Identities in Limbo

Securitisation of Identities in Conflict Environments and its Implications on Ontological Security: Prospects of Desecuritisation for Reconciliation in Cyprus

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Acknowledgements

It was not an easy decision to quit my job and uproot my partner and myself to pursue a PhD. It has been a difficult but also a very exhilarating journey of personal growth and intellectual stimulation. I remember my first month at the Department of Politics and International Studies (PAIS) in Warwick, where I thought I had a very precise project proposal and a very clear action plan, and wondered why some of my fellow doctoral researchers felt disoriented. I also remember when I felt lost and worried about my direction a few months into my research and my supervisor Proff. George Christou’s advice that reassured me the feeling was a natural part of the journey and it meant I was on the right track of intellectual exploration. This was a piece of advice I internalised. I welcomed the feeling of being lost as a means that would encourage me to be proactive and reflective; a feeling that would allow me to explore exciting new paths and be inspired.

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Last but not least, I cannot thank my husband Simon Hustings enough for his patience, support and love, and his uplifting faith in me, which gave me the confidence when most needed for the completion of this thesis.
Declarations

I declare that this thesis has been entirely my own work and follows the guidelines provided in the Guide to Examinations for Higher Degrees by Research of the University of Warwick. The dissertation has not been submitted for a degree at another university and any errors within are entirely my own.
Abstract

With the overall aim of contributing to the peace efforts in Cyprus and facilitating transformative peace on the island, this thesis explores the relationship between (de)securitisation, ontological security and reconciliation in protracted conflict environments. The theoretical framework is built upon this trilateral nexus and uses Cyprus as a single case study for its application.

In line with the overall aim, the thesis improves to the theorisation of institutionalised securitisations by complimenting the Copenhagen School with the Paris School, enriches the concept of (de)securitisation with ontological security literature and broadens the dual-ethnic approach to the Cyprus Problem by adding the Turkish settlers/immigrants to the empirical analysis. Underpinned by both theoretical and empirical contributions to the relevant literature, the thesis provides a more nuanced understanding of identity and friend-enemy configurations by analysing the securitisation dynamics that go beyond the primary self to include other-others, other-selves and othered-selves through a strategic blend of quantitative and qualitative methods.

Finally, the thesis suggests that we need to couple the concept desecuritisation with ontological security considerations in order to fully understand and explore its potential as a facilitating tool for transformative peace. More specifically for the case of Cyprus, the thesis argues that securitisation of Turkish immigrants as a threat creates ontological dissonance and peace-anxieties for the two main communities in Cyprus; thus, calls for their desecuritisation and inclusion in peacebuilding efforts.
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<td>AKEL</td>
<td>The Progressive Party of Working People</td>
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<td>AKP</td>
<td>Justice and Development Party</td>
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<td>CBM</td>
<td>Confidence Building Measure</td>
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<td>CCMC</td>
<td>Cyprus Community Media Centre</td>
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<td>CMIRS</td>
<td>The Centre for Migration, Identity and Rights Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMP</td>
<td>Committee for Missing Persons</td>
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<td>CS</td>
<td>The Copenhagen School</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
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<td>CSOS</td>
<td>Civil Society Surveys</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTP</td>
<td>Turkish Republican Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>DYSI</td>
<td>The Democratic Rally</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECHR</td>
<td>European Court of Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECJ</td>
<td>European Court of Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENOSIS</td>
<td>Hellenism and unification of the island to motherland Greece</td>
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<tr>
<td>EOKA</td>
<td>National Cypriot Fighters Organisation</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FG</td>
<td>Focus Groups</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTCA</td>
<td>Federation of Turkish-Cypriot Associations</td>
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<td>GCc</td>
<td>Greek Cypriot community</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPRAF</td>
<td>International Peace Research Association Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<td>KAB</td>
<td>Cyprus EU Association</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>PAIS</td>
<td>Department of Politics and International Studies</td>
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<td>PhD</td>
<td>Doctor of Philosophy</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIRA</td>
<td>Provisional Irish Republican Army</td>
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<td>PS</td>
<td>The Paris School</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>QTS</td>
<td>Quantitative Telephone Survey</td>
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<td>RoC</td>
<td>Republic of Cyprus</td>
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<td>SISAW</td>
<td>Speaking International Security at Warwick</td>
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<td>TAK</td>
<td>Turkish News Agency</td>
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<td>TAKSİM</td>
<td>The idea of the partition of Cyprus with the implication of unification of the northern part with Turkey</td>
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<td>TCc</td>
<td>Turkish Cypriot community</td>
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<td>TKP</td>
<td>The Communal Liberation Party</td>
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<td>TMT</td>
<td>Turkish Defence Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRNC</td>
<td>The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus</td>
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<td>UBP</td>
<td>National Unity Party</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>UN Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNFICYP</td>
<td>United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus</td>
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<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>USA</td>
<td>The United States of America</td>
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<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organisation (WHO)</td>
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<td>WW I</td>
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Introduction: Research Puzzle

Inception of the thesis

Achieving transformative peace\(^1\) in protracted non-violent conflict environments has proven very evasive globally. Unfortunately, it is hard to find inspiring peace stories in a World inflicted with conflict and crisis. Thus, the departure point of this thesis is instituted in the lack of success stories in conflict resolution and peacebuilding studies and seeks to unpack the relationship between (de)securitisation, ontological security and reconciliation in protracted conflict environments. A theoretical framework built on this nexus can help the conflict resolution and peacebuilding literatures that so far have mostly failed to engage with ontological security, to provide a nuanced understanding of identity and to break free from the inherent essentialisation of identities as ‘rival’ or homogeneous ‘opposing sides’. The departure point of the thesis can be summarised under three sections: theoretical, empirical and methodological, and personal.

Theoretically, instead of locating itself in conflict resolution and peacebuilding literatures, the thesis is broadly situated in security and identity studies. More specifically, it aims to explore the implications of the securitisation of identities on the ontological security of salient parties, and subsequently on reconciliation efforts in non-violent protracted conflict environments. Locating the research questions outside of the conflict resolution and peacebuilding literatures helps me expand my analysis beyond a focus on ethnicity; it equips me with more tools to unpack the nuances of identity and reinforces the foundations of the thesis that challenges the conflict resolution and peacebuilding literatures for treating identities within singular categories (i.e. ethnic) that focuses on the language of difference and assumes that compromise can be achieved based on mediation of ‘objective’ resources and rights. As a result, we obstruct reconciliation of identities within the categories by assuming a problematic singularity and completeness while simultaneously viewing those identities that fall outside of these categories as irrelevant or less relevant. This is partly the reason why conflict resolution

\(^1\) Transformative peace mainly refers to altering the entire structure of a polity, rather than merely ending violence. See Mitchell, A. (2015). Ontological (in)security and violent peace in Northern Ireland. In this thesis, I use it the concept more holistically, to also include societal reconfiguration of friend-enemy distinctions, where peace is not only signed on paper by the leaders but is internalised, accepted and routinised in social relationships as well. As such, peace reaches beyond a political agreement, and becomes a transformative politically and socially.
and peacebuilding literatures had largely excluded Turkish immigrants from their analysis. Within this framework that establishes a nexus between (de)securitisation, ontological security and reconciliation, the thesis adopts a normative commitment to desecuritisation as a transformative tool for reconciliation. The central theoretical argument of the thesis is that we cannot fully theorise and understand the potential of desecuritisation as a transformative tool for reconciliation without a consideration for ontological security and a more nuanced understanding of identity.

Overall, the underlying theoretical objectives of the thesis are threefold: 1) to contribute to debates about desecuritisation and institutionalised securitisations by providing a more nuanced understanding for the concept of identity with the help of ontological security and through empirical application; 2) to contribute to the ontological security literature by providing an empirical analysis based on mixed-methods and by demonstrating its integral role for peacebuilding; and 3) considering the rapidly growing literature on ontological security, desecuritisation and peacebuilding, peace research in general and peacebuilding efforts in Cyprus in particular can learn from the findings of the research, which can facilitate reaching a comprehensive solution on the island. To that end, the theoretical research questions of the thesis are as follows:

1. How can we broaden the concept of securitisation to make it more receptive to context and better theorise institutionalised securitisations and the role of the audience in the process?
2. What can securitisation theory learn from the ontological security literature to explore the limits and prospects of desecuritisation for producing transformative effects towards reconciliation?

The empirical and methodological approach works within this framework but also expands it by adopting mixed-methods, which is not often employed by securitisation or by ontological security literatures. As such, the fieldwork combines quantitative opinion surveys, focus groups and online civil society representative surveys. Empirically, the thesis is built upon a single case study: Cyprus. Numerous peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts since the 1970s have persistently failed to bring about a comprehensive solution to what is widely known as
the Cyprus Problem. The central empirical argument of the thesis suggests that securitisation of Turkish immigrants\(^2\) as a threat creates ontological dissonance and peace-anxieties for the two main communities in Cyprus, and in turn hinders the peace process, suggesting that their desecuritisation would facilitate peacebuilding and transformative peace on the island. Thus, the empirical analysis focuses on the securitisation of Turkish immigrants (people from mainland Turkey living in the northern part of Cyprus) by the host communities (Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots), and the implications of this securitisation on the peace process and reconciliation efforts on the island. Exploring the role of Turkish immigrants on host communities’ identity narratives and ontological security, the thesis asks the following empirical questions:

1. What are the key junctures that resulted in shifts in the identity narratives of the two main communities in Cyprus?
2. What are the securitisation dynamics and perceptions of threat in relation to Turkish immigrants living in the northern part of Cyprus?
3. What are the implications of this securitisation on the ontological security of Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots?
4. Can desecuritisation of the Turkish immigrants facilitate a comprehensive solution in Cyprus or would further securitisation bring Cypriots closer together against a common ‘enemy’ and reinforce the urgency for a solution?

Last but not least, the departure point of this thesis is very personal as well. As a Cypriot, I grew up with the Cyprus Problem as part of both my social and professional life, and I dedicated over nine years to bicommunal initiatives and reconciliation efforts. Thus, the choice to do a PhD on identity and conflict was also a personal choice to better understand my self-identity that felt trapped between Turkishness and Cypriotness, as well as other identity narratives and dynamics in Cyprus. Professionally, I grew frustrated with the repetitive peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts I was involved in; and with the amount of money spent on bicommunal projects that, for the most part, failed to reach beyond the ‘usual suspects’ in the civil society. I also grew frustrated with the concept of ‘bicommunality’

\(^2\) Turkish migrants refer to those who emigrated to the northern part of Cyprus from mainland Turkey after 1974, including both the economic migrants and the settlers.
engrained in peacebuilding efforts in Cyprus, which provides a framework too narrow for many people who call Cyprus home. It also perpetuates the ‘ethnic’ divide based on a binary, assuming two homogeneous communities divided along ethnic lines. Thus, recognising that I was ‘building-peace’ in a comfortable bubble that no longer innovated or provided me the room to grow, I decided to start my PhD as a way to continue to contribute to the peace process in Cyprus in a different way.

**Securitisation and ontological security: Theoretical framework and contributions**

Securitisation theory became increasingly popular in the 1990s with the works of Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde. In their book titled “Security: A New Framework for Analysis”, the authors introduced a regimental analytical tool that rests on three main components: the speech-act, the securitising actor and the audience, and that needed to complete three steps to be deemed successful: identification of existential threats; emergency action; and effects on inter-unit relations by breaking free of rules (Buzan, Wæver et al. 1998). At the core of the theory, the authors called for deepening and widening of the traditional security agenda beyond states as the referent objects and to sectors other than the military, based on a constructivist approach that focused on speech-acts. Yet, the concept of security remained anchored on the assumption that the desire for survival is ultimate and inescapable. Hence, while security agendas and security analysis were deepened and widened, the concept of security itself remained narrow (Huysmans 1998).

However, the Copenhagen School’s (CS) securitisation theory has grown much broader and looser than its inception in the past decade. The term securitisation has almost become a catch-all phrase for anything that is expressed as a threat or a security issue. Processes of securitisation are now analysed beyond discursive speech-acts and beyond the regimental components, steps and facilitating conditions initially prescribed by Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde. Securitisation theory in this thesis is not limited to Copenhagen’s initial theorisation and to discourse analysis; it rather takes the constructed and discursive nature of security as a starting point and pragmatically fuses it with the Paris School’s (PS) notion of ‘insecuritisation’ that focuses on the performative nature of security and places the emphasis on practices and technologies of securitisation rather than speech-acts.
I argue that the securitisation of collective identities in protracted conflict environments can become institutionalised and entrenched to an extent that they go beyond speech-acts, seeping into routines, daily interactions, slang, satire, prejudices, and hence, into self-identity; but I do not necessarily treat the discourse and performances of security as two distinct ‘domains’. When institutionalised, securitising actors and securitisation practices blur and multiply, and a top down (political elite, professionals of security or governmental/policy level) analysis cannot help us fully understand the relationship between fear and threat, and routines and identity. In other words, institutionalised securitisations in protracted conflicts can escape both the power holders and the discourse, and become multi-directional (horizontal and bottom-up), multi-actored (with the involvement of media, civil society, and individuals) and multi-layered (discursive, performative and routinised).

That being said, the underling objective of the thesis is not to delve deep into how the Turkish immigrants are securitised and to trace these securitisation practices, but to explore how this securitisation plays into the ontological security and identity narratives of Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots and in turn constrains reconciliation on the island. As such, institutionalised securitisations that are performative and routinised, become intricately embedded into identity narratives, and hence, into ontological security. Ontological security, which is about security-as-being rather than security-as-survival, is ultimately about our basic trust in our own biographical continuity. Giddens explains that while self-identity is the development of a consistent feeling of a self-biography, ontological security is about our basic trust in our social and material environment that we will continue to be as who we are (Giddens 1991).

Bahar Rumelili argues that we cannot properly theorise the identity-security nexus without distinguishing between ontological security and physical security (Rumelili 2013). This means, without ontological security and a more nuanced understanding of identity, we cannot fully understand the role of securitisation on identity narratives and its relationship with ontological security, and we cannot fully explore the prospects and limits of desecuritisation. Thus, the (in)securitisation literature will provide a loose but well established theoretical framework to make sense of the empirical data in terms of: a) locating the forces and processes of securitisation (i.e. historical events); b) local discourse and practices (i.e. speech-
acts, images, daily routines) portraying the Turkish immigrants as an existential threat; c) the role of different actors in creating this discourse and practices; and c) its effects on public perception and identity narratives, and hence on ontological security.

Copenhagen’s securitisation and CS’s insecurity, though based in distinctive literatures and fields, share the basic ‘DNA’ in terms of the way we ‘feel’ securitisation. This relates to our existentiality and survival, and the way we practice it, which is subjective and socially constructed, hence it is more about perception than objectifiable threats. These ‘schools’ are more complementary than their lack of ‘communication’ suggests, and securitisation literature has become bigger than the sum of both (see Collective 2006). Bridging (in)securitisation with ontological security, adding flesh to institutionalised securitisations, and contributing to the increasingly popular ontological security and peacebuilding literature are the main theoretical contributions of the thesis. Although this is not the first attempt at marrying (de)securitisation, ontological security and reconciliation, this emergent literature can benefit from more empirical application and theorising (see Zarakol 2010, Croft 2012, Celik 2013, Browning and Joenniemi 2015, Rumelili 2015). Moreover, the mixed-methods that combine quantitative and qualitative research can provide an important added-value to these literatures that mainly rely on qualitative research and discourse analysis.

The case of Cyprus: Empirical significance and contributions

The Cyprus Problem has long attracted the attention of scholars, researchers, politicians and international organisations. The literature on the Cyprus Problem and Cypriot identities is by no means thin. Nevertheless, even the most static, protracted and normalised conflicts are not immune to the dynamic nature of society, identity and realpolitik; considering the complexity and multiplicity of the actors involved, certainly Cyprus is no exception. Despite many obstacles, external factors and myriad players, finding a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus Problem is imperative and the case of Cyprus is pertinent for the advancement of peacebuilding and reconciliation literature due to six main reasons:

1) The prolongation of the conflict presents myriad human rights violations for the communities of Cyprus; the accession of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) to the European Union (EU) without the inclusion of the Turkish-Cypriots and without a comprehensive
settlement places the conflict within the borders of the EU. It also presents a significant challenge for EU governance across a diverse range of issues, and the EU objective of achieving stability in the eastern Mediterranean (Christou 2012);

2) The ramifications of the conflict on the NATO–EU relationship and European energy policy is disconcerting due to newly discovered gas resources in Cyprus, competing claims over these resources and the fact that Turkey’s geographical location makes it an important corridor in particular for gas and oil for the EU;

3) Even though the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) intentions with regards to full EU membership can be contested, non-resolution of the Cyprus conflict presents an obstacle for Turkey’s EU accession as well as being a persistent bitter thorn in Turkey–EU relations;

4) The peace negotiations were resumed after independent left-wing presidential candidate Mustafa Akıncı assumed office in the northern part of Cyprus in April 2015. Known for his pro-solution and Turkey defying stance and surprisingly clean political slate, many accounts consider that the Anastasiades–Akınci duo creates a very favourable environment and that the stars are perfectly aligned this time, bringing the island closer than ever to reaching a comprehensive settlement (Foster 2015, Taylor 2016). In such an encouraging environment, it is important to consider ontological security of the collective identities on the island to facilitate a comprehensive settlement and to achieve transformative peace in a post-settlement scenario.

5) Following the financial crises that hit the RoC in 2012, the economic concerns of the communities have gradually pushed the Cyprus Problem behind other concerns and priorities, specifically unemployment, inflation and increasing crime rates (Eurobarometer 2013, Eurobarometer 2014). However, the public was once again engaged with the peace process from early 2015, which could contribute to the ‘favourable’ environment by providing an opportunity for creating a more convincing prosperous ‘vision’ for the future of Cyprus without ‘the Problem’.

6) Considering Cyprus’ geographical proximity to Syria and Iraq in particular and to the Middle East and North Africa in general, it could be argued that the instability in the region (including Turkey), and the subsequent ‘refugee crisis’ are additional factors

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contributing to the ‘favourable’ environment as they add to the urgency for finding a comprehensive solution to the protracted conflict. The Cyprus Problem is a non-violent, ‘normalised’, and ‘comfortable’ conflict (see Adamides and Constantinou 2011), thus the regional dynamics can help cultivate a sense of urgency for reaching a comprehensive solution, which may in turn contribute to increased stability in the region, as it would not only ‘reconcile’ Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots but ease much pressure off Turkey, Greece and the EU as well.

Numerous diplomatic efforts have been made both domestically and internationally to enhance different forms of peaceful unity since the emergence of the Cyprus Problem (Anastasiou 2008). Over the decades, myriad negotiations and peace-talks have begun and have been halted, fast-tracked, and revisited. There is substantial literature on the Cyprus Problem that cannot be overlooked; books and journal articles focusing on identity, ethnicity, EU accession, conflict resolution are very rich⁴. However, this by no means indicates that all aspects, angles and approaches have been covered and addressed. For example, the socio-dynamics of civil society’s willingness to cooperate and work together; the influence and impact of civil society on Track 1 level diplomacy; the transformation of civil society following EU accession; interaction between local identities and migrant identities and their effects on reconciliation; the general impact of immigration on perceptions nationalism and ethnic identity; and the effects of the recent regional dynamics (in the EU, Middle East and Turkey) on the Cyprus Problem, are only some of the gaps in the literature that can be enriched and thickened (Bulent and Dagli 2016).

Historically, the Cyprus Problem is usually boiled down to competing ethno-nationalisms between Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot communities (TCc/GCc) in the literature; it is usually read in tandem with the ‘motherland’ nationalism in Turkey and Greece, is entrenched

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in the 1960s constitution along consociational lines and traced back to the decolonisation period in the 1950s (Papadakis, Peristianis et al. 2006, Hadjipavlou 2007, Akçalı 2010, Trimikliniotis and Bozkurt 2012). At one time or another, both communities in Cyprus have linked their destinies to those of their ethnic kin, to that of the large-group outside the island. Owing to Turkey and Greece’s involvement since its early stages, the conflict has had a distinct regional dimension for many years and since 2004, the EU became more directly embroiled when Cyprus acceded as a still divided island. Cyprus, who hosts one of the longest UN Peacekeeping missions (UN 2016), has effectively been divided into two since 1974, where Greek-Cypriots live in the southern part under the legally recognised RoC and Turkish-Cypriots live in the northern part under the unrecognised self-declared administration called the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (TRNC).

This thesis challenges the narrow binary approach to the Cyprus Problem that locates it between Turkish/Turkish-Cypriot and Greek/Greek-Cypriot positions based on rival ethno-nationalisms. It unpacks the concept of identity and security by breaking the dual-ethnic analysis and by extending the framework to include Turkish immigrants too. In doing this, the thesis seeks to add value to the existing literature through arguing that Turkish immigrants occupy a fundamentally important, yet surprisingly unrecognised, role in Cypriot identity narratives as well as in the discourses and dynamics underpinning the conflict. However, it does not attempt to explain the Cyprus Problem as a single-issue conflict, nor does it promote an alternative ‘root cause’ to ethno-nationalism. The Cyprus Problem cannot be reduced to a single cause; it is an elaborate set of issues, actors, dynamics and forces that established an intricate and multi-layered web across temporal and spatial lines. The two main communities living on the either side of the de facto divide share existential security concerns vis-à-vis the Turkish immigrants living in the northern part of the island. Greek-Cypriots securitise this group as the primordial enemy of the Hellenic world as well as the occupier and divider of Cyprus. They tend to see the Turkish military on the island, Turkish government and by extension people form Turkey as the aggressor, intimidator and an immediate threat to peace. On the other hand, their co-ethnic Turkish-Cypriots securitise Turkish immigrants as a threat to their own distinct, more ‘superior’, more European and secular identity despite the mainstream nationalistic discourse’s commitment to Kemalism and Turkish nationalism.
Even though the literature on the Cyprus Problem, Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot identities and contemporary Cypriot politics is very rich, the literature on the Turkish migrants rarely goes beyond a debate about their numbers. The literature that takes the debate about people from Turkey beyond a discussion about mere numbers are mainly limited to the works\(^5\) of Mete Hatay (2005; 2007; 2008), Neophytos Loizides (2015), Yeal Navaro-Yashin (2006), Hatice Kurtuluş and Semra Purkis (2012) and Hüseyin Çakal (2013). Other works that touch upon people from Turkey limit their analysis to what is on the negotiation table, and provide a general view about the Turkish military and Turkish immigrants vis-à-vis the Cyprus Problem (both of which are ultimately about numbers, how many will be allowed to stay, how many will be given citizenship and etc.) or look at general attitudes toward migrant groups in Cyprus (See Tocci 2002, CIVICUS 2011, Loizides 2011, Trimikliniotis and Bozkurt 2012).

However, despite Turkish immigrants’ securitisation as an existential threat and a major obstacle for reaching a solution and despite the controversies about their numbers and the demographics of the northern part of Cyprus, the conflict resolution and peacebuilding literature has been strictly defined around the main two communities of the island. Consequently, it failed to include the Turkish immigrants in its analysis, limiting the understanding of the conflict between Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots. The official discourses of the RoC, ‘TRNC’, Turkey, Greece as well as the discourses of international organisations and the majority of the literature on the Cyprus Problem see only two sides to the conflict; “the Turkish side” and “the Greek side”, focusing on the language of ethnic difference (Navaro-Yashin 2006). Mainstream conflict resolution and peace research has also remained narrowly empirical, not reflecting on its ontological foundations, epistemological premises, or the origins and implications of its concepts (Rytövuori-Apunen 1990, Arad, Balzacq et al. 2006).

The conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts in Cyprus neutered the conflict, reducing and isolating the problem to the two main communities on the island. However, the Cyprus Problem has grown not only bigger than the sum of the two main communities on the island, it is also more fluid and complex than the peacebuilding efforts assume; more fluid and

\(^5\) I have scanned 486 pieces of literature including articles, books and reports on Cyprus and the Cyprus Problem.
complex than the negotiation chapters the community leaders are focusing on; and more fluid and complex than the exclusive memories and traumas of the two communities about each other. These memories and traumas include other actors and hence other ‘enemy others’ than the Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots. There is no doubt that one of these major actors that keep coming up in the memories and traumas of the two main communities on the island and on the negotiation table are Turkish immigrants living in the northern part of Cyprus. Neophytos Loizides confirms that the increasing presence of Turkish settlers/immigrants has triggered domestic insecurities and is seen as an obstacle to the future reunification of Cyprus particularly by the GCc (Loizides 2015). Thus, it is necessary to take the analysis beyond a mere agreement on how many people from Turkey will get to stay in Cyprus after a settlement, to how this impacts the reconciliation process, perceptions of threat and security, anxieties about the future and identity narratives in Cyprus.

Exclusive and essentialist approaches can undermine the analysis by simplifying the complexity of the actors involved and disregard the multiplicity of broader concerns specifically with regards to identity. Failing to understand and consider the nuances of identity, its link with ontological security as well as the latter’s relationship with reconciliation, has kept the Cyprus Problem in a deadlock for over four decades; and arguably resulted in the rejection of the Annan Plan by the GCc in the 2004 referendum (Bulent and Dagli 2016). The thesis attempts to close this gap by empirically focusing on the implications of the securitisation of Turkish immigrants for Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot identity narratives and ontological security, and by breaking free of the dual-ethnic analysis.

**The case of Cyprus: Conceptualisation of ‘conflict’**

The protracted conflict in Cyprus has proven its intractability over the past 50 years since the communal division following the gaining of independence in 1960 and then the physical division after 1974. Today, the popular tourism destination is marketed as the last divided capital in Europe. Even though the two main communities of the island can now travel across the check-points freely and have increased interactions since 2003\(^6\), the island(ers) remains

\(^6\) On 21\(^{st}\) April 2003, Turkish-Cypriot leadership announced that they were easing restrictions on movement across the Green Line, allowing Cypriots to cross the dividing line for the first time in nearly 30 years (See BBC World News. (2003). Emotion as Cyprus border opens.)
divided; the southern part (RoC) has enjoyed full EU membership since 2004 while in the northern part (‘TRNC’) the acquis communautaire is suspended. Although negotiations resumed in 2015 and it can be said cautious optimism is more prevalent now following the election of Turkish-Cypriot president Mustafa Akıncı, many Cypriots express high levels of desire but low levels of hope towards reaching a comprehensive settlement since the simultaneous referendum in April 2004 over the reunification plan put forward by UN General Secretary Kofi Annan (a.k.a. Annan Plan). Many studies still point to the lack of trust between the communities and towards the political elite and the negotiations (Cyprus-2015-Initiative 2009, 2010, 2011).

Cyprus can be described as a non-violent protracted conflict. Even though the literature on the Cyprus Problem overwhelmingly defines it as an ethnic conflict (See Volkan 1980, Turk 2006, Wolff 2006, Anastasiou 2008), I would intentionally avoid that definition. There is no single category of ethnic conflicts; indeed there is a problem of over-categorisation, where everything that is not a civil war or regular warfare can potentially fall under this category. Myriad variations of similar categorisations such as ‘ethnopolitical conflicts’ (See Gurr, Harff et al. 1993, Gurr 1994, Byrne and Ayulo 1998), ‘communal conflicts’ (See Gurr 2000, Weiss 2003), ‘protracted social conflicts’ (See Azar and Farah 1981, Azar 1990), ‘deep rooted conflicts’ (See Burton 1987, Harris and Reilly 1998, Redekop 2002) and ‘identity-based conflicts’ (See Fisher 2001, Erik and Kristian 2006) all incorporate, to some degree, the variable of ethnicity in their definitions. An ‘ethnic’ conflict usually refers to one where incompatible goals are defined in ‘ethnic’ terms and the confrontation is due to ethnic distinctions (Kaufmann 1996, Wolff 2006). Questioning the usefulness of the term, Gilley cautions that the existence of ‘ethnic markers’ in a political conflict are not sufficient to label them as such, and that the term ‘ethnic conflict’ is not particularly useful, unless ethnicity is the actual cause of a conflict (Gilley 2004).

My contestation of the ‘ethnic conflict’ category for the case of Cyprus is based on the fact that it narrows and over-simplifies the analysis, pigeonholing different communities and

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7 The Cyprus-2015-Initiative (a.k.a. SeeD) public opinion poll survey revealed that while 68% of Greek-Cypriots and 65% of Turkish-Cypriots express high desires for a solution only 10% and 12% respectively express high hopes that a solution will be reached (See Cyprus-2015-Initiative 2010).
dynamic identities into strictly ethnic black and white (or rather Greek and Turk) categories with no practical leverage or theoretical added-value. These ethnic signifiers can in time turn into self-fulfilling labels. Categorising the Cyprus Problem as an ethnic or an ethno-national conflict automatically limits our analysis to a binary that reifies Greekness (and by extension Greek-Cypriotness) and Turkishness (and by extension Turkish-Cypriotness) as two poles or rivals that are locked in historical enmity. That is exactly what this thesis tries to criticise with regards to the conflict resolution and peacebuilding literature in Cyprus, which strictly limited itself to a binary dual-ethnic analysis. Costas Constantinou, for example, highlights that prior to independence in 1960, communities in Cyprus were divided according to their religious beliefs rather than their ethnic origin, but notes that religious beliefs and ethnic origins have at times been conflated (Constantinou 2007). He presents a similar criticism for the 1960 RoC constitution that does not allow for one to be simply Cypriot without a binary ethnic signifier. For Constantinou, the dominant bicommunal framework (that the reconciliation efforts are built upon), which reduces Cyprus to two competing ethnicities, is a result of the colonial legacy that has bestowed an aporia to the bearer of Cypriot identity.

However, my categorical avoidance does not mean I reject that there are ethnic elements or roots in the conflict; rather my contention is that an ethnic perspective provides a window too small to account for the changing dynamics and fluid identities since the start of the conflict; it reifies our positions and identities. Debates about security remain limited to military (i.e. guarantors and troops on the ground) and political (i.e. governance and consociational institutions) realms and security is approached mainly from an objectifiable perspective, seeking a political compromise without a nuanced understanding of identity and without much regard for entrenched friend-enemy narratives that can become a source of ontological security. Loizides argues that “identities and their political manifestations often tend to move at a faster pace than related mediation formulas in the stagnant Cypriot peace process”, which in turn pose a significant challenge for mediators in divided societies, who are

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8 “The most disturbing thing about being a Cypriot is that one can only be a Greek or a Turkish Cypriot. Postcolonial Cypriot identity is quintessentially and inescapably hyphenated; and hyphenated across a fixed Greek–Turkish axis. Being simply and singly Cypriot is a constitutional impossibility (RoC Constitution, Article 2). Who is Turk or Greek has been decided on the basis of religious beliefs and less, or not at all, on the basis of language or other cultural markers. Maronites, Latins and Armenians had, collectively, to choose at independence to be members of either the Greek-Cypriot or the Turkish-Cypriot community.” (Constantinou 2007:248)
simultaneously dealing with multiple and shifting identities during contested peace processes (Loizides 2015:73). Identities and self-narratives are (re)constructed and (re)negotiated in tandem with the conflict and the peace processes, and in time, they become dependent on the conflict. Considering the past five decades and the failed referendum in 2004, it is clear that such exclusive approaches undermine peacebuilding efforts and the road to transformative peace, and “deprive them of both inclusivity and the opportunity to address wider identity and security concerns” (Loizides 2015:88).

My choice of two descriptors (non-violent and protracted) for the case of Cyprus are significant for the theoretical framework as it helps to contextualise the broad concept of ‘conflict’: Firstly, ‘non-violent’ is self-evident, as apart from the two Greek-Cypriots and one Turkish-Cypriot that were killed in 1996, the Cyprus Problem has kept its non-violent (at least in physical sense) status since 1974. This is a significant descriptor because lack of immediate physical threats and concerns about security-as-survival (as opposed to security-as-being that relates to ontological security) provides a favourable ground to analyse ontological security and desecuritisation dynamics for reconciliation mainly for three reasons: 1) it is easier for individuals and collectives to establish daily routines and a sense of normality in non-violent environments; 2) ingroup and outgroup consolidation in the face of physical threats and fear about survival reifies exclusive identities and positions at the extremes (see Kinnvall 2004, Volkan 2006), making it even harder for reconciliation or reconfiguration of friend/enemy relationships; and 3) in violent conflicts, it is usually not possible to pursue reconciliation and peacebuilding before ending the violence and achieving peacemaking (Fisher 1993). Thus, the non-violent nature of the conflict provides an enabling environment to explore the ontological security, (de)securitisation and reconciliation nexus.

Secondly, the temporal descriptor ‘protracted’ does not suggest a clear-cut timeline for a

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9 According to Giddens, having answers and basic trust to our material environment is very important for our ontological security (Giddens 1991). In parallel with Giddens, Mitzen argues that when an actor has no idea what to expect, she cannot systematically relate ends to means, which in turn, creates deep uncertainty that renders the actor insecure. Actors are therefore motivated to create cognitive and behavioural certainty, through daily routines (Mitzen 2006).

10 This is because it is easier to replace the undefined anxiety on an ontological level with an objectified fear, as it is easier to focus and mobilise around a known threat that is outside to the self, than an anxiety that is internal to the self, which is not always experienced on the level of consciousness (Giddens 1991). Focusing on the outside of the self, on the enemy other that is defined and objectified also consolidates the sense of self.
conflict to be considered ‘protracted’; but rather it refers not only to its intractability but also its ‘institutionalisation’ over time. Over five decades, two generations of Cypriots have grown up with a sense of defensive positioning vis-à-vis enemy ‘other(s)’, which has become inherent to their identity narratives. Their perceptions of fear and threat are engrained in their identities and have seeped into their daily mundane routines. Institutionalised conflicts and institutionalised securitisations create a fertile environment for propaganda, fear and manipulation. Identities also become dependent upon conflict producing routines, which make it particularly hard to desecuritise. However, it is the protracted-ness of a conflict that calls for a marriage between ontological security and desecuritisation as a facilitating tool for transformative peace. Thus, conceptualisation of the Cyprus Problem as a non-violent, protracted conflict underpins the theoretical framework that builds upon (de)securitisation, ontological security and reconciliation nexus.

Case of Cyprus: Politics of labels
The (il)legality and legitimacy issue with regards to the ‘TRNC’\(^{11}\), makes talking and writing about the Cyprus Problem difficult even for the most ‘politically sensitive’ actors, as the chosen words are assumed to be politically charged. Labels are abundant in Cyprus; you can identify yourself as a Turk, Greek, Turkish-Cypriot, Greek-Cypriot, just Cypriot, refugee, Internally Displaced Person (IDP), settler and so on and so forth. In Cyprus, these simple sounding labels, geographical descriptions, even simple directions have political significance; they are charged with presumptions that identify you as a peace supporter or a peace spoiler. Some words and phrases have become so sensitive that not using the ‘correct’ political terminology would push you into one or more categories. For example, if you are someone who capitalises ‘N’ when writing north Cyprus, you may be suspected of seeking recognition for ‘the North’; if you say ‘occupied areas’ you are probably a Greek-Cypriot or Greek nationalist; if you use the EU accepted political terminology of saying ‘the northern part of Cyprus’, you are definitely taken as someone involved in bicommunal activities. If you use the

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\(^{11}\) Following Turkey’s military intervention in 1974, ‘Turkish Federated State of North Cyprus’ was proclaimed in 1975 and was succeed by Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (‘TRNC’) in 1983; neither administration was recognized by the international community, except the Republic of Turkey. 3 Days after the unilateral proclamation of TRNC, United Nations Security Council, reaffirming Resolution 365 (1974) and Resolution 367 (1975), adopted the Resolution 541 (1983), asserting that the unilateral decision to declare independence is legally invalid and the Republic of Cyprus is the sole authority on the island.
EU legal terminology (Protocol 10, 2003) to describe where you live, which is “the areas in which the Government of Cyprus does not exercise effective control”, you are probably a person from the marginalised left. Ironically, if you are a Greek-Cypriot and you refer to the north as ‘TRNC’, you are a true peace supporter, but if you are a Turkish-Cypriot who refers to ‘TRNC’ in a bicomunal setting, you would be an outcast. Yet another example is how you define the events of 1974; if you describe the event as: an 'invasion' you are a Greek (Cypriot) nationalist or again, a Turkish-Cypriot from the marginalised left; 'intervention' if you are from the UN or from an NGO involved in bicomunal activities; and 'peace operation' is for the Turkish (Cypriot) nationalists. If you try to remain apolitical by saying ‘the events of 1974’, you probably studied abroad and definitely fell prey to ‘imperialist hands’

At times, the deep concerns about being politically sensitive reaches uncomfortable extremes at bicomunal interactions. One good example is a personal experience at a bicomunal meeting where the RoC Minister for Education, being so concerned over how to address me, kept referring to me as “the girl from the north with a small n”, rather than my first name.

The way you talk about the history as well as the present immediately labels you in one or more categories in Cyprus. The reason why I feel it is necessary to highlight these labels attached to words and phrases that are used within the context of the Cyprus Problem is to somewhat acknowledge that my own descriptions in this thesis with regards to ‘the Problem’, ‘the northern part of Cyprus’ and ‘Turkey’s intervention’ cannot be immune to my own political standpoint and choices. Beyond recognising an element of banal researcher’s bias, it is also important to recognise how ‘loaded’ these terminologies and labels have become for Cypriots, and how ‘presumptuous’ they can make daily human interactions. For example, I too make presumptions about someone’s political convictions and stance towards a solution on the island depending on how they refer to 1974 or to the administration in the north. In the above example, being referred to as the girl from the north with a small ‘n’ in essence attaches me to a geographical location that is an alienated home and denies both my individual identity as Ilke as well as my collective identity as a Turkish-Cypriot. Given the nexus

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12 Following a visibility campaign about a bi-communal basketball event titled Play for Peace (in partnership Peace Players International, funded by Anna Lindh Foundation) that I had the opportunity to work as the project coordinator, I was personally attacked by a local newspaper (see 25 May 2008, Afrika Newspaper) in the northern part of Cyprus for choosing apolitical terminology in my outreach material, where a columnist accused me of being brainwashed by and a collaborator for the imperialist powers.
built for this thesis is (de)securitisation, ontological security (and identity) and reconciliation, these labels, their use in our interactions and their influence on our relationships becomes even more significant.

Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots are not each other’s only ‘different’ other charged with political discontent. A similar trait could be observed in the way Cypriots refer to Turkish immigrants. Among Turkish-Cypriots, they go by many different names ranging from ‘karasakal’ (blackbeard) to ‘fica’ (seaweed) or ‘fellah’ (Arabic/black peasant); and among Greek-Cypriots they are known as ‘Atilla’ (the Hun), ‘έποικος/έποικοι (settler), ‘η κουβαλητή του Denktaş’ (the ones Denktaş’ carried), ‘Κύλιξήρι/Κουλλούφι’13 (dirty, poor, homeless, uncivilised gypsy). While sometimes these derogatory terms simply stem from xenophobia, they also orientalise Turkish immigrants and carry political connotations about an individual’s opinion with regards to issues such as property and citizenship in a post-settlement scenario (i.e. their illegality as settlers, backward nature, and their repatriation after unification). It is widely accepted that Turkish immigrants have become the scapegoats for many Cypriots, who are discontented with their current situation (see Hatay 2008, Hatay and Bryant 2008, Kurtulus and Purkis 2012).

Loizides agrees that the presence of Turkish immigrants is prevalently perceived as a threat to the peaceful relations between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots and to the demographic structure of the country (Loizides 2011, Loizides 2015). The contested demography in the northern part of the island, the issue of the Turkish immigrants and their numbers has been a big part of the negotiations and yet they are excluded from the peace process and reconciliation efforts. While the growing number of the Turkish immigrants is perceived as an existential threat to the distinct Turkish-Cypriot identity, the pervasive presence of Turkey on the island has turned them into scapegoats for all Cypriots seeking a different future (Hatay 2008, Hatay and Bryant 2008). They are seen as the responsible party for all that is wrong with society in the northern part of Cyprus and as one of the main obstacles to a solution. For example, in a public opinion survey conducted in 2011, 69% of Turkish-Cypriots stated that

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13 ‘Κύλιξήρι/Κουλλούφι’originally refers to particular Roma groups, but is also used for Turkish immigrants as a derogatory term that means dirty, poor, homeless, uncivilised, gypsy and unruly, which is the closest equivalent to ‘fellah’.
‘foreigners’ (the big majority of whom are people from Turkey) have a negative effect on crime rates, and 33% stated that they do not want people from Turkey as neighbours \(^{14}\) (Yücel 2011). Similarly, in his research for the Oxford Centre for the Study of Intergroup Conflict, Hüseyin Çakal observed that over 85% of Turkish-Cypriot participants reported very high levels of threat posed to real assets Turkish Cypriots control (i.e. political power and economic resources) and to symbolic values (i.e. social values, traditions and cultural practices) by Turks (Çakal 2013:9).

On the other hand, an opinion poll conducted in 2009 shows that 59% of Greek-Cypriots prioritise ‘the issue of the people from Turkey’ for the Track 1 negotiations, while another out in 2011 shows 79% of Greek-Cypriots thought repatriation of all people who came from Turkey after 1974, including their descendants, after a settlement as highly desirable or absolutely necessary for a settlement (Cyprus-2015-Initiative 2009, 2010). Thus, considering the securitisation of this group as an existential threat by both Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots, the thesis seeks to extend the dual-ethnic approach to the Cyprus Problem by exploring the role of Turkish immigrants in Cypriot identity narratives, their sense of ontological security and the implications of these dynamics on reconciliation.

**Chapter outline**

This thesis consists of nine chapters in addition to an introduction and a conclusion. The chapters are organised under three parts: theoretical, contextual and empirical. The first four chapters in Part I establish the conceptual and theoretical dimensions of the thesis and explain the methodology of the fieldwork. The next two chapters in Part II present an overview of the ‘history of Cyprus’ and contextualises the case study. The three chapters in Part III focus on the analysis of my empirical findings, and reflects on the underlying arguments of the thesis and its implications for further research.

The thesis begins by examining the theory of securitisation and critically looks at the Copenhagen and Paris Schools of security. By providing a literature review and amalgamating

\(^{14}\) In parallel, Kurtulus and Purkis’ study shows that 64% of Turkish immigrants expressed that Turkish-Cypriots have negative attitudes towards them, or that they ‘do not like’ them (Kurtulus and Purkis 2012).
the two schools and by broadening their approach and application, the chapter establishes the first pillar of the theoretical framework. The theoretical framework is enriched in the second chapter, where ontological security literature is added as the second pillar. These theoretical considerations are expanded in the third chapter, which bridges the two pillars by establishing a nexus between (de)securitisation, ontological security and reconciliation/peacebuilding. Part I of the ends with Chapter 4, which explains the methodological choices and their justifications, and relates these to the research questions.

The two chapters that make up Part II of the thesis analyse the shifting identity narratives in Cyprus on a temporal timeline and contextualise the theoretical framework with an overview that focuses on significant historical milestones. Linking these milestones to the theoretical framework and bringing the timeline up to 2015, chapters 5 and 6 set the stage for Part III.

Chapters 7 and 8 of Part III analyse the empirical findings pertaining to the TCc and the GCc respectively. The empirical discussion is particularly focused on their perceptions of threat and feelings of anxiety vis-a-vis the Turkish immigrants and a potential solution to the Cyprus Problem. The last chapter of Part III and of the thesis provides a comparative analysis that searches for convergences in order to explore the potential for desecuritisation with the aim of alleviating peace-anxieties and ontological dissonance of the two main communities on the island.

Lastly, the conclusion summarises reiterates the primary theoretical and empirical thesis contributions and summarises the underlying theoretical and empirical arguments. Before discussing the broader research implications, I also consider potential desecuritisation strategies and make some recommendations to inform peacebuilding efforts in Cyprus.
Part 1: Theoretical Framework and Methodology

Chapter 1. Theoretical Framework: Broadening Securitisation

1.1 Introduction: Securitisation, what do we mean?

In Europe there is a vibrant debate over a number of competing schools in security studies. The Copenhagen (securitisation), Aberystwyth/Welsh (critical security studies) and Paris (Bourdieu inspired work of Didier Bigo and Thierry Balzacq, also known as insecuritisation) Schools are among the most debated and critiqued new approaches. However, beyond a common opposition to realism and traditional militarist, statist approaches to security, the non-traditional wider and deeper approaches often fundamentally deviate from each other. They differ on what the referent object of security should be, whether security is negative or positive, whether the objective should be to securitise or desecuritise, and whether the emphasis should be on normative or explanatory theory.

This chapter amalgamates the CS’s securitisation theory focused on discourse and security speech-acts with the CS’s more sociological approach focused on practices, governmentality and technologies to enrich the literature and contribute to its normative value with empirical application. While the CS argues that security issues are the political outcome of illocutionary speech-acts and that one of the most effective ways of analysis is through the discursive practices in different security sectors, the CS’s work has been concerned with practices of security shifting the focus from political agency to institutions and professionals involved in the definition of threats and the technologies to govern them (Buzan 1983, Buzan, Wæver et al. 1998, Bigo 2002, Collective 2006). Nevertheless, both schools do not account for the role of institutionalised perceptions of threat on identity narratives and hence fail to understand the interplay between (de)securitisation and ontological security.

Though rooted in different fields and criticised for their varying weaknesses, these two schools of thought have different strengths in terms of their analytical, normative and practical utility and can in fact be complementary. Even though the dialogue between the two schools has so far been minimal, the CS’s emphasis on practices is highly significant for
explaining the under-theorised concept of institutionalised securitisations where the role of
the speech-act and the enunciator diminishes by default, and where the perceptions of threat
and feelings of fear seep into identity narratives and daily routines. As such, the securitisation
process becomes multi-actored (i.e. elites, media, civil society), multi-directional (i.e. top-
down, bottom-up, horizontal), and multi-layered (i.e. discourse, imagery, routines), escaping
discourse to encompass performative forms of communication.

Even though the CS’s securitisation is probably the most widely applied and fully developed
study of securitisation processes, it is also widely criticised and its application and interpretation varied. However, since its initial inception based on a more regimental
prescription of rules and conditions, securitisation as a concept and as a process today is more
flexible in its meaning and application. Often, the concept of securitisation is largely defined
as a “process by which threats get constructed” (Coskun 2011:8), and boiled down to a broad
constructivist tool for analysing the construction of threats and the feelings of insecurity and
fear in the literature. On the one hand, it could be argued that securitisation theory has been
thinned out to an extent that it has lost its rigour and analytical value; on the other hand, it
could also be argued that it provides a popular loose framework that can be contextualised to
different realities to explore how something registers as a security issue and translates into a
political, emotional and performative reaction based on fear.

Without a strict commitment to either the Copenhagen or the Paris School, I use securitisation
as a broad constructivist tool for understanding the construction of threats and the feelings of
fear, because my main objective is not to trace these constructions but to analyse their role in
identity narratives and in turn their implications for peacebuilding and reconciliation. In
parallel with Adener, Chapman, and Theodossopoulos’ concept of ‘hollow categories’, I treat
securitisation as a ‘hollow signifier’ (see Ardener and Chapman 1989, Theodossopoulos 2007).
Just as hollow identity categories are forever incomplete and malleable ways of seeing the
world, and need to be supplemented with spatial and temporal information to acquire more
specific meaning; securitisation as a hollow signifier, gives us a general loose framework of
analysis, which is about construction and articulation of security issues and hence, conception
of a prevalent perception that something/someone is a ‘threat’ to us. Hollowness in this
interpretation is not a value judgement on validity or importance of the signifier, but reflects the subjectivity and externality of the image produced for the threat, and multiplicity of ways a threat can be produced. The threat can be reinvented, reproduced, accumulated, reinterpreted, negotiated at different levels by different actors through different means. In other words, without temporal and spatial context that adds meaning to the security issue, and helps us understand the process that shapes perceptions around the threat, ‘securitisation’ itself is a hollow signifier. As such, (de)/(in)securitisation simply denotes a process where an issue is constructed somehow by someone as a security issue and is perceived as a threat to something by some group somewhere.

The aim of this chapter is therefore to present my approach to the securitisation literature. The first section of the chapter will provide a brief literature review for the securitisation framework with a particular focus on critiques and its weaknesses. Theorising ‘institutional securitisation’ as a process that is located both within discursive practices of actors and within routinised acts or performances, the second section will discuss how marrying two schools of securitisation can benefit the framework and help its application in conflict environments. Empirically, the fieldwork data as well as secondary sources clearly establish the constructed existential threat (i.e. Turkish immigrants and Turkishness perceived as an existential threat by Cypriots) that the thesis focuses on (Hatay 2008, Loizides 2015). Thus, instead of tracing this construction through discourse analysis or looking at governmentality of insecuritisation, a pragmatic moulding of the Copenhagen and Paris Schools will assist the thesis in exploring how institutionalised threat perceptions relate to identity narratives, ontological security and in turn to peacebuilding on the island. Calling for a pragmatic amalgamation of the two schools to help securitisation be more amenable (responsive to context) and to add depth to our understanding of institutionalised securitisations, the chapter aims to remedy the overreliance on speech-acts that neglect the social and performative aspects of securitisation. Finally, the concluding section that emphasises the importance of routinised practices, imagery and the role of civil society and media for institutionalised securitisations and its intricate relationship with collective identity narratives sets the scene for the next theoretical chapter that adds ontological security to the theoretical framework of the thesis.
1.2 The ‘theory’ of securitisation

Some consider the CS’s securitisation theory as “one of the most important and controversial contributions to a vibrant body of new security theories since the 1990s” (Stritzel 2007:357). Securitisation theory rests on three main components: the speech-act, the securitising actor and the audience. According to Wæver, the main premise of securitisation theory is that it is not an objective condition but a speech-act: “It is by labelling something a security issue that it becomes one” (Wæver 2004:13). “The utterance itself is the act. By saying it something is done” (Wæver 1995:55). In other words, a securitising actor identifies a threat that threatens the existence of a referent object (nation, environment, society, group etc.) and labels it as a security issue.

Realising the risk of incoherency with the widening of the concept of security and to prevent anything from becoming a subject of security analysis and diluting or overwhelming the approach, the CS emphasises the need to conceptualise security in terms of something more than just any problem or vulnerability. Security is essentially about “survival in the face of existential threats” (Buzan, Wæver et al. 1998:27) and not about anything bad that can happen. Framing something as an existential threat is a prioritisation choice, “if we don’t tackle this everything else will be irrelevant because we will not be here/free or deal with it in our own way” (Buzan, Wæver et al. 1998:24).

However, not every security utterance is considered a successful securitisation, which needs to complete three steps: identification of existential threats; emergency action; and effects on inter-unit relations by breaking free of rules (Buzan, Wæver et al. 1998:6). In other words, first a securitising actor claims a right to extraordinary measures to safeguard the survival of a referent object by stating that the existence of a particular referent object is threatened; and second, the actor needs to convince an audience about the reality of the identified threat and mobilise support in order to legitimise emergency actions (e.g. military action, secrecy, imposing taxes, limitations on inviolable rights) and move the issue out of the sphere of ‘normal’ politics into the realm of emergency politics (Taureck 2006). Inspired by Austin’s concept of ‘felicity conditions’, securitisation theory also offers three facilitating conditions for
a successful securitisation practice: (1) The demand internal to the speech-act (the grammar of security), point of no return and a possible way out; (2) the social capital of the enunciator, (the capacity of the securitising actor); and (3) conditions historically associated with a threat. In themselves they do not guarantee the success or the failure of a securitising move but they are definitely facilitating conditions (Buzan, Wæver et al. 1998:33). According to the theory, if there is no resonance with the audience and, importantly, no consequent security practice, that is merely a securitising move (Buzan, Wæver et al. 1998).

In theory, a securitising move is an option open to any agent (unit or individual) because we can only identify a case of securitisation when an actor has convinced an audience of its legitimate need to go beyond otherwise binding rules and regulations. In practice however, a securitising move as conceived by the CS, is heavily based on the actors’ social and political power and capability to construct a threat (Taureck 2006). Even though the CS does not claim that authority is essential for the success of a securitising act, the underlying top-down relationship between the securitiser and the audience and the need for a ‘legitimate’ security practice means that the social capital of the agent carries more weight. It is this notion about the capacity to legitimise security practices that suggests a top-down directionality and assumes a distinction between the securitiser and the audience. For Aradau, it is difficult to see how agents without authority can legitimise emergency actions outside generally accepted democratic norms since the success of a securitising move is dependent upon the position the securitising actor vis-à-vis the audience and their capacity to reinforce a particular reading of reality (Aradau 2004). Aradau, who asserts that securitisation has an exclusionary and non-democratic logic, points out that the institutional knowledge and capabilities of security professionals with regards to threats results in monopolisation of securitisation, making them impermeable to the criticism of ‘amateurs’ such as civil society organisations (CSOs) (Aradau 2004).

Successful securitisation of an issue allows for the introduction of security practices, which would not be introduced under ‘normal’ conditions (Buzan, Wæver et al. 1998). Thus, a certain level of support from an audience is necessary to deem a securitising move successful. Here, while the theory assumes a start and an end point for the securitisation process (the
move/speech-act and the security practice), it is rather vague when it comes to the role of the audience before and after the ‘security practice’. What if the audience accepts the securitising move but there are no security practices? And if the acceptance of the audience is integral to the process, what is the role of the audience in shaping the speech-act(s)? Or what if there is a security practice despite a strong opposition from the audience? Or, when do we deem a securitising move successful; when the audience accepts the securitising move, or when we can see a relevant security practice/policy, or do we need to fulfil both conditions? If, for example, the Republican audience is convinced that Muslims citizens are a security threat and they support and legitimise Donald Trump’s emergency measures to brand and register all Muslims in the USA, but this emergency measure cannot be implemented due to opposition, do we have a case of successful securitisation where a particular audience has accepted and legitimised the security discourse, or a case of a mere securitising move because the emergency measure was not implemented? If we strictly remain within the boundaries of the securitisation theory, the answer would probably be the latter. However, if we focus on the audience and the performative nature of securitisation, we can see that despite lack of emergency measures, there is a significant shift in attitudes, understandings and performances of security, where a particular audience feels existentially threatened and where we need desecuritisation to address the feelings of fear.

As such, if we apply a strict interpretation of this sophisticated tool of analysis that is limited to a speech-act in a given time, which results in a legitimised security practice, the instances of successful securitising moves would be very rare. On the other hand, if we look at speech-acts that are accepted by an audience without resulting in a security practice, we would drown in successful securitising moves. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this thesis, I do not necessarily need a regimental and tight ‘equation’ about how threats are constructed to study how the constructed threat perceptions influence identity narratives, neither do I think such an equation is ‘desirable’ when it comes to studying such a contested and constructed concept. For the purposes of this thesis, securitisation is treated as a ‘hollow signifier’ that refers to social construction of threats, which can be multi-layered, multi-directional and is open to multiple actors.
Even though the main weaknesses and critiques of securitisation theory will be discussed in more detail later on, it is important to note here that the role of the audience stirs up debates about contradicting premises of the theory. These contradicting premises are about securitisation claiming to be founded upon illocutionary speech-acts (performing a function at the moment of speech – what is done in saying security) while at the same time requiring acceptance by the audience which rather invokes a perlocutionary (necessary for enabling particular actions – what is done by saying security) approach to the speech-act where there is an intended effect on and relationship with the audience rather than simply doing something by mere utterance (McDonald 2008, Stritzel 2011, Roe 2012). Perlocutionary acts are external to the performative aspect of the speech-act and thereby correspond not to the utterance itself but to its effects. By mixing perlocutionary and illocutionary acts together the CS obscures the role of audience(s) in securitisation theory. This may be due to the objective of providing a tight tool for the security analyst where s/he can trace a starting and an end point for the securitisation process, rather than creating a cyclical inter-subjective process that spirals in many directions, temporally and spatially.

The narrow focus on the speech-act also highlights the political decision to securitise; For Wæver, while the historical conditions that enable securitisation are significant (felicity condition 3), securitisation can not be reduced to the conditions of its social accomplishment, the focus is on the decision to securitise (the speech-act), which is an explicit political choice (Wæver 2000). Criticising this emphasis on decision, Michael Williams points that focusing too narrowly on “the search for singular and distinct acts of securitisation might well lead one to misperceive processes through which a situation is being gradually intensified, and thus rendered susceptible to securitisation, while remaining short of the actual securitising decision” (Williams 2003:521).

