The Condition of Market Emergence in Indonesia: Coloniality as Exclusion and Translation

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I dedicate this thesis to my parents, with love.
Declaration

This thesis is submitted to the University of Warwick in support of my application for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Politics and International Studies. It has been composed by myself and has not been submitted in any previous application for any degree.

Word Count

The word count of this thesis is 78,779, not including the acknowledgements, abstract, bibliography or appendices.
Abstract

This thesis elaborates a decolonial international political economy (IPE) as a means of examining the condition of market emergence in Indonesia. It presents the term ‘emerging market’ as the contemporary organising grammar which positions Indonesia in relation to international capital flows. This condition of market emergence is further understood in historical colonial perspective as the latest mode of producing Indonesia as an investible site for international capital. My expansion of decolonial IPE is made in this thesis through the analysis of difference-based ‘exclusion’ and ‘translation’, both as vital elements of coloniality and as processes which relate to accumulation and dispossession in an ‘emerging market’ context. I go on to make the case for bringing urban and rural terminable sites of extraction into the same frame of analysis. These are understood similarly here as internal frontiers along which social groups are materially and discursively excluded from the national emerging market project and thus rendered expropriatable. I further analyse the repeated dispossession of these expropriatable groups along with other means of enacting ‘translations’, or enforced alterations in ways of being. These translations are by no means passively accepted and my analysis further demonstrates various means by which these are negotiated and contested. This thesis therefore makes contributions to the literature on decolonial thought and IPE, at the same time as presenting an original examination of Indonesia in its present moment of market emergence.
Chapter One: Introduction to a Story of Emergence

The four-wheel drive Trooper sped southwards on the winding road, passing watermelon stalls, pineapple and oil palm plantations and jungle. As they approached the landslide area, the road surface changed from asphalt to gravel. In that area there were no oil companies opening up new roads. They stopped where the vehicular road ended, in the middle of a rubber plantation whose trees were currently in the last stages of losing their leaves, not far from Sei Kumbang and its river flowing towards Ogan. The sound of the river’s little rapids was audible above the rustling of the alang-alang grass that was being buffeted about by the wind.

(Utami 2005: 68)

Such then, is the condition of my kampung with its busy Djibril. You too, friend, can come to my kampung some time. My kampung can also become a soul-enriching tourist kampung. Finding it is not hard at all, because everyone in Djakarta knows where the national palace is located. Five hundred meters in a straight line toward the southwest, there my kampung stands in all its glory, defying the doctors and the technical professionals.

(Pramoedya 2000 [1952]: 84)

1 In Islamic thought, Djibril is the angel who takes the dead to Allah for judgement (Pramoedya 2000: 263).
Should you happen to leaf through contemporary works of Indonesian literature you might find further echoes of the rural and urban images contained in the passages above. The first, Ayu Utami’s brief description of a rural journey, is peppered with the commodity references a plantation estate landscape always evokes. The second is an extract from Pramoedya’s notes on his defiant kampung,² which troubles whatever iteration of a palatial building it shadows just as much as it troubles the hygiene planners and development experts of the day. These passages are from two separate texts by two different authors but, in a sense, they come from the same story; one of the making of material life through investment in nature-based commodities in rural areas as well as through the urban construction of the “exemplary centre”³ of the resource-rich archipelago now known as Indonesia. But they also hint at a story of terminable material life: Where are the communities who once settled on the place now occupied by the oil road, palm plantation, or ‘landslide area’? What will become of the kampung residents who disturb the exemplary urban image and whose hygiene is monitored by professionals building a case for their eviction?

This thesis picks up a similar story in Indonesia’s present moment of market emergence and forwards a critical analysis of the now-familiar narrative of the

² The literal translation of ‘kampung’ is ‘village’ but here the word refers to an urban poor neighbourhood.

³ Abidin Kusno (2010: 5, 59) uses this term to refer to contemporary Jakarta as a “microcosm that embodies political order”, drawing on Geertz’s work on the ‘theatre state’ in nineteenth century Bali as the “material embodiment of the political order” and “a faultless image of civilized existence [which] shapes the world around it into at least a rough approximation of its own excellence” (Geertz 1980: 13).
Southeast Asian archipelago as an ‘emerging market’. Within the standard narrations of Indonesia as emerging market by international financial institutions (IFIs), for instance, dispossession and the creation of poverty through displacement from urban and rural investment-intensive areas rarely figure in the analysis. The emerging market condition is narrated as an optimistic condition if national economic performance and financial market development appear strong. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), for example, celebrates Indonesia’s strong growth in the first decade after the “Asian Crisis” of the late 1990s, noting that real gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates ranged from 4.9 per cent to 6.2 per cent between the years 2000 and 2013 (OECD 2013). The World Bank (2011) similarly praises the country’s economic growth and notes that “[b]y 2025, Indonesia will be among six major emerging economies to account for more than half of all global growth”. Elsewhere, emerging markets are narrated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as sites attracting sizeable inflows of foreign investment, with Indonesia among seven countries with the highest levels of central bank debt holdings (IMF 2014). The picture of financial market development is related in this account to improvements in public debt management across emerging market economies.

In contrast, this thesis looks beyond the understanding of market emergence as simply an optimistic and contemporary empirical condition and towards a longer historical recognition of the discursive and material construction of the archipelago as an investible site for international capital. With a view to capturing something of the present condition of market emergence, the thesis travels, just as Utami and Pramoedya have done, along the resource frontiers and around the kampungs where

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4 See, for example Armijo & Katada 2015; Knoop 2013; Financial Times 2010; 2012; 2015a; 2015b.
investment capital most intensely concentrates its interest, creating the threat and reality of dispossession, as well as new and rediscovered modes of resistance.

This work is balanced approximately between theory and empirics; Chapters Two and Three deal with theoretical influences, Chapter Four reflects on my method, Chapter Five provides a historical perspective on the emerging market discourse, and the final three chapters offer a closer examination of life in sites of extraction and how this is negotiated. The main components of my central argument are as follows: The present-day discursive construction of Indonesia as ‘emerging market’ has a degree of continuity with historical modes of making the archipelago investible. Examining the present-day Indonesian political economy through rural and urban sites of extraction reveals the transformations and contestations produced in this new moment of investibility. Furthermore, the production and exploitation of (racial) difference is central to these transformations and allows for colonial modes of dispossession to be reproduced. Coloniality is therefore visible in the present as forms of exclusion and translation, which in turn inspire new modes of resistance.

Research questions

This thesis seeks to advance a deeper exploration of the core decolonial concept of coloniality as exclusion and translation and explores how these continue to function within the optimistic context of market emergence. Within each site of extraction I therefore consider the following research questions: (how) are communities excluded from the normalised trope of the human/subject in Indonesia? How are translations threatened or enacted in the social worlds of the excluded? And what kind of translations are threatened or enacted?
Each of the empirical Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight address these guiding questions in their specific geographical contexts of the Jakarta kampungs, West Papua, and Indonesia's rural resource frontiers. At the same time, however, the discussions in these chapters extend beyond the frames of the questions to cover details which could not have been anticipated. In this sense the text occasionally diverts to bring in unexpected stories which further demonstrate the complexities of life in sites of intense interest to capital under conditions of market emergence.

Ultimately, across the key sites of extraction studied in this research, I identify various means by which exclusions are produced. In the urban context these range from the material exclusions produced by commercial superblocks in Jakarta, to the spatial prohibitions brought about by the Jakarta ID card system, to the discursive exclusions of the urban poor from the figure of the proper, moral, economic subject. Further exclusions, I will go on to argue, may be identified in the codified distinction of the *masyarakat terasing* (or isolated people) who have been considered by Indonesian anthropologists and by the state to be outside of the frames of the proper Indonesian subject, in part because of their animist beliefs or nomadic ways of being. In West Papua, I will argue, exclusion has been produced by means of the temporal and hierarchical ordering of Papuan difference in order to signify the ‘backward’ and ‘inferior’ status of Papuans themselves. Representations of the immoral nature of Papuan intimacy and the ascription of the colonial trope of the cannibal are among the means by which Papuans are excluded and rendered inferior and thus expropriatable.

I will ultimately argue that threatened or enacted translations vary in their intensity and complexity across the three sites of study. However, across both urban and rural sites of extraction, ways of being related to particular spatial relations are transformed by the dispossession of land or shelter. Further translations identified in the context of Papua relate to ways of understanding intimacy as well as to systems of value and
exchange. These observations on exclusions and translations eventually feed into the claims and contributions of the thesis which are set out in the following section.

*Claims and contributions*

The claims and contributions this thesis makes may be considered in theoretical, methodological, and empirical terms. Theoretically, this work expands the possibilities of decolonial IPE by presenting exclusion and translation as vital elements of coloniality in an ‘emerging market’ context. Specifically, I make this expansion by analysing how exclusion based on (racial) difference functions in processes of dispossession in investment-intensive areas. Further, I deepen understandings of the condition of market emergence by setting this condition in historical colonial perspective. From such a perspective, ‘emerging market’ may be understood as the contemporary organising grammar which positions Indonesia in relation to international capital flows. In terms of methodology, this work deepens engagements with the ethics of conducting fieldwork-based research across (post)colonial power relations and presents a ‘reflexive field informed approach’ as a decolonial method. Empirically, the thesis adds unique material from interviews with kampung residents of Jakarta, mapping activists from across the archipelago, and corporate actors, as well as prominent figures in Indonesian public debates around land and urban rights. On the whole, the project makes various contributions to debates within IPE and decolonial thought, as well as presenting a novel study of Indonesia in its present moment of market emergence.
Working towards a decolonial IPE

I present this thesis as a work of International Political Economy (IPE) simply because it deals with the impact and historical constitution of capital investment, as well as patterns of dispossession and accumulation, how these are enabled in the first place, and how they are negotiated and resisted. In short, in common with the discipline of IPE, this thesis is concerned implicitly with questions of how power works through the global economy. IPE is itself a discipline contested in terms of both its roots and branches. Some thinkers root the discipline in the proliferation of work related to changes in configurations of power in the global economy in the 1970s following the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and understand it to be a sub-field of International Relations (IR); while others are keen to recover its antecedents in classical political economy (see Watson 2005 for an overview of these contrasting understandings). The present-day field is too broad to survey here. However, I will look more closely later in this introductory chapter at how Indonesia is specifically narrated in IPE texts and in other texts which speak directly to the field.

More specifically, I present this thesis as a work of decolonial IPE which owes much to a long and varied history of intellectual engagements with economic problematics from post- and de-colonial perspectives. To recognise just a handful here, such engagements range from Pablo Gonzalez Casanova’s (1965) analysis of the persistence of colonial modes of economic governance within the long-time independent nations of the Americas in *Internal Colonialism and National Development* (1965); to Walter Rodney’s (2012 [1972]) examination of the political production of poverty by means of European colonisers’ engagements with African economies in *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. 
Other works speak more directly to the discipline of IPE in the present. In *Savage Economics*, for example, David Blaney and Naeem Inayatullah (2010) extend their close reflection on the stadial temporal constructions of classical political economists and the resonance of such constructions in our understanding of economies in the present day. Through multiple published works, John Hobson has added to IPE debates on colonial legacies by means of his meticulous typologising of forms of Eurocentrism and racism in foundational liberal, Marxist, and realist modes of thought (see, for example, Hobson 2012; 2013). Robbie Shilliam’s (2012a) work has offered a rewriting of the constitutive historical reality of slavery back into understandings of political economy; and elsewhere (Shilliam 2012b) reconsidered the philosophical basis for Amartya Sen’s understanding of individual freedom which itself informs human development approaches adopted broadly by international financial institutions (IFIs).

There have been further thought-provoking interventions in the economic aspects of ‘globalisation’ debates: From Sankaran Krishna’s (2009) reading of globalisation as the extension and naturalisation of market logics, with postcolonialism read as a denaturalising and repoliticising counter-force; to L.H.M. Ling’s (2000) intersectional postcolonial call for the connection of ‘passions’ and ‘interests’ in analyses of globalisation in order to expose its raced and gendered logics. These are just a few prominent examples but in Chapter Two I will survey further engagements with the colonial question in more depth and in relation to economic moments within such examples of work.

In presenting this study as an example of ‘decolonial’ IPE, I do not simply use the term decolonial as a metaphor for ‘globalising’. Scholarship to ‘globalise’ IPE has been produced in waves, beginning with efforts to globalise the objects of analysis beyond Europe, the US and other liberal settler colonies (see for example, Phillips 2005;
Ebenau et al 2015). This work has, however, tended to apply the same Eurocentric framings to a broader geographical area. Eric Helleiner’s (2015) recent article goes beyond globalising the objects of analysis to globalising engagement with thinkers from beyond Europe who have adopted and adapted theories of political economy. While there is room in Helleiner’s analysis for the input and synthesis of thought from beyond Europe, the analysis itself is restricted by its confinement to the frames of liberalism, economic nationalism, and Marxism. This approach forecloses means of thinking the economy outside of these frames which might be derived, for example, from Indigenous modes of economic life. At the same time, Helleiner stops short of asking the more political questions of why thinkers from beyond Europe and its former liberal settler colonies are routinely excluded from the IPE canon; and of how this relates back to European colonial productions of race.

Matthew Watson’s (2016) recent disciplinary intervention steps beyond efforts to globalise the objects and theoretical engagements of IPE and considers how one of its core theories was colonially constituted in the first place. Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage, the economic bedrock of liberal IPE, sets out the mutual gains produced by means of a liberal trading arrangement without government intervention, taking the example of Portuguese wine and English cloth as national specialisations. The model derived from this scenario was based on a world in which only two economies and two goods interacted in trading relations. In the economic reality of the eighteenth century context, however, the cloth exported to Portugal created a significant trade deficit which the wine trade could by no means reduce alone. Portugal’s colonisation of Brazil meant the country had access to 40 per cent of new global gold reserves (ibid: 5) which were used to reduce the trade deficit Portugal had with Britain up until the mid-eighteenth century. However, the extraction of this gold depended upon slave labour from Portugal’s African colonies, and the merchant ships
taking gold to Europe would return by way of the African continent with newly enslaved people. Ricardo’s partial account, pared of its context of enslavement and imperialism, has nonetheless been used as the basis for understanding the economic rules of the terms of trade.

To return to the discussion of decolonial work; as will become clear throughout this thesis and especially in Chapter Two on theory and Chapter Four on method, my use of the term *decolonial* should be understood in the sense of a *decolonising* endeavour, as an unattainable goal, rather than a fully decolonised way of approaching scholarship. Decolonial should be further understood, not as a prescribed set of tenets adhered to by a defined group of scholars, but as an ethos which informs an ethical imperative to re-examine colonial histories and their legacies in the present. As exemplified in Watson’s work on liberal trade theory above, such legacies may be identifiable within, for example, institutional structures, academic concepts, theoretical approaches, within the sites and scales of study we privilege over others, and within other methodological habits. This is based on the understanding that European colonialism, as the dominant organising global system over most of the past five centuries, is implicated in some way in all of our concepts and theories of knowledge, and in the very act of producing research from an institution in the Global North.

Without engaging squarely with IPE as such, Ramón Grosfoguel (2009) sets out his understanding of what a decolonial political economy would look like, and in doing so he also goes well beyond the imperative to ‘globalise’. Grosfoguel includes the need to draw on plural epistemologies from beyond European thought, as well as the need to interrogate theories presented as abstract universals. Grosfoguel’s intervention in political economy is largely inspired by earlier path-breaking theoretical advances made in fields from law to international politics by scholars including Gloria Anzaldúa.
(1987), Patricia Hill Collins (2002), Kimberle Crenshaw (1989), and Cynthia Enloe (1990). This is a reminder that women, and particularly women of colour, have been at the vanguard of the decolonial turn in scholarship in its broadest understanding.

On the whole, I understand decolonial scholarship to be driven by the imperative to work towards global social justice in the present and to work against the perpetual repetition of raced modes of subjugation and expropriation, of anything from land to knowledge, which have their roots in the colonial era. Decolonial work may therefore comprise, for example, disciplinary revisionist efforts to recover the ways in which race and colonialism have structured our core concepts and/or historical revisionist efforts to recover those violent colonial histories we have evacuated from our understandings of the global economy in the present. Most of all, however, decolonial work engages with multiple epistemologies often by means of being guided by the scholarship of Indigenous, racialised, and/or colonised intellectuals.

The decolonial research I advance here is therefore claimed as such because it engages with the concept of coloniality in the present and deepens this through an understanding of the dynamics of exclusion and translation in relation to populations inhabiting sites of extraction. It also sets key concepts and phenomena, such as ‘emerging market’, ‘adat’,\(^5\) and the racialisation of Papuans, in historical perspective with their influences and antecedents in the colonial era. A further claim to decolonial scholarship is based on the prominence of the voices of racialised and colonised

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\(^5\) Adat is the customary legal system regulating drawing on various definitions (McWilliam 2006: 46, 49, 58; Henley & Davidson 2007: 3) we can consider adat to be a dynamic and evolving normative system comprised of jurisprudential, cultural, and spiritual elements which regulate, \textit{inter alia}, customary practices and land tenure, and which has traditionally been community-specific and orally-related, rather than formally codified.
thinkers throughout this study, as well as the voices and experiences of those who are discursively and materially excluded in the present moment of coloniality in Indonesia. These claims are fleshed out more fully in my reflections on method in Chapter Four.

Decolonial IPE will be a perpetual and necessarily imperfect project. Our intellectual currency includes concepts such as ‘land’, for instance, which, as Chapter Eight will partly address, have a very specific understanding in globalised European thought and inflect our scholarship with invested meanings before we even begin. Further, the political economy of scholarship itself continues to privilege work produced in the Global North, thus reproducing old colonial forms of racial and geographical privilege and obstructing the development of a truly global form of IPE produced from multiple geographical and cultural positions. Moreover, the sedimented trails of IPE scholarship continue to further build upon the work of canonised thinkers, such as Adam Smith and Karl Marx. Even critiques of the works of these thinkers by scholars concerned with the colonial question (Hobson 2012; Blaney & Inayatullah 2010) continue to reproduce their position as master texts rather than decentring them and positioning them as relational to global historical thinking on matters of economy. This is necessarily so, in a sense, as European foundational texts continue to inform the teaching of Economics and IPE and their interrogation remains an important project.

There is, therefore, work to do. This thesis is intended to contribute to that decolonial labour by diverting significantly from the existing IPE scholarship on Indonesia. The following section, *Indonesia in the IPE literature*, will forward examples of such work before the final section, *Thesis chapter summaries*, introduces just how the chapters of this thesis will unfold.
Indonesia in the IPE literature

When compared with the extensive Development Studies literature on Indonesia, IPE’s disciplinary engagement with the country has been, on the whole, tentative, ambivalent, and patchy. Since the wholesale structuring of ‘development’ in the form of a discipline (Development Studies), a global industry, and a regulatory system in itself in the mid-twentieth century era of decolonisation, post-colonial countries have been overwhelmingly studied as ‘developing’ country objects whose poverty is assumed to be natural rather than colonially produced (see, for example, Escobar 2011; Cowen & Shenton 1996; Rist 2002; Mitchell 1995). The Development Studies gaze, I argue, deals largely with the same basic problematics of economic governance as IPE does, but begins from an unspoken assumption that ‘developing’ countries require an intervention from outside in order to achieve economic success. The genealogy of this thinking can be found within Classical Political Economy in which colonised places have been understood to be largely incapable of immanent progress, suspended in ‘static’ traditional time – an understanding which helped to justify their subjugation under colonial rule in the first place (Cowen & Shenton 1996; Blaney & Inayatullah 2010).

Although progress had long been understood in this racially divided way in European thought, Cowen and Shenton (1996) place the specific shift in interventionist understandings of development itself in Saint-Simonian thinking in early nineteenth century France. At this time, a shift is perceptible from understanding development as a natural unfolding of immanent progress to its translation into a development doctrine as “the exercise of trusteeship over society [where] trusteeship is the intent which is expressed, by one source of agency, to develop the capacities of another” (Cowen & Shenton 1996: ix). In Bernstein’s terms, development was imposed
by European colonial powers as “anticipatory social engineering: the engineering of growth in ways, and at rates, compatible with social order” (Bernstein 2006: 48). Development, then, cannot be dislocated from its meaning as ‘trusteeship’, intervention, denial of immanent capabilities, and ‘anticipatory social engineering’.

Furthermore, Development Studies as a discipline is resolutely focused on what are mainly formerly colonised ‘developing’ countries of the Global South, it does not concern itself with the existence of poverty within European former colonising countries, their neighbours, or within Europe’s former white liberal settler colonies, the US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The political economy of these latter countries, as ‘developed’ domains have instead made up the overwhelming focus of IPE. Having said that, while Development Studies almost exclusively concentrates on ‘developing’ countries, IPE scholars have endeavoured to broaden their scope beyond those countries understood to be ‘developed’ (Phillips 2005; Tétreault & Lipschutz 2009). Certain foci of study, for example, necessarily draw ‘developing’ countries into the analysis. For instance, IPE work on globalisation, global governance and international financial institutions in particular (c.f. Elson 2013; Woods & Lombardi 2006), as well as work on globalisation and regionalism (c.f. Cai 2008; Chandra 2006; Beeson 2014; Dent 2016) has crossed over with the work of Development Studies on the Global South.

Indonesia has therefore featured more often within the analyses of Development Studies scholars (for example, Hill 1995; Booth 1992; Aswicahyono et al 2010) than it has within the analysis of IPE scholars.6 Nonetheless, some researchers whose work

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6 At the same time, a range of literature beyond Development Studies and IPE also treats the subject of Indonesian political economy from outside of those disciplinary frames (c.f. Hefner 1998 and contributions; Rudnyckyj 2009; Gellert 2008, 2010a; Pepinsky 2009).
speaks directly to IPE have subverted this disciplinary order by focusing their work on Indonesia across a range of foci including economic liberalisation (Bowie & Unger 1996; Rosser 2013), Islamic finance and microfinance (Seibel 2008; Holloh 1998), and global value chains (Neilson 2013) to give a few examples. Otherwise, core areas of IPE inquiry in which Indonesia has featured have included the rapid development of East Asian ‘tiger’ economies and theorising of the ‘developmental state’, especially during the 1980s and 1990s (Rasiah 2003; Felker & Jomo 2003). Theorising on the nature and balance of ‘states’ and ‘markets’, or the co-constitutive nature of these, has had a special focus on East Asia as a whole and on the model of the developmental state in its various guises (Underhill & Zhang 2005; Johnson 1986; Wade 1990; Haggard 1990).

However, it was undoubtedly the Asian Financial Crisis of the late 1990s which caused IPE as a discipline to further broaden its focus beyond majority-white liberal countries and macro-scale global governance analysis (see Noble & Ravenhill 2000; Haggard 2000). Work on Indonesia in recent years has often taken this crisis event as a foundational moment or entry point into the discursive field of IPE, with prior events narrated as a preface to that moment (see Callaghy 2000; Hamilton-Hart 2000; Palat 2003; Rosser 2013). But crises, as Laura Hyun Yi Kang (2012: 411) reminds us, are “archives of figuration” in themselves in the sense that the way crises are narrated serves to construct their associated geographies in particular ways. Kang brings the Asian Financial Crisis into comparative perspective with the 2008 subprime crisis in

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7 States and markets are often assumed to be in inverse relation to one another but some work on East Asia has sought to contest this: “empirically states and markets are never found apart, they constitute an analytically integrated form of public–private governance: the ways in which interests are structured, power is exercised and economic policy choices are made” (Underhill & Zhang 2005: 20).
order to demonstrate that both the ‘Asian’ and the ‘subprime’ borrower were identified in crisis discourses as the source of blame, and thus deficient, inferior, and behind. In the case of the Asian Financial Crisis, the naming of the crisis as such located this firmly as an ‘Asian’ problem with Asian origins, thus distracting from analysis of the damaging aspects of global capital mobility (Kang 2012). This is a prominent example of what the author calls *Asianisations* – or figurations of Asia through various dominant frames, including ‘miracle’, ‘crisis’, and ‘recovery’.

Furthermore, even where ‘developing’ countries do feature within IPE analysis the racialised distinction between the objects of study of Development Studies and IPE is often carried over. Consider this observation from Robison in relation to global patterns of liberalisation:

> programmes of economic deregulation, privatisation, the principles of macroeconomic austerity and the ideologies of individualism and consumerism have undoubtedly made deep inroads into the old social democratic amalgams of the West as well as into various systems of state-led capitalism and predatory populism that prevailed elsewhere.

(Robison 2005: 247)

‘The West’ appears in this frame as “old social democratic amalgams” whereas ‘the rest’ are represented broad-brush as “state-led capitalism and predatory populism”. Robison’s reduction here would be recognisable by Edward W. Said\(^8\) as an

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\(^8\) The contribution of the Palestinian scholar of literature Edward W. Said to the canon of work on the colonial question has been valuable beyond measure for the foundations of postcolonial scholarship.
Orientalising distinction through which the West itself is constructed and defined by means of a contrasting image (Said 2003 [1978]).

Continuing in this spirit, much of the IPE work on Indonesia has been centrally concerned with locating the Indonesian state within broader state typologies. Work within this mode includes implicitly Weberian analyses of the type of state in evidence in Indonesia, which is, in the final analysis, generally read to be ‘patrimonial’ rather than ‘rational-legal’. This kind of scholarship has also had a close analytical concern for shifting political coalitions and their articulations with neoliberal policy pressures, and such studies have enabled interaction with broader debates on the nature of the state across the ‘developing’ world (Abbott 2003; Budd 2004; Robison & Rosser 2000). However, again, the distinct way in which ‘developing’ countries are narrated allows for a scholar like Abbott (2003: 58) to say that Indonesia is like “neo-patrimonial states in Africa” rather than looking for forms of patrimony in Europe as comparison, for example.

To reach this conclusion regarding Indonesia’s resemblance with “neo-patrimonial states in Africa” Abbott connects a mistrust of the private sector and a predilection for state interventionism with Indonesia’s hard-won independence struggle. From here he identifies a degree of consistency in Indonesia’s state-managed economy from its independence and throughout the phase of Guided Democracy under Sukarno, and up to the fall of Suharto in the midst of the financial crisis of the late 1990s. Abbott’s work has an overwhelming focus on the wrangling between ‘technocratic’ and ‘patrimonial’ elites and the outcomes of such power struggles in terms of economic policy. By these means he traces the development of an Indonesian capitalist class resulting in what he

His most famous work (Said 2003 [1978]) considered the concept of Orientalism in terms of a discursive means of building European authority and domination over the Orient.
understands to be a form of clientelism as a dominant mode of governance practice. This kind of analysis projects a particular image of Indonesia which repeatedly accentuates the prevalence of “patron-client linkages” and labels the style of Indonesian political economy to be “crony capitalism” (Abbott 2003: 78).

In a similar mode, and read within the broader frame of a “Crisis of Oligarchic Capitalism” in East Asia (Robison et al 2000: 169), Robison and Rosser (2000) chart the unfolding of economic crisis in Indonesia through various dramatic stages in the late 1990s. They trace events in sequence from the collapse of the Thai baht, to the subsequent speculative run on the rupiah, to the moves of domestic corporations to accumulate dollars in reserve, to, ultimately, the loss of 80 per cent of the value of the rupiah (Robison & Rosser 2000: 171). They also retrace the events of the decades before the 1998 crisis and detail the reforms which pleased the IFIs at the time but which, they argue, served to sow the seeds for the later crisis from the 1990s. These changes included liberalisation in the wake of the oil price crash in the 1980s, and ensuing reforms which were aimed at breaking down public sector monopolies, liberalising trade and foreign investment laws, and deregulating banking and finance (ibid: 176).

Protracted negotiations with the IMF in Indonesia ultimately gave rise to an increasingly entrenched post-crisis recession and finally to the fall of Suharto in May of 1998 (ibid: 183). Robison and Rosser further chart IMF structural reforms in relation to internal negotiations and contestations between political and business interest groups in the post-crisis reorganisation of the political economic order. This approach to analysis of Indonesia feeds into a broader literature on neoliberal reform wherein this is understood as a process of erosion or reorganisation of the power of social and political coalitions (ibid: 173). On the whole, Robison and Rosser’s work thrashes over the kinds of questions which become contemplatable within IFI-
influenced discourses on ‘Asian capitalism’ such as: “Have Asian economies become functionally obsolete in the context of new capitalist markets and systems of production that constitute modern global capitalism?” and “Will the economic and social costs of maintaining dirigiste and predatory forms of capitalism become too great for the elites whose ascendancy is embedded in them?” (ibid: 172 [emphasis added]). Once again, even the formulation of research questions in terms of whether Asian economies might become ‘functionally obsolete’, or in terms of the pliancy of Asian ‘predatory capitalism’ indicates a specific form of Asianisation, to engage Kang’s term once again, which figures ‘developing’ economies as distinct from those we understand to be ‘developed’.

Hadiz and Robison (2005), writing some time after the dust had settled on the financial crisis, presented what they saw as the paradox of increased integration in the global market, the deepening of capitalism internally, and the intense involvement of the World Bank, occurring concurrently with the cementing of “authoritarian politics and predatory economic relationships” from this they feed into wider debates on the transformative nature of neoliberal reform and its sometimes counterintuitive effects (Hadiz & Robison 2005: 220). By 2013 the same authors were publishing work which essentially continued to ponder over the same mystery: the continuing prevalence of predatory practices among elite political figures, even beyond decades of economic liberalisation (Hadiz & Robison 2013).

All of this prominent work on Indonesia maintains the same close focus on the balance of power between elite groups in relation to external pressures to liberalise state involvement in the economy9. The same discourses of predation, oligarchy, and

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9 Andrew Rosser (2016) has, however, more recently published work within IPE on ‘everyday actors’ rather than elites in Indonesia.
cronyism are persistently reproduced within the dominant conclusions in this vein of scholarship (see also Achwan 2013).

In contrast, my thesis as presented here is fundamentally distinct from the above examples with their overwhelming focus on elite power configurations and the identification of the state as a particular type within a neoliberalising global context. Instead I seek to make visible the modes of (racial) exclusion and translation which relate to flows of capital in the present within a national emerging market context. I begin, not with the Indonesian elites, but with the discursively and materially excluded whose dispossession is so central to the optimistic growth story which is often blindly celebrated in scholarly accounts of market emergence. Figured instead in this analysis are Indonesia’s expropriatable and frequently dispossessed communities; firstly, the urban poor of Jakarta whose informal activity is so constitutive of urban economic life, yet who are evicted to make way for new modes of capitalist valorisation in the city; and secondly, the rural Indigenous peoples, living at the violent frontiers of Indonesia’s resources boom. The final section of this chapter will familiarise the reader with how the rest of the thesis will unfold.

Thesis chapter summaries

Chapter Two bears the title: The Colonial Question: A brief survey of the landscape of thought on (post)colonialism, empire, and decolonisation. To begin with, this second chapter runs through some shifting and unstable definitions of colonialism and imperialism and, in the process, considers the actual function of the analytical separation between the two terms. Here I will suggest that imperialism has been understood by Marxists as generally a stage of capital accumulation, and by liberals as an overarching system of stability, peace, and tutelage. In reality, both of these broad
understandings similarly effect a convenient analytical separation between imperialism and the colonialism it is constitutive of. This, in turn, allows for a de-raced understanding of domination over another people which denies the granular violence and exploitation of the colonial experience. Considering the erasures this separation has enabled, more recent moves to bring the colonial back into focus through the concept of coloniality have been productive in the sense that they have re-centred the ways in which hierarchised difference – especially racialised difference – functions within processes of accumulation, exploitation, and dispossession.

The chapter goes on to cover an exemplary Southeast Asian work on the colonial question more broadly, Syed Hussein Alatas’s *The Myth of the Lazy Native*, (1977). Within this text, Alatas identified a sweeping subject exclusion which figured Southeast Asian natives outside of the proper moral, labouring subject. This racialising exclusion had a dual political economic function in justifying colonisation in the first instance, as well as in justifying a coercive labour regime which would become central to Southeast Asian plantation economies. Following this, the chapter talks the reader through the rough, interrelated, and overlapping phases of work on the colonial question: characterised here as anticolonial impulse, postcolonial reflection, and decolonial re-edification. Diverse anticolonial work, exemplified here by the writings of Tan Malaka, should be read explicitly as political interventions made during particular moments within specific geographically situated struggles for independence. Written for such a forthright purpose, I argue here, anticolonial work tends to be decisively diagnostic at the same time as being boldly remedial.

Postcolonial work, Chapter Two goes on to claim, has been generally more reflective; concerned with the development of concepts such as hybridity and modernity, and with analysing the ambivalent postcolonial national condition. Here I accept that this body of work may be seen as less politically charged than anticolonial and decolonial
work, however, I note its application nonetheless for work concerned with matters of political economy. Finally, the chapter presents the decolonial re-edification of work on the colonial question, and considers the merits and contradictions of framing academic work in a decolonial way. Here I recognise the productive resonance of the concept of *coloniality* in a present in which “violent concentrations of resources” (Quijano 2007a: 168) are reproduced persistently along colonial lines of difference.

This survey of the landscape of thought around the colonial question is presented as preparatory matter for later conceptual work on coloniality in subsequent chapters. If decolonial thinkers have argued that colonial modes of exploitation continue to be enacted through regimes of difference, my intention here is to forward a deeper exploration of the concepts of exclusion and translation as key elements of coloniality in the present context of an emerging market. On the whole, this chapter allows me to situate the thesis as a decolonial study, albeit one influenced variously by anticolonial and postcolonial thought.

The themes set up by the second chapter are deepened in Chapter Three: *Centring Translation and Exclusion in Decolonial IPE*, which works to extend our understanding of the two interrelated core concepts of translation and exclusion. Translation is explored here both through material readings relating broadly to political economy and from the vantage point of work related to the colonial question which has drawn more extensively on textual and representational insights. Such textual readings of translation are exemplified in this section by the work of scholars such as Spivak, Chakrabarty, and Povinelli who deal variously with the distortions produced by means of translation from text to text, from social world into textual representations, and from one social world into another. Here I extract Povinelli’s useful understanding of the incommensurability of social worlds, as those which cannot be translated into one another without significant distortion. Then I go on to
consider material readings, including those of Marx and Polanyi who each theorised originary, singular processes of translation into capitalist life suggesting a total and unidirectional social transmutation, and Harvey’s accumulation by dispossession as a repetitive and multiple process, read in his work as ‘new imperialism’. The disconnect between these textual and material approaches is then bridged by examples of work from Alatas, Wolfe, and Chakravartty and Silva, who have each considered the material reality of social translation in relation to the representation of racial difference as inferior or backward. In conversation with these authors the section considers how historical translations have been effected in relation to specific economic categories, especially the categories of land and labour. These thinkers tell a contemporary and historical story of how raced modes of dispossession from the land has often meant translation into the category of labour in new or renewed ways. Chakravartty and Silva, in particular, adjust Harvey’s accumulation by dispossession by centring the historically attuned modes of colonial, imperial, and racial power, and connect these with the examination of well-rehearsed but still evolving methods of labour, resource, and land expropriation.

As the chapter outlines, translation is understood to encompass imposed ontological shifts. Such alterations in the way of being of a particular social world may be enacted through coercion, or through forced changes in the material or spatial conditions of the community which ultimately make the full continuity of a community’s way of life difficult or unviable. This third chapter sets up the claim that translation as a key element of coloniality may be provoked by material deprivations in the form of dispossession from rural land or from urban shelter. As the rest of the thesis goes on to illustrate, rural land-based ontologies have been profoundly disturbed by dispossession from the land, while self-sufficient ways of being in the city
have been similarly altered by eviction from urban shelter. Dispossession is therefore presented within this thesis as a prominent modality of translation.

The following section looks more closely at the concept of exclusion, drawing on the observation that colonialism has generally meant a forced inclusion into a dominant order as well as a parallel exclusion from that order’s normalised figure of the human/subject. This section does the conceptual work which later allows me to consider exclusion as an element of present-day coloniality in Indonesia. I work through the sociogenic theorising of Sylvia Wynter and Frantz Fanon to build an understanding of how it is that persons and communities come to experience themselves as defects of the human/subject produced as ‘normal’. I go on to consider this in relation to economic processes, in order to make the case that understanding exclusion brings us closer to explaining how it is that groups can be rendered repeatedly expropriatable, even in the optimistic context of market emergence.

Chapter Four sets out my method in close detail and elaborates the bases for my claim that this thesis is a work of decolonial IPE which seeks to build a form of relational epistemology guided by a decolonial ethos. I claim to realise this firstly by being guided by the expressions of those excluded, discursively and materially, from understandings of the national political economy of Indonesia, even as they constitute it; secondly, by foregrounding the work of racialised and colonised intellectuals whose particular subject positions afford them knowledge of the lived experience of coloniality in some form; and thirdly, by being attentive to the colonial histories of a number of key concepts and features which appear in the analysis. I also acknowledge that this is an ideal rather than a fully realised attainment, and that I hope the flaws and areas of contention in this study will add to debates around decolonial research ethics more broadly.
This chapter also sets out how I seek to make a methodological contribution which adds to existing discussions on decolonial research ethics, especially in the context of more fieldwork-intensive research. I explain here how I build a method influenced by critical feminist and intersectional work within Political Ecology and Critical Geography which is intended to avoid more extractive forms of empiricism by means of a reflexive field informed approach. This approach avoids asking the ‘wrong questions’, as determined by rigid theory, by instead being guided by the collective expressions of communities within the sites studied and by observations of conditions in the field which are locally contingent and otherwise unknowable.

I further rationalise my choice to study terminable sites of extraction, which are presented here as the foci of intense investment in an ‘emerging market’ setting, rather than as ‘marginalised’ sites as they are more commonly narrated. Further, within a context characterised by coloniality, optimistic, national-scale, growth-focused research into ‘emerging market’ dynamics silences the condition of those whose expropriation is so central to national (and international) accumulation. Thus an analytical shift to sites in which exploitation and expropriation are constitutive of growth-creating activities is intended to give a fuller picture of the emerging market condition. The urban poor find themselves expropriatable within sites of capitalist valorisation where the urban construction of the national imaginary takes place within Jakarta as the ‘exemplary centre’ of an emerging market; while rural populations find themselves expropriatable at the resource frontiers of Indonesia, the key focus of extractives and nature-based industries.

Otherwise this fourth chapter will run through the final details of my method, advancing a comprehensive account of fieldwork phases including reflections on the dead ends and failures which came to be so constitutive of this thesis, albeit in a silent way. It further fleshes out exactly how what I term here as exclusions and translations,
as elements of coloniality, can be studied in an empirical way. Here I also track the evolution of my approach to individual and group conversations into an incorporation of looser interviewing styles, before advancing an engagement with the ethics of my own research positionality and the problematic nature of my own racial and institutional privilege. This leads on to a discussion of the paradoxes of doing research in remote resource frontiers or within threatened urban poor neighbourhoods, which are seemingly sites of abandonment in mainstream political economic narratives.

Chapter Five follows up the decolonial promise made in Chapter Four to historicise core concepts within this thesis by tracing the making of the archipelago as an investible site. The chapter charts Indonesia’s journey to its present-day condition of market emergence from the beginnings of Dutch merchant trading operations, through the establishment of plantation economies on Java and Sumatra. Here I detail how the Dutch East India Company’s (VOC) innovations were made to secure its own investibility as monopoly merchant and then later as sovereign governor of the archipelago. I go on to cover how the Dutch Cultivation System ultimately made the Dutch East Indies an investible site for European capital for the first time, and opened the possibility for extensive international capital to be drawn into the plantation estates of Java and Sumatra, a transformation which still shapes the socioeconomic and geographical landscape in many parts of the archipelago today.

It further considers Indonesia’s post-independence engagement with Third Worldism as an interlude in which a meaningful attempt was fostered to cultivate ‘sideways’ relations with other (formerly) colonised countries without having these relations mediated by the (former) imperial core. This is explored here as a flawed but nonetheless significant project intended to break the imperial cartographic gaze. The chapter ends by considering how global investment architects then sought to replace the idea of the Third World within financial discourses with a new organising grammar.
centred on the ‘emerging market’, a grammar which would ultimately make key sites within the Global South more attractive to investment capital. Overall then, this chapter reimagines the condition of market emergence in relation to historical colonial productions of the archipelago as an investible site.

As the first substantive empirical chapter, Chapter Six forwards a close consideration of the Jakarta kampungs, or urban poor neighbourhoods. These are presented as terminable sites of extraction threatened by transformative inward investment, but also as incommensurable social worlds which do not translate into other spatial settings without distortion. Here I consider Jakarta’s historical role as ‘exemplary centre’ of the Dutch East Indies and then of Indonesia and, as such, its position as a key site for capitalist valorisation realised through transformative urban projects.

The central concept of exclusion is explored here through an examination of the discursive and material means by which the urban poor are kept apart from normalised forms of urban life, even as they constitute the social and economic fabric of Jakarta. Here I suggest that Jakarta’s middle class and governing elites have framed kampung residents as unfit economic subjects, and in doing so have denied their productive role in urban economic life and rendered them targets of dispossession and expropriation. Dispossession in the form of eviction from kampung neighbourhoods, I argue here, effectively ends the community’s way of being by destroying spatially contingent forms of economic and social organisation. These exclusions and translations by no means go unchallenged, however, and the chapter goes on to consider how kampung women in particular have contested subject prohibitions, including through public performances and through the mapping of their own economic activity. Therefore, through an examination of mapping and performance, I explore how the material conditions of the kampung give rise to distinct forms of
resistant subjectivity and new modes of gendered immanent politics which, in turn, have the potential to cultivate distinct forms of spatiality in the city through influencing the design of social housing.

Indonesia’s easternmost and most contested province, West Papua, is the focus of Chapter Seven which advances the story of the forced inclusion of the territory within Indonesia during the 1960s. The story of this annexation is recounted here against the backdrop of Indonesia’s own decolonisation, and in direct relation to the opening of the country to corporate transnationalism. More specifically, this story is told in relation to the added detail that access to West Papua’s most mineral rich areas had already been signed over to the extractives corporation Freeport McMoRan well before the so-called ‘Act of Free Choice’ which determined Indonesia’s sovereignty over West Papua.

I follow this with a closer examination in historical perspective of one site of extraction, namely Freeport’s Grasberg gold and copper mine in the Timika area of West Papua. The Freeport mine is one example of an extractive operation which contributes significantly to Indonesia’s optimistic ‘emerging market’ growth picture; it is also a place where new and old forms of exclusion and translation are created, intensified, and contested in relation to extractive activity. Here I explore one extreme mode of exclusion in the form of the racialisation of Papuans, read through the material and discursive means by which, over time, a concert of colonial, state, and corporate agents have fixed them in tense and hierarchy as backwards and inferior. In the terms of this thesis, the chapter therefore presents coloniality in the form of exclusions from the Indonesian subject and from the figure of the human itself. It goes on to examine some of the related forms of social translation effected within the contract areas of Freeport itself and also within the broader context of West Papua. The chapter finally considers Freeport’s particular corporate spatial production which
translates discursive racial exclusions into material spatial exclusions in and around the mining contract areas. In relation, the chapter examines how such exclusions relate to translations in local value systems and in moral understandings of intimacy in relation to the introduction of industrial-scale prostitution in the Grasberg area.

The eighth chapter advances a broader consideration of Indonesia’s resource frontiers, where the extension of state and corporate capitalist activity meets Indigenous social worlds with diverse ways of being, as well as diverse ways of understanding ‘land’. In a similar way to the dynamics of urban poor eviction which form the central focus of Chapter Six, the story told on Indonesia’s resource frontiers is in many respects a global one of intensifying and dispossessory capital investment met with new and revived forms of resistance, albeit with localised variation. Here I identify a specific line of difference along which the exclusion of the rural masyarakat terasing, or ‘isolated people’, can be performed discursively and materially, with this exclusion forming the basis for their translation by dispossesion.

Examples of Indonesia’s diverse land-based ontologies are given as examples in this chapter in order to demonstrate just how incommensurable these are with a liberal capitalist way of being centred on individuated understandings of land-as-property. The chapter considers the example of counter-mapping as a key mode of resistance in order to flesh out some of the complexities of appealing for state legal action against the expansion of dispossessory extractive activity. As the securing of adat, or customary law, is the ultimate goal of mapping itself, I also explore the (colonial) history and disciplinary function of adat, as well as how it functions practically as the subordinate set of laws in a system of legal pluralism. Ultimately this chapter advances a balanced discussion of the implications of employing a form of resistance to exclusion-based forms of translation by dispossesion by means of an essentially liberal technology (the map). While the real gains in terms of resisting corporate land
claims and forging broader alliances against corporate strategies of expropriation are sometimes evident, mapping is nonetheless charged here with exposing data to make communities legible to corporations and the state as well as easing processes of land individuation by embedding liberal concepts of bordering.

The final concluding chapter of this thesis, Chapter Nine, draws together all three sites of study and presents some comparative observations on forms of exclusion and translation across Indonesia. Here I end by setting out my final understanding of the condition of market emergence and the merits of studying an emerging market from its sites of extraction. Finally, I consider both the shortcomings of the thesis, as well as how it may provide a foundation for future work related to Indonesia and to sites of extraction globally, especially under conditions of market emergence.
Chapter Two

The Colonial Question:

A brief survey of the landscape of thought on (post)colonialism, empire, and decolonisation.

Colonialism, n. 2. The colonial system or principle. Now freq. used in the derogatory sense of an alleged policy of exploitation of backward or weak peoples by a large power.

(Oxford English Dictionary 2016)

This literature review chapter begins by noting the difference in the character and purpose of scholarship centred on imperialism, before moving on to work related to what I refer to as ‘the colonial question’. As an early example of literature on the colonial question, written from within Southeast Asia, I foreground a summary of The Myth of the Lazy Native, the masterwork of Syed Hussein Alatas (1977). In this text, Alatas identifies the discursive construction of the ‘lazy native’ which enabled labour exploitation and land expropriation to occur under colonial capitalism in the region. Finally, the chapter sets out some of the most prominent work within three broad frames, characterised here as anticolonial impulse, postcolonial reflection, and decolonial re-edification. This prepares the ground for the outlining of a decolonial analytical frame and the deepening of aspects of the concept of coloniality in subsequent chapters. More specifically it provides the background necessary for me to later make the case for an understanding of coloniality in terms of processes of
‘exclusion’ and ‘translation’ and to examine these in relation to political economic processes, such as accumulation and dispossession. On the whole, this chapter allows me to situate the thesis as a decolonial study, albeit one influenced variously by anticolonial and postcolonial thought.

From imperialism to the colonial question

In the scholarly discourse of today, to invoke colonialism or imperialism is primarily to frame a particular set of social relations in terms of a normative judgement on the unjust nature of those relations. Perhaps as testament to the work done by anticolonial movements to discredit colonial narratives, colonialism and imperialism have in this sense become terms suggestive of exploitation. As indicated by the Oxford English Dictionary definition above, the accepted dictionary meaning of colonialism has incorporated its derogatory connotations, even if this dictionary condemnation of colonialism as exploitation stops short of challenging the fiction that the peoples being exploited are usually “backward” or “weak”. Further, pointing out the normative use of these terms is not to deny that influential apologists for empire still excuse imperial violence in authored works and speeches; however, in spite of such apologism, the implied relations between empire, colony, and exploitation remain.

Beyond a common association with exploitation, definitions of colonialism and imperialism can be unstable and even deeply contradictory. Edward W. Said, for instance, defined these concepts as follows:

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10 See, for example, Gurminder Bhambra’s criticism of the imperial triumphalism of Niall Ferguson and William McNeill (Bhambra 2012).
Imperialism means the practice, the theory, and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan centre ruling a distant territory; ‘colonialism’, which is almost always a consequence of imperialism, is the implanting of settlements on distant territory.

(Said 1994: 8)

Said’s repetition of ‘distant territory’ makes his definition a difficult starting point for analysis, firstly because of the subjective spatial aspect to the understanding of colonialism as being across distance, and secondly because of the territorial aspect which is not seen as a defining component in analyses of, for example, finance and trade imperialism. Such forms of deterritorialised imperialism have been outlined within some relatively recent analyses of changes in the global system since formal independence was broadly achieved in the mid-twentieth century. This kind of meta-level structural understanding of imperialism has been particularly central to the work of Marxists such as Callinicos (2009), Arrighi (2007), Hardt and Negri (2001), Wood (2005), and Harvey (2004), just as it was to that of Lenin (1939) and Luxemburg (1951). However, for the latter two Marxists, and across subsequent Marxist work on the imperialist structure of the global economy, imperialism has primarily been understood as a phase in the development of capital accumulation.

With a further distinctive deterritorialised understanding, Callinicos (2009) has sought to draw attention to what he understands to be the specificity of US imperialism. In this particular form, the costly direct government of formal colonies is avoided and independent government is instead preferred within a coercive system which maintains free trade and the free movement of capital. A final example can be found in the work of world systems theory scholars like Samir Amin (2004) and Andre
Gunder Frank (1966) who moved towards an understanding of the ‘development of underdevelopment’ through a form of imperialism involving the domination of the Global South by the Global North.

