from 1914 to 1932, which was much inferior to the ration they received today;

198 Boris, French public opinion, p. 12.
they should also remember the purchasing power of an unemployed family in 1932 was much less than the purchasing power today. This article shed light on how German propaganda sought to make German soldiers appreciate the ‘good life’ they had today, and how food shortages outside of Germany were viewed as a natural result of the Occupation, something Germany had to endure when it was defeated in the last war. The feeling of revenge was apparent, which was consistent with Hitler’s view that the French deserved no sympathy as they had supposedly looted Germany by imposing huge reparations on Germany and had illegally occupied the Ruhr region in 1923.

The psychological battle
The BBC was well aware of the impact of food shortages on public opinion, especially on the poor and the hungry. The BBC feared that these groups would be more prone to German and Vichy propaganda. The British blockade was a key psychological battlefield of German and British propaganda.

The Nemours Incident of 31 March marked a period of heightened military tension between Vichy and the British. According to an official statement issued by the British, four merchant vessels left Africa for Europe, escorted by a French destroyer. The British navy wanted to search the vessels but the request was declined. The merchant vessels then retreated along the coast and the French batteries in Algeria opened fire at the British navy. The British navy returned fire at the French batteries but for humanitarian reasons they decided not to fire at the French merchant vessels. The French vessels then found refuge in the port of Nemours.

Duchesne spoke on the BBC the day after the incident. He argued that Darlan was attempting to use this incident to restore the sovereignty of the French fleet in the Mediterranean by protecting the French merchant fleet with French warships to safeguard the sending of supplies to France. Intelligence indicated that

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the British abstained from attacking any merchant ships and that the British blockade did not stop the trade between Algeria, Tunisia and Marseille. According to the French press, a total of 68 French merchant vessels reached Marseille from Algeria and Tunisia, carrying vegetables and fruit.\footnote{Jacques Duchesne, ‘Darlan remplace Laval’, 1 avril 1941, in \textit{Les Français parlent aux Français 1940-1941}, p. 882-3.}

This incident presented a golden opportunity for both the BBC and Vichy propagandists to sway French public opinion towards the British. Darlan’s accusation of the British opening fire at French batteries opened a new wound in the Franco-British relationship, casting another shadow following the attack on Mers-el-Kébir in July 1940 and the Battle of Dakar in September 1940. Duchesne defended the British vigorously, accusing Darlan of not telling the truth about his real intention. The British navy never opened fire at the merchant vessels and they did not attack the French batteries either; it was an act of self-defence. The British remained sympathetic towards the suffering of the French population but the searches of merchant vessels were essential to prevent valuable resources from falling into the hands of the enemy. The British knew what would happen when the merchant vessels arrived at the French ports: they would be inventoried and requisitioned by the Germans. The BBC propagandists defended the legitimacy of the blockade and placed the responsibility of the conflict solely on the ambition of Darlan to break free from British control in the Mediterranean. Nonetheless, the efficiency of the British blockade was never a topic of the BBC broadcast; when speaking on air, it was better to show empathy than to discuss efficiency. The situation was soon to change, when the Lend-Lease proposal was finally enacted on 11 March 1941 in the US Congress, providing more American goods and weapons for the British.\footnote{Richard Overy, \textit{Why the Allies Won} (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997), pp. 248-9.}

Apart from military incidents, the BBC fought the psychological battle for French public opinion using a number of sources as evidenced in its broadcast to divert criticism from the British blockade and to reveal the complacency of Vichy to German demands, including personal testimonies, interviews, excerpt from Vichy, German and third country newspapers.

Listeners’ reactions to the BBC broadcasts were carefully analysed. As stated in the BBC Intelligence Report in March, there was a fair amount of
correspondence expressing French acceptance of the blockade with no complaints coming from the Occupied Zone. Some of the letters originated in the port cities, where the witnesses spoke of their experiences of German pillage. The report concluded that the BBC broadcasts played an important role in persuading the French that the British blockade was in fact a battle of the French.\textsuperscript{206}

A letter read by Bonifas, a speaker at the BBC, in the programme \textit{Courrier de France} on 4 July gives a flavour of the experiences of an informant reporting looting in the port of Marseille. This informant from Paris who had recently arrived in Marseille stated that every day the inhabitants of Marseille saw boats loaded with oranges, but not a single orange was on sale in Marseille. He continued by stating that among all the cargos arriving in Marseille for the supply of the French population, 40 per cent went to Germany, 40 per cent to Italy, 12 per cent were put in stock by the French government and only 8 per cent were on the market. It was a real raid on food products.\textsuperscript{207}

Personal testimonies could serve as a powerful psychological weapon to reinforce the BBC’s argument that German requisitioning was responsible for the lack of food. The percentages quoted represented a personal estimation which required no accuracy check. On the other hand, the BBC collected intelligence from other sources for a more complete picture; for example, Robert Rasumny, a French silk merchant interviewed at the RVPS on 31 July 1941, stated that a German Major in the Anti-Aircraft (AA) said that 80 per cent of all the cargos which was unloaded in a French port were taken by them because they had priority of purchase. It was not done openly, though, as French middlemen were appointed to do the job.\textsuperscript{208} The report contains no information about the context in which the German officer said it, or whether the informant heard it personally or from hearsay; so his reliability could not be confirmed. However, if there were enough letters and sources painting a similar picture, and Vichy was known to have been made to pay hefty reparations, why not use all the dramatic figures to help the British cause?

Official statistics could be just as efficient as personal testimonies. Boris announced in his broadcast in April that he was in possession of a list of

\textsuperscript{206} BBC WAC, E2/186/4, 25 March 1941 (European Intelligence Papers).
\textsuperscript{207} BBC WAC, Mme Paris, MM. Bonifas, Brunius, Dumonceau, ‘Courrier de France’. Vendredi 4 juillet 1941. \textit{Les Français parlent aux Français}. 21:30-22:00 DBST.
\textsuperscript{208} Kew National Archives (KNA), WO208/3664 A.B.149, 31 July 1941 (Royal Patriotic School).
foodstuffs and other raw material sent from the two zones to Germany from 15 December to 15 January, a list that would stir up emotions in Washington and London: it included 300 cars loaded with coffee; 1,220 tons of pork; 28,000 heads of cattle; 6,750 tons of whale oil; 900,000 quintals of oats; over a million quintals of hay and straw; and raw materials which included 45,000 tons of lead, 9,300 tons of aluminium, 6,300 tons of manganese and iron and coal. The list was kept secret because Vichy wanted to hide it from the public at all cost.209

Boris did not reveal the source of this official list. However, to support the truthfulness of his claims, requisitions were recorded in the Prefects’ reports. In this case, the report dated 24 March 1941 stipulated that for the years 1940-41, the German requisition of oats amounted to 637,000 tons.210 Vichy was very well aware of Germany’s requisitions and its consequences for the civilian population.

Articles published in the press in Vichy were also used as evidence to support BBC’s reports about food shortage. On 17 April, Schumann read an excerpt of an article published in Temps, the official newspaper of Vichy, that:

_The food imported by our ships … should be exclusively used for feeding the French population. However, at the present time, it is not. The best proof is that in the Unoccupied Zone, it is impossible to obtain fruit, despite them arriving regularly from North Africa. To obtain butter, one must be queuing from 4 or 5 o’clock in the morning until 9am or later._211

Schumann used this excerpt from the official voice of Vichy to demonstrate that German requisitions, rather than the British blockade, were responsible for the worsening of the food situation in France.212 This was one of the rare occasions when the press of Vichy had inadvertently reported what could be used against them; another example being the RN unintentionally reporting the housewives’ movement in January 1942 and giving unexpected publicity to such

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212 Ibid.

Apart from information from official sources in Vichy, the BBC also used sources from German press as evidence. Ernest Bevin, Britain’s Minister of Labour, spoke on the BBC on 2 May about the whereabouts of wheat using evidence obtained this way. Bevin asserted that all that was taken, eaten or stocked by the Germans to consume later was not to be returned to France. The scarcity of bread in the whole of France was due to theft and to the looting carried out by the Germans. Those who saw the trains loaded with French wheat going to Germany knew, just like the BBC knew. The propaganda of Paris attempted to blame the wheat shortage on the British blockade, and to show the generosity of the Germans for sharing a little of the French wheat and flour with the Unoccupied Zone by opening up the demarcation line at their discretion. The BBC could now prove that French wheat was taken by the Germans and brought to Germany, because it was published in the German press. The Gazette de Cologne (Kölnische Zeitung) dated 20 February stated that a number of mills currently had at their disposal French wheat and that the wheat supply in the region of Mannheim had improved. The French needed to do more to rectify this situation.\footnote{Ernest Bevin, ‘Pas de pain’, 2 mai 1941, in Les Français parlent aux Français 1940-1941, pp.1001-3.}

The statements made in the German newspaper allowed Bevin to argue that if German mills in the Rhineland had French wheat at their disposal, this was due to the organised theft orchestrated in France, which was also the reason for the shortage of bread and other staple food in France. Bevin used this undisputable evidence not only to instill discontent towards Vichy but also to call for French action: the French should now question Vichy authorities about German’s restitution of French wheat before talking more about collaboration and any improvement of French lives; they should remind the Vichy authorities that Germans had a 25 per cent higher bread ration than the French, whereas French
children had their rations further reduced; they should also question whether this was what the new European Order meant for the French.

A further broadcast about German requisition of wheat was made by an unnamed speaker at the BBC on 5 September. The speaker warned the French about another massive levy on the French wheat harvest and a further reduction in their daily ration as a result of the German invasion of Russia in June. Goebbels declared on a radio programme that ‘food shortage is impossible in Germany, because Germany has Europe at its disposal, and that she can draw supplies of all kinds’. As stated in an article written by the Germans and published in a Dutch newspaper the previous July, the speaker asserted, ‘in the German economic system, the occupied countries must naturally supply to the Reich the products which are necessary to him, without regard to the form of payment’.

Germany had completely failed to benefit from the harvest in Ukraine, which meant the troops would have to be fed with supplies from Germany, when the cereal harvest in Germany was poor for the first time in years despite all the past bragging. The French peasants who made a fantastic effort to feed France would now in fact be working for Germany. The wheat was in the barn, but the French ration of bread was not going to increase as most of the wheat production was reserved for the Germans. On 4 September, it was announced on a Dutch radio station controlled by the Germans what the BBC had always maintained from the beginning: ‘thanks to the French harvest, the supply of Europe would be facilitated’.

The BBC very clearly stated facts which originated from ‘official’ sources used by the Germans, such as the Dutch newspaper and the Dutch radio station, and German radio. By using these sources, the BBC protected itself against any possible attack from both RN and Radio Paris as the sources originated from the enemy. This broadcast was a blend of factual information and advance warning to the French, highlighting the complacency of Vichy and its inability to stand up to the German demands.

**Housewives’ demonstrations and riots**

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216 Ibid., p. 186.
217 Ibid., p. 185.
218 Ibid., p. 186.
The first housewives’ demonstrations in France during the war years were recorded in December 1940 in the underground press and police reports. These demonstrations were viewed as a novelty when they first happened because they concerned the housewives and the working class alike living in towns and localities where protests on the street were rare or completely unheard of. These demonstrations also had political implications because these women openly and directly challenged the authorities. The main reason behind the housewives’ protests was to complain about the increasing difficulties of obtaining supplies. They took collective action spontaneously; they went out on to the streets or gathered around town halls to claim bread and milk for their children. At the end of January, such demonstrations and riots caused enough concern in both zones for the authorities to consider taking measures to prevent such actions without succeeding in suppressing them completely.

The BBC became aware of the housewives’ demonstrations in February 1941 and started reporting them on air. The narratives of these broadcasts shed light on what the BBC knew and how they portrayed these demonstrations, which were otherwise largely under-reported.

Schumann spoke on 21 February, accusing the Germans of having created and used famine for their own benefit. A letter received by the BBC stated that a riot broke out in Paris at Les Halles where the Germans requisitioned food in front of housewives, who had queued up for hours just to witness all the potatoes they ardently coveted being taken by the Germans. As a result of this riot, the potato supply to Paris was suspended for 40 days as a collective punishment. Another riot broke out at the Abattoirs de la Villette in Paris and as a result, Paris was deprived of meat for 40 days. Moreover, a quota meant milk was only available sparingly to children and the sick, but it was openly distributed to German soldiers in the railway stations by German nurses.

221 Tartakowsky, Les Manifestations de rue, p. 461; Thibault, Les femmes et la Résistance, p. 62.
223 Tartakowsky, Les Manifestations de rue, p. 462.
As Boris wrote, there was an acute shortage of potatoes, sometimes for weeks. There was no butter at all and not enough milk for the children. Housewives had to get up early and queue up sometimes for hours without being certain what they would be able to bring back home because the ration cards did not guarantee what they were entitled to. The necessary extra food had to come from the black market and was purchased at exorbitant prices. The dire situation led to increasing anxiety and unhappiness. The housewives had to live in constant worry, not knowing whether they would find enough food for their families. All these factors might have motivated the housewives to take matters into their own hands.

A further broadcast was made by Mme Paris in March announcing another demonstration which took place in front of a few city halls in various arrondissements of Paris the previous week. There were numerous housewives holding their children in their arms demanding milk. Mme Paris asked why these housewives suddenly unleashed their fury, and she concluded that it was due to the open distribution of milk to German soldiers. The Germans liked drinking milk, as much as the French liked drinking wine. France was a dairy country par excellence and a big producer of milk; therefore, the shortage of milk could not have been the result of the British blockade. ‘We must feed these gentlemen, the German soldiers, the guests, the tourists. We must shower them with milk while mothers do not have any for their little ones,’ she said. It should come with no surprise that the housewives, despite all their calm and dignity, decided to revolt and they would stop at nothing. She called for the responsible authorities to make better provision in milk rationing. What would Radio Paris say? she asked; perhaps only lies and insolence as the speakers were commonly known to support the enemy.

Mme Paris expressed assertively, as much as other speakers, that there would be no hope for any significant improvement in the status quo as long as Vichy agreed to supply the German army with milk and other essential food. Demonstrations were the result of these empty markets and irregular, delayed or

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225 Boris, French public opinion, pp. 11-12.
227 Ibid., pp. 785-6.
228 Ibid., p. 786.
reduced supply of food. The housewives would turn into a spontaneous and angry crowd marching towards city hall when they were desperate. Guillon stated that housewives were not satisfied with the explanations given by the authorities. This subsequently turned into a conflict which would often evolve into verbal violence, insults, physical violence (for example, pushing), forced entry into a building and attempted pillage in stores. Clashes were not uncommon, and the only way to calm the housewives down was to give them what they wanted.\textsuperscript{229} There is a stark contrast presented by Mme Paris between the ‘normal’ calm and dignified French housewife and the ‘crazy’ crowd of housewives revolting in public against the scandalous behaviour displayed by the authorities. This unusual housewives’ behaviour could only be explained by the food shortage. Only by a revolt could the housewives get what they needed most: milk and bread for their children. To show her contempt towards the occupier, Mme Paris expressed clear sarcasm in her broadcast as she described the German soldiers as ‘gentlemen’, ‘guests’ and ‘tourists’, because the listeners knew that they were nothing of the sort.

The BBC was known to organise passive resistance during the war years; for example, by calling for the French to remain indoors on 1 January. However, on this occasion, there was no evidence that the BBC was in any way involved in the organisation of the demonstrations. Housewives acted mostly of their own accord. The BBC merely reported the incidents; however, in reporting them when they were not reported elsewhere, it also served the purpose of igniting and inspiring women in similar situations to resort to resistance.

This idealised ‘image d’Épinal’,\textsuperscript{230} the image of a nation freeing itself, was used throughout the war years in BBC broadcasts as a means to encourage the French to take actions against the occupier. By the end of 1941, the BBC finally entered in a more active phase in its broadcasts in calling for the French public to act against the occupier. Boris’s first explicit call on air was made on 9 September and he called for the French to make a choice between slavery and freedom.\textsuperscript{231} It was followed by another broadcast on 25 September when he urged all French, including the peasants, workers, farmers and city dwellers, to stop French

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[\textsuperscript{229}] Guillon, ‘Les Manifestations de Ménagères’, pp. 127-9; Thibault, \textit{Les femmes et la Résistance}, p. 64.
\item[\textsuperscript{230}] Crémiel-Briilhac, ‘La France libre et la radio’, p. 81.
\item[\textsuperscript{231}] Georges Boris, ‘Régime sans pain’, 9 septembre 1941, in \textit{Les Français parlent aux Français 1941-1942}, p. 201.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
products from reaching Germany. These more explicit messages were overt in nature and served to encourage the French to think of themselves as being part of something bigger. Hampering food transport to Germany was now part of the required action led by the BBC to save French lives and to save France as a nation.\(^{232}\)

The effect of such calls was limited. The Prefect’s report of September 1941 for the Unoccupied Zone stated that peasants’ attitude was guided by the lure of profit, which was a determining factor. After ensuring that their families had sufficient food, farmers would naturally produce what would seem to give them maximum profit with minimum trouble. The report also highlighted the growing hostility between the city dwellers and the farmers due to the discrepancies in their ability to access food, and the situation was exacerbated by the black market, which favoured direct purchases by individuals on the farms.\(^{233}\) Farmers had to declare their produce to officials who knew little about farming, and price ceilings imposed at a local market would result in the disappearance of that produce in the market. The farmers saw the economic regulation imposed by the government as working against their interests and restricting their freedom, and evasion of the economic control and price control became more common.\(^{234}\)

The housewives’ demonstrations intensified at the beginning of 1942 due to the worsening of food supply following a harsh winter, with a series of demonstrations taking place in cities in the South such as Montpellier, Nîmes, Sète and Arles. These incidents were reported in Boris’s broadcast, after obtaining this information from a dispatch of Vichy's official news agency.\(^{235}\) Both the Prefect’s and the Police report of February 1942 highlighted continued housewives’ demonstrations in the Occupied Zone as well.\(^{236}\) The nature of protests had evolved from unorganised, spontaneous eruptions of discontent to organised actions, when the housewives protested at town councils around Paris.

\(^{234}\) Jackson, France: The Dark Years, p. 291.
for additional rations of bread.\textsuperscript{237} Given the nature and the increased intensity of such demonstrations, the attitude of the authorities also changed. As Tartakowsky observed, during the winter of 1940-41, housewives could often obtain satisfaction for their grievances on the spot. However, from 1942, to prevent a wave of new demonstrations from taking place, mayors were instructed not to grant any special distribution during or after a demonstration. Special distribution was to be given priority in the most peaceful towns.\textsuperscript{238}

Housewives were not the only ones standing up to express their discontent. There were reports of railway workers and winegrowers who systematically sabotaged the transport of wine, emptying barrels of wine destined for Germany from as early as July 1940.\textsuperscript{239}

\textsuperscript{237} PP, 220W7, 23 février 1942 (Police report).
\textsuperscript{238} Tartakowsky, \textit{Les Manifestations de rue}, pp. 462-3.
\textsuperscript{239} Kladstrup, \textit{Wine and War}, p. 93.
1.4 The year 1942

Mortality rate and weight loss

From September 1941 a drought period began that extended to many French regions during the agricultural year of 1941-42. Local thunderstorms followed in the South in November, and in the North both in January and May 1942, resulting in a significant surplus of rainfall. From 3 January 1942 an intense period of cold weather started and remained until 4 March with 33 consecutive days of frost observed in Paris. The average temperature in the winter of 1941-42 was the coldest since the winter of 1894-95. The excessive rainfall and the harsh winter contributed to the worsening of food supply in many French regions.

For the first time since the start of the war, numerous deaths ‘by physiological misery’ were reported in February 1942. The hardship had taken its toll and many men, women and children died of hunger. Obtaining food to feed the family was normally the task of women who, in their testimonies, explained how they had to deal with their children’s undernourishment and how often they deprived themselves of food to feed their families. Despite all their efforts, mortality rates rose ‘by 24 per cent in Paris, 29 per cent in Lyons and 57 per cent in Marseilles’. Conversely, mortality rate decreased in some agricultural areas, for example ‘by 11 per cent in the Indre, 10.9 per cent in the Mayenne and 10.4 per cent in the Orne’. The stark difference was partly the consequence of the rural area being much better off than urban areas in terms of food supply.

An unknown speaker of the BBC highlighted on 7 October 1942 the increase in the mortality rate in Paris, which may have created a dramatic effect on the listeners. The BBC re-used the report written by Professor Besançon of the Academy of Sciences, whose figures had previously appeared in Schumann’s broadcast on 12 November 1941. Professor Besançon stated that ‘since the German occupation began, the mortality rate increased by 9 percent in Paris.

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whereas the birth rate decreased by 18 percent. The mortality rate of children aged 1 to 9 years of age increased by 29 percent.\footnote{Laval censure Goering', 7 octobre 1942, in \textit{Les Français parlent aux Français 1941-1942}, p. 1481.}

The same speaker reinforced his argument by quoting another report from the Academy of Medicine compiled by Gounelle, Vallette and Moine, who studied the physical examination reports of 1,075 schoolchildren from Paris. The report noted that the index of development of young children was significantly down: boys of 7 to 12 years of age showed a deficit of 1.5 cm to 2 cm in height, and 1 to 2.28 kg in weight as compared to the pre-war level. Two named doctors stated that 50 out of 115 blood donors were declared unfit because of their blood pressure or insufficient number of cells in their blood, due to the lack of food. A further testimony originated from a 12-year-old girl, Denise, who was asked to write a French composition about a fairy granting the pupils a wish. Denise wrote that her dearest wish was to have enough to eat during her life as she was starving. There were suggestions to the Academy of Medicine that the physical education programme should be taken off the school curriculum, because it was too demanding for children who were undernourished.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 1481-2.}

In this broadcast a combination of evidence was used to support the argument, from authoritative figures in official reports, opinion of medical professionals to the only wish of a child. Food shortages had caused a higher mortality rate and posed a significant threat to people’s lives. ‘\textit{If you must be hungry somewhere, Göring said, it will not be in Germany.}’\footnote{Ibid.} This statement was repeated seven times by the speaker during this broadcast so that the message to the listeners was unequivocal, that the Germans were responsible for the famine in France. The speaker highlighted that this part of the speech by Göring was intentionally omitted by Vichy to conceal the true opinion of the German authority towards France.

Much of what the BBC reported was also reflected by officials’ concerns about public health. In the police report of 21 September, the extent of the progression of the ravages caused by tuberculosis since late 1940 was highlighted. Tuberculosis became the largest cause of death among the 15-19 age group and affected mainly the malnourished youngsters during their years of growth, among
other vulnerable people. On 27 June 1942, a letter was sent from Gidel, rector of the academy of Paris, to Abel Bonnard, Minister of Education, reporting that ‘students were abandoning their studies because of anaemia, general exhaustion, and lack of food, but above all because of tuberculosis, which was rapidly on the increase’. Vitamin deficiencies were also seen as a major contributor to the deterioration of children’s health. These reports compiled by the police and a public figure confirmed that the authorities were well aware of the consequences of food shortages on the health of France’s youth in particular: food shortages that were caused by too heavy requisitioning by the German occupier.

The desperation of the French population was equally felt by the BBC as it received letters showing increasing frustration from listeners. The Monthly Intelligence Report of 21 October observed that what mattered most for the majority of correspondents was the immediate question regarding their suffering. As famine and despair descended on France, it became more and more difficult to remain positive about the future. As one listener wrote:

_You over there seem incapable of making anything but speeches about the post-war world and statements about the excellency of production. But that is all one sees or hears and you may well imagine that the bitterness of a rapidly starving Europe is rising._ (Lot, 25.7)

This excerpt of a letter demonstrates how some French people felt at the end of 1942 when the situation became increasingly desperate. Food was lacking and there was no significant breakthrough in the Allied military efforts. Nothing seemed to have happened which would give courage back to the French. Perhaps the French wondered whether there would ever be an improvement of this dire situation. While doubt may have settled in among some of the listeners of the BBC, solidarity towards children and the vulnerable continued to bring hope to the population. Many relief organisations’ work in France sought to improve the lives of the vulnerable, and this should not be underestimated. Vichy’s efforts to improve health among French youth were not without merit, despite their ulterior

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248 PP, 220W10, 21 septembre 1942 (Police report); Halls, _The Youth of Vichy France_, p. 208.
249 Halls, _The Youth of Vichy France_, pp. 208 and 450.
250 Ibid., p. 209.
251 BBC WAC, E2/193/3, 21 October 1942 (European Intelligence Papers).
motives. However, the sense of realism was lacking because the means available were insufficient for the task at hand. The situation would remain unchanged as long as the Germans remained on French soil.252

**Family parcels and black markets**

As reported in an anonymous letter sent from Bâle on 27 July to the BBC, the situation of food supply in Lyon had become unbearable. Women would stand for hours in queues and sometimes still could not bring any food home. The Marché Saint-Antoine in Lyon used to offer a good quantity of fruit and vegetables, but now, there was little available to be bought. On 9 July, only over 30 stalls opened their businesses selling lots of peaches but no vegetables or salad. Large numbers of police officers were present in the market because mothers frequently manifested their outrage. Wholesalers blocked the sale of vegetables to the Germans as soon as they arrived. In the Rhône département, two tariffs co-existed: Tariff A (normal tariff) and Tariff B (black market).253 This and other letters outlined the desperate situation of the food supply in the Unoccupied Zone, and provided the BBC with empirical material about the food situation, people’s mood and opinion, as well as the intensified police control that was necessary to maintain peace. Correspondence such as this enabled the BBC speakers to discuss the local situation with confidence and use food shortages as a weapon to attack the Germans and Vichy. This was used as evidence in their broadcasts, as illustrated below.

Given the desperate situation, the family parcel was considered by many as a lifeline thrown at families as it offered them access to additional food. Both family parcels and the black market played an important role in helping French families cope with food shortages, although the poorer families remained disadvantaged.

Duchesne spoke on air about the dire food situation in France in a number of occasions in the run-up to winter, and argued that the government was not doing enough even if they permitted the sending and receiving of ‘family parcels’. In his broadcast on 21 September, he acknowledged that the information originated from letters and stressed that it was in the cities that the French suffered

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252 Halls, *The Youth of Vichy France*, p. 211.
253 BBC WAC, Anonymous letters from France (1077-1100), Bâle, 27 juillet 1942 (1077).
the most. During the summer months, the population received at least a variety of green vegetables such as salad, cabbage, chard and squash, although these vegetables were not really nourishing, and the actual quantity received was minimal. For example, in Paris or Lyon, the residents only managed to obtain the equivalent of about 1lb per month per person. The reason was that the Supply organisation prohibited ‘the sale and circulation of nutritious vegetables’. The same applied to family parcels: only greens and fruits were permitted but not butter, beans, potatoes or chestnuts. Any offenders would risk a heavy fine. Duchesne explained that France produced enough food for the whole population of France, but Berlin fixed the amount of food the French were entitled to have, and they were aided mercilessly by Vichy in depriving the French from consuming their own products. He asserted that the BBC would continue to monitor and bring updates on the food supply so that all French people would be better informed of the situation and find ways to improve their food supply in anticipation of a tough winter.

Veillon stated that the informal practice of the ‘family parcel’ was observed as early as 21 January 1941 although it was not formally regulated until 13 October 1941. The system permitted packages being sent from family or friends who lived in the countryside to the urban areas, in anticipation of another tough winter. Although it mitigated the food supply situation, there were various limitations imposed on the transport of such packages, for example, the weight limit of 50kg and the restrictions on the content of the package. Nonetheless, family parcels made a positive impact as they contributed significantly to the supply of large cities, curbed the rising of illegal prices and reduced the number of intermediaries. Thanks to the family parcels, many urban families survived. The system was so popular that ‘for the year 1942 alone, a total of 13,547,000 parcels were shipped for a total weight of 279,000 tons’.

However, not everyone could afford family parcels. According to the calculation

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255 Ibid.
256 Ibid.
259 Grenard, La France du marché noir, p. 138.
260 Ibid., p. 137.
of Sauvy, a historian of the French economy, the number of parcels received per capita in the wealthy *arrondissements* of 7, 8, 9 and 16 in Paris was 50 per cent higher than those going to poorer *arrondissements*.\textsuperscript{261} Despite acknowledging the family parcel system and its popularity, speakers such as Duchesne pointed out the limited content of the parcel, and used this to attack Vichy. This shows that the BBC was very well informed of the situation in Paris and other urban areas, and of the rising costs of food which meant only the better off could lay their hands on a larger quantity of food. Speaking as the voice of the BBC, Duchesne showed clear commitment and devotion to the task of keeping the French informed, and empathised with the French to remind them that the BBC would always be on their side.

In a different broadcast three days later, Duchesne raised the discussion of family parcels again, this time in comparison to the black market. He claimed that the French black market existed because of the German looting in France and the inability of the Vichy government to supply the French adequately and evenly. The black market only benefited the wealthy due to its exorbitant prices. The fact remains that Vichy created this fraud of the black market, and then pretended to fight against it without taking adequate measure to eliminate it. The black market could easily have been eradicated if Vichy had doubled the ration of bread and cheese, and freed the trade of potatoes and beans so everyone could eat cheaply. France had the means to achieve this as France produced enough. Why would Vichy not permit it? Duchesne then answered his own question, repeating that the family parcels would be the best way to help the French feed themselves cheaply, and this system could be one of the most efficient ways to fight against the black market. However, due to the restrictions imposed on its quantity and content, it was not surprising that those who had the means still resorted to the black market, without which many more French would starve. On the other hand, this dual system also condemned families on low incomes to famine.\textsuperscript{262}

By 1942, the black market had, to a certain extent, become the lifeline of many French. Despite their negative connotations, not all black markets were the same. In a letter read out in the programme *Courrier de France*, Brunius

\textsuperscript{261} Ibid., p. 138.
explained how the French organised the ‘marché de solidarité’ or ‘solidarity market’ between the city dwellers and the farmers to stand up against Vichy’s chaos.\textsuperscript{263} This type of information perhaps derived from an interview of an informant, such as Jean Abel Louis Poumeau de Lafforest, a French journalist at \textit{L’Ouest-Éclair}, who explained the different kinds of black markets. He spoke about the ‘Marché Rose’, which:

\begin{quote}
Covers all friendly transactions between townspeople and peasants whereby the small family rations are supplemented without having to pay the fabulous prices of the Black Market. The Black Market is a profit making racket, the Rose Market is the friendly self help of the poor.\textsuperscript{264}
\end{quote}

Grenard wrote about the existence of this ‘marché de solidarité’ as well, noting that it started as early as the summer of 1941 when city dwellers visited the centres of production using their bicycles or trains. The real danger was the journey back to the Paris railway stations where passengers were subject to controls. To avoid the controls, the ‘shoppers’ would throw the bags out of the window of the train before arriving in Paris, or they would get off at a suburban station and continue their journey to Paris by bicycle at night. If they were checked, their goods could be confiscated, but sometimes a friendly police officer would let them go in exchange for some money or some of the smuggled goods.\textsuperscript{265}

For those who did not respect the rules created by the authorities, the consequences could be dire for the offenders caught in their action of smuggling food into the cities. However, the Prefects, in their report of November 1942 of the Occupied Zone, noted the over-leniency of judges for crimes related to the black market. A law was introduced on 15 March 1942 enabling a greater repression of the black market with more severe punishment, including seizures of smuggled goods, and in some instances, seizure of certain properties of the offender, penalties of two to ten years in prison and fines; the seized property

\textsuperscript{263} BBC WAC, ‘Courrier de France’, vendredi 17 juillet 1942, in \textit{Les Français parlent aux Français}. 20:30-21:00 DBST.

\textsuperscript{264} KNA, WO208/3682 845, 1 August 1942 (Royal Patriotic School).

\textsuperscript{265} Grenard, \textit{La France du marché noir}, pp. 132-6.
could be confiscated for the benefit of the state. Despite the efforts to crack down on the black market, the Vichy government seemed to start treating food smuggling for self-consumption and that of the black market differently. Jean de Sailly, Head of the Service du Contrôle des Prix since November 1940,

reminded the agents in the summer of 1942 that the essential goal of the economic control was not to bother the offenders who smuggled food to supply their family: ‘the father accused of some irregularities committed just for the sake of improving the supply of his family deserves leniency’. 

Although the ‘marché de solidarité’ was encouraging, it was by no means the norm. Black markets sold goods at significantly inflated prices. On 17 July in the same broadcast, Brunius read out letters from listeners giving interesting insights in the local situations. In a letter from a Parisian, it stated that it was not humanly possible to live off the legal rations; the black market helped the French to survive because without it, ‘they would be dead’, but it also brought exorbitant prices. Freedom should be given back to the shopkeepers because that would bring prices down again. The black market was so widespread that the informant claimed that there was not one single family that had not purchased a few kilos of dried green beans or peas on the black market, or via friendly arrangements or from family. The average paid for these precious commodities was 20 to 40 francs per kilo. The correspondent highlighted that the harvest in 1941 was so plentiful that the farmers could not have possibly have sold all the green beans and peas. Vichy ordered them to block the sale of the stock so that it could be used as a reserve for general supply and requisition for the Germans. This prevented the circulation of such goods. The farmers struggled to keep all the stock in their silos and their barns. To free space, they would either have to obtain a direct voucher of requisition from the Germans, or, make arrangements with a black-market trafficker to sell the stock.

267 Grenard, La France du marché noir, p. 89.
268 Ibid., p. 175.
269 BBC WAC, ‘Courrier de France’, vendredi 17 juillet 1942, in Les Français parlent aux Français. 20:30-21:00 DBST.
270 Ibid.
The priority of food supply was also mentioned by Alain Beauge, a French lawyer, who claimed in an interview to be conversant with the situation of farmers in the districts of Carantec, Morlaix and Rennes in Brittany. He stated that the Director of Rationing, who had worked hand in hand with the Germans determining the rationing since about May 1942, was guided by the following considerations.\textsuperscript{271}

\begin{itemize}
\item[(a)] To create stocks immediately available for German requirements and that in French requisitioned premises.
\item[(b)] Then to create stocks officially for the French, distributed in small lots over an area, so that they can easily be requisitioned. These stocks are kept on unsuitable premises so that many of the foodstuffs perish.
\item[(c)] To block commodities in such manner that their distribution and consumption is prevented.
\item[(d)] No more non-rationed commodities.\textsuperscript{272}
\end{itemize}

With the empirical evidence from the listeners and interviews, the BBC could substantiate their claims more explicitly on the airwaves that the General Supply Service of Vichy was an agent of the German to purchase foodstuffs. On 28 October, an unnamed speaker at the BBC announced to the French peasants that from 1 November, the surplus of their production beyond the quota of mandatory supply would not be available to their city friends. Half of that amount would go to the Supply Services, which meant that it would most certainly be handed to the Germans. Moreover, the city dwellers could no longer buy food from the farmers directly if they could not state the name of the farmers. The speaker encouraged the farmers to contact their potential buyers proactively either by phone or by travelling to the city to provide this information. The BBC also urged the farmers not to keep anything from their production beyond the mandatory quota of requisition; otherwise they would see the Supply Services wasting their harvest by letting the stock rot or freeze, as had happened in 1941. If the surplus disappeared, the Germans would not be able to take anything away from the farmers. The speaker accused Vichy of being the official purchaser of

\textsuperscript{271} KNA, WO208/3682 847, 3 August 1942 (Royal Patriotic School).
\textsuperscript{272} Ibid.
foodstuffs for the Germans and for blocking a large quantity of the food from benefiting city dwellers.\textsuperscript{273}

In reality, Vichy was hardly able to change the situation as their hands were tied: they were in no position to rebel against the German demands, and they had no will to do so, particularly after Laval’s return to the office in April 1942.\textsuperscript{274} The BBC accused Vichy of being the puppet government of Germany and repeated this message again and again in its broadcasts. This served to convince many of its listeners who encountered day-to-day difficulties of food supply. The BBC accused Vichy of totally disregarding the interests of the French population, because it would rather let the stock rot or freeze than feed its people. They appealed to the patriotism and solidarity of the farmers and urged them to do more to help the urban population; however, it was questionable how realistic this course of action was.

Foodstuffs were made available to the French population only after meeting the German requirements, and if it suited German military demand. As Z.J.S. Sieniewicz, a Polish industrialist, stated in the summer of 1942, there was a mass slaughter of sheep in France because the German army needed coats for their military campaign in Russia in the winter. This resulted in large quantities of mutton and lamb available in the butchers’ shops,\textsuperscript{275} because the Germans preferred beef. This was in line with the findings of Cépède, that requisition of mutton was extremely low compared to beef: only 1,000 tons of mutton was requisitioned in 1941 and 1942 respectively, as compared to 116,000 tons of beef in 1941 and 163,000 tons in 1942.\textsuperscript{276}

**Food, the BBC and the Allied cause**

Food shortages in France created opportunities for both the Allies and the Axis powers to use as a psychological and economic weapon from 1940 to 1942 (and beyond), especially with the involvement of the USA in providing aid to the Allied cause from 1941. In a telegram sent by Roosevelt to Churchill on 23 March 1942, he stated that the United Nations should take advantage of the situation by

\textsuperscript{275} KNA, WO208/3690 1088, 25 November 1942 (Royal Patriotic School).
\textsuperscript{276} Cépède, *Agriculture et Alimentation en France*, p. 357.
staging a psychological and economic weapon by resuming limited economic assistance to the North Africa bridgehead to Europe and by sending further Red Cross aid to children in France to hold the Axis off. Further rumours were brought to light by the Agence Française d’Information de Presse (AFIP), the Gaullist Press Agency in London, on 26 June 1942 that the Anglo-American propaganda had intended to use a shipment of foodstuffs to France, with its risk of being intercepted or captured by the Axis power, to make psychological gains over the French population. Americans would gain the support of the French population if the food shipment was delivered to the population in France successfully; on the other hand, if it was seized by the Germans, it would deepen anti-German sentiment. This hypothetical shipment of food to help the French population, suggested by Roosevelt, under a false pretence of humanity, shows that it was a war in which propaganda played a key role.

On 1 July 1942, the BBC intelligence reported the concerns of several observers, who stressed the importance of tackling food shortages in conjunction with an Allied landing: ‘He who will bring enough to feed everybody will be followed and loved. There the Allies have a powerful trump card.’ The BBC also advised their staff to repeat the following message in their broadcasts: ‘stocks of food in reserve are being built up in England for France once we know that the French and not the Germans will eat it’. The purpose was to convince the French that by helping the Allies, food would come to them undoubtedly. The BBC intelligence report of 26 August 1942 concluded that almost all the observers who wrote to the BBC agreed that if French morale had fallen so low, it was due to empty bellies (for example, letter from Berne, 28.6).

The French were not very confident of the Allied victory, especially after their failure to open a second front during the Dieppe Raid, stating ‘on n’a pas fini de crever de faim’

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277 Telegram from the President of the United States, Franklin Roosevelt, to Churchill explaining his proposal to resume limited economic assistance to North Africa, 23 Mar 1942, available online at http://www.churchillarchive.com, CHAR 20/72/69-71 (11 April 2013). The term ‘United Nations’ is used by Roosevelt in his telegraph to represent the nations which are united against the Axis powers.
279 BBC WAC, E2/193/3, 1 July 1942 (European Intelligence Papers).
280 Ibid.
281 Ibid., 26 August 1942.
(we are not done starving).\textsuperscript{282} Between 1940 and 1942, the food situation and requisitioning became one of the best propaganda tools of the BBC, providing it with ammunition to attract listeners, influence their opinion towards the occupier and Vichy, and gain their support.

Throughout the period studied, the narratives of the BBC broadcasts had a consistent focus on instilling hatred towards the German occupier, and accusing Vichy of abandoning the interest of the French for the sake of the Germans, through passionate, patriotic or carefully crafted covert and overt messages. The supply problems and the hunger of the French population became one of the key propaganda tools against Germany and Vichy. As the war progressed, the narratives of the BBC broadcasts also evolved from stating the facts to building up discontent. Occasionally, it even encouraged passive and active resistance. For example, on 25 September 1941, a broadcast explicitly called for the French to use their own intelligence and ingenuity to help feed the French population with French produce. The message was clear: Vichy imposed a levy on food on behalf of the German authorities but there were things the French could do against it. For those who worked in the countryside, they could try to keep all they could for the French by preventing the Germans from getting hold of the stock; for those working in the transport industry, they could complicate the transport of food, and encourage the farmers to provide food for the city dwellers who were lacking all food items.\textsuperscript{283} The narratives of the BBC broadcasts became increasingly overt in their nature and this would soon develop into a period of advocate for resistance after the Allied landing in North Africa in November 1942.

