EMOTION AND VALUE

A Phenomenological Approach

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Declaration

I declare that this thesis is my own work and has not been submitted as a degree to any other institution.
Abstract

In this thesis I argue that the affective component of emotional experience plays an essential explanatory role in the acquisition of evaluative knowledge. I call this the notion of affect as a disclosure of value.

The thesis is divided into two parts. In the first part I critically assess three contemporary accounts which, I argue, are motivated either implicitly or explicitly by the notion of affect as a disclosure of value. I argue that all three accounts fail due to the theoretical assumptions they inherit from the respective underlying theories of perceptual experience they rely on to theorise the relation between affect and evaluation in emotional experience. Nevertheless, out of the critical assessment I extract three criteria that an account of affect as a disclosure of value ought to satisfy and I clarify the theoretical positions that we ought to avoid.

In the second part of the thesis I build on these three criteria to provide an account of affect as a disclosure of value. I argue that at the core of this account is the constitutive thesis that the formation of rationally intelligible motivational states towards an object is constitutive of the disclosure of value. I then argue that a defence of the constitutive thesis commits us to a response-dependent notion of the objectivity of value of the sort defended by David Wiggins and John McDowell. Finally, I rely on the work of John Campbell to clarify both the sort of evaluative knowledge at stake and the role of affect in its acquisition. I argue that the sort of knowledge at stake is the sort that grounds our evaluative concepts and affect provides us with the epistemic access to the evaluative concepts' semantic value.
INTRODUCTION

1. The Aim

A lot of interest in contemporary philosophical research on emotions has concentrated on their experiential dimension. The experiential dimension of an emotion refers to that aspect of an emotion that is occurrent, episodic and has phenomenal character. To get a preliminary grip on what the experiential dimension of an emotion is, it is useful to distinguish it from the dispositional dimension of an emotion. To illustrate. A mother’s love for her child need not be occurrent, or felt, by the mother in every moment of her life. Yet this does not mean that when the mother is not feeling her love for her child or thinking about it, she does not love her child. Rather, all things equal, the mother loves her child throughout her waking life and she is disposed to feel, or experience, her love only when certain conditions obtain, for instance when she is in the presence of her child or when her child is the topic of conversation. The target of this thesis are emotions as experienced and not emotional dispositions.

There are two features of emotional experience that have received particular attention in recent studies on the subject. The first feature is the sort of evaluation that is involved in having an emotional experience. For instance, when I experience fear at an ongoing robbery, I evaluate the ongoing robbery as dangerous or fearsome. When I experience indignation at the latest governmental cuts to higher education, I evaluate the governmental cuts as unjust. And when I feel joy at the birth of a new born, I evaluate the birth as a joyful event. The second feature of emotional experience that has attracted attention in recent accounts is their phenomenology. The phenomenology, or phenomenal character, of an experience is that aspect of the experience that is often referred to as the
“what it is likeness” of having that experience from a first person point of view. Emotional experiences have a salient phenomenal character that is usually characterised as affective. Although the notion of affect is general and its nature is subject of heated debates within a variety of disciplines, by “affect” philosophers generally refer to that feeling-component of an emotional experience that we often express as “moving” or “touching” us. For instance, in feeling sad at my friend’s death, the affective component of the experience of sadness is what we might metaphorically express when saying “It hurts that my friend died”. And in feeling exhilarated at the news that I won a prestigious prize, the affective component of the experience of exhilaration is what we might metaphorically refer to as the feeling of “elevation” at the news.

While it might be less controversial to agree that emotional experience involves an affective component, it might be more controversial to agree that emotional experience involves some sort of world-directed evaluation. Although in this thesis I do not expend energies in providing arguments to the effect that emotional experience involves evaluation, it will prove fruitful to provide two observations that support this claim and two further clarifications of the subject matter of this thesis in order to avoid initial potential objections. The two observations in support of the claim that emotional experiences involve evaluations are the following. First, as Deonna and Teroni (2012, 40) observe, a good indication that emotions are intimately related with evaluation is to look at our everyday language. Very often, there is a corresponding relation between a type of emotion and an evaluative predicate. For instance, sadness, happiness, fear, shame, admiration and contempt have the corresponding evaluative predicates “sad,” “happy,” “fearsome,” “shameful,” “admirable,” and “contemptible.” This first observation ties in neatly with the
second one. Michelle Montague, whose account of emotional experience we will look at in detail in the first chapter of this thesis, convincingly observes that having an emotional experience normally involves attributing an evaluative predicate to something. For instance, in feeling fear, I normally attribute the evaluative predicate of “dangerous” or “fearsome” to something, say the ongoing robbery. To put the same thought the other way round, it seems to make little sense to feel fear towards an ongoing robbery yet not see any reason why one should attribute the predicate “dangerous” or “fearsome” to the event. In the rest of this thesis, then, along with many other theorists of emotion, I assume that emotional experiences involve evaluations.

The two further clarifications of the subject matter of this thesis are the following. First, I am not arguing that all experiences that we normally denote with an emotional tag and that have a clear affective dimension are world-directed evaluations. For instance, panic attacks are experienced as having a strong affective component and are usually denoted as extreme forms of anxiety. Yet these forms of anxiety are not, at least at first sight, directed towards the world. The first clarification, then, is that in this thesis I focus strictly on emotional episodes that are clearly evaluatively related to worldly objects. By this I do not mean to include solely particulars occupying a spatio-temporal position in the actual world and which are present but also objects and states of affairs that are imagined, objects and states of affairs that belong to the past, future or conceivable states of affairs and objects, and so on. The second clarification stems from the fact that many experiences with an affective tone do not seem to be evaluations of particular objects in the world. For instance, subjects feeling depressed normally do not feel depressed at a particular object or

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1 Here I bracket cases of phobia where the subject fears an object yet is aware that there is no reason to attribute danger to the object.
state of affairs in the world. The same seems to be the case with melancholia. In these cases, subjects report the world in general to be “coloured” by their state of mind. Here, it is important to distinguish between emotional experiences and moods. Although to a certain extent this is merely a matter of terminology, in this thesis emotional experiences refer to experiences with an affective dimension that are evaluatively directed to particular objects or state of affairs while moods do not have particular objects or state of affairs towards which they are directed. As the examples listed at the beginning of this introduction suggest, I am interested in experiential episodes of, say, fear that are directed towards a particular state of affairs, say, an ongoing robbery or a past traumatic event or a future possible breakup from my beloved partner. Phenomena that fall under the category of moods as characterised here will not be part of my investigations in this thesis.

The target of this thesis, then, are emotional experiences understood as occurrent, phenomenally conscious episodes of emotions with an affective character that are evaluatively directed towards particular objects or states of affairs. Now, what distinguishes a prominent number of contemporary philosophical theorists of emotional experience -understood in the way that we have specified so far- is their belief that in theorising the evaluative nature of emotional experience we should not conceive their affective character as a mere contingent and extrinsic component. On the contrary, according to these theories, the affective component of emotional experience should be seen as playing an essential role in the way that we evaluatively relate to the world. But why should we think so? The motivation behind this belief is the phenomenological observation that in the absence of the affective component of emotional experience we miss something about the evaluative import of an object or state of affairs, something about
the evaluative import that we can gain solely in virtue of having an affective response to
the object. But what are we missing about the value of an object in the absence of an
affective response to an object or state of affairs? The thought is that what we are missing
is a distinctive sort of evaluative knowledge about the object or state of affairs, a sort of
knowledge that can be acquired solely in virtue of our experience having an affective
component. It is this intuition that would motivate many to claim that if, hypothetically,
you have never felt amusement at something, then no matter how much you have been told
about amusing things, you don’t really know what an amusing thing is. And if you have
never felt admiration, then no matter how much you have been told about admirable people,
you don’t really know what an admirable person is.

Although the claim that in the absence of emotional affect we are unable to acquire
a distinctive sort of evaluative knowledge about an object or state of affairs might resonate
with many, including myself, it might not resonate with others. For what sort of knowledge
is at stake here? And what exactly is the role that affect plays in the acquisition of such
knowledge? Are we claiming that if a subject is unable to feel, say, fear, then she is unable
to grasp the concept of “danger”? If not, then why should we think that affect plays an
essential role in the navigation of the evaluative realm? What would we be missing in case
we were to stop feeling emotions and become stone-cold, hyper-rational human beings?
The aim of this thesis is to answer these questions. More specifically, the aim of this thesis
is to argue that affect plays an essential role in the acquisition of evaluative knowledge. I
call this the claim of affect as a disclosure of value.
2. The Structure

There are two central questions that need to be answered in order to provide an account of affect as a disclosure of value, that is, in order to provide a defence of the claim that affect plays an essential role in the acquisition of evaluative knowledge. First, what sort of evaluative knowledge is at play? Second, what exactly is the essential role of affect in the acquisition of such knowledge? Both these questions are answered in steps throughout the various chapters of the thesis finding their culmination in the final chapter. In this section I want to review the overall argument of this thesis by giving a brief summary of the steps of the argument.

The thesis is divided into two parts. The first part of the thesis is composed of three chapters. In Chapter 1 I critically assess Michelle Montague’s argument to the effect that the affective phenomenal character of emotional experience is inextricably linked to its evaluative component. Strictly speaking, Montague’s aim is not to argue for affect as a disclosure of value even though, as we shall see, that is the motivation behind her account. I argue that Montague’s account falls short of securing the inextricability between affect and evaluation in emotional experience and therefore does not provide us with a viable account from which to argue that affect provides us with a distinctive sort of evaluative knowledge. I argue that Montague’s account falls short of its promise due to the theoretical constraints imposed by the theory of perceptual experience she relies on to theorise the relation between affect and evaluation in emotional experience. More specifically, I argue that since her arguments to the effect that phenomenology and intentionality are inextricably linked are unsuccessful, her account falls back into a position that suffers from the same problems as qualia theories of the phenomenal character of
experience do, namely one’s that do not allow us to show how the phenomenal character of experience, in this case affect, discloses not only features of the experience but also of the object of experience.

In Chapter 2 I critically assess Peter Goldie’s account of “feelings towards.” Here I argue that Goldie relies on an intentionalist, or representationalist, model of experience to make the case that affect and evaluation are inextricably linked. I argue that Goldie’s arguments are inconclusive as to whether affect and evaluation are inextricably linked. Moreover, I argue that due to his commitments to an intentionalist model of experience, what Goldie’s arguments can achieve at most is a necessary relation between affect and evaluation in emotional experience but not the claim that the presence of affect discloses a feature of the object of experience, namely its value, rather than just a feature of experience. I argue that the lesson to be drawn from the first two chapters is that if we want to secure the claim that affect is the disclosure of value, then at the very least the theoretical commitments of our account need to allow for the notion that in having a phenomenally conscious experience we disclose not only features of the experience but also of the object of experience.

In Chapter 3 I critically assess a final account of the relation between affect and evaluation underpinned by a specific theory of experience, namely Mark Johnston’s. The theory that underlies Johnston’s account is so-called Naïve Realism, or Relationism. I argue that although this theory of experience avoids the issues with the previous two theories looked at in Chapters 1 and 2, ultimately also in this case, when applied to affect and value, the account provided fails to secure its aim due to the theoretical commitments imported from the underlying theory of experience. Nevertheless, there is an important
difference between Johnston’s account and Montague’s and Goldie’s. While in the case of Montague and Goldie the aim is strictly to argue for the inextricability between affect and evaluation in emotional experience, by way of which one can then attempt to argue for the notion that affect is the disclosure of value, in the case of Johnston the aim is directly to argue for the latter. Moreover, with Johnston we start appreciating the importance of motivational states in the relation between affect and value. Indeed, as we shall see, the introduction of the question of the role of motivational states in the theorising of affect and value becomes of central importance in the arguments put forward in the second part of the thesis to the effect that affect is the disclosure of value.

In the final section of the third chapter I extract three criteria from the critical assessment in Chapters 1-3 that an account of affect as a disclosure of value needs to satisfy:

1. An account of affect as a disclosure of value must be able to show that the affective character of experience plays an essential explanatory role in the acquisition of evaluative knowledge of the object. In other words, it needs to be able to show why in the absence of affect one cannot gain insight into what the evaluative property of an object is.

2. An account of affect as a disclosure of value needs to be able to accommodate the phenomenological fact that affect renders readily intelligible one’s evaluative beliefs and motivational states. That is, it needs to accommodate the authority of affect.

3. An account of affect as a disclosure of value must be able to accommodate the disanalogy with the sort of disclosure at play in visual experience. That is, it must
be able to show that the sort of disclosure at play in affective experience is one where the evaluative import of the object of experience is disclosed in virtue of properties of the experience that are introspectively dissociable from the features of the object of experience.

In the second part of the thesis I build on these three criteria to provide an account of affect as a disclosure of value. In Chapter 4 I begin by arguing that the first two criteria need to be satisfied jointly which essentially comes down to Johnston’s insight that in order to understand in what sense affective experience is a disclosure of value we need to make sense of the phenomenological observation that affect renders readily and rationally intelligible not only the formation of our evaluative judgements but also of our motivational states. I then argue that to make sense of this phenomenological observation we should commit to the following constitutive thesis: the formation of our motivational states towards an object is constitutive of the disclosure of value. The key challenge in defending this constitutive thesis is the apparent tension between the idea that the sort of evaluative knowledge that we acquire in having an affective experience is objective, that is, it is knowledge of objects—hence the notion of affect as a disclosure of value—and the idea that the formation of motivational states of the subject is a constitutive part of such evaluative knowledge. How can the formation of motivational states of the subject be a constitutive part of knowledge of objects? I then rely on the work of John McDowell to argue that in order to dissolve this apparent tension we need to commit to a response-dependent notion of the objectivity of value. Importantly, I introduce in a preliminary fashion a distinction between two sorts of evaluative knowledge: theoretical knowledge of value, that is, propositional knowledge of value acquired by testimony and in the absence of affective
experience, and knowledge *of* value, that is, the sort of evaluative knowledge that can be acquired solely by affective experience. It is the latter sort of evaluative knowledge that is at stake in the claim of affect as a disclosure of value. This distinction is refined in detail in the final chapter of the thesis.

Although committing to a response-dependent notion of the objectivity of value allows us to show in a preliminary fashion that we can solve the challenge, we need to provide the details of this notion of objectivity that show how the challenge is solved, that is, that shows in what way the formation of our affective-cum-motivational responses is a constitutive part of what it means for the object to have value. I do so in Chapter 5. Here, I rely on the work of David Wiggins to provide a detailed account of the sort of objectivity that characterizes value and the way in which our affective-cum-motivational responses are inextricably related to it. We also learn why affect is essential in the generation of evaluation concepts. I then show how this account of the objectivity of value dissolves the apparent tension that lies within the constitutive thesis and therefore provides a defence of the idea that affect is the disclosure of value.

Finally, in Chapter 6 I clarify the sort of knowledge that can be acquired exclusively in virtue of an affective experience and the essential importance of affect in the navigation of the evaluative realm. I do so by specifying in detail the distinction I drew in chapter 4 between knowledge *of* value and theoretical knowledge *of* value. In order to do so, I rely on the work of John Campbell, from whom I borrowed the terminology of “the explanatory role of experience” and “knowledge *of*.” Crucially, knowledge *of* value is knowledge of the semantic value of the relevant evaluative concept. It is only by acquiring knowledge *of* value that we are able to gain an independent source of justification and intelligibility in
the deployment of evaluative concepts and in the formation of motivational states. The sort of knowledge at stake, then, is not the sort constituted by beliefs that necessitate higher order reflective faculties to be justified. Rather, it’s the sort that grounds our concepts of the features of objects, in the case of affect, evaluative features. The crux of the argument, then, is that in the absence of affective experience, and therefore of knowledge of value, we are unable to form rationally intelligible motivational states in the deployment of our evaluative concepts. I end the chapter by drawing out the full implications of this finding by devising various thought experiments. I argue that the implications indicate that affect plays an essential role in the navigation of the evaluative realm.

3. Phenomenology, Emotion, and Perception

I want to end this introduction by briefly clarifying two points regarding my approach to the theme of this thesis. First, the subtitle of my thesis states that my approach is phenomenological. We often find a distinction drawn between the phenomenological approach referring to the strictures followed within the Phenomenological tradition inaugurated by Edmund Husserl and counting the likes of Max Scheler, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and the phenomenological approach referring to a general interest in the phenomenal character of experience as studied within the Analytic tradition. There are undoubtedly some differences between the two traditions, but an equal number of differences can be found within the two traditions, and this is so because these differences are due to the creativity of individual philosophers and not to a supposed allegiance to either tradition. Although my thesis works with philosophers in the Analytic tradition, the thoughts in this work are owed just as much to the study I have pursued on key figures in the Phenomenological tradition, especially Husserl, Scheler,
Heidegger, and, *in primis*, Sartre. I believe that ultimately the subject matter of philosophers on either side is the lived experiential dimension of a psychological phenomenon and the motivation to investigate this aspect of psychological phenomena is the belief that if we are to give an accurate account of such phenomena, we cannot ignore the way that we experience them from a first person perspective. Indeed, our compass in theorising these complex psychological phenomena should be the way that they are experienced. It is in this spirit that my approach is phenomenological.

The second point in need of clarification is the following. One of the debates that has received most attention in the philosophical theory of the relation between emotion and value is the debate on whether emotional experience is a sort of perceptual experience of value.² In this thesis, I discuss in detail the analogies that some authors, namely Montague and Johnston, have drawn between perceptual experiences of colour and emotional experience of value, the disanalogies that have been drawn between two, for instance by John McDowell, and I rely on John Campbell’s argument to the effect that sensory awareness plays an essential role in grounding our concepts of the observable qualities of objects to formulate the final argument of this thesis, namely that affect plays an essential role in the acquisition of evaluative knowledge. Indeed, the overall argument of the first part of my thesis, namely that all three accounts of the relation between affect and value that I survey fail in their aim, is based on tracing their shortcomings to the theoretical commitments they import from the theories of the phenomenal character of perceptual

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² For a defence of the claim that emotional experience is a sort of perceptual experience of value, see de Sousa (1987); Tappolet (2000, 2011, 2012); Johnston (2001); Zagzebski (2003); Roberts (2003); Doering (2003, 2007); Prinz (2004); Deonna (2006); Goldie (2007); Poellner (2007, 2016); Cowan (2016). For an argument against this claim, see Salmela (2011); Whiting (2012); Deonna and Teroni (2012, ch.6); Brady (2013).
experience they rely on. It is in part inevitable that in theorising the relation between the affective character and evaluation of emotional experience one relies on theories of the phenomenal character of perceptual experience since the phenomenal character of experience and its role in grounding knowledge of our surroundings is primarily theorised through the study of perceptual experience, in particular visual experience.

Nevertheless, in no way do I take a stand on the question of whether emotional experience is a sort of perceptual experience of value. At best, I remain neutral on this question. At worst, I believe that the question, formulated as such, is not conducive to a constructive investigation of the phenomenon in question. I believe that what motivates many to ask this question, and attempt to answer it positively, is precisely the wish to capture the claim of affect as a disclosure of value. That is because, ultimately, one of the underlying motivations is to show that, just like in the case of perceptual experience the phenomenal character of experience plays an essential role in acquiring knowledge of, say, colours, in emotional experience the affective character plays an essential role in acquiring evaluative knowledge. I believe that in order to capture this phenomenon, one should not ask whether emotional experiences are sorts of perceptual experiences. Rather, one should pay close attention to the analogies and disanalogies between the two sorts of experiences and carefully draw out the appropriate conclusions while respecting the individuality of each. It is with this approach that I build the argument in defence of the notion of affect as a disclosure of value.
PART I
CHAPTER 1

Emotion, Value, and Resemblance

Introduction

In her papers “The Logic, Intentionality, and Phenomenology of Emotion” (2009) and “Evaluative Phenomenology” (2014), Michelle Montague defends the view that the phenomenology and intentionality of emotional experience are inextricably intertwined (see also Montague 2016, ch.9). Towards the end of her “Evaluative Phenomenology,” there is a passage that expresses Montague’s underlying thought about the phenomenon she seeks to capture through a defence of the inextricability thesis. It is worth quoting at length since it encapsulates the key motivating intuition about emotional experience and value shared with the other authors we will discuss in the following chapters, namely Goldie and Johnston, and which constitutes the focus of this thesis:

So, although one may be able to know intellectually (in some sense) that the death of a friend is of disvalue, and indeed that such a death is sad without feeling an emotion, one can experience the disvalue of the friend’s death in this distinctive way only if one has an emotional experience. Data in Star Trek, who does not have any emotions, may be capable of saying what is of value and disvalue, and in turn

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3 Montague’s defence of the inextricability thesis is part of her more demanding project of showing that the intentionality and phenomenology of emotional experiences are sui generis. In this paper I leave aside Montague’s further task of showing that if the inextricability thesis is secured, then we are at least in part on the way of showing that the intentionality and phenomenology of emotional experiences are not reducible to other forms of intentionality and phenomenology.

It also has to be noted that Montague focuses solely on the experiential dimension of emotions. So whenever she writes “emotions”, one should read “emotional experience”. Furthermore, it is helpful to clarify from the start that Montague is interested solely in experiences that are conscious and have intentionality. That is, experiences of which the subject is aware and have a phenomenal character and that are directed towards an intentional object distinct from itself.
saying what is sad and what is happy, but he cannot *experience* sadness or happiness and thus he cannot *experience* value or disvalue (in the special way I am indicating). A stronger claim about Data, which I do not have the space to pursue in this chapter, is that although he can say what is of value and disvalue, and know what is of value and disvalue, he cannot really *know* value and disvalue. It may be similar to someone who is blind from birth who can say this is red, when told that it is a ripe tomato, and indeed know that it is red, but not know what red is.

(Montague 2014, 47)

Montague distinguishes between two claims. First, unless one is able to experience emotions, one cannot experience value. I believe that the way we should interpret this claim is as entailing the belief that the presence of affect in emotional experience indicates the disclosure not merely of features of experience but also of the objects of experience, namely its value. The interpretation gains plausibility when we look at the second, stronger claim that the first one is meant to be a prelude to. The second claim is that the affective component of emotional experience provides us with a distinctive sort of knowledge about value that cannot be acquired in the absence of affect. According to Montague, her argument to the effect that the affective phenomenology and evaluative intentionality of emotional experience are inextricably linked is meant to secure the first claim, not the second. At the same time, it is not farfetched to suggest that it is the second claim that truly motivates Montague’s argument to the effect that phenomenology and intentionality in emotional experience are inextricably intertwined. More to the point, Montague seems to suggest, correctly, that the second claim cannot be secured without securing the first claim, that is, the claim that affect provides us with a distinctive sort of evaluative knowledge cannot be secured without securing the claim that the presence of affect discloses not only
features of experience but also of the object of experience. Since arguing for the
inextricability between affect and evaluation in emotional experience is meant to secure
the latter claim, then unless Montague can argue for the inextricability claim, her account
cannot be the basis for arguing that affect provides us with a distinctive sort of evaluative
knowledge.

Since the aim of this thesis is to secure the second claim, namely that affective
experience plays an essential role in the acquisition of evaluative knowledge, in this chapter
I ask whether Montague’s argument to the effect that affect and evaluation are inextricably
intertwined is fit to provide us with the starting material to argue for that thesis. In what
follows I argue that Montague’s account falls short of securing the inextricability between
phenomenology and intentionality in emotional experience and therefore does not provide
us with a viable account from which to argue that affect provides us with a distinctive sort
of evaluative knowledge. I argue that Montague’s argument falls short of its promise due
to the theoretical constraints imposed by the theory of perceptual experience she relies on
to theorise the relation between affect and evaluation in emotional experience. More
specifically, I argue that since her arguments to the effect that phenomenology and
intentionality are inextricably linked are unsuccessful, her account falls back into a position
that suffers from the same problems as qualia theories of the phenomenal character of
experience do, namely one’s that do not allow us to show how the presence of affect
discloses not only features of the experience but also of the object of experience. Moreover,
I argue that in tracing the theoretical constraints that impede Montague’s account to achieve
its goal, we learn the sort of theoretical assumptions about experience that we ought to
avoid if we want to construct an argument in support of the notion of affect as a disclosure of value.

This chapter is divided into two sections. In Section 1 I reconstruct Montague’s argument in detail and uncover the argument’s theoretical constraints imported from the theory of perceptual experience used to theorise the relation between affect and value in emotional experience. In Section 2 I show how these theoretical constraints impede Montague’s argument to achieve its aim. I end by clarifying the theoretical constraint we ought to avoid in the pursuit of our goal.

Section 1

Montague’s account begins with the claim that the phenomenological character of emotional experience ‘contributes essentially’ to its intentionality (Montague 2009, 184). Montague uses a sophisticated terminology in order to build her argument. I will introduce the technical terms only when needed since I think that the gist of her argument can be made sense of without unnecessary terminological complications. Let me begin to specify Montague’s argument by looking at how she uses the notions of “phenomenology” and “intentionality” in the context of emotional experience. Montague puts the thought that the intentionality of emotional experience is evaluative in kind in terms of emotional experience representing an evaluative property: emotional experiences ‘essentially represent objects and states of affairs in an evaluative way…That is, emotions essentially represent objects and states of affairs as having evaluative properties…Emotions, according to the present view, are essentially evaluative representations’ (Montague 2014,
For instance, in feeling sad at the death of a friend, I represent my friend’s death as sad. Montague puts the thought that the phenomenology of emotional experience is affective in terms of “colouring”: ‘the particular affect or feeling associated with an emotion is discernible by the (affective) coloring that the intentional attitude verb indicates’ (Montague 2009, 174). Furthermore, Montague points out that affect has valence, a point that will become significant in her argument. The valence of affect refers to the characteristic of affect as either positive or negative. While the feeling of sadness is generally thought of as negative, the feeling of joy is generally thought of as positive. A more precise formulation of Montague’s argument for the inextricability thesis, then, is the following: the affective phenomenology of an emotional experience plays an essential role in the representation of an object, event or situation as having an evaluative property. For instance, the affective character of the experience of sadness plays an essential role in representing my friend’s death as sad.

In order to specify further Montague’s view, we need to introduce her notion of “awareness-of-awareness” (I will also refer to this notion as “self-awareness”). According to Montague, during a conscious, intentional experience the subject having the experience is aware of an object distinct from the experience. Montague then claims that during a conscious experience, the subject is also aware of having the experience. This is the awareness-of-awareness, or self-awareness, component of a conscious experience. The awareness-of-awareness relation is understood as an intentional relation: it is an awareness of. According to Montague, in being aware of having an experience, the subject is aware

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4 Montague is careful in noting that claiming that emotions represent objects as having evaluative properties does not commit her to any sort of moral realism. The claim is strictly at the level of the subject’s experience and does not commit her to any metaphysical view.
of the phenomenological character of the conscious experience. Importantly, Montague claims that during an experience, the subject is aware of the phenomenological properties of the experience as properties of the experience: ‘phenomenological properties themselves present, phenomenologically, as what they are – properties of experience’ (Montague 2014, 38). In being aware of the properties of the experience, the subject having the experience is aware of the sort of experience he is having precisely because he is aware of its properties. Since Montague conceives conscious experience as representing an object distinct from itself, the subject having the experience is intentionally related towards two objects: the object distinct from the experience and experience itself. Following Montague, I will refer to the object distinct from the experience as the primary object of experience (Montague 2009, 184). (Montague refers to experience as an object of the experience itself as the secondary object of experience. I think it is clearer if I do not use this term and stick solely with the notion of the primary object of experience to distinguish the two objects of an experience). Since conscious experience represents the primary object of experience as having a property (or properties), the subject having the experience is aware of two sets of properties: the properties of the primary object (as experienced) and the properties of the experience itself.

Montague applies this general framework of the intentionality of conscious experience to both visual and emotional experience. The introduction and analogy between visual and emotional experience will become important in understanding further Montague’s view. Let me begin with visual experience. In having a visual experience of a red ball, the subject having the experience is aware of (intentionally directed towards) both the primary object, that is, the red ball, and the experience itself. The subject is aware of
the experience as a \textit{visual} experience, which according to Montague, means that he is aware of the phenomenological properties of the visual experience. In being aware of the phenomenological properties of the experience he is aware that he is having a \textit{visual} experience. What are the properties of visual experience? According to Montague, these are colour-phenomenology, shape-phenomenology, and so on (Montague 2014, 40). In this specific example, the subject is aware of the ‘reddish phenomenology’ of the experience as a property of the experience (as well as the ‘roundish phenomenology’; I stick to colour phenomenology for simplicity purposes) (ibid.: 44). Although Montague is not clear on this point, this does not seem to commit her to the implausible claim that experience itself is “reddish.” Rather, I am assuming that according to Montague the phenomenal properties of experience responsible for its, say, “reddish phenomenology”, are intrinsic properties of experience which, if they fail to have an inextricable relation to the intentional structure of experience, are somewhat reminiscent of qualia.\footnote{As we shall see, in the case of emotional experience Montague’s understanding of the properties of experience will become more complicated and, indeed, confusing. See footnote 5. I am aware that Montague herself does not subscribe to the qualia view of the phenomenal character of experience. Rather, she subscribes to what has been recently termed the “phenomenal intentionality research project”. Phenomenal intentionalists promise to be able to show that the phenomenal and the intentional are inextricably linked without falling back into a form of qualia theory or more traditional forms of intentionalism. Consistently with this, and as we shall presently see, I argue that Montague’s account, and in particular her arguments, fail in this regard and therefore her position relapses into a position that is vulnerable to the same problems as qualia theories of experience. See also my footnote 11 in Chapter 2. For the “phenomenal intentionality research project”, see Kriegel (2013). For a more specific elaboration of the view, see Farkas (2013). For early versions of phenomenal intentionalism, see Horgan and Tienson (2002) and Loar (2003). The notion of qualia has itself been widely debated. For a useful account of the history of the term, see Crane (2000a).} The subject is then also aware of the properties of the ball, namely, among others, its redness. The subject having the visual experience is therefore aware of two sets of properties: the “reddish” phenomenal property of the experience and the “redness” of the ball.
In the case of emotional experience, for instance in feeling sad, the subject having the experience is aware of the phenomenological properties of his experience of sadness and in being so aware he is aware that what he is experiencing is sadness. The phenomenological properties of an emotional experience are its affective and valenced qualities. During an experience of sadness, the subject having the experience is aware of the affective character of the experience and of its negative valence. Insofar as the subject experiencing sadness is also evaluating the primary object of experience as sad, he is aware of two sets of properties: the negatively valenced affective properties of the experience of sadness and the evaluative property of, say, his friend’s death, namely its sadness.

How does the above support Montague’s claim to the effect that affect and evaluation in emotional experience are inextricably linked? As I presented Montague’s account above, she wants to argue that the subject’s awareness of the phenomenological properties of the emotional experience plays an essential role in the representation of the primary object having the evaluative property it is experienced as having. If my understanding is correct, then it seems to me that Montague adopts the following strategy (Montague 2009, 184-188; Montague 2014, 43-48):

[a] Part of accounting for the way the primary object is represented in experience is to account for the property attribution we make in relation to that object.

[b] The subject’s awareness of the phenomenological properties of the experience contributes essentially to the property attributions we make.

[c] Therefore, the awareness of the phenomenological properties of the experience contributes essentially to the representation of the primary object of experience.⁶

⁶ Although the plausibility of Montague’s strategy hinges equally on the plausibility of claims [a] and [b], and indeed on whether [c] follows, Montague spends argumentative energies in securing
In the case of the visual experience of the red ball, the subject’s awareness of the sensory phenomenology of the visual experience is an essential component of the subject attributing the property ‘red’ to the ball. Since accounting for the subject’s property attribution is part of accounting for the subject’s representation of the primary object of the experience, then the subject’s awareness of the phenomenological, “reddish” property of the visual experience is part of accounting for the representation of the ball as red. For Montague, unless the subject is aware of the colour phenomenology of the visual experience, she would not attribute the colour property to the primary object.

In the case of emotional experience, for instance sadness, Montague’s rationale is analogous. The awareness the subject has of the affective character of the experience is an essential component of the subject attributing the evaluative property ‘sad’ to a friend’s death. Since accounting for the property attribution the subject makes is part of accounting for the representation of the primary object of experience, then the awareness of the phenomenological properties of the experience of sadness is accounting for the representation of the friend’s death as sad. Unless the subject is aware of the

[b] while [a] and whether [c] follows are taken more lightly and they are not given much defence. At this stage, I do not want to critically assess the plausibility of [a] or whether [c] follows since I am interested in getting at the bottom of Montague’s view. At the same time, it has to be noted that there seems to be an important difference between experiencing an object as having a property, or in Montague’s words, “experientially representing” (Montague 2009, 187) an object as having a property, and attributing a property to an object. More seems to be needed for the latter. I take it that this is the reason why Montague says that accounting for property attribution is “part of” accounting for the representation of the object. What Montague seems to me to be saying is, when experiencing an object, if we attribute a property to that object, it is due to the way that we experience it i.e. the way the object is represented in the experience. If that is the case, then, accounting for property attribution is in part accounting for the way that an object is represented in the experience. I think that Montague’s point has enough intuitive plausibility to withstand any sort of initial skepticism that would block her account at this stage. At the same time, as we shall see below, any issues that arise from the resulting account of property attribution should be treated as a signal of issues in the way representation has been accounted for.
phenomenological, affective properties of the experience of sadness, he would not attribute the evaluative property ‘sad’ to the friend’s death.

The inextricability thesis is then defended by arguing that unless the subject is aware of the phenomenology of the experience, she would not represent the primary object as having the properties it is experienced as having. The crux of the argument hinges on the putatively inextricable relation between self-awareness and representation that Montague argues for via the notion of property attribution. In order to see the full argument, though, we need to dig deeper. We said that according to Montague the subject’s awareness of the phenomenological properties of the experience plays an essential role in the representation of the primary object as having the properties it is experienced as having. In the case of visual experience, the claim is that the subject’s awareness of the colour-phenomenological properties of the experience is essential to the representation of the primary object as having the colour property it is experienced as having. The subject attributes the colour property ‘red’ to the ball in virtue of her awareness of the phenomenological ‘reddish’ property of the experience. In the case of emotional experience, the claim is that the subject’s awareness of the phenomenological, affective properties of the experience is essential to the representation of the primary object as having the evaluative properties it is experienced as having. The subject attributes the evaluative property ‘sad’ to the friend’s death in virtue of his awareness of the affective character (phenomenological properties) of the experience of sadness.

But how exactly do we move from the awareness of the phenomenological property of the experience to the attribution of a property to the primary object of experience? How exactly should we conceive the move from self-awareness to representation? What
Montague has to explain is the move from the subject’s awareness of the properties of the experience to her attribution of a property to the primary object of experience.