I take the position that securitisation is an inter-subjective socially constructed process, and it can be cyclical and the starting points we choose can in fact be arbitrary, but not necessarily unjustified depending on our research questions. Securitisation as an inter-subjective process is dependent on construction of a certain reality in terms of a threat/security issue; focusing on the ‘audience’ rather than a speech-act given at a particular moment in time can be the key in analysing institutionalised securitisation processes. This makes perlocution central
rather than tangential to understanding how a particular issue is turned into a security problem (Balzacq 2012:60-61). Allowing the possibility that speech-acts are perlocutionary gives a more significant role to the audience than actually theorised by the CS, and the over-emphasis on the speech and the enunciator fails to account for institutionalised securitisations.

Conflict environments provide a fertile ground for institutionalised securitisations, where it is not hard to observe multiple and at times opposing securitisation practices at play. Certain security issues in conflict environments may be historically embedded and taken granted as threats, which renders the securitising speech-act or the authority of the securitising actor redundant because the role of the speech-act shifts from convincing an audience that a specific issue is an existential threat, to merely reminding them, as the threat is a central element of the ‘political normality’ they live in. Contrary to the CS’s initial focus on securitisation practices that are top-down and elite driven based on specific security speech-acts aimed at a particular audience with a particular political intent (Buzan, Wæver et al. 1998), in conflict environments, this process can be more implicit and ambivalent given the myriad insecurities and threats inherent to the conflict itself. For example, the audience can assume the role of the securitising actor while at the same time demanding further securitisation or emergency measures for the identified threat, or there are often opposing securitisation forces that create dissonance. Engrained hostilities, self-enemy relationships, myths, collective histories and self-narratives can be effectively reproduced by a wide range of practices and actors, because the conflict serves as a reference point for the threat and feelings of fear to ‘stick’. As a result, with the involvement of multiple actors (i.e. civil society, business people, teachers, media) and blurring lines between the securitising actors and the audience, directionality of securitisation practices can become bottom-up and horizontal (Adamides 2012), and securitisation process can be reproduced with ‘actions’ other than the speech-act.

Salter, who also suggests non-state actors must be included in securitisation, agrees that the CS’s securitisation model is too statist/elitist and hence cannot match the complexity of

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15 For example political elite securitising one side of the conflict, peace-builders/mediators securitising another.
contemporary social dynamics of security (Salter 2008). In order to be able to measure the success or failure of a securitising move within different audiences, Salter adds temporal dimensions to considerations of securitisation; meaning the duration of the securitisation and the entropy of the public imagination, which is similar to my point that small securitising moves can accumulate or some securitising moves can ‘stick’ depending on the historical narratives and the context. The construction of security cannot be comprehensively understood in isolation from the role of the audience and the social, political and historical contexts in which particular discourses of security become possible. Neither can it be limited to speech-acts. Language is only one means through which meaning is communicated (Möller 2007). Especially in the contemporary world, there are multiple ways and mediums where stories and particular narratives can go viral and reach a wide audience, where discourse can escape both the ‘speech-acts’ and the ‘power holders’. Even though the CS acknowledges that a focus on speech alone is far too narrow and notes that ‘the security speech-act is not defined by uttering the word security’ (Buzan, Wæver et al. 1998:27), how an issue is designated as an existential threat beyond speech-acts remains almost entirely untouched, and the analysis remains almost exclusively focused on discourse created by power holders.

As Michael Williams argues, securitisation is not reducible to a purely linguistic rhetoric, but it needs to be understood as a broader performative act that is negotiated through a variety of contextual, institutional, and symbolic resources for its effectiveness (Williams 2003). Williams criticises this narrow focus, arguing that the hermeneutic approach to security is a deterministic understanding of the ‘moment’, when threats are constructed (Williams 2003). For Bigo, securitisation does not occur only at particular instances, security issues can become institutionalised as existential threats without dramatic moments of intervention (Bigo 2002). He explains that “security is constructed and applied to different issues and areas through a range of often routinised practices rather than only through speech-acts that enable emergency measures” (Bigo 2002:65). For example, Bigo argues that immigration as a security threat in Europe was the product of long-term processes of institutionalisation and related heavily to the incorporation of immigration within the jurisdiction of security professionals such as the police and customs officers (Bigo 2000). Persuading an audience to see the world in a specific way, creating a feeling of danger and insecurity, and thus acting in tandem with
the constructed reality is best done with a range of actors and tools with different capacities, knowledge and relationship to the audience(s). A theory so reliant on discourse for its explanatory power hence fails to address the dynamics of social construction of meaning in a world where meaning is increasingly bound with images, social media, the role of CSOs, mass movements, and even satire.

We can problematise the reduction of securitisation to a purely linguistic rhetoric by drawing on Michel Foucault. For Foucault, the meaning is constituted within material and textual realms, for they are not mutually exclusive (Foucault 1981). He holds that discursive practices verge on the territory of materiality, becoming intrinsically linked with performances of meaning; thus an over-concentration on language signals a myopic understanding of text in isolation from the material arrangements of power (Foucault 1981). Recognising the role of material and performative dynamics in the generation of meaning of security and threat, and the productive power of such dynamics, demand an acceptance that security exists outside of the speech-act. In parallel, Lene Hansen agrees that the speech-act framework of security neglects performative dynamics, which can produce and communicate the meaning of security in their own right (Hansen 2000). For example, seeing sunflower seed shells on the beach or in a park in north Cyprus is latent with meaning for Turkish-Cypriots. It serves to remind them that a person from Turkey was there, and reproduces the oriental and inferior threat narrative attached to this group, where their daily routines create nuisance on Turkish-Cypriots’ daily routines. Thus, the speech-act is just one dynamic of the securitisation process, the role of audience(s), other forms of communication, performatives and daily routines all have a role to play in the way an existential threat is constructed and experienced.

Securitisation exists within the interplay between self-identity and the construction of meaning across all social structures. Therefore, the securitisation approach taken in this thesis sees securitisation as a broader communicative process than the speech-act uttered by a securitising actor, as one that includes how meaning is conveyed by images, media, multiple actors and multiple practices; and broadens ‘consequent security practices’ to include more than emergency measures such as, social movements and practices that demonstrate the way audience accepts and interprets the securitising move.
Although its analytical utility is very attractive, the CS’s securitisation theory has attracted many criticisms; these can be categorised under four main captions: epistemological, conceptual, empirical and normative. Epistemological criticisms focus on the meaning of security as defined by the CS, its philosophical foundations and the speech-act theory. If the meaning of security is dependent on questions of epistemology, ontology and methodology underlying the respective school of thought and for securitisation theory the definition of security is what securitising actors make of it then it can be argued that the epistemological foundations of the theory is fallacious. For Balzacq, securitisation theory suffers from ‘detrimental effects of an inconsistent mixture of ontology and epistemology’ where constructivism is wedded with post-structuralism. Instead, the link between the speech-act approach to security and post-structuralism bears directly on a central problem in the epistemology of discourse analysis. (Balzacq 2012:59-60).

The conceptual critiques refer primarily to the concepts used in the structure of securitisation theory such as its use of speech-act theory, audience, social identity, ‘normal’ politics and exceptional measures. It is often argued that these concepts are under-developed by the CS (Theiler 2003, Williams 2003, Huysmans 2006, Ciuta 2009, Roe 2012). For example, Theiler identifies three underlying weaknesses for the concept of social identity as developed by the CS: a tendency to reify societies as independent social agents, vague definition of identity, and failure to demonstrate that social security matters to individuals (Theiler 2003).

On the other hand, securitisation theory is also criticised for not defining ‘normality’ and ‘normal’ politics sufficiently. Although it has been suggested that the normal politics implied by securitisation theory is that of liberal democracy (Aradau 2004, Huysmans 2004), it remains undefined in the CS (Collective 2006). If ‘normal’ politics is how things are ordinarily done in liberal democracies, then extraordinary politics is what normal politics is not (Roe 2012). Even though securitisation theory seems contextually excellent as it studies securitisation where and when it happens, for Ciuta, we cannot conceptualise a de-contextualised security (Ciuta 2009). Conditions of exceptionality and normality as well as what counts as a threat, are highly contextual. For example, environmental policies that are ‘normal’ within the EU can be
regarded as exceptional elsewhere. Or, what the audience deems ‘normal’ may not be the normality endorsed by the political elites.

Consequently, the third criticism of securitisation theory is its ‘inconsistent’ empirical application and its lack of emphasis on the context of where and under what conditions a securitising move is being done. Similar to the pragmatic approach taken in this thesis, where I open and expand the actors, securitising moves, and security practices, and use the concept more like a ‘hollow signifier’ rather than a rigorous theory, empirical application of securitisation as a theory had to rely on different interpretations to help the theory become receptive to context. Different scholars filled the gaps left by the CS (i.e. the role of the audience, scope of the speech-act, directionality of the securitisation process, the vitality of the emergency measures for the success of the securitising move and institutionalised securitisations) with different interpretations to help the travel of the theory to different contexts and normalities (see Coskun 2007, Doty 2007, Floyd 2007, Wilkinson 2007, Barthwal-Datta 2009, MacKenzie 2009, Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking 2010, Bilgin 2011, Hansen 2011, Adamides 2012, Corry 2012).

Other scholars such as Stritzel and Vuori join this debate which links with the normative and empirical debate about securitisation theory being limited to Western democracies, their ‘normalities’ and their understanding of legitimacy and power (Vuori 2008, Stritzel 2011). There is a ‘democratic bias’ in the ‘pragmatic understanding’ of the theory where the practice of securitisation involves moving of certain issues beyond the democratic processes of government and public deliberation into ‘special politics’ in order to deal with the identified existential threats (Huysmans 1998, Laustsen and Wæver 2000, Balzacq 2005). This inherent push towards democracy and thus the normative preference for desecuritisation should not, however, limit the application of securitisation to liberal democracies. If in democracies securitisation relieves decision-makers of the democratic mechanisms, in other regimes it can suspend some other constraints such as morality.
Although the CS developed ‘facilitating conditions’ (felicity conditions\textsuperscript{16}) to address the concerns about the context and offer a more specific framework for empirical analysis, these do not necessarily remedy the alleged insensitivity and limitation of securitisation theory outside of liberal democracies. (Buzan, Wæver et al. 1998:33). Vuori introduces what he calls the fourth felicity condition to overcome the democratic bias limitation and explores speech-acts from a linguistic and philosophical point of view to allow for the travel of the theory to non-democratic systems without conceptual stretching. He highlights that even non-democratic, authoritarian regimes need to legitimise their extraordinary measures and gain the acceptance of the audience. Thus, the fourth felicity condition is “conditions related to the audience of securitisation” (Vuori 2008). This means, as well as identifying the specific existential threat, referent object, securitising actor(s) and emergency measures, identifying the audience will help the empirical application of the securitisation theory in broader range of cases.

Overall, securitisation theory can benefit from a stronger focus on the role of the audience. Even with the fourth felicity condition, focusing on illocutionary power of securitising speech-acts of actors with social capital who have an identifiable audience and an emergency measure in mind, still assumes distinctive categories of securitising actors and the audience, implies a top-down relationship, and necessitates emergency measures to deem a securitising move successful. It assumes a linear starting and an end point, where a speech-act given at a moment in time is taken as the arbitrary starting point and the adoption of a particular security policy/emergency measure as the end point of the securitisation process. As a result, it fails to account for the perlocutionary affect the existential threat has on the audience(s), daily practices, interactions and identity narratives, or sufficiently theorise negotiated accumulated securitisation practices that become institutionalised.

\textsuperscript{16} 1) The grammar of security, meaning that the speech-act includes an existential threat, point of no return and a way out as well as specific discourse particular to the sector such as identity for the societal sector, sovereignty for the political sector and sustainability for the environmental sector; 2) the social conditions regarding the position of authority for the securitising actor, meaning the capabilities of the speaker and their relationship to the audience; and 3) the features of the alleged threats that either facilitate or impede securitisation, meaning how the threat is understood within a given context and historical past.
Perhaps the most vigorous critics fall under the last category about normative implications of securitisation theory. While for the Welsh School security is a normative concept, that when reconfigured as emancipation frees people from the physical and human constraints providing true security, for the CS, securitisation theory does not “entail conducting opinion polls and asking people what they think security means, nor asking philosophers what would be the most logically consistent definition, but analysing actual linguistic practices to see what regulates discourse” (Wæver 2004:8). The security analyst is only concerned about what security does, as opposed to what it can or ought to do (Floyd 2007). Neither does the analyst seek to examine the intentions of the securitising actors or whether the identified existential threats are real or not. As a securitisation process itself constitutes a social reality, assessing the ‘reality’ of a threat in any objective sense is not possible. Rather, the securitisation analyst is concerned about what is articulated, what is being securitised, under what conditions and with what effects. Although lacking a normative commitment in itself is not a weakness since the theory’s objective is to ultimately provide an analytical tool, the CS does voice a clear preference for desecuritisation, where issues are dealt with in ‘normal’ politics of deliberation rather than emergency politics.

According to critics that fall into the ‘normative’ category, the claim that securitisation theory should only be thought of as an analytical approach outside any political project, is at best controversial. For Aradau, shifting the understanding of security from the traditional state-centric, military definition to a constructivist broader concept amputated its critical edge, and failed to engage with the political implications of the concept (Aradau 2004). While Taureck supports the position of the CS by asserting that securitisation theory is not a political statement on the part of the analyst, but rather a theoretical tool of analysis (Taureck 2006), Aradau insists that, “analysis is not extraterritorial to politics but is directly linked with the space of politics” (Aradau 2006:83). This is what Huysmans called the ‘normative dilemma of speaking and writing security’ (Huysmans 1995:69). The normative dilemma refers to the idea that the security analyst in speaking and writing about a particular securitisation executes a speech-act and in part re-constitutes and reproduces that security issue. Although, if applied to the prescribed securitisation equation, it is hard to argue that the analyst can become a securitiser; however, within a broader perspective of speech-acts, practices and actors where
securitisation is negotiated, argumentative and accumulative, the normative dilemma becomes a bigger problem for the CS.

The second normatively defined debate about securitisation theory is about the conception of security as a negative concept and normative preference for desecuritisation (Aradau 2004, Gad and Petersen 2011, Roe 2012). The CS explicitly voices their preference for desecuritisation as the ideal and emphasise that “security should be seen as a negative, as a failure to deal with issues of normal politics” (Wæver 1995:29). Since securitisation disrupts the democratic processes, desecuritisation whereby issues are moved out of “the threat—defence sequence and into the ordinary public sphere” (Buzan, Wæver et al. 1998:29) where ‘normal’ politics and democratic norms apply is naturally favourable. Although I agree that securitisation creates a binary and exclusionary logic, a logic trapped in realist relative gains and win-lose scenarios and reproduces existential insecurities that can incapacitate audience(s), it is not easy to condone the power of securitisation, which can trigger mobilisation of resources to address the issue in a more responsive and urgent way. However, Bigo argues that the securitisation of societal issues raises the issue of protection by *insecuritising* the audience, hence creating a security trap (Bigo 1995). In other words, the more one tries to securitise an issue to assure the ‘security’ of a referent object, the more one creates (intentionally or unintentionally) a feeling of insecurity. As a logical consequence, the politics of maximal security are also politics of maximal fear (Collective 2006). In short, security is contested and complex; it does different things at different times and in different places (Browning and McDonald 2011).
1.3 Wedding Copenhagen and Paris

The CS distinguishes between state security that is military, political, economic, and environmental threats to sovereignty, and societal security, which relates to threats to a cultural identity. While state security concerns itself with the organisational stability of states, systems of government and ideologies, societal security, is about “the ability of the society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats... Societal security is about situations when societies perceive a threat in identity terms” (Waever, Buzan et al. 1993:23). However, when trying to categorise security issues under different sectors for analysis, it becomes very apparent that in some sense all security is political as all threats and defences are constructed from a political position. Since politicisation is political by definition, by extension securitisation is also an act of politics.

Though very closely related, according to the CS’s securitisation framework, societal security and political security are nonetheless distinct.

While the political sector is ultimately about threats to state sovereignty that are non-military and about political threats concerned with giving or denying recognition, support or legitimacy either internally or externally, societal security issues are ultimately about identity and culture (Buzan, Wæver et al. 1998). This, however, by no means implies that sectors always exist as discrete domains of insecurity. It is difficult to draw the borders of societal security. Threats to a cultural identity may be manifested through different languages, ethnicities, and religions, but reaction to security issues often merge gradually with the political sphere, making the distinction ambiguous (Waever, Buzan et al. 1993). The CS warns that societal security should not be confused with social security, which is about individuals and is largely economic while societal security is about collectives and their identity. For example, unemployment and crime, which are threats in society but affect individuals, can become societal security issues only if they threaten the breakdown of society as a whole.

Jeff Huysmans supports the sectoral analysis of securitisation by suggestion that since insecurities differ depending on the nature of the threat and the referent object that is threatened, they can be organised into different security sectors at least for analytical
purposes (Huysmans 2006). Nevertheless, the opening of securitisation to the societal sector and the referent object to that of identity led to a major controversy towards the end of the 1990s (McSweeney 1996, Buzan and Wæver 1997, McSweeney 1998, Williams 1998). The most serious criticism against the societal security concept is about reification. The CS is often criticised for treating societies as fixed variables rather than as entities that are constantly reconstructed, reimagined and renegotiated. McSweeney accuses the CS of regarding ‘society’ and ‘identity’ as objective realities and not treating communities from a deconstructionist sociological angle (McSweeney 1998). McSweeney argues that treating identity as a fixed entity, would be theoretically inadequate as identity is always fluid and contingent, based on the discursive constructions of ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson 1991, McSweeney 1998). He stresses that identity is not a fact of society but a process of negotiation among people and interest groups (McSweeney 1996:83-85). Buzan and Wæver defend their position by asserting that even though they treat societies as fixed variables in the societal security logic, social constructivism does not imply that the social world is always unpredictable and volatile (Buzan and Wæver 1997). They affirm that once constructed, many social practices, beliefs and institutions become deeply embedded and change only very slowly. Theiler supports this position by deepening our understanding with social identity theory and by reiterating that the “Copenhagen school uses societal security as a conceptual tool to try to account for specific events that have occurred at specific points in time in specific contexts...In line with this, it stands on solid methodological ground when it treats the social constructs concerned as de facto stable and fixed over the limited periods relevant to the analysis of these events, as long as there is no evidence to the contrary” (Theiler 2003:254).

Furthermore, in response to the criticism about reification, it is important to emphasise that the processes and practices people and groups employ to construct their self-image and identity also includes securitising moves. Thus, the criticism that the concept of societal security assumes society has a fixed identity misses the CS’s understanding of security, where securitising moves are the precise attempts at declaring a monolithic form of identity by reifying the self-image and the image of the ‘threat’ (Williams 2003). As such, securitisation of identities challenges their negotiability and flexibility, which invokes a Schmittian logic of friends and enemies based on a politics of exclusion. As Williams asserts, “a successful
securitisation of an identity involves precisely the capacity to decide on the limits of a given identity...” (Williams 2003:519).

Even though I agree with Theiler and Williams to a certain extent, I maintain that securitisation of such a personal, self-referential and multi-layered concept such as identity is more inter-subjective and negotiated than located in a speech-act at a given moment. Societal security as a sectoral analysis needs a more social level analysis that expands our understanding of securitisation beyond the political discourse, political speech-acts and political elites to include performatives and other platforms where meaning of security is created. Hence, the central problematique is the casting of securitisation merely in terms of a linear speech-act-legitimation-emergency measure sequence. Whilst alluding to the inter-subjective nature of security, the focus on the speech-act defines security less as a site of negotiation and more as one of articulation (McDonald 2008). The negotiation on the construction of a security issue is not necessarily linear or organised, it can be disorderly, where various counter-narratives and actors negotiate and reproduce the meaning of the threat through various performatives and mediums.

Similarly, Stritzel, who critiques the under-theorisation of the speaker-audience relations, argues “too much weight is put on the semantic side of the speech-act articulation at the expense of its social and linguistic relatedness and sequentiality” (Stritzel 2007:358). Stritzel’s embedded analysis situates the securitisation within a relationship between speaker–audience and within a context that predates the actual securitising act. His proposal to consider the performative force of the articulated threat texts and their embeddedness in existing discourses is particularly helpful for analysing institutionalised securitisation and can be complimented by Balzacq’s approach (Stritzel 2007). Arguing that securitisation processes are constrained by history, memory, and discursive tropes, and inline with Salter’s point that “securitising moves occur within the universe of the audience imagination”, Balzacq underlines the social aspect of securitisation focusing on “the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience, and the power that both the speaker and the listener bring to the interaction” (Balzacq 2005:172, Salter 2008:330).
This is exactly where the CS can lend a helping hand. The CS concedes that securitisation is an argumentative process rather than a pure speech-act mechanism; a discursive approach to securitisation gives an incomplete picture because it fails to account for variations of intensity within the process of securitisation, thus looking at the functions and implications of policy instruments are, at least, equally important (Bigo 2002, Balzacq 2008). Arguing that the securitisation process is more about routinised practices of professionals of security than it is about speech-acts, the CS can provide insights into how the audience can participate in the securitisation process (Bigo 2002). For example, Balzacq looks at political tools and instruments that unpack securitisation dynamics and allow us to explore the way securitisation evolves both in scope and scale. For him, not only securitisation can occur or evolve without the assent of an identifiable audience and securitisation practices (tools) can pre-date a speech-act, but also a securitising move successful in obtaining the audience’s support results in some sort of cognitive and behavioural change among the audience (Balzacq 2005, Balzacq 2008). Theiler supports this position by asserting that the intensity of a given inter-group conflict does not only depend on factors such as the strength of initial securitising moves, the discursive power of the ‘securitisers’ or their capacity, “Instead, once the dialectic between group defence and group affirmation has taken hold, it can acquire a dynamic of its own and escape the control of the ‘securitisers’ who initially unleashed it” (Theiler 2003:265). Thus, once the ‘cognitive and behavioural change’ occurs, the audience believing in that they need to defend themselves, will reproduce the perceived threat and demand emergency measures to address the perceived existential threat. As a result, it is irrelevant whether we complete all the securitisation steps (i.e. step 2, emergency action and step 3, effects on inter-unit relations by breaking free of rules) because once the audience accepts that there is an existential threat, threatening their very survival, desecuritisation will still be necessary to address the perceived existential insecurities and feelings of fear.

Drawing on Bourdieu, the CS circumscribes the problem raised by the CS, whereby the emergence of speech-acts was underspecified and their effects too broad, in comparison with other practices of power. For the CS, to study securitisation is to focus on the creation of networks of professionals of (in)security, the systems of meaning they generate and the productive power of their practices; it is to explore the relations among security agencies,
their status, roles, activities and institutional settings (Bigo 2000, Bigo 2006). According to Bigo, those who speak security must have the capacity to produce a discourse on the image of the enemy and be able to impose their own interpretation of the threat; their success depends on the positions and the symbolic capital they hold, as well as on the capacity to produce a discourse which supports and reinforces a particular reading of reality (Bigo 2002, Aradau 2004). This is not very different than Austin’s felicity conditions proposed by the CS. The difference is rather on the emphasis the CS puts on the ‘speech-act’, than the facilitating conditions, whereas the CS emphasises practices, audiences and contexts that enable and constrain the production of specific forms of governmentality; and locates securitisation at an institutional level rather than in political agency (See Bigo 2000, Balzacq 2005). The CS suggests a different understanding of securitisation where, instead of analysing security as an essential concept, it treats security as a ‘technique of government’ (Bigo 2000, Collective 2006, Huysmans 2006). As such, even though the focus is broader than the speech-act, securitisation is still conceived as a top-down process, and the performative side of the securitisation process is located within governmental institutions.

In conflict environments, the actors reproduce their historic narratives and maintain their protracted fears, which become engrained into their identity narratives, routines and language. Actions, images, experiences and interactions become the primary ways ‘the securitisation’ survives rather than speech-acts. However, the CS’s emphasis over the performative-ness of securitisation is found in the ‘managers of unease’ (security professionals), who compete over budgets and missions and transformation of technologies (data banks, surveillance etc.) (Bigo 2002, Bigo 2006). For example, Bigo is interested in the ways the security professionals and their habitus are “correlated with the globalisation of technologies of surveillance and control going beyond the national borders” (Bigo 2002:65). This particular focus on governmentality and technologies of security does not effectively apply to the case of Cyprus and securitisation of people from Turkey by Turkish-Cypriots, because the relationship between the ‘TRNC’ and the Republic of Turkey is a paternal one, where Turkey is the mother and the ‘TRNC’ is the babyland. Its governmentality and security professionals are dependent on the motherland, where sovereignty over ‘national’ borders or
even the concept of the ‘national’ (the distinction between Turkish-Cypriotness and Turkishness) is contested.

Securitisation of Turkishness and Turkish immigrants in north Cyprus is multi-directional, and not endorsed by the political elite or the government. The ‘TRNC’ is politically, economically and militarily dependent upon Turkey, is legally considered as the subordinate administration of Turkey and is not recognised by any other state than Turkey (See UNSC 2001). In fact, the national anthem or the currency of the ‘TRNC’ is that of the Republic of Turkey. Fiscal policies, banks, GSM operators are almost exclusively headquartered in Turkey, and the official discourse (with the exception of historically marginalised small left-wing parties) depicts Turkey as the ‘motherland’, and emphasises historical heritage, brotherhood and lineage with Turkey (See 'TRNC' Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011). While the mainstream identity narratives and history books treat Turkish-Cypriots as Turks who were born in Cyprus, major institutions that embody the security professionals (i.e. police and military) are constitutionally established under the Turkish Armed Forces. Thus, Bigo’s understanding of securitisation as “...structured by the habitus of the security professionals” (Bigo 2002:65) cannot explain the institutionalised securitisation of Turkish immigrants and Turkishness as an existential threat to Turkish-Cypriots’, as the ‘habitus’ draws its legitimacy and conviction from bottom-up and individual perceptions of threat and identity, rather than a reinterpretation of a professional’s own ‘mandate’.

Bigo’s underlying argument is that “securitisation of migration is a transversal political technology, used as a mode of governmentality by diverse institutions to play with the unease, ... so as to affirm their role as providers of protection and security and to mask some of their failures” (Bigo 2002:65). However in north Cyprus, as the empirical analysis shows, securitisation is not travelling from the institution or the institutional mandate to the professional, but rather from the individual to the institution; it is not the institutions interest and mandate being interpreted by the security professionals and hence shaping their routines, but it is the individuals convictions and perceptions about the threat that is shaping the daily routines (whether professional or personal). The CS’s emphasis on migration though closely related to the case, lacks the tools and the nuances to explore why people from Turkey
and by extension Turkishness are perceived as more of a threat to the Turkish-Cypriot identity compared to other migrants. Turkish-Cypriots, despite their shared ancestry, ethnicity, religion and language, securitise people from Turkey as an existential threat to their distinct self-identity, which can neither be solely explained by analysing security professionals and transversal technologies, nor by security speech-acts that fit the prescribed felicity conditions.

Many scholars would agree that Copenhagen’s articulation of securitisation resembles Schmitt’s focus on the sovereign exceptionalism (see Bigo 2002, Williams 2003, Collective 2006, Hansen 2011). Although, it is not subsumed by traditional state security, the illocutionary logic and the decisive power of the sovereign does imply a top-down understanding of the process (Doty 2007). Wæver suggests “security is articulated only from a specific place, in an institutional voice, by elites” (Wæver 1995). However, securitisation can happen at another level, a more social level where the primary directionality is not top-down, where the focus is not on securitising actors with social capital, speech-acts and security policies. This is somewhat different than the sectoral analysis of societal securitisation provided by the CS and different than the CS’s emphasis on performative-ness of securitisation located in the mandates and technologies of security professionals; in addition to discourse and governmentality, it is also about the way securitisation is lived and performed socially, and the way it shapes identity narratives.

‘The exception’ in a Schmittian sense is a situation of radical danger and contingency for which no prior law, procedure or anticipated response is adequate (Collective 2006). It brings about a fundamental existential need for unlimited, unconstrained and exceptional measures. However, institutionalised securitisation processes can escape the Schmittian understanding of exceptionalism created by a monolithic sovereign authority. When the general acceptance and fear around an identifiable threat is widespread, the enemy is ‘known’, and the danger is objectified, securitisation can become ‘viral’, and move bottom-up from the masses. Once widely accepted and taken for granted by the audience, the perception of a threat can move freely, not only bottom-up (from the audience to the elites) but also horizontally (from one audience to another), penetrating into public discourse, civil society, and business relations (Adamides 2012). This shapes and shifts the public opinion around the existential threat.
As a result, the threat becomes performative and embedded into collective identity narratives. In such situations, we do not need to track down a specific speech-act given at a particular moment by a particular securitisising actor with ‘enough’ social capital, neither do we need security policies to call it a case of successful securitisation. The audience, genuinely scared for their existence, can become the securitiser, demanding emergency measures and policies and changing the directionality of the securitisation process. Now institutionalised and performative, the threat is ‘visible’ and reproduced in daily routines and interactions, adding a different layer of meaning. For example, seeing someone paying with food vouchers, seeing a woman with a headscarf at the supermarket, at work, or in traffic, or hearing about an incident in a particular neighbourhood, is all read through the lens of a securitised public opinion with added meaning, validating the existence of the threat, the feeling of insecurity and the self/other relationship based on enmity.

The case of Turkish-Cypriots, suggest that it is possible to have a case of securitisation without a ‘sovereign’ or an elite discourse. As a result, the audience can exert bottom-up pressures for emergency measures to mobilise a response or resources against the threat (i.e. demonstrations, press releases and petitions) to influence those that are traditionally seen as the securitising actors and professionals. This is not to suggest that it is not possible to go back in history to a point where we can trace elite security speech-acts to the institutionalised securitisation processes. Rather, the argument here is that once institutionalised and engrained, the directionality of the securitisation process as well as the role of the audience changes considerably. Leaving securitisation of an issue open “to varied and dispersed locales” does not mean that elites or security professionals are not ‘participants’ in the securitisation process; but rather that they are not always the only or the most significant actors (Doty 1998:73).

Roxanne Doty, who examines immigration as a security threat that has multiple modes of securitisation, argues that there can be more than one understanding of security that may be operative in any particular case, and that there is no single logic to security (Doty 1998). Doty does not necessarily disagree with the CS or the CS; she rather argues that securitisation in the societal sector does not only emerge from successful speech-acts of political leaders, or
from a range of administrative practices and technologies of security. Her point is that securitisation is not limited to these emergence points alone, neither are these emergence points the most significant ones in all cases (Doty 2007). Looking at the Mexico-USA border and the civilian border patrols, Doty asks a question that is highly relevant to the case of Cyprus as well: “...what happens when it [threat] is perceived by a significant portion of the populace that the sovereign\(^{17}\) does not in fact recognise the enemy, thus... refusing to make the necessary decisions?” (Doty 2007:116). Hence, she questions the locus of the ‘decision’ and by extension the locus of the ‘sovereign’.

Influenced by Schmitt, securitisation theory mostly conceives the securitising actor (i.e. ‘the sovereign’) and speech-act (i.e. the ‘decision’ on the exception), as something that comes from a unified entity and moves top-down (Doty 2007). Doty expands the concept of the ‘sovereign who decides’ and takes the ‘decision’ beyond an official governmental understanding. In this analysis, the decision(s) on the exception can predate the security policies and the sovereign can be found in social forces. By examining the anti-immigrant movement and self-organised border vigilante groups, she illustrates how securitisation practices can originate from actors who are not necessarily ‘power holders’ or strategically positioned political or institutional agents (Doty 2007). This supports my argument about the multi-directional nature of institutionalised securitisations, where securitisation can become dispersed and amorphous, neither controlled nor initiated by the elites, and the state of exception can simultaneously prompt multiple ‘smaller’ or ‘unofficial’ decisions, be it vigilante groups, demonstrations, boycotts or personal discriminatory interactions shaped and justified by ‘the exception’.

Leaving the directionality and the emergence of a securitisation practice open gives a more significant role to the audience than actually theorised by the CS. In parallel with the CS, it also allows us to see securitisation as an argumentative process of negotiating existential threats between and among securitising actors and audiences. More importantly, it goes a step further than the CS, allowing us to study performatives beyond the security professionals as

\(^{17}\) In this case the sovereign refers to the Schmittian understanding and refers to the logic behind the securitising actors, meaning in their decision in creating discourse that decides who the enemy and where the existential danger is.

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well. As such, securitisation becomes better equipped to theorise institutionalised processes. Institutionalised securitisations open and expand the securitising move to different actors and underscore the role of the audience(s), where different actors may assume the role of the audience as well as the securitising actor simultaneously. Furthermore, institutionalised securitisation processes, where perceived threats are internalised and reproduced independently by the audience, who can simultaneously become the securitiser, would have significant implications for possible desecuritisation practices as well as their potential effectiveness.

According to the CS ‘securitisation can be either ad hoc or institutionalised’, stating that when a given threat is persistent or recurrent the response and sense of urgency become institutionalised (Buzan, Wæver et al. 1998:211). In parallel, Vuori notes how the identification of threats can become institutionalised through the use of ‘master signifiers’, which “decrease the need for elaborate arguments about the ‘securityness’ of specific cases”. Certain words like ‘terrorism’, ‘automatically bring the logic of danger ... whereby the necessity to combat them does not have to be argued every time’ (Vuori 2010:259). Turkish-Cypriots use the word ‘Anatolisation’ to imply that north Cyprus is being colonised and the demography is being changed by Turkey. They use the words ‘fica’ (seaweed), ‘karasakal’ (black-beard) or ‘gaco’ and ‘fellah’ (peasant/gypsy) to attach parasitic, criminal and backward connotations to Turkish immigrants. As such, we can see that the context plays a very significant role in institutionalised securitisations. For the audience to internalise the perceived threat on a collective level, engrain it into its routines and identity, there need to be collective experiences that are ‘sticky’. These collective experiences, such as the social trauma caused by the 9/11 terrorist attacks, create a reference point for the securitisation to ‘stick’ and become institutionalised. Considering that protracted conflicts nurture internalised perceptions of ‘enemy others’ and ‘us vs. them’ dichotomies, they provide an auspicious ground for securitisations to ‘stick’ and to become institutionalised.

However, in line with Doty’s argument, ‘institutionalised’ securitisation processes have multiple loci. Without a particular focus on the audience and performatives, hunting down an arbitrary speech-act as the discourse ‘unleashing’ securitisation process does not provide us
with added-value. Institutionalised securitisations do not simply happen following a speech-act and a brief inter-subjective process, nor do securitisation practices simply become institutionalised after the securitising speech-act is merely repeated ‘enough’ times. Even though it is hard to ‘measure’ institutionalised securitisations without using combined qualitative and quantitative methods, where opinion polls are corroborated with data from interviews and focus groups, or even observational work to show the degree of internalisation, considering how internalised and engrained the perception of security is, especially in conflict environments, they are not hard to ‘find’.

The exclusionary logic of securitisation becomes even more apparent when we analyse societal security where the enemy-other becomes another society or an ethnic group, and the security of one more often than not means insecurity of the other. We cannot speak about societal security without identifying the source of the threat, ‘the other’. In other words, societal “securitisation is rooted in the identity politics of Self and Other” (Buzan and Waever 2009:261). Thus, ‘societal’ survival, or rather the survival of collective identities may be sought in expense of others, when others are presented as existential threats to a society’s identity. As such, securitisation in the societal sector makes the kind of politics that defines the self on the basis of hostility, which necessitates the process of identifying and excluding/defeating the threatening other (Huysmans 1998). There is a common tendency in IR to lock self/other relationships, which are ultimately based on difference, into a win-lose logic and understand them from a mode of aversion and exclusion (Browning and Joenniemi 2013).

It can be argued that institutionalised securitisation of the Turkish immigrants in Cyprus goes beyond the persistence of threats, evolving into something socially diachronic and holistic (from the masses), despite the mainstream political discourse. Institutionalised securitisation of the Turkish immigrants by Turkish-Cypriots shows itself in widespread hate speech, nongovernmental actions such as Toplumsal Varolus Platformu (Communal Existence Platform), polarisation and ‘othering’ of the Turkish immigrants by the media and the like. In the minds of the many, the performatives of securitisation are politically and socially justified as ‘resistance’ or ‘self-defence’, because the political elite being dependent on Turkey in
myriad ways is ineffective or unwilling to address the existential threat and protect the very survival of Turkish-Cypriots.

Adamides and Balzacq explain that securitising practices and choices are influenced by specific set of dispositions unique to the social context, which means that identity, political positions and social norms of both the actors and the audiences have a deciding role on how the process develops (Balzacq 2005, Adamides 2012). This is what Balzacq calls the audience’s ‘psycho-cultural disposition’ (2005:172). In conflict environments, the psycho-cultural dispositions can usually be traced back to a reference point (i.e. a collective trauma). In the case of Cyprus, this reference point for Greek-Cypriots is the events of 1974, which was a collective trauma reproducing Turkey and people from Turkey as the ‘enemy other’. For Turkish-Cypriots, it is harder to point to a single pivotal event that securitised Turkey, the motherland who saved them from their ‘enemy other’. Institutionalisation and internalisation of the threat for Turkish-Cypriots occurred over time accumulating gradually with their frustration over non-recognition both politically and in terms of identity (not being recognised as having a distinct identity but as a continuation of Turkey, as Turks who happen to live in Cyprus) and their isolation, which is caused, at least partly, by Turkey. Thus, rather than tracing it back to a single event, it is also possible to go back in history to analyse the contributing collective and personal experiences of the audience. While 1974 was a collective trauma for all Greek-Cypriots and securitisation faced no resistance and opposition from the public or the elite (Adamides 2012), Turkish-Cypriots’ securitisation was incremental as not only was there no single event affecting ‘everybody’ but there was also resistance from the political elite. Thus, while the institutionalisation of the threat is more event-based for Greek-Cypriots, it is accumulated for Turkish-Cypriots.

Even though the CS notes that the persistence or recurrence of specific threats could lead to institutionalisation of the sense of urgency (Buzan, Wæver et al. 1998:27), which in turn reduces the need for questions concerning legitimacy, the process of institutionalised securitisations, its effects on actors and audiences and what it means for desecuritisation is left unexplored. More attention has been given to what Scott Watson calls ‘episodic forms of securitisation’ than institutionalised forms mainly due to a general commitment to the
speech-act and the importance of discursive practices (Watson 2009). According to the mainstream securitisation theory, securitisation follows a top-down elite driven process, facilitated by three felicity conditions that try to incorporate the social context into the theory (Buzan, Wæver et al. 1998:33, Vuori 2008). However, while the third felicity condition plays an important role in institutionalisation of security threats, the first and the second conditions exclusively indicate to an elite driven top-down approach and are not very helpful, specifically because institutionalised securitisations no longer necessitate the security speech-act to justify their status. Thus, the CS’s focus that is almost exclusively on discourse created by power holders can be expanded to include the performative side of securitisation with the help of the CS, and the role of institutionalised securitisations on identity narratives can be unpacked with the ontological security literature, to help us escape the conflation of difference with threatening.
1.4 Conclusion

From a larger system or international level perspective, the CS provides a more prescribed toolkit and a broader look at security from a sectoral analysis to gain more insight to wider “European security problematic in flux” (Huysmans 1998:480). On the other hand, the CS’s general interest lies within the European migration problematique, with a particular interest in insecuritisation, policing as a structuring practice and the politicisation of societal insecurities (such as hooligans, migration and border controls), from a more unitary internal security perspective (Guild and Bigo 2005). Both Schools however, have a constructed and negative view of (in)securitisation, where they voice preference for the normative twin of desecuritisation (Buzan, Wæver et al. 1998, Bigo 2002).

Overall, this chapter provided a literature review of the Copehangen and Paris schools of security and argued that we need to further contextualise our understanding of securitisation processes and expand our analysis to include multiple actors (civil society, media, elites), multiple layers (discourse, performances, routines) and multiple locus and directionalities (bottom-up and horizontal). The chapter also amalgamated both schools to better theorise institutionalised securitisation processes, which lack a linear logic and can be cyclical, dispersed and amorphous. Usually, linked to a collective societal trauma, which creates a ‘sticky’ environment for spreading fears, the threat becomes internalised with limited scrutiny. The multi-faceted and multi-directional nature of institutionalised securitisations that reach beyond political discourse and that are taken for granted can shape and reshape the attitudes and reconfigure identity narratives based on enemy others.

If we see securitisation as an argumentative negotiation, that can happen through accumulation of small securitising speech-acts and performatives, and acknowledge that the distinction between securitisers and the audience can be fuzzy, then it is not only the institutional knowledge or the technological means to deal with them that makes securitisation ‘impermeable’ (see Aradau 2004); the audience simultaneously being the securitiser, without ‘institutional knowledge’, or despite the institutional knowledge, can reproduce the perceived threat creating an unquestioned reality and a bottom-up demand for
emergency measures. As a result, (de)securitisation becomes closely linked with ontological security and (re)configuration of self and other relationships. To better understand institutionalised securitisations, we need to focus both on the discourse around security (however small or big) and on how the language of security translates into day-to-day practices and routines, which reconfigure identities and also shape the experiences with the enemy other on a daily basis.

Securitisation in the societal sector defines the other as a threat to one’s identity and reifies the identity of the self, leaving little or no room for the reconfiguration of the self/other relationship and thus making desecuritisation very difficult. Securitising an identity against a threat entails (re)drawing of those identity boundaries that may or may not have existed before the process of securitisation. Thus, the room left for desecuritisation to reconfigure the self/other relationship within this understanding of identity that conflates difference with threat, is very small. A broader and more critical approach to securitisation processes can provide the basis to contribute to the peace research literature and the case of Cyprus can provide the empirical foundations to understand under-theorised concepts of institutionalised securitisation and desecuritisation. Sharing both School’s preference for desecuritisation, I add the ontological security literature to the mixture in the next chapter, in order to establish a theoretical framework that can better explain institutionalised securitisation processes and better understand how identities that are securitised as existential threats become part of social reality and play into identity narratives of Cypriots, and into reconciliation and peacebuilding efforts.

For this thesis, empirical contributions, normative commitments to transformative peace and informing policy-making and peacebuilding efforts in Cyprus are as important as the theoretical contributions to securitisation and ontological security literatures. Thus, even though I would agree that both Schools have sufficient coherence and continuity to warrant that label as such (McSweeney 1996, Huysmans 1998, Collective 2006), this categorisation does not imply that the two approaches are incompatible, or that they are totally distinct and competing. Given that the ‘theory of securitisation’ has evolved into something more receptive and flexible since its inception, the authors of Case Collective too assert that this
categorisation can be misleading if taken too seriously (Collective 2006:447). As such, considering that securitisation grew to encompass both schools and beyond, this thesis treats securitisation as a ‘hollow signifier’ that assumes meaning with the context and the actors involved, amalgamates discursive and performative approaches inherent in the Copenhagen and Paris Schools of security, and expands its analysis to include the ‘social’ level.
Chapter 2. Theoretical Framework: Adding ontological security

2.1 Introduction: Just another ‘security’?

Even though ontological security is not a new concept in psychology and sociology, its application in IR is rather recent, though ever growing. Especially in the last two decades, non-traditional approaches to security have experienced a boost. We talk about environmental, economic, political, military, cyber, human and societal security. Thus, it is important to establish how ontological security is different than other non-traditional security approaches that take the concept of security beyond states and military.

Ontological security neither has a normative commitment to emancipation like critical security theories, nor does it prioritise survival over everything else. Basic trust, which is at the core of ‘hope’ and ‘the courage to be’, is the crucial difference ontological security provides to our understanding of security and self-identity that we cannot find in other non-traditional security studies (See Tillich 1962, Giddens 1991). In simple terms, ontological security is “a security of being, a sense of confidence and trust that the world is what it appears to be” and a sense of basic trust in our biographical continuity as who we are (Kinnvall 2004:30).

However, security studies in IR, including the critical approaches in security, have fallen into the pitfall of conflating ontological security with security-as-survival (physical security). Mainly due to the rationalistic approaches to security, and the prevalent Hobbesian understanding where survival is seen as the primary concern of actors, ontological security has been sidestepped particularly in conflict and peace studies. Many security scholars focus on discourses and practices of security-as-survival, where identity constructions depend on difference and difference automatically translates into danger, threat and behavioural othering (Wæver 1998, Williams 2003, Roe 2004).

For example, Roe’s analysis draws a direct relationship between the maintenance of distinctive identities and securitisation. Arguing that desecuritisation of minorities would undermine their distinctiveness, Roe reads identity configurations from an essentially ‘securitised’ lens, where the us/them dichotomy inherently becomes a securitised relation
based on survival (Roe 2006). Conversely, desecuritisation of minority rights would not necessarily undermine their collective distinctiveness, but it can end the reproduction of this distinctiveness through the representation of the majority as a threat (Rumelili 2013). Similarly, Behnke, argues that ‘inclusion and community can only be had at the price of exclusion and adversity’ (Behnke 2006:65). Consequently, this conflation of ontological security and security-as-survival in the literature reduces identity to a subject position constituted by discourses of fear and danger and ultimately locks desecuritisation into a vicious circle, where disrupting the friend/enemy dichotomy would undermine self-identity.

Fortunately, discourses of security are not necessarily an inescapable tool for (re)producing identity narratives. Rumelili, Steele, Huysmans and Mitzen all stress that actors do not only seek survival, and in fact they may often seek actions that jeopardise their very survival in their pursuit for ontological security (Steele 2005, Mitzen 2006, Rumelili 2015). As such, us/them dichotomies, which rely on understanding of identity based on difference, does not have to become a securitised relationship (Rumelili 2011). For Christopher Browning, “There is nothing natural or self-evident about the prioritisation of physical security in IR, and indeed such prioritisation arguably does little to account for either the emergence or resolution of many physical security issues” (Browning 2016:160). In parallel, Bahar Rumelili argues that we cannot properly theorise the identity-security nexus without distinguishing between ontological security and physical security (Rumelili 2013). She contends that desecuritisation especially in the societal sector, “is only possible because ontological security is distinct from and not reducible to physical security” (Rumelili 2011:8).

A lens that cannot imagine identities out of a relationship based on survival leaves no theoretical space for alternative identity constructions that would enable desecuritisation in a normative way, where difference is celebrated, or is simply seen as different without antagonistic connotations located in a zero-sum game (see Browning and Joenniemi 2013, Rumelili 2013). Thus, in the absence of this critical differentiation between ‘security-as-being’ and ‘security-as-survival’, the literature fails to account for the role of securitisation in identity narratives and for ontological security, and underestimates the potential of desecuritisation in reconfiguring self/other relationships and its transformative effects for reconciliation.
The aim of this chapter is to conceptualise ontological security, discuss whether it can be effectively scaled up for collective and state level analysis and establish its relationship with identity. Differentiating ontological security from societal security, the chapter will establish the analytical utility and added-value of ontological security for the theoretical framework. I will then offer my own understanding of ontological security as a spectrum rather than a fixed state of being. Lastly, the chapter will provide a forward looking conclusion about whether the desecuritisation of Turkish migrants and Turkishness can be used as a facilitating tool for reconciliation in Cyprus.
2.2 What is it and how does it relate to identity?

Conceptualisation of ontological security in the literature can be conflicting and elusive, which can prompt us to ask whether ontological security provides us with extra utility or added-value for our understanding of conflict, identity politics and societal security. How is it different than societal security or human security? How is it linked to self-identity or different than identity politics? Can we scale it up and extrapolate it to collectives and states? Is ontological security something actors have? Is it a state of being? A spectrum? Is it endogenously or exogenously constructed? And what does it mean to be ontologically (in)secure?

Unlike securitisation that views security as a negative, where security and insecurity share the same security problematique and do not constitute a binary opposition, ontological security can be seen as a positive security, meaning that actors desire it. In Wæver’s definition, the state of security suggests a situation marked by the presence of a security issue that includes a response, where the state of insecurity suggests that there is a security issue but no response (Wæver 1995). In this understanding, actors do not desire a situation conceptualised in security terms; when there is no security issue (asecurity), security becomes an irrelevant concern. Unlike security-as-survival, the concept of ontological security is something actors aspire for; it is about feeling secure in who we were, who we are and who we wish to be. When we are [ontologically] insecure, we feel uncomfortable with who we are on at least one level of our identity or another.

Ontological security was first coined by psychiatrist Ronald D. Laing, who described it as having a constant sense of presence in the world as real, alive and whole, and noted that in the absence of ontological security actors would be crushed under the burdens and anxieties of everyday life, feeling a continual and deadly threat (Laing 1971). Within the discipline of sociology, the term is most closely coupled with Anthony Giddens, who defined it as having the confidence in the continuity of the self. For Giddens, “to be ontologically secure is to possess, on the level of the unconscious and practical consciousness, answers to fundamental existential questions which all human life in some way addresses”, which allows actors to
manage the inherent anxieties of everyday life (Giddens 1991:47). He explains that, self-identity is the development of a consistent feeling of a self-biography, whereas ontological security is about the confidence an individual has in sustaining a biographical continuity through establishing a system of basic trust for the real world and for social relations with others (Giddens 1991).

Self-biography is the form of ‘discursive consciousness’ manifested in self-narrative, through which agents create meanings for their actions (Giddens 1984:374). Self-narratives add meaning to actors self-identity; they are the expressions of our ‘reality production’ (Steele 2008:11). Individuals have multiple identities (i.e. gender, ethnic, religious, sex, national, ideological, occupational and so on), thus we constitute our self-identity through multi-layered identity narratives. As a result, self gains coherence, at least to some extent. Alternatively, for Neumann, “the making of selves is a narrative process of identification whereby a number of identities that have been negotiated in specific contexts are strung together into one overarching story...” (Neumann 1999:218). Thus, self-narratives are central to the study of ontological security.

Mostly drawing on Giddens’ work, the concept of ontological security has given birth to a growing body of literature in IR (McSweeney 1999, Kinnvall 2004, Steele 2005, Mitzen 2006, Roe 2008, Steele 2008, Zarakol 2010, Lupovici 2012, Browning and Joenniemi 2013). Even though there is no consensus among IR scholars on whether states, collectives or groups are primarily driven by ontological security seeking/producing practices, McSweeney, Huysmans, Mitzen and Steele have all convincingly argued that collectives care about their ontological security as much as – if not more than – their physical security (Huysmans 1998, McSweeney 1999, Steele 2005, Mitzen 2006). Along similar lines, other scholars from the constructivists tradition, such as Wendt, assert that states, like individuals, have both physical and social motivations (Wendt 1999).

I take the position that ontological security can be extrapolated to collective or state level, not simply because it is common in IR to personify states, but because both collectives and states narrate their biographies and value their existence as per those biographies. A sense of
belonging to a nation, ethnicity or group is consolidated based on a narrative that promises continuation, without which ‘membership’ cannot acquire meaning. Therefore, collectives/states would naturally seek actions that may alleviate challenges to their self-narrative. Kinnvall, who centralises the role of narrative, suggests that organising history in a particular way constructs a salient narrative for group self-identity (Kinnvall 2004). Steele maintains that we can extrapolate individual feelings to states, and for the purposes of this thesis, to collectives, not because everyone does it, but because individuals are attached to their collective identities and states (Steele 2008).

Self-identity has an intimate relationship with group identities (be it social, political, familial groups); we feel a certain level of attachment to the narrative our collectives/states provide for our own self-identity. Ontological security is as much about memory and history of being as it is about the future of being (continuity of being). Thus, it is not far-fetched to argue that collective identities and states, that too construct their narratives on their pasts, seek ontological security as much as individuals. Collective identities and states can provide individuals with ancestry that reaches beyond their lifetime and add meaning, a sense of immortality, to their existence. However, the argument here is not that ontological security is an alternative account for understanding collective or state behaviour, but that it provides us with a more complete picture especially when we are studying security and conflict.

Mitzen defends the argument about scaling up ontological security, contending that assumptions about individuals help us explain macro-level patterns and ontological security of collectives/states reinforce the ontological security of its members (Mitzen 2006). Conceptually, the idea of a group, collective or a state cannot exist without a story that develops a sense of continuity for its members; collectives and “states have a historical account of themselves that has been built up through the narrative of agents of the past, present and the future” (Steele 2008:20). In his book ‘Modernity and Self-Identity’, Giddens points that “people in all cultures including the most resolutely traditional, distinguish future, present and past, and weigh alternative courses of action in terms of likely future considerations” (Giddens 1991:48). At the very least, collectives and states have identity commitments based on their narratives, and by extension they can experience challenges to
these identity commitments, which means they too seek ontological security. Steele eloquently stresses that “the process of the construction of self for any individual and collective is so complex that it might defy understanding, yet we can investigate particular components of that construction”, such as narrative, history, memory or actions and routines that reflect those narratives (Steele 2008:49). As such, this thesis accepts the assumption that ontological security and identity are important for collectives as well as individuals.

The concept of identity is ambiguous and frustratingly complex. According to McSweeney, the human and moral connotations of identity make it a popular subject and “its apparent subjectivity makes everyone an expert” because its fundamental character as an “inalienable human property blocks all criticism and makes it a secure possession” (McSweeney 1996:86, 87). It is almost a self-declaration or a self-revelation, not always on the level of consciousness, with many layers, some lax and some more rigid but it is fundamental to who we are. Even though the epistemology of identity is highly disputed, one thing that most scholars can agree on is that identity is not a fact of society but it is rather fluid and amorphous (Giddens 1991, Campbell 1998, Kinnvall 2004, Lupovici 2012). Collective identity is not ‘out there’ waiting to be discovered; rather what is ‘out there’ is identity discourse entailing the process of constructing, negotiating and affirming a response to the demand for a collective image (McSweeney 1996).

Giddens explains that “the identity of the self... presumes reflexive awareness ... It is the self as reflexively understood by the person in terms of her or his biography” (Giddens 1991:52-53). For states and collectives, this self-biography is their historical narrative interpreted and (re)produced over time. Identity is not a property or a fact of society; it is a process of negotiation, a choice, a construct made by people, politicians, and historians alike. The collective question, ‘Who are we?’ cannot be answered simply by reference to opinion polls, ancient myths, folk music or other measures of collective history. For McSweeney, being English, Irish, Danish is a consequence of political and social processes, and “it is that process, not the label symbolising it, which constitutes the reality that needs explication” (McSweeney 1999:85-90). Although, ‘we are who we choose to be’ overstates our freedom in the matter and disregards the social, material and political relationships that are integral to shaping
identity narratives, collective identity is not a property of society that transcends agency. As such, we cannot decide on the status or the relevance of identity a priori, identity can be the cause of a conflict but it is just as likely to be its effect (McSweeney 1996).

Nonetheless, we cannot deny our need for a secure stable self-identity or our need to belong to some group, community or society. Nor can we deny that some sense of common identity is a product of living together in common, or that national or ethnic identities can become a security problem (McSweeney 1999). In fact, social psychologists such as Herbert Kelman assert that identity is both a psychological need in itself and a mobilising force toward the fulfilment of needs (Kelman 2007). Similarly, according to Janice Stein’s simple but effective definition, identity is the way in which a person is, or wishes to be known by others, meaning it is the conception of self in relation to others (Stein 2002).

Even though there is somewhat of a consensus among scholars that identity is a social construct, the literature is divided on how scholars view identity construction; while some scholars like Steele and Wendt argue that it is an endogenous process (Wendt 1999, Steele 2008), others like Rumelili and Mitzen maintain that identity is dependent on difference, hence the process is exogenous (Rumelili 2004, Mitzen 2006). Steele stresses that identities can emerge endogenously, not just “in the dialectic between self and other but within the internal dialectic that arises from the ontological security-seeking process” (Steele 2008:32). In his analysis, I must first know self before I can relate it to an other. Similarly, Wendt downplays the role of difference in identity formation by arguing that corporate identities are “constituted by self-organising homeostatic structures”, and therefore are “constitutionally exogenous to otherness” (Wendt 1999:224). On the contrary, Mitzen claims that identities are constituted and sustained through social relationships rather than being intrinsic properties of actors (Mitzen 2006:35). Adopting a middle ground, Zarakol, argues that it is a chicken and egg situation, identity is both endogenously and exogenously constructed. For example, she points out that it is difficult to identify whether it is the identity-challenging interactions that are the main source of ontological insecurity, or whether insecure interactions are merely a symptom of an actor’s uncertainty about its self-identity (Zarakol 2010). Although this sounds like a problematique in establishing a causal relationship rather than a problematique about
the ontology of identity construction, Prozorov underlines that internal and external processes of identity construction cannot be disassociated from each other, and that temporal (self-narratives) and spatial (relations with others) identity formations cannot be detached (Prozorov 2011). Yet, I maintain that self does not come into existence without relating to an other; it cannot be assumed independent of an other, or the social and material environment. Make no mistake, the other does not have to be external to the self, but can be an othered-self established within an internal dialectic through reflexivity (see Rumelili 2004). In other words, however internal, the process of identity construction cannot exclusively be endogenous devoid of a relational relationship based on a different other.