\textsuperscript{282} Ibid.
Chapter 2 Radiodiffusion

2.1 Radio in France

Historical context

The modernisation of the radio network in France was initiated by Georges Mandel, the Minister for Post, between 1934 and 1936 and was then continued from 1938 onwards.¹ With increasing international tensions following the Munich crisis, the government of Edouard Daladier was compelled to reconsider its views on the power of the radio: RN was to be re-organised and developed within a larger structure which would include both news and propaganda.²

During the 1930s, there were about 5 million radio licence-holders in France, a quarter of whom were registered in Paris and its immediate suburbs. The listeners were mainly located in Paris, the North, Normandy and important towns in other French regions. In rural areas radios were virtually unknown.³ The approximate number of wireless sets was 6.5 million if undeclared ones were included.⁴

During the inter-war period the French listeners had the choice between two networks: the public network and the private network. The former operated with state funding and tax on radio sets, and the latter financed their programmes solely with commercial income.⁵ The predecessor of RN was the public network, the French equivalent of the BBC, and hosted a varied albeit elitist programme, including plays, classical concerts and serious but – according to listeners’ accounts – boring talks. The private network was, on the other hand, more spontaneous and imaginative in the presentation of their programmes. Their reportages and interviews were mixed with light music and commercials, as well as improvisation when reading from scripts. This was in stark contrast to the

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¹ Eck, La guerre des ondes, p. 17.
⁴ Luneau, Radio Londres, p. 22.
⁵ Eck, La guerre des ondes, p. 24.
public network where improvisation was not permitted and the speakers were expected to merely read out what was written on the pre-approved scripts.\textsuperscript{6}

The public network had at its disposal 14 stations. Three of them were in Paris: Radio Paris, Paris PTT and Paris-Tour Eiffel. The long-wave transmitter was located in Allouis\textsuperscript{7} and attributed to Radio Paris, making it the only station which could broadcast to the whole of France. The 11 remaining radio stations were located in the main provincial towns and broadcast regional news, in addition to the \textit{Radio Journal} and other political comments. The private network had 12 radio stations, four of which were in Paris: Le Poste Parisien, Radio 37, Radio-Cité and le Poste de l’Ile-de-France, with the remainder in major French provinces.\textsuperscript{8}

In February 1939, a Centre Permanent de l’Information Générale was created under the direct authority of the Président du Conseil, Edouard Daladier. Emile Lohner, former editor of the socialist weekly \textit{Vendredi}, became the director of the centre, whose purpose was to control the distribution of all official news, including ‘\textit{Radio Journal de France}, the various columns and press reviews, the radio broadcasts in foreign languages and the listening centre of the Fort de Bicêtre’.\textsuperscript{9}

\textsuperscript{6} Luneau, \textit{Radio Londres}, p. 22.
\textsuperscript{7} Ibid.; ARF, ‘De la drôle de guerre’, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{8} Luneau, \textit{Radio Londres}, pp. 22-3.
\textsuperscript{9} ARF, ‘De la drôle de guerre’, p. 1.
Figure 3: State of the Metropolitan Area Networks in early 1940. From ARF, *Cahiers d'Histoire de la Radiodiffusion*, No. 27 (décembre 1990), p. 32.
On 29 July 1939, five weeks before the war, RN was created by grouping all the services of the public network under its sole authority. It was given a status under a statutory order, which acted as ‘armour’ during and beyond the war (this framework governing French radio and television network remained in place for another 30 years after the war).\(^{10}\) The radio stations in the public network used to be linked with a common mode of funding, provision of infrastructure, and common programming, but they were largely self-managed and autonomous. When Daladier created this unified administration of RN, he also changed its reporting structure: rather than the Ministry of Postes, télégraphes et téléphones (PTT), it would now report directly to the Présidence du Conseil. Léon Brillouin, physicist and professor at the Collège de France, became the General Manager of RN, responsible for administrative and technical matters. The political and news programmes relied on the Lohner Centre. All the literary, artistic and music programmes were managed by Georges Duhamel, novelist and member of the Académie Française who did not accept any undue interference from his boss.\(^{11}\)

Meanwhile, under a separate statutory order, Daladier created a new post, a Commissariat Général à l’Information, ‘to organise, lead and coordinate all news departments and French propaganda’. Jean Giraudoux, a famous writer, was appointed to this post. The head office of RN would not be subordinated to the Commissariat Général as stipulated in the statutory order of 1 September 1939. Rather, both organisations would work in parallel. The sole responsibility of the Commissariat Général for the radio was to oversee the broadcasts aimed at overseas listeners, including news and information that the Lohner Centre produced. Giraudoux would also chair a daily meeting of coordination with Emile Lohner, Martinaud-Déplat, the director of censorship, and Colonel Thomas as the representative of the General Secretariat of National Defence. Under this new structure, RN had now four directors for the various aspects of its service: Brillouin, Lohner, Duhamel and Giraudoux. Daladier was later reproached for creating such a complicated organisation, leading to the conclusion that ‘the overlapping of responsibilities and the conflict of powers hamper the effective implementation of the war radio’.\(^{12}\)

\(^{10}\) Ibid., p. 1; Eck, La guerre des ondes, p. 19.
\(^{11}\) Eck, La guerre des ondes, pp. 19-20.
\(^{12}\) Ibid., p. 20.
As a democratic state, France had two major concerns about propaganda: it had been reluctant to subject its citizens to the control of the mind as Hitler had done in Germany. In addition, the new propaganda structures were inherited directly from those of 1918, which was prior to the arrival of radio, this new medium of wireless communication for the general public. Although radio broadcasting had already existed for a few years then, no one knew yet how to use it efficiently. As a result, RN was not prepared for war. As it turned out during the Second World War, radio would become a privileged medium of communication for psychological actions, particularly for the population in occupied countries such as France.

The status of the private stations changed after the war had begun. From September 1939, the independence and influence of these stations was reduced due to four fundamental reasons: many of their popular radio presenters were mobilised; their advertising revenues decreased considerably; their own news broadcasts were replaced by the Radio Journal de France and by the columns and reports provided by the Lohner Centre; the specialised weekly radio magazines which mainly featured the more diversified programmes of the private stations ceased to be published from the summer of 1939 and were replaced by a brief mention of their programmes in the daily papers.

RN was not immune to some of the problems of the private stations. On 24 August 1939, mobilisation day, the French army refused to exclude radio specialists from conscription, resulting in 387 out of 694 staff members being mobilised. Moreover, the staff of Germanic origin who were working for Pascal Copeau, head of foreign broadcasting, were imprisoned, resulting in tremendous efforts to have them released several weeks later.

The elitist nature of RN programming alienated its listeners, including the soldiers in their quarters or on the Maginot Line. For example, in December 1939, Radio Paris and Paris PTT broadcast 75 concerts including those by orchestras, soloists, and opera in a total of 52 programmes of variety shows. There was a retrospective of the French Comic Opera which was broadcast on Saturdays at

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13 Luneau, Radio Londres, p. 28.
14 Eck, La guerre des ondes, pp. 20-1; Ponsonby, Falsehood in War-Time, pp. 16, 28.
15 Eck, La guerre des ondes, p. 21.
18 Eck, La guerre des ondes, p. 21.
19h45. There were also drama plays which belonged to the repertoire of classics performed by the troop of the Comédie-Française and the Cartel des Quatres, including Louis Jouvet, Gaston Baty, Charles Dullin and Georges Pitoëff.\(^{19}\) In contrast, Radio Stuttgart, Germany’s French-speaking radio, disseminated its propaganda cleverly disguised between lively music and could be received by the weakest radio receivers at the border due to the location of its transmitters.\(^{20}\) There were critiques of the RN programmes. For example, Minister de Monzie named Giraudoux the ‘Marivaux of the abstraction’ because of the subtlety of his editorials.\(^{21}\) The playwright Armand Salacrou told Daladier: ‘We have lost the first battle, the one of the radio!’\(^{22}\) In addition, there were broadcasting issues regarding air time: RN remained silent from 09h00 to 12h00 and from 15h00 to 18h00,\(^{23}\) which made listeners tune in to other radio stations, including Radio Stuttgart.

Resolving the inter-governmental conflicts and developing a clear and consistent propaganda strategy proved to be a difficult task, since the people in charge of the Commissariat Général à l’Information never truly understood the problems facing them.\(^{24}\) The dissatisfaction with RN programming led to a long parliamentary debate in February 1940. However, the return to the ‘gaudriole’, an informal-and-fun style programme desired by the French troops, was ruled out as it did not suit the taste of the various leaders of the Information services and French Propaganda. The dithering stopped on 10 May 1940 when the German offensive began. The radio stations stopped broadcasting one after the other as the German troops advanced quickly across the land and captured them.\(^{25}\) As no news circulated in France, the public was unaware of the unfolding of the situation, resulting in a general panic; hence the welcoming of Pétain’s messages by the population because news finally reached them.\(^{26}\)

\(^{19}\) ARF, ‘De la drôle de guerre’, p. 3.  
\(^{20}\) Tangye Lean, *Voices in the Darkness*, pp. 104-5.  
\(^{22}\) ARF, ‘De la drôle de guerre’, p. 3.  
\(^{25}\) ARF, ‘De la drôle de guerre’, p. 4.  
\(^{26}\) Sorlin, ‘The Struggle for Control of French Minds’, p. 249.
The Armistice had a significant impact on radio broadcasting. It was at that time that all RN correspondents in London were ordered to return to France.\textsuperscript{27} France was split into two main zones, one was occupied by Germany, the other controlled by the new collaborationist French government located in Vichy. The Germans were quick to put restrictions on wireless communication. Article 14 of the Armistice settlement focused on the immediate role of the radio stations: ‘All wireless transmitters located in French territory must stop immediately their broadcasts. The resumption of wireless transmissions in the part of non-occupied territory will be subject to special regulations.’\textsuperscript{28}

From 25 June, only Radio Stuttgart, Radio Sottens Suisse Romande and the BBC could be heard in France.\textsuperscript{29} It was not until 5 July that Radio Paris resumed its broadcasting, and 6 July when the new RN resumed broadcasting after relocating to a studio at the Casino de Vichy.\textsuperscript{30}

After the Armistice, RN was in a paradoxical situation. The principle of sovereignty of the State over the airwaves was consistently asserted by the PTT administration. However, now that the German authorities were in control of a large part of the infrastructure of French broadcasting, they were in a position to decide how the programmes should be organised, leaving very little room for the French State (Vichy) to make decisions.\textsuperscript{31} No Vichy laws were to be applied in the Occupied Zone without German consent, whereas the Vichy government tried to maintain a sense of unity which did not exist in France any longer.\textsuperscript{32}

Soon after the Armistice, the Vichy government decided to control the news disseminated by the Press through the Havas agency, ‘in the same way as the Radiodiffusion Nationale in the general system of the state services responsible to inform the public, under the leadership of the responsible authorities to the country’.\textsuperscript{33} As Ellul argues, to have an effective propaganda, media such as film production, press and radio transmissions need to be controlled

\textsuperscript{27} Kay Chadwick, ‘Our Enemy’s Enemy’, p. 428.
\textsuperscript{29} ARF, ‘De la drôle de guerre’, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{30} http://100ansderadio.free.fr/HistoiredelaRadio/1940.html (27 September 2015).
\textsuperscript{31} Eck, \textit{La guerre des ondes}, p. 39.
\textsuperscript{32} Sorlin, ‘The Struggle for Control of French Minds’, p. 249.
centrally.\textsuperscript{34} This is precisely what Vichy wanted to achieve. Under the Vichy regime, the new role of the press would be to deal with the “disciplined renewal of French thought”, by taking as model Hitler's Germany, Franco's Spain and Mussolini's Italy.\textsuperscript{35} RN became the voice of the Vichy government. Naturally, no fair assessment of RN’s reorganisation is possible without considering the context of its limited sovereignty and its controlled environment largely dependent on the whims of the German authorities.\textsuperscript{36}

With this renewed recognition of the role of radio broadcasting as a propaganda tool, the reorganisation of radio broadcasting became all the more urgent for Vichy. A personal relationship between Pétain and the public had to be established; this personal relationship was in fact well depicted in the various broadcasts of RN. Vichy’s motto, \textit{Travail, Famille, Patrie}, was created for the French to adhere to the new moral order of the National Revolution and to reconstruct France, steering it away from the old Republican values.\textsuperscript{37} Pétain’s policy was ‘ideologically retrogressive; anti-industrial, rural, pro-Church, family, and the values of the past’.\textsuperscript{38} Pétain was aware of the important role radio played in society and since September 1940, RN broadcast nearly 80 hours of monthly news.\textsuperscript{39}

Once in Vichy, the government quickly took possession of the transmitters located in the Unoccupied Zone, possibly because Goebbels was conscious that French propaganda would be better suited to influencing French public opinion than German propaganda. The demarcation line corresponded exactly to the split of the network of transmitters between the Germans and the Vichy government.\textsuperscript{40} Pierre Laval, the Vice-Prime Minister, and Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancourt, a conservative deputy,\textsuperscript{41} were directly responsible for RN, and they were to use it to the benefit of Germany’s New Order. At that point in time, French morale was low and the alleged elites were ready to give in to the occupier.\textsuperscript{42} Under Laval’s

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{34} Ellul, \textit{Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes}, p. 102.
  \item \textsuperscript{35} Polonski, \textit{La Presse La Propagande et l’Opinion Publique}, p. 58.
  \item \textsuperscript{36} Eck, \textit{La guerre des ondes}, p. 39.
  \item \textsuperscript{37} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{38} François Garçon, ‘Nazi Film Propaganda in Occupied France’ in David Welch (ed.), \textit{Nazi Propaganda: The Power and the Limitations} (London and Canberra: Croom Helm, 1983), p. 168.
  \item \textsuperscript{39} Eck, \textit{La guerre des ondes}, p. 43.
  \item \textsuperscript{40} Ibid., p. 40.
  \item \textsuperscript{41} Vinen, \textit{The Unfree French}, p. 62.
  \item \textsuperscript{42} Polonski, \textit{La Presse La Propagande et l’Opinion Publique}, pp. 80-1.
\end{itemize}
leadership, pro-Nazi journalists and politicians penetrated RN staff and came in conflict with those who wanted to preserve France’s ‘neutrality’. As a result, a struggle ensued over the control of RN until Laval’s eviction on 13 December 1940 when many of the pro-Nazis left and joined Radio Paris. \(^{43}\) As Antoine Lefébure, French historian, pointed out, ‘after a flying start towards collaboration under the influence of Laval, “the radio resumes, after 13 December, a tone always oriented but more moderate.”’\(^{44}\)

**Challenges**

The distribution of transmitters in France prior to the war did not correspond with the number of people in a region or the number of radio sets, largely due to the political and electoral agenda at the time. While the North and Eastern regions were more densely populated and had a larger number of radio sets, there only were two transmitters located in Lille and Strasbourg, and none in Normandy. The southern region, which had less population and a very low density of radio sets, however, had a total of 13 transmitters, among them several powerful ones. \(^{45}\) Following the Armistice, the transmitters of the state-run stations located in the Unoccupied Zone, including those in Lyon, Grenoble, Nice, Marseille, Montpellier, Toulouse and Limoges, were under Vichy’s control. Vichy also had the legal control of the transmitters of private stations such as ‘Radio Toulouse, Radio Montpellier, Radio Agen, Radio Nîmes, Radio Méditerranée and Radio Lyon’. \(^{46}\)

Following the move to Vichy, the new RN faced various technical challenges. There was a lack of sufficiently powerful relays to carry their transmissions in the North and in Brittany, resulting in poor reception of its broadcasts in these areas. Some regions of the Unoccupied Zone also remained poorly covered due to the hilly terrains. \(^{47}\) The network of short- or medium-wave stations which were required to broadcast to the entirety of the Empire needed improvement. The quality of programmes was viewed as a matter of national prestige; however, any investment in producing an excellent programme would be

\(^{45}\) ARF, Box 1682W89 ‘Exposé d’ensemble de la situation de la Radiodiffusion Nationale’.
\(^{46}\) Eck, *La guerre des ondes*, p. 41.
\(^{47}\) Ibid.
pointless if the listeners were thwarted by the poor quality of transmission and reception of the broadcasts.\textsuperscript{48}

Figure 4: Geopolitical distribution of the stations and/or programmes (at 19 October 1941) to metropolitan listeners. From ARF, *Cahiers d’Histoire de la Radiodiffusion*, No. 30, (septembre 1991), p. 41.

\textsuperscript{48} ARF, Box 1682W89 ‘Exposé d’ensemble’.
Figure 5: Transmitters network. From ARF, *Cahiers d'Histoire de la Radiodiffusion*, No. 34, (septembre-novembre 1992), p. 79.
There were issues with the synchronisation of the transmitters. Prior to the war, the operations of both private and public stations were based on the autonomy of each station, which meant that each radio station would almost exclusively broadcast its own programmes using the designated wavelength of their allocated transmitter. The state network was built piecemeal as each station was connected with the other stations only in an episodic manner. Therefore, to achieve a true national network, it would be necessary to obtain a national wavelength linking all the stations, enabling each station to broadcast the same programme at the same time. This national wavelength would then resolve a crucial military security weakness and prevent enemy pilots from using various wavelengths as a beacon to identify their locations. The national synchronisation of December 1941 was later explained by Raymond Braillard, director of the technical services of RN, in an article published in *Radio National* in January 1942.\(^{49}\)

The weekly *Radio National* showed an inconsistent end-of-broadcasting time in the evening, for example, the programmes ended at 22h15 in the last week of May 1941,\(^{50}\) at 23h15 in the second week of July 1941,\(^{51}\) and at 21h15 in the first week of October 1941.\(^{52}\) Once the national synchronisation of the network was eventually achieved, RN was able to extend broadcasting time until midnight.\(^{53}\) This schedule would remain in force until November 1942 and beyond.\(^{54}\) It is also worth noting that synchronisation was a common problem encountered by the BBC and Radio Paris as well.

In addition to its technical challenges, RN also lacked popularity. The ‘Exposé d’ensemble de la situation de la Radiodiffusion nationale’ report released in early 1941 highlights the apparent causes for the disaffection of the public to RN. First, there was a lack of interest of the public in the artistic, musical programmes and varieties which were seen as mediocre. The public expected to hear well-known, gifted and loved artists as opposed to mediocre artists or understudies, and considered the programmes put on air below their expectations.

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\(^{49}\) Eck, *La guerre des ondes*, p. 41.


\(^{51}\) Ibid., 6-12 juillet 1941.

\(^{52}\) Ibid., 5-11 octobre 1941.

\(^{53}\) Ibid., 7-13 décembre 1941; http://100ansderadio.free.fr/Histoire delaRadio/1941.html (27 September 2015); Eck, *La guerre des ondes*, p. 46.

Second, RN had too many propaganda programmes on the themes of youth, agriculture and school, etc., and these programmes were often broadcast at the most popular hours of the day. They were mediocre in their presentation and the public soon became irritated by hearing constant propaganda. The schedule of these programmes was disjointed, uncoordinated and lacked organisation in the overall programming. More importantly, RN failed to meet the expectation of listeners who wanted to hear timely news because they would only report news 24 hours after the morning papers so as not to compete with the press. This put RN at a disadvantage in terms of the timeliness of its news broadcasting. The BBC had a similar arrangement in terms of the press and its news before the war but the restrictions were removed after the outbreak of the war, making their news programmes much more timely and attractive. In terms of the presentation of RN news, it was presented in a monotonous way; it was incorrect, outdated and uninteresting. This report concluded that RN would benefit from having its programmes monitored properly, making them more attractive and better presented in the overall schedule.

The same report highlighted the underlying structural issues behind staffing. The legal status of the various staff members at RN was not clear. The regulations were written such that the executives did not know where they were going or what was the limit of their authority. Confusion reigned at the top of the hierarchy. There were also frequent changes of responsibilities in senior management. Political interventions happened often and prevented the improvement of RN’s programmes. Moreover, staff lacked homogeneity because the employees came from very different backgrounds. RN was, in major part, composed of technicians from the PTT, but they were not trained in broadcasting, nor was there any interest in helping them develop knowledge or technical expertise in the technics of broadcasting. All this created confusion which hindered the operations of the various departments of RN.

Changes at Radiodiffusion from 1941 onwards

55 ARF, Box 1682W89 ‘Exposé d’ensemble’.
57 ARF, Box 1682W89 ‘Exposé d’ensemble’.
58 Ibid.
The first changes took place in May 1941 when the news programme was re-organised and divided to specialised services such as the Foreign Service, domestic policy and general information, supplemented by sports service and media service. RN stimulated the ‘good people’s’ simplicity, courage and good humour when it discussed regions and history. From June 1941, the number of hours for variety shows increased to 20 hours per week from 16 for information, communiqués and official broadcasts of all sorts. As RN was broadcasting a great deal of music of all kinds, it was decided in the autumn of 1941, that the artistic programme office in Marseille would acquire a real studio suitable for lyrical and symphonic pieces.59

Unfortunately, the politics of the Vichy government were undermined by the success of Radio Paris, which was threatening to divide public opinion in the two zones. Radio Paris also attacked the Vichy leaders on several occasions. RN would need to have been heard by the whole of France to advocate, instill and persuade the French to believe in the ideology of the National Revolution. However, the Vichy government was aware that RN had very limited access to the Occupied Zone. Therefore, it would be necessary for the province to renew the links with Paris. In September 1941, a major success was achieved by Vichy for securing access to broadcasting from Paris again twice a week to the Unoccupied Zone via the modulation centre of Lyon, enabling its listeners to hear again about the shows in Paris and other sports events held in the Occupied Zone.60

The political environment in which RN was operating had shifted further from preaching for the ideology of National Revolution and New France to an overt acceptance of collaboration with Laval’s return to power in April 1942. To Laval, propaganda was less about seducing French public opinion, and more about avoiding antagonising or hampering the current negotiations that he led with the occupier.61 As Laval said to Paul Creyssel, the director of propaganda services in the Unoccupied Zone: ‘The president had made me understand that my role, in his eyes, was not so much to make his government popular but to allow it to remain effective.’62 He made further substantial changes to RN by forming a

59 Eck, La guerre des ondes, pp. 48-9.
60 Ibid., p. 46.
61 Ibid., p. 79.
62 Ibid.
new team and appointed André Demaison as the new director of RN \(^63\) to ensure his vision about RN’s role in propaganda was implemented.

Eck argues that the substantial changes made in the programmes and politics of RN resulted in a more positive perception from the public. By the end of 1942, RN was filled with music, plays, poetry, sports, literary programmes, magazine and news, among other things throughout the day.\(^64\) In fact, RN benefited immensely from experienced entertainment presenters of private stations. Its entertainment programme was run by the Radio-Cité team in 1941-42.\(^65\) RN had succeeded in attracting the greatest artists, as did Radio Paris. Eck argues that RN had managed to deliver an extremely serious yet also light programme.\(^66\) The improvements made by RN did not go unnoticed by the BBC. The Intelligence Report of 17 August 1942 stated:

Word-weariness makes many also turn to Vichy’s radio … not jammed and not forbidden; and the authorities of Vichy are taking great pains to see that the programmes reach a high standard: Jean Antoine, the RDN’s Director of Programmes, declared in Radio National (24.5) that his aim is to put ‘all the intellectual resources of the country’ at the service of the RDN. A letter written from Lyons in January shows the danger there is that the dignity and gaiety of the French radio may delude more and more people into swallowing some of Laval’s attentiste and anti-British propaganda; it says: ‘In our house the radio is on, if not all day (except on Sundays) at least practically all the evening. The programmes are really French and very well done. If I could I would send you Radio National, the weekly radio paper, and you would see the pleasant variety of these programmes. A lot of singing, operas, operettas, (with an excellent cast); light and classical songs; a lot of symphony concerts … concertos, chamber music. It is a real feast. Comedies and classical dramas, reportages from Marseilles, Nice,

\(^66\) ARF, Lauzanne, ‘Un double tournant’, p. 5.
Toulouse and even music and Montmartre cabarets from Paris’ (Lyons, 6.1).  

A further change took place on 7 November 1942 when a new law was enacted. This law clearly defined the new role of RN as a propaganda tool at the disposal of the government and increased the level of centralisation and control. In the meantime, it also gave RN more flexibility in terms of its funding, allowing it to distance itself from a very restrictive financial administrative system. As a result, RN would now receive an extra budget allowing it to proceed with additional operations for development purposes. The effects of this new law would have certainly brought further changes to the RN, although full details of this were not explored as it was beyond the scope of this thesis.

67 BBC WAC, E2/185, 17 August 1942 (European Intelligence Papers).  
68 Eck, La guerre des ondes, pp. 80-1; ARF, Box 1682W89 ‘France: loi No. 994 du 7 novembre 1942 portant réorganisation de la radiodiffusion nationale’.

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Figure 6: Radiodiffusion Nationale programmes. From ARF, Cahiers d'Histoire de la Radiodiffusion, No. 30 (septembre 1991), p. 55.
The programmes and Radio National magazine

At the end of 1940, RN had developed a system of ‘themed programmes’ addressing different interest groups. For example, Radio Travail targeted workers, peasants, craftsmen, employees and business-owners. Radio Révolution led a counter propaganda campaign against the BBC and Radio Brazzaville (Free French radio in Africa) with its programme les Français de France répondent aux émigrés.69

Radio Légion was a five-minute programme hosted by the Légion Française des Combattants, an association for Veterans which was created in August 1940 as a major propaganda arm of Vichy. Anti-Semitic comments appeared openly from October 1940 when anti-Jewish laws came into force, and intensified as the laws were renewed in June 1941. Radio Légion became a daily programme from May 1941.70 From autumn 1942, to counter the BBC’s attack on Vichy’s roundup of Jews in the summer of 1942, Radio Légion portrayed the Jews as the enemy of the National Revolution from a racial and biological perspective. Broadcasts of anti-Semitic programmes also intensified with La question juive being broadcast three times a week from that point on.71

Radio Jeunesse, which was launched on 15 August 1940 under the leadership of the Youth Commissariat, had the aim of restoring young people’s courage.72 Pierre Schaeffer, Claude Roy and Pierre Barbier were among the first presenters of Radio Jeunesse.73 This programme soon became a concern for the British, as highlighted in the BBC Intelligence report of 4 June 1941. According to the feedback given in a letter dated 8 April from the Occupied Zone, ‘Radio Jeunesse “is presented in a lively and attractive form”. It also makes constant and constructive propaganda for Fascist youth organisations’.74 In November 1941, Radio Jeunesse expanded its broadcast to two sets of news bulletins: one at 07h20 and the other at 13h40. It also collaborated with some cultural programmes and hosted Radio Jeunesse magazine at 18h30 on Tuesdays and L’heure des Jeunes at

70 Eck, La guerre des ondes, p. 51; ARF, ‘La radio de Vichy’, Cahiers d’histoire de la radiodiffusion, No. 27 (décembre 1990), p. 50.
71 Eck, La guerre des ondes, p. 88.
73 Eck, La guerre des ondes, p. 51.
74 BBC WAC, E2/193/2, 4 June 1941 (European Intelligence Papers).
17h00 on Thursdays. These programmes were relayed by the private stations of
the Unoccupied Zone as well as Algiers and Rabat twice a week to the French
colonies.\textsuperscript{75} \textit{Radio Jeunesse} was one of the RN’s leading programmes, which
exemplified how far RN had gone to attract the youth of France and the French
Empire to the ideal of National Revolution.

RN and Radio Paris had a similar vision and concentrated on the same
themes: work, family and youth in their daily propaganda.\textsuperscript{76} Compared to the
intensity with which RN and Radio Paris targeted the French youth, the BBC’s
effort in this respect was low. As exemplified in the BBC report of 23 January
1942, between August 1940 and January 1942 the combined regular output of
broadcasts relating to youth from RN and Radio Paris rose from 4 hours 15
minutes per week to 13 hours 55 minutes per week, while that from the BBC
remained at half an hour per week. The report also highlighted that among the
correspondence received at the BBC, not one single letter referred to its youth
programme, for three possible reasons: it was more difficult for French youth to
get their letters to the BBC; the programme itself might not be interesting enough
for French youth; or poor coverage may have resulted in a lack of awareness of
the programme.\textsuperscript{77}

\textsuperscript{75} ARF, Lauzanne, ‘De la bataille d’Angleterre’, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{76} ARF, ‘L’année radiophonique 1941 au jour le jour’, \textit{Cahiers d’histoire de la radiodiffusion}, No.
\textsuperscript{77} BBC WAC, E2/188/1, 23 January 1942 (European Intelligence Papers).
Figure 7: Schedule of broadcasts to French youth as at 15th January 1942. From BBC WAC, E2/188/1, 23 January 1942 (European Intelligence Papers).
Figure 8: Schedule showing increase in output of broadcasts to French youth from both zones from Armistice to January 1942. From BBC WAC, E2/188/1, 23 January 1942 (European Intelligence Papers).
From September 1940, the various Vichy ministries were given a daily timeslot from 19h20 to 20h30 where they presented their achievements and projects: Sport and Hygiene on Sundays, Fine Arts on Mondays, Communications on Tuesdays, News on Wednesdays, Agriculture on Thursdays, Navy on Fridays, and Work and Education on Saturdays. At the start of these programmes, a representative of the Ministry of Family gave a brief talk. In addition to the Ministry’s propaganda, it was decided that RN would increase the number of broadcasts of the *Journal Parlé* to eight times a day from February 1941.\(^{78}\)

Despite the fact that Vichy had no control over the content of Radio Paris programmes, the latter did broadcast two daily RN news bulletins\(^{79}\) at 08h00 and at 11h45 for a quarter of an hour from 10 November 1940.\(^{80}\) This enabled the French population living in the Occupied Zone to follow what was happening in the Unoccupied Zone.

From the end of July 1941, RN developed a routine of concluding its daily programme with *La Marseillaise*,\(^{81}\) the national anthem which was banned in the Occupied Zone (to eradicate this key national symbol under which rebellion might be fostered) but which was performed routinely during Pétain’s travels in the Unoccupied Zone.\(^{82}\) RN tried to unite the French around the national anthem, to reinforce the idea that RN was the French national radio, and to reassure listeners that RN’s programmes represented the Vichy government as the legitimate national government.

To increase its audience, RN developed *Radio National*, a weekly magazine listing detailed daily schedules of the radio programmes, with its editorial office in Marseille at 3, rue Méry.\(^{83}\) *Radio National* also acted as a visual supplement to the radio, using every opportunity to instill patriotism in the French. The magazine was an effective propaganda tool as it could also reach those members of the general public who were not necessarily listeners of RN.

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\(^{78}\) ARF, Lauzanne, ‘De la bataille d’Angleterre’, pp. 4-5.

\(^{79}\) Jackson, *France: The Dark Years*, p. 256.

\(^{80}\) Pierrefitte-sur-Seine Archives nationales (AN), F43/59 Speakers on Radio Paris.

\(^{81}\) ARF, *Radio National*, 20-26 juillet 1941.


programmes. It was presented as an illustrated magazine which offered the readers reportages, portraits of artists, gossip columns, radio reviews and a women’s page. The first issue of Radio National came out on 25 May 1941, costing 2.50 fr. and containing 28 pages. The two issues on 12 July 1942 and 19 July 1942 shrank to 12 pages for unknown reasons but it was restored to the original size afterwards. The magazine also included schedules of Radio Suisse Romande, as well as overseas stations (Radio PTT Alger, Radio Maroc). Radio National introduced the detailed schedule of La Voix de la France, a programme which started on 1 August 1941 and enabled France to renew contact with its Empire thanks to a powerful short-wave transmitter. As for the programmes of Radio Paris, they appeared in Radio National from 9 August 1942 onwards.

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84 Eck, La guerre des ondes, p. 47.
86 Ibid., 12-18 juillet 1942; ibid., 19-25 juillet 1942.
87 Ibid., 15-21 juin 1941.
88 Ibid., 13-19 juillet 1941.
90 ARF, Radio National, 3-9 août 1941.
91 Ibid., 9-15 août 1942.
Figure 9: La voix de la France. From ARF, Cahiers d'Histoire de la Radiodiffusion, No. 30, (septembre 1991), p. 58.
The special issue marking Radio National’s first anniversary included an article celebrating its success by reviewing the first year of operation. It stated that as news archives were centrally kept in Paris, the journalists of Radio National, whose offices were now in Marseille, had great difficulty in gaining access to them. It took a great deal of ingenuity for these journalists to deliver the very first issues of the magazine to the public. They managed to obtain sufficient material from the archives of the Marseille Press (Le Petit Marseillais), the library of the city of Marseille, the Chamber of Commerce, the Academy of Arts and booksellers. The success of the magazine was also attributed to its innovative presentation and design, which took three months to develop, and a year to reach its final form. Radio National was read by 150,000 people in its first year with 13,000 subscribers, and its publication was viewed by the journalists as a success story.\footnote{Ibid., 24-30 mai 1942.}

The content of this magazine varied with articles covering various aspects of French people’s daily lives and their concerns. There was a section on the French PoWs in Germany, ‘boîte aux lettres pour nos prisonniers’, which aimed to inform, update and interpret the latest policies regarding PoWs, to give practical guidance on specific issues faced by the families of PoWs and to publish excerpts from listeners’ letters expressing their gratitude to the programme, their emotions, or any specific difficulties.\footnote{Ibid., 13-9 juillet 1941.} Another section, ‘Images des Stalag’, contained photos of PoWs in the stalags (non-commissioned officers and other ranks) and oflags (officers’ camp).\footnote{Ibid., 24-30 août 1941.} From 31 August, Radio National added a new section titled ‘Cette semaine, votre poste vous a parlé de …’ This section was made up of five or six short articles giving historical or background information surrounding a topic or an event which the radio had talked about in the previous week.\footnote{Ibid., 31 août-6 septembre 1941.} From 10 August, there was a page of ‘la Vie Parisienne’ where the realities and memories of Paris were portrayed. There was also a section for women, ‘Ecoutez Madame’, where the main topics discussed were those thought to be of interest to women: for example, health, food, children’s education, family values, solidarity between women, fashion, etc.\footnote{Ibid., 10-16 août 1941.} The last issue of Radio National in December
1941 published a list of about 200 names of artists who appeared at the microphone of RN.\textsuperscript{97}

Following a survey entitled ‘comment concevez-vous la RADIO?’ seeking the opinions of the general public regarding the role of radio, a selection of public feedback was published in Radio National from 16 November to 13 December 1941, reflecting the views of various intellectuals regarding the present and the future role of the radio.\textsuperscript{98} For example, Maître Henri Ripert, dean of the Faculty of Law of Marseille, stated that ‘if we want to grow our country, we must bathe the soul and spirit of our people, especially our young people, in greatness and heroism … The radio must and can realise this magnificent work’.\textsuperscript{99} Francis Carco of the Académie Goncourt considered that ‘the radio must inspire us to get back on our feet’.\textsuperscript{100} These excerpts indicate one of the commonalities between Radio National and RN: the use of ‘authoritative voices’ in their reportage to convey important messages and to achieve their propaganda objectives. They tend to quote officials or professionals whose ‘voices’ could not be easily contested or questioned.

**Correspondence**

The ‘Exposé d’ensemble’ report demonstrates that, as with the BBC, RN also sought its listeners’ opinions through correspondence. When the report was published, the disaffection among the French public for RN was reflected in some ways by the small number of listeners’ letters received, which fell to less than 500 a month during the last months of 1940, although the number of letters received would not necessarily correlate with the actual number of radio listeners.\textsuperscript{101}

There was, however, ample evidence that people were listening to RN. The BBC’s intelligence report of 8 April 1941 pointed out that RN profited from the distrust of Radio Paris and successfully presented itself as the ‘Voice of France’, despite a general feeling that both radio stations were seen with disgust.

\textsuperscript{97} Ibid., 28 décembre 1941-3 janvier 1942. This list reflects the key figures of entertainment at the time: Mistinguett, Maurice Chevalier, Fernandel, Sacha Guitry, Albert Préjean, Yvonne Printemps, Raimu, Tino Rossi, among other artists.

\textsuperscript{98} Ibid., 16-22 novembre 1941; ibid., 23-29 novembre 1941; ibid., 30 novembre-6 décembre 1941; ibid., 7-13 décembre 1941.

\textsuperscript{99} Ibid., 16-22 novembre 1941.

\textsuperscript{100} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{101} ARF, Box 1682W89 ‘Exposé d’ensemble’.
A letter from the English wife of a French doctor residing in the Gironde region wrote to the BBC stating that ‘we can no longer bear to listen to the lies of Radio Paris, we only take the French radio now (Arcachon, January)’.

This excerpt demonstrates that educated French people listened to RN despite their feeling of distrust. One of the most successful programmes, *Bonjour la France*, featuring Jean Nohain, aka Jaboune, as the presenter, received thousands of ‘friendship’ letters during Easter because of the pleasant content, as it encompassed ‘almanac of various sorts, recipes, simple poesy and physical education’.

Despite its popularity, *Bonjour la France* disappeared from the schedule in the autumn of 1941.

After contacting several archival institutions in Paris it remains unclear to me whether any of the letters received at RN survived to the present day. The limited scope of this thesis meant that no further resources could be allocated to exploring the whereabouts or the existence of such letters, but if they are uncovered one day, it would certainly add another dimension to the understanding of the role of RN during the war years, in particular how it was perceived by the listeners. As it stands, the only evidence of listeners’ responses to RN were those expressed in the ‘Exposé d’ensemble’ report, some highly selective letters from ‘authoritative voices’ published in *Radio National*, and excerpts of correspondence from the BBC official reports or correspondence obtained at the BBC Written Archives. The available correspondence from the BBC offers a glimpse on RN programmes as well as listeners’ responses but one must bear in mind that the French writers to the BBC were biased against Vichy’s ideology and the German occupier in France; therefore, it is impossible to compare views other than those expressed at the BBC from 1940 to November 1942.

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102 BBC WAC, E2/185, 8 April 1941 (European Intelligence Papers).
104 Eck, *La guerre des ondes*, p. 47.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid., p. 48.
2.2 The year 1940

Youth

RN’s broadcasts featured a number of recurring themes central to the political and propaganda aim of the Vichy government, most importantly national unity, work, youth and education.\(^{107}\)

Pétain had ‘Youth’ in his vision for a New France even before the Vichy regime. The idea that schools should follow a similar model of military training for the purpose of revenge was expressed in a well-known document entitled ‘L’école, antichambre de la caserne!’\(^{108}\) (‘School, the anteroom of the barracks!’), after the defeat against the Prussians in 1870. When Pétain spoke at the Cercle interallié on 15 December 1934 in Paris, he expressed a similar view, that it would be necessary to strengthen ‘the links between the school and the army’.\(^{109}\) In essence:

School executives and military officials have, in fact, a common mission: to develop the physical strength, to harden the hearts, and to forge the wills. While the army trains soldiers – the eventual instruments for National Defence, schools prepare citizens, permanent artisans for the grandeur of the country.\(^{110}\)

Pétain also said that “France has not acquired a true national education system” because the members of the teaching community openly allow themselves “to destroy the State and Society” by raising young people “in ignorance or contempt of the Fatherland”.\(^{111}\)

André Delmas, general secretary of the Syndicat National des Instituteurs, or National Union of Teachers (SNI),\(^{112}\) argued strongly against Pétain’s speech and refuted his statement point by point in the l’école libératrice of 15 December 1934. Delmas expressed that ‘the army and the school do not have “a common

\(^{107}\) Pétain, Discours aux Français, p. 31.
\(^{109}\) Giolitto, Histoire de la jeunesse, p. 77.
\(^{110}\) Ibid.
\(^{111}\) Ibid., pp. 77-8.
\(^{112}\) Halls, The Youth of Vichy France, p. xi.
mission’; what is true for fascists’ countries is not for France’; and that schools are not bound ‘to train the future soldier’, but ‘to train men and free citizens’.\(^{113}\)

Henri Becquart, the right-wing deputy, held similar views to Pétain regarding youth. As he announced at the Ecole Saint Joseph at Lille in 1936, pupils were witnessing the collapse of French society as individualism prevailed over the value of community. The young people had the obligation to restore the great traditions of every human society: ‘Family, Authority in the State, Liberty and Dignity of the individual, Work, Charity, Country.’\(^{114}\) Becquart saw youth as the bearer of hope for the French society. The right was now so close to the centre of power that it could influence education policies.\(^{115}\)

Following the fall of France, the first priority of Vichy was to assert its power as the new ‘legitimate’ government of France. To achieve this goal, it had first to justify the capitulation and the armistice, and to explain the reasons for the defeat. They could then begin to legitimise future collaboration with the occupier, and to establish those who would become the new enemies of France.\(^{116}\) Once they had achieved this, RN, as the official wireless propaganda medium, could address Vichy’s primary concerns such as the transformation of youth and the regeneration of France.

There were extensive discussions surrounding multiple facets of the youth question on RN airwaves. First, Vichy promoted youth as the means to regenerate France in the New Europe. The French population was ageing because of the decline in the birth rate which started at the beginning of the 19\(^{th}\) century. This was followed shortly by the high number of casualties (1.3 million Frenchmen)

\(^{113}\) Giolitto, *Histoire de la jeunesse*, p. 78.

\(^{114}\) Halls, *The Youth of Vichy France*, p. 6. The italics are in the original of the quote.