This is precisely what Montague does. Montague tries to explain the link between self-awareness and representation by explaining how the awareness of the properties of experience leads to the representation of the properties that the primary object of experience is experienced as having. Montague argues that the subject, in being aware of both the properties of experience and the properties of the primary object of experience, finds a resemblance between the two. As we have seen above, according to Montague, during the visual experience of a red ball the subject is aware both of the phenomenal properties of the experience as properties of the experience, namely its “reddish” phenomenology, and of the property ‘red’ attributed to the ball. Montague then asks what the relationship between these two must be in order for the subject to attribute the property ‘red’ to the ball in virtue of the “reddish” phenomenology of the visual experience. Montague, of course, settles for resemblance: the “reddish” phenomenology of experience resembles the ‘red’ property attributed to the ball. Montague writes:

An aspect of the phenomenal redness [i.e. “reddish” phenomenology] resembles an aspect of the redness attributed to the ball. We feel the experience of phenomenal redness gets it exactly right about, completely conveys the intrinsic qualitative character of, the objective property. This is what our belief in the resemblance consists in...Resemblance is part of explaining how the phenomenological property experienced as a property of experience gets linked to the property attributed to the object- a property experienced as an objective, mind-independent property. (Montague 2014, 45).
In the specific case of emotional experience, the properties of the experience the subject is aware of are its affective and valenced properties. The experience of sadness has the phenomenological properties of negative affect while the experience of joy has the phenomenological properties of positive affect. Montague then claims that we normally associate positive affect and negative affect with the positive value and negative value, or disvalue, of objects, respectively. Because of this association, Montague dubs the positive or negative affect of an emotional experience its “evaluative phenomenology” (hence the title of the second paper). More specifically, Montague claims that “The positive or negative evaluative phenomenology (the positive or negative affect) of an emotion represents the positive or negative quality of the object or state of affairs represented...negative and positive evaluative phenomenology represents disvalue and value” (Montague 2014, 46-47). Montague, then, argues that the reason why we attribute a value or disvalue to the primary object is due to the resemblance that the property of the primary object has to the property of the experience, that is, positive or negative affect. Representation is understood in terms of resemblance. Montague then proceeds to give the following account of evaluative property attribution in emotional experience:

The basic idea is that in experiencing the negative affect (the negative evaluative phenomenology) that is part of experiencing sadness, the negative affect is itself experienced as something of disvalue. This disvalue experienced in the experience of negative affect resembles the disvalue that is attributed to the state of affairs of the friend’s death. It is then partly in virtue of this resemblance relation that the negative affect experienced as a property of experience represents the disvalue attributed to the friend’s death. More strongly put, [] we feel the experience of feeling
the disvalue of negative affect gets it exactly right about, completely conveys the character of, the purported objective property of disvalue. (Ibid. 47-48)

Notice that Montague has added an element to her account. Now, the resemblance is not anymore strictly between the valenced affective character of the experience and the (dis)value attributed to the primary object. Rather, it is between the (dis)value associated with the valenced affective character and the (dis)value attributed to the primary object. Montague’s account is the claim that ultimately the subject attributes a disvalue to his friend’s death because of a resemblance it has with the disvalue of the negative affect of the experience of sadness the subject is having.7

Let me tie all of the above together. Montague argues that the affective phenomenology and evaluative intentionality of emotional experience are inextricably intertwined. Her argument revolves around the idea that during an experience, the subject is aware not only of the object distinct from the experience i.e. the primary object, but he is also aware of having the experience. That is, the subject is self-aware while experiencing an object distinct from the experience. Due to the subject’s self-awareness, he is aware both of the primary object of the emotional experience as having the evaluative properties that

7 In footnote 5 I said that once we switch to emotional experience, the nature of the intrinsic phenomenological properties of experience becomes more complicated. This is so because while in the case of visual experience the relation of resemblance is between the “reddish” phenomenal property and the property “red” of the primary object of experience, the resemblance relation in emotional experience is between the value associated with the affective-valenced phenomenal property of experience and the property of the primary object of experience. Therefore, while in the case of visual experience I stated that (due to Montague’s unsuccessful arguments) the intrinsic property is reminiscent of qualia, that is, non-intentional properties of experience responsible for the experiential phenomenal quality, in the case of emotional experience the affective phenomenal property of experience is associated with a value (which in turn resembles the evaluative property of the primary object of experience). So it seems as the affective property of the emotional experience does bare a further relation to something else, namely the associated value. Does this mean that it is somehow intentional? I am not sure. I take up this issue again towards the end of this section.
it is experienced as having and he is aware of the phenomenal, affective properties of the emotional experience itself. The primary object is represented as having evaluative properties in virtue of a resemblance between the positive or negative value associated with the positive or negative valence of the affective component of the emotional experience and the value or disvalue experienced as a property of the primary object. Since the subject of experience would not represent the primary object in an evaluative way unless he were aware of the phenomenal character of the experience, then the affective phenomenology of emotional experience plays an essential role in its evaluative intentionality. This shows, according to Montague, that the intentionality and phenomenology of emotional experience are inextricably intertwined.

Section 2

In what follows I aim to show that, in fact, Montague’s account fails on two counts. First, I argue that the resulting account of evaluative property attribution in emotional experience is implausible and that this implausibility has important reverberations for her account of the relation between affect and value. Second, and more importantly, I argue that Montague’s commitment to her underlying theory of experience does not allow her to argue for the inextricable link between phenomenology and intentionality in emotional experience that she seeks to defend.

A key notion in the argument above as I have presented it is property attribution. As we have seen, Montague argues that the subject’s awareness of the phenomenological properties of the experience plays an essential role in his attribution of properties to the primary object of experience and since property attribution is indicative of the way the primary object is represented in the experience, then the subject’s awareness of the
phenomenal character of the experience plays an essential role in the way that the primary object is represented in the experience. Montague’s account of evaluative property attribution in emotional experience states that we attribute an evaluative property to the primary object of emotional experience because of a resemblance between the disvalue or value associated with the negative or positive affect of the experience and the disvalue or value that the primary object is experienced as having. In the experience of sadness at the death of a friend, the subject attributes the property “sad” to the friend’s death due to a resemblance between the disvalue associated with the negative affective feel of the experience and the disvalue the friend’s death is experienced as having. Much here hinges on what we mean by the disvalue of the negative affect of the experience of sadness. Although Montague does not say, one plausible understanding of “the disvalue of the negative affect of sadness” is the fact that it feels bad, or it “hurts”, to feel sadness. We associate disvalue with the experience of sadness because it is, for want of a better word, uncomfortable to have that experience. If so, then Montague’s account entails that we attribute the property of sadness to the friend’s death because it hurts to feel sadness. And here is the problem: it doesn’t seem right to say that I attribute sadness to the event of my friend’s death due to the disvalue associated with the negative affect of my feeling of sadness, that is, because it hurts to feel sadness. I don’t attribute sadness to my friend’s death because the feeling of sadness hurts me. Rather, I attribute sadness to my friend’s death because I know that I will never speak to a beloved person again or because I know that her daughter will not no longer be able to play with her mother. There is a sense in which Montague’s resulting account of evaluative property attribution is “egoistic”: my
friend’s death is sad because it hurts me to feel sadness rather than because of factors that are outside of me.

This problem is indicative of an issue with Montague’s account of representation in emotional experience. If we follow Montague and agree that accounting for property attribution is part of accounting for representation, and that representation is to be understood in terms of resemblance, then we end up with the following picture: I represent my friend’s death as sad because of a resemblance between the sadness of my friend’s death (evaluative property of the primary object) and the fact that it hurts to feel sadness (evaluative property associated with the phenomenological property of emotional experience). But what kind of resemblance is there between the disvalue of an experience of sadness and the disvalue of a friend’s death? What aspects of the disvalue of the negative affective character of sadness resemble the relevant aspects of the disvalue attributed to the friend’s death? Again, the event of my friend’s death is not represented as sad, and therefore as a disvalue, due to the feeling of sadness but rather due to the factors mentioned above, such as a daughter losing her mother. It seems to me, then, that we don’t attribute disvalue to a friend’s death insofar as the event resembles the disvalue inherent in the negative affective quality of our experience of sadness. Indeed, we intuitively feel that someone attributing sadness to his friend’s death due to it hurting him to feel sadness got things terribly wrong. The issue here is that the representation of a friend’s death is not to be accounted for in terms of a resemblance between the disvalue of the phenomenological

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8 I speak of the aspects of properties of experience resembling aspects of the evaluative properties the subject attributes to the primary object since Montague does so when discussing visual experience. See next two paragraphs.
properties of sadness and the evaluative property the friend’s death is experienced as having.

Let me analyse further the problem in order to get at its source. The issue I just mentioned arises because the (dis)value of the valenced affective character of an emotional experience does not resemble in any obvious way the (dis)value the subject normally attributes to the primary object. But why did Montague postulate the subject’s awareness not only of the valenced affective character but also of the (dis)value associated with it? Why not postulate solely the awareness of the valenced affective character? The answer here seems to me to be that, again, there is no obvious way in which the valenced affective character of an emotional experience resembles the evaluative property normally attributed to the primary object. And since Montague postulates resemblance as doing the representational work, then by losing resemblance, Montague would lose representation. Insofar as this argument is in support of the inextricability thesis, if the phenomenology of an emotional experience does not play an essential role in the representation of an evaluative property, then the inextricable link between phenomenology and intentionality is severed. Montague’s problem is that the phenomenological properties of an emotional experience do not seem to resemble the sort of evaluative properties that we normally attribute to the primary objects of emotional experiences.

In fact, even if we concede the notion of resemblance a place in the theory of experience proposed by Montague, her account is unable to secure the sort of inextricability between phenomenology and intentionality sought after. According to Montague’s account of experience, what determines the phenomenal character of an experience are intrinsic phenomenological properties of the experience. For instance, during the visual experience
of a red ball, among other things, the subject is aware of the “reddish” phenomenal properties of the experience. And during the experience of sadness, the subject is aware of, among other things, the negatively valenced affective properties of the experience. Insofar as Montague is unable to secure the inextricability of phenomenology and intentionality, the phenomenal properties of these respective experiences are non-intentional, intrinsic features of experience, in many ways resembling qualia. They then partake in the intentionality of the respective experiences through resembling the properties that the primary object of experience is experienced as having. The “reddish” phenomenal property of visual experience partakes in its world-directed intentionality through its resemblance with the red colour of the ball. And the negatively valenced affective property of the experience of sadness partakes in the experience’s world-directed intentionality through its resemblance with the evaluative property of “sadness” that the primary object is experienced as having. But why should we think that, under the aegis of Montague’s theory of experience, experiencing a phenomenal, intrinsic property of experience should disclose a property of the object of experience? What the experience of a new sort of affect would give us is the disclosure of a new property of experience, namely the intrinsic property of experience constituting its phenomenal character, and at most the knowledge that the relevant object of experience causes the experience to have that phenomenal character. But it does not disclose the evaluative property of the object.

Let me draw an analogy. Take the case of accidentally cutting yourself with a piece of paper. The resulting experience has an acute phenomenal character. But does the phenomenal character of the experience disclose anything about the piece of paper apart from one of its potential causal effects? Suppose that my brother, who has never suffered
a paper cut, is sitting next to me when I cut myself and can therefore see that the piece of paper has the potential of cutting the epidermic layer. By undergoing the painful experience, have I learnt something new about the piece of paper that my brother cannot know? The answer seems to be no. What has been disclosed to me that hasn’t been disclosed to my brother is the phenomenal character of the experience but since this is merely the causal effect of the paper sliding on my finger, the phenomenal character of the experience has not disclosed anything about the nature of the piece of paper that my brother cannot appreciate from his comfortable point of view. Indeed, the properties of the experience of the cut in no way resemble the properties of the paper. It seems that an analogous case applies to Montague’s account. Insofar as the phenomenal character of the emotional experience is determined by intrinsic properties of experience and partakes in the intentionality of experience merely in virtue of resembling the evaluative properties of the object represented by the experience, Montague is unable to show that something about the evaluative property as a property of the object has been disclosed to the subject of experience that could not have been disclosed in the absence of affect. For all that has been said, the only thing that cannot be disclosed to Data is the intrinsic, phenomenal property of the emotional experience. That is, Data will never be able to feel an emotion. But nothing has been said to show that Data is therefore unable to “access” the same evaluative information as a human being.

In conclusion, the above seems to call into question whether Montague’s account is able to secure any form of the inextricability thesis at all. If the relation between the intrinsic property of experience constituting its phenomenal character and the property of the object of experience is one of mere causation, that is, the phenomenal character of the
experience discloses the fact that the object of experience has that sort of effect, then the relation is one of mere contingent association. Crucially, once we reject the claim that the two sets of properties are related by resemblance, causation seems to be the only plausible relation one can draw between the two. In the specific case of emotional experience, the inextricability between affective phenomenology and evaluative intentionality seems to be even more severed. Recall that according to Montague during an emotional experience there is a resemblance not between the valenced affective properties of the experience and the properties that the primary object is experienced as having but rather between the latter and the value or disvalue associated with the valenced affective property of the experience. But why should we think that here the associative relation is a necessary one? Unless we are given good reason to think that it is a necessary one, then in the specific case of emotional experience we have two reasons to be suspicious of the inextricability of phenomenology and intentionality. Therefore, in order to argue for the notion of affect as a disclosure of value, we have to avoid theoretical constraints from theories of experience that do not allow for the claim that the phenomenal character of experience discloses not merely an intrinsic feature of the experience but also a feature of the object of experience.
CHAPTER 2

Emotion, Value, and Representation

Introduction

I began the previous chapter by suggesting that Montague’s claim to the effect that the affective phenomenology and evaluative intentionality of emotional experience are inextricably intertwined is motivated by the phenomenological intuition that in the absence of an affective experience we lack a distinctive sort of epistemic access to the evaluative features of an object. I called this the notion of affect as a disclosure of value. I then argued that Montague’s argument fails to secure the inextricability between phenomenology and intentionality due to the theoretical constraints imposed on her account by the theory of perceptual experience Montague relied on to theorise affect and value in emotional experience.

In this chapter I make a similar claim against Peter Goldie’s argument in support of the inextricability between the affective character and evaluative intentionality of emotional experience. First, I believe that also in Goldie’s case it is the phenomenological intuition that affect is the disclosure of value that motivates his account of emotional experience. Furthermore, Goldie also relies on a specific theory of experience, so-called “intentionalism” or “representationalism,” from which it inherits certain theoretical constraints that impede him in securing his goal. Finally, also in Goldie’s case, tracing these theoretical constraints allows us to make progress towards building an argument to the effect that affect is the disclosure of value by identifying the theoretical constraints about experience that we should avoid.
The chapter is divided into four sections. In Section one I clarify Goldie’s version of the claim that affect and evaluation in emotional experience are inextricably linked by tracing the theoretical commitments his account imports from adopting an intentionalist model of experience. In Section 2 I reconstruct Goldie’s arguments in support of the claim that affect and evaluation are inextricably linked in emotional experience. I also argue that Goldie, just like Montague, wants to show that affect discloses not only a feature of experience but also of the object of experience. In Section 3 I argue that Goldie’s arguments in support of the inextricability claim based on the analogy with Jackson’s Mary are ultimately unsuccessful. Finally, in Section 4 I rely on arguments from the literature on sensory experience to argue that, due to the underlying intentionalist model of experience, Goldie’s account of the inextricability between affect and evaluation can at most show the inextricability between phenomenal and intentional properties of experience but not that affect discloses evaluative features of the object of experience. In the light of this, I argue that Goldie’s account of the relation between affect and value cannot provide us with the material to argue for the notion of affect as a disclosure of value.

**Section 1**

Peter Goldie advocates the inextricability between affect and evaluation in emotional experience through his characterization of emotional experience as “feelings towards”. Goldie’s notion of “feeling towards” is meant to capture the thought that our emotional experiences are not cold-blooded evaluations of an object or situation contingently coated with an affective phenomenal character, a claim committed to by what he terms “add-on” views of emotional experience. Rather, in Goldie’s words:

> Emotional feelings are inextricably intertwined with the world-directed aspect of emotion, so that an adequate account of an emotion’s intentionality, of its
directedness towards the world outside one’s body, will at the same time capture an important aspect of its phenomenology. Intentionality and phenomenology are inextricably linked. (Goldie 2002, 242)

Goldie formulates the inextricability of phenomenology and intentionality in emotional experience by employing theoretical tools borrowed from the intentionalist account of perceptual experience. To be sure, this does not mean that Goldie makes an analogy between emotional and perceptual experience. Rather, it means that he relies on a model of perceptual experience, the intentionalist model, when theorising the relation between the affective phenomenal character and evaluative intentionality of emotional experience. It is true that Goldie does not subscribe to any particular intentionalist view of perceptual experience and he never formulates the inextricability thesis in any detailed intentionalist manner. Indeed, at times he seems to rely on the intentionalist model as if it were a neutral model of experience (Goldie 2002, 241). Still, the intentionalist framework within which Goldie formulates his version of the inextricability thesis does have important theoretical consequences when attempting to show that affect plays an essential role in the sort of evaluation characteristic of emotional experience. Insofar as he formulates the inextricability thesis in these terms, he has to accept the theoretical consequences. Since I want to argue that Goldie’s reliance on the intentionalist model of experience plays a central role in Goldie’s unsuccessful attempt at arguing for the inextricability between affect and evaluation in emotional experience, I will begin this section with a few specific remarks regarding the intentionalist model. This will allow me to show what Goldie’s claims actually amount to.

9 In fact, Goldie does commit to the claim that emotional experience is a sort of perceptual experience in his later 2007 paper. He does not do so in the texts I shall consider here.
According to the intentionalist model, perceptual experience is a kind of mental representation. Perceptual experience represents the world being a certain way. For instance, when I see a brown chair in front of me, my visual experience represents a brown chair in front of me. The intentionalist model makes use of the notion that perceptual experience has intentional, or representational, content in order to cash out the thought that the object of perceptual experience, say a chair, is represented as being a certain way to the subject of experience, say as brown. Representational content, then, is one of the features of the structure of the intentionality of perceptual experience in virtue of which perceptual experience represents the world being a certain way to the subject of experience. According to the intentionalist, the representational content of perceptual experience has veridicality conditions: the representational content can be correct or incorrect. In case the perceptual experience is veridical, the properties represented by the content of the experience are the properties of the object of experience out there in the world. In case the experience is illusory or hallucinatory, the properties represented by the content of experience are not the properties of the object out there in the world. Nevertheless, the perceptual experience is still intentional insofar as it still has content, albeit one that misrepresents the world. According to the intentionalist, then, both veridical and illusory or hallucinatory experiences have something in common, namely representational content. This is how the intentionalist model explains the phenomenological indistinguishability between a veridical and illusory or hallucinatory experience. Importantly, intentionalists argue that in employing the notion of representational content there is no commitment to the claim that perceptual experience entails a veil of appearance or intermediary mental object between the subject and the object. Before we consider the intentionalist’s explanation of what
determines the phenomenal character of experience, it must be mentioned that that there is a second feature of the structure of perceptual experience that intentionalists take to determine its representational character: this is the intentional attitude that is taken towards the representational content. It is standardly accepted by proponents of the intentional model that the intentional attitude of perceptual experience is *sui generis* and not reducible to other forms of intentional attitude, such as believing. The intentional attitude of a perceptual experience is just that, an attitude of sensibly perceiving. The intentional attitude and representational content, then, are the two features that according to the intentionalist constitute the structure of intentionality.

So how does the intentionalist model understand the relation between the phenomenal character of experience and its intentionality? Since the intentionalist model is usually taken to be the standard model for theorising perceptual experience, it has engendered a variety of different answers to this question. Still, there seem to be two broad ways in which this question can be answered within the intentionalist model and which will allow us to understand further both Goldie’s claims and their flaws. The first way the intentionalist can understand the relation between the phenomenal character of perceptual experience and its intentionality is by drawing an intimate connection between the phenomenal character and the experience’s representational properties. According to this sort of intentionalist, the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience is determined by the *representational properties of the experience*. The representational properties of the experience are the properties the experience has due to its representational content and the intentional attitude taken towards it. Although different forms of this sort of intentionalist theory disagree on whether the phenomenal character is determined wholly by the
representational content or whether the intentional attitude also has a role to play, they agree that ultimately the phenomenology of perceptual experience is determined by the representational properties of the experience.\textsuperscript{10} So in the case of visually experiencing a brown chair, what it is like to perceptually experience a brown chair is determined by the content of the experience representing the chair, among other things, as brown (plus, for some intentionalists, the attitude of sensibly perceiving).

There is a second option that the intentionalist can also opt for that will become important in evaluating one of Goldie’s key claims. The intentionalist can account for the phenomenal character of experience by arguing that it is determined also by qualia, that is, non-intentional, or non-representational, intrinsic properties of experience. In this case, what it is like to visually experience a brown chair is determined by an intrinsic, non-intentional feature of experience associated with “brown-ness.” Of course, if one opts for this strategy then one has to provide an account of the relation between qualia and the representational structure of perceptual experience.\textsuperscript{11}

Notice that in both intentionalist options it is a property of experience that determines its phenomenal character: in the first case the representational properties of experience and in the second the intrinsic properties of experience, namely qualia. Importantly, though, while the first way of explaining the phenomenal character of experience is committed to the inextricability between phenomenology and intentionality,

\textsuperscript{10} For the view that the phenomenal character of experience is determined solely by the representational content, see Tye (1992); while for the view that the intentional attitude has also a determining role to play in the phenomenal character, see Crane (2003) and Crane (2009).

\textsuperscript{11} Notice that while this option is not the one originally opted for by Montague, it is the position that I argued she falls back into due to her unsuccessful arguments to the effect that phenomenology and intentionality are inextricably linked.
the second is not.\footnote{In fact, there is a third position as well within the intentionalist framework, namely “Phenomenal Intentionalism.” As we have seen in footnote 5, phenomenal intentionalists distinguish themselves from more traditional forms of intentionalism by aiming to characterise the intentional in terms of the phenomenal rather than vice versa. For a reply to the argument I will develop below to the effect that intentionalism is unable to show that the phenomenal character of experience plays an essential role in the acquisition of knowledge, see Cassam’s contribution in Campbell and Cassam (2013). Cassam also subscribes to a similar view as phenomenal intentionalism. Since, as I argued in the previous chapter, it is not clear that a phenomenal intentionalist take on emotional experience is able to avoid the problems that qualia theories have, it is not clear that a phenomenal intentionalist reply to the argument below is a viable option.} This is so because while in the first case it is the representational properties of the experience, that is, the properties it has due to its intentional structure, that determines the properties of its phenomenal character, in the second case the phenomenal character is determined by qualia which potentially have no necessary relation with the intentional structure of the experience. In other words, while in the first case it follows that if we alter the representational properties of the experience then necessarily we alter its phenomenal character, and vice versa, in the second case it is at the very least conceivable that we can alter the phenomenal character (qualia) of the experience without altering its representational properties. Opting for the latter strategy is therefore potentially problematic for an account in defence of the inextricability thesis.

In order to understand what Goldie’s inextricability thesis amounts to, and the argument he puts forward in its support, it is important to be clear as just how the intentionalist model of perceptual experience translates to the case of emotional experience. For the moment I will set aside the qualia option and consider it later on. If it is agreed that the intentionality of emotional experience is evaluative in kind, then by adopting an intentionalist model of experience we are confronted with three possibilities for understanding in what way its intentionality is evaluative. One possible option is to
theorise the evaluative component of the intentionality of emotional experience solely at the level of the attitude. In this case an emotional experience is thought of as possessing an evaluative attitude towards an evaluatively neutral content. If by “evaluative content” we understand that the object towards which the emotional experience is directed is represented by the emotional experience as possessing evaluative properties, then according to this first option the object is not represented as possessing evaluative properties. Rather, one takes an evaluative attitude towards non-evaluative properties of an object or situation. Such a view is instantiated by Deonna and Teroni (2012, 2014, 2015). To illustrate with an oversimplified example. In the case of someone fearing an approaching lion, according to this first option the subject’s experience of fear is a case of taking an evaluative attitude of “fearing” – where “fearing” is possibly construed as “evaluating something as dangerous”- towards, say, the sharp claws of the lion and its bare teeth which constitute its evaluatively neutral representational content.

By contrast, a second possible way of theorising the evaluative intentionality of emotional experience utilizing the intentionalist model is to theorise the evaluative component as being solely at the level of content. In this case emotional experience is thought of as possessing an evaluative content and an evaluatively neutral intentional attitude. Under one possible reading, this view is instantiated by Sabine Doering’s (2003, 2007) characterization of emotions as “affective perceptions of value”. The content of emotional experience is evaluative in kind and the intentional attitude taken towards it is one of perceiving, therefore not entailing an evaluative component. The representational content of the subject’s experience of fear, according to this second option, represents the lion as possessing an evaluative property, say danger, towards which the subject takes the
evaluatively neutral attitude of perceiving. In this case, then, the subject has a perceptual experience of danger.

Finally, a third possible option is that the evaluative component is found both at the level of attitude and of content. In this final case, the subject takes an evaluative attitude towards an object that is represented as having evaluative properties. For instance, the emotional experience of fear can be construed as taking an evaluative attitude of fearing towards the danger that the lion is represented as possessing.

If, then, we want to argue employing an intentionalist model of experience that the affective phenomenology of emotional experience is inextricably linked to its evaluative intentionality, we can express the inextricability thesis in three possible ways. Either we claim that the relevant representational properties of emotional experience determining its affective character are found at the level of attitude, or at the level of content, or both. According to the first option, the inextricability between the affective and evaluative components of emotional experience is located at the level of attitude such that a change in the affective character of the emotional experience should yield a necessary change in the evaluative attitude taken by the subject towards the representational content of the experience. And vice versa. For instance, if the subject ceases to feel fear due to the realization that the approaching lion is enclosed in a glass cage, then the change in the affective dimension of the experience necessarily entails that the subject has changed her evaluative attitude towards the evaluatively neutral properties that the object of experience is represented as having, that is, the lion’s sharp claws and bare teeth. There is no necessary change in the properties that the lion is represented as having. According to the second option, the inextricability between affect and value is captured in terms of content such that
a change in the evaluative properties the object is represented as having by the content of experience should yield a necessary change in the experience’s affective character. And vice versa. If the subject stops feeling fear, then according to this second option, the subject still has the same intentional attitude of perceiving, but the evaluative properties the object is represented as having have changed: the lion is not anymore represented as dangerous by the content of experience (while the intentional attitude is the same one, that is, one of perceiving). According to the third option, the inextricability between affect and value is theorised at both the level of attitude and content such that a change in affective character should yield a change in both attitude and content. And vice versa. Once the subject ceases to feel fear, then the change in affect not only yields a necessary change in the evaluative attitude taken towards the properties that the lion is represented as having, but also a change in those very properties.\textsuperscript{13} The lion is not represented as instantiating the evaluative property of danger any longer.

Notice that only options two and three are committed to the claim that the presence of affect yields a change in the sort of properties that the object is represented as having. By contrast, according to the first option, the presence of affect yields a change solely in the sort of attitude one takes towards the properties of the object and not a change in the way the latter are represented. Depending on the presence or absence of feelings, one takes different attitudes towards the same evaluatively neutral properties the object is represented as having.

\textsuperscript{13} These examples are oversimplified for illustrative purposes. To be sure, if a person suddenly realizes that the lion is trapped in a glass cage and that he is safe from the lion, then although the affective component of, say, fear might dissipate or change into relief, the subject might still adopt an evaluative attitude towards the lion’s danger simply insofar as he is aware that the lion is in fact a dangerous animal.
Now, Goldie’s account seems to instantiate the third view since he claims that the presence of feelings radically changes the nature of the evaluative intentionality of an emotional experience both at the level of attitude and at the level of content:

The difference between thinking of X as Y without feeling and thinking of X as Y with feeling will not just comprise a different attitude towards the same content—a thinking which earlier was without feeling and now is with feeling. The difference lies also in the content. (Goldie 2000, 60)

[The phenomenology is neither specifically an aspect of the attitude nor of the content: phenomenology infuses both attitude and content. (Goldie 2002, 242)]

Goldie is adamant that the presence of affect yields a change also at the level of content and not just at the level of attitude. Goldie’s metaphor that phenomenology “infuses” both attitude and content seems to want to convey the thought that we cannot simply detach the intentional attitude from the representational content of an emotional experience without distorting its phenomenology. In other words, Goldie claims that we distort emotional experience if we paint a picture where the presence of affect does not yield a change in the way evaluative features of the object are represented. If it were possible to detach the evaluative attitude from the representational content and locate the inextricability between the affective and evaluative components of emotional experience solely at the level of attitude without distorting its phenomenology, then the presence of affect would not indicate a disclosure at the level of representational content. And this is something Goldie is at pains to deny.

Section 2

In order to argue for his claim, Goldie provides us with the case of Irene, a person who, by slipping on ice, fears its danger for the first time (cf. Michael Stocker 1983).
According to Goldie, while before slipping on ice Irene had only a cool grasp of the danger of ice, now she apprehends its danger in a new, affective manner. What the case of Irene is meant to do is to tease out the intuition that once Irene fears the danger of ice, something new has been disclosed to her about danger that not only was not disclosed to her before feeling fear but could not have been disclosed to her in the absence of the affective component of the emotional experience.

To clarify and beef up his case, Goldie draws two analogies between the case of Irene and hypothetical cases in perceptual experience. In the first analogy, Goldie (2000, 60) considers ‘a colour-blind person who can reliably pick out red things because he has a constant companion who points out to him all and only things of that colour.’ Goldie’s thought is that the colour-blind person expresses the content of his thought when signaled correctly by his companion as “The object is red” even though he is never presented with the colour red but rather relies on accurate and trustworthy testament. If the colour-blind person were to be miraculously cured, then although the content of his thoughts would be expressed using the same words, he would have actually gained new knowledge about the colour red insofar as he would then be presented with it. According to Goldie, the case of Irene is analogous. Once Irene slips on ice and feels fear towards its danger, she has gained new knowledge about the danger of ice. Something new has been disclosed to her about danger.

The second analogy drawn by Goldie (2002, 243-6) is with the notorious thought experiment devised by Frank Jackson as an epistemic argument against physicalism. The protagonist of Jackson’s thought experiment is Mary, a colour scientist who has lived in a black and white environment for the whole of her life. The thought experiment hinges on
the claim that if one day Mary were confronted with a red object, she would acquire a new bit of knowledge regarding the colour red that she did not, and could not have, possessed before the encounter: namely, what it is like to phenomenally experience the colour red. What is important here is not what conclusions Jackson’s epistemic argument is able to achieve against physicalism. Rather, what is important is the intuitive grip that the thought experiment is able to have in support of the claim that Mary gains a new bit of knowledge regarding the colour red once she consciously experiences a red object. Something new is disclosed to Mary. There is a fact about being presented visually with a colour that cannot be captured by any other manner of representing the same colour, for instance by means of acquiring the knowledge of wavelengths defining the physics of the colour red. In an analogous way, Goldie wants to argue that after Irene slips on ice and develops a fear of ice, the dangerousness of the ice is presented to her in fear in a fundamentally different way from how it was represented in her “intellectual” thought that ice is dangerous. In the technical terms of the intentionalist model of experience, the evaluative property “dangerous” is represented in a fundamentally different way in the content of the experience of fear from how it is represented in the content of an “intellectual” evaluative thought. Just as with Mary, something new is disclosed to Irene.

But what is disclosed about danger to Irene that could not have been disclosed in the absence of affect? Somewhat surprisingly, we are not told by Goldie so that we are left wondering whether the disclosed item is a feature of the experience that the subject undergoes or of the object of experience. Goldie argues that the difference that the presence of affect makes is manifested in Irene’s ‘way of thinking’ about the danger of ice (Goldie 2002, 243). More specifically, Irene acquires a new phenomenal concept of danger which
gives her ‘new powers and potentialities of thought, imagination and feeling...[which] reverberate through the rest of her mental economy’ (Goldie 2002, 245, Goldie’s emphasis). For instance, Irene is now able to form “‘feeling-laden desires’ rather than mere ‘pro-forma’ desires” (ibid.) to avoid the danger of ice. Furthermore, Irene is now able to recall the feeling of fear and feel empathy towards others feeling fear of danger. Unless Irene felt fear towards the danger of ice, she would not be able to have these new mental powers which are indicative of the putative fact that something new has been disclosed to her. In intentionalist terms, we can say that with the advent of affect danger is represented in a different way by the content of Irene’s emotional experience, a way that allows Irene to gain new mental abilities regarding the concept of danger. If so, according to Goldie, then there is an inextricable link between the affective character of the emotional experience and the representation of the properties of the object of experience, between phenomenology and intentionality.

Section 3

At this point, we have to ask two questions. First, is the above argument able to show that the presence of affect necessarily changes the way that the evaluative property of the object of experience is represented in the content of the emotional experience? Second, when coated in intentionalist terms, what is the most that the above argument can hope to achieve? In this section I answer the first question and I leave the task of answering the second question to the next section.

The first question is in fact difficult to answer. Some authors have argued that Goldie is unable to show that there is any difference at the level of content in the presence of affect. For instance, Michael Brady claims that the difference between an evaluation
bereft of feeling and one “imbued” with feeling is simply that, a difference of evaluating an object without feeling in the first case and evaluating it with feeling in the second case. There is no difference in the way that the evaluative properties of the object constituting the content of the emotional experience are represented:

Suppose we assume that thinking of something as dangerous is thinking of it as meriting fear... Compare the content of feeling fear towards some object... and the content of non-emotionally thinking of the object as dangerous... The content in the first case is that the object merits a state with this affective or feeling element; the content in the second case is that the object merits a state with the affective or feeling element that has just dissipated. But I find it hard to understand how the first represents a “completely new” way of thinking about danger, when contrasted with the second. And I find it hard to understand, therefore, how the evaluative content of emotional experience in the first case differs from the evaluative content of the non-emotional experience in the second. All that has happened is that one’s relation to the relevant affect has changed: in the first case the feeling is presently experienced, in the second the feeling is remembered. How can this mark a genuine difference in what is disclosed about the evaluative realm beyond one’s body?