As diverse as these examples of work on empire and imperialism are, as a whole they may still be seen as distinct in character from the scholarship I will go on to summarise below which is more centrally concerned with what I call ‘the colonial question’. As quite distinct bodies of work have been inspired under the separate signs of imperialism and colonialism we might therefore expect to find equally distinct definitions for these terms. However, within the work of Callinicos, I perceive a conflation of the two concepts, while, similarly, Mehta (1999) openly admits to using the terms interchangeably. In contrast, Said’s definition above suggests that the two concepts describe somewhat distinct but related processes, with colonialism referring to territorial settlement, and imperialism referring more to the theory and ideology which overarches, justifies, and drives this practice of settlement. However, marking another variation in understanding, Syed Hussein Alatas (1977), believed the distinction between colonialism and imperialism was simply a question of scale, and he placed more emphasis on the significant psychological element underpinning both:

Colonialism, or on a bigger scale, imperialism, was not only an extension of sovereignty and control by one nation and its government over another, but it was also a control of the mind of the conquered or subordinated.

(Alatas 1977: 17)

The simple point I want to make here is that the terms imperialism and colonialism have been employed to describe different regimes, relations, and processes over time.
and by people of different political and theoretical persuasions. This has inevitably allowed for variation in what is included in, or excluded from, the analysis. The concept of ‘race’, for example, rarely appears within macro-structural works on imperialism,\textsuperscript{11} whereas it is central to the analysis of, for example, Quijano (2007a) of the global colonial system.

It is worth adding a note of particular interest here with regard to the analytical separation of imperialism and colonialism and the leaps of analysis this separation enables. The effects of this are most notable in a work such as Karl Polanyi’s (2001 [1944]) \textit{The Great Transformation} which combines somewhat segregated analyses of colonialism and imperialism within one text. The second half of Polanyi’s work includes an adroit examination of the violence of the process of colonisation at a societal level; much of this part of the book forms a lamentation of the loss of rich and complex social worlds as a result of the extension of market society. The first chapter of the same text, however, is titled \textit{The Hundred Years’ Peace} in reference to the nineteenth century \textit{Pax Britannica} period of high imperialism which Polanyi believed was maintained by a combination of the liberal state, the international gold standard, the self-regulating market, and the balance-of-powers system.

The contradiction in Polanyi’s critique of liberalism between his rosy view of empire and his critical stance on colonisation is not unique, however, and a similar tension has been noted in other works related to liberalism. For example, although within Mehta’s own examination of liberalism and empire the terms imperialism and colonialism are used synonymously, he makes an illuminating statement in a footnote\textsuperscript{11} Callinicos, for instance, isolates his treatment of race to an intervention of just a few pages (2009: 160—165).
to explain the liberal ambivalence which allows for an epistemic separation to be made between the two:

There is, however, one important sense in which the two terms refer to very different conceptual and concrete realities. In European settler “colonies” there was often an ideology and practice of exterminating aboriginal populations. In view of such ideas and practice the distinction between empire and colony is very significant. The liberal endorsement of the “empire” is [...] crucially predicated on notions of tutelage and kinship. It is not consistent with the notion of “colony” where this refers to the idea of exterminating aboriginals. Liberals did not advocate or countenance this practice.

(Mehta 1999: 3, footnote 1)

In this understanding, then, the analytical separation between imperialism and colonialism is not arbitrary but instead serves the purpose of allowing liberal thinkers to dislocate what they frame as the moral endeavour of imperialism from the undeniable violence of the process and praxis of colonialism.

Having noted the distinct character and purpose of a very small sample of empire-centred analysis, I want to largely set aside work on imperialism now, whether conceived in the Marxist sense as a phase of global capitalism or the liberal sense as a global frame for peace and ‘tutelage’. The rest of the chapter will instead concentrate on work which has centred on what can be referred to as the colonial question. This work can be fairly loosely divided into three main groups: anticolonial, postcolonial,
and decolonial scholarship, even though there are overlapping features and common concerns across all three.

The colonial question after the ‘Lazy Native’

This thesis deals largely with discursive forms of exclusion and the ways in which these forms of exclusion work in concert with material processes of dispossession at extractive frontiers within Indonesia. Theorising this in relation to coloniality requires engagement with work centred on discursive and material processes from across anti-, post-, and de-colonial scholarship. Before I summarise the three sub-groupings of scholarship on the colonial question, however, I want to begin with one exemplary piece of work which defies categorisation, and which is also particularly insightful for research related to Southeast Asia. The work in question is Syed Hussein Alatas’s The Myth of the Lazy Native; a remarkable book in the sense that it presents an analysis which works on at least three levels. To begin with, the Lazy Native combines the material analysis of a distinct form of colonial capitalism in Southeast Asia with analysis of the discursive construction of the ‘lazy native’ myth by colonising agents; tracing both the origins and political economic function of this colonial image of the native. Alongside this, Alatas was making a broader epistemic intervention in this text by decentring Western political economies from their prime position, either as ideal types with which the rest of the world must be compared, or as the telos towards which other economies are presumed to be travelling.

Alatas’s conceptualisation of colonial capitalism is worth summarising here, in part because this exemplifies his endeavour to define distinct concepts through which to analyse societies outside of Europe, but also because he expected colonial capitalism to continue to endure in some form well beyond independence. The colonial capitalism
Alatas identified in Southeast Asia differed in its historical configuration from the scholarly portrayals of the form of capitalism which developed in Europe, and had quite distinct effects on the societies in the region. For example, whereas in Europe capitalism was noted to erode feudalism, in what would become Indonesia and the Philippines, in contrast, “colonial capitalism became a type of transformed feudal order with racial undertones” (Alatas 1977: 18).

Further, analyses of European capitalism may place commercial capitalism first, followed by industrial capitalism from the eighteenth century, followed by a third phase of financial capitalism in which large-scale productive operations were owned by capitalists who were largely disconnected from production itself. Alatas disrupted this stadial understanding of capitalist development by noting that finance capitalism emerged in the Dutch East Indies well before it came to dominate in Europe, and well before industrial capitalism emerged locally (ibid: 6). He also engages with Lenin’s (1939) identified phase of monopoly capitalism as a stage in which the state protects monopoly interests from smaller-scale enterprises, and which in this formulation was understood to be an early twentieth century development. Conversely, Alatas’s understanding was that monopoly capitalism was in place in Southeast Asia from the seventeenth century, owing to the influence of Dutch and Iberian trading companies.

Beyond this distinct historical configuration, Alatas noted the features of colonial capitalism to include the following: a significant dependence on the export of raw materials; foreign (or “alien”) economic power in control of capital, commerce and industry, and of the government of the territory; trade being operated in the interests of the coloniser; the preferential development of the agrarian mode of production over industrial development; the restriction of technological development; the presence of

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12 Alatas draws specifically here on Wallbank and Taylor (1961) but see also Hilferding (2007 [1919]).
semi-free labour in the structure of production; the lack of trades unions and guilds; the exclusion of a large proportion of the population from capitalist enterprise; and the opposition of distinct elements in society which Alatas refers to as “dualism”\(^\text{13}\) (1977: 2).

Although he hesitates to firmly demarcate the period of colonial capitalism in Southeast Asia, Alatas notes that this system of economic organisation was “firmly entrenched” by the eighteenth century across much of what is now Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. The main preoccupation of Alatas, however, was neither to trace the historical development of capitalism in Southeast Asia, nor to analyse its character in any great depth. Instead, he sought primarily to examine the ideology of colonial capitalism in the region as the justifying means to colonisation. In his own words:

> The ideology of colonial capitalism sought a justification of Western rule in its alleged aim of modernizing and civilizing the societies which had succumbed to Western powers.

(Alatas 1977: 7)

His work demonstrated how a “governing idea” (ibid: 22) emerged from a specific historical context and in relation to the power relations within that particular setting. The ‘lazy native’ myth was identified as one important component of the ideology of colonial capitalism and therefore the main subject of Alatas’s analysis:

\(^{13}\) The concept of dualism is drawn from an earlier influential work by Boeke (1953) and describes the combination of capitalist and so-called ‘pre-capitalist’ forms of organising the economy.
In its historical empirical manifestation the colonial ideology utilized the idea of the lazy native to justify compulsion and unjust practices in the mobilization of labour in the colonies. It portrayed a negative image of the natives and their society to justify and rationalize European conquest and domination of the area. It distorted elements of social and human reality to ensure a comfortable construction of the ideology.

(Alatas 1977: 2)

What Alatas identified was a racialising narrative, that of the ‘lazy native’, which had a dual political economic function in justifying colonisation in the first instance, as well as in justifying a coercive labour regime which would become central to Southeast Asian plantation economies. In this sense the same narrative was connected to, and enabled, both land dispossession and labour extraction. Thus, within the key terms of this thesis, the ‘lazy native’ can also be considered as a discursively constructed subject exclusion with specific economic functions. Further, Alatas’s portrayal of the colonial ideology in Southeast Asia is figured within a global story of colonisation which depended upon the maintenance of European superiority through various means, including the uneven use of religion and ‘scientific’ racism in the service of domination. As Alatas says of Southeast Asia:
[Iberian and Dutch] powers were agreed that Western rule and Western culture were superior; that they were the most suited to exploit the natural wealth of the East; and that they were the best administrators. Consequently, the ideology of colonial capitalism played down the capacities of Southeast Asian societies. Every conceivable item was invoked to denigrate the Southeast Asian, including his size and physiognomy.

(Alatas 1977: 7)

However, the purpose of his text was not only to identify and denounce a rationalising discourse which enabled colonial dispossession and exploitation. Alatas traced the “distortion of the native character” back to its origins so that a reconstructive process of the correction of this image could be advanced (ibid: 16). The political purpose in Alatas’s work was therefore to recover and restore an accurate image of the Malays from its colonial distortion. In other words, and in my own reading, his intention was to refigure Southeast Asian natives as modern (and economic) subjects, existing in contemporaneous historical times and living to a rhythm of life which may have been different, but not inferior, to that of Europeans. Alatas’s work is therefore echoed in my endeavour here in the context of the Jakarta ‘slums’, West Papua, and other domains of the ‘isolated people’ of Indonesia, that is, to foreground the ways in which they themselves already articulate this subject status.

On a final note about the work of Alatas, The Lazy Native contained a nod to the future which indicated the expected trajectory of the colonial era’s racialising narratives. He noted the shift upon decolonisation to the post-WWII era of development in which continuity could be identified, even in the context of change:
The ideological elements have been transformed, and have assumed a new
garb. The image of the indolent, dull, backward and treacherous native has
changed into that of a dependent native requiring assistance to climb the
ladder of progress.

(Alatas 1977: 8)

Alatas’s work then, not only defied later segregations between material and
discursive analyses in the sense that it revealed the material effects of a racialising
narrative in articulation with colonial capitalism, but it also indicated how such
colonial narratives would continue to be productive in relation to material processes
beyond the formal colonial era. I will now follow up this overview of the work of Alatas
by setting out three broad groupings of work on the colonial question which have
unfolded in overlapping movements with somewhat distinct characters, described
here as \textit{anticolonial impulse}, \textit{postcolonial reflection}, and \textit{decolonial re-edification}.

\textit{Anticolonial impulse}

Anticolonial scholarship was authored mainly by recognised agents of history who
were involved, morally and often physically, in struggles against formal colonialism.
These explicitly political voices included Suzanne Césaire (2012 [1941-1945]) and
Aimé Césaire (2000 [1955]), Frantz Fanon (1967a, 1967b), Albert Memmi (1965), and,
within Southeast Asia, José Rizal (1996 [1887]) and Tan Malaka (2000 [1948]). These
works tend to convey a sense of urgency which is conferred in part by the pivotal
political context in which they were written and, relatedly, by the personal
circumstances of the authors themselves. Frantz Fanon (1967a), for instance, wrote
The Wretched of the Earth while he was dying of granulocytic leukaemia\textsuperscript{14} while Tan Malaka’s (2000 [1948]) three volume work *Dari Pendjara ke Pendjara* (From Jail to Jail) was penned while the writer was incarcerated.

*From Jail to Jail* and Tan Malaka’s other works are certainly less extensively endorsed than those of Fanon within the Western canon of scholarship on the colonial question, but these are nonetheless of great importance for their insight and influence, especially in the national context within Indonesia. Fanon’s (1967a) work *The Wretched of the Earth* was prefaced on publication by Jean-Paul Sartre, and engaged with broadly by intellectuals including Sylvia Wynter (2001) and Lewis Gordon (2011), and thus has been extensively interpreted and debated. In contrast, Tan Malaka’s masterwork *From Jail to Jail* was not translated into English until 1991, and has thus been engaged with mainly by an Indonesian audience until relatively recently. The translation work of Helen Jarvis (*Tan Malaka* (2000 [1948])) and the intellectual engagement of Abidin Kusno (2003b) have since brought Tan Malaka’s thought to a more global audience.

On the whole, most anticolonial thought should be read explicitly as a political intervention made passionately and decisively during particular moments within specific geographically situated struggles for independence. As such, this work tends to be decisively diagnostic at the same time as being boldly remedial. Aimé Césaire’s diagnosis for instance, that ““Europe” is morally, spiritually indefensible” (2000 [1955]: 1) was echoed by his fellow Martinican Frantz Fanon (1967a: 251) when he

\[\text{\textsuperscript{14} Lewis Gordon’s (2011: 17) comments on the cruel absurdity of Fanon’s death by cancer of the blood bear repeating here: “There is irony in Fanon – a man who devoted much theoretical and political energy to defanging the impact of race on modern society, a concept marked from its inception by proscriptions premised upon blood – dying of a blood disease.”}\]
wrote: “Leave this Europe where they are never done talking of Man, yet murder men everywhere they find them, at the corner of every one of their own streets, in all the corners of the globe.” Europe was therefore the diagnosed problem for these thinkers, both in the literal sense of the violence that was being perpetrated by European colonisers globally, and in the figurative sense in which Europe signified a particular episteme which allowed for the conditions of “living death”\textsuperscript{15} to be created and maintained, even in the name of liberal humanism. The remedy, in simple terms, was independence and self-determination. How this could be achieved, and how meaningful decolonisation could be attained and maintained, was the source of much debate and dissension among leading anticolonial figures. Fanon maintained a commitment to humanism and to a temporary and cautious form of independent nationalism, while Tan Malaka (2000 [1948]) was even more critical of nationalism and advocated the building of a pan-Islamic mode of decolonial solidarity. I will return many times to the work of both in this thesis, but an expansion of Tan Malaka’s life and thought has merit here, considering his status as the emblematic Indonesian anticolonial thinker.

Tan Malaka was born into local privilege within the matrilineal Minangkabau communities of Western Sumatra (Kusno 2003b: 327). And, as such, the Minangkabau tradition of learning through distant travel (rantau), along with his social ranking, allowed him to pursue an education in pedagogy in the city of Haarlem, within the metropole of the Dutch empire. From his teenage years onwards, he spent two decades in total outside of the East Indies, travelling from one imperial realm to the next and developing a distinct anticolonial consciousness in relation to what he witnessed. Tan Malaka’s thinking often ran against the collective passions of the time,

\textsuperscript{15} See Gibson (2011: 2).
and his own geographical imagination, shaped by his experiences across the colonised world, allowed him to envisage a political consciousness which expanded beyond the confines of the bounded rationality of the territorial nation-state. As such, he remained on the outside of Indonesian nationalist politics, and was viewed with suspicion by the Dutch colonial and the independent Indonesian governments alike, as well as by the Indonesian Communist Party he was connected to (ibid: 328).

Furthermore, just as Fanon was concerned with how the colonial social relation was substantiated materially and spatially, Tan Malaka also wrote about how built space in general served to reproduce colonial hierarchies and influence the subjectivities of both colonised and coloniser. His personal experiences in Japanese-occupied Shanghai, in particular, allowed him to observe how the Chinese Quarter and the International Settlement of the city existed in close proximity and yet, as Abidin Kusno (2003b: 330) puts it “stood in contradiction to each other”. Yet he also saw how such unequal spatial forms could be politically productive. In Tan Malaka’s understanding, the Chinese of the city, in their restricted and subordinated spatial world, shared a common condition with distant colonised Indonesians which could ultimately help to bond them in revolutionary struggle. Thus Tan Malaka’s experience of the common condition of otherwise distinct imperial sites allowed him to imagine unlikely forms of solidarity between dispersed colonised peoples.

On the whole, anticolonial works combined scathing critiques of European colonialism with urgent calls to unified action intended for a colonised audience. However, these works also set out genuinely radical thought experiments related to novel forms of sovereignty, social and political community-building, and means of meaningful decolonisation: imaginings for a better world. The postcolonial

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16 As I have discussed elsewhere, see Tilley (forthcoming a); and see also Kipfer (2011).
scholarship to follow would arguably concern itself more with reflecting on the realities that ensued than with explicit political interventions and radical social imaginings. The following section takes this proposition up in more detail.

**Postcolonial reflection**

The postcolonial field of study was established and deepened from the 1980s onwards and brought a much less urgent, and arguably more reflective, style of scholarship to the colonial question. It emerged in the context of a post-independence world in which scholars in formerly colonised and former coloniser nations attempted to frame and articulate their common postcolonial condition of cultural hybridity. Other common threads running through postcolonial scholarship include the articulation and reclamation of subaltern agency, the counteracting of cultural domination by former colonising societies, reflections on knowledge production after decolonisation, as well as reflections on modernity, the nation, and postcolonial subject formation, among other concerns (see Zein-Elabdin 2011: 44; Bhambra 2014: 119—129). The project was delimited by its own temporal marker – beginning from the ‘post’ of colonisation – and delimited spatially to include only those nations which would qualify for analysis in relation to this postcolonial condition. These delimitations of the project are not always clear. However, Bhabha revealed the boundaries of his postcolonial work in the form of a lamentation in the introduction to *Nation and Narration* in 1990:

> Amidst these exorbitant images of the nation-space in its transnational dimension there are those who have not yet found their nation: amongst
them the Palestinians and the Black South Africans. It is our loss that in making this book we were unable to add their voices to ours.

(Bhabha 1990b: 7)

So, in spite of the fact that Said, an exilic Palestinian, can be considered a parent of postcolonial studies, Palestine and apartheid South Africa, as plain colonies in the (then) present, were nonetheless largely figured outside of the frames of analysis of a project focused on the afterlife of colonisation. The ‘post’ may therefore be the root of the project’s perceived lack of urgency; unlike the work of earlier anticolonial independence writers/fighters and the later decolonial activist-scholars, postcolonial scholarship came with the arguably less pressing political imperatives of cultural expression within hybrid societies and the revision of unjust colonial narratives and histories.

The more dismissive critiques of postcolonial studies as an intellectual project should be approached with caution however, primarily because the work of the Indian Subaltern Studies collective has been mistakenly taken as representative of the postcolonial field as a whole (see especially Chibber 2013). In fact this work forms quite a specific project within an otherwise much more diverse field. The original subaltern project itself presented a scholarly-political intervention which sought to denounce elitist historiographies of colonial India (written by both colonial and bourgeois-nationalist Indigenous elites), instead centring the peasant as a political agent in the rewriting of histories from below (see Guha 1982). It began with the aim of recovering this subaltern agency, and later diverted towards post-structural critiques of Enlightenment thought (Chaturvedi 2012). The crux of Spivak’s (1985a) famous critique essay, Can the Subaltern Speak?, centred on whether this task could
be faithfully performed in scholarship, or whether representing the subaltern inevitably served to reproduce the same suppression of the peasant voice as elite historiographies did. In this sense, Spivak noted the eternal tension at the heart of what was nevertheless a vital political project. Shilliam (2015a) further notes that as Subaltern Studies began its wanderings into poststructuralist modes of study, it adopted the particular poststructuralist focus on the modern subject, by which, he argues, the colonising European subject is necessarily implied. As such it became “less an opportunity to decolonize knowledge regimes and more another faculty through which to deconstruct knowledge of the Western self” (ibid: 6).

Otherwise, postcolonial theory more broadly has been expanded by too many scholars to mention here, so I will limit this overview to the most prominent few. To begin with, Edward W. Said’s scholarship can be divided into two distinct, but equally compelling, bodies of work. One body (for example, Said 1999; Said 2000) is formed of his narrative, autobiographical, and deeply affective commentaries on Palestine (After the Last Sky: Palestinian Lives and Out of Place: A Memoir). Another body (Said 2003 [1978]; Said 1994) includes his meticulous and profound works of literary criticism, Orientalism and Culture & Imperialism, with these latter two works being canonical within the postcolonial field. His prime contribution was to demonstrate how Orientalist scholarship was implicated in imperial domination, in the sense that the cumulative depiction of the Orient as a passive and static entity justified intervention within it (for a more complex and comprehensive overview see Bhambra 2014: 120—122).

As another diasporic voice, persistently speaking from what he calls “the nations of others” (1990: 291), Homi Bhabha’s work explored the ambivalent narrative address of the postcolonial nation, as well as broader questions of hybridity and modernity. Bhabha’s scholarship has been most severely taken to task for its, at times, inscrutable
style, as well as for forming a distraction from the critique of global capitalism, which is the standard Marxist charge levelled at postcolonial work as a whole (see, for example, Dirlik 1997). Yet his scholarship has found application in relation to economic matters; in particular his work on colonial discourse has been used productively in Escobar’s (2011) astute critique of the discourse of development. Further, Bhabha’s concept of hybridity has also been particularly productive in formulating the basis of a postcolonial approach to the study of ‘the economy’, especially in contexts characterised by the coexistence of multiple cultures (see in particular, Zein-Elabdin 2011: 47; also Wilson 2007; Hobson & Seabrooke 2007).

Gayatri C. Spivak’s work – most famously Can the Subaltern Speak? (Spivak 1985a) – sits in an ambivalent position as both contribution to, and critique of, the postcolonial field. Spivak’s work addresses the opposition between (external) interest and (internal) desire in the respective structuralist and poststructuralist understandings of subject formation. Otherwise, she vigorously interrogated the narratives related to who can speak for, and about, the subaltern (Bhambra 2014: 126—128). Of all the postcolonial thinkers, Spivak in particular has maintained an eye on texts relating to ‘the economy’ as a realm of modernist discourse. She engages ‘capital E Economics’ scholarship, especially through a profound questioning of how ‘value’ is determined, revealing overall that “the attempt to produce a unified value form generates universalities such as ‘humanity’ and ‘development’” (Zein-Elabdin 2011: 45). Spivak’s overall challenge to Economics relates to questioning the binary between the economic and the cultural, which Zein-Elabdin (ibid: 45) reads as a

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17 Spivak’s engagements with ‘capital E’ Economics are worth noting here because IPE both draws from and critiques the discipline of Economics, so to some extent postcolonial engagements with Economics should at least be of interest to IPE scholars.
productive move towards “re-theorising ‘the economic’” rather than a reduction of material questions to textual analysis.

Each of these thinkers spoke from disciplinary positions within the humanities, and thus were rooted in some respects to literary theory (Said), comparative literature (Spivak), English language and literature (Bhabha), and history (Chakrabarty and Guha). Otherwise, there is a great deal of variety and dissension among them. Said (2003 [1978]), for instance, drew greatly on both Gramsci and Foucault, Spivak made Derrida her primary interlocutor in her early work (see Derrida & Spivak 1974; Spivak 1976), and the South Asian subaltern studies collective owed a great deal to its Marxist roots, even as it later diverted along a poststructuralist path (see Chakrabarty 1995). On the whole however, these various engagements with, and interweavings of, both Marxist philosophy and poststructural ideas make the postcolonial field a fruitful site for conversation between otherwise fairly atomised scholarly traditions.

San Juan Jr (2000) has criticised the position of postcolonial work as seemingly cemented within the frames of textuality, along with its general reticence to engage more forcefully with contemporary debates around capitalism and globalisation. This position reflects what Zein-Elabdin and Charusheela (2004: 4) note to be the common criticism that postcolonial theory emphasises culture over economy and is thus ill equipped to deal with material problems in the present. From this perspective postcolonial thought is not even equipped to deal with today’s reproductions of the colonial social relation in the form of economic inequalities. However, the authors dispute this characterisation with attention to Spivak’s work on the concept of value, as well as “economic moments” in the work of Bhabha and Said (see both Zein-Elabdin 2011: 44; and Zein-Elabdin & Charusheela 2004). These scholars argue that it is not so much an absence of reference to the economy in postcolonial analysis, but the quality of the engagement which is fallible: “Although postcolonial critics often invoke
economic forces in their analysis, the theory they draw on is often ill defined, gestural, and removed from current scholarship in Economics” (Zein-Elabdin & Charusheela 2004: 4-5). However, Zein-Elabdin (2011: 40) elsewhere argues that such critiques of the absence of material concerns in postcolonial work are also at fault for imagining an ‘economic’ realm separable from the cultural and textual domains which form the focal point of postcolonial critique. Evidently, applying postcolonial approaches to any discipline which imagines a separation of the ‘economic’ from the ‘cultural’ is unlikely to prove fruitful. In other words, there is critical work to do on both sides in order to firstly adapt existing work dealing centrally with ‘the economy’ which can then be brought into critical conversation with a more materially concerned postcolonial critique.

Otherwise, and as noted above, postcolonial thought has been most fiercely derided by some Marxist critics who consider this work to be a wasteful distraction from the pressing need to examine global capitalism (see, for example Hardt & Negri 2000; Kaiwar 2014). At their most detrimental, altercations between Marxists and postcolonial theorists have involved attempts to characterise, reduce, disprove, and therefore discredit and lay waste to an entire field of thought. Vivek Chibber’s (2013) assault in Postcolonial Theory and the Spectre of Capital is one such attempt to claim the superiority of Marxism over postcolonial approaches. Assent with Sinha and Varma’s (2015) assessment of Marxist-postcolonial exchanges, I believe that much is lost in Chibber’s style of engagement in the sense that it seeks to discredit one field in order to vindicate another.

There is no single, overarching ‘postcolonial’ theory to tie the field, just as there is no single anticolonial or decolonial theory. Therefore, to present any of these approaches as fundamentally contradictory of Marxism, in the same sense as liberalism may be set up in this way, is to construct a false contradiction. Postcolonial
theory became broad and complex, dealing with multiple concepts and subjects, and forging productive articulations with other approaches (including Marxism). As such it cannot be reduced to a single, dismissible claim as Chibber would profess. Yet for Chibber and some of his fellow Marxists, any diversion from the core problematic of the mechanisms of global capital and capitalist social relations is depoliticising and becomes framed as complicity in processes of neoliberalisation.

This is, however, also why the Marxist critique of postcolonial theory is so limited. The commitment to capitalism as a foundational category means that broader comments on the global economy as a whole, inclusive of all of its integral extra-capitalist spaces, are seen as a diversion, as Zein-Elabdin (2011) points out. A more productive approach on the whole would involve considering how our understanding of capital and capitalist social relations can be enriched by postcolonial work on Orientalism, the subaltern, hybridity, and other central postcolonial concepts, as well as by a broader understanding of modernity’s debts to the colonial era. Postcolonial theory never proclaimed to forward a comprehensive theory of capital, but in illuminating other aspects of social life which intersect with, and are even integral to the workings of capital, this work has much more potential to add to the insights of Marxist thought.

Another criticism holds that postcolonial scholarship has formed a distraction from the meaningful struggle towards decolonisation (see Shilliam 2015a: 5–7 again, mainly engaging with the Subaltern Studies project). This is also the charge of critics who admired the momentum and the clear political intervention of the anticolonial era and who warn against the depoliticising effects of conflating the anticolonial project with later postcolonial scholarship. As David Macey (2012: 499) notes in the afterword of his biography of Fanon: “no-one is going to take to the streets in the name
of post-colonialism. And no-one is going to die for it.” The decolonial project, on the other hand, would come to frame bodies on the streets in new and exciting ways.

Decolonial re-education

On November 29, 2015, a mass ‘climate march’ took place in London, bringing together multiple groups around the struggle against climate change. But the struggle within the struggle at this march turned out to be between a bloc of Global South organisations and what they perceived to be the depoliticised and corporatised mainstream NGO-linked groups (Virasami & Kelbert 2015). The former comprised the ‘Wretched of the Earth’ bloc, marching under the sign of Fanon’s canonical anticolonial text, and organising around the hashtag ‘co20nialism’. Like many other emerging scholarly and activist networks they have responded to the present-day imperative to ‘decolonise’, in part by re-inhabiting the defined cause of anticolonial thinkers. These activists claim that they were ordered to take down their placards centring imperialism in the problem of global climate change because these did not “fit the message of the day”. The Wretched of the Earth bloc resisted this call, later explaining and justifying their struggle to lead the march using the phrase “We die first, We fight first, We march first” in a clear repurposing of Fanon’s famous call “the last shall be first and the first last” (Fanon 1967a: 28). Virasami and Kelbert articulated a definitive statement of the movement’s ethos after the event:

Something needs to be made clear: the global climate movement starts at the frontlines of corporate colonialism, in Indigenous territories, where black and brown communities fight back against European-sanctioned
climate genocide. Neither the government nor the NGO liberal line will lead us to justice. This is a war of narratives, and ours is decolonial.

(Virasami & Kelbert 2015)

As noted above, the scholarly era of postcolonial reflection is seen by some to have represented a political impasse in theorising on the colonial question in the sense that postcolonial theory stopped short of informing the kind of politics that activists were impelled to “take to the street in the name of” (Macey 2012: 499). However, the framing of the Wretched of the Earth bloc at the 2015 London Climate March indicates how the new imperative to decolonise and the old anticolonial mode of intervention have come be articulated in various ways. In scholarship too, Sylvia Wynter (2001; 2003) has unified anti- and de-colonial concepts and objectives in new and productive ways and I will revisit her work many times later in this thesis. However, in order to place these scholarly and activist uses of decolonial work in context, and to move towards an outline of how this work will be used in the pages to follow, an overview of the decolonial canon is necessary.

Where we place the parameters around what constitutes this decolonial canon necessarily determines how ‘the decolonial’ itself is understood. It is possible to take a narrow understanding of decolonial work to refer to scholarship guided by the ‘coloniality/modernity’ collective made up of Walter Mignolo and other academics who have sought to employ critical theory in the decolonisation of knowledge (see Mignolo 2007). Yet these perceived attempts by Mignolo and others to solidify decolonial thought into a more coherent school have drawn criticism from the Aymara scholar-activist Rivera Cusicanqui (2012) for reproducing colonial hierarchies and the epistemic authority of the Global North. I will elaborate on this critique below.
Otherwise, we can delimit the decolonial in the same way as Maldonado-Torres (2008: 7), not as a defined school, but as spanning a broad decolonising ethico-political turn with “roots in critical responses to racism and colonialism articulated by colonial and racial subjects” from W. E. B. Du Bois to Frantz Fanon to Gloria Anzaldúa. This broader understanding and ethical commitment actively maintains resistance to the reduction of decolonial scholarship to a series of alienating neologisms in the (Western) academic discursive field. This thesis takes the latter understanding of the decolonial at its most broadly conceived, rather than committing faithfully to the conceptual frames of Mignolo and the members of his circle. However, the historical and conceptual work of the coloniality/modernity collective merits an extensive summary nonetheless.

During the 2000s, a self-defined and coherent research collective made up of Walter Mignolo, Arturo Escobar, Marí Lugones and others began to publish work centred on the concepts of coloniality and decoloniality. In 2007 a special issue of the scholarly journal Cultural Studies (Volume 21, Issue 2—3) presented a unified body of research which took its inspiration from the work of Aníbal Quijano and Enrique Dussel while recognising a general intellectual debt to Frankfurt School critical theory as well as world systems analysis and dependency theory, which Ramón Grosfoguel in particular sought to revisit and transcend (Mignolo 2007: 155—156; Grosfoguel 2007).

In contrast with most postcolonial thinkers whose historical analyses tend to centre on colonial life in South Asia or the Middle East, mainly in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Bhambra 2014: 118), Aníbal Quijano had extended analysis related to the colonial question back to the Colombian encounter in the Americas in 1492, seeing this violent intrusion as foundational in the development of the current world order. For Quijano, Eurocentred colonialism produced a “violent concentration of resources” and colonial power structures gave rise to forms of discrimination which
became codified along lines of race and other forms of difference. These forms of
difference were, in turn, presented as objective categories of science and arranged in
hierarchies which subordinated the colonised (Quijano 2007a: 168).

Colonialism, for Quijano, involved the *expropriation* of knowledge and resources;
the systematic *repression* of ways of knowing and of producing knowledge; and also
the *imposition* of the colonisers’ own way of being. Colonialism therefore sought to
effect a particularly violent form of *translation*: which began with a kind of theft, and
proceeded with the destruction of cultures and ways of being, followed by the
replacement of these with the culture of the coloniser, ultimately resulting in a
particularly imbalanced concentration of resources, as well as cultural domination.
Formal political colonialism was succeeded by Western imperialism after
decolonisation but the coloniality of power remained as a global force. Quijano
observes today’s “lines of exploitation” (2007a: 168) and finds that racialised and
colonised peoples are largely still exploited along lines of difference established during
hundreds of years of colonial rule. After 500 years of colonialism, then, the modes and
patterns of domination and exploitation remain. In other words, expropriation,
repression, and imposition are still enacted in correlation with regimes of difference
and, as such, ‘violent concentrations of resources’ are reproduced. At its core, this
thesis subscribes to the idea that colonial modes of exploitation continue to be enacted
through regimes of difference, thus it shares the foundational ideas of decolonial
thinkers like Quijano.

The primary conceptual contributions of the core decolonial school thinkers have
been twofold. Firstly, to identify the contemporary global *coloniality of power*; and,
secondly, to outline *decoloniality* as a means of realising the imperative to decolonise.
I will flesh out each of these concepts in turn here, beginning with coloniality before
moving on to decoloniality. To begin with, coloniality has come to have broad
application in reference to social relations, structures, and processes which reproduce colonial modes of domination and exploitation in the present. In Quijano’s original formulation, coloniality refers to the primacy of ‘race’ as a social category and organising principle in forms of domination and exploitation including, for instance, in the hierarchical distribution of forms of work across racialised populations (Quijano 2007a: 171).

For Mignolo, coloniality is conceptualised as a matrix of power which is exerted and reproduced through “the classification and reclassification” of peoples; through an “institutional structure” capable of producing and managing classifications; through “the definition of spaces appropriate to such goals”; and through a supporting epistemology (Mignolo 2012: 17). In other words, coloniality refers to an integrated yet undefined global system in which various institutions classify peoples, and in doing so contribute to the production of ‘race’ and other forms of difference and the hierarchical ordering of these. The production of knowledge in particular is implicated in the reproduction of hierarchies. In line with various insights of postcolonial scholars and earlier thinkers including Alatas, epistemic coloniality, or the control of the production of knowledge, allows populations to be represented in a temporal or hierarchical way as backwards or inferior, which in turn justifies intervention in their social worlds, as well as justifying their overall material repression. The question of the classification of social groups and the temporal and hierarchical ordering of classified groups recurs within the empirical chapters of this thesis. In Chapter Seven in particular we will see that epistemic classifications and the ordering of these are not just a feature of state control but a technique enacted by corporations too.

Decolonial thinkers have also argued that modernity cannot be understood without a comprehension of how colonial innovations continue to structure the present. For example, Mignolo’s (2012: ix) core thesis in his work Local Histories/Global Designs
holds that: “there is no modernity without coloniality and that coloniality is constitutive, and not derivative, of modernity.” But the coloniality of power is not static; instead it is in “constant reconversion” and has been adapted from its original form in the formal colonial era to an altered form in the era since widespread independence was achieved. Mignolo points out that nation building in the Global South, from the Americas in the nineteenth century to Africa and Asia in the twentieth century involved:

a reconversion of the coloniality of power from its exercise in the colonial state to its new form under the nation-state. It is precisely that reconversion that could be properly described as “internal colonialism.” Internal colonialism is the coloniality of power imbedded in nation-state building after decolonization.

(Mignolo 2012: 313)

In this sense, the decolonial turn in scholarship opens up the possibility of connecting an understanding of the macro-imperial – the focus of Marxist and other scholars mentioned earlier in this chapter – with the granular processes of coloniality within the nation-state. Although this is not explicitly foregrounded in decolonial scholarship, this work does provide a foundation for investigation into how international capital works in articulation with changing forms of coloniality at the national and local levels. Presented as a work of decolonial scholarship, this thesis should certainly be read as an attempt to illuminate the exploitative processes enacted at extractive frontiers in a national setting presented optimistically as an emerging market in reference to its high levels of international investment and economic growth.
As Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui (2012) points out, Mignolo’s outline of internal colonialism echoes an argument well-stated back in the 1960s by Pablo Gonzalez Casanova (1965) in his article *Internal Colonialism and National Development*. Casanova’s problematic was the abstraction performed by analysis of the international, or the presumed universal, which was treated entirely separately from, for example, the localised study of social dynamics. Further, Casanova observed that the ending of formal colonialism, as domination and political control across international borders, did not bring an end to the subjugated and exploited condition of many of the Global South’s peoples. Exploitation, Casanova argued, continues with “the same characteristics” (Casanova 1965: 27 [emphasis in the original]) as during the formal colonial era.

Casanova’s work was, however, heavily informed by the stadial constructs of modernisation theory, which was then the dominant paradigm for understanding progress in the postcolonial world. As such, he conceptualised internal colonialism as “a stage of industrial process” with political relevance for “newcomers” (Casanova 1965: 28), which represent direct conceptual imports from modernisation literature. However, this framing does not negate the worth of Casanova’s observations and I will return to his insights at times later in this thesis.

To return to decoloniality as the second major conceptual innovation of decolonial scholars; precisely what distinguishes the work of decolonial scholars from Casanova’s Eurocentric modernisation theory framing is their commitment to epistemic decolonisation (decoloniality), alongside the analysis of ongoing and adapting material forms of exploitation (coloniality). Quijano explains the rationale for working towards a more plural and inclusive mode of knowledge production:
First of all, epistemological decolonization, as decoloniality, is needed to clear the way for new intercultural communication, for an interchange of experiences and meanings, as the basis of another rationality which may legitimately pretend to some universality. Nothing is less rational, finally, than the pretension that the specific cosmic vision of a particular ethnie should be taken as universal rationality, even if such an ethnie is called Western Europe because this [serves] to impose a provincialism as universalism.

(Quijano 2007a: 173)

Decoloniality then, or the decolonisation of knowledge production, is a commitment to ending the dominance of provincial Western knowledge over the universal, as well as to ending the hierarchical ordering of knowledge and knowers which subordinates or excludes knowledge produced outside of the dominant Western cosmology. This is not an easy endeavour and Mignolo and others within the core decolonial collective have drawn criticism, especially from Rivera Cusicanqui (2012), for reproducing precisely what they claim to dismantle. This critique notes the distance of “Mignolo and company” from the Indigenous struggles they speak in the name of, equating scholars in the US academy with Bolivian elites, and charging such intellectuals with building “pyramidal structures of power and symbolic capital—baseless pyramids that vertically bind certain Latin American universities and form clientalist networks with indigenous and black intellectuals” (Rivera Cusicanqui 2012: 97—98). Decolonial intellectual capital is increasingly being accumulated in the Global North by means of expensive summer schools which geographically and financially exclude the marginalised voices decolonial scholars claim to speak for and through.
The challenge of scholarly decolonial labour, then, is to consistently work against the established political economy of the colonial academy by, firstly, producing work which is guided by Indigenous and colonised communities and, secondly, by putting institutional privilege to work in the service of social justice, rather than personal prestige. Beyond the core collective of Mignolo and company this is being more faithfully realised by scholars, including Robbie Shilliam, who adhere to a broad decolonial ethos and root their endeavour in “the living knowledge traditions of colonized peoples” (Shilliam 2015a: 8—9). On the whole then, decoloniality can be seen as an ethical commitment to an ideal form of plural knowledge production which ends the supremacy of European thought over other epistemologies, but which is not always fully achieved even by those most committed to it.

After this consideration of the landscape of thought on the colonial question, I situate this thesis as a decolonial study; however, I also continue to draw freely throughout on aspects of anticolonial and postcolonial theory as I do not believe that these should be considered as entirely separable spheres. In the following chapter, Chapter Three, I work towards the conceptual development of coloniality to incorporate the processes of exclusion and translation; while my methodological commitment to a decolonial ethos will be explained further in Chapter Four. Beyond this, the empirical chapters in the later sections of the thesis will engage more fully with the daily realities of coloniality in what I present here as sites of extraction in Indonesia.
Chapter Three

Centring Translation and Exclusion in Decolonial IPE

The act of bearing witness to life in both the urban ‘slums’ and the rural extractives regions of Indonesia leaves behind the overwhelming sense that colonial processes continue to be performed outside of formal colonial settings. As the closer examinations of Indonesia’s sites of extraction in Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight will go on to suggest, considering processes of exclusion and translation as vital modalities and implications of coloniality reveals much about how communities are made expropriatable, as well as about the pressures they face to alter their ways of being.

My intention in this chapter is to step partly outside of the conceptual framework of the core decolonial collective, but to do so without abandoning the imperative to decolonise. I will begin below under the heading *Coloniality as translation* to explore understandings of the concept of translation from various perspectives, ranging from broader thinking on the colonial question, to work on matters of political economy which has had a direct or indirect influence on IPE\(^\text{18}\). This section and the one to follow, entitled *Translation and race*, work towards an understanding of translation as a set of processes which have been common to formal colonial settings and which I assert have been at the heart of the act of colonising. Translation, I suggest, encompasses imposed sociocultural or ontological shifts, or in other words, radical

\(^{18}\) IPE draws on scholarship from disciplines from Geography to Political Economy to Economics and here I engage with influential work from that of the geographer David Harvey to that of the political economist Karl Polanyi.
alterations in the way of being of a community or society enacted through coercion or through altered material conditions which make a community’s former way of life unviable. Translation in this sense may therefore be provoked by dispossession from rural land or from urban shelter; each being material deprivations which effectively end the possibility of maintaining a particular way of being to its full extent. The connections between such ontological shifts and dispossession from material space will become clearer through the contextual discussions of rural and urban life in the empirical Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight. In the meantime, it is important to bear in mind that dispossession from the land has ended (or altered) rural land-based ontologies, while dispossession from urban shelter has done the same for self-sufficient ways of being in the city. Dispossession is therefore a prominent modality of translation, and as such features strongly in the exploration of the concept as it unfolds below.

The following section considers Coloniality as exclusion from the figure of Man, the modern economic subject. Here I forward an understanding of formal colonialism and coloniality in the present as effecting both an inclusion into the dominant order and an exclusion from that order’s normalised understandings of the human/subject. I further consider how Sylvia Wynter has built on Frantz Fanon’s work on sociogeny to examine how it is that persons and communities come to experience themselves as defects of the human/subject produced as ‘normal’. This sets up further engagements throughout the rest of the thesis with the ways in which exclusion is productive in relation to economic processes. Understanding exclusion, I suggest in this section, brings us closer to explaining how it is that groups can be rendered repeatedly expropriatable, in Chakravartty and Silva’s (2012) terms, even in the optimistic context of market emergence.
Coloniality as translation

[In Provincializing Europe] I tried to advance the proposition that the question of transition to capitalism in any setting was a question of translation as well, of a group of people being able to translate their life-worlds into the categories of capitalism.

(Chakrabarty 2011: 24)

As noted in the previous overview of theoretical work centred on what I refer to as ‘the colonial question’; postcolonial critique, emerging mainly from the humanities, has long been charged with emphasising textual and representational concerns at the expense of the material. As I build up an understanding of the core concepts used throughout this thesis my aim will, in part, be to deepen our understanding of the connections between the textual and representational insights of thinkers of the ‘colonial question’ on the one hand and the more material insights of (international) political economists on the other hand. With this in mind the following paragraphs collect together detail from work on the broad question of ‘translation’, both of texts and of societies.

As prominent postcolonial thinkers writing from the broad disciplinary landscape of the Humanities, when Spivak and Chakrabarty each turn to the question of translation, their concerns are inevitably built around the textual and around problems of translation into, or between, texts. Chakrabarty’s passages on “translating life-worlds into labor and history” (2008 [2000]: 72-96) in Provincializing Europe, for instance, consider the particular time of ‘history’ when history is written as a
Secular (disciplinary) History’s time, for Chakrabarty, is shared with that of “Newtonian science” in which the years pass in a linear procession and the weeks repeat in cycles; thus linear and cyclical time are interfused. Such secular historical time is applied as though natural and universal to societies which have distinct and varying understandings of time, memory, and historicity. This epistemological power allows the historian, as well as her interlocutors, to “assign people, places, and objects to a naturally existing, continuous flow of historical time” (ibid: 73). Chakrabarty’s observations here have material implications, and this power of assignation also allows for objects, people, and places to be moved around in historical time, even in a distortion of History’s own linear and cyclical laws. As the empirical chapters of this thesis seek to show through cases in which those labelled ‘backward’ are rendered expropriatable, links can also be made between such assignments of historical time and material processes, including those of extraction, accumulation, and dispossession.

Further, in his examination of disciplinary constructs, the time of the modern historical consciousness is also “godless” in the sense that spiritual forces “can claim no agency in our narratives” (Chakrabarty 2008 [2000]: 73). Chakrabarty’s imagination is centred here on India where, as in much of Indonesia, productive activity is rarely entirely secular, and yet comes to be written as secular histories of ‘labour’. “Such histories” Chakrabarty notes, “represent a meeting of two systems of thought, one in which the world is ultimately, that is, in the final analysis, disenchanted, and the other in which humans are not the only meaningful agents” (ibid: 72 [emphasis added]). The act of translation of the enchanted into a

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9 See Rudnyckyj (2010) for an examination of the spiritual working lives of steel workers in Banten, Indonesia.
disenchanted secular representation is revisited in Chapter Eight in relation to the 

counter-mapping of spirit-regulated forests in Kalimantan.

While Chakrabarty’s concern rests with the translation of “life-worlds” into modes 
of historical writing shaped by the dominant (Western) order, Spivak concentrates on 
the distortions produced in the process of translating from text to text, and extends 
her observations on textual translation to the development of human cultures. Beyond 
her overarching concern for the task of translation as “the most intimate act of 
reading”, in Spivak’s (2012: 255) essay “translation as culture” she presents an 
understanding of human life as a continual act of translation across nature/culture, 
mind/body divides. Drawing on the work of Melanie Klein (1984), she notes how we 
grasp “things” which become coded, or translated, into a “sign-system” (Spivak 2012: 
241):

In this never-ending weaving, violence translates into conscience and vice versa. From birth to death this “natural” machine, programming the mind 
perhaps as genetic instructions program the body (where does body stop and mind begin?) is partly metaphysiological and therefore outside the 
grasp of the mind.

(Spivak 2012: 241)

Spivak’s concern here is the individual subject and the constant dynamic translation 
of stimuli into her conscience. Her method involves the transferral and application of 
the patterns of textual translation onto the translation of things into individual 
subjective understanding. Diverting somewhat from Spivak while remaining rooted to 
language philosophy, Elizabeth Povinelli relies still on the textual, but what she derives
from the textual, in terms of commensurability between texts, she applies more directly to the social world. Her concern is specifically with the application of textual translation rules to social worlds of radical alterity, and hence to the collective rather than individual subject:

Scholars in the philosophy of language have understood incommensurability to refer to a state in which an undistorted translation cannot be produced between two or more denotational texts. The concept of incommensurability is closely related to linguistic indeterminacy. Indeed, they are sometimes used interchangeably. Indeterminacy is also used in a more narrow sense to refer to the condition in which two incompatible “translations” (or, “readings”) are equally true interpretations of the same “text.” In other words, if indeterminacy refers to the possibility of describing a phenomenon in two or more equally true ways, then incommensurability refers to a state in which two phenomena (or worlds) cannot be compared by a third without producing serious distortion.

(Povinelli 2001: 320)

Povinelli’s use of the concept of incommensurability is instructive as a heuristic device or as a framing for discussions on social worlds which cannot be translated into one another without significant distortion. The distinction made between incommensurability and indeterminacy, as referring to plural representations of reality, is also productive. Within her understanding, the text is folded together with the material or social world in the sense that the social world is expected to follow the distortions produced in textual translations. In the text, just as in the social realm, the
act of translation can produce a metaphysical dislocation. This cannot be reduced to a simple analogical observation that ‘the social world acts like the text’ because for Povinelli, the text is not actually prior. When she sets out the relationship between the textual and the material, she is clear that it is “social power” which determines commensuration in translation in the first place (ibid: 324). In other words, linguistic distortion can only be understood within the material context of (almost inevitably imbalanced) social power, such that when Povinelli and her fellow anthropologists apply observations derived from linguistic distortion, the textual is not antecedent but instead folded together with the material. In this thesis then, when I refer to incommensurability in reference to social worlds, I follow the sense defined by Povinelli of social worlds which cannot be translated\textsuperscript{20} into one another without distortion.