\(^{115}\) Ibid., p. 7.

during the Great War.\footnote{Jackson, \textit{France: The Dark Years}, p. 31; Laborie, \textit{L'opinion française sous Vichy}, p. 83; Jean Giraudoux, \textit{Pleins Pouvoirs} (Paris: Gallimard, 1939), pp. 46, 55-8.} As Pétain wrote in 1940, ‘the family is the essential cell, it is the very foundation of the social structure’.\footnote{Giolitto, \textit{Histoire de la jeunesse}, p. 36.} The role of women was to ensure the growth of the French race, and this needed to be understood by young women at school age.\footnote{Halls, \textit{The Youth of Vichy France}, pp. 10-11.} Vichy multiplied laws to restrict women’s activities in an attempt to reverse the decline in the birth rate and the lack of male children, which was seen as partially responsible for the defeat in 1940.\footnote{Thibault, \textit{Les femmes et la Résistance}, p. 12.} Coupled with this, Vichy also vigorously promoted family ideology: both birth control and abortion were illegal and as of February 1942, a new legislation made abortion punishable as a crime against the State and French ‘race’.\footnote{Sarah Fishman, \textit{We Will Wait: Wives of French Prisoners of War, 1940-1945} (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), p. 45; Jackson, \textit{France: The Dark Years}, p. 329.}

Vichy’s decision to put policies surrounding women and family as a priority had a striking resemblance to that of the National Socialist Party in Germany when it first took power. Germany had suffered a decline in its birth rate during the inter-war period as well. Goebbels stressed as early as 18 March 1933 that women’s new role in the German society was childbearing and the education of children, for the Fatherland’s immortality.\footnote{‘Deutsches Frauentum’, \textit{Signale der neuen Zeit}. 25 ausgewählte Reden von Dr. Joseph Goebbels (Munich: Zentralverlag der NSDAP., 1934), pp. 118-26, available online at German Propaganda Archive, at http://research.calvin.edu/german-propaganda-archive/goeb55.htm (5 June 2013).} He stated that ‘If the nation once again has mothers who proudly and freely choose motherhood, it cannot perish. If the woman is healthy, the people will be healthy. Woe to the nation that neglects its women and mothers. It condemns itself.’\footnote{Ibid.}

Vichy viewed women as responsible for the family both as a wife and as a mother. The Vichy motto \textit{Travail, Famille, Patrie} was forced on the French repeatedly through a variety of means, including the use of more advanced technology such as radio broadcasting and propaganda documentary clips. It became common practice in cinemas to show a short clip of news or documentary prior to the main feature, with images of cradles, babies and children to remind the audience that the family ‘is the France of tomorrow’. Vichy propaganda promoted childbearing as early as 1940 with its first short film ‘Première Valse’; a
multitude of others followed suit. The most important one was made in 1942, ‘Le jardin sans fleurs’, \footnote{Jean Pierre Bertin-Maghit, ‘Le documentaire de propagande dans la France de l’Occupation’, in Jacky Evrard and Jacques Kermabon (eds), Une encyclopédie du court métrage français (Pantin: Festival Côté court, 2004), p. 275.} illustrating the decline of the birth rate in France during the inter-war period and stressing that French families needed to have more children to have a happy family life. \footnote{‘Le jardin sans fleurs’ on the DVD Les documentaires de propagande, France 1940-1944 included in Jean Pierre Bertin-Maghit, Les documenteurs des Années Noires (Paris: Nouveau Monde, 2004).}

The second aspect of discussions surrounding youth focuses on the new role and function of the various youth groups in the community as a whole. Vichy attempted to capture and train the minds of young individuals to be conditioned to Vichy’s core values and ideology. Vichy made a considerable commitment to ensure the prodigality of its support to youth movements and this resulted in a multitude of youth groups being created to serve this purpose. The number of young people enrolled in these groups more than doubled in 1941 and youth groups in different uniforms seemed to be omnipresent in the Unoccupied Zone, but not in the Occupied Zone. \footnote{Paxton, \textit{Vichy France}, pp. 160-1.} Youth groups’ participation in the daily lives of French households was considerable as they brought comfort and gave help to the community at large. Their actions improved the lives of many French citizens in need, especially their involvement with charitable organisations.

However, the German authorities quickly became suspicious of youth movements in Vichy, particularly their leaders and teachers, because some youth movements were led by French army officers. Any physical, moral, or patriotic ‘regeneration’ of French youth would pose a risk to Germany in time. The Germans had applied a similar strategy with their own youth groups against the French when France occupied the Rhineland after the defeat of Germany in the Great War. \footnote{Halls, \textit{The Youth of Vichy France}, p. 401.}

The Prefect’s report of 28 October indicated that the legality of youth groups in the Occupied Zone was threatened by the September 1940 decree. A letter by General Streccius of 4 October 1940 targeted youth groups such as the ‘Chantiers de la Jeunesse’, the ‘Compagnons de France’ and ‘Scouts de France’,
which existed in both zones, directly.\textsuperscript{128} He stated: ‘I cannot allow these groups to continue their activities in occupied territory ... the labour camps are not just to provide work; they can also be used for the military training of youth.’\textsuperscript{129} Following the decree, the youth movements were curbed in the Occupied Zone but continued to flourish in the Unoccupied Zone.

The third aspect of discussions surrounding youth focuses on the crucial reform of education to mould French youth. Pétain publicly castigated primary school teachers ‘as a major contributor to the defeat’ in 1940 for not managing and not having the desire to teach moral and patriotic values to their pupils.\textsuperscript{130} Teachers were accused of failing the youth by preaching for peace. For the teachers, the Great War was to be the last of all wars: many teachers who participated in the Great War never returned. They stood in the forefront of all pacifist demonstrations taking place between the two wars, urging the French not to accept ‘to die for Danzig’.\textsuperscript{131} On 23 April 1939, J. Fontaine stated in the \textit{l’École émancipée},\textsuperscript{132} a labour and educational magazine published since 1910,\textsuperscript{133} that he would ‘prefer servitude than war, because with servitude we return, whereas with war we don’t’.\textsuperscript{134} Such statements deeply offended the military.

Until Laval’s dismissal in December 1940, teachers were being ostracised by Vichy.\textsuperscript{135} Moreover, the former education system was blamed: the teaching body needed to be purged; the curricula needed a complete makeover, including textbooks and teaching methods. As conscription no longer existed, youth organisations needed to fill the gap for school leavers.\textsuperscript{136} This old education system was seen as too bookish by emphasising ‘instruction’ rather than ‘education’. The new curricula included Vichy’s elements of civic, social, moral education, artistic activities, physical training, and games. It was adopted at all levels of the ‘new’ education system, and this new value was embraced by the

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\item \textsuperscript{128} La France dans la Deuxième Guerre mondiale - Edition des rapports du Militärbefehlshaber Frankreich et des Synthèses des rapports des préfets, 1940-1944 (edited reports), available online at http://www.ihtp.cnrs.fr/prefets/, (17 June 2013).
\item \textsuperscript{129} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{130} Giolitto, \textit{Histoire de la jeunesse}, p. 124.
\item \textsuperscript{132} Giolitto, \textit{Histoire de la jeunesse}, p. 125.
\item \textsuperscript{133} http://www.ecoleemancipee.org/spip.php?rubrique4 (3 August 2015).
\item \textsuperscript{134} Giolitto, \textit{Histoire de la jeunesse}, p. 125.
\item \textsuperscript{135} Ibid., p. 126.
\item \textsuperscript{136} Halls, \textit{The Youth of Vichy France}, p. 9.
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Youth was to become a fundamental part of Vichy ideology as guarantor for the future of the New France. Children had to be made to believe in the New France, and in the vital role they would play as mothers, farmers, soldiers, etc. once they were adults. Education needed to be turned into indoctrination.

The fourth aspect of discussions focuses on the role of sports in youth development, which featured much more heavily from 1941. For Drieu La Rochelle, writer, French nationalist and collaborationist, only the ‘revolution du corps’ (‘health, dignity, development, and harmony’) as proposed in fascism was capable of regenerating French youth. Hitler believed that education should focus on German pupils being healthy and having a balanced body, and Pétain had a similar vision, despite Vichy not being a fascist state. Sport, therefore, was placed at the heart of Vichy’s educational reform. The Germans were opposed to the French participating in sport and outdoor activities because these nurtured youth’s physical strength, promoted national sentiment and military prowess, and increased the risk of French youth becoming a threat to their position. In an internal memorandum at German headquarters in Paris in 1941, the Germans learned that the Commissariat Général à l’Éducation Générale et aux Sports supplied 250 pairs of skis for use in the schools of the Hautes-Alpes to encourage primary school pupils to participate in skiing. The memorandum questioned, ‘by giving instructions in skiing will not interests other than sporting ones [sc. Military ones] be pursued?’ Moreover in early 1941, the Germans were horrified to discover that ‘twelve out of the thirty-four inspectors and sports delegates for the occupied zone were ex-regular officers’. The German authorities monitored the activities of the Commissariat Général for sport closely as they were suspicious of the military characteristics of this ministry. They

137 Ibid., p. 186.  
138 Proud, Children and Propaganda, p. 12.  
139 Ibid., pp. 7-8.  
141 Giolitto, Histoire de la jeunesse, p. 181.  
142 Ibid.  
143 Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. 409-14.  
144 Giolitto, Histoire de la jeunesse, p. 181.  
146 Halls, The Youth of Vichy France, p. 199.  
147 Ibid.  
148 Ibid., p. 189.
ordered a monthly report to be submitted to them with information about the Commissariat’s activities as well as a list of its key staff members with particulars of their former employers.\(^{149}\)

Vichy’s actions could be understood as a logical response to the military defeat of 1940, which made physical preparation for a future liberation, national recovery or revenge its policy priority.\(^{150}\) Vichy mobilised a huge amount of resource to convince teachers of the necessity of teaching physical education and to create this sporting faith in France,\(^{151}\) resulting in physical education becoming deeply rooted in the life of all schools between 1940 and 1944.\(^{152}\)

The following section will discuss in greater detail how the themes surrounding youth as outlined above were taken up by the RN in their daily broadcasts to the Unoccupied Zone.

**Rejuvenation of France through a renewed commitment to family and birth**

RN emphasised the need for the young generation to make a necessary return to the values lost during the Third Republic. Pétain, as the new Président du Conseil, spoke on 25 June, three days after the Armistice was signed, on Radio Bordeaux Sud-Ouest, part of RN’s public network, announcing that a New Order in France was to begin.\(^{153}\)

During his speech, Pétain warned the French that life would be harsh from now on but people could count on him to hear the truth. France would be able to rely on its children in the future because of the way they would be brought up: they would be raised with a sense of duty towards France.\(^{154}\) ‘Our defeat was the result of our slackening. The spirit of enjoyment has destroyed what the spirit of sacrifice has built,’ he stated; however, with intellectual and moral rejuvenation, a New France would rise from the ashes.\(^{155}\)

The French suffered a shattering trauma in 1940 after being conquered in merely six weeks. It was against this background that the French were happy to

\(^{149}\) Ibid.

\(^{150}\) Ibid., p. 186; Gay-Lescot, *Sport et Education sous Vichy*, p. 192.

\(^{151}\) Giolitto, *Histoire de la jeunesse*, p. 182.


\(^{154}\) Pétain, *Discours aux Français*, p. 66.

\(^{155}\) Ibid.
greet the news that the Armistice was signed. Robert Gaillard, a French prisoner of war, wrote in his diary on 12 July 1940, expressing a feeling probably experienced by many French at that time: ‘What is the point of revolting when we are nothing; what is the point of fighting when we are defeated?’ Pétain’s broadcast made it clear that France needed shock treatment; its future would lie in the virtue of change, and the population needed to embrace the value of sacrifice and Vichy ideology to rejuvenate France. Bowles argued that the purpose of the National Revolution was ‘to restore the essence of French grandeur by purging the causes of the Third Republic’s supposed decadence and humiliating demise’. To achieve that, a return to the values ‘through a return to the earth, an embrace of regional culture and a restoration of the moral and physical vigor of French youth’ became necessary. The French would have to seize the defeat as an opportunity to change their behaviour. Only through change could they eventually forget their selfishness and individualism, and embrace a new sense of ‘community’. To Pétain, France then was no different from Spain in 1936, and Spain was saved by its youth, its faith and its sacrifice. *Travail, Famille, Patrie* was the centrepiece of the National Revolution, without which there would be no salvation.

Vichy’s expectations of France and its youth were met with mixed responses, and Vichy was well aware of it. In a document originating from an official source, it was stated that despite all the indoctrination, Vichy did not have much hope that it could transform the French into believers of the New Order, because Vichy’s preaching was so radically different to that which ‘made the France of yesterday’, that a real conversion of people’s mentality would be necessary for the New Order to succeed. It would be naïve to think that French adults would be converted that easily. This is why the Vichy government targeted the youth, because ‘they are not yet ossified in their values; they are powerful and not yet a fluid human being’.

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156 Jackson, *France: The Dark Years*, p. 121.
160 Ibid.
162 Ibid., p. 18; Proud, *Children and Propaganda*, p. 4.
However, this expected transformation of the values of French youth demanded by Vichy, and by Pétain in particular, did not appeal to everyone, as Benoîte Groult wrote in her diary on 21 September 1940:

This morning, we learned that it was no longer permitted to divorce. Mind your own business, Maréchal? We are already prisoners of the occupier; we will now be the prisoner of our spouse! ... Because we enjoyed life too much under the Third Republic, as Pétain said; and pleasure debases us. The moralising, reactionary and petit-bourgeoisness in Pétain’s doctrine is stinky. It is disgusting to be defeated.¹⁶⁴

Vichy’s policy about family and abortion had clearly engendered hostility as early as September 1940.

Pétain recorded the following broadcast on 11 July, speaking about the value of family and the expected role of the state, parents and young people, urging the French not to lose hope. He promised that French families would have the respect and protection of France. France would provide their children with education, confidence which had been lost over the years, and a bright future. French families were the custodians of a long history of honour, and they had a duty to safeguard and pass the ancient virtues which made them strong to their offspring. Youth in modern times needed to fulfill its role by living with other young members of society and nurturing its strength through safe and friendly outdoor activities to prepare them for the future battle of life. The government would also make sure that the young enthusiasts were to be united in a new momentum, which would define the new nature of the French race.¹⁶⁵ He concluded that France needed to be a place where ‘(a)ll the French are proud of France, and France proud of every French ... Let us give ourselves to France. She has always led her people to greatness.’¹⁶⁶

In his message, Pétain expressed his vision of what France would need for a brighter future and to regain its greatness. The state would nurture young people, allowing them to learn, to develop and to prepare themselves for future

¹⁶⁵ Pétain, Discours aux Français, pp. 67-71.
¹⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 71.
battles, all in a safe environment. These statements represent an overt declaration of Pétain’s intention to revolutionise youth education, intensify youth movement and take a gender-specific approach about youth. This gender-discriminative social order had provoked resentment, as Groult wrote, ‘freedom to the men, kitchen to the women’. It became clear that women would pay the price for this new education system implemented by Vichy. Pétain’s vision of a united youth in this New France, which would define the new nature of the French race and contribute to the happiness of youth, was not necessarily to the taste of the youth themselves, especially young women.

In a separate reportage broadcast by RN in November, Pétain spoke with a worker while visiting a construction site at the tunnel of the Croix-Rousse during his three-day visit to Lyon and Toulouse. The reporter explained that Pétain was having a walkabout with the workers. At one point, he spoke with a 62-year-old foreman, who told Pétain that he had one daughter. Pétain immediately expressed his regret that the foreman did not have more children, because he would otherwise have brought up more children beautifully, just like the foreman himself. A little while later, a young boy was brought in on the site to raise the French flag. The boy, with the help of a representative of the workers, pulled the string with all his strength and raised the flag. Pétain praised him for the job well done, stating that the boy would remember this moment all his life.

This broadcast was a typical example of overt propaganda for a higher birth rate as Pétain asked the foreman about his family. Ellul argues that although it remains curious how a higher birth rate should be achieved without any obvious change in public perception regarding larger families, there could be no doubt that propaganda in favour of a higher birth rate had a profound effect on the population, resulting in a noticeable increase in birth rate not only in France but also in Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy since 1941. The young boy and his actions represented Pétain’s ideal for the youth, a revived generation with vigour, strength and patriotism. The high-profile use of pre-adolescent children during Pétain’s public appearance was also observed elsewhere, dominating the crowd

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167 Groult, *Journal à quatre mains*, p. 133.
scene, waving flags, surrounding Pétain. Every opportunity was used to win over the affections of the youth.\textsuperscript{170}

From the surviving broadcasts it seems that from 1941, the rhetoric about family values and the role of women subsided and the discussions about women shifted. However, it did not completely disappear from the airwaves. A further broadcast dated 19 June 1941 showed the contrast between the size of the families in cities and in rural areas. When Pétain visited the Limousin region, he stopped at the Richaud farm where he met with the peasants and discussed the situation on the farm. Pétain spoke with the sharecropper’s wife, who had two children; both were prisoners of war. She pleaded to Pétain to bring them home.\textsuperscript{171} He replied, ‘your turn will come, have patience, patience is required for everyone including me. All the prisoners are my children. You have two; me, I have one and a half million’.\textsuperscript{172}

During his visit to the farm, when talking to the local residents, he often enquired about the make-up of the family as well as the numbers of prisoners of war. One of the families interviewed had eight children and another family six,\textsuperscript{173} to which Pétain commented, ‘happiness belongs to large families’.\textsuperscript{174}

There is a striking contrast between his visit to Lyon in November 1940 and his visit to Richaud farm in June 1941. During his visit to the Richaud farm, Pétain expressed his satisfaction when the interviewees talked about their large families. During Pétain’s visits, family and children would usually occupy a prominent place and this reinforced his image as a father figure of France. This broadcast was no exception, as Pétain referred to all prisoners as his children.

\textbf{The beginning of youth movements}

The office of the Secrétariat Général à la Jeunesse (SGJ) was created on 12 July 1940 as a priority in the national strategy to guide and moralise young people, with Georges Lamirand as its head. This office served a dual purpose: to provide a place at the government level to discuss specific issues concerning human, social

\textsuperscript{170} Proud, \textit{Children and Propaganda}, pp. 5-7.
\textsuperscript{171} INA, Fonds Vichy, disques de la BDIC, \textit{Pétain visite une ferme dans le Limousin}, recorded on 19.06.1941, on Radio État Français-Radiodiffusion Nationale.
\textsuperscript{172} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{173} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{174} Ibid.
and political aspects of youth, and to provide space for collective initiatives, such as the Chantiers de Jeunesse, Compagnons de France, Ecole des Cadres, etc.\textsuperscript{175}

Lamirand supported the creation of two new youth movements almost immediately after the instigation of the office, the Chantiers being one of them. The Chantiers were intended as a civil replacement for conscription and joining was compulsory for any eligible young adult aged 20 or above. It was led by General de la Porte du Theil. The first recruits would spend six months in the movement, but a law of 18 January 1941 changed the duration to eight months. Their education focused on three areas: academic activities which were aimed at correcting deficiencies in schooling; cultural activities such as singing, dancing and visiting local communities in partnership; and vocational activities which focused on learning technical processes in workshops and farms. The recruits would also undertake a regime of vigorous outdoor physical activities to keep them fit. All was done for them to embrace the community ideal.\textsuperscript{176}

Pétain’s broadcast of 13 August was written by René Gillouin, Vichy’s Minister of Education from 12 July to 6 September 1940.\textsuperscript{177} It was the first time that Pétain announced specific plans for youth of this age group as they were to become ‘officially’ full participants in the rebuilding of France. It was an official endorsement of the fact that Vichy was determined to cultivate youth as future leaders to the realisation of the vision for a New France.

Part of the broadcast focuses on the young soldiers who did not take part in the war but who would now contribute to new projects of national interest which had been neglected for far too long;\textsuperscript{178} their tasks would include the ‘management of the forest, of camps and stadium, and construction of youth housing in villages’.\textsuperscript{179}

These projects were key to the rebuilding of France, and Pétain’s message made it clear as to who would be at the forefront of the reconstruction. Vichy wanted the youth to contribute to all aspects of community life. On the other hand, it is conceivable that Vichy did not have a choice but to take care of these young


\textsuperscript{176} Halls, \textit{The Youth of Vichy France}, p. 284-292.

\textsuperscript{177} Pétain, \textit{Discours aux Français}, p. 25.

\textsuperscript{178} Ibid., p. 76.

\textsuperscript{179} Ibid.
men, because many of them had lost their parents in the war, were homeless, or could not return home at present.\textsuperscript{180}

The other group of youth featured in this broadcast was the young ‘demobilised’. These young Frenchmen were to be placed in long-term work, such as ‘foster care, craft apprenticeship, labour camps, and agricultural assistance’.\textsuperscript{181} Regarding youth groups, Pétain declared that ‘all the existing youth movements will be maintained; their originality will be respected; their action will be encouraged, extended and completed by new initiatives’.\textsuperscript{182} These efforts were intended to create a ‘strong youth, sound in body and mind, and prepared for the tasks which will raise their souls as Frenchmen’.\textsuperscript{183}

From the broadcast, there could be little doubt that the government intended the young generation to adopt its ideology. A key feature of the youth movement was that army officers held leading positions in the SGJ as well as other various youth organisations,\textsuperscript{184} who were experts in training young people both physically and mentally, and in instilling the value of discipline and order. From August, a decision was taken to promote a strong and healthy youth which would not only revive France, but also return France to its former splendour and glory. The potential military benefit of promoting sports and youth movement was noted by an informant, Jean-Claude Fischoff, a French Engineer who was interviewed at the RVPS on 21 May 1942. He stated that he was connected to the scout movement in France before being mobilised on 9 June 1940, hence his special interest in youth movement. He considered that the best way to revive the French national spirit was for young people to receive training under rigid discipline. He argued that if the Ministry of War had had some influence on youth, military training could have been given to them and paramilitary organisations could have been formed more easily to fight the Germans when time came.\textsuperscript{185}

There were also a series of broadcasts which were intended to appeal to French youth to help the community at large and to instill the value of solidarity towards those who were living in a precarious situation.
On 9 October, Pétain declared that a Comité national d’assistance had now been constituted in both zones. He appealed to the youth to become a member of the Committee, as he saw these committees as a prelude to the work of civic reconstruction and national efforts of social collaboration. Both young men and women should come to the aid of those who had been badly bruised by the war and those who had to face new and distressing ordeals in the harsh winter to come.186

Pétain reiterated this message on 10 November, pleading to the population as a whole but especially to the young people. He stated that pitying the population would not solve problems, but action would. He called for the population to give generously any blankets, shoes, clothes, underwear, sweaters, socks, i.e., any necessary personal effects which could still be used, to the teams of young people who would come to knock at doors and collect items for those in great need of help. Winter would not wait, so the response had to be quick if all the French were to be sheltered by the end of November. The Secours National would help the refugees, the unemployed and the needy, whereas the Service des prisonniers de guerre in collaboration with both Comité national d’assistance and the French Red Cross would send clothes to camps in France and Germany.187

The Secours National was a voluntary organisation which provided relief of all kinds to the civilian victims during the Great War.188 It was revived by the decree of 1939 and subsequently placed under the authority of Pétain by a law of 4 October 1940.189 These two broadcasts focused on Pétain’s repeated plea to the population and for the youth’s urgent support to these mutual assistance programmes. The donations of clothes, food, money and other items collected by the Secours National were later announced on the radio to showcase this achievement. To encourage the French to donate, Pétain highlighted the seriousness of the situation in France, stating that in the coming months it would become a matter of life and death for hundreds of thousands of French who were living in difficult situations and who would not survive without the help provided by the youth. Their actions would help create a national effort for solidarity in France.

186 Pétain, Discours aux Français, p. 85.
187 Ibid., p. 97.
189 Pétain, Discours aux Français, p. 96.
Jean Masson spoke on the radio on 15 November to reiterate the messages in Pétain’s two broadcasts. Masson’s message was specifically intended to mobilise the youth and to secure their continued support to help the Secours National. He discussed the important role of the Secours National for French society as a whole, especially to the elderly and to victims of solitude, and how desirable it was that all youth movements supported the Secours National. Masson appealed to the hearts of the French to play their roles in this collective relief effort. He stated that the government wanted the French to donate, but also to pay amicable visits, say good words and encourage more people to volunteer their time and effort as part of their community work to alleviate the saddened and the bruised. The French population would have to act with confidence and tenacity in their fight against cold, hunger, misery, discouragement, sadness and despair in every town. Dedication would help the most deprived in the community to live through the winter and France would see better days.\(^{190}\)

The Secours National was widely recognised as a significant force which participated in numerous generous mutual solidarity actions during the war.\(^{191}\) Propaganda of such a nature appealed to the long tradition of ‘mutual aid’ in France and so the French population responded positively to Vichy’s appeal to help other French in need, even though the appeal was announced on RN, the voice which favoured collaboration. The French population seemed to take into consideration the purpose of the appeal when acting or ignoring the calls made on the radio.

**New education in France**
A further type of reportage was about the ‘elite schools’, or leadership training schools, that were created for the training of the new leaders of France. The school at the château de la Fauconnière at Gannat was relocated later in October 1940 to Uriage, another castle near Grenoble, and became the most celebrated youth leader training facility,\(^{192}\) operated under the leadership of Major Pierre Dunoyer de Segonzac. Vichy set up a total of six such ‘école des cadres’ including Uriage, and the idea was to prepare the leaders of youth movements

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\(^{190}\) INA, Fonds Vichy, disques de la BDIC, *Campagne du Secours National d’hiver*, recorded on 15.11.1940, on Radio État Français-Radio Nationale.

\(^{191}\) Halls, *The Youth of Vichy France*, p. 208.

\(^{192}\) Ibid., p. 312.
through ‘lived experience’ instead of the old bookish system. The purpose of Pétain’s visit was to demonstrate the impact of such education on young man, who in turn, would become the new elite in charge of rebuilding France.

A broadcast was recorded on site and put on air the following day, as evidenced in the edition of the newspaper *L’Ouest-Éclair* dated 22 October 1940. RN recorded the departure of Pétain after visiting the château de la Fauconnière for the reading of the oath of the future leaders of the National Revolution. The reportage began with the youth singing *La Marseillaise* as Pétain and his officials drove away. The officials consisted of Marcel Peyrouton, Minister of Interior; Mr Georges Ripert, Minister of Education and Youth; and Mr Georges Lamirand. The journalist then explained the purpose of the visit and briefly described what happened during the ceremony: each youth team leader turned towards the French flag and said ‘on behalf of my men, I pledge to work with all the strength of the mind and of my heart, with courage, perseverance, till death, for the salvation of France’. The journalist explained that the ceremony itself would be broadcast the following day at noon on *Radio Jeunesse*. He then conducted an interview with Mr de la Chapelle, the Director of Schools for Training of Youth Leaders, explaining that this school, which currently offered training to potential youth leaders, was going to transform rapidly into an elite school for youth leaders in the near future. De la Chapelle explained the network of schools and facilities that were devoted to the training of youth and youth leaders. De Segonzac, the head of the School of the Youth, then commended all the young Frenchmen who had aspired to become a true leader. While the interview was being conducted, the youth leaders were singing loudly in the background, finishing with *La Marseillaise* once again. The journalist expressed that the passion and enthusiasm of the youth leaders could be heard and felt throughout his reportage and that it was the wish of all French people to witness this renewed vigour of the youth.

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194 In the archival record of INA, this broadcast was filed under October 1941 but I listed it as October 1940 because it became apparent after listening to the content of the recording that the event took place in 1940; *L’Ouest-Éclair* 22 octobre 1940, available online at http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k662136t.item (2 October 2015).
196 Ibid.
This broadcast served as a ‘taster’ for a ceremony which Pétain attended to raise interest in the listeners and to entice them to tune in the next day for the full reportage. The interviews conducted served a similar purpose, giving background information about the event, showcasing the enthusiasm of these youth leaders, who were presented as ‘true’ Frenchmen fit to lead France to a bright future, devoted and united for a common ideal. These young men who seemed to have accepted the legitimacy and ideology of Vichy administration were presented as ‘role models’ for the French population and other youth to follow suit and take control of their destiny by following the path of true leaders in the New Vichy France.

La Marseillaise was used as a tool to heighten French patriotism. In this case, it signified Pétain’s departure after an activity which involved youth. Vichy had the tradition of using La Marseillaise because it was a part of the protocols which accompanied the head of state’s travel. Both La Marseillaise and the flag could be seen as political symbols, which evoked a set of common representation and aspiration for the French population. La Marseillaise is to be found in 37 broadcasts of RN from 24 July 1940 to 13 September 1942. Despite being banned in the Occupied Zone, two broadcasts containing La Marseillaise were produced by RN for Radio Paris: on 27 August 1941, Radio Paris aired a broadcast featuring the celebration in Versailles of the first French contingent of volunteers going to the Russian front to fight alongside the German soldiers; on 24 January 1942, it aired another broadcast featuring a conference in Toulouse presented by Paul Marion, French Minister of Information, about the ‘national
revolution and social revolution’.\textsuperscript{199} Both broadcasts clearly had German interests in mind.

Further broadcasts containing \textit{La Marseillaise} were produced and aired on Radio Paris from 1 January 1941 onwards on specific occasions: during a political rally where the audience asked to sing \textit{La Marseillaise} against the Jews and Freemasons and for eternal France;\textsuperscript{200} during a gospel concert, which Pétain attended, in Notre Dame de Paris dedicated to the French PoWs currently in Germany;\textsuperscript{201} during a follow-on reportage for the first French contingent of volunteers going to the Russian front where the reporter declared that for the first time since the Armistice, the French flag floated officially on the pediment of a barracks in the Occupied Zone;\textsuperscript{202} and after a speech delivered by de Brinon (delegate of the French government in the Occupied Zone) at the inauguration of the exhibition ‘Bolshevism against Europe’ in Paris.\textsuperscript{203} Considering the context in which \textit{La Marseillaise} was performed in public in the Occupied Zone, its presence served to enhance German propaganda and their views on the future of France, and to direct the patriotism of the French to a France which existed within the framework of the German authorities. In such cases, it did not seem to matter that \textit{La Marseillaise} was played on Radio Paris.

As could be observed in the broadcasts, \textit{La Marseillaise} sung under Vichy was frequently truncated; this could be explained by the lack of time or the need to shorten the ceremonies.\textsuperscript{204} There was also the fact that some stanzas had probably no place in a defeated and divided France, especially for a government which depended on the occupier. The shortened anthem would appear to resonate well with the desire of Vichy to nurture the sacred love to France through \textit{Travail, Famille, Patrie}. Truncated, \textit{La Marseillaise} could be described as ‘a touching love

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{199} INA, Inventaire Disques, \textit{Conférence ‘Révolution nationale et Révolution sociale’}, recorded on 24.01.1942, on État Français - Radiodiffusion Nationale (RN), 1942.
\item \textsuperscript{200} INA, Inventaire Disques, \textit{Réunion politique organisée par le mouvement ‘le Feu’}, recorded on 01.01.1941, on Radio Paris (RP), 1941.
\item \textsuperscript{201} INA, Inventaire Disques, \textit{Cardinal Emmanuel Suhard : concert de musique religieuse donné au profit des prisonniers de guerre}, recorded on 08.03.1941, on Radio Paris (RP), 1941.
\item \textsuperscript{202} INA, Inventaire Disques, \textit{Fernand de Brinon : l’attentat de Paul Collette contre Pierre Laval}, recorded on 28.08.1941, on Radio Paris (RP), 1941.
\item \textsuperscript{203} INA, Inventaire Disques, \textit{Discours prononcé par Fernand de BRINON}, recorded on 01.03.1942, on Radio Paris (RP), 1942.
\item \textsuperscript{204} For example, INA, Inventaire Disques, \textit{Fernand de Brinon : l’attentat de Paul Collette contre Pierre Laval}, recorded on 28.08.1941, on Radio Paris (RP), 1941.
\end{itemize}
song’, 205 one that continued to stimulate nationalism and patriotism towards Vichy as France.

Moreover, the emphasis placed on youth could be felt both by Pétain’s presence at the ceremony and by the subsequent flourishing of youth schools. The ‘école des cadres’ became an important tool for training young people and potential leaders of young people. These young students ‘would be physically hardened, intellectually indoctrinated, and receive the civic and moral education necessary’ for the accomplishment of their future responsibilities. 206 The oath was to be the cement that bound young people to become the leaders of the National Revolution but also to face their future responsibilities towards the state, to the death if necessary.

Another broadcast, which was recorded in November and featured Pétain’s visit to an agriculture school in the Toulouse region, highlighted the role of education in Vichy. In this very short reportage, a student addressed Pétain and declared that all students wished to become educated and become efficient farmers. Pétain expressed his gratitude and declared that he was extremely satisfied that the students had answered his call to ‘the return to earth’ and stated that their studies were interesting because of their practicality. 207

Pétain advocated vocational education following primary school, and this agriculture school represented the ideal route of education, where the youth would pick their trade while at school. Moreover, the recovery of France could only be achieved with the National Revolution, and one of the aspects of recovery was agriculture. It meant a great deal to Vichy to motivate the youth to take up agriculture, not least because they participated actively in this sector during summer time. 208

Despite the propaganda efforts of Vichy, it would appear that young people in France remained divided in their devotion to this new ideology. As revealed in BBC’s intelligence report of 16 December 1940, a letter from the Unoccupied Zone dated 24 October described how some French youth saw the future of France: ‘At the lycée the opinion of the young ones does not change. We

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205 Dompnier, ‘Entre La Marseillaise et Maréchal, nous voilà!’, pp. 75-6.
206 Halls, The Youth of Vichy France, p. 308.
207 INA, Fonds Vichy, disques de la BDIC, Voyage dans la région de Toulouse: Pétain visite une école viticole, recorded on 19.11.1940, on Radio Etat Français-Radiodiffusion Nationale.
208 Giolitto, Histoire de la jeunesse, p. 313.
only live and feel for England and the French leaders, de Gaulle and Muselier." A subsequent report of 23 December concluded that Vichy had failed to capture the hearts of youth as there was a high proportion of young people and schoolteachers writing to the BBC stating their attachment to ‘the French traditions of free thought and national culture’. Clearly, there is a discrepancy between Vichy propaganda broadcasts on RN and the testimonials reaching the BBC from both teachers and French students.

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209 BBC WAC, E2/185, 16 December 1940 (European Intelligence Papers).
210 BBC WAC, E2/186/4, 23 December 1940 (European Intelligence Papers).
2.3 The year 1941

Youth movement in full swing

Youth movement was in full swing in 1941, although this was not necessarily reflected proportionally in the number of surviving radio broadcasts. There were a total of 13 broadcasts in the first half of 1941 concerning the various aspects of youth. Broadcasts featuring youth movement seem to pick up after spring, perhaps because the weather became more conducive for outdoor activities, and campaigns to encourage youth participation in areas where there was a labour shortage, for example, harvesting in the summer and charity work, was promoted more frequently on the radio. On the other hand, 1941 also saw the emergence of the image of a united youth following Pétain’s ideal, which made for excellent propaganda.

Pétain’s repeated calls for a youth united behind his vision were highlighted in the BBC report of 4 June 1941, commenting that Vichy spared no effort in its attempt to harness the patriotism of the youth to its own cause. As a letter from Marseille stated:

_The Marshal is trying to create a spiritual re-awakening based on youth. The Youth camps propaganda is done by fairly primitive means – the Marshal’s words pinned on the walls, charcoal inscriptions on facades. Everything here shows a great willingness._ (Marseille, 19.3)

This observation demonstrates that Vichy’s efforts to rally the youth movements to his ailing cause were increasingly visible and overt.

Achievements of different youth groups were advocated on the airwaves as well, particularly during Pétain’s visits. During his visit to the Richaud farm in Limousin on 19 June, Pétain also met with a priest who was in charge of the youth of the Chantiers. The priest explained that these young people were abandoned children or orphans from Limoges but they were all working as farmers now.

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211 There is a total of four broadcasts among these 13 which are dated 1.1.1941; as explained in Introduction, these are not necessarily the actual dates of the broadcasts.
212 BBC WAC, E2/193/2, 4 June 1941 (European Intelligence Papers).
213 INA, Fonds Vichy, disques de la BDIC, _Pétain visite une ferme dans le Limousin_, recorded on 19.06.1941, on Radio Etat Français-Radiodiffusion Nationale.
The broadcast ended with a compliment from a young boy to Pétain, ‘Our motto is the one you have given us, Maréchal: “Travail, Famille, Patrie”’. 214

Vichy’s encouragement for the youth movement gave a tremendous boost to the work of charitable organisations. It also enhanced the link between the city and rural areas as the victims of the war were taken care of, provided for, and given the opportunity to obtain practical skills and work experience as famers. The ‘return to the earth’ policy of Vichy included education as a core element. The ultimate purpose of this policy was to enable young people to learn practical skills. In the above broadcast, the learning of practical skills was led by a priest and supported by the Chantiers. To conclude the meeting, a young boy pledged his faith to Pétain’s motto for the country most unreservedly in a cheerful and happy voice. Such a genuine and spontaneous pledge from young people through the radio is a common element of Pétain’s reception during his visits, showcasing his popularity among the youth and the success of Vichy’s indoctrination.

The next broadcast was recorded the next day, 20 June, featuring Pétain’s visit to Valmatte. 215 This was a major public event involving a significant number of participants. As reported by Radio National shortly after the event, 216 10,000 young people attended, including schoolchildren, students, workers, peasants and other groups. 217 As it is a typical representation of Pétain’s visits, I have decided to describe the event as it unfolded on the airwaves to give a flavour of the ambience and public responses during such an event.

This broadcast is made up of two reels. The first reel has four extracts but the first two segments are missing. The second reel has one extract, featuring Lamirand’s speech. The broadcast started with an address by a representative of the Legion, a former Verdun veteran who expressed to the Maréchal his feelings of gratitude, loyalty and affection. This was followed by the Maréchal’s address, which ended with the crowd shouting ‘Vive le Maréchal’, and with La Marseillaise being played by a brass band and accompanied by an overwhelming chorus from the crowd. The fourth segment of the first reel begins with the youth rallying at the fairgrounds.

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214 Ibid.
215 INA, Fonds Vichy, disques de la BDIC, Voyage de Pétain à Limoges, recorded on 20.06.1941, on Radio État Français-Radiodiffusion Nationale.
216 ARF, Radio National, 29 juin–5 juillet 1941.
217 Pétain, Discours aux Français, p. 146.
The second reel was a reportage which began with repeated vivas from the crowd. A band played *La Marseillaise* while the crowd sung, followed by a hymn to Pétain to the tune of *Frère Jacques*. A young girl handed over 60,000 francs to Pétain, collected from all primary and secondary schools in the *département* of Haute-Vienne for less privileged children. Lamirand’s address followed shortly afterwards. He declared that the young people of Limousin were joined today by the delegates of all the provinces of the Unoccupied Zone. Moreover, the youth in the Occupied Zone had asked him in a previous meeting in Paris to represent them in this ceremony. Therefore, the youth from both zones were present today to show Pétain their unwavering confidence in the destiny of France and to swear their devotion with all their strength to the recovery of France. For eight months, Lamirand recalled, he had travelled and met young people in their towns and villages, and was deeply impressed that they understood the reasons and the extent of their deserved unhappiness. They also accepted the great mission to rebuild France and give it a new place in the world. They understood that this task would require renunciation, sacrifice, and even heroism.

Lamirand concluded that the young people of France were ready because they were working hard to learn a trade passionately and they had the ability to live tomorrow with joy and enthusiasm. Youth was resolutely united as young people of all youth movements stood side by side. For the young people who did not belong to a youth movement such as the workers, the peasants, the students, they were united in life by the creation of this social state which Pétain had designed and laid the foundation for, the National Revolution. They were united around the true leader whom they followed unconditionally and loved passionately. Pétain then spoke again, announcing that he agreed with Lamirand because the largest share of the recovery of France would be accomplished by the youth. ‘*Youth, I trust in you!*’, he concluded. Again, his speech was greeted with ‘*Vive le Maréchal*’.  

For Vichy, there was a great need to show a sense of unity behind the regime as this was vital for its survival and to assert its authority over the people. 219 This gathering of youth in the symbolic ceremony in Valmatte was a

218 INA, Fonds Vichy, disques de la BDIC, *Voyage de Pétain à Limoges*, recorded on 20.06.1941, on Radio État Français-Radiodiffusion Nationale.
showcase of the mass support of French youth for Vichy. Such events were important as they allowed Vichy to demonstrate the power of youth being united and their willingness to devote their energy to the cause of the National Revolution. Patriotism was frequently expressed among the crowd, especially when *La Marseillaise* was performed.\(^{220}\) Vivas from the crowd to welcome Pétain were a common feature in all such broadcasts. These vivas often originated from adults but they were joined by children and adolescents, who occupied a prominent position during Pétain’s travels. The presence of young people was highlighted by the participation of all the schools in the *département* and the collections were presented as the fruit of their hard work to help the community. The young girl represented the virtue and innocence of France and she was chosen to hand over the money, which was supposed to show the strength and devotion of youth to the course of the National Resolution. By ‘desired unhappiness’, Lamirand meant the spirit of enjoyment which prevailed during the Third Republic, and the French young people now understood that they had to go through a period of sacrifice and redemption.\(^{221}\) Lamirand’s speech mirrored the message in Pétain’s broadcast. Both leaders expressed their full confidence in French youth repeated at various occasions and broadcasts, creating a picture of national unity in their resolution to follow the calls of Vichy.