(Brady 2013, 67-68)

Brady then concludes by stating that the claim ‘about the necessity of affective presentation of evaluative information appears undermined: the same information can be presented non-emotionally’ (ibid., p.68-9). Earlier Brady writes: ‘it is difficult to see how this difference between the experiences constitutes a difference in representational evaluative content. It is difficult to see, in other words, how the presence of the relevant feeling or affect conveys different evaluative information about the dangerousness of the object’ (ibid., 68). At the start of his discussion, Brady writes that ‘[t]he issue [i.e. whether affect is an essential
component of the evaluative intentionality of emotional experience], as I understand it, turns on the question of whether it is the feeling or affective element in emotional experience that plays the representational role; of whether, that is, our feelings are *the way in which* evaluative information is presented or disclosed to us’ (ibid., 52). What Brady means by the “representational role” of affect, I take it, refers to what I have repeatedly mentioned above, namely that according to the intentionalist model a change in phenomenal character yields a change in the properties represented by the content of experience.

Brady is not alone in complaining that affect does not seem to make any representational difference. Although Damien Whiting does not argue against Goldie’s argument directly, his objections are even more explicitly coated in intentionalist terms. He rejects the idea that ‘when we undergo emotion we represent evaluative properties to ourselves by means of feeling’ and this is because ‘although emotions comprise feelings, these feelings do not manifest phenomenally a representational character or content’ (Whiting 2012, 96-97; first emphasis mine). In fact, Whiting’s objection is more specific insofar as by “affect” or “emotional feelings” he understands the awareness of bodily or physiological changes that take place within us when undergoing an emotional experience. So Whiting writes that ‘the representation of there being a dangerous (or fearsome) object in front of me is no part of the experience of the unpleasant edgy sensation that pervades my guts and limbs when I am frightened’ (ibid.). Later on, Whiting rebuts the objection that his notion of emotional feelings is too narrow. ‘I reject the claim that I am considering the wrong (sorts of) feelings when I argue that emotional feelings do not have the sought-after representational or intentional properties. And this is because the only feelings that
are phenomenally manifest in the emotions are the feelings I have been describing in this paper’ (ibid., 100-101). Notice that Whiting’s dogmatic belief that the only emotional feelings there are are the awareness of physiological changes is a belief that is subject of intense debate and controversy. Indeed, Goldie himself, and other authors that Whiting argues against, such as Doering (2003, 2007), explicitly state that the feelings they have in mind are not bodily feelings. Therefore Whiting’s objection as he formulates it ends up having a very narrow target. As far as I know, the only account that agrees that the only sort of emotional feelings are bodily feelings, and that explicitly uses the notion of representation in theorising the relation between the affective and evaluative component of emotional experience, is Prinz (2004). Whiting, then, either needs to provide us with a reason to believe that indeed the only kind of feelings involved in emotional experience are of the sort he claims, or, strictly speaking, his objections are relevant solely to Prinz’s account. At the same time, Whiting’s objection is important because even if we are more liberal in our understanding of emotional feelings, his argument is essentially the same as Brady’s, namely that it is difficult, or at least not straightforward, to understand what kind of representational work emotional feelings perform in relation to value.

Now, I think that it is difficult to adjudicate whether Goldie’s argument is effective in showing that the presence of affect changes the evaluative content of an emotional experience. On the one hand, there is room for being sceptical about whether the way Brady sets up the issue is the one Goldie had in mind. Consider again Brady’s objection. In his set up, the person having the thoughts that the ice is dangerous has presumably already experienced danger in the past and in particular the danger of ice. The contrast is then between the subject recollecting the feeling of fear while entertaining the thought that the
ice is dangerous and the subject entertaining the thought that the ice is dangerous without recollecting the feeling of fear. As I suggested above, there seems to be something right about the claim that the way danger is represented by the content of these two thoughts is not different. But perhaps this is *not* the sort of set up Goldie wanted to convey when trying to contrast the two evaluative contents before and after the onset of emotional experience.

We can discern the difference between Goldie’s set up of the Mary analogy case and Brady’s set up of the contrast by looking closer at the analogy with Jackson’s thought experiment. In the latter, Mary has *never* phenomenally experienced the colour red (in fact, no colour except for white and black). She has no idea what it is like to experience the colour red. Therefore, when we move to Goldie’s thought experiment we shouldn’t set it up as if Irene has *already* experienced fear at the danger of ice and is now merely recollecting the feeling of fear while thinking about the danger of ice. In fact, this i.e. Brady’s, way of setting up the contrast seems to already imply that the affective and evaluative components of an emotional experience are detachable, an implication the truth of which is precisely at the heart of the matter. Rather, we should think of Irene as having no idea what it is like to feel fear at a danger in general and having merely an “intellectual” grasp of fear and danger in the same way that Mary, before leaving the black and white room, had only an “intellectual” grasp of the colour red i.e. through the acquisition of knowledge of the wavelengths defining the physics of the colour red. The relevant contrast then is between the evaluative content of a thought the content of which does not and cannot be constituted by a phenomenal concept, in this case the phenomenal concept of danger, due to being entertained before having ever experienced fear at a danger, and the evaluative content of a thought after having slipped on ice and felt fear, and therefore being constituted
by the phenomenal concept of danger acquired through the experience of fear; and not between the evaluative content of two thoughts entertained after one has experienced fear at a danger. Insofar as Brady sets up the wrong sort of contrast, his challenge seems to miss the mark and therefore lose its force.

On the other hand, Goldie himself concedes that it is difficult to show that the presence of affect changes the way evaluative properties are represented by the content of experience. Indeed, before offering the analogy with Mary, Goldie writes that 'there is no requirement to give a substantial characterization of what is the difference in content between thinking of something with feeling, and thinking of it without feeling. It might even be that no words are sufficient to capture this difference’ (Goldie 2000, 61; cf. Goldie 2002). In fact, Goldie not only faces the issue that it is difficult to adjudicate the difference in evaluation before and after the onset of an emotional experience, but his characterization of the difference as being one of the ‘way of thinking” about the evaluative property of the object of experience introduces a further worry as to whether Goldie is able to secure the inextricability thesis at all.\(^\text{14}\) Recall the intentionalist’s “qualia option” above. According to this option, the phenomenal character of an experience is determined by an intrinsic, non-intentional property of experience. This property partakes of the intentionality of the experience by mere contingent association. That is, the intrinsic property of the experience is associated to the object of experience as cause and effect: the object causes the experience with that sort of intrinsic, phenomenal property. But there is no necessary, inextricable relation between the way that the object is represented in the experience and

\(^{14}\) Notice that Brady’s objection does not concern the inextricability thesis per se but rather the specific version Goldie puts forward. For all that has been said, Brady might opt for a version of the inextricability thesis as given by the “felt evaluative attitude” theory of Deonna and Teroni. See above.
the experience’s phenomenal character. This is essentially the argument we put against Montague in the previous chapter. Now, Irene’s acquisition of a completely new “way of thinking” about the danger of ice due to her acquisition of the phenomenal concept of the danger of ice is compatible with the “qualia option” scenario. According to the “qualia option,” when Irene experiences fear towards the danger of the ice, what is disclosed to her is something new about the experience, namely its phenomenal character, that is, an intrinsic, non-intentional feature of the experience of fear. This intrinsic feature of the experience is then associated with the object of experience as cause and effect. Irene then learns something new about ice, namely that it causes that sort of affective phenomenal character due to its danger. This is sufficient for Irene to acquire a new phenomenal concept that in turn allows her to think about ice in a completely new way by forming all sorts of mental connections such as the ones mentioned by Goldie above. In other words, acquiring a completely new way of thinking about the danger of ice does not necessitate, and therefore does not show, that there is any sort of inextricable relation between phenomenology and intentionality.

Section 4

The answer to the second question—that is, when coated in intentionalist terms, what is the most that Goldie’s Mary type of argument can hope to achieve?—is more interesting. Once Goldie frames his version of the inextricability thesis in intentionalist terms, what his claim actually amounts to is that if we remove or alter the affective character of an emotional experience, then we necessarily also alter the representation of the evaluative

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15 For an analogous argument within debates on sensory awareness against representationalism employed in the next two paragraphs, see Campbell’s contribution in Campbell and Cassam (2014), esp. ch.2. See also Campbell (2002) and Campbell (2011). For a useful discussion of Campbell’s argument, see Soteriou (2016), 93-111. More on Campbell in chapter 6.
properties the object is experienced as having (in addition to the evaluative attitude the subject takes towards the content). If successfully argued for, this claim shows that there is an inextricable relation between the affective phenomenology of emotional experience and its evaluative intentionality, but it does not show that affect is the disclosure of an evaluative property of the object of experience. This is so because, once framed in intentionalist terms, the putative inextricable link one investigates is the one between two features of experience: the experience’s phenomenal character and representational properties. Nothing so far has been said about whether a property of the object of experience has been disclosed.

To be sure, an intentionalist might reply that in case the emotional experience is veridical, the representational properties of the experience are correct, and therefore it is the case that a property of the object of experience has been disclosed. If Irene’s fear of the danger of ice is correct, then the representational properties of her experience of fear are accurate, and therefore her acquisition of the phenomenal concept of danger occurs through the disclosure of a property of the object of experience. But this reply would miss the mark. For, analogously to the case of the qualia option discussed above, one might ask whether the acquisition of a new way of thinking about, say, the danger of ice, is due to the disclosure of a property of the object or due to the acquisition of a new mode of presentation of the object. In the case of Mary, if asked whether she acquires a new phenomenal concept of redness due to the experience disclosing redness itself or rather due to the acquaintance with a new mode of presentation of redness, the intentionalist is inclined to answer the latter. And the same goes for the case of Irene. Irene acquires a new phenomenal concept of danger due to becoming acquainted with a new mode of presentation of danger. But this
does not allow the intentionalist to claim that therefore a feature of the object itself has been disclosed to Irene. Therefore, even a successful attempt at showing that alteration at the level of affective phenomenology yields necessarily an alteration at the level of representational, evaluative content would fall short of showing that affect is the disclosure of evaluative features of the object of experience. If so, then Goldie’s arguments can at most achieve a form of the inextricability claim that show the inextricable relation between the phenomenal (affective) and intentional (representational) properties of emotional experience and not the claim that affect is the disclosure of evaluative qualities of objects of experience. This issue is found in Goldie’s analogy with the case of Mary. While setting up the issue by means of the analogy with Jackson’s thought experiment might help Goldie in showing that there is an inextricable link between the affective character of emotional experience and its evaluative intentionality, it does not settle the question whether what is disclosed is a feature of experience or of the object of experience. Once coated in intentionalist terms, then, the most that the analogy with Mary can show is that the presence of the relevant phenomenal character is inextricably linked with the representational properties of the emotional experience.

In conclusion, there are three claims that we can draw from the above. First, Goldie seems to want to argue for the claim that the presence of affect indicates the disclosure of an evaluative property of the object of experience. Second, once coated in intentionalist terms, Goldie’s claim can at most aspire to show that there is an inextricable relation between the phenomenal character of the experience i.e. affect, and the way that the evaluative property of the object is represented by the content of the experience. That is, that there is an inextricable relation between two properties of experience, not between a
property of experience i.e. its phenomenal character, and the evaluative property of the object of experience. Third, the argument Goldie provides us with is inconclusive at best and is compatible with a view of experience that denies there is an inextricable relation between phenomenology and intentionality at worst.

So where does this leave us? It is crucial to emphasise that all of the above arguments, both for and against the notion that affect is a sort of disclosure of value, are framed by using the intentionalist model of experience as if it were the only option on the table. Both Brady and Whiting conclude from the claim that it is difficult to conceive a way in which affect plays a representational role in the content of experience that affect is not a genuine disclosure of value. But they miss the more fundamental point that by relying on the intentionalist model of experience, nothing has been said about whether affect is the disclosure of a property of the object of experience. Their arguments, insofar as they are challenges to the claim that affect plays a representational role, are challenges solely to Goldie’s specific version of the claim that affect and evaluation are inextricably linked that results from being wedded to an intentionalist model of experience. They are not challenges to the notion of affect as a disclosure of value. For his part, Goldie also uses the intentionalist model as if it were the only game in town. But this is not the case.\textsuperscript{16} This opens the possibility of cashing out the notion that affect is the disclosure of value by employing different theories of experience, theories that are committed to the idea that the phenomenal character of experience is determined in part by the objective features of the experience.

\textsuperscript{16}For important challenges to intentionalist accounts of sense experience from the point of view of so-called relationism, or naïve realism, see Martin (2002), Travis (2004), Campbell (2011) and Campbell’s contribution in Campbell and Cassam (2014). More on what a relationist view of affect and value looks like, and its inherent problems, in chapter 3. For a clear overview of what the debate between representationalists and relationists comes down to, see Soteriou (2013), ch.2.
object of experience. It is legitimate to ask, then, whether perhaps we can theorise the role played by affect in the evaluative intentionality of emotional experience in some other terms that would avoid the problems raised above. In other words, whether Goldie’s motivating intuition could be reframed, and perhaps vindicated, by employing a different underlying theory of experience.
CHAPTER 3
Emotion, Value, and Authority

Introduction

In the previous two chapters I argued that neither Montague nor Goldie are able to provide us with an account of the relation between affect and evaluation in emotional experience that is capable of providing us with the theoretical material to build an argument towards the notion that affect is the disclosure of value which, in both cases, I suggested is the motivation behind their accounts. Moreover, I traced the shortcomings of both accounts to the theoretical constraints imposed by the respective underlying theories of experience. In so doing, we learnt what assumptions about experience we need to avoid in order to argue for the claim that affect is the disclosure of value. In particular, we learnt that if we are to argue that affect is the disclosure of value, then at the very least the theoretical commitments of our account need to allow for the notion that in having a phenomenally conscious experience we disclose not only features of the experience but also of the object of experience.

In this chapter I look at a final account of the relation between affect and evaluation underpinned by a specific theory of experience, namely Mark Johnston’s. The theory that underlies Johnston’s account is so-called Naïve Realism, or Relationism. I argue that although this theory of experience avoids the issues with the previous two theories we looked at in Chapters 1 and 2, ultimately also in this case, when applied to affect and value, the account provided fails to secure its aim due to the theoretical commitments imported from the underlying theory of experience. Nevertheless, there is an important difference between Johnston’s account and the previous two we have looked at.
While in the case of Montague and Goldie the aim is strictly to argue for the inextricability between phenomenology and intentionality in emotional experience, by way of which one can then attempt to argue for the notion that affect is the disclosure of value, in the case of Johnston the aim is directly to argue for the latter. Two things follow from this. First, with Johnston, we are not only dealing with arguments to the effect that affective phenomenology and evaluative intentionality in emotional experience are inextricably linked. Rather, we are dealing directly with the question of whether affect plays an essential role in the acquisition of evaluative knowledge, that is, knowledge of the object of experience. Second, since Johnston deals head on with the claim that affect is the disclosure of value, his account provides us not only with “negative” lessons, that is, with lessons about what assumptions we should avoid in constructing an argument to the effect that affect is the disclosure of value, but also with “positive” lessons, that is, with lessons about what assumptions regarding the relation between affect and value we should adopt. Most importantly, with Johnston we start appreciating the importance of motivational states in the relation between affect and value. Indeed, as we shall see, the introduction of the question of the role of motivational states in the theorization of affect and value will become of central importance in the arguments put forward in the second part of the thesis to the effect that affect is the disclosure of value. So although I argue that Johnston’s account ultimately fails in its aim, I also argue that his account provides us with invaluable insights in the building of our account of affect as a disclosure of value.

This chapter is divided in three sections. In Section 1 I reconstruct Johnston’s argument to the effect that affect is the disclosure of value and clarify the underlying theoretical differences between his account and Montague’s and Goldie’s. In Section 2 I
discuss two problems encountered by Johnston’s account. First, I argue that Johnston’s commitment to a Naïve Realist conception of experience, when applied to affect and value, leads him to adopt an incoherent position that ultimately risks being vulnerable to the same charge as the one put forward against the representationalist account of Goldie. The second problem, also fruit of Johnston’s commitment to a Naïve Realist conception of experience, introduces the notion of the transparency of experience. I argue that Johnston’s account is unable to accommodate the phenomenological observation that affective experience is not transparent. Respecting the “opaqueness” of affective experience will become a key criterion in the building of our account of affect as a disclosure of value. Finally, Section 3 concludes the first part of the thesis by outlining three criteria that an account of affect as a disclosure of value ought to satisfy. These are taken from the lessons learnt from the previous and present chapters. The second part of the thesis will build on the attempt to satisfy these three criteria.

Section 1

In “The Authority of Affect”, Mark Johnston argues for the thesis that ‘[s]ensing the utterly specific ways in which a situation, animal or person is appealing or repellent requires an appropriate affective engagement with the situation, animal or person. Absence of appropriate affect makes us aspect-blind’ (Johnston 2001, 181). Johnston specifies that ‘the kind of affect in which [he is] interested includes both a pre-judgmental orientation towards the world, and occurrent ‘crystallizations’ of this orientation, understood as pre-predicative or pre-judgmental disclosures of sensuous values’ (ibid., 182). In turn, by “sensuous values” Johnston means ‘the utterly determinate versions of such determinables as the beautiful, the charming, the erotic [], the banal, the sublime, the horrific and plain
old appealing and the repellent’ (ibid.). Once “sensuous values” are introduced, Johnston restates his thesis thus:

Within each determinable range, the determinate values in question would be inaccessible to beings without an appropriate sensibility. So these values might be called the inherently sensuous values. Thought and judgement directed at these determinate values could not be generated simply by the understanding. Something akin to sensing and sense-based imagination is required to make them available as topics for thought and judgement. While reason can include in its accounting judgements directed at such values, it cannot deliver the judgements themselves. Just as we need to sense cherry red to make a goodish range of judgments as to its nature, we need to encounter the determinate sensuous values in order to have them either as the topics or as the things predicated in our most basic evaluative judgements...If one has never been moved or affected by the determinate ways in which things are beautiful or charming or banal or sublime or horrific or appealing, then one is ignorant of the relevant determinate values. (ibid., 182-183)

Johnston writes that the sort of psychological phenomena he is after are not emotional experiences ‘which typically arise after one is drawn to or repelled by something’ (ibid., 182, fn.1). Johnston understands emotional experience as psychological occurrences grounded on the affective apprehension of value. Although, as we have seen, Goldie and Montague speak of emotional experiences in their respective accounts of the relation between affect and value, I believe that in the passage quoted above there is enough evidence to show that Johnston targets the same phenomenological intuition motivating the accounts of Goldie and Montague, namely that affect is the disclosure of value. This is so because, just like Goldie and Montague, Johnston emphasises in various ways that without an affective dimension to one’s experience, one does not gain access to the evaluative
features of one’s surroundings. In the absence of affect, we are ‘aspect-blind’, we are unable to form informative judgements regarding value. Reason and the understanding alone cannot provide us with insight into values. These are all themes that we have seen to be at the root of Goldie’s and Montague’s accounts.

The core of Johnston’s argument in support of his thesis relies on the claim that the affective component of the sort of experience under investigation, if appropriate, has a normative authority over the evaluative judgments and relevant actions motivated by the experience. From a first person perspective, there is no felt need to justify one’s evaluative judgments and relevant actions when these are motivated by affect: affect can make these readily intelligible (ibid., 187). Johnston then argues that it is in virtue of being a disclosure of value that affect has this sort of authority:

[I]t is because affect can be the disclosure of the appeal of other things and other people that it can have authority in the matter of what we should desire and do. By ‘the authority of affect’ I mean not to refer to its sheer effectiveness as a source of desire or action, but rather to the fact that the presence of the affect can make the desire or action especially intelligible to the agent himself. It can make the desire or act seem apt or fitting in a way that silences any demand for justification.

(Johnston 2001, 189)

Furthermore, Johnston argues that ‘[a]ffect has authority, when it does, by being a refinement of sensing and correct imagining, a more skilled way of doing these things’ (ibid., 205). According to Johnston, both affect and sense experience share the same sort of disclosure as a feature of their phenomenal character and this is manifested in the way both sorts of experiences have authority over the relevant beliefs and desires. Immediately following the previous passage, Johnston writes:
In this way affect is akin to perceptual experience considered generally. Perceptual experience makes certain immediate perceptual beliefs about the perceived scene seem apt or fitting in a way that silences any demand for justification for those beliefs...Perceptual experience discloses how things stand in the environment and so confers a ready intelligibility on immediate perceptual beliefs. In the same way affective disclosure of sensuous goods makes desire readily intelligible from the inside. (Ibid., 189-190; cf. Martin 2002, 389-390)

Here “sensing” must be understood broadly and not as referring solely to one particular sense modality. The thought, then, is that affect is a “refinement” of sensing in that it shares an essential feature of its phenomenal character, namely the disclosure of properties of objects which in turn bestows it with normative authority over beliefs and desires.

Just like Goldie and Montague, Johnston relies on a specific theory of sense experience to theorise the relation between affect and value. Where Johnston radically departs from both Goldie and Montague is in the sort of theory of sense experience that he relies on. Elaborating on their differences will prove crucial in gaining further clarity about Johnston’s account.

According to my argument in Chapter 1, since Montague’s arguments to the effect that phenomenology and intentionality are inextricably linked are unsuccessful, she falls back into a position that is vulnerable to the same problems as a qualia theory according to which the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is constituted by intrinsic, non-intentional, non-representational properties of experience. As we have seen, Montague argues that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is inextricably linked to its intentionality by way of a strict resemblance between the intrinsic properties of experience and the properties that the object of experience is experienced as possessing. In the case of
emotional experience, the story is slightly more complicated since the resemblance postulated is one between the evaluative property that the object of experience is experienced as having and the value associated with the valenced character of the affective properties of the experience. As for Goldie, I argued that he commits to some form of the intentionalist model of experience. According to this model, perceptual experience is a mental representation of the world. The structure of this mental representation, or of the intentionality of experience, is explicated in terms of the notion of intentional attitudes directed at a representational content with veridicality conditions. The content of experience is the way in which the experience represents the world to be. In the case of a genuine perceptual experience the veridicality conditions of the content of experience are satisfied and the experience correctly represents the way the world is while in the case of a perceptual illusion or hallucination the veridicality conditions of the content of the experience are not satisfied and therefore the experience misrepresents the way the world is. Crucially for our purposes, according to the intentionalist model imputed to Goldie, the phenomenal character of experience is captured (wholly or in part) by the representational content, that is, it is constituted by the properties the experience has in virtue of which it represents the world as being thus and so.

Both Montague and Goldie, then, adopt theories of experience that theorise its phenomenal character as constituted by properties of experience. In the case of Montague, it is intrinsic, non-representational properties of experience that constitute its phenomenology. In the case of Goldie, it is the experience’s representational properties that do so i.e. (wholly or in part) the experience’s representational content. This commonality between the theories underlying Goldie’s and Montague’s accounts can be
appreciated further by considering the way in which the respective theories cash out the phenomenological indistinguishability between a veridical and hallucinatory experience. By a hallucinatory experience I mean an experience that purports to be about an object that in fact is not present in the subject’s surroundings. According to a theory that employs the notion of qualia to give an account of the phenomenal character of experience, a hallucinatory experience is phenomenologically indistinguishable from a veridical experience insofar as the subject is in both cases presented with an intrinsic property of experience viz. a mental quale. The difference between the two experiences lies in the fact that while in the case of the hallucinatory experience there is no appropriate worldly object causing the quale, in the case of veridical experience the quale is caused by an appropriate worldly object. According to the intentionalist model, the phenomenological indistinguishability of the two sorts of experiences is explained by their sharing the same representational content. Since the phenomenal character is determined (wholly or in part) by its representational content, then in sharing the same representational content (and, for some, intentional attitude), they share the same phenomenal character. It is just that while in the case of hallucination the representational content misrepresents the way the world is i.e. its veridicality conditions are not satisfied, in the case of a genuine perceptual experience its representational content correctly represents the way the world is i.e. its veridicality conditions are satisfied. Just as in the case with qualia theory, the difference between the two experiences is a matter of their causal history. While in the case of a veridical experience an appropriate worldly object causes the mental representation of the world being a certain way, in the case of a hallucination it does not.
By contrast, according to Johnston, talk of the phenomenal character of sense experience is not to be captured solely in terms of properties of experience. Johnston’s rejection of qualia as constituents of the phenomenal character of experience is explicit:

The function of sensory awareness is not to deliver sensations, or structured qualia…Instead the senses are forms of openness to things in the environment…Start then with the notion that the senses provide neither sensations nor qualia, but awareness of environmental particulars –objects, stuff, states and events. One distinctive consequence of such awareness of an environmental particular is this: By turning our attention toward the particular of which we are aware we then have it, and not merely some quale it has produced or some mode of presentation of it, isolated as a topic or subject for further thought and judgement. (Ibid., 206-207; cf. Johnston 2006)

Sensory experience is not a matter of being acquainted with an intrinsic property of experience but with a particular object and its properties out there in the world. So far, though, we haven’t shown exactly how Johnston differs from an intentionalist since also the latter can agree that the phenomenal character of experience is not constituted by intrinsic, non-intentional properties of experience i.e. qualia. So how does Johnston differ from the intentionalist, specifically in his understanding of the constitution of the phenomenal character of experience? The broader answer lies in Johnston’s rejection of the conception of sensory experience as providing us with a mental representation of the world. Rather, according to Johnston, (veridical) sensory experience is to be conceived as a psychological, nonrepresentational relation between the subject and the particular

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17 I wrote “can agree” because an intentionalist can opt for a view where the phenomenal character of experience is constituted by qualia.
worldly objects out there in the world. In order to see more clearly Johnston’s disagreement with the intentionalist regarding the phenomenal character of experience, we need to dig slightly deeper into his theory of sense experience.

We find the necessary details in his “The Obscure Object of Hallucination” (Johnston 2004). The crux of Johnston’s theory is that veridical sensory experience provides us with worldly particulars instantiating what he terms “sensible profiles”, that is, ‘a complex, partly qualitative and partly relational property, which exhausts the way the particular scene before your eyes is if your present experience is veridical’ (Johnston 2004, 134). According to Johnston, we should think of sensible profiles as pertaining to the world insofar as they just are the sensible way that an arrangement of particular worldly objects and their properties strikes us as being. In other words, sensible profiles are properties of the scenes we are confronted with, scenes constituted by a particular arrangement of worldly objects and their properties. Johnston invites us to think of sensible profiles through Wittgenstein’s notion of “seeing as” (Johnston 2004, 137). When I see a pine tree, I see the tree as a pine tree. Sensory awareness provides me with the sensible profile of the tree as a pine tree. In having a veridical perceptual experience of a pine tree, the object of my experience is the particular pine tree before me that instantiates the sensible profile “as a pine tree”. The sensible profile just is the arrangement of the tree’s properties that allows me to see it as a pine tree. The characterization of sensible profiles in terms of “seeing as” is important because it allows Johnston to explain how our sensing can be expanded beyond the sensing of standard properties such as colour and shape and therefore to talk of sensing ‘considered generally’. This is so because our ability to see things “as” is expanded by our conceptual abilities. I am able to see my dog as a Golden Retriever because I possess the
concept “Golden Retriever.” In a similar vein, sensing sensuous values is a matter of seeing objects as exemplifying sensuous values (Johnston 2001, 209). Understanding affect as a disclosure of value is understanding it as the phenomenal character of an experience where a particular object or event appears as possessing an evaluative property. In other words, in the absence of an affective engagement with the object or event one is unable to apprehend it as instantiating an evaluative property.

What about cases of hallucination or perceptual illusion? In cases of hallucination or perceptual illusion, Johnston argues that we are still presented with sensible profiles, the “only” difference being that these are not instantiated by particular objects in the world. According to Johnston, if I hallucinate a pine tree, or fall under the illusion that the tree before me is a pine tree, I am nevertheless presented with a sensible profile - not instantiated in the world. Crucially, this does not mean that I am presented with a mental item. Sensible profiles are not properties of experience. They are complex properties instantiated by particular objects in the world that can be detected by sensory awareness in case of veridical perceptual experience and that are not instantiated by objects in case of hallucinations or perceptual illusions. In both the case of hallucinatory, or illusory experience, and veridical experience, the phenomenal character of experience is to be understood (in part) in terms of the subject’s awareness of an item that is not a property of the experience.

Importantly, according to Johnston, although the phenomenological indistinguishability between a veridical perceptual experience and a hallucination is accounted for by the characterization of both sorts of experiences as an awareness of sensible profiles, it does not follow that these two sorts of experiences are directed towards the same kind of object. In the case of veridical perceptual experience, we are presented
with particular worldly objects that instantiate sensible profiles while in hallucination we are presented with sensible profiles that are not instantiated. To assume that in both cases we are presented with the same kind of object, namely sensible profiles, is to assume what Johnston calls the ‘The Phenomenal Bottleneck Principle’ according to which ‘[i]f two acts of awareness are qualitatively indistinguishable for their subject then objects of the very same type are directly presented in each act of awareness’ (Johnston 2004, 151). For our purposes, what is important to highlight is that by rejecting ‘The Phenomenal Bottleneck Principle’, Johnston rejects the assumption that we gain access to particular worldly objects by being presented with sensible profiles. Rather, Johnston’s thought is that we are presented with particular objects as having sensible profiles. As Johnston puts it, ‘the ‘as’-structure of sensory awareness is not the loaded ‘by’-structure of the friend of indirection’ (ibid, 155). This is important because, as we shall see presently, it reveals what Johnston takes to be a defining feature of experience that distinguishes him from the intentionalist.

So how does Johnston’s account of sensory experience differ from the intentionalist? As we have seen above, according to the intentionalist, a genuine perceptual experience is a veridical mental representation while a hallucinatory experience is a nonveridical mental representation. The phenomenological indistinguishability of a veridical and hallucinatory experience is due to the experience’s sharing the same representational content. By contrast, Johnston rejects the idea that in both veridical perceptual experience and hallucination we are presented with the same sort of object where this is conceived as a property of experience. Rather, what the two experiences share is being an awareness of a complex property i.e. a sensible profile, where this

18 Here I do not in any way mean to suggest that intentionalists deny that in experience we are presented directly with the mind-independent object and its features.
property is *not* a property of the experience but rather, in the case of a veridical perceptual experience, it is a property instantiated by the particular objects out there in the world. So in the case of veridical perceptual experience, the phenomenal character is constituted (in part) by the very features of the objects we are confronted with. And in the case of hallucinatory experience, the phenomenal character is constituted by non-instantiated sensible profiles. Crucially, then, *contra* the intentionalist, Johnston maintains that in the case of veridical perceptual experience, the phenomenal character of sensory experience is *not* ultimately constituted *solely* by properties of the experience, properties that it shares with hallucinatory experience. Rather, the phenomenal character is (in part) constituted by the qualitative features of the particular worldly objects confronting the subject. This is part of what Johnston means when he writes, against a form of intentionalism which he labels the Fact-Directed Attitude View, that ‘it does not earn the right to the metaphor of the senses taking in *concrete* reality’ (Johnston 2006, 269).

Let me illustrate this difference with the case of Jackson’s Mary. According to Johnston, when Mary sees a red object for the first time, her acquisition of a new phenomenal concept of redness is due to her becoming acquainted with the colour red itself. The phenomenal character of her experience of redness is constituted (in part) by the very redness that qualifies the object of experience. By contrast, according to the intentionalist,

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19 There is another way to contrast Johnston and the intentionalist but which does not have an immediate bearing on questions of phenomenology but rather of epistemology. According to the intentionalist, the content of experience has veridicality conditions, that is, it can be assessed as true or false. According to this picture, sensory experience provides us with *truth-bearers*. By contrast, according to Johnston, objects of experience are not assessable as true or false, they are not truth-bearers. Rather, they are the particular objects out there in the world. In and of themselves, the particular objects of sensory awareness do not have veridicality conditions, they are not assessable as true or false. The epistemological function they have is as *truth-makers*, that is, they can make the content of our judgements true or false. For more details, see Johnston 2006.
when Mary sees a red object for the first time, her acquisition of a new phenomenal concept of redness is due to her experience representing the colour red in a new, phenomenal way. Within this latter framework, Mary does not gain access to redness itself but rather to a mode of representing redness that she might have had even in the absence of a red object out there in the world, as in the case of hallucination. So when Johnston writes that ‘What Frank Jackson’s Mary does not know is not what some mental quale is like. What she does not know is what redness is like’ (Johnston 2004, 146), he is not only rejecting the qualia theorist but also the intentionalist. We are now also in a position to understand why the same goes for the quote above where Johnston writes that ‘By turning our attention toward the particular of which we are aware we then have it, and not merely some quale it has produced or some mode of presentation of it, isolated as a topic or subject for further thought and judgement’ (Johnston 2001, 207). The phenomenal character of sensory awareness is constituted (in part) by the features of the particular and not by a way of representing the particular.

We are now in a better position to appreciate what is at stake in Johnston’s account of affect as a disclosure of value. As we have seen, Johnston claims that his ‘thought about the sensuous values is that exemplifications of them can typically be sensed only when sensing is refined by affect’ (Johnston 2001, 210). First, recall that the objects of veridical sensory awareness are the particular objects we are confronted with that instantiate sensible profiles, where the notion of sensible profiles is comparable to the phenomenon of “seeing as” introduced by Wittgenstein. So when Johnston speaks of affect as a refinement of sensing he means that in an affective experience, just like in a sensory experience, particular worldly objects strike us as being a certain way, in this case as exemplifying
certain values. Most importantly, what the above discussion of the difference between
Johnston and the intentionalist brings out is that the way we are to think of the phenomenal
class of affect is as constituted by the way that the particular worldly objects strike us
as being which in this case is as instantiating evaluative properties. When we ask what
constitutes the phenomenology of a veridical, or appropriate, affective experience
according to Johnston, we should not answer by mentioning solely properties of experience
but rather also by mentioning the particular objects confronting us that instantiate a sensible
profile “as possessing a determinate, sensuous value”. Affect is the presentation of
particular objects in the world as exemplifying evaluative properties. It is in this way that
we should understand Johnston’s claim that affect is the disclosure of value. Here
disclosure takes all the loaded sense of experience being (in part) the presentation of the
properties of the object itself, of being a genuine openness to the world, of experience, as
Johnston put it, taking in concrete reality.