We are who we are because we draw the boundaries of our identities based on what we are not. The world is built upon relative dichotomies, however minor they may be. Identities are always constituted in relation to difference because a thing can only be known by what it is not. We would not know who we are if we lacked any kind of interaction with the outside world where we could establish reference points of difference to establish our own distinctiveness. In Wibben’s words, “we cannot understand what it means to be inside without at the same time understanding who or what is outside” (Wibben 2013:86-88).

Giddens, who notes that “learning what is not me” is the origin of self-identity, affirms the discursive necessities that make identity dependent on difference (Giddens 1991:42). At the same time however, Giddens also points to endogenous formations of identity and asserts that self-identity is “…something that has to be routinely created and sustained in the reflexive activities of the individual” (Giddens 1991:52). Still, a reflexive approach to self-identity and an emphasis on relationships are not mutually exclusive approaches to identity construction. In fact they overlap to an extent that it becomes impossible to separate reflexivity from relation. Self-narratives always need the rule of relativity/difference to be produced and sustained even if that difference is reflexively created. As long as identity has boundaries, whether flexible or rigid, there are those that are in and those that are out, which means those that are out are different to the ‘self’ – an old self, a worse self, an othered-self or a different other.
Rumelili, using the EU as a case where its own confrontational war-torn past is othered, asserts that a relationist ontology does not presume the other be external to self; hence it is compatible with Steele’s idea of ‘internal dialectic’ (Rumelili 2004). Even though ontological security requires differentiation and in that sense presupposes an other, these may be minor distinctions that are recognised in the context of similarity, positive identification and friendship or they may be major distinctions that situate the self and other as polar opposites (Rumelili 2004). Therefore, although actors need to distinguish themselves from other actors to be able to exist, difference need not to always appear as negative (Browning and Joenniemi 2013). Embracing a relationist approach, I concede the interaction of the self with the social and material environment cumulatively constructs the subjective biographical narrative of the self. However, this construction is “not destined to translate into mutually exclusive and incompatible categories of subjectivity” (Browning and Joenniemi 2013:493). Browning emphasises that “the very notion of friendship (at both the individual and inter-state level) suggests alternative options are available for anchoring ontological security that may even (and often does) include an active appreciation of difference. ...Rather than being built on antagonism, it [friendship] is a positive form of difference premised on equality, respect and solidarity” (Browning 2016:169).

In order to better understand how ontological security is interlinked but different than identity, we should turn back to Giddens; he explains that to ‘be’ is to have ontological awareness; though closely related, ontological awareness is not the same as awareness of self-identity (Giddens 1991). For him, ontological security is about having an element of trust in the continuity of identity not only for the present but also for the future. In a sociological and psychological context, ontological security develops with self-identity and trust, as a continuance of life, self and the existence of the real world. The two are closely related in the developing experience at infancy. Drawing on Erik Erikson and Donald Winnicott, Giddens centralises the concept of ‘basic trust’ for self-identity, which emerges from “the original nexus that combines emotive-cognitive orientation towards others and the object-world”(Giddens 1991:38). The concept of ‘basic trust’ is integral for both the concept of ‘hope’ and what Tillich calls ‘the courage to be’ (Tillich 1962) as it acts as a shield to block off negative possibilities that loom in the background of actors’ daily lives.
Developing a sense of ‘basic trust’ starts at infancy for individuals, and this infancy can translate to the inception of group identities (i.e. nation-building). The infant, who is on the brink of unimaginable anxiety is called into existence by the environment provided by the caretaker; as such, the infant develops a self in response to the social and material context it experiences (Giddens 1991). In Giddens’ words “The ‘struggle of being against non-being’ is the perpetual task of the individual, not just to accept reality, but to create ontological reference points as an integral aspect of ‘going on’ in the contexts of day-to-day life. In ‘doing’ everyday life, all human beings ‘answer’ the question of being...” (Giddens 1991:48). Hence, routines become integral for ontological security, as they nourish the trust we have in our social and material environment, and help us manage endless possibilities that can create chaos and anxiety. Mitzen, for example, resembles ontological security to a immunity vaccination against all that can possibly go wrong, stating that it serves “the important emotional function of ‘inoculating’ individuals against the paralytic, deep fear of chaos”, without which we would feel a deep sense of incapacitating anxiety (Mitzen 2006:347). At some level, ontological security is concerned with repetition, which creates a coping mechanism and provides stability and predictability (Browning and Joenniemi 2013).

According to Giddens, to be ontologically secure is to possess answers to fundamental existential questions about life and it is based on our ability to be recognised as belonging (Giddens 1991). Thus, “the responses of the other are necessary to the sustaining of an ‘observable/accountable’ world” (Giddens 1991:52). Once again, this indicates that ontological security cannot be separated from the self/other configurations. Goffman and Butler assert that the self always needs an audience. The ‘presentation of self’ is always designed for an audience, even if that audience is imaginary or self observing (Goffman 2012). In other words, identity is about becoming intelligible to one’s self and to others (Wetherell 2009), and according to Butler being intelligible includes engaging with current forms of social recognition (Butler 2004). Similarly, Kinnvall supports that ontological security is essentially a quest for a stable narrative about the self but stresses the “intersubjective ordering of relations” (Kinnvall 2004:748), which refers to the way individuals or collectives define themselves in relation to others.
Consequently, self-identity and ontological security is dependent on and in part the property of our relationships with others; basic trust in the nature of those relationships and acknowledgement of others is necessary to reproduce and bolster self-identity and ontological security. As Browning and Joenniemi points out, our basic trust in relating to the other(s) is not dependent on an assessment about how ‘trustworthy’ the other is, but rather how predictable the relationship itself is (Browning and Joenniemi 2013). In other words, do we know what to expect from those relationships and how much do we trust in the nature of the relationship, whether it is based on enmity or friendship? In its simplest form, our relationship and experience of the social and material world reflexively constructs our self-narrative, and the sense of basic trust provides us with a sense of continuity, which is key to our understanding of ontological security as linked but distinct from self-identity.
2.3 How is ontological security any different?

Ontological security revolves around concepts such as trust, hope, shame and anxiety rather than survival, power, risk and fear as the locus of its ontology is in psychology rather than politics. These distinctions are particularly critical for understanding the added-value of ontological security in security studies. In addition to the concept of ‘basic trust’, which is the anchor of an ontologically secure individual that allows her to deal with the challenges of everyday life and existential anxieties, the concept of anxiety as opposed to fear, as well as the concept of shame as opposed to guilt, is integral to our understanding of ontological security.

Giddens distinguishes anxiety from fear, and guilt from shame. He explains that fear is a response to an identified threat and thus has a definite object, where as anxiety is a generalised state of the emotions, not always on the level of consciousness and has no object (Giddens 1991). For example, the two-layer approach to societal security proposed by Rumelili (Rumelili 2011, Rumelili 2013), where she calls for a separation between security-as-survival and security-as-being, is rooted in this differentiation of fear and anxiety. Similarly, shame does not depend on identified rules and laws, it occurs when there is a disconnect between our actions and our self-narrative. Young defines shame as “…a self-directed adverse judgement, tied to the idea that this individual now feels he is not the kind of person he assumed himself to be, hoped to be or ought to be; and an audience before which he now feels degraded” (Young 1997:220). In other words, it is an internal, private sense of transgression, where no official rule had been broken (Steele 2008). However, these emotive distinctions and the conceptual distinction between security-as-being and security-as-survival can cause dissonance when they are not mutually reassuring such as breaking the rules (guilt) to avoid shame because we feel morally compelled to do something; or not breaking the rules to avoid guilt but as a result feeling shame because we failed to do anything; or remaining in abusive relationships (fear) because anxiety about what we will become out of that relationship is too much to manage.
Steele explains that the constructivist view that identities and interests are co-constituted means that it is unnatural for actors to identify one way and perform in another, hence shame occurs when actors feel anxiety about the ability of their narrative in reflecting their behaviour (Steele 2008). Or put another way, we feel shame when there is a miss-match between our self-narrative, who we say we are, and our actions; when we fail to reconcile our actions or decisions with our biographical narrative to justify our behaviour. Steele demonstrates the distinction between guilt and shame using actors’ responses to humanitarian crisis. In his analysis, despite ‘liberal’ regimes may not feel guilty when they fail to act in a humanitarian crisis, they may feel shame because inaction is inconsistent with their sense of integrity and self-identity (Steele 2008). In response to shame, actors can show remorse and adapt their routines reflexively, or engage in counterfactual practices and compulsively stick to their routines in order to mask their feeling of shame. Steele and Mitzen agree that rigid routines constrain actors in their ability to ‘learn’, they prevent us from adapting, limit our subjectivity and instead insert objectivity (Mitzen 2006:364, Steele 2008:60).

Lupovici takes the concept of shame and dissonance a step further by pointing out that identity and behavioural changes that are needed to address a particular anxiety may in fact add another dimension of ontological insecurity by creating “a gap between the identity and the expected resulting practices” (Lupovici 2012:817). This is what he calls ontological dissonance; in contrast to cognitive dissonance, which is studied at the individual level of analysis, Lupovici introduces the term ontological dissonance to represent a dissonance experienced by collective actors. Different from ‘identity conflict’, which means that there is a clash between the identities held by collective actors, and ‘identity dissonance’, meaning that there is clash between one of the identities and the actor’s behaviour, ‘ontological dissonance’ denotes a clash between the measures taken to address the threats to the different identities. Ontological dissonance specifically occurs when a practice that aims to secure one of the identities that actors hold challenges another identity held by the same actor (Lupovici 2012). Lupovici’s analysis can be read as a more intricate way of understanding the concept shame; the dissonance does indicate a disconnect between the self-identity
narratives and the actors’ actions and decisions, but it particularly emphasises the complexity of multi-layered identity narratives and points to a clash across different layers.

However, anxiety does not necessarily translate into shame, or it is not necessarily a negative condition. Even though Tillich stresses that all anxiety boils down to ‘non-being’ and relates to situations where our identity narratives or self-integrity is being challenged, and triggers a sense of meaninglessness (Tillich 1962:38), anxiety is also key to a reflexive and, in Heidegger’s terms, to an ‘authentic’ life. For Heidegger, an authentic life is when the being does not just physically exist as alive but is aware of the prospect and scope of its own mortality (Heidegger 2002). What he referred as ‘Dasein’ was this self-aware reflexive ‘being’, who could lead an authentic life, and who cannot be decontextualised from the world it lives in (Heidegger 2002). Heidegger’s Dasein is partly influenced by Nietzsche’s equivocal and highly debated work on ‘will to power’, which contemplates human motivation and drive for self-affirmation, self-preservation and self-realisation (Nietzsche 1968). For Heidegger, and in part for Nietzsche as well, our fear and self-awareness about the prospect of an inevitable death is what makes authentic life a possibility. Authentic life in Heidegger’s terms is possible for collectives as well, as they too recognise mortality, and thus, feel urgency for their biographical continuity and mark on history.

Steele, who views daily anxiety positively, underlines that anxiety can serve as a reminder of humanity (Steele 2008). Despite actors’ temptation towards eliminating anxieties inherent to daily life, without them, actors would lack reflection and the motivation to act. A certain level of anxiety allows actors to live as beings beyond merely surviving. However, anxieties can become multi-layered, deeply existential and unmanageable. While ‘some’ anxiety is good, ‘a lot’ of anxiety can be incapacitating. As such, actors who are incapacitated by existential anxieties can turn to counterfactual narratives (i.e. denial) or to securitisation to identify a source for their anxieties (i.e. blame). Yet, when faced with existential anxieties, actors are usually tempted to find quick solutions to avoid distancing from the self-narratives (i.e. adaptation). Reconfiguration of historical and institutionalised self-narratives is difficult and unattractive for actors, because distancing from the self can risk lacerated, decapitated sense of being (Steele 2008), a state Laing refers to as ‘disembodied self’ or the ‘divorced self’ (Laing
Steele warns that over-excavation and too much reflexivity can result in self-negating action and endanger ‘paralysis by analysis’ (Steele 2008:62).

Steele, theorising anxiety at the state level, introduces agency as a condition for our conceptualisation of anxiety. In his words, “We feel anxiety not about those things that are outside of our control, but about those we perceive to be in the realm of our possible agency” (Steele 2008:61). Drawing in Kierkegaard, he argues that absolute emancipation can create ‘dizziness’ and incapacitating anxieties, and to bring order to our freedom and anchor our dizziness, we construct routines. “It is precisely because routines reduce our freedom that we find hem comforting. They reduce the number of things about which we can feel anxious” (Steele 2008:61). As a result, Steele concedes that the more power and capability agents have, the higher levels of anxiety they would feel due to their increased sense of ‘responsibility’. The role agency plays in different levels of anxiety actors experience, hence its links with the capacity to think ahead and to anticipate future possibilities in relation to the chosen action, did not escape Giddens. Drawing on Freud, Giddens claims that the extent of anxiety felt in any given situation “depends on a persons knowledge and sense of power vis-à-vis the external world” (Giddens 1991:43-44). Therefore, if the self completely lacked reflexivity in relation to its environment, or if it did not perceive change to be within its capacity, it would also lack agency, and hence would feel neither shame, nor anxiety.

Ontological security, though related, is different from other non-traditional security concepts like societal security. Even though identity is integral to both ontological security and societal security, the latter is associated with a negative, threat-based and survivalist conception of security. It refers to the failure of dealing with issues within the realm of normal politics and as such, securitisation of issues as existential threats to legitimise the use of emergency measures (Buzan, Wæver et al. 1998). We speak of societal security when there is an articulated existential threat to a society’s identity. Hence, societal security deals with identifiable threats and dangers, and in that sense refers to ‘fear’ rather than ‘anxiety’. On the other hand, ontological security, which is based on basic trust to deal with anxieties of the real-world that are not identifiable, is associated with a positive conception of security that enables the ‘owner’ to ‘to be’ and ‘to go on’ (Giddens 1991). McSweeney sees ontological
security as a “property of a relationship, a quality making each secure in the other” (McSweeney 1999:15). Nonetheless, for Rumelili, ontological security also usurps the value distinction between positive and negative security; what makes the self secure in the other could be a negative relationship of enmity and hostility as well as a positive one of friendship and harmony (Rumelili 2013). Hence, ontological security does not presuppose a threat to identity but is concerned with its stability.

Furthermore, identity is treated as an external variable in societal security, and it always refers to the process of securing a collective identity (i.e. does not apply to individuals). Although, the CS does not reify identities as something objective and given, it assumes their de facto stability and rigidness over the limited periods relevant to the analysis of a particular securitisation event (Buzan and Wæver 1997, Theiler 2003). Wæver defines societal security as “the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats” (Wæver 1993:23). Hence, unlike this conceptualisation of identity as a pre-constituted and fixed ‘commodity’ that is secured from an ‘attack’, for ontological security, the concern is not an identifiable threat to a given identity but an enduring quest for a stabile narrative.

Steele succinctly states that “being a human being means knowing both what one is doing and why one is doing it” (Steele 2005:526). An ontologically secure actor can produce answers to fundamental existential questions and relay these answers in her actions, which are turned into routines that reaffirm self-identity and reproduce basic trust in the real world and the relations with others (Giddens 1991). Giddens stresses the importance of various forms of routines in developing ontological security; “the discipline of routine helps to constitute a formed framework for existence by cultivating a sense of being and its separation from non-being, which is elemental to ontological security” (Giddens 1991:39). Thus, ontological security is essentially concerned with “a sense of knowing what to expect” that is grounded in stability providing routines in the social world (Browning and Joenniemi 2013:495). Therefore, the pursuit of societal security within the securitisation framework is distinct from ontological security, inasmuch it is about defending collective identities against identified threats, a distinction which ultimately reflects Giddens’ differentiation between fear and anxiety.
2.4 Ontological security: A fundamental need or an unattainable quest?

The ontological security literature is ambivalent about whether ontological security is always a never-ending pursuit of security maximisation for an ideal complete identity-narrative or a fixed state of being. Neither Laing’s nor Giddens’ conceptualisation clearly contemplate this distinction. Even though Giddens notes that “self-identity is not something that is just given, as a result of the continuities of the individual’s action-system, but something that has to be routinely created and sustained in the reflexive activities of the individual”, which indicates to a shifting spectrum of experiencing being; he also talks about ontological security as a personal quality, or an ability (Giddens 1991:62). Similarly, Ronald D. Laing, who coined the phrase ‘ontological security’ in his book titled ‘The Divided Self’, defines it as “a centrally firm sense of one’s own and other people’s reality and identity” (Laing 1990:39). However, it is unclear whether Laing treats ontological security as something we have, a position we hold, or a shifting sense of being experienced as a continuous journey that is not fully on the level of consciousness. He interchangeably refers to it as a ‘sense of being’ and as a ‘basic existential position’ in which a person ‘has a firm core of ontological security’ (Laing 1990:39, 4, 42). While modes of experiencing a coherent sense of being would be better understood as a spectrum, conceptualising ontological security as a basic existential position implies that ontological security is a quality that can be possessed. In this fourth section of the chapter, I will contemplate what it means to be ontologically (in)secure for individuals and collectives, and argue that ontological security is an oscillating spectrum rather than a quality or a fixed state of being.

According to Giddens, as well as others such as Steele, ontologically secure actors can adapt and change their routines through reflexive behaviour under ‘critical situations’ that create anxieties and challenge self-identity by imperilling the sense of basic trust (Giddens 1991, Steele 2005:526). According to Giddens, critical situations are “circumstances of a radical disjuncture of an unpredictable kind which affect substantial numbers of individuals, situations that threaten or destroy the certitudes of institutionalised routines” (Giddens 1984:61). An agent is ontologically secure when they choose a course of action that complies with their sense of self-identity. If critical situations, or traumas (e.g. a near death accident,
separation, rejection, structural/territorial/political transformations) become very frequent or reach a high intensity, actors may fail to manage the resulting existential anxieties because their routine is incapable of accommodating such circumstances, which creates ontological insecurity (Giddens 1991, Steele 2005). Kinnvall explains a state of ontological insecurity as a disruption where the self has lost its anchor to its identity narrative and, consequently, its ability to sustain the coherence of its narrative and answer questions about doing, acting, and being (Kinnvall 2004). Mitzen and Zarakol point out that unmanageable existential anxieties may arise from deep uncertainty, a sudden change in the identity definitions that tie the self to the objective world, and/or from the failure to be acknowledged and affirmed by others, which can pull the actor into incapacitating state of ontological insecurity overwhelmed by the confusion about which dangers to confront and which to ignore (Mitzen 2006, Zarakol 2010).

In other words, existential anxieties appear when a person’s self-identity is challenged, but an individual who is ontologically secure can deal with these anxieties reflexively and can change and adapt to circumstances (Giddens 1991). Accordingly, Rumelili underlines that “in a state of ontological security, the self experiences a stable, certain, and consistent social existence, where it remains in control about its identity and capacity for action” (Rumelili 2013:8). For Steele, “ontological security comes about when agents continue to choose actions which they feel reflect their sense of identity” (Steele 2008:52). As such, ontologically secure actors can manage day-to-day anxieties, adapt in the face of critical situations and continue to ‘be’. This analysis seems to assume that ontological security is something actors can ‘have’, or a fixed state, like being ‘zen’, rather than a constant on-going and never-ending quest for maximising the feeling of ontological security.

However, I argue that ontological security is not a binary state of being where the self is either secure about its identity or not. Ontological security is not a quality that ‘comes about’. Identity is never complete, there is no final destination, or an absolute state. Actors’ self-narratives are a constant work in progress, responding to, interpreting and negotiating their experiences in the social and material world. Their identities are multi-layered, and by extension so are their self-narratives, and again, by extension so are their anxieties. Considering that ontological security is not external to self-identity, and that neither does it
develop independent of self-identity, assuming it can be a fixed state of being severs this intricate and organic interdependence and co-constitution. Security-as-being can only be as complete as being itself. Thus, I argue that as identity is fluid and ever shifting, actors are all ontological security seekers, always engaged in the pursuit of maximising their sense of ontological security in search of a more stable identity. For Kinnvall, who contends that social constructivism can only explain collective identity as something more than the sum of the individuals involved precisely because it locates identity construction in the process of becoming, rather than complete, “the fact that individuals search for one stable identity does not mean, however, that such identities exist” (Kinnvall 2004:747).

Therefore, the view of identity as constructed, incomplete, fluid and multi-layered concept also needs to acknowledge that different layers of our identities can be simultaneously challenged. Hence, actors can experience different levels of anxiety directed at different layers simultaneously. Although being in a state of absolute ontologically security is the ideal end point, in practice, actors travel on a spectrum of ontological security and insecurity moving along the line of unfulfilled ontological security. Those of us who enjoy a more developed sense of basic trust in our relationships with others and the social world, and have stronger sense of continuity may feel closer to the secure end of the spectrum, where we do not perceive a disconnect between our behaviour and self-identity, where our self-narrative is not existentially challenged, and where we have the capacity to perform ontological security seeking actions that can effectively address our anxieties. In other words, on the secure end of the spectrum, we enjoy a stronger ability to manage anxieties and adapt routines when faced with critical situations.

On the other hand, those of us who are closer to the insecure end of the spectrum may feel heightened anxieties that are difficult to manage, or shame caused by inconsistent behaviour, or simultaneous challenges at more than one identity level. For example, a sudden change in identity narratives such as betrayal of a ‘friend’ or rejection by the in-group may trigger incapacitating anxieties on one level while the actor may still be feeling reaffirmed and coherent on another level of her identity. Thus, I argue that all actors seek actions that try to maximise their ontological security but their effectiveness and reflexiveness depend on the
capacity of the actors, the multitude and the level of anxiety experienced at different identity layers, and significance of those layers of identity to the overall self-narrative. If the search for a complete identity does not have destination, and the desire to eliminate all anxieties is unachievable, then we can concede that our desire for a complete identity that experiences the absolute ontological security utopia is not only an unattainable quest, it is an undesirable end, because it is this quest that provides the opportunity for an authentic life.

Those actors that are closer to the insecure end of the spectrum may have compulsive rather than reflexive and adaptive attitudes towards routines. They may lack the capacity to deal with anxiety producing critical situations or may seek to securitise others in search of a more stable identity due to their lack of confidence in their biographical continuity. These actors would find it particularly hard to trust the objective world and their relationships with others; and their ontological security seeking practices may create dissonance with other layers of their identity. Collectives would most likely disintegrate in a state of absolute and complete ontologically insecurity, where they lack basic trust, continuity, acknowledgement and affirmation on every identity level. As identity is multi-layered, so are the experienced feelings of security and insecurity. Anxieties in one identity-layer may be incapacitatingly high, but on another level, they can be just right for reflexive behaviour. As a result, actors can move along the spectrum depending on the intensity and the number of anxieties that challenge their multi-layered identity narratives. For example, changing our gender identity may be reaffirming one layer of our identity-narrative while challenging another. Or, in the case of Cyprus, reaching a comprehensive settlement may be addressing anxieties by affirming the European identity narrative of Turkish-Cypriots but at the same time challenging their ethnic identity narratives that depend on a historic enmity with Greek-Cypriots. Or, the UK may be ontologically secure with regards to its relationship with the USA but not with the EU.

Giddens notes “self-identity is not a distinctive trait, or even a collection of traits, possessed by the individual. It is the self as reflexively understood by the person in terms of her or his biography.” (Giddens 1991:53). Therefore, we can interpret ontological security as a constant journey rather than an acquired quality in itself. Giddens also explains that self-identity and routines are both robust and fragile. Self-identity is fragile because the biography of the self is
only one ‘story’ among many other possible stories that could be told about the self, and it is robust because a sense of self-identity is often securely held against major tensions and critical situations, as actors seek to maintain their self-identity and resist change (Giddens 1991). The same is valid for routines, they are both rigid and delicate, because even though they reproduce trust, they are begotten by actors’ self-identity, which is fluid (Steele 2005).

Ontological security is based on the cumulative narrative of the self that transpires into routines. This self-biography is the accumulation of experiences, relationships and (dis)trust towards some material and social world. Every drop that adds to this self-narrative affects the sum by reaffirming or challenging it, thus it has an effect, however hefty or minute, on our sense of ontological security too.

Since eliminating all anxiety is not possible or desirable, achieving a holistic fully complete state of ontological security too is not attainable nor is it desirable. We maximise it by planning, routinising, trusting, reaffirming, insuring and securitising. It becomes something we desire, but are never able to close on an end in itself where we are secure in ourselves completely and absolutely. Pointing to Jean Paul Sartre’s “Being and Nothingness”, Woolley argues that having an absolute sense of ontological security would mean denying our status as a being ‘for-itself’ rather than ‘in-itself’, it is living in the past where all possibilities are foregone (Woolley 2007:184). In Derrida’s terms, state of self is always open, and it is this open-endedness of existence that allows us to live and experience being with possibilities (Derrida and Ewald 1995). Absolute ontological security would mean closing the self-narrative, which is effectively ‘non-existing’. Hence, completely securing the self in-itself would mean being becomes static, and like ‘death’, self becomes that of the past. This does not mean we do not seek coherent consistent narratives and try to secure ourselves in-ourselves, but thankfully, such a state of ontological security is unattainable. While Woolley conceptualises ontological security as a sense of being at peace with the conditions of ones existence as one authentically experiences it, and terms it ‘ontological quietude’ (Woolley 2007:184), I conceptualise it as an unfulfilled ontological security journey on a spectrum stretching from secure to insecure.
2.5 Conclusion

This chapter provided a literature review on ontological security, and explored its intricate relationship with identity. Establishing ontological security as a distinct concept from security-as-survival that can be extrapolated to states and collectives, the chapter adopted a conceptualisation of ontological security as an ongoing quest for a consistent and coherent biographical self-narrative rather than a binary state of being. Despite the inherent elusiveness of the concept, which is not overtly cognitive and at times beyond capture; interpreting Laing’s and Giddens’ writings that beheld ontological security as a ‘reflexive project of the self’, I argue that is best viewed as a constant work in progress that is never complete, or a journey without a destination (Laing 1971, Giddens 1991:5). In this analysis, absolute ontological security is neither attainable, nor desirable because it closes the door on the opportunity for an authentic life.

In contrast to the securitisation framework where security does not refer to an ideal state but to a state where the self experiences concern about imminent threat and danger, in an ideal state of ontological security (towards the secure end of the spectrum), the self enjoys existential stability, certainty and continuity and the actor feels confident about her identity and capacity for action. On the insecure end of the spectrum, the self feels high levels of existential anxiety and lacks the capacity to effectively manage those anxieties. While the ideal state for the securitisation framework would be a state of asecurity, where the self experiences no concerns about imminent threat or danger, it is difficult to talk about a case of ontological asecurity where the self is not concerned about pursuing a stable and constant identity. In such a state, conceptualising basic trust, relationships with others and the real world would be very difficult, if not impossible.

This chapter mainly aimed to add another key theoretical layer to the first chapter on the securitisation framework, where I argued for broadening it to different actors and beyond speech-acts. Since multi-directional institutionalised securitisations can escape the securitising actors’ discourses and result in cognitive and behavioural changes, they are closely intertwined with ontological security due to their innately performative nature. Consequently,
because security-as-being is as important for actors, if not more so, as physical security or security as survival, conflation of the two in the literature limited the way we understand the relationship between security and identity and the way we theorise desecuritisation. Thanks to this distinction, desecuritisation of identities in protracted conflicts that is integral to peacebuilding efforts can be achieved without endangering or undermining group distinctiveness, or replacing one enemy other with the next. Therefore, without unpacking the distinctions between ontological security and security-as-survival, and a more nuanced understanding of identity, we cannot fully grasp the prospects of desecuritisation for peacebuilding, which leads us to the next chapter that adds the third dimension to the nexus, namely desecuritisation and ontological security.
Chapter 3. Ontological security, (De)Securitisation and the Peacebuilding Nexus

3.1 Introduction: Contextualising the theoretical framework

Protracted conflicts provide a fertile ground for institutionalised securitisations, spatially and temporally, to establish norms, rules, myths, stories and institutions that categorically define and essentialise who belongs and who does not, and securitisations that become institutionalised to an extent that they no longer need explicit articulations to justify their status, pose a particular challenge for desecuritisation (Hansen 2012). As previously discussed, securitisation of identities in protracted conflict environments can become rooted in identity narratives, where they become a perpetual source of threat engrained in history, in ‘chosen traumas’ and ‘chosen glories’ that make up that history (see Volkan 1997). As such, the conflict itself can become a source for ontological security where the collective identity is consolidated vis-à-vis an enemy-other and the conflict producing routines reinforce and reproduce identity narratives (Fierke 2007:112).

As Rumelili warns, securitisation processes that reify identities and challenge their negotiability and flexibility, leave self with little or no capacity to transform its relation toward the other, while preserving its ontological security (Rumelili 2011). Transforming those identity narratives out of the conceptual realm of security can be extremely difficult, and without the distinction between security-as-being and security-as-survival we obstruct the potential transformative effects of desecuritisation, running it into a vicious cycle. Not accounting for ontological security considerations in desecuritisation strategies can lock actors into self-perpetuating conflict producing routines. Consequently, sustainable desecuritisation especially in protracted conflicts necessitates a two-fold process where removal of physical security issues is complemented with reconfiguration of self/other relations in order to alleviate ontological security challenges.

Despite the CS’s normative commitment, processes, conditions and consequences of desecuritisation have remained relatively under-theorised almost like an afterthought to securitisation (Aradau 2004, Rumelili 2011, Hansen 2012). Ole Wæver coined the term desecuritisation as the mirror image of securitisation, where desecuritisation is conceived as
the opposite direction of a securitisation process where a security issue is unmade (Wæver 1995). Once sufficiently subdued, countered or resolved, the threat hypothetically ceases to exist, or to be articulated in existential terms, returning to the realm of normal public discourse. However, when both the referent and threats are ultimately about identities and the threat is embedded in the identity narratives, where does desecuritisation leave the self in relation to the other? How can the self move from a securitised to a desecuritised relationship with the other while its very identity depends on this relationship? What happens to the self once we take the threat out of the self-narrative that is constructed in opposition to an enemy?

Consequently, we cannot study desecuritisation when the referent object is the collective identity of a group without looking at varying self/other configurations that are constructed as a result of - and prior to - securitisation processes. The main aim of this chapter to establish the link between (de)securitisation, ontological security and peacebuilding and to unpack this nexus through a more refined discussion in order to help contextualise the theoretical framework for the case study at hand. In doing so, the chapter helps establish the full theoretical framework that is used to analyse the historical context of Cyprus and the empirical data, and provides the thesis with the necessary tools to assess the role of Turkish immigrants in peacebuilding in Cyprus. To that end, I first present the different desecuritisation approaches in the literature and establish a normative commitment for the concept. The second section discusses the concept of peace-anxieties that illustrate the delicate relationship between (de)securitisation and ontological security, which can turn peace into an insecure experience. In the third section, I explore different self/other configurations that allow us to imagine the self outside of a securitised relationship with the other. Finally, I ask whether it is possible to envision the ‘self’ without ‘enemies’ and extrapolate this question to the case of Cyprus.
3.2 Conceptualising desecuritisation

Although the theory of securitisation allows for the possibility of desecuritisation, its understanding of identity as an ‘external factor’ (Wæver 1998:69) significantly constrains that possibility. Despite the CS’s normative preference for desecuritisation, it is widely recognised that the concept of desecuritisation is left highly under-theorised and its application is at best unsystematic and inconsistent in the literature (Hansen 2000, Aradau 2004, Huysmans 2006, Taureck 2006, Coskun 2011). For example, the rather obvious relationship between desecuritisation and reconciliation was left unexplored by both the Copenhagen and Paris Schools. However, the recent literature addressing this gap has been growing exponentially (Noble 2005, Coskun 2008, Kay 2012, Lupovici 2012, Mitchell 2015, Rumelili 2015, Çelik 2015).

Buzan and Wæver define desecuritisation as “a process in which a political community downgrades or ceases to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and reduces or stops calling for exceptional measures to deal with the threat” (Buzan and Wæver 2003:489). The assumption is that if a particular phenomenon can be constituted as a security issue through discourse, it can also be desecuritised at some point, where it re-enters the realm of normal politics. Wæver suggests that security approaches are inherently defensive, hence they can prove to be an ineffective way of dealing with some issues, because they lock people into talking in terms of security and reiterating the threat (Wæver 1995).

Securitisation can happen at multiple fronts, meaning multiple political, economic, societal issues can simultaneously be securitised as threats to a referent object’s survival, which cultivates fear. Living in a constant state of fear that has multiple sources is far from ideal. In fact, if the ideal state is asecuritisation as opposed to (in)security, where there are no threats and no fear, desecuritisation of at least some security issues back to the politics of ‘normality’ is necessary to move on, to manage fear without creating a prevalent state of panic, or to mobilise resources for another securitisation process that is prioritised by the securitising actors. Desecuritisation does not only open up a more inclusive platform for public deliberation, but also transforms the identities and interests of self and others by loosing the friend-enemy distinction.
The CS’s view of securitisation is negative in itself, as it elevates issues to a state of emergency, and consequently, it creates political deadlocks, inefficiency, secrecy and fear. Conversely, desecuritisation moves them back to the normal politics of deliberation, which is at least the case for liberal democracies (Buzan, Wæver et al. 1998). Even though the CS does not rule out that securitisation can be normatively justified in certain circumstances and recognises that the mobilisation power and resources inherent to the securitisation framework can be used pragmatically for ‘good’ ends, their reluctance in promoting such an approach is very explicit. Since securitisation needs desecuritisation as its constitutive and equally political mirror image to achieve analytical and political meaning, Huysmans maintains that the preference for desecuritisation is technical, managerial and instrumental, rather than genuinely political or ethical (Hansen 2012) (Huysmans 1998).

Still, preference for desecurisation can also be normative and ethical. Hanrieder and Kreuder-Sonnen warn that organisations and institutions involved in security practices are prone to what they call the ‘emergency trap’, meaning the effectiveness and mobilisation provided by securitisation can become addictive and reoccurring (Hanrieder and Kreuder-Sonnen 2014). In other words, reducing the obstacles in dealing with issues through securitisation increases the incentives and makes it easier for institutions to reactivate the language of security. For example, the World Health Organisation (WHO) may have increased the effectiveness of dealing with the SARS crisis in 2003 through securitisation, but this led to the institutionalisation of emergency powers within the organisation, which made it easier for the WHO to securitise other outbreaks without much deliberation (Hanrieder and Kreuder-Sonnen 2014). Therefore, the legal and institutional consequences of securitisation can in fact be more far reaching than the pragmatic concerns about mobilising power and resources because the logic of emergency is not only a transient mode of political decision making but can transform institutional structures by providing them with the allure and the precedent of setting the ‘exception’. This can be particularly unfavourable, if not outright detrimental, when it comes to framing issues about society and identity within a threat-defence sequence. Thus, desecuritisation is not only an alternative strategy in cases where elevation to a state of emergency is not an effective way of dealing with issues, but also it becomes more of a normative commitment when issues are particularly about identity and society.
If securitisation is seen as a top-down political choice, and we approach desecuritisation as a reverse equation as such, then this implies that the same components present in a securitisation process (securitising actor, audience, speech-act and facilitating conditions) should be present in desecuritisation as well. However, Hansen highlights the performative nature of desecuritisation, stating that desecuritisation is not a linguistic or political two-step procedure where first ‘we’ have to agree that X is no longer threatening and then, ‘we’ agree to stop speaking security (Hansen 2012:533). As such, if we adopt a broader approach to securitisation, where processes can move bottom-up and horizontal, where they can be accumulated and negotiated, where they are both discursive and performative, where once institutionalised they result in cognitive and behavioural change and where they can be initiated and reproduced by other actors, then we also need to broaden our theorisation of desecuritisation too.

As far as the question of how to desecuritise is concerned, the CS merely outlines three options that I label as pre-emptive, retroactive and reversive respectively: 1) not to talk about issues in terms of security in the first place; 2) once an issue has been securitised, try not to generate security dilemmas and vicious cycles; and 3) to move security issues back into ‘normal’ politics (Buzan and Wæver 2003:253). Bezen Coşkun, who simply describes desecuritisation as the fading away of a particular issue from the security agenda when certain threats are no longer valid or have been replaced with more powerful threat perceptions, highlights the difficulty of using desecuritisation as an explanatory framework as the three options outlined by the CS are too imprecise and vague when it comes to empirical application (Coskun 2008). The theoretical inferiority attached to desecuritisation is evident as while the CS delves into analysing the quality of securitising actors for different sectors and regions in detail, who can be a desecuritising actor, how desecuritisation can be applied and what kind of qualities or facilitating factors are necessary for desecuritisation is left almost untouched.

Since securitisation in the societal sector is about threats to identity, we can assume that desecuritisation in the societal sector requires a level of acceptance that two identities can
coexist (Coskun 2008); or at the very least, recognise each other as legitimate. In protracted conflicts, the pre-emptive option (not to talk about issues in terms of security in the first place) and the retroactive option (to avoid the generation of security dilemmas and vicious cycles) are not conceivable because even if non-violent, protracted conflicts have deeply embedded daily narratives and routines that perpetuate the security-ness, and render these two desecuritisation options implausible. On the other hand, the reversive option (to move security issues back into ‘normal’ politics) assumes that the same actors who were part of the securitisation process and who reproduced their identity narratives in response to an enemy other can initiate desecuritisation by renegotiating emergency measures and conveying the reinterpretation of the threat to the relevant audience, which seems particularly elusive within the broader understanding of securitisation. Within the broader approach, cognitive and behavioural change can occur without emergency measures, and emergency measures are not only limited to security policies but also include social and civil movements and interactions. Consequently, securitisation does not necessarily escape ‘normal politics’ but prevalently redefines certain identities and groups within a threat-defence sequence based on survival, which thwarts compromise and reconciliation efforts, and hence makes desecuritisation particularly difficult in conflict environments.

On the other hand, Hansen, who underlines the tenuous definition and application of desecuritisation in the literature, identifies four forms of desecuritisation: Replacement, silencing, change through stabilisation and re-articulation (Hansen 2012). Replacement and silencing seem like the more straight forward modalities, where the former conceives desecuritisation as the combination of one issue moving out of security while another is simultaneously securitised, and the latter happens when the issue is obliterated, repressed, or it disappears or fails to register in security discourse (Browning and Joenniemi 2010). However, once a threat is explicitly articulated and institutionalised, the likelihood of these simply disappearing ‘on their own’ without intentional suppression is quite small (Hansen 2012). Further, while change through stabilisation (détente) implies a slow move out of an explicit security discourse, which facilitates a less militaristic, less violent and more genuinely political form of engagement, rearticulation suggests a more direct, radical form of political and social engagement where a political solution is reached for the threats, dangers, and
grievances in question or where the threats are rearticulated out of the survivalistic logic based on enmity. Even though Hansen argues détente seems to have disappeared from political and academic use, not only as a concept, but also as a way to understand desecuritisation since the end of the Cold War (Hansen 2012), I maintain that they are more interconnected than Hansen’s initial analysis which fails to account for the ontological security needs of the actors.

In essence, stabilisation can be conceived as a facilitating tool for rearticulation since rearticulation would be very difficult without stabilisation (i.e. ongoing violence). Stabilisation normalises the existence of the threat and accepts the situation, integrating it into daily life and routines without a comprehensive resolution. Yet, while it may help manage anxieties, it does not address insecurities in a transformative way. For example, opening political communication channels between Cuba and the USA, or Iran and the USA can be considered as attempts at stabilising a securitised relationship, which provides the opportunity for and facilitates rearticulation. This approach does bear similarities with Rumelili’s two-level analysis, as rearticulation of self/other configurations need to take ontological security dimension into account to manage existential anxieties. For instance, it could be argued that Greece-Turkey relations first stabilised after the Imia/Kardak incident in 1995 where the two parties were engaged in military confrontation over the small island of Imia/Kardak, before they were successfully rearticulated post-earthquake incidents in 1999 (see Rumelili 2005, Şahin 2010). Without rearticulation, resecuritisation of a ‘stabilised’ issue would continue to loom in the background like in the case of Turkey and the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK); where the cease-fire declared in 2013 temporally stabilised the conflict and provided the space for diplomacy and dialogue, but the failure in rearticulation of the self/other narratives saw the violence reignite in 2015. According to Ayşe Çelik, the process that remained exclusively focused on the bargaining between the PKK and the Turkish state, failed to include measures that promote reconciliation at the societal level, and construct new narratives and routines that could help maintain the sense of ontological security (Çelik 2015).

Even though stabilisation of a militarised or a confrontational relationship may be the first step before rearticulation, this is more of an empirical question. In the case of Cyprus, we
could argue that normalisation of the relationship between the RoC and Turkey (i.e. implementation of the Ankara protocol) can be a form of stabilisation strategy to pave the way for rearticulation and reconfiguration of the friend-enemy relationship. However, considering Turkish-Cypriots securitise Turkish immigrants and Turkishness only on the social level, without a securitised political relationship with the Republic of Turkey, rearticulation and reconfiguration of Turkish immigrants as a threat to distinct Turkish-Cypriot identity does not necessarily rely on stabilisation.
3.3 The delicate relationship: Can peace be an insecure experience?

Failing to account for ontological security would obscure the potential of desecuritisation for transformative peace, where peace is not only agreed on paper but experienced socially (see Kay 2012). Considering securitisation reifies identities and challenges their negotiability and flexibility, it is important that desecuritisation reconfigures self/other relations from a state of insecurity to one of asecurity without inducing unmanageable existential anxieties (Williams 2003). Investigating the road to transformative peace, Sean Kay argues that while peacemaking can be explained by rational actor models that focus on negotiating ‘objective’ issues, constraints on peacebuilding remain ontologically driven, which explains the dramatic decrease in violence but the persistence of existential anxieties in Northern Ireland (Kay 2012). Comparatively, despite the fact that violence has been non-existent (except sporadic hooliganism and vandalism incidents) since the opening of borders in 2003, opinion polls and referenda predictions show that insecurities and anxieties attached to achieving a comprehensive settlement in Cyprus are still very strong.

Rumelili explains ontological security and insecurity-as-survival, or ontological insecurity and asecurity as survival, are not sustainable states of security (Rumelili 2004). In other words, actors’ concerns about survival are likely to destabilise security-as-being, and insecurity-as-being may generate concerns about survival as actors will turn to securitisation to reaffirm their identity narratives and find an identifiable threat to channel their existential anxieties in search for a more stable identity (Rumelili 2011). Within this framework of analysis, the ideal state and normative view of security is the state of ontological security/physical asecurity, where the self is secure about its biographical continuity and self-identity and does not experience a concern about imminent threat or danger. In such a state, actors can maintain the self/other distinctions without seeing the other as a threat. Conversely, where security-as-survival and security-as-being contradict one another, actors are tempted to translate anxiety, which has no identifiable object, into fear, which is easier to pin down. The powerful drive in humans to maintain the sense of self-identity and biographical continuity that dispels fear of changing too fast or against one’s will makes all actors ontological security seekers (see Sigel 1989). As Browning notes, “fear often operates as a means of escaping (or sidestepping)
anxiety”, because constituting an enemy can become an easy way of reaffirming a particular notion of collective self (Browning 2016:167).

Tajfel explains that because groups provide a sense of belonging and self-esteem, individuals tend to favour their own group (ingroup) in relation to other groups (outgroups) even when the group formation per se is relatively meaningless (Tajfel 1982, Tajfel 2010). However, this does not mean that group membership is static, or exclusive or singular; they can overlap, dissolve or emerge. Our relationship with the collective group is co-constructed, meaning the group narratives affect our self-identity and a change in our identity-narratives could affect our group or our membership. Actors who feel existentially uncertain (towards the insecure end of the spectrum) seek to reaffirm their self-identity by drawing closer to any collective that is perceived as being able to reduce insecurity and existential anxiety (Kinnvall 2004). Any collective identity that can provide such security is a potential pole of attraction because collective identities are institutionalised and embedded in historical narratives that reach beyond their members and provide a sense of immortality. For example, nation-states or religious communities can offer both the strong narrative for individuals to anchor their identities historically, and a primordial relationship to a certain territory (Kinnvall 2004:763).

Thus, actors inevitably tend to intensify their connections to the respective identity group that they perceive can ensure their safety. In pursuance of the preservation and reaffirmation of the collective-self, groups will often advocate policy solutions connected to the values embodied within the context of their respective identities. As a result, competing groups may increasingly come to view one another as obstacles to a desired stability, threats to an object of value or as impediments to a particular goal. Within this process, self and other become essentialised bodies, which reduces them to a number of subjectively fabricated characteristics that are perceived as natural and unified signifiers for groups; those on the outside lack the traits that are valued by the self (Kinnvall 2004). Securitising subjectivity in an attempt to re-affirm self-identity based on exclusive collective narratives involves a process of turning the stranger into an enemy, through which self is sacralised by demonising the other (Kinnvall 2004). In other words, communities establish norms, routines and institutions to identify who belongs and who does not in an attempt to narrate their identities and bolster
their ontological security; those, who are on the insecure end of the spectrum, are more likely to establish an inherently securitised relationship with the other and come to portray ‘outsiders’ as threats to their safety, which increases the likelihood of conflict and violence between groups.

‘Insecure’ actors repeatedly attempt to create a secure base for their identity narratives, which prompts defensive positioning that is prone to securitisation (see Young 1999). Routines and habits that are integral to actors’ quest for ontological security can take a life of their own (Hopf 2010, Kay 2012). Giddens explains blind commitment to established routines as a sign of neurotic compulsion due to lack of basic trust; “It is a compulsiveness born out of unmastered anxiety, which lacks that specific hope which creates social involvements over and above established patterns” (Giddens 1991:40). Without basic trust, actors lack the capacity to act or think creatively in relation to routines. According to Giddens, “trust itself, by its very nature, is in a certain sense creative, because it entails a commitment that is a ‘leap into the unknown’” (Giddens 1991:41). Lack of creative and reflexive capacity, because of the compulsive enactment of routines, or because of lack of basic trust in relation to social and material environment, can trigger chronic melancholic or schizophrenic tendencies. Adapting routines and behaviours to alleviate anxieties or maintaining the right amount of anxiety that allows for self-reflexivity without translating it into securitisation can be particularly hard for collective identities due to their institutionalised and self-perpetuating quality.

Under ‘critical situations’ the self is tempted to fortify the borders of its identity, more often than not, by turning to exclusivist rhetoric to differentiate between members and non-members. ‘Chosen traumas’, and their opposites, ‘chosen glories’ that bolster collective harmony and self-esteem provide comforting stories in times of intensified existential anxiety. (see Volkan 1997) Yet, making ethnic memories, traumas or narratives an integral part of the collective self-identity reduces ontological security to upholding a particular securitised identity, which means closing the door on reflexivity (Browning 2016). Some actors may be less capable than others to reflexively monitor their actions, due to their historical narratives, failed nation-building (infancy), high levels of existential anxiety, perpetuating conflict, or due to their systems of government, institutional structures or regimes. In such situations, actors
resort to xenophobic, fundamentalist, exclusive and populist accounts of nationalism, ethnicity and religion as an ontological security seeking strategy (Kinnvall 2004, Roe 2008, Browning and Joenniemi 2013).

Although ontological security is inter-dependent but by no means the same as discourses of securitisation, for the very reason that securitisation is an easy resort to reinforce ontological security, actors can find themselves in conflict-producing routines (Mitzen 2006). Particularly in protracted conflicts, there is a strong tendency to see the security needs of the rival identity narratives as zero-sum and to assume that one’s own security and identity can be protected or enhanced by depriving the other of security and identity (Kelman 1997:68). Consequently, peace processes that do not predicate on adaptation of self-narratives and routines are bound to remain vulnerable to resecuritisation or at worse, reignition of violence. Yet, desecuritisation cannot leave the existing identity constructions intact because those antagonistic and threatening relationships embedded in protracted conflict environments are part of the narrative that establishes the boundaries of a distinct-self. Ontological security considerations are crucial for desecuritisation to be successful and sustainable in reconfiguring the self/other relationships based on representations of threat and enemy.

Consequently, this begs the question of how the self can move from a securitised to a non-securitised relation with the other while its very identity is dependent on this relationship. In other words, how do we desecuritise threat perceptions embedded in identity narratives without creating existential anxieties that challenge self-identity and hence trigger ontological insecurity? Opening up the securitisation framework to a broader range of actors and beyond the speech-act, and understanding it as a multi-directional negotiated process could help us better theorise desecuritisation and identify actors who can initiate sustainable desecuritisation practices. Without underestimating the importance of external factors and political will on the part of the political elite for peacemaking, broadening and extending the analysis can help us place actors such as civil society and media at the heart of desecuritisation and provide us with more tools to support the bottom-up and horizontal reconfiguration of narratives in a creative and reflexive way. ‘Peace’ cannot merely be agreed on by the political elite, it also needs to be believed in by the audience. In other words, it
needs to entail a shift in enemy perceptions and exclusive identity narratives, and reconfigure the enemy or the threatening other into a partner, a parent, a neighbour or a friend. To address our lack of understanding and capacity to deal with effective, emotional, perceptual and the not overtly cognitive experience of peacebuilding we need to acknowledge the intricate relationship between desecuritisation and ontological security.

Protracted conflicts often endure because despite the discernible threat posed to physical security in terms of ineffective use of resources, damage to infrastructure, or loss of life, they uphold and reaffirm a sense of certainty about both self-identity and the identity of the other (Mitzen 2006, Steele 2008, Rumelili 2015). By contrast, desecuritisation produces anxiety, as it requires flexibility and openness towards reconceptualising the identities involved in conflict and accepting that the world might not actually be how we think it is. Desecuritisation as a peacebuilding strategy needs questions about who will we be if our enemy was not an enemy after all or if we were more similar to the enemy than we thought. Faced with such an anxiety-inducing prospect of self-questioning, if not handled with care, reconciliation may well be rejected in favour of the security of what is known (Browning 2016). Therefore, agreeing on a peace settlement on Track 1 level requires a significant and reflexive adaptation of embedded routines, habits and by extension narratives because a peace settlement requires creativity to break the ‘safety’ of the conflict that is known and a ‘leap into the unknown’ for collective identities. Although this is exactly why the ‘non-violent’ descriptor of the Cyprus Problem is relevant (it provides room for reflexivity, two-level desecuritisation and a more ‘stabilised’ environment for reconciliation), it is also why I maintain that the failure to reconfigure the identity narratives vis-à-vis Turkishness and to address Greek-Cypriots’ existential anxieties triggered by the prospect of making peace with their primordial enemy is one of the main reasons behind the ‘no’ vote on the reunification referenda in 2004.

Inevitably, the prospect of peace does/needs to challenge the fears, deprivations and isolations of groups by bringing them together, but that very possibility can create a sense of anxiety since it requires actors to question their previous understandings of the ‘other’ and open themselves up for new definitions and group relations (Çelik 2015). Unlike the way material resources such as territory or governance is negotiated on Track 1 level, the self is
a non-negotiable object in peacemaking. Because the self can only be negotiated through reconfiguration of narratives, these anxieties need to be channelled constructively through carefully crafted peacebuilding efforts to move actors towards the ontologically secure end of the spectrum. Failing to do so would thwart peace efforts and possibly result in further securitisation. In other words, although structural interventions and Track 1 level peacemaking can achieve security-as-survival and stabilisation, they create what Rumelili calls ‘peace-anxieties’ (See Rumelili 2015); they can also essentialise the identity narratives of the salient parties by assuming homogenised positions and inherent interests. If not addressed, peace-anxieties can have a crippling effect on the peacebuilding efforts, such as compulsive attachment to routines in relation to the other or phobic behaviour towards the peacebuilding efforts.
3.4 Is it possible to envision the ‘self’ without ‘enemies’?

Connolly argues that there is a “double relation of interdependence and strife between identity and difference”, which constitutes the ‘paradox of difference’ and makes identity an insecure experience (Connolly 1991:64). The paradox of difference, which means that identity is dependent on difference, epitomises the omnipresent potential that the behavioural relationship between self and other can be constituted on the representation of the other as threatening to self’s identity. However, Rumelili also emphasises that “the two levels of security are mutually constitutive, yet are partially independent, in the sense that neither representations of self and other are derivates of representations of threat and danger, nor are the social structures of meaning that shape identities reducible to acts of securitisation and desecuritisation” (Rumelili 2011:16). Hence, although the potential for the transformation of difference into threatening always exist, the logic of identity allows for a great deal of variation in self/other relationships. Rumelili distinguishes between threatening-others where the relationship is characterised by conflict and othering, and different-others where the other is seen as non-threatening and the relationship could be characterised as guardian/children or leader/partner (Rumelili 2004).

Rumelili’s two layered approach identifies three constitutive dimensions along which self/other relationships vary to (not) produce relationships of othering: nature of the difference, social distance and response of the other (Rumelili 2004, Rumelili 2011). The nature of difference relates to whether the identities in question are exclusive identities or inclusive identities. Where the former identify the other based on acquirable characteristics such as democratic, liberal or developed, the latter base difference on inherent characteristics such as European (in terms of geography), Islamic or heterosexual. This is simply an experiential distinction, as an objective marker does not exist to help us categorise identities as simply inclusive and exclusive. Rumelili explains that for exclusive identities, the difference is permanent and possibilities for change in the other are by default non-existent; whereas if the difference is constructed based on acquired characteristics the difference is perceived to be temporary and possibilities for reconfiguring the identity narratives are ample. This does not mean that the inclusive identities are essentially good and exclusive ones are bad, both
identities can configure self/other relationships that can be characterised by threat, fear and othering (Rumelili 2004, Rumelili 2011). Rather, it gives us an indication of what types of desecuritisation strategies are potentially more effective and feasible (i.e. parental, partnership, friendship etc.).

The second constitutive dimension that Rumelili identifies is the social distance between the self and the other. Identities can be secured through association with or dissociation from the different others (Rumelili 2011). In terms of states or collectives, she differentiates association from cooperation as it embodies a feeling of similarity, or co-belonging. In this context, association means that the other is not a polar opposite, and the self/other relationship can be configured based on guardian/children or leader/partner axis. On the other hand, while dissociation makes the inclusive identity more insecure by challenging the perceived similarity and co-belonging, it makes the exclusive identity more secure as it reinforces the inherent differences and boundaries (Rumelili 2011).

Since the construction of identity is a performative action that includes both the self and the other, the third constitutive dimension is about the response of the other. The response of the other in terms of discourses and practices has reinforcing or destabilising effects on the difference attributed to the other and on self-identity, which is conceptualised on a spectrum running between recognition and resistance. Whereas recognition reinforces the self-identity narratives, resistance makes it more insecure by challenging the perceived difference. Consequently, resistance tempts actors to reaffirm their self-identity by asserting the differences of the other, which would in turn result in securitisation of subjectivity, where the other is represented as a threat. However, inclusive/exclusive, association/dissociation, recognition/resistance, othering/not-othering are all a matter of degree and there can be myriad variations of self/other configurations (Rumelili 2004, Rumelili 2011).

In the case of Cyprus, although the peacebuilding efforts reduce the conflict to one that is based on ethnicity and see only two sides to the conflict, we need to challenge the view that “ethnic identity is generally singular and these singular identities reliably predict behaviour, attitudes and values” (Wetherell 2009:10). It is exactly this approach that boxes the Cyprus
Problem into two opposing ethnic poles hyphenated between the Greek-side and the Turkish-side; it disregards the multiplicity and fluidity of identity narratives and fails to account for ontological security. For example, while Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots are each other’s ‘other’, they also perceive people from Turkey as their ‘other’ as well. Historically, ethnic identity signifiers in Cyprus, which are based on inherent characteristics that assume a permanent difference, provided a mutually exclusive future on the same territory for Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots. Yet, Turkish-Cypriots’ growing Cypriotism, and disassociation from Turkey and Turkishness challenges these singular ethnic narratives. As a result, Turkish-Cypriots find themselves in identity dissonance and by extension ontological dissonance, where affirmation of their distinctiveness from Greek-Cypriots clashes with their affirmation of distinctiveness from Turks. The response of the other (people from Turkey) and the limited capacity for reflexivity further complicates the picture; while the other depicts Turkish-Cypriots as Turks who happen to live in Cyprus and hence resists their perceived distinctiveness, Turkish-Cypriots lack the ability to address their anxieties, due to their significant political, economic and financial dependence on Turkey. On the other hand, disassociation from Turkey (i.e. under the EU umbrella) and the response of the other (Turks) reaffirms the perceived differences of Greek-Cypriots and thus, reinforce their self-identity narratives, but the peacebuilding efforts challenge both their Greekness and Cypriotness by associating it with Turkish-Cypriots, Turkish migrants and by extension Turkishness.