**Winter campaign for solidarity and charity**

From November onwards, RN intensified calls for young people to take action and to join the Secours National as winter was approaching fast and resources were becoming scarce again. There were at least four broadcasts on this topic.

Despite all the donations received from the Empire, the Secours National still faced a significant shortage of funds and materials. On 17 November, Pétain made a second appeal on the airwave for charity and solidarity.\(^{222}\) He declared that the previous year, he had asked the French to donate to the Secours National to help those in misfortune: ‘In the course of one year, it has collected three

\(^{220}\) Dompnier, *Entre La Marseillaise et Maréchal, nous voilà!*, pp. 70, 80-1; INA, Fonds Vichy, disques de la BDIC, *Voyage du Maréchal Pétain à Chambéry (Savoie)*, recorded on 01.01.1941, on Radio État Français-Radiodiffusion Nationale. This broadcast’s archival date is 1 January 1941 but Pétain’s trip actually took place on 22-23 September 1941. See ARF, *Radio National*, 28 septembre-4 octobre 1941 for more details.

\(^{221}\) Jackson, *France: The Dark Years*, p. 129.

\(^{222}\) Pétain, *Discours aux Français*, p. 205. It was broadcast at 18h00.
He was making another plea for a similar effort to be undertaken to help the Secours National in its attempt to alleviate misery in collaboration with the Croix-Rouge française and the Comité central d’assistance aux prisonniers de guerre. Answer the call, Pétain pleaded, so that they could feed those who were hungrier and clothe those who were colder. He asked his listeners to give whatever money and food they could spare, to search for spare clothes to bring happiness to those who had nothing. The schoolchildren would collect donations on Sundays. He asked his countrymen to donate in the spirit of mutual aid in anticipation of the dawn of the French resurrection.\textsuperscript{224}

Shortly after Pétain’s plea, Henri Champetier, a reporter at RN, repeated his message on 22 November, reinforcing and emphasising the urgency of helping those in distress in the spirit of dedication and solidarity. The spirit of ‘mutual help’ was presented as the only way to fight against the cold, hunger, misery, discouragement, sadness and despair, to pass the winter and to look forward to better days in the spring.\textsuperscript{225}

Another broadcast with a similar message was transmitted through the radio the same day, featuring a speech by a teacher to his pupils. He spoke as a friend to the children because he knew them well and understood their current situation. He had been teaching for over 20 years in a village similar to many found across France. The present situation was caused by the defeat in 1940 and there were French today who suffered more than before and they were not to be forgotten: the prisoners, the widows, the orphans and the refugees. He stated that all French people had a duty to renew their efforts this year. Quoting the Maréchal’s message a few days earlier, he reiterated that youth was needed to rebuild France, youth action such as visiting people’s houses to collect donations in their cities, towns, villages and neighbourhoods. They needed to be polite and courteous but also assertive and persistent in order to get results. The teacher

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{223} Ibid., p. 206. \\
\textsuperscript{224} Ibid., pp. 206-7. \\
\textsuperscript{225} INA, Fonds Vichy, disques de la BDIC, \textit{Campagne d’hiver du Secours National}, recorded on 19.11.1941, on Radio Etat Français-Radiodiffusion Nationale. This programme was broadcast on 22.11.1941.
\end{flushright}
concluded that he knew he could count on the children to do their duty because of
their generous hearts.\textsuperscript{226}

On 27 November, Lamirand made a further announcement on the
airwaves. This speech was made on behalf of Pétain, addressing to the youth of
the Occupied Zone and the Forbidden Zone at the Vélodrome d’Hiver in Paris.
The youth in these zones were called to give three days of service to the French
community, especially to those who suffered the most: the prisoners of war, the
victims of war, the elderly and the children less fortunate than themselves. By
helping the efforts of organisations such as the Secours National, they would
demonstrate great solidarity against the threat of the winter and faith for France.\textsuperscript{227}
Lamirand announced that ‘this faith is matched only by the trust I have in you’.\textsuperscript{228}

As can be observed from these four broadcasts, they were made by
different people but in a short space of time and with striking similarities: they
were presented by people who were clearly sympathisers and supported Pétain’s
political views and ideology; the messages carried a clear signal that greater
efforts had been put into urging both youth and the general public to comply and
to act, and the targeted audience were the French in both zones. It was through
this continuous repetition that propaganda messages impregnated and convinced
the public.\textsuperscript{229} Due to the repetitiveness of the narratives of the broadcasts, new
elements were only highlighted after the first broadcast.

Youth was fundamental to Vichy’s vision for a New France, both
ideologically and at a practical level. It was, therefore, important to win the
support of the teachers who had direct contact and great influence over young
people, and a broadcast by a teacher was more effective than a generic news
column. France had a long tradition of mutual aid and solidarity within the
community but there were now clear signs of intensified efforts for nationwide
voluntary actions by both youth and the general public to combat the threat of
winter, in multiple zones of France. The Prefect report of November 1941
highlighted that this was the first time that the overall actions of all young people
were organised in the Occupied Zone. Good results were noted and the teachers

\textsuperscript{226} INA, Fonds Vichy, disques de la BDIC, \textit{Message d’un instituteur pour le Secours National},
recorded on 19.11.1941, on Radio Etat Français-Radiodiffusion Nationale. This programme was
broadcast on 22.11.1941.

\textsuperscript{227} Pétain, \textit{Discours aux Francais}, p. 207.

\textsuperscript{228} Ibid., p. 208.

worked loyally to ensure the success of this three-day-campaign as they organised
a large part of it, especially in smaller towns, although many prefects noted that
many youth lacked morality and had a sceptical and ‘laissez faire’ attitude.\footnote{230}

The ‘moral renaissance’ of pupils
Pétain visited schools on a number of occasions to preach about the ‘moral
renaissance’ of pupils; reports of his visits were broadcast on RN. During these
visits, he stressed the new moral values of honesty, integrity, loyalty and virtue to
schoolchildren in person, and by broadcasting the visits, RN had become an
effective tool of communication with all the children from the Empire. This was
part of a broader campaign to raise pupils’ moral standards and encourage them to
become intoxicated with the value of Vichy. Pupils were urged to form a ‘league
of loyalty’, and to display in their classes ‘honour codes’ that they would
undertake to follow.\footnote{231}

On 13 October, Masson presented a live news talk centred around Pétain’s
visits to a school in Périgny, a small village in the département of Allier. From his
introduction, it became clear that RN broadcast his visit so that all the children of
France would hear the Maréchal when he spoke to these pupils, and would feel his
presence. Périgny was chosen for a specific purpose as well; in Masson’s words, it
was because it hardly changed over time, and possessed all the virtues of a
traditional village with its 596 inhabitants.

Prior to Pétain’s arrival, Masson interviewed Mr Martel and his wife, both
teachers, and learned that there were 47 children in the school from 5 to 13 years
of age. Masson met with the children first, who looked a bit frightened at the
prospect of meeting the Maréchal, and explained that the Maréchal loved
disciplined children very much.

Once Pétain arrived, he explained why he chose this village, and that the
visit was to reward the pupils with his presence because the pupils studied
assiduously and the teachers were very good. Pétain continued with a compelling
speech to all the pupils of France to mark the start of the school year. The pupils
needed to know that he counted on them to help him rebuild France and to make

\footnote{230} La France dans la Deuxième Guerre mondiale - Edition des rapports du Militärbefehlshaber
Frankreich et des Synthèses des rapports des préfets, 1940-1944 (edited reports), available online
the French loyal and honest people. However, what mattered was not saying but acting on it. The pupils had obstacles in front of them and so he needed courageous boys and girls ready to take up the fight. The first obstacle was the challenge of tenacity. Pupils may have made a lot of ‘good resolutions’ but some were forgotten very rapidly at the start of the school year. The challenge was to try to keep their word until their resolution was achieved. Tenacity was a quality that Frenchmen lacked somewhat, but those who possessed it would be more successful than those who did not. The second obstacle was disloyalty. He was aware that some pupils could not resist the temptation of cheating to get some extra points, although he wanted to believe that most of the pupils did not cheat. Pupils should have the courage not only to remain honest but also to prevent others from cheating. Pétain was aware that some pupils had organised ‘Leagues of Loyalty’ and had a lot of success. He congratulated them for being proactive and he was sure that the teachers would advise and help them in this path. Even if you have cheated in the past, he said, you should redeem yourself by saying ‘no’ to it from now on. The children sang *La Marseillaise* at the end of his speech and at his departure from the school.

This broadcast was an example of the close relationship between Masson and Pétain: in the pre-talk, Masson gave a touching speech about how proud the pupils should be for meeting the Maréchal, as if he was a ‘quasi-divine figure’. A few observations can be made from the narratives. First, the village of Périgny was significant. The fact that both Pétain and Masson explained the reasons for their visit gave away its symbolic importance: a small, rural, unchanged place throughout the years where people’s lives remained little changed, and where good moral standing continued to flourish. The focus of the talk was on the pupils of primary age who had not come under the influence of the pursuit of ‘unhealthy pleasure’ which had started to dominate the youth of urban areas as well as rural areas, albeit to a lesser extent. Pétain was hoping to send a strong message to all school pupils that they must realise that they could be better than the adults because they were more adaptable, and they would play a more important role in

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the rebuilding of France. He preached about tenacity and honesty as well as the
creation of the league, reflecting both an idealised image of youth for Vichy and a
brushing-over of the problems which had started emerging for young people: low
morality, apathy and juvenile delinquency, the conviction rate of which increased
at an alarming speed from 1940 to 1942. 236 ‘Forgiveness’ was preached as a
given: as long as the pupils had corrected any misbehaviour voluntarily, it was all
forgotten and forgiven. As evidenced elsewhere, Vichy’s ‘moral renaissance’
began to decline as early as 18 February 1941. As Micheline Bood, an adolescent,
wrote in her diary, ‘Nothing has changed, in spite of the so-called “moral revival”.
The same things are done as before, only they are done more hypocritically.’ A
month later she added: ‘God, how fed up I am with school and the Révolution
Nationale’. 237

Vichy’s attempt at a moral renaissance of pupils was not restricted to the
Unoccupied Zone. Algeria was part of the French empire and to show its devotion
to Vichy’s policy, the oath of the pupils in Algeria to Pétain, the head of state for
this empire, was broadcast. 238

It began with an unidentified man’s voice speaking to the Maréchal: ‘you
asked schoolchildren to be honest and loyal in the classroom. The schools of
Algeria have listened and prove it’. 239 The children of Algiers then sang a song to
the glory of the Maréchal and France, followed by an oath:

I swear to be loyal, that is to say, honest, sincere, frank at all times and in
all places, I swear it!
I swear not to copy in class and not to defraud in composition and exams. I
swear it!
I swear to always tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. I
swear.

Now you are bound by your oath, will you break it? No! 240

236 Ibid., p. 182.
237 Ibid., p. 184; Micheline Bood, Les années doubles: Journal d’une lycéenne sous l’occupation
238 INA, Fonds Vichy, disques de la BDIC, Serment de la ligue de loyauté des écoliers d’Algérie,
recorded on 01.01.1941, on Radio Etat Français-Radiodiffusion Nationale. The exact date of
recording and broadcasting are unknown.
239 Ibid.
240 Ibid.
The schoolchildren recited the oath in a boisterous manner. At the conclusion of the ceremony, the pupils shouted out ‘For France! Ready!’, followed by *La Marseillaise*.\(^{241}\)

Taking an oath was part of Vichy’s attempt at moral revival, although it was an obsolete custom in France as Marcel Déat, the founder of the Rassemblement National Populaire (RNP), a collaborationist party in early 1941, observed. Oaths were taken by schoolchildren, by the Légion des volontaires français (LVF),\(^{242}\) and by athletes.\(^{243}\) To what extent the oaths imposed on schoolchildren had achieved the desired ‘moral renaissance’ remained questionable, but for many it was nothing more than lip service. As Hall argued, attempts to set up ‘moral codes’ were doomed to fail at a time when cheating and lying to trick the Germans ‘had almost become a patriotic duty’.\(^{244}\) A headmaster of a school in Marseille declared that dishonesty continued unabated despite admonitions made to schoolchildren. Denunciation was encouraged outside school as well.\(^{245}\)

If the pupils of the Unoccupied Zone were indoctrinated by this constant call of ‘moral renaissance’, the pupils of the Occupied Zone had a very different experience under German occupation and showed different perceptions of Pétain and Vichy as the legitimate government of France. The following broadcast features an interview with French young people and their teachers, when a group of boys were visiting the Unoccupied Zone for a summer camp after having met the Maréchal.\(^{246}\)

The broadcast began with a reporter conducting an interview with a boy, whose parents lived in Lille, and he said that he was happy to come to Vichy. There was, however, hardly any enthusiasm in his response. The reporter then interviewed a physical education teacher who accompanied the boys. The teacher explained that the pupils were very tired after a long journey to Vichy town, but

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\(^{241}\) Ibid.


\(^{244}\) Halls, *The Youth of Vichy France*, p. 179.

\(^{245}\) Ibid.

\(^{246}\) INA, Fonds Vichy, disques de la BDIC, *Pétain reçoit des enfants en vacances à Vichy*, recorded on 01.01.1941, on Radio Etat Français-Radiodiffusion Nationale. The actual date of the broadcast is unknown and was archived as 01.01.41 but it could be gauged from the content of the broadcast that it was recorded around the month of September.
they were satisfied with their stay in Vichy because there was plenty of food: some young boys had gained 2kg to 3kg. The children were distressed because they knew that food was plentiful in the summer camp but once they returned home, they would have to face food shortages again. One teacher said that he was ready to lose his vacation to work in the summer camp with the children. Another teacher who was eating a cake said that she went for a walk with the children and taught them some songs.

During the interviews, the reporter emphasised the importance of spending three weeks in the camp to find fitness, plenty of good food and various activities to entertain the children. The reporter then asked a 13-year-old boy if he was happy to have met the Maréchal. The boy responded in a soft voice. The reporter insisted that the boy repeat his answer with greater enthusiasm which the boy complied. However, it became apparent that despite all the efforts of the reporter to make the boys talk, he found unwilling participants who made numerous long and awkward silences during the interviews. The most common answer from the children was ‘yes sir’. In his last attempt, the reporter insisted that one boy should tell everyone that he met the Maréchal up close and personal once he returned home, but there was no audible response to it. The broadcast ended with the reporter’s frustrated voice, ‘I have had enough, we will be able to do the editing’.  

This ending to the recording made it unlikely that it was used unedited on air. As the reporter’s comment suggested, the content of this broadcast would either be edited or was never aired at all because of the lack of enthusiasm of the children during the interviews. There is a stark contrast of the responses of French youth to Pétain in the two zones. It would seem from this particular broadcast that the children from the Occupied Zone were much less impressed or enthusiastic than those from the Unoccupied Zone. One cannot rule out the possibility that the enthusiasm, behaviour, and attitudes displayed by the children in the Unoccupied Zone in the broadcasts were staged for propaganda purposes, but no evidence could be found in the edited broadcasts available in the archives. In the Unoccupied Zone, the young people were always very enthusiastic in their responses to Pétain; when interviewing them, the propagandists only aired what

\[247\] Ibid.
\[248\] Ibid.
they wanted the public to hear. However, children’s enthusiasm for Pétain as displayed in the broadcasts was not necessarily a reflection of how they felt about their participation in youth groups, sports or working in the fields as part of the regeneration of France.

Children living in the Unoccupied Zone viewed their lives very differently to those who lived in the Occupied Zone, where the occupier was present and where the prospect of starvation, among other things, was much more acute. In this case, the teachers would appear more than eager to participate in the interview and to express their enjoyment of the ‘good’ life of the camp; however, not all teachers were always keen to participate in such events, or liked engaging the children in the presence of the Maréchal. 249

**Sports as a means to cultivate the strength of youth**

Sport occupied an important place in the RN programmes, as evidenced in *Radio National*’s weekly schedule. 250 It is likely that major sporting events which featured heavily on *Radio National* were broadcast on RN, although very few of such broadcasts survived. 251 Vichy tried to promote sports and athletic activities to serve its political agenda as soon as it took power. In this section, the lack of narratives from broadcasts is compensated by the printed articles in *Radio National* to give a fuller picture of how sports were reported to inspire youth and to foster their physical and mental strength. As detailed in the introduction of this thesis, the nature of the *Radio National* magazine makes it possible to infer the content of the broadcasts from the printed articles for event reportage.

The organisation and broadcasting of major sporting events served as a testimony of Vichy’s achievement in the pursuit of (what the regime called) national rejuvenation as it showed the sheer number of youth demonstrating their strength, patriotism and unity. 252 Vichy’s success in this area made the German occupiers suspicious. Military sports involved demanding physical training under

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249 Halls, *The Youth of Vichy France*, p. 15.
250 For example, it was announced in ARF, *Radio National*, 7-13 septembre 1941 that Georges Briquet would present sports in *Radiodiffusion* from 18h05-18h10 on 13 September.
strenuous conditions and was ‘highly relevant to future military service’. This kind of event served to foster and cultivate the spirit of nationalism among the young participants as well as the audience at large in the Unoccupied Zone. As one of the army officers who organised the event said to the journalist, ‘the charter of physical education, sports and sporting military training in the army has laid the principles of a new regulation in which the idea and the value of sports are no longer separated from the military idea and value’.

In July 1941, Jacques Breteuil wrote an article about the story of the discovery of the caves of Aven d’Orgnac to promote risk-taking, hard work, teamworking skills, courage and strength to young people. These were key qualities that were needed in the new youth for the rebuilding of France, qualities that Vichy was keen to foster and encourage.

In August, J.P. wrote about a major event taking place at the Municipal Stadium of Vichy town which would welcome the first of a series of similar events, allowing the public to witness the renewal of the young French army; a display of muscles, and youth in uniform in the presence of Pétain and Jean Borotra as commissioner to the General Education and Sports among other VIP guests. Articles of such a nature were used extensively to demonstrate the renewed French youth in action as a way to feature the idealised outcome of what was expected of youth.

A similar sporting event took place on 7 September at 14h45, also at the Municipal Stadium of Vichy town, when Jean Borotra presented the Collège National de Moniteurs d’Antibes to Pétain. The purpose was to demonstrate the different activities for teaching physical education which would be applied to all the schools from the following October.

Radio National dedicated a full-page article about this event with five photos of athletes throwing javelins, performing the high jump and hurdling etc. The team had previously toured North Africa and was cheered upon, the reporter wrote. The event began with a choir and was followed by a demonstration of various sports activities of an exceptional quality. There was then a friendly

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254 ARF, Radio National, 31 août-6 septembre 1941.
256 Ibid., 31 août-6 septembre 1941. The initials were used as a pseudonym.
257 Giolitto, Histoire de la jeunesse, p. 111.
258 ARF, Radio National, 7-13 septembre 1941.
competition between the best athletes of the College and their counterparts from Paris, Marseille, Lyon, La Rochelle, Tarbes, Tourcoing, etc. All the proceeds would be given to the Secours National on the last day of the ‘Croisade de l’Enfance’. The reporter explains that all these activities served only one goal: to train men who would put into practice what the General Commissioner had proposed, ‘to be strong to serve better’.\(^{259}\) This event also signified the first step towards ‘sports days’ which would be later organised in the main cities of the Unoccupied Zone.\(^{260}\)

By these sport events Vichy wanted to promote sport and to encourage people to join in the celebration. There are several overt messages in these articles: France remains united, with athletes from both the Occupied and the Unoccupied Zones participating in the events; funding raised for the Secours National should show the cohesion and unity of the New France. More importantly, these sport activities united youth, the public and those in need in one cause.

The oath by the athletes was another way to instill nationalist emotions towards Vichy. R.E.B. wrote a short article about the ceremony, which took place in Marseille in the presence of l’Amiral Darlan and Borotra, and which involved the participation of 16,000 young French people who paraded in a ‘more or less’ spectacular fashion.\(^{261}\) The athlete Pau Peyre swore the oath: ‘I swear on my honour to participate in sport with impartiality, discipline and loyalty, to better myself and better serve my country’\(^{262}\).

The oath by the athletes was first pronounced on 29 April 1941 during the tour of Borotra in North Africa. Later on, it was said that the athlete oath became controversial because the athletes saluted the national colours in a way that was similar to Hitler's salute. In fact, the Olympic salute had been codified in France for many years although it surprised the Germans during the opening parade of the Berlin Games in 1936.\(^{263}\) The ceremony of the ‘oath’ was similar to that of school pupils, and both demonstrated that Vichy propaganda sought to portray the

\(^{259}\) Ibid.
\(^{260}\) Ibid.
\(^{261}\) Ibid., 21-27 septembre 1941. The initials were used as a pseudonym.
\(^{262}\) Ibid.
popularity of sports, fitness and strength among French youth, representing the image of a strong and fit nation.
2.4 The year 1942

Pierre Pucheu, Secretary of State for the interior, made a comment to Colonel Groussard at the end of December 1941 that ‘the more order reigns in a country, the stronger this country will be. The more strength Germany feels in us, the more she will respect us’. It had now become clear that the Vichy regime would intensify its youth propaganda to ensure increased youth participation in the construction of the New France. As highlighted in the BBC report of January 1942, Vichy started targeting the disillusioned unemployed youth immediately after the armistice. Their propaganda efforts increased shortly thereafter to promote the vision and the ideology of the new regime, using tools such as the radio, the press, the youth-led display of ‘personal action’; flattery and the description of youth movement uniforms; the activities in the camps and various youth rallies. This report also quoted the opinion of a French man who wrote to the BBC to say that ‘the Ministry of Youth ... has been the most efficiently organised (1.1.41)’. 6 December 1941 marked a milestone in the Second World War when America entered the war. Laval’s return to power in April 1942 meant that French youth would be targeted even more by Vichy propaganda, not least because of the acute labour shortage, but also due to the renewed importance of luring young people into collaboration.

Demonstration of youth in action

Following Pétain’s address on 13 October 1941 at Périgny, numerous letters were sent to him. A group of young people belonging to the Chantiers were involved in helping to sort and distribute the letters in a youth hostel in Hauterive, near Vichy. In January, Champetier accompanied Pétain to visit these young people and broadcast the reportage.

Prior to Pétain’s arrival, Champetier explained that the refectory at the youth hostel had been divided into three areas, looking like a post office sorting room. There were huge piles of bags full of letters in each corner, and two long
tables with a dozen young people from the Chantiers, in their forest-green uniform, busy sorting the mail in the middle of the room.\textsuperscript{268}

Champetier then interviewed Maurien, the Assistant Commissioner and head of the \textit{Détachement}, who explained that the Chantiers of Chatelguyon had a responsibility to open letters on behalf of Pétain and sort them. So far, 1,700,000 letters had been received since his address. Mr Brisse, the foreman in charge of youth supervision, also explained that the young people were tasked with identifying the return address, so that each child of France would receive a response, and to sort the letters according to their point of origin. There were also drawings, works of art, money and other items of value in the letters; all monetary donations were sent to the Secours National.\textsuperscript{269}

This part of the reportage demonstrated Pétain’s popularity among the French: the listeners would be impressed by the voluminous amount of letters (over 1.7 million). The Chantiers who were chosen to perform this honourable task of opening the letters further emphasised the important role youth occupied in the construction of New France. The description of the green uniform of the Chantiers enabled the listeners to visualise the youth as symbols of growth, freshness, hope and harmony. The message that these letters originated from all corners of France and her Empire created an impression of the allegiance of the population to the head of the Vichy regime. The report about the donations was meant to show the faith and trust the French had in the Vichy government which pledged to help the population in need.

Maurien then read a ‘randomly picked’ letter as an example of French youth’s affection for the Maréchal. This letter was written by José, a 12-year-old boy, living in the Oise region:

\textit{I have understood that it would mainly depend on the efforts of young French, that is to say, the schoolchildren of France. I, therefore, resolved to apply myself in my homework and learn my lessons seriously. I followed the advice, your advice and those of the mistress, and I will behave better. I have made efforts in mathematics, and especially I missed much less classes than the previous years. Your portrait is displayed at the school. It reminds me every}

\textsuperscript{268} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{269} Ibid.
moment that I have to be honest and I cannot say to you that I have always been. I am going to try to improve. The mistress repeats all the time that it is more meritorious to earn a point on its own than five points by copying a neighbour. I am going to strive to be more honest after acquiring greater love for my work. I express to you my gratitude for all that you do for us and I beg you to accept my respects.²⁷⁰

Champetier commended the boy for being so honest in his writing.²⁷¹

Maurien stated that the letter read out was chosen at random but was representative of the feelings of the pupils all across France and her Empire. We do not know whether the letter was randomly chosen or carefully selected; however, the content of the letter was in perfect harmony with the speech of the Maréchal to all pupils in 1941, where he instructed the pupils to be honest, not to cheat and to work hard. This letter showed an indoctrinated pupil who pledged to follow the politics of the Vichy regime. This voice of this young boy is essentially the voice Vichy would hope to hear from all French youth, although this voice in unison was nothing more than an idealist illusion.

The second part of the reportage begins with Pétain and Ménétrel’s arrival at the youth hostel. Champetier explained that the sorting of the letters started on 5 January, and many letters contain children’s wishes to the Maréchal for a Happy New Year. Some letters were asking for help, and these would be referred to the Medical Service. The amount of money received so far amounted to 50,000 francs.²⁷²

As evidenced elsewhere, despite all the moral and material difficulties, children wrote letters from school to Pétain at Christmas. It was said that ‘in 1940 some 200 post-bags arrived, accompanied by a million drawings on the theme of France’²⁷³ which resulted in 10,000 of the best drawings being displayed in Vichy town. The large number of letters and offerings revealed the effect of a ‘father figure’ image which was built up by propagandists, and also how the omnipresent propaganda served to draw children into this idolatry, particularly during the

²⁷⁰ Ibid.
²⁷¹ Ibid.
²⁷² Ibid.
²⁷³ Halls, The Youth of Vichy France, p. 14. In this case, Halls consulted the newspaper La Croix of February 1941 as primary source to substantiate the veracity of such a claim.
Christmas holidays of both 1940 and 1941. Donations, particularly large sums, were always acknowledged in the broadcast and pledged to be re-directed for charitable purposes. In this reportage, a unique feature is the lack of input from the children themselves. As compared to earlier broadcasts, only the voices of the journalist, the authoritative figures and Pétain himself were heard, although this may be attributed to the quality of the disk which is extremely deteriorated, rendering some parts inaudible.

To demonstrate the lived experience of the young people involved in youth groups, Pierre des Vallières wrote an article at Radio National about the camp of the Chantiers in January, which merits closer examination. No one had tried harder than General de la Porte du Theil to make the Chantiers something exceptional, he claimed. There were a total of 52 groups scattered around the Unoccupied Zone, each having their special focus depending on the geography and the needs of the locality, for example, grape-picking. The Chantiers would practise ‘Hébertisme’ (more details of which are explained below) as a morning exercise, take care of the horses, cook, wash and sow, or write to their fiancée. Others listened to the radio or read books in the library. There was always a sense of rivalry as each group tried to outperform the rest of the groups. Des Vallières concluded that the camp was the place where youth could lead a healthy and active life with the entire community and where reluctant and hostile youth were transformed into real men. At the end of the day, the teams would gather around the flag as it went down.

This article illustrated the utopian lives of young people in a camp. In reality, the conditions could be harsh and demanding, especially during the winter season. This is where youth learned how to live in a community, work as a team and develop their physical skills. ‘Hébertisme’ was an activity named after Lieutenant Hébert, who invented it during the Great War for French soldiers. It was used extensively by both the Chantiers and the Compagnons. It consisted of ‘walking, swimming, running, jumping, crawling, climbing, balancing, throwing, lifting, and self-defence’. Hébert argued that there was a link between the body and the mind and they could not be dissociated as one influenced the other. This method

274 Ibid.
275 ARF, Radio National, 4-10 janvier 1942.
276 Halls, The Youth of Vichy France, p. 199.
was seen as a vital element of moral regeneration and character development by Vichy for the youth.\textsuperscript{277}

Unsurprisingly, not all youth enjoyed the harsh living conditions at the camp, as the Prefects’ report of January observed. Morality in different youth camps was varied, and in a number of places, low temperatures caused a significant drop in the morale compared to previous months.\textsuperscript{278} Nonetheless, after a day of hard work, the various youth groups would all muster around the pole where they were united under one symbol, the French flag, despite the living conditions.

A further broadcast was made about the Chantiers in July.\textsuperscript{279} It was a reportage presented by Champetier, who accompanied Pétain during his inspection of the Chantiers’ facilities in the Forêt de Randan. Group 21 (or group ‘Galliéni’) would receive the honour of Pétain’s visit. There were a hundred young men and women who came from far away to meet with him. Boisterous acclamations from the young were heard repeatedly. The Maréchal appeared in his military uniform, which he wore during official visits, accompanied by the Commissioner General de La Porte Du Theil and the Commissioner of Group 21. After visiting the facilities, Pétain spoke briefly to the Chantiers, who greeted his speech with vibrant and disciplined enthusiasm. Pétain said that he would like to write a letter to tell them all the ideas and emotions that came to him while visiting their camp. They were making wonderful preparations for their personal development and reflection. Their current experience was the best training they could receive. The government would continue to seek ways to provide young people with the most fruitful way to furnish their minds and body, and Randan was a perfect example of what he was looking for. The broadcast ended with the song \textit{Ce n’est qu’un au-revoir}, which was sung in unison by the Chantiers at his departure.\textsuperscript{280}

During the visit, Champetier spent a generous amount of time introducing background information, all of which clearly served a political purpose. He

\textsuperscript{277} Ibid., p. 199; Giolitto, \textit{Histoire de la jeunesse}, pp. 181-2.


\textsuperscript{279} INA, Fonds Vichy, disques de la BDIC, \textit{PETAIN dans les Chantiers de jeunesse de RANDAN}, recorded on 01.01.1942, on Radio Etat Français-Radiodiffusion Nationale. This recording date is 1 January and the broadcasting date is 28 July 1942.

\textsuperscript{280} Ibid.
described in some detail the uniform worn by Pétain and the Chantiers. The fact that Pétain was wearing his uniform for official visits highlighted the importance of the Chantiers: the facilities and activities they offered to youth played a crucial role in the rebuilding of the New France. Champetier introduced Pétain as the hero of Verdun who had unity at heart and was totally devoted to France. In his speech Pétain emphasised the importance of practical training which the youth were acquiring in the camp. This was in line with the ideology of the new education system where practical skills and physical activities were seen as an integral part of both formal and skills related education.

The Compagnons was another important youth group, which was founded by Henri Dhavernas,\footnote{Unpublished Memoirs BNF.} a young inspector of finances, who was replaced in the autumn of 1941 by Colonel de Tournemire.\footnote{Paxton, Vichy France, p. 163.} Dhavernas immediately received official financial support, allowing him to organise the first Compagnons’ camp from 1 to 4 August 1940 at Randan, near Vichy.\footnote{Halls, The Youth of Vichy France, p. 267.} It was a voluntary youth group for boys of 15 to 20 years of age and existed alongside other organisations for the same age group in the Unoccupied Zone, mostly church groups and scout organisations.\footnote{Paxton, Vichy France, p. 161.} As Pétain said to the Compagnons in September 1941, they were ‘supposed to be the “avant-garde of the National Revolution”’.\footnote{Ibid.} There were different kinds of ‘companies’ within the Compagnons group: rural companies, which put the young unemployed to farm work; city companies, which were charged with uniting all social classes; and itinerant companies, which were made up of young artisans and included a theatre company.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 161-2.}

A broadcast recorded in July 1942 on the occasion of the second anniversary of the Compagnons explained in some detail the origin, purpose and success of this organisation.\footnote{INA, Fonds Vichy, disques de la BDIC, Discours aux Chantiers de jeunesse de RANDAN, recorded on 26.06.1942, on Radio Etat Français-Radiodiffusion Nationale. From the context of broadcast, it seems it was recorded on 26.07.1942 instead.} Leaders of various social circles and professional bodies met to discuss the development and future of the significant youth movement in France. The only question which was to be asked about the Compagnons, said the speaker, was this:
By what means can we survive, so as to go back up the hill which we
descended in a freefall in June 1940? What is the education system which
should be rightly imposed on the youth? For the movement, the fatherland
commands in absolute terms, unconditionally, with respect and dedication.
It is therefore necessary to raise the young in this conviction, which they
have to defend, safeguard, no matter what.288

The journalist continued his live presentation with military music in the
background. He emphasised the popularity of the Compagnons. At first, there
were 150 pioneers in the Forêt de Randan when the Maréchal visited them in
August 1940, now the Compagnons had 30,000 members from France and the
Empire, imbued with enthusiasm.289 Today, on 27 July, the second anniversary of
the organisation was celebrated in its birthplace with a far greater number of
participants: 3,000 Compagnons were expected but 7,000 attended from all the
provinces of France, Algeria and Tunisia, using all possible means of
transportation, some even by walking a long distance, all dressed up in blue. The
occasion was marked with the informal visit of the Maréchal, who came as a
‘neighbour’, wearing a simple grey suit rather than his uniform. Both the head of
state and Colonel de Tournemire watched the new youth of France marching on
the great alley of the forest, with the leader of each provincial delegation carrying
a white urn containing some soil of that province. Later on, the soil would be
mixed together and each group would bring back a bag containing the mixed soil,
which represented the land of France. The demonstration was followed by a
performance by folk groups, whose participants wore traditional costumes. Then
the offerings were brought in, including a sheep, silk pieces, flowers and perfume.
A number of provinces were represented, including Provence, Languedoc,
Lyonnais, Bourgogne, Franche-Comté and Tunisia. This spectacular parade lasted
over 45 minutes. The Compagnons cheered when the Maréchal addressed his
audience.290 He declared that his message was essentially about honour and the
accomplishment of one’s duties, and this was similar to a ‘catechism’ that one

288 Ibid.
290 At this point, the recording is of poor quality and some parts of the speech were inaudible.
needed to embrace from an early age. Invariably, he repeated to the youth: ‘try to
do the tasks that you have to do in the best possible way … If you manage to do
very well what you have to do, France will rise by itself’.\(^\text{291}\) This concluded the
broadcast, with applause, cheers and vivas from the crowd.\(^\text{292}\)

The celebration of the anniversary of the Compagnons highlighted the
ideology of the Vichy government behind the creation of this youth group, and its
perceived success and popularity. Pétain was open about the principles which he
wanted young people to accept and reflect: follow his vision and messages, and
France would rise up again. For youth, there was no room for creativity,
imagination or space to choose their own destiny. They were asked to accept, not
to discuss; to act, not to question. As stated in the First Commandment for Good
Compagnons, something of a bible for this youth organisation: ‘Since we are not
fully informed, we submit ourselves unreservedly to the Marshal and we refuse to
discuss any decision taken by him in the political sphere. We follow the Marshal
submissively in any political decision he may take’ (26.7.41).\(^\text{293}\)

The large number of attendees from both the provinces and the Empire
featured in the broadcast should demonstrate to the RN listeners that the French
youth supported Vichy ‘en masse’; youth that Vichy had tried to reign in and
control.

The colour of the clothes and the offerings were important. The
Compagnons were all wearing blue, a symbol for conservativeness, trust and
authority. The unity in colour also represents their unity in faith. Blue is one of the
colours of the French flag which makes it a symbol for nationalism and
patriotism. Pétain was wearing a grey suit as a civilian, which was in contrast to
his wearing full military uniform when he visited the Chantiers. This may be
attributed to the fact that the Compagnons was a voluntary organisation and his
participation in their anniversary event represented his acknowledgement and
endorsement of the organisation as the head of the state rather than as a high-
ranked officer, although military music was played in the background, giving
away the quasi-military nature of the event. The offerings sessions had become a
custom during Pétain’s visit as the gifts represented the respect of the population

\(^{291}\) INA, Fonds Vichy, disques de la BDIC, Discours aux Chantiers de jeunesse de RANDAN,
recorded on 26.06.1942, on Radio Etat Français-Radiodiffusion Nationale.
\(^{292}\) Ibid.
\(^{293}\) BBC WAC, E2/188/1, 23 January 1942 (European Intelligence Papers).
for the father figure through the hands of those who were – according to Vichy ideology – destined to rejuvenate France. Offerings came in all kinds and shapes; in this occasion, sheep and other items.

Although the broadcast depicted the Compagnons as an attractive and positive youth organisation, the perception of those who worked closely with the organisation or the members themselves could be very different. As early as February 1942, the Prefect’s report of the Unoccupied Zone noted the individualism displayed by most youth which prevented their development: despite their enthusiasm during the fortnight of the Secours National, their behaviour left much to be desired.294 A Compagnon stated that ‘in the Compagnons it’s not very interesting because one doesn’t learn much, and, what’s more, one becomes more of a layabout than a worker’.295 The Compagnons were described by an outsider as ‘idle fellows, badly looked after, badly fed … thefts, burglaries, etc … They couldn’t care less’.296 A report highlighted in some instances that ‘fifty out of sixty Compagnons here are for de Gaulle’.297 Despite Pétain and Vichy propagandists’ efforts to keep the youth as close followers, there was an anti-Vichy undercurrent among the Compagnons themselves and in other Youth camps.

Vichy and the teachers
With the return of Laval to head the government in April 1942, Carcopino left his position as the Minister of National Education and returned to his permanent post as Director of the Ecole Normale Supérieure. His departure marked a turning point in Vichy’s education policy towards young people, from constructive reform, the perseverance of political neutrality of schools and the pursuit of good faith under the ideology of the National Revolution, to hypocrisy and overt subservience to the Germans and their ideology. Carcopino was replaced by Abel Bonnard, who would remain in this function until August 1944.298

296 Ibid.
297 Ibid.
298 Ibid., pp. 32-3.
This change in educational ideology could be observed in the broadcasts and the written press. After April, there was a sea-change in policy so that the propaganda addressed to teachers no longer sought merely to instill the National Revolution but reconciliation and subtle conversion to the alliance of Germany’s ‘New Order’ in Europe.\textsuperscript{299} Instead of hostility and criticism, Bonnard publicly declared at Lille that ‘teachers had not been responsible for the defeat’\textsuperscript{300} of France. On 28 August, he made a ‘forgive and forget’ broadcast, stating that he had no interest in teachers’ former opinions.\textsuperscript{301}

This policy of reconciliation was reflected in Pétain’s address to teachers on 3 September in a broadcast which was aired at 13h45.\textsuperscript{302} Champetier reported the visit, announcing that the Maréchal would be addressing the thousand teachers from both Unoccupied and Occupied Zones waiting in the schoolyard of the lycée Jules Ferry in Vichy. The Maréchal was accompanied by Laval, Bonnard and other high-ranking officials. A short while later, Pétain started his speech, declaring that the previous message from the Minister of National Education was remarkable and that they should read and meditate on it. Meanwhile, his thoughts for the teachers came back more often or more willingly,\textsuperscript{303} because he himself was a teacher for the soldiers when he was an officer. ‘In all military commands that I presided, from the most modest to the highest, I have always had the desire and wish to join the men who depended on me, to make them understand me, and to gain their trust.’\textsuperscript{304}

Pétain declared that trust could not be commanded, it had to be earned; no one would be better qualified to win the confidence of youth than their teachers. He knew it as he fulfilled such a function in the army. Now it was in this capacity as a teacher that he allowed himself to give them some advice:\textsuperscript{305}

\textit{Teachers of France, it is you who, in the nation today, train the nation of tomorrow. You are both educators and instructors. You take charge of the

\textsuperscript{299} Ibid., p. 127.
\textsuperscript{300} Ibid., p. 128.
\textsuperscript{301} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{302} Pétain, \textit{Discours aux Français}, pp. 272-5. The speech was made at 11h00 and broadcast at 13h45 the same day.
\textsuperscript{303} INA, Fonds Vichy, disques de la BDIC, \textit{Message aux instituteurs de France}, recorded on 03.09.1942, on Radio État Français-Radiodiffusion Nationale.
\textsuperscript{304} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{305} Ibid.
child to form a man in him. Let them grow for the health and the greatness of France; these little French that the fatherland puts in your hands.\textsuperscript{306}

At the conclusion of his address, the children sang \textit{Maréchal, nous voilà!}\textsuperscript{307}

Pétain was dressed in civilian clothes although he referred extensively to his role in the military. To him, there was no difference between teaching soldiers or teaching children. The essence of education remained the same: trust from pupils was essential and could not be achieved unless the teachers had great affection and love for the pupils and for what they did. By using himself as an example, he implied that every teacher possessed the ability to command victory in their mission of educating the generation of the future. He urged the teachers to follow his example, attempting to convert them to be part of his alliance. This was a clear shift from blaming the teachers for the defeat of France to seeking their collaboration and allegiance as a new strategy necessitated by the low morality and apathy of the pupils, as previously discussed.