By distinguishing himself from both Montague and Goldie in the manner just
explained, Johnston is able to avoid the trap they fall into. Montague’s account relies on a
theory of experience that conceives its phenomenal character as constituted by intrinsic,
non-intentional properties of experience that gain intentionality through a resemblance
with the properties of objects. I argued that Montague’s notion of resemblance is not
sufficient to secure an inextricable link between phenomenology and intentionality, let
alone a defence of the notion of affect as a disclosure of value, since the intrinsic, non-
intentional phenomenal properties of experience participate in the intentionality of
experience solely by way of a contingent association. The causal impact of the object out
there in the world on the subject’s cognitive faculties generates the experience’s
phenomenal properties which are then associated with the external object. Translating this to the case of Mary, when Mary sees for the first time a red object, there is a causal relation between the object and Mary’s cognitive faculties that generates a red quale in her experience. Mary acquires the phenomenal concept of redness via becoming acquainted with an intrinsic, phenomenal property of experience. What Mary learns is something new about the experience of seeing red rather than about redness itself. In the case of Irene, Goldie’s ice-cool scientist who never felt fear before, what she learns when slipping on ice for the first time is something new about the experience of feeling fear rather than about the evaluative property of the object of experience, the danger of ice. Within this framework we are not able to show why without an affective engagement with the object of experience we are unable to access new knowledge regarding its value, that is, what a certain determinate value is.\(^{20}\) All we are able to show is why in the absence of affect we are unable to access new knowledge regarding the experience.

In the case of Goldie, I argued that what the arguments he puts forward can achieve at best is showing an inextricable relation between the phenomenal properties of experience, which is how affect is conceived in the intentionalist model, and the experience’s representational properties, that is, the way that the object is represented as being by the representational content of experience. (At worst, it can be argued that Goldie’s arguments are compatible with a qualia theory of the sort Montague falls back into which is unable to secure an inextricable relation between the two sets of properties). I then argued that even if Goldie could convincingly show that affect plays a

\(^{20}\) One possible way to answer this problem is by adopting a dispositionalist view of the relation between affect and value. Dispositionalism is a position that will become an important reference point in the second part of the thesis.
representational role, he could not show that this is a case of a genuine disclosure of the evaluative feature of the object. As we have seen above, according to the intentionalist, when Mary is confronted for the first time with a red object, she acquires a new phenomenal concept of redness due to her experience representing the colour red in a new, phenomenal way. In both the case of representing redness by its physical constituents, as Mary is able to do before leaving the black and white room, and representing redness in the new, phenomenal way, redness is precisely *represented* by the experience to Mary. But, as I have argued in the previous chapter, why should we think that the representational content of this new, phenomenal way of representing redness, even if veridical, qualifies as a genuine case of disclosure when the representational content of the other, non-phenomenal ways of representing redness that Mary possessed before leaving the room do not qualify as genuine cases of disclosure? And therefore why should we think that the phenomenal character of this new way of representing redness is providing Mary with the knowledge of what redness itself is like? If the phenomenal character of Mary’s sensory experience of red is determined by the experience’s representational content, then the phenomenal character of her experience teaches her a new way of representing redness, not what redness is like. The item of knowledge that Mary acquires is not what redness is like but rather an ulterior way of representing redness. Applying this to the case of Irene, if we commit to an intentionalist framework, when she slips on ice for the first time and feels fear at its danger, then all we are able to show is that Irene is provided with a new way of representing danger but which, again, does not allow Goldie to claim that *this* representational content, even if veridical, is a case of a genuine disclosure of value. This is so because by “affect as a disclosure of value” we mean that in having an affective experience we gain knowledge
about value that could not be learnt before, or in the absence of, the advent of the affective experience. Neither in the case of Mary nor of Irene are we told what the essential role played by the respective phenomenal characters are in the acquisition of new knowledge of the object of experience. Veridical representation, then, is not sufficient for disclosure. Therefore, just as in the case of Montague, within this framework we are not able to show why without an affective engagement with the object of experience we are unable to access new knowledge regarding value, that is, what an evaluative feature of an object is like.

By contrast, we have seen that Johnston’s account of affect as a disclosure of value relies on a theory of experience that conceives its phenomenology in such a way as to allow for a genuine notion of disclosure. According to Johnston, when Mary leaves the room and is presented with a red object, the phenomenal character of her experience is (in part) constituted by the very redness that qualifies the object. We are now able to say that the item of knowledge that Mary gains is what redness is like rather than what a mental quale is like or what a new, phenomenal way of representing redness is like. And therefore we are able to explain the essential role played by the phenomenal character of the experience in acquiring new knowledge of the object. Similarly, we are able to say that when Irene feels fear for the first time she learns what danger is like and does not merely learn something about the experience of feeling fear or a new way of representing danger.21 Therefore, we are now able to show why without an affective engagement with the object of experience we are unable to access new knowledge regarding value, that is, what a certain determinate value is. That is because the evaluative property of the object

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21 As we shall see, there are crucial disanalogies between the sort of disclosure at play in sensory experience and in affective experience.
constitutes (in part) the phenomenal character of the experience. So unless we have an experience with that phenomenal character, we are not being presented with the value itself.

Now, the reason for presenting Johnston’s account and the way it avoids the trap is neither to endorse the details of Johnston’s account of sensory experience nor to endorse its relationist roots. As I argue in the second section of this chapter, not only is Johnston’s specific account confronted with certain issues, but committing to a conception of the phenomenology of experience along relationist lines when theorising the relation between affect and value is problematic. Rather, my aim so far has been to show the sort of criterion about experience that we need to satisfy if we want to defend the notion of affect as a disclosure of value. This is, that the phenomenal character of experience has an essential role to play in the acquisition of new knowledge of the object of experience. This is a criterion that the theories of experience underlying Montague’s and Goldie’s accounts are unable to satisfy and that the theory of experience underlying Johnston’s account does seem to satisfy - but at a cost.

Section 2

In what follows, I want to discuss two problems that arise from committing to the sort of conception of the phenomenal character of experience championed by Johnston when theorising the relation between affect and value. The first problem deals with the specific way in which Johnston cashes out the relationist conception of the phenomenal character of experience when applied to the case of affect and value, namely by appeal to the claim that sensory awareness, and therefore affect, has an “as-structure.” The question I want to ask is whether the notion of “seeing-as” is appropriate to capture the notion of disclosure that we are after. A related question is whether the notion of “seeing-as” is not
perhaps closer to the notion of representation than first meets the eye, a notion that I argued above is insufficient for disclosure. The second problem begins with the observation of a discrepancy between some paradigmatic cases of sensory awareness and affective experience. The discrepancy consists in the fact that while in the case of many paradigmatic cases of sensory awareness the subject is unable to focus on the features of its phenomenal character without focusing on the features of the object of experience, the same is not the case in affective experience. In the latter case, the subject is able to dissociate between features of the affective experience and the evaluative features of the object of experience and focus on the former without focusing on the latter. This discrepancy has important reverberations on the notion of disclosure that we are after in the case of affect, reverberations that Johnston not only does not consider but, I argue, that his account is unable to accommodate. Overall, the aim in discussing these two problems with Johnston’s account is to come up with further criteria that a successful notion of affect as a disclosure of value is meant to satisfy.

Problem 1

According to Johnston, the phenomenal character of veridical sensory experience is constituted (in part) by worldly particulars and their very features. The phenomenology of visually experiencing a red object is constituted (in part) by the very redness instantiated by the particular confronting us. This conception of the phenomenology of experience allows Johnston to use the notion of disclosure encapsulating the essential thought that without the relevant phenomenal character we are unable to gain a certain kind of knowledge regarding the object of experience, namely knowledge of what a certain property of the object is. Or put in another way, it encapsulates the thought that the
phenomenal character of experience has an essential explanatory role to play in our acquisition of new knowledge regarding worldly objects. In the case of redness, the phenomenal character of visually experiencing a red object has an explanatory role to play in our acquisition of the knowledge of what redness is like since the phenomenal character is conceived as constituted (in part) by the very redness in question. Here the phenomenal character of the visual experience has an explanatory role to play in the acquisition of new knowledge regarding the object since it consists in the disclosure of the very redness of the object.

Sensory awareness, on Johnston’s account, does not provide us only with properties such as colour but also with complex properties, namely sensible profiles. The notion that sensory awareness provides us with particulars instantiating sensible profiles is explained by the idea that sensory awareness has an “as-structure.” Due to its “as-structure”, sensory awareness not only allows us to attribute properties such as colour to particulars but also to attribute complex properties such as being a pine tree or a Golden Retriever: I see a tree as a pine tree and a dog as a Golden Retriever. The ability of sensory awareness to detect complex properties is expanded by our conceptual sophistication. I can detect the property of a tree being a pine tree and of a dog being a Golden Retriever only if I possess the concepts “pine-ness” and “Golden Retriever” respectively. In these cases, the phenomenal character of sensory awareness is constituted by particulars instantiating the sensible profiles “pine-ness” and “Golden Retriever.” The phenomenal character of these experiences consists in the disclosure of particulars instantiating these sensible profiles.
Johnston conceives affect as a refinement of sensing. When I affectively engage with an object I see the object as exemplifying a determinate value. Affect is the detection of a determinate value instantiated by a worldly particular. In experiencing indignation at the latest governmental cut of public funding for higher education, I detect, say, the determinate injustice of the event. Insofar as affect is conceived as the disclosure of value, it follows that without an appropriate affective engagement with the event one is unable to acquire new evaluative knowledge about it. Without feeling indignation, one cannot see the event as unjust. The feeling of indignation is the disclosure of the event’s injustice.

Now, the question is the following: does Johnston’s account of affect as a refinement of sensory awareness have the resources to argue that the affective character of an experience has an essential explanatory role to play in the acquisition of new evaluative knowledge of the object of experience? When we ask the same question for the case of visually experiencing a red object, the answer seems to be rather forthcoming (if we accept Johnston’s conception of the phenomenal character of experience, of course): yes, Johnston’s account does have the resources to show the essential explanatory role played by the experience’s phenomenal character since redness itself (in part) constitutes it. The phenomenal character of seeing red just is (in part) being presented with redness itself. According to this conception of the phenomenal character of experience, we cannot learn what redness itself is unless we have a visual experience with that phenomenal character. Can we hold on to a similar thought once we shift to affect and value?

Let me begin by noting that in order to explain the role played by the phenomenal character of the visual experience of a red object in acquiring knowledge of what redness is like, there is no immediate need to introduce the “as-structure” of sensory experience
that Johnston takes it to have. Although it would not be wrong \textit{per se} to do so, we do not need to cash out the thought that the phenomenal character of a visual experience plays an essential role in acquiring new knowledge regarding the colour red i.e. what redness is like, by saying that sensory awareness presents the object \textit{as} red. We simply point out that redness itself (in part) constitutes the phenomenal character. Yet the same does not seem to be the case once we turn to affect and value. Here it seems as though there is a stronger need to introduce the “as-structure” of experience to make sense of the essential role played by the affective, phenomenal character in acquiring new evaluative knowledge of an object, that is, what its determinate value is like. For once we wish to cash out the claim that, say, the affective character of the experience of indignation provides us with new evaluative knowledge of an event, that is, with what its determinate value is like, in this case injustice, we appeal to the claim that the phenomenal character is (in part) constituted by the particulars instantiating a sensible profile, one that allows us to attribute an evaluative property to the object. And this last claim is in turn cashed out in terms of the claim that we attribute injustice to the event insofar as the affective experience consists in presenting, or disclosing, the event \textit{as} unjust. While in the case of sensing redness we do not need the further step of introducing the “as-structure” of sensory awareness in order to explain the essential explanatory role played by the phenomenal character, in the case of affect and value we do.

Yet once we appeal to the “as-structure” of sensory awareness, affect’s essential role in acquiring new evaluative knowledge regarding value becomes less clear. What exactly is the essential role played by affect in seeing an event \textit{as} instantiating a value? What reason do we have to think that in the absence of affect one cannot experience an
event as instantiating a value? Or, why are certain cases of seeing-as essentially affective while others not? To reiterate, in the case of a visual experience of a red object, since redness constitutes part of the phenomenal character of the visual experience, then the phenomenal character plays an essential role in acquiring new knowledge regarding the object since it just is (in part) the presentation of the object’s feature itself i.e. redness. But in the case of affect and value, in order to make sense of the claim that an evaluative property constitutes part of the affective character of the experience we need to introduce the claim that experience has an “as-structure.” But now the essential role played by affect in acquiring new evaluative knowledge regarding an object, that is, what its determinate value is, becomes obscure since we are not told exactly what makes certain cases of seeing-as essentially affective.22

The effect of rendering less clear the essential role of affect in acquiring new evaluative knowledge of an object by appealing to the “as-structure” of experience brings us to a further point. Recall the objection put forward against committing to an intentionalist conception of the phenomenal character of experience when arguing for the notion of affect as a disclosure of value: insofar as the phenomenal character is conceived as constitutively determined by the way an object is represented as being by the experience, it is not clear why in the absence of affect one is unable to gain evaluative knowledge of an object since value can be represented without the presence of affect, for instance in the content of a thought. In other words, why should we think that affect plays an essential role

22 Compare with Robert Roberts’ (1988) and (2003) characterisation of emotions as concern-based construals. According to Roberts, emotions are construals of events or objects as having an evaluative property, where the notion of construal is explicitly taken from Wittgenstein’s notion of seeing-as. Crucially, though, Roberts argues that the notion of construal employed in the characterisation of emotions does not involve any sort of affective phenomenology.
in the acquisition of evaluative knowledge if it consists in the way that an object is
evaluatively represented and objects can be evaluatively represented in feeling-less
thoughts. Now, it seems to me that this objection contains a similar worry to the one
expressed above regarding the introduction of the notion of the “as-structure” of
experience. For in both cases the worry concerns the obscurity of why the presence of affect
is essential to the acquisition of evaluative knowledge of the object, knowledge that could
not be acquired in the absence of affect, and this obscurity is due to the terms within which
the phenomenal character is cashed out in the respective theories, namely the
representational structure of experience in the case of the intentionalist and the “as-
structure” of experience in the case of Johnston. In both cases we can ask why some
evaluative representations of objects, or presentations of particulars as instantiating a
sensible profile inducing evaluative property attributions, essentially entail an affective
character while others do not. In virtue of this commonality, it is not clear how the “as-
structure” of experience is meant to be an improvement on its representational counterpart
in supporting the notion of affect as a disclosure of value.

The fact that there is a similar worry in both cases raises the suspicion that the “as-
structure” of experience advocated by Johnston entails some sort of representationalist
notion when it comes to explaining the essential role played by affect in the acquisition of
evaluative knowledge. Just as in the case of the intentionalist, Johnston simply tells us that
in the absence of affect we are unable to apprehend an event as, say, unjust, but we are not
told why. So now we have grounds to question whether the claim that, say, injustice
constitutively determines (in part) the affective character of indignation equates the claim
that the affective experience of indignation is the presentation of a particular event as, say,
unjust. Is there not perhaps some change in the way we conceive experience and the role played by its phenomenal character in the acquisition of new knowledge of objects once we switch to talk of objects being presented as something i.e. in such and such a way, in the experience? Whether the answer to this question is positive or negative, the fact remains that a relationist conception of experience is problematic once applied to the theorization of affect and value.

**Problem 2**

It is often observed that if we are asked to describe the phenomenal character of sense experience, and in particular of visual experience, we naturally end up attending to, and therefore reporting, properties of the object of experience rather than some property of the experience associated with the properties of the object. For instance, if we were to describe our visual experience of the green leaves of a tree standing before us, we would end up attending to, and therefore reporting, among other things, the greenness of the leaves rather than some property of the experience associated with the greenness of the leaves. This phenomenological observation is used to argue against accounts of the phenomenology of experience according to which its constitutive components are intrinsic, non-intentional properties of experience associated to the properties we experience objects as having, i.e. versions of the qualia theory. If the phenomenal character is constituted by intrinsic, non-intentional properties, then how come we are unable to introspectively report them? By contrast, both the intentionalist and the relationist conception of the phenomenology of experience can accommodate the phenomenological observation that in the attempt to describe the phenomenal character of experience we end up describing the features of the object of experience. If one agrees that the phenomenal character of
experience is constitutively determined by the way in which the experience represents the object, as the intentionalist does, then in describing the phenomenal character one describes the way in which the object is represented in the experience, that is, as having such and such properties. And if one agrees that the phenomenal character of sense experience is partly constituted by the very properties of the object of experience, as a relationist like Johnston does, then it is only to be expected that in describing the phenomenal character one reports the properties of the object.

It also often observed that, in contrast to sense experience, and visual experience in particular, if we were asked to describe the phenomenal character of the affective dimension of an emotional experience, we would *not* naturally end up attending to, and therefore reporting, the evaluative property of the object. Rather, in the case of affect, we do seem to be able to attend to, and therefore report, features of the experience without having to attend to, and report, properties of the object of experience. For instance, if asked to describe our feeling of sadness after the breakup from a beloved one, we would be able to describe our feelings without necessarily describing its features by focusing on the beloved one or at the event of the breakup. To be sure, it is often the case that in describing our emotional experience we think or recall the event and report some of its features in order to justify how we feel. So we might mention the empty side of the bed where she used to sleep, or the unused toothbrush, or perhaps recall the enchanting character traits of the beloved one. But even a complete report of these features would be unable to exhaust our description of the affective dimension of the experience. Rather, we would have to add a description of the properties of the affective experience that we are able to attend to without attending necessarily to the evaluative feature of the event. The features of the
affective experience are the sort that can be captured both by metaphorical descriptions and by descriptions of a more concrete, bodily type. For instance, on the metaphorical side we might report a feeling of emptiness and heaviness. More concretely, we might report a constriction in our abdomen or coldness in our hands. None of these descriptions, metaphorical or not, necessitate reference to a description of the evaluative import of the event.

This discrepancy underlines an important disanalogy between the sort of disclosure we find in paradigmatic cases of sensory awareness, such as visual experience, and affect. In the case of affective experience, the property of the object i.e. its evaluative import, is disclosed in virtue of properties of the experience i.e. its affective character, that we are able to introspectively dissociate from the former. By contrast, in the case of paradigmatic cases of sense experience, such as visual experience, the property of the object e.g. its colour, is not disclosed in virtue of properties of the experience constituting its phenomenal character that we are able to introspectively dissociate from the former. Rather, its disclosure is precisely characterised by an impossibility of dissociating the features of the object from the features of the experience.23

Johnston argues that affect is a refinement of sensing. As we have seen, what motivates Johnston to argue for this claim is the observation that both paradigmatic cases of sensory awareness, such as visual experience, and affect share an essential aspect of their phenomenal character: disclosure of worldly particulars and their properties. I argued

23 The ability of the relationist conception of the phenomenology of experience to accommodate this phenomenological fact, though, does not count in favour of the notion of disclosure that has been advocated above. For the intentionalist conception of the phenomenology of experience is also able to accommodate it and yet, as we have seen, the intentionalist is not allowed to make use of the notion of disclosure advocated by Johnston.
that Johnston is allowed to use the notion of disclosure in sensory experience due to his commitment to a relationist conception of the phenomenology of experience whereby its phenomenal character is conceived as constituted (in part) by the very features of the object of experience. Yet once we recognise the disanalogy in the notion of disclosure at play in visual experience and affect, due to the discrepancy underlining it, it seems as we are not allowed to simply copy and paste the relationist formula of the phenomenology of experience from the case of visual experience to the case of affect. In the case of visual experience, the phenomenal character is the presentation of, say, the colour of the object insofar as the former is partly constituted by the latter. The phenomenal character is conceived as performing its disclosive function in virtue of the fact that it is constituted (in part) by those very properties it is putatively disclosing. By contrast, in the case of affect, we cannot simply state that affect is the disclosure of value insofar as the evaluative feature of the object partly constitutes the phenomenal character of the experience. For in affective experience it is possible to attend to features of the experience without attending to features of the object. But if the very features of the object constitute the phenomenal character of the experience, then we should expect an inability to introspectively dissociate the two and report the properties of the latter without necessarily reporting the features of the former. The fact that this is not the case indicates the difficulty of holding on to the relationist formula in order to argue for the notion of affect as a disclosure of value.

It follows that if one wants to hold on to the notion of disclosure advocated so far in the case of affect, one has to do so by accommodating the disanalogy between disclosure in paradigmatic cases of sensory awareness, such as visual experience, and affect. Now, although Johnston does not provide us with the resources to do so, he does provide us with
a warning about how to do so. In his critical discussion of what he terms “projectivism”,
that is, the view that value is reducible to our affective attitudes which are then projected
onto a value neutral world, Johnston argues that the projectivist commits the error of
“mentalising” affect:

Instead of affect being a way in which the appeal and repulsiveness of other things
and other people makes itself manifest, the affective states themselves become the
focus of attention, as if affective engagement were an interior, private sensation
detachable from one’s being taken with or repelled by things. (Johnston 2001, 203)

In order to illustrate his point, Johnston quotes a biographical anecdote of Martin Buber.
As a young child, Buber spent his summers at his grandparents’ estate. There, he enjoyed
cressing one of the horses. The act of caressing the horse was experienced by the young
Buber as establishing a genuine relationship with the animal defined by mutual trust. One
day, while stroking the horse, Buber shifted his attention from the horse as a friend to the
pleasure that the feeling of caressing gave him. The anecdote ends with Buber recounting
how the next day the horse does not respond to his caresses in the same way. The horse’s
unresponsiveness is interpreted as a judgement to the effect that Buber’s shift of attention
rendered the animal a mere instrument for his pleasure. In turn, Johnston interprets Buber’s
anecdote as being illustrative of “the pornographic attitude.” Once we adopt this attitude,
we reduce people, animals and worldly events to mere sources of pleasure or displeasure
for us rather than apprehending them as instantiating a value that anyone with the
appropriate feeling can detect. Once the young Buber focuses solely on the way that the
affective character pleases him, the sort of knowledge that his feelings provide him about
the horse is solely whether the animal is a source of pleasure or not for him rather than of
instantiating the value of friendship. Hence the horse’s response.
The key thought to take from Johnston’s treatment of the pornographic attitude as the result of mentalising affect is that there is a potential danger that comes with conceiving of feelings as features of our experience that can be detached from the evaluative import that worldly things have. The danger is precisely that we lose sight of the sort of disclosing function that affect has and in doing so we end up with a conception of affect that is unable to capture its normative authority over our evaluative judgements and relevant actions.

Once the young Buber apprehends his feelings by adopting the pornographic attitude, all that his feelings can justify is a “speculative psychological judgement” (Johnston 2001, 200) of the sort ‘the way this horse feels when caressing it pleases me.’ It is speculative insofar as the judgment’s reach beyond oneself is a matter of speculation and it is psychological insofar as its subject matter is the psychological effect that the horse’s fur has on one’s cognitive faculties which gives rise to the relevant experience. These sorts of judgements do not capture an evaluative truth about the world that anyone with the appropriate feeling would be obliged to recognise, such as the judgement of ‘This horse is a friend’ (or, less warmly, ‘this horse instantiates the value of friendship’). Under the guise of the pornographic attitude, then, affect loses its authority.

In light of Johnston’s treatment of the pornographic attitude as the result of mentalising affect, we should be careful not to lose sight of the authority of affect once we agree to accommodate the disanalogy, and underlying discrepancy, between the sort of disclosure at play in paradigmatic cases of sensory awareness and affect. This sort of warning becomes crucial when we consider one account of affect and value that seems to be able to hold on to the notion that affect is a disclosure of value and accommodate the phenomenological fact that in affective experience the evaluative import of the object is
disclosed in virtue of features of the experience that we are able to introspectively
dissociate, and attend in isolation from, the features of the object. The sort of account I
have in mind is a version of dispositional accounts of value. According to the sort of
dispositional account of value I have in mind, an evaluative property is a property of the
object that normally disposes subjects to have an affective experience under certain
conditions. A dispositional account of value of this sort is able to accommodate the claim
that affect is the disclosure of a property of the object and not solely of the experience since
the affective experience the subject has is caused by the dispositional property of the object.
Therefore, the experience itself counts as a disclosure of a property of the object and not
solely of the experience. Furthermore, the property disclosed by having the affective
experience is an *evaluative* property since that is what an evaluative property is according
to the dispositionalist viz. the disposition to cause an affective experience in the subject.
Moreover, the dispositional account of value is able to capture the phenomenological
observation that in affective experience the evaluative property of the object is disclosed
in virtue of properties of the experience that we are introspectively able to dissociate, and
attend to in isolation from, the property of the object. If the evaluative property of the object
is conceived as the disposition the object has of causing an affective experience in the
subject, then one can attend to features of the affective experience while still claiming that
that is a case of disclosing the evaluative property of the object.

The problem with a dispositional account of value of this sort is precisely that it
lacks the means to capture a crucial element regarding the notion of affect as a disclosure
of value, an element sitting at the core of Johnston's account, namely affect’s normative
authority over our evaluative beliefs and desires. The subject experiences the evaluative
property of the object as not merely causing the affective experience but as meriting it (see also McDowell 1985; more on this in the next two chapters). The act of cutting public funds towards higher education merits our indignation. This is crucial since it’s due to the object being experienced as meriting the appropriate affective experience that it renders readily intelligible to the subject the relevant evaluative beliefs and desires. By contrast, the dispositional account of value conceives the evaluative property of the object as the disposition of the object to merely cause an affective experience in the subject. It is therefore unable to capture the peculiar way in which affect exerts its normative authority. And this is a feature of affect as a disclosure of value that we want to keep. So even though a dispositional account is able to accommodate the phenomenological observation that value is disclosed in affective experience in virtue of features of the experience that we can introspectively dissociate from the features of the object being disclosed, it does so in a way that leaves out an essential feature of the sort of disclosure at play in affective experience.

Section 3

Let us take stock. In this paper I began by showing that Johnston’s account of affect as a disclosure of value commits to a relationist conception of the phenomenology of experience according to which the phenomenal character of experience is constituted partly by the features of worldly particulars. According to Johnston, due to its “as-structure”, sensory awareness detects not only simple properties, such as colour and shape, but also complex properties that he terms “sensible profiles.” It is precisely in terms of the “as-structure” of sensory awareness that Johnston explains in what sense affect is a refinement of sensing: if appropriate, affective experience presents an object or event as instantiating
a value. I then argued that Johnston’s relationist conception of the phenomenology of experience allows him to employ the sort of notion of disclosure we are after, that is, one that explains successfully the essential explanatory role played by the phenomenal character of experience in acquiring knowledge of objects. In this way, Johnston avoids the sort of issues confronting the accounts put forward by Montague and Goldie.

Importantly, though, I also argued that Johnston’s relationist conception of the phenomenology of experience becomes problematic once applied to affect and value. First, the specific way in which Johnston cashes out the idea that the phenomenal character of veridical sensory experience is constituted by particulars instantiating sensible profiles is suspicious. Appeal to the “as-structure” of sensory awareness renders obscure the essential explanatory role played by affect since we are not told why some cases of seeing-as are essentially affective while others are not. In this respect, it is difficult to see an improvement on the representationalist picture. Second, Johnston overlooks an important disanalogy between the sort of disclosure at play in paradigmatic cases of sensory experience, such as visual experience, and affect. While in the case of affective experience the property of the object is disclosed by properties of the experience that the subject is able to introspectively dissociate from the property of the object, this is not the case in visual experience. Crucially, I argued that a relationist conception of the phenomenology of experience is unable to accommodate this disanalogy. I also introduced a further position that ought to be avoided, namely dispositional theories of value. Dispositional theories of value ought to be avoided since they are unable to capture the thought that affect exerts a normative authority over our evaluative judgements and motivational states.
In conclusion, I want to sum up the first part of the thesis. I argued that all three models of the phenomenal character of experience - the qualia model, the intentionalist model, and the relationist model - are saddled with problematic issues when trying to capture the notion of affect as a disclosure of value. Yet a positive side emerges from this negative work. This is because by looking at the distinct ways in which each model fails to capture adequately the notion of affect as a disclosure of value we have gained some criteria that an adequate model would have to satisfy. We have uncovered three such criteria:

4. An account of affect as a disclosure of value must be able to show that the affective character of experience plays an essential explanatory role in the acquisition of evaluative knowledge of the object. In other words, it needs to be able to show why in the absence of affect one cannot gain insight into what the evaluative property of an object is.

5. An account of affect as a disclosure of value needs to be able to accommodate the phenomenological fact that affect renders readily intelligible one’s evaluative beliefs and motivational states. That is, it needs to accommodate the authority of affect.

6. An account of affect as a disclosure of value must be able to accommodate the disanalogy with the sort of disclosure at play in visual experience. That is, it must be able to show that the sort of disclosure at play in affective experience is one where the evaluative import of the object of experience is disclosed in virtue of properties of the experience that are introspectively dissociable from the features of the object of experience.
As we have seen, the qualia model is unable to satisfy the first criterion since its conception of the phenomenology of experience is able to show solely that the presence of affect entails the acquisition of knowledge of the experience and not also knowledge of the object of experience. This is a criterion that the intentionalist model is also unable to satisfy since its conception of the phenomenology of experience is unable to explain why certain representations of value are essentially affective while others are not and therefore it fails to show the explanatory role of affect in the acquisition of evaluative knowledge that could not be had in the absence of affect. By contrast, the relationist conception of the phenomenology of experience is potentially able to satisfy this criterion. As we have seen, though, the latter conception of the phenomenology of experience becomes problematic when attempting to satisfy the third criterion. The phenomenological observation that the features of the phenomenal character of experience can be introspectively dissociated from the features of the object of experience is one that also an intentionalist model has difficulty in satisfying. If the phenomenal character of experience is constitutively determined by the way that an experience represents the object, then focusing on the affective character should in theory amount to focusing on the way that the object is represented, that is, as having such and such evaluative property (unless the evaluative component is thought to be located at the level of the intentional attitude rather than on the level of representational content). There is no leeway for the possibility of attending to the features of the experience in isolation from the features of the object. Interestingly, this criterion can be accommodated by the qualia model since according to it the phenomenal character of experience is constituted by intrinsic properties of the experience associated to the features the object is experienced as having. But this comes at the cost of being unable to fulfill the
first criterion. Therefore, an account of affect as a disclosure of value must satisfy the third criterion by avoiding to collapse into some form of the qualia model. That is, it must satisfy the third criterion by showing how the features of the affective character of an experience are not merely contingently associated to the evaluative features of the object but rather how their relation constitutes a genuine case of disclosure. Furthermore, we have seen that the introduction of the third criterion brings to the fore an additional position regarding the relation between affect and value that an account of affect as a disclosure of value must distinguish itself from, namely dispositionalism about value.

Finally, in this chapter I argued that an account of affect as a disclosure of value must be able to satisfy the three criteria set out above and in doing so show how it differs from the three models of the phenomenal character of experience discussed, namely the qualia theorist, intentionalist, and relationist, and how it does not collapse into a crude version of a dispositional understanding of the relation between affect and value. Providing an account that satisfies these three criteria by avoiding these four positions is the aim of the next chapter.
PART II
CHAPTER 4

Disclosure and Constitutivity

Introduction

In the first part of the thesis I critically assessed the viability of three accounts to capture the claim of affect as a disclosure of value, that is, in showing that affect plays an essential explanatory role in the acquisition of evaluative knowledge. I argued that all three accounts fail due to the theoretical assumptions they inherit from the respective underlying theories of experience they rely on to theorise the relation between affect and evaluation in emotional experience. Nevertheless, out of the critical assessment I extracted three criteria that an account of affect as a disclosure of value ought to satisfy and clarified the theoretical positions that we ought to avoid. The aim of the second part of the thesis is to build on these lessons and provide a viable account of affect as a disclosure of value.

The aim of this chapter is to provide the skeleton of an account of affect as a disclosure of value that satisfies the three criteria outlined in the first part of the thesis. I argue that at the heart of this account is the commitment to a response-dependent notion of the objectivity of value according to which the formation of rationally intelligible affective-cum-motivational states is constitutive of the acquisition of evaluative knowledge. I rely on John McDowell’s, and in part on David Wiggins’, writings on the subject to sketch the outlines of the account. I conclude by arguing that although McDowell provides us with the correct intuitions necessary for an account of affect as a disclosure of value, his account does not provide us with sufficient details as to precisely how the formation of rationally intelligible affective-cum-motivational states constitute the acquisition of evaluative knowledge (and, in all fairness, the arguments of his papers do not require him to do so).
It is the aim of the following chapters to provide the skeleton of the account with the necessary substance to ultimately defend the notion of affect as a disclosure of value.

The chapter is divided in five sections. In Section 1 I argue that the first two criteria should not be satisfied independently from one another. This gives rise to the following constitutive thesis: the formation of our motivational states towards an object is constitutive of the disclosure of value. This constitutive claim becomes the core of the account of affect as a disclosure of value that I defend in the remainder of the thesis. In this section I also introduce the distinction between theoretical knowledge of value, that is, propositional knowledge of value acquired by testimony and in the absence of affective experience, and knowledge of value, that is, knowledge of value that can be acquired exclusively in virtue of an affective experience. It is the latter sort of knowledge that is referred to in the claim that affect plays an essential explanatory role in the acquisition of evaluative knowledge. The distinction is refined in detail in the final chapter of the thesis. In Section 2 I introduce David Wiggins’ and John McDowell’s neo-Aristotelian moral psychology. I do so in order to show what the key challenge is in trying to satisfy the first two criteria jointly, that is, what the key challenge to the constitutive thesis is. The key challenge is to theorise a notion of the objectivity of value that allows us both to talk of value being disclosed by affect and that, at the same time, cannot be specified independently of the subjective point of view, in this case the formation of affective-cum-motivational states. In Section 3 I rely on McDowell’s account of the objectivity of value, known as response-dependent objectivity, to show how to solve the challenge outlined in Section 2. In Section 4 I satisfy the third criterion. I argue that the “opaqueness” of affective experience is a constitutive feature of the sort of disclosure that characterises the relation of affect to value. By “opaqueness”
here is meant the characteristic of affective experience of having features that one is able
to focus on without needing to focus on the features of the object of experience (in contrast
to the “transparency” of visual experience). I argue that also the third criterion is satisfied
jointly with the first two. Finally, in Section 5 I answer the potential objection to the effect
that the account of affect as a disclosure of value presented to in this chapter is unable to
accommodate the fact that affective experience is in part constituted by the awareness of
bodily changes.

Section 1

In the first part of the thesis I outlined three criteria that an account of affect as a
disclosure of value needs to satisfy. In what follows I want to focus on the first two and
leave the third criterion aside until later in the chapter with the initial assumption that
satisfying in the correct way the first two criteria will provide us with the way in which to
satisfy the third one as well. The first criterion states that an account of affect as a disclosure
of value needs to be able to show that the affective character of experience plays an
essential explanatory role in the acquisition of evaluative knowledge of the object. This
first criterion captures an important analogy with the visual experience of colour where, at
least according to some philosophers, we can show that the phenomenal character of the
visual experience plays an essential explanatory role in the acquisition of knowledge of
what, say, a colour like redness is. The second criterion an account of affect as a disclosure
of value must satisfy is that it must be able to capture affect’s authority. The authority of
affect refers to the ability of affect of rendering rationally intelligible the motivational states
the subject forms as a response to the object or event confronting her, in addition to making
readily intelligible the evaluative beliefs she forms regarding the event or object. This second criterion marks an important disanalogy with the visual experience of colour since the phenomenal character of visual experience has authority solely over the subject’s perceptual beliefs regarding the object of experience. Motivational states do not normally figure in the range of states made intelligible by the phenomenal character of a visual experience of colour.