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18 Tuğrul İlter argues, Turkish-Cypriots “are surrounded by denials of their independent existence” (İlter 2015). This denial in itself has two roots; one is the denial of distinctiveness by the ‘other’ and the other is the denial of legitimacy by the ‘international’. While the first one is focused on the response of the other, where the official rhetoric in Turkey denies a distinct Turkish-Cypriot identity and sees Turkish-Cypriots as one and the same as the greater Turkish nation, the second one is focused on international recognition and legitimacy of Turkish-Cypriots’ communal existence. Mainstream media and politicians in Turkey are, at best, indifferent to the distinctiveness of the Turkish-Cypriot identity and mostly refer to Turkish-Cypriots as ‘Cypriot Turks’ (Kibrıs Türkü), or as ‘our compatriots in Cyprus’, which undermines and circumstantialises their Cypriotness. They also refer to the northern part of Cyprus as babylond (yavruvatan), implying a sense of ownership over the northern part of Cyprus and Turkish-Cypriots. Even though this rhetoric was historically accepted and even celebrated by many Turkish-Cypriots, a growing sense of Cypriotism and discontent with Turkish immigrants and Turkey’s policies created a strong displeasure towards this paternal relationship that denies distinctiveness to Cypriots. In reaction to the expressions such as the ‘Cypriot Turk’ that underplays Cypriotness, left-wing journalists such as Sevgül Uludağ and Arif Hasan Tahsin, choose to use new terms to define Turkish-Cypriots that underplays Turkishness. For instance, Uludağ uses the term ‘Kibrıslıtürk’ instead of ‘Kibrıslı Türk’, to deemphasize the Turkish component of the identity, and Tahsin uses the term ‘Turkish speaking Cypriot’ (Loizides 2015).
Table No 1: Ontological security matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Inclusive</th>
<th>Exclusive</th>
<th>Disassociation (from people from Turkey)</th>
<th>Association (with people from Turkey)</th>
<th>Response of the other (people from Turkey)</th>
<th>Peacebuilding efforts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turkish-Cypriots</strong></td>
<td>Civic - Cypriotness</td>
<td>Ethnic - Turkishness</td>
<td>Undermines Turkishness; Reinforces Cypriotness</td>
<td>Reinforces Turkishness; Undermines Cypriotness/Europeanness</td>
<td>Resistance reinforces Turkishness; Undermines Cypriotness/Europeanness</td>
<td>Undermines Turkishness; Reinforces Cypriotness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Greek-Cypriots</strong></td>
<td>Civic - Cypriotness</td>
<td>Ethnic - Hellenic</td>
<td>Reinforces both</td>
<td>Undermines both</td>
<td>Recognition reinforces both</td>
<td>Undermines both</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Vamık Volkan problematises the peacemaking and peacebuilding policies concerning the Cyprus Problem that center around the promotion of an ‘illusionary’ ‘new’ large-group ‘Cypriot’ identity, arguing that they undermine the ethnic identities of being a Turk or a Greek (Volkan 2008:8). Volkan, who argues that there has never been a ‘Cypriot’ ethnicity or nationality, seems to fall into the same singular ethnicity trap. He rejects the idea that there is a distinct sense of Cypriotness shared across collectives living in Cyprus that creates a sui generis character independent from the motherlands of the two main communities. In his view, civic or cultural perceptions of Cypriotism are not only illusionary but they cannot coexist with ethnic or religious associations with the motherlands. However, despite their different religious, linguistic or ethnic ancestries, and despite the nationalist discourse that dominated the identity narratives historically, the sense of Cypriotness has been growing across the island. Loizides notes that the identity narratives of the two main communities on the island are not only increasingly detaching themselves from the motherland narratives, but the growing variations of Cypriotism and its political manifestations are moving at a faster pace than the related mediation and peacebuilding formulas (Loizides 2015).

That being said, even though I disagree with Volkan’s prioritisation and singular view of ethnic identity over other identity layers, and his view of Cypriotism as ‘illusory’, reading Volkan’s argument from an ontological security perspective provides better ground for his analysis. Identity narratives in general and collective identity narratives in particular, are resistant to
change. Giddens and Lupovici argue that actors’ attachment to their identity makes it difficult to implement a reflexive behavioural or an identity change to adapt to a new situation that is creating anxiety (Giddens 1991, Lupovici 2012). Similarly, humans, according to Volkan, cannot accept change without mourning what is lost, which is valid for collectives as well (Volkan 1997). Since desecuritisation does not and cannot leave the existing identity constructions intact, peacemaking and peacebuilding can in fact disturb existing and embedded identity narratives and create anxieties by blurring distinctiveness.

Desecuritisation processes that have been predicated on the transcendence and blurring of differences are unsustainable because they elicit a sense of uncertainty regarding the biographical continuity and distinct identity of the self vis-à-vis the other (Rumelili 2011). This means that the resolution of protracted conflicts challenge deep-rooted antagonistic identities and unsettle self-identity narratives that are dependent on the conflict. As such, desecuritisation processes that culminate in a state of ontological insecurity/physical asecurity are easily reversible because existential anxieties can easily be politically mobilised and manipulated into fear (Rumelili 2015). We secure ourselves as beings mainly by discourses and practices that differentiate us from others because identity lacks a pre-given, objectively identifiable essence (Connolly 1991, Campbell 1998). Thus, perceived incompatibilities between Turkish-Cypriots and the Turkish immigrants, between Greek-Cypriots and the Turkish immigrants or between the two main Cypriot communities are not a pre-given but ‘exist’ only because they are continuously re-produced both bottom-up and horizontally.

Departing from this approach, the thesis empirically argues that a collective ‘shared’ Cypriot large-group identity needs to be envisioned carefully. Ethnic, religious and linguistic differences can be re-constructed as part of a broader, more inclusive identity that encompasses different ways of being Cypriot without subsuming or transcending distinctions. In other words, Cypriotism that undermines difference and only underlines similarity would produce existential anxieties for Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots; it can also result in essentialisation of Cypriotness which in turn risk securitisation of migrant communities or other minorities in Cyprus. Therefore, peacebuilding efforts need to consider ontological security when crafting desecuritisation strategies that promote an overarching Cypriot
identity; instead of minimising the distinctiveness of variant identities in Cyprus, they need to acknowledge their ‘shared-ness’ under a more inclusive and fluid identity narrative and celebrate their difference rather than avoiding or securitising it.

This by no means is an idealistic approach. There are success stories that show formerly antagonistic identities can be sustainably desecuritised without resecuritisation of another group as a replacement. One such example that Browning and Joenniemi explore is the construction of a security community among the Nordic states where similarity is appreciated, difference is celebrated, and it is not translated into danger (Browning and Joenniemi 2013). The Nordic Security community has emerged from a mutually reproducing war community and was transformed into a region of peace where the idea that there are different ways of being Scandinavian has replaced the categorical perceptions of difference between the Scandinavian nations as existentially threatening (Browning and Joenniemi 2013). Could it be possible to envision a Mediterranean security community too, where Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots do not only reconfigure their relationship to fit a larger and more inclusive Cypriot identity narrative without undermining their distinctiveness but also come to see themselves as the members of a different but unthreatening larger Mediterranean community that includes Greece and Turkey among others?
3.5 Conclusion

This chapter unpacked the concept of desecuritisation to explore its intricate relationship with ontological security. The chapter argued that even though there is an omnipresent potential of desecuritisation in creating a sense of ontological insecurity as the removal of threat perceptions can leave actors in a state of uncertainty and existential anxiety vis-à-vis their self-identities and relationships with their significant others, this does not have to be the case. Conflict can become a source of ontological security and “the desire to protect a ‘sense of self’ can be the basis from which old conflicts become new” (Kay 2012:239). Yet, coupling desecuritisation in Track 1 level negotiations that challenge self-identity narratives with desecuritisation at the grassroots level can provide a way out of the vicious cycle the securitisation framework creates. Put differently, multi-directional institutionalised securitisations require multi-directional desecuritisation strategies that are equipped to reflect on ontological concerns.

Although the concept of ontological security is intimately tied to identity, and that its pursuit requires differentiation from an other, a stable relationship with the other can be based on minor distinctions that are recognised in the context of similarity, positive identification and friendship or they may be major distinctions that situate self and other as polar opposites and enemies (Rumelili 2004, Rumelili 2013). As Kay stresses, ultimate attainment of peace in conflict environments requires fundamental transformation of the self (Kay 2012). Still, this does not mean that I envision an idealised form of self/other relationship that is not latent with power; instead, the intricate link between (de)securitisation, ontological security and peacebuilding suggests that non-securitised forms of otherness is possible, and the normative commitment of this thesis is more concerned with facilitating transformative peace in Cyprus than with the emancipation of identities from constraints of power imbued relations.

From a pragmatic perspective, we may be interested in questioning whether the securitisation of the Turkish immigrants would bring Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots closer together against a common enemy and produce a sense of urgency for reaching a comprehensive settlement on the island. However, based on the analysis in the first three chapters, which will
be further supported in the empirical chapters, I argue in favour of both the normative preference for desecuritisation, and for the desecuritisation of the Turkish immigrants as the way forward for transformative peace. While securitisation of Turkish immigrants is the reason behind growing xenophobia, racism and existential anxieties among the TCc as well as the reason for their consolidated Cypriot identity, it is also creating ontological dissonance and peace-anxieties. Consequently, it may be argued that the peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts for the reunification of Cyprus are repeatedly failing because they generate existential anxieties that tempt parties into securitising issues and differences that need to be resolved for making a comprehensive settlement possible.

Challenging the essentialised ethnic approaches to protracted conflicts where reconciliation efforts singularly focus on imposing a sense of similarity at the expense of ontological security could be the key to fully understanding the potential of desecuritisation for transformative peace. Constructing a collective non-essentialised narrative for a larger Cypriot identity that simultaneously celebrates similarities as well as the differences of people who call Cyprus home can be the way forward for achieving certainty and stability of being, while remaining in a state of physical asecuritisation vis-à-vis one another. Within this context, I argue that in order to facilitate a comprehensive solution and achieve transformative peace in Cyprus, we need desecuritisation strategies that include all ‘others’. Peacebuilding efforts on the island should not only address reconciliation between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots, but they should employ desecuritisation as a tool to reconfigure the relationship between the two main communities and Turkish immigrants for the very reason that a comprehensive solution will, by default, create existential anxieties for all parties that perceive each other as threatening.

However, this thesis does not go as far as to devise desecuritisation strategies for the case of Cyprus. More research and comparative analysis would be needed to formulate specific policy recommendations in this regard. Nonetheless, it is still necessary to explore the ontological security, (de)securitisation and peacebuilding nexus in order to answer the research questions, which can in turn inform the desecuritisation literature, peace research and break
the dual-ethnic approach to the Cyprus Problem that has locked the island in stalemate for nearly five decades.
Chapter 4. Research Methodology

4.1. Introduction

The thesis focuses on a single case study to provide a thorough and in-depth analysis of the securitisation of identities in conflict environments, its relationship with ontological security and its implications on peacebuilding efforts. Grounding itself on the empirical data collected in Cyprus, the research will explore shifting identity narratives and the role of ontological security in the peace process on the island. In doing so, the thesis explores the prospects of desecuritisation and its delicate link with ontological security as a facilitating tool for achieving transformative peace. Based on the theoretical framework and considering; a) the audience’s role in securitisation; b) that institutionalised securitisations can become bottom-up and horizontal resulting in cognitive and behavioural change; and c) the interdependent relationship between (de)securitisation and ontological security, the thesis blends qualitative and quantitative methods in order to seek answers to underlying theoretical and empirical research questions. The thesis adopts mixed-methods research that is formally and broadly defined as “the class of research where the researcher mixes or combines quantitative and qualitative research techniques, methods, approaches, concepts or language into a single study” (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004:17).

Measuring, assessing and evaluating ontological security and identity, and analysing securitisation within the broader approach adopted in this thesis is complex. Especially when the aim is to inform peace research and reconciliation efforts in Cyprus, drawing conclusions and credible argumentation that can reflect the multi-layered narratives, actors and realities on the island becomes even more challenging. To alleviate these challenges inherent to the theoretical framework, the thesis adopts mixed-methods that provide meticulousness with numbers and statistics, as well as depth and meaning, to increase the vigour and robustness of its data and analysis. Additionally, in order to magnify the utility and effectiveness of this methodological approach, the fieldwork strategy also borrows from previous opinion polls and surveys and secondary data sets that allows for a temporal comparison. As such, the thesis adopts a two layered approach to its research questions, while the theoretical questions are
concerned with overarching contributions to the literature, they also underpin the empirical questions and relate to the normative commitments of the research:

Table No 2: Research questions (1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theoretical Research Questions</th>
<th>Empirical Research Questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. How can we broaden the concept of securitisation to make it more receptive to context and better theorise institutionalised securitisations and the role of the audience in the process?</td>
<td>1. What are the key junctures that resulted shifts in the identity narratives of the two main communities in Cyprus?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. What can securitisation theory learn from the ontological security literature to explore the limits and prospects of desecuritisation for producing transformative effects towards reconciliation?</td>
<td>2. What are the securitisation dynamics and perceptions of threat in relation to Turkish immigrants living in the northern part of Cyprus?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. What are the implications of this securitisation on the ontological security of Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots?</td>
<td>4. Can desecuritisation of the Turkish immigrants facilitate a comprehensive solution in Cyprus or would further securitisation bring Cypriots closer together against a common ‘enemy’ and reinforce the urgency for a solution?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.2 A Birdseye look at research methodology

In line with the identified research questions, the fieldwork methodology primarily combines quantitative surveys, online semi-structured questionnaires and focus groups, and enriches these with secondary datasets. Recognising the limitations of using a single method, mixed methods research encourages researchers to use multiple approaches to collecting and analysing data within a single study, allowing for a more complete understanding and analysis of the research problem (Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998, Hanson, Creswell et al. 2005). The utilisation of multiple research methods to study the same general problem by posing different specific empirical questions has pragmatic implications for social theory; “rather than being wedded to a particular theoretical style ... and its most compatible method, one might instead combine methods that would encourage or even require integration of different theoretical perspectives to interpret the data” (Hunter and Brewer 2006:55). Adopting a mixed methods approach however comes with some inherent problems especially based on the debates ‘paradigm-method fit’ and the ‘best paradigm’ debates, which mainly stems from the idea of incompatibility between different philosophical world-views and the quantitative or qualitative approaches (Reichardt and Rallis 1994, Migiro and Magangi 2011).

The ‘paradigm-method fit issue’ and the ‘best paradigm’ issue have inspired considerable debate regarding the philosophical basis of mixed methods research. While the ‘paradigm-method fit’ debates are based on how well the chosen methods and value-based systems relates to the research questions and how well the epistemological and ontological foundations of the research fit with the methodological choices; the ‘best paradigm’ debates relate to the adoption of a philosophical paradigm that provides the best foundation for mixed methods research. According to Guba and Lincoln, the paradigm differences between post-positivist philosophical assumptions and naturalistic assumptions are incompatible in terms of epistemology, ontology, axiology and methodology, which renders quantitative methods unfit for constructivist and post-positivist paradigms (Guba and Lincoln 1994). From this perspective, mixed methods research can be viewed as untenable because certain paradigms and methods can not be legitimately fit together (Smith 1983, Sale, Lohfeld et al. 2002). Nonetheless, this debate inherently assumes that the choice of research methods
represent a commitment to a certain kind of truth and the concurrent rejection of other kinds of truth (Gorard 2010). For Gorard, this approach becomes divisive and conservative, impoverishing the range of methods deployed to try and analyse important social questions. He asserts that it is impractical to sustain an argument that all parts of the chosen methodology have to carry epistemological and ontological commitments; as he argues that in real life, methodology and epistemology cannot be easily separated and the clear cut distinction between paradigms (qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods) is in fact imposed and illusionary (Gorard 2010).

In responding to these debates, Tashakkori and Teddlie adopt a pragmatist approach that provides the researcher with a wide range of methods and flexibility for the research questions at hand (Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998, Tashakkori and Teddlie 2009, Tashakkori and Teddlie 2010). “Pragmatism views knowledge as being both constructed and based on the reality of the world one experiences and lives in. ... [It] endorses pluralism and carefully considered integrative eclectism ... [where] different even conflicting theories and perspectives can be useful ... in solving traditional philosophical dualisms as well as for making methodological choices” (Tashakkori and Teddlie 2009:74). Many scholars propose pragmatism as the best paradigm for justifying the use of mixed methods research and believe that decisions regarding the use of either or both methods depend on the research questions and the “ongoing phase of the inductive-deductive research cycle” (Howe 1988, Guba and Lincoln 1994, Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998:87, Biesta and Burbules 2003, Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004, Morgan 2007). In other words, the pragmatist approach prioritises the research question over the theoretical lens or the underlining methodological paradigms.

Based on the above discussion, this thesis will combine quantitative and qualitative methods in a complimentary way that allows for robust triangulation, corroboration and temporal comparison. This approach can yield a more complete picture for analysis because neither one on its own is sufficient to capture the details and nuances of a non-violent protracted conflict that is interlaced with a challenging but unique theoretical framework. Thus, statistical and narrative data, collected in parallel, can help better understand the research problem providing strength to conclusions that can be generalised and reflective at the same time. As
such, the thesis can provide strong foundations both for further research on formulating specific desecuritisation strategies and for comparative analysis for other non-violent protracted conflicts.

Even though empirical application of securitisation theory often utilises discourse analysis as a methodological tool, the broadened approach to securitisation in this thesis that expands the concept to include performatives, calls for a methodological choice beyond discourse analysis. Rather than the top-down securitisation speech-acts of power holders and elites, the empirical research questions are more interested in analysing the cognitive and behavioural nuances in grassroot perceptions and securitisation practices that are bottom-up and horizontal. Lastly, there are underlying practical limitations for conducting an island-wide discourse analysis for the case of Cyprus, such as the language barrier (i.e. translation of documents from Greek and Turkish into English) and accessibility of data and documents.

On the other hand, the ontological security literature has remained mostly theoretical and did not produce a concrete framework for empirical analysis; this is not only due to the relative youth of the literature itself but also due to ontological security often being an experience on the level of sub-consciousness and due to issues with scaling it up to collectives in particular, and due to ambivalence of measuring identity in general. For example, the ontological security that has its roots in psychology comes from a phenomenological tradition\(^\text{19}\) that makes the distinction between experiencing a sense of being and actual embodied being difficult, if not impossible to validate (Woolley 2007). According to Moran and Mooney, neither can we reduce all that exists to appearings, nor confirm an unknown behind appearances (Moran and Mooney 2002). Yet, even if we cannot categorically and definitely distinguish the two, there are elements that we can investigate that reflect our self-narratives spatially and temporally, such as interpretation of history, memory, actions and routines\(^\text{20}\).

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\(^{19}\) Phenomenology is distinct from that of the nature of being. Phenomenology is primarily concerned with the study of the structures of consciousness and the content/acts of conscious experiences, and attempts to create conditions for the objective study of topics usually regarded as subjective, such as such as judgements, perceptions and emotions (Szanto and Moran 2015).

\(^{20}\) For example, we can probe into reflexivity in the adaptation of routines in response to anxiety producing critical situations, and assess the feeling of shame caused by disconnect between chosen actions and self-identity narratives by looking into discourse.
Philosopher Peter Burgess summarises the ambivalence with regards to measuring identity as a ‘prisoner of language’, meaning that “identity needs language to be expressed, but even its expression is by nature part of identity itself” (in Bruter and Lodge 2013:34). Thus, the answers of two people to a certain question about identity\(^{21}\) will not, in principle, be directly comparable. Capturing identity and measuring it quantitatively at the individual level may appear ‘inappropriate’ to some scholars (see Duchesne and Frognier 1995), but this leaves a significant range of research questions surrounding identity, and especially collective identity, untouched and unexplored. Even though it is difficult to operationalise a concept that is widely said to be unmeasurable, it is not impossible with a strategic combination of different research tools and methods. In that sense, the research provides originality in its methodology.

Even though many scholars may perceive quantitative measures of identity as an ‘inappropriate approach’, conflict resolution, ontological security and desecuritisation literature on a collective level for the case of Cyprus necessitates a birds-eye view of society as well as reflective, in-depth qualitative analysis in order to inform policy-making and reconciliation efforts. Drawing conclusions for institutionalised securitisation practices and for the role of collective ontological security for reconciliation would not be well grounded and legitimate without looking at the perceptions, fears, anxieties, tendencies and identifications of the general public in a representative way with quantifiable data. At the same time, it would not be as well grounded and valuable to draw these conclusions only with quantitative research, without substantiating it with in-depth qualitative analysis that is more human, individual and reflective and that can capture and interpret the more emotive and affective side of peacebuilding.

Even though the quantitative measurement of identity is difficult because it is not spontaneously conceived in analytical terms but at best ‘expressed’; this limitation can be somewhat mitigated by approaching it both with labelled scale questions and with self-placement questions. Additionally, Michael Bruter (2014) suggests yet another alternative model to quantitative analysis of identity that distinguishes between two conceptually and

\(^{21}\) For example: Do you feel more Cypriot than Turk/Greek? or How Cypriot do you feel on a scale from one to five?
empirically distinct components of identity: civic and cultural. While the ‘cultural’ pillar is related to a person’s sense of belonging to a community, with which they believe they share certain commonalities such as culture, values, religion and ethnicity; the ‘civic’ pillar is linked to a person’s identification with a political system, referring to a system that defines their rights and duties as an agent (Bruter and Lodge 2013).

Even though I believe this differentiation can be significant for some cases, it is not analytically possible within the scope of this thesis to separate cultural attributes from civic ones. In Cyprus, we see changes in identity narratives that shift from religious to ethnic, and ethnic to civic; the majority of Cypriots claim to have a distinct Cypriot identity that is both Mediterranean and rooted in the shared experiences of living together for centuries under different rulers. This sense of Cypriotness, which at first looks like a categorical shift in identification, cannot be simply attributed to ‘civic’ as Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots alike emphasise shared cultural distinctiveness while living under two separate political systems. However, the quantitative research combines self-placement questions with labelled scale questions to get a more comprehensive picture for the elusive concept of identity. Adopting this approach, the quantitative opinion poll includes questions such as “How would you self-identify yourself?” which will provide response options such as “I consider myself only a Greek/Turk, not at all Cypriot”, or “I consider myself mostly a Greek/Turk and somewhat Cypriot”, or “I consider myself a Greek/Turk and a Cypriot to the same degree” and so forth. The opinion poll also includes a question relating to respondents’ cultural-civic identity such as “On a scale of 1-5 to what extent do you believe in a distinct shared Cypriot identity among all Cypriots?” as well as triangulating this with ethnic identity signifiers with questions such as “To what extent do you consider Cyprus/Turkey/Greece your motherland?” These questions can then be temporally compared to other surveys carried out by other institutions.

Methodologically, if we agree that identity is utterly individual, mostly sub-conscious and can only be expressed, then qualitative measures of identity suffer from similar limitations as quantitative approaches. Thus, acknowledging that identity cannot be measured in ideal terms because it is contextual, individual, fluid and expressive, a strategic blend of the both
qualitative and quantitative methods would provide a strong foundation to draw conclusions for the purposes of this thesis. On these grounds, the empirical analysis is based on quantitative surveys with 1000 people in total (500 Turkish-Cypriot and 500 Greek-Cypriot), 3 focus groups with Turkish immigrant population and 101 online semi-structured questionnaires with CSO representatives to provide a grounded and nuanced understanding of identity perceptions as well as perceptions of threat and anxiety in Cyprus.

In addition, the island-wide quantitative surveys and semi-structured online questionnaires include questions with regards to Cypriots’ perceptions of threat, anxieties and fears about settlement plans/options with regards to the Cyprus Problem and perceptions towards the Turkish immigrant community that will demonstrate the extent of the securitisation dynamics. Particularly, the semi-structured online questionnaires with CSO representatives provide more in-depth reflection on the institutionalisation of securitisation practices and horizontal and bottom-up movement of these practices. This data will also be triangulated with focus groups with the Turkish immigrant groups and enriched with media clippings, press releases and personal anecdotes mainly from civil society representatives.

In this respect, the thesis will assume both a normative and a pragmatist stance towards the Cyprus Problem. Normatively, I argue that reconciliation is more desirable for Cypriots than the status quo and the current deadlock, and that inclusion and deliberation is more conducive and facilitatory for reconciliation. Thus, desecuritisation and inclusion of the Turkish immigrants can have transformative effects for reconciliation. Pragmatically, I argue that a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation as foreseen by the UN resolutions, Track 1 level negotiations and myriad settlement plans to date is more desirable than other solution options, such as partition or a unitary state. I, by no means, strictly hold that this is the ideal model for a solution to the Cyprus Problem; however, it is the most practical starting point that has been adopted by the negotiation teams and the international community, and challenging this solution alternative is beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead the thesis is interested in facilitating this model through informing peace research and peacebuilding efforts to facilitate reaching a comprehensive settlement and to contribute to its sustainability.
4.3 The Chosen methods and justifications

The research questions are broken down into more specific sub-questions and matched to particular research methods to provide an overall table that summarises the design of the thesis in a snapshot. Each chosen method is then justified one by one by briefly discussing its utility, strengths and weaknesses.

Table No 3: Research questions (2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Underlying empirical research questions</th>
<th>Chosen methods to address the questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What are the key junctures that resulted shifts in the identity narratives of Turkish/Greek-Cypriots?</td>
<td>Historical and contextual analysis (see chapters 4 &amp; 5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are Turkish/Greek-Cypriots becoming more Cypriot and what are the nuances of this Cypriotness?</td>
<td>Quantitative survey (see appendix 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO questionnaires (see appendix 2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing narratives &amp; secondary data</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do Greek-Cypriots differentiate between Turkish-Cypriots and people from Turkey?</td>
<td>Quantitative survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO questionnaires</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing narratives &amp; secondary data</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do Turkish-Cypriots differentiate themselves from people from Turkey?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do Turkish-Cypriots differentiate between Turkish immigrants and other migrant groups in Cyprus?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How do Turkish/Greek-Cypriots securitise Turkish immigrants living in the northern part of Cyprus?</td>
<td>Quantitative survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO questionnaires</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus groups (see appendix 3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing narratives &amp; secondary data</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are these threat perceptions and how do they relate to ontological security?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are the implications of Turkish/Greek-Cypriots’ ontological (in)security in finding a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus Problem?</td>
<td>Focus groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary data based on civic mapping of peacebuilding efforts since 1980s</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent, if at all, are Turkish immigrants included in the peacebuilding efforts?</td>
<td>Quantitative survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO questionnaires</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent, if at all, should Turkish immigrants included in the peacebuilding process?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Cyprus as a case study

Case studies allow for temporally and spatially bounded in-depth and intensive analysis of a single ‘unit’ or a ‘phenomenon’ (Gerring 2004:342). Even though single case study analysis has been subject to a number of criticisms that include issues concerning methodological rigour, researcher subjectivity and external validity, these criticisms are not unique to case studies per se but more specific to chosen methods of analysis\textsuperscript{22}. One particularly criticism specific to single case studies is the inter-related issues of reliability, replicability and generalizability (Flyvbjerg 2006). How can one case reliably offer anything beyond the particular? Although single case studies contain no greater bias toward verification than other methods of inquiry\textsuperscript{23} and although this thesis and fieldwork is potentially replicable, the criticism of generalisability is of little relevance when the intention is particularisation, and the objective is based upon conducting explanatory research rather than theory-testing and theory-building. As such, this thesis is neither interested in ‘proving’ or ‘disproving’ theories and hypotheses nor in making predictions. Single case studies also offer a more practical advantage as they are economical for all resources including money, human resources, time and effort. Cyprus is a unique case that can demonstrate the links between (de)securitisation, ontological security and peacebuilding; it is a practical case due to my links and networks; and it is a case that I am personally invested and interested in.

**Ethical concerns:** My personal attachment to and involvement in various CSOs on the ground and my explicit political position vis-à-vis the Cyprus Problem could be considered as researcher bias. Nevertheless, considering subjectivity cannot be eliminated and the research has explicit normative commitments, these concerns can also be viewed as strengths, as they present effective access and understanding for the case study. The established rapport with myriad stakeholders and personal experiences could strengthen the interpretive aspect of the research when drawing conclusions.


\textsuperscript{23} On the contrary, according to Flyvbjerg “experience indicates that the case study contains a greater bias toward falsification of preconceived notions than toward verification” (Flyvbjerg 2006: 237).
Analytical and methodological concerns: The research may not be comparable to other protracted conflict environments and it is difficult to draw generalisations beyond the case study. However, the research will pave the way for comparative studies, could be replicated in other conflict environments and enrich emerging the academic literature on the (de)securitisation, reconciliation and ontological security nexus.

The focus on Turkish immigrants

Turkish immigrants are part of the comprehensive settlement negotiations on Track 1 level but the existing research rarely goes beyond a debate about their numbers. As previously discussed, the literature that takes the debate about people from Turkey beyond a discussion about mere numbers are mainly limited to the works of Mete Hatay, Neophytos Loizides, Yeal Navaro-Yashin, Hatice Kurtuluş and Semra Purkis and Hüseyin Çakal. However, despite the securitisation of Turkish immigrants as an existential threat and a major obstacle for reaching a solution and the lack of agreement about their future on the island on the negotiation table, the conflict resolution and peacebuilding literatures have failed to include Turkish immigrants in their analysis, limiting the understanding of the conflict between Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots.

By expanding the focus to include this group, the thesis seeks to add value to the existing literature through arguing that Turkish immigrants occupy a fundamentally important, yet surprisingly unrecognised role, in the Cypriot identity narratives as well as in the discourses and dynamics underpinning the conflict. Furthermore, the Turkish settler/immigrant community holds a different status compared to other migrants in Cyprus for five main reasons: 1) their growing numbers are a big concern for Cypriots and this number is being negotiated by the parties at Track 1 level; b) they are more politically charged than other migrants due to their numbers and ties to Turkey; c) Turkey’s role in Cyprus and the ‘TRNCs’ dependence on Turkey is undeniable as a guarantor, occupier, negotiator, financer and so forth; d) They are a diverse group of people that include settlers, economic migrants, students, soldiers, investors and so forth who are mostly pigeonholed into a lump sum number; e) They have ethnic, linguistic and religious ties with Turkish Cypriots.

24 I have scanned 486 pieces of literature including articles, books and reports on Cyprus and the Cyprus Problem.
Ethical concerns: Due to different cultural values and traditions within the Turkish immigrant community, the female participants were asked whether they felt comfortable in participating in a mixed group or whether they preferred to participate in an only female group during the ‘recruitment’ process. However, no female participant expressed such a concern for the two focus groups that took place in Nicosia and Famagusta. In fact, female participation in these two focus groups was meaningful both qualitatively and quantitatively. In the third focus group that took place in Kyrenia, where the migrant population is particularly made up of unskilled construction workers, all 13 participants were male. The method of recruitment that was used for all focus groups was the snow-ball technique but the researcher’s unfamiliarity with the city compared to the other two cities meant a heavier reliance on this technique. However, all male participation in the third focus group is also representative of the social and economic background of the migrant population in Kyrenia, as participants in the capital and in Famagusta are more socially and economically integrated and established. As such, these participants were more likely to come from educated backgrounds that inter-married Cypriots or acquired ‘TRNC’ citizenship. In Kyrenia, the snow-ball technique was particularly effective as the migrants in this city expressed disempowerment and being disenfranchised; they expressed their excitement at the opportunity to share their opinions and problems to someone who was interested outside of an election campaign.

Analytical and methodological concerns: The migrant groups from Turkey are highly diverse and it is important not to pigeonhole people into identity categories. Although Turkishness may not be the primary identity for some people in this group, some categorical analysis is necessary to draw conclusions from the research. Methodologically, the research adopted a strategically controlled bias when recruiting to ensure that the diversity of this group is respected. Age groups, birthplace, gender, location and time of stay in Cyprus were among these considerations. That being said, the majority of both Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots, except for some civil society representatives, tend to securitise this diverse group of immigrants into one all-inclusive and undifferentiated threat category under the title of ‘people from Turkey’ (Turkiyeliler).

25 2 females and 4 males in Nicosia; 3 female and 5 males in Famagusta.
26 Including Kurds, Shi’as, Laz/Pontus, soldier/veteran families, settlers, economic migrants.
Quantitative telephone surveys

Quantitative telephone surveys, which were based on stratified random sampling among Cypriot citizens to provide data on the perceptions of the existential threat(s), anxieties, identities and possible solution scenarios, are chosen for their efficiency and cost effectiveness in reaching out to a large number of people. Quantitative work often comes with budgetary and efficacy constrains. Telephone surveys are comparatively cheaper and faster to conduct compared face-to-face questionnaires and they also offer discreet anonymity for the respondent and are proven to provide more honest replies when the interviewer and interviewee are fundamentally unknown to one another (Mathers, Fox et al. 1998). Telephone interviews are particularly useful when the respondents to be interviewed are geographically distributed, but the complexity of the interview is limited without the use of visual aids and prompts (Parfitt 2005). The quantitative surveys were conducted by two research companies in Cyprus; one in the RoC that conducted the survey in Greek for RoC citizens and one in north Cyprus that conducted the survey in Turkish for ‘TRNC’ citizens. The sample was based on citizenship and did not filter out those who had non-Cypriot parents, who were dual citizens or who acquired citizenship due marriage or length of stay in Cyprus. The two research companies delivered the data in SPSS format.

Ethical concerns: Due to the political content of the questionnaire questions, the interviewers were particularly instructed to clearly state the nature and objectives of the project before starting the questionnaire and receive respondents’ consent.

Analytical and methodological concerns: In quantitative methods, sampling and analytical concerns are particularly tricky as the aim is to be able to draw credible, representative and legitimate conclusions. The research used stratified random sampling to represent the population in Cyprus. Generally, a sample for student projects for descriptive or exploratory surveys is ranged between 60-120 (Davies and Hughes 2014); however, considering the objectives of the thesis and its normative commitments, the legitimacy and the robustness of the data is crucial. Thus, the telephone survey sample, which was drawn separately based on registered telephone lines, was 500 for each community. Considering the decrease in the use of landline phones and wide penetration of mobile phones, telephone survey methodologists
that mainly rely on landlines face a new challenge to overcome coverage bias\textsuperscript{27} (Groves 1989). However, based on the study carried out on coverage bias in European telephone surveys, which included both the RoC and north Cyprus, the concern about coverage bias is not a decisive one for this research (see Mohorko, de Leeuw et al. 2013).

The main analytical concern with regards to employing this methodology in the context of Cyprus is the problem of different interviewers asking the same questions in two different languages, which may create nuances in the meaning of certain words such as ‘anxiety’ and ‘fear’. Considering the difficulty with measuring identity, the telephone survey questions were strategic and carefully crafted in consultation with the research companies and thesis supervisors. Some of these questions were also adopted from previous opinion polls that tested their viability and allowed for a temporal comparison. The identity questions included scale questions and self-referential questions in order to avoid pigeonholing people into identity labels and to try to establish the closest associations. In this sense, the research is mainly interested in cultural, ethnic and civic identity perceptions rather than other identity layers that may come with religion, family, gender, age, occupation, sexual orientation and so forth.

Another analytical concern is asking interviewees to reflect on changes over time (i.e. with regards to their identity perceptions). This raises issues of ‘recall bias’, meaning that the past can be glorified, damned, downplayed, or ‘not recalled’ (Bruter and Lodge 2013). However, the key interest for the research is to explore the shared perceptions of change and not the ‘hard reality’ of change; thus, despite being a concern, recall bias will not be decisive for the conclusions.

\textsuperscript{27} Referring to over-representation of some groups and the gap between the target population and the sampling frame.
Focus groups

Focus groups provide an in-depth analysis about Turkish immigrants’ perceived role in and understanding of the Cyprus Problem and the peacebuilding process, and insights about their experiences of the securitisation dynamics. Focus groups are a very efficient way of garnering empirical data as they allow the researcher to collect data from the group interaction as well as the responses of the individual participants. Compared to individual interviews, a free flowing discussion with a small group of people can significantly increase the sample for a qualitative study. It is also worth noting that participants in focus groups can build on each other’s responses and insights, which improves the richness of discussion and is more likely to be revealing. The three regional focus groups that were conducted as part of the fieldwork are summarised in the table below:

Table No 4: QTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Turkish-Cypriot community</th>
<th>Greek-Cypriot community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Data collection</strong></td>
<td>August – September 2014</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sample size</strong></td>
<td>500 (minimum needed 495)</td>
<td>501 (minimum needed 496)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population size</strong></td>
<td>294,906 (2011 census)</td>
<td>838,897 (2011 census)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Confidence level</strong></td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Margin of error</strong></td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of questions</strong></td>
<td>13 survey questions divided into 4 sections (identity, perceptions, anxieties and fears, reconciliation) and 5 general statistical questions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Method</strong></td>
<td>Telephone interviews</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Format</strong></td>
<td>SPSS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reference</strong></td>
<td>(QTS:2014)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table No 5: FG

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FG 1</th>
<th>FG 2</th>
<th>FG 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Location</strong></td>
<td>Famagusta, KTOEOS</td>
<td>Nicosia, Prologue Ltd.</td>
<td>Kyrenia, Teachers Lodge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Date</strong></td>
<td>6/02/2015, 17:30-19:30</td>
<td>9/02/2015, 18:00-20:00</td>
<td>11/02/2015, 18:00-20:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of Participants</strong></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age groups</strong></td>
<td>1 participant in his early 30s, 5 in their 40s and 50s.</td>
<td>All participants were between early 30s and early 40s.</td>
<td>All participants were between late 30s and mid-50s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender distribution</strong></td>
<td>2 Female, 4 Male</td>
<td>3 Female, 5 Male</td>
<td>All male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Participant backgrounds</strong></td>
<td>2 highschool teachers, a housewife, a council member and two public hospital clerks and an unemployed environmental engineer.</td>
<td>A teacher, a lawyer, an academic, two shopkeepers, one private sector manager and two delivery men.</td>
<td>Mostly construction workers or other skilled manual work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Birthplace</strong></td>
<td>All in Turkey except 1</td>
<td>All in Turkey except 1</td>
<td>All in Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Parents birthplace</strong></td>
<td>All in Turkey</td>
<td>All in Turkey</td>
<td>All in Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Living in Cyprus since/for</strong></td>
<td>Two participants since 1976, two since 1980, one since 1992, one born in Cyprus.</td>
<td>One participant since 1980, three between 1990-95, three between 2003-06 and one born in Cyprus.</td>
<td>All participants moved to Cyprus between 1994-2003 from the same region in Turkey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Notes</strong></td>
<td>All participants were working and middle class 'TRNC' citizens including public servants and teachers, one participant was Kurdish who moved to Cyprus during the junta in 1980.</td>
<td>All participants were working and middle class 'TRNC' citizens mostly working in the private sector except one. Three Participants were Alevi, which was a significant factor in their decision to migrate.</td>
<td>All participants were working class people without 'TRNC' citizenship. All came from Kahramanmaras, except one who came from Hatay. The participants claimed that 110 families moved to Cyprus from the same town between 1994-2003.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Ethical concerns:** Due to the political content of the questionnaire questions, the nature and objectives of the project was clearly stated to the participants during recruitment and before the focus group to ensure that the participants knew the data would be used anonymously and that they can withdraw from the research at any time. Focus group conductors remained outside of the discussion without expressing their own opinions on the subject matter. Overall, there were two experienced focus group conductors, while one facilitated the
discussion and I acted as the note taker and observer. The conversation was free flowing but guided with a list of open-ended questions. The focus groups were audio recorded as people tend to feel more conscious about their expressions when there is a video camera present.

**Analytical and methodological concerns:** Generally, the ideal sample for focus groups is approximately 4-6 but can move up to 20 depending on the complexity and the depth of the questions (Davies and Hughes 2014). The focus group participation was between 6-13 people in each location. Sample was based on noncitizen people of Turkish origin who are residents in north Cyprus and ‘TRNC’ citizens of Turkish origin who were born to non-Cypriot parents. The sample took age, gender and occupation into consideration to ensure diversity but young people aged 18-30 and people aged over 60 were not represented. This was a result of the snow-balling technique in recruitment as well as due to transportation issues (i.e. young people and people over 60 lacked access to cars). Considering the data will not be used for generalisations but rather to enrich and triangulate other fieldwork data, the limitations with the representation of all age groups is not a major concern.

The focus group data is used reflectively for interpretive analysis to allow the reader to get a sense of the nature and meaning of the responses offered, as well as illustratively to support arguments rather than to make arguments. The aim is not to count the number of people who agreed and quantify it or to represent a diverse migrant community as a whole, but rather to bring to surface the reflective thoughts and experiences of small but strategically selected sample, and to shed light on an identified, practical, policy-related or conceptual question.

**Semi-structured online surveys**

Online surveys have become really popular tools for systematic gathering of data from a target audience as they are cheap, efficient and practical. Compared to email questionnaires, online survey software or websites increase the efficiency of data gathering by streamlining the responses, providing some control over which questions need to be answered (i.e. administering skip logic techniques), and providing the initial data analysis very rapidly.\(^{28}\)

\(^{28}\) Other advantages include: a) Allowing respondents to take their own time to complete the survey; b) Providing anonymity thus they can be better at addressing sensitive questions; c) Offering fairly quick response time for
**Ethical concerns:** There are a few ethical concerns about online surveys, such as sending unsolicited emails can be intrusive or be considered spamming. Some emails being rejected as spam or falling into junk folders or not being delivered can be a worry for the researcher too. There are also the sampling considerations about online surveys as they exclude those who do not have access to the Internet, IT resources or those who are not IT literate. All these concerns about spamming and sampling do not apply to this particular research project as the online surveys were used to reach out to a specific target group. Cyprus CSO Directory was used to identify the target group, who were emailed directly on an individual level with a link to the online survey to avoid spamming or intrusion.

**Analytical and methodological concerns:** At a first glance, it can be argued online surveys are not suitable for surveys with open-ended questions because there is no trained interviewer to explore the answers of the respondents, and no human contact or a chance to build rapport. However, recent studies show that high quality responses to open-ended questions are obtainable in web surveys (Smyth, Dillman et al. 2009). Even though there are no spur of the moment anecdotes or the instant opportunity follow up on an interesting topic, semi-structured online surveys tend to produce less non-response questions than other modes, as they have the ability to prompt a respondent when a question is left blank; where, in face-to-face or telephone interviews, interviewers are more likely to accept ‘no opinion’ answers without any probing in order to maintain the rapport or not to intimidate the respondent (Fricker, Galesic et al. 2005). For semi-structured and open-ended questionnaires, including an introduction to a question that states the importance of the question for the study can result in higher quality and longer responses (Christian and Dillman 2004, Smyth, Dillman et al. 2009). There are similar studies that show that online respondents on average use more words (Schaefer and Dillman 1998).

Furthermore, online surveys are well suited for CSO representatives not least because they have internet access and are computer literate, but also because they are more likely to be familiar with the survey questions and the topic at hand, which negates the need for guidance participants; e) Ease of dissemination; f) Ability to track respondents and do follow ups; g) Hassle-free and efficient handling of data (Miller 2003).
and explanation during the survey. To further eliminate the concerns regarding the lack of guidance and human contact, a pilot study was conducted with 10 individuals including PhD students and professionals to ensure that the questions were clearly phrased. Approximately 200 CSO’s\(^{29}\) were identified and the survey link was sent to an identified CSO representative\(^{30}\) rather than directly to the organisational email address or web forum to minimise interns, assistants or people who cannot be considered ‘representatives’ from filling in the questionnaire.

Table No 6: CSOS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CSO Representatives (north)</th>
<th>CSO Representatives (RoC)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Survey link</strong></td>
<td><a href="http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/SRK5NM9">www.surveymonkey.com/s/SRK5NM9</a></td>
<td><a href="http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/9NCZSJv">www.surveymonkey.com/s/9NCZSJv</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Data collection</strong></td>
<td>August – October 2014</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sample size</strong></td>
<td>Total responses: 67</td>
<td>Total responses: 43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Usable/valid responses: 62</td>
<td>Usable/valid responses: 39 Representing 37 organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Representing 53 organisations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Language</strong></td>
<td>English</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of questions</strong></td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Method</strong></td>
<td>Online survey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Format</strong></td>
<td>Exportable data (.exl or .doc)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{29}\) Including international organisations, local authorities, trade unions, chambers, associations, think-tanks and etc.

\(^{30}\) A CSO representative refers to a founding/board member, project/programme coordinator/manager, general secretary/chair or an active member.
4.4 Conclusion

Today, social sciences in particular and research world in general are becoming increasingly inter-disciplinary. In fact, inter-disciplinary work is not only growing but being actively encouraged and promoted through various grants and programmes. This is not only a ‘new trend’ in academia, but it also underlines the acknowledgement and realisation that ‘purist’ approaches that treat subjects, methods and tools mutually exclusive are not necessarily on solid ground in assuming the existence of inherent incompatibility between different research methods. Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, who promote epistemological and methodological pluralism, contend that mixed-methods facilitate communication and collaboration across approaches and disciplines and provide superior research (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004).

If we do not assume that the logic of justification has inherent impositions on data collection, then epistemological and paradigmatic ecumenicalism becomes more achievable by allowing us to move past the paradigm wars, and by offering a practical alternative to combine the strengths of both qualitative and quantitative methodologies (Howe 1988, Bryman and Burgess 1994). In other words, we should not treat epistemology and methodology as being synonymous, or assume that methodological choices dictate our epistemological commitments. Acknowledging the weaknesses and limitations of different methods, a good blend of quantitative and qualitative analysis and strategic triangulation of data can provide the thesis with a strong foundation to interpret and draw valuable conclusions about ontological security, identity narratives and (de)securitisation practices in conflict environments.

In addition to the primary data collection laid out in this chapter, the thesis also utilises existing secondary datasets and data such as opinion polls carried out by different organisations, CSO reports, press releases, and the like to corroborate, triangulate and temporally compare the findings. This secondary data is invaluable for identifying and

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31 For example, Cyprus-2015-Initiative, funded by USAID and Interpeace has produced numerous option poll reports since 2008 and Cypriot’s Voice, a bicomunal think-tank, has published myriad press releases about the concerns and priorities of the two communities.
triangulating securitisation dynamics, ontological security concerns and perceptions about Turkish immigrants.

Considering protracted conflicts provide a fertile ground for institutionalised securitisations and institutionalised securitisations pose a particular challenge for desecuritisation, Cyprus presents a unique case study to explore the theoretical research questions. Similarly, as the concepts of identity, threat and security are all intermingled and interlaced, exploration and enrichment of these concepts through empirical analysis and providing a more nuanced understanding would inform peace research and reconciliation in conflict environments. Understanding multi-layered and complex identity narratives and perceptions of threat across the island calls for a nuanced, empirically-rich, holistic fieldwork methodology. As such, application of multiple qualitative and quantitative research methods can provide the thesis with a more wholesome and well-grounded data in understanding and analysing the underlying research questions.
Part II: The Case of Cyprus: Who we were? Who we are? Who will we become?

Introduction

Cyprus is the third largest island in the Mediterranean Sea. It sits roughly forty miles south of Turkey and five hundred miles southeast of mainland Greece, with a population of 1.1 million. The history of Cyprus has been tempestuous with the involvement of many actors ranging from different empires and nations of the past to regional and global actors of today. As George Christou highlights, the history of Cyprus “has been characterised by tension and conflict due to the diametrically opposed interests of Greece and the Greek-Cypriots on the one hand, and Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriots on the other” (Christou 2004:29).

The Cyprus Problem operates on local, regional and international levels: the local entails the relationship between the two ‘ethnically’ categorised communities; the regional, which is the product of geography, history, and demographics of the region, at its core, involves the relationship between Greece and Turkey or Greekness and Turkishness; and at the international level, the problem has preoccupied the UN since 1964 and involved NATO, the USA and increasingly the EU. On the other hand, conflict resolution and reconciliation efforts on the island mainly operated on two levels, Track 1 level (peacemaking through peace negotiations at the level of political leaders) that traces back to 1960s and Track 2 level (peacebuilding at the level of civil society) that was introduced in the 1990s (Broome 1998, Loizos 2007, Hadjipavlou and Kanol 2008).

Part II of the thesis serves as a bridge between the theoretical framework presented in Part I and the empirical analysis in Part III; it contextualises the theoretical framework to the case of Cyprus before moving on to the analysis of the fieldwork data. Considering that the debates about identity and security remain intricately interweaved in protracted conflicts, providing a historical account for the case of Cyprus is not only an inevitable task for contextualisation of the theoretical arguments and the empirical data, but also necessary to understand how
securitisation of different others relates to and is engrained in the ontological security of the two main Cypriot communities.

The analysis of historical events presented in the next two chapters illustrates the dynamic and kaleidoscopic nature of Cypriot identity, where identity narratives demonstrate a shift from religious to ethnic and ethnic to civic and cultural. This shift supports Kinnvall’s argument that actors who feel ontologically insecure are tempted to draw closer to any collective that can provide them safety to reduce their existential anxieties (Kinnvall 2004). However, the writing of history is selective; as Benjamin Broome suggests, “the past has been distorted beyond recognition by the educational systems and political propaganda of both sides” in Cyprus (Broome 2005:83). While the historical accounts about Cyprus can be contradictory, ascertaining individuals’ and/or collectives’ self-identity from history or remembering/interpreting identity narratives retroactively is at best challenging. However, in order to explore the relationship of the self with different and/or enemy others, and how this relationship impinges upon ontological security, we need a deeper understanding of the particular ‘self(s)’ as well as the particular ‘other(s)’. To that end, Part II of this thesis will provide an extended historical account for the case of Cyprus and map the shifting identity narratives on a timeline. Mainly drawing from old data sets, literature on the Cyprus conflict, media sources and history books, the two chapters in this section traces Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot identity narratives through history.

Historian and psychoanalyst Peter Loewenberg concurs that when we examine history it can often be difficult to figure out where reality ends and fantasy begins (Loewenberg 1995). This is certainly the case in Cyprus as well. When Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots, and in fact Greeks and Turks in general, speak or write about what has happened in Cyprus during the last five decades, they select and highlight two different events as the most traumatic and devastating for their communities. For example, while the Greek-Cypriot history textbooks focus on British rule and the events of 1974 (Makriyianni and Psaltis 2007), Turkish-Cypriot history textbooks focus on the Ottoman period and the inter-communal strife before the events of 1974 (Papadakis 2008, Bekerman, Kızilyürek et al. 2010). Hence, they ignore those events that do not satisfy their identity narratives sustained by the government (Papadakis
2005). Despite the difference in the way historical events are selected and presented, the policies and strategies used to construct and reinforce identity narratives are very similar; both communities have created symbols, ethnic maps, detailed accounts of murders and heroes, and a conception of the other as the ultimate enemy whose existence on the island comes at the expense of ‘our’ existence.

Cypriots’ self-identification varies on a scale of ‘only Cypriot’ to ‘only Turkish/Greek’, where the majority position themselves somewhere in the middle (see Volkan 2008, Ker-Lindsay 2011). I personally identify myself as a Turkish speaking Cypriot, which is a personal choice that *circumstantialises* my ‘Turkishness’ and limits it to my mother tongue rather than linking it to my civic, ethnic or national identity. I do not deny that I have a shared culture with people from Turkey; after all I love hummus and goblet drums... However, I cannot deny the same shared culture with other Mediterranean people either. For me, just as an Australian or an American speaks English without perceiving ‘Englishness’ as an identity signifier, the fact that Turkish happens to be my mother tongue does not necessarily define who I am. At least ideally, I wish it did not. As previously discussed however, identity is not solely a self-referential practice, it is also about the response and acknowledgement of the other (see Butler 2004, Rumelili 2004, Wetherell 2009) and being simply and only Cypriot is not ‘accepted’. In social and professional interactions, as well as in the 1960 Constitution of the RoC, I am, more often than not, required to specify what ‘kind’ of Cypriot I am. Nevertheless, my self-identification is only one variation on one end of the spectrum; on the other end are those whose sense of belonging lies with their Turkishness/Greekness, and they define themselves as Turks/Greeks, who happened to be born in Cyprus.

While many scholars locate the conflict in a dual-ethnic analysis based on historic enmity between Greeks and Turks (i.e. Akcali 2007) and others locate it in the 1960 constitution, which is viewed as inherently defective (i.e. Adams 1966, Trimikliniotis and Bozkurt 2010), some others read it as a failure in nation-building and national integration of ‘Cypriots’ (i.e. Nimetz 1991, Rizvi 1993) and others as the product of manipulative foreign interests in the region (i.e. Mavratsas 1999, O’Malley and Craig 2001). Generally, the locus of the
responsibility for the conflict in these readings are either situated inside, meaning internally to communities, or outside, linked to the selfish interests and conspiracies of external powers, where the two communities are to an extent stripped of agency. Appropriating the blame to others and self-victimisation is especially prevalent in the national narratives of the two communities. These approaches risk essentialisation and reification of the actors involved and assume rationality, autonomy and homogeneity of actors and their interests (Trimikliniotis and Bozkurt 2012). It is counter-intuitive and reductionist to seek a singular answer or diagnosis to the protracted conflict in Cyprus. Historic enmities, shifting identity narratives, physical and existential insecurities and anxieties, colonial legacy, the Cold War dynamics, realpolitik interests, the constitutional impositions and defects, the role of international organisations and even personal egos and ambitions of certain political figures\(^\text{32}\) have all had a role to play, amalgamating into what we came to know as the Cyprus Problem.

Helen and Everett Hughes argue “an ethnic group is not one because of the degree of measurable or observable difference from other groups; it is an ethnic group... because both the ins and the out feel and act as if it were a separate group“(Hughes and Hughes 1952:152). National and ethnic identities, like the other layers of our self-identity, are incomplete and permeable layers; meaning, they are always in the process of shifting and becoming. For example, being British, Turkish, Greek or Cypriot is not about fulfilling a set criteria essential for membership, but it is rather an inter-subjective process negotiated between the self, the members of the collective and the non-members. This inter-subjective process adds meaning to the membership, but it is also constantly re-negotiated in relation to our social and material environment. Thus, locking the conflict into one of ethnicity, does not only essentialise ethnic signifiers, assuming there is a homogeneous group of Turkish-Cypriots that align themselves in opposition to Greek-Cypriots based on their Turkish ethnicity and Turkish interests, but it also reifies them as complete and unchanging. The binary and dual-ethnic approach thwarts peacebuilding efforts as it assumes that the rival and homogeneous positions of each ‘side’ can be mediated based on ‘objective’ negotiations and compromise that satisfies their ‘interests’. As a result, it disregards the inter-subjective and co-constitutive

\(^{32}\) For example former community leaders Rauf Raif Denktaş and Archbishop Makarios wielded greater power in determining their respective community’s stance than any other individual actor.
nature of identities, and fails to account for ontological security and for peace-anxieties triggered by the prospect of a comprehensive solution.

That being said, by no means am I trying to postulate a singular diagnosis for the roots of the conflict or a new alternative explanation to the whole story; neither am I trying to reinvent the wheel for peacebuilding. Instead, while recognising that the conditions on all levels need to be favourable for a comprehensive settlement, I argue that the narrow dual-ethnic focus thwarted the peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts on the island. Thus, in order to break free of an essentialist dual-ethnic approach, I introduce ‘other-others’, ‘other-selves’ and ‘othered-selves’ to the historical analysis of identity narratives and add ontological security considerations to the equation. For example, I explore the role of Turkish immigrants as other-others and Turkishness as the othered-self for Turkish-Cypriots. One significant and original contribution of this historical and contextual account is the adoption of a broader and more nuanced lens to our understanding of identity narratives in Cyprus. As such, in addition to exploring Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot identity narratives, Chapters 5 and 6 also trace the perceptions towards people from Turkey and Turkishness. While the Greek-Cypriot perception of Turkishness as their enemy other did not shift but instead was reinforced by historical events, it is interesting to see how Turkish-Cypriots’ self/other relationship that was first based on similarity and admiration for Turkey and Turkishness was securitised into one based on inferiority and disassociation.