\textit{Maréchal, nous voilà!} is a song dedicated to Pétain, expressing the affection of the people in the Unoccupied Zone towards Pétain. Dompnier states that the popularity of the song was a powerful symbol of the support given to Pétain. Although the title of the song is addressed to the Maréchal, its lyrics played a role in indoctrinating the youth about the National Revolution, reinforcing its popular slogans. It played a similar function to \textit{La Marseillaise}, although it could not be considered a national anthem due to the political situation in France.\textsuperscript{308} Everyone in the Unoccupied Zone knew \textit{Maréchal, nous voilà!}, especially the children, who learned it at school and in youth organisations, and sang it in public ceremonies especially when Pétain was present.\textsuperscript{309} The song was also played on the radio on many occasions.\textsuperscript{310}

\textsuperscript{307} INA, Fonds Vichy, disques de la BDIC, \textit{Message aux instituteurs de France}, recorded on 03.09.1942, on Radio État Français-Radiodiffusion Nationale.
\textsuperscript{308} Dompnier, ‘Entre La Marseillaise et Maréchal, nous voilà!, pp. 70-1.
\textsuperscript{309} Ibid., pp. 73, 84-8; \textit{Maréchal, nous voilà!} available online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=synfcZIQ1HY (7 July 2016).
\textsuperscript{310} See for example, INA, Fonds Vichy, disques de la BDIC, Aubusson accueille Pétain, recorded on 20.06.1941, on Radio État Français-Radiodiffusion Nationale; INA, Fonds Vichy, disques de la BDIC, Pétain à Aix-les-Bains, recorded on 22.09.1941, on Radio État Français-Radiodiffusion Nationale; INA, Fonds Vichy, disques de la BDIC, \textit{Maréchal PETAIN: voyage à Clermont-
A week after Pétain’s address at Jules Ferry primary school, Léon J. Gros wrote an article in *Radio National* commenting the future duties of the teachers for educating young people.\(^{311}\) Gros reproduced a segment of Pétain’s speech to assert the shift in the official position regarding teachers: ‘*I am committed to returning to your profession the dignity it deserves. I want you to feel honoured, and that the conditions of your life be sufficiently assured so that you are able to forget about them and devote yourself to your job*’.\(^{312}\)

He commented that this simple statement signalled an end to the intellectual and material injustice towards the teachers during the Third Republic, a gesture now endorsed by Laval. Gros interpreted the message contained in this broadcast: teachers were to be forgiven for their past mistakes for allowing individualism to spread. The Third Republic was the real culprit for having created an oligarchy for the sole interest of their politics and money, and the teachers had been manipulated and betrayed by this politics.\(^{313}\)

It was common practice for *Radio National* to reproduce and comment on important broadcasts in printing so that their audience, whether having listened to the broadcast or not, could have the opportunity to comprehend the important message the leaders of the state wished to convey. In this case, the essence of the interpretation is that the failure in education was the failure of the regime, not the teachers’. RN called for reconciliation and collaboration and acceptance of the new education ideology of Vichy. The material hardship endured by teachers and the schools were reported elsewhere; for example, in the Prefects’ reports of the Unoccupied Zone of February 1942, it was noted that teachers’ salaries were so low that some resigned as soon as they found a better-paid job; that classrooms

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\(^{312}\) *ARF, Radio National*, 13-19 septembre 1942.

\(^{313}\) Ibid.
were not heated in several départements and there was a serious deterioration in pupils’ work due to undernourishment.314

A further broadcast was recorded on 13 September during Pétain’s visit to Bourg-en-Bresse, where he met a number of officials and professionals including a school inspector and two headteachers.

When meeting with the Inspector of the Academy of the département of Ain, Pétain reminded him of the admonition he had given to the teachers a few days before.315 The inspector declared that the staff members accepted and followed his admonition with great interest; that pupils read his messages with the highest attention and learned them by heart so that they could put them into practice; that Maréchal’s messages were regularly published in the newsletters of the primary schools.316 ‘So you are my best propagandist’, Pétain said, to which the Inspector responded, ‘Yes, Mr Maréchal, I believe so.’317

Pétain was then introduced to two headmasters, one from a secondary school for boys and one for girls. He asked them about the general spirit of the pupils. Before the headmaster could give an answer, Pétain expressed his disgust about the situation in some secondary schools in Paris where some pupils misbehaved, and sometimes there was even a black market (in school) encouraged by parents. The headmistress promptly assured the Maréchal that such a practice did not exist here.318 Pétain asserted that he would ‘hit it on the head’319 if he knew of anything, because the black market was shameless and it had to be stopped. To tolerate this would mean the general morality had become ‘disgusting’.320

One observation that could be made from this broadcast is that Pétain spoke over everybody else as he usually did, and spoke as if everyone agreed with him. His authority was never challenged in any reportage. In the conversation with the headmistress, Pétain asked her a question about her pupils but was not

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315 The date and content of the admonition were unknown. From the context of the broadcast it seems to be linked to poor behaviour of pupils in some schools.
316 INA, Fonds Vichy, disques de la BDIC, Deuxième journée à Bourg-En-Bresse, recorded on 13.09.1942, on Radio État Français-Radiodiffusion Nationale.
317 Ibid.
318 Ibid.
319 Ibid.
320 Ibid.
interested in her answers. He was simply making a point expressing how displeased he was with the situation in Paris, and was seeking reassurance that nothing of this kind would be tolerated in the Unoccupied Zone. There was never any disagreement between Pétain and any of the delegates that he spoke to, and everyone was keen to show that they agreed with him.

Despite the positive images Vichy was presenting on the airwaves of RN about its politics and achievement regarding education, it was evidenced that the real situation at school was far from ideal. As reported by the prefect of the département of the North on 2 January and 2 March 1942, schoolchildren lacked moral sense because they skipped school to go to the cinema or took money from the café tills. Apathy was noticeable in the Unoccupied Zone where the population had not suffered the same rigours as imposed by the occupiers.  

Although there were only a few surviving broadcasts on the topic of schools and teachers, it could be observed that despite the fluctuation in public opinion about Pétain and Vichy in 1942, the propaganda style to the general public was very much ‘business as usual’. Despite a departure from using the teachers as the scapegoat for the defeat of France, Vichy pursued a ‘carrot and stick’ policy to lure the teachers into collaboration. Only the most collaborative teachers and pupils were represented in the broadcasts and accompanying publication, while any contention or disagreement were swept under the carpet. There was no opportunity to discuss, debate or challenge the official position.

Sports to inspire youth
The Commissariat Général à l’Education Générale et aux Sports, since its inception, had focused on the promotion of three particular types of sports: skiing, mountaineering and gliding. Mountaineering was considered an exemplary sport as it was particularly conducive to Vichy’s education policy: it required strength, endurance and strong will, and cultivated teamwork and moral responsibility. Promotion of outdoor sports to the young people was made via a variety of means including broadcasting via the RN. The date and time of some of the broadcasts were announced in articles in Radio National either before and/or after the event.

322 Gay-Lescot, Sport et Education sous Vichy, pp. 44-5.
Multiple articles were written in *Radio National* that demonstrated Vichy’s efforts to indoctrinate young people about the pursuit of sports and physical challenges to nurture their body and mind to prepare them for the future challenges of restoring France. The following represented some of the examples with sufficient details to exemplify how propagandists used sports to inspire youth.

In April, des Vallières wrote an article about ‘Jeunesse et Montagne’ as an example to showcase the success story of this youth organisation, including how young people acquired strength through the pursuit of mountaineering, and how other youth could develop their skills and strength by following their example. The article was written ahead of the broadcast which was scheduled for Tuesday 14 April at 07h20 on *Radio Jeunesse*, and served to raise interest and give background information. It was evident from the achievement of the ‘Jeunesse et Montagne’ youth organisation in the previous winter championships, he wrote, that ‘to be strong to serve’ could be the motto of any pursuit of sport requiring energy and self-control. The pretentious theorists who taught with their slippers on had no right to command a group of young people; only those who had practical experience could lead and show the rest of the group how to cope when exposed to the elements. If ‘Jeunesse et Montagne’ were to recruit new members, they should address youth with the following statement:

> Young people, if you are disappointed by the banality of daily life, if you enjoy long winter hikes on the powdery snow or the difficult climbs of inaccessible rocks, come and breathe the mountain air with us; learn by facing the elements, by overcoming your fear, while accomplishing your compulsory national service.

Des Vallières concluded that for the young people who were interested in mountains, alpine sports would provide an ideal environment for physical and moral education which could be practised all year long.

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323 *ARF, Radio National, 12-18 avril 1942.*  
324 Ibid.  
325 Ibid.  
326 Ibid.
Radio Jeunesse was a programme which specifically targeted youth. This article represents what Vichy was aiming to achieve by promoting sports to young people; sports allowed young people to enjoy the outdoors, to be physically engaged in a way that promoted a sense of discipline, something of critical importance when pursuing group activities in the mountains. The ‘Jeunesse et Montagne’ organisation was glorified and portrayed as a place where the young could gain physical and moral strength, as well as other qualities which were key to the resurrection of New France, although there was no mention of how this could help overcome practical problems that young people facing at that time. Gay-Lescot argues that alpine sports tend to involve small groups of people, meaning that the majority of youth would not participate in such an activity.\(^{327}\) The Comité d’études pour la France warned that pupils were facing malnutrition and so it was necessary to cut down on their use of physical energy so as not to compromise their health.\(^{328}\) Parents complained about the lack of clothes for their children as well as the rapid wear and tear of the footwear which hindered the practice of sport.\(^{329}\)

A further article about mountaineering was written by Noël Vindry in the July issue of Radio National, advocating it as a sport which embraced danger and comradeship. The article was published prior to the broadcast, which was scheduled for 30 July at 07h50 in the programme Pour la santé.\(^{330}\)

Vindry described the sense of achievement one would acquire after conquering a summit: he could feel what he had created by his own effort. The achievement was as concrete and tangible as an artisan after creating an object. To climb, one needed passion, the awareness and acceptance of danger, human solidarity and comradeship. To survive this expedition, a roped party was necessary at all times and death was part of the experience. If one fell, he must be held by the other two climbers to the limit of their strength, or they would fall together if they could not save him. There was no honour in surviving alone when your comrades fell. Hierarchy must also be respected in mountaineering, as the leader held absolute power on the organisation of the roped party. Experience and instinct were needed to climb up a mountain. Even the best athlete needed to be

\(^{327}\) Gay-Lescot, Sport et Education sous Vichy, p. 174.
\(^{328}\) Giolitto, Histoire de la jeunesse, p. 206; Halls, The Youth of Vichy France, p. 211.
\(^{329}\) Giolitto, Histoire de la jeunesse, p. 207.
\(^{330}\) ARF, Radio National, 26 juillet-1 août 1942.
accompanied by a guide, even if he knew the way. Vindry concluded that climbing was ‘an admirable effort, made of courage, of perseverance, of energy, of intelligence, and of dedication’.

It is evident that climbing represented, in many ways, the virtues that Vichy promoted as part of their National Revolution: Vichy actively propagated craftsmanship and sense of community, and climbing brought about the same sense of achievement whether the outcome was in an object or an experience; the need to follow a leader who knew the best for the nation was no different to the leader who held absolute power in the course of climbing; solidarity and comradeship among participants as well as harmony with nature were key values that Vichy was keen to instill in youth.

As explained in the Introduction of this thesis, Radio National was used to supplement the narratives of RN as it synchronised with the themes and topics being aired at any given time. Radio National was used extensively in the theme of sports; on this occasion, it is possible to link the article with an announced broadcast, with the articles serving the purpose of either a ‘taster’ or supplement, making it possible to obtain a glimpse how the propagandists used sports to cultivate the desired image of a renewed generation of youth.

In summary, Pétain promoted youth as the new force of France to enable the regeneration of the country. He dreamt of a healthy, strong and virile generation of youth to undertake this daunting task. Unfortunately, it was during his reign as the leader of the Vichy government that the young generation’s health was compromised: dietary deficiencies weakened children by making them more vulnerable to childhood diseases, by hindering their physical development and by compromising in the end the future of the French ‘race’ which was so important to Vichy. Vichy propaganda constantly sought to inspire youth to devote themselves to youth movements, to follow Pétain’s vision and guidance and to participate in sports. Despite the surge in the popularity of youth movements and sports, it remains questionable how convinced and enthusiastic the young people remained at the end of his reign. In the overwhelming majority of cases, those who practised sports heard the government’s slogans without listening to them,
and their goal was simply to escape reality momentarily.\textsuperscript{334} As Gay-Lescot argues, boredom and despair were one of the reasons of the revival of sport activities, the cinema and reading.\textsuperscript{335}

\textsuperscript{334} Gay-Lescot, \textit{Sport et Education sous Vichy}, p. 213.
\textsuperscript{335} Ibid. p. 201.
Chapter 3 Radio Paris

3.1 The rebirth of Radio Paris after the Occupation

Propaganda Abteilung

Prior to the war, Radio Paris was part of the French public network, whose political, technical, and personnel background are discussed in greater length in Chapter 2. Once the Armistice was signed on 25 June 1940, Radio Paris followed a different path of development to RN. Tangye Lean argues that Hitler made a serious mistake by suppressing French radio in the Armistice clause, a mistake that he quickly realised when General de Gaulle declared on the BBC the same night that a French National Committee would be formed in London, because the new government in France would be subject to the control of Germany and Italy. Orders were given for French radio to resume transmission. The period of radio silence from 25 June at 0h30 to 5 July heralded the end of the Third Republic and the beginning of a new era in France. The Germans could now use Radio Paris to influence French public opinion thanks to the almost intact network of French transmitters which fell into their hands after the campaign of May-June 1940.

Propaganda Abteilung (department) was a Nazi propaganda service under German military command in occupied France. It was created on 18 July 1940 and remained in service until the end of the Occupation in August 1944, operating from their offices set up at the Hôtel Majestic. Propaganda Abteilung implemented the guidelines of the propaganda ministry, headed by Goebbels. The political agenda of Propaganda Abteilung was twofold: to break the morale of the French population so they would comply with German directives, and to convince the French of the superiority of German culture. Propaganda Abteilung established a “tool of ideological repression” in all fields of thoughts and culture,

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1 Luneau, Radio Londres, p. 22.
3 Tangye Lean, Voices in the Darkness, pp.142-3.
such as cinema, fine arts, publishing and the radio.\textsuperscript{8} Its budget was over 1 billion Reichsmarks, with 1,000 people employed to work in its six divisions, radio being one of them.\textsuperscript{9} Dr. Bofinger, former head of Radio Stuttgart, was put in charge of Radio Paris, which was under the direct control of Propaganda Abteilung, headed by Major Heinz Schmidtke.\textsuperscript{10} The studios of Radio Paris were located at 116, avenue des Champs-Elysées and their technical facilities were considered to be the most modern in Paris.\textsuperscript{11}

The radio programmes were divided into three sections: music, talks and varieties, and news and information, to which a ‘censorship and control service’ was set up. The recruitment of artists, musicians, lecturers and comedians was subject to the policy of cordon sanitaire where those working on culture and entertainment programmes had no involvement in politics, something exclusively reserved for those working on news and propaganda. Propaganda Abteilung also used a combination of bonuses, praise, threat and manipulation to attract employees. Radio Paris had a distinct advantage over RN because it offered higher wages.\textsuperscript{12} Although it is impossible to determine today the total amount of money spent by the Germans on radio propaganda in the Occupied Zone during the Occupation, it was calculated that Radio Paris alone spent a total of 3,435,915 Reichsmarks (the equivalent to 69,078,300 francs using the exchange rate of 1943) for fees and salaries paid to artists, journalists and speakers throughout the Occupation.\textsuperscript{13}

\textbf{Transmitters and broadcasting hours}

Following the Armistice, Radio Paris became the legal term given to all radio stations attached to Propaganda Abteilung, private or public. Collectively, these stations enabled the Germans to start and sustain an extremely active and direct propaganda in the Occupied Zone.\textsuperscript{14}

An official assessment of the war damages report stated that the transmitters used for radio broadcasting in the Occupied Zone could be broadly

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{8} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{9} Ibid. There is no evidence that this 1 billion Reichsmark originates from the occupation cost.
\item \textsuperscript{10} Schwartz, ‘La musique’, pp. 89-90; Méadel, ‘Pauses musicales’, pp. 236-7.
\item \textsuperscript{11} ARF, Chardonnier, ‘Radio-Paris’, p. 71; Luneau, \textit{Radio Londres}, p. 52.
\item \textsuperscript{12} Méadel, ‘Pauses musicales’, pp. 237-9.
\item \textsuperscript{13} ARF, Box 1682W90 ‘Radiodiffusion’.
\item \textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
divided into three categories. At the time of occupation, the transmitters at the disposal of Propaganda Abteilung were for the public stations of Rennes-Alma, Allouis ondes courtes I, and Radio-Normandie, as well as the private stations of Poste Parisien and Bordeaux Sud-Ouest. All these stations broadcast programmes in French and the operating staff were paid by RN. Their broadcasts could almost reach the whole of France. The second category of transmitters was those available to Höhere Nachrichten Führer (HO.NA.FU.) which included the public stations of Rennes-Thourie, Bordeaux-Néac, Allouis ondes courtes II, Bordeaux Lafayette, and Allouis National (long waves), as well as the private station of Radio-Cité. These stations broadcast programmes in German and their operating staff were paid by the Germans. The last category of transmitters was those either detached from the network, for example, the station of Lille Camphin which was attached to HO.NA.FU. Belgium; or destroyed, the transmitters of Paris-Villebon and Strasbourg Brumath, which was not rebuilt at the time of the report.

One constant battle between Radio Paris and the BBC was about reaching the French audience, and the Germans made great efforts to block the reception of BBC broadcasting using jamming as the main technical measure. Due to security concerns, the military dictated that Radio Paris’s broadcasting would stop after 20h00, giving the BBC the monopoly on the airwaves afterwards. Otto Abetz, renowned specialist of French opinion, noted this disadvantage and brought Dr Grimm, a diplomat and academic, to Paris in September 1940. Dr Grimm advocated fighting on equal footing with the BBC by extending Radio Paris’s broadcasting time late into the night, which was achieved progressively.

In 1940, Radio Paris’s logbook indicates a stable schedule time ending at 22h20, until 15 September when a new timetable came into effect, ending the programmes at 21h00. This schedule remained in place until November. Between 4 November and March 1941 the programmes ended at 19h15 except for the three days during Christmas and New Year of 1940-41 where the programmes ended at midnight and 01h00 respectively. From March 1941 until mid-1942, there was a

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17 ARF, Box 1682W90 ‘Radiodiffusion’.
18 The end of programming on the radio varied throughout the year as detailed in the Radio Paris logbook.
steady increase in broadcasting time: from 20h15 on 2 March 1941, to 21h00 on 2 June, 20 22h15 on 9 November, 21 and eventually to 02h00 on 22 June 1942, increasing the number of le Radio Journal de Paris (a news programme advocating Nazi propaganda) to nine broadcasts per day at 07h00, 08h00, 09h00, 13h00, 14h00, 15h00, 20h00, 22h00, and 24h00. 22

Management and programmes
The Germans almost made a clean sweep of the staff and programmes after they took over Radio Paris and, as a result, they did not encounter any problems or qualms as experienced by RN. 23 Radio Paris had clearly become a German radio station in terms of its organisation and control, but remained a French station for its staff, the listeners, and its programmes. 24

Radio Paris mainly targeted the Occupied Zone, especially residents in and around Paris. The German leadership set up a realistic and efficient schedule which would remain in place during the four years of Occupation, and which served a dual purpose of propaganda and appealing to the general public. 25 Radio Paris made good use of the services of its extensive pool of actors, singers and musicians from Paris. Many of the contemporary songs played were popularised by Radio Paris. Apart broadcasting views from officials, 26 writers, 27 and artists, 28 the reporters also developed new types of broadcasts, for example, by interviewing people on the street, playing a mixture of music, hosting variety shows, and giving running commentaries. 29

Radio Paris’s management was headed by Dr Bofinger, and supported by Friedrich Dambman (he was also a speaker known as Dr Friedrich), Lieutenant Morenschild (the director of the Radio-Journal de Paris), Sonderführer Joseph

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20 AN, F43/59 Speakers on Radio Paris. A gap exists in the logbook covering the period ranging from September 1941 to July 1942 included and Les Ondes is only obtainable from January 1942 at Radio France archives.


22 ARF, Les Ondes, 21 juin 1942.


24 Ibid., p. 238.


26 For example, INA, Inventaire Disques, Les grands travaux entrepris dans la région parisienne, recorded on 22.08.1941, on Radio Paris (RP), 1941.

27 For example, INA, Inventaire Disques, Interview de Jean VIGNAUD, sur l’aide apportée aux prisonniers, recorded on 11.02.1942, on Radio Paris (RP), 1942.

28 For example, INA, Inventaire Disques, Charles DULLIN, nouveau directeur du Théâtre Sarah BERNHARDT, recorded on 30.07.1941, on Radio Paris (RP), 1941.


Morenschild appointed Gabriel du Chastain, a former member of Action française, an extreme-right organisation, to recruit collaborators from members of several organisations. Among these recruits some were from RN as they considered Vichy policies too ‘soft’ in their path of collaboration.

The ‘Service politique’ department was responsible for ensuring that broadcasting followed the strict directives from the ‘Section Pays étrangers’ (Foreign Countries Section) of the Ministry of Propaganda in Berlin. Haëfs would brief the French editorial writers and the leaders of the news teams about the directives, and make ‘suggestions’ to them what could be put on air to facilitate German propaganda and to counter the propaganda of unfriendly news agencies, such as the BBC.

In terms of its programmes, almost all of Radio Paris’s programmes were broadcast in French. Only a 15-minute programme entitled Informations pour les soldats allemands and a 60-minute programme entitled L’Heure du soldat allemand were broadcast in German. These broadcasts were aimed at German soldiers but were short lived, ending in October 1940. In reality, it might not have been so clear cut: four broadcasts were found in the archives presented in German after this date: two were recorded in November 1940, one in December 1940 and one in August 1941. It is, however, unclear whether these recordings were ever broadcast.

Chardonnier argues that the artistic programmes of Radio Paris fulfilled their mission as these programmes were popular, of good quality and interesting.

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35 AN, F43/59 Speakers on Radio Paris.
36 INA, Inventaire Disques, Hommage aux morts allemands de la guerre 14-18, recorded on 09.11.1940, on Radio Paris (RP), 1940; INA, Inventaire Disques, Alfred Rosenberg: cérémonie nazie au Palais Bourbon, recorded on 28.11.1940, on Radio Paris (RP), 1940; INA, Inventaire Disques, Hitler dans un meeting de travailleurs de l’armement, recorded on 10.12.1940, on Berlin : Reichsrundfunk (ARD), 1940; INA, Inventaire Disques, Attentat contre LAVAL, recorded on 27.08.1941, on Radio Paris (RP), 1941.
for a wide audience. French production occupied an important part of its programmes, which were among the most interesting and the best made until the 1950s in the history of radio. The French team was built around a handful of musicians and radio presenters. Radio Paris gave Jean Fournet, a 29-year-old musician, the task of building le Grand Orchestre de Radio Paris, which consisted of 90 musicians. The orchestra boasted that between 20 April and 31 July 1941, it ‘did not play twice the same piece, despite having two or three weekly concerts’, and made ‘a huge effort in the research, study and execution of new pieces or forgotten ones’. Raymond Legrand, whose orchestra was founded in 1934, reached his golden age during the occupation. His orchestra featured regularly on Radio Paris from August 1940 to 1943. Between August 1940 and March 1942, the band was involved in 520 broadcasts and performed with guests’ singers such as Tino Rossi, Maurice Chevalier and Mistinguett. Raymond was arrested in September 1944 for having worked for Radio Paris but was given a light sentence of six months in prison by the Comité d’épuration des professions artistiques (Purification Committee of Artistic Professions) because he had helped the Resistance from 1943 onwards. Richard Blareau, who founded an orchestra which grew to as many as 50 musicians, performed at least two concerts a week on Radio Paris and participated in major galas at the Théâtre des Champs-Elysées where he performed with Maurice Chevalier and Charles Trénet. His orchestra was well suited to the style of Radio Paris and radio broadcasting. He became conductor at the Opéra de Paris after the war.

An activity report published on 23 May 1941 gave detailed information about the programmes from July 1940 to May 1941, which shed light on the types of programmes, their aims and their impact as evaluated by the propagandist. The report divided the programmes into two categories: general news and political news.

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37 ARF, Chardonnier, ‘Radio-Paris’, p. 73.
38 Ibid., p. 66.
42 Tournès, ‘Le jazz’, p. 316.
43 ARF, Chardonnier, ‘Radio-Paris’, p. 60.
The report stated that the development of ‘general news’ was initially hindered due to the lack of French collaborators. Since the beginning of August, a reportage service was created with Laporte, the chief reporter, as its speaker, presenting the most important moments of Parisian life as it returned to normal, resulting in the programmes being more varied. This was the reason why on 1 January 1941, under the supervision of Radio Paris, the broadcasting company Radio-Actualités re-opened. Its director Ferry was given the monopoly of reportage production. By the time this report was written, ten reportage programmes were broadcast a week, allowing the listeners to participate in the most important Parisian events via the radio. Another subsidiary company of Radio-Actualités had been in development in Bordeaux since 15 April, as a result of Radio Paris’s initiative. Apart from reportage, there were programmes presented as discussions of a special interest to professionals in various fields and to certain categories of the population; for example, *Le Jardin d’enfants* for children (since 16 July), *Le Micro est à vous Mesdames* for women (since 30 October), *Le Fermier à l’écoute* for farmers (daily since 30 October), *Pour l’Ouvrier* for workers (since 1 May 1941). Entertainment programmes such as *La revue de Cinéma* for film lovers (since 4 August), *Le Feuilleton théatral* for radio plays (since 15 March 1941), cultural reportage discussing places of interest, or historical events, were also put into this category.

The non-political programmes had ‘the purpose to sweeten the radicalisation of the content of the news.’ From 29 September 1940, the management of Radio Paris issued a statement highlighting the artistic vision for the next season: ‘The programmes must be such that all French may follow with pleasure, even if they do not have the musical or literary culture. They will be constituted in such a way that they will appeal to the dilettante.’

Music programmes occupied more than two thirds of the broadcasting schedule, covering a diverse range of music, singers, composers and orchestras. Although the study of music is precluded from this thesis as the research is focused on the narratives of the broadcasts, it is possible that many listeners...

44 Normal here implies the normalisation of the occupation and that people were getting on with their lives under occupation.
45 PP, Box JB 37 ‘Rapport d’activité sur 10 mois des radio-actualités’.
turned to Radio Paris for its wide variety of music programmes. The German censorship for music programmes (Rundfunksgruppe) did not interfere too much with the choice of the producers and this meant Radio Paris’s music programmes were largely authentically French.\(^49\)

In terms of ‘political news’, the writer stated that both ‘general news’ and ‘political news’ programmes had a political significance and the transition between the two types of programmes was imperceptible.\(^50\) Within ‘political news’, there were five sub-groups of programmes. The first were political programmes disguised as non-political programmes: for example, *Grands Français et grands Allemands* (since 1 January 1941), *Interviews d’artistes et de savants* (since December 1940) etc.

The second group were programmes about ‘crisis’, focusing on the magnitude of the existing misery in France as well as the efforts of Radio Paris in fulfilling a social function and in alleviating the misery of the population. These programmes had a high social and propaganda value; for example, *Du travail pour les jeunes* for the employment of young people (since 7 December) and *Le Trait d’Union du Travail* for the unemployed (since 1 January 1941), had both been highly successful as they had already provided jobs to 1,500 unemployed Frenchmen. The aim of *Grand concours social* was to find solutions to local unemployment.\(^51\) Thanks to this programme, the Centre d’initiatives contre le chômage was created under the leadership of M. Raymond Froideval, the trade unionist,\(^52\) facilitating the employment of over 2,000 people.\(^53\) A separate report by the same writer highlighted the value of these programmes in attracting listeners: they had a great effect on the public because they attempted to alleviate the social difficulties caused by the military chaos, and these altruistic programmes encouraged listeners’ participation by asking them to propose local solutions to counter unemployment, promising to forward these solutions to the Commissariat Général Français à la lutte contre le chômage (French General Commission for the fight against unemployment) to consider.\(^54\) Other

\(^{49}\) Ibid., p. 242.
\(^{50}\) PP, Box JB 37 ‘Rapport d’activité’.
\(^{51}\) Ibid.
\(^{53}\) PP, Box JB 37 ‘Rapport d’activité’.
\(^{54}\) PP, Box JB 37 ‘Rapport zg du 28 février au 30 avril 1941’.

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programmes such as *Où sont-ils?* (from 7 July to 9 October, sometimes three times a week), *Recherches par la Croix-Rouge* (since 31 January 1941), *À la recherche des enfants perdus* (since 1 February 1941), all had an aim of searching for missing or lost people.

Through these programmes tackling social crisis, Radio Paris presented itself as a station for the public good by helping the unemployed, the injured and the missing. However, there was a hidden agenda: to attract the listeners to tune into their programmes and to disseminate the covert propaganda cleverly slotted in between programmes or intertwined with the programme. A separate report dated April 1941 stated that the social programmes occupied a large part of Radio Paris’s programmes, including those specifically targeting women and young people.56

The third group of programmes were political talks and sketches. Various campaigns were organised under different themes; for example, *Une parodie de Radio Londres* from 3 September to December; and *Sketch-Surprise*, a political satire, from 28 September to December. From 18 October, a new programme, *Tribune*, was created where pro-Nazi collaborators would present a discussion on the air every evening. Radio Paris gathered a panel of collaborators, knowledgeable in specific fields, whose talk would follow a specific area of interest for the public. Over a hundred collaborators participated in these discussions, such as Marcel Déat, a politician; Georges Oltramare aka Dieudonné, a Swiss journalist, and Eugène Schueller, an industrialist and founder of *L’Oréal*, to name just a few. One of the themes discussed in *Tribune* was anti-British propaganda, and this featured heavily in the broadcasting schedule during the first ten weeks. From 15 December 1940, this anti-British programme doubled its output to noon and evening through *Tribune de Midi* and *Tribune du Soir*. The writer concluded that following the anti-British propaganda campaigns and the *Tribunes* programmes, there was a considerable increase in public participation and in the number of letters received at Radio Paris, and hopefully this would bring new listeners.59

55 PP, Box JB 37 ‘Rapport d’activité’.
56 PP, Box JB 37 ‘Rapport zg’.
57 PP, Box JB 37 ‘Rapport zg’.
59 PP, Box JB 37 ‘Rapport d’activité’.

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La Rose des Vents is another example of a very successful programme under this category. It was created on 1 December 1940\(^{60}\) under the leadership of Robert Peyronnet, a rare idealist among Radio Paris’s collaborators, and was dedicated to the problems of the moment and social issues,\(^{61}\) often with the participation of French comedians.\(^{62}\) It was so popular among French listeners that Radio Paris received approximately 20,000 letters. A special service ‘Contact avec les auditeurs’ (Contact with the listeners) was created around the same time to deal with the letters,\(^{63}\) presumably due to the increasing number of letters received for various popular programmes. A report stated that among the 6,250 letters received from 28 February to 30 April, 83.5 per cent were in favour of collaboration, and that this programme had an estimated total of 18,000 followers.\(^{64}\) This success was noted in the BBC’s Monthly Surveys of European Audiences of 4 June 1941, where a listener stated in his letter dated 12 May 1941 that ‘Radio Paris has adopted a new technique. A transmission called “La Rose des Vents” claims to have “met with enormous success because it expressed the sentiments of every true Frenchman”’.\(^{65}\) Another letter sent on 21 May declares that:

Although there are constant boasts of heavy mail bags full of listeners’ letters, bribery in the form of competitions with 1,000 francs prizes seems to have been found necessary in order to obtain such letters. These are then read out at the microphone to the accompaniment of laborious attempts (‘oh dear, this one is so badly written’) to prove their genuineness.\(^{66}\)

\(^{60}\) There is a discrepancy to be noted in the report as La Rose des Vents seems to appear for the first time in February 1941; information obtained in the radio logbook at AN, F43/59 Speakers on Radio Paris.

\(^{61}\) Eck, La guerre des ondes, p. 55.

\(^{62}\) PP, Box JB 37 ‘Collaborateurs de la Rose des Vents’. For example, Arlette Carlyls (comedian), Max Delty (comedian and collaborator of the Rose des Vents from 1940 to 1944), Pierre Ducornoy (9 programmes only), Yves Furet (Comédie-Française), Jacques Marin (Comedian-speaker), etc.

\(^{63}\) PP, Box JB 37 ‘Rapport d’activité’.

\(^{64}\) PP, Box JB 37 ‘Rapport zg’.

\(^{65}\) BBC WAC, E2/193/2, 4 June 1941 (European Intelligence Papers).

\(^{66}\) Ibid.
Tangye Lean argues that monitoring was not a characteristic of Radio Paris as it preferred speaking to listening,\(^{67}\) however, *La Rose des Vents* was one of the exceptions where correspondence was used to air the opinions of their listeners.\(^{68}\) It is unclear whether they were all from genuine listeners or whether some letters were fabricated.

The fourth group of programmes were those with a focus on ‘special actions’, which were aimed at supporting the politics of the day. There was ‘Action Anti-anglaise’ from 13 October to 31 December 1940, where a contest was organised by the news department which encouraged listeners’ participation. The contest was for the listeners to find out *De qui est-ce* (Who is …) the person, using information provided in short historical sketches or quotes originating from a famous person against Britain. With this contest, Radio Paris successfully achieved two goals: the active participation of the public,\(^{69}\) and the gathering of ‘*the first extensive address list of the listeners of political programmes of Radio Paris*’.\(^{70}\) There was action regarding the National Revolution\(^ {71}\) which started from 15 April 1941. Representatives of each trade discussed the Revolution and its impact on their field, and the public was encouraged to respond and propose contradictory suggestions. Radio Paris would select the public response which represented the desired view of the propagandists as the voice of the people.\(^ {72}\) As the report states: ‘*The purpose of this programme is to influence listeners in the way we desire, for the inevitable establishment of a new French state doctrine and social (mentality)*’.\(^ {73}\)

The last ‘special action’ programme was on anti-Semitic actions from 11 May 1941. In all the news services of Radio Paris, there was a focus aimed at destroying the influence of Jews in both Zones. These programmes were presented to the public in a variety of forms: reportage, interview, sketches, slogans, etc.\(^ {74}\) After June 1941, Radio Paris attacked the Bolsheviks virulently, as

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\(^{67}\) Tangye Lean, *Voices in the Darkness*, p. 182.

\(^{68}\) Eck, *La guerre des ondes*, p. 55.

\(^{69}\) PP, Box JB 37 ‘Rapport d’activité’.

\(^{70}\) Ibid.

\(^{71}\) This is not necessary the ‘National Revolution’ of Vichy. From the context of the report this term seems to refer to the new order envisaged by Germany.

\(^{72}\) PP, Box JB 37 ‘Rapport d’activité’.

\(^{73}\) Ibid.

\(^{74}\) Ibid.
Operation Barbarossa was viewed as a “liberating” conflict to rid Europe of “the Bolshevik nightmare which has hunted it for twenty years”.

The last group of programmes was concerned with contact with the listeners of Radio Paris. The report stated that a large number of letters arrived at Radio Paris, which made the management reconsider how the political views of the radio could better reach their sympathisers. What came out of this consideration was the creation of Les Ondes, a new weekly news magazine which reached a circulation of 100,000 from its fifth issue. The purpose of both the radio and its magazine was to reinforce German leadership and European collaboration. Two brochures, ‘Ici Radio Paris’ and ‘La Rose des Vents’, which were sent by post, were hugely successful as was demonstrated by the large number of thank-you letters received by Radio Paris; they helped increase the station’s contact with its sympathisers.

The report itself is biased in its evaluation of Radio Paris, and may have exaggerated its success or presented an overly positive impression of its listeners, but it gave a useful overview of the various programmes of Radio Paris and their underlying political aims, which is lacking in most secondary literature about Radio Paris. It enables the researcher to place the study of the narratives of various broadcasts in the context of the various programmes and their political interests. Radio Paris also targeted children with programmes such as Tante Simone, an attractive programme featuring a woman of Austrian origin and filled with songs, stories and soap operas. The competence of programme directors and the talent of renowned comedians helped to bring quality and popularity to Tante Simone, which may not be considered a political programme per se but reflected the occupiers’ policy towards French youth.

Les Ondes

The weekly magazine of Radio Paris, Les Ondes, was first published on 27 April 1941, although the first issue available in the archives was dated 11 January 1942. Its editorial office first settled at 82, boulevard des Batignolles in Paris before moving to 55, Avenue des Champs-Elysées two months later. Its price was 3

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75 Jackson, France: The Dark Years, p. 256.
76 PP, Box JB 37 ‘Rapport d’activité’.
77 PP, Box JB 37 ‘Rapport zg’.
78 Eck, La guerre des ondes, p. 55.
francs, which was comparable to other magazines. The cover of the magazine featured exclusively celebrities at the microphone, such as Yvonne Printemps, singer and actress, Tino Rossi or Madeleine Renaud.\footnote{79} Les Ondes provided primarily the detailed schedule of the weekly programmes of Radio Paris, but also those of Rennes-Bretagne, Radiodiffusion Nationale, Paris-Mondial, and Radiodiffusion Allemande,\footnote{80} and later that of Poste Européen Téléradio (a station of European news and opinion broadcasting news, talks and sketches,\footnote{81} replaced by Poste ‘Métropole’ from June 1942).\footnote{82} The schedule of La Voix du Reich was added in the summer of 1942, focusing on news and l’Heure française.\footnote{83}
Figure 10: Radio programme of the radio from 18 to 24 October 1942. From ARF, *Les Ondes*, 18 October 1942.
LA VOIX DU REICH

Radio 20 Oct.

PARIS-MONDIAL

MARIE BIZET

MAJOR DU REICH

Photographie

que vous entendez à Radio-Pols, le mardi 20 octobre, à 17 h 30.

Le Radio-Journal de France.

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The number of pages varied considerably between 16 and 36; however, from 17 May 1942 onwards it stabilised at 20 pages per issue, which may be the result of a shortage of paper. Half of the magazine was dedicated to the detailed schedule of the radio stations for that week, organised day by day. The layout of

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84 Ibid., 17 mai 1942.
85 ARF, Chardonnier, ‘Radio-Paris’, p. 56.
the magazine meant that there was less space for supplementary articles as compared to Radio National.

Among the articles published, the editorials of Roland Tessier, the chief editor and columnist, addressed mainly unemployment, social problems and the difficulties of daily life.\footnote{ARF, Lauzanne, ‘Un double tournant’, p. 4; ARF, Les Ondes, 18 janvier 1942; his columns appear in almost every issues of Les Ondes in 1942.} His articles always featured on the third or fourth page, a prominent place before the detailed daily schedules of the radio programmes. In these articles he rigorously defended the merit of the social order.\footnote{ARF, Chardonnier, ‘Radio-Paris’, p. 56.} There were other articles in Les Ondes as well. ‘L’heure de la femme’, by Françoise Laudès, focused on fashion.\footnote{ARF, Les Ondes, 5 avril 1942.} ‘Tante Simone Vous Parle’ told stories to the children,\footnote{For example, ARF, Les Ondes, 25 janvier 1942; ibid., 8 février 1942; ibid., 12 avril 1942; ibid., 7 juin 1942; ibid., 21 juin 1942; ibid., 19 juillet 1942; ibid., 16 août 1942; ibid., 18 octobre 1942.} supplementing the same programme on Radio Paris. Pierre Hiégel discussed the various aspects of music: composers, performers, interpretation of music, recording, etc.\footnote{Ibid., 12 avril 1942.} Pierre Aubertin was the presenter of Le Fermier à l’écoute, a weekly talk show which became a daily programme in the summer of 1942. This programme offered advice from fellow farmers. Aubertin also wrote articles to supplement the radio broadcast. The hundreds of letters received every day asking for additional information showed the popularity of this programme among farmers.\footnote{Ibid., 19 juillet 1942.}

Each week, several pages were reserved for promoting the Franco-German collaboration and the ideology of National Revolution. For example, the article ‘Le Secours Rapide de Radio-Paris’ called for French solidarity in helping and giving donations to the victims of the bombing of Paris by the Royal Air Force (RAF).\footnote{Ibid., 15 mars 1942.} Articles promoting collaboration were written by Jacques de Lesdain, a columnist of Illustration (a weekly French newspaper), Raymond Froideval, Schueller and Dr Friedrich etc..\footnote{ARF, Lauzanne, ‘Deux hebdomadaires’, p. 83.}

Although Les Ondes reflected the political and ideological vision of Radio Paris, the articles published served various purposes. For example, some articles were to give a flavour of an event or topic to raise the listener’s curiosity, such as
an article providing background information about a cycling event due to take place shortly after. Others had a clear political agenda; for example, Jean Brun Damase’s article criticised the messages of the ‘ex-general’ de Gaulle. Les Ondes was a written representation of Radio Paris, providing detailed daily schedules of various radio stations and propagating the ideology of collaboration, with anti-British and anti-Semitic sentiments in many articles.

Radio Paris openly promoted its anti-Semitic stance from as early as October 1940. Among surviving broadcasts, there are three such in 1940, 17 in 1941 and 14 in 1942. Anti-Semitism is not discussed in this thesis but it is one of the key and recurring themes in the broadcasts and in Les Ondes. Radio Paris was known for advocating aggressively anti-Semitic rhetoric. It would seem that real attacks on Jews started in May 1941, using sketches, smart talks and historic facts to reinforce anti-Semitic emotion. For example, Radio Paris used reportages of exhibitions such as ‘Le juif et la France’ to illustrate and justify its policies on Jews, and historic references to justify the order for Jews to wear the yellow star, which should not therefore be taken as demeaning.