One way in which one can go about trying to satisfy these two criteria is by attempting to devise an account that satisfies the first criterion independently of the second, and then attempt to show how the resulting account is able to accommodate the second criterion. I don’t think this is the way we should proceed. An account of affect as a disclosure of value should not attempt to capture the notion of disclosure at play here in isolation from capturing the ability of affect to have authority over one’s motivational states in addition to evaluative beliefs. Rather, the authority of affect over our motivational states should be conceived as an inbuilt feature of the notion of the affective disclosure of value. Part of Johnston’s core argument in defense of his account is precisely the idea that we should conceive affect as a sort of disclosure insofar as it has authority over our evaluative beliefs and motivational states. Affect’s disclosure is structured in such a way as to have authority. Therefore, theorising the sort of disclosure at play in affective experience independently of its authority would result in a distorted picture of affective disclosure. But what does this mean when theorising the role played by affect in the acquisition of evaluative knowledge?

24 In the remainder of this chapter I will drop the qualifier rationally intelligible and take it for granted that the sort of intelligibility that qualifies the formation of motivational states is a rational one.
When we characterise an affective experience as involving the disclosure of value, what we mean is that in having the affective experience we acquire knowledge of what the value of something is, a sort of knowledge that we would not be able to acquire in the absence of affect. So when we claim that an inherent feature of the affective disclosure of value is its authority over our motivational states, we are claiming that an inherent feature of the acquisition of such evaluative knowledge is making it readily intelligible to us why we are motivated to act in certain ways towards the object or event whose evaluative import we are learning about. Therefore, we should not conceive the formation of motivational states pertinent to the situation as external occurrences to the acquisition of evaluative knowledge. Our motivational propensities are not, say, mere consequences of learning what the value of something is. If this were the case, then a gap, however small, would open between such evaluation and the formation of motivational states and at this point there would be enough leeway to ask why should the acquisition of evaluative knowledge necessarily make our motivational states intelligible. This sort of question is the direct result of conceiving the acquisition of evaluative knowledge by means of affect in isolation from its authority. Therefore, a better way of formulating the claim we want to defend is that we should conceive the formation of motivational states as constitutive of the process of acquiring evaluative knowledge by means of affect. The very acquisition of evaluative knowledge by means of affective disclosure entails the formation of intelligible motivational states. The disclosure of value has authority over our motivational states, then, precisely because part of what it means to disclose value is to form intelligible motivational states.
Understanding the way in which the formation of motivational states is a constitutive part of the disclosure of value entails rendering the distinction between gaining evaluative knowledge of an object and valuing or disvaluing it somewhat porous. There is a sense in which we cannot acquire the sort of evaluative knowledge in question without to a certain extent simultaneously valuing or disvaluing the object whose evaluative import we are learning about. Part of what it means to understand the evaluative import of something is to come to value or disvalue it, that is, to be taken by it in a positive or negative way. Since affect is the source of the formation of our motivational propensities, and the formation of our motivational propensities constitutes in part what it means to value or disvalue something, then the disclosure of value i.e. the acquisition of knowledge of what a value is, insofar as it entails to a certain extent valuing or disvaluing, makes our motivational states readily intelligible for the very reason that forming those motivational states is part of what it means to disclose the evaluative import of something. This is where the disanalogy with the experience of colour becomes pronounced. In the case of colour, there is no analogue of the distinction between gaining knowledge of the colour and valuing it or being taken with it, let alone is there an analogue of blurring this distinction. Disclosing the colour red in visual experience, that is, gaining knowledge of what redness is in visual experience, in no way entails valuing that colour. Not only is valuing the colour not a constitutive part of disclosing it, but it is even hard to conceive what that might mean. Why on earth should valuing a colour be a constitutive part of the process of disclosing what that colour is in visual experience? Learning what a colour is

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25 This claim can be read along dispositional lines. One of the key aims of this chapter is to show what is entailed in reading this claim in a non-dispositionalist way.
by phenomenal acquaintance simply does not entail forming motivational propensities towards it.

This brings out a further point. The reason why the acquisition of the relevant evaluative knowledge entails the formation of appropriate motivational states is that, in part, the content of that knowledge is constituted by one’s motivational propensities. Metaphorically speaking, we should not think of the content of the sort of evaluative knowledge in question as the content of a room whose door necessitates our motivational propensities in order to be unlocked but whose content would remain the same regardless of whether the unlocking necessitated the formation of our motivational propensities. Rather, the very content of what it means to know the value of an object is constituted by the formation of intelligible motivational states. Part of what it means for a subject to possess the sort of evaluative knowledge acquired by means of affective disclosure is to form intelligible motivational propensities towards it. The authority of affect is an inbuilt feature of the disclosure of value because the evaluative import disclosed is in part defined by the appropriate motivational propensities one forms towards it. None of this applies to the disclosure of colour. The content of the sort of knowledge we acquire by means of phenomenal acquaintance with redness is impervious to whether we form desires about it or not.

We are now in a better position to characterise the sort of evaluative knowledge that we gain from affective experience by distinguishing it from what we might term "theoretical knowledge" of value. There are two ways in which we can contrast theoretical knowledge of value from the sort that we acquire from affective experience. The first way relies in part on the analogy with visual experience of colour. Before leaving her black and
white room, Mary has theoretical knowledge of what the colour red is. This is propositional knowledge that she acquires by testimony. Yet she has never seen the colour red. Once she leaves her room and is presented with a red coloured object, Mary acquires knowledge of red. The sort of knowledge about redness acquired by means of a visual experience is not reducible to theoretical knowledge of red in the sense that even if Mary were provided with no matter how much information about redness by testimony prior to ever seeing the colour red, she would not be able to acquire the sort of knowledge she gains by means of the visual experience of red. We find an analogous case when trying to formulate the notion of theoretical knowledge of value. Before slipping on ice, Irene has theoretical knowledge of what danger is. She acquires this knowledge by testimony. Once Irene slips on ice, she feels fear for the first time towards the danger of ice. She now has acquired knowledge of what danger is. The sort of knowledge about danger acquired by means of affective experience is not reducible to theoretical knowledge of danger in the sense that even if Irene were provided with no matter how much information about danger by testimony prior to feeling fear, she would not be able to acquire the sort of evaluative knowledge she gains by means of her affective experience.

The second way of contrasting theoretical knowledge of value versus the sort of evaluative knowledge we acquire by means of affective experience relies on the disanalogy with the visual experience of colour. While our affective experience of value essentially entails the formation of appropriate motivational propensities towards the event or object experienced, our visual experience of colour does not entail the formation of any motivational state. When Mary sees for the first time a red coloured object, the knowledge she gains does not involve forming appropriate motivational states towards the red
coloured object. Her acquisition of knowledge of what redness is by means of a visual experience is not constituted by her being motivated to act in any sort of way. Motivation to act is not part of coming to know what redness is. By contrast, it is part of coming to know the value of something that one is motivated to act appropriately towards or away from the event or object experienced. The involvement of the formation of motivational states in the acquisition of knowledge is what distinguishes theoretical knowledge of value from the sort of evaluative knowledge acquired by affective experience. While the formation of appropriate motivational states is an integral part of acquiring evaluative knowledge by means of affective experience, acquiring theoretical knowledge of value by means of testimony and in the absence of affective experience does not essentially involve the formation of appropriate motivational states. Irene is able to learn what danger is by means of testimony without her necessarily forming appropriate motivational states. She might form appropriate motivational states once she acquires knowledge by testimony about what danger is, but this would presumably entail further conditions. For instance, it would entail higher order reflective faculties in order to infer from being presented with an object with certain features the sort of motivational state she ought to form. Furthermore, the relation between the formation of appropriate motivational states and the acquisition of theoretical knowledge of value is merely an external one: the former is not essentially involved in the latter. It is only once Irene feels fear towards danger that she forms appropriate motivational states insofar as her coming to fear danger is in part constituted by her forming appropriate motivational states. Here, Irene’s acquisition of knowledge of

26 More on this in Chapter 6, Section 3.
what danger is in part constituted by her forming appropriate motivational states, such as avoiding walking on ice.

There are two factors, then, that characterise the notion of theoretical knowledge of value. First, theoretical knowledge of value is acquired by testimony and not by a phenomenal acquaintance with the value through an affective experience. Second, theoretical knowledge of value does not essentially entail the formation of appropriate motivational states. Mirroring the characterisation of theoretical knowledge, we have two factors that characterise the sort of evaluative knowledge acquired by means of affective experience. First, the sort of evaluative knowledge acquired by affective experience is not reducible to knowledge acquired by testimony and in the absence of an affective experience but is rather the presentation or phenomenal acquaintance of value. Second, the acquisition of the sort of evaluative knowledge acquired by means of affective experience essentially entails the formation of appropriate motivational states. Notice that this second factor qualifies the first one. The sort of evaluative knowledge acquired by means of affective experience is not just a phenomenal acquaintance with the value, in the same way that the sort of knowledge acquired by visual experience is a phenomenal acquaintance with a determinate colour. Rather, the knowledge of what a value is essentially entails the formation of appropriate motivational states. We can then reformulate the notion of affect as a disclosure of value by saying that in having an affective experience we acquire the sort of knowledge of value not reducible to theoretical knowledge of it.²⁷

²⁷ This is a preliminary and admittedly a rather dry clarification of the distinction between theoretical knowledge of value and the sort of evaluative knowledge we gain from an affective experience. Part of giving substance to the distinction, especially by providing details of what is the content of the sort of evaluative knowledge we acquire through an affective experience, will be provided when developing the response-dependent notion of the objectivity of value I will
Section 2

A similar idea to the one sketched above, namely that the acquisition of the sort of evaluative knowledge in question entails the formation of appropriate motivational states, is found in Wiggins’ and McDowell’s Aristotelian moral psychology, more specifically in McDowell’s account of the way in which the phronimos, or virtuous agent, acquires knowledge of what “doing well” amounts to (eu prattein, which Aristotle also associates with eudaimonein, often translated as “to flourish”). A (very) brief exposition of Wiggins’ and Dowell’s neo-Aristotelian moral psychology will prove useful in identifying the key challenge with our constitutive claim. Within McDowell’s Aristotelian framework, the ability to acquire knowledge of what “doing well” amounts to is not independent from the employment of practical reason. McDowell draws a distinction between orectic, or motivational, and doxastic, or cognitive, states. McDowell argues that knowledge of what “doing well” amounts to involves the activation of the virtuous agent’s (correct) motivational propensities, or concerns, when confronted with specific features of a particular situation (McDowell 1998b, 1998e, §4 and 2009; cf. Wiggins 1987c, 231ff). These concerns are instilled in the agent throughout her upbringing, or Bildung (McDowell 1994, 87-88), until they become “second nature”. Hence the centrality of the notion of moulding the virtuous agent’s character within her upbringing through habituation. The virtuous agent is habituated in recognising certain actions as noble and as being worth pursuing in the correct situations. The ability of the virtuous agent to activate the correct concerns, or his sensitivity, is her knowledge of what doing well amounts to. Being virtuous is knowing which concerns should be activated when confronted with specific

argue lies at the core of an account of affect as a disclosure of value. I do so in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6 I refine this distinction further by discussing John Campbell’s work on “knowledge of.”
circumstances. As Wiggins puts it, ‘The man of highest practical wisdom is the man who brings to bear upon a situation the greatest number of genuinely pertinent concerns and genuinely relevant considerations commensurate with the importance of the deliberative context’ (Wiggins 1987c, 233). It is crucial to appreciate that habituation does not inculcate in the virtuous agent solely motivational dispositions: ‘[w]e travesty Aristotle’s picture of habituation into virtue of character if we suppose the products of habituation are motivational propensities that are independent of conceptual thought, like a trained animal’s behavioural dispositions’ (McDowell 1998b, 39). Rather, it inculcates the conception of “doing well” which entails one’s motivational propensities to be activated in the right circumstances: the acquisition of the concept of the noble entails the acquisition of certain motivational propensities. And vice versa, the virtuous agent does not form the conception of what it is to do well by means of a purely intellectual faculty and then trains to bring his motivational propensities in conformity with the conception of “doing well”: ‘Aristotle…does not picture the practical intellect as operating independently of moulded motivational propensities’ (McDowell 1998b, 39). What it is to possess the correct conception of “doing well” is, or at least essentially entails, being motivated to act when confronted with certain features of a particular situation. The phronimos acts virtuously because his concerns, or motivational propensities, are inextricably, and correctly, linked with the way he sees the situation. This thought is well expressed in McDowell’s belief that if we were given the task of generating the motivation of acting in the right way in an amoral person, we would stand a better chance to try to “convert” him through habituation rather than attempt to convince him through some piece of elaborate reasoning. That is, we
should attempt to change his character by moulding his motivational propensities with

It is important to notice how in McDowell’s account motivational states do not play
a role solely in the exercise of moral knowledge but also in its acquisition. That is,
appropriate motivational propensities are not formed only once the relevant knowledge has
been acquired: the formation of appropriate motivational propensities is part of the process
of learning what is the right thing to do. This is linked to the second way in which we
distinguished the sort of evaluative knowledge gained in affective experience from
theoretical knowledge of value. The acquisition of theoretical knowledge of value does not
entail the formation of appropriate motivational states. Therefore, we should defend a
similar claim to McDowell’s and Wiggins’ when theorising the way in which the formation
of motivational states plays a constitutive role in the affective disclosure of value. The
formation of motivational states occurs not only once value has been disclosed. Rather, the
very process by which value is disclosed entails the formation of appropriate motivational
propensities. It is important to emphasise this point since in making an initial analogy with
the visual experience of colour it is tempting to conceive the acquisition of the sort of
evaluative knowledge in question as an exercise exclusively in our cognitive abilities. But
that is precisely the picture we need to avoid if we want to explain how the affective
disclosure of value entails making intelligible our motivational propensities. Acquiring the
sort of evaluative knowledge in question makes intelligible appropriate motivational
propensities because being motivated in a certain way is constitutive of knowing the value
of something. Appropriate affect is not the result or a consequence of the acquisition of
evaluative knowledge but is constitutive of the acquisition of such knowledge.
There are two points that emerge from looking at Wiggins’ and McDowell’s treatment of the virtuous agent’s acquisition of moral knowledge. First, as McDowell (and Johnston) remind us, it is important not to construe the above through some crude form of dispositionalism about value. According to a dispositionalist construal of the above, the formation of motivational states is constitutive of the acquisition of evaluative knowledge insofar as the value of something just is its disposition to cause certain motivational states in the agent by way of an affective experience. This construal, though, misses the essential point that the affective disclosure of value is meant to have a rationalizing effect on the agent’s formation of motivational states, not merely a causal one. So in theorising how the acquisition of evaluative knowledge by means of affective disclosure entails forming appropriate motivational states, we have to capture the essential thought that the agent experiences the object evaluated as meriting the formation of her motivational states towards it. Furthermore, we should also not construe through dispositionalist lenses the claim that a constitutive part of the content of the sort of evaluative knowledge we acquire by means of affective disclosure is the sort of appropriate motivational states one forms towards the object whose evaluative import one is learning about. From a dispositionalist perspective, our motivational propensities constitute part of the sort of evaluative knowledge in question simply in virtue of the fact that for something to have value is for it to dispose the agent to be motivated to act in certain ways. Again, this construal misses the point that affect has a normative authority over our motivational states. We do not experience the evaluative import of the object as a mere causal pull. Rather, we experience it as meriting our motivational response. More on the notion of “merit” and the need to avoid dispositionalism in the next section.
As McDowell and Wiggins put it, the virtuous agent is the one that brings as many appropriate motivational propensities, or concerns, to bear on the situation. In doing so, the virtuous agent exercises his knowledge of the situation, as being one that merits such and such a response. The second, crucial point then is the following: although the knowledge acquired and exercised is objective in the sense that it is knowledge about the situation confronting the agent, a constitutive part of what it means to acquire and exercise this knowledge is to form appropriate motivational propensities. If the claim is that the moral knowledge exercised by the virtuous agent is constituted in part by the agent’s motivational propensities, then we are saying that subjective features, namely motivational propensities, are part of the knowledge about the situation. But how can this be if the knowledge in question is meant to be objective, that is, about the situation, not about the agent? Similarly, in our case, if we want to argue that a constitutive part of what it means for something to have value is that it merits the formation of appropriate motivational propensities towards it, then we need to show in what sense objective knowledge is constituted by subjective elements, that is, elements pertaining to the subject and her experience. What we need to avoid, in addition to a dispositionalist account, is a crude form of subjectivism about value according to which the value of an object is conferred on it by the subject’s affective-cum-motivational responses. That is, the claim that the object has value because the agent feels motivated to act in certain ways towards it. By contrast, the thought should be that the situation deserves this or that sort of motivational response because the situation instantiates a value and my motivational response counts as knowledge of the situation’s evaluative import. In other words, we have to respect the objectivity of value. The knowledge we acquire is knowledge of a property of the object of experience. It’s
something about the object being evaluated that renders intelligible my motivational propensities towards it. Hence why we speak of the disclosure of value. So the question is: what do we mean when we say that the sort of evaluative knowledge in question is objective, that is, what do we mean by objectivity in the case of value, such that a subjective element such as the agent’s motivational propensities are necessary in order to disclose it? In the next section I rely again on McDowell to show what sort of notion of objectivity we need in order to answer this question and therefore to lend support to the notion of affect as a disclosure of value.

Section 3

In his “Values and Secondary Qualities” (1998g), McDowell argues in support of the notion that values are real features of our surroundings. In typical McDowellian fashion, the adopted strategy is one that uncovers the assumptions made by his opponent and then proceeds to show how these assumptions portray a false picture of what one is committing to when defending the thesis in question. In so doing, the thesis defended surfaces to a level of plausibility at the very least equalling the opponent’s position. What are the assumptions made by someone opposing the possibility that values might be part of the world beyond one’s body? At the root of the opposition stands the difficulty of understanding the compatibility of the putative objectivity of value, the thought that values are genuine properties of objects out there in the world, with a further feature of what it means for something to be valuable, namely its intrinsic connection to a subject’s motivational states. This is precisely the difficulty we saw needs to be answered in defending the notion of affect as a disclosure of value.
McDowell’s argumentative move involves two steps. In the first step (sec. 2-3 of his 1998g paper), McDowell equips himself with a notion of objectivity that shows how a property deemed to be genuinely possessed by an object of experience can nevertheless have a conceptual connection to the subject’s experience of the property. McDowell does so by arguing for a response-dependent conception of secondary qualities and then draws an initial analogy between secondary qualities, such as colour, and value. In this first step the assumption made by the opponent that McDowell uncovers and rejects consists in the thought that if a property is characterised as objective then it must be modelled on the notion of primary qualities since secondary qualities are mere projected figments of the subject’s mind and therefore do not count as objective. McDowell’s second step (sec. 4-5 of his 1998g paper) consists in arguing that a certain test for the reality of a property is unfit in the case of value. The test in question is one where the reality of a property is thought to depend on whether the property in question has a clear causal role to play in the explanation of the experience the subject has of that property. Since, according to McDowell’s opponent, evaluative properties cannot be shown to have such a causal role, they cannot be said to be part of reality. McDowell shows that in making this claim his opponent is assuming a notion of causality that we are not obliged to accept, namely one where properties can have causal powers solely if they are endowed with the sort of objectivity that is specifiable independently of the subject’s responses. Indeed, McDowell shows that applying this notion of mere causality to the case of value misses a crucial component of our experience of value, namely that it is essentially characterised by a sort of intelligibility, the sort that cannot be captured by a mere casual explanation. Rather, the explanation of an object having value is one that essentially entails the subject’s affective
and motivational states as appropriate responses to the object, or of the object meriting the subject’s response. This is precisely what is involved with the phenomenon we have been referring to as the normative authority of affect. This second step draws on the disanalogy between our experience of secondary qualities, such as colour, and value. Ultimately McDowell argues that once we reject this notion of causality and accept that we can still speak of causality regarding properties whose concepts are response-dependent, then we are able to capture what is truly distinctive of the experience of value.

The two steps ultimately paint a picture showing not only that value is objective and that experience of it is intrinsically motivating, but that the very objectivity of value must be conceptualized as being essentially constituted by the subject’s formation of intelligible affective and motivational states. That is, McDowell connects the sort of response-dependent conception of objectivity defended in the first step to the specific feature of the experience of value as being intrinsically and rationally motivating. And, as argued at the end of Section 2 of this chapter, this is the sort of notion of objectivity that we need to defend the thesis that affect is a disclosure of value. Understanding McDowell’s arguments and the notion of objectivity of value he favours, then, is an essential step in reconstructing the contours of the sort of notion of the objectivity of value we need to defend the thesis that affect is the disclosure of value.

In the first step of his argument, McDowell argues that the conception of a property the understanding of which is conceptually connected to the subject’s experience of that property, or of how that property looks to a subject, does not detract from our being allowed to speak of that property as objective. McDowell’s argument consists in showing that his opponent’s conception of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, in this
specific case Mackie’s Lockeanism (McDowell 1998g, sec.2), is incoherent and that we should adopt a different understanding of what this distinction entails, one precisely that shows how secondary qualities are objective properties and not mere figments of the mind projected onto objects out there in the world. I don’t want to enter the details of McDowell’s argument against Mackie’s Lockeanism. Rather, I want to present McDowell’s characterisation of the objectivity of secondary qualities for it contains an essential characteristic of the sort of objectivity that McDowell argues characterises value as well. I think that the plausibility of this characterisation of objectivity is gained just as much from whether it works in characterising the sort of evaluation human beings engage in as it does from McDowell’s arguments against Mackie’s Lockeanism.

McDowell’s characterisation of the objectivity of secondary qualities relies on a dispositionalist understanding of secondary qualities. Consider a dispositionalist characterisation of the secondary quality of colour: for an object to be, say, red is for the object to be disposed to look red to the subject under normal conditions. This entails that understanding what it is for an object to be red, and thus attributing redness to an object, is conceptually dependent on the subject understanding what it is for an object to look red. Yet this does not detract from the object having the property of being red. Even though there is no one at a particular time to whom the object looks red, we are still allowed to characterise the object as being red. To clarify his claim, McDowell draws a distinction between two ways of framing the distinction between a property being objective or subjective (McDowell 1998g, 136). According to one way of framing the distinction, a property is objective insofar as the understanding of what it is for an object to have that property does not depend on the subject understanding the way that property looks in
experience. For instance, our understanding of primary qualities, such as the microphysical structure of an object, does not conceptually depend on our understanding how the property looks in experience. Our understanding of what it is for an object to have a microphysical structure is conceptually independent from whether the object looks to a subject as having a microphysical structure. Indeed, the microphysical structure of an object is a property that normally eludes our experience. By contrast, the understanding of what it is for an object to be red depends conceptually on the subject understanding how the property looks in experience, in this case of an object looking red to a subject. In this sense, redness can be said to be a subjective property. According to the other way of framing the distinction, the objectivity of a property can be understood as the fact that the property is really there to be experienced and is not merely a figment of our mind projected onto the object. Here, for a property to be subjective it means that it is a mere figment of our mind projected onto the object of experience. McDowell’s point of making this distinction is to point out that if a property is subjective in the first sense distinguished above, it does not follow that it is subjective in the second sense. Just because the understanding of what it is for an object to be red depends conceptually on the subject understanding the way the property looks in experience, it does not mean that redness is a mere figment of our mind projected onto the object.

Crucially, the dispositionalist characterisation of the objectivity of secondary qualities is a response-dependent notion of objectivity. Insofar as the object being red is its disposition to look red to a subject under normal conditions, the understanding of the property “red” is conceptually dependent on the experiential response of the subject. Yet the dependence of our understanding of what a property is on our experiential response to
the property does not make the property subjective in the second sense distinguished above, that is, a mere figment of the mind. Indeed, a dispositionalist construal of the response-dependent character of the property shows how the property can be deemed objective, as a feature of the object ready to be experienced. It is the response-dependent sort of objectivity that McDowell equips himself with in the first step in order to argue that values are objective: values are objective in an analogous sense in which secondary qualities such as colour can be said to be objective. They are objective in the response-dependent sense: that is, our understanding of a value is conceptually dependent on the experiential and motivational response a subject has to an object deemed valuable.

Although McDowell’s first step consists in arguing that the sort of objectivity pertinent to value is analogous to the sort of objectivity pertinent to secondary qualities, that is, in the response-dependent sense, McDowell’s second step consists in arguing that in order to fully capture what it means for a value to be an objective property we need to recognise a fundamental disanalogy with secondary qualities such as colour. Here is where McDowell abandons the dispositionalist take on response-dependence and offers an alternative take on response-dependence, or rather the seeds for an alternative. McDowell’s opponent argues that we earn the right to call a property real only if it can be shown to have a causal role in the generation of the subject’s experience of that property. For instance, we are allowed to call a primary quality real since we can mention it in the causal explanation of the subject’s experience. A subject experiences a ball as round because of the ball’s shape. The shape of the ball has a causal role to play in the explanation of why the subject has an experience as of a round shaped object. If so, the opponent continues, then value cannot be real since value is not the sort of property that can be specified independently of
the subject’s point of view as in the case of primary qualities. McDowell’s characterisation of a response-dependent notion of objectivity in the first step of his argument has already provided us with a conception of objectivity, or what it is for a property to be real, that provides us with an answer to the objector. What the objector is assuming is that the only valid notion of causality is one that presupposes the primary quality model of objectivity, namely where a property is deemed real, or objective, only if it can be specified independently of a subject’s point of view. It follows, according to the objector, that a property can have causal power only if it can be specified independently of the subject’s perspective. Since our experience of value is intrinsically characterised by our affective-cum-motivational responses towards the object evaluated, then, according to the objector, values cannot be objective, or real. But once we show that there is another notion of objectivity, precisely a response-dependent one, then it is not clear anymore why we cannot give value a causal role to play in the explanations of our experience of an object as valuable. Now, when asked why am I feeling fear, I can answer ‘Because the dog is dangerous!’ where danger plays a causal-explanatory role.

Crucially, and this is where the disanalogy with secondary qualities comes into play together with abandoning the dispositionalist take on response-dependence, McDowell points out that there is further reason why applying a primary quality model of causality to value would be a mistake. This is where McDowell’s advice on paying close attention to the “lived character” of evaluative experience comes in (McDowell g, 131) and where the notion of “merit” mentioned already in the previous two sections of this chapter plays a central role. If we pay close attention to our experience of an object as valuable, we notice that our experiential response to the object deemed valuable is characterised by a certain
form of appropriateness in the having of it that mere causal explanations are unable to capture. Or to put it in McDowell’s terms, the object deemed valuable is experienced as *meriting* the sort of response characteristic of evaluative experience (McDowell 1998g, 143; cf. McDowell 1998c). The experiential responses in question are affective and motivational. For instance, our experience of an event as unjust is essentially characterised by our feeling of indignation and the motivation to, say, protest against its occurrence where these experiential and motivational responses are experienced as the appropriate manner of responding to the object. The event is experienced as meriting these responses. The evaluative property of being unjust is response-dependent insofar as our understanding of what it is for an event to be unjust depends on the sort of affective and motivational responses that we deem appropriate to have. There is therefore a notion of rational intelligibility inbuilt in the notion of merit. From the subject’s perspective, her affective and motivational responses are rationally intelligible when evaluating the object of experience for those are the sort of responses that the object deserves in virtue of having that evaluative import.

McDowell’s point, then, is that the sort of response-dependence that characterises the objectivity of value is one that cannot be captured by causal explanations if these are conceived as in the primary quality model, that is, as conceived by a model assuming that only properties specifiable independently from a subject’s response can have causal powers. This is so because causal explanations of this sort are unable to capture the notion of merit distinctive of evaluative experience, the sort of experience on which our understanding of an object as valuable depends. The sort of intelligibility that we would gain from a causal explanation of this sort of our responses is not one that would allow for
the rationalization of our affective-cum-motivational responses. And this brings out what is wrong with the dispositionalist. For an object to be valuable is not for it to merely cause certain affective-cum-motivational responses in the subject. Rather, for an object to be valuable it is to merit the subject’s affective-cum-motivational responses. Hence the disanalogy with secondary qualities such as colour. Our experience of redness does not involve any notion of merit.

So far McDowell has provided us with argumentative material to diffuse the opponent’s objections against the thought that values are indeed features of objects in the world. First, we are not obliged to think of the objectivity of a property along the sort of objectivity that characterises primary qualities, that is, one the understanding of which is conceptually independent from the subject’s understanding the way in which the property looks in experience. We can equip ourselves with a response-dependent notion of objectivity instead. Second, the fact that values are not the sort of property that play a mere causal role in the explanation of the sort of experience the subject has in evaluating an object not only does not count against their objectivity due to the analogy drawn with the objectivity of secondary qualities, but in fact it is a welcome observation since the sort of explanation one should look for in explaining the affective-cum-motivational response characteristic of evaluative experience is precisely one that does not assume that sort of mere causal explanation. Rather, rendering intelligible the sort of affective-cum-motivational response characteristic of evaluative experience necessitates a sort of explanation that is essentially given in terms of the object meriting those responses, and not merely causing them.
From these diffusing moves we gain a positive insight: the sort of response-dependent objectivity pertaining to value is one that essentially entails the subject’s affective-cum-motivational responses being readily and rationally intelligible to her. Since the subject’s understanding of what a value is is conceptually dependent on her intelligible experiential responses, then the activity of explicating the intelligibility of a subject’s experiential responses is simultaneously an attempt at understanding the evaluative import of the object. And vice versa, understanding the evaluative import of an object essentially entails the attempt at understanding one’s affective and motivational responses. This is what McDowell means when he writes that ‘a technique for giving satisfying explanations of cases of fear…must allow for the possibility of criticism; we make sense of fear by seeing it as a response to objects that merit such a response…For an object to merit fear just is for it to be fearful’ (McDowell 1998g, 144). Here is where we find a further important dimension to McDowell’s argument in support of the claim that values are part of reality: the distinctive conception of response-dependence that we find in evaluative discourse, namely that it essentially involves a ‘critical dimension’ (McDowell 1998g, 145), is itself indicative of the objectivity of value for the very fact that we are able to have readily and rationally intelligible affective and motivational responses tells in favour of envisaging objects in the world as having value. ‘[E]xplanations of fear that manifest our capacity to understand ourselves in this region of our lives will simply not cohere with the claim that reality contains nothing in the way of fearfulness. Any such claim would undermine the intelligibility that the explanations confer on our responses’ (McDowell 1998g, 144). As I understand it, McDowell’s claim is that the sort of explanation of one’s

28 In fact, McDowell does not take danger to be a value though he uses it as an analogous case to value.
experiential responses peculiar to evaluative discourse, namely the subject’s rationally intelligible affective-cum-motivational responses, presupposes, or even necessitates, reference to how objects in the world strike us as being, namely as having value. If we tried to explicate the rational intelligibility of our affective-cum-motivational responses without referring to how objects in the world strike us as being, we would find it at the very least challenging to understand our responses. The objectivity of value is, once again, what allows us to make sense of our responses.

How does the above allow us to make progress in the argument in support of the notion of affect as a disclosure of value? Arguing for the notion of affect as a disclosure of value entails showing that affect plays an essential explanatory role in the acquisition of evaluative knowledge. A clue to what this role might be is provided by the fact that affect has a normative authority not only over our evaluative beliefs but also over our motivational states, that is, affect renders readily and rationally intelligible to us the way in which we want to behave towards the object evaluated. Normative authority over our motivational states is an inbuilt structural feature of the affective disclosure of value. We saw that we can make sense of affect’s authority over our motivational states if we conceive the formation of our motivational propensities as constitutive of the acquisition of the sort of evaluative knowledge we gain by means of affective experience. This is manifested in part by the fact that what it means to acquire evaluative knowledge by means of affective experience is to be taken by the object evaluated in a positive or negative way, that is, to come to value or disvalue it. Furthermore, this means that the very content of the sort of evaluative knowledge we gain by means of affective experience is constituted by our motivational states. If so, then we need to make sense of the idea that our knowledge of
evaluative properties of objects i.e. *objective* knowledge, is constituted by our motivational states i.e. *subjective* states. This led us to ask the following question: what do we mean when we say that the sort of evaluative knowledge in question is *objective*, that is, what do we mean by objectivity in the case of value, such that a *subjective* element such as the agent’s motivational propensities are necessary in order to disclose it? According to the response-dependent notion of objectivity introduced above, the subject’s attribution of a property to an object is conceptually dependent on the subject’s experiential responses to the object. In the particular case of value, what it is for an object to be valuable is for it to merit the appropriate affective-cum-motivational response of the subject. And here we arrive at the crucial juncture: *affect plays an essential explanatory role in the acquisition of evaluative knowledge because what it means for an object to have value is for it to merit an appropriate affective-cum-motivational response.*

**Section 4**

We are now in the position to show how a commitment to a response-dependent notion of the objectivity of value allows us to satisfy the third criterion. The third criterion arises as a response to a possible objection to the notion of affect as a disclosure of value. The objection goes as follows. In the case of the visual experience of colour, we are allowed to speak of its phenomenal character as an instance of the disclosure of a property of the object of experience in part because the experience is “transparent.”

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29 Recall that the aim of this chapter is to provide the skeleton of an account of affect as disclosure of value. It is the aim of the next two chapters to provide substance to this skeleton. Therefore, also the claim that *affect plays an essential explanatory role in the acquisition of evaluative knowledge because what it means for an object to have value is for it to merit an appropriate affective-cum-motivational response* needs further qualifications and development which will be provided in the next two chapters.

30 The notion of “transparency” within the context of debating the nature of the phenomenal character of experience is far from univocal. For useful expositions of the notion of
visual experience refers to the phenomenological observation that we are not able to attend to and report features of the phenomenal character of experience without attending to and reporting features of the object of experience. The visual experience is characterised as transparent since trying to attend to and report features of the phenomenal character of experience inevitably leads us to “fall through” the experience and attend to and report features that we experience as pertaining to the object of experience. For instance, attending to and reporting the phenomenal character of the visual experience of a red ball inevitably leads us to attend to and report features experienced as pertaining to the ball, for instance its redness. By contrast, in the case of affective experience, we are able to attend to and report features of the phenomenal character of experience that are not experienced as properties of the object evaluated. In this sense, affective experience is not transparent. Therefore, the objection continues, if we are able to attend to features of the phenomenal character of affective experience that do not strike us as properties of the object of experience, then how can we speak of the phenomenal character of an affective experience being a case of the disclosure of a property of the object of experience rather than just of the experience itself? The challenge is to show how the “opaqueness” of affective experience is at the very least compatible with the notion that affect entails the disclosure of properties of the object of experience, namely its evaluative import.