Furthermore, tracing how identity narratives shifted over time against certain milestones and how they were reconfigured on a temporal basis will allow me to interpret the fieldwork data and better assess the prospect of desecuritising ‘Turkishness’, as a potential facilitating tool for reconciliation. Yet, it would be extremely challenging and counter-intuitive to study the identity narratives of Cypriots’ independently as they cannot be analysed in disconnect from each other. Thus, Part II adopts a linear chronological approach where each chapter is organised around major milestones that have (re)shaped and (re)configured the two main identity narratives on the island. Unlike Part I, where each theoretical chapter had its own introduction and conclusion, considering the chapters in Part II present the two parts of a bigger temporal whole, I do not deem that necessary here. Instead, the chapters in Part II
share the same introduction and conclusion. While Chapter 5 traces shifting identity narratives and relevant historical events from the Ottoman to the British period and then from independence to division, Chapter 6 traces the identity narratives from the division of the island, to the Europeanisation of the conflict and the reunification referendum (a.k.a. Annan Plan). Starting from the Ottoman era, which was the origin of Turkish presence on the island, the two chapters bring the timeline up to 2015, which sets the scene for empirical analysis of the fieldwork data in Part III.
Chapter 5. Shifting Identity Narratives: Pre-Division

5.1 From the Ottoman to the British: Religious vs. Ethnic signifiers (1571-1960)

5.1.1 Primordial enemies on a rock

It is the majority Greek-Cypriots who are the older established peoples on the island. The ethnological contention is that they are directly descended from Achaean Greeks who settled in Cyprus in the 14th Century BC and again at the beginning of the 12th Century BC, following the Trojan Wars (Lee and Lee 1973). The preservation of the language, customs and traditions, especially after the introduction of Christianity to the island has given the Greek-Cypriots a permanent ethnical, cultural and religious link with Greece. Greek-Cypriots take pride in the ancient and rich Greek language, and in the accomplishments of many Greek thinkers and philosophers, who are considered as the foundation blocks of Western civilisation and democracy (Broome 2005). Compared to Turkish-Cypriots, whose presence on the island dates back to the Ottoman rule that was established in the 1570s, the archaism of Greek-Cypriots’ identity narratives provides them with strong primordial ties to the island and simultaneously represents the island’s Hellenic essence (see Stamatakis 1991). Due to this archaic link with the greater Hellenic world, Greek-Cypriot identity narratives adopt the history of Greece with all its glories and traumas, from the fall of Constantinople to the Greek War of Independence, where Ottomans and by extension Turks play a central role (Theodossopoulos 2007:2).

Consequently, national education in Greece and in the GCc symbolically relies upon the image of the Turk to foster an understanding of what it means to be a Greek (Theodossopoulos 2007). In this imagination of the self, the undifferentiated Turk is the most significant and salient other. For example, a common Greek/Greek-Cypriot saying that denotes growing anger and frustration in a social interaction resembles the feeling to “becoming a Turk” or “acting like a Turk” (see Papadakis 2005). The official history textbooks can elucidate this reliance upon the image of the enemy for the construction of the self; they stretch back to Mycenaeans (1200 BC) and present the Byzantine period in exclusively positive light and the

33 Εγινε Τούρκος ("He became a Turk") denotes extreme anger towards someone or because of something; or Κάνει σαν Τούρκος ("He acts like a Turk") implies somebody is acting in an uncivilised or very rude manner.
Ottoman period in exclusively negative light. In his revealing comparative study of the history schoolbooks, Yiannis Papadakis notes that adopting the dominant model of the history of Greece, the history books in the RoC convey the message that “Cyprus is and has been Greek and nothing but Greek” and “Cypriot Hellenism” is the central actor of history from beginning of time (Papadakis 2008:132). As such, history textbooks use the term Cypriot (Kyprioi) and Greeks (Ellines) interchangeably, which excludes the possibility of any other legitimate indigenous peoples on the island. They also refer to Turkish-Cypriots either as Turks, who are depicted as barbaric and unruly, or as descendants of Islamicised Greeks in Cyprus (Papadakis 2008). Consequently, textbooks that argue even the people initially brought over from Anatolia by the Ottoman Empire in the 16th Century were originally of Greek stock reifies Cypriotness based on ‘ethnic’ descent and blood, and denies a distinct identity to Turkish-Cypriots and a legitimate claim to political equality since they do not ‘exist’ as a ‘real’ ethnic group. Drawing from a study conducted among Greek-Cypriot youth and high school teachers that revealed Turkish-Cypriots as the most rejected collective category above others such as Roma people, Arabs, ‘foreign artists/dancers’ (meaning sex workers) and Asian domestic workers, Papadakis confirms that the representations that treat the presence of others on the island as incidental and parasitic pervade not just history teaching but the overall educational system in the GCc (Papadakis 2008).

On the other hand, the Turkish presence in Cyprus dates back to the Ottoman years (1571-1878). Even though at one point during the Ottoman rule the number of Turks exceeded that of Greeks, their numbers fluctuated over the years and at the time of independence in 1960, Turkish-Cypriots made up approximately 18% of the population in Cyprus (Ker-Lindsay 2011). However, ethnicity was not an identity signifier until the British rule. Before the Ottomans obliterated the feudal system and serfdom in the 1570s, identity was defined in terms of class as well as religion. While class distinctions became less relevant to identity categorisations during the Ottoman rule, religion, even though it cannot automatically be equated with ethnicity, was the key categorical distinction for the millet system (see Pollis 1996, Hatay 2007). The Ottoman millet system divided the population between millet-i hakimiye and

34 The word millet came to mean nation in the 19th C but its earlier meaning referred to an organised religious community whose leader was responsible to the Ottoman for the community’s obligations under the Empire, such as taxation.
millet-i dhimmiye, meaning between the ruling Muslim community and the subject non-Muslim communities. The religious communities mingled freely enough on friendly terms, tolerant of religious differences, and often interacted through commercial transactions and social functions, but mostly lived in separate villages or town quarters and intermarriages were very rare (See Hannay 2005); a trend that did not change post-1960s.

While the Ottoman rule is depicted as a time of oppression in the Greek-Cypriot textbooks, it is glorified as a time of freedom and progress in the Turkish-Cypriot textbooks that start with the Ottoman conquest of the island, linking it historically, strategically and geographically to Anatolia (Papadakis 2008). Adopting a similar thesis to the Turkish history books, Turkish-Cypriot textbooks present the Ottomans as the gracious and tolerant rulers compared to the cruel Venetians, and Greek-Cypriots as ungrateful mutineers. However, ‘renting’ the island’s administration over to the British Empire in return for diplomatic aid against Russia in 187835, marks a significant milestone for the Turkish-Cypriot identity narratives, as it can be perceived as their first ‘rejection’ trauma by the large-group. They were handed off to another ruler; ‘traded in’ and ‘sacrificed’ for diplomatic aid. As it will be discussed later, these feelings of rejection and betrayal were triggered by different historical events again and again.

Following the census of 1881, the millet system was officially replaced with a Legislative Council, composed of twelve elected members, nine Orthodox, three Muslim, and six appointed British officials. Although, together with the Turkish-Cypriot members British representatives could prevent Greek-Cypriot majority and domination over decision making, representative arrangements based on proportionality rather than the millet system, meant that demography now had more of a political significance for the communities (Nevzat 2005). When the British rulers started classifying and institutionalising the local population based on their ethnicity following the World War I (WW I) and Britain’s annexation of Cyprus, the terms Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot started appearing as categorical definitions for the communities on the island (Nevzat 2005, Hatay 2007).

35 The Convention of Defensive Alliance, signed in Constantinople between Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire in 1878, was also a strategic deal for the British to protect their sea route to India
The role of the British Empire in Cyprus was reconstructed after WW I. On the one hand, the disappointment and frustration of Greek-Cypriots', who hoped that the British Empire would help Cyprus join Greece as it did with the Ionian Islands, was growing especially after Cyprus officially became Crown Colony (Borowiec 2000). On the other hand, the end of WW I played a significant role in reconfiguring Turkish-Cypriots’ political association with the Ottoman Empire and their growing sense of solidarity with the wider Turkish community. While Greek-Cypriots nurtured their desire for independence and subsequently Enosis, as well as their budding enmity against the colonisers who were the obstacle in front of these aspirations, Turkish-Cypriots saw the British Administration as their only source of security in the wake of the invasion of Istanbul and growing disturbance among Greek-Cypriots (St John-Jones 1983, Nevzat 2005). After the Treaty of Lausanne, which left Cyprus outside of the Misak-i Milli (the national pact re-drawing modern Turkey’s borders) in 1923, Turkish-Cypriots experienced another sense of abandonment, evident from old newspaper articles and accounts of the political elite of the time (See Nevzat 2005, Persianis 2013). Despite their great eagerness and support for Atatürk’s reforms, the narrow nationalist policy of the Turkish War of Independence relinquished claims over ‘Turks’ living outside the borders of the new Turkey (i.e. Crete and Cyprus). Altay Nevzat writes that “the hostilities between the empire of their roots and the empire of their rulers”, which prompted full annexation of the island by the latter, left little leeway for Turkish-Cypriots to profess a dual allegiance (Nevzat 2005:256). While some re-negotiated their dual allegiance and started distinguishing between Ottomanism and Turkism, others chose to leave the identity dilemma and the island itself behind, migrating to Turkey and to the UK by the thousands.

The ethnically Turkish and religiously Muslim population of Cyprus declined during the British rule as many migrated to Turkey or left the island. Between 1878 when the island was leased to Britain and 1923 when Cyprus was added to the Crown Colony, Turkish-Cypriot population decreased over 10% (St John-Jones 1983, Nevzat 2005, Nevzat and Hatay 2009). The changes in demographics also changed the representation in Legislative Councils, where the town mayors became, almost exclusively, Greek-Cypriot (St John-Jones 1983, Heper and Criss 2009).

36 Cyprus was under British protectorate between 1878-1914, under British military occupation until 1925 and part of Crown Colony in after 1925. Turkish government formally recognised Britain’s sovereignty over Cyprus with the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923.
This created what Rebecca Bryant calls a “a situation of structural inequality”, which marked the minority complex of Turkish-Cypriots; as their number decreased, so did their voice and legitimacy on the island (Bryant 2006:48).

While the Greek-Cypriot national identity corresponds with the Greek War of Independence (1821-1832), the Turkish-Cypriot national identity coincides with the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 (Samani 1999). The War of Independence and Atatürk’s revolution compelled the TCc to reassess their political outlook; as the religious and Ottoman elements receded, the Turkish component and the key themes of the revolution, modernisation and Turkism, became evident (St John-Jones 1983). For example, Kıbrıs (Cyprus) newspaper started distinguishing between ‘religious’ and ‘national’ identity, promoting the need to teach the Turkish-Cypriot youth both their ‘religious’ and ‘national’ heritage (Nevzat 2005:151). Further politicisation of national and ethnic identities over religious ones on the island polarised the communities into separate ethnic groups and undermined the potential of constructing a shared collective identity; instead, the two main communities of the island were politicised and socialised in a mutually exclusive way towards unification with their ‘motherlands’ (See Nevzat 2005:157).

While the GCc was introduced to the concept of ‘modernisation’ and ‘nationhood’ in late 19th Century, for Turkish-Cypriots it was Kemalism. Consequently, the TCc distanced themselves from their religious and Ottoman identity, turning their past into an unwanted inferior ‘other’. As Bryant explains, while the Greek orthodox majority claimed not only to possess European ancestry but that they were real ancestors of Europe, the Muslim minority desired to disconnect themselves from the ‘backwardness’ of their past, and were eager to adopt the concepts of ‘modernisation’ and ‘Europeanisation’ underpinned first by the Young Turks movement and then more unequivocally by Atatürk’s reforms (see Bryant 2004, Bryant 2006). They saw their new politicisation as a project of national modernisation that explicitly aimed at bridging the East and the West (Kızılyürek and Gautier-Kızılyürek 2004, Aktar, Kızılyürek et al. 2010).
The discourses of national and ethnic identity appropriated from the motherlands were translated into nationalist education to civilise and modernise the citizen. In the Greek-Cypriot case, these narratives were reproduced against their historical nemesis at the gates (Ottomans/Turks), and in the Turkish-Cypriot case, a backward other within the communal self, that was inferior and needed fixing (Bryant 2006). Their desire to be more European, more civilised and more modern was reflected in a sense of a weakness that had to be corrected, leading to a greater acceptance of colonial mandates (see Bryant 2006). Zarakol explores international stigmatisation and sense of inferiority in the Ottoman Empire especially after WW I, which created a prevalent sense of ‘discreditablity’ as Eastern, backward, uncivilised and oriental (Zarakol 2011). She explains that stigmatised collectives are almost always self-conscious about falling short of what they consider the normative standard and calculating about the impressions they are making, which manifests itself in an officially sanctioned but stifling self-narrative that motivates actors’ every interaction.

Zarakol’s analysis of stigmatised collectives, who are obsessed with international stature, recognition and acceptance rings true with the TCc as well. This obsession with recognition is illustrated in the later sections after the division of the island, but at this juncture of the historical timeline, it can be seen as one of the reasons why Turkish-Cypriots had been more loyal to their colonisers. The colonisers were not only the source of security against the Greek-Cypriot majority that nurtured unification with Greece but also the source of ‘modernity’ and ‘Western civilisation’, the end goal they (Turkish-Cypriots as well as the Kemalists) aspired to achieve.

Highlighting the concepts of imposition versus acceptance and adoption in post-colonial literature, Bryant and Navaro-Yashin elucidate how the ambivalent feelings toward the British rulers gradually became more positive especially during and after Atatürk’s revolution (Bryant 2006, Navaro-Yashin 2006). The clear sense of backwardness, structural inequality, and perceived inferiority created a prevalent demand for ‘development’, which meant moderate feelings towards the colonisers and eagerness in adoption and appropriation of Kemalist Westernisation reforms. In line with Zarakol’s analysis of internalised stigmatisation, in her book titled “Imagining the Modern”, Rebecca Bryant explores this feeling of inferiority and
weakness as not a mere interpretation of a minority having a distinct disadvantage with regard to the majority, or being oppressed by them but rather as a weakness of the ‘self’, a weakness internal to their society in comparison to Greek-Cypriots who were more ‘modern’ and ‘successful’ (Bryant 2004). Their ‘threatening other’ was the Ottoman backwardness that was ‘bağnaz’ (meaning bigoted and sectarian), which was a threat to ‘medeniyet’ (meaning being civilised and developed), a concept that got closely associated with secularism.

Turkish-Cypriots, who readily and immediately adopted the Kemalist reforms, ‘modernised’ and ‘secularised’ themselves and orientalised their past. Hence, while civilisation for Greek-Cypriots was a desire to return to their heroic and celebrated past, which was something to be revived and protected; for Turkish-Cypriots, it was a goal to be achieved, something that needed to be acquired based on their self-critique. Thus, Atatürk’s reforms and modernisation mission was not perceived as an imposition of Western values but rather a prescription, a remedy for their diagnosed weakness.

5.1.2 National and ethnic polarisation
The feelings of ethnic and national identification grew stronger in the early 1900s, which was facilitated and spread through the rise of media and the spread of education. To emphasise their independence to one another and to demonstrate their allegiance to the mainland, Turkish-Cypriots had been eager to display the flag of their ‘motherland’ at any kind of function, institution and even in their homes. Yet, although inter-marriages were extremely rare and co-existence did not necessarily mean a rosy picture of friendship or a relationship of close compatriots, Cypriots engaged in business ventures and participated in each others’ celebrations especially in the capital and in mixed-villages until their political goals and desired future grew mutually exclusive (Kızılyürek 1993, Kızılyürek 2002).

In Nathalie Tocci’s analysis, “The Greek-Cypriot struggle for self-determination triggered the violation of Turkish-Cypriot rights and ignited reactive ethno-nationalisms, as did the Georgian, Turkish, Israeli, Serbian nation-state building projects vis-a-vis the Abkhaz and Ossetians, the Kurds, the Palestinians and the Montenegrins respectively” (Tocci 2007:2). Tocci notes that in all of these five cases, the real and/or perceived violation of individual
and/or collective rights has fuelled and/or justified ethno-nationalism and exclusivist identity-politics, which led to mutually exclusive goals and desires. The Turkish-Cypriot ethnic and national identity grew stronger in response to their own ‘weak modernisation’ and in reaction to the growing calls for Enosis especially after many of the Aegean and Ionian islands were unified with Greece following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Cyprus began to appear first on the maps of Greece and then of Turkey. The island was nicknamed as Megalonisos (Big Island) by Greek nationalism and Yavruvatan (Babyland) by Turkish nationalism (Kızılyürek 1993, Aktar, Kızılyürek et al. 2010). While Greek-Cypriot educators and history teaching emphasised a primordial ancestral bond with the Hellenic World and Cyprus’ Greek heritage, Turkish-Cypriots cultivated narratives focused on an organic geographical bond and proximity, asserting that Cyprus was part of Anatolia broken from the ‘mother’ after the Ice Ages (Kızılyürek 1993, Kızılyürek 2002).

As a defensive minority, Turkish-Cypriots fostered a counter-nationalism focused on survival and on fears of being assimilated by the majority GCc, whose sense of ethnic identity were cultivated almost a century earlier (Aktar, Kızılyürek et al. 2010). In response to Enosis, Taksim (partition and then unification with Turkey) became the Turkish-Cypriots’ core political propaganda and end goal (Kızılyürek 2002). According to Kızılyürek, this nationalistic approach created a political myopathy of the Cypriot elite, which ultimately undermined and ignored the shared local commonalities, and the ethnic antagonism diminished the significance of Cyprus for the collective identities to an ‘irrelevant geography’ who were waiting to be ‘rescued’ by Greece or Turkey (Kızılyürek 1993).

In the years that followed the British rule, Greek-Cypriot demands for Enosis developed rapidly. The economic depression of the time provided fertile ground leading to several uprisings and demonstrations, the most significant of all was the destruction of Government House in the capital during the riots of 1931 led by the Greek-Cypriot National Radical Union. The period between 1931 and 1940 proved to be a very difficult one for the Cypriots. With the aim of imposing ‘calmness’ and to prevent local public interest in politics, the Governor at the time, Sir Richmond Palmer, took a series of suppressive measures which included limitations on teaching of Greek and Turkish history and on the administration and functioning of
schools, and prohibition of trade unions, associations and political parties as well as national symbols; the Legislative Councils were suspended, public meetings were prohibited, the press was silenced and no municipal elections took place until 1943 (Oberling 1982, Hill 2010). The uprising and the suppressive new regime deeply disconcerted the Turkish-Cypriots; they were agitated by the ‘seriousness’ of the threat of Enosis and felt punished for what the Greek-Cypriots did despite their loyalty to the British rule (Dodd 2010).

The suppressive measures were not lifted until World War II (WW II), during which more than thirty thousand Cypriots joined the British armed forces. The period after 1931 left little room for nationalist expressions especially for Turkish-Cypriots, who were relatively less mobilised and less politicised compared to Greek-Cypriots, partly because of their perceived ‘inferiority’ and adoration for ‘modernity’ and the British rule, partly because of Turkey’s disinterest and also partly because they lacked an organised institution that provided both religious and ideological leadership like the Orthodox Church. Although WW II distracted the nationalist mobilisation for a limited period of time, the de-colonisation movement and their military support during WW II reinforced Greek-Cypriot hopes for Enosis (Loizides 2007).

During this time, both Turkish-Cypriots and the British colonialists realised the need for Turkey’s support and involvement to act as a safeguard against Enosis and to maintain the status quo, who thus far remained mostly disinterested in the case (Dodd 2010). In 1950, the Turkish foreign minister Ali Köprülü said “For Turkey, there does not exist any Cyprus issue” (quoted in Collective 2009:208). Although disheartened with rejection once again, the Turkish-Cypriot press, initiated an organised attempt to develop a link with Turkish intellectuals, politicians and journalists, which proved effective in shifting the public opinion in Turkey (Nevzat 2005, Aktar, Kızilyürek et al. 2010). Initially, Ankara approached Cyprus affairs with great caution, focusing on maintaining good relations with Greece and the UK. Yet, even though Turkey did not promote the spread and growth of nationalism and Kemalist ideas among Turkish-Cypriots, and wished to maintain the status quo, it did inadvertently help the Turkish-Cypriot nationalists through indirect actions such as providing schoolteachers, and making it easy for Turkish-Cypriot students to enter Turkish universities (Nevzat 2005).
Consequently, fearing both rising communism among Greek-Cypriots and amplified calls and proposals submitted to the Government for Enosis, Turkish-Cypriots became more politicised and more mobilised by the end of 1940s. They complained that the Greek-Cypriots were changing Turkish street names into Greek, flying Greek flags everywhere and disregarding Turkish-Cypriots in the municipal councils (Markides 2001, Loizides 2007). Turkish-Cypriots’ insistence on having separate municipal councils, and eventual establishment of separate de facto municipalities in 1958 was seen as presaging partition by both Greek-Cypriots and the Government in Cyprus. By the end of 1940s, Turkish-Cypriots started to see the response they were looking for from Turkey; Ankara was making clear that there could be no change of regime in Cyprus that was not favourable to Turkey. The development of public pressure in both Greece and Turkey toward Enosis and Taksim respectively saw the deterioration of the relations between two countries (Dodd 2010).

It is important to note that other international interests and strategies were at stake as well. Good relations and a strong alliance among Greece, Turkey and Great Britain through NATO was very important for the Middle East, the Suez Canal and the West, especially during the paranoid atmosphere of the Cold War era. While Enosis would clearly upset Turkey, the UK and the USA feared the self-determination option due to Greek-Cypriots’ Orthodox heritage and closeness to the Soviet Union (see O’Malley and Craig 2001). Britain had no intention of leaving the island or considering Enosis. However, the claim for Enosis only became stronger, making the nationalist polarisation, antagonism and mutually exclusive political end goals more profound and mainstream. Soon after, two guerrilla organisations were created, which resulted in the escalation and militarisation of the conflict.

5.1.3 Thorny road to fettered independence

In early 1955, a Cypriot born Greek colonel called Georgios Grivas, established EOKA (the Nationalist Organisation of Cypriot Fighters), started the violent acts of insurgency in April 1955. EOKA attacks significantly inflamed public opinion in Turkey and further polarised both the Turkish-Cypriot and left-leaning Greek-Cypriots, who preferred a political rather than a military route to Enosis (Markides 2001, Makriyianni and Psaltis 2007). In response, Turkish-

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37 EOKA insurgents attacked both the British and Turkish-Cypriots, as they were both seen as obstacles for Enosis.
Cypriots quickly founded TMT (Turkish Resistance Organisation) in 1958 to fight for Taksim and to ‘strengthen Cyprus Turks’ links with Turkey38 (Kızılyürek 2002).

The British Government openly accepting that the Cyprus Problem was not something that could be resolved without the involvement of Greece and Turkey, called for the Tripartite Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean in 1955 that did not involve the participation of neither Turkish-Cypriots nor Greek-Cypriots (HM-Stationery-Office 1955). Even though the parties did not reach an agreement, The Conference solidified the position of the ‘motherlands’ in the destiny of Cyprus, and most importantly heralded The Treaty of Guarantee that was signed in 1960 (Michael 2011). Following The Conference, several British proposals on self-government, such as the Radcliff proposals and the MacMillan Plan, were refused by Greek-Cypriots and Greece, as they did not overtly lead to self-determination. Self-determination that was already a popular concept was not considered until the UN debate on Cyprus in 1957, that discussed independence as a solution but highlighted that self-determination could not be used to justify joining another state (UNGA 1957, UNGA 1958).

While the international community was discussing the future of Cyprus and Cypriots in their absence, violent ethnic clashes continued. In the years from 1955 to 1959, the long-lasting polarisation between the British and the Greek-Cypriots reached its peak and were transformed into an armed confrontation. EOKA was fighting on three fronts, against TMT, against moderate Greek-Cypriots (including the communist party AKEL) and against the British rulers. Meanwhile, the TMT was increasingly becoming a threat and as vicious as EOKA in its treatment of ‘traitors’ and leftists (Oberling 1982). Even though TMT was not as well organised or as militarily powerful as EOKA, when it took violent action it was difficult to contain. Some civilians from both communities were forced to abandon certain areas because of fierce armed conflict and intimidation. During this period, Turkish-Cypriot leader Rauf Raif Denktaş and Federation of Turkish-Cypriot Associations (FTCA) pushed for cultural Turkification to prioritise and politicise ethnicity (Kızılyürek 2006). The ‘Citizen Speak Turkish’ campaign even imposed fines on those Turkish-Cypriots who spoke Greek or used Greek

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words. For TMT, FTCA and many others fighting for partition, they were not Turkish-Cypriots but Cypriot Turks ( Kıbrıs Türkü ), or the Turks of Cyprus.

Increased violence led to the London-Zurich Conference between the UK, Greece and Turkey ( UNGA 1958 ). Abandoning Enosis and Taksim, the three parties at the conference reached an agreement on an independence formula as well as the basic articles of a constitution for the new Cypriot state. Even though Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots did not participate in the formulation of the new constitution, they were asked to give their assent ( Oberling 1982, Stefanidis 1999 ). The London-Zurich Conference that did not foresee a geographic separation and was based on political equality, produced a series of agreements that described the solution as a ‘functional federal state’ ( Dodd 2010:38 ), and came with three important treaties: First, The Treaty of Guarantee, designating Turkey, Greece and the UK as the guarantor powers, who were tasked with jointly or separately maintaining the state of affairs in the newly found Republic of Cyprus and gave recognition to the basic and immutable articles in the Constitution; second, The Treaty of Establishment, which included the right of the UK to keep sovereign military bases on the island; and third, The Treaty of Alliance, signed by Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, stating that the they will co-operate in their common defence.

In the end, despite all the political campaigns, the mutually exclusive aspirations of Cypriots proved impossible to realise. Instead, on 16th August 1960 Cypriots found themselves in a political partnership under the Republic of Cyprus with the pressure of Western alliance at the height of the Cold War. Cyprus was transferred from one ruler to another, ruled by different empires throughout its history without ever becoming a ‘sovereign’ state. Cypriots too did not aspire for sovereignty; instead they nurtured their aspirations to belong to what they perceived as their ‘larger-group’ that was the bigger and better respective motherlands with a heroic past and an ‘imagined’ bond. Thus, the newly created Republic of Cyprus did not generate ownership among Cypriots but it was perceived as a ‘stepping stone’ to join the ‘imagined community’ that was across the sea ( See Anderson 1991 ).
5.2 The Ephemeral Republic: The quick journey from independence to division

5.2.1 Early days of the new Republic: 1960-1963

Many political analysts and scholars refer to the period of independence that came in 1960, as ‘fettered independence’ due to the treaties that gave a disproportionate influence of foreign powers (i.e. United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey) over the fate of the island (Theophanous 2000, Kızılyürek 2002, Constantinou 2007, Dodd 2010). Becoming somewhat of an exceptional case in the post-colonial literature\(^{39}\), the RoC was ‘internationalised by the backdoor’. James Crawford explains this ‘internationalisation’ as the front door portraying a sovereign state with international recognition, while the foreign powers enjoyed constitutional privileges at the backdoor (Crawford 2006). The attempt by Turkey, Greece and the UK to create a common state in the absence of Cypriots with limited sovereignty, which Constantinou aptly calls a ‘realpolitik compromise’ for a ‘reluctant republic’, was doomed to fail from the beginning as it lacked unity of purpose (Constantinou 2010:17). The RoC became an ‘unwanted child’, the symbol of the ‘unfulfilled struggle’ for Cypriots who aspired to live with their respective motherlands rather than with each other. As Michalis Michael puts it, “The fact that Cyprus’s independence was externally manufactured, with little or no input by the Cypriots themselves, imposed by the colonial power with the consent of their neighbouring motherlands, only added to the mythology of betrayal and conspiracy” (Michael 2011:214).

The next 50 years witnessed a long and frustrating process of inter-communal talks and several UN settlement plans, turning the island into a ‘graveyard of diplomats’ (İnanç 2010). As a result, the communities, who were psychologically divided under the new federation, would soon become physically and demographically divided.

While it can be argued that the new constitution that was premised upon political equality could be considered a victory for Turkish-Cypriots, Greek-Cypriots regarded it as an imposition (Clerides 1989). The new Republic lacked support and constituency, as Enosis and Taksim remained the political desire and the ‘national cause’ for both Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-

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\(^{39}\) For a post-colonialist analysis of Cyprus see Bryant R. (2006). On the condition of postcoloniality in Cyprus.
Cypriots. For the community leaders Denktaş\textsuperscript{40} and Makarios\textsuperscript{41}, there was no Cypriot nation but rather a hollow state as the nation was seen as a natural phenomenon, an expression of ethnicity made up of people with the same descent (Denktaş 2000:402). Glafcos Clerides\textsuperscript{42}, who said that the Cyprus flag was the best in the world “...because no one would die for it”, clearly illustrated this lack of commitment (quoted in Stearns 1992:172).

The 1960 Constitution provided for a presidential system, where the GCc elected the President, and the TCc elected the Vice-President with veto powers on decisions relating to foreign affairs, defence and security. The Council of Ministers and the House of Representatives were elected by separate communal electoral rolls. Legislation was by simple majority, but laws and decisions on elections, finance and municipalities had to be approved by each community. Separate communal Chambers were established for educational, religious and cultural matters. The articles of the Constitution could only be amended with a double majority (two thirds) of the representatives of each community (Constitution 1960). Overall, the 1960s Constitution was neither as unitary as the Greek-Cypriots would have wanted nor did it provide for geographical separation, as the Turkish-Cypriots had preferred. Instead of inaugurating the grounds to consolidate cooperation and trust building, it rather created rival institutions and chambers, and ethnically hyphenated local authorities, sport clubs and schools. Greek-Cypriots considered the power sharing arrangement that was based on 70:30 ratio for civil service posts and 60:40 ratio for military posts as unfair since the Turkish-Cypriots constituted only 18.5% of the population (See Treaty of Alliance). For them, the Constitution established a political and social division, whereby the communal minority rights of the Turkish-Cypriots, who were perceived to be inferior in culture, education and intelligence, were raised to a disproportionately exalted status (Polyviou 1980, Faustmann and Peristianis 2006).

\textsuperscript{40} Rauf Raif Denktaş (27 January 1924 – 13 January 2012) was a Turkish-Cypriot politician, barrister and jurist elected in 1973 as the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus. He later became recognised by Turkey as the founding President of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (TRNC), holding that position until 2005.

\textsuperscript{41} Makarios III (August 13, 1913 – August 3, 1977) was the archbishop of the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus (1950–1977), and the first President of the Republic of Cyprus (1960–1974 and 1974–1977).

\textsuperscript{42} Clerides was the Greek-Cypriot interlocutor in the peace negotiations and the president of the Republic of Cyprus from 1993 to 2003.
Communal chambers, municipalities, separate majority voting, educational funds, taxation, establishing the military (the National Guard) all were among the most problematic issues that created deadlock in the new government. Both communities continued to foster their ethnic nationalism. Paramilitary groups EOKA and TMT did not abandon their end goals nor did they abandon their activities. Kızılyürek writes that exploiting the mistakes or hitches in the implementation of the new Constitution to use it to achieve Taksim continued to be the underlying policy of the Turkish-Cypriot elite (Kızılyürek 2006). Even though there were intellectuals, journalists and left-wing activists who wished to see the new establishment succeed, both paramilitary organisations had zero tolerance to opposition, especially if the opposition promoted another identity narrative than one that was based on ethnicity. Numerous organised political movements took place especially between 1960 and 1963 to suppress the opposition. The early years of the Republic was tainted by tug of war both between the two main communities and between those who maintained their commitment to Enosis/Taksim and those who wanted the new Republic to work.

5.2.2 The break-up and the enclaves: 1963-1964

In 1963, President Makarios proposed 13 amendments to the Constitution, which removed the safeguards for Turkish-Cypriots and reduced their status to a political minority. The proposal included the abolishment of the right of veto of the President and the Vice-President and the provisions to replace double majority voting with simple majority voting for certain issues such as the decisions of the Public Service Commission. It is worthy to note two other dynamics here; the first pertaining to Greek-Cypriot and USSR relations, and the second to the coup in Turkey. President Makarios developed close relationships with the USSR especially between 1961 and 1963, reinforcing the high tide of USSR influence in the Middle East. The arms trade agreement with USSR, which was perceived as an attempt to set up an “East Mediterranean Cuba” in Cyprus triggered fears among ‘the West’ (Goktepe 2013). Meanwhile, 27th May 1960 saw the first coup d’état in Turkey, which ended with the execution of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, among other political leaders.

Soon after Makarios’ proposal, Turkish-Cypriots had taken to the streets of the capital in protest. The inter-communal conflict that started in Nicosia quickly spread to the rest of the
island. Harassment of Turkish-Cypriots by the Greek-Cypriot police and sporadic ethnic violence begun as a tactic to get Turkish-Cypriots to accept the proposal (Collective 2009, Kızılyürek 2015). Turkish-Cypriots left the government in protest and as the situation deteriorated, those in scattered villages and towns where Greek-Cypriots were in majority, started moving into enclaves to defend them selves better. By 1965, 60% of them were living in enclaves confined to the 3% of the island with limited access to food and basic amenities (UNSC 1964, Stephen 2001). Although the Constitutional amendments presented a ‘fortunate’ pretext for the Turkish-Cypriot nationalists to ‘prove’ that the Republic was unworkable, the decision to withdraw from the government did not help their cause for Taksim. Instead, Turkish Cypriots’ physical insecurity and suffering in the enclaves from 1963 until 1974 was a collective trauma shared and passed down to younger generations (Navaro-Yashin 2012).

According to Volkan, the idea of motherhood and fatherhood, that brings the fundamental concepts of caring, protecting and guiding, is contained in the idea of a ‘nation’, which relates to security and governance of the self (Volkan 1980). This analysis of the emotional relationship actors have with their imagined nations, which is heightened in conflict environments offers a complementary psycho-political level of analysis to the ontological security literature. Volkan’s study of conflicts reveal that boundaries, walls, enclaves and cages take on a powerful meaning as actors derive their sense of self and self-worth from identification with a nation and the continuity of the self become dependent on this identification. For him, actors’ self-esteem rise and fall with the fate of their nation that is closely tied with ‘geographic actuality’. Those who cannot give geographic actuality to their definition of a nation live in a constant condition of injured self-regard and inner rage (Volkan 1980). As such, the new Republic did not only fail to satisfy the geographical actuality of the mainstream national identity narratives of the two communities, it also promoted a geographical actuality that challenged the mainstream identity narratives.

Yet, the Turkish-Cypriots’ confinement to the enclaves brought about a certain political homogeneity and united them as an isolated minority. This political homogeneity solidified the call for partition and the position of the political elite, especially that of Denktaş and later that of UBP (National Unity Party lead by Dr. Eroğlu), reinforcing the belief that Greek-Cypriots
and Turkish-Cypriots could not live together since the former will always try to dominate the latter. Thus, the alternative voices to the mainstream nationalistic narrative were quickly marginalised and silenced. This created a largely unchallenged self-narrative for Turkish-Cypriots as a small but brave group, severed from the motherland. Their narratives adopted Greek-Cypriots, who were depicted as the extension of the Greeks, as the natural enemy of the Turks. As such, they internalised their suffering and violence as righteous resistance.

Kızılyürek writes about the tragic example of the fate of two lawyers Ayhan Hikmet and Ahmet Gürkan. With the establishment of the RoC, Hikmet and Gürkan launched the weekly Cumhuriyet (Republic) newspaper, which was explicitly in favour of the new Republic and was promoting peace and coexistence as well as criticising the nationalistic movements and the elites’ propaganda (Kızılyürek 2015). Cumhuriyet Newspaper was one of the earliest sources, if not the first, that promoted a collective Cypriot identity detached from ethnicity and opposed Enosis/Taksim. The newspaper had close ties with the Greek-Cypriot communist party AKEL and worked under the common motto “Cyprus for Cypriots” and “Constitutional Patriotism”. In his newspaper article series titled “Journalists of the Republic”, Niyazi Kızılyürek notes that Cumhuriyet was also supported by the Turkish Embassy, and both Hikmet and Gürkan were previously assaulted and threatened by the TMT, which declared that the assaults were necessary punishment not because they were in opposition of the establishment [referring to the mainstream Turkish-Cypriot elite], but because they were undermining the national unity of the community (Kızılyürek 2015, Kızılyürek 2015). At the time, Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots were bombing their own heritage cites and places of significance and were blaming each other for the incidents to instil tension and provoke violence (Zaman 2010, Kızılyürek 2015). Cumhuriyet Newspaper allegedly uncovered one of these incidents, namely the bombing of the Bayraktar Mosque in 1962. Soon after Hikmet and Gürkan wrote about TMT attacks on the mosque, the two men were assassinated by none other than TMT members (See Uludağ 2004, Navaro-Yashin 2012).

43 It should be noted that the perpetrator(s) are unknown to date and there are also accounts that claim The Minister of Interior, Polycarpos Georgadjis had ordered the attack, though these accounts are limited to the Denktaş himself and the Nacak (hatchet) newspaper printed by Danktaş and the community leader Dr. Fazıl Küçük.
In his book titled ‘Killing in the Name of Identity’, Volkan, whose family had lived in enclaves in the 1960s, explores the subsequent collective trauma through its symbols and collective mourning processes (Volkan 2006). He studies collective traumas, especially those that come at the end of perceived enemies, using Erikson’s concept of ‘blow to the basic tissues of social life’ (Erikson 1976) and Parkes and Williams’ concept of ‘biosocial regeneration’ (Parkes and Williams 1975). Parkes and Williams’ research in Aberfan and Merthyr Vale following the disaster44, reveals that survivors did not only want to repair the damage but also bring something positive out of the tragedy, which was demonstrated by the significant boom in birth rates in the aftermath of the disaster as if to replace the children who had been lost. This reaction to the disaster was not confined to bereft parents but to the entire community. According to Volkan’s interpretation, if the tissue of a community is not completely torn part, meaning, if the bonds (both emotional and material such as photographs and mementos) that link people together do not disappear, psychological transition from the trauma shows elements of biosocial regeneration (Volkan 2006). Drawing links between other collective traumas such as Hiroshima, Chernobyl and the conflict in Georgia, Volkan studies Turkish-Cypriots’ experiences in the enclaves. He argues Turkish-Cypriots’ collective trauma did not tear their basic tissues of social life, partly because of their ties with the motherland and hope that they will be saved, and partly because their links with their material and emotional symbols of their identity though severed and damaged, was not totally destroyed45 (Volkan 2006). Volkan observed that instead of bearing more children, Turkish-Cypriots in the enclaves raised hundreds of parakeets46 in cages, representing their own imprisonment and self-image. As such, he argues that prevalent breeding of caged parakeets in the “subhuman conditions” of the enclaves was a way to control Turkish-Cypriots shared anxiety; as long as the birds were kept alive so was their hope for salvation (Volkan 2006:113).

The clashes of 1963, what is known as the Turkish-Cypriots’ bloody Christmas, heralded a more organised attack on Turkish-Cypriots, which was laid out in what is known as the Akritas

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44 The Aberfan disaster was a catastrophic collapse of a colliery spoil tip in the Welsh village of Aberfan, near Merthyr Tydfil, on 21 October 1966, killing 116 children and 28 adults.
45 Mainly because enclaves were partly self-imposed and houses and possessions were still, for the most part, intact.
46 Parakeets are not native to Cyprus.
Plan. The objective of the Akritas Plan, later conferred by Glafkos Clerides47 in his memoirs, was to convince international opinion that the settlement was unjust and that the Treaty of Guarantee was an intrusion and should be annulled, and to amend the constitution and subjugate Turkish-Cypriots before outside help could arrive (Clerides 1989, Hoffmeister 2006, Bryant and Papadakis 2012, Isachenko 2012). Even though the existence of the plan is not disputed, its significance and meaning is. According to Kızilyürek, Drousiotis and Hatzivassiliou, it was a ‘stupid’, wishful and impractical plan that got more attention than it deserved due to propaganda (See personal interviews with Drousiotis and Kızilyürek by Uludağ 2004, Hatzivassiliou 2006). However, the main significance of the Akritas Plan was the instillation of panic, paranoia and fear among Turkish-Cypriots. Based on her interviews with those who remember the events of the 1960s, investigative peace journalist Sevgül Uludağ asserts that rumours spread like Chinese whispers and people started waiting for the ‘genocide’ to happen because there was a ‘plan’ to ‘end’ them all, endorsed by President Makarios and lead by Minister of Interior, Yiorkadjis (see Uludağ 2004).

For the Turkish-Cypriot elite and leaders, geographic separation was unattainable without the outright support of Turkey and the Turkish military, and such a level of support would be possible only in the most dire circumstances. Despite President Makarios’ and Turkish President İnönü’s urge to return, Turkish-Cypriot deputies and most of the civil servants refused to take up their positions in government citing that they feared for their lives (Demirer 1993, Dodd 2010). The range and bitterness of the fighting that broke out inflamed Turkish public opinion that triggered threatening jet flights for deterrence (Hannay 2005). The intervention of British troops led to the establishment of a cease-fire line and the first UN force (UNFCYP), was deployed in early 1964.

5.2.3 The clashes and the world outside: 1964-1974

The UNSC Resolution 186 that deployed the small UN force in 1964 is still very relevant today and established the legal framework for the Cyprus Problem; it references the government of Cyprus and internationally recognises the existence of the administration despite the absence

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47 Glafcos Ioannou Clerides (24 April 1919 – 15 November 2013) was a Greek-Cypriot politician who served as the fourth President of Cyprus from 1993 to 2003.
of the Turkish-Cypriots, and hence recognises Greek-Cypriots as having the effective control over the functions and institutions of the Republic (UNSC 1964). Ultimately, Resolution 186 still persists today, laying the foundations of Turkish-Cypriots unrecognised status. Turkish-Cypriots resented this resolution arguing that there can be no government of Cyprus without their representation (Ker-Lindsay 2011), which can be perceived as yet another rejection adding to their self-victimisation.

The plans and reports that followed the cease-fire, such as that of the UN Mediator, Dr Galo Plaza either claimed or subtly implied that the rights TCc obtained from the London-Zurich Agreements were “greatly superior to those which can realistically be contemplated for in the future” and those Turkish-Cypriots who did not like the wishes of the majority of the population could be assisted to resettle in Turkey (Plaza 1965:Para. 161). It is not hard to see the position of Greek-Cypriots (as well as the negotiators’ of the time) and their perceived injustice pertaining to power sharing and political equality with the 18% of the population that was part-enemy. Neither is it hard to understand the fears of domination, assimilation and physical security of the Turkish-Cypriots who had always been poorer, less mobilised and smaller in numbers, with an inherent inferiority complex (see Fisher 2001). That being said, it is still hard to justify the international actors’ insistence on political equality over a protected minority status without a comprehensive consideration of the global Cold War dynamics of the time. The insistence on a federal solution between the two communities within the Cold War context that made ‘sense’ for the actors such as the UK, US and Turkey has transformed into an unchallengeable given, especially for Turkish-Cypriots. For them, insistence on political equality became more than an acquired right; it became part of their identity narratives and the foundation of their ‘existential resistance’.

All settlement alternatives since 1974 have unchallengeably relied on the reunification of Cyprus based on a bicommunal, bizonal federation based on political equality, single sovereignty and single citizenship (See UNSC 2008). While this unchallengeable settlement framework challenges Greek-Cypriots’ narratives that depict Cyprus as Greek and Turks as their eternal enemy, any deviation from bicommmunality and bizonality challenges Turkish-Cypriots’ ontological security by rendering their ‘existential resistance’ and ‘heroic struggle’ as
a community a moot point. Mere suggestion that there may be a different alternative that can be put on the negotiation table is enough to make Turkish-Cypriots feel defensive and anxious. A recent example is the debate initiated by the former presidential candidate of 2015 elections Dr Kudret Özersay. Özersay made public announcements to ‘warn’ the TCc and call for ‘caution’ following the UN Special Advisor Espen Barth Eide’s statement on 27th July 2015 that the EU advisers would provide support to “...make the settlement fully compatible with the EU principles and acquis” (TRNC 2015). Özersay’s admonition that was widely published in mainstream newspapers and social media warns the TCc that the word ‘acquis’ had never been included in joint declarations and statements pertaining to the peace negotiations, and that compliance with the ‘acquis’ may imply a deviation from bizonality and bicommunality (Özersay 2015).

However, bizonality and bicommunality was not the alternative considered in the 1960s. In 1964, the US started showing more interest in Cyprus to avoid an open conflict between two NATO allies, Greece and Turkey (Hannay 2005). Turkey and Greece under the auspices of the Washington tried to broker a solution based on the Acheson Plan, named after Dean Acheson, American Secretary of State at the time. Turkey was open to Enosis in exchange for a Turkish military base in north Cyprus, but the parties could not agree on the size and terms of the base48 (Dodd 2010, Ker-Lindsay 2011). Even though the negotiations quickly broke down when violence between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots was exacerbated, this was yet another disappointment for Turkish-Cypriots despite their devotion to the motherland. Turkey’s disinterest in Cyprus and Turkish-Cypriots that can be traced back to the start of the British rule in late 1800s, their lack of commitment to Taksim and their willingness to negotiate for Enosis in exchange for a military base made Turkish-Cypriots feel dispensable and rejected by the large-group yet again. However, in the years to come, the Turkish-Cypriot pressure led by Denktaş succeeded in cultivating Turkey’s interest on the island.

Even though Turkey’s intervention was rebuffed at the last minute in 1964 and again in 1965 and 1967 by Washington and London (Hitchens 1997, O’Malley and Craig 2001), these developments both encouraged (because Turkey was now showing interest) and disappointed

48 Turkey insisted on sovereign bases, and Makarios proposed lease agreements.
(because Turkey was showing hesitation) Turkish-Cypriots. In the face of the inter-ethnic clashes and Turkish military threats, President Makarios, without abandoning his desire for Enosis\textsuperscript{49}, adopted a more reconciliatory stance towards negotiations. His new policy to seek a ‘feasible’ solution prompted strong criticism from Greece, and created a stark division between those Greek-Cypriots who wanted Enosis ‘now’ and those who were moving away from the idea (Clerides 1989, Hitchens 1997, Ker-Lindsay 2011).

In June 1967, under pressure from the ‘mainland’ that was now ruled by the junta, the Greek-Cypriot House of Representatives unanimously voted for immediate Enosis (Stavrinides 1976). Subsequently, things turned darker for Turkish-Cypriots; people went missing, buses and vehicles were stopped for random ‘checks’, and people were strip searched in the streets by the Greek-Cypriot police. However, they did not only suffer at the hands of Greek-Cypriots, their own leadership exerted pressure on those who did not move into the enclaves and threatened those who entered Greek-Cypriot controlled areas without a special permit. Turkish-Cypriots who visited Greek-Cypriot courts, hospitals and other state institutions, or entered the Greek-Cypriot controlled areas for business, leisure or for friendly association with Greek-Cypriots were met with severe punishment and fines (Uludağ 2005).

November 1967 witnessed one of the bloodiest clashes between the two communities. Violence broke out between Turkish-Cypriots villagers in Kofinou/Geçitkale and Ayios Theodoros/Boğaziçi and Greek-Cypriot forces led by colonel Grivas (Dodd 2010). TMT fighters under the command of a Turkish military officer were blocking the Nicosia-Limassol road and not letting anyone pass without a UN escort. Grivas and his troops attacked and burned down both villages (Uludağ 2005). The incident that brought Greece and Turkey to the brink of war, reshuffled the international dynamics. In response, the Turkish Government ordered preparations for military intervention in Cyprus and presented a list of demands to the Greek Junta, that included the immediate recall of colonel Grivas, the withdrawal of excess troops in accordance with the 1960 Accords, compensation for the Turkish-Cypriot victims, relaxation of restrictions on Turkish-Cypriots living in the enclaves and guarantees against any further assaults on the Turkish-Cypriots (UNSG 1967). Although the Turkish-Cypriots were somewhat

\textsuperscript{49} Nevertheless, some Hellenists considered him a traitor for abandoning the fight for enosis (see Dodd 2010).
resentful that Turkey had not achieved more for their position and the deal was merely a reversion to the situation in 1963 in the enclaves, they had been nonetheless encouraged by Turkish determination to intervene militarily (Dodd 2010).

This event is significant for reproducing self-victimhood and the aggressiveness of the other in the Turkish-Cypriot historical narratives. The events in these villages are integral to the ‘chosen traumas’ and as such, they are remembered and retold as a pretext for the Turkish-Cypriots’ need for Turkey’s military presence on the island and their objection to the withdrawal of Turkish troops in a post-settlement scenario. The current Turkish-Cypriot history textbooks that interchangeably refer to Turkish-Cypriots as island-Turks or Cyprus Turks or simply Turks, link these events to the Akritas Plan, representing them as the symbol of Greek/Greek-Cypriot desire for ethnic cleansing. The unilateral establishment of the ‘TRNC’ in November 1983, on the 6th anniversary of the events further memorialises this chosen trauma.

When the door of the enclaves opened in the summer of 1968 following the event, Turkish-Cypriots faced a shocking reality, similar to the one when the check-points were opened after four decades of separation in April 2003. Even though the life in the enclaves was not easy and access to basic needs were limited, Hatay and Bryant note that a feeling of togetherness was bolstered: “Not only were they “all together,” but social and economic differences were flattened, as everyone was subject to the rulings of the administration and the needs of community defence” (Hatay and Bryant 2008:439). The life in the enclaves destroyed many of the traditional hierarchies between the young and the old as well, where boys as young as 12 would take up guard duty in the evening and girls would stitch uniforms. Faced with a threat to their existence as a collective, their togetherness took an organic form and their lives were given a purpose and a common goal (Hatay and Bryant 2008). They founded their first theatre, first radio station and pop groups in the enclaves (Volkan 1980, Hatay and Bryant 2008). In line with Freud’s argument that groups are found on the basis of common need (Freud 2001),

50 The Cyprus-2015-Initiative opinion poll shows that 79% of Turkish-Cypriots express support for the continuation of Turkey’s guarantorship and 33% think both Turkish and Greek troops should remain on the island permanently in a post settlement scenario (Cyprus-2015-Initiative 2009).
Turkish-Cypriots found themselves as a community in the enclaves on the basis of their need for defence and survival.

Volkan describes Turkish-Cypriots’ reaction to the opening of the barriers as their “first taste of freedom” that “paradoxically evoked symptoms like those of depression”, reflected in the increased use of antidepressant drugs and minor tranquillisers (Volkan 1980:102). Although their confinement came with extreme hardship, it had provided them with security and comfort by distancing them from the dangers of the ‘outside’. During his visit in 1968, Volkan notes, “This world was now gone, and its inhabitants were faced with the humiliating recognition that a prosperous Greek life-style surrounded them on every hand” as the Greek-Cypriot economy had flourished significantly (Volkan 1980:103). In Volkan’s analysis, Turkish-Cypriots’ aggression evoked by the shocking reality of the outside following their ‘freedom’ “was turned inward and directed against the self, and self-esteem was reduced” (Volkan 1980:103). Now exposed to the outside reality, they tried to relieve their damaged sense of self-worth and self-esteem by continuing to deny Greek-Cypriots entry to the enclaves and hence trying to maintain a level of control over their lives and destiny (Volkan 1980, Hatay and Bryant 2008).

In the midst of the negotiations between Clerides and Denktaş that started in 1968, Grivas, who had become the symbol of militant Enosis, had returned to Cyprus in 1971 (Michael 2011). Opposed to the inter-communal negotiations and Makarios’s ‘feasible’ solution policy, Grivas established EOKA-B, a new, more militant and fanatic version of EOKA. Breaking the atmosphere of relative calmness, EOKA-B targeted Greek-Cypriots who were supporting the negotiations as much as Turkish-Cypriots (Fouskas 2001). The re-instigation of violence directly impacted the negotiations. In 1973, with Bülent Ecevit as the new prime minister, Turkey backtracked from the concessions asserting a federal solution rather than a unitary bicommmunal state to the Cyprus Problem, which drew the negotiations to a deadlock (Necatigil 1993).
5.2.4 The division and amnesia: 1974

In July 1974, the coup directed by the Greek junta ousted President Makarios, declaring the notoriously anti-Turkish Nikos Sampson as the President, which set the ‘favourable’ conditions for Turkey’s military intervention. Turkish-Cypriots fearing massacre believed that the Akritas Plan, or a version of it, was now put into play (Volkan 1980). Citing its right to intervene under the Treaty of Guarantee, Turkey intervened on 20th July 1974. Having gained control of nearly 36% of Cyprus, Ecevit declared that the “foundations have been laid for the new federal state of Cyprus” (quoted in Michael 2011:36). By August 1974, a UN-brokered ceasefire extended the original ‘Green Line’ in the capital of Nicosia across the entire length of the island, where it remains to this day. The Turkish military intervention is still celebrated as the ‘happy peace operation’ by Turkish-Cypriots today, although with increasing cynicism.

It is all together another question beyond the scope of this chapter why Britain and the USA watched Brigadier Dimitrios Ioanides, leader of Greek junta, stage a coup in Cyprus despite the warnings and CIA intelligence as early as 1973, and despite the fact that Ioanides had told the CIA officers in Athens in June 1974 that he was to overthrow Makarios (Fouskas 2001, O’Malley and Craig 2001, Dodd 2010, Michael 2011). It is important to note once again that the Cyprus Problem cannot be reduced purely to ethnic hatred between the two main communities of the island. For many accounts such as Michalis Stavrou Michael’s book ‘Resolving the Cyprus Conflict: Negotiating History’ and Brendan O’Malley and Ian Craig’s book ‘The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion’, the events of 1974 were all part of the Cold War strategy with “the hand of the CIA” at “every important turn”, when “unevenly matched and differently motivated forces came together to divide the island” (O’Malley and Craig 2001:vii).

During the inter-communal clashes and as a result of Turkey’s intervention, thousands of Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots, including my grandfather, were taken as prisoners of war, many of whom went ‘missing’ and hundreds of thousands became internally displaced (Gürel, Hatay et al. 2012). If Turkish-Cypriots’ collective trauma was their years in the

51 The 1960 Treaty of Guarantee states that each guarantor power, after consultation, reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs (Treat of Guarantee 1960:No.5475).
enclaves, Greek-Cypriots’ was the Turkish intervention that physically divided the island into two. In 1974, Greek-Cypriots suffered most in terms of casualties as well as missing and displaced peoples. Around one-third of the Greek-Cypriot population (160,000) was displaced to the southern part of the island, while 45,000 Turkish-Cypriots were displaced to the north (Fisher 2001, Papadakis 2008). Without underestimating the psychological, social and material costs of dislocation for both communities, it is important to note that while Turkish-Cypriots’ displacement was perceived as necessary cost for their salvation, Greek-Cypriots’ displacement was caused at the hands of their primordial enemy.\(^{52}\)

In Volkan’s diagnosis, 1974 served a therapeutic function for Turkish-Cypriots, repairing their ‘narcissistic hurts’, where sharing aggressive feelings toward a common enemy with Turkey reinforced their self worth providing a liberating, cleansing sensation for a minority suffering self-victimisation and low esteem (Volkan 1980). While the events represented a victorious time for Turkish-Cypriots, as their large-group finally came to save them from oppression; it is mourned by Greek-Cypriots as the darkest days in their modern history where they have lost lives, property, land and felt betrayed by the motherland and the international community. The events of 1974 also generated a historical amnesia among the Greek-Cypriots, creating a prevalent narrative that the communities lived peacefully before the junta and the Turkish invasion,\(^{53}\), and if it were not for EOKA-B, the junta and the invasion, Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots would have lived happily ever after.