**Popular speakers**
The presenters of Radio Paris played a major role in the diffusion of German propaganda on air. Dr Bofinger used a team of young, inventive and intolerant Frenchmen who were encouraged to criticise Vichy’s policies and its neutrality, and were allowed to develop the most provocative views as long as they supported German policy. They were extreme-right French collaborationists who intended to transform the defeat into revolution. They wanted to *take revenge on the old order ... to establish a regime certainly as authoritarian and hierarchised as that of the French state, but which would no longer be controlled by “reactionary” and “clerical” gerontocracy*.  

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94 ARF, Les Ondes, 27 septembre 1942.
95 Ibid., 8 février 1942.
98 Eck, *La guerre des ondes*, p. 53.
The French team for the artistic programmes was built on a handful of presenters, such as Pierre Hiégel, who came from Radio-Cité before the war and worked at Radio Paris from the summer of 1940 until the Liberation in 1944. He tried to reach out to all music lovers and to the public at large.\textsuperscript{99} Hiégel said in a letter dated 3 February 1949 to the ‘Inspection Général de la Radiodiffusion française’ that as he was:

\begin{quote}
‘The only Frenchman participating in the committee of music programming of the station’, and that by his ‘patient and repeated action’, he could impose a maximum of French music on the air: Debussy, Ravel, Fauré, Duparc, Roussel, Messager … and not –‘as the Germanic taste wanted – Lortzing, Lehar, Strauss’.\textsuperscript{100}
\end{quote}

After the war, Hiégel was suspended from all professional activities for a nine-month period, but he found a job at a private radio station, Radio Luxembourg, where he continued his career.\textsuperscript{101} Luc Bérimont, who often worked with Pierre Hiégel, hosted literary and poetic programmes. His main programme was \textit{Le film invisible}, whose idea was to offer rich and vivid sound pictures so that the listeners’ imagination would enable them to recreate the scenes. Comedian guests would be assisted by a residential team to deliver the programme every week.\textsuperscript{102}

André Alléhaut, who came from the Poste Parisien, was very interested in radiophonic theatre. He wrote and directed numerous adaptations of literary works which he produced and presented on Sunday evening each week. He provided quality radio programmes at a time when the radio occupied an important place in Parisian life.\textsuperscript{103} André Claveau was a talented singer and radio presenter who held a special place in the world of entertainment, especially among the female audience of Radio Paris. \textit{Cette heure est à vous}, a music programme using the title of one of his songs, was popular with women. He had a crooner’s voice which was well suited for radio and this contributed to his popularity. Chardonnier

\textsuperscript{99} Méadel, ‘Pauses musicales’, p. 239.
\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., p. 241.
\textsuperscript{101} Ibid., p. 250.
\textsuperscript{102} ARF, Chardonnier, ‘Radio-Paris’, p. 70.
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid., pp. 67-9.
argued that Radio Paris started his career.\textsuperscript{104} Claveau was permitted to return to work at RN in 1948.\textsuperscript{105}

Jean Hérold-Paquis was one of the most virulent presenters of Radio Paris in his attacks against the British and the Gaullists.\textsuperscript{106} He was appointed by Paul Marion, Secretary General to the Information, as Delegate for Propaganda in the Hautes-Alpes after the Armistice. By the end of 1941 he had become disappointed with the Vichy’s National Revolution, and decided to join Jacques Doriot’s party, the Parti populaire français, or French Popular Party (PPF). The Germans had been interested in the PPF since the beginning of the conflict in Russia in June 1941, and they were seeking a leader from the French collaboration movement in occupied Paris to work for them at Radio Paris. This was when Paquis met Lieutenant Morenschild, the number 2 in the political section of Radio Paris, who arranged for him to work as an editor at Radio Paris from January 1942. During the summer of 1942 and for the next two years, Jean-Hérold-Paquis became ‘the voice’ of Radio Paris.\textsuperscript{107} After the war, he was executed at Fort de Châtillon on 11 October 1945.\textsuperscript{108}

Discussions surrounding Radio Paris in secondary literature appeared more in the context of its high-quality entertainment programmes which might have been enjoyed by those in Paris and beyond. However, less evidence could be found in terms of its presenters and how many people actively listened to its programmes. Unfortunately, following the defeat of the Germans in 1944 and successive transfer of responsibilities among administrations, many documents were destroyed.\textsuperscript{109} Moreover, until 1942 the Germans were winning the war and Radio Paris’s programmes and styles more or less reflected this fact: it was more about entertainment, laughter, normalising the Parisian life and glorifying collaboration and the New Order in Europe.

\textsuperscript{104} Ibid., p. 58.
\textsuperscript{105} Méadel, ‘Pauses musicales’, p. 250.
\textsuperscript{106} INA, Inventaire Disques, \textit{Commentaires d’Hérold PAQUIS sur publication des discours de DE GAULLE}, recorded on 01.01.1942, on Radio Paris (RP), 1942.
\textsuperscript{107} ARF, Lévy, ‘1942: Radio-Paris’, p. 50.
\textsuperscript{108} http://data.bnf.fr/13011307/jean_herold-paquis/ (14 December 2016).
\textsuperscript{109} Eck, \textit{La guerre des ondes}, p. 369.
3.2 The year 1940

The new German order and French youth

As stated previously, Radio Paris offered a good variety of programmes in different genres. As a French voice representing the German authority talking to the listeners, unsurprisingly the broadcasts had a clear political agenda. They encouraged collaboration, tried to motivate the French to work in Germany, countered British propaganda and promoted anti-Semitism and anti-Communism. More covertly, from 1941 on, Radio Paris showed an increasing interest in French youth, not so much in the interests of the regeneration of France, as promoted by RN, but rather to sway them into collaboration with Germany and to establish a new identity as citizens of the New Europe that was being created and that would guarantee a bright future.

Many historians see the creation of Vichy as the outcome of the pursuit of peace and resumption of normality which was given the highest priority after the French defeat, and that collaboration was a French proposal which offered an attractive alternative to total occupation by Hitler, at least in 1940. What Vichy envisaged from collaboration, however, was very different to the terms that Hitler was willing to work with. When Pétain met Hitler in Montoire on 24 October 1940, a symbolic milestone in the politics of collaboration, his main expressed objectives were to keep France united and to re-position France in the construction of the new European order: collaboration would bring a reduction of the cost of Occupation, the return of French PoWs, less rigidity of the demarcation line and better treatment of France. For Hitler, collaboration meant an amenable France which gave him a secure base in Western Europe against Britain and a rich source of supplies both in terms of materials and manpower.

By working with the German occupiers, Vichy was hoping for the New France to gain a privileged place and a partnership status in Hitler’s new Europe. Vichy defenders had argued that Pétain acted as a shield to protect France and its people from having the same fate as Poland, although others asserted that it was never Hitler’s intention to destroy France; rather, he wanted to exploit it. This the

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110 Paxton, *Vichy France*, p. 51.
Germans did pursue efficiently throughout the years of 1940-44, taking so much from the French economy that the calorie intake in France was the lowest in Western Europe. Vichy was also credited for reducing the number of French workers being sent to Germany, although Jackson rejected this claim, arguing that Vichy facilitated the conscription of workers rather than deterring it, resulting in the French being the third largest group of workers in Germany after the Russians and the Poles.\textsuperscript{113}

Pétain would not have known, in 1940, that the balance of power between Vichy and Germany was so disproportionate that many of his objectives for collaboration were simply unachievable. Hitler was not interested working in partnership with France in this new European order; he wanted the French to accept the superiority of German power. The propaganda of Radio Paris served to demonstrate this aim very early on.

Radio Paris’s propaganda emphasised the benefits of the New German Order in Europe to both families and youth. Young people were addressed directly and indirectly to pressure the French into accepting Radio Paris’s solution as the only viable answer to existing problems and guarantor of the future of the family. There is no shortage of examples of Radio Paris’s propaganda aims; some of them will be discussed in more details in this chapter. For example, Radio Paris targeted unemployed women with many children, with the speaker talking in a fatherly way. It attempted to legitimise collaboration by promoting employment in Germany as a means to support the families, outlining the feasibility and benefit of doing so by interviewing youths who were already working in German factories. It also emphasised the civic duty of youth to devote their hard work and love of the country to agriculture and to the ‘return to the earth’.

Youth were encouraged to help distressed people through various charity organisations such as the Secours National and the Radio Paris Social Services. Radio Paris put on air tirelessly the loss of civilian life, especially the number of children who died in Paris and its suburbs as a result of British air raids, to raise hostility towards the Allies. It featured the enthusiasm of French youth in political meetings for the New Order, the large number of interested young people visiting exhibitions or attending workshops to learn a trade in Paris in 1941 and 1942.

\textsuperscript{113} Jackson, \textit{France: The Dark Years}, pp. 233-5.
Radio Paris also had a special programme dedicated to help locate children who were separated from their parents, which had a practical benefit for the French.

There was both overt and covert propaganda towards youth, sometimes disguising itself as the authorities giving a helping hand to the distraught families. Therefore, I decided to focus in this thesis on the narratives of the propaganda of Radio Paris targeting youth, as this makes it possible to compare this propaganda with the narratives of RN and of the BBC.

The number of indexed broadcasts concerning youth in 1940 is extremely low. There were only three surviving broadcasts in the archives from July to September 1940. Following the incident in Dakar on 23 September\(^ {114} \) there was an increase in the number, with a total of 23 broadcasts from October to December 1940 available in the archives. A large number of these broadcasts involve theatre, music, political affairs and the promotion of collaboration. Among the broadcasts of 1940, only two of them dealt with youth: *Le Maréchal Pétain dans la forêt de Tronçais*, recorded on 8 November 1940, and *Importance de la veillée de cendres de l’Aiglon aux Invalides*, recorded on 15 December 1940.

The first broadcast is about Pétain’s visit to the Chantiers in the forest of Tronçais. It is interesting to take a closer look at the narratives of this broadcast because youth activities were curbed in the Occupied Zone from October 1940 onwards. This is the only broadcast available from 1940 to 1942 regarding the Chantiers, one of the largest youth groups in France. This reportage was recorded on 8 November 1940, the early days of the war, when the reportage of Radio Paris was conducted in a similar style to that of RN.

The reporter, Michel Ferry, justified why Radio Paris wanted to broadcast this event: the sound reported from the forest would enable the French to hear the voice of the Maréchal, a familiar voice that everyone loved to hear.\(^ {115} \) This was – he continued – the advantage of a radio broadcast, as it gave the listeners the opportunity to feel the ambience of the event without being there in person. Ferry explained what was happening: the repeated vivas from the crowd, shouts of

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\(^ {114} \) The Battle of Dakar is a confrontation between Vichy France and the Anglo-Free French from 23 to 25 September 1940. It ended in failure for the British and Free French.

\(^ {115} \) INA, Inventaire Disques, *Le Maréchal Pétain dans la forêt de Tronçais*, recorded on 08.11.1940, on Radio Paris (RP), 1940. It would seem that the main part of this broadcast was recorded on 8 November but it was broadcast on 9 November according to Michel Ferry.
‘toujours prêts’, the motto of the young people of the Chantiers, similar to that of the scout movement. He then explained that the Maréchal talked to a few people working in different roles in the forest because he cared about the craftsmen working in local industries. He also spent more than 20 minutes in the company of the young of the Chantiers. The Maréchal spoke familiarly to everyone and asked specific questions about their work, about having enough books, whether their food was adequate and if their living condition were good enough to allow them to spend the winter in the forest. He spoke with great kindness and simplicity, and demonstrated a deep knowledge of things and people.

There is a reason why Pétain asked these questions. At that time, life was particularly hard for the young people in such camps as they lacked everything, including stores and tools. They had to build their camps, ‘helped only by mules whose fodder was often the bread ration issued to their drovers’. All was improvised in the camps. However, since the forest was one of the few abundant assets in the Unoccupied Zone, they used tree felling and the charcoal in the ovens to keep them warm. It was a 24-hour activity just to keep the fire burning. It is evident that life in the camps was not easy for the local craftsmen or the young people, and Pétain showed by his questions that he was well aware of this.

The image of Pétain being surrounded by enthusiastic young people was one that could also be found in photos taken during Pétain’s visits. Both the photos and the radio broadcasts of Pétain speaking to young people conveyed the message that an ageing Pétain, the father figure of the New France, who was stern but gentle, could communicate easily with the simple, honest and innocent youth, and was re-invigorated by their enthusiasm and vivacity.

Ferry continued his reportage by stressing that the majority of the young people of the Chantiers originated from Alsace and Lorraine, regions now

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116 Ibid.
118 INA, Inventaire Disques, *Le Maréchal Pétain dans la forêt de Tronçais*, recorded on 08.11.1940, on Radio Paris (RP), 1940.
120 Ibid.
121 Ibid., pp. 290-1.
attached to Germany. It seems as though he wanted to highlight this to stress that despite being annexed to Germany, people from these regions were still considered French and participated in the activities of the Chantiers. This is a similar style to RN reporters, who always made a point of presenting such information, especially in Pétain’s presence, or when the opportunity presented itself. It also seems as though Ferry was keen to present Radio Paris as a ‘French’ station, despite it being under the control of the German authorities. Over the following months this would change.

Ferry then reported the main activity of the day: the Oak Tree Ceremony. The ceremony was dedicated to a tall, strong and healthy oak tree of 270 years, which was chosen, as Pétain explained, because it had weathered the storms of all these years. Although Pétain denied that he could ever live as long as the tree or grow as tall as the tree, Ferry clearly drew an analogy between the strength of the tree to his contribution to the country. The tree was tall, solitary, pure, and stood in the middle of the forest, just like the Maréchal who had to stand up tall in a forest of difficulties to lead France to its new future. The ceremony concluded with the tree being named the ‘Oak Maréchal Pétain’.

This was an important message for the youth of France: they were being led by someone of the same strength as the oak tree, and it implied that Pétain was old but connected well with the young, with his roots deeply in the ground, just like that oak tree.

It was not explained why the reporter travelled to the Unoccupied Zone to report a symbolic and (what would become) a typical ceremony involving Pétain and young people. The Chantiers were already outlawed in the Occupied Zone so there was no benefit in promoting such an event. It may be part of Radio Paris’s German management gesture of support following the handshake between Hitler and Pétain in October, which sealed the agreement of collaboration between the occupier and Vichy and marked a new era where Pétain would be acknowledged as the legitimate head of the French state, as opposed to the illegitimate government of de Gaulle in exile in Britain.

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123 INA, Inventaire Disques, *Le Maréchal Pétain dans la forêt de Tronçais*, recorded on 08.11.1940, on Radio Paris (RP), 1940.
124 Ibid.
The second broadcast was presented by André Vauquelin des Yveteaux, who was in charge of a youth group called ‘jeunesse populaire françaises’. In this live reportage, he announced that the gathering involving this youth group would take place from 20h30 to 08h00. He claimed that it was the first time that all the youth groups were present together to guard the ashes of the Aiglon, the ashes which represented the past ‘grandeur’ of France being guarded by the youth which represented the future ‘grandeur’ of France. He then compared Napoleon I, the French hero who sought to create a united Europe, with Hitler, who had the same vision. The purpose of both leaders was to make France rise again from the ashes as part of something honourable and ‘grand’, with youth on their side.\(^{125}\)

This very short broadcast is a fine example of the propaganda strategy of Radio Paris, where youth was being put at the heart of the efforts to regenerate France as part of a new empire governing Europe. The return of the ashes of the Aiglon, the son of Napoleon I, to Paris was a gift from Hitler to win the support of the French. The role of youth was to protect the ashes of the only son of a French legend and take this opportunity to focus on the future of France by following Hitler in his quest for a New Europe.

\(^{125}\) INA, Inventaire Disques, *Importance de la veillée de cendres de l’Aiglon aux Invalides*, recorded on 15.12.1940, on Radio Paris (RP), 1940.
3.3 The year 1941

Employment matching as a social service

One of Radio Paris’s political news programmes focused on ‘crisis’ and sought to address and alleviate various societal issues. Many of the crises were about common issues concerning ‘Work, Family, Youth’, similar to RN\textsuperscript{126} but not necessarily in the same contexts.

Unemployment became a concern from 1941 on and young people were particularly vulnerable, especially young children who were dependent on their single mother. Radio Paris had several programmes aimed at linking the unemployed to employers.

There were several surviving recordings which featured employment matching initiated by the unemployed. The radio presenter would interview the unemployed on air and employers were encouraged to contact the radio to offer employment. The participants did not have to give their real names; instead, they were allocated a number which was easier for the potential employer who might be interested in offering employment. As evidenced elsewhere, such programmes were broadcast regularly, some of them on a daily basis, as a social service to the general public. Employers who took up this opportunity were praised for caring about their social duties and given free publicity.\textsuperscript{127}

It was fairly common for one broadcast to host several successive interviews, with the whole programme lasting 15-20 minutes. The reporter would ask a number of set questions; for example, locality, age, household situation, children, the trade and what the person was looking for. The interviewee would answer each of these questions in a very informal manner. The reporter would then summarise their situation, emphasising their number and plead to employers to respond and help the person in question. This style of interviewing was common in broadcasts regarding employment, including interviews of French workers in France and Germany.

This broadcast recorded on 10 January is a typical example of how these interviews were conducted. A woman of 36 years of age was interviewed. She was allocated number 236. Her husband was a PoW and she had a 13-year-old daughter. The reporter asked her to introduce her daughter to the listeners. The

\textsuperscript{126} ARF, ‘L’année radiophonique 1941’, p. 37.
\textsuperscript{127} Tangye Lean, \textit{Voices in the Darkness}, p. 144.
daughter took acting lessons at Châtelet because she wanted a career in theatre. She also took dance lessons which were free and a German course. The reporter wished the daughter success for her career; however, he thought that they were right not to consider the theatre as the only option for the future. In his words, the theatre was ‘a job that one could learn by any means’– it was enough to be pretty to get a job at the theatre and she was pretty. Now it would be time for her to acquire general and technical knowledge. Of course, that would be expensive for her mother, he added. The reporter then turned to the mother’s situation, as she was having a difficult time supporting the family even with the military allowance. She explained that she had worked as a fabric sampler, an unskilled job, since the age of 15 but only intermittently since she got married. She was hoping to find a job so that she could afford a small place to live and to raise and educate her daughter.\(^\text{128}\)

Despite the main purpose of such a programme which was to link the unemployed with the employers, it was obvious that this reporter did not consider theatre as of practical value and insisted that the young women should acquire real knowledge which could lead to jobs in the future. The common view of women at the time was that their primary role was to take care of their family and children. If they had to work (which was often the case for working-class women), they would work in gender-specific roles; for example, in low-skilled ‘womanly’ jobs which could be performed at home, or in a profession that was considered suitable for women such as working in the textile industry or teaching.

It is also worth highlighting that the fact that the daughter was studying German (which the mother possibly had to pay for) was mentioned in a neutral manner, without any negative undertones. As Burrin stated, before the war, one in five French families would put their daughter down for a German language course. This increased to one in two families in 1941. What was most striking in this decision was that it was initiated by the parents themselves. According to Burrin some of the French bourgeoisie seemed to have been resigned to Germany winning the war; learning German improved chances of their daughter bringing them a German son-in-law.\(^\text{129}\) The reason the reporter spent quite some time

\(^{128}\) INA, Inventaire Disques, \textit{Plusieurs interviews de personnes au chômage}, recorded on 10.01.1941, on Radio Paris (RP), 1941.

\(^{129}\) Burrin, \textit{Living with Defeat}, p. 300.
exploring the daughter’s situation was to urge employers to offer the mother employment to enable her daughter to continue with her education.

The broadcast continued with the interview of another unemployed woman, number 107, who raised six children on her own. She was a refugee in Paris who had no housing, and lived alone with her children because her husband had recently abandoned her. When her husband was around, she said, they lived in a hotel. Since he left, she and her children moved to the barracks of the Boulevard de Port-Royal. Her children were eight, six, four, three, two, and one year of age. The woman received no financial support and her children depended entirely on her. Luckily, they were fed at the barracks. The woman’s skills were household jobs and sewing, as she used to work as a dressmaker. The reporter declared that she urgently needed a job so that she could house her little ones and feed them. From the reassuring voice of the reporter, there was no doubt that one of the employers listening to the programme would give her that chance.\textsuperscript{130}

This broadcast is an example of how Radio Paris represented itself as a station with a social conscience which aimed at helping distressed wives and mothers, who were always welcome on this programme, or those with problems of a similar nature. Many jobseekers in this programme were women with children, although it was not exclusive to women but open to anyone in need of financial help through work. The radio presenter always had a few kind words, showed warmth and consideration and reassured the interviewees that someone out there would give them a job because solidarity was a value embraced by employers. The programme served to present the unemployed to the prospective employers, but it did not provide any update regarding each individual as to whether they eventually found employment.

From 1941, \textit{Le Trait d’Union du Travail} became a popular employment matching programme initiated by the employers, announcing available job opportunities. This was underpinned by political motives, as job opportunities dwindled in France while demand for labour increased in Germany.\textsuperscript{131}

In this broadcast recorded in August, a job numbered 5771 for an unmarried woman to work on a farm in Charente-Inférieure was announced. She

\textsuperscript{130} INA, Inventaire Disques, \textit{Plusieurs interviews de personnes au chômage}, recorded on 10.01.1941, on Radio Paris (RP), 1941.
\textsuperscript{131} Eck, \textit{La guerre des ondes}, p. 55.
had to be serious, honest and active; have knowledge of milking cows; perform various household duties including washing for four people and helping the farmer in all aspects of the farming life. In return, she would be fed, accommodated, given clean linen, and she would make a good living. The location of the farm was relatively isolated, about 1km from a main town.132

This broadcast is an example among many where young women were required to work on a farm. It represented the common social expectation of an unmarried woman: to take care of household duties and the host family in exchange for lodging and a good salary. Such programmes were always presented in a neutral way and there was no overt propaganda promoting Radio Paris or German ideology. However, it is possible to detect a covert agenda: for example, by offering the service, Radio Paris sought to give itself the positive image of a station which genuinely cared. The practice of linking the unemployed to employers using radio, which was a fairly new technology for many households, also offered a new channel of jobseeking which had a unique advantage compared to traditional means.

**Working in Germany**

In 1940 and 1941, Germany pursued a policy of economic exploitation, although French manpower remained the most under-utilised of all the factors of production for German purposes. The various methods of exploitation were duly pursued and exploitation of French labour intensified from 1942, although opinions were divided as to where French workers should work.133

From January 1941 onwards,134 interviews with French workers already working in German factories became a regular feature on Radio Paris, with a clear political agenda of recruiting French labour to work in Germany to aid the war effort. Conditions of work and pay would vary slightly from one employer to another, but were fairly consistent across employers. In reality, as early as September 1940, the German authorities had already publicised a clear and comprehensive outline of the French labour recruitment plan. In a typical example

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132 INA, Inventaire Disques, *Offres d’emplois pour chômeurs*, recorded on 17.08.1941, on Radio Paris (RP), 1941.
134 INA, Inventaire Disques, *Interview d’un ouvrier français revenu d’Allemagne*, recorded on 29.01.1941, on Radio Paris (RP), 1941.
where the workers would work for Ratal-Werke Company or with the suppliers of this company in Wernigerode, Cologne or Frankfurt, the wage for skilled workers would be 15 francs per hour for those over 23 years old, or 14 francs per hour for those aged between 20 and 23. Because the workers were paid for piece-work, they could earn an average of additional 6 francs per hour. Each worker would also receive 300 francs as relocation subsidy when arriving in Germany; this would have to be repaid if the worker did not complete 12 weeks of work in Germany. For married workers who were separated from their families, an extra allowance of 30 francs a day would be provided to them during their stay in Germany. Each employee had to work an average of 50 to 60 hours per week. The employer would offer accommodation which was charged weekly, and workers would be entitled to a few days of unpaid leave and travel expenses once their service duration had reached a threshold. A maximum of 125 Reichsmarks or 2,500 francs a month could be sent to their families in France.\textsuperscript{135} This introduction to the benefits given to French workers, included in the September 1940 police report, gives an excellent overview of what the reporters of Radio Paris asked at every interview to lure potential French workers to work in Germany.

In a broadcast recorded on 25 February 1941,\textsuperscript{136} several French workers in an assembly plant in Berlin were interviewed. It was apparent from the noise that the interview took place in a factory. Radio Paris started the programme with the following announcement, which they did prior to the beginning of each interview:

\begin{quote}
Dear listeners, please listen to a story about the life of French workers volunteering in Germany. These workers will be able to give you, through the intermediary of the microphone, news as well as their impressions of their lives in Germany. We are now in an assembly workshop in a factory for public transit. Needless to say, the plant is a modern establishment on all aspects, technical, hygiene, etc. Ah, let’s get back to the basics. We are in an assembly workshop. I am going to talk to one of these young French who is working at a workbench at this time.\textsuperscript{137}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{135} PP, 220W1, 9 septembre 1940 (Police report).
\textsuperscript{136} INA, Inventaire Disques, \textit{Interviews d’ouvriers français travaillant dans une usine à Berlin}, recorded on 25.02.1941, on Radio Paris (RP), 1941. This is one of the few broadcasts which has both a recording date (25 February) and a broadcasting date (28 February).
\textsuperscript{137} Ibid.
In each case, the reporter would follow a similar interview structure in question-answer style, asking the workers a number of set questions. In this broadcast, the second interviewee was a worker named Marcel who stated that he lived in the 15th arrondissement of Paris. He was married with three children. His wife was still in Paris and his children attended school there. He had now been in Germany for four months and worked as a milling machine operator. Marcel explained that he did not bring his family to Germany, despite his initial plan to do so, because they could not attend school there, and they were at an age where they could not be absent from school. The reporter expressed his regrets as it would have been more pleasant for Marcel to be with his wife and children while working in Germany; a statement gracefully acknowledged by Marcel. Marcel emphasised that his wife was from Alsace, spoke German very well and would have helped him and the whole family to adapt to and live in the new situation if she had come.138

The rest of the interview focused on standard questions which a reporter would ask each worker in such a programme; for example, the conditions in the dormitory, how many people lived with him, the type of food he ate, his work at the factory, his wages including the amount sent to his wife, the number of hours he worked, his work schedule, hygiene at the factory, the kindness and warmth of the German workers towards the French workers at the factory, and the language spoken at work. At the end of his interview, the reporter asked the name of his children and Marcel replied: a girl, named Ginette, and boys named Jacques and Claude. The reporter ended the interview by asking Marcel to send a message to his wife, children, parents and friends, which he did.139

During the interview, the reporter showed considerable empathy and sympathy for Marcel being separated from his family. He was trying to create a real-life story with real people talking about their environment, work and feelings. He made the interview personal as if he was speaking to an old friend, sending his greetings to his family, picking up on happy moments and obstacles which had to be overcome, making the information accessible to the listeners who might be interested to know what working in Germany would be like in reality. Marcel

138 Ibid.
139 Ibid.
voluntarily pointed out that his wife was from Alsace and that she spoke German. Reporters in Radio Paris picked up information where there might be a connection between France and Germany, in this case a French wife who spoke German, to demonstrate that such connections would facilitate their building of a new life in Germany. Perhaps it was a way to confirm the importance of speaking German in the New Europe, or it might have been a way to reassert German ownership of Alsace and Lorraine through the language spoken by the wife. The fact that Marcel was working in Germany would have been reported with sarcasm or criticism by Anglo-friendly radio stations; however, the tone here was cheerful and neutral as if it was the most natural thing for a Frenchman to do due to the increasing demand of French workers in Germany and the good work conditions. The fact that Marcel did not bring his family to Germany was presented as a legitimate and reasonable compromise to demonstrate that if he had the choice, he would have brought his whole family to Germany willingly.

The interviews continued, and the sixth interviewee was a law student from Paris who had arrived three weeks previously in Poppenberg/Papenburg,\textsuperscript{140} Germany as a volunteer worker. He was working as a locksmith, a job he had never done before but he could cope with now. He had visited Berlin twice since his arrival, and he did not find life in Berlin very different to that in Paris. Despite the war, the city remained vibrant. He would return to Paris in the middle of the year for a short break, the student continued. His mother was now residing in Lille and he wrote her whenever he wanted to. It would take about eight days for the letters to get to Lille and eight days to return, so he knew that he would not hear from his mother for a little while. Regarding his language skills, he had never learned German before but he hoped that in a few months, he would be able to get by.\textsuperscript{141}

The broadcast sought to portray him as a young person with a prestigious status which could be used as a reference by listeners. Throughout the interview, the student highlighted all the positive aspects of life in Germany, especially his visits to Berlin, which offered as much of a cultural and urban lifestyle as Paris.

\textsuperscript{140} Due to the French pronunciation of the German town, it was not possible to identify clearly which town the interviewee talked about because both cities names exist and both are far away from Berlin.
\textsuperscript{141} INA, Inventaire Disques, \textit{Interviews d’ouvriers français travaillant dans une usine à Berlin}, recorded on 25.02.1941, on Radio Paris (RP), 1941.
Working in Germany did not prevent him from staying in contact with his mother as he could write as often as he wished to. It also gave him the opportunity to learn German, which should not be too difficult – a recurrent topic on Radio Paris, which promoted the learning of the German language.\textsuperscript{142} As early as 1941, Radio Paris broadcasts had incorporated in their interview pattern discussions of points of practical concern for a French person considering working in Germany as part of the recruitment strategy for French labour.\textsuperscript{143}

The incentives to work in Germany were theoretically numerous, as pointed out by Radio Paris, especially in comparison to the limited availability of food in the Occupied Zone despite the price controls: the wage controls imposed on the French economy by the German authorities, the relatively higher salary working for the Germans, and the underemployment in many sectors in France meant that working in Germany was an attractive option.\textsuperscript{144} Many French people did work in Germany. It was calculated that by 1943, the amount of money transferred by the French workers from Germany to France reached at least 277,046,200 Reichsmarks. The French Reparations Commission also estimated a total of 13 billion hours of work lost to the French economy due to French labourers working in Germany or for German agencies during the war years.\textsuperscript{145}

Apart from interviews, there were also other programmes on Radio Paris which complemented the ‘real-life story’ approach from a different angle. Among them the most prominent is perhaps the weekly talk of Dr Friedrich on air. From April 1941, Dr Friedrich started his talk programme entitled \textit{Les causeries du Dr. Friedrich, \textit{Un journaliste allemand vous parle}}’. His talks demonstrated the need and the benefits of collaboration for the French as he presented them as partners of the European revolution, not enemies.\textsuperscript{146}

On 15 June, Dr Friedrich spoke about German socialism, explaining that socialist ideology was now deeply rooted in Germany. The German worker had understood that social problems would not be solved by opposing the state; they

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{142} Burrin, \textit{Living with Defeat}, p. 305.\\
\textsuperscript{143} Eck, \textit{La guerre des ondes}, p. 91.\\
\textsuperscript{144} Milward, \textit{The New Order}, p. 114.\\
\textsuperscript{145} Ibid., pp. 274-5.\\
\textsuperscript{146} Eck, \textit{La guerre des ondes}, p. 57; a collection of Dr. Friedrich’s talks in Dr Friedrich, \textit{Un journaliste allemand vous parle} … (Paris: Editions LE PONT, 1942).
\end{flushright}
accepted that there was an eternal chain necessitated by nature, the chain which bound ‘the individual to his family, the family to his people, the people to their race, the race to humanity’. German workers would seek to improve their lives according to the interests of the state, and not against it. Dr Friedrich’s position in his talks was borne out of the doctrine of Hitler’s National Socialism which aimed to unite all classes and workers in comradeship with the state, which, according to Friedrich, improved the worker’s position and gave him social benefits. With the vision of the New Order in Europe, the same benefit rendered by National Socialism to German workers would be equally felt in France, especially by the French youth who would in future form the backbone of the French workforce.

147 Dr Friedrich, ‘Le socialisme allemand’, 15 juin 1941, in Un journaliste allemand vous parle, p. 46.
148 Ibid.
149 Ibid.
LES "CAUSERIES" DU DOCTEUR FRIEDRICH

(Archives I. N. A.)

Une série de brochures nous retranscrivent les causeries au micro de Radio-Paris du Dr FRIEDRICH du 20 Avril 1941 au 8 Août 1943.

Voici la date et le thème de chacune de ces causeries en /

- 20.04. - Français notre révolution est la vôtre.
- 27.04. - Vichy sert les intérêts de la France.
- 11.05. - "Mein Kampf" est-il méprisable pour la France ? Non, la France avait fait des erreurs.
- 18.05. - Il faut intensifier la collaboration à la suite de PÉTAI et de DARLAN.
- 1.06. - L'Angleterre et l'Europe; elle a bien mérité d'être chassée du continent.
- 22.06. - Explication de ce que fut le pacte germano-soviétique.
- 29.06. - Le bolchevisme est combattu maintenant par l'Allemagne, son idéologie est un faux socialisme.
- 2.07. - Ouvrier français, tu fus trompé par le communisme.
- 6.07. - Hitler n'est pas Napoléon, il ne sera pas écrasé en Russie.
- 9.07. - La communauté nationale allemande basée sur les ouvriers "sains".
- 15.07. - Liberté, égalité, fraternité sont encore des mots dénués de sens.
- 20.07. - Le signe de la victoire allemande partout.
- 22.07. - Appel du F.C.P. à un front national commémé en se référant aux drames et horreurs de la guerre d'Espagne.
- 27.07. - La nouvelle conception européenne.
- 3.08. - Réponse à un contracteur de Radio-Londres.
- 10.08. - L'Angleterre parjue.
- 25.08. - L'assassinat d'un officier allemand, résultat de l'excitation judéo-anglaise.
- 28.08. - L'hypocrisie anglaise, l'influence des racines sur les esprits faibles.
- 6.10. - Bilan du Secours d'Hiver.
- 2.11. - De GAULLE est le valet de l'imperialisme britannique (sp.tract F.C.P.)
- 16.11. - Le développement allemand depuis 1933.
- 30.11. - Les fauteurs de guerre, ce sont ROOSEVELT, CHURCHILL et les Juifs qui les dominent.

Figure 11: Dr. Friedrich’s list of talks from 20 April 1941 to 14 December 1941. From Cahiers d'Histoire de la Radiodiffusion, No. 30, (septembre 1991), p. 53.
Dr Friedrich’s talk about National Socialism was followed by another announcement addressed specifically to French workers. On 2 July, he explained that he viewed himself as a passionate socialist who enjoyed discussing with the workers and the peasants, whom he considered his brothers, and who formed the pillars of the nation. Despite his doctor title, he used to be a worker himself, just like the listeners; he worked hard every day in his overalls and old shoes and he understood well the workers’ plight and sorrow. His past working experience – he continued – enabled him to forge the ties that bound him to the working class, and he spoke in a language that the workers understood. He saw a clear analogy of the social problems in Germany in the past and France today; that French workers today had every reason to be pessimistic, as they:

*Live in a slum, with a wife and four children. To feed them, one works from morning to the evening and evening to the morning, in vile conditions; in the workshops on a dirty site, poorly ventilated and poorly lit. When one feels like a beast of burden by those who make you work, one automatically loses all optimism, all confidence in human justice … One considers oneself as the damned of the earth and one becomes obviously proletarian with all that ensues … one throws oneself into the arms of international Marxism.*

However, Dr Friedrich continued, the French workers should think for themselves and not fall for communism or any enemy of the state which would only bring famine and chaos, and even poorer conditions for the workers. The French should not copy blindly the German model of socialism but rather take advantage of Germany’s experience and achieve a social justice which was suitable for France. Friedrich recommended that France should implement a National Socialism similar to that in Germany to improve the people’s situation.

Dr Friedrich’s broadcasts linked very closely with the image that Radio Paris tried to project tirelessly through their interviews, that the French working in

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150 Dr Friedrich, ‘Aux ouvriers de France’, 2 juillet 1941, in *Un journaliste allemand vous parle*, p. 56.
151 Ibid., p. 57.
152 Ibid., pp. 57-8.
Germany had already been given the same privilege as German workers: they received better wages, had better working conditions and better occupational benefit; they had not lost their ties with France and yet could give their family members living in France the chance of a better life. The testimonies of the French workers served as evidence. Dr Friedrich urged the listeners to ‘think for themselves’ what would have been better for them: a better life in France brought by the same National Socialist politics as had been implemented in Germany in the era of the New Order, or, to believe in those propagating Communism for an ideology which had only been preached and never materialised.

It is interesting to note that both Radio Paris and the BBC appealed to the everyday experience using affectionate language in their broadcasts to present their arguments, but concluded with urging their listeners to ‘think for themselves’ using the evidence presented in their argument; this was a common propaganda strategy, so that their points sounded compelling but less patronising or threatening.

The Rural Civic Service

There was a massive shortage of labour in France during the Second World War: 50,000 farmers died during the war and half a million more were taken prisoner, which was approximately a third of the entire agricultural workforce. To sustain agricultural output and avoid starvation, it was necessary to enlist young people to work in the fields. The Rural Civic Service was developed out of the law of 9 March 1941 that required young people, with the exception of Jews and foreigners, to perform civic duty. This service was of significant importance for the Occupied Zone because youth movements had been outlawed the previous year and therefore there was no incentive or legal obligation for urban youth to participate in civic service. The service was under the administration of Vichy, with Lamirand playing a leading role in campaigning in the Occupied Zone for youth participation.

On 20 June, an appeal was made to French youth in the Occupied Zone via Radio Paris. The speaker began with a factual introduction of the Rural Civic Service and its practicalities: it was compulsory for young men and women

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between the age of 17 to 21; there were benefits to early registration; the youth participating in this service could save the crops and save France from starvation.

Lamirand’s speech followed. Speaking on behalf of Pétain, he reminded the listeners that the French had to endure a painful period at the beginning of the previous winter but he had faith in the French and in the land of France that a similar situation could be avoided this year. People could only rely on themselves, on their resources and the work of their sons. The land of France was rich – he continued – the peasants would soon begin to work in the fields because harvest was around the corner. However, there were one and a half million men who were prisoners of war and among them, farmers who would not be able to work in the fields. Eligible youth were now required to replace those absent, to ensure the return of the crops of France, for the people of France. Lamirand stated that he had no doubt that the youth would answer the call of the ‘Chef’,

the land, it doesn’t lie, as the Maréchal said. You, the sons of this land, you will not fail your duty, or else you would make a liar out of France, and France, as the land, doesn’t lie.’

‘France will become again what she should never have ceased to be: an essentially agricultural nation,’ said Pétain. Agriculture had become a matter of survival for France. What mattered for the Vichy government was the return to the essential values of the past and a ‘return to the earth’. What mattered for the Germans was a harvest essential for the war effort. Lamirand’s call for French youth to participate in the civil rural service not only reflected the urgency of the crisis in the fields, but also signified the willingness of the Germans to offer support to Vichy for a matter which, if not tackled, was detrimental to their interests.

It was generally known that the German authorities were behind Radio Paris. The BBC used this in its propaganda and produced a memorable jingle ‘Radio-Paris ment’ which had been broadcast since September 1940. Any direct messages to French youth that would have benefited the German authorities were therefore communicated by a member of a Vichy ministry, the ‘official’

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154 INA, Inventaire Disques, Georges Lamirand: appel en faveur du service civique rural, recorded on 20.06.1941, on Radio Paris (RP), 1941.
155 Ibid.
156 Jackson, France: The Dark Years, p. 149.
157 Cornick, ‘Fighting Myth with Reality’, p. 83. Translation see p. 44.
governing body of France. In this case, calling for the patriotism of French youth to contribute to a service for the nation was more effective when coming from a French minister than from the German authority.

Lamirand referred to Pétain as ‘Chef’ as it was a term frequently used by Pétain himself in his speeches in the elitist and hierarchic regime of Vichy. He presented himself many times as ‘the chef of the French, the chef of the State, the chef of the government and the chef of the army’, although it was used much less frequently after Laval returned to power in April 1942, as Pétain’s role became more an honorary one.

Five days after Lamirand’s speech, another talk ensued in a broadcast to promote the Rural Civic Service. The speaker first explained in more detail the legal requirement of this service, stressing the benefits and the compelling reasons for young people to participate. Two students from Paris were then interviewed to give their views: Gérard Brasseur, a student of political science, and an anonymous student of business studies.