Thinkers working more explicitly with the concepts and problematics of (international) political economy have, by contrast, largely remained fixed on material processes in considerations of what I read here to be translations, which are closely related to processes of dispossession and other means of provoking transformations. David Harvey, for instance, deals in grand, global transformations when he identifies accumulation by dispossession (ABD) as the “‘new’ imperialism” (Harvey 2004: 63). Although Harvey would not identify as an IPE scholar, his work has been drawn on within studies presented squarely within IPE debates (c.f. Castree 2007; Wilson 2011). Harvey’s concept of ABD is founded on a critique of Marx’s primitive accumulation,

\textsuperscript{20}Translation has a slightly different meaning in this context to how it is used in the rest of this thesis. Here it means the rendering of something into a different language which may or may not provoke a significant alteration in meaning. Translation is otherwise used in this work to indicate conversion to a different form.
which is set out as a singular, originary, and complete process which, by this nature, comes to be situated prior to, and therefore outside of, his general theory of capital accumulation. Marx’s primitive accumulation is also understood by Harvey to be largely state-driven and to include the commodification of land, peasant dispossession, the extension of property rights and the restriction of the commons, the appropriation of assets and resources, and the extension of the credit system (ibid: 74).

Harvey’s vital adjustment of Marx performs a break from this singular and one-way conception and instead centres repetitive dispossessory processes within our understanding of accumulation itself. Distinct from the prior event of primitive accumulation, Harvey’s ABD is common to every historical period, but varies in the form it takes and is intensified under conditions of crises of overaccumulation (ibid: 76). Such crises are understood in this formulation to drive a spatio-temporal fix in which capital expands across space and time through, for example, the making of new markets, broadened production capacities or through investment in long-term projects. The act of ‘fixing’ refers not only to providing a solution for capital, but also to its solidification in material form, such as in the built environment. In Harvey’s work, overaccumulated capital appears hyper-agential, God-like even, as it:

necessarily creates a physical landscape in its own image at one point in time only to have to destroy it at some later point in time as it pursues geographical expansions and temporal displacements as solutions to the crises of overaccumulation to which it is regularly prone.

(ibid: 66)
In this understanding, overaccumulated capital, in its agential, expansionary state, is the driver of ‘new’ imperialist activity, as it reaches out of domestic environments and across national borders to find its spatio-temporal fix. Such capital-driven global transformations in Harvey’s account hinge greatly on the hegemonic power of the US, such that repeated motions of accumulation by dispossession are understood to be a notable feature of the kind of imperialism which is characteristic of US power (ibid: 82).

Overall, Harvey guides us through various transformations with an overwhelming focus on moments of crisis and how these come to restructure social relations of production. However, there is less indication of how social translations occur in times of ‘emergence’ optimism and economic growth within a (post)colonial country. Further, and characteristic of a dialectical analysis with a focus on capital and labour, Harvey’s transformations occur across undifferentiated spaces and similarly undifferentiated labouring bodies; there is no sense within this framing that some spaces and some bodies might somehow be produced as more expropriatable than others. There is also a large degree of complexity grouped in this account under the sign of ‘labour’ which in reality comprises various, and at times dissonant, forms of rural peasant life, Indigenous ways of being, informal and collective urban life, and so on, as the empirical parts of this thesis will go on to illustrate with regard to the case of Indonesia. Finally, and in distinction from Chakrabarty’s and Spivak’s textual accounts, Harvey’s explanation isolates the material from the representational while also hovering at the national and global macro levels of analysis. Through the lens of Harvey, therefore, we stand to miss the granular level articulations of the material and the discursive in dispossessory patterns, as well as the ways in which specific regimes of hierarchised difference might be central to such processes.
The work of political economist Karl Polanyi has also been drawn on extensively within IPE and cognate fields (Sandbrook 2011; Birchfield 1999; Holmes 2014). Polanyi’s magnum opus *The Great Transformation* centres mainly on the epochal change brought about in the early twentieth century by political economic alterations, including the end of the international gold standard and the introduction of the self-regulating market. His central thesis pivots on identifying the breakdown of the “human and natural substance of society” under market economy conditions and the modes of self-protection societies adopt in response to this breakdown (Polanyi 2001 [1944]: 3). For Polanyi, comprehending the market economy is conditional upon an understanding of its impact on society. However, while Harvey’s account concerns global *imperialism* in the present, Polanyi is more often concerned with tracing historical accounts of local *colonial* processes of transformation.

Polanyi’s work is partly instructive here because his concern is for social transformations under conditions of perceived *improvement*, where improvement came to be conceived only in economic terms within liberal histories of social change (*ibid*: 35). In this sense, any account of ‘development’ or market emergence in today’s context should find his notes of caution practicable in some ways. Further, and as distinct from scholarship treating the metropole and colony as separate histories, Polanyi’s work is fruitful in the sense it draws together the experiences of both at various historical junctures.

In a similar sense to Marx with regard to primitive accumulation, Polanyi speaks of social change in the singular, referring to “the metamorphosis”, “the transformation” or “the dislocation” (*ibid*: 44). This suggests a complete and singular process of political economic change which brings a total and unidirectional social transmutation. In this sense Polanyi’s approach to transformation can be distinguished from Harvey’s perpetual and repetitive ABD. However, and most
notable with regard to the concern of this section for translation in relation to dispossession, Polanyi places particular emphasis on land in relation to sociocultural ways of being and the metaphysical in general. In his chapter on *Market and Nature* (ibid: 187—200) Polanyi forwards his reflections on the isolation of the land from its “traditionally” integrated relationship with nature, labour, and human organisation more broadly. The separation of land from man, for Polanyi, was vital to operationalising a market economy and, in turn, key to the colonial ‘shattering’ of sociocultural systems:

Again, it is in the field of modern colonization that the true significance of such a venture becomes manifest. Whether the colonist needs land for the sake of the wealth buried in it, or whether he merely wishes to constrain the native to produce a surplus of food and raw materials, is often irrelevant; nor does it make much difference whether the native works under the direct supervision of the colonist or only under some form of direct compulsion, for in every and any case the social and cultural system of native life must be first shattered.

*(ibid: 187—188)*

Clearly, a comprehensive socio-cultural translation takes place as a result of dislocation from the land in Polanyi’s understanding. Dispossession alone, or in combination with the conversion of the native into labour, results in the shattering of
the existing way of life in this account.\textsuperscript{21} His overall emphasis here is on a broadly applied process of “the commercialisation of the soil” (\textit{ibid}: 188) which has brought about the detachment between man and land and thus “the dissolution of the body economic into its elements so that each element could fit into that part of the system where it was most useful.” Within this framing, he goes on to detail various modes of implementation ranging from individual violence and war to legislative and administrative modes of dispossession, both rapidly and slowly executed.

However, the element of representation of difference is the key silence in these parts of Polanyi’s work. Like David Harvey after him, he never asks the question of what it is that makes a group, community or population inherently expropriatable. It may seem self-evident that a colonial power relation is presupposed in the dispossessory processes described by Polanyi, yet without an understanding of the construction of others as inherently inferior or deficient the analysis is left incomplete. Racialisation or the presentation of difference as inferiority are processes without which the colonial social relation and the dispossessions it enabled could not have been enacted and sustained. Polanyi either ignored this element or otherwise he may have subscribed, at least subconsciously, to the naturalised hierarchies of the era in which he wrote.

So, while in David Harvey’s work dispossession is considered to be a repeated process to be understood within any theory of accumulation, Polanyi was more concerned with building a deeper understanding of the ways in which the sociocultural is integrated with the relationship with the land, and of how ways of life were broken under a single prior act of dislocation from the land. Overall though, with regard to

\textsuperscript{21} One criticism which may be levelled here is that Polanyi reproduces the ‘fatal impact thesis’ (Moorehead 1966) in which cultures and ways of life were assumed to be swept away, rather than understanding processes of translation as resisted, contested, and at times negotiated.
processes I am grouping together here under the sign of ‘translation’, the disconnect is self-evident between Chakrabarty’s and Spivak’s textual considerations on one side and the material concerns of Harvey and Polanyi on the other side. Nonetheless holding these alongside one another serves to expose the lacunae in each approach, which in turn allows for a fuller appreciation of work which manages to bridge these two sides to varying degrees. The paragraphs in the following section contain summaries of work which I believe performs such a bridging in various productive ways, as well as considering more closely the idea of translation in relation to race.

**Race and translation**

As outlined in Chapter Two, the contribution of Syed Hussein Alatas was to demonstrate that the discursive construction of the ‘lazy native’ in Southeast Asia was essentially a racialisation (although he does not use this precise term) which eased native translation into the category of labour in the service of plantation economies. As Alatas notes, “it was partly the question of labour which gave rise to the negative image of the native and to the ideology of colonial capitalism” (Alatas 1977: 18). This clearly derogatory depiction of the character of Southeast Asian people served to justify their inclusion in a particularly coercive form of labour regime for plantation production as the only form of productive role they were deemed suitable for. Without European intervention and the structure of a coercive regime they would simply stagnate, according to the lazy native ideology.

Although his geographical subject is distant from Southeast Asia, I want to move on from Alatas to engage in some depth with the work of Patrick Wolfe here, mainly because of the quality of his method. Through his finely detailed historical work, Wolfe (2001) draws attention to the foundational processes of dispossession enacted in
liberal settler colonies, with particular attention to Australia and the United States, but also to Brazil by way of comparison. His endeavour is more general than this, though, and seeks to provide a broader examination of processes of racialisation in relation to abstract economic categories, in particular in relation to those of land and labour.

Wolfe’s core thesis in this work rests on the following observation: that the treatment and classification of the physical substance of racialised groups have been differentially approached according to the economic category they have been most closely associated with. Thus, ‘Indians’ in America and Aborigines in Australia have been racialised in correlation with the land they are gradually dispossessed of, while American Blacks have been racialised in correlation with ‘labour’, the assigned category within which they were supposed to propagate as enslaved workers. Native Americans, racialised as ‘Indians’, as well as Australian Aborigines have therefore been constructed as assimilable into white physical substance within a few generations.

There is no official recognition, for example, of those who are one-sixteenth Aborigine in what Wolfe calls the “genetic arithmetic” of Australia’s classification of Aboriginal physical substance. This means that beyond one-eighth native parentage a person is essentially considered to be white (Wolfe 2001: 873). This treatment of physical substance accords with a wider concert of policies in both the US and Australia including forms of violence, homicide, assimilation, miscegenation, child abduction, and so on (ibid: 885) which have together constituted a broader logic of elimination.

In stark contrast, the ‘one-drop rule’ once ascribed to American Blacks ironically reflects what might be read as the superior and infinite potency of Black blood which assures the social reproduction of a subjugated labour force. Whiteness and assimilation have been rendered unattainable for American Blacks through miscegenation and social reproduction because of the official treatment of their physical substance. Black difference in America, in Wolfe’s terms, was therefore made
“absolute, essential, and refractory” (ibid: 885). ‘Race’, within Wolfe’s analysis, is not treated as a “master category” but instead covers a differentiated set of disparities which form the bases of regimes of difference, which in turn reproduce, reinforce, or create power relations. In his own words: “At stake in the unending struggle over differentiation is the fundamental issue defining any social system – who exploits whom in the production and reproduction of power, wealth, and privilege?” (ibid: 905). The point of Wolfe’s work is therefore not to forward a model of the functionings of colonial power, nor to set out a metatheory of race in the global, or any national, economy, but instead to suggest a method of examining racialisation in relation to economic categories which in turn exposes raced representation as a vital enabling element within accumulative and dispossessory processes.

The relative racial clarity of the distinction between Native Americans and geographically alienated Black slaves in the American context allows Wolfe to demonstrate what he refers to as the “foundational distinction” between land and labour (ibid: 887) onto which were mapped opposing forms of racialisation. However, these cannot be understood separately in the colonial context and instead must be seen as forming and acting in symbiosis. In other words, land and labour and the forms of racialisation correlated to these must be read together according to Wolfe’s method. In the Australian case, as distinct from that of the United States, labour was generally supplied by the surplus populations of dispossessed whites from Europe, but local variance was also evident, for example in the northern cattle farming industry in which Aboriginal labour was vital.

Wolfe’s attention to the foundational distinction between the abstract categories of land and labour also leads us back to the dispossessory functionings of a liberal regime based on land-as-property. According to Locke’s original doctrine, applying labour, in the form of settled agriculture for instance, is the most efficient and productive use of
land. Land with labour applied to it could then become private property, which in turn creates surplus land upon conversion from hunting grounds to cultivated farmland due to the relative productive efficiency of the latter. In the European context this had emancipatory effects, to a degree, in the breaking down of hereditary landed power. However, when later cast in the form of the doctrine of *terra nullius* in the colonial context it became the grounds for the legally framed dispossession of native, and especially nomadic and communitarian, peoples.

In a sense, Wolfe’s concern for colonial processes of land dispossession provides a basis for bringing his work into conversation with that of Polanyi. However, while Polanyi was concerned more for the social effects of dispossession, Wolfe attends in greater depth to the combinations of material and discursive mechanisms through which it was enacted. Wolfe’s work also chimes with Povinelli’s in the sense that he identifies the incommensurable nature of Native American tenurial systems with the settler colonial dominant order. He examines the ways in which a commitment to communal land holding ensured the fundamental incommensurability of Indian Territory with the broader liberal United States and served to preclude its accession to statehood within the country. Further, he details the ways in which the breaking down of tribal land into individual allotments was enacted in the wake of the 1887 General Allotment Act, otherwise known as the Dawes Severalty Act. The parcelling of land into ostensibly more productive allotments of property for the purpose of agricultural cultivation necessarily created a surplus of land according to Lockean tenets. The result was that surplus allotments ended up in white ownership such that native land became ‘checkerboarded’. Later policies following World War II made subsidies available for Native Americans who were willing to move to urban areas and assimilate into urban life, and thus into the dominant sociocultural order. Similar dynamics are
evident across Indonesia's resource frontiers, and Chapter Eight in particular picks up this thread within the rural Indonesian context.

Overall, allotment and the extension of land-as-property through other means was key to the breaking up of native lands and to what Wolfe refers to as “the production of the propertied individual” (ibid, 891). During the decades between the early 1880s and the mid-1930s, over one hundred million acres, or two-thirds of what remained of native lands were lost in this great dispossession. With attention to these dynamics then, Wolfe is able to identify a logic of elimination with respect to Native Americans to which land dispossession is central in the effecting of sociocultural translation.

Wolfe’s historical work is in many ways productive and methodologically innovative, clearing a path towards an IPE attuned to regimes of difference, including, but not limited to, racial difference. He also reveals the granular, contextual detail which demonstrates the specificity of each regime of difference in relation to economic constructs and processes. Work on a more sweeping macro level would surely miss the differential racialisations and other productions of difference which correlate with economic categories. Nevertheless, there are obvious limits to Wolfe’s historical work, at least for my purposes here, which are also common to the limits of Polanyi’s work on transformation and Marx’s conceptualisation of primitive accumulation. In particular, I am limited by his focus on the historical extension of the settler colony and therefore on the originary, singular, and unidirectional translations, whether these are translations of personhood into the category of labour or sociocultural translations enacted through dispossession from the land, or some symbiotic combination of both of these. I seek instead to understand the kind of repeated dispossessions described by Harvey in the present in Indonesia, but under regimes of difference which function in a similar way to those analysed by Wolfe in an historical context.
In their article framing a special issue of American Quarterly on ‘Race, Empire, and the Crisis of the Subprime’, Paula Chakravartty and Denise Ferreira da Silva (2012) make an important intervention by casting the US subprime crisis as an explicitly raced event and by examining it through a global historical lens of race and empire. Their radical move in this work is to connect the conditions enabling the Global South to be structurally adjusted with the conditions enabling those cast as ‘subprime borrowers’ to be dispossessed within the US. Setting the subprime crisis in its global historical context in this way also serves to fundamentally challenge our normalised disciplinary separation between Europe and its former liberal settler colonies (as the objects of IPE) and the Global South (as the object of Development Studies).

In many ways the work of Chakravartty and Silva marks a confluence of the disparate approaches to representation and to dispossession that I have summarised in the preceding paragraphs of this section. They explicitly draw on, and adjust, Harvey’s work on accumulation by dispossession, accepting that, in what Harvey understands to be the newly imperial moment of millennial capitalism, accumulation by exploitation of the worker through production has become somewhat overshadowed by repetitive motions of dispossession within the context of economies dominated by the generation of wealth through exchange. This can also be extended to economies dominated by extraction, as will be argued in Chapter Five; and in Indonesia’s emergence moment of ‘jobless growth’ this shift in emphasis is certainly fruitful.

However, these authors challenge Harvey’s own contradiction of doing work framed in the context of what he calls the ‘new’ imperialism without considering the functionings of race and difference in the present. If the ‘old’ imperialism was a project enabled in part by the discursive construction of racial hierarchies, a de-raced understanding of imperialism in the present is the equivalent of beginning the analysis
with an unexplained erasure. Chakravartty and Silva, by contrast, begin by centring the historically attuned modes of colonial, imperial, and racial power, and connect these with the examination of well-rehearsed but still evolving methods of labour, resource, and land expropriation. Race is figured at least twice in Chakravartty and Silva’s account of the subprime crisis: once as a historically determined mode of representation of the human or place, and once again as bearer of material legacy. With regard to the former, Black and Latino borrowers in the US were represented as not creditworthy or trustworthy when they were originally redlined from credit markets and then subsequently super-included as subprime borrowers (see also Dymski et al 2013). With regard to the latter, it was precisely their racially determined lack of inheritance and their disadvantage on the scale of historically entrenched material privilege that rendered their debts unpayable; their lack of accumulated wealth meant they were “less able to weather the sudden decline in home values” (ibid: 361) and were inevitably the first to be dispossessed. These appearances are intimately related in the sense that the historically determined absence of inherited material wealth helps to build the perceptions that feed into representations of communities as morally and intellectually deficient. This is because in one respect they are seen as incapable economic actors, unable to manage their personal finances as Chakravartty and Silva point out, but also because their poverty confines them to inhuman, racialising spaces marked by contamination and uninhabitability, of the kind Bench Ansfield (2015) refers to in his examination of urban New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. A similar image reappears throughout the empirical chapters of this thesis.

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22 “The Katrina event was fodder to a discourse of contamination already written into the foundation of New Orleans. With racial and sexual transgression constitutive of the historical-geographic workings of New Orleans, the city has long been as threatened and enlivened by the defilement of the body politic.
in relation to the human/subject exclusions ascribed to the urban poor in the Jakarta kampungs and to rural communities living along resource frontiers.

Overall then, Chakravartty and Silva draw attention to how the racialised urban poor, represented as morally deficient, became targets for “incomprehensible (moral) obligations and unpayable (monetary) debts [which] expose a political-economic architecture that has always thrived on the construction of modern subjects who lack mental (moral and intellectual) capacities” (ibid: 370). In this understanding, the subprime crisis cannot be isolated in the context of urban America under conditions of neoliberalism, but instead resonates with a global (post)colonial economy in which repetitive expropriation is constructed as the ‘natural’ condition for those the authors call the “others of Europe” (ibid: 364). The subprime crisis was therefore a direct relative of 1980s’ and 1990s’ expropriatory episodes across the Global South in which those represented as falling short, morally and intellectually, of the modern economic subject were targets for debts unpayable and thus became dispossessed by ‘calculated mistake’.

Observing the subprime crisis through a lens of race and empire in this way allows for Chakravartty and Silva to formulate the following defining research questions, which could productively be extended to the global context: “what is left to be dispossessed in this new moment of (accumulation by) dispossession?” and “How is it that they are rendered expropriatable anew?” (Chakravartty & Silva 2012: 366, emphasis added). The “they” within this question refers to the persons rendered expropriatable; however, it also refers to the spaces these persons are associated with. What the authors refer to as the “postcolonial apparatus of racality” works to produce

as it has by the cyclical depositing of effluvium by an outraged and unwieldy Mississippi” (Ansfield 2015: 125).
persons and places as deficient and therefore figured outside of the defined frames of the (economic) subject. Their extension of the notion of the subject beyond the person to the person’s place of origin or place of habitat, is a move which has the potential to further expand the analysis. Overall then, I read Chakravartty and Silva’s work as a productive bridging between (international) political economy approaches which have neglected the role of representation in accumulation and dispossession, and work centred on the colonial question which has stopped short of connecting insights on representation to those material processes. They open up the imperative question of how it is that some bodies and spaces are rendered repeatedly expropriatable, even after it seems as though they have nothing left to expropriate.

This section as a whole has served to explore the concept of translation as a process which may be provoked by dispossession or by other forms of expropriation; material processes which in turn rest on representations of a community or space as being inherently expropriatable. I will return many times in this thesis to this particular understanding of coloniality as translation in reference to forced alterations in ways of life in Indonesia in the present. Particular attention will be paid to translations provoked upon dispossession from rural extractives regions (Chapters Seven and Eight), upon expulsion from urban ‘slums’ (Chapter Six), or the much more complex forced changes enacted in social life when communities come into contact with extractives corporations in West Papua (Chapter Seven).

Ending here on a discussion of the work of Chakravartty and Silva is fitting as their scholarship is notably compelled by the decolonial imperative and influenced in particular by the work of Sylvia Wynter (especially Wynter 2003). I would now like to take up this genealogical thread of influence and trace Wynter’s work back to Frantz Fanon’s anticolonial humanist thinking in order to begin to build an understanding of coloniality as exclusion from the human/subject in the present.
Coloniality as exclusion from the figure of Man, the modern economic subject

In Chapter One I made the claim that formal colonialism generally involves a simultaneous inclusion and exclusion of the colonised society. To begin with, a usually involuntary inclusion of that society into the dominant colonial order is enacted, but at the same time, the persons belonging to that same society are actively excluded from the dominant order’s normalised figure of the human/subject. If coloniality in the present can be said to perform a comparable exclusion, in the same sense as Chakravartty and Silva identify with reference to communities who became marked with the subprime signifier in the US, then understanding this brings us closer to explaining how it is that groups can be rendered repeatedly expropriatable, even in the optimistic context of market emergence. Therefore, what I seek to understand here is how certain groups or social worlds come to be figured outside of this normalised trope of the Indonesian human/subject. In the passages to follow, I trace Fanon’s development of sociogenic understandings of human life, in which some humans are made to understand themselves as defects of the normal human/subject. I interweave the work of Wynter with that of Fanon as I understand much of her thinking to be a clear conversation with the texts he left behind. This leads on to how Wynter crafted her ‘sociogenic principle’ out of Fanon’s sociogeny and how she came to hover over the question of how exclusions from the figure of the human can continue to be produced. I do not mean to use ‘human’ and ‘subject’ as synonyms here but I do wish to suggest that the two are intimately linked in the sense that dehumanising narratives are often key to subject exclusions. A person can hardly be considered (at least in popular discourse) to be a subject if she is not even considered to be human.
Fanon’s distillation of nineteenth century thought on the human emphasises two genealogical traditions: first, axiomatic phylogeny (or species evolution), which was later followed by Freud’s ontogeny (the development of the psychic and individual organism). Against Freud’s isolation of the individual, and nineteenth century biology’s determinism, Fanon sought to centre society in his analysis: “Beside phylogeny and ontogeny stands sociogeny” (Fanon 1967b: 11). In *Black Skin, White Masks* he went beyond the accepted schema of the human’s physical experience of the world – what Wynter refers to as its phylogenetic/ontogenetic dimensions (Wynter 2001: 40) – and towards an understanding of how the human is socialised into a particular mode of sociogeny in which a person can be made to experience herself as the defect of the human produced as ‘normal’. Fanon’s understanding of the human was developed through consideration of both conscious experience and physical processes, where consciousness in Fanon’s conception is socially situated, and so differs according to social context. Following this formulation, to biological schema must be added an historico-racial schema if we are to understand the experience of the material self (Wynter 2001: 41).

In *Black Skin, White Masks*, Fanon’s own sense of self is cultivated within the colony in relation to the French sense of self, where the objective is to become more ‘human’, more like the colonisers. However, Fanon is profoundly altered by his journey to the metropole where the deep subjugation he experiences as part of the colonial social relation is more acute and wherein he becomes fixed in a subhuman status which affects him physiologically. He repeatedly describes his physical nausea upon falling under the white gaze in France. When a little boy repeats the words: “Look, a Negro!” his reaction is altogether bodily: “My body was given back to me sprawled out, distorted, recolored, clad in mourning in that white winter day” (Fanon 1967b: 113). As Wynter remarks: “Meaning, negatively marked, has likely affected matter (that is
physiology) negatively” (Wynter 2001: 38). A change in meaning across sociocultural situations provokes a biochemical change in matter itself, and the self is experienced in an altered way by the colonised person as a result. In the words of Scott, “displacement has a hermeneutical function” (2000: 132) due to the altered interpretation of the self upon a change in social and physical contexts.

Wynter takes the sociogenic baton from Fanon by examining the “socio-situationally determined” subjective experience (Wynter 2001: 36) in which some people come to experience themselves as defects. Her central thesis asserts that each social order has a “culturally prescribed sense of the self or sociogenic principle” which is brought into being over “processes of social conditioning.” These senses of self, for Wynter, are situated and “culturally relative modes of being” (ibid: 48), but here the material is always already enfolded within her understanding of the cultural. Wynter’s concern is with how the human is “made to experience objects in the world” within the terms of that culture’s frames of categorisation and perception (ibid: 49).

Wynter traces the European construction of the figure of Man and its globalisation as a “supracultural universal” (2001: 43) which comes to function as a disavowal of all other “modes of being human” (Silva 2015: 91). Following Foucault’s timeline of Man, and at the same time complicating it with the naturalisation of the racial colonial order of humanity, Wynter tracks the Renaissance secularisation and Enlightenment transformation of the human through homo politicus to homo oeconomicus to arrive at the present day figure of Man, the investor/overconsumer which “overrepresents itself as if it were the human itself” (Wynter 2003: 260) and presupposes a necessarily ‘dysselected’ and inferior human Other, or Other-than-Man.

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23 Wynter uses the term ‘dysselected’ in a Darwinian sense to refer to those who are seen as not “selected by Evolution” and thus outside of the dominant ethnoclass figure of the human (2003: 315).
Although Wynter broadly adopts his understanding of epistemes, she wholly rejects Foucault’s antihumanism. Raised in the midst of the Jamaican anticolonial struggle, Wynter aligns instead with other anticolonial thinkers including Fanon and Césaire by maintaining a commitment to a reconstructed humanism: “a dissonant, a non-identititarian, but nonetheless a comprehensive and planetary humanism” (Scott 2000: 121). This planetary vision of the human is the seam running through her broad canon of work, expressed in its multiple registers. Over and over again she poses the question of why some humans experience negation and as a result are persistently degraded as less-than-human. This, for Wynter, is the failure of humanism, a failure rooted precisely in the collective reproduction and overrepresentation of the ethnoclassed description of Man and the sociogenic principle which governs him and his Others. Outside of Wynter’s figure of Man are not only the racialised but also a transracial collection of “the poor, the jobless, the homeless, the underdeveloped” who are persistently reproduced as Other-than-human (Wynter in conversation with Scott 2000: 201). Wynter’s Man in the present therefore becomes at once a globalised European ethnoclassed figure, and at the same time, a localised figure with shifting frames which is made culturally specific.

I will return repeatedly to Wynter’s formulations of how the human is figured, and of how some come to be excluded from such dominant figurations throughout this thesis in relation to the Indonesian subject. If Indonesia has a ‘culturally prescribed sense of the self’ or sociogenic principle in Wynter’s terms, we might expect the normalised figure of Indonesian Man to be a non-secular version of the investor/overconsumer approximating *homo oeconomicus*. In the empirical chapters of this thesis I will give indications of how the normalised Indonesian subject is produced either discursively or through the material form of built space. However, I will pay more attention overall to how this subject is produced through its exclusions by identifying three of the main
social groups of humans in Indonesia who are pressured to experience themselves as the negation of Indonesian Man. These are, kampung dwellers; those Indigenous groups the state calls ‘isolated people’; and the Papuan people as a whole. After noting these subject prohibitions I will also observe how those who are encouraged to experience themselves as defects refuse to do so, instead making claims on already-human status, both in urban and rural space.

If a planetary humanism is inhibited by the overrepresentation of Man, Wynter’s work is politically productive because it leaves space for the retrieval of modes of being human beyond this prescribed figure. In this sense, Wynter’s overall intellectual struggle comes to be one against the overrepresentation of Man and for a restatement of what it means to be human. The assertions of this thesis on the material overrepresentation of Man and modes of materialising the already-human in urban and rural Indonesia are in some ways intended to add to such a retrieval.
Chapter Four

Method

The most cursory glance over disciplinary journals and monographs reveals that there are multiple ways of approaching research within International Political Economy; furthermore, in methodological terms, the disciplinary boundaries of this contested field are being constantly redrawn. This chapter sets out the method employed in the planning, research, and writing of this thesis as a decolonial IPE study. It opens with a consideration of how approaches to IPE can be decolonised through reformulations and innovations in method under the section title: *making International Political Economy decolonial*. Within this same section, I also explain how I claim to work in a way that is faithful to a decolonial ethos, firstly by beginning with the collective expressions of inhabitants of marginalised sites, and secondly by allowing the thesis as a whole to be guided by the scholarship of racialised and colonised intellectuals. In the following section: *towards a reflexive field informed approach*, I deepen this decolonial methodological frame by drawing on the ethical reflections of critical geographers specifically in relation to fieldwork-intensive research.

I go on to explain my selection of research sites under the heading: *terminable sites of extraction, space as method*, noting how a focus on these sites disrupts dominant narratives of growth and accumulation in an emerging market context by illuminating repeated patterns of exploitation and dispossession. I further detail how space became central to understanding threats of, and resistances to, translations in ways of life. In the following two sections, I explain how the core concepts of the thesis – ‘exclusion’
and ‘translation’ – were approached methodologically under the section titles: identifying human/subject exclusions in sites of extraction, and: identifying translations among excluded communities in sites of extraction. The final two sections: fieldwork phases, and: approach to interviews and focus groups, describe my approach to fieldwork and the methods of interviewing employed, as well as detailing the events which shaped the outcome of my research both in Indonesia and back in the UK.

Making International Political Economy decolonial

How is the framing of this thesis informed by a decolonial ethos? This question sets the tone of the discussion contained in the paragraphs below. Broadly speaking, there are multiple ways of decolonising research relating to IPE and I briefly rationalise the imperative to decolonise here, before explaining how my method of framing this thesis is informed by a decolonial ethos.

Western scholarship has long drawn criticism for presenting its own cultural worldview as universal (see for example, Chakrabarty 2008 [2000]; Quijano 2007a). The search for methods to overcome this is not driven by the imperatives of identity politics but instead by a commitment to scholarly rigour, because presenting one culture’s worldview as universal rationality is simply an unsound way of representing the world. Moreover, the act of routinely excluding the intellectual articulations of racialised and colonised thinkers serves to limit scholarship to a very narrow subjective field. The logical outcomes of these exclusions are, firstly, that only a fraction of global historical phenomena can be sufficiently understood, and secondly, that claims to scholarly comprehension of a broader global historical picture have only a very limited intellectual basis. Perfect, objective information may be an unachievable
ideal, however, the conscious restriction of sources to those produced from a dominant Eurocentric cultural position works against, rather than towards, this ideal.

The most urgent purpose of decolonial work has therefore been one of \textit{decentring Europe} by way of a method which instead centres epistemological positions emanating from beyond the West. In his work \textit{The Black Pacific}, Robbie Shilliam (2015a: 11) elaborates a “decolonial science” by drawing Māori and Rastafari thought into conversation with Black liberation theology in a deep and direct relational epistemology which is not centred on the (former) imperial metropole. Similarly, ‘border thinking’, elaborated by Mignolo (2012), inspired by Gloria Anzaldúa (1987), and also employed by Grosfoguel (2009), imagines a territorial margin to Western epistemology and writes from that marginal position. This also works towards a relational approach beginning with knowledges which are produced as ‘subaltern’. These examples do not seek to exclude, but instead to decentre Europe/the West in the scholarly endeavour.

Finding a method through which to decentre Europe is a fraught undertaking. It is difficult to identify a pristine ‘non-Western’ epistemology which is not related in some way to European thought. This is, firstly, because European colonialism’s extensive reach has allowed European thought to influence intellectual formations across most of the world to some degree. And, secondly, because ‘Europe’ itself was not produced in a vacuum, but instead is the product of resources (material and intellectual) drawn from the rest of the world.\textsuperscript{24} Having said that, there are degrees of epistemological

\textsuperscript{24}This was articulated most eloquently in the words “Europe is literally the creation of the Third World” by Fanon (1967a: 81) in his text \textit{The Wretched of the Earth}. Other historical work on the production of Europe includes Pomeranz’s (2000) \textit{The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World}, and Hobson’s \textit{The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation}.
variation in the present and also historical epistemologies which can be recovered from the past. Indigenous cosmologies, for instance, inform epistemologies which understand phenomena referred to as ‘land’, ‘value’, ‘wealth’, and so on differently than in Eurocentric IPE scholarship. These distinct ways of understanding the concepts we take as ontological reveal their culturally produced nature and, through interrogating their ontological basis, serve to enrich scholarly understanding, rather than undermine it. Within the context of Indonesia, Indigenous understandings of land in particular are explored in Chapter Eight. A relational epistemology guided by retrieved positions such as these is a vital methodological shift which challenges the ways in which Europe/the West reproduces itself in the present as the global epistemic authority, both through its claim to universal rationality, and through the systematic erasure of the intellectual contributions of racialised and colonised thinkers.

In this thesis my method has sought to work towards a relational epistemology which reflects a decolonial ethos in two main ways. The thesis is guided, above all, by the expressions of some of the inhabitants of Indonesia’s ‘marginalised’ spaces, inhabitants who are perceived to be excluded from the human/subject figure and who are thus living under threat of dispossession or other forms of intervention in their social worlds. These inhabitants are those who suffer most under the particular social relations of what is identified in this thesis as coloniality in an emerging market context. I will further elaborate below on how the specific sites of study – namely

25 Land for the Orang Suku Laut (the ‘people of the sea’ living across the maritime Malay world) is never individually owned, instead it is a collective possession acquired as an “inalienable gift” from ancestors which leads to a relationship with the land conceived in terms of “affiliation” and “custodianship” (Chou 2010: 62), and as such it may not be bought or sold. Dayak communities of Kalimantan also have complex and often communitarian understandings of land, which in some places includes spirit-regulated cultivated forests (Mulyoutami et al 2009).
Jakarta’s kampungs, rural extractives regions, and the province of Papua – came to be central to the thesis and how the inhabitants of these sites came to shape its contours.

Secondly, my engagements with literature throughout the thesis foreground the work of racialised and colonised intellectuals whose particular subject positions afford them knowledge of the lived experience of coloniality in some form. I believe this is true of tenured scholars working from positions of privilege in the Global North, such as Denise Ferreira da Silva, as well as of Indigenous intellectuals such as Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui and of anticolonial thinkers like Tan Malaka. Neither does this relational epistemology actively exclude the often maligned ‘white male’ academic; Patrick Wolfe’s work, for instance, is instructive for its exemplary method and ethical commitment to investigating racialisation in relation to settler colonial ideologies. Excluding Wolfe’s work on the grounds of his whiteness would be detrimental to scholarly rigour in the same way as the countless exclusions of racialised intellectuals have been to mainstream Western scholarship. I believe that the common thread uniting diverse scholars from Tan Malaka to Sylvia Wynter to Patrick Wolfe is the ethical commitment to revealing the logics, strategies, and effects of colonialism and/or coloniality across various sites and historical periods. Here I can make the claim that my own ethical commitment to decolonisation, both as a route to, and by means of, scholarly rigour, has guided and informed this thesis throughout. I do not make the claim to having produced perfectly decolonised scholarship, however, and the epistemic flaws and areas of contention within this thesis will also cultivate, I hope, fruitful terrain for debate.

Another important aspect of decolonial work relates to historical method. As noted in Chapter Two, postcolonial work recovered and revised the colonial histories of South Asia and the Middle East in the nineteenth centuries, while the historical method of decolonial scholars extended this to consider the modes and legacies of
colonisation from the turn of the seventeenth century in the Americas. Historicising a particular problematic by retrieving an otherwise occluded colonial past is productive because it can reveal the ways in which the concepts and phenomena we take as natural have in fact been shaped in relation to colonial projects. In research concerning matters of political economy, shifting the focus, for example, from how poverty can be reduced to how poverty has been historically produced is a decolonial move (Mignolo 2012: xviii) although not one exclusive to scholars identifying their endeavour as decolonial. This kind of historical retrieval also allows for continuities to be identified in the present.

My engagements with history here are selective and uneven because they are elaborated in response to the need to trace the genealogy of a particular concept or phenomenon, rather than the need to engage with a comprehensive chronological history of Indonesia as a whole. In Chapter Eight, for instance, rather than accept the concept of ‘adat’ to refer to customary means of regulating land tenure, it was necessary to trace the formulation of adat systems in relation to key colonial innovations in the Dutch era. In addition, in order to further our understanding of how the archipelago, or parts of it, became a site for different forms of investment, it was necessary to trace a series of interventions by the VOC, the Dutch colonial state, and by Western investors with respect to Indonesia’s present condition of market emergence in Chapter Five.

Overall, I have tried to stay faithful to the guidance of decolonial scholars in this thesis, both by allowing it to be led by the collective expressions of the marginalised in

26 See for example the classic work by Walter Rodney (2012 [1972]) on how Africa’s underdevelopment was produced by European colonisers.
Indonesia and to be shaped as far as possible by the work of racialised and colonised intellectuals. I have also followed the decolonial example by being attentive to colonial histories in the formation of key concepts and other phenomena. However, beyond the central decolonial ethos which serves to shape the contours of the study, I draw methodological guidance from the more fieldwork-intensive disciplines of Political Ecology and Critical Geography, especially in their feminist and intersectional variants, to build a suitable method.

Towards a reflexive field informed approach

How were extractive forms of empiricism avoided in the field? In the following paragraphs I draw on critical work relating to fieldwork methods to answer this question and to explain how a ‘field informed’ approach was developed. Geography, like Anthropology, has been implicated in imperial projects in overt ways, from elaborating the maps used in the claiming of territory, to engaging colonised peoples in research which reproduces colonial power relations and forms of extraction. Some critical geographers have therefore begun to scrutinise disciplinary field methods and criticise the forms of empiricism which they perceive to reproduce relations of extraction (see for example, Wainwright 2013; and Schlosser 2014).

From Kolson Schlosser’s (2014) reflections on the dangers of reproducing forms of extraction in research, I develop the idea of a “field informed” approach (Schlosser 2014: 203). This is distinct from what Schlosser perceives to be more extractive forms of empiricism which begin with a defined theoretical framework and a fixed method through which data is collected and then analysed. Drawing on the work of Law (2004), he argues that methods are the means by which questions are answered, whereas theory informs the questions we ask in the first place, and asking the “wrong
questions” informed by a rigid and inappropriate theoretical frame can produce problematic research (ibid: 202). An extractive empiricist approach, in Schlosser’s understanding and among many other factors, is one which assumes the right theory-guided questions are being asked, based on a prior assumption of sufficient knowledge about the field. By contrast, a “field informed” approach is reflexive and, along with employing theory which is “formative of method”, also involves field observations which shape the overall framing of the study. Reflexive field informed research is therefore more receptive to those conditions in the field which may be “unknown, unknowable, or situationally contingent” (ibid: 203).

For this particular study, employing a field informed approach meant first being guided by the most perceptibly prominent expressions made by local organisations and activists within the communities most at risk of dispossession and other forms of translation-producing interventions in their social worlds. This approach begins from the assumption that communities themselves tend to make visible both perceived problems and perceived solutions. However, there are both benefits to and problems with making these expressions a starting point. In one respect, collective expressions, having been previously made prominent by the community, or on the community’s behalf, are already at least partially in the public domain and are often expressions that individuals or groups wish to draw attention to in the interests of social justice. Research taking such expressions as a point of departure can be distinguished from more extractive kinds of research in which the trust of the

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27 These may be in the form of campaign materials, maps, public performances, or other collectively produced statements or material which may have a specific intended audience, for example, maps are intended to make land rights claims to the state, but may reach a number of groups and actors beyond their intended audience.
community is gained only for previously unknown data to be exposed to bodies that might use that data for the purposes of intervention, for example corporate or state institutions. There is original, previously unpublished data in this thesis, however, the information exposed remains within the frames of struggles which have been otherwise publicised in activist materials or public expressions.

In a negative respect, however, collectively formulated expressions risk amplifying prominent voices in the community and reproducing existing means of silencing those who are subordinated within a particular power relation. The extent to which power relations and existing silences are reproduced through collective expressions varies greatly. In the case of what I identify as immanent organisation in the Jakarta kampungs in Chapter Six, collective expressions are made by women who feel they have been subordinated within power relations both inside and outside of the slum. Their collective expressions appear to be widely inclusive of the female population in those communities, which are relatively small in comparison with the national or Papuan scales which come into focus in other chapters. In the case of the organisation around mapping which is the focus of Chapter Eight, such a nation-wide project inevitably reproduces silenced voices, such as those of rural women, because it tends to be dominated by urban, educated males. Finally, in the context of Papua, a broad range of voices are silenced under conditions of repression and, as such, a few voices in exile are much more audible than those of the wider Papuan population. Therefore, as much as this thesis works towards the recovery of those stories and perspectives usually silenced within narratives of emerging market optimism, there will inevitably be further silences reproduced along the way.
Terminable sites of extraction, space as method

How were the sites studied in this thesis chosen in the first place? In a context characterised by coloniality, a focus on national, regional, or even industrial scale growth, presented as optimistic research into an ‘emerging market’, would ignore, and even contribute to the exacerbation of, the situation of those dispossessed or otherwise exploited within an emerging market context in relation to growth-creating activities. Research which uncritically celebrates national scale economic growth reinforces an overall paradigm in which governments and corporations reproduce dispossession and exploitation in the name of the growth imperative. A decolonial study of market emergence would begin therefore, not with a focus on accumulation and growth, but with a focus on the creation of forms of privation which Blaney and Inayatullah (2010: 3) have referred to as the “wound of wealth”, or in other words, the poverty creation constitutive of wealth creation. One opening assertion of this thesis is that the condition of market emergence is differently understood when the scholarly lens is refocussed on the production of privation, rather than on the production of wealth. A more recognisable IPE study on state institutions, for instance, or on the role of private investors or IFIs, would otherwise have merit, but would illuminate only part of the picture. Beginning with collective expressions made in marginalised sites enhances wider understanding of the condition of market emergence by expanding the frames of analysis to foreground those suffering under what is identified in this thesis as forms of coloniality. The research is therefore focused on three sites perceived as ‘marginalised’: the Jakarta ‘slums’ or kampungs, rural sites where communities resist state-corporate dispossession, and the province of Papua with particular attention paid to the Grasberg gold and copper mine which is run by the Indonesian subsidiary of the US-
based corporation Freeport McMoRan. A much more detailed overview of each of these sites will be given in the respective Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight.

Referring to the sites studied here as ‘marginalised’ is, in a sense, to reproduce a popular fallacy. The sites are of interest precisely because they are absolutely central to the concerns of investors in Indonesia’s moment of market emergence. Alongside the ‘slums’ in the capital, Jakarta’s “superblock” commercial complexes draw in private investment capital and create “a spectacle of national recovery” (Kusno 2010: 86) managed through public-private partnerships. Sites like the Freeport Grasberg gold and copper mine in Papua, as well as multiple other nature-based industrial investments along Indonesia’s rural resource frontier are also a key destination for investment capital. Hindering the objectives of investors in both rural and urban sites are always the existing inhabitants whose presence and way of life contradict investment strategies.

It can be considered, therefore, that the sites chosen as the foci of this study have in common their general interest to investment capital, or relation to the impact of investment, as well as being sites subject to dispossession and other means of provoking social translation. I refer to these as terminable sites because, through the expansion of state and corporate activity in remote resource-rich areas and through urban ‘slum’ clearances, these are places under consistent, but not inevitable, threat of dispossession or demolition. Further, I understand the places forming the foci of this study to be sites of extraction, with the meaning of extraction taken to be as defined in Chapter Five: activity which converts material into value to be extracted, predominantly through rural, nature-based industrial activities (for example, oil palm cultivation or mineral extraction) but also through transformative contemporary processes of urban investment. Extraction is also understood to be inherently dispossessory and to contribute to the closure of rural and urban
economic frontiers, giving rise to the contestation of such closures and therefore to struggles over spatially-grounded social and political ontologies.

As terminable sites of extraction, therefore, the research locations experience common dispossessory threats provoking spatial contestations which amount to struggles over inhabitants' very ways of being. Commonalities can therefore be observed across the sites studied in relation to forms of contestation. In the Jakarta kampungs urban women’s organisations and other urban poor groups focus on influencing designs for social housing and on mapping informal economic activity. In relation to rural state and corporate activity across the Indonesian archipelago, mapping activists employ cartographic techniques in the defence of Indigenous and peasant land against expropriation by state and corporate actors. And in West Papua, activists contest Indonesian sovereignty as a whole, while localised activity resists the large-scale extractive operations of the mining firm Freeport. All of these diverse contestations are formulated from spatial claims made under the threat of (or the reality of) imposed social translation of one kind or another.

After an initial examination of collective expressions made from terminable sites of extraction, and in line with a field informed approach, the common denominator of spatial claims across diverse sites of contestation could be identified. The spatial question, therefore, became central to the method of the study because it is clear that spatial concerns underpin a much wider set of relations and associated concerns, from the ability to maintain a communal rural existence, to the ability to organise collective responses to domestic violence; questions, in other words, of social and political ontology. I therefore arrived at space as method because, through my field informed

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28 This is also a nod to Kuan-Hsing Chen’s (2010) work Asia as Method: Toward Deimperialization, in which he develops a means of disrupting knowledge production in the present through a relational
initial observations, it became clear that struggles over space equate to struggles over ontology. From here it is important to note how what I refer to as ‘human/subject exclusions’ in these sites of extraction were approached methodologically in this thesis.

Identifying human/subject exclusions in sites of extraction

In line with a reflexive, field informed process, the spatial-ontological struggles of communities can be drawn into conversation with expressions in theory made in relation to contemporary, but historically contingent, forms of producing privation. Here I connect with theoretical work previously outlined by Sylvia Wynter (2003) as well as Chakravartty and Silva (2012) regarding human and subject exclusions. To recall these theoretical expressions; Wynter identifies a globalised European figure which is also culturally informed in different geographical locations. This figure is the investor/overconsumer correspondent to homo oeconomicus which is widely overrepresented as the human itself. From Wynter’s perspective, being positioned outside of the figure of Man, the normalised trope of the human, enables one’s exploitation and dispossession. Similarly, Chakravartty and Silva identify the reproduction of an apparatus of raciality through which persons (and places) are produced as deficient and therefore figured outside, morally and intellectually, of the defined frames of the (economic) subject. These scholars see the same dispossessory logics working across subject exclusions in both the Global South and North, and

approach which uses “the idea of Asia as an imaginary anchoring point, [through which] societies in Asia can become each other’s points of reference so that the understanding of the self may be transformed”.

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through the structural adjustment and subprime eras in particular. Building on their scholarship, and to some extent echoing Alatas’s observations on ‘the lazy native’, it can be expected that subject-excluding narratives are associated with the communities and sites studied which render them expropriatable, or able to be dispossessed. In other words, the inhabitants of ‘slums’ and rural extractives regions are expected to be discursively excluded from the normalised Indonesian human/subject and this exclusion is thought to enable these sites to be terminable, or under constant threat of dispossession.

Following on from the work of these authors therefore, I extend the understanding of coloniality to encompass a subject exclusion which renders the person or the space expropriatable in the first place. As such, the minor research question could be formulated of: *how* are communities excluded from the normalised trope of the human/subject in Indonesia? For each site I identify discursive exclusions, legally codified or otherwise, and repeated variously through the media, popular press, literature, and embedded in the perceptions of government agents and those of other elites or privileged sections of society. I draw on a range of sources to establish the dominant narratives in the sites studied, including interview statements of activists and inhabitants, government ministry communications, existing literature, and historical memoirs. The exclusions defined in these representations distinguish urban kampung dwellers, rural ‘isolated people’ across the archipelago, and racialised Papuans as deficient and therefore outside of the figure of the Indonesian human/subject. Related to these human/subject exclusions and central to the understanding of coloniality within this thesis is the concept of ‘translation’. The following section explains how I approach this concept methodologically in this study.
Identifying translations among excluded communities in sites of extraction

As I have noted in the conceptual work in Chapter Three, in this thesis I take *translation* to refer to an imposed sociocultural or ontological shift in a particular social world which amounts to a significant distortion in that community’s way of life. Drawing on a range of theoretical work I arrived at an understanding of translation as a process which may be provoked by dispossession or by other forms of expropriation. However, these are material processes which in turn rest on representations of a community as being deficient in relation to the normalised trope of the human/subject making their expropriation possible. The theoretical framing of this thesis understands the concepts of exclusion and translation to be closely related and to be central to coloniality in the present. The intention is therefore to study forced, or threatened, alterations in ways of life in Indonesia in the present with particular attention paid to translations provoked upon dispossession from rural extractives regions, upon expulsion from urban ‘slums’, or the much more complex forced changes enacted in social life when communities come into prolonged contact with extractives corporations.