Drawing from Stanley Cohen, Rebecca Bryant argues that there are two different forms of ‘denial’ and two different forms of ‘silence’ in Cyprus (Bryant 2010). Greek-Cypriots remembrance of the period before 1974 as blissful coexistence resembles Cohen’s ‘denial of injury’ (Cohen 2013). According to Cohen, this silence about the sufferings of Turkish-Cypriots, or denial of injury where the offender insists that the actions did not cause any harm or damage, can emerge even as the events are unfolding, where the majority community or the community in power may not see the violence or suffering inflicted or recognise the lasting

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\(^{52}\) For a more detailed account on perceptions regarding the refugee and IDP status of the two main communities see Zetter, R. (2007). More Labels, Fewer Refugees: Remaking the refugee label in an era of globalization.

\(^{53}\) Greek-Cypriots use the term ‘occupation’ or ‘invasion’ for the events of 1974, while the Turkish-Cypriots use the term ‘happy peace operation’. I opt for the more neutral term ‘intervention’ or ‘the events of 1974’.
trauma. On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriots’ denial resembles Cohen’s ‘denial of the victim’, where trapped in self-victimisation, the ‘victim’ justifies causing displacement and destruction on those that are perceived to be responsible based on a ‘they deserved it’ psyche. In other words, while the Greek-Cypriot amnesia silences the traumas and sufferings of the period before 1974, the Turkish-Cypriot denial justifies all wrongdoing, traumas and sufferings of 1974. As such, while the amnesia prevents Greek-Cypriots from coming to terms with the past, the denial prevents Turkish-Cypriots from engaging with any moral accounting. Bryant also talks about a ‘loud silence’ since the opening of the check-points in 2003, where increased interactions and friendships exacerbated the silence and denial rather than breaking the invisible border to the past and coming to terms with each others’ sufferings and truths (Bryant 2010). The scholars note that in the name of preserving newfound friendships, Cypriots avoid talking about the past and their views on the Cyprus Problem.

Papadakis confirms that the historical amnesia of the Greek-Cypriots that romanticises the past as times of coexistence provides the pretext for the possibility of reunification without which, the myth of return to the lost lands cannot be sustained (Papadakis 2008). For example, the primary school textbooks describe the period of 1960-1974 as follows: “From 1960 when the Republic was created to 1974 Cyprus enjoyed unprecedented development in all sectors. The population had full employment and its life constantly improved” (quoted in Papadakis 2008:10). Similarly, Philippou and Varnava point out that the formal curricula construes the Cyprus Problem as an international violation of statehood by a foreign state that dates back merely to 1974 (Philippou and Varnava 2009). They also highlight that the terms Greek and Cypriot are used interchangeably, which suggests Cypriots are Greek and non-Greeks are not Cypriot (Philippou and Varnava 2009).

Drawing on his fieldwork among Greek-Cypriot school children, anthropologist Sypros Syrou explores the role of ‘the Turk’ as the primary other in children’s identity construction, where the enemy helps “concretise the sense of self” (Spyrou 2007:258). Syrou’s work demonstrates that Greek-Cypriot children cannot deal with the unusual message of ‘the Turkish-Cypriot’, who are Turks therefore different from the self but are also Cypriots, which makes imagining the self confusing. He explains that the problem of conflation Greek and
Cypriot identity, where the local more particular history of the latter dissolves into the larger history of the Greek nation, results in the exclusion of Turkish-Cypriot claims to Cypriot identity (Spyrou 2001:174-175). As such, peacemaking and peacebuilding that have been ultimately based bicomunality, requires Greek-Cypriots to accept Turkish-Cypriots, who are part-enemy and part-self, as legitimate political equals on the island. This challenges the ontological security of Greek-Cypriots, by adding Turkishness into the definition of Cypriotness and challenging the their historical and identity narratives.

Examining the nationalist historiographical and pedagogical Turkish-Cypriot narratives, Doğuş Derya argues that Turkish-Cypriots are presented as the historical objects of Turkish national pedagogy (Derya 2010). According to Derya, the creation of the ‘evil other’ serves as a dual amplifier by disregarding the cultural differences between Turkish-Cypriots and Anatolian Turks and by situating the problem between Turks and Greeks (Derya 2010). In this process, Greek-Cypriots become one and the same with the larger Greek nation, who tried to break the Ottoman Empire apart, and Turkish-Cypriots become the descendants of Anatolian Turks, highlighting sameness and discounting distinctiveness. This historical narrative subsequently serves as the axis of reference for all historical events. For example, just like Greek-Cypriots interpret the events of 1974 with the same lens as the annexation of Constantinople by the expansionist and barbaric Turks, Turkish-Cypriots interpret the struggle for Enosis as a struggle for the re-establishment of the Byzantine Empire.

The official historical narratives silence the pain of the other, in effect reducing the historic existence and the legitimacy of the ‘other’ on the island. This is apparent from the reactions to a speech made by Doğuş Derya in parliament on 15 December 2014, who is a Member of Parliament for the Republican Turkish Party (CTP54). In her speech, Derya emphasised that Turkish-Cypriots were not the only ones losing as a result of the Cyprus Problem, and that there was a need to acknowledge the traumas and sufferings of others. Pointing to the sufferings of Greek-Cypriots, Armenians and Maronites, Derya said that contrary to Orthodox

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54 Republican Turkish Party is a left-wing, pro-peace, social democratic political party in north Cyprus, founded in 1970. The party was led by Mehmet Ali Talat from 1996 until his election as president in 2005.
doctrine, the Church had allowed abortions for rape victims in 1974 (See Hadjipavlou 2010).
This speech made the headlines the next day, both in Cyprus and in Turkey (Yeniduzen 2014).
The majority of commentary on online platforms, social media and in the mainstream media denied Derya’s claims and condemned her for being ‘ignorant’ and a ‘traitor’.

Peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts reduce reconciliation to ‘bicommunalism’ and take this inescapable hyphenation for granted. This excludes the nuances and dynamism of identity and disregards its multiplicity. Consequently, bicommunalism assumes two inherent and homogeneous positions to the conflict, that of Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots. Within the context of the Cyprus Problem, Cypriots cannot simply be Cypriot because their political legitimacy is built upon their perceived ethnic ties. In other words, Turkish-Cypriots cannot claim Cypriotness as political equals without their Turkishness, and taking Greekness away from Cypriotness allows the enemy to seep into the self for Greek-Cypriots. Turkish-Cypriot trauma is tied in with Greek-Cypriots’ Greekness (i.e. Enosis and Greek junta); and their damaged self-esteem and internalised stigma is underpinned by their 11 years of confinement in the enclaves and their minority status. On the other hand, Turkish-Cypriots’ Turkishness is tied to the eternal barbaric enemy narratives of Greeks and Greek-Cypriots, and to the Greek-Cypriots’ trauma of 1974. Both Cypriot communities find their political legitimacy as well as their enemy in their ethnic ties with the motherland. Thus, reconciliation between Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots could never explore its true potential without desecuritising the ‘national centres’ and ethnic roots.

The sense of betrayal by the motherland and the events of 1974 had a profound effect on Greek-Cypriots’ identity narratives. Michalis Michael explains 1974 as “…the apex of national treachery for Greek determinism, which reverberates through Greek Cypriot political culture and haunts their decision-making throughout the peace process” (Michael 2011:33). The social consequence of 1974 on the Greek-Cypriot psyche was the ideological reconfiguration of Cypriot consciousness, which facilitated the growth of Cypriotism as a sociopolitical movement at the expense of Greek ethno-nationalism (Michael 2011). Papadakis also notes that the historical amnesia triggered a shift in the ascriptions of the two communities from Greeks to Greek-Cypriots and Turks to Turkish-Cypriots to distinguish Turkish-Cypriots from
both Turkish settlers/immigrants, and Turks in general, who were the aggressors responsible for the trauma of 1974. Similarly, Stamatakis and Mavratsas characterise the second half of the 1970s as golden age of Cypriotism, where a Cypriot political identity and a sense of loyalty to the RoC was systematically cultivated for the first time (Stamatakis 1991, Mavratsas 1997). As the desires for Enosis were abandoned and the seeds of Cypriotism were sowed, the Cyprus flags started waving together with the Greek flags at public institutions and national holidays (Papadakis 1998). Greek-Cypriots’ renewed attitudes towards rapprochement was reflected in the post-1974 doctrine of epanaprosegisi, meaning “coming together again”, which further reinforced the historical amnesia (Papadakis 1998:152).

This was an important juncture for Greek-Cypriot identity narratives, which in tandem with the peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts created ontological dissonance. On the one hand, abandoning Enosis and embracing independence could only be justified based on coexistence with the Turkish-Cypriots that necessitated a common Cypriot dimension. On this account, historical amnesia helps to shift the blame for the sufferings of 1974 outside of the GCc and to maintain the enemy’s image as aggressive, barbaric and expansionist. On the other hand, religious and cultural heritage that is integral to Greek-Cypriots’ self-identity narratives still required an emphasis on Greekness and Hellenism. In effect, while the division challenges the integrity of the geographical actuality Greek-Cypriot self-narratives are based on (whole of Cyprus), promoting rapprochement allows the enemy (Turkishness of Turkish-Cypriots) into their self-narratives. To date, this dilemma creates ontological dissonance for Greek-Cypriots, where addressing their anxieties attached to division simultaneously exacerbates their anxieties attached to a prospective solution.

The events of 1974 that demarcated the communities in Cyprus both socially and demographically had a significant impact on the subsequent peace negotiations. Bicommunality under a unitary state that was the basis of negotiations up until 1974 came to include bizonality as a fundamental principle post-division. Today, the principles of bicommunality and bizonality have become the unchallengeable foundations of any potential comprehensive settlement to the Cyprus Problem.
Chapter 6. Shifting Identity Narratives: Ethnic to civic signifiers post-division

6.1 Never-ending Inter-communal Negotiations and the Road to Europeanisation (1974-1990)

6.1.1 Recognition vs. unrecognition

The ethnic and geographical division that came in 1974 severed nearly all contact and communication between the two communities until the opening of the check-points in 2003. Broome notes that lack of contact that eliminated the opportunity to establish any kind of social, political or business interactions created a wide crevasse between the two communities that solidified unfavourable images of the other (Broome 2005). Unable to travel to the other half of their island, especially the new generation of Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots, who lacked direct experience with the other community, relied on myths, rumours and propaganda, which fuelled misunderstandings, misconceptions, and mistrust. As the division became protracted, the difference between history and myth, reality and propaganda and what is possible and what is fantasy became fuzzy.

In the post-1974 period, Greek-Cypriots focused on reconstructing and reconfiguring their Cypriotism under the RoC while mourning for the other half of their island. Across the divide, Turkish-Cypriots, now having territorial control over approximately 36% of the island and a strong Turkish military presence had a new sense of [physical] security and confidence. With the establishment of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus in 1975, they now considered themselves on an ‘equal footing’ with the RoC, which they perceived as the ‘Greek-Cypriot state’ (Volkan 1980, Dodd 2010). This self-confidence did not last for long however. The international community, particularly the UN, was condemning Turkish military action, which created thousands of internally displaced people (IDPs) and violated the Treaty of Guarantee. Even though the ultimate goal of the Turkish-Cypriot political elite was to solidify their administration and gain recognition as an autonomous political unit in the post-1974 era, failing to do so turned the ‘pseudo’ administration into an invisible enclave55. As the years

55 During the mass demonstration in 2003, one among many of the striking posters read, “We don’t want to live in an open air prison” (Açık hava hapishanesinde yaşamak istemiyoruz). Another read “I lost a parent [to war] but I still want peace” (Ben bir şehit çocuğuyum ve barış istiyorum) (Bayrak 2003, Christou 2003).
passed, Turkish-Cypriots came to mock their unrecognised state as the ‘banana republic’ or likened it to children ‘playing house’ (see Ergü 2005, Turan 2014).

A new round of negotiations, known as the Vienna talks, started in April 1975 under the UN auspices. Greek-Cypriots argued for a strong federal state, while Turkish-Cypriots argued for a weak one, closer to a confederation. Very little was achieved in Vienna, apart from an agreement on population exchange for the people left on the ‘wrong’ side of the Green Line (Hannay 2005). Failed Vienna talks that collapsed in 1979 were marked by what is known as the historic High Level Agreements, where Makarios and Denktaş agreed upon a set of guidelines that established the parameters of a future settlement; although both sides agreed on a bicomunal ‘federal’ solution, what each side understood from the concept of ‘federalism’ was very different (Hannay 2005). Turkish-Cypriots, due to their underlying fear of political domination and being reduced to a political minority, insisted that federalism should also include bizonality and autonomy, which suggested partition to Greek-Cypriots and was not acceptable; they wanted a strong federation focused on functionality. There was a stark discrepancy between what was feasible at the negotiation table and what was desirable by the two communities. These positions have not changed much over the decades, and the discrepancy between what is negotiated and what is desired still continues to date.

Even though there was no agreement on the meaning and the content of a federal solution, considering the heavy economic embargoes and lack of international recognition of Turkish-Cypriots, time was clearly on the side of Greek-Cypriots. This became the basis of ‘long struggle’ for Makarios, who was replaced by Kyprianou after his death in 1977 (Varnava 2013). The bargaining chip of recognition vs. unrecognition was put into ‘good’ use with the internationalisation campaign of the Cyprus Problem to strengthen the international pressures and the embargoes on the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, which in turn had an adverse effect on the inter-communal relationships. Greek-Cypriots promoted their case at myriad international platforms and events, such as the non-aligned conferences in 1976 and in 1979 and followed a successful campaign with the Universal Postal Union to invalidate the Turkish-Cypriot postal stamps (see District General 1976:26, para.85, General 1979:63, para. 197, Kyle 1997). United Nations General Assembly Resolution 34/30 of 1979 also confirms the
success of this campaign and notes one of the earliest concerns pertaining to the Turkish settlers/migrants that ‘deplores’ “all unilateral actions that change the demographic structure of Cyprus” (UNGA 1979). These developments had a crippling effect on the Turkish-Cypriots’ economic and social life. Consequently, they were excluded from all sporting events and international organisations, their tourism industry suffocated, and they did not receive much international financial aid that was being offered to the RoC (Kyle 1997).

UN resolutions and internationalisation campaigns were creating resentment among Turkish-Cypriots. When another attempt by the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative Hugo Gobbi to find a settlement through inter-communal talks failed (1980-1983), the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), which remains the unrecognised administration in north Cyprus, was declared by a unanimous vote in the Turkish-Cypriot parliament on 15 November 1983 (Dodd 2010). Three days later, the UN Security Council Resolution 541 deplored the declaration as invalid and called for its withdrawal56 (UNSC 1983).

Peace negotiations continued between different Greek-Cypriot presidents, and Denktaş, who kept getting re-elected in landslide victories. Despite the positive atmosphere surrounding the negotiations due to the improved Turkish-Greek relations following their respective juntas57, numerous draft agreements proposed by the UN were rejected by the community leaders. For Greek-Cypriots the lack of mention of ‘settlers’ and Turkish troops in the drafts was intolerable, and for Turkish-Cypriots, the reference to ‘substantial’ numbers of Greek-Cypriot IDPs allowed to return and the provisions to remove Turkey’s unilateral guarantee was utmost worrying (Kyle 1997).

6.1.2 Securitisation of Turkish immigrants
Towards the end of 1980s and early 1990s, the issues pertaining to demography and the Turkish settlers/immigrants were being debated with more emphasis among Greek-Cypriots,

56 Denktaş, the president of the new Republic, in his response to the UN Security Council said, ‘It was decided that my people, because they are fighting for their liberty, and do not accept colonisation by the Greek Cypriots, should be isolated in this world like lepers... Now on their behalf you are asking them [the Greek Cypriots] to squeeze us out economically. We have lived on bread, on onions, on beans for twenty years. We shall continue to do so, if necessary, but we shall not accept those who occupy by force the seat of Government as the Government of Cyprus’ (quoted in Moran 1997:241).
the Turkish-Cypriot left and international circles such as the Council of Europe (CoE), who asked the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography to prepare a report on Cyprus (see Cuco 1992). The report highlighted the inexplicable population growth in north Cyprus and inaccuracy of the data provided by the Turkish-Cypriot authorities. The issue was becoming increasingly securitised as an obstacle to a comprehensive settlement on the island across different circles. Later in 2003, another CoE report stated: “The settlers come mainly from the region of Anatolia, one of the least developed regions of Turkey. Their customs and traditions differ significantly from those present in Cyprus. These differences are the main cause of the tensions and dissatisfaction of the indigenous Turkish-Cypriot population, who tend to view the settlers as a foreign element. ... The Assembly is convinced that the presence of the settlers constitutes a process of hidden colonisation and an additional and important obstacle to a peaceful negotiated solution of the Cyprus Problem” (Laakso 2003:139).

Hatay confirms that the Turkishness that came with a Sunni Muslim identity was not familiar to Turkish-Cypriots; and as the feeling of injustice about Greek-Cypriot land and property given out to new comers spread, so did the orientalisation of the Turkish immigrants (Hatay 2008). The growing number of Turkish immigrants in north Cyprus in conjunction with mass Turkish-Cypriot emigration, especially to the UK, conditioned the emergence of discontent that contested the Turkishness of Turkish-Cypriots, bringing forth anxieties related to their biographical continuity as a distinct identity. Volkan explains that historical developments after the summer of 1974 continued to traumatisie Turkish-Cypriots in a slow and often unrecognised fashion (Volkan 2008). Although, they changed the names of villages in north Cyprus to Turkify their geographic actuality in line with their national identity narratives, Turkish-Cypriots failed to provide a geographical actuality for their national identity narratives. Their Turkishness and perceived primordial bonds with Turkey was no longer providing them with the concepts of caring, protection, safety that came with the idea of motherhood/fatherhood, neither did it grant them the nation and large-group identity they were looking for (See Volkan 1980). The new realities that kept them unrecognised in their new invisible enclave, and the injustices pertaining to the distribution of Greek-Cypriot ‘ganimets’ (spoils) left in the north disturbed the tight community feeling created by the

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enclave mentality of 1960s. Feelings of injustice, rejection, and isolation undermined their initial ‘we-ness’ and Turkishness as well as the nationalistic projects of the right-wing political elite. This prompted Turkish-Cypriots to seek an alternative collective identity that came with a geographical actuality (i.e. the EU and their Cypriotness). Following the “exaggerated nationalistic feelings and excitement over “being free” during the years following 1974, large-group identity splits began to appear clearly” among the TCc (Volkan 2008:8). Turkish-Cypriots that reproduced their Turkishness among the Greek-Cypriot majority started realising and reproducing their distinctiveness from Turkish mainlanders.

Although the identity narratives first grew in opposition to each other based on motherland nationalism, by the end of the 1980s, primordial attachment to Turkey and Turkishness began to lose its homogeneous allure. As Niyazi Kızılyürek and Sylvaine Gautier-Kızılyürek assert, we can observe a gradual process of differentiation and divergence in the post-1974 era where Turkish-Cypriots were in search of their own connection to Cypriotism (Kızılyürek and Gautier-Kızılyürek 2004). Artists, intellectuals, and the left in general, began to challenge the Turkish nationalist discourse and Turkey as the motherland, the saviour and the liberator (Ramm 2006). Especially with the Europeanisation of the conflict in late 1990s and early 2000s, the colonial heritage became a shared collective experience that helped shape Turkish-Cypriots’ Cypriotness as a distinct narrative from the motherland. In other words, Turkish-Cypriots’ colonial past distinguished them from their stigmatised Turkishness; being an ex-colony, part of the Commonwealth and their intermingling with the Greek-Cypriots provided them with the desired attributes in relation to being more Western and more European compared to people from Turkey. This is demonstrated in the ‘othering’ of Turkish immigrants in north Cyprus today, who are generally perceived as backward, oriental and religious, and not as secular and modernised as Turkish-Cypriots (see Kurtulus and Purkis 2012). The growing support for the left-wing political parties, the EU project and civil initiatives such as the ‘This Country is Ours Platform’ (Bu Memleket Bizim Platformu) polarised Turkish-Cypriots, who demanded recognition of their distinct identity, and Turkish immigrants, who sought a better life in Cyprus; it also strengthened their desires to find a comprehensive solution. The
increasingly authoritarian and decreasingly secular direction of the Turkish government especially since 2011 further exacerbated this polarisation.

The tendency to securitise people from Turkey as a threat is not limited to the Turkish-Cypriot left-wing. In addition to Mete Hatay’s work on the prevalent orientalisation of Turkishness, research shows that Greek-Cypriots too differentiate between Turkish-Cypriots and people from Turkey. They are more willing to cohabit with Turkish-Cypriots than with Turkish settlers/immigrants, have more negative attitudes toward them, perceive more social-identity differences between themselves and people from Turkey, and perceive more victimisation from the them than from Turkish-Cypriots (Danielidou and Horvath 2006). The quantitative telephone surveys also shows that Greek-Cypriots, 68% of whom think people from Turkey are a big obstacle to reaching a comprehensive settlement in Cyprus, differentiate between Turkish-Cypriots and Turks: While 62% of Greek-Cypriots express anxiety about living next to a Turk, only 37% express anxiety about living next to a Turkish-Cypriot (QTS: 2014).

6.1.3 Speckled feelings of Cypriotism and ontological dissonance

Cypriotism, or what Doob calls ‘Cypriot patriotism’, grew despite the separation, resting on both communities’ innate need to differentiate themselves as Cypriots (Doob 1986). For Greek-Cypriots, their sense of Cypriotism was fueled by their sense of betrayal by the motherland due to the military junta that led to the Turkish invasion and later on due to their remarkable economic growth that set them way ahead of Greece. However, this new Cypriot patriotism did not necessarily include Turkish-Cypriots. Caesar Mavratsas notes that following the democratisation of Greece and the declaration of the ‘TRNC’, Cypriotism was configured as Greek-Cypriot nationalism that distinguished from mainland Greeks but maintained the Hellenic roots in Cypriotism (Mavratsas 1999). Thus, it reproduced Greek identity in the context of an independent polity, without severing the organic ties to the Hellenic culture and the Greek state. According to Mavratsas, in the now dominant Greek-Cypriot nationalist discourse, Cyprus, even if independent, is essentially perceived as a Greek-Cypriot entity (Mavratsas 1999).

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59 Justice and Development Party (AKP) first came to power with a majority in the 2002 elections, the party increased its representation in the parliament in subsequent elections in 2007, 2011 and 2015 from 34.3% to 46.6%, 49.8% and 49.5% respectively.
On the other hand, Cypriotism for Turkish-Cypriots was fueled by the orientalisation of the Turkish immigrants as backward, religious and inferior and by their failed nation-building process, and later, it was further reinforced by the Europeanisation of the conflict. For Turkish-Cypriots across the political spectrum, who are mostly secular and agnostic, being European and Western is idealised. Yavruvatan (Babyland) / Anavatan (Motherland) rhetoric, that provided confidence by reminding Turkish-Cypriots that they were part of a large-group, became increasingly controversial and provocative for the those who highlight their loyalty to Cyprus and reject the nickname and the parental relationship it implies. Even the right-wing Turkish-Cypriots, who emphasise their loyalty to Turkey and to Kemalist ideals, and see themselves as the natural extension of the Turkish nation, tend to distinguish between the more ‘European’ Turks from Western Turkey (i.e. Istanbul and İzmir) and ‘oriental’ Turks from Eastern Turkey (see Hatay 2008).

Even though those who challenge the babyland/motherland rhetoric are often labeled as Greek-lovers, traitors or as being ungrateful and misinformed by people from Turkey and right-wing Turkish-Cypriots, the growing disassociation from Turkishness can be observed in the strained communication between the Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and pro-solution Turkish-Cypriot president Mustafa Akıncı following his election in April 2015. Akıncı, calling for the abandonment of the ‘yavruvatan’ rhetoric to escape from mother-baby relationship, stated that Turkish-Cypriot’s wanted a relationship of brotherhood rather than motherhood and that the ‘baby has to grow sometime’, which angered both Erdoğan and the right-wing Turkish-Cypriot political leaders such as Serdar Denktaş (Bilge 2015, Bilge 2015). While Serdar Denktaş reiterated the motherland rhetoric saying Turkey will always be the Turkish-Cypriots’ mother, numerous politicians and news platforms in Turkey called Turkish-Cypriots ‘ungrateful’ and ‘spoiled’. In response, an angry Erdoğan, emphasising that there are Turkish martyrs on the babyland soil, scorned Akıncı, telling him to ‘watch his words’ and to ‘think before he opens his mouth’ and realise why Turkey has ownership over the babyland (BBC 2015, Bilge 2015).

There is a widespread belief that Turkish-Cypriots are outnumbered in the north (see Hatay 2005, Hatay 2007, Loizides 2011, Kurtulus and Purkis 2012). The discourse about the
‘numbers’ of Turkish immigrants re-ignites the Turkish-Cypriots fears about being a disempowered minority. In addition to a Greek-Cypriot majority that have been presented as their historical enemy other, Turkey and Turkish immigrants are now increasingly perceived as a growing threat to Turkish-Cypriot identity as well. The quantitative survey clearly demonstrates this existential anxiety about the biographical continuity of Turkish-Cypriots: 55% of Turkish-Cypriots fear that they are becoming ‘extinct’ due to the growing numbers of the people from Turkey in north Cyprus.

This identity dilemma triggered by the securitisation of Turkish immigrants and by extension Turkishness, is a source of ontological dissonance both for Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots. On the one hand, underplaying their Turkishness and emphasising their more ‘modern’ and more ‘European’ Cypriot identity challenges the legitimacy of Turkish-Cypriots’ claims for political equality under a comprehensive settlement, and disassociating themselves from Turkey and by extension Turkish military, challenges their physical security among the more prosperous Greek-Cypriot majority. Conversely, highlighting their Turkishness would contradict their Europeanness and desires for EU-membership, as it is this part of their identity that is securitised as non-European and as oriental. Moreover, as Turkey moves further away from the EU, those who emphasise their Turkishness along with or above their Cypriotness are finding it increasingly harder to reconcile the European, Kemalist and secular elements in their identity narratives with their Turkishness.

Similarly, for Greek-Cypriots, Turkish-Cypriots are a contradiction in terms because they are half-self and half-enemy; their Turkishness makes them the primordial enemy of the Greeks, and their Cypriotness makes them part-self (see Spyrou 2001). Thus, as peace negotiations essentially rely on the reunification of Cyprus based on a bicomunal, bizonal federation with political equality, single sovereignty and a single citizenship60, they automatically challenge the self-narratives and consequently the ontological security of Greek-Cypriots. As such, while accepting a comprehensive solution means accepting that Cypriotness is not inherently tied to Greekness but can also include Turkishness, not supporting a comprehensive solution

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challenges Greek-Cypriots’ historical amnesia and requires them to accept the division of the island as permanent.

6.2.1 The road to EU membership (1990-1999)

The events of 1974 dramatically changed the nature of the Cyprus Problem; physical partition and demographic separation of the communities created additional psychological, social, political and international layers and facilitated the domination of the nationalist narratives. Despite the growing opposition in the TCc, Denktaş and the nationalist ruling elite remained in power and no major progress was made. However, the cards were reshuffled once again when the RoC applied for EU (European Community at the time) membership on behalf of the whole island in 1990. Constrained by the physical divide until the opening of the check-points in 2003, inter-communal interaction was mainly limited to UN-mediated talks that became the common denominator of all future negotiations in the post-1974 era. With the application of the RoC, the EU and Europeanisation was now added both as an actor and a layer to the ‘realities’ of the Cyprus Problem (see Anastasiou 2008, Ulusoy 2012).

The EU application was not welcomed as good news in the TCc. Turkish-Cypriot objections on the grounds that the Greek-Cypriot government was not representing the whole of Cyprus, and that the Article 1 of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee did not allow RoC to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any state whatsoever, fell on deaf ears in the international community (Michael 2011). This was an unwelcomed development, not the least because it could force Turkey to accept more concessions pertaining to the Cyprus Problem to make its own way into the EU61, but it also reinforced the feelings of rejection and dismay among Turkish-Cypriots. They were not against EU membership, but they remained invisible as their ‘enemy other’ represented them and as the ‘motherland’ pursued EU accession.

The new UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali, adopting a more vigorous approach, reignited the efforts to bring the two communities together with what became known as ‘The Set of Ideas’ (UNSC 1992). Despite both Vassiliou and Denktaş agreed with the majority of the Ghali proposals at the new phase of inter-communal talks that started in 1992, it was not

61 EC Summit in Dublin in June 1990 linked Turkey’s accession to the Cyprus Problem (Christou 2004).
surprising when the issue of rotating presidency, territory, property, return of IDPs and repatriation of Turkish immigrants gridlocked the negotiations. Even though Ghali’s was yet another failed attempt to find a solution to the protracted problem, it laid the groundwork for the principles of bizonality and single sovereignty, which was added to the foundational parameters of all future negotiations along with bicommunality and federation. For the Greek Cypriot right-wing, Vassiliou who had agreed to bizonality “had committed the cardinal sin. ...compromising the most sacred of values, namely, the nation and Hellenism” (Anastasiou 2008:100). While the bizonality element challenged Greek-Cypriot identity narratives that relied on ‘holistic’ sovereignty and integrity of the island as a whole and further undermined the possibility of a unitary state, it reinforced Turkish-Cypriot identity narratives by emphasising their distinctness and legitimacy as equal political partners rather than a cultural and/or religious minority that need to be accommodated.

Europeanisation of the problem was thought to act as a catalyst to finding a comprehensive settlement on the island (see Christou 2004). However, when the EU suggested that a settlement was not an essential condition for the admission of Cyprus, the EU became an alternative platform to seek a more favourable settlement for Greek-Cypriots (Christou 2004). The Greek-Cypriot case pertaining to the ‘three freedoms’ (freedom of movement, settlement and property) that would have to be curtailed with bizonality and limitations on the return of IDPs would be strengthened by EU membership. Hence, the unconditionality of EU accession was affecting Greek-Cypriot attitudes toward the peace process (Hannay 2004, Ulusoy 2012). Even though unconditional acceptance of the RoC as a member state did not act as a catalyst and Cyprus acceded as a divided country, the Europeanisation of the conflict did act as a catalyst in the redefinition of identity narratives especially in the TCc.

Looking at the EU’s role in conflict resolution and capacity in promoting peace, Tocci argues from a social constructivist point of view that through participation in common institutional structures, actors can reconfigure their identities, and hence their perceived interests and collective goals, either top down through change agents or bottom-up with civil society’s support (Tocci 2007). Considering the absence of bilateral relations between Brussels and the

62 Such as the European framework persuading domestic elites or through institutional interaction.
Turkish-Cypriots, and the dominance of the nationalist ruling elite led by Denktaş until 2005, Europeanisation of the Cyprus Problem triggered a bottom-up change in the TCc, where civil society and the left-wing elite re-assessed their interests, adopted new European norms, reproduced their Cypriotism and reconfigured their stance towards a solution (see Kyris 2013). Their new interests, goals and norms that became more European required them to become more Cypriot and less Turkish, which also reinforced the bottom-up securitisation of Turkish immigrants as an obstacle to their desired future.

Europeanisation of the conflict became more visible as it seeped into different European institutions. For example, in addition to numerous property cases at the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) with regards to use and sale of formerly Greek-Cypriot properties in north Cyprus, the cases at the European Court of Justice (ECJ), simultaneously undermined the nationalist narrative by highlighting the pariah status of the administration in the north and by fuelling feelings of rejection in the TCc. The cases were brought against Turkey (not the ‘TRNC’), and north Cyprus was now defined as the ‘subordinate administration of Turkey’ (ECHR 1995). In 1994, the ECJ decision that required Turkish-Cypriot exports to EU states to be certified by the Greek-Cypriot authorities was a major blow to both the Turkish-Cypriot economy and psychology (Börzel 2003, Tocci 2007). It did not only significantly reduce lucrative citrus and potato exports to the EU, but also demonstrated a lack of understanding of ‘realities’ on the EU’s part. The ECJ, stating that the Turkish-Cypriot exporters could apply to the RoC for the necessary certification did not consider that, among other difficulties, crossing across the Green Line to acquire such certification was not possible at the time (ulusoy 2012). The economy became even more dependent on Turkey and Turkish-Cypriots more dependent on Turkish aid.

Although Turkey was suffering from shaky coalitions and domestic instability in the 1990s, according to Dodd, halving the financial aid to ‘TRNC’ in 1995 was aimed at making the Turkish-Cypriot ruling elite and particularly Denktaş more willing to agree to a settlement (Dodd 2010). For the ruling elite, the Turkish-Cypriot cause was going to be sacrificed for the RoC’s path to EU membership and Turkey’s path to customs union. After all, Kemalism, built on the idea of modernity, believed that Turkey was essentially European and that the Cyprus
Problem was causing an inconvenience towards that goal. By March 1995, as Turkey’s customs union agreement was approved and the RoC started the accession talks (EC 1995), Denktaş, although noting gradual decline, won his presidential seat for the fifth time with 63% of the vote (TAK 2015). Turkish-Cypriot opposition grew with their crippling economy and corruption, high dependency on Turkey, and the perception that Denktaş in particular and right-wing nationalists in general were propped up by Turkish immigrants and the Turkish military. The prevalent perception that the right-wing political leaders were kept in power with the support from Turkish immigrants was disproved by Mete Hatay. Hatay, who studied voting patterns of Turkish immigrants, concluded that they tend to vote in line with the rest of the electorate (Hatay 2005). In line with Hatay’s analysis, Loizides emphases that the Turkish settler/immigrant population in Cyprus, unlike many other settlers in contested lands, are not mobilised and politicised [by their motherland], despite perceived discrimination and fear of relocation following a negotiated peace agreement because they meet the profile of migrant populations, who are concerned with daily survival issues rather than territorial and ideological politics (Loizides 2015).

It was in late 1990s that the bi-communal workshops and meetings were being used as a tool to challenge the perception of ‘us’ vs ‘them’ and the idea of ‘win-lose’ (Broome 1998, Broome 2005). I participated in my first bi-communal workshop in 1996 in the mixed village of Pyla/Pergamos 63, where I met Greek-Cypriots for the first time. The enthusiasm and excitement of participating in these workshops were both curbed and heightened by the fact that they were not approved by the political elite. For the right-wing nationalists led by Denktaş and Eroğlu, the organisers were traitors, and they were using ‘kids’ to serve their ambitions. At times, civil police watched our workshops from afar, or took our names. At other times, they were cancelled all together at the last minute or we were stopped from going. These brief encounters were our only opportunity to engage with the ‘enemy other’ and challenge the official historical narratives taught to us in schools.

63 Pyla was the only mixed village that provided a ‘buffer’ for bicommmunal interaction. Only the residents of the village could travel across the island but non-resident Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots could come together at the village that provided a space of exceptionality within the political, territorial and social division upheld by a cease-fire and doctrine of necessity.
The year 1996 was marked with great hostility. Greece and Turkey were fighting over a small rocky island in the Aegean called Kardak/Imia (Clogg 2013). Tensions that spilled over to Cyprus peaked when a group of bikers tried to cross the Green Line as part of a protest against the Turkish invasion. One biker who made it across the barbed wire was beaten to death by a Turkish-Cypriot mob and another was shot and killed by Turkish forces as he climbed a flagpole to take down the Turkish flag (Anastasiou 2014). A few weeks later a Turkish soldier was killed and another seriously injured by Greek-Cypriot civilians (CNN 1996). In this hostile atmosphere, which was further exacerbated by the S-300 missile crisis\(^{64}\), the nationalist discourse across the island was finding ground again. The UN tried once more to bring the two sides together in 1997 in Glion but the negotiations did not yield any results or agreements (see Tocci 2003, Christou 2004).

In 1999, the UN called for proximity talks once again, this time with no preconditions and all issues on the table. Denktaş refused to participate unless there was political equality from the start, which for him meant recognition (Dodd 2010). Although Denktaş had the support of the Turkish public and military, his unyielding position and stubbornness was not liked by the Turkish government\(^{65}\) (Anastasiou 2009). Following the disastrous earthquake on its western coast that killed over 15,000 people, the Turkish economy was in a dire condition and needed financial aid from the USA, and global financial institutions. For that, and to be on good terms with the EU, Turkey needed Denktaş to play ball.

Moreover, Turkey was now on very good terms with Greece. Greek-Turkish relations that revolved around a constant tug of war, frequent military confrontation and nationalistic narratives based on enmity were revolutionised following the earthquake that hit Northwest Turkey and a month later Athens in 1999. The confrontational relationship of enmity was quickly reconfigured with the images of Greek and Turkish rescuers digging out women and children from the debris (see Rumelili 2005, Şahin 2010). Greece’s immediate and sincere humanitarian response desecuritised the image of the historical enemy, transforming it into a

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\(^{64}\) In early 1997 RoC ordered S-300 ground-to-air missiles from Russia as part of its military build-up, which created tensions with Turkey. This triggered provocative Greek and Turkish military exercises over and around the island.

\(^{65}\) For example, Denktaş always kicked up a fuss about being called/invited as the Turkish-Cypriot leader rather than the Turkish-Cypriot president. Neither did he like the word ‘community’, preferring stronger terminology to refer to the Turkish-Cypriots.
good neighbour offering a helping hand. The new relationship was likened to that of a sibling, where no matter how much you fight, you still love and help each other (Kinzer 1999, Özsüer 2012). Correspondingly, Turkish rescuers were among the first foreign teams to arrive when the earthquake shifted further west to Athens a month later (Smith 1999, Şahin 2010). Desecuritisation of Greek-Turkish relations was reflected in the mainstream media, where joint films, adverts and productions with Greek and Turkish protagonists became commonplace. Theodossopoulo explains “in local conversations during the period that followed the earthquakes, the Turks were discovered as fellow humans, who shared the same concern for peace and comparable aspirations…” (Theodossopoulo 2007:10). Unfortunately, however, this sudden desecuritisation did not reverberate in Cyprus.

6.2.2 Peacebuilding and ontological anxieties

When Denktas was eventually convinced to participate in the proximity talks with much pressure from Turkey, the European Council formally accepted Turkey as a candidate for membership at the Helsinki Summit in 1999 (Christou 2010). This meant that Turkey could no longer claim that the RoC’s application was not admissible on legal grounds. As such, a EU candidate’s relationship with individual member states or other candidates may significantly influence a country’s EU accession prospects and timeline (Archick 2014). Yet again, it was not only the EU that considered Turkish-Cypriots not anything more than an inconvenience for the accession of the RoC by not making a settlement a condition; now Turkey reiterated that it would prioritise its EU ambitions over Turkish-Cypriots and showed that it was prepared to make future concessions on the road to EU membership.

The proximity talks that saw the seeds of what is known as the Annan Plan lasted until Denktas withdrew from the process at the end of 2000. Denktas, who won yet another presidential election earlier in the same year, was insisting on the ‘acknowledgement’ of the ‘TRNC’ if not recognition (see Lacher and Kaymak 2005). The insistence on ‘acknowledgement

66 Politiki Kouzina (A touch of Spice), a story about a Greek boy living in Turkey during the period of political turmoil, who is interested in becoming a cook released in 2003 (see http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0378897/?ref_=fn_al_tt_2). Eti, a big international snack and biscuit producer in Turkey created an advert that featured friendly Greek and Turkish soldiers guarding at the border in 2006 (see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U-pplLhDlxq). Bulutlari Beklerken (Waiting for the Clouds), a Turkish production based on a novel by Georgios Andreadis that focuses on Greek and Turkish ethnic identity in the 1970s was released in 2003 (see http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0418309/?ref_=fn_al_tt_1)
even for a day’ before a settlement looks like childish stubbornness at a first glance, but can be better understood from an ontological security perspective. For the right-wing Turkish-Cypriots and the ruling elite, if the federation were to be established without the acknowledgement of their administration, their historic struggle would count for nothing and their fight for the Turkish-Cypriot ‘cause’ would become a moot point. A settlement that did not acknowledge their heroic resistance and suffering would challenge their identity narratives and sense of community built over the decades, turning their resistance and suffering into a failed self-inflicted rebellion. Thus, recognition of the ‘TRNC’ was as much to do with the pride and power of the political elite as it was about recognising collective struggles and suffering. Consequently, agreeing to a settlement that added the TCc back to the 1960 Constitution without acknowledging the ‘TRNC’ was as a big source of ontological insecurity for the ruling elite and for Turkish-Cypriots of right-wing persuasion.

Unsurprisingly, insistence on acknowledgement was unacceptable for Greek-Cypriots. The declaration of the ‘TRNC’ was a source of ontological anxiety for Greek-Cypriots; it not only challenged the perception that Cyprus was Hellenic, but also the temporary-ness of partition, which in turn undermined their hopes for return to their land and properties left in the north. Greek-Cypriots managed these anxieties by denying, isolating, distancing and disassociating themselves from the ‘TRNC’. Acknowledging or recognising it even for a day would trigger incapacitating existential anxieties for Greek-Cypriots and would legitimise the events of 1974, and by extension the expansionist and unlawful actions of the enemy. The issue of recognition is such a sensitive sore wound for Greek-Cypriots that many view the crossing of the checkpoints and showing identification documents to Turkish-Cypriot authorities as ‘recognition by implementation’, which is an act that effectively legitimises the Turkish invasion. Syrou confirms that these rationales that oversimplify the international principles concerning state and government recognition and impose holistic and negative understandings of the other, demonise and undermine peacebuilding and reconciliation initiatives (Spyrou 2001:177). However, instead of only engaging with the audience that is pro-peace and ‘Cypriot enough’, and creating gatekeepers, peacebuilding efforts need to engage with and learn from the ontological security literature in order to carefully cater for and accommodate the different security needs of the salient parties that cannot be objectively negotiated on the table.
Many scholars, such as Kızılyürek, Volkan and Tocci, agree that Turkish-Cypriot identity narratives were developed and nurtured in opposition to the Greek-Cypriot identity narratives, thus buttressing that opposition and enmity simultaneously reinforces the perception of the self. Similarly, considering that the Greek-Cypriot identity narratives depict Turkey and Turkishness as their historical enemy and the Ottomans as the oppressor of the Hellenic nation, conflict producing events and clashes reinforce these narratives, reproducing the identity of the self. Therefore, the perception of security produced by the separation of Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots (distancing from the enemy), henceforth the perception of security created by the protracted conflict, becomes a source of ontological security.

MacGinty, Muldoon, and Ferguson emphasise that “there is often a dissonance between the peace agreed at the elite level and the interpretation and experience of that peace at the group and individual level” (MacGinty, Muldoon et al. 2006). In parallel, LeBaron, Broome, Hadjipavlou, Anastasiou and Kanol contend that conflicts are not just about territory, boundary, and sovereignty issues but they are also about acknowledgment, representation, and legitimisation of different identities, as well as ways of living, being, and making meaning (LeBaron 2003, Broome, Hadjipavlou et al. 2012). The importance of a political agreement (i.e. peacemaking) for peacebuilding cannot be overstated; however, what happens ‘the day after’ (Kyriacou, Oğuz et al. 2009) an agreement is equally important. The reason for thinking about ‘the day after’ is to stress the need to provide a feeling of security that the traumas of the past will not reoccur and to facilitate the reconfiguration of identity narratives where historic enemy others are removed without existentially destabilising the self. This points to a gaping hole in the mainstream peacebuilding approach, as ignoring ontological (in)security limits its capacity to deal with the affective, emotional, and perceptual realm of peacebuilding.

Whether or not a political agreement will produce an environment of insecurity and fear by asking people to live with those they believed were their existential enemies depends on whether reconciliation at the grassroots level has managed to desecuritise the self/other relationships by reconfiguring identity narratives. The prospect of peace ideally needs to challenge the fears, deprivations and isolations of groups by bringing them together; but the very process of peacebuilding and the possibility of a settlement creates a sense of anxiety.
because it entails reconfiguration of group relations, and requires actors to question and redefine their understanding of the other (Rumelili 2010, Zarakol 2010). Hence, the peace-anxieties arising from the prospect of finding a solution need to be addressed carefully and constructively. This cannot be simply done by bringing together Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots, who are open to engage in a dialogue together, but needs to include other others, other-selves and othered-selves too\textsuperscript{67}.

Failing to consider ontological security and nuances of identity as an important layer in the conflict, peacebuilding efforts in Cyprus could not break free of the dual ethnic approach and overcome the psychological obstacles to a negotiated settlement. As such, it excluded the Turkish immigrants and condoned their securitisation by both Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots. Thus, over the years, confrontational phases prompted two opposing waves; while one was usually a positive attempt to diffuse (or desecuritise) the confrontation through peacemaking/peacebuilding initiatives, the other was solidification of entrenched nationalist positions and mutually exclusive identity narratives.

Michalis Michael points out that confrontational phases in the history of the Cyprus Problem were often followed by a more cooperative mood demonstrated in ‘new’ initiatives injected into the inter-communal talks creating a somewhat renewed impetus (Michael 2011). For example, the unilateral declaration of the ‘TRNC’ in 1983 was followed by the High Level Meetings in 1985; the 1987-1988 Aegean crisis\textsuperscript{68} was followed by the Cuellar and Boutros-Ghali initiatives (Set of Ideas) in the early 1990s; UK Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind’s 10 point plan (see SCFA 2005) and negotiations at Glion came after the Kardak/Imia crisis and the border clashes in 1996 and the S-300 missile crisis of 1997; and lastly, increased resentment and nationalist propaganda in the north and Turkey triggered by the unconditional agreement to go ahead with the accession negotiations with the RoC and not include Turkey in the next enlargement (EU Agenda 2000) was matched by the Annan initiative in the 2000s.

\textsuperscript{67} Other others refer to Turkish immigrants and people from Turkey, other-selves refer to those who are labeled as spoilers or dissidents of peace because they do not fit the peacebuilding framework, and othered-selves refer to Turkishness in Turkish-Cypriot identity narratives.

\textsuperscript{68} The Aegean dispute refers to various interrelated controversial issues between Greece and Turkey over sovereignty and related rights in the Aegean Sea such as airspace, territorial waters and exclusive economic zones. The conflict was particularly hostile in 1987-1988 and in 1996 and led to military build up and brought the two sides to the brink of war.
Even though Michael considers this pattern a ‘paradox’ (Michael 2011:206), it is no coincidence. Securitisation and ontological security literatures can offer an alternative explanation for this pattern and consequently for the failed peacemaking attempts. Each confrontational event that triggered feelings of physical insecurity was matched with a political desecuritisation attempt on Track 1 level to re-incite hope/vision for a solution. When faced with a heightened sense of fear, the two main communities on the island resorted to securitisation. By adding the fear caused by each new confrontation to their identity narratives, Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots remembered and reinterpreted their past traumas, and reinforced their entrenched positions vis-à-vis the enemy other. To counter this securitisation dynamic, the international community pushed for peacemaking efforts as a desecuritisation strategy. However, these attempts were not sufficiently supported at a social level to address feelings of ontological insecurity. Thus, while the political leaders were brought together under the auspices of international actors, and as such the confrontation was diffused, communities and collective identity narratives on the societal level remained largely securitised based on discourses of enmity. As a result, the Cyprus peace process became over-dependent on official Track 1 diplomacy, which often disregards, dismisses and silences anxieties and ontological security needs at the societal level.

Michael’s conclusion that both communities had become supporters of the status quo because even though the status quo was not ideal, it was preferable to the uncertainties of a new settlement that did not match the communities’ respective expectations can be unpacked with the ontological security literature. In addition to his analysis that the “fear of worst-case scenarios paralysed the will and the capacity to pursue a riskier but ultimately more promising course” (Michael 2011:205), a prospective solution, no matter how ‘well’ matched to expectations, requires reconfiguration of historic identity narratives by default. Even a ‘perfect’ solution plan would trigger feelings of insecurity and existential anxiety as it challenges the image of the enemy and disrupts the daily routines of the actors involved in conflict. Identity narratives in Cyprus have created an image for the self that depended on the image of the enemy; where all internal was good and just, and all external was bad and evil (Papadakis 2008, Volkan 2008). External did not only include the other community, but also the motherlands, the colonial powers and other actors. Hence, saying ‘yes’ to a
comprehensive settlement, however perfect, means saying ‘yes’ to confronting engrained societal fears and anxieties, and saying ‘yes’ to living side by side with the ‘enemy other’. It effectively requires Cypriots to accept the other as a legitimate partner, and as a group that is part-self, who also has rights and has also suffered. As peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts challenge the image of the enemy, they also challenge our self-identity narratives.

Even though literature on the Cyprus Problem rarely engages with ontological security, many scholars problematise the disconnect between peacemaking efforts and identity narratives reproduced through education and official histories. Philippou and Varnava argue that the official historical sources in the RoC portray Turkish-Cypriots as a cultural and religious minority, which delegitimises their political rights based on numerical grounds and weakens the sense of political justice that various solution plans require (Philippou and Varnava 2009). Greek-Cypriot history textbooks represent Cyprus as homogeneously Greek-speaking and Christian Orthodox in European maps and base the concept of Europe on ethno-cultural content that is inherently Greek: “the European civilisation is the continuance of the ancient Greek and Roman civilisation. An important element of the European cultural heritage is also the teachings of Christianity” (quoted in Philippou and Varnava 2009:201). Furthermore, official sources and history textbooks that reduce the Cyprus Problem to the Turkish invasion, essentially point to a simple solution: The need for Turkey to follow UN resolutions, which will allow for ‘re-acquisition’ of what was lost, restoration of Greek-Cypriots’ human rights and a return to the 1960 Constitution (Christou 2006).

Unsurprisingly, a similar reductionist portrayal can be found in the Turkish-Cypriot history textbooks that reduce the problem to uncompromising and greedy Greek-Cypriots who refuse to accept Turkish-Cypriots as equals and did/will attempt to rid the island of Turks and Turkish-Cypriots at every opportunity. The difference in this portrayal is the perception of 1974 as the ‘solution’ to the problem rather than the root of the problem. The solution can only be truly celebrated if Greek-Cypriots stop lobbying the international community to isolate and deny recognition to the Turkish-Cypriot administration. As such, according to mainstream nationalists, the division of the island was the final goal, and hence the Cyprus Problem was already ‘solved’ (Kızılyürek 2012).
This reductionist portrayal and lack of vision towards a solution in official histories and textbooks is in stark contrast with the official political rhetoric of all governments of the RoC and the Turkish-Cypriot administration that engaged in peace negotiations since 1977. While the community leaders continued to pursue a settlement based on a bicomunal, bizonal federation of varying forms at different historical periods, the mainstream ethnic and national identity narratives reproduced the friend-enemy distinction, reinforcing the other’s identity as aggressive and illegitimate. As a result, the solution pursued at the political level contradicts the ideal solution presented in official historical sources and falls short of constructing a vision of what the future will look like in a reunified Cyprus (Irwin 2005, Christou 2006).

Nonetheless, it should be noted that there was a significant but failed bicomunal effort to revise the history textbooks across the island in 2004. The new narrative based on peace education, civic identity and principles of multiculturalism even criticised the older one for depicting Cyprus as a Turkish/Greek homeland, opting for more inclusive terms like ‘Cypriots’ and ‘people of Cyprus’ to embrace both Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriots (MEKB 2005, Papadakis 2008, Tamcelik 2009). Even though the textbooks were revised in the TCc, the old books were re-introduced merely after five years in 2009. The revision was never completed in the GCc due to strong opposition and outcry that it would undermine collective self-identity and justify the actions of the enemy (Bekerman, Kızılyürek et al. 2010). On the issue of revised textbooks, Hadjikonstantas, a Greek-Cypriot philologist observed that, “national heritage of three thousand years is questioned by pseudo-arguments for intercultural and multicultural ideology” (quoted in Makriyianni and Psaltis 2007:59).

Once again, failing to consider ontological security concerns, the initiative underestimated the existential anxieties a new historical account would create, especially for Greek-Cypriots. As such, re-narrating historical events and ‘realities’ that are central to the Greek-Cypriot identity narratives based on multiculturalism would challenge their disassociation with Turkey and Turkishness, and destabilise the image of the primordial enemy that is blamed for all wrong doing and misfortunes. Hence, it would also destabilise the identity of the self. However, since Cypriotness comes with a European identity for Turkish-Cypriots, meaning they need their Cypriotness in order to be European, it could be argued that the initial success of the initiative
was, at least partly, due to the fact that ontological anxieties were more manageable for Turkish-Cypriots as the new historical narrative reinforced their ‘Europeanness’. In other words, the revised textbooks had the potential to provide a future-oriented narrative for Turkish-Cypriots that underplays their stigmatised and oriental past. On the contrary, they would challenge Greek-Cypriots’ deeply historicised narrative that provides them links with an ancient and great civilisation that contributed to the very foundations of the Western world, and instead emphasise their links with the oriental, non-European other.

Both peacemaking and peacebuilding initiatives treated the Cyprus Problem as an ethnic conflict and sought its resolution on this basis. Although, the guarantor powers were kept in the loop on the Track 1 level, other levels of diplomacy and reconciliation, especially grassroots level, almost always had a dual-ethnic approach, excluding other identities and communities. The issue of Turkish immigrants in the Cyprus Problem is especially hefty because it adds highly emotive issues to an already tense situation, including human rights violations, IDPs’ resentments about property losses, anger and humiliation over military losses, fears of electoral manipulation, and anxieties about cultural and demographic distinctiveness due to the perceived ‘Turkification’ of north Cyprus. It goes beyond a banal racism and xenophobia towards foreigners as it is tied into collective traumas, identity narratives, and desired and idealised futures. Christiensen contends that “the pejorative discourse about Turkish settlers cannot be dismissed as a case of historic hatreds or cross-ethnic animosities, for slurs against Turkish immigrants are echoed on both sides of the island. That is, Greek Cypriots talk about the settlers in ways nearly identical to how Turkish Cypriots talk about Turkish settlers” (Christiensen 2005:55).

It is not new to say that reconciliation at the grassroots level facilitates Track 1 diplomacy neither theoretically nor empirically for the case of Cyprus (see Diamond and McDonald 1996). What is new however, is that on a theoretical level, peace research has a lot to learn from ontological security and desecuritisation literatures; and on an empirical level, breaking free of the dual-ethnic approach to the Cyprus Problem with a more nuanced understanding

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69 Even though Turkish immigrants are not the only other identity group in Cyprus that needs to be included in the process, the focus on their involvement stems from the underlying argument that this group is securitised by both Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots, as well as the fact that Turkishness is an integral part of Turkish-Cypriots identity narratives.
of identity and expanding the efforts to desecuritise Turkishness and Turkish immigrants would facilitate a comprehensive settlement and support the implementation of a negotiated solution by providing the tools to address peace-anxieties. As such, their involvement in reconciliation is necessary to reconfigure the threat perceptions that create peace-anxieties pertaining to a potential comprehensive settlement.

6.2.3 More Europeanisation and more reconfiguration (1999-2003)

Going back to the historical timeline, despite the green light at Helsinki in 1999, exclusion of Turkey from the 2000 enlargement strategy was not welcomed news. It encouraged an attempt by Ankara to bring Turkey and the ‘TRNC’ closer together, something the Turkish-Cypriot ruling elite supported to counteract the Europeanisation of the conflict and the mobilisation of Turkish-Cypriots against the status quo. However, Turkey’s economic troubles that led to a banking crisis in 2001 saw ten banks collapse in Turkey and in the ‘TRNC’ (BBC 2001). Imposition of drastic economic reforms reinforced the conviction for the need for a solution instead. Demonstrations that bore the signs and slogans saying “This Country is Ours”, meaning that the north did not belong to Turkey, were starting to grow, each bigger than the previous one (Bu Memleket Bizim 2000, Durduran 2000).

Turkish-Cypriots were increasingly losing faith in Denktash and Eroğlu and simultaneously detaching themselves from Turkey and their Turkish identity. Demonstrations in the face of harsh economic reforms and the banking crisis were showing growing support for the Turkish-Cypriot left-wing, who rejected motherland nationalism, adopted mottos such as ‘Cyprus belongs to Cypriots’ or ‘Cyprus for Cypriots’, and promoted Cypriotism that was anchored upon peace and reunification. As Kızılıyürek contends, the left-wing emerged and gained support as an identity movement against Turkish nationalism, and Turkey’s intervening, clientelist patronage system (Kızılıyürek 2012). As a result, the struggle for democracy as well as for Turkish-Cypriot identity was inseparable from the struggle for peace. Everything from lack of water and electricity, to corruption and bad education was tied to the Cyprus Problem.