Brasseur stated that he signed a commitment with his colleagues in political science to spend his holidays in Touraine. They intended to go in teams of six or eight. Two teams were planned, one would go from 15 July to 15 August and the second team from 15 August to 15 September. The other student’s situation was simpler, as he was already living in the countryside near Guingamp, at Plouisy, where his uncle ran a small farm of 15 hectares. He arranged everything with his uncle as his uncle would be happy to have him on his farm. Nonetheless, he acknowledged that he might not be too useful as he did not know how to drive a mower or handle horses. The reporter assured him that he would do very well at the farm and that all he needed was good will. The student agreed that he would learn how to handle a fork and mower quickly. At the end of the interview, the reporter concluded that these two students, alongside others, would

158 Although the legitimacy of Vichy government remains contested from 1940 to 1942, it maintained its function as a governing body for social and civic matters for both the Occupied Zone and the Unoccupied Zone, as long as the politics in place were not in conflict with the interest of the Germans.
159 Pétain, Discours aux Français, p. 34.
160 Ibid., pp. 34-5.
give effective help to the farmers.\(^{161}\) Their work ‘will be, for the whole nation, an example and the assured promise of bread.’\(^{162}\)

The interview with the two university students sought to show their great enthusiasm about their patriotic mission, even if they did not know much about farming. The important message was that if they could do it, then nobody should be discouraged due to a lack of skills, and everyone should try their best to participate, in the general interest of the country. Radio Paris was an ideal platform for such calls, as it could be heard throughout France due to its powerful transmitters. In reality, despite the vast number of youth working the fields and the unmarried women who were brought into the agricultural workforce, the Rural Civic Service and the youth organisations did not save France’s agricultural output as these young people were largely unskilled. There was a dramatic fall in production, caused by German occupation and hefty requisitions.\(^{163}\)

Both Radio Paris and RN emphasised tirelessly the importance of working in the agricultural sector, because it was for the common good. In the Unoccupied Zone, Claude Roy explained in Radio National the instrumental role played by Radio Jeunesse programmes in reporting the various achievements of French youth in solving the problem of labour shortage in agriculture. Radio Jeunesse painted a rosy picture demonstrating the enthusiasm of young people for working in the fields, and the willingness of youth from urban and rural areas to work together. This, coupled with the articles published on Radio National, served as a powerful propaganda tool to showcase success and encourage participation.\(^{164}\) Radio Paris followed a similar pattern in its efforts to motivate young people in their attempt to address labour shortage in agriculture.

In reality, the Rural Civic Service, which operated between 15 June and 15 October, had a ‘carrot and stick’ system. Youth were encouraged to apply as volunteers and those who did so were given certain benefits: their service would last five weeks instead of the ‘non-volunteers’ who would have to serve for three months; they had the right to choose the region and the farm; they were entitled to bring home 25kg of potatoes for every two weeks of work; they were fed and

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\(^{161}\) INA, Inventaire Disques, *Appel en faveur du service civique rural*, recorded on 25.06.1941, on Radio Paris (RP), 1941.

\(^{162}\) Ibid.


accommodated; and they would receive an allowance of 10 francs per working day for the first ten days, 15 francs per working day for the subsequent ten days of work, and 20 francs per working day for the last ten days of work. Performance bonuses were also available. On the other hand, there were ‘sticks’; for example, sanctions would be enforced when deemed necessary and workers could be moved from one farm to another; the allowance could be removed partially or entirely; and the duration of the service could be extended to a maximum of three months, etc. Although many young people attempted to escape from their Rural Civic Service duties by providing false medical certificates, 12,000 students were mobilised in 1941, increasing to 700,000 in 1943.\textsuperscript{165}

\textbf{A common interest: skilled and submissive youth}

In terms of propaganda aimed at young people, Radio Paris had an ingenious approach. Despite making youth movement in the Occupied Zone an illegal act, there were elements of the youth movements which were in the interests of the German authorities: the large number of skilled workers both for immediate use and for the purpose of rebuilding their New Europe. As early as 1941, the Germans sought to inspire youth leadership in the name of a New France through the broadcast of Lamirand from Paris.

Radio Paris made a reportage of Lamirand’s speech to French youth workers at the salle Wagram, Paris in a major youth event, speaking on behalf of Pétain, who could not attend. As introduced by the reporter at the beginning of the programme, there were well over 3,000 young enthusiasts present to talk about the foundation of youth today.\textsuperscript{166}

Lamirand stated that France had lacked managers in recent years, and that trend would continue in the future. He expressed the absolute necessity for French youth to become educated in order to be trained as future executives and to become part of the elite.\textsuperscript{167} ‘\textit{You have the opportunity, you have the duty to learn your craft and learn it thoroughly,}’\textsuperscript{168} declared Lamirand. Speaking to the present and to the radio audience, he stated, ‘\textit{I want you to understand the overwhelming}}
responsibilities that you will have – tomorrow you will be the leaders of this country.' He argued that a few diplomas were not sufficient to lead a factory; one must know the craft well through hands-on training to become a good manager. Speaking with 20 years of experience, he stated that a true leader was difficult to find.

Lamirand continued by stressing the necessity of a united and coordinated youth movement across the country. This was why a leader was needed and trust had to be placed in the Maréchal. Then, Lamirand explained that the term ‘collaboration’ had been mistakenly taken as a synonym for treason. He stated that ‘when the Maréchal speaks of collaboration, as you well know, it is for France to have its place in the New Europe. He did not pronounce the word to the vanquished; he pronounced it as the chef of the country that wants France to live.’

The reporter summarised that collaboration was meant to further French unity and European unity. Then four young men walked up to the podium; they were the sons of Frenchmen killed during the Great War and they would now testify their thoughts about the Maréchal individually. One of them stated: ‘And yes, we must have a simple faith; we must follow the leader blindly. Do not try to understand. You have nothing to understand, we have wasted enough time talking, he gives orders, let’s obey!’ Loud applause can be heard after each youth had spoken to the audience.

Lamirand’s speech was similar to Pétain’s, as if Pétain himself was speaking to the young people in Paris. This was not in conflict with the German interests either: to create a New France which was part of the New Europe, both Pétain and the German authorities needed new and skilled young people who believed in this New Europe and had the skills and aspirations to lead the others. Germany also needed skilled French workers, including young people, to fill the places in factories and workshops, and encouraged the youth to learn a trade.

Lamirand defended collaboration vigorously in his speech. This was in agreement with what the German authorities would have expected from the Vichy

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169 Ibid.
170 Ibid.
171 Ibid.
172 Ibid.
173 Ibid.
174 Ibid.
government. Lamirand wanted to convince the youth that the future of France lay in the willing integration of France into the New Europe. Both Pétain and Lamirand presented it as the best path for the country, and so the youth should follow Pétain’s leadership rather than questioning it.

However, what the Germans would like French youth to think and believe is fundamentally different to Vichy’s vision. While Radio Paris did broadcast speeches and talks from the Vichy administration targeting French youth, they did not hesitate to attack Vichy when they felt Vichy’s call for youth was getting out of hand. As observed by a BBC intelligence report,\(^\text{175}\) apart from labelling the youth movement a miserable failure, Radio Paris also attacked Vichy policy on youth which they saw as reactionary. For example, Déat announced on Radio Paris on 14 March 1941 that:

\begin{quote}
As a result of eight months of reactionary fanaticism, schools have been wrecked … we need a young France, and we are offered an old and doddering France. We want a France turned towards the New Europe, and this is the France they are trying to smash. It is a sordid attempt, it is also a risky attempt, and France will not allow it to be done.\(^\text{176}\)
\end{quote}

Despite the tension, there remain striking similarities in the narratives of the speakers from RN and Radio Paris in terms of the future for French youth. For Pétain, the key to make the French happy again lay in the pursuit of the National Revolution, in which young people should have complete faith in; they should embrace and act upon it wholeheartedly. As Lamirand spoke in December 1941 to a group of 6,000 youth standing on the lawn of the stade de la Pépinière in Nancy, Lorraine, France was in trouble but the French should not lose trust. The new generation should not despair and they needed to fully trust their heritage for the sake of France. Obstacles would have to be overcome but French youth was ready and willing to make the effort and sacrifices which had to be made, especially after years and compromises, of domestic conflict and of hatred. He referred here

\(^{175}\) BBC WAC, E2/188/1. 23, January 1942 (European Intelligence Papers). In this report, the BBC recognises the originality of this German propaganda towards youth by promising them a place in the New Europe, and the danger their appeal to the youth entails if German dominance over Western Europe remains unchanged for a long period of time.

\(^{176}\) Ibid.
to the French Republic. The National Revolution meant a complete and definitive break with the past to regain control and join forces of the whole country to rebuild France; a New France where justice would prevail and more brotherhood would coexist between the French. The Maréchal – continued Lamirand – had a fierce determination to bring more happiness in France, which could only be accomplished by asking everyone to participate in this joint effort. All this would require youth to work, make an effort and make sacrifices.\textsuperscript{177}

The speech of Lamirand was of a similar style to Pétain; it was filled with the rhetoric of abstract ideal but with little substance. He did not address anything that would be of practical value to youth; he talked about collaboration as a means to revive France but not anything about the hardship the young people had to endure as the result of collaboration.

The idea of happiness expressed in Lamirand’s speech mirrored what Dr Friedrich expressed in his broadcast of 18 May. The wait-and-see policy was now outdated as France had to work for the European cause, Dr Friedrich declared. He stressed that the French should not look for immediate happiness without pain in the eventuality of a Franco-German agreement, nor should any individual seek happiness to the detriment of the community. It would be illusory or utopian to think otherwise.\textsuperscript{178} He assured the listeners that ‘it is by working for Europe, that you will be closer than ever to the happiness of your children’.\textsuperscript{179} To bring happiness to the future of France, today’s hardship and suffering was inevitable.

Both Lamirand and Dr Friedrich addressed the need for the workforce, adult and young people, to make decisions now. Both argued for the cause of a New France, which would find its place among the great countries again as part of a New Europe. Both acknowledge that it would not be an easy path, and would require effort and sacrifices on the behalf of the whole population including the youth.

As further events unfolded in 1942, there would a shift in the narratives of the speakers regarding French youth in Radio Paris, as exploitation of French labour would become a key element in the German policy from 1942 onwards. As Halls stated, a burden fell on the shoulders of youth; the matter ‘which eventually

\textsuperscript{177} INA, Inventaire Disques, \textit{Discours de Georges LAMIRAND à la jeunesse}, recorded on 01.12.1941, on Radio Paris (RP), 1941.
\textsuperscript{178} Dr Friedrich, ‘L’avenir se dessine’, 18 mai 41, in \textit{Un journaliste allemand vous parle}, pp. 21-2.
\textsuperscript{179} Ibid., p. 22.
affected the majority of young men aged between eighteen and twenty-four, was conscription for industrial work in Germany'.\textsuperscript{180}

\textsuperscript{180} Halls, \textit{The Youth of Vichy France}, p. 357.
3.4 The year 1942

The bombing of Paris

Following the RAF bombing of Paris on 3 March, one of the largest air raids killing hundreds of civilians, Radio Paris seized the opportunity and increased the intensity of radio broadcasts about the aftermath of the bombing. There were numerous interviews with people who were affected by the bombing in an attempt to stir up anti-British sentiment among the French. One tactic used was to highlight the gruesome aspect of children killed, injured or orphaned to pinpoint the cruelty of the British who showed no mercy even to children.

On 4 March, a reporter interviewed some local people residing in the area of rue de Seine of Boulogne-Billancourt. He began the broadcast quoting a short text from a leaflet dropped by British aircraft over Paris the previous day stating that ‘in France, as elsewhere, our targets are chosen after specific intelligence. And to provide the most immediate results, we will also aim as accurately as possible - we know our business.’ He then described his impression of the streets of Boulogne-Billancourt to see how ‘precise’ the bombing had been. He stated that the British had assaulted this quiet neighbourhood in a cowardly manner, destroying houses and leaving homeless people wandering through the streets trying to retrieve whatever pieces of household items were left after the bombing. The reporter emphasised that there was very little left of this peaceful working-class neighbourhood. He had just now seen a bicycle which used to belong to a girl aged 15, who was killed in her bed as a wall collapsed on her. She died and so did her mother, who was only 40 years old. Her father and her brother were injured and taken to the hospital. The bicycle was the only thing left which would remind the people how life used to be in this peaceful neighbourhood.

From the angle of the reportage there can be little doubt that the reporter was seeking to emphasise and amplify the drama, the death and the sufferings of this quiet neighbourhood of Paris. The reporter used an everyday object, a girl’s bicycle, which is associated with the normality of life, to highlight the tragic death of the young girl and her mother, thus creating a compelling contrast between life before and after the bombing to shock the listeners and inflict a sentiment of

181 INA, Inventaire Disques, Reportage et interviews après le bombardement de Boulogne-Billancourt, recorded on 04.03.1942, on Radio Paris (RP), 1942.
182 Ibid.
hatred towards the British – not only was their ‘accuracy’ pathetic, but they were also ruthless in killing innocent civilians.

After this emotional account of the girl’s bicycle, the reporter interviewed a few people living in the neighbourhood, enquiring about their experiences in the bombing, the damage to their properties, and whether there had been any children injured or killed in the incident. Among the several interviews he conducted, one stood out as particularly emotional as the radio transmitted the innocent voices of a mother and her child.

The interview was with a woman living at rue de Meudon, a victim of the bombing herself. She gave an account of her story in a matter-of-fact fashion: her house was not completely destroyed in the raid; however, no one could enter the house because it had been structurally damaged, and there was still an unexploded bomb in it. When the raid started at bedtime, she said, she and her nine-year-old boy went to hide in the cellar. The reporter asked the boy if he was scared, and the answer was no. The family lost everything in the raid, she continued, and they were now on the street with no shoes. They did not expect the raid so they only had time to put on their slippers. They did not know where to find food either. The reporter explained that they would be directed to an accommodation centre where they could spend the night. Tomorrow, they would see what to do next. He concluded his interview by wishing her good luck.  

His vivid reportage continued with a visit to a room where coffins were lined up, where corpses were found with stunned and distorted faces, and where entire families rested in peace such as an eleven-member family who had all died together. There were women, children and unknown people whom parents and friends anxiously attempted to recognise. The reporter wrapped up his broadcast by declaring that the war brought on French soil by the British was covered with women’s and children’s blood. This was the same soil that the British had not been willing to fight for or defend two years ago. He asked, where were the RAF and its bombs when the Germans were near Paris in 1940? Boulogne-Billancourt was the vision of war brought by the British to France.

References to women’s and children’s suffering appealed to the emotions of ordinary people and led to an outcry from the public. A short propaganda film

183 Ibid.
184 Ibid.
was made to illustrate the damage caused by the British air raid over Boulogne-Billancourt in March 1942. Radio Paris’s reportage following the air raid focused mainly on the people: the suffering of those who had lost their houses, food, jobs and income; and how the authorities were quick in providing aid, practical help and advice. The fact that key military production facilities such as the Renault plant were destroyed, which would be detrimental to the German war effort, was deliberately omitted by the reporter. Throughout the reportage, only one man who was a worker at Renault plant was interviewed but the reporter did not ask any specific questions relating to his workplace. With the bombing of Paris the reporter had clearly found it easier to blame the British directly as perpetrators of these actions, thus radiating anger through the airwaves.

This raid was the first large-scale air offensive in the West; it was met with mixed responses from the public, and left Britain vulnerable to German propaganda. For example, one Frenchman wrote to the BBC stating that ‘some English people found they were “not looked upon with a very friendly eye”’ (Monte Carlo, 7.3). In the summary of the BBC report dated 6 May, most of the excerpts of letters from the Unoccupied Zone reflected a similar opinion: the British should have left the French alone and the attack was unnecessary. However, excerpts of two letters from the Occupied Zone were much more sympathetic to the British, stating that the reasons for the bombing were understood, despite the damage, the cost of human life (Switzerland 23.3) and the sadness for the innocent victims (Paris, undated, via Tangiers, 4.4). It may be that for the French living in the Occupied Zone, the presence of the Germans in their day-to-day life made it easier for them to accept the bombing as a necessity to destroy German military production; however, for the French living in the Unoccupied Zone, having little German presence meant that they did not feel the acuteness of the invasion and were more inclined to see the casualties and death rather than the reason for the air raid. The air raid was well publicised in the Unoccupied Zone with Radio National dedicating a full page consisting of five

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185 The clip is available here: 1942 03 06 Bombardement Britannique sur Boulogne Billancourt Paris Actualités françaises, available online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JO2N0Lqh22c (23 March 2016).
186 INA, Inventaire Disques, Reportage et interviews après le bombardement de Boulogne-Billancourt, recorded on 04.03.1942, on Radio Paris (RP), 1942.
187 BBC WAC, E2/193/3, 6 May 1942 (European Intelligence Papers).
188 Ibid.
prominent photos taken after the raid, although the description of each photo was written in a seemingly neutral tone. This demonstrates that while Radio Paris had become completely overt in its anti-British propaganda after this bombing, Radio National remained more covert and subtle, preserving its neutrality in its reporting at this point, although this neutrality proved to be short-lived as British bombing continued.

There were other air raids by the British afterwards and there was extensive coverage on air by Radio Paris following each air raid in Paris and its suburbs. The broadcasts were very similar in its reportage style, and the questions asked and answers given in interviews. The aim of Radio Paris was to portray a broad but clear picture that the British were responsible for murdering a large number of innocent people among the civilian population, including women, children and the elderly. Presenting miserable pictures of the French who suffered from the air raids repeatedly served to reinforce hatred towards Britain. All aspects of a particular air raid were exploited to serve this purpose, as illustrated in the broadcast dated 1 May which focused on the bombing of the hospital in Argenteuil, another suburb of Paris.

The reporter interviewed the director of the hospital who stated that the alert sounded at 23h00. Thirty minutes later, they heard the cracking of the building. Fortunately, the maternity service had been evacuated some time ago, and there were only a handful of people in the hospital due to the persistent threat over Paris. However, the reporter continued, there were five people who lost their lives including a nurse on duty who was killed at her battle station by an isolated piece of shrapnel. Another victim was a three-year-old boy who just had an operation for a hernia. He was supposed to leave the hospital this very morning but he was killed in the raid at night. Three more bombs exploded in the garden, leaving a few buildings intact including the children’s ward, where about 50 children went into hiding in the cellars. The reporter declared with a sympathetic tone that it was true luck that the children’s ward was not hit as it would have seriously increased the number of deaths among the children at the hospital. At

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190 INA, Fonds Vichy, disques de la BDIC, Après le bombardement de Brest par la RAF, recorded on 01.01.1941, sur la Radio Etat Français-Radiodiffusion Nationale. In this reportage, which is estimated to be recorded a month later, the tone was much more aggressive, accusing the RAF of killing civilians.
the end of his reportage, he concluded that it could be no doubt that the aim of the RAF was twofold: to destroy the French population’s morale and systematically to destroy French industrial facilities. The real intention of Britain was to remove a future industrial competitor. Who would believe that Britain could win the war by attacking Paris suburbs, he questioned? He continued to emphasise that France was the real target; that the bombing was symbolic because it took place the day before 1 May, implying that it was to undermine French workers. For this reason, French workers had to unite against Britain because their future was directly threatened.  

This broadcast represents a typical reporting style which involved the amalgamation of the grave consequences of the military attack on the civilian French population and the condemnation of the British attacks. In this context, the reporter was making an overt attempt to insert logic into his conclusion about the reasons for the air raid. Using the symbolic importance of Labour Day, he was trying to make the French workers resent Britain for destroying their workplace. It was important for the Germans to obtain the support of French workers because at that time, French workers had already started having suspicions about whether the recruitment of French labour for work in Germany would remain voluntary. In fact, a decree made in Belgium on 6 March 1942 became one of the first indications that recruitment of labour to Germany would become compulsory. French workers would soon find out that this suspicion was not unfounded when Laval announced the Relève on 22 June on the radio.

**A coordinated approach for crisis relief**

Following the bombing of Paris and its suburbs by the RAF in March, apart from the propaganda to instill hatred and resentment towards the British, there was also extended coverage on both Radio Paris and *Les Ondes*, on the charitable work Radio Paris had initiated and implemented to provide immediate aid to the victims. This shed light on the paradoxical nature of Radio Paris as both a propaganda tool of the German occupying force and as a highly efficient medium

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191 INA, Inventaire Disques, *Reportage après un bombardement à Argenteuil*, recorded on 01.05.1942, on Radio Paris (RP), 1942.  
193 Ibid., p. 115.
to promote solidarity and charity, and how the messages from Radio Paris were perceived by the audience.

Within days of the bombing of 3 March, Radio Paris announced in the first part of its programme, *Le quart d'heure du travail*, the results of a collection to provide immediate aid to the victims. The reporter stated that this was a follow-up to the discussions held the previous evening regarding the amount of donations received. The campaign for donations was a total success because 100,000 francs had now been collected. Moreover, since the previous afternoon, Radio Paris had already hired a truck and brought the first load of clothes for women, men and children as well as food for those in need. As that was not sufficient, the reporter continued, he would now like to make another appeal to the public to donate shoes, clothes, blankets, towels and food urgently. He gave clear instructions about how to make different kinds of donations: the address where gifts, postal order and cheques should be sent; any donation to be clearly marked as ‘Secours Rapide’ on the envelope or package so that it could be easily identified and sorted; that Radio Paris would be open from 09h00 to 20h00 where people could drop their packages; and that if they could not come, they could phone at Elysées 1382, stations 312 and 313 where the staff would arrange to collect the packages from people’s homes. At the end, he expressed his heartfelt gratitude to the audience.¹⁹⁴

Radio Paris’s campaign for donations was supported by *Les Ondes* to promote the charitable work of its aid agency, the Centre d’initiative sociale de Radio Paris, or Social Initiative Centre of Radio Paris (CIS). An article published on 15 March stated that Radio Paris was working closely with the CIS to provide relief to the victims of the bombing in the Paris suburbs. Radio Paris was able to mobilise its services immediately, calling for donations through the airwaves and arranging the collection and distribution efficiently; its listeners responded with a moving spontaneity. As announced on air, 600,000 francs had now been received along with thousands of parcels with clothes, shoes, baby clothes, blankets, sheets etc., as well as foodstuffs such as sugar, coffee, pasta, biscuits, jams and chocolate, etc. The French also brought all kinds of items ranging from bedding, dishes, toys and coal. One of the most remarkable aspects of these collective efforts was demonstrated by the sheer number of requests made to adopt child

¹⁹⁴ INA, Inventaire Disques, *Résultats d’une collecte en faveur des sinistrés d’un bombardement*, recorded on 06.03.1942, on Radio Paris (RP), 1942.
victims: over 500 requests were received on the first evening. It was also noted that at that point, 800 families were still homeless. *Les Ondes* praised Radio Paris for its magnificent initiative and the dedication shown by its staff for having helped the Parisians along with all the Frenchmen who fulfilled their duty in these difficult times. The article concluded that these were examples of selfless acts which would lead to hope in the future of France.\textsuperscript{195}

Radio Paris, *Les Ondes* and CIS were mobilised immediately after this crisis to coordinate the collection of donations and their efficient distribution, giving material relief alongside warm messages expressing empathy and devotion to the victims. The extensive promotion and efficient distribution of aid for the victims was presented in stark contrast to the cause of the crisis: the British who had inflicted the suffering and death of innocent workers and families, and this clearly served the political agenda of Radio Paris. Despite the dubious motive, the charitable work of Radio Paris did capture the hearts of many French who provided swift and vital help which could make a real difference to the victims, especially the children. As observed elsewhere, the sympathy and the generosity of the adults for French children never faltered. The work of the numerous relief organisations which sought to improve the daily lives of children should not be underestimated, despite the mixed motives of some of them.\textsuperscript{196}

Following the RAF bombing, the work of CIS became better known due to the publicity on air. A broadcast in April featured a reportage highlighting the achievements and future plans of CIS.

The reporter first announced an update of the accomplishment of the charitable collections following the bombing: 280,000 pieces of clothing and 2 tons of groceries, which amounted to a total value of 10 million francs, had been collected. He praised the generosity and fraternity of the listeners of Radio Paris who had voluntarily deprived themselves of food and clothing to bring a little comfort to those who had lost everything. The most striking fact, he highlighted, was that most donations were very modest but they came in great quantity. This meant that the vast majority of donations most certainly came from people who were themselves in a difficult situation: people who had PoWs in their families or people who were themselves badly affected by the war. A ceremony ensued in

\textsuperscript{196} Halls, *The Youth of Vichy France*, p. 211.
front of the press, with the head of CIS presenting a cheque for 1,885,930 francs to M. Yvetot, the head of the Comité ouvrier de secours immediate, or immediate relief workers' committee (COSI). This was the amount of donations received so far by CIS, and more would follow as some were being logged and more donations continued to arrive. The reporter explained that to remember the beautiful solidarity shown by the public, a certificate would be given to all the donors with the statement ‘small donations have relieved the greatest miseries’, and this should never be forgotten.

This first part of the reportage showcased the rather impressive achievement of CIS in its efforts of providing relief following the bombing. There could be little doubt that their acts were underpinned by political motives, and the frequent updates of the amount of donations served to raise the profile and popularity of both Radio Paris and its subsidiaries. However, despite the political motives, the CIS had also undoubtedly played a significant role in providing crisis relief with the vast amount of donations received and distributed in materials, and the amount of donations in cash given to the other charity. There could be little doubt that the aid agency of Radio Paris was considered part of the solidarity movement and played an active role in fostering it among its listeners. Radio Paris was notorious for its anti-British propaganda but it also served to some extent a social function which provided practical aid to alleviate the suffering of the victims of the war, complementing the efforts of a number of French charitable organisations. Despite an overt attempt to sway the French public into the mindset of collaboration it would be too simplistic to label the radio as a pure German propaganda machine. Likewise, it would be far too simplistic to divide the French into categories of collaborators and members of the resistance; the fact that the French public participated en masse in the initiatives of Radio Paris in giving aid to the victims of the bombing does not necessarily represent their allegiance to the political stance and aims of Radio Paris. The complexity of the inter-relationship between the French and the occupier, as well as those speaking on its behalf, should not be underestimated. The practical sense of many French and the widely embraced value of solidarity to help the vulnerable often led to acts which may be labelled as collaboration, but which indeed goes beyond any political allegiance to

serve humanitarian causes. As Gildea concluded, it was remarkable that ‘the French formed new relationships, built new networks and discovered new forms of solidarity in order to deal with the challenges and crises inflicted by the Occupation’.  

The second part of this reportage was dedicated to M. Perrot, manager of the CIS, showcasing the extensive range of activities and future plans of the CIS. Thanks to the generosity of the listeners, said the reporter, the CIS was able to give practical items such as prams, wireless sets, books, clothing, baby clothes, among other things, to those in need every day. Their job placement office also helped unemployed people find jobs: within one year, it had helped 35,000 unemployed people to find jobs, including 4,500 wives of PoWs, thus helping to make some improvements in their daily lives. M. Perrot went on to explain the plan of CIS to launch several joint projects with the Secours National: reopening of the new beaches in the Paris area where many children would be able to get the fresh air and the space that was too often missing in their poor neighbourhoods; sending a large number of children on holiday and most importantly, opening ‘two temporary shelters for the poor children, preferably war orphans, children of prisoners, children of unemployed, children whose mothers cannot provide care’ very soon in the Paris region. The CIS had also organised two magnificent children’s festivals at the end of the previous year, a party which was attended by over 3,000 children and offered a great choice of activities and toys that most of the children had not seen for a long time. These efforts had to be continued and that was why the press had been invited to learn more about the social activities of Radio Paris so that the printed media would help them promote their activities and attract donations.  

In summary, CIS focused on immediate relief at great speed, which was often lacking in the actions of the Secours National, which contributed to the relief of the victims of a disaster as well but at a much slower pace in its action as its aim was to alleviate long-term misery. The activities that CIS organised for young people were similar to those offered by Secours National, although the

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198 Gildea, Marianne in Chains, p. 16.  
199 INA, Inventaire Disques, La collecte du centre d’initiative sociale de Radio-Paris, recorded on 02.04.1942, on Radio Paris (RP), 1942.  
200 Ibid.  
201 Ibid.  
202 Déat, Mémoires Politiques, p. 665.
latter was far more influential and had a wider coverage both in the Occupied Zone and the Unoccupied Zone.\textsuperscript{203} In a short film created to promote the importance of sending young people from the cities to enjoy group activities in the countryside, ‘Ouverture de la campagne de l’air pur’, it was said that in 1941, close to 1 million children enjoyed the benefit of this programme organised by the Secours National.\textsuperscript{204} This film, made by ‘les Actualités Mondiales’, was a newsreel propaganda, which was seen exclusively by the audience in the Occupied Zone;\textsuperscript{205} its intention was to call upon the generosity of the public so that more children might have the opportunity to participate in various summer camps than in 1941. The film depicted how happy the children were together away from the city for a full month during which they could sing, play outside, eat well and have normal relationships with other children, showcasing the success of this attractive and joyous experience.\textsuperscript{206} Despite being much smaller in scale, CIS was keen to tap into the activities of Secours National and to involve more young people in its various activities and initiatives. Using the opportunity of presenting the donation, CIS managed to secure more media coverage by press involvement so that Parisians would know about them via the wireless or by printed press. Both CIS and Radio Paris obviously had much to gain from having public support and by presenting themselves as working for the French in distress and the wellbeing of the French children.

\textbf{Selling employment in Germany to French youth}

As compared to 1941, there was a sharp increase in the efforts to promote the employment centres for French to work in Germany, with much reportage featuring a wide range of interviews with jobseekers, French people already working in Germany, and spokesmen from French authorities clarifying the incentives, training opportunities, employment conditions and social welfare while working in Germany. Travailleurs français en Allemagne, or French workers in Germany (TFA), were introduced to Radio Paris’s programmes as

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{203} Pétain, \textit{Discours aux Français}, p. 96.
\textsuperscript{204} Ouverture de la campagne de l’air pur, available online at http://www.ina.fr/video/AFE85000902 (22 July 2015).
\textsuperscript{206} Ouverture de la campagne de l’air pur, available online at http://www.ina.fr/video/AFE85000902 (22 July 2015).
\end{footnotesize}
early as October 1940 specifically for this purpose. Among the French already working in Germany, quite often the testimonies were given by workers, foremen, worker representatives, managers; people in favour of collaboration who were willing to make a public commitment to showcase their success and to normalise the idea that French workers should work in Germany. The frequency of TFA programmes intensified significantly in 1942: out of the 34 surviving broadcast scripts involving the TFA, four were aired in 1941 and 30 in 1942. As TFA programmes appeared regularly on Radio Paris (in 1942, this programme was aired bi-weekly, each broadcast lasting 15 minutes), the total number of broadcasts would certainly be much greater than those available at INA.

Some interviews were with French people who had already been working in Germany. This type of interview continued to be presented in the familiar format of question/answer; however, there was now a marked shift in the focus of the interview from the rhetoric about the superior pay and benefits (although this aspect continued to be present) to the modern and clean working environment in German factories, the broadening and enriching personal experience through working abroad, the opportunities to travel which appealed to young people, and the emergence of a French workers’ community in Germany.

This shift is well illustrated in the reportage of an interview with a 19-year-old Frenchman who had been working in Germany for five months. The interview appeared to be taking place in a factory in Germany. The young man explained that he was originally from Rouen in Normandy and had previously worked in an office in Paris. He decided to go to Germany because he was unemployed. He had read about the possibilities to work in Germany in *Paris-Soir*. Within a week of sending his application as a labourer, he was sent to work in a factory in the outskirts of Berlin where he worked as a spray painter and then as an assistant fitter for two months before he was allocated to a different factory in a different town where he worked in various workshops. In the second factory, there was a large French community with over one hundred French workers. He

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207 Tangye Lean, *Voices in the Darkness*, p. 144.
gave an account of his salary, number of hours worked, provisions for time off and food in the canteen.\textsuperscript{209}

The young Frenchman then started talking about what he did on his days off with much greater enthusiasm. The workers were free in the evenings and from noon on Saturdays and the whole of Sundays, and they were allowed to travel in Germany. He visited Berlin, a city he now knew well. The reporter commented that it must have been a very interesting experience for a young man like him. The young man agreed wholeheartedly, stating that the taste of travelling was one of the reasons why he decided to work in Germany. He enjoyed going to the cinema because he understood a bit of German. He visited the town, played cards, went to the café with his French mates, just like he did while in France. He explained that \textit{ArbeitsFront}, a German organisation, created a magazine for the French workers with the purpose of giving workers news about France. Moreover, travel opportunities in Germany were being thought through and would be introduced from spring. He stated that the work and living conditions in his factory were excellent. The workshops were both hygienic and clean. During the winter, the temperature in the workshops was mild and workers were entitled to regular breaks. He thought that it was the duty of all Frenchmen with families to work in Germany so that they could provide for their families, especially as he learned recently that the workers could now bring their wives and children to Germany. He was going back to Berlin on Wednesday to work in a different factory himself. The reporter concluded that this young Frenchman was interested in working in Germany for two reasons: travelling, and excellent conditions of employment. He added that this was a simple and direct testimony which should inspire young unemployed people from France to work in Germany where factories ran at full capacity, even for a short period. This young man represented the audacity of the youth and proved himself a role model for many young French to follow his example.\textsuperscript{210}

This interview highlighted how easy it was to obtain a job in Germany, with or without technical skills. This was an important message because many unemployed young French people did not have any technical skills. The reporter

\textsuperscript{209} INA, Inventaire Disques, \textit{Interview d’un travailleur français en Allemagne}, recorded on 30.05.1942, on Radio Paris (RP), 1942.
\textsuperscript{210} Ibid.
repeatedly contrasted the poor working conditions in France with the superior modern factories in Germany. Travelling was something that appealed to the young but was restricted in France. However, when working in Germany, travelling in the local area and to Berlin became a possibility. French people working in Germany had access to a variety of entertainment and leisure activities and had money to spare. The Germans even acknowledged the emergence of a French community and fostered its growth by publishing a magazine in French, and creating opportunities for them to meet more Frenchmen outside of work. All these portrayed the normality of life among the French community in Germany.

Other interviews focused on the French who expressed an interest in working in Germany. The reportage of this type of interviews is quite often very detailed, and would cover French people in different situations and belonging to different age groups. There is no evidence that Radio Paris targeted any specific categories of people. Interviews with jobseekers appeared to be ad hoc, spontaneous and without prior arrangement, quite often completed with their names and residential addresses. Naturally, this would come across to the listeners as if they were listening to real people and their stories, whether credible or not.

The following broadcast of 12 August in the programme of TFA is a typical example of this type of interview. The reporter began by stating that this was his fourth reportage of interviews taking place in a different employment centres in Paris, having previously reported from the employment centres of Courbevoie, Issy-Les-Moulineaux and Vincennes. He was now at 1, rue Scribe in the district of the Opera, a former bank, and he was going to interview the jobseekers in the office. This employment centre had recruited over 4,000 workers for Germany since its opening. One section of the office was reserved for the recruitment of female labour to Germany.

The first interviewee was a 15-year-old girl. The centre employee told her that she was too young as no one under the age of 18 could be sent to work in Germany. From 18 to 21, she would need to present a parental authorisation paper legalised by the commissioner. The employee added that once she reached the legal age, she could come back to the office and they would help her find a place, an easy job in a factory, which would not require many skills, as training would be provided if required. The whole procedure would go quite fast. She would earn 10 francs per hour at the beginning, but when she became competent to earn by
the piece, her salary would increase naturally. The young girl appeared disappointed because she wanted to make a living; she already had some work experience as an apprentice tailor. Apprentice tailors were needed in Germany, the reporter was told, as they could work in fashion design. The employee concluded the interview by telling her to grow up quickly so that she could go to Germany. After the interview, the employee said to the reporter that they had placed young women mainly in families where they were well treated and highly regarded in their work.\(^{211}\)

Even though the employee did not place the under-aged girl, she did not hesitate to encourage her to come back when she turned 18, and to reassure her that she did not need any particular skills. This was meant to inspire other young women, with or without skills, to approach the employment office. Under-aged girls asking to work in Germany also appeared in *Les Ondes*. In the section ‘Le courrier des Ondes’, a question was asked by a 17-year-old girl who introduced herself as Nostalgie, as to whether she could work in Germany without the authorisation of her parents. The response was negative, as the legislative provision regarding minors were still in force in 1942.\(^{212}\) This was a recurring question in both *Les Ondes* and the various programmes of Radio Paris for jobseekers, highlighting the vulnerability of these young women as their only alternative would be to seek employment illegally if they could not obtain help through official channels. As evidenced elsewhere, this rule about minors and parental authorisation was often disregarded and minors were placed to work in Germany on numerous occasions.\(^{213}\)

The second interviewee was Miss Bernal, a 18-year-old Parisian who was going to Vienna the following Thursday. Her father had died four years earlier from a work accident, and she lived with her mother, who was a kitchen assistant. Despite never having worked in her life, she decided to go to the employment centre at 129, rue La Fayette where she was offered a job in a Viennese family, where she would help in the household and keep the young girls of the family company. She admitted not speaking much German because the pronunciation was difficult, but it would not be so much of a problem as the daughters knew a

\(^{211}\) INA, Inventaire Disques, *Au centre de recrutement pour TFA*, recorded on 12.08.1942, on Radio Paris (RP), 1942.

\(^{212}\) ARF, *Les Ondes*, 16 février 1942.

bit of French themselves – they could teach each other. She confessed that she was happy to go but she was sad at the same time because she had never undertaken such a long journey before.\textsuperscript{214}

It was, in fact, not uncommon for young men and women to work in the German Reich voluntarily. As evidenced elsewhere, those who volunteered to work in Germany would start as early as 20 years of age, quite often due to family circumstances or the lack of job opportunities in France because of all the restrictions imposed by the occupying authorities. There was also the omnipresent fear in occupied France which resulted in young French people having very little opportunity to experience life outside home. This was a common feature of the young generation.\textsuperscript{215} German records would suggest that about 80,000 French women, or a third of all French volunteers, went to work in Germany during the war. Women did so for various reasons; for example, to avoid being a burden to their family or to run away from a family in France, but most importantly, many worked in Germany simply because they needed money.\textsuperscript{216} There was again the reinforcement of the language barrier which was a common feature in broadcasts promoting employment in Germany; interviewees were always happy to state that they could get around it thanks to the help given by the host family.

The last interviewee was Mr Morel, a Parisian who had already worked in Germany previously but wanted to return for another six months. He was married with three children. He said that he had worked for a year and a half in the suburbs of Berlin, and now he was going to Stuttgart. He went to work in Germany because the wages were much higher than in France. By working in Germany, he could send money to his wife to raise the children and even save some for the rainy days. The only thing he complained about was the payslip, which was not written in French. The interview continued with standard questions regarding the weekly living costs for a worker, the cost of meals in the canteen and how they dealt with their evening meals; how they got along with the German workers; useful tips to give to new joiners to improve their daily life, for example, the difference in wages depending on skill levels and qualifications, and how to transfer money quickly and reliably from Germany to France, especially if the

\textsuperscript{214} INA, Inventaire Disques, \textit{Au centre de recrutement pour TFA}, recorded on 12.08.1942, on Radio Paris (RP), 1942.
\textsuperscript{215} Vinen, \textit{The Unfree French}, p. 272.
\textsuperscript{216} Ibid., pp. 164-6.
beneficiary lived in the provinces. The reporter added that the issue about money transfer from Germany to France was studied very seriously by the department of French Workforce in Germany, a department which was recently created at 18, rue de Madrid, and which would benefit the French workers in Germany tremendously. This service was known to Mr Morel because he had already received a visit from a delegate of this department in Berlin, who helped him resolve some issues and enabled him to help many of his colleagues with similar concerns. The service also provided support for the workers’ families who remained in France. The reporter concluded by reiterating that this programme was for the benefit of French listeners by giving them as much information as they might desire. Listeners could also help improve the programme by writing to Radio Paris.

This reportage with three interviews is a typical example of Radio Paris’s campaign to promote the employment centres in Paris that arranged for French people to work in Germany. Throughout the three interviews, the desire of the French jobseekers to work in Germany and the positive feedback of their previous experience dominated the tone of the broadcast, making working in Germany both an attractive opportunity to the skilled or unskilled, and a positive experience which did not need to be feared. Mr Morel’s circumstances would perhaps attract the attention of many French with big families. The detailed account of the economic benefits, as well as the existence of a dedicated office to assist with practical issues both to the French working in Germany and their families living in France, would be both valuable information and an attractive alternative to those who struggled to make ends meet in France.

In addition to financial details, the reporter also sought positive feedback about living and working in Germany, and the personal satisfaction this brought about. In this case, Mr Morel liked changing location so the opportunity to work in different parts of Germany was an advantage to him. In the conclusion to the broadcast, the reporter made an appeal to the listeners of Radio Paris to provide feedback and suggestions, which could be used to monitor the popularity of the programme. It also became apparent that the opportunity to travel was promoted regularly to potential young workers as an advantage of working in Germany; the

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learning of other cultures was presented as a new valuable experience; and learning German appeared frequently in the interviews – the reporter never failed to compliment the willingness and desire of the French workers to learn German to facilitate communication and friendship between the two communities.

The Speer Report found that the French workforce was the most efficient of all the various foreign nationalities working in Germany, although they were less efficient than their German counterparts. Speer’s optimistic view originated from a survey by the Reichswirtschaftskammer (Reich Chamber of Commerce) in 1944, which concluded that the productivity of Russian women and French men was roughly situated at between 90 and 100 per cent of their German counterparts. Milward argued that the French in Germany were indifferent to the quality of their work. Nonetheless, he estimated that it was ‘beyond doubt that French workers were more productive in Germany than in France’.