To explore this, the following minor research questions could therefore be formulated: *How are translations threatened or enacted in the social worlds of the excluded? And what kind of translations are threatened or enacted?* Answering these questions demands paying attention to the collective expressions of the inhabitants of the sites studied to determine the ways in which they feel their ways of life to be threatened. The inhabitants of these sites fully understand that dispossession enacts social translation. However, social translation can also be enacted through diverse and sometimes surprising means, and this becomes particularly apparent in the case of West Papua in Chapter Seven.
To reveal the details of enacted or threatened translations, I examine individual interview expressions, related historical work in which past translations have been documented, literature related to the sites studied, and the collective expressions of activists through various registers, including maps, performances, and campaign material. The sites studied are very different in terms of scale, character, and in terms of the threats inhabitants face, therefore the collective expressions, and thus the material examined, differs across each site.

In the remaining sections of this chapter on method, I set out the approach to fieldwork in this thesis, detailing the phases of research in Indonesia and the UK and my approach to individual and group interviews.

Fieldwork phases

The first phase of fieldwork took place during the months from June to September of 2013. This was an important phase for realising the various practical and ethical limitations to researching forms of dispossession and social translation in the extractive sites of the Indonesian economy, especially those situated across rural, resource-rich areas. During this time, I made initial connections with the mapping organisation which became the central focus of Chapter Eight. Three initial interviews were conducted in the urban offices of the organisation at this exploratory stage, but I was also invited to spend time with the organisation’s employees as they went about their various tasks. One of my visits took place not long before the Iftar meal during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan and I was invited to stay to join the meal. This coincided with a visit from mapping activists from across the archipelago, including those from Papua, Sulawesi, Kalimantan, and Sumatra, who were happy to talk about the commonalities and differences between the forms of dispossession and
exploitation experienced across their respective provinces. It was undoubtedly impromptu and insightful conversations like these which served to shape the overall contours of the thesis.

In addition, during this phase I travelled many thousands of kilometres across the archipelago through Java, to Bali, then on to Kalimantan, and finally Sumatra. These journeys allowed me to connect with mapping activists in each location and witness the different commodity-driven forms of expropriation which dominate each island. However, three main limitations became apparent during this journey. First of all, some rural, and especially Indigenous communities are sometimes suspicious of outsiders. This may be because visitors to these remote spaces tend to be state or corporate actors with an interest in extractive activity. The mapping organisation studied here has a policy of waiting for an invitation rather than approaching a community with an unsolicited suggestion of mapping their lands in the interests of defending it against corporate expropriation. It was also entirely inappropriate for me to reach out to communities uninvited and, as such, visiting remote regions without being involved in a specific invited action was a very limited exercise.

Secondly, complex topography as well as patchy infrastructure and transport connections make some areas of rural Indonesia, especially parts of Kalimantan, incredibly difficult to access. Those working for extractives corporations use flights and private contracted vehicles to travel around at corporate expense but these were beyond my budget. Thirdly, corporate space itself tends to be highly protected with access often deliberately restricted and I will give much more detail related to how this is the case around the Freeport Grasberg mine in Papua in Chapter Seven. Visiting the sites of some nature-based industries was possible, and I witnessed the operations of oil palm and coffee plantations as well as a diamond mine in operation, albeit on a very small scale. However, in East Kalimantan, for instance, I attempted to reach the
expanding coal mining sites around the town of Melak. This area is not accessible easily by road, so I took a long bus journey to Samarinda, and from there travelled by river boat up the Mahakam River to Melak (see Figure 4.1. below). The journey itself took two days but this allowed me to talk to those who travel up and down the Mahakam to reach connections in urban areas, or to visit other villages. This at least gave me more of an insight into the movements of rural communities and the form that rural-urban linkages take in that area.

Figure 4.1. Shows the river route from Samarinda to Melak up the Mahakam (image source: maps.google.co.uk).

On the whole however, these limitations were disappointing and at the time were registered as a series of failures in the research process. Yet at the same time, these initial trips were still vital to the formation of the project. A degree of understanding of the varying terrain, commodity development, infrastructural limitations, and social realities can only be gained by witnessing remote areas of Indonesia. In this sense much of what I saw and experienced in rural parts of the archipelago caused me to
rethink previous ideas for theoretical framings and construct an alternative outline which corresponded with what I had witnessed, as well as with what activists were telling me.

It was also during this first phase of research that I came to be familiar with the various urban poor groups working across Jakarta and began to make initial contact with some key activists working in the city. This was a particularly exciting time for those fighting for the rights of marginalised city inhabitants because Joko Widodo (known popularly as Jokowi), himself raised in kampungs, had become Governor of Jakarta and had set in motion a much more open and direct style of politics in the city. I began to gain a picture of how kampung inhabitants were organising around threats of eviction and other issues and of how central spatial concerns were to their struggles.

Finally, I also made initial contact at this time with professionals who had extensive personal experience of West Papua, specifically within the areas around the Freeport mine. West Papua is distinct in this case because of the restrictions on association around many Papuan causes related to human rights and self-determination. As such, the most overt activity contesting Indonesia’s sovereignty over the territory, as well as the legitimacy of the Freeport mine, takes place in the diaspora, most notably under the rubric of the UK-based Free West Papua Campaign. However, during this first research phase I met regularly with a participant who was then still working for the company. These conversations were untaped and I am unable to disclose further details but, again, these initial exchanges helped to guide the thesis as a whole.

The second phase of fieldwork took place during the months of June and July of 2014. By this time I had established a regular connection with urban poor groups, mapping groups, and various individuals with links to West Papua. In the Jakarta kampungs I was able to hold group discussions with members of urban poor advocacy groups and mutual aid organisations. One of these discussions took place in a
community building in the Muara Baru kampung and the conversation itself was centred on newly-drawn plans for the eviction and resettlement of neighbourhood inhabitants (see Figure 4.2 below). Considering that evictions seemed imminent at that stage, the conversations relating to likely relocation sites and the possibilities of influencing social housing were quite urgent. Community groups were also acutely aware at that stage both of how they were being represented by elites and officials and of the broader impact dispossession would have on their social and economic structures and way of life.

Figure 4.2. Discussion in Muara Baru of relocations around a map of the existing kampung and proposed new sites (photograph by the author).

In the same research period from June 30, 2014, I was invited to travel with a group of counter-mappers to Central and South Kalimantan, the Indonesian part of the island known elsewhere as Borneo. This trip allowed me to observe training exercises and to interact with local activists across key parts of these provinces. Travelling with
a group in this way, well beyond public transportation routes, allowed me to access parts of rural Kalimantan which it had been impossible to reach in 2013. More importantly though, travelling with the mappers and meeting peasant and Indigenous activists allowed me a highly privileged insight into the general and localised patterns of dispossession, exploitation, and resistance across these particular sites of extraction.

*Approach to interviews and group conversations*

The interview material which has fed into this study generally serves an illustrative purpose, or serves to clarify, deepen, or add detail to collective expressions made otherwise through maps, performances or campaign material. Participants include community members; activists who may consider themselves as belonging to the community or as external advocates; professionals who have worked in some way with the communities, for example as health workers, researchers, or development workers; prominent public figures who are considered to be influential experts on Indonesian land rights; and also the director of Indonesia’s human rights commission.

In order to protect participants from being identified, I have maintained the anonymity of the mapping organisation, the counter-mappers, and all of the activists and state actors who participated by referring only to first name pseudonyms. Other more prominent figures who tend to write about or speak out publicly on land issues or urban poor issues and who gave permission to be cited are identified by their full names. This is based on my understanding that those who use their public profile to draw attention to their cause – for example Marco Kusumawijaya from the urban poor organisation Rujak, or Gunawan Wiradi who has long been involved in policy-making and academic work related to agrarian reform – benefit on the whole from being
mentioned in academic work. On the other hand, the activists who are organising at the community level as well as the state, corporate, development, and other workers operating in a professional capacity stand to gain no benefits from being identified and naming them could actually be detrimental to them professionally or in their organising activities.

Aside from the informal and untaped conversations which helped to shape this study, during 2013 some of my interviews with urban poor leaders, members of the mapping organisation, and people with experience of Papua were structured or semi-structured and often took place at urban headquarters and within the more confined time frames of pre-arranged interview appointments. By the time of the following research phase in 2014, ‘the interview’ as the requisite research event had been replaced with less structured conversations. Paradoxically, these less structured conversations were much more purposeful and productive. Leading on from the observations of Schlosser (2014) recalled earlier in this chapter that the wrong theory can lead to the wrong questions being asked, structured interviews which are anchored to the wrong questions can actually serve to foreclose the most pressing concerns.

The interviews and group conversations held in the second phase of fieldwork were thus at once much more purposeful and targeted and at the same time much more loosely structured. Some of the discussions, however, were lengthy and chaotic with multiple interruptions. This especially applies to the exchanges held among community members of the Jakarta kampungs, and to many of the group conversations held while travelling to different sites across Kalimantan and visiting the offices of various activists. There are also many brief exchanges which were not taped which could not be drawn on in the form of direct quotes but which still served in some way to guide or delimit the content of the thesis.
Finally, between these two fieldwork phases in Indonesia, and since returning from the second phase, I have maintained contact with some key urban poor activists, as well as with mapping activists. This contact has helped me to clarify key points and also to keep informed during key events, such as the violent evictions of Kampung Pulo as part of ‘slum’ clearances in August of 2015. Further, during the UK-based phases of the PhD I have been able to conduct interviews with Papuans in exile who are organised around the Free West Papua Campaign. I have also maintained my involvement with exiled Papuans by participating in a roundtable event, as well as other meetings with scholars and activities, and by taking part in a Parliamentarians for West Papua discussion in the British House of Commons in relation to the Free West Papua campaign.

**Positionality**

The paradox of decolonial scholarship is that it at once compels us to engage with, and be led by, voices from the Global South, while at the same time reminding us of the politics of representation in scholarship and the difficulties of negotiating subject positions across colonial power relations. Clearly, undoing the overrepresentation of European epistemology requires a deeper engagement with epistemologies and ontologies of the South or “worlds and knowledges otherwise” (Escobar 2007) but how can we ensure that such engagements do not simply reproduce colonial forms of appropriation, domination and, as central to this thesis, human/subject exclusion and translation? This is a substantive ethical dilemma which I have addressed more
comprehensively in a full paper elsewhere\textsuperscript{29} (Tilley, forthcoming b) however I will detail my approach in this thesis to aspects of this ethical dilemma in the following paragraphs.

In this particular global historical moment in which environmental and economic crises are intensifying and yet corporate resource frontiers continue to expand bringing dispossession, exploitation, and contamination to sites of extraction, it is increasingly important to draw attention to dispossessory patterns and resistance struggles. As a researcher who has taken an interest in these struggles at remote resource frontiers I have been welcomed, sometimes with disbelief, by activists resisting dispossession in sites of extraction. I remember one activist in Central Kalimantan saying to me: “Why are you here? Nobody ever comes here apart from the corporations. Nobody else cares”. So, while I accept the criticisms of those who point out the inherently problematic nature of white Westerners conducting research in the Global South, these critiques also need to be balanced by those voices from the Global South who welcome, or even seek, the engagement and solidarity of sympathetic people from across the world.

Investment capital and multinational corporations operate globally and they do so according to partial and uneven ethical codes according to their location, its remoteness, and the national regulatory regime it is governed by. To echo Kloppenburg Jr (2000), I commit to the idea that the focus of my critique should be

\textsuperscript{29} My article for a forthcoming special issue of the journal \textit{Sociology} on \textit{Global Futures and Epistemologies of the South} presents a much broader reflection on decolonial research methods which is relevant for interdisciplinary work and relates to concerns which are beyond the scope of this particular thesis.
“my people”30 and their legacies, and unfortunately my people and their legacies are visible in the form of exploitative corporate activity and colonially-rooted raced modes of dispossession. To take the position that researchers should only operate locally is to shield corporations and investors from a vital source of criticism.

At the same time, my privilege remains problematic and needs to be confronted. My whiteness, my material inheritance of the profits of colonial forms of extraction, and my institutional privilege, all place me in a problematic power relation with my participants. Being at the subjugated end of class and gender hierarchies ‘back home’ complicate, but do not resolve, this central ethical problem. I have therefore tried, throughout my doctoral research, to confront imbalanced power relations in an active and constant self-reflexive process. My first move was to dismantle a Eurocentric theoretical framework which would have used European theorists to frame the representation of Global South country. The second move was to develop a field informed approach, as explained above, which allowed the thesis to be guided by the collective expressions of communities in sites of extraction. The third move can be expressed in the negative; there were certainly communities I did not attempt to engage with in my research, largely because I felt as though they were not reaching out for solidarity and engagement, or trying to publicise their struggles. Finally, I have always viewed the people I interact with as partners in the co-cultivation of knowledge,

30 “The Huambisa of Peru are not my people. I may not like it much, but those who run Monsanto and Washington University and the National Institutes of Health and the National Science Foundation and the Agency for International Development are my people. And if Monsanto and Washington University and the National Institutes of Health and the National Science Foundation and the Agency for International Development want the Huambisa to enter into a bioprospecting agreement with them (and they do), and if I think the deal is unjust and destructive (and I do), my primary task is to oppose the actions of my own people, not those of the Huambisa” (Kloppenburg Jr 2000: 514).
rather than simply as sources of ‘data’ to be used in ‘my’ research. A doctoral thesis must necessarily be single-authored but elsewhere I have collaborated on co-authored work with participants in order to work towards a joint knowledge endeavour (see Mutaqin & Tilley 2014).

All of this might not be sufficient, however, and critics might still wish to take me back to Spivak’s iconic essay Can the Subaltern Speak?, the core problematic of which is restated by David Lloyd as: “Can the intellectual represent [the subaltern]” (Lloyd 2014: 2—3). I read this question as an ethically and politically disabling one. I simply do not recognise myself distinguishably as ‘the intellectual’ nor do I recognise the voices echoed in this thesis as subaltern. Instead, we are all intellectuals and “there are no subalterns [here]”.31 On the whole, however, there will remain unresolved ethical questions regarding my privilege and position in relation to the voices in this thesis. I can only hold my hands up and accept those ethical criticisms while lamenting the impossibility of equal exchange between North and South, just as Syed Hussein Alatas lamented the loss of an anticipated world of Malay and Javanese trading houses in the West.32

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31 This is taken from Shilliam (2015a: 183) who is troubled by the concept of the subaltern in the sense that it reproduces colonial erasures, and who ultimately rejects it, or ‘thinks beside it’.

32 “Had there been no colonialism, by the end of 19th century there would have been Malay and Javanese trading houses in the West. There would have been an independent, influential trading class in Indonesia and Malaysia, and possibly the Philippines, to spearhead the cultural contact. [...] What would have been the emergence of commercial coastal towns, probably comparable to those of Italy in the 15th century and forging new economic and social life, was hindered by the expansion of Dutch power in the 17th century. Thus what might have been the Renaissance of the Malay Archipelago was smothered before it was born” (Alatas 1977: 21).
Ahead of the final detailed empirical chapters exploring coloniality as exclusion and translation in the sites studied, the following chapter looks at active projects to make the Indonesian archipelago an investible site, from the seventeenth century merchant operations of the Dutch East India Company through to today’s condition of market emergence.
Chapter Five

Making the Archipelago Investible:

From VOC Extraction to the Condition of Market Emergence in Indonesia

To all intents and purposes, the arbiter of emerging markets is now Morgan Stanley Capital International, whose indexes are used as benchmarks by some 90 per cent of emerging markets managers. This gives the MSCI huge influence over where flows of money are directed.

(Financial Times 2006)

Figure 5.1 J.C.R. Colomb’s 1886 world map (Columbia n.d.).
Imperial depictions of the world, as exemplified by John Charles Ready Colomb’s map published in *Graphic* in 1886 (Figure 5.1), generally reflected a cartographic gaze which understood colonised people and places only in relation to the imperial core. This served to preclude possibilities of colonised peoples relating to one another directly and “cultivating knowledge ‘sideways’ so as to possibly inform a decolonial project” (Shilliam 2015a: 3). In line with such a mode of relation, the archipelago which would come to be known as Indonesia gradually became defined by its position in relation to the imperial centres of Europe, and later also the US, in part through its production as a site for international capital investment. Therefore, as a contemporary ‘emerging market’ the Financial Times can now claim that Indonesia’s ultimate arbiter within the global financial system is Morgan Stanley Capital International, as the guide quote for this chapter notes above. Indonesia’s journey to this present-day condition of market emergence began, I suggest in this chapter, with Dutch merchant trading and the establishment of plantation economies on the islands. However, I also recognise here the brief Third Worldism interlude to represent a meaningful attempt to cultivate ‘sideways’ relations without looping back through the imperial core.

In line with a decolonial approach, as discussed in Chapter Four on Method, the purpose of this chapter is to add historical perspective to our understanding of the construction of the archipelago as an investible site. The following paragraphs therefore outline aspects of the broader global context in terms of shifts in international discursive and material conditions which have allowed active political projects to draw in or direct capital to what is now Indonesia across the colonial and post-independence eras. The chapter thus firstly advances a very brief overview of the establishment and key innovations of the Dutch East India Company (VOC), as monopoly merchant, later to become sovereign governor of the archipelago. The VOC set the scene for the Cultivation System to emerge under Dutch sovereign rule, a
system characterised by forms of unfree labour and which itself ultimately made the archipelago an investible site for European capital for the first time. It then covers the production of a plantation economy centred on Java and Sumatra which drew in extensive international capital and still shapes the socioeconomic and geographical landscape in many parts of the country. The relational commonality of Third Worldism is then explored as a flawed but nonetheless significant project intended to break the imperial cartographic gaze. Finally, the chapter considers how global investment architects sought to erase the term Third World from financial discourse and bring into being ‘emerging markets’ as a new organising grammar through which sites in the Global South, including Indonesia, could be made investible. As such, the condition of market emergence is broadly understood here in historical colonial relation as a discursive and material reconfiguration of Indonesia’s investibility.

The VOC from merchant trading to the birth of the Cultivation System

The Dutch East India Company (VOC) brought parts of what is today the Indonesian archipelago into a particular imbalanced economic relationship with Europe, and more specifically the Dutch Provinces, from the seventeenth century onwards. The Company was first established by Dutch States General decree in 1602 as a composite of early trading companies (voorcompagnieën) which had, up until that point, been intensely competitive with one another and were therefore deemed detrimental to both themselves and the national interest (Robertson & Funnell 2012: 349; Gelderblom et al. 2013: 1053).

33 Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie, literally translated as the United East India Company but more commonly known in English as the Dutch East India Company or VOC (Ward 2009: 1).
During its early years, the VOC relied on a revolving system of finance in which fleets to Asia were funded by the profits from previous expeditions. This circulating capital had its limitations and fleets could be delayed when the returns of one expedition were found to be insufficient to finance the next. Further, military operations against competing European merchant fleets were seen as necessary for securing commercial interests in Asia at the time. These were increasingly costly, however, and reduced the return profits and thus the amount available to reinvest in future expeditions. Diminishing return cargoes due to warfare expenditure therefore provoked two main VOC innovations: One was financial reform to establish a permanent capital, and the other was the gradual securing of strategic territory in order to reduce defence costs. Thus by 1612 the Company had managed to acquire permanent capital through a complex system of multiple loans, while the strategic site that would later become Batavia (today’s Jakarta) was captured as an operational hub in 1619, and by 1623 VOC directors had also obtained limited liability (Gelderblom et al 2013).

The VOC itself thus commands scholarly attention in part because its early organisational and financial innovations have had such a lasting effect on corporate institutions.\textsuperscript{34} Whether these key institutional features were a product of calculative design and thus present from the company’s inception, or otherwise assembled in a piecemeal fashion in reaction to the exigencies of its trading environment is a subject

\textsuperscript{34} For example, at its inception the corporation possessed the (then innovative) features of transferable shares and the separation of management and ownership which have come to be core traits of the modern corporation. However, contrary to views that these two come “as a coherent logical set” (Gelderblom et al, 2013: 1072) along with three other key corporate features of legal personhood, limited liability, and a permanent capital, in fact the latter three developed incrementally and in reaction to the exigencies of merchant operations in the East, particularly relating to the need to finance such extensive operations.
for ongoing academic debate well beyond the scope of this study. However, closer examination of the formation of the Company’s key institutions serves broader research questions related to the relationship between colonialism and the development of some key features of capitalism; and to this end, recent archival research continues to revise understanding of, and question the order and motivation of, VOC innovations.35

Otherwise, and of most relevance to this chapter, along with other early European trading companies the VOC’s distant endeavours were simply unprecedented in their scale and intercontinental scope, ending ultimately in the formal colonisation of the Dutch East Indies. These extensive operations also demanded significant spatial innovations on the part of the Company. Driven initially by profit-making rather than colonising ambitions, the VOC’s territorial strategies and its gradual production of an imperial spatial web were largely formed in reaction to its exposure to competitive logics and the related drive to monopolise trade in the East Indies. As such, it did not begin with a blanket territorial and legal strategy which produced a uniform corporate

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35 Where the VOC appeared not to innovate is presently a subject of intrigue. For instance, the debate over whether double-entry bookkeeping (DEB) is a prerequisite for the capitalist mindset central to commercial capitalism has drawn contributors such as Weber and Sombart. Yet each of the six chambers of the VOC (Amsterdam, Zeeland, Delft, Rotterdam, Hoorn and Enkhuizen) persisted with different methods of bookkeeping until 1608 when the methods of all chambers were streamlined around the Amsterdam technique of accounting, although accounting was never fully centralised. After this standardisation of methods the VOC persisted with a Hanseatic method of accounting in the Netherlands which reflected the former Germanic influences on Dutch business practices. Hence the contradiction remains that the VOC as “the first public limited liability joint stock company” (Robertson & Funnell, 2012: 343) never engaged the DEB accounting techniques that would have allowed for calculation of return on investments.
space, but instead created a “partial and contingent” web of irregular spaces of sovereignty (Ward 2009: 10).

The Company’s vast geographical reach ultimately facilitated ‘material networks’ (flows of people, goods, capital, transport, correspondence and so on) and ‘discursive networks’ (of law, information, and culture) which in turn enabled the company to move people around according to their legal status as slave, banished, criminal, servant or otherwise (ibid: 10). As such, the VOC’s epistemic habits (the ways in which the Company legally classified the ‘bodies’ within its domains) interplayed with its territorial network strategies in interesting ways and, as I will note in relation to Freeport in Chapter Seven, there are echoes of this in today’s corporate strategies in West Papua.

The ‘nodes’ within VOC domains are also of interest and some, like the Cape of Good Hope from 1652, began as ‘refreshment points’ for passing trading ships (ibid: 10) but were increasingly peopled with settler populations and gradually acquired permanence, enhanced importance, and ultimately Company sovereignty. The sovereignty of the VOC was indeed intended as a protraction of Dutch sovereignty, however, its legal structure differed somewhat from that of the Netherlands. Places were governed in a “negotiated and contingent” way, according to the particular located synthesis between the legal ambitions of the VOC and the limitations of local customary laws (ibid: 15). This is a reminder that empires are not simply formed from above by totalising forces, but negotiated and shaped by localised circumstances and as such contain significant variation.

All of the above contours the beginnings of the Dutch East Indies as a colony and site of interest for global capital. The main point here is that in the early years of the VOC’s operations its financial innovations were geared towards making the Company itself investible in order to enable merchant operations involving trade and exchange
with what would later become the Dutch East Indies. At the same time, competition with English and Iberian merchants demanded increasingly costly warfare which in turn brought about the territorial imperative to secure strategic hubs. Gradually, therefore, the company established a broader imperial web which had uneven characteristics because it was negotiated with diverse local social structures, rather than simply imposed.

Up until the early nineteenth century the VOC had acted as government and as monopoly merchant in the archipelago while its system of forced delivery\textsuperscript{36} obliged the production of crops including coffee and sugar (Clarence-Smith 1994). Later, and under direct Dutch rule from the early nineteenth century, this character of cultivation was altered somewhat but largely maintained as the Dutch plantation economy became more firmly established. Building upon the early spatial and economic innovations of the VOC in the eighteenth century, 1830 saw the introduction in Java of the Cultivation System designed by Van den Bosch (Van Niel 1990: 67). In tandem with this comprehensive plantation development, the ‘lazy native’ image of the Javanese was further etched onto the colonial consciousness, not least by the very architect of the Cultivation System Van den Bosch himself. As Alatas notes: “Van den Bosch himself considered the Javanese as a nation barely comparable in intellectual development with Dutch children of 12 or 13 years” (Alatas 1977: 61, cites Van den Bosch 1864).

\textsuperscript{36} On Java, the VOC forced villages to cultivate coffee and retained all, or at least a portion, of the profits as tax revenue (Clarence-Smith 1994: 243; see also Van Niel 1990: 70). Rebellions in the early years of the nineteenth century in which Javanese cultivators destroyed plantations and burnt storage places led to some reforms.
The available historiography of the Cultivation System is mixed overall, with a great deal of the scholarship on the System serving to justify it as a benign means of increasing productivity in the Dutch East Indies. Some scholars do rightfully recognise the violence and exploitation inherent to the System (see, for example, Fasseur 1994), while others maintain an astonishing ideological blindness to its faults: one author insists, for example, that “the Cultivation System was the greatest benefaction bestowed by the Netherlands on the Indies” (Van Niel 1990: 69, cites Gerretson 1938).

As part of this ‘benefaction’, the Dutch government imposed both corvée service and cultivation service upon Javanese peasants. In addition, along with Van den Bosch’s design of the System, obligatory labour was newly codified in the 1830 Fundamental Law, while at the same time, the pre-existing obligatory corvée labour continued, thus adding to the amount of forced labour required by the colonial government.

At the very least, the Cultivation System was a transformative intervention in local social life in Java which was made expressly for the purpose of expanding the export-oriented sector and serving world market demands. However, and most importantly for this chapter, this was a key point in the formation of the investibility of the archipelago because the System was also the first means by which European capital

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37 Article 80 of this legislation ruled that one-fifth of village land use should be turned over to crops for export. Derived from this was the system through which one-fifth of a peasant’s annual labour was obligated to the colonial government as “cultivation service” itself a replacement for earlier forms of tax and produce delivery (Van Niel 1990: 74).

38 As agricultural production for export expanded its capital base under the Cultivation System, new resentments were created between the Dutch residents of Java and those in the metropole. European networks on Java were perceived to be guarded and nepotistic with respect to land rights and plantation contracts, protectionist practices which, ironically, many Dutch in the colonial metropole objected to (Van Niel 1990: 72).
could be extensively drawn into the Dutch East Indies. The attraction for investors was made apparent as soon as Java’s agricultural productivity for a global market became significant; and, furthermore, these innovations on Java would ultimately lead to the expansion of European capital investment across the wider archipelago (ibid: 86–87). On the whole, as Van Niel notes, the Cultivation System: “introduced some tactical changes which made colonial exploitation more effective, but it was part and parcel of a longer historical process involving the integration of Java into a system of market economy” (ibid: 89).

By the 1860s corporate capital was also being intensely drawn into Sumatra and would take up a highly organised structure, characterised by coercive labour forms and the influx of Javanese migrant workers as well as European capital owners (Stoler 1985: 15). Within five decades an estate industry developed in Sumatra producing tea, oil palm, tobacco, rubber, and sisal which came to comprise a third of the overall export revenue of the Dutch East Indies. Sumatra’s East Coast plantation belt, also known as Deli, thus became the site for the wholesale “commercial mastery” (Stoler 1985: 3) of the landscape into the rational plantation form which would ultimately shape the oil plantation landscape of much of present-day Sumatra. Deli also came to make up a hierarchically ordered society which was divided spatially accordingly. As Nieuwenhuys (1978, cited by Stoler 1985: 14) put it “Deli was a conglomerate of white settlements with Chinese and Javanese colonies encircling it”, in other words, an explicitly racialised economic landscape. Further, the region’s ethnic groups would be transformed in very distinct ways – with some coastal Malay communities coming to form a quasi-rentier class while the upland Karo Batak suffered dispossession and the loss of their means of communal land-holding (Stoler 1985: 5). In sum, the influx of international capital to the plantation estates of Sumatra brought absolute transformation of much of the landscape, complex forms of social translation, and the
entrenchment of the plantation estate form which continues to structure the social, political, and geographical present on Sumatra.

It was out of this context that corporate capitalism began to emerge in the nineteenth century Dutch East Indies, eased along by a combination of local and international transformations. The fact that local small planters had been driven out by price fluctuations, the abolition of slavery in the Americas, and the eventual opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 had all combined to provide new openings in Sumatra for foreign capital investment in larger-scale plantations including those of rubber, tobacco, coffee, and tea (Stoler 1985: 17–18; Beckford 1972). This period can therefore be identified as a key moment in the transformation of the archipelago in relation to international capital, and one which continues to resonate in the present in many ways.

Overall then, this section has provided a partial overview of the period in history which marked the gradual forced inclusion of the archipelago into highly imbalanced economic relations with the Dutch and other Western countries. A series of innovations on the part of the VOC between the Company’s inception in 1602 and the embedding of the Cultivation System and plantation estates in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries served to draw European capital into the archipelago in new ways. As such, the Dutch East Indies became investible; a condition which brought profound social translations in the process. Hence it was in this way that much of the territory now known as Indonesia came to be understood primarily in relation to the imperial core. The following section will consider Indonesia’s attempt to delink from its relations with the imperial centre and forge more relational ‘sideways’ links through the ethos of Third Worldism.
If throughout the monopoly merchant and Cultivation System phases of VOC involvement in the archipelago the East Indies were understood overwhelmingly in relation to the imperial core, as in the European cartographic gaze, then hard-won independence from the Dutch brought an opportunity to redraw the map. Within this context, the city of Bandung in Indonesia hosted a conference in 1955 which provided the central stage from which broad attempts to work towards extensive ‘sideways’ relations between formerly colonised countries were crystallised in the form of Third Worldism. In truth, the Bandung conference had extensive precedence in the form of what Armstrong (2016: 305) calls the often overlooked “solidarity of commonality” forged especially by women’s movements from colonised countries. The Conference of the Women of Asia, for instance, had previously taken place in Beijing, China in 1949, co-convened by women’s federations from India and China. Nonetheless, Bandung is still remembered as the emblematic moment in the formation of the Third World as a self-defined solidarity movement which informed the ideals of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and in turn fed into the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).

This movement is also remembered, in more favourable understandings, as mobilising colonised and formerly colonised countries around an anti-colonial and anti-racist ethos of unity in resistance to new forms of capitalist and communist imperialism (see Shilliam 2015b for an overview of what Bandung and Third Worldism signify in the anticolonial imagination). The product of the conference was therefore the Bandung Spirit, an ethos which outlives criticism of the conference itself and remains retrievable into the present. As Vijay Prashad puts it: “Bandung produced something: a belief that two thirds of the world’s people had the right to return to their
own burned cities, cherish them, and rebuild them in their own image” (Prashad 2007: 32–33 also cited in Roberts & Foulcher 2016: 2). Overall then, Third Worldism may be understood as an attempted break from the Western gaze, and as a meaningful project to cultivate relational politics without the need to loop back through the old imperial centre.

Some scholars, however, contest idealised narratives of Third Worldism, as expressed through Bandung values, and claim that the Bandung grouping was neither explicitly anti-racist nor non-aligned in any meaningful way, with the non-aligned commitment proving particularly difficult to maintain in the Cold War context of US and Soviet imperial ambitions. Further critical views consider it to be an elitist project which reproduced nationalism and statism, ultimately in the service of developmentalism (Vitalis 2013; Patel & McMichael 2004). The material reality of Third Worldism may then have been quite some distance from the more favourable representations of Bandung ideals:

Third Worldism, situated between the empires of capitalism and communism, embodied the contradictions of the age: the universal institutionalisation of national sovereignty as the representation of independence of decolonised peoples, political confrontation with European racism, and a movement of quasi-nationalist elites whose legitimacy depended on negotiating their economic and political dependence.

(Patel & McMichael 2004: 241)
From this perspective it was thus under Third Worldism that elite nationalist projects were consolidated in the immediate era after formal independence; a process which Casanova (1965), whose work was discussed in more detail in Chapter Two, would recognise to be the securing of internal colonialism in newly independent states. Further, it was during this period that new ways were found to align with international capital and to newly subjugate internally ‘othered’ populations. In other words, it was under the relational and anticolonial ideals of Bandung that a new phase of coloniality was configured. Further, over a period of forty years, Third Worldism became assimilated and overpowered by global capitalism, with the 1980s debt regime marking the most intense moment in the capture of the Third World state by international capital.

Within Indonesia under Sukarno, Third Worldism had signified the mass mobilisation of the citizenry into various parties and organisations centred variously on Islam, communism, and nationalism. This mass base mobilisation supported Sukarno’s statist developmentalism and was geared towards the ends of challenging Western dominance in the region (Patel & McMichael 2004: 242). Ultimately however, Sukarno’s developmentalist route to delinking from Western imperialist influence was largely undone by Suharto’s CIA-backed coup in Indonesia in 1965. The ensuing violence killed up to one million communists, communist sympathisers, and many who were simply suspected of activism around land and social justice issues. Suharto’s coup, aside from being supported by the US, was also encouraged by the British Labour government under Harold Wilson, which had called for the protection of Western commodity interests in Southeast Asia at that time.39

39 In July of 2016 an international tribunal at The Hague ruled that Britain, the US, and Australia had all been complicit in the 1965 mass killings in Indonesia which were referred to as “politicide”. All three
The coup and the purges of leftist (or assumed leftist) social actors became the enabling context for the rapid expansion of what Patel and McMichael have referred to as “corporate transnationalism”, which instigated the shift away from Sukarno’s Third Worldist orientation towards nationalist economic management and opened a new era of corporate influence (ibid: 242–243). As these scholars put it: “The coup marked a turning point in the trajectory of Third World nationalism, introducing new forms of state developmentalism, partnering with global corporations in market expansion (anticipating liberalisation 1980s-style)” (ibid: 244). If the Sukarno era had instilled negative investor perceptions of Indonesia, the period immediately after the violent coup and mass killings brought a gradual restoration of investor confidence, eased by an active political project on the part of the Suharto regime to draw in international capital.

By 1966, investors had begun to visit Indonesia in order to explore business conditions in the country. The initial interested parties included minerals companies from California, a mission from Belgium led by a government minister, and further missions from the Netherlands, Australia, France, and South Korea (Winters 1996: 55–57). However, the key moment in Indonesia’s new phase of opening to investors came soon after James A. Linen, the president of Time Inc., paid a visit to Bali, and subsequently arranged a summit intended to bring together Indonesian and international parties. This Time Inc.-sponsored meeting took place in Geneva and welcomed a ministerial delegation sent by General Suharto as well as leaders of major

of these complicit states were found to have encouraged the violence by “using propaganda to manipulate international opinion in favour of the Indonesian army” a policy which continued even after evidence of mass killings had become apparent (Global Research 2016).

During this meeting, the Indonesian ministers presented the post-purge country as a stable and predictable setting for investment, with Foreign Minister Adam Malik reportedly emphasising the country’s political stability with the words: “The government is not vitally challenged by any other power with a radically different political philosophy” (cited in Winters 1996: 60). The Indonesian delegation also emphasised their apologies for former nationalisation policies under Sukarno and announced moves to return companies to former owners in an effort to sell their country as an investible site. In a statement which bears resonance for the later discussion of West Papua in Chapter Seven, Mohammed Sadli, another member of the Indonesian delegation, looked back on the meeting and advanced the following reflection:

> Overall, we were extremely forthcoming in our presentation. We were desperate to get new investments, and we were willing to receive anything. With Freeport, which was the first generation of new investments in Indonesia, I all but said, ‘Where is the dotted line for me to sign on?’ They were ready to invest before we had an investment law under which to sign the agreement.

(Mohammed Sadli, cabinet minister under Suharto, as cited in Winters 1996: 74)

The company he is referring to here is the US extractives firm Freeport McMoRan which would go on to set up one of the largest gold and copper mines in the world in West Papua. Freeport thus became the pathbreaker in Indonesia’s new phase of
investibility; the first company which would serve to test the water and subsequently encourage other firms to dive in. The wider importance of this will become clear in Chapter Seven when I advance an examination of Freeport’s relation to West Papua’s contested sovereignty. But what Sadli neglected to mention was that the Freeport deal was negotiated, not only before foreign investment laws were finalised, but also without the consent of Papuans and against a backdrop of uncertainty over sovereignty in the region.

It was also during this meeting that the planned Foreign Investment Law of 1967 was unveiled to an international audience. And it was in this way – after an active political project accomplished by both internal and external agents and much bloodshed – that Indonesia became openly investible once again. As such, over the course of the two decades to follow, sweeping privatisation ensued, with many privatised contracts given to Suharto’s extended family network (Patel & McMichael 2004: 246) thus entrenching the power of Indonesia’s class of politico-business elites. The following section considers further transformations after this reopening to investors in the 1960s, leading up to the production of Indonesia’s investibility as an emerging market in the present.
The condition of market emergence: making Indonesia investible in the present

“There are no markets outside the United States”

(Van Agtmael 2007: 1)

In the Future, there will be no markets left waiting to emerge.

By 2050, 19 of the 30 largest economies will be in countries we now call "emerging."

The Future starts here. Be part of it.

Figure 5.2 HSBC advert (HSBC 2013)

The term episteme can be used to refer to a system of understanding which serves to structure knowledge for the duration of a given temporal period. Hence the present dominant Western-centric phase in the global economy is understood here to be what Dia Da Costa and Philip McMichael (2007) refer to as the market episteme. In relation to development thinking within this market episteme, Da Costa and McMichael note that, even in the wake of crises related to market-driven methods of poverty alleviation, “the legitimacy of private forms of accumulation” is reinforced as the means of achieving ‘development’ (2007: 590). It is therefore within this market
episteme context that parts of the Third World have been reclassified as ‘emerging markets’.

The emerging market term is curious in part because of the ambiguity of its multiple meanings and unstable ascription criteria. Aside from providing a common marker for mainly postcolonial and post-Soviet countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, Chile, and Poland which are otherwise diverse in terms of political and economic policies and institutions, the term also serves as the organising grammar of global investment databases. The MSCI\textsuperscript{40} equity index, for instance, classifies 23 countries as ‘emerging markets’ and a further 28 as ‘frontier emerging markets’. For Morgan Stanley, these classifications – the latter marked with the ‘frontier’ echo of settler colonial advance – are based on market access conditions for foreign investors. In contrast, however, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) considers 152 countries to be ‘emerging markets’, using the criteria of export diversification, per capita income, and global financial integration in the decision to ascribe that label (Financial Times 2015a).

The term emerging market can further be used to refer both to countries themselves and to the currency, equity, and bond markets within those countries. One correlate of this ambiguity is that the emerging market term may be \textit{ascribed} to indicate the level of advancement in financial market development, but it may be more often \textit{read} as an indication of overall economic performance. Further, an ‘emerging market economy’ is clearly discursively positioned as subordinate to a ‘developed market economy’ within a constructed global hierarchy. And, when ‘emerging markets’ come to be spoken of in terms of ‘submerging markets’, this change in status is not indicative of any sudden unwinding of financial market capacity, but related instead to perceived poor economic performance and capital outflows (Financial Times 2013).

\textsuperscript{40} Morgan Stanley Capital International (see MSCI 2016).
If it can be said that ‘emerging market’ and ‘developed market’ classifications are more often read as markers of a country’s position on a global hierarchy of market economies, in some cases these labels do not correspond with the real positioning of a country’s economic performance and stability, as noted in the Financial Times:

Chile has a bigger economy, a bigger population, less debt and lower unemployment than Portugal but is classed as emerging, whereas the European nation remains part of the developed world. Similarly, on a per-capita income basis, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and South Korea are wealthier than several developed countries, but are still consigned to the emerging camp.

(Financial Times 2015a)

In these cases the emerging market term appears to function as a racial signifier, maintaining the hierarchical distinction between the ‘superior’ developed West and its ‘inferior’ Others, even when this is grounded in no differential economic correlate. In this sense the emerging market label has dual and seemingly diametric functions – first as a marker of optimism, of inclusion within the world of mobile capital, of investibility; and second as a marker of exclusion from the world of developed markets. This corresponds with the understanding of colonialism as fleshed out in Chapter Two as a simultaneous inclusion within and exclusion from a centre of power.

Antoine Van Agtmael is the man often credited in the popular investment press with the invention of the term ‘emerging market’ in the early 1980s (see for example Financial Times 2006; Economy Watch 2010). This was neither an arbitrary labelling nor a considered classification based on empirical observation, and it was certainly not
the result of a sudden change in the self-identification of the countries now understood to be ‘emerging markets’. From the beginning, emerging markets were labelled as such in order to discursively construct them as viable sites for private foreign investment. Van Agtmael recalls the overall impression of the Global South which he perceived was held by private Western investors in the 1970s:

The year was 1974. I was a young banker, still wet behind the ears, working at Bankers Trust Company in New York. I had been asked to conduct a study on recycling petrodollars. Helping governments overseas to invest on a truly global basis seemed like a logical concept. But when I interviewed the bank’s trust department (at the time among the largest in the United States), an intimidating executive tugged on his red suspenders and wrathfully snarled: “There are no markets outside the United States”.

(Van Agtmael 2007: 1)

A few years after this memorable exchange at the close of the decade, Van Agtmael believed that, within the Western financial world, understanding of the geographical limits to private investment had expanded little from this mantra of “there are no markets outside the United States”. At this time, upon returning to the US to work for the World Bank within its private sector branch the International Finance Corporation (IFC) in 1979, Van Agtmael was reminded that, in the West, “the idea of portfolio investment in developing countries was regarded with suspicion, as fundamentally unsound” (ibid: 3).

Against what he perceived to be the collective mood of the times in the investment world, and influenced by his time spent living in Asia as well as his studies at the
Netherlands School of Economics, Van Agtmael presents himself as a pioneer of portfolio innovations in countries seen at the time as unsafe for private investment. In his own words, Van Agtmael claimed he had long been “fascinated with the fate and fortunes of what was then known disparagingly as “The Third World”” (ibid: 1). As such he and some of his fellow financiers, whom he describes as “courageous” set about redescribing the Third World, or at least a selected portion of it, as “emerging markets” which could be grouped together for ‘basket’ investments in order to disperse the risk involved. According to Van Agtmael’s account, this is how parts of the former Third World, as well as parts of the former Soviet Union, became included as component parts of funds with risk well-spread over broad portfolios.

In reality, the broader picture of global credit market transformation following the debt crisis of the 1980s was much more complex than the above account suggests. At this time, bank loans were increasingly perceived to pose a systemic risk, so the disintermediation of financial systems through the development of domestic bond markets was pursued as a market-based means of reducing this risk. At the same time, a shift in private sector lending towards the development of portfolio lending also reduced the prevalence of bank loans. However, these increased portfolio investment flows would go on to create new systemic risks and short-term speculative capital would eventually play a prominent role in the financial crisis in East Asia in the late 1990s (Rethel 2012).

 Nonetheless, Van Agtmael’s ‘invention’ of the ‘emerging market’ and its associated financial innovations was presented as an emancipatory project to overcome what he perceived to be the stagnant financial condition and the low-grade image of the Third World. However, his understanding of the label ‘Third World’ as a term of disparagement betrayed Van Agtmael’s lack of knowledge of the history and roots of the signifier as one intended to mark empowerment through solidaristic connections
between newly-independent countries. Furthermore, the act of relabelling parts of the world under a new sign invented by Western investors was clearly Orientalist in the sense that it sought epistemic control over the depiction of the Third World in order to justify a new form of economic intervention within it.

Marion Fourcade’s examination of those ‘emerging markets’ later to be grouped together as the ‘BRICs’ (Brazil, Russia, India, China) also notes that, in terms of internal organisation and development policies, these countries had very little in common that would bind them into a collective grouping. Their union is, instead, “better apprehended through its symbolic and political dimensions, as an effort by well-placed actors in the financial markets to drum up excitement about investment opportunities” (Fourcade 2013: 256). Otherwise, Fourcade argues, the BRIC countries were only really united initially by their common condition of exclusion from structures of global economic governance.

Furthermore, the labelling of emerging markets subsequently became much less subtle in terms of performative intentions; where BRIC became a sign for solid economic building, ‘PIGS’ or ‘PIIGS’, in reference to the most troubled parts of Southern Europe as well as Ireland after the 2008 financial crisis, became a sign for repellent economies, ready for slaughter. In contrast, those countries aggregated around the ‘MINT’ acronym, including Indonesia but also Turkey, Mexico, and Nigeria, have been reported on in the investment press with a narrative of fresh sweetness, for example: “Nigeria [...] is thought to be in an economic sweet spot” (Forbes 2014) and “investors thought the Mints sounded simply delicious” (Financial Times 2015b). As such, these groupings were constructed as explicitly moral categories with suggestive acronyms designed to direct investment capital towards them, or, conversely, intended to repel investors from economies presented as in decline.
Ngai Ling Sum also examines the BRIC grouping as an economic imaginary, representative of hope and strength, which was not simply reflective of changes in the financial and productive economy, but was also a discursive construction reinforced through knowledge technologies including blogs, books, reports, and investment funds themselves. Sum argues that the BRICs were built at least three times after 2001, once through an investor narrative as a specific grouping within Van Agtmael’s broader emerging markets frame of investible sites, again through a specific investor-consumer narrative around the time of declining consumption in the West related to the 2008 financial crisis, and finally through an “investor-consumer-lender story” in which China in particular became the potential saviour of the world economy through its own ability to lend money (Sum 2013: 547).

In a more material analysis centred on patterns of Western equity financing of Global South companies since the 1990s, Susanne Soederberg (2007) notes the increasing tendency for US-based pension funds to spread investments across ‘emerging markets’. She argues that this has also enabled the concurrent development of new forms of conditionality through indices like the Permissible Country Index (PCI) which quantitatively rates, or ‘benchmarks’, economic and social factors and forms the basis for judgement of a country’s suitability for investment (ibid: 478). This kind of conditional equity financing exemplifies a new form of ‘entrepreneurial development strategy’ in which the private sector plays a leading role, and which deepens and legitimates the role of foreign capital, but also extends the disciplinary function of capital investment within so-called ‘emerging markets’ (ibid: 478—479).

41 Soederberg understands this within a wider context of “neoliberal revisionism” (ibid: 480) following the adverse results of structural adjustment policies (SAPs) prescribed by financial institutions which served to deepen poverty and inequality in the Global South.
Capital is disciplinary in this context because investors can make demands of local institutions under threat of withdrawal. Further, this kind of divestment from a country can have disastrous consequences and the very potential for divestment both reflects and reproduces a highly imbalanced power relation.

These literatures build an overall picture of the interplay between narrative constructions and the material realities of investment flows in relation to those countries labelled as ‘emerging markets’ since the 1980s. Parallels can be drawn here with discursive constructions discussed elsewhere in this thesis; even a negative construction in the form of the ‘lazy native’ myth, discussed in Chapter Two, enabled a certain economic reconfiguration in the form of plantation estates. However, if the discursive construction of emerging markets was intended as a move to help reorient selected parts of the Third World, including Indonesia, in relation to the imperial core as sites of investment, then changes internal to Indonesia were, at the same time, serving to complement this drive towards investibility. It is therefore worth revisiting here Indonesia’s general approach to foreign investment in the decades leading up to the invention of the emerging market discourse in the 1980s.

As noted above, Indonesia had opened up to mobile investment in the aftermath of the anti-communist violence of the 1960s, an opening which immediately afforded Freeport McMoRan the rights to access the contested subsoil of West Papua. Following the 1967 Time Inc. meeting in Geneva between Indonesian delegates and corporate investors, foreign corporations then had direct input into Indonesia’s rapidly changing investment policy. The first wave of foreign corporate investment was subsequently followed by an active period of attracting ethnic Chinese-Indonesian investment capital. However, the state remained in firm control of the oil and gas sector and, consequently, the Indonesian treasury benefitted directly from the revenues from
fossil fuels. As such, when oil prices began to rise sharply in 1973, Suharto’s regime became greatly enriched (Winters 1996: 92, 96).

After the intense courting of international corporations in the 1960s, therefore, the oil boom subsequently allowed the state to be less eager to please foreign investors. Jeffrey Winters argues that the fossil fuel windfall revenue during the oil boom years allowed for more managed forms of state allocation to be prevalent, claiming that the state then became relatively indifferent to the policy demands of mobile investors because their withdrawal from the economy was seen as inconsequential in the context of high oil revenues. This was also an era in which the power of Suharto’s close circle was at its height and it was largely understood that investors either had to appease those in the Suharto camp or expect “surgical strikes” to sever their operations (Winters 1996: 145).

Once the oil price began to fall in 1982, and amid severe criticism from the World Bank and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), a new “era of deregulation” or “deregulasi” was opened in Indonesia in which private investors became much more influential (ibid: 143). Economic reforms were implemented between the years of 1983 and 1989 which included banking deregulation to allow for greater capital mobility, tax reform to reduce rates paid by investors, rounds of regulatory reform in the areas of trade and investment to reduce licensing restrictions on a range of imports, and the lowering of duties on various product groups. As such, all of this internal restructuring towards liberalisation was occurring in Indonesia at the same time as Van Agtmael and others were actively reconstructing parts of the Third World as investible sites and engineering suitable financial products, such as basket investments, to complement this discursive reconstruction.
Since the crash in oil prices and the reconstruction of parts of the Third World as emerging markets in the early 1980s, Indonesia has weathered bouts of severe economic trouble only to ‘emerge’, once again, as an MINT-grade investible site. The most catastrophic subsequent event for Indonesia was the Asian Financial Crisis of the late 1990s which ultimately led to the downfall of Suharto. From June 1997, speculative attacks on Asian currencies triggered capital flight, rapid increases in unemployment and crises in equity markets and private sector debt, thus marking the onset of financial crisis in Asia. The International Monetary Fund intervened with a rescue package for Indonesia in 1997 to the value of US$43 billion (Robison & Rosser 1998: 1593; Doraisami 2014: 581). However, the conditionality of the IMF package was at odds with the Suharto regime’s economic plans and style of governance, largely because it demanded that a number of large-scale national development projects should be shelved, state agricultural monopolies should be abolished, and tariffs and subsidies should be reduced or removed. The reform package did not serve to mitigate the inflation rate or the weak exchange rate, and, against the backdrop of this ongoing instability, Suharto proceeded with a number of costly development projects and went against IMF guidance by delivering an expansionary budget.