Crucially, in satisfying this criterion, we have to once again avoid two pitfalls. The first one is answering this challenge without construing the phenomenal character of

experience as the qualia theorist does. Recall that the qualia theorist conceives affect as an intrinsic, non-intentional property of the experience that gains intentionality once it is associated with the feature of the object causing the subject to have the experience. Although the qualia theorist is able to capture the phenomenological fact that we are able to attend to and report features of the affective experience that are not experienced as properties of the object evaluated, her ability to do so comes at a high cost, namely it results in construing the relation between affect and the evaluative feature of the object as one of mere contingent association. In so doing, we lose the right to speak of affect as a disclosure of value since within the framework of the qualia theorist what we learn about in having an experience with affective character is properties of the experience rather than of the object of experience. The second pitfall is set once again by the dispositionalist. The dispositionalist conceives of affect as a mere causal effect of a dispositional property the object possesses, namely its value. The dispositionalist then seems at first to be able to answer the challenge by claiming that since the value of an object just is its disposition to cause an affective experience in the subject, then attending to properties of experience, namely its affective character, is a case of the disclosure of value since, again, value just is the disposition to cause an affective experience in the subject. But we have repeatedly seen that this answer comes at a great cost: it leaves out the authority of affect. That is, the dispositionalist is not able to capture the fact that affect renders rationally intelligible our motivational states rather than merely causally intelligible.

So how does the above provide us with a clue to satisfying the third criterion without falling into the pitfalls set by the qualia theorist and the dispositionalist? According to the above, a constitutive part of the disclosure of value is forming intelligible affective-
cum-motivational responses. In having an affective experience, then, we are able to attend to and report features of the experience that are not experienced as properties of the object of experience, namely the features that constitute or affective-cum-motivational propensities. These features are properties that pertain to the experience of the subject and not to the objects of experience. Yet, since the formation of intelligible motivational states is constitutive of what it means to affectively disclose value, then attending to and reporting the intelligibility of the affective and motivational character of our experience is constitutive of the disclosure of the evaluative import of the object of experience. For instance, in experiencing indignation at the latest governmental cuts, I can attend to and report what it feels like to feel indignation and form intelligible motivational states. For instance, the feeling of indignation motivates me to organize a protest or write an op-ed article denouncing the government. In feeling indignation, I am able to attend to features of my experience, features that are not experienced as properties of the object of experience. Yet, within the framework above, the description of the way it feels like to feel indignation, for instance wanting to organize protests and write harsh criticisms of the latest governmental cuts, entails describing the responses’ intelligibility which, in turn, necessitates referring to the injustice of the government. Insofar as the formation of appropriate affective-cum-motivational responses is a constitutive part of what it means to disclose value, accurately describing the phenomenology of these responses i.e. as intelligible to the agent, entails describing the sort of disclosure of value at stake. This means that within the framework of the account above we have a ready explanation as to why describing the experiential aspect of our affective-cum-motivational responses, that
is, features of the experience that are not experienced as properties of the object experienced, already amounts to describing part of the disclosure of value.

This way of satisfying the third criterion avoids the pitfall set by the qualia theorist because within the framework above we are able to capture the “opaqueness” of affective experience in full respect of the inextricability and necessity of the relation between affect and the disclosure of value. Insofar as describing the intelligibility of our affective-cum-motivational responses towards the object is a constitutive part of learning about the evaluative import of an object, and insofar as describing the intelligibility of one’s affective-cum-motivational responses entails the act of attending to and reporting the responses’ subjective features, then attending to and reporting the intelligibility of the phenomenal character of an affective experience is necessarily related, and not merely contingently associated, with the disclosure of the evaluative import of the object. Furthermore, we avoid the pitfall set by the dispositionalist since our claim is that on the one hand we are able to attend to and report features of our experience without necessarily attending to and reporting features of the object of experience yet on the other hand our description of the intelligibility of our responses necessarily entails attending to and reporting features of the object of experience, namely its evaluative import. The subject learns the value of an object by forming her intelligible affective-cum-motivational response. This is in stark contrast to the dispositionalist according to whom the value of an object just is its disposition to merely cause an affective-cum-motivational response thus leaving out the intelligibility of the responses.

Crucially, notice that the above account not only satisfies the first two criteria in a way that shows them to be interdependent, but it does so also with the third criterion. That
is, the phenomenological fact that affective experience is “opaque” rather than “transparent” is not only accommodated by the account resulting from the simultaneous satisfaction of the first two criteria. Rather, the account above provides us with a picture that shows “opaqueness” to be an essential feature of the sort of disclosure of value characteristic of affective experience due to the response-dependent nature of the objectivity of value.

**Section 5**

I want to end this chapter by discussing the way that my account takes in consideration the bodily component of affective experience. William James writes that ‘If we fancy some strong emotion, and then try to abstract from our consciousness of it all the feelings of its characteristic bodily symptoms, we find we have nothing left behind’ (James 1884, 193) since ‘[a] purely disembodied human emotion is a nonentity… for us, emotion dissociated from all bodily feeling is inconceivable’ (ibid., 194). There are different intuitions one might extract from James’ words. The prevalent reading has been that James argues for a reductive account of emotions in terms of the awareness of bodily changes (but see, e.g., Ratcliffe 2005). I do not endorse this view. I also do not want to argue for the claim that the awareness of physiological changes is essential to emotional experience. Yet I am sceptical of the notion of purely “psychic” feelings that some authors have put forward in their accounts (see, e.g., Scheler 1973; Stocker 1983; Goldie 2000). All I want to do in this section, then, is to show that the account of affect and value provided above is not incompatible with descriptions of emotional affect in terms of the awareness of bodily changes.
I do so by considering the following worry. In the previous section I argued that even though in the case of affect we are able to attend to and report features of the experience that are not experienced as properties of the object of experience, the description of the intelligibility of our affective experiences cannot be given independently from the description of the evaluative property of the object confronting us. Yet it seems as we can describe the experience of bodily changes independently of the evaluative property of an object. For instance, I can describe the experience of accelerated breathing, of sweat dripping down my back, of my muscles tensing, and of my throat drying up, without having to mention the fearsomeness of the object confronting me. If so, then are we to conclude that the experience of bodily changes is not part of the sort of affective experiences in question? This conclusion goes against the intuition that there is an undeniable physiological component in affective experience. So how do we reconcile the thought that there is an undeniable physiological component in affective experience that can be described independently of the evaluative features of the object we confront and the thought that we cannot describe the intelligibility of our affective experiences independently of those same evaluative features?

The answer lies in recognising that the apparent tension is fruit of two distinct levels of description of the same phenomenon. In order to illustrate this, I want to rely on an argument put forward by Lambie and Marcel (2002) to the effect that different descriptions of the phenomenology of emotional experience need not be thought to be incompatible. In their paper “Consciousness and the Varieties of Emotion Experience,” Lambie and Marcel argue that one of the main reasons why we find in the literature a diversity of, and at first appearance conflicting, theoretical descriptions of the phenomenology of emotional
experience is that theorists tend to give unitary characterisations of the phenomenon when in fact there is a variety (ibid., 220). This variety depends on which aspects of the phenomenology one directs one’s attention towards. For our purposes, the key point that Lambie and Marcel make is that the different theoretical descriptions need not be incompatible, they just mirror the attentional focus of the theorist.

Lambie and Marcel’s argument relies on drawing a series of distinctions and then showing how what at first appeared to be conflicting descriptions of the phenomenology of experience in fact are descriptions of the same phenomenon. In what follows I present the key distinctions drawn by Lambie and Marcel and then I show how these can be used to dissolve the apparent tension at the heart of the worry above. The first distinction that Lambie and Marcel draw is between first-order phenomenal experience and second-order awareness, or reflexive consciousness (ibid., 228). First-order phenomenal experience is a phenomenally conscious experience. Second-order awareness is the result of an act of focal attention on first-order phenomenal experience. Importantly, Lambie and Marcel point out that the act of focal attention on phenomenal experience not only produces second-order awareness but, due to its focal nature, it also entails a selection of an aspect of phenomenal experience. Now, there are two aspects to the sort of focal attention that we can take on first-order phenomenal experience. First, there is general directedness. One can focus on that aspect of emotional experience that is directed towards the self or one can focus on that aspect of the emotional experience that is directed towards the world. Lambie and Marcel describe the relation between self-focus and world-focus as one between figure and ground. Focusing on the world-directed aspect of emotional experience does not entail that there isn’t a self-directed aspect to the experience. Rather, it means that in focusing our
attention on the world-directed aspect we allow it to stand out against its background, the self-directed aspect. And vice versa. Lambie and Marcel use tactile experience in order to illustrate the figure-ground relation between the self and world-directed aspects of emotional experience generated by a change in focal attention. When one slides one’s finger on the edge of a table, one can shift one’s focal attention between, on the one hand, the sensation at the tip of one’s finger and, on the other hand, the features of the edge of the table, for instance, its shape, texture, and so on. Here, focusing one’s attention on one aspect of the tactile experience does not entail that the other aspect disappears entirely. It just means that it recedes in the background of one’s attention. Similarly, focusing on, say, the world-directed aspect of emotional experience does not entail that the self-directed aspect disappears or is non-existent. Rather, it recedes in the background and is not the object of our focal attention.

The second aspect of focal attention is its mode. The mode of focal attention is characterised in two ways. First, the mode of focal attention can either be synthetic or analytic. It is synthetic if the focus is on the emotional experience as a whole and it is analytic if the focus is on a component of emotional experience. Second, the mode of attentional focus can either be immersed in the object of experience or detached. Extreme cases of immersion with the object of emotional experience usually result in the absence of second-order awareness. Typical cases of extreme immersion with the object of experience are so-called experiences of “flow,” that is, experiences where the subject is deeply involved in a task that is challenging yet where the subject performs successfully.

32 For similar illustrative uses of the phenomenon of tactile experience in the description of the bodily component of emotional experience, see also Ratcliffe (2008), Slaby (2008), and Colombetti (2014).
By contrast, detachment from the object of emotional experience facilitates second-order awareness insofar as the focal attention is directed towards one’s doing or experience rather than on the object of experiences. An example of detachment with the object are cases where the subject is asked to report aloud the protocol of a task.

Armed with these distinctions, Lambie and Marcel argue that depending on the sort of focal attention that a theorist adopts, a different description of the phenomenology of emotional experience will be generated. Yet this does not entail that the theorist is describing a different phenomenon. Consider the case of fear. Suppose that we focus our attention towards the world-directed aspect of the experience, in an immersed and synthetic mode of attention. The content of the resulting description most probably will concern the way that the object of experience appears to us, that is, in its fearsomeness. Now suppose that we switch our focal attention to the self and adopt a detached and analytic mode of attention. What would the content of the resulting description include? I surmise that the description would include factors such as one’s accelerated breathing, the sensation of sweating, and so on. Lambie and Marcel’s point is that although the content of the two resulting descriptions is indeed different, it doesn’t seem as we are describing two different experiences. After all, we are still describing the experience of fear. What we have done is that we selected certain aspects of the experience of fear and consequently momentarily excluded others. Here, in switching from a world-directed to a self-directed, and from a synthetic to analytic focus, we momentarily exclude the situational components of the experience of fear, namely its object and its experienced evaluative properties. Mere switching though does not necessarily entail that the aspect of the emotional experience that has receded in the background, in this case its world-directedness, has disappeared in
the overall experience. Rather, by switching our focal attention, it has receded in the background.

How does this help us with the worry above? Recall that the answer to the worry needs to show how we can reconcile the thought that there is an undeniable physiological component in affective experience that can be described independently of the evaluative features of the object we confront and the thought that we cannot describe the intelligibility of our affective experiences independently of those same evaluative features. What Lambie and Marcel’s argument asks us to appreciate is that descriptions of emotional experience change in virtue of changes in our focal attention but that the different aspects of emotional experience we focus on, and therefore the different descriptions that are generated, need not be mutually exclusive. On the contrary, they provide a richer description of the emotional experience. The worry above results from not appreciating that one level of description need not exclude another. Indeed, the worry seems to be generated precisely by adopting one level of description, the content of which are physiological changes, and excluding the other level, the content of which is the evaluative, world-directed aspect. Once this happens, the affective component of the emotional experience is conceived as being solely a matter of physiological changes. But now we have distorted the phenomenon under description since we have permanently excluded its evaluative, world-directed aspect, precisely the aspect that needs description in capturing the intelligibility of our affective experiences. Nico Frijda provides us with a useful analogy: ‘[a]ction awareness by necessity is situated; otherwise it becomes mere awareness of muscle tension. Take the experience of pointing one’s finger: It feels different from stretching one’s finger, because the action is guided by orientation towards a point in space’ (Frijda 2005, 480).
Analogously, excluding the evaluative aspect of emotional experience and keeping solely the description of physiological changes gives the description of a different phenomenon altogether.

I believe that the mistake that one makes when endorsing one description of affect at the exclusion of another in part constitutes the erroneous conception of affect that Johnston imputes to the projectivist. Recall that Johnston accuses the projectivist of “mentalising” affect. One “mentalises” affect when one focuses on affect and in doing so construes it as a private sensation. Once affect is “mentalised”, then one loses the grip on the sort of disclosing function that affect has. In turn, we end up with a conception of affect that is unable to capture its normative authority over our evaluative judgements and motivational states. The level of description which is needed in characterising affect as a disclosure of value is one that allows for the description of its intelligibility which itself entails an outward looking stance, that is, a stance towards the world. The puzzlement over how the experience of physiological changes can constitute the disclosure of the value of objects derives from focusing on one sort of description of affect at the exclusion of the other.
CHAPTER 5

Disclosure and Response-Dependent Objectivity of Value

Introduction

In the previous chapter I began with Johnston’s insight that in order to understand in what sense affective experience is a disclosure of value we need to make sense of the phenomenological observation that affect renders readily and rationally intelligible not only the formation of our evaluative judgements but also of our motivational states. I then argued that to make sense of this phenomenological observation we should commit to the following constitutive thesis: the formation of our motivational states towards an object is constitutive of the disclosure of value. The key challenge in defending this constitutive thesis is the apparent tension between the idea that the sort of evaluative knowledge that we acquire in having an affective experience is objective, that is, it is knowledge of objects –hence the notion of affect as a disclosure of value- and the idea that the formation of motivational states of the subject is a constitutive part of such evaluative knowledge. How can the formation of motivational states of the subject be a constitutive part of knowledge of objects? I then argued that in order to dissolve this apparent tension we need to commit to a response-dependent notion of the objectivity of value. According to a response-dependent notion of the objectivity of value, the value of an object is inextricably tied to the affective-cum-motivational responses of the subject since for an object to have value is for it to merit an affective-cum-motivational response. Although committing to a response-dependent notion of the objectivity of value allowed us to show in a preliminary fashion that we can solve the challenge, we have yet to provide the details of this notion of objectivity that show how the challenge is solved, that is, that shows in what way the
formation of our affective-cum-motivational responses is a constitutive part of what it means for the object to have value.

The aim of this chapter is to provide an account of a response-dependent notion of the objectivity of value that defends the constitutive thesis by dissolving the apparent tension that lies within it. My strategy is the following. In the next section (Section 1) I consider four possible ways of conceiving the relation between value and our affective-cum-motivational responses that range from an extreme form of subjectivism to an extreme form of objectivism. I then show why each of these options is not viable for our purposes. The purpose of considering why these are not viable options is to provide us with two reference points needed to calibrate the sort of relation between value and our affective-cum-motivational responses, that is, of a response-dependent notion of the objectivity of value, that fits our account of affect as a disclosure of value. In Section 2 I rely on David Wiggins’ work on the objectivity of value to flesh out the sort of notion of objectivity we are seeking. I argue that David Wiggins’s account of value embodies the sort of response-dependent notion of the objectivity of value that is calibrated by the two reference points extracted in Section 1. In Section 3 I show how the account of the objectivity of value formulated in Section 2 dissolves the apparent tension that lies within the constitutive thesis and therefore provides a defence of the idea that affect is the disclosure of value. Finally, in Section 4 I look at Bennet Helm’s account of the objectivity of value. I do so because his account is also inspired by McDowell and Wiggins and it therefore serves as a useful account against which to clarify our own position. I argue that his account encounters a problem that symptomises an incorrect calibration between subjectivity and objectivity. Considering this problem will allow us to clarify our own position.
Section 1

In this section I distinguish four accounts of the relation between value and our affective-cum-motivational responses. I do so with an eye to providing two reference points for the account of the objectivity of value to be developed in the remainder of the chapter. I term the four accounts in the following way: “robust objectivism”, “colour-analogy objectivism”, “dispositionalist objectivism”, “traditional subjectivism.” These four positions are meant to be conceived as on a spectrum going from an extreme conception of objectivism to an extreme form of subjectivism.

1. Robust Objectivism

According to the robust objectivist, our conception of value is specifiable independently of the subject’s responses. Objects would have value even if creatures equipped with the ability to respond affectively and motivationally, or more broadly, with an evaluative interest, did not exist. The only relation there is between a subject’s affective-cum-motivational responses towards an object and the object’s value is, we might say, contingent, that is, the relation obtains when the subject has a veridical experience of the object as having the relevant value but no such relation need obtain for the object to have value. Insofar as on this view value is specifiable independently of a subjective point of view, it becomes utterly mysterious why our experiences of value should have an intrinsically affective-cum-motivational character. This is because, to put it in somewhat unfashionable terms, according to a robust objectivist view, there is no special link between value and the will. This is the sort of conception of objectivity that lead Mackie to argue that the notion of the objectivity of value is committed to a “queer” notion of properties (Mackie 1977, 38). For how can a property that is specifiable independently of our
subjective responses have nevertheless a special link to our will i.e. affective-cum-motivational responses? As we saw in the previous chapter, McDowell argues, contra Mackie, that we need not commit to this sort of objectivity in arguing that value is objective. For our purposes, we need to be clear that if value is specifiable independently of our affective-cum-motivational responses, that is, if there is no necessary relation between our conception of value and our affective-cum-motivational responses, then we are unable to explain why affect renders readily, let alone rationally, intelligible the formation of our motivational states.

2. Colour-Analogy Objectivism

Recall that in the previous chapter we repeatedly looked at an analogy and a disanalogy between our conceptions of colour and value. The analogy is that just as our conception of what colour is is dependent on our sensory experiences of colour, our conception of what value is is dependent on our experiences of value. The disanalogy is that while our experiences of value have an affective-cum-motivational character, or in other words, entail the formation of motivational states, our experiences of colour don’t. That is why, we argued, sensory experiences render readily and rationally intelligible perceptual judgements but not the formation of motivational states, while experiences of value render readily and rationally intelligible both evaluative judgements and the formation of motivational states. We can think of the colour-analogy objectivist as committing solely to the analogy and not to the disanalogy. Perhaps the colour-analogy objectivist thinks that our experience of value is characterised by the sort of phenomenal acquaintance that characterises our experience of colour where phenomenal acquaintance in no way entails any affective or motivational component. Perhaps this sort of
acquaintance can be thought of as some sort of intuition. Insofar as the colour-analogy objectivist commits to the analogy with colour, she differentiates herself from the robust objectivist by maintaining a necessary link between our conception of value and our experience, where the relevant sort of experience is not characterised as an affective-cum-motivational response. After all, in committing to the analogy, the colour-analogy objectivist is a response-dependent objectivist since she takes value to be a property of the object while maintaining that it is not possible to specify value independently of our experiential responses. For our purposes, the problem with the colour-analogy objectivist is that if our experience of value is conceived as a mere phenomenal acquaintance bereft of any affective-cum-motivational character, then although we might be able to explain why, just as our experience of colour is able to make readily and rationally intelligible our perceptual judgements, our experience of value is able to render readily and rationally intelligible our evaluative judgements, we are unable to explain why our experience of value is able to render readily, let alone rationally, intelligible the formation of our motivational states (in the same way that our experience of colour is unable to do so).

3. Dispositionalist Objectivism

As we have already noted, according to the dispositionalist, value is a dispositional property in the object to cause an affective-cum-motivational response in the subject. Insofar as value is conceived as a property of the object, the dispositionalist is an objectivist. The dispositionalist differentiates herself from the robust objectivist insofar as according to the former value cannot be specified independently of the subject’s point of view since for an object to have value just is for it to cause the subject to have the relevant response. Although the dispositionalist agrees with the colour-analogy objectivist in
maintaining an internal link between our conception of value and our experiences of value, the dispositionalist differentiates herself from the colour-analogy objectivist by characterising the sort of experience that the dispositional property in the object i.e. value, causes the subject to have as an affective-cum-motivational response. The dispositionalist, then, is a response-dependent theorist of the objectivity of value that seems at first sight to be able to make sense of affect as disclosure of value. Our affective-cum-motivational experiences are a disclosure of value since our having these experiences is caused by the dispositional property of the object i.e. its value. The problem with the dispositionalist, as we have repeatedly observed in previous chapters, is that all that her conception of the objectivity of value can show is that there is a causal link between value and our affective-cum-motivational responses. This is a problem since if our notion of the objectivity of value merely tells us that value causes our affective-cum-motivational response, then we are not able to make sense of the phenomenological observation that the disclosure of value renders rationally intelligible the formation of our motivational states. This is the problem with dispositionalist theories that we saw McDowell pointing out. By contrast, as we have seen McDowell arguing, the object is experienced as having value when it is experienced as meriting the relevant affective-cum-motivational response, or to put it in slightly different terminology, the object has value when it makes our affective-cum-motivational responses appropriate. A mere causal explanation cannot capture this aspect of our affective experience and this aspect is precisely what we need in order to argue that affect is a disclosure of value. So the notion of disclosure that results from a dispositionalist conception of the objectivity of value is unsuitable for our purposes.
4. Traditional Subjectivism

According to the traditional subjectivist, value is reducible to our affective-cum-motivational responses. This conception of value is then married to a form of projectivism according to which we project onto a value-neutral world our affective-cum-motivational states and in so doing judge objects to have value. The traditional subjectivist is against any notion that value might be an objective property, that is, a property of objects in the world. Therefore, according to the traditional subjectivist, although it might seem to the subject of experience as if value is a property of the object, that is not the case (see, e.g., Blackburn 1985). If so, then there is no sense in which our affective-cum-motivational experiences are disclosures of value. Although traditional subjectivism denies any notion of disclosure to our affective experience, it nevertheless commits to a claim that our notion of objectivity also wants to commit to, namely that there is an inextricable link between our conception of value and our affective-cum-motivational responses. The inclusion of the traditional subjectivist position, then, is important because it puts in perspective what claim we do want to commit to, namely that there is an inextricable link between our conception of value and our affective-cum-motivational responses, yet it stands as a warning for us not to fall into some form of reductionism and consequent projectivism. In other words, it provides us with the limit that we ought not to surpass in removing ourselves from the sorts of objectivism to be avoided when calibrating the sort of objectivism that we need.

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Having surveyed these four possible ways of conceiving the relation between value and our affective-cum-motivational responses and the way each one is unable to capture
the notion of affect as a disclosure of value, we can now formulate four lessons required to calibrate the notion of objectivity we are after:

1. Against the robust objectivist, the sort of objectivity needed is one that maintains that our conception of value has a necessary link to our experiential responses.

2. Against the colour-analogy objectivist, the sort of objectivity needed is one that characterises the sort of experience that is necessarily linked to our conception of value as an affective-cum-motivational response.

3. Against the dispositionalist objectivist, the sort of objectivity needed is one that is able to capture the phenomenological observation that our affective experiences render *rationally* intelligible the formation of our motivational states. That is, the sort of objectivity needed is one that provides both a causal and *justificatory* explanation of our responses.

4. Against the traditional subjectivist, we need a conception of the relation between value and our affective-cum-motivational responses that maintains that there is an inextricable link between them does not reduce the former to the latter.

Notice that the dispositionalist objectivist position avoids the problems with (1) and (2). It then avoids falling into (4) but by means of an unsuitable notion of objectivity, one that allows her to capture solely a causal link between value and our affective-cum-motivational responses. The dispositionalist objectivist, then, should be seen as someone who wants to commit to the traditional subjectivist’s claim of there being an inextricable link between value and our affective-cum-motivational responses but nevertheless also wants some sort of objectivity for value and therefore at the very least shows us that the traditional subjectivist’s claim is not in principle incompatible with some sort of objectivity of value.
In brief, then, the position we are after is between the dispositionalist objectivist and the traditional subjectivist. They are our two key reference points in theorising the notion of the objectivity of value that we are after. To clarify: we want to keep the traditional subjectivist’s claim that there is an internal, indeed constitutive, link between value and our affective-cum-motivational responses yet interpret this link in such a way as to allow value to be objective in a way that renders the formation of our motivational states rationally intelligible. What we need to do, then, is to emancipate from the traditional subjectivist towards a notion of objectivity that avoids the dispositionalist error. This will then allow us to maintain the constitutive thesis together with the objectivity of value suitable for the notion of affect as a disclosure of value.

Section 2

David Wiggins’ response-dependent account of the objectivity of value should be seen precisely as a position that is born from a marriage between the traditional subjectivist’s claim that there is an internal link between our conception of value and our affective-cum-motivational responses and a desire to allow value to be objective and not merely the projection of our affective-cum-motivational states. I believe that a fruitful way of extracting the notion of the objectivity of value we are after from Wiggins’ re-interpretation of the traditional subjectivist’s claim is to concentrate on, and then clarify, two central commitments of his view. The first one is a certain circularity in his conception of value. Wiggins provides an original, circular interpretation of the traditional subjectivist’s claim that there is an internal link between our conception of value and our affective-cum-motivational responses. As we shall see, this circular interpretation is what allows Wiggins to slip in his peculiar notion of objectivity. The second commitment is to
a certain form of *relativism* in his conception of value. This is where Wiggins refines the circular conception of value and therefore of its objectivity. In so doing, he emancipates himself from the traditional subjectivist towards a notion of objectivity that maintains the claim that there is an internal link between our conception of value and our affective-cum-motivational responses and avoids the dispositionalist’s trap.

Wiggins interprets the traditional subjectivist’s claim that there is an internal link between our conception of value and our responses as the biconditional that ‘x is good/right/beautiful if and only if x is such as to make a certain sentiment of approbation appropriate’ (Wiggins 1987, 187). Paraphrasing the biconditional using our terminology: an object is valuable, or has value, if and only if the object is such as to make a certain affective-cum-motivational response appropriate, or in slightly different words, if the object is such as to merit a certain affective-cum-motivational response. The circularity consists in that once we try to cash out the notion of merit, or of what it means for an affective-cum-motivational response to be appropriate, we revert to making reference to the object having value. For instance, an object is fearful if and only if the object is such as to make a fearful response appropriate yet in explicating the appropriateness of a fearful response we make reference to the object being fearful. Is this circularity problematic? There are two reasons why one might think so. The first worry is that the resultant account of value is, precisely, circular and circular definitions are problematic since they use the terms to be defined as part of the definition. The source of this worry, though, is a misunderstanding of the commitments to such circularity. The circularity is not meant to be an attempt at *defining* value in terms of the normativity of our responses. In other words,
committing to this circular conception of value is not a commitment to an account of value that reduces it to the normativity of our responses.\footnote{For a characterisation of Wiggins’ position as committed to a reductive analysis of value in normative terms see, e.g., Jacobson 2011. For an interpretation of Wiggins that denies this, see Tappolet (2011). Others remain worryingly ambiguous on this matter. For instance, see D’Arms and Jacobson (2000) and Rabinowicz and Ronnow-Rasmussen (2004).} Here is how Wiggins puts it:

Whether such circularities constitute a difficulty for the subjectivist depends entirely on what the subjectivist takes himself to be attempting. If we treat it as already known and given that ‘x is good’ (or ‘right’ or ‘beautiful’) is fully analysable, and if ‘x is such as to arouse the sentiment of approbation’ (or ‘x is such as to make that sentiment appropriate’) is the subjectivist’s best effort in the analytical direction, and if this equivalent fails to deliver any proper analysis, then subjectivism is some sort of failure. Certainly. But even if classical subjectivists have given this impression to those who want to conceive of all philosophy as analysis, analysis as such never needed to be their real concern. What traditional subjectivists have really wanted to convey is not so much definition as commentary. Chiefly they have wanted to persuade us that, when we consider whether or not x is good or right or beautiful, there is no appeal to anything that is more fundamental than actually possible human sentiments[.] (Wiggins, 1987b, 188-9).

The circularity would be vicious solely if we attempted to give a reductive definition of value in terms of the normativity of our affective-cum-motivational responses and then found ourselves defining the latter in terms of the former. Since normative reduction is no part of the agenda of this circular conception of value, the circularity is not vicious.

The second worry is the following. Someone might argue that even if the circularity is not vicious insofar as it is not committed to a normative reductive account of value, it is
nevertheless *uninformative* since the terms within which value is characterised, namely an appropriate affective-cum-motivational response, is in turn characterised in terms of the object’s value. But, as Wiggins points out, this worry is unfounded since the circular interpretation of the conception of value is informative insofar as it informs us regarding the way in which the subject learns about the evaluative import of the object. Again, the project is not one of providing us with a definition of value but rather with a clue to the milieu within which we generate our conception of value, a milieu that essentially involves our affective-cum-motivational responses. As Wiggins writes:

But what use (I shall be asked) is such a circular formulation? My answer is that, by tracing out such a circle, the subjectivist hopes to elucidate the concept of value by displaying it in its actual involvement with the sentiments. One would not, according to him, have sufficiently elucidated what value is without that detour.

(ibid., 189)

This goes hand in hand with Wiggins’ claim in the previous quote that the message that the traditional subjectivist wants to convey in their conception of value is not a definition of value but rather a ‘commentary.’ Since the circularity is neither vicious nor uninformative, it is ultimately ‘benign’ (ibid., 188).

The key point that should be appreciated from Wiggins’ response to both worries about circularity is that what a circular interpretation of the internal link between our conception of value and our responses delivers is precisely a denial of the need to conceive the internal link in terms of analysability. In other words, simply because our conception of a property makes necessary reference to our experiential responses it does not mean that therefore the property is reducible to our experiential response (cf. our discussion in the previous chapter of McDowell 1998g, 136). This is what allows Wiggins to take a first step
away from the traditional subjectivist since he effectively provides us with an interpretation of the internal link between our conception of value and our affective-cum-motivational responses that does away with the reduction of the former to the latter. In so doing, Wiggins shows that the internal link between our conception of value and our affective-cum-motivational responses, when interpreted as entailing a circularity, can very well admit of an objectivist take on value.

The claim that the circular interpretation of the internal link between our conception of value and our responses admits of objectivity finds expression in Wiggins’ “speculative” account of the formation of our evaluative concepts (Wiggins 1987c, 194-199; see also Wiggins 1987a, sec.5 and Wiggins 2013, sec. 6; cf. Pettit 1991, 600-602). Looking at this account is important then to see how the circular interpretation of the internal link between our conception of value and our responses admits of objectivity.

The speculative account of the formation of our evaluative concepts can be reconstructed as involving two stages. The first stage begins with the recognition that we respond in various ways to objects and persons we confront. The sort of responses that indicate that an object or person matters to us often consist in experiences with an affective and motivational character. For instance, we are repulsed at a person who doesn’t repay kindness with kindness, or we feel ashamed at ourselves when we lie, or we feel respect at someone who sacrificed something of his own for someone else. We then group the objects and persons that seem to elicit similar responses and label them with names: the repulsive, the shameful, the respectful. This leads us to seek to find the features that all allow the objects to fit in the categories we have devised. This entails arguing as to why and whether our actual responses are appropriate, or to put it the other way round, whether the object or
person merit that sort of response. In so doing, we specify the relation of the relevant “evaluative concept-affective response” pair. For instance, the specification of the content of the concept of the respectful is achieved by arguing whether that object or class of objects merits our respectful responses by agreeing or disagreeing as to what the features are of the object that count in favour or against that kind of response. Simultaneously, we refine our understanding of the sort of response that a respectful object renders appropriate.

The process is one of mutual adjustment between the evaluative concept and the affective response (cf. Johnston 2001, 212). That is, we argue as to how an evaluative concept and a response are made for one another, what the ‘marks’ (Wiggins 1987, 196) of the concept are that pair it with the appropriate affective-cum-motivational response. Wiggins characterises this activity as a ‘process of interpersonal education, instruction and mutual enlightenment’ (Wiggins 1987, 196). The second stage begins once a sufficient “lock” has been achieved between the pairs “evaluative concept-affective response.” At this point, we can move from arguing about what the features of a particular class of objects are such that they make a certain response appropriate, to focusing on a response, say indignation, and argue about what are the features of the related property, say injustice, such that it merits that response or makes that response appropriate. It then becomes essentially contestable without a detrimental loss of univocity in the use of the evaluative predicate what an object has to be like in order to fall under the relevant evaluative concept, that is, what the object has to be like in order to instantiate that value.

What the speculative account renders explicit is the interdependence between our conception of evaluative properties and our affective-cum-motivational responses. Neither can be specified independently of the other. This was the point of characterising the internal
link between our conception of value and our affective-cum-motivational responses as circular. We should not, then, make the mistake of conceiving either side as potentially specifiable independently of the other. This is especially illuminating in the case of evaluative properties. Here is how Wiggins puts it in a more recent text:

The presence of such properties, that is of value properties, is ascertained by all the multifarious means that are called for by the exercise of our grasp of this or that ethical concept. [Evaluative] properties are to be conceived in the light of what it takes to exercise that grasp—and not vice versa. A particular ethical property, we might say, is to be identified or singled out as the property which the reasonable exercise of the grasp of such and such a concept, as regulated by criticism, hunts down…The objectivity of the reasonable exercise of the grasp of an ethical concept is not established by reference to the product of some independent understanding of the property. (Why should it need to be?) It is established by those who exercise it and engage fairly first-order criticism. (Wiggins 2006, 334-335)

Although in this passage Wiggins’ focus of discussion is the objectivity of ethical judgements in first-order ethical discourse, we gain the useful insight that the specification of what a certain evaluative property is, is to be conceived in terms of what is involved in our ability to apply an evaluative concept. Since our affective-cum-motivational responses play an essential role in the formation of our evaluative concepts, then the ability to apply an evaluative predicate entails an understanding, if not an experiential undergoing of, the sort of affective-cum-motivational response that the relevant evaluative property renders appropriate. If so, then an evaluative property should not and cannot be conceived independently of our affective-cum-motivational responses.
The same goes for our responses. Our conception of what sort of response an object ought to evoke is dependent on our conception of the evaluative property that the object is taken to instantiate. Hence why Wiggins writes, when commenting on our conception of amusement, that ‘[t]here is no object-independent and property-independent, ‘purely phenomenological’ or ‘purely introspective’ account of amusement’ (Wiggins 1987, 195). For us to specify our conception of amusement, we need to make reference to the property that makes an object funny. Indeed, thinking that we can give an object-independent account of our responses is one of the mistakes that the traditional subjectivist makes. Recall Johnston’s charge of “mentalising” affect discussed in Chapter 3 and at the end of Chapter 4. If we sever the specification of our responses from our conception of value, then we end up distorting the nature of our original target, namely, our affective-cum-motivational responses, to such an extent that we risk ending up describing a completely different phenomenon from the original target, such as one’s awareness of physiological changes. That is why Wiggins seems to intimate that there is something fishy in thinking, as the traditional subjectivist does, that it is possible for a subject to tell in what experiential state she is in without ‘looking outward’ (ibid., 208).