As previously discussed, Turkish-Cypriots low self-esteem and minority complex shows itself in their narrative about always needing a guardian or a saviour. However, by the early 2000s,
Turkey was not the saviour anymore; this role was now projected on to the EU. The perception that Turkish-Cypriots needed saving did not change, but who they wanted to be saved by was no longer tied to their ethnic identity. The subsequent societal outcome of this was the growing securitisation and xenophobia towards Turkish immigrants who were scapegoated as agents of Turkey and as the obstacle for a better future.

The EU accession was initially viewed as a threat by many Turkish-Cypriots due to the domination of public opinion by the nationalist elites, who supported EU membership only after a settlement or after Turkey’s accession (Tocci 2003). As the right-wing political elite started to lose its grip on power, this view started to transform. In the context of international isolation, the EU project was more than just economic prosperity; it also meant ‘acceptance’. It offered a new relationship, very different in style compared to the Turkish-Cypriot experience of dependent, parental relationship they had with the ‘motherland’ that treated them like a frail incompetent child70. EU membership meant recognition of Turkish-Cypriots’ distinct identity by the international community; it meant that Turkish-Cypriots could participate in global politics, in global sporting events, they could have a postcode and they could trade with the world.

By 2002, EU accession was no longer perceived as a threat, but rather as the necessary condition for the TCc’s survival. Europeanisation of the conflict also meant collective socialisation for Turkish-Cypriots. Their re-evaluation of EU membership happened hand in hand with their re-evaluation of self-identity, which was facilitated by their widespread discontent with the status quo, by the effective mobilisation of the civil society and by the banking crisis that demonstrated their fragility. However, Denktaş, still president at the time, was not convinced of the appeal of membership and considered EU money a bribe for osmosis to trick Turkish-Cypriots to relinquish their ‘sovereignty’ (Tocci 2007:44). As civil society matured, Turkish-Cypriots started perceiving their administration, which used to be a source of pride (symbol of their heroic resistance, when with the support of their large-group, they,

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70 In 2011, Erdoğan was angry with the demonstrators who used signs and slogans saying “Turkey, get lost” (Türkiye, defol), “Ankara, move your hands off our throat/collar” (Ankara, elini yakamızdan çek). Erdoğan called Cypriots “Besleme”, meaning an orphan handmaiden, a serving child, which triggered much anger and resentment (EurActiv 2011).
though a minority, gained victory), as a delusion; instead of being dominated by Greek-Cypriots they were being controlled by Ankara (see Christou 2004, Tocci 2007).

The inter-communal talks resumed in January 2002 and by June the Annan Plan was taking shape (Dodd 2010). The negotiations gained further speed as the pressure on Denktas and the political elite grew, now not only exerted from the domestic front, but following the election of the AKP led by Erdogan, more overtly from Turkey as well. That being said, Turkish political and public opinion had been very ambivalent on the Cyprus issue especially since 1990s. Even though the secularist Kemalist front inherently supports Europe, coming from a Turkish nationalist background as they see themselves as the founders and protectors of Turkey, just like the armed forces, they feel a national pride and responsibility for the Turkish-Cypriot ‘cause’. Many interactions are limited to the fact that the blood of brave Turkish soldiers had been spilled to ‘save’ Turkish-Cypriots, and despite this Turkish-Cypriots are not grateful enough towards Turkey. This perceived debt bondage was recognised in the focus groups and the civil society surveys, where one participant highlighted that “They call us garasakal [blackbeard] to insult us but we insult them by saying ‘we saved you’, ‘if we didn’t save you, you wouldn’t be here’. We constantly rub their nose in it. The discrimination we face is also defensive. … The migrants who came here couldn’t go to Germany, in Germany they needed to integrate and adapt. But those who came here, came thinking they were ‘bosses’ [of Turkish-Cypriots]… they came as saviours, with a sense of entitlement” (FG2-N:2015).71

With very little time to spare before the EU decision on accession negotiations that was to be taken in Copenhagen in December 2002, the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan presented his draft plan for Cyprus (Hoffmeister 2006). In a nutshell, the Annan Plan was based on a presidential (a presidential council rather than a single person) federal system that was drastically different from the 1960 Constitution. The communal veto powers were radically reduced (a concern for Turkish-Cypriots), Guarantees were retained (a concern for Greek-

71 Responding to a comment about, “young Cypriots discriminate because they don’t know their history and that Turkey had saved them; if they were taught the history, they wouldn’t discriminate…”, Hasan offers a self-reflective analysis: “We need to discuss why their [Turkish-Cypriots’] perception has changed, why they feel reactionary towards us and why this [discriminatory] environment had emerged. … The door [the border] is open to Turkey, there is no control. Both good people and bad people come freely. Rather than just simply complaining that they don’t like us, we need to question why. … We didn’t come to integrate, we came to change the society, because we saw it as ‘ours’ (Hasan, which is not his real name, was a focus group participant, who works as a journalist at a big newspaper. The quote is author’s own translation of the focus group transcripts from Turkish to English (FG2-N:2015)).
Cypriots), federal institutions possessed a wide range of powers such as foreign affairs, central bank, natural resources and communications (not as loose as Turkish-Cypriots wanted), and it included fairly detailed residence, reinstitution and property arrangements (restrictions on return\textsuperscript{72} of IDPs to the northern constituent state was another Greek-Cypriot concern). The plan also allowed for approximately 50,000 Turkish migrants to remain, which was ‘too much’ for Greek Cypriots (Christou 2004). The aim was to get both communities to agree on the plan before Copenhagen and finalise the remaining provisions and annexes before putting it to referenda at the end of March 2003.

However, the Copenhagen deadline was missed as Denktaş refused to sign the plan. The next important deadline was now the Treaty of Accession to be signed in April 2003. In response to various suggestions and feedback, the plan was revised again as ‘Annan III’ in February 2003. There was less than a month left to negotiate. Turkish-Cypriots were afraid that under the Plan the more prosperous and numerous Greek-Cypriots would overpower them, and any restrictions imposed on the Greek-Cypriots would have to be a temporary derogation from the EU acquis. However, even those Turkish-Cypriots who would be displaced from their former Greek-Cypriot homes, including my parents, supported the Plan. They saw it as a moral responsibility to sacrifice earthly possessions for a better future. The alternative being the continuation of their invisible enclave, or what they called at the demonstrations their ‘open air prison’, was not considered a viable option (Bayrak 2003). Even the Morphou/Güzelyurt, a city that would be given to the Greek-Cypriot constituent state according to the Annan Plan, which would create thousands of IDPs, voted 64.21% in favour of the plan\textsuperscript{73}, clearly demonstrating that their concerns over biographical continuity, distinct identity as Cypriots and their future were prioritised over immediate financial losses, their ‘home’ or their ties to their land. Reconfiguration of Turkish-Cypriots’ loyalties and identity narratives towards Cypriotness and Europe, and away from Turkishness and Anatolia, helped alleviate peace-anxieties pertaining to the Annan Plan. It also provided a vision for the future that trumped other fears. Bryant notes, “Beginning with the 2002 announcement, Turkish Cypriots began a long, hard struggle to change their government, to gain the support of Turkey and to educate

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item After 15 years the Greek Cypriots could constitute only 21% of the northern constituent state’s population.
\item http://www.cypriot.org.uk/Documents/Haber1/23-Nisan.htm
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
the electorate. ...But even in those districts where thousands of Turkish Cypriots would have been relocated, the plan was approved with a resounding majority, for it would have meant a new state of certainty about the future” (Bryant 2004:2).

Large mass demonstrations led by the Turkish-Cypriot Chamber of Commerce that mobilised approximately 90 civil society organisations, political parties, civil servants and the business sector based on a document called the ‘Common Vision’ [of Turkish Cypriots]’ were being held on a monthly basis and were bringing 70-80,000 people from all kinds of backgrounds and political views into the streets (Christou 2003, Tocci 2003). Considering the small population of north Cyprus, this was a very significant number. The movement became the symbol of the Turkish-Cypriot reunification movement and focused on Turkish-Cypriots’ will to decide upon their own destiny (Durduran 2000, Kıbrıs 2002). In December 2002 and January 2003, unprecedented numbers of Turkish-Cypriot poured into the streets and city squares waving EU flags, slogans, and olive branches to call for reunification, EU membership and the resignation of Denktaş. Demonstrators that included a section of Turkish immigrants as well, cried “We are ready for the EU and solution” and “Yes be Annem” (Tocci 2007).

Figure No 1: Turkish-Cypriot demonstrations (1)

*14 January 2003 Demonstrations.

74 The Common Vision document declared that Turkish-Cypriots commitment to ‘freedom’ [from Turkey], EU membership and reunification.
75 According to the 2011 census, the de facto population in the northern part of Cyprus was 294,906.
76 “Yes be Annem” meaning, Yes mummy, played on words Annem and Annan.
However, the civil society movement and the enthusiasm for reunification was not matched in the GCC, who thought they would be in a more advantageous position to negotiate a more beneficial settlement after EU accession (Lacher and Kaymak 2005). Many perceived it as being unfairly favourable for Turkish-Cypriots and believed that the Turkish Cypriot Constituent State would try to expand its functions and make every effort to become autonomous (see Bryant 2004, Broome 2005). They also greatly feared the continuation of the Treaty of Guarantee, fearing Turkish military intervention.

The Church was particularly opposed to the Plan. In fact, the Bishop of Kyrenia announced that those who vote yes to the Plan will not be able to go to paradise (Anastasiou 2008). As Bryant notes, “The plan was presented to them in bits of propaganda and in the diatribes of the church, many of whose leaders condemned the plan as 'satanic' and threatened their flocks with damnation if they voted in favour” (Bryant 2004:2). This was part of a larger campaign to securitise the Annan Plan as an existential threat to the Hellenic character and existence of Greek-Cypriots. It owed its effectiveness to the trust the GCC have in the Church. The strong opposition to the Annan Plan was reflected in the presidential elections of February 2003. The hard-liner candidate Tassos Papadopoulos was elected president with 51.1% of the vote over Clerides, who was perceived to be too moderate. What was painfully surprising however, in particular for the Turkish-Cypriot left-wing, was AKEL’s (communist party) support for Papadopoulos (Pericleous 2009).


On 16 April 2003, together with nine other candidate countries, the RoC signed the EU accession treaty without a comprehensive settlement. Nevertheless, the road to finding a settlement was still not final; hence the negotiations continued. All candidates would formally join the EU on 1st May 2004. However, 5 days later on 21st April, something breath-taking happened. A surprise move was made to relax the restrictions on movements across the Green Line. The Turkish-Cypriot authorities announced that they would allow freedom of movement across the Green Line for the first time since 1974 (BBC 2003). In a very short time,

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77 According to opinion polls, over 45% of the public trust the church (Cyprus-2015-Initiative 2009), and compared to the 46% EU average, over 81% Greek-Cypriots believe that religion has a very significant role in society (Eurobarometer 2006).
almost over night, the check-points on the Green Line that divided the communities for almost 30 years were opened. There was much excitement, optimism and media coverage, both locally and internationally. The opening of the checkpoints were treated as the first tangible step towards reunification (See Loizos 2007).

This was a big milestone both politically and psychologically. Cypriots were going to meet the ‘other’ that they had spent three decades vilifying through the media, history textbooks, national holidays and memorials. Although decades long separation made it easy for the mainstream nationalist discourse to vilify the ‘other’, it also concealed a curiosity for the ‘other side’; the unknown dark side that could not be visited. The ‘dark’ took a more literal meaning for Turkish-Cypriots, as we watched the twinkling colourful lights in the south from our windows and balconies when the northern part suffered from regular electricity blackouts. The curiosity for the ‘other side’ demonstrated its intensity when the borders were opened for the first time in April 2003 and thousands of people queued at the check-points to visit the estranged half of their island, some sleeping in their cars from the night before. Many wanted to visit their old houses, or their grandparents’ villages or orchards.

This surprising move stirred, shifted, challenged and strengthened identity narratives simultaneously; north was more ‘normal’ and less Islamic than the Greek-Cypriots had imagined, and the south was more developed, more European and more Western than the Turkish-Cypriot expected. Turkish-Cypriots were impressed by the relatively high level of development by comparison, and to Greek-Cypriots’ surprise, despite obviously being less prosperous, the northern part was not poverty stricken and disease ridden, with Turkish soldiers guarding every corner as their propaganda often implied. Hatay notes that the opening of the check-points “provided new access to the island’s south and gave Turkish-Cypriots a new vision of the island’s ‘essential’ ‘European’ character” (Hatay 2008:158). This ‘European’ character of Greek-Cypriots was visible by the cars they drove, the clothes they wore and the type of vacations they took. It was visible especially to the younger generation, who travelled more. They did not even have Starbucks, McDonalds and Debenhams; all of which were, at least for them, symbols of modernity and the ‘Western’ world. Crossing back to their isolated ‘dark’ side, Turkish-Cypriots blamed Turkey and Turkish immigrants for
turning the north into ‘the East’, into what they perceived as part of Anatolia. Hatay further argues that “this visceral, visual difference became one of the primary motivations for large segments of the population in the north to support a UN reunification plan that would have ... made north Cyprus, also, a part of Europe” (Hatay 2008:158). Yet, despite the stark and obvious differences, the ‘other side’ was familiar, or may be familial in an organic way; it tasted and sounded similar78.

To the disenchantment of the nationalists, the opening of the check-points did not create havoc. Lack of violence or hooliganistic incidents also showed that the two communities would not simply tear each other apart like the mainstream political elite claimed and that may be, peaceful co-existence and a common future on the same island was possible. That spring, my father waited with excitement on the balcony for ‘our’ Greek-Cypriots to arrive. The majority of our neighbourhood was Greek-Cypriot property, my parents had moved into the 2 rooms in the basement as students in 1983 as a newly engaged couple and slowly extended and built upon the house over the years. As other neighbours had ‘their’ Greek-Cypriots come and go, the anticipation grew. People exchanged old photos and memorabilia. A neighbour on the street kept the wedding gown and wedding photos of the former inhabitants and finally had the chance to give it back. The stories from our neighbourhood was, luckily, pretty rosy. Our own first encounter a couple of weeks after the opening of the check-points was very timid, and the second one very emotional. The second time the extended Greek-Cypriot family, who were the original owners of our house, came all together to visit. Two brothers and their wives and children. The two brothers were very young when they had to run away, about 10-12 years old. The younger one mentioned that he had buried his ‘valuables’ in the garden before they left. My dad having planted trees and plants in the garden over the years said he never found anything. We went downstairs together, and he pointed to a spot to the right of the olive tree that had been there for years, so close to the trunk of the tree that my dad never dug there. It took two digs with a small shovel and we found the little clay pot filled with the valuables of a 10 year old boy when he had to abandon his house and run away in fear. The pot contained a rusty cross, a couple of little toy cars and some dusty torn bundle of paper that was probably money. It was very emotional for

78 Despite the language differences, mannerisms, sounds, folk music and slang is very similar across the Green Line.
everyone involved. Funnily, a day later the neighbourhood was taken by the rumour that my family was ‘sitting’ on Greek-Cypriot ‘gold’ that we never found and now the owners had come to take it back.

The opening of the check-points further intensified the Turkish-Cypriot opposition movement directed at Denktaş as the symbol of status quo and division. The identity narratives became more Cypriot-centric as the left-wing and pro-peace rhetoric gained support (see Panayiotou 2012). Accordingly, Huseyin Çakal’s study reports contact with Greek-Cypriots cause Turkish-Cypriots to experience more anger when thinking about the current conditions, which in turn increases their willingness to engage in radical collective action for change (Cakal 2013). The Cypriotist narratives rather than expressing feelings of gratefulness to Turkey and the Turkish military as the ‘saviour’, perceived Turkey as the puppet master, an unwanted hegemonic power that claimed entitlement over their future and political will. Those Turkish-Cypriots who prioritise their Cypriotness are also those who do not feel as ‘saved’ and who feel the squeeze of the invisible enclave more, because they envy and long for (or may be see themselves as more deserving) what Greek-Cypriots have enjoyed over the decades; the colourful, modern and European world Greek-Cypriots were a part of while they, watched from afar, even though they too were ‘Cypriots’. This shift fuelled the polarisation, differentiation and disassociation between Turkish-Cypriots and Turkish immigrants, where the former claimed to be less nationalist, less religious and more European:

“… I consider myself different than people from Turkey. Especially in terms of culture of society; respect for human rights and freedoms are much less in Turkey. Turks’ tolerance of violence and despotism is much higher than the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. … the only aspect I feel different than a Greek Cypriot is related to the way religion is organised and practised in the Greek Cypriot community, which does not really happen in the Turkish Cypriot community. … For the Turkish government up until the 2003 we were not Turkish enough, and currently we are not Muslim enough. … And thus, for me Turkey poses a threat to my existence as a human being in Cyprus and in the world.” (Anonymous, Association for Sustainable Development, (CSOS:2014))
In response to the Turkish-Cypriot move of opening the check-points, the Greek-Cypriots announced a series of measures to give Turkish-Cypriots the opportunity to enjoy the rights and benefits that the RoC extends to its citizens such as medical care, education and RoC passports. The latter was particularly important since the RoC was virtually an EU member. With the freedom of movement across the island, more and more Turkish-Cypriots acquired RoC passports, which did not only make their Cypriot identity available to them once again but also became a symbol of their European identity. Turkish-Cypriots, who were neither Turkish nor Muslim enough, could never be Cypriot enough under their unrecognised pseudo state; at least now, they had a recognised Cypriot passport that also confirmed their European identity. The more ‘European’ they became, the more they set themselves apart from the Turkish immigrants, who could not cross the check-points or acquire the RoC passports, and hence were not deemed ‘fit’ to be European. This encouraged not only manual workers and artisans to work across the divide, but also families started sending their children to private schools in the RoC. The Turkish-Cypriot ruling elite described this as a ‘charm package’, aimed at promoting ‘osmosis’ (Kibris 2006, Christophorou, Sahin et al. 2010). They were not happy with the developments; they tried to discourage Turkish-Cypriots from shopping, visiting and travelling from across the divide through intimidation at the check-points, naming and shaming, confiscation of their shopping items and the like. The ruling elite also (verbally) banned Turkish-Cypriots from getting the passports but then it was leaked that they themselves had already acquired theirs (Turan 2004, Milliyet 2011).

The Turkish-Cypriot parliamentary elections in December 2003 were like a rehearsal referendum for the Annan Plan. The campaigns concentrated on acceptance or rejection of the Plan, and on the issue of international recognition before an agreement. The opposition parties claimed that the government was rigging the elections by granting citizenship, and hence voting rights, to Turkish immigrants (Hope 2003). This was of course based on the assumption that the Turkish immigrants lacked the ‘Common [EU] Vision’. Even though there was an increase in the number of citizenships that were granted prior to the elections (Dodd 2010), this was mainly because many Turkish immigrants who had lived in the north for a long time wanted to jump on the EU bandwagon and pursue their citizenship applications to secure their place in Cyprus in case of a settlement. This development did not, in fact, help the
government. The president of the TRNC Migrants’ Association, Nuri Çevikel, openly supported CTP in the elections and the Annan Plan (Kıbrıs 2003, Radikal 2003). In the end, CTP increased its votes from 13.35% in 1998 to 35.17% in 2003, and Mehmet Ali Talat, the leader of CTP, became the first ever left-wing Prime Minister of the TCC.

The negotiations continued until March 2004. Even though the leaders (Papadopoulos and Denktaş) at the negotiation table did not support the Plan, they agreed to continue the negotiations, as they could not afford to be regarded as not wanting a solution or to be the side that left the table. It was agreed that if the two sides had not reached an agreement before the referendum, then the Secretary-General would fill in all the ‘blanks’ (Asmussen 2004). As expected, all the issues were not resolved when the time ran out, and the Annan Plan IV was revised for the fifth time by the Secretary-General to accommodate the concerns of both sides. By the end of March 2004 less than a month before the referenda, Annan V79, with all its annexes and legal documents that amounted to thousands of pages, was finalised.

The Greek-Cypriot negotiation team objected inter alia to derogations on the rights to property and residence, to the Treaty of Guarantee, representation in the Senate on a communal (ethnic) basis, voting by Turkish immigrants (with citizenship) in the referenda, the numbers of Turkish immigrants that could remain80, and the lack of hierarchy between federal and constituent states. The Greek-Cypriots also wanted the Greek and Turkish military contingents out by 1 June 2015, or earlier if Turkey joined the EU (see Palley 2005, Hoffmeister 2006). Even though the Turkish-Cypriots were worried about the property and residence restrictions that were eased in Annan V, which had to be temporary (limited to 19 years), and about the reduction of their territory to from 37% to 29%, which would create considerable number of IDPs, the call for reunification, ending of isolations and EU membership was so strong, all these concerns were drowned (see Asmussen 2004, Hoffmeister 2006).

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79 http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/
80 48,000 in Annan Plan V
In the north, President Denktaş and the right-wing UBP, led by Eroğlu, openly opposed the Plan; the CTP, led by Talat and other left-wing parties supported it, while the Democratic Party, led by Serdar Denktaş (son of Rauf Raif Denktaş) was divided on the issue. In the south, apart from DISY, led by Nicos Anastasiades, no party supported the Plan, not even AKEL or the Greens. President Papadopoulos made an emotional televised appeal against the Plan, where he called on the people not to support it. At the TV interview, Papadopoulos said in tears, “I call on you to reject the Annan plan. I call on you to say a resounding ‘no’ on 24 April. I call upon you to defend your dignity, your history and what is right. I urge you to defend the Republic of Cyprus, saying no to its abolition” (Kadritzke 2004). Calling upon ‘Greek-Cypriotism’ and Greek-Cypriots’ attachment to the RoC that they recreated from its ‘ashes’ after 1974, Papadopoulos said, “I was given an internationally recognised state. I am not going to give back ‘a community’ without a say internationally and in search of a guardian” (quoted in Loizides 2015:85). Further, he argued that the plan’s provision to disband the National Guard would create conditions of insecurity for Greek-Cypriots, which bitterly reminded people of mainland Greece’s inability to protect Greek-Cypriots militarily in 1974. Papadopoulos’ speech was very instrumental in translating feelings of ontological insecurity into securitisation, where peace-anxieties were directed to an identifiable threat; the Turkish military and immigrants that were going to be part of their new reality if they said ‘yes’. This emotional appeal and AKEL’s change of heart undeniably affected Greek-Cypriot voters; even AKEL, allegedly the most understanding of the Turkish-Cypriots, who to-date supported unification, was strongly against the Plan. On 24th April 2004, 65% of the Turkish-Cypriots approved the Plan, whilst 76% of the Greek-Cypriots rejected it (BBC 2004).

Cypriot Academy, a civil society group that promotes Cypriotism, with the implication that Turkish-Cypriots are those Greeks/Greek-Cypriots who converted to Islam during the Ottoman rule, wrote “...the majority of Cypriots rejected the Annan Plan not because they reject a solution to their island’s division. Far from it. They rejected the plan because they reject the legitimisation of aggressive acts. They rejected the plan because they reject losing rights to property and free settlement in their own homeland. They rejected the Plan because they reject apartheid, just as apartheid was rejected in South Africa” (Academy 2002). Despite the

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81 The turn-out for the referendum was 88% among Greek-Cypriots and 87% among Turkish-Cypriots.
peace-anxieties, the Plan reinforced Turkish-Cypriots distinct identity as Europeans and as Cypriots; but for Greek-Cypriots, the Plan was a screaming source of ontological insecurity that challenged their self-identity, ‘legitimised’ the acts of their enemy, and undermined their heroic historical struggle and suffering.

With the rejection of the Annan Plan in the simultaneous referenda, Cyprus officially became an EU member state as a country divided by cease-fire on 1st May 2004. The ‘anomaly’ of Cyprus was accommodated with the addition of Protocol 10 to the Accession Treaty that states the acquis communautaire will be suspended in “areas of the Republic of Cyprus in which the Government of the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control”\(^82\). In parallel with Constantinou’s argument that the Cyprus case presents multiple states of exception, the anomaly of its accession was yet another ‘state of exception’: “…not much is normal with the state of Cyprus. The RoC was intended to function as a state of exception from its very inception; an exception to the principle of self-determination, an exception to the withdrawal of colonial armies, an exception to independence from the ‘motherlands’ and an exception to the unfettered exercise of sovereignty” (Constantinou 2008:145). Anastasiou discusses how the EU accession was yet another exception that galvanised Cyprus’ ‘special status’ that is effectively not that special: “… the first EU member country that was ethnically divided; that was represented at EU level exclusively by members of one of the rival ethnic communities; that was partially occupied by the military forces of an EU candidate state; that had the institutional means to apply the acquis communautaire in one part of its territory but not in another; that had a cease-fire line and a buffer-zone manned by UN peacekeepers; and that had one portion of its citizens deprived of the right to their property and residence and another portion of its citizens deprived of the right of access to and participation in the EU economy and EU political institutions. Moreover, Cyprus was the only EU member where its major ethnic communities recognise the EU law while simultaneously rejecting each other’s

\(^{82}\) It is important to note that the wording in the Protocol 10, allaying the purely legalistic approaches to the conflict, adopted a more political approach, where it avoided referring to the north as the ‘occupied areas’, and hence softening the EU’s position on the presence of Turkish military on the island. This indicated that Turkey and Turkish-Cypriots were no longer viewed as the secessionist and obstructionist side, but rather the side that proactively supported reunification. See European Union Treaty of Accession - Protocol no 10: On Cyprus. 12003T/PRO/10, Official Journal of the European Union 23 September 2003. L 236, Volume 46.
law; where its major ethnic communities accept the legitimacy of the EU while rejecting each other’s legitimacy within their own shared island” (Anastasiou 2009:131).

After the referenda, the EU Commissioner for Enlargement Günther Verheugen said, ‘I feel cheated by the Greek Cypriot Government’ (Spiteri 2004). So did Turkish-Cypriots, especially by AKEL. As the disappointment and rejection sank in, so did the feelings of resentment. Turkish-Cypriots took the ‘no’ vote very personally, saying ‘They don’t want us, they still see themselves as real Cypriots and us as the minority’ (See Volkan 2008, Beyatli, Papadopoulou et al. 2011). Turkish-Cypriots’ feelings of rejection and their self-image as an inferior ‘expendable’ ‘minority’ has a long history: They were rented to the British Empire by the Ottomans in 1878; left out of Misak-ı Millî by Atatürk in 1920; pushed into a ‘federal’ solution with the Greek-Cypriots despite their desires for Taksim in 1960; excluded from the negotiations between Greece-Turkey that were based on Enosis with concessions between 1963-1967; UNSC Resolution 186 recognised the legitimacy of the RoC without their representation; they remained unrecognised by the international community; and the EU accepted the RoC’s membership without their representation. This time, they were rejected by the Greek-Cypriots. The irony of them being the ones left out of the EU despite the fact that they accepted the Plan was very traumatic (see Varnava and Faustmann 2009).

Michael notes, “protracted negotiations, gridlocked in perpetual impasse, collapsing under their own weight, had accumulated a reservoir of expectations, disillusionment, and despair” (Michael 2011:108). Over the years, decades long disappointments and rejection exhausted the public faith in a prospective settlement and translated into peace fatigue. It is not uncommon for communities to develop ‘peace-fatigue’ in normalised protracted conflicts, or as Constantinou and Adamides call it, in ‘comfortable conflicts’ (Adamides and Constantinou 2011). What I refer to with ‘peace-fatigue’ is a shift in focus to more mundane and internal problems as people and civil society start feeling disillusioned and disempowered without a tangible achievement at Track 1 level peacemaking efforts. This was a prevalent case.

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83 Misak-ı Millî (meaning National Pact, or National Oath) is the set of six important decisions prepared by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, accepted by the last term of the Ottoman Parliament, that was used as the basis for the new Turkish Republic’s claims in the Treaty of Lausanne and the borders of modern Turkey.
especially among the TCc following the referenda, as they felt that even though they had done everything within their power to change the status quo, a comprehensive settlement was not reached.

Peace fatigue, that is latent with despair and frustration, can also be observed by looking at the gap between ‘desire’ for a solution and ‘expecting’ a solution. For example, opinion polls show that the general population continued to desire a solution in principle but lost hope about the negotiations’ potential for reaching a positive outcome (Lordos, Kaymak et al. 2008). Similarly, according to a survey conducted in 2009, while 69% of Greek-Cypriots and 42% of Turkish-Cypriots stated that they desire a solution, 61% and 58% respectively said they did not expect the peace process to succeed (Cyprus-2015-Initiative 2011). Considering that 65% of Turkish-Cypriots had voted ‘yes’ in the referendum, not only were their expectations curbed but their frustrations suppressed their desires too. As the negotiations failed to bring any change to the status quo people began to disengage from the political process.

The Annan Plan referenda were the closest Cypriots ever got to reunification since the break up of the RoC in 1963. Despite the negative outcome of the referenda, Europeanisation of the conflict and the ‘yes’ campaigns for the Annan Plan provided an unprecedented platform for collaboration, bolstering a collective Cypriot identity and nurturing Cypriotism across the island. As civic participation and activism increased, Turkish-Cypriot civil society matured; partnerships across the divide and more institutionalised CSOs meant more bicomunal projects, more peacebuilding initiatives, politicisation of more young people, and demand for more transparency and accountability especially pertaining to the peacemaking processes. As a result, mainstream Turkish-Cypriot political elite and right-wing parties lost their comfortable positions. As the joint ventures, projects and networks started to grow, and professional and casual interactions across the Green Line became part of daily life, the vision and the future these elites promised no longer matched the new vision of Turkish-Cypriot civil society.

Recognising that something had to be done to improve the status of the Turkish-Cypriots and ‘reward’ their political will and support for reunification, the European Commission (EC) announced a €259 million aid package for the TCc in July 200484. The optimism and hopes were still alive; there was now more room, more leverage and more carrots and sticks to end the isolations of the north and push for a comprehensive settlement within the EU framework. The EU sidestepped the RoC’s demand to administer the aid package by placing its administration under the directorate that dealt with countries negotiating accession. This was the EU’s subtle ‘punishment’ to the RoC for their disappointment over the referenda results. In addition to infrastructural work and support for small businesses, the aid package provided the boost civil society needed to maintain the momentum.

On the other hand, Greek-Cypriot civil society movement in the post-referendum era continued to lack impetus and remained limited to the work of a few marginalised

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84 See the EU regional policy for the aid programme for the Turkish Cypriot community: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/policy/themes/turkish-cypriot-community/
organisations. Charalambous and Ioannou note that even though the bicommmunal initiatives at the societal level experienced a boost due to the increased amount of aid during the early 2000s, this pro-rapprochement rhetoric did not really resonate with the political elite, and it failed to challenge the exclusivist and nationalist rhetoric that reproduced the division based on ethnicity (Charalambous and Ioannou 2015). Mainstream discourse continued to rely on self-victimisation, national pride, Turkish aggressiveness and greed as the main causes of the Cyprus Problem. In Charalambous and Ioannou’s analysis, pro-solution civil-society initiatives remained either marginal with little impact on the political process, or attached themselves to parties and politicians, turning themselves into pressure groups, with limited appeal.

More mobilised and focused civil society movement in the north succeeded in toppling Denktaş’ deep-rooted position as the ‘Turkish Cypriot community leader’. In 2005, CTP leader Mehmet Ali Talat won the presidential elections, obtaining 55.6% of the vote (Kızılyürek 2012). After having been successful in every presidential election since 1975, the victory of another candidate against Denktaş, especially from the left, was a truly historic event. In July 2006, Talat and Papadapoulos started the negotiations again but very little was achieved. In the meantime, many deals and agreements such as the ‘direct trade’ deal were promised and discussed to ease the isolation of Turkish-Cypriots, which outraged the Greek-Cypriot government, as de-linking the embargoes from political recognition, what became known as ‘Taiwanisation’, was not acceptable. These peripheral deals and negotiations apart from the aid packages and the Green Line regulation did not materialise. On the contrary, they added to the disappointment and peace fatigue of Turkish-Cypriots (See Anastasiou 2009). For example, Turkish-Cypriot attempts to secure representation in EU institutions was a political failure. In 2009, Talat demanded from the President of the European Parliament that two of the six Cypriot MEP seats should be left vacant for allocation to Turkish-Cypriots until a solution was reached. However, the Greek-Cypriot officials rejected the request and all six

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85 Green Line Regulation, adopted in 2004, sets out the terms under which persons and goods can cross the dividing line. The original regulation can be found at: http://ec.europa.eu/cyprus/documents/turkish_community/greenline.pdf
In 2015, trade across the Green Line reached around €3.5m compared to €3.4m the previous year. Despite this slight increase, trade remains at a low level due to the scope of the regulation, inconsistencies in its application and other psychological and practical barriers that thwart business deals across the divide. See European Commissions’ Green Line report at: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/activity/tcc/eleventh_report_on_the_implementation_of_council_regulation_ec_8662004_en.pdf
seats were filled by Greek Cypriot candidates (Kaymak 2012). As Anastasiou confirms, these outcomes elated Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot nationalists who had been trying to revive the secessionist agenda, while it alienated the pro-peace forces (Anastasiou 2009).

Optimism was once again restored when Demetris Christofias, leader of AKEL was elected as the new president of the RoC in 2008. Considering the close ties between the two left-wing parties and their explicit Cypriotist stance, this presented a new window of opportunity. Turkish-Cypriots, who blamed Papadopoulos for the failure of the referendum, saw the Christofias and Talat duo as a match made in heaven; not only did the two leaders come from two left-wing parties with similar ideologies and socialist pasts, they were both explicitly pro-unification and pro-federalism. I remember celebrating the election results with my Greek-Cypriot friends; now we no longer had hard-liner nationalists like Papadopoulos and Denktaş leading the peace process, we had a toast for the comprehensive settlement that was just around the corner.

Although the signs were good and both leaders declared they wanted an early solution, they could not agree on a starting point for the negotiations. While Talat wanted to renegotiate the Annan Plan, Greek-Cypriots including AKEL had already rejected it and wanted to start fresh. Two particular characteristics that distinguished this new round of negotiations were ‘indigenisation’ of the Cyprus Problem and merging of ‘core’ and ‘soft’ issues. Firstly, as Michalis Michael notes, a new terminology crept into the peacemaking and peacebuilding mind-set under the rubric of ‘Cypriot-led, Cypriot-owned’ (Michael 2011:196). The so-called indigenisation, that quickly became the guiding principle of the negotiations, rested on the notion that Cypriots had to take full ownership and responsibility of the process, and that the UN and the EU would only play a facilitating role rather than arbitrating. This indigenisation of the process supported the left-wings’, and particularly Christofias and Talat’s ideological adherence to Cypriotism that advocated ‘Cyprus for Cypriots’. Although this notion was intended for empowerment and ownership, and to move away from the feeling that settlement plans have historically been ‘imposed’ on Cyprus, it added to the securitisation of Turkish immigrants and Turkishness, because it established those who identified as Cypriot first and foremost as the gatekeepers of the peace process, and everyone else as outsiders.
In addition to Turkish immigrants being securitised as other-others by both communities, those Cypriots, who identified closer with the national centres and did not fit the peacemaking framework, became other-selves.

Secondly, to move the negotiations forward from the now ‘null and void’ Annan Plan, the two sides adopted an approach that treated ‘core issues’ (i.e. governance, territory, guarantees) and ‘soft issues’ (i.e. confidence building, cultural heritage sites, missing peoples) as co-dependent. Several technical committees (i.e. gender) were established to address day-to-day issues. Recognising that the mediators underestimates the opposition and overestimated the malleability of public opinion, the new round of negotiations with their Cypriot-led approach aimed to promote inclusivity and build constituency for the peace process (Kaymak 2012). Numerous confidence building measures (CBMs) were discussed but only a few were implemented, such as opening more check-points to ease the movement across the Green Line. To a large extent, CBMs remained limited to symbolic gestures and many were shelved despite the opinion polls consistently showing overall support for them (Lordos, Kaymak et al. 2008, Kaymak 2012).

Resumption of fully-fledged negotiations in 2008 did not bring about a significant qualitative change to the peace process. Track 1 level peacemaking and the civil society initiatives remained disconnected, the leaders and technical committees continued to withhold information (i.e. on convergence) and there were no integrated input or public participation mechanism. As a result, not only the bicomunal initiatives lacked legitimacy, but they also lost potency as they remained limited in their outreach. The same group of peace activists that became known as ‘the usual suspects’ or the ‘converted’ continued to work for reunification with little success and little support. As Erol Kaymak suggests, even the technical committees that were supposed to bridge Track 1 with civil society were subordinated to political authority and confidentiality, which means that the technical committee work failed to trickle down into public discourse and achieved very little synergy in cross-fertilising ideas with CSOs (Kaymak 2012). There was practically no tangible constructive progress on the ‘soft’ issues, let alone any convergence on the ‘core’ issues except Talat’s agreement to add ‘single citizenship and sovereignty’ to established parameters based on ‘bizonal, bicomunal
federation with political equality’. This was an important compromise for the Turkish-Cypriot side, but it was not enough to rejuvenate the negotiations. According to Kaymak, the negotiations between Talat and Christofias, “if anything, has led to more alienation than ownership” (Kaymak 2012:107).

While the Turkish-Cypriot left experienced unprecedented success for their identity movement that challenged Turkish nationalism and its policy of ‘Turkification’, this was also partly the reason behind the peace fatigue; when the ‘Common Vision’ based on EU membership and reunification no longer seemed achievable even after the mainstream power holders were somewhat replaced, the left-wing parties and initiatives could neither maintain the civil society momentum nor their own unity as an identity movement. Without this vision and hope, the Turkish-Cypriot left-wing in general and CTP in particular could not vindicate their openings and compromises toward the Greek-Cypriots and on the negotiations table. Consequently, what Kızılyürek calls ‘postnational patriotism’ started losing its allure and appeal (Kızılyürek 2012). Being denied Cypriotness and Europeanness, the Turkish-Cypriots continued to long for a stronger large-group identity that provided them with security-as-being where they could safeguard their distinct identity, and security-as-survival, where they could protect themselves as a minority.

As the negotiations proceeded, the optimistic environment quickly dissipated and the Cyprus Problem continued to fester in a limbo. Frustrations over the Annan Plan, AKEL’s rejection, and Christofias and Talat’s failure to yield anything tangible in the negotiations, turned the ‘spring’ of Turkish-Cypriot civil society into a ‘fall’, and saw the return of the right-wing UBP to the government as the majority party of the coalition following the general elections in 2009, and the election of the UBP leader Derviş Eroğlu as the president in 2010. This showed Turkish-Cypriots’ loss of faith in the peace process and a federal united Cyprus (See Kaymak 2012).

When the RoC started the search for oil and gas within the islands Economic Zone in 2011, Turkey protested that the Turkish-Cypriots had an equal right to these possible resources, and tried to stop search vessels in the Mediterranean. Turkey also refused to open its ports to the
Greek-Cypriot vessels claiming that it did not wish to ‘recognise’\(^{86}\) the RoC prior to a settlement deal. Consequently, the EU halted Turkey’s accession negotiations. The tension thwarted the peace process and churned the exclusive and nationalist narratives once again. For Greek-Cypriots, Turkey was trying to intimidate them again, showing muscle and interfering in their business, and Turkish-Cypriots wanted to keep their half of the island to themselves while at the same time trying to be equal partners in the RoC. For Turkish-Cypriots, Greek-Cypriots were demonstrating how they did not want to share Cyprus and its resources, and how they did not see Turkish-Cypriots as legitimate partners. As such, the positive and vibrant environment could not be maintained post-referenda.

As the peace fatigue set in, continuation of the embargoes and the tension over oil and gas excursions fuelled Turkish-Cypriot perceived injustices. Their lives under isolation on the fringes of the EU did not see them any worse off than before; in fact, life was relatively better due to the EC’s harmonisation programmes and aid. However, every frustration was exacerbated with ‘but we said yes’ rhetoric, every bump and compromise pertaining to the peace process was ‘undeserving’ because ‘we said yes’. The 65% that said ‘yes’ were losing face to the 35% that said ‘no’; they had said ‘yes’ to the ‘enemy’, and still got nothing; they went against the mainstream narrative and denounced their Turkishness, and still got nothing; they were willing to give up land and territory that was won with blood, and still got nothing. No voters had won, not only in the southern part of the island, but also in the north.

Although civil society mobilisation lost momentum and potency, it was temporarily rejuvenated to an extent in 2011 following the discontent with regards to Turkey’s interference in domestic politics and imposed economic reforms. Inspired by the uprisings in the Arab world and the Occupy Movement, what started as a protest against Ankara’s austerity measures to curtail public expenditure quickly descended into a resistance movement against Turkey’s patronage and was also reflected in the Occupy Buffer Zone movement of Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot peace activists\(^{87}\). Anti-Turkey demonstrations

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\(^{86}\) Although there is no Republic of Cyprus Embassy in Ankara and Turkey refers to the Republic of Cyprus government as The Greek Cypriot Administration of South Cyprus’, it is possible to travel to Turkey with a Republic of Cyprus passport, and Greek Cypriot sporting teams and organisations have been represented in events in Turkey under the Republic of Cyprus flag.

\(^{87}\) See http://www.occupybufferzone.info/
organised by the “This Country is Ours Platform” mobilised over 25,000 people in the capital and called for Turkey to ‘f-off’ from Cyprus and for Ankara to take her ‘hands off Turkish-Cypriots’ (Zaman 2011). Such strongly worded banners used at the demonstrations organised around the time of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to the ‘TRNC’ in February 2011 generated a lot of reaction in Turkey and prompted Erdoğan to express his anger by likening Turkish-Cypriots to ungrateful orphan housemaidens/servants that feed on Turkey (Bilge 2011, EurActiv 2011). Erdoğan lambasted Turkish-Cypriots saying they were “fed and maintained by Turkey,” had “no right to hold such protests,” and that Turkey had “martyrs, heroes and strategic interests” in Cyprus (Bahçeli 2011). Demonstrations continued nonetheless, and Erdoğan’s unfortunate expression further fuelled anti-Turkey and anti-Turkish immigrant sentiments in northern Cyprus.

**Figure No 2: Turkish-Cypriot demonstrations (2)**

*Left: February 2011, Demonstrations in Nicosia, north Cyprus. The blue banner uses a Cypriot curse word that translates as “Holy shit” or “we are screwed”. The banner reads: “Were we saved? ...Holy, shit!”. The red caption published by several online newspaper in Turkey reads “Ingrate Cypriots”, which depicts the demonstrators as ungrateful for the ‘generosity of the motherland’ (En Son Haber2011).

*Right: March, 2011, Demonstrations in Nicosia, north Cyprus. The banners from left to right read: “Solution and peace right now”, “No to extinction”, “No more ruled by order”, “AKP take your hands off our throat/collar”, “AKP, Take your hands off”, “No to extinction”, and “Not a hostage of Turkey, not a patching/patch-up to Greek-Cypriots” (Zaman 2011).
The Europeanisation of the conflict has significantly shifted and reconfigured Turkish-Cypriot identity narratives along the lines of Cypriotism. This reconfiguration was further intensified when the AKP government, who were supportive of the Annan Plan, slowly turned away from the EU. As the democratic moderate Islamic image of the AKP government started to fade away, and as the Sunni identity was increasingly highlighted as integral to Turkishness, it became even harder for Turkish-Cypriots to reconcile the two parts of their identity narratives. Similar to Spyrou’s analysis of Turkish-Cypriots being a contradiction in terms for Greek-Cypriots (Spyrou 2001), pro-solution Turkish-Cypriots became half-enemy, half-self to themselves too. Especially following the Istanbul Gezi demonstrations in 2012, Erdoğan’s Islamic agenda was no longer implicit. The no-solution scenario was becoming scarier for Turkish-Cypriots due to their dependence on Turkey. Bottom-up and horizontal securitisation of Turkish immigrants and Turkishness by the Turkish-Cypriot civil society and general public increased as democracy in and the European ambitions of Turkey became more questionable.

Similarly, the economy in the RoC started deteriorating. The economic crisis and the painful bail-out plan of 2012-2013, the catastrophic explosion of 2011 in the village of Mari that cost

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88 http://followwoody.blogspot.co.uk/
the lives of 13 people and blew away most of the RoC’s largest power station combined with the stalemate on the Cyprus Problem weakened AKEL and Christofias’ position as well (See Charalambous and Ioannou 2015). Economic crisis triggered two opposing narratives in the GCc. While one focused on the economic benefits of a prospective solution hence emphasising the need and the sense of urgency for a comprehensive settlement, the other was based more on national pride, that linked the trauma and the ‘destruction’ of the bailout to the events of 1974, arguing that if Greek-Cypriots succeeded in rising from their ashes after the Turkish invasion, they could surely survive the TROIKA’s austerity measures and the crisis (See Triga and Papa 2015). On balance, however, the economic crisis was not directly linked to the Cyprus Problem in the public discourse. As Adamides argues and as can be observed three years after the bailout plan, the overall narrative and the political discourse about the conflict remained mostly unchanged in the GCc and the economic concerns were simply prioritised over the concerns about the Cyprus Problem (Adamides 2014). In other words, the economic crisis was merely ‘disruption’ where the attention was temporarily focused elsewhere.

At the end of 2011, no negotiation dossier was formally or provisionally declared closed and as the RoC assumed the EU presidency in June 2012, the negotiations were once again stalled. In 2013, Nicos Anastasiades, the leader of DISY, a centre-right party that consistently supported reunification and the only party that favoured the Annan Plan, was elected as the new President. The peace talks were reinitiated briefly in early 2014 but were once more postponed to an indefinite time in the future when the president of the RoC withdrew from the negotiations due to the violation of Cyprus’ exclusive economic zone by the Turkish seismic vessel, Barbarous (Anastasiou 2015). The negotiations resumed after the independent left-wing presidential candidate Mustafa Akıncı assumed office in north Cyprus in April 2015. Known for his pro-solution and Turkey defying stance, many accounts consider the Anastasiades and Akıncı duo creates a very favourable environment and that the stars are perfectly aligned this time, bringing the island closer than ever to reaching a comprehensive settlement. Despite the negotiations continuing in a relatively constructive and positive environment and the two leaders declaring 2016 will be the year of ‘peace’ for Cypriots, it is hard to say if Cyprus is any closer to reaching a comprehensive settlement.
Conclusion

Providing a historical and contextual analysis for the case study was an inevitable task for this thesis. However, instead of presenting a factual historical timeline of the key events for the case of Cyprus, Chapters 5 and 6 linked this timeline from 16th Century to 2015 to shifting identity narratives on the island, and tried to unpack the relationship between these narratives, ontological security of Cypriots and the peace process. Thus Part II of this thesis was written in a way to bridge Part I that focuses on the theoretical framework with Part III that provides an empirical analysis based on the fieldwork data. Just as the two chapters in this part shared a single introduction, I will conclude this lengthy historical and contextual part of the thesis with a single conclusion as well.

Chapter 5, starting with the Ottoman period and stretching back to the 16th Century traces how identity narratives that were based on religion (Muslim and non-Muslim) during the Ottoman era became politicised and nationalised along ethnic lines especially during the British rule. The first section of the chapter focuses on key events that were influential in configuring the identity narratives of the two main communities in the mirror image of their respective motherlands, Turkey and Greece. As the two main communities’ desires for the future became increasingly mutually exclusive, the second half of the 20th Century was tainted with inter-communal violence. Subsequently, the second section of Chapter 5 takes the timeline from the establishment of the RoC in 1960 to the division of the island in 1974, looking at how these mutually exclusive desires and identity narratives along with the Cold War dynamics gradually gave birth to what we came to know as the Cyprus Problem.

Especially since the establishment of the RoC, one can only be a Greek-Cypriot or a Turkish-Cypriot in Cyprus. The late TCc leader Rauf Denktaş’ unfortunate and unpopular statement that there are no Cypriots on the island, and that the only true Cypriots are the island’s donkeys living in Karpasia is in fact a legal reality89 (İnanç 2010). As such, the 1960 constitution

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89 The former leader of the Turkish-Cypriot community and the late President of the ‘TRNC’ Denktaş: “I am Child of Anatolia. Everything on me is Turkish. My roots are in Central Asia. I am Turkish in my language, culture and history. My country is my motherland. Cyprus culture, Turkish-Cypriots, Greek Cypriots, a common state, all these are nonsense. The Greek Cypriots are Byzantium, they are Greeks, we are Turks. They have their Greece and we have our Turkey. Why
reified and essentialised identity narratives on the island, conflating religious identity with ethnic identity based on primordial blood relations. Social and political life was then predicated on this distinction, where media outlets, schools, sports clubs and civil service positions were all founded upon this hyphenation. However, at least until 1974, the two main communities’ bonds with their respective motherlands, and their Turkishness/Greekness, although legally imposed for some, shows itself as the dominant primary identity narrative that legitimised their political claims and their exclusive desires for the future.

The ephemerality of the RoC that had three disjointed caretakers (guarantors) can be unpacked with Gidden’s concept of basic trust. Developing a sense of ‘basic trust’ at infancy resembles the inception of collective identities through actions such as nation-building practices or establishing entities that (try to) embody collective identities such as states. The infant, who is on the brink of unimaginable anxiety is called into existence by the environment provided by the caretaker and develops a sense of self in response to the social and material context it experiences (Giddens 1991). For collective identities this environment represents the social and material relations with its neighbours and other collectives in the regional and international arena. The inherent distrust towards the caretakers and their intentions (i.e. Greece, Turkey and the UK), as well as the instability of the domestic social and material environment coupled with the instability of the regional and international environment due to the Cold War dynamics, hampered ‘basic trust’ of the ‘infant’ that was being called into existence. This analysis can help explain, at least partly, why the RoC as the infant could not develop a coherent sense of self that could comfortably accommodate both Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots.

The key turning points for identity reconfiguration in this period until the division of the island can be summarised with the respective traumas of the two communities. For Turkish-Cypriots, their collective trauma was underpinned by a feeling of consistent rejection and dispensability from their large-group and was galvanised with their eleven long years living in the enclaves.

should we live under the same state? We once declared Taksim or death. Now that we are so close to Taksim, why should we choose death? Some people talk about the so-called Turkish-Cypriots or Greek-Cypriots. There are no Turkish-Cypriots, no Greek-Cypriots and no Cypriots. Do not dare to ask us, if we are Cypriots! We would take this as an insult. Why? Because in Cyprus the only thing that is Cypriot is the donkey” (İnanç 2010).
For Greek-Cypriots, their collective trauma was buttressed by a feeling of betrayal from their large-group and enflamed with the Turkish invasion and division of the island. This point in time is where the analysis in Chapter 6 starts.

Since the division of the island, the break away northern part of the island has been administered by the ‘TRNC’, which is not internationally recognised by any state other than Turkey. The RoC, which is internationally recognised as having the sole sovereignty over the island, continues to function with the doctrine of necessity in the absence of Turkish-Cypriots, but effectively only represents the southern part of the island. The analysis in Chapter 6 is located in this legal and political anomaly. The first section explores the post-division era leading up to the civil society mobilisation and Europeanisation of the conflict in the 1990s while the second section explores the period leading up to the Annan Plan referendum. Subsequently, the last section of the chapter moves the discussion forward to post-referendum period that is marked with a prevalent sense of ‘peace fatigue’ and intensifying identity limbo. The chapter illustrates how the peace process and securitisation dynamics create other-others (Turkish immigrants), other-selves (those who do not fit the peacebuilding framework such as the nationalists or ‘no’ voters) and othered-selves (Turkishness in Turkish-Cypriot identity narratives), and how the narrow dual-ethnic approach of the peace process fuels ontological dissonance and thwarts the reconciliation efforts.

The gradual but significant shift from dominant irredentist motherland nationalism towards Cypriotism of the Greek-Cypriot identity narratives which also reconfigured their approach to the conflict is rooted in the events of 1974, and remained mostly resistant to change thereafter. For Turkish-Cypriots, this shift is inherently linked with Europeanisation of the conflict and the failure of the ‘TRNC’ to provide a geographical actuality for their identity narratives. The lack of a geographical actuality still creates existential anxieties for Turkish-Cypriots, who are neither Turkish nor Muslim enough to be/feel part of Turkey, and not Cypriot and European enough to be part of the RoC and the EU.

Although Chapter 6 traces this emerging Cypriotism, it is important to highlight its intrinsic nuances. Two major Cypriotist narratives are exclusivist in their own way. One comes from a
smaller, more marginalised group on the left, who emphasises a distinct Cypriot identity that encompasses both Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots, but also searches for a ‘pure’ and ‘native’ Cypriotness that particularly excludes Turkish immigrants among others that are not deemed ‘Cypriot’ enough. The other that resonates with the majority of Cypriots, amalgamates the ethnic ties with territorial loyalties and distinguishes Cypriotness from motherland nationalism while simultaneously homogenising ‘interests’ into two opposing camps; Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot.

The discussion and key events in Chapter 6 clearly demonstrate that Cypriot identity narratives are both contingent and contextual. Loizides, underlines that the “case of Cyprus supports scholarly perspectives that see identities as constructed and reconstructed as political factors and opportunities change”, and points to the exclusivist nature of the mainstream Cypriotist identity narratives (Loizides 2007:185). He suggests that reassertion of attachment to the ethnic community in the form of Greek-Cypriotism or Turkish-Cypriotism is more than simply a middle ground between ‘motherland nationalism’ and ‘civic Cypriotism’. In other words, ethnic Cypriotism appropriates national symbols and rhetoric from the motherlands but prioritises the aspirations of the respective ethnic communities on the island over the interest of the ‘national centres’ or Cyprus as a whole. “Thus, Greek-Cypriotism and Turkish-Cypriotism take ascendancy in two respective frequently oppositional camps” (Loizides 2007:173). Loizides illustrates this exclusivist Cypriotism using the public response to Papodopoulos’s emotional speech against the Annan Plan in April 2004 that shows a turning point in Greek-Cypriot self-perception: “...while all other ‘glorious moments’ in Greek Cypriot history were celebrated with Greek flags, at the end of Papadopoulos’s speech, individuals spontaneously rushed to the presidential palace waving Cypriot flags, appropriating those as a symbol of Greek-Cypriot identity...” (Loizides 2007:185).

To visualise fluid and shifting identity narratives of the two main communities on the island, we can chart them on a spectrum. On the right end of the spectrum are those Greek-Cypriots/Turkish-Cypriots who see themselves as Greeks/Turks first and foremost, placing little, if any, emphasis on their Cypriot identity. They see themselves as Greeks/Turks who happen to be in Cyprus, just as like Greeks/Turks who happen to live in Crete/Salonika. On the
left end of the spectrum are those who prefer to stress their Cypriotness and they see themselves as culturally and historically tied to the island of Cyprus above all else. For them, Greece/Turkey is a distant and foreign land. However, increasingly since the division of the island most Greek-Cypriots/Turkish-Cypriots fall between the two polar ends. They recognise that they have a Greek/Turkish ancestry and feel a bond, however strong or weak, with Greece/Turkey, but they also see themselves as clearly distinct from Greece/Turkey. They find pride in their Cypriotness and distinct Cypriot dialect, and feel a strong allegiance to their island (Ker-Lindsay 2011). Those in the middle of the spectrum and toward the left end, despite their different ideal solution scenarios, are also those who are most engaged by the peace process on the island.

The review of historical timeline leaves us with the conclusion that since the break up the RoC in 1963, negotiations followed a repetitive cyclical pattern where disagreements on the substantial issues (governance, sovereignty, property, citizenship etc.) saw both sides retreat to their entrenched positions. Effectively, there is a mismatch between what is negotiated and ‘feasible’ at Track 1 level, and what the two main communities desire. A loose federation as Turkish-Cypriots desire creates ontological insecurity for Greek Cypriots as it challenges their self-identity that rests on the whole of Cyprus, its unity as one singular homeland with a Hellenic heritage; the sovereignty disagreements (Turkish-Cypriots prefer sovereignty to emanate from constituent states rather than the federal state) challenge the legitimacy of the RoC and the narrative that is based on righteous legitimate Cypriots victimised by their eternal enemy Turkey, who forcefully took away half of their land. Similarly, a strong federation as Greek-Cypriots desire creates ontological insecurity for Turkish-Cypriots due to their engrained fears about being/becoming a minority; while demands for singular central sovereignty, undermines their heroic struggle based on their self-perception as a community who was refused political equality, pushed out by the majority but bravely resisted, achieving ‘self-determination’ in the end, proving that Cyprus is not Hellenic.