42 Liberal accounts from the IMF and others blamed rises in external debt and short-term private sector borrowing along with overvalued currencies, a loss of export competitiveness, real estate bubbles, and overextended banking systems for the Asian Financial Crisis, marking it, in other words, as having endogenous ‘Asian’ origins in countries with state interventionist cultures. More statist accounts contest that the crisis was rooted in the power shifts of the 1980s away from the state and towards private business interests and, further, that it was the capture of the state by private capital which allowed for overextended banking systems and debt burdens to arise in the first place (Robison & Rosser 1998 1594—1595).
Conditions had continued to worsen in Indonesia during the first quarter of 1998, with the rupiah continuing to fall against the dollar, the stock market collapsing, and the bankruptcy of many Indonesian businesses. Suharto was ultimately pushed towards resignation in May of 1998 – amidst widespread violence, student protests, broader social mobilisation, and brutal organised violence against minority Chinese Indonesians – and was succeeded by the B.J. Habibie interim regime, followed by the presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid in 1999. This change signified the opening of the reformasi era of reform and decentralisation (see Tyson 2010: 34; Kingsbury & Aveling 2003: 1) which was complemented by economic recovery linked to a global boom in the demand for both mineral and agricultural commodities (see Garnaut 2015).

Then the effects of the so-called Global Financial Crisis, catalysed by the US subprime mortgage crisis, were also felt in Asia a decade later, including in the form of reduced exports and a dip in commodity prices, to which Indonesia responded with a fiscal stimulus package (Doraisami 2014: 582). However, in the context of Indonesia’s relative stability in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, emerging market narratives were re-deployed; once in relation to investibility, and again in relation to consumption potential. The investment press featured affirmations of emerging market optimism such as this from Roy Morgan analyst Debnath Guharoy in the Financial Times: “There is no other major economy with such a high level of confidence. This is the time to invest. Indonesian consumers can afford to buy” (Financial Times 2011). Clearly resonating with Sum’s observations on the construction of the BRIC countries, Indonesia has also figured within world economy-saving narratives of steady investibility and surging consumption:
Indonesia’s consumers are doing their bit to keep the world economy going [...] [Jakarta’s] high-flyers are known for showing off their wealth at the capital’s sprawling malls; on a recent Sunday afternoon red Lamborghinis and Ferraris were lined up at the kerb-side valet of Pacific Place, one of Jakarta’s top shopping spots. Imported cars were a popular buy in the first quarter of this year, as automobile sales surged 70 per cent and GDP ticked along at nearly six per cent. The growth is driven by strong domestic spending and rebounding foreign demand for abundant raw materials, such as coal and crude palm oil [...] the message to the shoppers of Jakarta is – keep spending.

(Financial Times 2010)

Further, in the years after the onset of the Global Financial Crisis Indonesia continued to be presented in this way as something of a safe haven for investors in a time of broader economic turbulence:

Investors are drawn to Indonesia by strong domestic consumption from an increasingly wealthy population of 240m [...] Indonesia’s exports add up to a little more than 20 per cent of GDP, according to HSBC, compared with more than 60 per cent in Thailand and Vietnam. That means a fall in trade affects Indonesia less than nearly all of its peers [...] many of those domestic consumers earn their salaries in industries closely linked to commodities and are thus vulnerable to the volatility expected in those markets this year.

(Financial Times 2012)
The link is also clearly made here in the investor press between raw commodity extraction – the rurally situated element in Indonesia’s market emergence growth story which frames Chapters Seven and Eight of this thesis – and the consumption element of market emergence located in the urban setting and which frames Chapter Six. Within this thesis, therefore, the condition of market emergence is understood, not simply as a contemporary empirical condition experienced by countries with booming economies, but as a mode of constructing investibility within the present-day market episteme which also has historical precedence in various investment discourses and material economic interventions and reconfigurations.

As noted previously in Chapter One, where the construction of investibility brings increased inward flows of investment, optimistic narratives of emergence mask the negative transformative nature of such investment. As such, a decolonial political economy would begin by asking broader questions relating to the darker side of accumulation: Where is investment concentrated? Who is newly dispossessed or otherwise impoverished? What new or intensified forms of translation are enabled? How do exclusions along existing lines of difference enable forms of accumulation and dispossession? By reconsidering market emergence as a contemporary mode of producing investibility, but also as a new mode of enabling extraction, this thesis therefore builds a decolonial IPE attentive to coloniality in the form of exclusion and translation. Throughout the empirical chapters, therefore, the thesis attends to how existing forms of exclusion serve international capital operating through the national emerging market context and, secondly, it attends to the forms of translation instigated in the areas of concentrated investment, or sites of extraction. It is precisely through a focus on sites of extraction – urban poor neighbourhoods and rural resource frontiers – that the condition of market emergence is explored throughout the final empirical chapters of this thesis. Ahead of these empirical parts, the following
paragraphs of this chapter are therefore intended to deepen understanding of extraction under conditions of market emergence.

*Extraction under conditions of market emergence*

Within the broader context of the spatial expansion of the global market episteme, a paradigm of intensifying extractivism can be observed across much of the (post)colonial world. The literature on extraction – understood here to refer to a set of extractive processes – and extractivism – understood here as a broader organising economic paradigm – is most well advanced in relation to Latin America, but there are certainly grounds for including wider sections of the Global South, and indeed parts of the Global North, in the analysis of the extractivism paradigm.

Contemporary extractivism, or neoextractivism, is considered more to be a paradigm of accumulation which involves intense forms of extraction. Neoextractivism is defined by Maristella Svampa (2015: 66) as “the pattern of accumulation based on the overexploitation of generally nonrenewable natural resources, as well as the expansion of capital’s frontiers toward territories previously considered non-productive.” The case can be made, therefore, for Indonesia’s resource frontiers to be analysed within this frame. Svampa also notes that neoextractivism has a tendency towards monocultural production which somewhat contradicts her previous mention of non-renewable resources. Again, however, Indonesia’s vast oil palm plantation regions, such as those in Sumatra, also correspond to this definition. Otherwise she also emphasises the investment-intensive nature of activity within an extractivist paradigm which draws extensively on capital but creates relatively few jobs, which also resonates in the Indonesia context (see Li 2014: 3 and Aswicahyono et al 2010 on jobless growth in Indonesia).
Further, Svampa presents contemporary extractivism as marking a paradigm shift from the Washington Consensus era of coerced neoliberal state reform to a “commodity consensus” era in which the state has more freedom to enact progressive policies but is nonetheless restrained by the “irresistible” dynamics of extractives-led growth. Considering that coercive forms of conditionality have altered in character, but have not ended, in the post-Washington Consensus era, and considering that extraction itself has a long colonial history, I divert from Svampa’s understanding of the commodity consensus as a clear paradigm shift. Instead, within this thesis I understand contemporary forms of investment and extraction in Indonesia to display continuity with those forms developed during the colonial and much of the post-independence era.

Where the Latin American experience most clearly corresponds to the Indonesian experience is in relation to the character of contestations provoked by extractivist expansion. Conflicts over land and resources are sparked between state or corporate parties and existing inhabitants; examples of such contestations will be highlighted in both the rural and urban Indonesian contexts in Chapters Six and Eight of this thesis in particular. As Svampa (2015:68) notes, these conflicts tend to “express different conceptions of territory, nature, and the environment as well as understandings of development and democracy”. In other words, and in line with points made repeatedly throughout this thesis, struggles provoked by extractivism tend to be ones of social and political ontology, rather than simply over the control of land and resources.

Extending our understanding further, Mezzadra and Neilson define extraction (as opposed to extractivism) as follows:

Extraction refers literally to the forced removal of raw materials and life forms from the earth’s surface, depths, and biosphere. While these activities
are by no means historically new, they have reached unprecedented and critical levels as the rush to convert materials, both organic and inorganic, into value has escalated with expanding populations, new technologies, and green horizons of capitalism. The sharp increase of land grabbing—through the sequestration of arable farmlands and clearing of forests for the production of biofuels and foodstuffs—is only one feature of this contemporary landscape of extraction, which extends well beyond activities such as mining, oil drilling, and fishing. **Important processes of capitalist valorization such as those linked with the gentrification of urban spaces can also be critically analysed as forms of extraction.**

(Mezzadra & Neilson 2015: 2 [emphasis added])

The radical move performed here by Mezzadra and Neilson is to suggest that the term extraction can be used beyond reference to the literal removal of minerals and biotic resources from the earth, recognisable as a rurally grounded process. Beyond this, they argue, the concept can be employed to encompass investment in urban development—processes more usually linked with positive substantives like ‘regeneration’, ‘production’, and ‘growth’ rather than the negative ‘extraction’. This is interesting because it causes us to look more closely at processes framed with positive substantives, especially what is normally termed the production of urban space, and understand these also in the negative terms of a kind of removal and the extraction of value instead.

Taking the connection between extractivist dynamics and urban processes further, Verónica Gago considers the concept specifically in relation to ‘marginalised’ urban peripheries within contemporary modes of accumulation:
It is necessary to broaden the concept of extractivism beyond the reference to the reprimarization of Latin American economies as exporters of raw materials in order to understand the particular role played by territories in the urban peripheries in this new moment of accumulation. These territories remain marginalized in the productive framework by thinking of the economy only in terms of primary materials and the countryside.

(Gago 2015: 21)

The case Gago makes in the same text also goes beyond a focus on gentrifying investment patterns in urban space and encompasses the subject production of the ‘citizen-consumer’ as a replacement for the enfranchised worker. Gago argues that such a shift in citizenship occurs when a government moves away from the goal of full employment and, instead, consumption itself becomes “the form of guaranteeing social inclusion” (2015: 20). More inclusive possibilities of consumption are supposedly enabled in an extractivist context by the redistribution of the profits gained from extraction.

For this shift to citizen-consumer subjectivities to take place, of course, fitting spaces of urban consumption must first be produced. Along these lines, I will explore in greater depth in Chapter Six how in the Jakarta context built space is increasingly produced for ‘Man’, or what Sylvia Wynter would recognise as the overrepresented consumer/investor figure which has come to be the normalised trope of the Indonesian subject. This chapter will also consider the correlate of this to be the dispossession of ‘slum’ communities, especially by means of their direct removal through eviction for urban development.
Within this thesis I use the concept of ‘extraction’ within an emerging market context, as opposed to the broader paradigm of extractivism, to refer to the character of activity which dominates the particular rural and urban sites studied and which to a great extent structures the social contestations within those sites. As the following empirical chapters attest to, therefore, these diverse sites experience common dispossessionary threats provoking spatial contestations which amount to struggles over inhabitants’ very ways of being. My own understanding of extraction is thus derived from the definitions above: Extraction refers to processes which convert material into value to be extracted, predominantly through rural, nature-based industrial activities (for example, oil palm cultivation and mineral extraction) but also through transformative contemporary processes of urban investment which produce spaces of consumption. Extraction is also understood to be inherently dispossessionary and to contribute to the closure of rural and urban economic frontiers, and therefore to the contestation of such closures, provoking struggles over spatially-grounded social and political ontologies.

**Conclusion**

The primary purpose of this chapter has been to deepen our understanding of the condition of market emergence in Indonesia beyond the often-implied straightforward empirical condition of beneficial economic growth and towards the discursive and material production of investibility in the present. In addition to this, the concept of extraction was introduced in order to frame the urban and rural sites of study which attract inward investment within an emerging market context, but which are understood here as sites of extraction, rather than simply as sites of investment and production.
Furthermore, the chapter presented Indonesia’s contemporary emerging market condition as set within a broader present-day market episteme but also in relation to a longer historical context. As such, rather than being peculiar to the present, Indonesia’s condition of market emergence is understood as having continuity with historical processes of making the archipelago investible in various ways throughout the colonial and ‘postcolonial’ eras and mainly in direct relation to the relevant imperial core. To illustrate this, aspects of Indonesia’s economic history were traced from the merchant colonial era in which the VOC itself was made investible through its engagements with the archipelago, to the Cultivation System of Java and the plantation estates of Sumatra which brought transformative international corporate capital into the islands from the mid-nineteenth century onwards.

If these movements towards making the archipelago investible served to structure the Dutch East Indies unfavourably in relation to ‘the West’ – understood in its changing geographical contours from the Dutch Provinces to the US and other ‘developed’ countries in more recent decades – the independence era allowed for an attempted break in the imperial gaze in the form of Third Worldism. Third Worldism may be understood in its idealised form as a meaningful project to cultivate relational politics without the need to loop back through the old imperial centre. The limitations of this narrative have, however, been well recognised and the project cannot be understood to be genuinely non-aligned, as recognised in this chapter.

It is certain, however, that the broader signification of the ‘Third World’ was entirely misread when Van Agtmael reconfigured investor understanding of parts of the Global South under the sign of ‘emerging markets’ in the 1980s. Since then, market emergence has been the organising grammar of Indonesia’s investibility; understood, as the guide quote for this chapter makes clear, in relation to the imperial core with MSCI as ultimate arbiter. This thesis thus presents an alternative exploration of the
condition of market emergence, read through sites of extraction which are ordinarily understood as magnets for investment but, as will become clear through the empirical Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight, may also be understood as sites of exclusion and of related forms of translation of in ways of being. It is within these sites that the optimistic emergence narrative is starkly contradicted by a reality of dispossession, exploitation, translation, and exclusion.
Chapter Six

Contesting Translation in the Kampungs: Claiming, Performing, and Mapping the Jakarta Economic Subject

Globally, the material conditions of urban poor neighbourhoods, such as the kampungs of Jakarta, are productive of various forms of privation, but also of new forms of immanent politics. Harm is caused to urban poor residents through the periodic spectacles of financial and environmental shocks, as well as through the slow and everyday forms of abjection, precarity, domination, and violence that relate to power relations both within and outside of the kampung. Added to all of this, state-orchestrated evictions and resettlements also have devastating effects on urban poor communities (see Contractor 2008; Harriss-White et al. 2013; Parkar et al. 2003; Davis 2007). This chapter takes up this global story in the Jakarta context, where, despite ongoing legal contestations, the eviction of residents from the neighbourhood of Kampung Pulo on the alluvial banks of the Ciliwung River in Jakarta began on 20 August 2015, displacing over 1,500 households (Jakarta Post 2015b). The scene was familiar, and multiple past dispossession of ‘slum’ neighbourhoods, both within Indonesia and across the postcolonial globe, were echoed as the violent performance of the eviction unfolded. In the Indonesian context, the repeated settlement and displacement of the urban poor continues within an ‘emerging market’ whose

economic success is rooted in ‘jobless growth’ (Li 2014: 3; Aswicahyono et al 2010), which itself is largely attributable to displacement-inducing rural and urban extraction. For all the ‘emergence’ optimism then, Indonesia is a populous country in which many have no place in the formal economy and, at the same time, are left physically placeless by multiple ordeals of dispossession from both rural and urban settlements.

Against this backdrop, this chapter considers coloniality in the form of subject exclusions and related risks and realities of social translation within the kampungs of Jakarta and in the present context of market emergence. Throughout, it considers the research questions: (how) are communities excluded from the normalised trope of the human/subject in Indonesia? How are translations threatened or enacted in the social worlds of the excluded? And what kind of translations are threatened or enacted? The chapter begins by setting out an understanding of the Jakarta kampungs as terminable sites of extraction and home for social worlds which are incommensurable with other forms of social life. I further historicise the city’s role more broadly as the “exemplary centre”, of empire and then of nation, in which the spaces of the urban poor have been persistently removed in order to make way for the realisation of successive urban projects. The chapter then considers the various ways in which the subject and its exclusions are produced in Jakarta, both materially and discursively. It proposes that Jakarta’s middle class and elites have framed kampung

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44 See for example Tania Li (2009) on rural dispossession; McCarthy et al (2012) on development-related land grabs; and Garnaut (2015) on Indonesia’s resources boom. See also the final section of Chapter Five of this thesis on extraction.

45 The kampungs are incommensurable social worlds in the sense meant by Povinelli (2001), as set out in Chapter Three, as social worlds which are significantly distorted when translated into the dominant order.
residents as unfit economic subjects, thus denying their productive role in urban economic life and rendering them targets of dispossession and expropriation. However, it goes on to argue that kampung residents, and women residents in particular, have contested these subject prohibitions in part through public performances and through the mapping of their own economic activity. I also examine how women drive immanent politics within the ‘slum’ and go on to further argue that the material conditions of the kampung give rise to distinct forms of resistant subjectivity. These in turn have the potential to cultivate distinct forms of spatiality in the city, realised by means of women’s attempts to influence the design of social housing.

The kampung as terminable site of extraction

As explained within Chapter Four on Method and within the Extraction section of Chapter Five, I take up Mezzadra and Neilson’s (2015: 2) suggestion that “the gentrification of urban spaces can also be critically analysed as forms of extraction” [emphasis added]. I understand this to be because investment in urban areas converts material into value to be extracted and also provokes the displacement and dispossession of urban poor communities. As noted, Jakarta’s kampungs are under persistent threat of demolition to make way for new visions of the city to be constructed. And yet, rather than being a contemporary phenomenon, Jakarta has long been made and remade to reflect the vision of the wider nation or empire it has been central to, thus destruction in the service of urban production has a long and varied history.

At least two quite contrasting historiographical approaches to Jakarta have informed accounts of the city’s past. Many Dutch accounts begin, as those of Balbian
Verster and Kooy-van Zeggelen (1921) and Breuning (1954) do, with VOC settlement activities in 1619 and the construction of a Dutch fort. In contrast, Indonesian revisionist historiographies note the much longer and culturally complex history of the city, presenting it not as a European invention, but as an important and variously Hindu-Javanese and Muslim port which Europeans had come to dominate from the seventeenth century (see, for example, Ali & Bodmer 1970; and Tjandrasasmita 2001).

Indeed, Indonesians today celebrate the victory of the Muslim Sultanate of Banten over Portuguese traders who had anticipated constructing a fort on the site in 1527. It was after this event that the port was renamed “Jayakarta” or “Victorious and Prosperous” the early version of the name the city bears today. The ‘victorious’ Jayakarta then became the centre of a long-running struggle between European powers to monopolise trade in the surrounding region (Abeyasekere 1987: 6–7).

It was almost a century later that Jan Pierterszoon Coen, Governor-General and headmost empire builder of the VOC from 1618, envisioned the Jayakarta site as administrative centre, central hub for goods and ship repair, and connecting point for the expanding series of trading posts across the Company’s developing empire (ibid: 8–9). The Dutch overcame English and Javanese interests around the port and named it Batavia after the ‘Batavi’ Germanic tribe that the Dutch were descended from. As the depiction in Figure 6.1 below would suggest, Batavia was to become the “exemplary centre” of the Dutch East Indies and the home of the imperial elites. After the Dutch

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Abidin Kusno (2010: 5, 59) uses this term to refer to contemporary Jakarta as a “microcosm that embodies political order”. He draws this from Geertz’s study of the nineteenth century ‘theatre state’ in Bali in which he describes the exemplary centre as “the theory that the court-and-capital is at once a microcosm of the supernatural order […] and the material embodiment of political order. It is not just the nucleus, the engine, or the pivot of the state, it is the state […] by the mere act of providing a model,
destroyed the existing town in 1619, brick-built town houses were constructed to line
the canalised stretches of the Ciliwung River and Javanese street stalls were banned in
order to reproduce, as faithfully as possible, the Dutch metropole within the colony
itself (Abeyasekere 1989: 18). On the whole, the destruction of Jayakarta in order for
the exemplary centre of Batavia to be realised as the ‘capital of all Dutch factories and
settlements in the East Indies’ depicted in Figure 6.1 makes for a comparable precursor
to the later realisation of Jakarta in all of its incarnations as the Indonesian capital.

Figure 6.1 “The City of Batavia in the Island of Java and Capital of all the Dutch Factories and
Settlements in the East Indies” - a Dutch depiction of Batavia displayed at the Maritime Museum, Sunda
Kelapa, Jakarta (photograph by the author).

a paragon, a faultless image of civilized existence, the court shapes the world around it into at least a
rough approximation of its own excellence” (Geertz 1980: 13).
Independence from the Dutch opened a long phase of nationalist urbanism in Jakarta which arguably persists to the present day but has changed in form over time. Indonesia’s first president after independence, Sukarno, came from a professional background in civil engineering and architecture and believed in the unifying and aspirational power of the material urban image. He furnished the city with grand projects such as the tall obelisk of the National Monument and the Istiqal Mosque with its nod to the style of the Middle East, as well as staples of decolonial modernity such as the high-rise Hotel Indonesia and the first of Jakarta’s department stores, ‘Sarinah’. As detailed in Chapter Five, after Suharto came to power in 1966, his New Order regime opened up a new era in which foreign capital was actively courted, and the extractives and manufacturing sectors drew in the sudden intense involvement of corporations from the West. This also provoked rapid office block development in Jakarta as investors drove up the demand for administrative work space in the city (Abeyasekere 1989: 217). And, with Jakarta awash with international capital, many of the nationalist urbanist projects begun or envisaged under Sukarno could finally be finished under Suharto.

During Suharto’s time in power and into the present, Kusno identifies two separate dynamic trends at work in Jakarta, one being Western-led, investor-driven liberalisation, the other being the nationalist authority which reproduces Jakarta as the “exemplary centre” of Indonesia. However, across changing forms of national

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47 Understood as the construction of the nation through the built space of the city, often requiring the demolition of poor neighbourhoods (Kusno 2010: 25).

48 Sukarno was “passionately devoted to the idea that architecture and town planning could serve to create the ideal society […] He harnessed architecture to the cause of the Indonesian Revolution, which he proclaimed was the greatest in history since it would lead the world in the fight against imperialism” (Abeyasekere 1989: 168).
prestige-making and international influence, there has been one constant: “If a *kampung* (poor urban neighbourhood) has to be demolished and the master plan changed, the further development of the nation provides sufficient justification” (Kusno 2010: 25). The terminable status of the Jakarta *kampung* persists, as the destruction of Kampung Pulo in 2015 makes apparent, albeit in an altered context following the start of democratisation. After Suharto’s resignation amidst the chaos of financial crisis in 1998, a perceptible shift occurred towards a more critical civic participation. Since then, urban projects have still been designed to build nationalist consciousness, and still presuppose the violent erasure of Jakarta’s *kampungs*, but since the fall of Suharto this kind of nationalist urbanism encounters much more critical civic engagement and resistance (Kusno 2010: 30—31).

Further, the *reformasi* demonstrations of 1998 were strongest in the capital and Jakarta’s streets became a battlefield for inter-communal violence. This resulted in the burning down and general physical destruction of much of Glodok, the Chinese urban area to the north of the city (Wiriyomartono 2014; Kusno 2003; Kurnia 2011). In the aftermath, Jakarta became a symbolic site of physical reparation, the place where national grief was assuaged through the rebuilding of neighbourhoods and the fresh construction of the monumental. Post-crisis recovery, then, found its material expression in the construction anew of the face of Jakarta. As such, Jakarta was also recovered as the “exemplary centre” of Indonesia and resumed what Kipfer has termed “comprador urbanism” through the construction of “grandiose buildings in the capital” (2011: 100). At the same time as the nation was rebuilt in urban space, the parallel international dynamics identified by Kusno continued to make Jakarta into a city emblematic of contemporary global capitalism, with much in common with other megalopolis across the postcolonial globe in terms of its striking inequalities and extremes of marginalisation and accumulation, demolitions and constructions. The
following section considers how these extremes of urban material life contribute to the production of the Jakartan subject and also to the production of its exclusions.

*The production of the Jakartan economic subject and its exclusions*

I love Indonesia, but does Indonesia love me back?

(Ho 2013)

The following paragraphs address the research question identified in Chapter Four: *(how) are communities excluded from the normalised trope of the human/subject in Indonesia?* The central claim of this section is that the placeless urban poor in Jakarta are discursively constructed to be deficient beings, parasitic upon, and damaging to, the city’s economy and ecology. In this sense they are prohibited from inhabiting the defined figure of the Indonesian, and more specifically Jakartan, economic subject, understood as an investor-consumer, *homo oeconomicus* figure who is fully able to participate within the formal economy of an ‘emerging market’. This prohibition in turn serves to justify attempts to erase the placeless urban poor from the city. In this section I first consider how the urban material of Jakarta is itself productive of both

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49 See for example Jakarta Post (2015a) “Government agencies have negotiated with people living illegally or who are involved in illegal or questionable activities for far too long. [...] These people migrate from villages with no place to live, no skills and no work. Nationally, the appropriate government agencies need to determine why people leave their villages and how to boost people’s livelihoods in villages to avoid the annual wave of urbanization, which invariably increases crime, discrimination against these people and the ever-present illegal shacks rising throughout cities”.
the subject and its exclusions, before considering wider means by which subject exclusions are produced discursively and through the Jakarta identity card system.

I have elsewhere mapped Sylvia Wynter’s observations of the global problem of exclusions from the figure of the human onto an urban setting in order to argue that ‘Man’ has become overrepresented in urban life in the material form of the mall, the executive office block, sanitised interior spaces, the rational and regulatory grid of reductive urban planning, and so on (Tilley forthcoming a). Wynter’s anticolonial forerunner, Frantz Fanon, was certainly attuned to the cultivation of urban life and to how the colonial social relation between dominant and subjugated figures was materially produced, at the same time as being productive of material forms (see also Kipfer 2011). In some of his most poetic passages in The Wretched of the Earth he illustrates ‘two towns’ of material inequality, one “made of stone and steel”, bright and orderly; the other “a world without spaciousness” where people live crammed together in material deprivation. In the present, unequal relations of coloniality can be

50 These passages deserve repeating in full: “The settler’s town is a strongly-built town, all made of stone and steel. It is a brightly-lit town; the streets are covered with asphalt, and the garbage-cans swallow all the leavings, unseen, unknown and hardly thought about. The settler’s feet are never visible, except perhaps in the sea; but there you’re never close enough to see them. His feet are protected by strong shoes although the streets of his town are clean and even, with no holes or stones. The settler’s town is a well-fed town, an easy-going town; its belly is always full of good things. The settler’s town is a town of white people, of foreigners.

The town belonging to the colonized people, or at least the native town, the Negro village, the medina, the reservation, is a place of ill fame, peopled by men of ill repute. They are born there, it matters little where or how; they die there, it matters not where or how. It is a world without spaciousness; men live there on top of each other, and their huts are built one on top of the other. The native town is a hungry town, starved of bread, of meat, of shoes, of coal, of light. The native town is a crouching village, a town on its knees, a town wallowing in the mire” (Fanon 1967a: 30).
understood to be informed by urban material. Kusno considers how the self is modelled in part through architecture and urban space, as well as how the urban environment impacts upon collective subjectivities. Urban planners may design urban material with a certain citizen in mind – the professional citizen consumer, for instance – and in this sense, urban space can be considered to be both produced by, and productive of, the subject. However, urban material is open to a variety of interpretations, misinterpretations, and subversions by those who encounter it. In Kusno’s words:

Visually perceptible forms (such as buildings and their symbolic elements) can be seen as not merely expressing a social and political system but also as helping to constitute the subjectivity of the people who live in and through them. However we cannot fix the meaning of an urban form nor can we assume full knowledge of a subject’s actions embedded in physical space.

(Kusno 2010: 157)

In Kusno’s terms then, the urban space of Jakarta helps to constitute the subjectivity of those living through it. However, within this frame, the intended meaning of space can be supposed, but its interpretations can never be assumed to be fixed. As indicated in Figures 6.2 and 6.3, the urban material of the city features both luxury in ‘stone and steel’ as well as neighbourhoods of privation. Jakarta apposes the slum and the opulent
superblock and as such puts in sync, both in physical space and in the imagination, the extremes of inequality within a setting characterised by coloniality. We can say that the two towns of Fanon find their analogue here. In this sense the capital renders normal the absolute coevalness of wealth and poverty within Indonesia as emerging market, even as we are told by development narratives that these are separated by tense; that poverty is the past and wealth is the future.

Through its vast-scale shopping malls and extravagant condominiums, the luxury parts of Jakarta produce the subject but also actively exclude urban poor communities. This exclusion is both a subjective perception, in the sense of not ‘fitting in’ with the wealthy consumer crowd the mall is designed to attract, and also a physical reality, as
security can deter people from entering at all. Jakarta’s malls can also be understood as a form of monumentality,\textsuperscript{51} meant to project a certain image, both internally and beyond its material boundaries. As explored in Chapter Five, and drawing on the work of Gago (2015: 20), the figure of the “citizen consumer” is bound up with, and reinforces, the extractivist paradigm in multiple ways. Consumption is a route to a delimited kind of social inclusion, and more inclusive possibilities of consumption are supposedly enabled in an extractivist context by the redistribution of the profits gained from extraction. In the city, Indonesia’s emergence growth story is evident in the form of rising luxury consumption and the visible effects, through the production of apt spaces of consumption, of the active making of internal consumption markets. How these spaces of consumption in Jakarta overflow their material boundaries can be noted in travel and lifestyle writings on Jakarta which emphasise the cultivation of Indonesian, and expat, consumer subjectivities in the city setting:

If you enjoy window shopping and following fashion trends, you’ll enjoy the fashion showcased at Plaza Indonesia, and Plaza Senayan, Senayan City, Grand Indonesia, Pacific Place, Mall of Indonesia, and Pondok Indah 2. Shops offer the latest collections from the fashion capitals of the world – Milan, London, Paris and New York – to titillate the fancy of well to do

\textsuperscript{51} Lefebvre, for example, refers to a plural monumentality of religious, state, social, and sporting constructions, to which we should surely add commercial buildings like the monumental shopping malls of Jakarta. This plural monumentality, he argues, gives concrete place to previously placeless and abstract ideas “divinity, majesty, royalty, justice, liberty, thought” (Lefebvre: 38-39). The monumental is also meant to project, command, and arrest, so the monumental city “overflows its material boundaries” (\textit{ibid: 38}) and beyond its material boundaries it also dominates the page of the academic urbanist.
Indonesians and expatriates alike. Prior to the opening of luxury malls, Indonesians had to shop in Singapore, Europe or the U.S. to buy such well-known international brands as Bvlgari, Prada, Cartier, Versace, Louis Vuitton, Bally, Aigner, Ferragamo, Hermes, Chanel, and Escada. Now, these brands, and many more, are available in Jakarta.

(Living in Indonesia 2012)

The luxury mall, as presented here, becomes the equivalent to, and replacement for, foreign travel, situating the international within the city itself. The Senayan City superblock, pictured in Figure 6.3, is particularly interesting in this regard. The Senayan space was originally publicly funded under Sukarno and conceived for the Asian Games of 1962 as a means to showcase the national project for an international audience, as well as provide public recreation space for all Jakartans (Kusno 2010: 84). The development of privately funded commercial buildings for an exclusive clientele have made of the site a showcase of the international for the nation.

Further, the vast malls of Jakarta are not simply places to purchase necessities; they are presented as sites of modern acculturation. And experiencing modernity in Jakarta largely involves living ‘mall to mall’:

To Jakartans, shopping and spending the whole day in malls is entertainment. Malls are places to hang out and spend happy weekends with family and friends. For Jakarta malls offer everything from large department stores, luxury boutiques, supermarket, gym, upmarket restaurants, food centers, cafes, bookshops, kids playground, beauty salons, to cinemas, all under one roof and in total air-conditioned comfort. And
this, in often hot Jakarta, is one of the main reasons why people spend long hours in malls.

(Wonderful Indonesia, 2013)

Rather than suggesting that mall life is somehow a radical break with Indonesian tradition, however, mall-centred lifestyles are portrayed as continuous with timeless practices of communal congregation and social interaction. As such the mall is presented as simultaneously preserving the essence of rural village sociality, and as essentially international and modern:

In traditional Indonesian society, open common areas in villages and towns or the courtyard of the Sultan's palace have long been a place to gather and spend late afternoon and evening hours. Small vendors set up their wares, food carts gather and people stroll around meeting friends and sharing gossip. Jakarta's shopping malls are a modern urban equivalent of traditional meeting points – a place to shop, eat and gather with friends and have some fun on the weekends [...] a big attraction is 'people watching' for the see-and-be-seen crowd. The elegant marble, expansive open spaces and lofty atriums offer a sense of luxury that is further enhanced by air conditioning, no-smoking policies, good housekeeping, and security. According to some social analysts, malls have replaced traditional town centers as locations for community interaction.

(Living in Indonesia 2012)
The person suggested in this description is concerned with ‘luxury’, ‘housekeeping’, and ‘security’ and as such the ‘community interaction’ referred to here implies a circumscribed, safe, and hygienic form of community. The mall is presented as a sanitised and orderly interior\textsuperscript{52} which finds its antipode in the insanitary and disorderly streets outside. This sanitised order is maintained too by the presence of security guards, body scanners, and metal detectors – bordering practices which seem to deter those who do not fit with the see-and-be-seen-crowd, and the clientele of Prada and Gucci. Jakarta’s malls are therefore clearly intended to physically exclude the urban poor.

If the commercial buildings of the city are intended both to produce the subject and exclude at the same time, a range of other practical and discursive practices can be seen to produce the same function. I will first consider how elite discourses produce exclusions from the normalised figure of the Jakarta subject and then give an overview of the Jakarta identity card as a practical means of exclusion. To begin with, government officials tend to refer to the urban poor as \textit{penduduk liar}, which translates as ‘wild’ or ‘feral’ inhabitants, a representation suggestive of irrational and less-than-human beings (Winayanti & Lang 2004: 44). Urban poor activist Sandyawan Sumardi further explains the attitude of the Jakarta authorities: “They give economic reasons: [they say] ‘there is no use in supporting the urban poor, because they’re only illegal persons and don’t have any economic use’” (interview in Jakarta, July 2014). Similarly, Dian Tri Irawaty from the organisation Rujak argues that the government has tried to engender the idea that Jakarta “is only for the selected people” with those perceived to be educated, middle class, and rich, seen as “resources for the city” while the urban

\textsuperscript{52} For discussions of the creation of sanitised bourgeois interiors as a characteristic of capitalist urban production, see Pred (1990) and Harvey (1989).
poor are marked as an unproductive element within the metropolis (interview in Jakarta, July 2014). Drawing again on Chakrabarty and Silva’s (2012: 367) language, urban dwellers are simply not “constructed as referents [of] persons presumed in commerce” or with the capacity for exchange productivity. They are understood instead as “improper economic subjects” (2012: 369) and this construction – as persons without a place in productive and consumer life – becomes the condition of possibility for their dispossession.

I understand this discursive exclusion of the urban poor to constitute a line of difference in Jakarta which corresponds to what has elsewhere been described as the “slum-line” by Morales-Moreno53 (2011: 1). In this account, the “slum-line” is discursively constructed and performed as a separation between the wider city population and its urban Others:

[T]he distancing function of language demarcates a slum-line that defines and creates a “natural” separation between slums and the rest of urban populations to the extent that some see that the modern concept of slum opens an urban dimension of Orientalism.

(Morales-Moreno 2011: 1)

If the city population is divided, materially and discursively, along this ‘slum-line’, the ‘slum’ can be understood to be set within a regime of difference which allows for historically rehearsed forms of expropriation to be reproduced. In agreement with

53 Drawing also on Prunty (1998).
this, one of the claims of this chapter is that modes of dispossession and exclusion function along discursively and materially constructed lines of difference in Jakarta. In particular, the spatial limits of the kampung and the discursive limits of Jakartan economic subjectivity are considered to maintain the equivalent of the slum-line. ‘Slum’ communities are therefore rendered inferior or improper economic subjects and thus also rendered expropriatable as targets for dispossession.

In addition, the authorities of Jakarta attempt to exclude the undocumented urban poor from the city altogether by means of what might be referred to as the domestic bordering practices of the Indonesian state, maintained through identity cards which state whether or not an individual has the right to Jakarta residency. These identity cards, or *Kartu Tanda Penduduk* (KTP), are issued by local governments in Indonesia, and to obtain a specific Jakarta ID card residency in a neighbourhood with *Rukun Tetangga* (RT), or ‘neighbourhood association’, status is required. Those who live in kampungs without the RT administrative status are not entitled to ID cards or to their associated benefits, such as eligibility to enrol in assistance programmes (Winayanti & Lang 2004: 42, 53).

Dian from the organisation Rujak recalls how ID check operations always used to take place at the end of *Idul Fitri*, when almost all kampung residents had travelled back to their rural place of origin for the annual holiday. The heightened ID checks at the bus terminals and train stations would result in those without a Jakarta ID being sent back to the countryside (Dian, interview in Jakarta, July 2014). If new arrivals could not prove that their visit had a purpose then “the government would think [they were] the new burden on Jakarta” (Dian, interview in Jakarta, July 2014). Those found without a Jakarta ID card were sometimes transferred by truck to somewhere outside of the Jakarta vicinity, reinforcing their physical positioning outside of the city, but also reinforcing their discursive positioning outside of the proper Jakarta subject.
In this sense the Jakarta ID is a highly overt means of physically excluding people from the city. Yet this physical exclusion does not appear to fulfil its intended aims; as Kusno (2010: 54) puts it: “It is reported that every year three hundred thousand (underclass) people from the surrounding regions come to Jakarta even though the city continues to expel thousands who do not have a city ID.” Early movements to provide social housing were also limited to those few kampung residents who had existing rights to live in the city, as demonstrated by their possession of a Jakarta ID card. Hence those evicted without the appropriate identity card were left physically placeless.

Against this backdrop of the discursive exclusion and the physical displacement of the urban poor, the rest of this chapter takes a closer look at how exclusions and translations are subverted and contested within kampung sites. After giving more detail with regard to the conditions in the kampung sites studied in the passages below, I examine collective expressions in the form of kampung performances and community-produced maps intended to disrupt elite and middle class perceptions.

Contesting exclusion and translation from kampung sites

Three of Jakarta’s many kampung areas are referred to specifically here. The Muara Baru neighbourhood is located in the Penjaringan Subdistrict near to the mouth of the Ciliwung River and the Sunda Kelapa port of old Batavia. This area is an expansion of the much older Kampung Luar Batang which had grown by the 1980s to cover the site of former coastal fishing pools. Muara Baru Street itself runs along the route of the former Moeara Baroe River (Funo et al. 2004) and the kampung houses are

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54 See Funo et al for a study of the spatial and environmental aspects of this area.
constructed on the edge of the Pluit Reservoir which has been occupied in part since the 1970s (group interviews with residents in Jakarta, June 2014). These coastal and alluvial lands are persistently sinking and are thus increasingly prone to two main types of flooding: tidal flooding can occur without any warning, while river flooding is usually anticipated in advance as it tends to follow a period of heavy rain (group interviews in Jakarta, June 2014). As such, the densely packed settlement houses are generally built in two storeys, with families moving to the upper floor when they have sufficient advance warning of kampung flooding. Residents recall flooding after heavy rain during 2013 which left adults waist-deep in water and caused a number of deaths across Jakarta (group interviews in Jakarta, June 2014). Aside from the dangers of flooding, the kampung is also at serious risk of fire, which can be started by faulty electrics and can spread rapidly between the closely positioned homes.

The fate of the existence of a particular ‘slum’ may be closely related to the tenurial status of the land on which it has been developed, and in the case of the Muara Baru neighbourhood, residents believe that uncertainty is on their side. There are reported to be two sets of land titles held by two different parties claiming rights to the same area of land on which the kampung is situated. Muara Baru dwellers claim therefore that their prolonged occupation of this site is enabled by this uncertain status involving the competing claims of separate landowners, with neither party able to legally act to evict the community (group interviews in Jakarta, June 2014).

The other kampungs of concern to this chapter are the Bukit Duri community, situated on the alluvial surrounds of the Ciliwung River, and the neighbouring but

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55 Two weeks before the interviews for this study took place, what began as an electrical fire had destroyed 150 homes in Muara Baru. At that point the JRMK office, the location for the interviews, was being used to distribute donations to victims of the fire (group interviews in Jakarta, July 2014).
recently evicted Kampung Pulo community. Urban poor activist Sandyawan Sumardi (interview in Jakarta, July 2014) believes there are 38,000 families in total living along the Ciliwung River from Pasar Minggu in the south of the city up to North Jakarta, but the Bukit Duri community is home to only around 400 of these families. Bukit Duri is situated at the lowest point in Jakarta and, as such, it is also prone to flooding, suffering severe floods every five years or so (Sandyawan Sumardi, interview in Jakarta, July 2014). The residents of both kampungs, in common with all of the similar neighbourhoods of Jakarta, are at risk from disease and infections related to inadequate sanitation and the difficulties in obtaining, and affording, clean water (Sandyawan Sumardi, interview in Jakarta, July 2014).

Both the Bukit Duri and Muara Baru kampungs are largely populated by old rural communities rather than newly-arrived rural migrants per se, but urban poor groups claim that interdependency is maintained between the kampungs and rural relatives (group interviews in Jakarta, 2014). This means that there are frequent flows of people travelling back and forth from the city to the countryside, especially during harvesting times. This may be true for those with their family roots in rural Java; however, those from the more distant islands of Indonesia may only return once a year during the Idul Fitri (Eid al-Fitr) holiday at the end of Ramadan. Rural family members may also be dependent upon remittances from urban workers to sustain them between harvests (group interviews in Jakarta, June 2014). This interdependence and rural-urban movement is, however, complicated by the fact that many kampung residents lack KTP identity cards and, as such can be targeted for removal from the city.

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56 One of the women from JRMK interviewed here claimed to be a fourth generation Jakarta resident, another had lived in the city for sixteen years, another for twenty-six years.
Performing resistance to subject exclusions

On the whole, the notion that those who are comparably wealthy make up resources for the city, while the urban poor simply make no meaningful economic contribution to Jakarta, is a recurring one which has persistently been central to the justification of the violent removal of kampung communities and their epistemic exclusion through the ID card system. Yet through immanent political organisation, communities have challenged these subject and spatial prohibitions and the following sections will consider the modes they have employed in the form of public performances and the mapping of kampung economic activity.

The banks of the Ciliwung have been the setting for riverside music and theatre plays, choreographed and acted by kampung residents, with women taking the most prominent roles. As the violence directed towards kampung inhabitants, as well as the deprivation suffered by them, is seen in part to be enabled by the elite and middle class denial of their status as full Jakarta economic subjects, performances have become a key site from which to contest this discursive prohibition and for residents to make a claim for provisional forms of subjectivity. Kampung performances articulate with a host of other techniques employed by residents (including the mapping techniques viewed in the following section) towards the end of freeing themselves from the stasis in which they are represented; a representation which, in turn, allows for their material conditions to be restricted.

Importantly though, the performances are not aspirational in the sense that the singers and actors make a claim to approximate a Jakarta middle class way of being,

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57 Recorded clips of kampung performances can be viewed at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=07sAGV3Ku7o from 3:00.
as in “we too can be your Jakarta”; instead, they are an exercise in voicing distinct but constitutive kampung vernaculars, making the claim, in other words, that “we too are already Jakarta”. With this in mind, rather than constructing a theatrical backdrop in a more contrived aesthetic style, performances often draw in and involve the material environment of the kampung itself. Plays and songs have been performed on a bamboo platform on the Ciliwung, and mid-performance a hand might be dipped into the flow of the water, intimately connecting the body of the kampung inhabitant with her material context and with the urban ecologies in which she is entangled. Performing from a position of exclusion is therefore enacted in two ways: kampung women perform from the excluded material and physical position within the metropolitan context (the kampung), as well as from their position of socio-economic exclusion as kampung dwellers. This in itself renders exclusion productive and transforms these marginal positions into powerful platforms from which to make their claims on Jakarta.

Some of the performances are oriented towards disrupting the petrified state of elite mentalities which have rendered kampung residents static in their representations, thereby challenging the slum-line and one of the existing bases of the order of power in the city. In one emotional scene a woman lies prostrate on the stage and asks: “but why are you the ruler always happy? You dance upon our suffering!” essentially questioning why the human suffering which is central to the existence of kampung residents is simply not registered by elites. The deployment of affect as a theatrical device becomes a highly effective way of illustrating the alienated condition of kampung dwellers and disturbing their representational stasis, as well as moving the audience towards viewing the residents as human beings, rather than a sort of plague destructive to the city ecology. As the shows are open to anyone and not only kampung residents, some middle class Jakartans do attend (Sandyawan Sumardi, interview in
Jakarta, July 2014) thereby providing performers with a platform from which to challenge middle class perceptions.

The performances are also gendered in interesting ways. The affect deployed is largely centred on female suffering, and tragedy is often played out through inter-generational relationships between women; for instance, the death of a mother takes place in the arms of her daughter, and the ties of grief demonstrate the distinctive nature of female bonds. Therefore, in one sense what is performed here remains within the terms of gendered stereotypes, with women portrayed as the emotional actors in a community drama. In another sense though, the performances also go far beyond gendered prohibitions, especially with regard to violence - these are often highly physical performances in which women fight back. Through this physical device, they enact a bodily authorisation of the perpetual struggle fought by women in kampung communities, performing not only the violence women are subjected to but also scripting them as agents of counter-violence, rather than simply passive objects.

In one of the most emblematic kampung performances, a violent eviction scene is dramatised on the stage. Two groups of figures divide the stage space through the middle. A band of uniformed male soldiers pound the floor in their lace-up boots, marching on the spot, and confront a mainly female cluster of kampung residents, barefoot, and wearing loose shift nightdresses, their vulnerability expressed in garment form. Eventually physical confrontation causes the bodies to mingle and a violent struggle ensues, with military members dragging kampung women across the floor in their nightclothes. This is a performance of the highly gendered nature of state violence which at the same time disrupts the image of the kampung woman as a passive victim. This disruption is enacted through the performance of a concerted struggle on the part of kampung women, even though they are eventually overcome by the power of uniformed state agents at the end of the scene.
Another notable feature of this particular scene relates to the lyrics of the song accompanying the brutal eviction; evocative of peasant struggles, the accompanying words refer to the unique connection between land and life for the kampung communities:

This land, the land of memories
For each step there is a story
This land, the land of life
For every inch there is a breath
This land, the land of struggle
For each plot there is a victim
This land, free land
Every inch unites us

As I explore in more detail in Chapter Eight, rural and Indigenous life in Indonesia has involved multiple ways of understanding land beyond the liberal conception of it as simply a commodity to be owned. Land may be cultivated, cared for communally, and understood in terms of custodianship, rather than ownership as such, in rural conceptions. In the song above, understandings of land as a unifying entity which is intimately connected to ‘memories’ and ‘struggle’, are brought into the urban frame in relation to the realities of violent eviction. Such public expressions of rural identifications made by kampung women serve to emphasise their cultivation of urban life and the bonds this process builds with the kampung, just as cultivating the soil builds an attachment to rural land. This is indicative of the rural-kampung interconnections noted earlier in this chapter and suggests that a degree of learning from countryside struggles informs the anti-eviction strategies of those in the
metropolis. Indeed, around the time of the evictions of Kampung Pulo in August of 2015, residents stated their right to remain on kampung land under ‘customary law’ (adat), a legal tool more usually connected with Indigenous land struggles which I also examine in more detail in Chapter Eight. This was reported at the time as follows:

residents of Kampung Pulo have stood their ground, insisting that their land is customary land where they have resided since 1930, with Ciliwung Merdeka legal team member Vera Soemarwi saying that such land is recognized under Law No. 5/1960 on basic agrarian principles.

(Jakarta Post 2015b)

Kampung inhabitants draw on rural modes of resistance to dispossession in order to fight evictions in the city and, also drawing on rural identifications, residents have performed their connection with the land as an iteration of their role in the cultivation of urban life. This also demonstrates the vital link between rural and urban ecologies which suggests that further research should be done to connect struggles to sustain and cultivate life within and across rural and urban sites.

Overall, kampung performances in Jakarta have served as a platform from which residents make a claim to already be full Jakarta subjects, albeit in a distinct kampung mode with its rural-informed character. Women in particular have used the banks of the Ciliwung as a stage from which to inhabit a stereotype as affective community members but also to subvert gendered prohibitions through the acting out of counter-violence against state authority.
Mapping as resistance to subject exclusions

As already noted in this chapter, there has been a basic denial of the co-constitutive nature of the kampung and the city on the part of some elites and members of the middle class. Kampung residents are simply seen as a parasitic burden on the city’s economy and ecology, blocking the roads and waterways, causing traffic jams, fires, and floods. Yet in reality, the kampung has co-produced contemporary Jakarta, both spatially and socially, and kampung residents have fed into the building of the city in multiple ways.