The circularity between our conception of value and our affective-cum-motivational responses introduces a commitment to a certain form of relativism. If an object has value if and only if it renders appropriate our affective and motivational responses, then value is, in a sense to be specified, relative to our responses. But if value is relative to our responses, how can we claim objectivity? Wiggins’ strategy in answering this worry is to refine the notion of relativity he is committed to. Wiggins begins by pointing out that he is not claiming that the value of an object is constituted by the
agreement between participants in the critical process (ibid., 204-205). If there is agreement among the participants as to what the appropriate response is to an object, that is because the object has the evaluative import that makes it such as to make it appropriate to have the relevant response. More subtly, Wiggins points out that his account is not committed to the idea that one can simply substitute “‘x is good’” with “‘x is such as to arouse or make appropriate [a certain] sentiment of approbation’ (ibid., 206). Rather, the claim is that ‘x is good if and only if x is the sort of thing that calls forth or makes appropriate a certain sentiment of approbation given the range of propensities that we actually have to respond in this or that way’ (ibid., original emphasis). The thought here is that value is not relative to our actual responses, period. Rather, value is relative to our actual tendencies of which our actual responses are part. Or putting it the other way round, value is relative to our actual responses conceived as part of a collection of tendencies that we actually have to respond in certain ways. Let me illustrate this point. Take the case of a community where the vast majority believes that repulsion is the appropriate response to homosexuality and therefore believes that homosexuality is repulsive. In this case, according to Wiggins, if value were relative to the actual responses of the community, period, then we should conclude that, for that community, homosexuality is repulsive. But this sort of relativity, of course, would take away any claim to objectivity since it would make value local to the community. Rather, the thought is that value is relative to the actual tendencies of the members of the community to feel in one way or another, of which repulsion is one sort. This opens up a gap allowing for progress insofar as now there is room to argue which response we should have, that is, to argue which response is appropriate given the range of tendencies to respond we actually have. Hence the element
of essential contestability in the application of evaluative concepts. By contrast, if value were relative to the actual responses of the community, period, then there wouldn’t be any room to argue whether homosexuality is or is not repulsive, that is, whether repulsion is or is not an appropriate response to homosexuality, since the application of the evaluative concept “repulsive” would be “fixed” by the actual responses.

We are now in a position to see the way in which Wiggins’ circular, or interdependent, interpretation of the internal link between our conception of value and our affective-cum-motivational responses has introduced a notion of objectivity within the traditional subjectivist framework- and hence the way in which Wiggins has emancipated us from it- without falling into the dispositionalist trap. Insofar as the specification of evaluative properties needs to make reference to subjective responses, the internal link between our conception of value and our affective-cum-motivational responses is preserved. Yet, what the circular interpretation allows Wiggins to do is to avoid the mistake of the traditional subjectivist of reducing value to our responses since we are shown that the specification of our responses needs to in turn make reference to evaluative properties. At the same time, Wiggins avoids falling into the dispositionalist trap because, as we have seen, the claim is not that value is relative to our actual responses, period. Rather, value is relative to the appropriateness of the relevant response given the range of the actual collective responses we have. The value of an object is what ‘calls forth’ (ibid., 210) a response that potentially fits the features of the object that make it valuable. That is, there is reason for the object to call forth the relevant response. Importantly, the value of an object is not reducible to the fact that there is reason to respond in a certain way;  

34 I take this to be Scanlon’s view. See Scanlon 1998, ch.1 and 2.
the values are what provide us with potential reasons to respond in the relevant way. If so, then the value of an object does not merely cause an affective-cum-motivational response but also provides the subject with the marks for potential justification. If so, then the sort of explanation that we give in having an affective-cum-motivational response is one that lends itself both to causation and justification. The dispositionalist is unable to provide this sort of explanation because it does not make room for justification. This is what presumably Wiggins has in mind when he writes that ‘the subjectivism we have envisaged [i.e. the response-dependent objectivism of the sort we are after] does not treat the response as a criterion, or even as an indicator…[Rather] it is a judgement indispensably sustained by the perceptions and feelings and thoughts that are open to criticism that is based on norms that are open to criticism. It is not that by which we tell. It is part of the telling itself’ (ibid., 208). The objectivity of value as envisaged by Wiggins, then, is one that essentially allows for the possibility of justifying one’s responses. Again, this is why the application of an evaluative predicate essentially involves contestability: that is because value is the sort of property that essentially entails the possibility of arguing whether its application is correct or incorrect which is established by arguing whether a certain response is appropriate or not.

Section 3

We are now in a position to dissolve the apparent tension within the constitutive thesis. The constitutive thesis states that the formation of our motivational states towards an object is constitutive of the disclosure of value. The key difficulty in defending the constitutive thesis is the apparent tension between the idea that the sort of evaluative knowledge that we acquire in having an affective experience is objective, that is, it is
knowledge of features of objects, and the idea that the formation of motivational states of
the subject is constitutive of such knowledge. The tension dissolves once we admit of the
possibility of the formation of motivational states as constituting evaluative knowledge of
objects and this is precisely what the response-dependent notion of the objectivity of value
formulated in the previous section allows us to do. According to this conception of value,
the value of an object is that property of an object that renders the formation of our
motivational states appropriate. The formation of our motivational states is a response to
the evaluative property of the object. As we have seen, evaluative properties are not
specifiable independently of our responses since the specification of the former is in terms
of what renders appropriate the latter. Yet evaluative properties maintain their objectivity
precisely because they are those properties of the object that justify our responses. The
knowledge we gain from having an affective-cum-motivational response, that is, a response
entailing the formation of motivational states, is objective since its content consists in the
features of the object that render our responses appropriate. At the same time, our responses
are constitutive of this sort of knowledge because they are the terms within which we
specify those features, that is, as those that render our responses appropriate. I believe that
here is where the importance, and subtlety, of Wiggins’ quote above comes out:
‘[Evaluative] properties are to be conceived in the light of what it takes to exercise that
grasp’ where the grasp is of the relevant evaluative concept the formation of which
essentially entails the potential justification of our responses (Wiggins 2006, 334).

We can now make sense of the idea that affect renders readily and rationally
intelligible the formation of our motivational states insofar as it is a disclosure of value.
Our affective responses are responses to evaluative properties of objects and persons
confronting us. The link between our affective responses and the object’s evaluative properties is inextricable since evaluative properties are specified in terms of those features of the object that render our affective responses appropriate. In turn our responses are specified in terms of those experiences that respond to an evaluative property—hence Wiggins’ scepticism of the possibility of a purely “introspective”, object-independent account of our affective experiences. Insofar as the formation of our motivational states is part of having an affective experience—hence the term “affective-cum-motivational response” I have employed throughout this chapter and the previous one—affective experience has authority over the formation of our motivational states because the formation of our motivational states is itself a response to the evaluative properties of the object of experience. This lands us on the conclusion that affect renders readily and rationally intelligible the formation of our motivational states because it is a disclosure of value.

The notion of the objectivity of value with which we have dissolved the apparent tension explains the phenomenon mentioned in the previous chapter that there is a sense in which we cannot acquire the sort of evaluative knowledge in question without to a certain extent simultaneously valuing or disvaluing the object whose evaluative import we are learning about. The idea that part of what it means to understand the evaluative import of something is to come to value or disvalue it, that is, to be taken by it in a positive or negative way, is made salient by contrasting it with the case of colour. The acquisition of the sort of knowledge that grounds our concepts of colour does not entail being taken with the object in the relevant sense. Yet the acquisition of the sort of knowledge grounding our evaluative concepts does. At this point, this phenomenon should not be mysterious since this is due to
the different sort of responses essential to the acquisition of the respective sort of knowledge. In the case of value these are affective and motivational, while in the case of colour they are sensorial. Sense experience of colour does not involve the formation of motivational states while affect does. This difference is encapsulated within the grasp and use of the respective concepts. Evaluative concepts retain within their very meaning the fact that they have been formed within a process involving our affective and motivational states, that is, responses that characteristically manifest a concerned interest in the object or person. This is what Wiggins calls, following Stevenson, ‘the ‘magnetism’ of value terms’ (ibid., 198). Evaluative concepts are “magnetic” because their very meaning points to being taken with the object, either negatively or positively. None of this holds for our concepts of colour. It is no surprise then that the application of an evaluative concept to an object or person normally entails the adoption of a certain valenced attitude towards it. That is because the genesis of evaluative concepts essentially involves our affective and motivational responses.

Section 4

In this final section I want to look at Bennet Helm’s account of the relation between affective experience and value. I do so for the following reason. Helm’s account is inspired by the response-dependent account of the objectivity of value of McDowell and Wiggins that I have been relying on to argue for affect as a disclosure of value. Therefore, it affords us with an account against which we can refine our own. As we shall see presently, Helm aims to situate his account also in between an extreme form of objectivism and an extreme form of subjectivism. Yet his account encounters a problem that symptomises an incorrect calibration. Considering this problem will allow us to clarify our own position.
Helm employs the term “import” to refer to value as he understands it. Helm situates his response-dependent notion of the objectivity of import between what we have termed “robust objectivism” - objectivity conceived as specifiable independently of the subjective point of view - and what we have termed “traditional subjectivism” - value is reduced to our affective responses and is conceived as projected onto a value-neutral world. Helm’s account characterises import as ‘perspectively subjective in the sense that their [i.e. values’] existence is intelligible only in terms of being the objects of a certain sort of awareness, a certain perspective on the world’ (Helm 2001a, 56). This is the sort of ontological status that, according to Helm, is characteristic of secondary qualities such as colour. Helm does not distinguish between a dispositionalist notion of objectivity, which is the sort that we have bestowed on secondary qualities such as colour, and the sort that we have argued pertains to value. Rather, Helm writes that ‘we can accommodate what is right about the idea that things have import because we evaluate them as good or bad by understanding import to be perspectively subjective: something’s having import is intelligible only in light of a subject’s evaluative perspective. Of course, in contrast to secondary qualities, import can be relative to the individual, and is in this way more subjective than secondary qualities’ (ibid., 57). The notion of “perspectival subjectivity” is then meant to capture both the idea that import is more subjective than the status of secondary qualities such as colour and yet is, in some sense to be specified, objective.

In what follows, I focus on Helm’s account of the objectivity of value and its relation to affective experience. I therefore skip other interesting aspects of Helm’s overall theory, such as his notion of “felt evaluations” and their hedonic nature; and the relation between invention and discovery in deliberation about value. For more details on the former, see Helm (1994), Helm (2002) and Helm (2009); while for more details on the latter, see Helm (1996) and Helm (2000).
The notion of an individual’s “evaluative perspective,” then, seems to play a crucial role in calibrating subjectivity and objectivity in Helm’s account of import. What kind of perspective is this? And how does it calibrate subjectivity and objectivity of import? Helm provides us with the following account of perspective. The first thing to note is that “[such a perspective is constituted not by particular evaluations…but rather by a broader pattern in our evaluative attitudes’ (ibid.). The broader pattern of our evaluative attitudes is conceived as being constituted by rational interconnections between the emotional responses in the subject’s perspective. Helm distinguishes between two sorts of rational interconnections between emotions: transitional and tonal commitments. Transitional commitments are the rational interconnections between forward- and backward-looking emotions. Forward-looking emotions are emotions characterised by evaluations of present or future states of affairs. Examples of future-looking emotions are hope and fear. Backward-looking emotions are emotions characterised by evaluations of past states of affairs. Examples of backward-looking emotions are regret and relief. The thought is that ‘forward-looking emotions rationally ought to become the corresponding backward-looking emotions’ (Helm 2001b, 193). For instance, it is rationally appropriate that if one fears about one’s vase being destroyed, one then feels relief when the vase has escaped the danger of being destroyed. Or to put it the other way round, it would be rationally inappropriate if one feared that one’s vase will be destroyed yet does not feel relief when the vase escapes the danger. The second sort of rational interconnection between emotions is characterised in terms of tonal commitments. Tonal commitments are the rational interconnections between positive and negative emotions. Positive emotions are emotions characterised by evaluations of something as good while negative emotions are emotions
characterised by evaluations of something as bad. ‘To say that emotions involve tonal commitments is to say that if one experiences a positive emotion in response to something good that has happened or might happen, then, other things being equal, one rationally ought to have experienced the corresponding negative emotion if instead what happened (or conspicuously might happen) were something bad; not to experience this emotion would be rationally inappropriate’ (ibid., 193-194). For instance, if I feel happy that my vase has not been destroyed (positive emotion), then it would be rationally inappropriate if I were not to feel distress in the case that my vase would be destroyed (negative emotion). Helm then states that the source of the rational commitment of an emotion to other emotions is the emotion’s focus, that is, the background object of concern of that emotion. For instance, what commits one’s fear that the vase will be destroyed to feel relief in case the vase escapes the danger is the background concern for one’s vase. The thought is that when emotions have the same focus then they impose on each other certain rational commitments. The pattern of commitments between a subject’s emotions is rational because it spells out the appropriateness of one’s emotion. A subject’s evaluative perspective, then, is constituted by a rational pattern of emotions within which one’s particular emotional response can be assessed as appropriate or not.36

How does import fit in this story? Helm begins with the thought that ‘at least part of what it is to have import is to be a worthy object of attention and action: insofar as something has import for one, one ought to pay attention to what happens to it and so be

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36 The evaluative perspective of a subject is not only constituted by the pattern of one’s emotions but also by one’s evaluative judgments. For our purposes, we do not need to go into Helm’s account of the relation between our emotional responses and evaluative judgments or indeed in how Helm conceives evaluative judgments in the first place. For more details, see Helm 2001b, 199-205.
prepared to act on its behalf when otherwise appropriate’ (ibid., 195). To characterise the sort of attention to an object that has import, Helm distinguishes between two sorts of vigilance. Active vigilance entails deliberately directing one’s attention to an object. By contrast, in passive vigilance one’s attention is ‘naturally drawn’ to an object. According to Helm, it is the latter sort of vigilance that characterises the sort of attention towards objects having import. Helm then argues that there is ‘a two-way conceptual connection between import and the pattern of emotions defined by their mutual commitments to a common focus’ (ibid., 195). First, the sort of passive vigilance characterising the attention towards something of import is made possible by the commitments in the pattern of our emotions. It is partly due to those commitments that we are ‘naturally drawn’ to certain objects, that is, to objects with the relevant import. Furthermore, we make sense of an object naturally drawing our attention, and therefore having import, in part because our patterns are rational: failing to be drawn to an object with import would be inappropriate. Hence why we are drawn to it. Import is *perspectivally subjective*, then, in the sense that we make sense of an object having import by means of the rational interconnections and commitments in the pattern of the emotions constituting an evaluative perspective. When viewed in this way, the pattern of emotions is conceptually prior to import. Yet import is also *objective*. This is the second direction in the conceptual connection between import and the pattern of emotions. Import is objective insofar as it is conceived as the standard in terms of which we assess the appropriateness of a particular emotional response in the overall pattern. An emotion is appropriate when it rationally fits in the overall pattern and the pattern is rational because the emotions share a common focus of import. Without a common focus of import, we would not be able to make sense of the rationality of the
pattern and therefore we would not be able to assess a particular emotional response. Now, import is conceived as conceptually prior to the pattern of emotions. The result is that neither import nor the pattern of emotions is ultimately prior to the other. Rather, the two are constitutively interdependent. Although we have discussed only attention in explaining the sense in which import and the pattern of emotions are constitutively interdependent, the same applies to action. Part of what it means for an object to have import is that it is worthy of being the source of motivation of a subject. We make sense of an object having import in terms of a subject’s pattern of motivation towards that object. At the same time the appropriateness of a subject’s motivational state is assessed against the import of the focus. Again, we have a two-way conceptual connection between import and the pattern of one’s motivational states insofar as neither is conceptually prior to the other.

Notice that Helm’s account of the response-dependent sort of objectivity of value, or import, is characterised by the two key features that we have seen characterise Wiggins’ conception of value: circularity and relativity. First, it is circular since neither the appropriateness of our emotions nor import are conceived as conceptually prior to each other. Rather, each is conceived in part as constitutive of the other. Just like in Wiggins’ account, Helm’s circular account is neither vicious nor uninformative since it does not analyse value in terms of our emotional responses, or in Helm’s terminology, it does not bestow conceptual priority on either side of the circle. Second, import is conceived as relative insofar as an object having import is relative to a subject’s evaluative perspective, that is, the pattern of emotional responses she has towards the object. Yet in the case of relativity I believe there is an important difference with Wiggins. In what follows, I want to point out where the difference lies and ultimately argue that not only is this a difference
that fundamentally distinguishes Helm’s account from the account we committed to above but also that it renders Helm’s account problematic in a way that ours is not.

Recall the way in which value is relative to our responses in Wiggins’ account. Value is relative to our actual tendencies or propensities to respond in certain ways. Characterising value as relative to our propensities to respond in certain ways rather than to our responses, period, allows for a sufficient leeway to argue for the appropriateness of a particular response. Value is not relative to how we respond but rather to how we ought to respond. In turn, the source of normativity of our responses is the value of an object. The objectivity of value is such as to essentially allow for argumentation as to the appropriateness of a particular emotional response. So far, Helm’s account seems to be in line with Wiggins’. Yet, in Helm’s account the normativity of our responses is conceived as arising from the commitments between our emotional responses. This means that the import of an object is relative to the rational pattern of our emotional responses. I believe that it is not too farfetched to assume that Helm’s notion of a rational pattern of emotional responses is meant to do the work of the notion of “propensities” in Wiggins’. Yet the key difference is that Helm construes the rationality of the pattern, and therefore the standard of the appropriateness of a particular emotional response, as defined by the commitments of a single evaluative perspective. That is, the rationality of the pattern is particular to a subject and therefore import is relative to a particular pattern of emotional responses. By contrast, in Wiggins, value is not relative to the evaluative perspective of a single subject. Rather, value is relative to the appropriateness of an emotional response which is assessed against the propensities to respond that anyone in a community ought to have.
According to Helm, the rationality arising from the commitments between a subject’s emotional responses is sufficient to secure a notion of objectivity. But is it? Consider the example used by Helm, namely being afraid for one’s precious vase. What it means for the vase to have import for me, is for me to be committed to respond emotionally in certain ways towards it. I feel fear when I have reason to believe that the vase is in danger of being destroyed and I feel relief when I have reason to believe that the vase escaped the danger. I feel happiness at the thought of my friends appreciating my vase and disappointment when my friends do not appreciate it. But if the import of the vase is in part constituted by the rationality of the pattern of my emotional responses, then why think that the vase itself has import. That is, if the appropriateness of my emotional response towards the vase is assessed by the rationality of the pattern, which in part constitutes import, who is to say that the pattern is actually rational? We can conceive of a situation in which the commitments between our emotional responses are respected yet when seen from someone else’s perspective the pattern as a whole is not rational at all. For instance, if one feels joy at torturing insects, then one might be committed to feeling sadness at not being able to torture insects. Here, the transitional commitment is respected yet we wouldn’t characterise the emotional response as rational or appropriate. The incoherence in Helm’s account is that it ends up characterising emotional responses that are not rational or appropriate as rational or appropriate.

Of course, Helm might reply that the emotional response is rational for the subject whose evaluative perspective we are considering. Yet this brings out the fundamental problem with Helm’s account. If the value of something is relative to the evaluative perspective of an individual, where her evaluative perspective is characterised by the
commitments of her pattern, then it seems like we have calibrated wrongly the sort of relativity characterising objectivity in a response-dependent account of value. That is, we have allowed too much subjectivity in our account to be able to hold on to a genuine notion of objectivity. For if the objectivity of import boils down to the commitments between the emotional responses constituting an individual’s evaluative perspective, then we have no way of adjudicating whether the object of import really does have that import. Recall that according to Helm it is the focus of a pattern, that is, its background object of concern, that bestows rationality on the pattern. In the example above of my valuing the vase, what renders intelligible the commitments characterising my emotional pattern is the background object of concern of my valuing the vase. As Helm puts it, ‘emotional commitments constitute an attunement of one’s sensibilities to the focus of that pattern’ (ibid., 195, Helm’s italics). Yet in what sense is the value of the focus objective? What has established that? And therefore what sort of “attunement” is at play here? If the objectivity is, again, a matter of respecting the commitments between our emotional responses, it seems like the value of the vase is entirely up to me to decide. Now, it is not clear that Helm’s account of value is distinguishable from the projectivist commitment of what we have termed “traditional subjectivism.” I believe this is betrayed when Helm characterises the objectivity of value as being more subjective than the objectivity of secondary qualities. Part of the point of McDowell and Wiggins in drawing the analogy between secondary qualities and value is precisely to argue that value is not less objective, or more subjective, than secondary qualities. By contrast, in Wiggins’ account we do not fall in the same problem because the relativity that characterises value is not to a single evaluative perspective and its constitutive pattern but rather to the propensities that anyone in a
community ought to have. In arguing whether an emotional response is appropriate or not we do not consider solely the evaluative perspective of a single individual but rather we argue for the evaluative perspective that anyone should have.
CHAPTER 6

Affect as a Disclosure of Value

Introduction

In the previous chapters I formulated the notion that affect is the disclosure of value in terms of affect playing an essential explanatory role in the acquisition of evaluative knowledge. The aim of this final chapter is to specify this role and in so doing clarify the commitments of the account of affect given in the previous chapters. This entails specifying further the distinction I drew in chapter 4 between knowledge of value and theoretical knowledge of value, where theoretical knowledge of value stands for propositional knowledge of value acquired by testimony in the absence of affective experience. In order to do so, I rely on the work of John Campbell, from whom I borrowed the terminology of “the explanatory role of experience” and “knowledge of.” Campbell argues for an analogous thesis for sensory awareness, that is, he argues that sensory awareness plays an essential explanatory role in the acquisition of knowledge of our surroundings. More specifically, Campbell’s aim is to argue that sensory awareness plays an essential role in grounding both our concepts of mind-independent objects and their qualities and our propositional knowledge of objects. My strategy is to reconstruct Campbell’s account in defence of the explanatory role of sensory awareness in order to then rely on it when specifying the role of affect in the acquisition of evaluative knowledge. In so doing I specify the notion of “knowledge of value” and its role in grounding evaluative concepts and its relation to propositional knowledge.

Two caveats. First, although Campbell’s aim is to show the role of experience in grounding not only the concepts of the qualities of objects but also the concept of objects
as mind-independent, I am interested only in the role of experience in grounding concepts of the qualities of objects and not in the concept of objects as mind-independent. This is important as I will focus on Campbell’s arguments that are designed to show the role of experience in grounding concepts of features of objects, such as their shape and, especially, colour, while leaving aside Campbell’s arguments specifically designed for the concept of objects as mind-independent. Second, Campbell’s overall aim in his set up of the issue of the role of experience in grounding our concepts of objects and their features is to argue for his relational, or naïve realist, view of experience. As the first part of my thesis shows, I am neutral at best and sceptical at worst on whether any of the current dominant theories of the phenomenal character of experience are suitable on their own to argue for affect as a disclosure of value. Therefore, although I reconstruct Campbell’s argument for naïve realism in order to extract his take on the role of experience in grounding our concepts, I do not in any way want to support a relational view of experience and indeed I show that I can rely on his formulations of the problem of the role of experience in grounding knowledge without committing to his overall aim.

The chapter is divided in three sections. In the first section I discuss Campbell’s argument in defence of his Relational View of Experience. In so doing, I extract Campbell’s insight into the specific role of sensory experience in the acquisition of knowledge. The insight is that phenomenally conscious experience provides the subject with the source of justification and rational intelligibility in her deployment of the relevant concept. I argue that this insight, embodied in the notion of “knowledge of”, is not tied to any of the dominant theories of the phenomenal character of experience. Combined with the arguments in the first three chapters of the thesis, this allows me to defend the notion
of affect as a disclosure of value without endorsing any of the three dominant theories of the phenomenology of experience. In Section 2 I apply the findings from Section 1 on the case of affect and value. I argue that in the absence of affective experience, we are unable to form readily and rationally intelligible motivational states when deploying evaluative concepts. Finally, in Section 3 I draw out the implications of the findings from Section 2 by considering a variety of thought experiments similar to the case of Goldie’s Irene we have looked at in the previous chapters. I argue that the implications indicate that affect plays an essential role in the navigation of the evaluative realm.

Section 1

Campbell’s argument in defence of the naïve realist conception of experience relies on the claim that only the naïve realist can account for the principle of ‘the explanatory role of experience’ which states that ‘concepts of individual physical objects, and concepts of the observable characteristics of such objects, are made available by our experience of the world. It is experience of the world that explains our grasp of these concepts’ (Campbell 2002, 128). The first step of Campbell’s argument, then, is to argue that experience does indeed play such a role. Campbell’s argument in defence of the principle of the explanatory role of experience begins with a distinction between two ways in which we can conceive the property of an object: a dispositional conception and a categorical conception. Here is how Campbell formulates the distinction:

There is a difference between the family of dispositions an object has in virtue of having some categorical property, and the underlying categorical property itself. On the one hand, there is the collection of dispositions a round object has in virtue of being round: a tendency to roll when pushed, if it is made of sufficiently rigid material, to leave gaps when stacked together with other things of the same shape,
and so on. On the other hand, there is the characteristic of roundness itself, in virtue of which the object has all these dispositions. We ordinarily take ourselves to have the conception of categorical objects and properties; we do not think only in dispositional terms. (Campbell 2005, 103-104)

Campbell illustrates this distinction and the fact that we are able to have both conceptions of a property by asking us to consider what happens when the property of an object is changed. For instance, consider what happens when we change the shape of a chair by bending its leg. In changing the shape of a chair, we simultaneously alter the object’s dispositions. Now, the chair cannot support a person sitting down, or it cannot be stacked on top of another chair. According to Campbell, when we think of a case like this one, we intuitively, and correctly, tend to think that what we have changed is not primarily a set of dispositions of the chair, or even just one disposition, but rather we have changed the underlying categorical property of the object, that is, its shape. The change in dispositions of the chair is a consequence of our changing its categorical property. Campbell’s point is that in our everyday lives we naturally take it as evident that we are confronted with categorical objects and categorical properties in virtue of which there are a set of possibilities of various things happening to these objects and properties when set in different conditions.

Once Campbell has secured the intuition that we are able to, and indeed normally do, think of categorical properties as such, he claims that ‘[i]t is experience itself that makes

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37 The notion of a “categorical object” is important for Campbell in his argument to the effect that sensory awareness plays an essential role in our grasp of objects as mind-independent.

Campbell’s the thought is that in sensory experience we do not encounter objects as bundles of properties but as the bases instantiating properties. Since I am focusing on Campbell’s treatment of our experience of properties and the way in which experience grounds our conception of these properties, I leave aside any further discussion on the plausibility of the notion of “categorical objects.”
it compelling that we encounter the categorical; and only an appeal to experience will explain how it is that we can think in terms of the categorical at all’ (ibid., 107). There are two points Campbell is making here. First, and explicitly, it is only in virtue of experiencing a property that we encounter it categorically and are therefore able to think of it categorically. Secondly, and implicitly, what Campbell is also saying here is that no amount of knowledge of the dispositions that a property has can provide us with the categorical conception of the property. Only an experience of the property can do so. For instance, recall Goldie’s example of the colour-blind person that relies on a trustworthy companion to select red objects. In this case, one of the dispositions of red objects is to dispose the trustworthy companion to signal the colour-blind person to select red objects. Now suppose that the colour-blind person learns many more dispositions of red objects that allow her to select red objects in ever subtler ways. Campbell’s intuitive point here is that no matter how vast the set of known dispositions of the colour red the colour-blind person is in possession of, she cannot have a categorical conception of the colour red because she has never experienced it. It is only experience that can provide the colour blind person with the categorical conception of what the colour red is.

At this stage, according to Campbell, we have a stable enough foundation to argue for naïve realism. For once we agree that we are able to acquire a conception of a categorical property as such, and that only experience can provide us with such a conception of a property insofar as it is in experience that we encounter the actual property itself rather than merely its dispositions, then the question turns to what conception of experience we need in order to be able to make sense of this. According to Campbell, only a naïve realist conception of experience can do so. Recall that according to a naïve realist
conception of experience, the phenomenal character of conscious experience is partly constituted by the object of experience itself and its qualities. Campbell’s argument is that the naïve realist can capture the idea that the phenomenal character of experience plays an essential role in providing us with the categorical conception of properties precisely because it conceives the phenomenal character as being in part constituted by objects and their categorical properties. By contrast, according to Campbell, alternative accounts of experience, namely qualia theories and representationalism, are unable to do so. We have encountered the arguments as to why qualia theory and representationalism are unable to do so in Chapters 1 and 2, respectively. Recall that according to the qualia theorist the phenomenal character of conscious experience is constituted by intrinsic, non-intentional properties of experience that are caused by the object of experience. If so, then the only conception of the property of the object of experience that we can acquire through experience is a dispositional one, that is, the property’s disposition of causing a particular kind of intrinsic, non-intentional property of experience. According to representationalism, the phenomenal character of experience is determined by the representational properties of the experience. The representational properties of the experience are the properties the experience has in virtue of its representational content and the intentional attitude taken towards it. The reason why, according to Campbell, representationalism is unable to account for the fact that the phenomenal character of experience plays an essential role in the acquisition of the categorical conception of a property is that the notion of representational content is insufficient to capture the phenomenal character of experience. That is, it is unclear why the possession of a representational content should suffice to make a mental state phenomenally conscious. If, then, our access to properties is by means of
representational content, then the phenomenal character of experience does not play a necessary role in the epistemic access to the properties in question. And if so, then, analogously to the qualia theorist, all that experience can provide us with is a non-categorical, dispositional conception of the property. Campbell concludes that neither the qualia theorist nor the representationalist is able to account for the fact that experience acquaints us with the actual property itself and therefore neither is able to account for the fact that through experience we acquire the categorical conception of a property.

For our purposes, we do not need to agree with Campbell’s’ argument to the effect that the naïve realist conception of sensory experience is able to capture the thought that the phenomenal character of experience plays an essential role in our epistemic access to the categorical base of properties, and therefore in providing us with the concept of properties as categorical bases. Neither do we have to agree with the claim that it is the only conception of experience that is able to do so. What is important here is to appreciate the claim, to which Campbell commits, that sensory experience provides us with a distinctive epistemic access to properties. It is here that we encounter the notion of “knowledge of.” Campbell introduces the notion of knowledge of by distinguishing it from propositional knowledge. It is worth quoting Campbell at length:

[First] There is your knowledge of how things are around you: knowing that the book is on the table, that the tree is full of birds’ nests, and so on. Second, and more basically, there is knowledge of which things and properties are to be found in your surroundings. For example, consider knowledge of colour. I don’t just mean that there is such a phenomenon as colour, but knowledge of which property scarlet is, for example. We usually find it compelling that this knowledge can be provided by experience of the colours. A capacity for correct, blind-sight guessing
as to the colours of things would not be enough for knowledge of what the colours are; you wouldn’t know what scarlet is, in the absence of experience of it. Or again, we take it that to know which particular thing someone is trying to draw your attention to, you have to experience the thing; a mere capacity for blindsight-style guessing, a mere hunch that someone is there, isn’t enough. This kind of knowledge is, on the face of it, not a matter of knowing that things are thus and so. It seems a precondition of knowing that things are thus and so. To know that the apple is red, for example, you have to know what an apple is, and you have to know what redness is. (Campbell 2014, 77).

The first sort of knowledge distinguished by Campbell is propositional knowledge that can be acquired by testimony in the absence of experience. The second sort of knowledge is what I have called “knowledge of.” There are two distinct claims that we should extract from the above regarding the distinction between knowledge of and propositional knowledge. First, knowledge of a property, say of the colour scarlet, can only be acquired in virtue of having an experience of scarlet. This claim goes hand in hand with the claim that it is only in virtue of experience, and therefore acquiring knowledge of scarlet, that we acquire the categorical conception of scarlet. Experience is what grants us the epistemic access to i.e. knowledge of, the categorical property of scarlet and is therefore what grounds our categorical concept of scarlet. By contrast, propositional knowledge acquired by testimony in the absence of experience is not the sort of knowledge that grants us epistemic access to what a colour like scarlet is. Second, Campbell claims that knowledge of is ‘more basic’ than propositional knowledge. This second claim is then explicated in terms of knowledge of being a ‘precondition’ of propositional knowledge: in order to know that the
apple is red you need to know what an apple is, that is, you need to have knowledge of an apple, and you need to know what red is, that is, you need to have knowledge of red.