The propagated glorious opportunities of working in Germany are contradicted by evidence elsewhere. For example, a girl named Charlotte wrote a letter to the BBC on 29 September 1942 that at the end of August, at the Blériot factory at Puteaux, two workers had been killed and numerous others were injured by the French police who attempted to force the workers to go to Germany. She also claimed that French workers did not want to return to Germany once they had completed their contract. As Herbert argues, the extent of the brutality, cruelty and arbitrariness embedded in the familiar day-to-day life of the foreign labourers in Nazi Germany could only be understood in the context of a social order built on repression and terror against such foreign labourers. In this case, Radio Paris sugar-coated working in Germany by presenting the opportunities and advantages but disregarding risks and dangers.

The Prefects were also aware of the discrepancies between the number of French workers needed in Germany and the number of French people who had volunteered to go. The Prefects’ report highlighted that by June 1942, in all départements in the Occupied Zone, the employment centres for French workers to Germany were far from being successful due to the small number of volunteers.

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219 Ibid.
220 BBC WAC, Anonymous letters from France (1276-1308), 29 septembre 1942 (1291).
who came to seek employment.\textsuperscript{222} The situation remained unchanged by August, making it necessary to stage a more sustained and creative propaganda campaign to attract more volunteers. The prefect of the Loire-Inférieure instigated a system where the children of French parents who went to work in Germany were placed in rural families, on the principle of ‘mutual help’: the more French went to work in Germany, the more French PoWs would be able to return home. If enough families agreed to take care of the children left behind to enable their parents to go to Germany, then there would be more PoWs returning home and one day, it might be the sons or the husband of that family. The Prefect concluded that this argument enabled him to present a link between the rural population and the workers: welcoming the children of the French volunteers to enable the return of French prisoners.\textsuperscript{223}

The difficulty in recruiting French workers was also substantiated by the testimony of Leonidas Savinos, a Greek merchant who arrived in England in 1942 (and who was subsequently interviewed on 16 September). He stated that there had been no increase in the number of French workers going to Germany since Laval returned to power because those willing to do so had already left. Furthermore, a German director told him that working conditions in Germany were terrible and that foreign workers were absolutely hopeless because of the length of time needed to train them in the usage of German machinery. Unfortunately, he could not remember the name of the director or his factory.\textsuperscript{224} The Greek merchant’s account offers a glimpse of the suspicion which might well have been the underpinning cause of the failure to recruit French workers: the distrust in German propaganda despite numerous testimonies from French workers which sounded credible. The opinion of the anonymous ‘German director’ towards foreign workers might not be completely baseless, either, as the employment centres cared more about recruiting French workers but far less about their skills.

This is perhaps why Radio Paris tirelessly promoted technical education to young people so that they could develop specific practical skills for the future,

\textsuperscript{223} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{224} KNA, WO208/3684 982, 17 September 1942 (Royal Patriotic School).
perhaps in a German factory. For example, one broadcast was about the training centre of Pantin, the purpose of which was to train young unemployed people from the ages of 14 to 17 on courses such as carpentry, general machinery, sheet metal, foundry, electricity and masonry for a period of three years. The apprentice would, then, receive his certificat d'aptitude professionnelle, or certificate of professional competence (CAP).²²⁵

Another broadcast was about the aircraft manufacturing workshops of Issy-les-Moulineaux, where labourers of 18 to 48 years of age, including hairdressers and bakers, could attend the onsite training. The German director stated that the workers would receive training for a period of eight to ten weeks prior to being sent to Germany and they would be given a similar position and wage to those trained workers. Most importantly, the sketches given to the trainees would be written in both French and German.²²⁶ These broadcasts demonstrated that the Germans were systematically rounding up young French people, using technical training as an excuse to give them some basic but often inadequate training, and the ultimate goal was to send them off to work in Germany.

La Relève

On 4 September, a new law stipulated that ‘any male over the age of 18 and under the age of 50, as well as any unmarried female over the age of 21 year and under the age of 35, may be subject to do any work that the Government deems useful in the higher interest of the nation.’²²⁷

This marks the formalisation of the Relève (the ‘Relief’) of French prisoners in Germany. The Prefect’s report of September for the Occupied Zone highlighted the growing hostility towards the occupier due to this policy.²²⁸ A separate report about the situation in the Unoccupied Zone dated September 4th, 1942.

²²⁵ INA, Inventaire Disques, Reportage au centre d’apprentissage de Pantin, recorded on 01.01.1942, on Radio Paris (RP), 1942.
²²⁶ INA, Inventaire Disques, Aux ateliers de construction aéronautique d’Issy-les-Moulineaux, recorded on 01.07.1942, on Radio Paris (RP), 1942
²²⁷ PP, 220W10, 21 septembre 1942 (Police report).
indicated that this policy might be received negatively by the workers, who would see it as the beginning of forced enlistment.\textsuperscript{229}

To counter the negative reception of this law, Radio Paris broadcast the visit of François Chasseigne to the workers of the factory of ManuRhin, in Cusset. At the beginning of this visit, Chasseigne declared that he came to Cusset to explain what the government expected from the French working class regarding the \textit{Relève} of the prisoners. He had brought two former PoWs with him who lived in the region; both of them wanted to challenge the false perception which was widespread among the French workers that only those prisoners who were in poor health or were no longer wanted were returned to France. These two men wanted to make an appeal to their fellow French workers that their comrades were still in Germany, waiting eagerly for the decision of the workers of France. Chasseigne went on to explain that this operation, the \textit{Relève} of the prisoners, requested by the Germans, was simply asking for more skilled workers. He urged the workers to leave for Germany in groups so they would continue working together in Germany under similar conditions as in their current job. He addressed young workers in particular, stressing that they had a duty to work in Germany: the French PoWs had fulfilled their duty by fighting for France; now it would be the duty of young French people to work in Germany so that the PoWs could return to their families. Chasseigne urged the wives of PoWs to talk to the young people and act so that their husbands might return as a result. He warned that if the recruitment target could not be reached by 15 October, there would be repercussions for the whole of France.\textsuperscript{230} ‘\textit{I am afraid that even this zone, which believes itself to be free, is only free in appearance. Other measures will follow’},\textsuperscript{231} he said, ending his address.

Chasseigne’s visit was part of an extensive campaign staged by Vichy officials in a bid to reach the recruitment target, in which they were failing miserably: Germany had imposed a quota of 150,000 skilled workers to Germany by 15 October, but two thirds were missing by the deadline, despite Chasseigne addressing the French six times on RN in the first two weeks of October.\textsuperscript{232} He

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{229} Ibid.
\bibitem{230} INA, Inventaire Disques, \textit{Discours de François Chasseigne en faveur de la relève}, recorded on 05.10.1942, on Radio Paris (RP), 1942.
\bibitem{231} Ibid.
\bibitem{232} Eck, \textit{La guerre des ondes}, p. 94.
\end{thebibliography}
also spoke on Radio Paris where he continued to appear keen to eliminate the fear and distrust among French workers by asserting that healthy PoWs were being repatriated as well as the sick ones, and that French workers leaving in a group would continue to work together. He sought to create an obligation for the ‘free’ French workers to help the ‘unfree’ PoWs, making it a patriotic duty to bring back the PoWs. In addition to young workers, Chasseigne also attempted to motivate ordinary French wives to believe in his reasoning and to join him in persuading the young people to follow the orders given by Vichy. The threatening undertone was apparent as well: France had no other option but to comply with the requests of the occupier, and French workers had to volunteer to save the country from severe penalties and to end the suffering of the PoWs. On the other hand, there were multiple Police reports which highlighted that large numbers of sick PoWs arrived in France by train, alongside normal PoWs. For example, the Police report dated 24 August recorded that a train from Germany arrived on 14 August, with 401 sick PoWs on board destined for Paris and 125 sick PoWs destined for Lyon.233

The following broadcast supports Chasseigne in his quest to get more skilled French workers to work in Germany. This time, Schueller spoke on Radio Paris to express his views about the Relève to factory employees targeting particularly the young people who had escaped the fate of the battlefield and who should now take responsibility for the country like their older peers had done in 1940.

Schueller started his broadcast with the following statement:

Some prisoners, since the beginning of the war, have been there for 37 months ... They are the ones who are out there, away from their country, from their family, from their friends; they are the ones who could be in your place, here, with their family, among their friends. Do you not feel a great injustice? You could make some of them come back.234

233 For example, PP, 220W5, 11 août 1941 (Police report); PP, 220W8, 18 mai 1942 (Police report); PP, 220W9, 8 juin 1942 (Police report); PP, 220W10, 24 août 1942 (Police report).

234 INA, Inventaire Disques, Propagande en faveur de la relève, recorded on 20.10.1942, on Radio Paris (RP), 1942.
Schueller elaborated his argument along a similar line as Chasseigne but emphasised to a greater extent the patriotic duty of young people, who had so far been spared by the war. ‘Do you not feel you have a duty to fulfill, a debt to pay and now it is time for you to do so,’ Schueller questioned. It would now be up to the young people to achieve this act of national fraternity. Schueller stressed that at the present time, many did not want to volunteer to work in Germany unless they were conscripted. However, going forward, there would only be three possibilities: to volunteer, to be conscripted, or to be taken at random; both latter scenarios would mean that the workers would lose control of their destiny.

He then moved on to talk about the incentives and his personal experience of working in Germany. He had gone to Germany 30 years previously because he wanted to learn and experience a new life. He had to save up for the trip and pay for his own living expenses. Today, everything was given to the workers: travelling expenses and a guaranteed job. He appealed to their sense of adventure. Had the French forgotten the taste for travel, he declared, the excitement of going abroad and meeting other people to learn about their customs? French workers would gain both personal and technical skills with this important experience when they returned to France.

Both broadcasts labelled the Relève as ‘a necessary and sacred duty’, and commended those who were volunteering to work in Germany as having fulfilled ‘their civic and moral responsibility’. As in the previous broadcast by Chasseigne, Schueller used a similar rhetoric in an attempt to make the workers feel compelled to volunteer to work in Germany. His speech placed on the French a sense of guilt for not helping a countryman when they could, and a sense of losing out on an exciting adventure. To ensure that French workers would go to Germany, the authorities had prohibited French employers from employing new workers unless special authorisation was given. Despite the increasingly patronising message and pressure put on French workers, many chose not to work in Germany. Jean, a French electric engineer who left Bordeaux on 23 October 1942, stated that the workers were all against the idea of working in Germany and

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235 Ibid.
236 Ibid.
237 Ibid.
238 Eck, La guerre des ondes, p. 91.
239 Ibid., p. 92.
240 Ibid., p. 94.
that they would only go if they were forced to. The method used by the authorities to incite the French to work in Germany was a simple yet powerful one: to lower the salary for working in France significantly as compared to working in Germany. Jean ascertained that the pressure put on French workers to work in Germany only served to increase their discontent and resentment towards the Germans. The Prefect’s report of June 1942 in the Occupied Zone highlighted an undercurrent of incompliance of French industrialists who disregarded the calls of the Vichy government to send specialist workers to Germany. Because these specialised workers were also in short supply in France, if they did not want to work in Germany, their employers were more than happy to keep them in France. Faced with the failure to gather sufficient numbers of specialists demanded by the occupier, Laval spoke on air on 20 October and threatened the public that ‘the government is determined not to tolerate the resistance of individuals or groups of bosses or workers who, in defiance of the national interest, remain deaf to the call that I address to them’.

To conclude, Radio Paris’s propaganda targeted French workers using a variety of tools: interviewing French workers at the employment centre and in German factories, boasting of the superior working conditions there; reiterating the willingness of managers and the advantages of organised departure with teammates; and personal testimony from PoWs. Benefits and other advantages were described at length to encourage them to work in Germany.

On the question of French labour export to Germany, it had started in 1940 on a voluntary basis, but the slow take-up meant that more pressure was being brought to bear by 1942, presenting a challenging situation for the Vichy administration. Consequently, Radio Paris increased the number of programmes designated to this purpose, which demonstrates that the exploitation of French labour had become a key element in the German policy from 1942 onwards largely due to the military situation in Russia.

On the other hand, the state of affairs in France in 1942 was far more complex than a clear trajectory of German domination of Europe. Two elements,

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241 KNA, WO208/3695 1217, 22 January 1943 (Royal Patriotic School).
243 Eck, La guerre des ondes, p. 94.
in particular, could have overwhelmed the youth with a sense of freedom rather than shame: the entry of America in the war in December 1941, signalling a wind of change that Germany would not be able to win the war so easily in the long run; and the sustained suspicion that the Vichy doctrines would not last, not least because of the lack of moral examples from Vichy leaders. It is not at all surprising that young people were not convinced of the permanence of collaboration – even a devoted collaborator had doubts. As Pierre Drieu La Rochelle wrote in his journal on 22 April 1942, he did not believe in collaboration any longer, and thought the French would ‘rather stay faithful to the sentiment of shame than to dominate this sentiment’. Equally, many French workers rejected working in Germany despite the repeated calls of Radio Paris. The Relève was the last attempt by Vichy to compel French workers to go to Germany on a voluntary basis before the total occupation of France in November 1942, giving way shortly afterwards to a compulsory labour scheme from 15 February 1943, under the name Service du travail obligatoire, or compulsory work service (STO), concerning specifically the young people born from 1920 to 1922.

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246 Eck, La guerre des ondes, pp. 94-5.
Conclusion

The experiences of the Second World War seem to confirm the belief that propaganda has the capacity to shape minds.¹ The BBC had gone to great lengths to collect intelligence regarding the day-to-day situation and events in France from correspondence from listeners of both zones, French and foreign press, interviews of people arriving in the UK, monitoring of radio stations in France, all with the aim to gauge public opinion.² The BBC was credited both by historians and by listeners for providing accurate and timely news and information to its listeners.

The information collected from listeners’ correspondence and interviews was based on personal accounts and observations which were subjective and opinionated, but the lived experience of ordinary French people could not be understood merely from official reports and figures. The BBC trusted these kaleidoscopic and disparate sources of information when compiling their Monthly Intelligent Reports about listeners’ responses and public opinion, and this played an important role in ensuring that the content of their daily broadcast to France stayed relevant.

When compared to the BBC, there is little evidence that an equivalent level of monitoring of public opinion was conducted by RN or Radio Paris. There were letters from listeners to RN and Radio Paris, but they were mainly addressed to specific broadcasts. The Vichy government had censorship in place which involved opening and vetting private letters and tapping telephone lines; however, there is little evidence that the intelligence obtained was passed on to the radio station.³ Radio Paris compiled reports of listeners’ responses to the popular programme La Rose des Vents, for example, but it used the correspondence mainly to create a network of supporters of collaboration.⁴

Both RN and Radio Paris made their presence felt among the listeners in France as they broadcast from Vichy and Paris respectively. Their reporters could

⁴ PP, JB 37 ‘Rapport zg’; PP, JB 37 ‘Rapport d’activité’. From the available evidence it is unclear if such a report was compiled ad hoc or regularly.
report from any corner of France, using a variety of formats such as reportage, the
cover of sporting events, organising concerts, interviews with artists and
professionals, while cleverly promoting their political views and propaganda
messages. Compared to RN and Radio Paris, the BBC had an inherent
disadvantage when broadcasting to France because of its overseas location. Most
of the programmes were made in the studio, and there could be no real live
broadcast of events taking place in France. In fact, the BBC had to wait until mid-
1942 to be able to broadcast news about events taking place in the Unoccupied
Zone with only a few hours’ delay; for example, the coverage of the 14 July
celebration, which was the first for the BBC since the war had started.5

It was, therefore, no small achievement that the BBC managed to
broadcast to both zones of France6 and to stay relevant to their listeners
throughout the period 1940-42. Moreover, despite jamming and synchronisation
issues, the retention of their listeners in the early months of the war7 and the
increase of their popularity as the war progressed despite various setbacks, were
crucial to the later success of the BBC. By 1942, it had firmly established its
credibility among the French,8 and was well heard across France.9

As for RN, among surviving broadcasts there is a large number of live
broadcasts focusing on Pétain’s visits, his political addresses to the French and his
participation in live public events, showcasing Pétain’s popularity and promoting
Vichy’s ideology in the Unoccupied Zone. The broad coverage of these events
also served to demonstrate the public’s enthusiasm for Pétain’s leadership. By
broadcasting live events, the listeners could easily immerse themselves in the
scene with its background noise and transcended by Pétain’s presence. The
response of the crowd to Pétain’s presence was always boisterous, and the
passionate display of enthusiasm at that moment was captured faithfully by the
recording of RN and could be broadcast at will by the radio. This is a unique
feature of the programmes of RN, which could be heard clearly within the borders
of the Unoccupied Zone.10

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5 Pessis, Les Français parlent aux Français 1941-1942, p. iv.
6 Brooks, British Propaganda to France, p. 54.
8 Pessis, Les Français parlent aux Français 1941-1942, pp. vi-vii.
9 Brooks, British Propaganda to France, p. 54.
10 Eck, La guerre des ondes, p. 41.
RN inherited problems with its distribution of transmitters which was largely due to the French politicians’ lack of vision prior to the war. National synchronisation in the Unoccupied Zone was only achieved on 1 December 1941.\(^{11}\) In the Occupied Zone, its programmes were not heard properly due to the lack of sufficiently powerful relays, and this remained the case throughout the period studied. RN’s programmes were, at first, met with a marked disaffection from the public. In the beginning of 1941, it became apparent that there was a lack of interest from the public for its radio programmes, including its artistic, musical programmes and varieties which were of mediocre quality. The public was irritated by its lack of timely news, and the programmes surrounding the themes of youth, work, school, etc., which were often broadcast at peak time.\(^{12}\) A reform was initiated from May 1941, resulting in the news department being re-organised, and this resulted in a marked improvement of the quality of its artistic programmes\(^{13}\) and made it an attractive alternative to the jammed BBC broadcasts. By the end of 1942, it had shifted from a radio station promoting an idealised and abstract motion associated with the National Revolution with mediocre quality, to a station aimed at maintaining the efficiency of the Vichy government and providing light and vivid artistic and entertainment programmes.\(^{14}\) However, it remained a radio station operating within the shadow and constraints of the German authorities. In 1942, its propaganda aimed more and more at facilitating the relationship between Laval and the occupiers, and not so much about shaping French public opinion.\(^{15}\)

Radio Paris was clearly a German station by organisation and management but presented itself as a French station in terms of the programmes broadcast to the public.\(^{16}\) Its programming was completely overhauled after the German takeover, using new support and frontline staff,\(^{17}\) with the most modern studio technical facilities in Paris.\(^{18}\) Although it could reach the whole of France, the programmes were intended for listeners in and around Paris. The German

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\(^{11}\) Ibid., p. 46.
\(^{12}\) ARF, Box 1682W89 ‘Exposé d’ensemble’.
\(^{13}\) Eck, *La guerre des ondes*, pp. 48-9.
\(^{14}\) ARF, Lauzanne, ‘Un double tournant’, p. 5.
\(^{15}\) Eck, *La guerre des ondes*, p. 79.
\(^{16}\) Méadel, ‘Pauses musicales’, p. 238.
\(^{17}\) Ibid., p. 240.
management carefully balanced the various programmes to appeal to the audience at large and to maintain its propaganda purpose. The programme schedule remained more or less the same from 1940 to 1944, with built-in flexibility to broadcast unplanned events.\textsuperscript{19} This is a similar approach to the BBC where the programme schedule remained practically unchanged from 18 July 1940 until 1944.\textsuperscript{20}

As with RN, Radio Paris often reported from outside the studio; for example, it broadcast live recordings of entertainment, interviews conducted in public space or employment offices, etc. However, the style was more formal and there was little appetite for showcasing Pétain’s visits. Many of Radio Paris’ programmes reflected the political aim and social issues of the time. Their propaganda messages could be crude and repetitive, although they often engaged authoritative figures and used examples to indoctrinate the French or to evoke fear. Radio Paris’s entertainment programmes occupied more than two thirds of the broadcasting schedule.\textsuperscript{21} It served to glue the radio schedule together and to lighten the listening experience. These artistic programmes were popular, interesting and of good quality, and therefore reached a wide audience.

Radio Paris had five powerful transmitters located in the Occupied Zone, enabling it to cover Paris and its suburbs, as well as much of Vichy France, making it a more powerful station than RN in terms of geographic coverage.\textsuperscript{22} Synchronisation of the transmitters was also a problem for Radio Paris. As the war progressed, it became imperative for Radio Paris to extend its broadcasting hours late into the night so that the BBC would not become the default choice for the listeners,\textsuperscript{23} but this was not achieved until June 1942 when the broadcasting of programmes was extended beyond midnight.\textsuperscript{24}

The BBC French Service did not have a magazine to illustrate their radio programmes to their targeted audience in France, due to the very nature of it being an overseas station. In contrast, the messages and the narratives of RN were supplemented by its in-house magazine, \textit{Radio National}, which was published weekly with detailed daily schedule. \textit{Radio National} was more than a magazine

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., pp. 55-6.
\textsuperscript{20} ARF, ‘Ici Londres’, p. 56.
\textsuperscript{21} Méadel, ‘Pauses musicales’, p. 241.
\textsuperscript{22} ARF, Box 1682W90 ‘Radiodiffusion’.
\textsuperscript{24} ARF, \textit{Les Ondes}, 21-27 juin 1942.
for radio programmes; it was also a very effective propaganda tool to reach out to the general public who were not necessarily listeners, in order to revive patriotism with its numerous articles on Pétain, the youth movement, sports, etc. It was also regularly supplemented by photos, commentaries and illustrated pictures. Radio Paris also had a magazine, *Les Ondes*, which played a similar role to *Radio National*, promoting the weekly programmes of Radio Paris and other friendly radio stations, giving information about the numerous Parisian shows, and using commentaries, columns, articles and photos to illustrate its political position.

In terms of the narratives of the broadcasts of the three radio stations, the BBC reported events taking place in France according to their intelligence, picking up issues which would seem insignificant in isolation, but would portray a societal tendency when taking place often and spontaneously. The women’s demonstration against food shortage in France is a good example. The study of the narratives of the BBC had a focus of ‘food’ in broad terms, encompassing the reality about food supply, the underlying military and political reasons for food shortages, the public’s reaction to them, and the physical and psychological consequences. It portrayed a realistic image of the food situation in France. By doing so, it maintained a link between the Allies and the population in France, communicating what was happening and why it happened that way, and this served to counteract the organised propaganda of RN and Radio Paris.

What the BBC reported regarding the food situation, the French were already largely aware of: the food rationing, the requisitions and levies, the presence of the occupiers, the empty grocery stores, etc. In fact, the French were the ones reporting these details to the BBC. One could argue that the role of the BBC, in this sense, was to join the dots, to enable the French to have a fuller picture of the extent of the persistent requisitions and levies imposed by both the occupier and the Vichy government, to appreciate the devastating effects of food shortages on the ordinary French people and to voice their discontent. By doing so, they fostered a sense of solidarity against the occupiers and Vichy as their puppet government. The narratives served a dual purpose of ‘agitation’ and ‘integration’: agitation against the occupier and Vichy, and unity among the people. It was not until September 1941 that the BBC started giving advice on
how to counteract German and Vichy’s food exactions, moving further along the direction of resistance.

It also became evident that as the war dragged on, food became one of the major concerns for the French. This also forms one of the lasting war memories of the French population: a film made in 1956, *La Traversée de Paris*, which portrays two men carrying the meat of a pig illegally slaughtered in a suitcase through the city of Paris quickly became a classic as it caught the imagination of the public regarding the black market.

To revive the patriotic flame of the French, the BBC spoke regularly about what it meant to be French and the importance of French grandeur. As time went by, the speakers started talking more and more about the practical problems of the French people who had to face difficult times ahead. To win the hearts and minds of the people, the BBC started to blend cleverly in their broadcasts what made France great with solid and detailed information depicting people’s feelings and concerns about what France would look like after the war was over.

Although propaganda could convince people and even make them believe stories, ‘to what extent could propaganda make people act?’ is a different question altogether. General de Gaulle did not have any illusions about it but he was certain that, to liberate France, the French themselves had to contribute to their liberation. What mattered most was to create an environment conducive to active resistance to which the 3 per cent of the active resistent>This was done in a completely innocuous way: youth was presented as a positive and promising force for the reconstruction of France. RN’s narratives were more focused on Vichy’s political and ideological aspirations rather than on the everyday problems of the population. Vichy was more concerned about how youth should think, talk and behave and how they would fit in the making of the

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26 Vinen, *The Unfree French*, p. 3.
New France. Vichy’s political and ideological aspirations concerning youth was achieved through the development of youth groups, the reform of the education system, the emphasis on sports but also by repeatedly calling, appealing, coaching and indoctrinating young people via radio.

In a way, Vichy largely emulated the German policy about youth and women, demonstrating a certain level of similarity in their ideology. However, Germany did not want Vichy to replicate the German model to strengthen French youth, as the rise of French youth could be turned against Germany. Therefore, a successful development of the youth movements in Vichy would be against the interest of the Germans: they wanted to use French youth as a source of labour for German war efforts and for the ideology of New Europe, not for the rise of France.

The context and purpose of the narratives is what makes the broadcasts of RN appealing and dangerous at the same time. RN’s narratives reflect the rhetoric of the Vichy government, promoting Pétain’s ideology of National Revolution. But for the people who lived in Vichy France during the war years, it would be difficult to contest the narratives of the broadcast; for example, how would any French contest a high standard of behaviour of pupils at school, the love of the country, the importance of hard work and learning a practical skill to be successful in life, the encouragement of sport to allow the development of friendship, comradeship, teamwork, courage, tenacity, or the necessity to maintain local and regional traditions. Even today, the moral values promoted by RN still seem to mimic largely conservative moral values.

RN was never going to be an independent or neutral radio station, as it claimed itself to be. Although the stance and rhetoric of RN changed little in the period studied, especially those associated with the youth movement and the National Revolution, it became inevitable that it would gradually lose its self-perceived neutrality due to the pressure from German authorities, using to a greater extent the language of the occupier, making it apparent for the public to see through Vichy’s hypocrisy and thus losing credibility with the listeners, particularly after Laval’s return to power in April 1942.

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28 Eck, *La guerre des ondes*, p. 149.
Radio Paris was a station in which the Germans invested more time and effort than on any other European stations.²⁹ Radio Paris presented an entertainment package of superior quality, with its state-of-the-art studio facilities and experienced French presenters. It is also evident from the broadcasting narratives that it presented itself as a French radio station for Parisians, promoting solidarity and fulfilling its social duty by promoting practical skills, providing employment information for jobseekers, encouraging the young to assist the elderly and the vulnerable, and to help with the harvest.

French youth was of common interest for Vichy and the German occupiers. Therefore, some elements of collaboration between the radio stations could be observed. For example, Radio Paris broadcast the speech of a minister of the Vichy government about education, the future of youth, practical training for young people, etc., all of which reflected the ideology of the National Revolution. However, despite sharing a common focus on ‘Work, Family, Youth’ in many of their daily broadcasts,³⁰ youth had a different meanings for RN and Radio Paris. RN portrayed youth as a mean to rejuvenate and repopulate France and create new families, youth being one of the pillars of the New France, and work being the synonym of the reconstruction of France. In contrast, the German occupier was not interested in the National Revolution; they were interested in having a pool of indoctrinated and trained young people who could help the German war efforts and support their vision for a new Europe. By 1942, the narratives presented in their broadcasts about youth became overtly pro-collaboration and anti-British. The focus shifted to a renewed vision for French youth, their obligation to engage in charitable work for France, and the recruitment of youth labour to work in Germany. The exploitation of French labour became a key element in German policy from 1942 onwards due to the situation in Russia.³¹ By February 1943, with mandatory conscription to work in Germany, French youth had to choose between collaboration or fighting against the occupier. Being neutral with a ‘wait-and-see’ attitude became an impossible option for youth to contemplate.

It is conceivable that the listeners enjoyed Radio Paris’s high-quality entertainment programmes while rejecting many of the propaganda messages

which many loathed.\textsuperscript{32} However, less evidence could be found in terms of how many people actively listened to its programmes and how widely \textit{Les Ondes} circulated. The fact remains that, following the defeat of the Germans in 1944, many documents were destroyed, deliberately or not.\textsuperscript{33} Moreover, until 1942 the Germans were winning the war and Radio Paris’ programmes and styles more or less reflected this fact: it was more about entertainment and laughter; about normalising the Parisian life and glorifying collaboration and the New Order in Europe.

There were limitations as to what propaganda could achieve. During the period 1940-42, the changes in the military landscape from rapid and sustained Germany victories to a period of stagnation helped comfort the people in believing that German rule might not last and that there was hope in the Allies’ final victory: from the victory of the Battle of Britain in 1940, the entry of the United States of America into the war on 6 December 1941, to the problems the German army encountered against the Soviet Union in 1942. The military setbacks of Germany and the increasing hope for its defeat attributed much more to the flourishing of the French resistance movement after 1942 than the BBC’s repeated calling for patriotism and resistance.

Nonetheless, the BBC propaganda contributed to the prosecution of the war by asking the audience to gather information; by asking them to disrupt the German war effort; and by asking them to obey the instructions given by the Allies. 1942 was a year marked with an explosion of civil resistance in France, and listening to the BBC was widespread in France. ‘For many people … listening to the BBC was the first act of resistance’.\textsuperscript{34} This was the achievement of the BBC radio propaganda as practical concerns were discussed and direct appeals were made on the airwaves to bring the French together to fight the occupier.\textsuperscript{35}

As for Radio Paris, although its entertainment programmes were known for their quality, the remaining content, which contained overt or covert political messages, was often frowned upon and considered as unpalatable, especially the direct anti-Semitism and anti-British rhetoric. It also tried too hard to convince the French to work in Germany, so much so that many turned away from listening to

\begin{footnotes}
\item[33] Eck, \textit{La guerre des ondes}, p. 369.
\item[34] Brooks, \textit{British Propaganda to France}, p. 160.
\item[35] Ibid., p. 5.
\end{footnotes}
its political messages in 1942. Radio Paris and its attempt to present itself as the true voice of French were discredited from as early as September 1940 when the BBC put on air the jingle ‘Radio-Paris ment’. \textsuperscript{36}

The narratives of radio broadcasts and their magazines are valuable sources for the study of the social history of France. Radio as a relatively new technology penetrated the households of millions of people, re-defining the landscape of national and transnational communication. The French lived through the war accompanied by these three main radio stations (and the radio magazines): they heard news, commentaries, reportage, music and entertainment. They heard views and opinions expressed by each radio station, fighting for their ground in an attempt to indoctrinate the listeners and steer public opinion for their own political gain. The narratives of the radio broadcasts and their magazines gave an authentic account of how each radio station interacted with and attempted to impact on society, and to convey its political messages in the execution of a psychological battle. These narratives offer another dimension to the construction of the experiences of wartime France using retrospective testimonies and contemporary documents. \textsuperscript{37} Therefore, they contribute to the understanding of the social history of France as much as official reports, personal diaries, published memoirs, and autobiographies.

As a final thought, this thesis should be viewed as a starting point for further studies on the historiography of radio propaganda in Europe. For example, Radio Paris has a complete list of participants who were featured in Radio Paris programmes throughout the war, with a short description of their role (for example, singers, comedians, journalists), and the number of times they were present at the station. This information could serve as a starting point for further research to explore the history of Radio Paris in greater depth. \textsuperscript{38} My study is also limited largely by the surviving broadcasts and radio magazines available in the archives. The narratives studied are based on the available materials and so further research with new evidence which may come to light in the future may yield different conclusions.

\textsuperscript{36} Cornick, ‘Fighting Myth with Reality’, p. 83.
\textsuperscript{37} Vinen, \textit{The Unfree French}, pp. 6-7.
\textsuperscript{38} PP, Box JB 37 Untitled documents listing the name of collaborators who worked at Radio Paris, listed in alphabetical order.
The study in this thesis is relevant to the study of narratives of propaganda in modern warfare and conflicts as well; for example, the conflict in Ukraine or the war in Syria where mass media is used extensively to communicate and spread political messages to rally support from their allies and spread fear among the enemy. This study will enable us to appreciate the evolution of technology from radio broadcasting to the use of TV broadcasting, the internet and social networking tools such as Facebook, Twitter, etc., as well as the evolution of the narratives in propaganda messages, from simple, repetitive, formal, lengthy communication to short, snappy, fast-flowing messages which the new generation increasingly grow accustomed to. The essence of propaganda remained a similar one: to strive to be the first to release new information, accurate or not, and to present one’s interpretations as the voice of truth to sway, persuade and indoctrinate the targeted audience. As with RN and Radio Paris, the media of today continue to be concerned with projecting legitimacy and disseminating information using the voices of authorities and celebrities. The rapid development of technology since the Second World War has made it much easier and quicker to penetrate households and to enable public participation via a variety of channels, but the foundations of this technique was laid back when radio was the modern medium of communication.
Appendix: list of broadcasts cited in the thesis

The BBC:

Miscellaneous topics:

From the British Broadcasting Corporation Written Archives Centre, Caversham, Reading (BBC WAC):

BBC WAC, ‘La chasse’, September 17, 20h30-21h00.

BBC WAC, ‘Le Faust de Berlioz’, 21 septembre 1940, Les Français parlent aux Français, 20h30-21h00.

BBC WAC, Jacques Duchesne, ‘Réflexion de Jacques Duchesne’, samedi 22 mars 1941, Les Français parlent aux Français, Service Français, 20h30-21h00 BST.

BBC WAC, Jacques Duchesne, ‘Réflexions de Jacques Duchesne, 2 novembre 1941, Les Français parlent aux Français, Service Français, 20:30-21:00 BST.

BBC WAC, ‘La Savoie’, dimanche 29 mars 1942, Demi-Heure Française du Matin, French Service. 11:45-12:15 BST.

BBC WAC, Jean Marin, ‘Dépêche’, jeudi 20 août 1942, Quart d’Heure Français de Midi, French Service, 12h00-12h15 BST.

BBC WAC, Maurice Schumann, 11 Novembre 1942, French Service.

From Jacques Pessis’ collection of broadcasts from 1940-1942.


From Maurice Schumann’s collection of broadcasts from ‘Honneur et Patrie’


**Broadcasts about food**

**From the BBC WAC**


BBC WAC, ‘Courrier de France’, vendredi 17 juillet 1942, in *Les Français parlent aux Français*. 20:30-21:00 DBST.

**From Jacques Pessis’ collection of broadcasts from 1940-1942.**


Radiodiffusion

Miscellaneous topics:

From the Institut national de l'audiovisuel, Paris (INA)

INA, Fonds Vichy, disques de la BDIC, *Après le bombardement de Brest par la RAF*, recorded on 01.01.1941, sur la Radio Etat Français-Radiodiffusion Nationale.

INA, Inventaire Disques, *Attentat de Paul Collette contre Pierre Laval et de Marcel Déat*, recorded on 27.08.1941, on Etat Français - Radiodiffusion Nationale (RN), 1941.


Broadcasts about Youth

From the Institut national de l'audiovisuel, Paris (INA)

INA, Fonds Vichy, disques de la BDIC, *Pétain: sa prise de fonctions*, recorded on 17.06.1940, on Radio Bordeaux Sud-Ouest.

INA, Fonds Vichy, disques de la BDIC, *Pétain: La demande d’armistice*, recorded on 20.06.1940, on Radio Bordeaux Sud-Ouest.

INA, Fonds Vichy, disques de la BDIC, *Philippe Pétain conteste les propos de Churchill sur l’armée*, recorded on 23.06.1940, on Radio Bordeaux Sud-Ouest.


INA, Fonds Vichy, disques de la BDIC, *Violente critique des querelles des gaullistes*, recorded on 01.09.1940 on Radio Etat Français-Radiodiffusion Nationale.


INA, Fonds Vichy, disques de la BDIC, *Voyage dans la région de Toulouse: Pétain visite une école viticole*, recorded on 19.11.1940, on Radio Etat Français-Radiodiffusion Nationale.


INA, Fonds Vichy, disques de la BDIC, *Voyage du Maréchal Pétain à Chambéry (Savoie)*, recorded on 01.01.1941, on Radio Etat Français-Radiodiffusion Nationale.

INA, Fonds Vichy, disques de la BDIC, *Serment de la ligue de loyauté des écoliers d’Algérie*, recorded on 01.01.1941, on Radio Etat Français-Radiodiffusion Nationale.

INA, Fonds Vichy, disques de la BDIC, *Pétain reçoit des enfants en vacances à Vichy*, recorded on 01.01.1941, on Radio Etat Français-Radiodiffusion Nationale.

INA, Fonds Vichy, disques de la BDIC, *Pétain visite une ferme dans le Limousin*, recorded on 19.06.1941, on Radio Etat Français-Radiodiffusion Nationale.

INA, Fonds Vichy, disques de la BDIC, *Voyage de Pétain à Limoges*, recorded on 20.06.1941, on Radio Etat Français-Radiodiffusion Nationale.


INA, Fonds Vichy, disques de la BDIC, *Après la visite de Pétain à l’école de cadres de Gannat*, recorded on 20.10.1941, on Radio Etat Français-Radiodiffusion Nationale.


INA, Fonds Vichy, disques de la BDIC, *PETAIN dans les Chantiers de jeunesse de RANDAN*, recorded on 01.01.1942, on Radio Etat Français-Radiodiffusion Nationale.

INA, Fonds Vichy, disques de la BDIC, *Maréchal PÉTAIN: voyage à Clermont-Ferrand*, recorded on 22.03.1942, on Radio Etat Français-Radiodiffusion Nationale.

INA, Fonds Vichy, disques de la BDIC, *Construction d’un centre socio-culturel à Châteauroux*, recorded on 28.05.1942, on Radio Etat Français-Radiodiffusion Nationale.


INA, Fonds Vichy, disques de la BDIC, *Aubusson accueille Pétain*, recorded on 20.06.1941, on Radio Etat Français-Radiodiffusion Nationale.

INA, Fonds Vichy, disques de la BDIC, *Discours aux Chantiers de jeunesse de RANDAN*, recorded on 26.06.1942, on Radio Etat Français-Radiodiffusion Nationale.

INA, Fonds Vichy, disques de la BDIC, *Discours aux scouts de France*, recorded on 15.08.1942, on Radio Etat Français-Radiodiffusion Nationale.


**From Jean-Claude Barbas’ collection of Pétain’s broadcasts**

No 34, Allocution du 20 juin 1941, pp. 146-7.
No 52, Message du 13 octobre 1941, pp. 194-6.
No 58, Message du 27 novembre 1941, pp. 207-8.
No 81, Message du 3 septembre 1942, pp. 272-5.
Radio Paris

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INA, Inventaire Disques, *Hommage aux morts allemands de la guerre 14-18*, recorded on 09.11.1940, on Radio Paris (RP), 1940.


INA, Inventaire Disques, *Hitler dans un meeting de travailleurs de l’armement*, recorded on 10.12.1940, on Berlin: Reichsrundfunk (ARD), 1940.

INA, Inventaire Disques, *Réunion politique organisée par le movement ‘le Feu’*, recorded on 01.01.1941, on Radio Paris (RP), 1941.

INA, Inventaire Disques, *Cardinal Emmanuel Suhard: concert de musique religieuse donné au profit des prisonniers de guerre*, recorded on 08.03.1941, on Radio Paris (RP), 1941.


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INA, Inventaire Disques, *Attentat contre LAVAL*, recorded on 27.08.1941, on Radio Paris (RP), 1941.

INA, Inventaire Disques, *Fernand de Brinon: l’attentat de Paul Collette contre Pierre Laval*, recorded on 28.08.1941, on Radio Paris (RP), 1941.


INA, Inventaire Disques, *Commentaires d'Hérold PAQUIS sur publication des discours de DE GAULLE*, recorded on 01.01.1942, on Radio Paris (RP), 1942.
 INA, Inventaire Disques, _Interview de Jean VIGNAUD, sur l’aide apportée aux prisonniers_, recorded on 11.02.1942, on Radio Paris (RP), 1942.

 INA, Inventaire Disques, _Discours prononcé par Fernand de BRINON_, recorded on 01.03.1942, on Radio Paris (RP), 1942.

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**Broadcasts about Youth**

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 INA, Inventaire Disques, _Georges Lamirand: appel aux jeunes ouvriers_, recorded on 16.06.1941, on Radio Paris (RP), 1941.

 INA, Inventaire Disques, _Georges Lamirand: appel en faveur du service civique rural_, recorded on 20.06.1941, on Radio Paris (RP), 1941.

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 INA, Inventaire Disques, _Offres d'emplois pour chômeurs_, recorded on 17.08.1941, on Radio Paris (RP), 1941.

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INA, Inventaire Disques, *Reportage après un bombardement à Argenteuil*, recorded on 01.05.1942, on Radio Paris (RP), 1942.

INA, Inventaire Disques, *Interview d’un travailleur français en Allemagne*, recorded on 30.05.1942, on Radio Paris (RP), 1942.


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Online Archives

The Atlantic Archives


Churchill Archives


German Archives


Les Archives départementales de la Savoie


Published broadcasts


**Secondary Sources**

**Books**


Chapters in edited books


**Articles in journals**


**Pamphlet**


**Periodicals**


**Computer sources: Prefects’ reports, documents, websites, Video documentaries and DVDs**

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