To begin with, historical accounts demonstrate the contribution rural migrants have made to the city’s economic life. Abeyasekere, for instance, explains how patterns of economic activity in the capital have historical roots in the places of origin and ethnic groups of the city’s communities:

The 1930 census observed that coolies at Tanjung Priok were usually seasonal workers from Banten and Tangerang, Batavia’s closest hinterland. People from Central Java and Buitenzorg tend to work as servants, market gardeners, wharf labourers, vegetable sellers and laundry workers. Even more specifically, a study of a ward near Pasar Senen in 1936 found that hawkers of particular goods came from different areas: so sellers of lemonade and ice cream came mainly from Sundanese districts and Central Java, while almost all gado-gado hawkers were from Cirebon and Kuningan. It seems likely that such preferences and expertise were the result of newcomers gravitating towards kinfolk who might help them in a competitive environment.

(ABeyasekere 1989: 100 – 101)
Similarly, the present day communities along the Ciliwung continue to group themselves economically according to their place of origin and their ethnic and family groups:

The old communities along the Ciliwung, but also the new migrants, mainly from Central Java, usually work in the same type of work, so people from the same area will go into the same line of work. If there is already the boss there with an established business, more relatives will join him and they’ll all work in the same business.

(Dian, interview in Jakarta, July 2014)

It is clear that close rural communities, specialising in particular trades and services, have long made up the industrious elements of Jakarta’s population. As such, an alternative history of Jakarta could begin by following the industry of the casual labourers and informal workers who built, staffed, cleaned, and serviced the ports, roads, and buildings of the city, and fed its growing population and workforce. This would be the real story of the production of Jakarta, in which kampung residents are recognised to be constituent of the city’s economy, rather than parasitic and expendable beings on its margins. Yet this is the story erased by the consumer spaces of Jakarta’s built space, by elite discourses which exclude the urban poor from the Jakartan subject, and by the produced absence of the slum, as in the recent case of the destruction of Kampung Pulo.
Figure 6.4. Commercial profiles of informal businesses. Provided by Ciliwung Merdeka.
To illustrate this contribution, and make their activities more visible, residents have produced commercial profiles of businesses within the kampungs with the help of the organisation Ciliwung Merdeka\textsuperscript{58} (see Figure 6.4). The productive activities profiled range from furniture making and screen printing to tofu production and cake baking, and include diverse women’s economic activities, making visible their productive roles in Jakarta’s (informal) economy. The residents have also produced maps of the final destinations of some of the kampung products across Jakarta (Figure 6.5), illustrating the spatial distribution of three types of product – cuts of chicken, bakery products, and tofu. These residents’ maps show not only where products end up in the city, but also where raw materials are sourced from in other parts of Jakarta, and therefore form a representation of the spatial distribution of the markets they are embedded in.

\textsuperscript{58} Ciliwung Merdeka is a community-level foundation which facilitates various forms of mutual aid, basic healthcare provision, education and cultural programmes in Jakarta kampungs (Ciliwung Merdeka 2013).
These commercial profiles and related maps of the distribution of kampung products serve to contradict a number of common misrepresentations of kampung dwellers. To begin with, they present the residents as full economic subjects, engaging in entrepreneurial activity and participating in market forms of life, not only within the kampung itself, but across Jakarta. Further, the maps demonstrate how kampung
activity is interwoven into the wider fabric of city life. Kampungs are not isolated islands, floating apart from the social life of Jakarta; they are the city’s factories, providing essential products and services for a range of Jakarta residents. For lower income residents and workers across Jakarta more broadly, life is simply not viable in the city without the low-cost products and services that kampung residents provide. In general then, these maps serve to present kampung residents as economic subjects and to situate them within the wider economy of the city. In particular, however, considering that some of the business owners depicted are women, they also represent the informal business activities of kampung women as vital to urban economic life.

*Contesting translation through immanent organisation around social housing*

As already suggested throughout this chapter, immanent political organisation in the kampungs is highly gendered. Urban poor activists in Jakarta note that formal politics at the city level is dominated by male actors, while in contrast, political organisation at the kampung level is coordinated and driven largely by women. Dian from the organisation Rujak suggests that the material challenges of the slum combined with a lack of representation in formal politics have caused women to empower themselves within and across various Jakarta neighbourhoods:

This has been an empowering process of change in the community, the women are more active, they have more courage and knowledge. The women present very rational arguments: they can argue! And in a much more rational way in order to convince these [male] leaders. If the leaders
say something they don’t try to rationalise or convince people their arguments are rational, [they] do not have a rational argument because of the power they have and the interests they defend.

(Dian, interview in Jakarta, July 2014)

Women organise in order to reach out to the authorities to articulate their demands for social space, schools, parks, mosques and so on, but they also address problems within the communities such as domestic violence. Community representatives have gained paralegal training and have set up safe houses and witness protection programmes in the kampungs to protect victims of abuse (group interviews, Jakarta June 2014). They have also challenged the traditional attitude of male police officers who might be the first to arrive at the scene after an instance of abuse. “Where previously a male police officer would say ‘well, you have to obey your husband,’ the presence of paralegals means police officers no longer judge so much” (Dian, interview in Jakarta, July 2014). Dian therefore believes that women’s organisation is in some ways circumventing the patriarchy of the police who had previously acted in articulation with violent patriarchy within the slum.

Outwardly, the kampung-based organisation JRMK (Jaringan Rakyat Miskin Kota – the Urban Poor Network) now has networked community groups across Jakarta and Bogor, meaning that issues facing kampung inhabitants are more likely to be linked together rather than dealt with in isolation by individual neighbourhoods (group interviews in Jakarta, July 2014, with JRMK members). Inwardly, community organisation is also highly coordinated. In the Muara Baru area, each group of ten households tends to have one coordinator, and these groups not only form the basis for meetings and discussions, paralegal support and domestic violence protection,
they also provide the basis for community money-saving initiatives. Such savings initiatives aim to allow families in the kampungs to prepare for times of expense, such as children starting school, or the family holiday over *Idul Fitri*, without the need for them to resort to borrowing money (group interviews in Jakarta, July 2014). These dynamic and developing forms of organisation are challenging, and protecting against, interrelated gendered power structures both within the neighbourhoods and without.

Abject conditions within the kampung, as well as internal and external power relations give rise to distinct gendered forms of subjectivity. What results is that women organise to challenge state forms of domination, especially violent evictions and gender-biased policing, and in some ways fill the role of the state, for example by providing their own domestic violence support services. However, they also make a claim for state support in the areas where it is needed, including for better spatial planning, neighbourhood parks, and more suitable social housing (group interviews in Jakarta, June 2014; Dian, interview in Jakarta, July 2014). Organisation is therefore geared towards placing demands on the state, rather than simply towards internal self-help.

Gendered forms of social and political organisation are also enabled by the specific spatiality of the kampung which is built around, and facilitates, informal economic activity. The neighbourhoods develop organically as neighbours gradually organise their economic activities in symbiosis, often choosing endeavours that are complementary to one another. Having a degree of control over the form of their housing allows residents to adapt the space they inhabit to suit the small business that they decide to pursue (Dian, interview in Jakarta, July 2014). However, these productive neighbourhoods of Jakarta have been subject to multiple and violent processes of eviction which have only rarely been followed up with the provision of social housing for a few of the dispossessed. The ‘closed city policy’ implemented from
the 1970s actively intended to restrict the number of rural residents migrating to Jakarta, while at the same time, so-called ‘Kampung Improvement Programmes’ began with the improvement of ‘slum’ area infrastructure in the 1970s. Yet even some of the neighbourhoods that had been ‘upgraded’ through these programmes were subsequently subjected to eviction and demolition.

Related social housing and urban regeneration projects have been implemented by city and national level governments since the mid-1970s, however, these have had very limited success (Winayanti & Lang 2004: 44—46). The Marunda housing estate, for example, a low-rent, high-rise development on the north-eastern edge of Jakarta has been widely criticised for its distance from the city centre as well as the lack of transportation and social provision, such as schools and parks (see for example, Urbanalyse 2013; Jakarta Globe n.d.). Most critically, however, established forms of gendered organisation and economic spatiality do not translate into existing models of social housing, as Dian from Rujak explains:

I believe in density, in people located in the same space and organising. This is what social housing breaks. It breaks economic communities. They build mutual benefits and complementary activities, rather than competition, and circulations of money among them are very high. [...] [Social housing design is] not trying to facilitate the way of life of the people who live in the previous settlements. If you know how the people live, then you know they use the space as economic space as well as social space. This is not transformed into the new social housing.

(Interview in Jakarta, July 2014)
In this sense, the kampungs can be understood as incommensurable social worlds, as defined by Povinelli in Chapter Three, because they simply do not translate into social housing without significant distortion. In particular, the rehousing of some of Jakarta’s evictees in distant high-rise living spaces in developments such as the satellite Marunda estate mentioned above, effects much more than a simple physical displacement. Upon resettlement, the home is reconfigured as a separate domain from the economic domain. This spatial translation becomes a social translation, requiring residents to go out to work, thus restricting the array of productive activities they can engage in; for example, carpentry, mechanic services, and metal work become impossible unless they have the money to rent separate premises, or can find formal employment in this area. It also dislocates residents from the markets they were involved in in the slum, whether those are consumer, labour, or wholesale markets. Hence distant social housing projects like Marunda leave residents entirely dependent upon the formal and informal labour market, yet at the same time they also leave them stranded at a costly and time-consuming distance from any place of work.

Relocation alters the way of being of all kampung residents but the effects of this are also gendered. Social housing inhibits women’s economic self-sufficiency, it limiting their earning activities and confines them to the home or to more gendered forms of work in the labour market. Similarly, relocation also disperses kampung residents and breaks down their immanent forms of social organisation. Residents are moved in random order which dissolves the spatial forms of gendered social networks. The social patterns of communal life and reciprocity that are enabled by, and dependent upon, the spatial logic of the dense, horizontal, and networked living of the ‘slum’ are disbanded, at least temporarily. This dissolution affects the women-led intra-kampung paralegal services, for example, that form a buffer against state repression, and also the support services that act against power relations within the ‘slum’ itself. Social
housing, therefore, enforces a broader social translation, which is why kampung women have organised to try to influence the architectural designs of homes, thereby making a bid to influence the productive material context of their existence.

A core focus of kampung politics in Jakarta has become the design and location of social housing. Both the Bukit Duri and the Muara Baru areas are terminable settlements under threat of eviction and, in anticipation of this, urban poor groups have proposed alternative social housing designs which begin with a consideration of the existing lives of kampung residents. The designs were developed together with participatory input from local residents through discussion groups, as well as the involvement of architects from Universitas Indonesia. The resulting architectural plans centre on the concept of the ‘vertical kampung’ which attempts to recreate the essential features of horizontally organised space in the ‘slums’, but in a more condensed area and over a greater number of storeys. The prime objective of the vertical kampung idea, as demanded by potential residents, is the incorporation of economic space into social housing. In addition, residents have also articulated demands for places of religious worship and other forms of social space to be integrated into the design.

JRMK members have placed great emphasis on the social support networks of the kampungs and have campaigned for residents to be moved in sequence, rather than shuffled in random order into social housing, thus maintaining the gendered spatial logic of community networks. Under these proposals, the groupings of around ten households which form the basis of community savings activities, domestic violence support, and paralegal services would be maintained upon translation to social housing.

For a very brief period from around 2012 to 2014, these proposed changes were comparably well received by the Jakarta government. A change in approach
undoubtedly occurred in city politics under the governorship of Joko Widodo (Jokowi) who was famously raised in the slums of Surakarta, the city otherwise known as Solo (see, for example, New York Times 2014). Sandyawan explains the change in mood at that time:

We had a very bad experience of local government [under Sutiyoso and Fauzi Bowo] but under the new Governors Jokowi and Ahok, this is the first time that they have opened up and are ready to at least communicate and work with us. I have always maintained Golput Golongan Putih, but now I’m involved in the Jokowi campaign.

(Interview in Jakarta, July 2014)

Jokowi’s style of politics was entirely different to what had come before, he became famous for his regular acts of blusukan – impromptu visits to fish markets, ports, other sites of industry and trade, and to residential areas and kampungs. The blusukan symbolised the supposed closing of the gap between the city authorities and the urban poor, but this was only really ever embodied in the figure of Jokowi and blusukan politics effectively ended when he left the Jakarta governorship to become the national President. Nonetheless, in the summer of 2014, Sandyawan remained buoyed by the change in atmosphere:

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59 This translates as the ‘White Group’, or the ‘Abstentions Group’ and refers to a New Order era movement around organised abstentions from electoral activity.
When Jokowi and Ahok campaigned in Bukit Duri [in 2012], I invited the local leaders [from across Jakarta] including the leaders of street vendors [...] in total fourteen representatives of different communities, most of these victims of evictions of some sort. It was a phenomenal meeting [which marked] the first time a Governor of Jakarta ever sat together with urban poor leaders.

(Interview in Jakarta, July 2014)

At the same time, Sandyawan was doubtful that the same momentum could be maintained under the governorship of Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) who was sworn in as Jakarta Governor on November 19 of 2014 (Jakarta Globe 2014):

I believe Jokowi because he doesn’t see the urban poor just as a tool [whereas] the urban poor are always a problem on Ahok’s side. Ahok says, ‘if you don’t want to move from this place, then we will force you. At least we have given you the alternative house over there in Marunda. You don’t want to take it? Okay, that’s up to you’.

(Interview in Jakarta, July 2014)

Although the vertical kampung plans were well received by Jokowi, and urban poor activists felt they had won his support, what he could actually achieve during his short governorship was also limited by the bureaucracies he was dependent upon to bring
social housing plans to fruition. Dian complains that the spread of responsibility and authority over social housing plans across various national and city-level departments has made it very difficult to realise changes. Sandyawan also explains the journey of urban poor communities from hope to disappointment in a short time frame:

At that time [of the city government elections] Jokowi promised that if he was chosen, then the day after he would come here [to Bukit Duri] and he fulfilled this promise and came back with his staff. He asked me to present the social housing proposal and at the time it looked well fulfilled. But at that time the Ministry of Public Works and the Ministry of Housing were not in agreement, and even Jokowi and Ahok couldn’t give the money because it wasn’t agreed by the party coalition. So he planned to build twenty-seven projects like this [vertical kampung] in Jakarta but [in the end] only one came to fruition.

(Interview in Jakarta, July 2014)

The UPC and JRMK also acknowledge Jokowi’s support around alternative social housing plans, but they retain a greater degree of optimism that the momentum around the needs of the urban poor will be maintained. The Muara Baru area is already undergoing a phased eviction process which will see groups of houses removed and the residents rehomed in gradual stages. The first four blocks of this phased social housing programme are now occupied, but these are more in line with the old, ‘living space only’, concept of social housing, rather than a realisation of the vertical kampung ideals of Muara Baru residents. This new social housing is near to the Muara Baru site, so residents can travel to their existing places of work or access their existing markets.
if they have a cart or stall-based business (interview in Jakarta, July 2014). The outlying Marunda development has also been improved more recently, with better provision of utilities as well as transportation provided by way of an Indonesian naval boat from the waterfront near the social housing to residents’ old sites of work in North Jakarta (group interviews in Jakarta, July 2014). Further, in the aftermath of the Kampung Pulo evictions in August of 2015, many residents were resettled in the neighbouring West Jatinegara site. The proximity of Jatinegara to the old kampung makes this resettlement something of an improvement on previous distant satellite experiments in social housing. The site also has both a mosque as well as a floor of the building dedicated to economic activity. However, as in the Muara Baru case, the ‘vertical kampung’ ideas of the evicted communities have not been fully realised and social networks were still greatly disrupted by the eviction and relocation.

Overall the demands of the urban poor are formulated and expressed through immanent political processes, as well as in connection with NGOs, academics, and sympathetic political figures such as Jokowi. These demands aim at gaining recognition of their contribution to Jakarta and their constitutive role in the wider urban economy, while at the same time preserving their involvement in some markets and their ability to opt out of others.

Conclusion

This chapter returned to one of the core problematics found across work on the colonial question, as identified in Chapter Two, which relates essentially to how representation works together with material processes of exploitation and expropriation. Against the backdrop of ongoing evictions in the kampungs of Jakarta, the chapter identified these neighbourhoods as terminable sites of extraction, central
to urban investment and value creation, and therefore persistently under threat of destruction. Far from situating this temporally as a uniquely contemporary phenomenon, the chapter briefly traced a historical story from the production of Batavia as the exemplary centre of the Dutch East Indies, through to the production of Jakarta, reconceived through nationalist urbanism as the exemplary centre of post-independence Indonesia.

Jakarta’s ‘superblock’ luxury malls, office buildings, and condominiums gesture towards the production of an ideal Jakarta subject, imagined as an Indonesian approximation of Sylvia Wynter’s ‘Man’, the investor/overconsumer *homo oeconomicus* figure, who is overrepresented as the human itself in Wynter’s understanding. This in itself serves to exclude the urban poor whose material conditions leave them outside of the possibilities and places of luxury consumption. Yet exclusions are also produced through elite expressions and through the epistemic tool of the Jakarta ID card. In other words, and as I have expressed above, a discursively and materially constructed ‘slum-line’ delimits the urban poor and prevents them from inhabiting the defined figure of the Jakartan economic subject.

However, these exclusions are not left uncontested and the chapter examined ways in which subject prohibitions are subverted by kampung residents. As detailed here, neighbourhood performances have used the kampung ecology itself as a stage from which to dramatise the plight of the urban poor, who both perform from, and contest, a position of subject and material exclusion. In doing so, kampung residents make their claims on the city and state the case that they too are *already* Jakarta. Their performances also centre on the gendered nature of state violence and feature women as affective actors in kampung life. Yet, at the same time, they *contest* gendered prohibitions by casting women as agents of counter-violence in eviction struggles. Further, the chapter detailed how mapping has also been a mode of situating kampung
residents within the wider economic life of Jakarta as well as a means for residents to make a claim on full Jakartan economic subject status.

In relation to translation – another core concept explored within this thesis as a feature of coloniality in the present – the chapter identified facets of social translation which are enacted by eviction and relocation to social housing. Kampung communities have made it clear through collective and individual expressions that their spatial arrangements enable their particular way of being, such that eviction and relocation enacts a translation in their social ontology. In Povinelli’s terms, the kampungs are incommensurable social worlds which cannot simply be moved into social housing without distortion. Economic activity, mutual aid arrangements, domestic violence support, and so on, all depend upon the distinct formation of kampung spatiality and eviction enacts not only a spatial translation but also a social translation.

To contest this translation and the eviction-induced breakdown of support networks, the focus of immanent political organisation has become the location and design of social housing. This contestation ultimately becomes a bid to shape the productive material context of kampung residents’ existence, to maintain the spatial logics of their support networks, resist dependence on the labour market, and, ultimately, to claim their position as economic actors and full subjects of Jakarta.

The following chapter continues this decolonial examination of the condition of market emergence in Indonesia through the analysis of Freeport’s Grasberg gold and copper mine in West Papua. The mine is also understood to be a site of extraction within which exclusion along lines of racialised difference performs an economic function and where violent forms of translation are provoked in local social worlds.
Chapter Seven

Exclusions, Interventions, and Translations around Freeport’s Site of Extraction in West Papua

As a twentieth-century industrial installation implanted in the middle of a Stone Age society, the Ertsberg project has had a broad impact on the life of the natives in the area. The full consequences will not be known for many years, but some changes are already apparent.

(Forbes Wilson, Freeport corporate agent, 1981: 212)

If the ‘slum’ story recounted in the previous chapter is in many ways a global one, another, not unrelated, story can also be told from across the world’s resource frontiers. State and corporate operations expanding and intensifying across Indigenous and peasant lands are not only productive of forms of dispossession and contamination, but also of new forms of resurgent, largely Indigenous, politics (see, for example, Peluso 1992; Alfred & Corntassel 2005; Orta-Martínez & Finer 2010). The organisation Global Witness (2016) has recently documented rising resource-related violence against rural, and especially Indigenous communities, across the world from Brazil to the Philippines. The prominent political murder of the Indigenous environmental justice campaigner Berta Caceres in Bolivia in 2016 was characteristic

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60 I mainly use the name ‘Freeport’ here to refer to the US-based extractives corporation Freeport McMoRan Inc (see Freeport MacMoRan 2015) as well as to refer to its Indonesian subsidiary PT Freeport Indonesia which controls operations within West Papua.
of an increasing global trend towards violence in rural corporate activity. As the Global Witness report summarises:

We documented 185 killings across 16 countries, a 59% increase on 2014 and the highest annual toll on record. On average, more than three people were killed every week in 2015 - more than double the number of journalists killed in the same period. The worst hit countries were Brazil (50 killings), the Philippines (33) and Colombia (26). Mining was the industry most linked to killings of land and environmental defenders with 42 deaths in 2015. Agribusiness, hydroelectric dams and logging were also key drivers of violence. Many of the murders we know about occurred in remote villages or deep within rainforests – it’s likely the true death toll is far higher. For every killing we are able to document, others cannot be verified, or go unreported. And for every life lost, many more are blighted by ongoing violence, threats and discrimination. This report sheds light on the acute vulnerability of indigenous people, whose weak land rights and geographic isolation make them particularly exposed to land grabbing for natural resource exploitation. In 2015, almost 40% of victims were indigenous.

(Global Witness 2016: 4)

The closer picture of corporate extractive activity suggests that the social harm caused, even beyond killings and displacements, is complex and enduring, and it is this more complex social picture that this chapter seeks to reveal in relation to West
As outlined in Chapter Three, the work of Sylvia Wynter has drawn our attention to the ways in which each social order constructs its own sense of the self through an image of the accepted figure of the human/subject. Those excluded from this figure are made visible through their negation, exclusion, and racialisation. Further, the attention of Patrick Wolfe, as well as that of Chakravartty and Silva, has been on the narratives which render a community or a people expropriatable, or even exterminable, in the first place; those dehumanising and subject-excluding discursive constructions which create and maintain a regime of difference in which people are rendered removable.

This chapter therefore takes up what I understand to be a global story within the West Papua context, where extractive operations contribute significantly to Indonesia’s optimistic ‘emerging market’ growth picture but where new and old forms of exclusion and translation are created and intensified in relation to extractive activity. Within this context, therefore, this chapter considers coloniality in the form of exclusions from the Indonesian subject and from the figure of the human itself. It also considers the related forms of violent social translation which have been effected.

61 In this chapter I will use the term ‘West Papua’ to refer to the Western half of the island of New Guinea which is currently under Indonesian rule. The territory as a whole presently has the official name of ‘Papua’ while ‘West Papua’ (Papua Barat) is actually the official name for the province which covers the island’s two western peninsulas. However, the term West Papua is still frequently used in academic and activist texts to refer to the entire Western half of New Guinea and is the preferred term of most Papuans. Under Dutch colonial administration the territory was known as West New Guinea, or Netherlands New Guinea, then West Papua from 1961, then West Irian and Irian Jaya from 1973 to 2002 when the current official name of Papua was ascribed by Indonesia (See Abrash 2002). I will also use ‘Papuan(s)’ to refer to the Indigenous people of West Papua, again in line with the general usage of Papuans themselves (Saltford 2003: 2).
in the West Papua context and especially around Freeport’s contract areas. Over the course of the chapter the following research questions are revisited: \(\textit{how) are communities excluded from the normalised trope of the human/subject in West Papua? How are translations threatened or enacted in the social worlds of the excluded? And, what kind of translations are threatened or enacted?}\)

The following section begins by setting out the story of West Papua’s annexation, told against the backdrop of Indonesia’s own decolonisation, leading up to mass-killings of leftist Indonesians in the 1960s, and the subsequent opening of the country to corporate transnationalism. The forced inclusion of West Papua under the so-called ‘Act of Free Choice’ is reconsidered against the added detail that access to West Papua’s most mineral rich areas had already been signed over to Freeport. The chapter proceeds through a detailed examination of the Grasberg mining area as a site of extraction formed through a particular corporate spatial production which translates discursive racial exclusions into spatial exclusions.

After this, coloniality as human/subject exclusion is examined in more detail through the tracing of the racialisation of Papuans by colonial, state, and corporate agents. I demonstrate how, including through the narratives reproduced by Freeport agents, Papuans have been discursively isolated in historical time as ‘stone-age people’ locked in a coexisting past. Finally, the last section of this chapter examines translations in Papuan social worlds in and around Freeport’s site of extraction. It becomes clear that racialising exclusions from the human/subject have been the basis for justifying interventions in Papuan life which, in turn, have provoked translations in local ways of being. This final section considers translations in local value systems, in moral understandings of intimacy, and ultimately details the introduction of industrial-scale prostitution in the Grasberg area.
The forced inclusion of West Papua

As the easternmost domain of the Dutch East Indies, the part of the island of New Guinea which is today formally known as Papua, referred to here as West Papua, was set on a course to independence during the era of post-WWII decolonisation. However, as I will detail below, in 1969 a corrupt and coerced vote known as the ‘Act of Free Choice’ brought West Papua under Indonesian sovereignty and since then repressive operations in the province have continued to violently suppress any political activity which is vaguely or explicitly associated with a pro-independence stance. The vote itself is recognised to have taken place under coercion and analysts have argued that “the UN and global community knowingly stood aside while Suharto’s military engineered the outcome of the ballot” (Banivanua-Mar 2008: 584).

Some analysis has attended to the ways in which the US extractives corporation Freeport McMoRan is implicated in the story of Papua’s lost appeal for independence after the withdrawal of the Dutch from the Dutch East Indies (for example Saltford 2003; Leith 2003) and this chapter picks up this thread by centralising Freeport in the story of the forced inclusion of West Papua, as well as in the narrative exclusion of Papuans and in forms of social translation they are subjected to.

The subjugation of West Papua under Indonesian colonial rule is particularly curious precisely because this specific colonisation occurred in tandem with, and in relation to, the decolonisation of the broader archipelago. In the aftermath of the Second World War, Japanese occupying forces had surrendered in the Dutch East Indies and the independence of the Republic of Indonesia had been declared by the anticolonial leader Sukarno. Over the course of the two decades to follow however, a complex sequence of colonial reassertions, military operations, diplomatic talks, signed agreements, independence drives, insurgencies and counter-insurgencies
would be played out between the Dutch and the Indonesians on the one hand, and the
Indonesians and the Papuans on the other, with various international state and UN
bodies involved along the way. In November of 1949 the Netherlands finally ceded
sovereignty of the East Indies to the Indonesian Republic as part of The Hague
Agreement but retained West New Guinea, pending further talks over its status. A
decade later, in 1959, the Dutch began to set up elected regional councils in what was
then West New Guinea with elections subsequently held in 1961 for sixteen members
of a planned West New Guinea Council, with a further twelve appointed by the Dutch.
By 1961 this semi-elected, semi-Dutch-appointed WNG Council was inaugurated with
British and Australian representatives present (see Saltford 2003: xvi—xxv for a
timeline of these events).

The new Council settled on a national anthem and flag, voted to name the territory
West Papua, and collectively backed the ‘Luns Plan’, a roadmap to ending Dutch
sovereignty by way of an interim UN administration ahead of a plebiscite to determine
the final sovereign status of West Papua. But in the same year, Sukarno launched
efforts to mobilise Indonesians towards the aim of ‘liberating’ the Papuan people. Over
the years to follow, hostilities continued to unfold between the Dutch and the
Indonesians, with the US and the UN making various attempts to intervene and guide
the trajectory of West Papua’s sovereign status. In the wake of the catastrophic
violence which followed the 1965 coup attempt in Indonesia, and under the new
administration of Suharto, the Indonesian government agreed in 1966 for a vote to be
finally held on the self-determination of West Papua which would take place in 1969
(Webster 2013; Saltford 2003).

In this broader chronology of West Papua’s annexation into Indonesia, one vital
detail is often overlooked: In 1967, a full two years before the Act of Free Choice,
Suharto had already sealed a Contract of Work with the US extractives corporation
Freeport under his new Foreign Investment Law of the same year (Wilson 1981: 163). This contract gave Freeport the right to mine Papuan land and made possible an extractive operation which would become one of the biggest gold and copper mines in the world and a significant contributor of tax revenue to the Indonesian state. A sense of injustice over this is expressed by Papuan independence leader Benny Wenda (interview in Oxford, March 2015): “America didn’t need to deal with Indonesia, they needed to deal with us.” And, in Saltford’s (2003: 108) words: “Freeport’s lucrative agreement with the Jakarta regime was a factor in the willingness of Western governments to accept whatever policy Indonesia chose to adopt with regard to Papuan self-determination”.

Globally, this deal can be understood as reflective of a broader movement to capture the Third World state in the interests of international capital through the expansion of corporate transnationalism, as I touched upon in Chapter Four. At that time, a delegation of around twenty Indonesian leaders, including the economic and foreign ministers, had attended an Indonesian Investment Conference hosted by Time Inc. in Geneva where Time’s then-president, James A. Linen, connected them with US business leaders from a number of major industries (Winters 1996: 58). It is worth remembering cabinet minister Mohammed Sadli’s reflection, quoted in Chapter Five, on the importance placed on the Freeport deal at the time. This contract was seen as the vital path-breaker for broader foreign investment to follow and the Indonesians seemed determined to sign regardless of sovereignty disputes. Sadli emphasised the government’s desperation to draw in investment and his eagerness to seal an agreement with Freeport whether or not the proper investment laws were in place (Winters 1996: 74). Freeport’s deal was thus the first to be signed under the new legislative regime implemented in the same year, 1967. State developmentalism had gone into partnership with multinational corporations with the ultimate aim of market
expansion; hence Freeport, at the expense of West Papua, was the first beneficiary of this affiliation.

Two years later, and with the lucrative Freeport deal already securing the corporation’s rights to the Papuan subsoil, preparations began for the UN-observed vote on Papuan sovereignty. Representatives of the Papuan population were chosen to vote in the so-called Act of Free Choice, but the UN witnessed the selection of only 195 out of a total of 1,022 representatives (Saltford 2003: xxiv). Ultimately, against a backdrop of intimidation and killings by Indonesian security forces, and with the representatives themselves isolated from the wider Papuan population, each of the Assemblies voted unanimously for West Papua to accept Indonesian sovereignty over the territory. Then-confidential British documents from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office privately express recognition that: “the people of West Irian have no desire to be ruled by the Indonesians [...] the process of consultation did not allow a genuinely free choice to be made” (cited by Saltford 2003: xxvi).

Since then, a settler colonial-style concert of policies has been enacted which has brought into existence what Free West Papua leader, Benny Wenda (interview in Oxford, March 2015) has referred to as a “little apartheid”. Transmigration policies, implemented to populate West Papua with people from other Indonesian islands, have left Papuans in the minority on their own lands, while aggressive assimilation policies and persistent military violence against Papuans have all contributed to this perceived little apartheid picture (Banivanua-Mar 2008: 584). Further, and in common with historical European settler-colonies, international sanction has been granted to Indonesia’s settler state in West Papua. Below I will consider how prominent agents of Freeport have contributed to the narratives which serve to racialise and exclude Papuans from the human/subject, thereby making this settler colonial project possible. Ahead of this, however, I will give an overview of the geography of Freeport’s
contract area and its surrounds which make up the focal site of extraction of this chapter.

*Freeport’s contract area as terminable site of extraction*

Figure 7.1. Astronaut photograph ISS011-E-9620 of the Grasberg mine taken from space and published by the Nasa Earth Observatory (Nasa 2005). Clearly visible left of centre is the four-kilometre-wide eye of the Grasberg complex with its access road leading away from the mine towards the top left of the image. Equatorial glaciers are visible to the right of the mine and through the lower part of the image the grey Otomina and Ajkwa rivers can be seen which carry 200,000 tonnes of tailings daily from the Grasberg site.
Freeport’s mine at the Grasberg location in the Papuan highlands is the site of highly productive extractive operations which also inevitably provoke the displacement of local communities as well as other significant translations in local social worlds. Although it is around 3,500km away from the Indonesian capital, this site of extraction has in common with the kampungs of Jakarta patterns of dispossession which relate to international investment flows. The Grasberg mine itself is described by Rio Tinto as “one of the world’s largest copper and gold mines in terms of ore reserves and production” (Rio Tinto 2015). Operations are majority owned and controlled by Freeport, but Rio Tinto has a forty per cent share of the mine’s ore production. The present open pit mine is anticipated to be exhausted in 2017 when operations are expected to be transferred in full to underground operations. Following this development, the subsequent extraction from two planned block cave62 mines is expected to amount to 240,000 tonnes per day by the year 2022.

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62 Block caving is a large-scale mining method which relies on undermining and gravity-induced collapse for mineral extraction. After the initial capital investment requiring the construction of extraction mechanisms underground and beneath the ore deposit, the recovery of caved ore is supposed to be relatively cost effective due to its reliance on the natural force of gravity in the break up and extraction of the rock mass (Castro et al 2007). Campaign groups such as the Arizona Mining Reform Coalition (nd) and Ground Truth Trekking (2014) warn of the environmental effects of this mining method in the form of subsidence – block mining creates a vast crater which destabilises the surrounding area – and water contamination from the metal toxins released.
Both the contested political status of West Papua and the implication of Freeport’s extractive activities in dispossession and environmental harm have led to a specific form of state and corporate spatial production in the area. The whole of West Papua has been a restricted space to some degree in the sense that foreign journalists have not been permitted entry to the province; two French journalists, for instance, were detained by the Indonesian government for violating the ban on media coverage in West Papua in October of 2014 (Human Rights Watch 2014). Attempts to gain access to conduct detailed human rights investigations in the areas controlled by Freeport have been inhibited by the company itself and by Indonesian organisations, resulting
in limited and incomplete analyses (see Abrash 2002: 4). But a closer zoom specifically on the areas in which Freeport operates shows that other spatial restrictions are more partial and graduated. Freeport’s core contract area on the southern slopes of the Jayawijaya mountain range includes the mine itself and Tembagapura city (indicated on the map in Figure 7.2) with the most controlled space found around the mine, Tembagapura, Timika city and the roads connecting these three sites. Timika city itself began as an administration town and a place to house workers’ families for the mine. Up until the early 2000s, only Freeport’s own airline could access its private airport in Timika, hence the area was highly restricted; since then it has been opened up to other carriers and become much more accessible, however foreigners still need special state permission to land there.

Andri, a former senior Freeport manager, explains the spatial restrictions and bordering practices in place between the public area and the contract area:

> Basically there is a clear border [in Timika city] between the contract area and the public area. The airport is the frontline of the Freeport location. From the airport there are guard posts and you have to show your ID card. Then if you don’t show your ID card you cannot get permission, you have to bring an approval letter that you have to obtain from the Freeport office in Jakarta, all the employees will have cards with a chip that you have to scan.

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63 The human rights report compiled by Abrash (2002: 4) was: “circumscribed by Freeport’s lack of cooperation and other interference with the assessment process. Due to political sensitivities on the part of Indonesia’s National Commission on Human Rights (“Komnas HAM”) and the Indonesian provincial police in Papua, it has not been possible to carry out the on-site fact-finding necessary for completion of the proposed independent assessment. This paper is therefore not intended to serve as the report of a comprehensive independent human rights assessment.”
Throughout the [route to] the city of Tembagapura which is 68 miles, there are guard posts at mile 18, mile 38, mile 50, and then at mile 66, and after 66 miles you can reach Tembagapura at mile 68. Each one performs ID checks.

(Andri former head of public health for Freeport, July 2014)

Only those classified as Freeport employees can officially travel beyond Timika in the direction of the mine. As Andri explains, the road between Timika and Tembagapura is about 109 kilometres long and the only way to travel along this road is by Freeport’s own bus or otherwise by way of a Freeport contracted 4x4 vehicle, there is no public transportation, “so basically without the Freeport vehicle you cannot enter, without a Freeport ID card you cannot enter”.

Most employees can only leave the contract areas at weekends. At one time there was a regular bus service known as the *kerinduan* service (the 'longing' or 'missing' bus which would take workers to their family members in Timika). Now, after reported shootings along the Timika-Tembagapura road, the service is very infrequent and the bus is panelled with metal sheets: “you cannot see anything, it’s like driving in a tank. Now they have only very limited service and the high officials come down by helicopter.” Other Freeport workers sometimes have to wait for a few days in the Sheraton Hotel in Timika for the armoured bus service to take them up to the mining areas.

The Mimika area (also indicated on Figure 7.2) is much less restricted and has a number of transmigration stations, rehoming both migrants from other Indonesian islands and Indigenous people removed from the tailings sites in the highlands. Otherwise, Indigenous Papuans who are not employed by Freeport are largely
excluded from Freeport’s contract areas, and the main exceptions to this have been the cases when non-employee Papuans have been admitted to hospital within Tembagapura itself. On the whole then, Freeport’s contract areas and environs are accessible to those classified as approved bodies by the company. The physical exclusion of most Papuans, along with their prior displacement from the extraction areas, is arguably enabled by their discursive exclusion from the figure of the human. In the following section, therefore, I consider how this exclusion has been scripted and performed by a concert of agents but I pay special attention to Freeport agents themselves.

*The racialisation of Papuans and their exclusion from the figure of the human*

As noted so far in this chapter, in light of its territorial incorporation, the essence of the settler colonial condition in West Papua is found in the form of a simultaneous inclusion and exclusion. Papuans have been brought against their will into the wider world of Indonesia and yet, at the same time, continue to be produced racially in a way that prevents them from inhabiting the defined figure of the modern Indonesian subject. In Chapter Six, I referred to ‘difference’ and subject exclusions beyond the ‘slum-line’ in Jakarta, and in the following chapter, Chapter Eight, I will identify a broader form of difference which allows for the subject exclusion of Indonesia’s ‘isolated people’, or those Indigenous groups living in remote rural locations across the archipelago. The broader claim here is that exclusions across diverse forms of difference have in common a relation to processes of exploitation, as well as dispossession and various other forms of translation. In relation to West Papua, however, a more explicit claim can be made about the particular regime of difference observable as one which is structured around the racialisation and dehumanisation of
Papuans. Hence, in this section I will address the research question: \textit{(how) are communities excluded from the normalised trope of the human/subject in West Papua?}

Racialisation, as noted in greater depth in Chapter Three, has occurred historically in relation to economic processes, as well as to categories such as land and labour, and can take different forms. In Wolfe’s understanding, racialisation comes before and goes beyond the codified racial doctrines that have been central to colonial and state governance. Wolfe reflects on the performativity of race\textsuperscript{64} which is not understood as a descriptor of human difference, but instead brings “human groups […] into being as inter-relating social categories with behavioural prescriptions to match. Racialisation refers to this active productivity of race, whereby colonialism refashions its human terrain” (Wolfe 2016: 10). Racialisation is the subjugation, exclusion, and dehumanisation of a people in relation to phenotype, which may be in relation to some political or economic purpose, but becomes embedded beyond all rationality to the realm of “emotive virulence”, as Wolfe (\textit{ibid}: 12) puts it.

Budi Hernawan makes similar claims to those made in this chapter about the simultaneous inclusion and exclusion of Papuans, but he also identifies what he refers to as governance through torture in West Papua, with this torture being enabled by the dehumanisation of the Papuan people:

Papuans are being excluded to the margins of the Indonesian state but on the other hand, they continue to be claimed and retained tightly as a non-negotiable entity. As part of the abjection process, Papuans have also experienced dehumanising treatment by being labelled as ‘monkey’ or

\textsuperscript{64} Drawing on J. L. Austin’s and John Searle’s formulations of performativity.
‘stone-age people’. [...] Although these stereotypes are not the basis of torture, they have informed the mindset of the Indonesian security apparatus to neutralise their moral conscience so that torturers perceive that they only torture non-humans, situated one level below the torturer’s self-identity.

(Hernawan 2015: 210)

The racialisation of Papuans is by no means historically unique; overall, the long history of colonialism is a lesson in the articulation and coefficient nature of racial representation and exploitation as demonstrated most notably by Said (1994; 2003 [1978]). And in the context of the Dutch empire, colonial agents from the Netherlands constructed and ascribed to a particular imagined geography they referred to as “the real world”; Papuans were firmly situated outside of this world of “the real” which was characterised by symbols of modernity, distance transport, movies, and schools (Slama & Munro 2015: 4). Further, those Pacific islands known as ‘Melanesia’ from the 1860s had already been discursively constructed in a racialised way, such that within an established regional colonial context, Freeport agents were able to perform the already existing colonial racial images and engage classic colonial tropes. The most notable trope was that of the cannibal, and the representation of Pacific islanders as cannibals in colonial discourse served to justify dispossession, exploitation, and genocidal practices against them.

Myth and mystery surrounding the Papuan people as ‘cannibal’ islanders have persisted into the twenty first century and these colonial images have also continued to shape the tone of some distance encounters with Papuans, with Papua being reduced to a representation as “a few thousand miles of cannibal lands” by Robert
Kommer, CIA advisor to John F. Kennedy (cited by Banivanua-Mar 2008: 583). Back in 1961, two disparate social worlds were brought into comparative relief when Michael Rockefeller, the aspiring anthropologist and heir to the Rockefeller fortune, disappeared after his canoe was overturned five miles off the coast of New Guinea while he was on a mission to collect ‘primitive art’. Although Rockefeller had drifted for two days before deciding to swim the five miles to shore through shark-infested waters, it is nonetheless still publicly speculated that he was eaten by natives. Most recently, a documentary film and related press coverage resurrected the debate over whether Papuans had actually cannibalised a US banking heir (see Figures 7.3 and 7.4).

Figures 7.3. and 7.4. Recent stories in the Daily Mail claim that (Dec 2014) “Michael Rockefeller WAS eaten by cannibals” and then (Feb 2015) that “Rockefeller heir joined a tribe of naked cannibals”.

Stories such as this one, fresh as it was in the 1960s, helped in the discursive presentation of Papuans as a people to be tamed, and against this backdrop West Papua was subsumed by Indonesia with the full complicity of the international community. However, Freeport agents themselves have also been active in the racialisation of Papuans, setting them discursively in the past, stone-age tense and
inferior in hierarchy. Back in the 1960s, Freeport began to envisage the area now home to the Grasberg mine in Papua as a site of extraction, and the US mining geologist Forbes Wilson was, by his own account at least, the key driving agent of the establishment of Freeport’s operations in Papua. His words are useful here as Wilson is one figure among a concert of agents who have contributed discursively to narratives intended to justify the dispossession and marginalisation of Papuans. Wilson personally maintained and amplified discourses which set Papuans in tense and hierarchy by constructing them as backwards and inferior, but he also began the interventions which would alter local understandings of value and exchange.

In May of 1960, Wilson arrived on New Guinea with the singular goal of reaching the Ertsberg, an immense black outcrop of high-grade ore which had been written about twenty-four years earlier by a petroleum geologist working for Shell Oil by the name of Jean Jacques Dozy (Wilson 1981: 6). While Shell had dismissed the idea of mining the Ertsberg due to its remote and topographically hostile location, Wilson was determined to lead the US firm Freeport McMoRan towards the viable exploitation of the then inestimably valuable outcrop. His memoir of the determined mission, entitled *The Conquest of Copper Mountain*, documents his subjective account of not only the physical and logistical efforts to reach the ore mound, but also his moral dilemmas, assertions, and elisions as he encountered and ‘employed’ Papuans on their own land, towards the end of exploiting their natural riches.

A racialised representation is foregrounded in Wilson’s account when Papuans are presented as Stone Age savages and monstrous demons, as well as being innocent, foolish, and childlike. But this narrative clearly unravels as his memoirs progress due to its inherent mendacity. Papuans become, variously, resourceful and unusually intelligent, as well as archetypal noble savages. Wilson ascribes the past tense to Papuans, and in doing so, firmly seals them in a coexistent history. He notes upon his
first encounter with a Papuan village that in a little over two weeks since leaving New York “we had gone back thousands of years in time” (Wilson 1981: 22) and elaborates:

One of our biggest challenges was to find ways of helping the simple Stone Age people in the area adjust to their sudden confrontation with the technological and social complexities of modern Western civilization. Our goal was to improve their austere living conditions without disturbing the valuable qualities of their traditional existence.

(ibid: 9; see also references on pages 5, 12, 22, 29, 30–32, 47, 49, 94, 105.)

The problems with such a temporal displacement are evident and manifold. To begin with, the assumption that Papuans have remained in a static, unchanging state for over 4,000 years is simply false; Wilson himself describes the linguistic diversity and difference in practices which have developed between various Papuan tribes topographically disconnected from one another (ibid: 5). Further, the assumption of stasis equates to a disavowal of the Papuans’ potential for immanent development. This has been a vital key to contemporary and historical colonial interventions: the construction of an object in need of intervention because the immanent potential for progress is absent (see for example, Blaney & Inayatullah 2010). Wilson’s own interventions in Papuan social worlds, as detailed below, are never morally questioned and are explicitly enabled by the exclusion of Papuans from full human status.
Translations and interventions in Papuan social worlds

This section follows the detailing of racialisations performed by Forbes Wilson and continues with an account of the interventions and translations that such racialisations enabled. Following this it considers other forms of translations related to interventions in Papuan moral understandings of intimacy on the part of colonial agents as well as the Indonesian government and Freeport itself. As such the following questions are addressed here: How are translations threatened or enacted in the social worlds of the excluded? And, what kind of translations are threatened or enacted?

As detailed above, Forbes Wilson’s account begins from the implicit premise that he, and Freeport, had every right to pursue their mission in Papua, with the imperative of ‘developing’ this ‘Stone Age world’ (alongside turning a handsome profit), so his dilemmas are not related to the morality of the mission itself. Instead his quandaries relate to the need to draw in local labour and the awareness that, despite residual clues that other outsiders had been (and in some cases continued to be) present in Papua, the Papuans he employed on the expedition remained unfamiliar with monetary forms of exchange:

Items such as ax blades, which we called “inducement goods,” were our chief form of compensation to the packers, who had no knowledge of or use

65 In the village of Omowka, for instance, Wilson (1981: 23) encounters Dutch influence in the form of “an open-air building used as a mission school and a barnlike structure which served as a Catholic Church. An empty Japanese shell case served as a bell to call the faithful.”
for money. Barter economics is much more inconvenient than money economics, and about 10% of our packers had to be allocated to the task of moving our bulky and heavy payroll along the trail.

(Wilson 1981: 35)

This meant that local labour was engaged (on what would become a multi-billion dollar enterprise for Freeport) for next to nothing in Western value terms. Higher value items were carefully guarded from the Papuans, lest they served to devalue the preferred ‘inducement goods’.66 Take the instance in which a group of Sansaporese built a bridge across the river for the expedition, after which the workers lined up to each be paid by Wilson’s colleague “with three strands of colored beads.” Wilson adds that the “initial cost of 100 strands of these beads must have been no more than a dollar” (ibid: 98) meaning the final payment to the ten bridge builders came to an approximate total of three cents. If Wilson was triumphant over the minimal remuneration he was awarding Papuans, he decided that labour was naturally limited by the lack of inclination towards accumulation:

We had already utilized as bearers nearly all of the available adult male population in the vicinity of the Tsinga-Praubivak route. Each had received an ax blade, a parang [a type of machete], and an assortment of other goods.

66 At one stage Wilson had to leave behind gas cookers which “were buried in a pit dug in the wet moss along with other goods that, if discovered by the Irianese, could detract from the attractiveness of our regular inducement goods.” These goods and the camp’s buried alcohol supply were eventually lost altogether in a landslide (ibid: 123).
Having no sense of Western-style wealth accumulation, the Irianese would likely see no need for more than one of an item like an ax blade. What could we use as additional inducements?

The answer, we decided, was khaki shorts and white T-shirts [...] shorts could well replace the gourd as the preferred apparel of status-conscious mountain Irianese.

(ibid: 121)

The plan to create a new desirable object in the minds of their Papuan bearers seemed to work in the favour of Wilson’s expedition, until a helicopter-drop of shorts and T-shirts failed to materialise and the offended bearers abandoned the mission – and its weighty ore samples and equipment – halfway down the mountain (ibid: 136). Having exhausted the local adult male population, Wilson and his team began to recruit child labour to haul their heavy loads for the remainder of the arduous trip,67 while Wilson and the other Westerners in the group carried only their own bodies (ibid: 138).

Evidently, Wilson and his team were careful to limit local payment ultimately for their own benefit, as well as so that the supply of local labourers would not be exhausted, nor would those labourers become accustomed to more costly luxury goods. Yet, within a few short decades, the Papuan value system in the vicinity of the mine had undergone acute distortions as Freeport’s operations had become more extensive. Illustrating just how extreme a translation had occurred since Wilson’s

67 “Since most of their fathers had already served as porters and had obtained as much of our inducement goods supply as they wanted, Moses had turned to the next generation” (Wilson 1981: 137)
mission, one former Freeport employee recalled that in the early 1990s when Freeport was into its second decade of mineral extraction, his tasks included distributing black refuse sacks full of cash to the local population to compensate for the disruption caused through Freeport’s operations:

Freeport was only providing them with cash-money at that time, with hard cash, because I was involved in distributing cash at that time in trash bags, in big trash bags for each family, without any preparation or education. [The money was given] to the head of the tribes. We learned from that because it was not effective – the money was used by the male heads just to get drunk and visit the prostitution areas.