Two points need elaboration in order to clarify the notion of knowledge of and the role it plays in relation to concepts. First, I said above that for our purposes we do not need to commit to any of the dominant theories of the phenomenal character of experience. Yet I want to commit to the idea that there is a distinctive sort of knowledge of properties, namely knowledge of, that can be had solely by subjects that can enjoy a phenomenally conscious experience. This sort of knowledge grounds concepts of those properties that can be acquired only in virtue of having a phenomenally conscious experience of the property. Call such concepts phenomenal concepts of properties. What needs to be appreciated is that a commitment to the notion that the phenomenal character of experience plays an essential role in the acquisition of phenomenal concepts of properties, or in other words, a commitment to the notion of knowledge of, does not entail a commitment to any particular theory of the phenomenal character of experience. Although so far we have looked at the notion of knowledge of as embedded in Campbell’s naïve realism, it seems as the naïve realist is not alone in being able to capture the thought that in the absence of a phenomenally conscious experience of a property we are not able to acquire a distinctive way of thinking about that property, that is, a phenomenal concept of the relevant property.\textsuperscript{38} Consider the qualia theorist. According to a qualia theorist, in having a phenomenally conscious experience of an object as red, we are phenomenally acquainted with an intrinsic feature of experience that we associate with the colour red. We gain the phenomenal concept of redness in virtue of becoming acquainted with the sort of quale that

\textsuperscript{38} In this paragraph I rely on Soteriou 2016, 105-106.
we associate with redness. Since, according to the qualia theorist, it is only in having a phenomenally conscious experience that we are able to gain epistemic access to the quale that we associate with redness, it follows that the phenomenal character of experience plays an essential role in the acquisition of the phenomenal concept of redness. So the qualia theorist and the naïve realist agree that Mary lacks something epistemically. The point of their disagreement lies in what the naïve realist and the qualia theorist take to be the item that the phenomenal character of experience acquaints us with. In the case of the former, it is a property of the object of experience while in the case of the latter it is a property of the experience. Again, the crucial point to be extracted here is not whether the qualia theorist’s argument is a threat to naïve realism, or whether it is even a viable option. Rather, the point is that the qualia theorist just as much as the naïve realist, can employ the notion of knowledge of, that is, of a distinctive sort of knowledge provided exclusively by the phenomenal character of experience that puts us in a presentational relation with a property. Knowledge of, then, is neither a notion peculiar to the naïve realist nor to the qualia theorist, nor to any theorist of the phenomenal character of experience. Knowledge of denotes the distinctive epistemic access to a property that is provided exclusively by a phenomenally conscious experience that grounds a distinctive conception of the relevant property.39

Second, and most importantly, we need to clarify the sense in which knowledge of is a precondition of propositional knowledge. For consider the following worry. Someone might say that we can understand perfectly well the proposition that the apple is red, and have propositional knowledge that the apple is red, without ever having encountered an

39 The claim that knowledge of is not a notion peculiar to any theory of the phenomenal character of experience does not entail the claim that therefore any theory of phenomenal character is able to accommodate it. All I argued for here is that I need not commit to a particular theory of phenomenal character in order to employ the notion of knowledge of.
apple or the colour red. For instance, Goldie’s colour-blind person can know that the apple is red simply by testimony and in the absence of the experience of the colour red. And Jackson’s Mary can know that certain objects are red in virtue of their physical properties without ever having encountered a red object. That is, the colour-blind person and Mary can know that the apple, or any other object, is red without acquiring knowledge of red or knowledge of the relevant object. So in what sense is knowledge of a precondition of propositional knowledge?

The answer to this worry takes us to the heart of the matter regarding the role played by phenomenally conscious experience and knowledge of in the deployment of concepts. So far we have agreed with Campbell that the experiential encounter with the observable properties of objects, such as colour and shape, provides us with a distinctive sort of epistemic access to the relevant properties. We have termed this distinctive sort of epistemic access “knowledge of.” Let us elaborate further on what knowledge of affords us with. In acquiring knowledge of a property, we acquire knowledge of the semantic value of the concept of the relevant property. That is, we acquire knowledge of the thing to which the concept refers. For instance, in having an experience of a red object, we learn what the concept “red” refers to. Crucially, knowing the semantic value of the concept “red” is the source of justification for our deployment of the concept “red.” It is our knowledge of what the concept “red” refers to that affords us with the justification of our deploying the concept “red.” When we encounter a red object and we apply the concept “red” to the object, we are justified in doing so because we have knowledge of what the concept “red” refers to. Since it is in virtue of having a phenomenally conscious experience that we acquire the knowledge of the semantic value of the concept of the relevant property, experience plays
an essential role in acquiring the source of justification at play in the deployment of the relevant concept.

Notice that the sort of justification at stake here is not the sort at play in the justification of our beliefs. When we try to justify our beliefs, we employ higher order reflective faculties. For instance, in trying to justify the belief that there is a pig in the surroundings, I might reflect on various bits of evidence that lead me to conclude that there is a pig in the surroundings. By contrast, the sort of justification at play when I deploy the concept “red” in seeing a red object does not involve the sort of higher order reflective faculties needed in justifying my beliefs. Rather, what is involved is the knowledge of what the concept refers to. In this sense, the sort of justification with which we are dealing in the deployment of concepts is more basic than the sort of justification we deal with in the formation of our beliefs. From now on, then, it is important to keep in mind that the sort of justification we are dealing with is of the more basic sort. Notice also that the knowledge of the semantic value of the concept of the relevant property not only justifies but also *causes* the deployment of the concept. In seeing a red object, I deploy the concept “red” *because* I know what the concept “red” refers to. Here, the “because” entails both causation and justification.

What knowledge *of* provides us with, then, is a fundamental sort of competence in our deployment of the relevant concept. This fundamental sort of competence is characterised by a *rational intelligibility* in the deployment of the relevant concept. In seeing a red object, it is readily and rationally intelligible to us why we deploy the concept “red.” The source of the rational intelligibility in the deployment of the concept “red” derives from our knowing what the semantic value of the concept red is, that is, from
knowing what the concept refers to. That is, it is the sort of justification mentioned above that renders rationally intelligible our deployment of the concept. This sort of justification, we said, is not one that involves higher order reflective faculties. It is therefore from the theorist’s perspective that we can trace the source of the rational intelligibility in the deployment of the concept to that of justification. In other words, in order for the deployment of the concept to be rationally intelligible from the subject’s perspective, there is no need to involve higher order reflective faculties. Now, since it is in virtue of acquiring knowledge of a property that we learn what the concept of the property refers to, and therefore we acquire the source of justification for the concept’s deployment, it is in virtue of having acquired knowledge of the relevant property that the deployment of the relevant concept is rationally intelligible to us. In turn, since we acquire knowledge of in virtue of having a phenomenally conscious experience of the relevant property, experience plays an essential role in rendering our deployment of the relevant concept rationally intelligible.

Now take the case of Jackson’s Mary. Mary is able to acquire propositional knowledge regarding the colour red without having ever had an experience of a red object. This means that Mary is able to employ the concept “red” without having knowledge of the relevant property. The key point here is not whether or not Mary is able to employ the concept “red” since we have assumed that she is. Rather, the point is that Mary’s understanding of the concept of the colour red is deferential. That is, the concept Mary uses to refer to redness has the content it has for someone else. In Mary’s case, it might be of whoever is providing her with the propositional knowledge of the colour red. What this means is that Mary’s justification for her deployment of the concept “red” depends on the person to whom she defers her understanding. Assuming that the person to whom Mary
defers her understanding of the concept “red” has knowledge of the relevant property, and therefore has knowledge of the semantic value of the concept “red,” Mary’s justification for her deployment of the concept “red” depends on that person’s knowledge of the relevant property. This means also that the rational intelligibility of Mary’s deployment of the concept “red” depends on the subject who has knowledge of the relevant property. In other words, although Mary is able to employ the concept “red” and acquire propositional knowledge by testimony about the colour red, she does not possess an independent source of justification for the deployment of the concept since she lacks knowledge of the relevant property. Since we acquire knowledge of by having an experiential encounter with the relevant property, it is only by having an experience of the relevant property that we acquire an independent source of justification and intelligibility for the deployment of the relevant concept.

The answer to the worry above, then, is the following. The worry gets it right that Mary is able to employ the concept “red” and acquire propositional knowledge of the property of redness by testimony and in the absence of an experiential encounter with the relevant property. Yet this in no way undermines the claim that knowledge of is a precondition of propositional knowledge. This is because Mary’s ability in using, and justification for her use of, the concept “red” depends ultimately on the justification that is acquired by knowledge of redness that is possessed by the person that provides her with the propositional knowledge regarding redness. Knowledge of is a precondition of propositional knowledge in the sense of being the ultimate source of justification in the deployment of the relevant concept. Since we acquire knowledge of the relevant property solely by means of having an experience of the property insofar as it is in virtue of
experience that we acquire knowledge of the semantic value of the concept of the relevant property, experience plays an essential and fundamental justificatory role in the deployment of our concepts.

**Section 2**

I now want to employ the discussion of Campbell’s notion of the role of experience in grounding our concepts of features of objects to specify the claim that affect plays an essential explanatory role in the acquisition of evaluative knowledge, that is, that affect is a disclosure of value.

In chapter 4 I provided a preliminary contrast between knowledge of value and theoretical knowledge of value, where theoretical knowledge of value is propositional knowledge of value acquired by testimony in the absence of affective experience. There I pointed out two points of contrast. The first and most obvious is that theoretical knowledge of value is acquired in the absence of any affective experience while knowledge of value can be acquired solely by means of an affective response to an object. The thought here is that no matter the amount of theoretical knowledge of value, one cannot acquire knowledge of value in the absence of affective experience. This point draws on the analogy between sensory and affective experience. Just as in the case of affect and value, we gain knowledge of a sensory property such as colour solely in virtue of a sensory encounter with the relevant property and no amount of theoretical knowledge can provide us with knowledge of the relevant property. By contrast, the second point draws on the disanalogy between sensory and affective experience. That is, the affective encounter with value entails the formation of motivational states while the sensory encounter with a sensory property such as colour does not. Insofar as the acquisition of theoretical knowledge of value does not entail an
affective experience, it does not involve the formation of motivational states while insofar as the acquisition of knowledge of value does entail an affective experience, it entails the formation of motivational states.

In what follows I want to show the importance of acquiring knowledge of value by means of affective experience by replying to a potential objection against the idea that affect plays an essential role in the acquisition of evaluative knowledge. This objection has been lurking in the background throughout the previous and present chapters and it is similar to the objection we considered in the previous section to the effect that knowledge of is a precondition of propositional knowledge. The objection is the following. The objector begins by conceding, for the sake of argument, that knowledge of value is not reducible to theoretical knowledge of value and that therefore we cannot acquire the former from the latter. Yet, the objector might ask, why should we think that someone who, hypothetically, would be unable to have affective experiential responses to her surroundings is therefore unable to grasp or understand the value of an object? If the fact, if it is a fact, that we cannot acquire knowledge of value from theoretical knowledge of value does not entail that we cannot acquire propositional knowledge of value by testimony and in the absence of affective experience, then why shouldn’t we be able to apply evaluative predicates, even correctly at times, without necessarily undergoing experiences of an affective kind, indeed, without being able to undergo such experiences at all? If this is the case, that is, if we can after all acquire theoretical knowledge of value without knowledge of value and therefore acquire the ability to apply evaluative concepts without the need to be able to have affective experiences, then why should we think that affective experience is so important, indeed essential, in the navigation of the evaluative realm?
The answer to this objection combines the findings from our discussion in the previous section with the analogy and disanalogy between sensory and affective experience. Let’s begin with what is analogous between the two sorts of experiences. As we have seen, just as in the case of sensory experience, in the case of affective experience the acquisition of knowledge of the relevant property can occur solely through an experiential encounter with the property. In the previous section we argued that by acquiring knowledge of the relevant property we acquire epistemic access to the semantic value of the concept of the relevant property, that is, we acquire knowledge of what the concept refers to. In turn, knowledge of the semantic value of the concept of the relevant property is the source of justification (and causation) in our deployment of the relevant concept. Knowing what the concept refers to makes it readily and rationally intelligible to us why we deploy the relevant concept. Since knowledge of is acquired solely in virtue of having an experiential encounter with the relevant property, experience plays an essential role in the acquisition of the source of justification of the deployment of concepts of features of objects. As we have also seen, this does not entail that a subject who acquires propositional knowledge by testimony and in the absence of an experiential encounter with the relevant property, and who is therefore not in possession of knowledge of the relevant property, is not able to understand and employ the concept of the property, that is, is not able to apply the predicate in a correct way. Rather, what this entails is that this subject has a deferential understanding of the concept, that is, his understanding of the concept depends on the understanding of whoever provides the subject with the propositional knowledge. In turn, this means that the subject’s justification for her deployment of the concept depends
on the justification of the person to whom she defers. It is in this sense, we said, that knowledge of is a precondition of propositional knowledge.

This is brought over to the case of affective experience. In having an affective experience, we acquire knowledge of the semantic value of the relevant evaluative concept, that is, we acquire knowledge of what the evaluative concept refers to. In acquiring such knowledge, we acquire an independent source of justification for the deployment of the relevant evaluative concept. In having had the relevant affective experience, it becomes readily and rationally intelligible to us why we deploy an evaluative concept. Again, this does not entail that someone who acquires propositional knowledge of value by testimony and in the absence of affective experience cannot deploy the relevant evaluative concept. Rather, it means that her justification for doing so depends on the justification of the person to whom she defers her understanding of the relevant evaluative concept. And the same is the case for her intelligibility in deploying the relevant evaluative concept. Her intelligibility depends on the justification of the person to whom she defers. To illustrate.

When Goldie’s Irene learns everything there is to know about danger by testimony and in the absence of having felt fear, she is able to apply the concept of danger to objects and situations in her environment. Yet the justification for her deployment of the concept of danger depends on the person from whom she acquired propositional knowledge of danger. Once Irene slips on ice and feels fear for the first time, she acquires knowledge of danger, that is, she acquires knowledge of what the concept of danger refers to. Now, Irene’s justification for, and intelligibility in, deploying the concept of danger is not dependent on anyone. That is because she now knows what danger is.
So far, the objector can agree with us and yet still be sceptical of the importance of affective experience in our evaluative relation with the world. After all, before having ever felt fear, Irene was nevertheless able to apply the evaluative predicate “dangerous” correctly to objects and situations in her environment. This is where the *disanalogy* with sensory experience becomes crucial. The disanalogy consists in the fact that having an affective experience entails the formation of motivational states while having a sensory experience does not. This means that, in contrast to the case of sensory experience, acquiring knowledge of the semantic value of an evaluative concept, or in other words, acquiring knowledge of what the evaluative concept refers to, or in still other words, acquiring knowledge of an evaluative property, entails the formation of motivational states. So in contrast to the case of sensory experience, when a subject learns how to apply an evaluative predicate without having experienced the relevant affect, and therefore by means of a deferential understanding of the relevant evaluative concept, her competence in the deployment of the evaluative concept does not entail the formation of the relevant motivational state. The subject might very well be able to apply the relevant evaluative predicate but she does so without being motivated in the same way as the subject who learns how to apply the evaluative predicate by means of an affective experience. So while in the case of sensory experience the lack of an experiential encounter with the relevant sensory property might not seem to be a pressing issue once it comes to the ability to apply the relevant concept, in the case of affective experience it becomes a pressing issue in the sense that acquiring propositional knowledge of value by testimony and in the absence of affect does not entail the formation of the relevant motivational state. In other words, the subject who acquires evaluative knowledge solely by means of testimony and in the
absence of motivational states is missing a crucial component of our evaluative relation with the world: its *practical* dimension. The reason why affective experience plays an essential role in the navigation of the evaluative realm, then, is that acquiring knowledge of value by means of an affective experience involves forming the relevant motivational states, that is, it means gaining access to the practical domain of the evaluative realm. An inability to have affective experiences entails a motivational blindness when navigating the evaluative realm.

Let us be more specific about what exactly the subject who acquires knowledge of value in the absence of affect is missing and how this is relevant to our evaluative relation with the world. Since knowledge of the relevant property is the source of justification (and causation) in the deployment of the relevant concept, and since affect entails the formation of the relevant motivational state, in having an affective experience one gains the source of justification (and causation) not only for the deployment of the relevant evaluative concept but also for the formation of the relevant motivational state. That is why, together with Johnston, we have repeatedly claimed that affective experience renders readily and rationally intelligible the formation of our motivational states in addition to the formation of our evaluative judgements. Now, acquiring propositional knowledge of value by testimony and in the absence of an affective experience does *not* entail the formation of motivational states. In acquiring evaluative knowledge in the absence of affect, then, one does *not* acquire what renders readily and rationally intelligible the formation of the relevant motivational state. This means that one’s competence in deploying the relevant evaluative concept does not involve forming readily and rationally intelligible motivational states.
Let me illustrate. When Mary learns all there is to know about the physical properties of the colour red by testimony and in the absence of an experiential encounter with the relevant property, she is able to apply the concept of redness. The fact that she is missing knowledge of the relevant property does not seem to be a pressing issue insofar as she is nevertheless able to discriminate red objects. When it comes to Irene, though, her lacking knowledge of danger doesn’t simply mean that her understanding of the concept of danger is deferential and is therefore anyways able to discriminate dangerous objects. What it means is that in applying the concept of danger, that is, when Irene is confronted with what she deems to be a dangerous situation, she does not automatically form readily and rationally intelligible motivational states. It is therefore essential to Irene that she feels fear towards an object if she wants to be able to automatically form readily and rationally intelligible motivational states when deploying the concept of danger.

Let us consider two possible ways in which the objector can reply and in doing so clarify further still our claim. First, the objector might reply that we have proved too much. For now, it seems as if we are committing to a picture of our dealings within the evaluative realm where the deployment of an evaluative concept necessarily entails the formation of the relevant motivational state. But surely forming a motivational state is not a necessary condition in deploying an evaluative concept even in the case that we have knowledge of the relevant value. In response, we agree with the objector that we do not need to form the relevant motivational state every time we deploy the relevant evaluative concept. That is, we do not need to undergo the relevant affective experience every time we deploy the relevant evaluative concept. For instance, after having felt fear for the first time towards the danger of ice, Irene need not feel fear each time she deploys the concept of danger. But
this is not a commitment of ours. Our claim is that if Irene is to be able to form readily and rationally intelligible motivational states in her deployment of the evaluative concept of danger, then she must have felt fear before. In no way does this entail that therefore it is necessary that she feel fear every time she deploys the evaluative concept of danger. Compare with deploying the phenomenal concept of the colour red. Mary’s deployment of the phenomenal concept of “redness” is readily and rationally intelligible to her insofar as she visually experienced the colour red. In no way does this entail that she needs to visually experience the colour red every time she deploys the concept of “redness.”

Second, the objector can point out that we have committed to a picture where unless we have acquired knowledge of value by means of an affective experience, then we are unable to form the relevant motivational states. But surely in learning what a value is by testimony and in the absence of affective experience, we also learn the sort of motivational states that are characteristically associated with the deployment of the relevant evaluative concept. For instance, suppose that in learning what danger is before having ever felt fear, Irene also learns that when one is confronted with a dangerous object, one ought to flee. It might then be thought that even though Irene never felt fear before, when she encounters an object she deems dangerous, she knows that she ought to flee and consequently forms the relevant motivational state. This might be thought to be in part what is involved in the deferential use of an evaluative concept. Therefore, the objector continues, in deploying an evaluative concept we can form the relevant motivational state without necessarily having acquired evaluative knowledge by means of affective experience. Furthermore, the objector might add, the formation of the relevant motivational state is rationally intelligible to the subject since she knows that one ought to flee when deploying the concept of danger.
The fact that her source of justification is dependent on the person to whom she defers her use of the concept of danger does not mean that the formation of the relevant motivational state cannot be rationally intelligible to her.

It is certainly possible to conceive Irene learning by testimony and in the absence of affect the sort of motivational states that normally characterise one’s deployment of the concept of danger in feeling fear and then forming these motivational states on the basis of her propositional knowledge. Yet it is not clear that the formation of the relevant motivational state would be readily and rationally intelligible to her. In acquiring knowledge about danger by testimony and in the absence of affect, Irene’s intelligibility in the deployment of the concept of danger and in the formation of the relevant motivational state is dependent on the justification of the person to whom she defers her use of the concept of danger. While her deployment of the concept of danger might be rationally intelligible to her even though her use of the concept is deferential, it seems that the consequent formation of the relevant motivational state would need the employment of higher order, inferential faculties to become intelligible. The crucial point is that in this case Irene’s deployment of the concept of danger would not be constituted by the formation of a readily and rationally intelligible motivational state. In confronting a dangerous object, Irene might be able to deploy the concept of danger and then form the relevant motivational state yet the latter would not be constitutive of the former. So our claim above is not that if one acquires evaluative knowledge in the absence of affective experience then it is inconceivable that in deploying the relevant evaluative concept one also forms the relevant motivational state. Rather, our claim is that in the absence of acquiring evaluative knowledge by means of affective experience, the deployment of the relevant evaluative
concept cannot be in part constituted by the formation of a readily and rationally intelligible motivational state.

We have now clarified our claim: if one is to be able to form readily and rationally intelligible motivational states in the deployment of an evaluative concept, then one has to acquire evaluative knowledge by means of affective experience. Put the other way round, in the absence of affective experience, one is unable to automatically form readily and rationally intelligible motivational states when deploying an evaluative concept. Yet our persistent objector can still wonder why affect is essential in the navigation of the evaluative realm. After all, again, although a subject who acquires evaluative knowledge by testimony and in the absence of affective experience might not be able to form automatically rationally intelligible motivational states, she might be able to form them in a different way, for instance by relying on her propositional knowledge of the relevant value and inferring from her evaluative judgement the sort of motivational state she ought to form. According to the objector, this would suffice to ensure that a subject who does not possess the ability to feel emotions is able to judge evaluatively an object and potentially act accordingly towards it. In order to answer conclusively the objector, we need to look at what is missing in a subject who lacks the ability not only to feel one particular sort of emotion, say, fear, but who is unable to undergo any sort of emotional affect. In other words, in order to draw out the full implications of the findings of this section, we need to ask what would happen if a subject, or indeed all the subjects of a community, would be unable to form readily and rationally intelligible motivational states when deploying any evaluative concept. The aim of the next section is to answer conclusively the objector by
answering this question and in so doing show that, and how, affect plays an essential role in the navigation of the evaluative realm.

Section 3

Let us begin with the hypothetical case of an individual subject who lacks the ability to feel any sort of emotion. Call her Jane. Jane differs from Irene in that while Irene never felt fear before but, supposedly, has felt other emotions such as joy, sadness, indignation, and so on, Jane never felt any sort of emotion. Nevertheless, Jane lives in a community where the other members are able to feel emotions. Jane learns all there is to know about value by testimony and in the absence of affective experience. This includes what sorts of motivational states one ought to have when deploying the relevant evaluative concept. For instance, Jane is able to discriminate dangerous objects from innocuous ones, unjust deeds from just ones, sad events from joyful ones, and so on. Jane also knows that, normally, one ought to flee a dangerous object, be repelled by unjust deeds, and wish to avoid sad events. Moreover, Jane is able by means of inference to form the relevant motivational state when deploying an evaluative concept. Jane’s justification for deploying an evaluative concept and forming the relevant motivational state depends on the members of her community to whom she defers her understanding of value. This means that when Jane forms the relevant motivational state, her rational intelligibility in doing so derives from her deferential use of the relevant evaluative concept. What Jane is unable to do is to automatically form rationally intelligible motivational states when judging an object or situation to have value. Her deployment of the relevant evaluative concept is not in part constituted by the formation of the relevant motivational state.
Now, it is conceivable, for the sake of argument, that Jane would be able to coexist more or less in an undisrupted way with the other members of the community. She can judge with others what is dangerous or innocuous, unjust or just, sad or joyful, and she can form similar motivational states to her peers. The difference lies in the fact that Jane has to rely exclusively on her peers’ testimony to know what sort of motivational states she ought to have. Her learning about value does not entail the formation of readily and rationally intelligible motivational states and therefore Jane’s deployment of an evaluative concept does not entail the formation of such states. So although Jane is able to coexist with her peers within the community, it seems as she lacks a fundamental aspect of our evaluative relation with the world and others, an aspect her peers possess, namely an independent source of justification for the formation of motivational states. This means that unless one of her peers informs her that, normally, one ought to flee when judging an object as dangerous, then Jane will not flee when confronted with an object deemed dangerous. And unless one of Jane’s peers informs her that she ought to be repelled by unjust deeds and attracted to just ones, Jane will not be repelled by injustice and attracted to justice. And unless one of Jane’s peers informs her that, normally, one ought to be attracted to, and wish for, joyful events, Jane will not be attracted to and wish for joyful events. Without the help of her peers, Jane is motivationally blind. It now appears as if Jane’s inability to feel emotions—and therefore form rationally intelligible motivational states in the deployment of the relevant evaluative concept—is not a mere deficiency that can be replaced by some sort of associative learning technique between value and the relevant motivational state. No matter how good Jane becomes in her associative technique, she will not become motivationally sighted when it comes to the motivational aspect of the values that she has
not learnt about with the help of others. It is only by becoming able to feel emotions that
Jane would become motivationally sighted independently of others. Therefore, although
Jane might be able to form the same evaluative judgements and (consequent) motivationa
states as her peers, ultimately without the help of the other members of the community Jane
would not be able to form the relevant motivational states. Jane lacks knowledge of value.

So what would happen if all other members of the community were unable to feel
emotions? Let us distinguish between two case scenarios. In the first case scenario, the
members of a community have been struck by a tragic curse. Although they were able to
feel all the sort of emotions that humans normally feel within a lifespan, they have now
suddenly lost this ability for all emotions. Suppose also that the curse struck all the future
offspring of the members of the community. At the time the curse strikes, the members of
this community, then, possess knowledge of what value is, knowledge that they have, in
one way or another, acquired by means of a mix of affective experience and theoretical
knowledge, as in any normal human development. The present members of the community
are then able to recall what it felt like to be afraid, joyful, sad, and so on, and know which
motivational states they ought to form in response to the deployment of the relevant
evaluative concept. They then are able to pass this knowledge onto the next generations.
Would the community’s navigation within the evaluative realm remain the same as before
the curse? Due to the absence of the motivational aspect of our experience of value, it is
not farfetched to suppose that the present members of this community, let alone the future
generations, would, bit by bit, start losing sight of why things matter. That is, they would
lose sight of why it matters to flee a dangerous object, why it matters to be repelled by
unjust deeds, why it matters to wish for joyful times. Since the members of this community,
in contrast to Jane, have no one to rely on to remind them why one ought to form a certain motivational state when deploying the relevant evaluative concept, then although they would still be able to apply evaluative predicates, they would stop caring in the relevant way about the objects they judge. Bit by bit, the practical dimension of the evaluative realm would start disappearing. Ultimately, by losing the ability to form rationally intelligible motivational states in the deployment of evaluative concepts, the community loses contact with the evaluative realm as we humans know it.

In the second case scenario, the members of the community never felt emotions and are unable to do so. Based on what we have argued so far, no one in this community would be able to form the motivational state relevant to the evaluative concept being deployed. But, in contrast to the first case scenario, this would not leave us with a community where, at least at first, its members would be able to deploy evaluative concepts but would lack the interest in doing so. Rather, here, the members of the community would not only not possess the ability to deploy evaluative concepts but, more importantly, would be unable to generate them in the first place. That is because a subject who is unable to feel emotions is unable to form rational motivational states independently from the help of others providing her with a deferential use of evaluative concepts. And since the members of this community cannot rely on anyone else providing them with the deferential use of evaluative concepts, insofar as no one can feel emotions, then it seems as the members of this community would not form evaluative concepts of the relevant sort at all. In lacking the ability to form rational motivational states in response to objects in their environment, and in being surrounded exclusively by people with the same deficiency, the members of the community would have no resources from which to generate evaluative concepts. This
ties in with Wiggins’ speculative account of evaluative concept formation we have discussed in the previous chapter. Our conception of value is generated by an intersubjective effort in arguing the appropriateness of our affective-cum-motivational responses. If no member of a community is capable of having affective-cum-motivational responses, that is, forming readily and rationally intelligible motivational states, then the community as a whole is unable to enter the evaluative realm.

In either case scenario, and in the case of Jane, what becomes apparent is that without the ability to undergo an affective experience, and therefore form rationally intelligible motivational states, our relation to the evaluative realm is severed. In the most extreme case, embodied by the second case scenario community, the members of the community are not only unable to deploy evaluative concepts but are unable to generate them. In Jane’s case, she is able to get a hold of the evaluative realm solely because her peers, who are able to feel emotions, provide her with a bridge into it. Without them, she would be unable to judge evaluatively. And in the first case scenario, the community slowly loses the practical dimension of the evaluative realm which, to all effects, means losing the evaluative realm as we humans know it. In the absence of affect, we have simply no access to the evaluative realm. That is, we are unable to disclose value.

In conclusion, I want to consider a reverse hypothetical case from the ones we have considered so far. I believe that doing so will not only seal the claim that affect plays an essential role in the navigation of the evaluative realm but it will also illustrate the symmetrical dependence between our ability to feel emotions and the coming into existence of the evaluative realm as we humans know it. Take the case of Claire. Claire is a member of the second case scenario community. She has never felt an emotion before
and no one in her community has either. This means that, in contrast to Jane, Claire not only is unable to form rationally intelligible motivational states in deploying evaluative concepts, but she has never acquired any sort of evaluative knowledge. In turn, this means that Claire does not possess evaluative concepts at all and therefore does not possess the ability to deploy them. Now suppose that one day a miracle strikes the community and one of their members, namely Claire, is suddenly able to feel a glimmer of joy while witnessing the birth of a baby. Setting aside complex issues such as whether Claire would be able to recognise her feeling as an emotion as such or whether she would be able to express it to others, I want to ask whether it is plausible to think that Claire would, in developing her feeling of joy, also develop other sorts of feelings, such as feelings of sadness. For suppose that Claire, after having witnessed the birth of the baby, cannot stop thinking of the joyful event of the mother giving birth. The more Claire thinks about the event she witnessed, the more intense the feeling becomes. She forms wishes that the state of affairs continues and her wish is rationally intelligible to her due to the joyfulness she experienced in the event. Now suppose that the following morning Claire is told that the baby did not survive the night. Is it plausible, within the confines of the plausibility of this case scenario, that Claire does not feel anything at the tragic news? That is, is it plausible that Claire feels an intense and clear joy at the event of the baby’s birth but feels nothing at the news of the baby’s death?

Although it is not impossible to conceive Claire feeling joy at the birth of the baby and yet nothing at the baby’s death, I believe that there is a strong intuition behind the thought that Claire’s ability to feel joy is somewhat inextricably connected to her ability to feel sadness. If so, once Claire is able to feel sadness at the baby’s tragic death, it seems
plausible to suggest that then Claire would develop the ability to feel, say, hope for a healthy new born. In turn, this might lead Claire to develop the ability to feel disappointment if the new born is ill and relief when the new born survives the night and is declared out of danger. And so on and so forth. Due to the interdependent relation between the ability to feel emotions and the ability to disclose value, the case of Claire signals at the same time the implausibility of thinking that she could experience the joyfulness of a mother giving birth yet not be able to experience the tragedy of a mother losing her child. This thought ties in with Helm’s claim, discussed in the previous chapter, that there seem to be rational interconnections between our emotions which in turn means that there are rational interconnections between our evaluations. Now, I want to suggest that the strength of this intuition derives from the motivational aspect of the affective disclosure of value. The implausibility of Claire feeling joy at the baby’s birth yet not feeling sadness at the baby’s tragic death derives from the fact that it would mean that Claire wants the baby to be healthy but is neutral as to the baby’s death. That is, it derives from the implausibility of Claire forming positive rationally intelligible motivational states towards the baby’s birth without forming any towards the baby’s death. It’s the motivational aspect of our evaluative relation with the world that ties our emotions together and therefore our ability to disclose value. Indeed, if the miracle striking Claire would consist in her acquiring out of nowhere a bit of propositional knowledge regarding joyfulness, including what sort of motivational state one ought to form in the case of experiencing joyfulness, but without feeling joy, we would not be surprised at all if Claire would not be able to generate and deploy the evaluative concept of sadness, and form the relevant motivational state, in the case of the baby’s death.
The message that the case of Claire is meant to convey is that emotional experiences are part of a single ability to feel emotions. Although some emotions are more strongly connected than others to one another, it is implausible to think that an individual could feel a single emotion, say joy, without feeling any other related emotion. Again, the implausibility derives from the motivational aspect of emotional experience. The miracle that strikes Claire, then, is not simply the bestowal of a compartmentalised ability, that is, the ability to feel solely joy in experiencing the joyfulness of the mother giving birth. Rather, the miracle consists in the bestowal of the ability to feel emotions. And this means that the miracle does not simply consist in gaining access to what joyfulness is, but rather it consists in gaining access, little by little, to the evaluative realm as a whole. In becoming able to feel emotions and therefore forming rationally intelligible motivational states, Claire is now able to disclose value.
CONCLUSION

To sum up. In this thesis I argued in defence of the claim that affect plays an essential role in the acquisition of evaluative knowledge. The sort of knowledge at stake is the sort that grounds our evaluative concepts. The core of the argument consists in the constitutive thesis that the formation of rationally intelligible motivational states towards an object or state of affairs is constitutive of the disclosure of the value of the object or state of affairs. Since it is in virtue of the affective, or feeling, component of an emotional experience that we are able to form rationally intelligible motivational states towards an object or state of affairs, affect plays an essential role in disclosing the value of the object or state of affairs. In other words, affect provides us with a distinctive sort of epistemic access to the evaluative features of an object or state of affairs. It is in virtue of this distinctive sort of epistemic access to the evaluative features of objects and state of affairs that we are able to generate evaluative concepts.

One of the main virtues of this account of affect as a disclosure of value is that it shows that we need not commit to any of the dominant and controversial theories of the phenomenal character of experience in order to theorise and defend the claim that affect plays an essential role in the acquisition of evaluative knowledge. Another virtue of this account is that while it steers clear of the popular debate as to whether emotional experience is a sort of perceptual experience of value, it captures one of the key motivations behind many of the accounts that want to argue for a positive answer. Indeed, it does so by paying close attention at what the analogies and disanalogies between the two sorts of experiences are. At the same time, it shows that if we are to argue for the claim that affect is the disclosure of value, then we have to commit to a response-dependent notion of the
objectivity of value as defended by philosophers such as David Wiggins and John McDowell. Needless to say, this position is controversial. The hope is that in having clarified in detail the commitments of this position, and the beneficial consequences of committing to it, it begins to look more plausible.

More generally, I believe that the arguments in this thesis show the crucial importance of the role of emotions in our evaluative relation with the world. As is evident from the examples I have relied on throughout the thesis, it is within the ethical domain in particular that I believe the arguments in this thesis have most impact. Indeed, I believe that the upshot of this thesis is a defence of neo-Aristotelian approaches to moral psychology which conceive the relation between emotions and reason as two interdependent developmental aspects of our moral upbringing. Thus, they drive a wedge in the traditional debate between the Kantian emphasis on moral reasoning as the source of moral judgement and motivation and the Humean denigration of reason as the slave of the passions. In particular, I believe I have filled in a gap in neo-Aristotelian accounts by identifying the meeting point of reason and emotion in the acquisition of evaluative knowledge at the level of our motivational states. The arguments of this thesis, then, are also a rejection of the assumption common to both Kantian rationalists and Humean emotivists that conceives emotions as mere causal, rather than also rational, determinants in the formation of moral agency.
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