Mills, Christopher E. (2013) The problem of paternal motives. Utilitas, 25 (4). pp. 446-462. doi:10.1017/S0953820813000046

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Abstract

In this article I assess the ability of motivational accounts of paternalism to respond to a particular challenge: can its proponents adequately explain the source of the distinctive form of disrespect that animates this view? In particular I examine the recent argument put forward by Jonathan Quong that we can explain the presumptive wrong of paternalism by relying on a Rawlsian account of moral status. I challenge the plausibility of Quong's argument, claiming that although this approach can provide a clear response to the explanatory challenge, it is only successful in doing so when it relies on the strength of its rival: the argument from personal autonomy. In doing so I illustrate that such responses are conceptually dependent on an account of respect for persons, and thus much of the relevant controversy is actually disagreement over how we respect other individuals.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) J Political Science > JC Political theory
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Law
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Paternalism -- Philosophy, Political science, Rawls, John, 1921-2002 -- Influence
Journal or Publication Title:	Utilitas
Publisher:	Cambridge University Press
ISSN:	0953-8208
Official Date:	29 July 2013
Dates:	Date Event 29 July 2013 Published 1 June 2013 Accepted
Date of first compliant deposit:	8 August 2017
Volume:	25
Number:	4
Page Range:	pp. 446-462
DOI:	10.1017/S0953820813000046
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access

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