(Andri, interview in Jakarta, July 2014)

Andri claimed that 50 to 100 million rupiah (around £2,500 to £5,200 at the time of writing) per tribe of three or four families would be distributed annually, using a truck filled with sacks of cash in order to fulfil Freeport’s obligation to distribute one per cent of its profits among the local community. He claims that the money was always put in the hands of the male tribal heads and that it was spent before it could benefit the women and children. This is a problematic assertion in itself which feeds back into the racialisation of Papuans as inferior and primitive. Further, Andri also

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68 This commitment is detailed in Rio Tinto’s 2007 Annual Report: “In meeting the mine’s social obligations to local communities, at least one per cent of Grasberg’s net sales revenue are committed to support village based programmes. In addition, two trust funds were established in 2001 in recognition of the traditional land rights of the local Amungme and Komoro tribes” (Rio Tinto 2007).
insists that from this Freeport learned “that cash-money has never been effective, especially with indigenous people, they commonly use only what’s provided by nature, they have never had any experience to manage capital because their capital is nature” (ibid, July 2014).

Since then, the one per cent profit-sharing commitment has been fulfilled through payments to an organisation established to manage the funds. Now there is a community-owned hospital in Timika, there are education programmes, scholarships for higher education, and health programmes. However, Andri claims that resentment is still harboured by community members who remember the days of cash payment, and the issue rears up again each time there is dissatisfaction expressed with Freeport.

It may seem quite a leap from the days in which Wilson had local bridge-builders queuing up for three cents worth of beads between them, to the recent demands that cash payments be resumed, but the injustice of the interim decades is apparent. The natural value of the area is being destroyed and polluted by Freeport in order to produce around half of West Papua’s GDP, the majority of which ends up in Jakarta (King 2004: 23). The debate is intractable over whether an arguably illegitimate operation like that of Freeport in West Papua can engage in local investment that can ever be seen as just. In one sense, a high percentage of Freeport’s profits should be retained locally; this is revenue from the land and subsoil of West Papua after all. However, acceptance of a share of the profits can be argued to make locals complicit in the project and amounts to the purchase of legitimacy for Freeport.

This debate notwithstanding, the justification for intervention in West Papua has always been to bring the ‘benefits’ of modernity to ‘primitive’ Papuans, but even those who believe in such a mission must admit that this is failing on its own terms. The one per cent of Freeport profits spent locally covers only what amount to basic services, such as clinics and schools, which could (and arguably should) be paid for anyway by
the state out of tax revenues from the Grasberg site. But as Yudianto said in an interview in 2013, “Freeport is the one to take care of those communities, because the government doesn’t exist there”. Freeport investment has provided basic services but locals are often left with clinics without medical staff and schools without teachers, as attracting personnel to the highlands is difficult and outsiders tend to limit their stays to around one month.

In the long run, what other future is imagined beyond unstaffed clinics and schools? How else is Freeport investment put to use locally towards the expressed aims of bringing ‘development’ to Papua? These are rhetorical questions. Infrastructure remains limited to connecting the operations of the mine with the port, and once the Grasberg site is exhausted, left behind will be only the decaying arteries of an extractive economy with nothing to extract.

In the beginning, Freeport’s “philosophy”, according to Wilson, was to “resist demands for cargo and avoid charitable, paternalistic activities that might foster excessive dependence” (1981: 219–220). Yet around the Grasberg site multiple displacements, environmental depletion, geochemical contamination, the disturbance caused by tailings placement, and so on, all serve to dislocate Papuans from their former means of subsistence and inevitably leave them with the ‘excessive dependence’ on Freeport that Wilson claimed the company sought to avoid. In the present, Yudianto paints a picture of perpetual demand formulation on the part of the locals in the highlands, responded to by piecemeal concessions on the part of Freeport.

They know Freeport has big money, they know they can ask for anything [...] I understand from the Freeport side. It seems to me that Freeport just lets them get anything they want as long as the production is still working there. So, don’t let them disturb the production [...] whatever they ask, just
give them the money and [you are] protected by the community leaders, this is more political. Not only Freeport but all the mining companies would be shut down because of conflict from the community. So I think the way they are helping development is [aimed at] ‘don’t let them disturb’. That’s [what is meant by] saying that giving money, everything they want, this is anti-development or something like that.

(Yudianto, September 2013)

Yudianto suggests that Freeport’s payments and investments locally are part of a pacification strategy: communities make demands, and Freeport concedes in order to limit the risk of conflict. What is clear is that, just as there was no moral reflection over the justness of establishing operations on Papuan land to the benefit of US investors and the Indonesian government, neither has there been a proper appraisal of the long-term costs to West Papua of the operations.

Forbes Wilson set a precedent in Freeport’s site of extraction by performing colonial discourses which presented Papuans as backwards and inferior and therefore in need of interventions in order to develop. His experimental interventions in Papuan economic relations around what would become the Grasberg site, have since been echoed by Freeport’s continuing acts of distortion in Indigenous social worlds, such as through the distribution of sacks of cash and the building of unstaffed clinics. But alongside these experimental social interventions, Freeport has also modified the geography of the area into a highly defined form of corporate space, as detailed earlier in this chapter. This, in turn, has enabled the control of classified bodies as well as further experiments in social interventions. The rest of this section considers how the specific corporate spatiality of Freeport’s site of extraction is related to the
development of industrial prostitution in the area, marking a significant intervention in Papuan social life.

The disciplining of intimacy in West Papua has been attempted by various colonial agents who have specifically concerned themselves with Papuan morality. Since the first missionaries began to practice in West Papua (comparably late in the 1950s) through to the present day with the interventions of Indonesian public health workers in Papuan communities, there has been a keen moral examination, and condemnation, of Papuan forms of love and intimacy. As such, a racialised moral hierarchy has been constructed with Papuans situated below most other Indonesians in their sexual ethics. ‘Civilising missions’ in Papua by Dutch and American missionaries have explicitly worked against the polygamous practices of peoples such as the Dani and the Asmat and the eradication of morally ‘low’ forms of love and intimacy has served as a prime justification for this outside missionary influence.

This finds continuity in present-day discourses which reproduce the idea of Papuans as morally subordinate. Some of those interviewed for this study certainly confirmed the claim of Butt that: “Bureaucrats and outreach workers speak of Papua as a zone of unrestrained tribal sexualities and Papuans as sexually voracious, out of control, and thus in need of more stringent regulation” (Butt 2008: 126). In line with this claim, Papuans were repeatedly presented to me as promiscuous, unhealthy, and

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69 “Numerous Dani cultural particularities – such as polygamy, men’s long hair, greasing with pig fat, finger cutting, bride price and pig sacrifice – were discouraged because they were part of the “former life”” (Farhadian 2003: 64).

70 De Graaf notes that Dutch Liberated missionaries in the Upper-Digul area to the south-east of Freeport’s areas of interest “preferred the Papuans to live in a single family household because from a biblical point of view, the often polygamist household with separate rooms for men and women was undesirable” (de Graaf 2012: 81).
unorthodox in their intimate practices by public health workers unafraid of illustrating in close detail what they believed to be morally questionable habits.

Looking again, however, in the context of outside efforts to help Papuans to ascend a constructed hierarchy of moral intimacy, we can see that what has occurred instead in the vicinity of Freeport’s contract areas are translations and distortions in sexual behaviour related to both explicit and clandestine forces of commensuration. In the wake of missionary interventions over polygamous practices came the active development of industrial prostitution appended to Freeport’s site of industrial extraction. Particularly alongside mining sites, areas for sex workers exist across Indonesia in the form of lokalisasi, which are best described as industrial brothel complexes and can be established by the government or military, or emerge privately. Andri mentioned that when he first began working for Freeport in the early 1990s, there was already a lokalisasi located inside of the Freeport contract area with what he claims were 800 sex workers working there at that time (Andri, interview in Jakarta, July 2014). Later, in the 2000s, the lokalisasi was moved out of the contract area and so could then be accessed by the wider local Papuan population as well as, much less frequently, by Freeport employees.

The period during which the lokalisasi was located within Freeport’s restricted area is of most interest for the questions it raises regarding its establishment and management. Bearing in mind the spatial practices of Freeport outlined above, especially the highly controlled techniques of zoning according to the classification of bodies, the Freeport contract area was only accessible to Freeport employees, as well as Indonesian military forces. Although there would undoubtedly have been clandestine bodies crossing the Freeport site at any one time, a lokalisasi staffed by 800 sex workers could not have emerged without the complicity or the direction of Freeport. As Andri notes: “theoretically someone in Freeport [must have] managed
the *lokalisasi*, because it was inside the contract area, there is no public transportation to enter that area [...] so I think somebody managed that, but I don’t know for sure how.” Farel, on the other hand believes that Freeport simply acquiesced:

Freeport, they just let it happen, because they know that when they try to contain this, then they have a problem with the military. And they know that this is part of the support system for their employees [who are] mostly men, far away from the family, with money. Freeport is just doing awareness campaigns [...] just do it safely with condoms, that’s all. But they don’t care about the slavery, they don’t care about the moral issues.

(Farel, interview in Jakarta, July 2014)

Whether the *lokalisasi* in the Freeport contract area was down to the company’s direction or acquiescence, it is clear that it was seen as part of what Farel calls the employee “support system”. Moreover, the level of discursive disapproval reserved for Papuans’ promiscuous and polygamous intimate habits is not reproduced with respect to the idea of workmen in the extractives industry frequenting the *lokalisasi*. Andri speculates on Freeport management logic:

I never knew what was behind that scheme, but it seemed that management realised that less than ten per cent of the employees could bring their families to Freeport [...] and most of the employees at that time were non-Papuan [...] so the sexual needs at the time were the motivation behind the building of the *lokalisasi*.

(Andri, interview in Jakarta, July 2014)
Andri’s suggestion that this was a demand-driven initiative, led by the sexual needs of the (at that time) 99 per cent male\textsuperscript{71} Freeport staff is one theory. Another theory would hold that the market for sex workers is actually \textit{made} by profit-motivated agents who manufacture the commercial demand in the first place. In line with this view of the \textit{lokalisasi} system as an active economic project, Leslie Butt (2008: 125) has identified a “system of sexual migration” in Indonesia in which the military and police perform a regulatory role and in which sex workers are rotated around different commercial sites, including those connected to extractives and other rural industries.\textsuperscript{72} In line with this, the Freeport \textit{lokalisasi} was certainly a node in a military-regulated network through which women were (and continue to be) moved as commodities.

Farel, who has conducted extensive research into public health and sex work in Indonesia claims that women are often tricked and then bonded into the Indonesian sex industry. They may be sourced from rural areas where down payment is given to families on the promise of something along the lines of restaurant work in another part of the archipelago (Farel, interview in Jakarta, July 2014). The women may then be sold on and begin work in the sex industry with a debt of approximately ten million

\textsuperscript{71} Andri claims this was the approximate male employment figure within the company at the time but that Freeport hired more women from around 1998 onwards.

\textsuperscript{72} Butt (2008: 125) comments on Indonesia’s “well-organized system of sexual migration. They provide expensive services at brothels and hostess bars in select locations in the province. Heavily regulated by the police and the military and, in the eyes of Papuans, controlled by them as well, these women have no voice in public discourses about health concerns or treatment practices. They arrive surreptitiously, work for a short time, and are then moved on by their handlers. They rotate locations, working out of brothels set up in regional transport hubs or in frontier towns that have grown up alongside resource extraction industries”.

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rupiah (around £500 at the time of writing), therefore much of their earnings go
towards servicing the debt, and much of the rest goes towards ‘security’ and rent in the
lokalisasi. Farel also claims the Indonesian ID card system is used as a tool of control
by those operating networks in Indonesia:

What I found on some islands is the pimps bribe the police in the ports
[and] they issue a special ID card for sex workers coming from Java. Then
when you want to go outside of the island, of course you have to go to the
port and you have to show your ID. When they see the ID with a special
mark [...] the port authorities will call the pimps for confirmation: “is it true
that you allowed this girl to travel?” “No, no, she escaped from me!” and
then they will send her back. This is modern slavery.

(Farel, interview in Jakarta, July 2014)

Farel also insists that there is “usually a logistical arrangement where they would
work in East Java and then move to West Papua for some time, like a rotation. Like in
Papua they would say “soon there will be a barang baru [new collection]”. Sex
workers, in other words, are spoken of in the same way as garments in the fashion
industry. Commodified women are rotated in order to manufacture enhanced desires
and boost the custom of lokalisasi clients. But what does this tell us about the
normative monogamy that is vital to the construction of the hierarchy of intimate
practices in Indonesia which subordinates polygamous Papuans? The idea of barang
baru women on rotation breaks the narrative that these are basically faithful,
monogamous men, using the ‘support services’ of their company to fulfil a sexual need
because they are away from their wives.
Whatever the motivation and justification Freeport may have had for its complicity, the establishment of industrial scale prostitution operations in West Papua made for an intervention which contradicted prior social interventions in Papuan intimate and moral life. These interventions rested on narratives which disparaged Papuan polygamy as morally inferior. Such narratives had contributed to a wider racialising discourse which, ironically, had served to justify the presence of Indonesia and Freeport in West Papua the first place.

**Conclusion**

The conditions in West Papua have much in common with conditions across Indigenous spaces globally as the violent expansion of resource frontiers continues to impact upon rural areas (Global Witness 2016). Within the immediate context of Indonesia’s optimistic condition of market emergence, this chapter has considered the coloniality of the present in West Papua through an analysis of the particular forms of exclusion and translation which Papuans have been subjected to, especially in and around the site of extraction that is the Freeport gold and copper mine on the Grasberg location. I began here with an overview of the forced inclusion of West Papua into Indonesia, an event which itself was connected to Suharto’s move towards corporate transnationalism and which followed the devastating massacre of hundreds of thousands of left wing Indonesians in the mid-1960s. The Freeport contract was the first and most lucrative to be signed under the new Foreign Investment Law between the Suharto regime and a foreign corporation, and was sealed a full two years before the so-called ‘Act of Free Choice’ which determined Indonesian sovereignty over West Papua. The vast Freeport mining area, itself so central to the story of Papuans’ forced
inclusion, is also the site of extraction which is of particular interest to this chapter as
a site of exclusion and translation.

Returning again to Sylvia Wynter’s claims that each social order constructs its own
culturally prescribed figure of the normalised human/subject, in the West Papuan case
this construction is most evident through its negation. Thus in relation to the research
question of how communities are excluded from the normalised human/subject in
West Papua, I have identified some of the ways in which Papuans have been repeatedly
constructed as being outside of the figure of the human over the historical course of
the Dutch and Indonesian colonial projects. This chapter has covered how the
racialisation of Papuans as a backward and inferior people formed the condition of
possibility for Freeport to gain mining access to Papuan land in the first place and,
soon after, for Indonesia to annex West Papua with international complicity. Since
then, Freeport agents have continued to deploy classic colonial tropes and perform
colonial discourses to set Papuans in tense and hierarchy, thereby justifying continued
‘development’ interventions in Papuan social worlds.

This discursive exclusion is also related to spatial exclusions and this chapter also
began to uncover how the spatial practices of Freeport articulate with its epistemic
strategies, as well as to reveal the sort of corporate power deployment these enable. Its
highly controlled geographies are delimited by restrictions and checkpoints, such that
Indigenous Papuans and other non-employees are excluded, while female sex workers
drawn from Indonesia’s military-controlled networks are super-included within
corporate space.

In relation to the question of how translations are threatened or enacted in the
social worlds of the excluded and the question of the kind of translations enacted, an
array of translations in Papuan social worlds have been documented here, especially
in relation to interventions made directly by agents of the corporation itself. Forbes
Wilson’s early manipulations in local populations, for example, established payment systems to remunerate those taken on as part of exploration missions to the Ertsberg and distorted local understandings of value. Within two decades, Freeport would be distributing sacks of cash around the communities affected by mining operations but would later move on to more refined ‘development’ initiatives. Each of these has had the effect of provoking significant distortions in Papua’s incommensurable social worlds, especially around Freeport’s site of extraction.

Other identified translations provoked by interventions in Papuan social worlds have related to moral understandings of intimacy. The controlled influx of sex worker bodies into Freeport’s corporate space has been framed as a strategy of employee support, providing a necessary service for Freeport workers. Alternatively, however, the development of industrial prostitution in Papua may be seen as an active market-making project serving to normalise understandings of woman-as-commodity within the social space of the site of extraction. This social intervention has taken place alongside, or in the aftermath of, moral interventions on the part of a concert of agents, including European missionaries and Indonesian health workers, who have discursively placed Papuans at the base of a hierarchy of love and intimacy and actively attempted to restrain their sexual behaviour and polygamous practices.

The following chapter moves on to a consideration of one prominent form of resistance which has been enacted across rural resource frontiers, not only in West Papua, but also more broadly throughout the archipelago. It examines how the rapid expansion of corporate operations in an emerging market context is resisted through counter-mapping, ostensibly a key form of resistance to translation through dispossession but one which ultimately turns out to be complicated by the liberal foundations of the map itself.
Chapter Eight

Resource Frontiers and the Cartographic Impulse

If one of the core concerns of decolonial thought has been to examine the spatial extension of global Eurocentred capitalism across worlds of social difference, then central to this must be, first of all, consideration of how standardised liberal capitalist land relations exert eradicative pressure over more diverse ways of relating to land, and further, how such processes come to be countered. In the context of the rapid expansion of capital investment across rural frontiers in Indonesia’s emerging market context, therefore, this chapter examines attempts to resist dispossession and its related forms of translation in greater empirical depth. It takes the example of counter-mapping to illustrate the manifold complexities of employing a liberal technology (the map) in order to appeal for state legal protection from both state and corporate disposessory advancement across rural resource frontiers.

Resource frontiers are first identified below as key sites of investment-intensive extraction within Indonesia’s emerging market setting. The following section then identifies a key line of difference which coincides with these resource frontiers and which serves as the basis for the exclusion of Indonesia’s masyarakat terasing, or ‘isolated people’. Examples of Indonesia’s vast array of land-based ontologies at risk of translation through dispossession are then identified and examined in relation to dominant liberal understandings of land relations. I will then use the testimonies of cartographers in Indonesia, as well as related literature, to make sense of counter-mapping as a mode of resistance to dispossession and related forms of social translation. As the strengthening of adat law is the ultimate goal of mapping, the
following section explores the history and disciplinary function of adat in greater detail and cautions that customary law is generally subordinate in a system of legal pluralism. A final section deepens the analysis of mapping in relation to decolonial thinking on hierarchies, market expansion, and the extension of liberal ways of relating to land. Here, I recognise that mapping brings genuine gains in terms of resisting corporate land claims and forging broader alliances against corporate strategies of expropriation. Yet, at the same time, I note that it may ease processes of land individuation by embedding liberal concepts of bordering. It may also make communities complicit in the exposure of much more detailed human land use data for the purpose of easing the task of land management for the state.

*Indonesia’s rural resource frontiers as terminable sites of extraction*

As noted in Chapter One and in the extraction section of Chapter Five, as well as at various points throughout this thesis, the spread of extractive activity across rural lands has caused an increase in dispossession and displacement within Indonesia as well as across other resource frontiers of the world. This is a phenomenon which continues and intensifies under the optimistic conditions of market emergence across the archipelago. The impact of this corporate resource expansion most affects peasant and Indigenous communities and reveals the complex and contingent nature of land tenure in rural areas. The encroachment of logging and mining operations, the spread of oil palm and rubber plantations, as well as the rise of the political forest and national parks as political spaces (Peluso & Vandergeest 2001) have all been implicated in the loss of terrain often termed ‘customary land’ in Indonesia (Davidson & Henley 2007). The extent of contemporary dispossessory practices is made clear by Dr Dianto
Bachriadi of Komnas HAM, Indonesia’s National Commission on Human Rights, who describes a year-on-year increase for three consecutive years in the land-related human rights violations reported to his office as rural populations continue to be dispossessed by state-corporate land expropriation:

Mostly conflict comes from land-grabbing activities by the big corporations for plantations and mining, we can also say land-grabbing by the state institutions, the military, and also the state-owned enterprises as part of the corporate land grabs. [...] And in the rural areas when we talk about land conflict, it has not only occurred in the non-forest areas but also in the forest areas where many Indigenous people live, and it halts their way of life.

(Bachriadi, interview in Jakarta, July 2014)

When Dianto Bachriadi claims that corporate investment-related land grabs halt the way of life of rural peoples, he is referring precisely to the forms of translation provoked by their dispossession in relation to extraction. He can speak in broad-brush terms here in relation to common experiences across the archipelago which correspond to the working understanding of extraction developed within this thesis. To reiterate the outline made in Chapter Five, extraction is understood here to refer to processes which convert material into value, especially through rural, nature-based industrial activities, but also through processes of urban production. Extraction is also

73 Dr Dianto Bachriadi is Vice Chairman of the National Commission on Human Rights in Indonesia (Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia, Komnas HAM) as well as its Special Rapporteur on Agrarian Issues.
understood to be inherently dispossessory and to contribute to the closure of rural and urban economic frontiers, and therefore to the contestation of such closures, provoking struggles over spatially-grounded social and political ontologies. Indonesia’s resource frontiers are therefore broadly considered within this chapter to be sites of extraction. But these sites of extraction also fall roughly along particular lines of difference in Indonesia which in turn enable forms of exclusion. The following section therefore considers the production of this difference through the discourse of masyarakat terasing (or isolated people) along Indigenous resource frontiers.

The production of masyarakat terasing as exclusion from the national subject

As outlined in Chapter Two, decolonial thinkers commenting on the present, as well as Casanova commenting on the Latin America of the 1960s, have pointed out the continuities in the forms of extraction and expropriation beyond independence. Casanova identifies the ‘internal colony’ which carries on the “ascriptive character” (1965: 33) of the colonial regime, in which a group or groups are denigrated culturally or racially, and dehumanised in the service of domination and exploitation. Casanova referred to the Indigenous inhabitants of the Americas as the paracolonised population whose land and labour continued to be appropriated: “The plundering of the Indian communities fulfils two functions as during the colonial era: it deprives Indians of their land, and it converts them into peons or paid workers” (ibid: 35). In other words, the integrated nature of the exploitation of land and labour persists in the proletarianisation of the rural dispossessed. Once again, these thinkers place

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74 See also Winichakul (1994) on internal colonisation.
discursive representations at the centre of material processes of dispossession across lines of hierarchised difference.

Similarly the term ‘internal imperialism’ has been used by Acciaoli (2001) to describe Indonesia’s regimes of difference in which ‘Fourth World’ peoples are subordinated within an independent postcolonial country. Across Indonesia’s world of ethnic and cultural diversity a specific categorical binary has been drawn, with the help of state ideologues and anthropologists such as Ali Moertopo\(^{75}\) and Koentjaraningrat,\(^{76}\) between those who are within the bounds of what the state views as acceptably Indonesian, despite their heterogeneity, and those who have been termed ‘isolated people’ (suku terasing or masyarakat terasing) whose way of life is seen to contradict the Indonesian cultural identity. These are groups considered not just geographically isolated but socially and culturally isolated, and thus unassimilable with national developmental dynamics without significant socio-cultural translation.

Masyarakat terasing are variously nomadic communities, often shifting cultivators, and usually follow animist traditions rather than the state-accepted ‘modern’ religions. As such, there has been a kind of internal civilising mission to encourage sedentarism and monotheism, among other necessary practices, to bring these communities to an acceptable level of Indonesianness (see Chou 2010: 14—15; Acciaoli 2001). State discourse has shifted in recent years and now masyarakat terasing are more likely to be referred to as komunitas adat terpencil (KAT for short) ‘remote adat communities’ or ‘remote indigenous communities’ by the Ministry of

\(^{75}\) Moertopo’s influence on Suharto-era New Order ideology was derived in part from Enlightenment ideas about teleological progress and took the form of a “model of cultural evolution” as detailed in Strategi Kebudayaan (Strategies of Culture) his 1978 book (Acciaoli 2001: 11).

\(^{76}\) See for example Koentjaraningrat (1987).
Social Affairs (KEMENSOS 2010). Interventions in KAT communities are reframed in the language of *pemberdayaan* or ‘empowerment’. Nonetheless, the Ministry of Social Affairs maintains a focus on the potential of intervention to assimilate and integrate *masyarakat terasing* politically and socio-economically, claiming that “KAT Indigenous communities are characterised by their relatively closed and isolated nature, and could be opened socially, economically, and politically” (*ibid*). Overall the epistemic distinguishing of Indigenous people remains pervasive and continues to group socioculturally diverse and geographically dispersed communities into a single administrative category.

This bureaucratic ordering has been both temporal and hierarchical, in the sense that *masyarakat terasing* are presented both as backward and inferior. As such this representation has been fundamental to the maintenance of what has been termed the ‘colonial difference’ (Mignolo 2000: 49) – the temporal displacement into the past of those deemed too primitive to be recognised as coexisting in the same space and time as modern subjects. Their temporal displacement serves too as a spatial isolation into pockets of ‘living ancestors’; excluded at the outer epistemic borders of modernity as well as often at the administrative boundaries of the modern state. This is recognisably the displacement performed through the construction of *masyarakat terasing* in Indonesia – the discursive isolation of mainly Indigenous groups within a living but terminable past.

This kind of exclusion is homogenising, it separates one geographically dispersed fraction of the wider Indonesian population and creates a commonality that did not exist before, that of being in the same state classification as ‘isolated’. In reality, the category of *masyarakat terasing* covers a range of linguistic, ethnic, and ontological diversity and it groups together communities which have very little in common with one another. On the whole, however, KAT communities do share the common
condition of living ‘outside’ of global liberal capitalist space which was spread originally through colonialism and which continues to be advanced through independent national government in concert with international capital. Living ‘outside’ of this system can mean living in ways which contrast with, and are even incommensurable\textsuperscript{77} with, liberal capitalist ways of being, at the same time as being constitutive of the capitalist system in the sense they are connected through, for example, trade and ecological interrelations. Ontologies of these social worlds can be maintained in spite of these interrelations, however, dispossession and the extension of liberal understandings of space risk or enact ontological ‘translation’ in the sense outlined in Chapter Three. The \textit{masyarakat terasing} social worlds at risk of translation in this way are highly diverse and some examples of their complex ontologies are given below, read through their ways of relating to land.

\textit{Complex land-based ontologies in Indonesia}

Land within liberal capitalist space in Indonesia is generally characterised by individual ownership and sedentary habitation, or else by corporate or state ownership, as in the case of plantation estates or managed political forests (see, for example, Warren & Lucas 2013). Such land is represented and communicated by ‘modern’ maps in two dimensions of what Harley called ‘scientific’ geometry (1989). The following paragraphs are intended to point out that this way of administering and representing land is something peculiar to liberal capitalist space. To demonstrate

\textsuperscript{77} I continue to use incommensurability here in the same way as Povinelli to refer to social worlds which cannot be translated into one another without significant distortion, as outlined in Chapter Three.
this, we can briefly sketch two alternative ways of seeing land drawn from the better
documented of Indonesia’s many diverse ‘masyarakat terasing’ communities whose
customary land uses are at odds with the liberal ideals of the Indonesian state.

To begin with, the Orang Suku Laut (people of the sea) dwell in and around the
province of Riau but view themselves as inhabitants of a wider Alam Melayu, or Malay
World, which stretches broadly across maritime Southeast Asia (Chou 2010: 1). They
are – counter to the sedentarist outlook of successive state regimes – semi-nomadic,
and dwell between the sea and the land across a network of island “living spaces”
linked by familial ties (ibid: 59). At times they are more sedentary and land-based,
depending upon environment, season and the health of a person, at other times they
may spend months on the water in house boats, mooring at dwelling-sites of close or
distant kin. Land for the Orang Laut is never individually owned, instead it is a
collective possession acquired as an “inalienable gift” from ancestors. Such a gift is
owned in a way, but this ownership is conceived of more as “affiliation” and
“custodianship” (ibid: 62), and as such it may not be bought or sold.

The Orang Laut’s own communal territories are not bordered as such, in the sense
that there are no exclusions and no impediments to travelling within these zones nor
even restrictions to benefiting from their resources. However, visitors should
announce their arrival to the community chief and inform of their departure. As their
territories are not defined by borders, but are seen as part of an essentially borderless
and historic Alam Melayu, they have a particular view of those political borders which
divide Southeast Asian states and form the margin of economic zones, such as the
SIJORI growth triangle, as being temporary and altering constraints to their ‘timeless’
socioeconomic mobility (Chou 2006: 119).

Most curious to the imagination accustomed to liberal cartography, however, is
that, although they traverse vast areas and possess deep knowledge of travelling
distances and navigational routes, movements of the air, the currents and tides of the sea, the flora and fauna of the region and so on \((ibid: 113)\), the ‘maps’ of the Orang Laut are entirely cognitive and related only orally over a lengthy learning period, being as they are without paper or printed maps \((ibid: 127)\). This means that territory is always experienced and represented in its multiple dimensions rather than abstracted and flattened to the two dimensional polygons of the map.

In another place beyond core liberal capitalist space, the Dayak communities of Kalimantan, the Indonesian bulk of the island of Borneo, have had a similarly communitarian view of territorial possession. Aside from swidden cultivation, Dayak forest-dwelling populations in East Kalimantan maintain various forms of *simpukng*, or forest gardens, which may be family-owned or belong to a wider community \((Mulyoutami et al 2009: 2054)\). *Simpukng* may be cultivated in fallow areas formerly used for growing rice, or otherwise in areas of secondary forest with a mixture of naturally-growing and cultivated plants and trees – hence at first glance *simpukng* appear to be wild and unmanaged forest spaces. In reality they are regulated by customary rules to avoid over-exploitation, and traditionally they have been managed by the customary chief of the *lamin* or longhouse, the elevated ironwood structure which serves as a communal dwelling for a number of families. The basic cosmology of Dayak peoples rests on the interdependence of land and people, and the concept of *lati tana* joins land use to the spiritual, familial and social dimensions, as well as the economic sphere. However, the Dayak connection with the land has traditionally been less permanent and inter-generational than that of the Orang Suku Laut, and Dayaks are often compelled to move every decade or so \((ibid: 2057)\), and especially after the death of a family member, rather than building an enhanced spiritual connection with the land around the ancestral burial site.
Denny, an activist in Central Kalimantan illustrates his understanding of the multiple different forms of forest found on local Dayak lands, and of their vulnerability under the corporate gaze:

*Pahewan* is a protected forest area, it is spiritual, the people are aware that there is something in that forest. *Kaleka* forests are used for cultivation. There are settlements in forest areas and *kaleka* can be on ex-settlement areas. *Hutan keramat* is like a walled forest, nothing can be taken. *Tajahan* is the most spiritual form of forest. Spirits are there to protect the trees – the people would be afraid to take too much – the people yes, but the companies no! The companies don’t believe in spirits!

(Denny, activist, interview in Central Kalimantan, July 2014)

This returns us to Chakrabarty’s warning as recounted in Chapter Three that the modern consciousness, represented in Denny’s testimony through that of the company, is disenchanted, yet is interacting with a world in which “humans are not the only meaningful agents” (Chakrabarty 2008: 72). As such, the act of translation of the forest into the corporate understanding necessarily involves the distortion of the enchanted into a disenchanted representation.

Beyond, and overlapping with, incommensurable social concepts of land relations, certain landscape *forms* are also at odds with a liberal property regime. South Kalimantan, for instance, is home to extensive wetland areas of ecological importance including peat swamp forests and freshwater swamp forests contained in zones such as the Sungai Negara wetlands (on which see MacKinnon *et al.*, 1996). These
swamplands by nature cannot be parcelled into individual plots but instead must be managed communally, as explained by Rizki, a peasant activist in South Kalimantan:

The communities depend on the swamps for their livelihoods, they use the wetlands for fishing. They have defined the zones in the swamp, there are fishing zones, a zone for wood for building, a zone for livestock, but because of the palm oil corporations, many people lost their incomes.

(Rizki, activist, interview in South Kalimantan, July 2014)

As such, the counter-mapping described later in this chapter is difficult to apply to wetland community land use, and fails to address what Rizki and others claimed to be the primary problem faced which is the alternate drainage and flooding of swamps by managed oil palm plantations. In line with the claims of Harris & Hazen (2006) regarding forms of privileged nature, activists in the area also complain that swamps attract very little support from a global level in comparison with the forested areas of Kalimantan which draw international attention with an environmental focus.

This section has provided a mere glimpse of the many complex land-based ontologies in Indonesia which are grouped together under the exclusionary term of masyarakat terasing or, more recently, as KAT communities. These are recognisable as incommensurable social worlds which do not translate into liberal capitalist ways of being without significant distortion, to use Povinelli’s terms. Furthermore, such diverse communal landholding arrangements, as well as ways of living in relation to certain landscape forms such as swamps, complicate the bordering and parcelling endeavour of the forms of mapping as resistance which are detailed as the central focus of this chapter. The following section moves on to more closely consider mapping as
one means by which rural communities with diverse land-related ontologies, such as those mentioned above, resist dispossession and thus related forms of social translation.

Contesting exclusion and translation through mapping

Map-making as a technology of power has long been implicated in the realisation of colonial projects (Akerman 2009). Nonetheless, against the geographical violence exerted by colonial state power, resistance has also been compelled by a ‘cartographic impulse’ – identified by Edward W. Said (1994: 272—273) as the impulse to “reclaim, rename, and reinhabit the land.” Anticolonial resistance in this sense sought to reinvent and reappropriate the land by redefining it – to perform a cartographic rebordering in order to claim it back. However, the cartographic impulse to subvert claimant power by redefining land through changing the way it is represented is resurgent today in a more literal sense than that intended here by Said. As a form of resistance to contemporary state-corporate claimant practices, especially in resource-rich rural areas, a counter-mapping movement continues to expand in Indonesia, as in many places across the globe, largely in the name of Indigenous territorial defence (see for example, Phys Org 2013; Peluso 1995; Wainwright & Bryan 2009; Roth 2006; Mollett 2013). Within this movement, counter-mapping organisations have been formed with the intention of engaging the same tools as those state and corporate claimants, but subvert their use in order to rebalance power in favour of rural communities living under threat of eviction (see for example Forest Carbon Asia 2013).

True to Said’s observation that the colonial eye sees a “blank place” (1994: 253), nature-based corporations may present maps detailing the structure and contents of
the subsoil but with much of the overground physical and habitational elements omitted from representations of rural lands, while the Indonesian government has mapped vast forested areas onto “empty charts”\(^78\) (Eghenter 2000: 352). Activists such as Akmal have also explained their frustration with corporate cartographic strategies:

 ellos. They used maps with blank spaces – the government and corporations always use the map without any information inside, just the boundaries [...] nothing about where the village is, where the local community area is. For example with the national park, across all of the map you can only see green colour without any information.

\(^{78}\) On ‘empty’ space see also Bryan and Wood (2015: 100).

In the past, communities would mainly orally relate their complaint against the corporations by describing the detail of the conflict areas, which limited their attempts to use legal routes to contest land claims. In contrast, counter-mappers create representations of customary boundaries and populate their maps with settlements and diverse cultivated areas, resulting in the production of documents of legal value in the eyes of the state’s courts of law (Warren 2005). Indonesian state acceptance of Indigenous maps covering 2.4 million hectares as part of the UKP4\(^79\) and BIG-led\(^80\) ‘One Map’ project has largely been claimed as a success by mapping organisations seeking to defend communities on resource frontiers from dispossession (see Down to

\(^{79}\) The President’s Delivery Unit for Development Monitoring and Oversight.

\(^{80}\) Bandan Informasi Geodpasial or Geospatial Information Agency.
Earth 2012; World Resources Institute 2013; Samadhi 2013). However, in order to make sense of the counter-map and its potential for meaningful decolonial resistance to ontological translation a deeper understanding of the processes and effects of mapping is necessary.

The following passages engage with the claims of counter-mappers working for one nationwide mapping organisation made during periods of research in 2013 and 2014, as set out in Chapter Four. To begin with, the conduct of mapping organisations differs, but the group studied here maintains a specific code which regulates engagement with communities, as well as how the mapped data is used afterwards, as explained by Hardi:

These are our principles: the community sends a letter or makes an oral request to us. Why do we need the letter? This is our mandate, we can show the letter when we arrive at the community. [...] Secondly we discuss with the people, explain the process and how to use the map, what to do with the map afterwards [...] finally we give the map to the community [our organisation] takes only a duplicate, if we want to use it we have to ask permission from the community.

(Hardi, counter-mapper, interview in Kalimantan, July 2014)
Once permission is obtained much of the subsequent mapping process remains markedly low-tech. This is notable as much of the mapping literature centres on what Harley (1989: 2) has called the ‘culture of technics’ which has since evolved along with increasingly user-friendly and ever-cheaper spatial information technologies in the form of geomatics such as geographic information systems (GIS) and global positioning systems (GPS) (c.f., Mohamed & Ventura 2000; Palmer & Rundstrom 2013; Crampton 2010). As one counter-mapper explained (Aditya, interview in Jakarta, July 2013), in the first stage of the process sketch maps are made with the community involved; an example of such a sketch map is shown in Figure 8.1. Once these are complete, the sketch maps are taken to the field and further deliberation
takes place in situ over the location of boundaries. A redrawing of the map and naming of features usually takes place at this stage. Another workshop is then organised during which the modified sketch map is transferred by a cartographer to a scale map with the addition of satellite imagery. Further, the deliberative stages in the mapping process involve in some cases 19 representatives of various communities, as well as agents of local government from the village or subdistrict levels (Aditya, interview in Jakarta, July 2013).
Figure 8.2. An example of a detailed scale counter-map. The community names of river points are indicated in blue type with blue markers, sacred forest areas are indicated with green and black markers, and settlements and villages are indicated with yellow markers. Borderlines are indicated in black and red, footpaths are indicated in pink, and roads are indicated in red. Image courtesy of Akmal, July 2014.
The collaborative process of mapping is also foregrounded in some of the scholarly literature as being just as productive and ‘empowering’ as the end goals in terms of legal gains over territory (see especially Parker 2006; Warren 2005). Young and Gilmore (2013) also stress the affective and emotional nature of mapping, questioning the often implicit assumption that mapping is a rational deliberative process realised among impartial participants. Indeed, all of the counter-mappers consulted for this study also place emphasis upon the significance of the process of mapping as well as upon its end goals, stressing the clarification of community rights with respect to land, to water, and to resources. They tend to present mapping as an activity which creates a consultative, democratic, and gender-egalitarian space:

We want to make a democratic space for the people, for spatial planning. With Indigenous leaders, consultation is the important thing. Women are invited into the consultation. We invite all of the village to synchronise with other villages, marking the boundaries between villages.

(Denny, counter-mapper, interview in Central Kalimantan, July 2014)

The ideal of the consultative, democratic, and gender-egalitarian space created through mapping is complicated by two main factors. Firstly, it is complicated by the fact that mapping is instigated by (mainly urban) activists from outside of the community and may be seen as an intervention across a power relation. Secondly, the fact that rural communities have diverse existing social structures which do not always correspond to the designs of the mappers further complicates the picture. Matius, for instance, similarly emphasises the discursive processes of consciousness-raising and
technological training with communities but admits that the processual spaces of counter-mapping tend to be far from gender-egalitarian in praxis:

First is the village discussion with community members; what do the villagers know about their land? They know best about how their land is threatened, [with the] big threats coming from mining companies, palm oil. We build awareness with the communities of how to use the map, to prove their claim, prove their land. The first thing is always the village discussion, secondly, after the agreement, [...] is the discussion about the function of the map, how to conduct community mapping. The intention is that we want the community to do the mapping by themselves, but they have no skills so we train them to use the GPS, compass, to know about scale. [...] After that comes surveying of the land. Participants can be Indigenous leaders, youth groups, women, people who know well the history of the land, the borders. [...] Women are always invited (we have this policy) but they don’t always come – usually the leaders would be men.

(Matius, counter-mapper, interview in South Kalimantan, July 2014)

When compared with the forms of resistive praxis examined in Chapter Six which are led by kampung women, it is evident that counter-mappers’ attempts to create egalitarian spaces are quite distinct. The urban forms of organisation considered were led by women and arose from immanent political organisation within the kampungs, rather than being arranged according to the ideals of an organisation from outside.

On the whole, however, counter-mapping in Indonesia is a social process, rather than simply a technical process, aimed at consciousness-formation among ‘isolated’
rural people. It is undoubtedly intended to be politicising; Hardi, for instance, explains he aims at “making the community aware the problem is in the politics” (Hardi, counter-mapper, South Kalimantan, 2014). Further, the process itself is credited with familiarising communities with the use of the map as a document with state-recognised legitimacy to counter land claims by powerful corporations. As communities are familiarised with the state’s legal mechanisms of protection, the promise of the strengthening of ‘adat’ or customary law becomes the prime end objective of mapping. In order to understand mapping, it is therefore important to understand adat, its historical constitution, and the form it takes in the present. With this in mind, the following section explores this legal impulse in the historical context of adat law.

*The colonial constitution of adat in the present*

As Bryan (2011: 40) notes with reference to the Honduran context, Indigenous mapping brings a promise to more formally codify land rights, and this promise in itself functions as a disciplinary tool. In the Indonesian context counter-mapping’s legal promise, in the form of adat law, must be understood at least in some historical detail, especially from a decolonial perspective attuned to the colonial genealogies of structures in the present, as noted in Chapter Four in relation to method.
Across Indonesia, land has traditionally been regulated by customary systems referred to as *masyarakat hukum adat* (see UNORCID 2013) more commonly known simply as ‘adat’. However, adat is a fairly elusive concept frequently referred to but often left nebulously defined in the scholarly literature. Drawing on various definitions (McWilliam 2006: 46, 49, 58; Henley & Davidson 2007: 3) we can consider adat to be a dynamic and evolving normative system comprised of jurisprudential, cultural, and spiritual elements which regulate, *inter alia*, customary practices and land tenure, and which has traditionally been community-specific and orally-related, rather than formally codified. Therefore, considering adat as referring to mainly evolving and oral traditions, the immediate problem arises of its translation into more rigid legal codifications recognised by the state. However, any changes associated with legal codification would echo a long history of transformations effected through the encounters of adat with a variety of influences.

Two main contravening forces have contributed to the erosion, transformation and even the reinvigoration of adat over the course of its history: these being successive
states on the one hand and Islam on the other. In the sense that Islam is a similarly holistic jural, spiritual, and cultural normative system (Abou El Fadl 2012), Islam and adat are often in tension with one another at the local level, as exemplified by Birgit Bräuchler (2010) in her study of Islam and adat in the Moluccas context. But it has been its encounters with successive states that have had the most corrosive but also formative effects on adat in Indonesia.

During the colonial era, the Dutch enacted agrarian laws in 1870 and 1874 which eased commodity development, but at the same time lawfully enabled the territorial dispossession of thousands of swidden farming communities (McWilliam 2006; Peluso & Vandergeest 2001: 775) and comprised a legal assault against all but sedentary ways of living which persists up to the present day in Indonesia in various forms. By the time of the Dutch so-called ‘ethical policy’ in the late colonial era, the enhancement of legal pluralism81 recognised adat zones of authority according to a meticulously categorised typology of racialised cultural groupings. Yet adat remained in tension with the imperatives of economic development and was in practice subjugated to national legal structures. Even if adat was rarely upheld in reality, the epistemic habits of Dutch colonial administrators in their attempts to codify local laws were enough to reinterpret adat sufficiently for McWilliam to argue that “the concept of adat law [became] a reified product of Dutch colonialism” (2006: 49–50). The point here is that adat, rather than being a mystic and unchanging feature of communities of pristine indigeneity has instead been constituted by, and developed in response to, successive state and colonial projects.

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81 In the sense of more than one legal system encompassing a single social area (Peluso & Vandergeest 2001: 765)
If adat law as it stood in the mid-twentieth century had become a product of Dutch rule, the close of the era of Dutch colonisation saw it gradually eroded by the newly independent nationalist regimes (Eghenter 2000: 342–343). Sukarno’s ‘Guided Democracy’ regime sought to streamline the Dutch pluralist legal system, but although its Basic Agrarian Law (BAL) of 1960 continued to recognise adat, at the same time it too effectively subordinated adat to national interests. Further, under Sukarno and then under Suharto’s centralist ‘New Order’ regime, the same development and territorialisation imperatives redolent of the Dutch era persisted and mass disposessions continued.

The dramatic restructuring of authority during the post-Suharto Reformasi era has seen power shift to the local and regional level under district heads (bupati) and village heads (kepala desa). This political restructuring in itself has not forthrightly empowered adat nor halted its erosion in places (McWilliam 2006: 56) as the drive for economic growth, so contingent upon resource extraction in remote rural areas, still tends to be prioritised by local authorities over customary land rights. Nonetheless, the much more dynamic civil society arena has allowed for the resuscitation of adat since the fall of the Suharto regime (see von Benda-Beckmann & von Benda-Beckmann 2012; Tyson 2010). Groups organising around environmental issues and the politics of indigeneity, not least the customary mapping groups themselves, have sought official recognition and protection of customary areas. Most recently, in May of 2013, Forestry Law no. 35 (PUU-X) of 2012 was passed by the Constitutional Court in Indonesia which redefined what had been legally codified as “state customary forest” as simply “customary forest” turning these areas back over to the authority of masyarakat hukum adat (UNORCID 2013).

A number of Constitutional Court rulings leading up to this verdict had also codified the increased acknowledgement of adat in forested, island, and coastal areas, as well
as recognising the need to consult local communities in the development of extractive industries in rural areas. This legal recognition is an important advance in efforts to defend customary lands against the encroachment of corporate activity but as UNORCID (2013) point out, a number of practical questions remain open regarding the clarification of what constitutes customary land and who bears the institutional responsibility of administering claims and disputes.

Further, we can expect the present era of adat revivalism to echo the Dutch colonial era in which adat was transformed by its renewed recognition by external powers. The difference in the contemporary era rests on the number and levels of external influences, ranging from national non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the state to international organisations. Cristina Eghenter (2000: 348–349) notes that the Dayak adat customary concept of *tana ulen*, which covers complex forms of restricted land, became reinterpreted within the ideational frame of the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) as a timeless philosophy of environmental sustainability. In subsequent public discourse the customary chief of one locality, Hulu Bahau, engaged the terminology of the WWF in his explanation of *tana ulen*, which reframed the concept specifically in terms of ecological rejuvenation. As part of such exchanges, the complex meanings of adat terms become transmuted through reflexive translations between organisations and communities.

Overall then, if the promise of adat is the prime disciplining mechanism enacted through counter-mapping then it helps to understand adat as historically contingent and mutable. Most importantly though, adat should be understood as the most dispensable layer in a context of legal pluralism in which the legal protection of national development interests has tended to take precedence. This is important to bear in mind when we consider that all of the efforts communities put into mapping towards the realisation of state recognition of adat land claims take place in a context
in which development imperatives can cause adat claims to ultimately be ignored. At the same time, however, mapping for the legal recognition of claims demands that communities rethink their land use in terms of bordered and parcelled space so that it may be translated into the two dimensional contours of the map. The following section explores this in greater depth within the context of a broader decolonial critique of counter-mapping.

*Market legibility and the impulse to parcel and border*

Decolonial thinkers including Mignolo (2011) have detailed the construction of not only racial hierarchies, but also gendered, aesthetic, epistemic, linguistic, and moral hierarchies, which ultimately become central to forms of governance and social interaction. Turning a decolonial lens on counter-mapping in theory and in practice demands attention to how hierarchies may be overturned or reproduced in relation to the map. To begin with, hierarchies and temporal displacements are reinforced within the counter-mapping theoretical literature itself and the colonial difference emerges on occasion in the presentation of Indigenous and rural people as materially and cognitively ‘behind’. Mohamed and Ventura (2000: 224), for instance, discuss whether “indigenous people” have the “technical knowledge and cognitive ability to analyse and map their land and natural resources in a self-empowering process” [emphasis added] while later alluding to the problems of dealing with what they call a “technologically unsophisticated populace” (*ibid*: 226). These authors make their contribution to the management of the colonial difference by effectively subjugating Indigenous knowledges in the knowledge hierarchy and devaluing Indigenous knowers by evaluating their awareness of hegemonic knowledges rather than of their own distinct expertise.
Such subjugations of Indigenous knowledge lead us to wonder how the literature would read if it began from an inversion of the knowledge hierarchy – from the consideration that subjugated knowledges are superior in many ways and our epistemic tools are simply inadequate in performing the task of unlocking and representing them. Instead the knowledge hierarchy passes largely unchallenged and the colonial difference is unwittingly reproduced. From this view, counter-mapping remains a means of educating those at the bottom of the knowledge hierarchy, as expressed by Lydon (2003) when she states that participatory mapping “opens up cartography to the amateurs” [emphasis also added]. Turning back to the complex land-based ontologies considered above allows us to see two-dimensional liberal cartography in a different way. Diverse social groups like the Dayaks and the Orang Laut understand land and territory in complex, multi-dimensional ways, and translating these understandings through counter-mapping inevitably demands a simplification. In contrast with the view of counter-mapping as an opening to amateurs therefore, it may be considered in the form of a closing, an epistemic domination through which multi-dimensional conceptions of space are reduced to two dimensions of mapped representation implying bordered and parcelled liberal capitalist space.

Furthermore, mapping for legal recognition also usually involves the marking out and delineating of Indigenous land, not just around but also between and within communities. This impulse to border and parcel land is seen as a move towards the individuation of land ownership, which in itself is presented variously as a simplification, a strategy of control, and an assault on communitarian practices and other complex understandings of land (c.f. Mollett 2013; Bryan 2011; Peluso 1995; Roth 2006). This must be considered in relation to historical techniques and patterns.
in the spread of liberal capitalist space in which land is understood as a commodity for individual ownership.

To expand on some of the points made in Chapter Three, the global historical picture has been more often one of liberal advance across distinct and complex land-based ontologies, like those outlined earlier in this chapter in relation to Indonesia’s rural peoples. Scholars from Karl Polanyi (2001 [1944]) to Patrick Wolfe (2001) have recognised the relationships between hegemonic pressure to liberalise land relations, dispossession, and socio-cultural erasure. Polanyi noted that the expansion of colonial territories was in part contingent upon the ‘shattering’ of alternative socio-economic systems through the commercialisation of the land they depend upon (2001 [1944]: 187). The ‘commercialisation of the soil’ gradually effaced land *extra commercium* through successive enclosure acts in what Casanova might have recognised as Western Europe’s own phase of internal colonialism from the sixteenth century onwards. Rehearsed internally and then projected externally, the erasure of land *extra commercium* continues to be realised by postcolonial states on the boundaries of their administrative reach. This picture of Indigenous erasure, pivoting on the extension of liberal capitalist space, is central to what decolonial thinkers like Quijano (2007a) and Mignolo (2000) have termed the *modern colonial system* and has clear echoes in contemporary Indonesia.

When we consider mapping as resistance within this frame however, the interrelations between counter-mapping and liberal space are shown to be highly complex. The Maya cartographers of Southern Belize who ultimately produced the Maya Atlas as a counter-mapping project made popular the motto “map or be mapped” (Parker 2006: 472). The distinction they made was intended to shift the emphasis away from being the *object* of cartographic action towards being its *subject*, and in the process identify the oppositionary nature of the two positions. Yet the outcomes of
‘mapping’ and ‘being mapped’ are similar in the sense they each make Indigenous space legible and governable (see Scott 1998 on legibility; Fox 2002; Sletto 2009; Bauer 2009; Mollett 2013) by exposing human terrain data for military intelligence (Wainwright 2013; Bryan & Wood 2015) or by enhancing what can be described as ‘market legibility’ through the defining of land borders (Roth 2006; Bryan 2011).

To return to consider the geomatic technologies so credited with facilitating the counter-cartography revolution, the very tools and concepts inscribed in these technologies tend to be geared towards private property regimes (Mohamed & Ventura 2000: 224). In this sense, counter-mapping becomes an epistemic problem which facilitates a self-effected advance of the liberal regularisation of land tenure into Indigenous space – effectively a form of self-enclosure. Yet mapping as resistance cannot simply be discredited because it risks aiding the translation to a liberal property regime. This negative aspect must be balanced with the realities of Indigenous engagements with commodity production, as well as with the broader realities and possibilities of forging solidarities against corporate activities.

Complicating these critical understandings, the work of Tania Murray Li has highlighted the instances in which colonial and postcolonial agents of governance have instead imposed communal arrangements on Indigenous communities. Contrary to images of Indigenous landholding as always collective in its ‘natural’ state and subject to erasure by the always-liberalising tendencies of successive state and other governance forces, Li (2010: 387) points out occasions in which a “communal fix” has been imposed by external actors who exclude communities from property arrangements on the grounds that they are unable to inhabit the form of the proper market subject. Governance in these cases can be argued to be working to preclude market participation among communities who are told they are better off adhering to ‘timeless’ communal practices for their own protection. This is another form of
exclusion which is enabled by an unequal power relation of coloniality, and one which causes us to reconsider our understandings of engagements with market interactions by those who are epistemically excluded in state discourse.

The contemporary Indigenous cartographic impulse should be understood in relation to the broader economic context, which Roth notes to be “the expansion of global markets and government policy into areas previously peripheral to government concern; into the territories of indigenous people and rural farmers” (Roth 2006: 49). Market expansion cannot simply be seen as an imposition from above and the dichotomy between indigeneity and capitalist activity has long been a false one. As noted, rural communities have often actively sought “market opportunities” even as state and global agents of governance have on occasion prescribed, in a paternalistic way, their protection from market forces (Li 2010: 385). Communities may then become more receptive to the processual bordering of counter-mapping if they are already compelled by the commodity towards individuated landholding. As Albertus Pramono, a former counter-mapper in Indonesia explained, communities may have ample tools to resolve disputes without introducing mapped borders, but the impulse to border is often sparked not by the map itself but by the commodity:

Without the map they can [resolve disputes] with negotiations through adat. After the map, adat mechanisms can still be strong. It becomes more complicated when there is an economic interest, resources within or across the boundary. The case is usually if they have gold, or certain valuable timbers like ironwood, or if the area is marked for oil palm plantations; then boundaries become contentious.

(Albertus Hadi Pramono, academic and former counter-mapper, interview in Jakarta, July 2014)
Understanding how the map acts, therefore, demands consideration of how it acts within the contextual complexities of commodity production. Pramono adds further detail with regard to how commercial logics have already caused communities to turn towards individuated ways of relating to space in West Kalimantan:

In West Kalimantan individualisation of landed property started with rubber. And also it forced people not to migrate anymore because they have to tend the rubber, before they were more likely to move [...] but rubber forced people to settle. [With rubber] people can still ask the owner to tap the tree and they can basically share the profits. With oil palm I think it’s more fixed than it used to be, because people know the value of money more than they used to, they want a secure income, so the concept of boundaries also changes with oil palm.

(Albertus Hadi Pramono, academic and former counter-mapper, interview in Jakarta, July 2014)

Overall, Pramono suggests that some commodities more than others create the conditions for the cartographic impulse towards fixed bordering to emerge. However, it would be wrong to deduce from this that counter-mapping simply works to ease the deepening of capitalism in rural areas. The following paragraphs add a note of caution in this regard by detailing the productive potential of the mapping method to unite disparate rural interest groups against fairly consistent corporate strategies.

There are wider merits of mapping which must be considered in balance with risks of translation to a liberal ontology and the deepening of capitalism, and these can be considered in terms of building broader alliances against corporate strategies of
expropriation. We can begin here by considering how rural interests may work against one another in Indonesia, with those of peasant groups often found to be at odds with those of Indigenous communities and with both of these contrasting at times with conservation imperatives. The country’s archipelagic geography and diverse tenurial systems also divide rural organisation. Mapping as a resistance method, insofar as it can be rolled out across the archipelago in a common form, still has the potential to unite fragmented rural communities against fairly homogenous corporate power. Overall frustration with this fragmented resistance to violent rural evictions has been described by Dianto Bachriadi:

> When you’re talking about the evictions, appropriations, exploitation, everyone is facing the same problems [...] Take one or two big plantation companies, like Wilmar or Sinarmas, they operate in many areas of Indonesia – Kalimantan, Sumatra, Sulawesi – in those areas the same conflict occurs, so why don’t the people who have conflict with Sinarmas in Sumatra communicate with people who have conflict with Sinarmas in Sulawesi? They face the same enemy with the same tactics. Okay, so the land tenure system [differs] but we’re not talking about the difference in how they regulate their own tenurial systems, we’re talking about dealing with similar mechanisms of eviction, similar mechanisms of expropriation, similar mechanisms of grabbing land.

(Dianto Bachriadi, interview in Jakarta, July 2014)
Bachriadi alludes to the fact that across Indonesia nature-based companies, especially palm oil corporations, operate according to relatively homogenous corporate strategies. Techniques of land appropriation are rehearsed, refined, and repeated across the archipelago, as well as brought in from and practiced abroad. Singapore-based oil palm giant Wilmar, for instance, had acquired close to 250,000 hectares of plantation estates by the end of 2013, 71 per cent of which was located within Indonesian territory, a further 25 per cent on Malaysian soil, and a final five per cent of its plantations were on the African continent, principally under its new operations in Ghana (Wilmar 2015). Yet, while the operations of a corporation such as Wilmar gain in national and transnational coherence by building logical interconnections and homogenising practices, resistance to corporate appropriation of land is becoming more fragmented along the lines of rural interest politics. At the same time, political representation has become more localised in Indonesia since the implementation of decentralisation reforms over the Reformasi period. In other words, broad corporate strategic coherence is not met with an integrated social and political response.

As an example of this fragmentation, one fault line can be observed between the Indigenous movement and the peasant movement. The Indigenous movement is largely consolidated nationally under AMAN and around the objective of the strengthening of adat customary law. The peasant movement, in contrast, is broadly in favour of the strengthening of Indonesia’s Basic Agrarian Law (BAL - on which see Lucas & Warren 2013). Peasant activists’ deeply rooted belief in the social function of BAL and its compatibility with adat law is exhibited by Gunawan Wiradi:
The young generation misperceive the relation between BAL and customary law. The idea of our founding fathers was that our national agrarian policy should be based on adat law, but this is not to revive the old adat. [Instead] adat law should be modernised and we should not just imitate the land ownership concept from the West. That is why we scrapped the so-called eigendom – that is, absolute property – so, we have no ideas about absolute property, lands should have a social function, so that private ownership is constrained by the social function.

(Gunawan Wiradi, academic and former Chairman of the Basic Agrarian Law Committee, Interview in Bogor, July 2014)

An additional fragmenting factor is that there is no single AMAN-like consolidated body for peasant activists but instead a number of national peasant organisations. Further, decentralisation has facilitated direct local politics (see, for example, Tyson 2010), but local struggles have come at the expense of logical interconnections being made nationwide. Bachriadi’s comments suggest that this has happened to the extent that companies like Wilmar are treated in a sense like local actors as they are countered through localised struggles.

As Abdul, co-founder of one Indonesian mapping organisation explained in 2014, his group served to unite environmental and agrarian activists around a common project: “We all had different backgrounds, agrarian activists, environmental activists, conservation...” And, unlike other organisations which seek to counter rural exploitation, this project is organised around a methodology which does not require allegiance to a particular rural ideology. To the contrary, however, organising around an ostensibly neutral methodology risks a disorientation in the political direction of
the organisation itself. To illustrate how this might be the case, the following paragraphs give an example of the provision of mapping training to state agencies, an engagement which is suggestive of this political drift on the part of the mapping organisation involved.

One form of mapping training observed for this study involved what was described as 'land use and spatial planning training for local authority agencies' in a district of Central Kalimantan. A number of state agencies were represented, including BAPPENAS (the Ministry of National Development Planning) and the Ministry of Environment and Forestry. Yet, state agencies necessarily have distinct interests from rural communities; they may operate in the guise of protection but are perceived more often to protect corporate interests (as expressed by Albertus Hadi Pramono, interview in Jakarta, July 2014). In fact, the state recipients of participatory mapping training observed expressed their discontent after the four-day training sessions. This unease was directed at the particular mapping methods engaged which involve only a single act of mapping with the community, before the technology is taken away again. Kevin explained his objection to this:

I think it’s better if [the communities] keep the technology [...] with the technology they can minimise potential conflict [over borders]. And for us it’s easier, we can concentrate on other things, managing the natural resources. Local people can help, they are the nearest to the land. It’s easier for us if we have the data from the people so we don’t have to spend money to go to the village. They can send reports to us and maybe we can just go occasionally.

( Kevin, state employee, interview in Central Kalimantan, July 2014)
On the whole, the state employees, rather than conceiving of mapping as a tool of resistance for communities against corporate encroachment, envisaged it more as a means of making communities cooperate in the exposure of much more detailed human land use data for the purpose of easing the task of land management for the state. This would essentially mean engaging the services of rural populations, free of labour costs, and allowing for the reduction of state resources at the same time. Overall, the degree of state involvement in mapping, the risk of exposing more data to the state for purposes of control, as well as the fact that mapping is geared towards seeking recognition by the state are all important to bear in mind when evaluating mapping as resistance. These key points relating to the state return us to a key difference between the ‘cartographic impulse’ identified by Said as central to anticolonial struggles against the state, and the contemporary cartographic impulse which tends to engage the state, accepting its normative authority and seeking its legal assistance. Counter-mapping, from this perspective, becomes an affirmation of state territorial sovereignty beyond its former administrative reaches.

There are also problems relating to what is effected during the mapping process which were not mentioned by the advocates of mapping consulted for this study. To begin with, the process risks reifying or magnifying existing power relations, not just within communities, along status or gender lines for instance, but also between the communities and the mappers themselves. Rural communities under threat of eviction are rooted in peasant and Indigenous social bases, whereas mapping facilitators tend to be metropolitan actors, as Albertus Pramono explained in July of 2014:
The usual social base of the mapping facilitators is a social science background and [they are] mostly urban-based social movement activists, usually they have graduated from university so they are mainly urban middle class. If they come from the villages they are already urban educated, so they might have been up to junior high school in the villages, but then they would have moved to the city.

(Albertus Hadi Pramono, academic and former counter.mapper, interview in Jakarta, July 2014)

Furthermore, counter-mapping organisations are controlled and networked from metropolitan centres in Indonesia, and therefore come to function as structures through which metropolitan cultures speak for provincial areas. Perhaps this metropolitan imagination in itself also lends a predilection for fixed bordering. This brings us back to the critical processual issue mentioned earlier in the chapter relating to the emphasis placed on liberal divisions by mapping facilitators, who approach land conflict as though it can be solved by solidifying borders around, between, and within communities. This is evidently antithetical to the understandings of borders traditionally held by diverse nomadic and communitarian groups detailed earlier in the chapter, and, as noted, socialising communities into notions of fixed bordering risks the parcelling of land may make expropriation easier in the future. When beginning from the liberal metropolitan imagination bordering becomes a prominent and obvious solution, yet beginning from, say, the Orang Laut or Dayak imagination outlined above might first involve drawing on a host of other tools for resolving conflict.
Conclusion

This final empirical chapter sets out the existent complexities of mapping as resistance to rural land dispossession and its implied forms of social translation in Indonesia. It began by setting out an understanding of rural resource frontiers as sites of extraction within an emerging market setting, where concentrations of corporate capital in nature-based and extractives industries provoke dispossession and contestations. Further identified here is a broad regime of difference which serves to exclude the Indigenous *masyarakat terasing*, more recently known as KAT communities, from the normalised figure of the Indonesian national subject. Such an exclusion groups together highly complex social worlds which are characterised by diverse land-based ontologies, examples of which have been detailed in the paragraphs above. Situated in relation to this regime of difference, counter-mapping ostensibly works against modes of dispossession which are enabled by forms of exclusion based on hierarchised difference. However, the way this kind of cartographic resistance functions in practice is complicated by the orientation of mapping towards legal recognition by the state as well as by the liberal roots of the map itself.

Distinct from the anticolonial cartographic impulse described by Said, Indigenous mapping is motivated by the protective promise of adat law, despite its historically contingent, negotiated, and ultimately vulnerable nature within a system of legal pluralism. Counter-mapping’s associated impulse to border and parcel land risks the erasure of land *extra commercium* and the translation of complex land-based ontologies into a liberal property regime, bringing market legibility. Yet this is sometimes desired by communities and may relate to a particular existing commodity impulse, rather than being the product of the map itself. Further, the coloniality of counter-mapping (and much of the academic literature which narrates it) is apparent
in its failure to flatten or invert hierarchies. Indigenous knowledge and ways of relating to land are simply not catered for by dominant forms of counter-mapping in Indonesia, which do not provide a neutral technical fix, as is implicit, but instead begin from a liberal foundation. The map remains, therefore, an epistemic problem.

For mapping to work more effectively against coloniality, understood here as manifested through forms of translation, it would need to begin with a full exploration of the ideology inscribed in cartographic technologies so that comprehensive informed disclosure can be made to communities participating in mapping, especially in relation to its limitations in the representation of complex Indigenous tenurial systems. Beyond this, for mapping to meaningfully ‘counter’, cartographic theorists and the developers of geomatic spatial technologies should begin again using the land-based ontologies of communities beyond capitalist space as a point of departure. I suggest here that a radical thought experiment is in order which begins from the land-based ways of being of those who wish to defend themselves against the coloniality of liberal capitalist space. Counter-mapping, along with other technologies of resistance, should be in full recognition of the right to being otherwise.
Chapter Nine
Concluding Discussion

To end this thesis by returning to the beginning, I will echo the claims and contributions set out in Chapter One. First of all, in this research I sought to expand the possibilities of decolonial IPE by means of an examination of coloniality in Indonesia’s optimistic emerging market context. I claim to make this expansion through the analysis of difference-based exclusion and translation, both as vital elements of coloniality, and as processes which relate to accumulation and dispossession. Studying these through urban and rural sites of extraction, rather than through an undifferentiated national analytic, reveals the dynamics of enclosure on Indonesia’s internal frontiers where social groups are materially and discursively excluded from the national project.

The condition of market emergence, I claim here, should be understood in historical colonial perspective as the latest mode of producing Indonesia as an investible site for international capital. Furthermore, rather than simply describing an empirical reality, the term ‘emerging market’ may be understood as the contemporary organising grammar which positions Indonesia in relation to international capital flows. In addition, my contribution to the ethics of method is made through the development of a reflexive field informed approach as a means of conducting fieldwork-based research across (post)colonial power relations. I further claim to present unique interview material from conversations with residents from kampung neighbourhoods, mapping activists from across the archipelago, corporate actors, as well as prominent figures in Indonesian public debates around land and urban rights.
In its final form, then, this thesis makes contributions to the literature on decolonial thought and IPE, at the same time as presenting an original examination of Indonesia in its present moment of market emergence. The remainder of this final chapter will reflect on these claims, draw the sites of study into comparative perspective, and point out key shortfalls as well as openings for further research.

*Decolonising IPE*

Each doctoral thesis is in itself a play of sorts. By means of the chapter contents and the interview and imagery material included, the characters are chosen, the acts are determined, and the scenery is displayed to achieve a certain effect. The scenes, the plot, and the characters may be real, factual, and living; however, the selection and arrangement of these allows for significant variation in the portrayal of their story. Chapter One demonstrated that the preferred emplotment of Indonesia when staged as an IPE ‘drama’ casts elite factions as the main characters in a plot dominated by the external pressures of neoliberalisation. The final scene in such studies often serves to locate Indonesia as a particular type of state to be classified alongside ‘patrimonial’ states in Africa. This doctoral study, by contrast, is set along the urban and resource frontiers which are so central to processes of capitalist valorisation and value extraction, and it casts as protagonists those who are rendered expropriatable in this new moment of market emergence. It is, in part, this shift in casting which allows me to present this thesis as a decolonial study.

However, in the final analysis, by means of controlling the scenery, the characters to be included or excluded, and their precise emplotment, I became what Morgan Stanley is to emerging market investments, that is, the ultimate arbiter of this particular representation of Indonesia. Regardless of how far the theorists included speak from
racialised and colonised positions, or how much those interviewed for the thesis are usually marginalised or silenced in mainstream IPE narrations of Indonesia, the overall performance is nonetheless mediated by a white researcher situated in the (former) imperial core of the Global North. This is inevitably the overarching tension of the thesis and this I duly recognise. It is for the reader to decide whether this negates the merits of the insights of this study into the changing apparatus of coloniality in the present and its historical formation.

At the same time, I do not present this thesis as a series of criticisms of Indonesia itself, nor of the Indonesian people. Instead I want to suggest that my main target for critique is Europe, not in the bounded geographical sense but in the Fanonian sense of ‘Europe’ as a globalised system of knowledge, economics, liberal property relations, and other means through which modes of colonial oppression continue to be reproduced. In this sense the thesis feeds into a global story about the reproduction of such modes of oppression across the world’s urban and resource frontiers. We might be reminded here of Fanon’s appeal to:

Leave this Europe where they are never done talking of Man, yet murder men everywhere they find them, at the corner of every one of their own streets, in all corners of the globe. [...] Europe undertook the leadership of the world with ardour, cynicism and violence. Look at how the shadow of her palaces stretches out even farther! Every one of her movements has burst the bounds of space and thought.

(Fanon 1967a: 251)
True to Fanon’s prognosis, Europe is everywhere and continues to reproduce through colonial modes of expansion. The ‘shadow of her palaces’ stretches out across the globe and her ‘movements’, such as liberal property relations, have ‘burst the bounds of space and thought’. This thesis has therefore examined, in the Indonesian context, how the colonial conditions of inclusion, exclusion, dispossession, and translation of ways of being continue to be reproduced so long after the era of independence from formal European control.

Throughout this thesis, I have also endeavoured to stay faithful to a decolonial mode of scholarship in various respects, despite my problematic position as ultimate arbiter. Decolonial work is, on the whole, committed to decentring the Europe Fanon speaks of by means of the recovery of the scholarship of Indigenous, racialised, and colonised intellectuals who are ordinarily evacuated from mainstream research. Knowledge production in the decolonial mode thus maintains a focus on ending the dominance of provincial Western knowledge over the universal, as well as on ending the hierarchical ordering of knowledge and knowers which subordinates or excludes knowledge produced outside of the dominant Western cosmology. My main interlocutors throughout this thesis can be said to have produced knowledge from racialised and colonised positions, as in the cases of Syed Hussein Alatas and Sylvia Wynter, or otherwise from a position of deep scholarly reflection on race and the colonial question, as in the case of Patrick Wolfe. As such, I present this thesis as a decolonial work in line with a broader ethico-political turn in scholarship which is not necessarily confined to the school of modernity/coloniality, as most famously characterised by the work of Mignolo, but instead draws from broader scholarship on the colonial question.

This research does, however, remain faithful to many of the core concerns of the decolonial school of Mignolo and others, including Anibal Quijano. Quijano’s central problematic, for instance, was the production of a “violent concentration of resources”
(Quijano 2007a: 168) both through colonialism and through coloniality beyond the era of formal independence. This central consideration leads to a deeper reflection on what colonialism and coloniality constitute, with a particular focus on the expropriation of knowledge and resources; the systematic repression of ways of knowing and of producing knowledge; and also the imposition of the colonisers’ own way of being. A related concern has thus been the treatment of difference in the service of accumulation. Decolonial work has considered the classification of peoples along lines of difference, the hierarchical ordering of such classifications and the material result of such hierarchies. Accordingly, within this thesis I consider how difference is treated in ways which serve to bring about the discursive and material exclusion of certain social groups from the normalised Indonesian figure. The particular groups studied here were identified as Papuans, the rural ‘isolated people’, and the urban poor who are all excluded in the service of dispossession and, ultimately, in the service of an ever more imbalanced concentration of resources. This thesis thus presents a decolonial examination of the condition of market emergence largely by means of engagement with the expressions of these excluded, and therefore repeatedly expropriated, groups on Indonesia’s internal frontiers.

*The condition of market emergence*

This research goes against the grain of scholarship which represents the condition of market emergence in the global economy as, firstly, a straightforward empirical reality and, in addition, an optimistic condition in which economic growth is to be uncritically celebrated. Instead, I understand the emerging market discourse to be the present-day means by which Indonesia is made investible; in other words, it is the contemporary organising grammar which positions the archipelago in relation to
international capital flows. As explored in Chapter Five, comparable active political projects to direct capital to Indonesia have featured throughout its colonial and independence history. Examining this history of how the archipelago has been made and remade as a site of investment reveals the patterns repeated in both the means of producing investibility and the kinds of transformations and contestations such capital influxes provoke.

The fifth chapter therefore offered a consideration of the innovations of the Dutch East India Company, or VOC, which gradually drew the archipelago into a highly imbalanced economic power relation with Europe, first through its actions as monopoly merchant trader and then as sovereign governor of the Dutch East Indies. The Cultivation System on Java, established under Dutch sovereign rule over the VOC’s former territories, was then the first means by which international capital could be drawn intensively into the Dutch East Indies, and this set the precedent for plantation economy systems on other islands. Through this extensive development of plantation estates, the Dutch East Indies became more integrated into a global market economy and increasingly drew in direct investment from abroad. Plantation estates ultimately made for a transformative intervention in social and ecological life on Java and Sumatra, which converted the islands into rationalised and racialised landscapes characterised by ethnicity-based settlements.

By contrast, independence in the mid-twentieth century brought a commitment to a Third Worldist ethos of cultivating relations ‘sideways’ without reliance on the imperial core. However, it is disputed how far this was ever meaningfully realised and by the 1960s under the new Suharto administration, Indonesia was actively seeking to open a new phase of corporate transnationalism, beginning with a lucrative West Papua mining contact with the US firm Freeport McMoRan. By the 1980s, investment managers in the US were looking to innovate the way in which the Global South was
marketed to investors and thus sought to erase the term ‘Third World’ from financial discourse in order to replace it with the optimistic and future-oriented term ‘emerging markets’.

The HSBC advert featured in Figure 5.2 within Chapter Five proclaims that: “In the Future, there will be no markets left waiting to emerge” (HSBC 2013). It is curious to note that the word ‘Future’ is capitalised here as if were a proper noun, perhaps a person or a place, rather than simply a temporal marker. This is ironic in a sense because this is precisely what the emerging market discursive project is intended to do; it is, in effect, a *capitalisation* on the future in the sense of “rendering the future available in the present” (see Mitchell 2015) by means of investment projects. In other words, the real, material, capital ‘F’ ‘Future’ becomes a materialised place in the present, such as a copper mine or an urban commercial superblock, rather than an unknown condition to be anticipated.

Another important observation on the condition of market emergence is that this is not simply a stage a country passes through *en route* to developed country status. As noted in Chapter Five, in some cases ‘emerging market’ economic performance has surpassed that of ‘developed’ economies, yet the respective labels remain unchallenged. The only fluidity appears to be between the labels of emerging market and *submerging* market, with the latter ascribed when investment agents name a declining economic trend (see Financial Times 2013). As such, emerging market economies remain in a fluid space in which emergence and submergence are both possible, but being fully ‘emerged’ or ‘developed’ appears to be out of reach. This is an unstable domain in comparison with the assumed relative stability of ‘developed’ economies. I therefore proposed that the term ‘emerging market’ functions as a racial signifier and a marker of hierarchical distinction which is, in some cases, grounded in no differential economic correlate. I also put forward the contradictory dual functions
of this term, first as an indication of inclusion within the circuits of international
capital mobility, but also as a marker of exclusion from the world of developed
markets.

On the whole, then, the condition of market emergence is broadly understood here
in historical colonial relation as a discursive and material reconfiguration of
Indonesia’s investibility in the present. It is a fluid condition in which ‘submergence’
is a possibility if a downward economic trend is identified, and yet not so fluid in the
sense that positive economic performance does not mean automatic entry to
developed status. The emerging market condition further involves the materialisation
of the future in the present by means of investment on urban and rural frontiers. Yet
this also involves the concurrent repression of those who are ascribed the past tense
and are thus made expropriatable, suffering repeated displacement as a result. This
condition further echoes the ways in which past movements to make the archipelago
investible have transformed the landscapes and social worlds of the islands in the
service of international capital. The condition of market emergence, I further propose
here in the context of Indonesia, involves the closure of urban and resource frontiers
along (raced) lines of difference. This difference is made central to present-day
coloniality in the form of exclusion and related modes of dispossession and
translation.

*Considering market emergence through sites of extraction*

I began work on this thesis by thinking about market emergence through the
dynamics of dispossession at both urban and rural sites of extraction. In part, this was
a means to draw the urban and the rural into the same analytical frame when they are
so often treated separately within Urban Studies and Political Ecology, or otherwise
subsumed within the national analytic of some work within IPE. The extension of the concept of extraction, usually associated with rural nature-based industries, to include modes of capitalist valorisation in the city has made for a productive way of thinking through urban-rural commonalities and connections. I came to understand extraction both in the more familiar sense of processes which convert commodity material into value to be extracted, but also as transformative contemporary processes of urban investment which produce spaces of consumption.

My observations of the kampungs of Jakarta and rural resource-rich areas like West Papua suggest that there are clear commonalities in the terminable condition of material life in those sites. Across urban and rural areas there are comparable means of discursive and physical exclusion deployed which serve to render populations expropiatable. This, in turn, leads to their dispossession and associated modes of translation, but also to new and recovered modes of resistance. Now that the thesis is written, I have also come to understand such sites of extraction as *internal frontiers*, which returns me to the 1997 text of Ann Laura Stoler on *Sexual Affronts and Racial Frontiers*. As a long-time scholar of colonial and postcolonial Indonesia, Stoler has stressed the relevance of exclusionary practices within colonial and national forms of governance. She builds on both Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Etienne Balibar to consider the notion of an “interior frontier” as the location of exchange, passage, and enclosure. Further:

> When coupled with the word *interior*, frontier carries the sense of internal distinctions within a territory (or empire); at the level of the individual, frontier marks the moral predicates by which a subject retains his or her
national identity despite location outside the national frontier and despite heterogeneity within the nation-state.

(Stoler 1997: 199, drawing also on Fichte quoted in Balibar 1990: 4 [emphasis in the original])

In accord with Stoler, then, I have come to consider interior frontiers as sites of challenge to the national subject, where exclusions are produced, as well as sites of enclosure and dispossession. Reading rural and urban terminable sites of extraction as interior frontiers thus compels reflection on how intense capital investment and extraction articulate with forms of discursive and material exclusion in the service of dispossession. In the final analysis, extraction is understood in this thesis to be inherently dispospossessory and to contribute to the closure of internal frontiers, as well as the contestation of such closures, provoking struggles over spatially-grounded social and political ontologies.

Inclusion/exclusion as the conjure of coloniality

Colonialism is itself often broadly understood as the domination of one society over another, enacted through the forced inclusion of the colonised society into a dominant order. However, my emphasis in this thesis has been on the less examined aspect of colonialism and of post-independence coloniality as exclusion. This paradoxical and simultaneous inclusion and exclusion may be seen as the specific conjure of colonialism/coloniality. Thinking back to the work of Sylvia Wynter outlined in Chapter Three on the ways in which an accepted figure of the human/subject is constructed by each social order; this sociogenic way of understanding social relations
has informed the conceptualisation of exclusion throughout this thesis. Those outside of this normalised figure are subject to dehumanising exclusions which create and maintain a regime of difference in which people are rendered removable. The work of Patrick Wolfe, as well as that of Chakravartty and Silva, have similarly focused on the ways in which governance through exclusion renders a social group expropriatable, or even exterminable. The work of these scholars enriches our understanding of exclusion as a mode of colonial governance, and of governance in the coloniality of the present.

The claim I therefore want to emphasise here is that exclusions across diverse forms of difference have in common a relation to processes of exploitation, as well as to dispossession and various other forms of translation. The role of difference-based forms of exclusion is broadly missing from work such as Harvey’s (2004) understanding of accumulation by dispossession, but well understood by Chakravartty and Silva (2012) in relation to the context of the subprime crisis. In order to bring difference-based forms of exclusion into the analysis, I therefore began with a research question formulated as: (how) are communities excluded from the normalised trope of the human/subject in Indonesia? This question was informed by sociogenic thinking which maintains that the proper mode of being in any society is prescribed both discursively and materially, referring again to what Sylvia Wynter (2001), following Fanon (1967b), refers to as the sociogenic principle, or the normalised sense of the self in any given social order.

Exclusions from the normalised figure of the human/subject were first explored in the urban context in Chapter Six. In Jakarta, as the ‘exemplary centre’ of Indonesia, or the material embodiment of the order of an emerging market economy, the opulent superblock has come to dominate urban life. If subjectivity is made, in part, through urban material, the residents of Jakarta are produced as the investor/overconsumer
figures of Man through the overrepresentation of commercial buildings. Luxury malls and condominiums both produce the ideal subject of Jakarta and actively exclude the urban poor. This exclusion is both a subjective perception, in the sense of not ‘fitting in’ with the wealthy consumer crowd the mall is designed to attract, and also a physical reality, as security can prevent people from entering at all. At the same time, the kampungs of Jakarta are persistently produced as terminable, under constant threat of eviction. The intended meaning of space in Jakarta may be evident through these overrepresentations and erasures. However, the subjectivity of those living through Jakarta’s urban space is by no means wholly determined in this way. This was made clear by means of the discussion in Chapter Six of kampung residents’ modes of contesting exclusions and prohibitions through mapping and performances as modes of making claims to their already-human status.

Across Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight, key exclusions along lines of difference were identified to be central to forms of expropriation in Indonesia’s current moment of market emergence. Aside from the more obvious exclusions provoked by built material and by evictions in Jakarta, in Chapter Six I employed the concept of the ‘slum-line’ to refer to the ways in which the urban poor are excluded from the normalised figure of the Jakarta subject. I emphasised how middle class and elite expressions presented the urban poor as improper economic subjects and therefore as persons without a place in productive and consumer life. This perception of the urban poor helps to make them expropriatable and thus becomes the condition of possibility for their dispossession.

The discursive exclusion of the urban poor is further articulated with a material exclusion created in part by the Jakarta ID card system which indicates who has a right to reside in the capital. A lack of proper identification has led to the ‘deportation’ of persons from the Jakarta urban area in the past and determines whether residents
have any right to social housing after eviction. Evictions themselves, as always violent processes, are another means of reinforcing the exclusion of a particular social group from the city.

In the rural context, a more codified epistemic exclusion has also been produced to exclude the *masyarakat terasing* (isolated people) or, more latterly, *komunitas adat terpencil* (or KAT ‘remote adat communities’, see KEMENSOS 2010). This exclusion stems from an active state-anthropological project to identify groups whose ways of being are understood to place them outside of the frames of what is considered to be an acceptable Indonesian ontology. Animist and nomadic ways of life, for instance, are considered inferior to those which follow the state-recognised religions and observe sedentary ways of being. The classification of ‘isolated people’ in this way serves to reproduce the ascriptive tendencies of European colonisers in the treatment of difference. It further forms the basis for interventions to ‘open’ such communities to the broader Indonesian social and economic way of life. Acciaoli (2001) has explicitly referred to this treatment of difference in Indonesia as internal imperialism but here I understand it as a key aspect of contemporary coloniality.

Indigenous Papuans are largely considered also to be *masyarakat terasing*. However, the treatment of Papuan difference has produced a broader form of exclusion which extends across Papuans living both within and at odds with state-accepted ways of being. The exclusion of Papuans from the normalised figure of the human/subject, and from present historical time, is therefore considered explicitly in this thesis as their racialisation. Chapter Seven noted how a concert of colonial, state, religious, and corporate agents have participated in the temporal and hierarchical ordering of Papuan difference in order to signify their ‘backward’ and ‘inferior’ status. As with so many colonised peoples across the world, this constructed status has been
employed as the justification for colonial, corporate, and ‘development’ interventions in Papuan social worlds.

My focus in Chapter Seven was largely on the role of corporate agents from the extractives firm Freeport McMoRan who made their own contribution to the racialising narratives which justified Papuan expropriation. Freeport’s contribution to the making of a political economy of exclusion in West Papua is important in at least two respects. Firstly, these discursive exclusions have since been translated into spatial exclusions in the mining contract area controlled by Freeport itself. Secondly, Freeport was the first corporation to sign a contract with the Indonesian government after the mass killings and the subsequent opening of Indonesia to corporate transnationalism in the mid-1960s. This contract gave the company the right to mine West Papuan minerals a full two years before Papuan sovereignty was ceded to Indonesia by means of the corrupt Act of Free Choice. Freeport has therefore been the beneficiary of both the forced inclusion and discursive exclusion of Papuans within and from the dominant Indonesian order.

Each of these forms of difference-based exclusion of the urban poor, rural Indigenous, and racialised Papuans in their degrees of formality and codification are understood here to reproduce the colonial difference – a discursive displacement into the past which is then used to justify interventions and forms of expropriation. At the same time, the fact that the active creation of new forms of exclusion through which populations can be governed has occurred in tandem with the Indonesian era of formal decolonisation indicates a key shortcoming in the way decolonisation has been enacted as an emancipatory project. Understanding exclusion, I therefore claim here, is vital to understanding how coloniality functions in the present in the reproduction of colonial modes of expropriation.
Translation, negotiation, resistance

If colonialism brought radical transformations in the ways of being of the colonised, such that it made for the translation of incommensurable social worlds into the dominant order, then how can we read the complex forms of translation occurring under the coloniality of the present? As the research for this thesis progressed I came to consider translation to be very closely related to exclusion in the sense that exclusions from the human/subject enable intervention and expropriation-related forms of translation. I also came to consider translation, not as a totalising moment of ‘fatal impact’, but as a negotiated and resisted process which is never quite complete. Translation, I will also suggest, is sometimes strategically welcomed, as in the case of the Dayak selective adoption of liberal land relations in Kalimantan in order to produce a particular commodity for the wider market.

My guiding research questions in relation to translation were worded as follows: *How are translations threatened or enacted in the social worlds of the excluded? And what kind of translations are threatened or enacted?* And, in the final analysis, the forms of translation threatened or enacted across the three sites studied varied greatly in form, complexity, and intensity. Across both urban and rural frontiers, I suggest that spatially-grounded ways of being are endangered or ended by dispossession of land and shelter. There are, therefore, interesting parallels to be drawn between rural and urban experiences in Indonesia which merit their consideration within the same frame.

In Chapter Six we saw how the kampungs of Jakarta have a specific spatiality which enables socio-economic life to continue in its particular form. Most kampung dwellings incorporate some form of economic space, such as a small shop, workshop, or food production unit, and living space is often of secondary importance to this.
Further, social support networks, and especially gendered forms of mutual support, develop in relation to the layout of the kampung. Eviction and relocation to social housing for those deemed eligible therefore provokes a translation of the kampung way of being into a distinct mode of living. Social housing provides living space only, ending the informal economic activity of kampung residents and leaving them mainly dependent on the labour market. Social networks are also broken down and disbursed which ends immanent forms of mutual aid and political organisation.

In rural areas, the enclosure of land *extra commercium* continues through state and corporate expropriation of land along resource frontiers. The colonial extension of liberal capitalist space has involved an often integrated process of both land and labour expropriation from Indigenous populations and this continues under the coloniality of the present in Indonesia. In Chapter Eight I considered some of the highly complex land-based ontologies across Indonesia’s vast archipelago which are centred on ways of relating to land which are completely at odds with liberal capitalist understandings of land-as-property. These are examples of the incommensurable social worlds which are in danger of undergoing significant translation if dispossession draws them into the dominant order.

My discussion of counter-mapping in Chapter Eight showed that, even though this activity is placed squarely as a mode of resistance to the extension of liberal capitalist space through state and corporate land-grabs, in reality the map is a liberal technology which itself risks translation into a liberal property regime. Communities are encouraged through mapping to consider their land in terms of borders and individual parcels – a way of understanding land which is often at odds with more complex communitarian forms of land relations.

Forms of translation in West Papua, as observed in Chapter Seven, have been diverse, and often violent and extreme. My analysis concentrated particularly on the
contract areas and surroundings of Freeport’s Grasberg gold and copper mine in the highlands of West Papua where mining operations and infrastructure have intensely disrupted the Indigenous population. Freeport interventions in local value systems were traced from the original incursions by early company agents who paid Papuans in low-cost ‘inducement goods’ to aid company explorations of remote ore-rich sites, through to the more recent distribution of sacks of cash to villages in the area. As such, Papuan translation into a cash economy in the area has been mediated through the actions of the company.

Chapter Seven also noted how the exclusion of Papuans from the figure of the human/subject has in part been produced through the presentation of their understandings of intimacy as morally inferior. From early colonial missionaries to present-day Indonesian state actors, various agents have similarly figured Papuans outside of the frames of the proper moral subject, thus justifying interventions to encourage Papuan translation to monogamous practices. I considered this in relation to claims from company employees that Freeport had been complicit in establishing industrial-scale prostitution within its contract area. I read the development of industrial prostitution as an active market-making project which ultimately serves to normalise understandings of woman-as-commodity within the social space of the site of extraction. Ironically, it was in part the racialisation of Papuans in relation to their ‘inferior’ understandings of intimacy which cleared the brush for Freeport’s involvement in the area in the first place.

Extraction in West Papua is often considered in relation to the dispossession caused by the establishment of extractive operations and the toxic ecology around the tailings area. However, beyond and in relation to this, varying and contradictory interventions in Papuan social worlds have disrupted understandings of intimacy, as well as social systems of value and exchange. Around the Freeport site in West Papua, as well as
across the broader resource frontiers and terminable urban neighbourhoods of Jakarta, various modes of translation are threatened or enacted. These range from translations in economic life, such as increased reliance on formal labour markets, to translations in ways of relating to the land; and from translations in social support structures to translations in understandings of intimacy. As such, I make the claim here that the coloniality of the present can be read through the instability of alternative ontologies under the assimilative pressure of the dominant order.

Final words

As I draw the writing of this thesis to a close, the burning season is only just opening across the plantation landscapes of the Indonesian archipelago. During the burning season in 2015, more than 100,000 forest and peatland fires, lit to clear the ground for oil palm plantations, were estimated to emit more carbon dioxide than the annual output of the UK (see Greenpeace 2015; Guardian 2015). There is, therefore, a story left untold in this thesis about the local and global ecological harm caused in this moment of market emergence which also has its roots in a colonial plantation economy history. This would merit further research into the relationship between dimensions of ecological harm, emerging market investment, and the dynamics of exclusion and dispossession on resource frontiers.

A further story which is untold, or at least under-told, in this thesis is one of gendered difference and how this intersects with other forms of difference-based exclusion and oppression. Chapter Six revealed the gendered forms of immanent politics which have emerged in the Jakarta kampungs, while Chapter Seven revealed how gendered power functions in the corporate production of industrial prostitution in West Papua. Further research with a more central gender focus would need to be
carried out in order to consider forms of difference more closely in relation to one another. Such research might consider which forms of difference are prior, as well as how they intersect within processes of dispossession and accumulation at frontier sites of extraction. It might also forward a more sophisticated analysis of the ways in which gender, class, and race are produced in relation to one another and in relation to economic processes.

Despite these under-told stories, I believe this thesis makes its own contributions to various debates, both within IPE and in relation to work on the colonial question. I have argued elsewhere that matters of political economy should be of concern for any pursuit of decolonial science, considering that we are all embedded within a colonial economy of knowledge production which reproduces patterns of value extraction from the Global South to the Global North (Tilley forthcoming b). Within this thesis I make a complementary case for an IPE attuned to decolonial science, with a particular focus on the reproduction of colonial modes of expropriation.

My appeals in these final paragraphs are for the following. Firstly, I appeal for a decolonial IPE which recognises the multiple dimensions of market emergence and resources-led growth in terms of the new productions of dispossession and expropriation these enact. I have made the case for these dispossessory dimensions of market emergence to be understood in relation to a long history of political projects productive of investibility and related socio-economic transformations. Secondly, I appeal for a decolonial IPE which deepens our understanding of how discursive and material forms of exclusion enable processes of dispossession and translation in the service of accumulation. Exclusion on the basis of degrees of difference has been central to colonial governance and continues to be the condition of possibility for expropriation in the present, as the examination of Indonesia’s internal frontiers in this thesis suggests.
Thirdly, and in relation, if the long centuries of European colonialism involved the honing of governance through exclusion, my final appeal is to find the means to work against the reproduction of coloniality in the form of difference-based exclusion in the present. One failure of IPE has been to reproduce an uncritical celebration of market emergence without considering how ways of being ‘otherwise’ are excluded and translated in the process of growth creation in an emerging market. Sylvia Wynter added her voice to that of Fanon and Césaire in an appeal for a reconstructed and planetary humanism which works against, rather than reproduces, sociogenic forms of negation. The combined call of those living on terminable frontiers of extraction is, similarly, one of “we are already human, in our multiple ways of being”. Papuan, other Indigenous, and kampung voices continue making their claims to humanity and upon humanity in defiance of colonial modes of exclusion. They are also warning us, as are so many in terminable sites of extraction across the globe, that the condition of life as repeated displacement is, quite simply, unbearable.
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### Appendix I: Glossary of Terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adat</td>
<td>Customary law and practice</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bupati</td>
<td>District Head</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hutan kaleka</td>
<td>Cultivated forest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hutan keramat</td>
<td>Sacred forest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hutan pahewan</td>
<td>Sacred/ritual use forest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kepala Desa</td>
<td>Village Head</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komunitas adat terpencil</td>
<td>Remote Indigenous communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lati tana</td>
<td>Forest land</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lokalisasi</td>
<td>A large brothel complex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masyarakat terasing</td>
<td>Indigenous ‘isolated people’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masyarakat hukum adat</td>
<td>Customary law communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pemberdayaan</td>
<td>Empowerment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reformasi</td>
<td>‘Reform’ used in reference to the post-Suharto transition era</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simpukng</td>
<td>Forest garden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajahan</td>
<td>Spiritual forest</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tanah adat</td>
<td>Customary land</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tanah negara</td>
<td>State land</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tana ulen</td>
<td>Customary forest management</td>
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# Appendix II: Abbreviations and Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMAN</td>
<td>Aliansi Masyarakat Adat di Nusantara (Alliance of Indigenous Peoples of the Archipelago)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAL</td>
<td>Basic Agrarian Law (see UUPA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAPPENAS</td>
<td>Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional (Ministry of National Development Planning)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPE</td>
<td>Global Political Economy</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFC</td>
<td>International Finance Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPE</td>
<td>International Political Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komnas HAM</td>
<td>Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia (National Commission on Human Rights)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSIC</td>
<td>Morgan Stanley Capital International</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>UUPA</td>
<td>Undang—Undang Pokok Agraria (Basic Agrarian Law)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix III: List of Interviews

June—Sept 2013:

Informal conversations:

- Anthropologist working for Freeport – Yudianto (pseudonym)
- Freeport health worker – Krisna (pseudonym)
- Freeport trade unionist – Hidayat (pseudonym)
- Anthropologist working for Freeport – Indah (pseudonym)
- Anthropologist working for Freeport – Amir (pseudonym)

Structured or semi structured interviews:

- Mapping activist (urban offices) – Aditya (pseudonym)
- Mapping activist (urban offices) – Mahmud (pseudonym)
- Mapping activist (urban offices) – Raharjo (pseudonym)
- Mapping activist (urban offices) – Tirto (pseudonym)
- Government employee (mining Melak) – Mansur
- Government employee (forestry Melak) – Taufik
- Rujak urban offices – Marco Kusumawijaya (identified)

June—July 2014:

Taped semi or unstructured interviews:

Mapping

- Mapping activist – Aditya (pseudonym)
- Mapping activist – Denny (pseudonym)
- Mapping activist – Hardi (pseudonym)
- Forestry Ministry employee – Kevin (pseudonym)
- Central Kalimantan Service Centre Coordinator – Fauzi (pseudonym)
- Peasant activist, South Kalimantan – Rizki (pseudonym)
- Coordinator for South Kalimantan service centres – Matius (pseudonym)
- Mapping activist – Akmal (pseudonym)
- Former mapping activist – Monti (identified)
- Co-founder of mapping group – Abdul (pseudonym)
- Gunawan Wiradi (identified)
- Dianto Bachriadi (identified)
- Multiple group conversations

Urban

- Urban poor activist – Dian (identified)
- Urban poor activist – Marco (identified)
- Urban poor activist – Sandyawan (identified)
- Urban poor activist – Harry (pseudonym)
- Group conversations Bukit Duri
- Group conversations Muara Baru I
- Group conversations Muara Baru II

Papua

- Development worker, Papua – Agung (pseudonym)
- Development worker, Papua – Nur (pseudonym)
- Freeport health worker – Andri (pseudonym)
- Freeport trade unionist – Yohanes (pseudonym)
- Freeport health worker – Rahman (pseudonym)
- Anthropologist working for Freeport – Melati (pseudonym)
- Benny Wenda (identified)
Appendix IV: Ethics Statement

Final Project Title – The Condition of Market Emergence in Indonesia: Coloniality as Exclusion and Translation.

Supervisors: Prof. Matthew Watson, Dr Lena Rethel, and Prof. Firouzeh Nahavandi

Where the research for this project drew on secondary data, no further ethics review was necessary for this secondary use. With regard to the collection of primary interview material, a number of steps were taken to ensure ethical data collection. I understand ‘informed consent’ to mean ensuring that participants are fully informed about the purpose and aims of the research and about what the interview or survey process entails in full. To obtain informed consent, participants were presented with a statement of purpose which outlined the aims of the study. The statement was presented variously in English, translated into Bahasa Indonesia, or verbally translated at the time of the interview, depending on the context of the interview and the language of the participants. Participants also signed a version of the standard PaIS consent form at the time of the interview. In the case of group interviews in both the kampungs and rural regions, some participants entered the conversation partway through recording and had not signed a consent form in advance. The input of these persons was therefore recorded but I have not directly quoted them in this thesis.

Consent forms were signed without any form of coercion, implicit or explicit. It was explained to participants that they had the freedom to opt out of the research at any time and could refuse to answer any question that they did not wish to answer. The
contact details of the University of Warwick and the Department of Politics and International Studies were given to participants and it was explained that, should any concerns arise from the research or should any perceived harm or stress be caused that they should contact the institution I represent.

Finally, I have ensured the security and integrity of any collected data through appropriate storage methods in accordance with the Data Protection Act (DPA). I understand that the processing of data collected from participant research is “personal data processing” and is subject to the principles of protection stipulated by the DPA, including safeguarding it from loss, unauthorised access or destruction. All of the interview recordings are kept on a secure hard drive and the details of anonymised participants are stored separately from the transcripts of their interviews.