Securitisation of Turkish immigrants and Turkishness turns this insecurity into dissonance both for Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots. Turkish-Cypriots need their Turkishness to have a legitimate claim within the peacebuilding framework and to maintain the narrative that they
need the Turkish military for their security-as-survival among the majority GCc. Yet, their Turkishness is also part of the obstacle to their desired future and associates them with their securitised and orientalised other-other that contradicts their secularism and Europeanness.

As such, it comes as no surprise that national, ethnic and cultural/civic identity is a controversial subject for Cypriots. In fact, I personally find myself ambivalent about my own self-identification. For example, when filling online administrative forms, the drop-down nationality menus provide two options: ‘Cypriot (non-EU)’ and ‘Cypriot (EU)’. These two options pragmatically try to make a legal distinction between those Cypriots who hold a RoC passport and those who only hold a ‘TRNC’ passport without making a reference to ethnicity. However, they also allude to an internalised and stigmatised narrative. Due to recognition issues, the forms avoid referring to the ‘non-European’ side as the ‘TRNC’; instead, the differentiation between Cypriots is made based on ‘Europeanness’. As previously discussed, in parallel with Zarakol’s approach to ‘stigma’, the choice between ‘Cypriot (non-EU)’ and ‘Cypriot (EU)’ becomes a choice between belonging to the more civilised, Westernised and modernised box that refers to the GCc and one that is non-European, backward and oriental that refers to the TCc. As such, Europeanness and Westernisation attributed to those Turkish-Cypriots who hold the RoC passport distances them from the internalised stigma pertaining to Turkishness, but those who do not hold the RoC passport for whatever reason (be it political or due to their or their parents birth place) become non-European or less European.

What is more, the ambivalence ceases to be an administrative tick-box and becomes part of the daily routine every time I go back to Cyprus. For example, when I cross the check-points to travel to the ‘other’ side, I need to queue at the Greek-Cypriot customs booth assigned to Turkish-Cypriots despite the fact that I have an RoC passport; while someone with a Greek sounding name with the same passport can walk through without queuing; my name designates me as a Turkish-Cypriot even though I carry the same piece of identification document produced by the same institution. When I first moved back to Cyprus in 2006, I used to challenge the border guards and customs officers because I considered queuing at the booth assigned to Turkish-Cypriots an arbitrary meaningless act and an imposition upon my self-identity. However, and may be unfortunately, crossing the check-points on a daily basis
became part of my routine, and arbitrary impositions and daily frustrations stemming from the Cyprus Problem became part of that routine. Ironically, working for peacebuilding projects meant that my daily routine was integrated into the conflict and visa-versa; making it all a normalised part of ‘reality’. I stopped challenging the border guards and the customs officers; I stopped questioning the connotations of me, with a non-Greek sounding name queuing to cross to the RoC, while my friend Katerina, holding the same passport, just walking through.
Part III Empirical Analysis of Identity Narratives: Is Peace an insecure experience?

Chapter 7. Securitisation Dynamics and Identity narratives in the Turkish-Cypriot Community

7.1 Introduction

“Yurdunu sevmeliymiş insan şöyle diyor hep babam
benim yurdum ikiye bölünmüş ortasından hangi yarısını sevmeli insan” (Yasin 1979)

“It is easy to want peace but not always easy to imagine it. Imagining peace in protracted conflicts means re-imagining the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ in an uncertain future. Peace is conditional, depending on the fears and anxieties of the island’s two main communities, and these fears and anxieties are by no means static and homogeneous. Even though Cyprus’ two main communities can freely travel across the check-points and have increased interactions since 2003, recent generations of children still grow up learning about their existential enemy that lives next door, across the Green Line. They created an image for themselves that depended on the image of the enemy; where all internal was good and just, and all external was bad and evil. Peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts challenge this image, and hence challenge the reification of self-identities, as just and moral. However, perceptions of threat and security in Cyprus extend beyond the primary self/other (Turkish-Cypriot/Greek-Cypriot) relationships that the peacebuilding efforts focus on, and include other-others, other-selves and othered-selves

The belief that Turkey is encouraging immigration to change the island’s demographic balance, and to distort the democratic will of the ‘indigenous’, ‘real’ Turkish-Cypriots is prevalent among both the Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots (see Hatay 2005). The ‘Turkish settlers issue’, that is technically and legally different than an ‘immigrant’ or a ‘refugee’ issue,

90 My own translation
is indistinguishable in the narratives and consciousness of Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots. The perception of threat this group poses is widespread irrespective of their legal status. Even though on a theoretical level, individuals may recognise these distinctions, in daily routines and interactions, these become negligible. As such, Cypriots generally refer to this group with the essentialised all-inclusive categorical term ‘Türkiyeliler’ in Turkish, meaning people from Turkey and ‘έποικοι’ in Greek, meaning settlers. This essentialised group includes everyone from Turkey; irrespective of whether they are Kurds or Shi’is, came to the island in 1974 or yesterday, students, businesspeople or military personnel, or whether they are working with or without work permits.

Hatay argues that the debates and gross exaggerations about the number of Turkish immigrants are one of the main reasons behind the Greek-Cypriots’ ‘no’ vote in the referendum (Hatay 2005). For instance, the myths about the number of Turkish immigrants in northern Cyprus range from 150,000 to 700,000 depending on the accounts (see Hatay 2007, Faiz 2008, Kurtulus and Purkis 2012, Soyalan 2013). The uncertainty about their numbers only enhances suspicion and anxiety about the issue, and feeds into the conspiracy (or not) about Turkey’s demographic engineering plans. Even though the official census and demographic studies carried out by Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) suggest the numbers are heavily exaggerated, the statistics are irrelevant to the perceived threats and feelings of fear and anxiety (Rosello 2001:18). An interview quote from Mahmut Anayasa, the author of the book ‘İsyanım İşgale’ (My Rebellion is Against the Occupation) can illustrate this further:

“We are being suffocated in the lands where we were born. I believe that there are at least 700,000 people in this country. Why should I pay attention to the delirious statements of the State Planning Organisation⁹¹? Whether it is de jure or de facto does not concern me. What concerns me is the street. Because the street does not lie. ... Am I in the minority? Yes!”⁹² (Soyalan 2013).

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⁹¹ State Planning Organisation is the ‘TRNC’ department that carries out censuses among other things.
The importance of demography impacts upon Turkish-Cypriots’ consciousness and incites fears about their existence and anxieties about their biographical continuity, which are intensified by the increasingly authoritarian and Islamicised direction of Turkey. Even though their securitisation by the GCc is unsurprising considering the island’s history and that of Greece-Turkey, where similar enemy-other constructions exist, it is particularly interesting to explore the securitisation of this group by Turkish-Cypriots despite their shared ethnicity, language and religion. Securitisation that shows itself in xenophobia, discrimination and social polarisation also impacts upon the Turkish immigrants’ ability to integrate, to claim basic rights, and their sense of certainty about the future.

Drawing on the fieldwork data carried out in 2014-2015 and enriching it with secondary data sets stretching back to 2008, this chapter unpacks the securitisation dynamics between Turkish-Cypriots and Turkish immigrants, how this impacts the peace processes and how it relates to Turkish-Cypriots’ anxieties about their current situation and future. The empirical evidence presented demonstrates four interesting findings: 1) **Turkish-Cypriots are becoming more Cypriot and less motherland centric**; 2) **Turkish-Cypriots’ feelings of Cypriotness and perceived levels of threat posed by Turkish immigrants have a positive relationship**; 3) **Turkish-Cypriots who prioritise their Cypriotness feel higher levels of threat to their identity and also feel more anxiety about their current situation**; 4) **Higher levels of anxiety about their current situation intensifies the desires for a comprehensive settlement but does not make compromise easier due to ontological dissonance**. Thus, feelings and expression of Cypriotness, securitisation of Turkish immigrants as the other-other, Turkishness as the othered-self and anxiety about the future and desire for a solution seem to go hand in hand. However, when the primary other, that is the generalised Greek-Cypriot majority on the island, is added to the equation, we can observe ontological dissonance as accommodation of Turkishness and Cypriotness along with peace-anxieties becomes too difficult to manage.

The chapter first maps the securitisation of Turkish immigrants and the growth of Cypriotism among the TCc and explores how Turkish-Cypriots differentiate themselves from people from Turkey and how this translates into representations of fear and danger. The chapter then delves deeper into these expressions and feelings of fear and anxiety, and analyses the
reasons behind Turkish-Cypriots’ prevalent concerns about existence and extinction by exploring the response of the other(s) and the concept of ‘home’. The penultimate section of the chapter inserts the other-selves into the analysis in addition to other-others and othered-selves and scrutinises the inherent fears and anxieties by drawing parallels between Northern Ireland93 and the Åland Islands94. Lastly, suggesting that the exclusion of Turkish immigrants from the peace process and their securitisation creates ontological dissonance, the chapter concludes that institutionalised desecuritisation strategies of Turkishness can provide a way out of the vicious cycle. Moreover it suggests that such a move will allow Turkish-Cypriots to find comfort in their in-betweenness and escape the limbo where they simultaneously securitise the part of their identity that legitimises their claims for their desired future, and hence facilitate transformative peace.

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93 The Good Friday Agreement can be considered as one of the rare success stories in peacebuilding literature. An interesting parallel can be drawn between varying and shifting identity narratives in Northern Ireland and Cyprus, where the peacebuilding framework has inadvertently created gatekeepers and dissidents of peace.

94 The Åland Islands consists of an archipelago at the entrance to the Gulf of Bothnia in the Baltic Sea. It is autonomous, demilitarised and is the only monolingually Swedish-speaking region in Finland. The Åland crisis was one of the first issues put up for arbitration by the League of Nations when the Swedish speaking Ålandars demanded self-determination in 1921. However, sovereignty over the islands was retained by Finland but international guarantees were given to allow the population to pursue its own culture to address the perceived threat of forced assimilation by Finnish culture. The case of Ålandars, their desires for unification with Sweden and their association and distinctiveness with Finland has parallels with the case of Cyprus.
7.2 Motherland No More: The self

The arrival of Turkish settlers and migrants to north Cyprus began in 1974. In 1974, Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot administration entered into an agreement called the Agricultural Labour Force Agreement (ITEM) to facilitate the settlement of approximately 30,000 people from rural Turkey to recreate the economy of the island and Turkify the demographics as Turkish-Cypriots ended up with 37% of the territories when their population was only 18% after the division of the island (Hatay 2008). Those immigrants who were part of this policy received empty Greek-Cypriot properties and citizenship in the new Turkish-Cypriot ‘state’ almost upon arrival (ITEM 1977). This facilitated the migration of people from Turkey until the late 1970s, and it is this group that is mainly referred to as the ‘settlers’. Migrants who continued to arrive after the ITEM agreement mainly came in search of a better life without specific incentives, or included groups such as Kurds and Shi’as running away from persecution in Turkey.

Up until the late 1990s Turkish-Cypriots’ identity was mainly defined along ethnic and national lines emphasising their cultural and historical links with Turkey and Turkishness. The emphasis on their Turkishness legitimised their claims to political equality, self-determination and autonomy on the island and justified their resistance against Greek-Cypriots. Turkishness was the part of their identity that linked them to a much stronger large-group that could defend them against the ‘aggressive’ Greek-Cypriot majority. It was the involvement and protection of Turkey, and Cyprus’ perceived political, historical and geographic tie and significance to Anatolia that elevated their minority status to that of an equal partner on the island. However, the initial honeymoon period with Turkey proved to be ephemeral. After experiencing an initial boost of ‘we-ness’, fuelled by nationalistic feelings and excitement over ‘being free’, splits began to appear clearly in north Cyprus during the years following 1974. The rural background, clothing and lack of education of the migrants provided the host community with grounds for prejudice and discrimination, who had developed a culture that was distinct from the ‘mainlanders’ as a result of their intermingling with Greek-Cypriots and accustomed way of living under the British Empire. As their frustration with isolation and non-recognition grew and with the Europeanisation of the conflict in late 1990s, the prospect of a
large-group European identity seemed not only more achievable but also more desirable. Turkishness was no longer a large-group that could provide them safety and security; so, Turkish-Cypriots moved closer to the Cypriot part of their identity.

The securitisation of Turkish immigrants can be traced back to late 1980s and early 1990s, but this was mainly a marginalised effort limited to (far) left-wing individuals and activists, who were easily labelled as traitors, as ‘Greek-seeds’ or as communists; while some were assassinated, the others’ voice was drowned out by the dominant mainstream motherland nationalism of the political elite. Every time the opposition leaders, poets and writers were attacked and branded as ‘traitors’ by the nationalists, they became more Cypriot because they saw these attacks as either initiated or supported by Turkey (Hatay 2008). Consequently, anything that appeared to praise Turkey and almost anything Turkish became an object of hostility and a symbol of oppression. The left-leaning groups mobilised in opposition to the right-wing, or in opposition to Taksim or ‘TRNC’, but they were also united by a sense of difference from the Turkish settlers (Hatay 2008). Despite the mainstream nationalist narrative that positioned ‘Turks of Cyprus’ in opposition to ‘Greeks of Cyprus’ and dominated the discourse especially until the early 2000s (until the demise of Denktaş), the securitisation process that initially started among the left-leaning Turkish-Cypriots, gradually spread horizontally and bottom-up across the populace. Today, despite the acknowledgment of kinship, the comparison of the fieldwork data carried out in 2014 to the Cyprus-2015-Initiative surveys shows that Turkish-Cypriots are moving away from motherland-centrism and increasingly prioritising their Cypriotness over their Turkishness (Cyprus-2015 Initiative 2009, 2010, 2011, QTS:2014). As such, while over 96% of Turkish-Cypriots stated that they consider Cyprus as their motherland, those who consider Turkey as their motherland decreased from 78% to 69% in the past 6 years.

95 A derogatory phrase indicating that they have Greek DNA in them, and that they are not Turkish enough and implying that their mothers had bed with the enemy.
96 Cyprus-2015-Initiative survey sample was based on stratified random sampling of 1000 Turkish-Cypriot with ‘TRNC’ citizenship. Thesis fieldwork survey sample was based on stratified random sampling of 500 Turkish-Cypriots with ‘TRNC’ citizenship. The survey company that carried out both surveys was the same, thus these datasets are highly compatible for comparative analysis.
Furthermore, a growing sense of Cypriotism in the TCc is clearly visible from the temporal analysis of the quantitative data, whereby those who identified themselves as only/mostly a Turk significantly dropped from 24% to 8% and those who identified as only/mostly a Cypriot increased from 20% to 28% (Cyprus-2015 Initiative 2009, 2010, 2011, QTS:2014).

97 The slight increase in the expression of ethnic identities and motherland centrism between 2009 and 2011 can also be observed in the Greek-Cypriot community. Looking at the timeline of events, this increase can be explained by three key factors: 1) The confrontation between the RoC and Turkey over the natural gas excursions and Turkish-Cypriots’ claim that any natural resources found in the EEZ of Cyprus belonged to both communities; 2) The return of the right-wing government in the Turkish Cypriot community and the pessimism pertaining to the Track 1 level negotiations; and 3) The global economic crisis.
As the number of the migrants increased over the years, Turkish-Cypriot identity felt under attack reinforcing a feeling of security-as-survival and ontological insecurity regarding their biographical continuity as a distinct identity. It is important to note that this securitisation of Turkish immigrants is different than the blatant xenophobia against migrants in general that can be observed in other parts of Europe (see Huysmans 2000). The securitisation is not only economic (about cheap labour and infrastructure), or social (about social cohesion and a fear of different ethnicities/religions), but it is also political (about Turkish-Cypriots own political will and empowerment linked to past traumas about being a minority) and existential (about their biographical continuity and oblivion/extinction). For example, 56% of civil society representatives disagreed with the statement that “People from Turkey are no different than other migrants in Cyprus” (CSOS-TCc:2014). While trying to balance their opinions and feelings with a more humanistic attitude toward immigrants in general, many civil society representatives elaborated that the social and cultural differences with the Turkish immigrants posed a threat to their society and identity, and that they were scared of assimilation, often choosing the word ‘extinction’ to express their feelings. They also strongly differentiated**98** themselves from the category of ‘mainland Turk’ (CSOS-TCc:2014).

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98 20 out of 60 respondents stated that they perceived more identity similarities with Greek-Cypriots than Turks and 23 emphasised their differences compared to Turks, while 27 acknowledged both their differences and similarities compared to both groups.
“Even though Turkish-Cypriots have historical, linguistic and cultural ties with Turkey, they have cultivated a distinct community for themselves. They adopted a more tolerant and open lifestyle, and welcomed modernisation movements without a conservative reaction [like in Turkey]. This more open and tolerant approach allowed different religious identities to coexist on the island. We share the same geography and hence same geographical characteristics with Greek-Cypriots. Although we have religious and linguistic differences, our genetics and DNA analysis would show more familial ties. Plus, we both carry Mediterranean characteristics and a common cultural identity.” (Anonymous, Cyprus Turkish Teachers Union)

In addition to emphasising distinctiveness based on lifestyle and culture, Turkish-Cypriots also emphasise their somewhat agnostic approach to religion as an important element in their self-image. Ali Erel, voiced his ambivalence of being a Turkish-Cypriot during an informal communication in November 2013; “Turkish-Cypriots are under more pressure than ever to become better Turks and most of all, better Muslims”. Similar opinions about religion were also raised by civil society representatives (CSOS-TCc:2014):

“Culture wise I feel different from Turkey and with Erdoğan's politics I feel that in the future I might feel completely different in every aspect. I perceive myself more familiar to Greek-Cypriots but religion is creating a huge gap.” (Nilay Bilsel, The International Network for Traditional Building, Architecture & Urbanism)

Considering the paternal relationship and dependence on Turkey, the processes of securitisation that is prevalent among civil society and the general public is neither translated into the official discourse of the government in north Cyprus or into emergency measures, nor is it negotiated into the mandates of the security professionals (i.e. stricter migration control and regulations, more border policing or a shift in entrance/visa requirements for people from Turkey). Hence, the bottom-up securitisation attempts of civil society and the general public

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99 Author’s own translation.
100 Ali Erel is the former chair of the Cyprus Turkish Chamber of Commerce, former president of Cyprus EU Association and the former president of the Solution and EU Party (ÇAP).
who express fears about their existence and anxiety about their future move horizontally from civil society to the general public and vice versa with increased pessimism and desperation about their current conditions. This shows itself in increased discrimination and xenophobia toward people from Turkey and the bottom-up and horizontal reproduction of the sense of insecurity and victimhood. In their extensive research on experiences of the Turkish immigrants in north Cyprus, Kurtuluş and Purkis confirm that Turkish-Cypriots’ discontent about their present situation, their self-victimisation as a small vulnerable community that was first oppressed by Greek-Cypriots and now by Turkey, is reflected in the increased marginalisation of the Turkish migrants (Kurtulus and Purkis 2012). The perceived differences between Turkish-Cypriots and Turkish immigrants that are translated into a securitised relationship of othering are also corroborated by the focus group participants. Neşe101, a guidance teacher at a public high school, who was born in Cyprus to Turkish immigrant parents, gave vivid examples of discrimination in education institutions (FG2-N:2015):

“... I work in a public school, and we have very few dual citizens, the majority of the students are from Turkey. And when Cypriots come to enrol their kids, they request [from teachers and the school administration] their kids to be assigned to an all-Cypriot classroom. ... We have purely Cypriot classrooms with some dual citizens, and purely Turkish classrooms. ...We end up with ‘iPhone classrooms’ [Cypriots] and ‘nothing classrooms’ [migrant students].102"

Similarly, Ahmet, a high school teacher, who came to Cyprus in 1975 voiced his exasperation on the indifference of the political leaders to recognise increased polarisation between the two groups (FG1-F:2015):

“Politicians don’t address societal marginalisation and discrimination, they deny it. In order to address it, they have to accept that it exists... Just like Turkey denied the Kurdish problem and considered it solely economic, they deny that there is a problem between Cypriots and Turkish people...103”

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101 Please note that the participant names have been changed for anonymity.
102 Author’s own translation of the focus group transcripts.
103 Author’s own translation of the focus group transcripts.
Many focus group participants also highlighted their amplified sense of marginalisation due to not being able to cross to the southern part of the island. For example, Demir, a businessperson married to a Turkish-Cypriot, who came to Cyprus in 1996, expressed his anger and anxiety about the opening of the check-points, despite the fact that he, himself can cross with his marriage certificate:

“It makes me anxious. A Russian, a Bulgarian, a Greek [repeating the word ‘Greek’ with a slightly detestable emphasis], can cross really nicely, they also fly to Turkey from the north. Because the Republic of Cyprus is a smart government and ours is stupid. That is why our youth got snobbish [referring to Turkish-Cypriots who can cross]. … Once, the son of this patisserie that I always go to looked me in the eye… and told me ‘you will leave from this island ‘be fellah’104’. I said ‘what did you do for this country to have the right to kick me out? … I am from here, my children, my wife is from here, my future is here’. When the check-points were opened, when CTP came to power, they negotiated on us at the table. When they received a ‘higher’ status [referring to RoC citizenship], they said that we had to leave. …We will face more discrimination and nationalism [Cypriotism] after a solution, but I still respect CTP’s pro-solution stance, they are defending their own land.105”

In their study titled “Cypriot Perceptions of Turkey”, Bryant and Yakinthou explore the nature of the increasingly tense relations between Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriots. Noting that Turkish-Cypriots came to know Turkey more closely after 1974, they contend that the Turkey with whose fate Turkish-Cypriots were now entangled was not the Turkey of their imaginations, “…pushing them into further reliance on a state whose behaviour towards the island seemed increasingly to blur the boundaries of protectorate and province” (Bryant and Yakinthou 2012:10). The Cyprus Problem itself, neither achieving recognition nor realising their demonstrated political will for a federation in the 2004 referendum left Turkish-Cypriots in an ontological limbo as the ambiguities about identity, the future, and their sense of

104 ‘Be’ in Turkish and ‘Re’ in Greek is a slang sound used to call or refer to people without using their name, similar to ‘Oi’. ‘Fellah’ directly translates as peasant but is exclusively used for people from Turkey that scorns their appearance and clothing.
105 Author’s own translation of the focus group transcripts from Turkish to English. Emphasis added.
belonging, and frustrations about their control over their own fate has created anxieties at multiple fronts. As a result, the relationship that many Turkish-Cypriots have long described as ‘familial’ and ‘organic’, and the image of Turkey as the ‘saviour’ has increasingly begun to seem paternalistic and colonial.

Comparably, Kurtuluş and Purkis confirm this generalised imprecise categorisation of the ‘Turkish immigrant’ as the agents of the ‘coloniser’ who are taking away Turkish-Cypriots’ future, culture, political will and their distinct identity (Kurtulus and Purkis 2012). Turkish-Cypriots often define this relationship and their anxiety with words and phrases such as ‘incest’, ‘assimilation’, ‘cultural erosion’, ‘demographic engineering’, ‘demographic danger’ and ‘extinction’ (see Bryant and Yakinthou 2012). A survey carried out by Hüseyin Çakal at the University of Oxford confirms that Turkish-Cypriots perceive threats from two main out-groups, Turks and Greek-Cypriots (Çakal 2013). According to the study, Turkish-Cypriots report higher levels of threat posed by Turks than by Greek-Cypriots to their political power and economic resources as well as social values, traditions and cultural practices (Çakal 2013). Accordingly, both quantitative survey results and civil society survey responses show that Turkish-Cypriots place Turkish immigrants at the centre of the Cyprus Problem and see them as a threat to their Cypriotness.

Empirical evidence suggests that securitisation of Turkish immigrants and Turkishness intensifies the desires for a comprehensive settlement for Turkish-Cypriots by reinforcing and reproducing their distinct Cypriot identity. Those who emphasise the Cypriot part of their identity express more fears about their existence and feel more anxiety about their biographical continuity; and those who perceive more threats from Turks evaluate their current situation more negatively and express more anxiety about the status quo. Overall, respondents express higher levels of anxiety about their current situation and the prospect of being stuck in a stalemate scenario, compared to anxiety about reaching a comprehensive settlement. For example, civil society representatives clearly articulate their anxieties about their current situation (CSOS-TCc:2014):

“The uncertainty of the future makes it uneasy to live. The plans you make seem irrelevant.” (Aris Denis Terziyan, North Cyprus Hoteliers Association)
“My biggest fear is the formal division of the island and the annexation of the northern part to Turkey. Needless to say, my only hope is a settlement and a democratic, multicultural, tolerant country. ... The possibility of no solution makes me anxious for two reasons: Firstly I don't think the non-recognised state of ours is sustainable, ...the only way out of this mess is to be in an internationally recognised body. Secondly, living in such a small country with so many armies and arms is unacceptable for me.” (Derya Beyatlı, KAB and CMIRS)

“Possibility of no solution makes me anxious in all ways... Without a solution I don't beleive I have a future in Cyprus.” (Kani Kanol, HASDER Folk Art Foundation)

“... With no solution we face a myriad of problems including the very real threat of assimilation with Turkey, job insecurities and losing what is left of Cypriotness.” (Anonymous, Cyprus Community Media Centre (CCMC))

The quantitative data corroborates that the feelings of anxiety voiced by civil society is shared across the community. The first table below shows the relationship between Cypriotness and perception of existential threats, illustrating that the more Cypriot Turkish-Cypriots identify themselves the more insecure they feel about their identity. The second table shows the relationship between anxieties about no-solution and fears about extinction, illustrating that those who perceive more threats from people from Turkey also feel more anxiety about the status quo. To confirm the dependence between both values, the chi-square test is used. The chi-square test statistically assesses the goodness of fit between a set of observed values. A chi value that is less than 0,5% confirms a meaningful relationship for the observed values and theoretical assumptions. The chi-values calculated below confirm this positive relationship and dependence between the two statements. As such, 59% of those who express fears about ‘extinction’ identified themselves as Cypriot and Turkish to the same degree compared to only 6% who identified themselves as mostly Turk or only Turk; and 83% of those who express
anxiety about the current status quo expressed fears about ‘extinction’ due to growing numbers of Turkish immigrants (QTS:2014).

**Table No 7: Cross-tabulation between Turkish-Cypriot fears about extinction and self-identity**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q10.6 I fear that Turkish-Cypriot identity is becoming extinct due to the growing numbers of people from Turkish in the north</th>
<th>Q2. In terms of national and cultural identity, how would you self-identify yourself?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Only a Turk, not at all Cypriot / Mostly a Turk and somewhat Cypriot</td>
<td>Only a Cypriot not at all Turk / Mostly a Cypriot and somewhat Turk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly/ Somewhat disagree</td>
<td>count</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>16.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>count</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>8.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly/ Somewhat agree</td>
<td>count</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>5.49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>count</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-Square Tests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31,158a</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N of Valid Cases

| 483 |

**Table No 8: Cross-tabulation between Turkish-Cypriot fears about extinction and anxieties about the status quo**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q10.6 I fear that Turkish-Cypriot identity is becoming extinct due to the growing numbers of people from Turkish in the north</th>
<th>Q10.4 The prospect of being stuck in a stalemate with regards to a settlement makes me anxious</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly/ Somewhat disagree</td>
<td>Strongly/ Somewhat disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>count</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>29.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>count</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>20.31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly/ Somewhat agree</td>
<td>count</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>10.99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>count</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Nevertheless, securitisation of Turkish immigrants that intensify the desires for a solution does not make compromise any easier. On the one hand, Turkish-Cypriots, who perceive higher levels of threat from Greek-Cypriots tend to evaluate Turks more positively, but perception of threats from Turks do not necessarily influence their evaluations of Greek-Cypriots, especially for those who have right-wing convictions (Cakal 2013). On the other hand, Turkish-Cypriots need their Turkishness for political legitimacy and claims on the negotiation table, and they demand Turkey’s guarantorship and military presence to address their insecurities among a Greek-Cypriot majority. It is interesting to note that Turkish Cypriots’ responses about their Turkishness and Cypriotness vary depending on whether the same question\textsuperscript{106} is asked within the context of the Cyprus Problem or disconnected from it. For instance, the same question asked by the New Cyprus Association survey, disconnected from the Cyprus Problem demonstrates a steep increase in the number of people identifying themselves as only Cypriot, where they heavily underplay their ethnic identity\textsuperscript{107}. When asked within the context of the Cyprus Problem, respondents tend to resort to ‘official’ categorisations that provide legitimacy for their political claims (Pollis 1996).

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Chi-Square Tests} &  &  \\
\hline
\textbf{Pearson Chi-Square} & \textbf{Value} & \textbf{df} & \textbf{Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)} \\
\hline
\textbf{N of Valid Cases} & 75,711$^a$ & 16 & ,000 \\
488 &  \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{106} How you identify yourself? Mostly Turkish, Only Turkish, Equally Turkish and Cypriot, Mostly Cypriot, Only Cypriot.
\textsuperscript{107} The same trend can be observed among the Greek-Cypriot community to a lesser extent. This is mainly due to the fact that Greek-Cypriots do not have legitimacy and recognition concerns pertaining to their Cypriotness as they are the legitimate, recognised representatives of the RoC. While the expression of Cypriotness (mostly/only Cypriot) rises from 28% to 88% among the Turkish-Cypriot community when the question is disconnected from the Cyprus Problem, this increase is less drastic among the Greek-Cypriot community, where the rise is from 41% to 57% (QTS:2014)
Consequently, the securitisation of Turkishness that contradicts their identity narratives based on Greek-Cypriots being their primary enemy other, their anxieties about their biographical continuity and the future, and what they are willing to compromise to get to that desired end creates dissonance. As such, while Turkish-Cypriots perceive a comprehensive settlement a salvation to their Cypriotness from the threatening Turkish immigrants and Turkey, they call on Turkey and their Turkishness to secure their political equality and maintain their distinctiveness from majority Greek-Cypriots. Civil society representatives express their anxieties about both solution and no-solution scenarios (CSOS-TCc:2014):

“Both make me anxious. No solution means more tension and more unclear relations and divisions. Also the more we live without a solution the more tight connection to Turkey the north will have. I am anxious about a solution because I see a lot of deep racism from the GC population and very weak reconciliation strategies.” (Anonymous, Gender and Minorities Institute)
“The prospect of a solution makes me anxious because I'm afraid that the agreement will not be along the lines of a win-win situation, but one where one side will lose out. ...The possibility of no solution is even scarier as the way things are now did not and will not work for the local community, another win-lose situation.” (Anonymous, MAGEM – Famagusta Youth Centre)

We can observe this discrepancy in the Turkish-Cypriots’ trust towards the Turkish military as well. Even though they see Turkish immigrants as a danger to their distinct identity and as an obstacle to their desired future, they continue to rationalise their need for the Turkish military and cultivate trust for this institution. Insisting on Turkey’s guarantorship or rejecting the withdrawal of the Turkish military after a solution is one of the major issues that draw the negotiations to an impasse, which subsequently exacerbates Turkish-Cypriots’ anxieties about their current situation and the future. According to the Democracy Index Report of 2011 published by the CMIRS, a think-tank established in the northern part of Nicosia, when asked about their trust towards different institutions108, 86% of Turkish-Cypriots stated that they trust the military (Elmas 11 March 2012). This data is consistent both with the Cyprus-2015-Initiative survey, where 90% asserted that they trust the armed forces and the fieldwork data, where Turkish military comes on top as the most trustworthy institution (Cyprus-2015-Initiative 2011).

**Chart No 5: Levels of trust in institutions (QTS:2014)**

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108 Such as the police, judiciary, government, military, media, parliament, political parties, civil society and the president.
Furthermore, the fieldwork data shows that 48% of Turkish-Cypriots agree with the statement that the prospect of living next to a Greek-Cypriot makes them anxious, which can be attributed to their minority complex. However, compared to 71%, who voice anxiety about being stuck in a stalemate with regards to the Cyprus Problem, only 39% of Turkish-Cypriots voice anxiety about reaching a comprehensive settlement\(^\text{109}\) (QTS:2014). Yet, this is not making compromise any easier in terms of accommodating Greek-Cypriots’ insecurities pertaining to the Turkish immigrants and the military. According to the Cyprus-2015-Initiative survey regarding the specifics of any potential agreement, the 57% of Turkish-Cypriots found the statement “the rights of intervention by Turkey or Greece should be abolished” entirely unacceptable (Cyprus-2015-Initiative 2011). In response to the same question, 53% of Turkish-Cypriots thought exclusion of military intervention from the right of intervention by Turkey or Greece was entirely unacceptable. Nonetheless, the table below shows that Turkish-Cypriots are most anxious about the current stalemate situation\(^\text{110}\), and even though they also express anxiety about living next to Greek-Cypriots, looking at their relative peace-anxieties and their increased emphasis on Cypriotness, it can be argued that the urgency and desire for a negotiated settlement is high among the TCc.

![Chart No 6: Turkish-Cypriot anxieties (QTS:2014)](chart)

Turkish-Cypriots’ ontological dissonance arises from the fact that the potential measures to protect their distinct Cypriot identity challenges their historical narratives and simultaneously

\(^{109}\) The 39%, who express peace-anxieties are in line with the 35% of Turkish-Cypriots who said ‘no’ to the Annan Plan referendum.

\(^{110}\) Compared to 61%, who said they were not content with the status quo, only 24% of Turkish-Cypriots stated that they were.
triggers insecurity-as-survival. For instance measures that could facilitate a peace agreement and hence help reinforce their Cypriotness such as severing ties with Turkey, accepting repatriation of the Turkish immigrants back to Turkey or ending Turkey’s guarantorship and military presence simultaneously challenge their sense of physical security among the Greek-Cypriot majority and their historical narrative emphasising that “they would have perished without the presence of the United Nations Peace-keeping force and without the political and military interference of Turkey” (Volkan 2008:97).

Therefore, we can see the more Cypriot Turkish-Cypriots become, the more they perceive Turkish immigrants and Turkishness as a threat to their identity, and the more they securitise Turkish immigrants the more anxious they feel about their current situation. Europeanisation of the Cyprus Problem and the opening of the check-points intensified the securitisation of this group by reinforcing and reproducing Turkish-Cypriots European and Cypriot identity. Hence, securitisation of this group cannot be separated from the Cyprus Problem and the peace process. It needs to be understood both within the historical context and people’s vision and desires about the future and analysed within both security-as-survival and security-as-being perspectives. As such, anxieties about existence and extinction, fears about becoming a minority and losing control over their own political will and destiny, and fears and anxieties about a potential settlement are all interwoven delicately and equivocally in Turkish-Cypriots narratives as well as their daily interactions and routines. Thus, Turkish-Cypriots are finding their limbo between Cypriotioness, Turkishness, Muslimness, Europeaness very uncomfortable to accommodate in their self-image. Irem, a high school teacher, articulates her view of the Turkish-Cypriots’ identity limbo rather well (FG1-F:2015):

“Turkish-Cypriots did not have to fight for a distinct identity like Kurds, they are not simply Turkish like us, they have a big identity dilemma. What will they become after a solution? They don’t know where they belong, they don’t know who they are... I think this is a big problem.”112

111 Almost 30% of Turkish-Cypriots who participated in the quantitative survey asserted that they either feel more Cypriot or more European, while 65% said they feel the same.
112 Author’s own translation of the focus group transcripts from Turkish to English.
7.3 Home, Hospitality and Extinction: The other-others

Empirical data explicitly illustrates Turkish-Cypriots’ heightened feelings about being overwhelmed by the people from Turkey. According to the quantitative survey, 89% of Turkish-Cypriots think that there are too many people from Turkey, and 37% believe that they pose an obstacle to reaching a settlement\(^{113}\) (QTS:2014). This data is consistent with the civil society representative survey and the past surveys carried out by different organisations. For example, compared to the Cyprus-2015-Initiative survey, where 75% of the Turkish-Cypriots stated there are too many people from Turkey, we can see a 14% increase in people who are feeling overwhelmed by the number of Turkish migrants (Cyprus-2015-Initiative 2011). Similarly, a majority of the civil society representatives also shared the belief that there were too many people from Turkey in north Cyprus (80%) (CSOS-TCc:2014). In addition, the Cyprus CIVICUS survey reported that when asked about who they would not like to have as neighbours 29% of the Turkish-Cypriot respondents stated immigrants or workers from Turkey, and the crime and identity survey carried out by CMIRS\(^{114}\) found that 70% of Turkish-Cypriots blame people from Turkey for rising crime rates (CIVICUS 2011:99, Yücel 2011).

**Chart No 7: Perceptions about Turkish immigrants (QTS:2014)**

\(^{113}\) 53% of Turkish-Cypriots do not agree with the statement that ‘people from Turkey are an obstacle to reaching a comprehensive settlement’ on the island and 9.6% noted their ambivalence towards the question.

\(^{114}\) The Center for Migration, Identity and Rights Studies. Face to face questionnaires with 1500 people.
Perhaps the strongest expression of anxiety is demonstrated by the fact that 55% of Turkish-Cypriots agreed with the statement that “Turkish-Cypriot identity is becoming extinct due to the growing numbers of people from Turkey” (QTS:2014).

**Chart No 8: Anxieties about extinction (QTS:2014)**

The word ‘extinction’ is ultimately linked with fears about survival, existence and anxieties about biographical continuity, which were repeatedly voiced by the civil society representatives as well (CSOS-TCc:2014):

“First of all, I feel culturally and socially threatened. Not in terms of traditional food and other elements that make up culture as a whole but in a way that has something to do with the freedom that we used to enjoy as Turkish Cypriots are somewhat being threatened with the new 'regime' in Turkey. As a Turkish Cypriot who lived in Turkey for 20 years, I can assure you that the culture of personal freedom and rights is much evolved in Cyprus than in Turkey. And thus, for me Turkey poses a threat to my existence as a human being in Cyprus and in the world.115 ” (A Respondent from Association for Sustainable Development)

115 Emphasis added.
“We don’t have the luxury to wait any longer. The biggest problem for Turkish Cypriots is Turkey that threatens our existence and benefits from the current deadlock.” (A Respondent from Cyprus Turkish Teachers Union)

Comparably, Cypriots’ Voice, a bi-communal think-tank that endeavours to contribute to a comprehensive settlement on the island, has repeatedly emphasised the danger of extinction Turkish-Cypriots face in their communiqués:

“The stalemate in the settlement process is threatening the very existence of the Turkish-Cypriot Community who are part and parcel of the Cypriot people.” (Cypriots’-Voice September 2012)

“The Cypriot’s Voice, further expresses its deep concern about the contingency of annihilation facing the Turkish-Cypriot community, which is the direct result of the policy of population transfer from Turkey into Cyprus.” (Cypriots’-Voice July 2011)

The reasons of the persistent declarations of existence on the part of Turkish-Cypriots is two-fold: The first is linked to their feelings of fear and anxiety about their existence and biographical continuity that is underpinned by their low self-esteem and minority complex; and the second to their lack of acknowledgement regarding their existence and distinctiveness that is underpinned by the response of the other(s) in terms of recognition/resistance and (dis)association. Firstly, just as Greek-Cypriots hold on to their vivid memories of 1974, which is the main reason why they securitise Turkey and the Turkish community in north Cyprus as a threat, Broome suggests that Turkish-Cypriots have not let go of the feeling of being treated as second-class citizens, or the trauma of living in enclaves during 1963-1974 (Broome 2005). As they securitise their past where their past is perceived as a vulnerable minority denied equal status, any situation that comes close to reminiscing this securitised past is a threat. Persistence on political equality under a peace agreement and securitisation

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116 Author’s own translation, emphasis added.
117 Emphasis added.
118 Emphasis added.
119 see Table No 1: Ontological security matrix
of the Turkish immigrants as a ‘demographic danger’ partly stems from this historical trauma. Even though they need Turkey for protection and economic survival, however rational this perceived need may be, they also despise the Turkish immigrants for diluting their identity and taking the political will away from Turkish-Cypriots and they despise Turkey for interfering into their domestic politics. Nilay Bilsel\textsuperscript{120} voices her anxiety over the probability that one day north Cyprus could become part of Turkey, “I do not want to wake up one day and see Cyprus as Turkey’s province” (CSOS-TCc:2014). Similarly, another respondent from Hands Across the Divide, a bi-communal women’s organisation, states “I fear for my children’s future due to lack of recognition and a deterioration of traditional values/customs as we become more mainstreamed with the mainland Turkish culture” (CSOS-TCc:2014).

Hatay confirms that Turkish-Cypriots prevalently believe that the generalised category of ‘Türkiyeliler’, irrespective of their status on the island, always follow the will of Turkey and hence impede the political will of Cypriots (Hatay 2008). The view that Turkish-Cypriots are losing their identity is widespread in the literature about Cyprus, among CSOs and many Turkish-Cypriots. For example, Ker-Lindsay, in his book “The Cyprus Problem: What everyone needs to know” notes that, “The pace of immigration—both in terms of those who are given citizenship by the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and those who are simply temporary workers—is such that there is a real danger that the Turkish-Cypriot community will be swamped and may eventually disappear altogether” (Ker-Lindsay 2011:6).

Secondly, as Tuğrul İlter puts it, Turkish-Cypriots “are surrounded by denials of their independent existence” (İlter 2015:25). This denial in itself has three roots: a) the denial of distinctiveness by Turkey/Turks; b) the denial of Cypriotness and Europeanness by the EU and Greek-Cypriots, and c) the denial of legitimacy by the international community. Where the official rhetoric in Turkey denies a distinct Turkish-Cypriot identity and sees Turkish-Cypriots as one and the same as the greater Turkish nation, Greek-Cypriot narratives as well as the ‘no’ vote in the referendum denies their inherent Cypriotness and being left out of the EU despite their ‘yes’ vote, denies their Europeanness. Finally, lack of international recognition and

\textsuperscript{120} A civil society a respondent from INTBAU–Cyprus (The International Network for Traditional Building, Architecture & Urbanism)
isolation denies the legitimacy of Turkish-Cypriots’ communal existence. These denials of existence are ultimately about the response of the other. Rumelili explains that the identity and difference nexus is performatively constituted both by the self and the other, thus how the other responds to the construction of this identity is a very important dimension (Rumelili 2004). She notes that the conceptualisation of the response of the other can vary between recognition and resistance, where recognition reinforces the identity of the self and confidence in its continuity, and resistance undermines the self-identity as it challenges the difference attributed to the other. Comparably, Browning and Joenniemi note that it is not uncommon for actors lacking a strong sense of self to lash out, especially when they feel their boundaries are being transgressed, undermining the actors’ sense of distinct selfhood (Browning and Joenniemi 2013).

Turkish-Cypriots differentiate themselves from the ‘mainland’ Turks to reproduce their identity as distinct. However, their self-image and self-esteem is challenged when the other does not recognise their distinctiveness but reproduces an official rhetoric that narrates Turkish-Cypriots as Turks who happen to live in Cyprus. For example, mainstream media and politicians in Turkey are, at best, indifferent to the distinctiveness of the Turkish-Cypriot identity and mostly refer to Turkish-Cypriots as ‘Cypriot Turks’ (Kıbrıs Türkü), or as ‘our compatriots in Cyprus’, which undermines and circumstantialises their Cypriotness. They also refer to north Cyprus as ‘babyland’ (yavruvatan), implying a sense of ownership over north Cyprus and Turkish-Cypriots. In reaction to the rhetoric that relies on Turkishness as a strong commonality and underplays Cypriotness, left-wing journalists such as Sevgül Uludağ and Arif Hasan Tahsin, choose to use new terms to define Turkish-Cypriots that underplays Turkishness. For instance, Uludağ uses the term ‘Kıbrıslıtürk’ instead of ‘Kıbrıslı Türk’, to deemphasise the Turkish component of the identity, and Tahsin uses the term ‘Turkish

\[121\] Abdullah Gül: “Kıbrıs Türk halkı bugün kendi devletinin çatısı altında özgürlüğü solumaktadır” (Abdullah Gül: “Today, Cypriot Turks breath freedom under the roof of their own state”) (Kıbrıs Ada Haber 15 November 2013). TBMM Kıbrıs Dostluk Grubu Başkanı ve AK Parti Malatya Milletvekili Ömer Faruk Öz: “Tayyip Erdoğan Kıbrıs meselesine, Kıbrıs Türk’üne sahip. Türk halkının yaşam kalitesini artırmak için her türlü imkani seferber etti” (The Chair of Grand National Assembly of Turkey Friends of Cyprus Commision and Justice and Development Party’s MP for Malatya Ömer Faruk Öz: “Tayyip Erdogan, owns the Cyprus issue and Cypriot Turks. He mobilised every possible resource to improve life standards of the Turkish people”) (Haber Kıbrıs 1 February 2012).

\[122\] AK Parti Diş Politikadan Sorumlu Genel Başkan Yardımcısı Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu: “Kıbrıs bizim yavru vatanımız. Kıbrıs’ın meselesi bizim için doğrudan Türkiye’nin meselesidir” (AK Party Foreign Policy Deputy Chair Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu: “Cyprus is our babyland. For us, Cyprus’ affairs are Turkey’s affairs” (Vatan Gazetesi 30 November 2013).
speaking Cypriot’ (see Loizides 2015). The denial of the other triggers ontological insecurity by blurring the perceived identity differences between people from Turkey and Turkish-Cypriots. As such, Turkish-Cypriots resort to securitisation as an ontological security seeking strategy to reinforce and reproduce their distinctiveness, which shows itself in behavioural practices of ‘othering’ marked by representations of threat and danger.

Calling it ‘the narcissism of minor differences’, Freud wrote: “it is precisely communities with adjoining territories and related to each other in other ways as well who are engaged in constant feuds...” (Freud 2001). For Freud, hostility between such groups derives over time from the effect the proximity of one group has upon the way the members of another group feel about themselves. In relation to Freud’s analysis, Gregory Rochlin, writes that hostility arises not only when the survival of the self is threatened, but also when a person or a group is seen threatening the worth of the self (Rochlin 1973). Analogously, Simon Harrison talked about ‘a justificatory rhetoric’ that rationalises difference, which can deny the most self-evident similarities (Harrison 2002:212). For Harrison, groups that strive to be different, often have more in common than what is anticipated, or what they are ready to accept. In addition, social theory too offers important insights to the biased cognitive appreciation of the differences between and within groups; while the first is exaggerated, the latter is usually minimised. As such, phenomena such as ingroup bias, stereotyping, and outgroup discrimination in social theory are described as operations of categorisation that play a critical role in the formation of individual and collective identities (Austin and Worchel 1979, Tajfel 2010). The concept of proximity in relation to narcissism of minor differences for Turkish-Cypriots is not only geographic or ancestral. Turkey is not only deeply involved in the conflict as a guarantor of the RoC, or merely because of its ethnic and historical ties with Turkish-Cypriots; considering that creation of ‘TRNC’ would not have been possible without Turkey’s backing, the northern part of the island has effectively become the subordinate local administration of Turkey (ECHR 1995) and Turkish-Cypriots are highly dependent on Turkey, politically, militarily and especially economically. Subsequently, the concept of proximity also becomes about political, economic and social dependence, which makes it more difficult to reproduce and sustain a sense of difference.
Furthermore, Turkish-Cypriots, who lack international recognition and suffer international isolation, live in a ‘pseudo’ state with the ‘pseudo’ prefix attached to their existence, where their daily lives are caught between a state of ‘de facto’ and ‘de jure’. As such, all public institutions and people with institutional titles in north Cyprus are presented in inverted commas (i.e. “TRNC”, “the Mayor”, “the Ministry of Education” etc.). Even their Cypriot identity, which only became available to them in practice in April 2003 after the opening of the check-points, cannot provide them the political and communal representation outside of the peacebuilding arena under the auspices of the UN. İlter emphasises that the implications of this designation are not only limited to particular legal considerations but also have ontological significance for the Turkish-Cypriots (İlter 2015).

This hostage situation between ‘de facto’ and ‘de jure’ and ‘existence’ vs. ‘extinction’ extends to daily routines and practicalities. For example, there are no country codes or postcodes specific to north Cyprus. Since the ‘TRNC’ is internationally unrecognised, all international mail and phone calls are routed through Turkey. The ‘TRNC’ uses the country code of Turkey (+90) and the last line of address on an international mail reads ‘Mersin 10, Turkey’. Hence, the more theoretical and ontological identity limbo also becomes a ‘de facto’ vs ‘de jure’ dilemma of home, citizenship, where we are, who we are and which box do we tick when we are filling an application/petition form? Dupuis and Thorns explain that our understanding of ‘home’ as a bearer of security is based on its ability to link together a material environment with a deeply emotional set of meanings that is grounded upon our need of permanence and continuity (Dupuis and Thorns 1998). Building on this, Kinnvall asserts that ontological security is sustained when home is able to provide a sense of constancy in the social and material environment, providing a spatial context for daily routines of human existence (Kinnvall 2004). Considering the ‘pseudo’ status of the ‘TRNC’, it can neither provide Turkish-Cypriots with a sense of constancy nor legitimacy. This lack of reliability and permanence translates into lack of faith in their future and lack of basic trust in their social and material environment that can maintain their biographical continuity. Hence, it could be argued the main source of ontological insecurity for Turkish-Cypriots is ‘extinction’ as a distinct identity, which links the two reasons of the persistent declarations of existence together under the concept of home.
The ‘de facto’ vs ‘de jure’ dilemma of home and existence is in parallel with the ‘geographic actuality’ discussion based on Volkan’s work in the previous chapter and with the concept of hospitality expertly articulated by Derrida. Volkan links self-esteem to collectives’ ties with their geographic actuality, and argues that those who cannot give geographic actuality to their definition of a nation live in a constant condition of injured self-regard and inner rage (Volkan 1980). This geographic actuality can be extended to include a sense of home; where the ambiguous geographic actuality of the ‘TRNC’ combined with the Cyprus Problem is making it hard for Turkish-Cypriots to imagine a wholesome sense of home. Banners, cartoons and slogans used by different demonstrators, CSOs or left-leaning media can also illustrate Turkish-Cypriots’ concerns that are underpinned by denial of their legitimate existence and a sense of disempowerment with regards to the concept of ‘home’.

**Figure 4. Denial of existence**

*Left: “When a Cypriot dies, the population does not decrease”, cartoon published in Afrika newspaper (11 September, 2009).  
*Middle: “We want to be master of our own home!”, in Yenidüzen newspaper (6 September 2012).  
*Right: Turkish Cypriots citizens hold placards during a demonstration in Brussels, Belgium, (27 June 2012).

Exploring the connections between the native and the foreigner, the host and the guest, and ultimately self and other, Derrida links the concept of home to the concept of hospitality (Derrida and Dufourmantelle 2000). For Derrida, hospitality’s core is that of home (familial, communal, national, socio-political etc.), and is based on a sense of control and power over one’s home. This power provides the host with the choice of hospitality or hostility, that relates closely to the Turkish-Cypriots’ belief that their political will is taken from them and that they lack control over their own destiny. For Rosello, without hospitality home is merely an address that lacks geographical actuality and hence the host lacks self-esteem and ontological security (Rosello 2001). Consequently, as İlter points out, Turkish-Cypriots fail to offer hospitality to people from Turkey because they are not the ‘masters of their home’ but
rather, they believe that the ‘guests’ perceive themselves as the master due to the hosts’ dependence on Turkey (İltar 2015). Derrida explains that lack of such power would lead to xenophobia:

“... one can become virtually xenophobic in order to protect, or claim to protect, one's own hospitality, the own home that makes possible one's own hospitality. I want to be master at home ... to be able to receive whomever I like there. Anyone who encroaches on my "at home", on my ipseity, on my power of hospitality, on my sovereignty as host, I start to regard as an undesirable foreigner and virtually as an enemy. The other becomes a hostile subject and I run the risk of becoming their hostage.” (Derrida and Dufourmantelle 2000:53-55)

As previously discussed, securitisation is a common tool to reinforce a sense of stable self when actors feel ontologically insecure. The civil society representative survey can add depth to the perception of threat and its layers that are intertwined with anxieties pertaining to lack of a geographic actuality and a sense of home. As such, a majority of the respondents link their existential fears and anxieties to disempowerment, disenfranchisement, control and power over one’s sense of home and destiny (CSOS-TCc:2014).

“Due to the growing number of Turkish originated TRNC citizens, who outnumber the Cypriots (Cypriots being the people, who have lived in Cyprus quite a while now and have a certain Cyprus lifestyle, values, etc.), I personally see this as a threat on political and social life. This could be associated with many aspects of life, but most importantly in democracy and in the right of Cypriots to be able to make decisions solely based on their own will.123” (Mehmet Yıldırım, the deputy chair of the Cyprus Turkish Investment Development Agency)

“...prospect of a solution does not make me anxious, the possibility of no solution however does. This 'system', or should I say lack of one, is completely under the control of Turkey. They can change everything with a blink of an eye,

123 Emphasis added.
be it the wages of employees or the number of migrants living in the north or the amount of and cost of water coming through our faucets. A solution will, hopefully, enable us to build a future as opposed to thinking merely about the present day…” (Anonymous, CCMC)

In line with the above anecdotes, a press release signed by five big trade unions unequivocally emphasises that Turkey and Turkish immigrants are at the root of fears about extinction:

“Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, AKP and their local collaborators are bringing Turkish-Cypriots to the verge of extinction with systematic assimilation policies, such as encouraging population transfer and settling 100 thousands of migrants and colonising the northern Cyprus, building 192 new mosques compared to 162 schools, cutting funds for education while providing more funds for mosques and religious education institutions, and promoting Sunni Islam propaganda and Kur’an classes. ... The assimilatory approach attempts to annihilate Turkish-Cypriots, make them identity-less, character-less and keep them hostage as a bargaining chip. ...AKP fascism that came to the forefront with Istanbul Gezi Park demonstrations, is a reality that Turkish-Cypriots have been enduring for a long time.” (KTOEOS, KTOS et al. 9 July 2013)

Based on the above analysis and empirical data, it is clear that Turkish-Cypriots express prevalent concerns about their existence, and they direct their concerns at Turkey and the Turkish immigrants, placing them at the root of their fears about their biographical continuity. Immigrants are not only perceived as a threat due to their numbers but also because they may impede Cypriots’ political will. Lacking a geographical actuality for their more ‘European’ and more ‘Western’ collective identity and sense of control over their ‘home’ and destiny, Turkish-Cypriots translate their existential anxieties into behavioural othering.

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124 Cyprus Turkish Teachers Union, Cyprus Turkish Secondary School Teachers Union, Cyprus Turkish Civil Servants Union, Eastern Mediterranean Workers Union, Cyprus Turkish Doctors Union.
125 Author’s own translation, emphasis added.
7.4 Peace-ing Othered-selves and Other-selves Together

Being a ‘Turkish-Cypriot’ has become an existential limbo. The identity dilemma lies in the fact that the Sunni identity attached to being Turkish does not have a reflection in the Turkish-Cypriot identity; that they are neither part of Turkey nor the RoC; that their political equality claims under a unified Cyprus are disproportionate to their numbers; that they have remained internationally unrecognised not having their identity acknowledged by others; that rejection of the Annan Plan by Greek-Cypriots was taken personally by many Turkish-Cypriots as a denial of their Cypriotness and Europeanness; and that they take pride in being more ‘European’ than mainland Turks but in practice do not enjoy those ‘European’ privileges they desire (See Volkan 2008, Beyatli, Papadopoulou et al. 2011).

As a result, Turkish-Cypriots are caught between a rock and a hard place with regards to their identity; they realise their distinctness from mainland Turks but have failed to be simply Cypriots on their divided island. Their fears about their existence, political will and biographic continuity, tied to their traumas about being a minority are felt on both fronts (majority Greek-Cypriots and growing number of Turkish immigrants). Even being a Turkish-Cypriot does not come comfortably as their break away administration is neither independent nor self-sufficient (see Ergü 2005, Turan 2014). Lack of international recognition reaches beyond economic, political and social isolations. It also means lack of acknowledgement of Turkish-Cypriots’ suffering, resistance and existence, which shows itself in a fragile sense of self and self-esteem.

Looking at the identity perceptions linked with expressions of minor narcissistic differences translated into fear in the previous sections, we can see that Turkish-Cypriots are uncomfortable about the ambiguity of their identity. They recognise their similarities and differences compared to both Greek-Cypriots and Turks, and simultaneously experience victimisation from both groups. Even though they do not deny the self-evident similarities, they justify their securitisation and othering by rationalising difference and by locating securitisation and discrimination into ‘resistance’. In his article titled “Problem of Pigeons: Orientalism, Xenophobia and the Rhetoric of the ‘Local’ in North Cyprus”, Hatay claims that
Turkish-Cypriots conveniently confuse their concerns about cultural and political ‘colonisation’ by the Turkish state with labour migration from Anatolia (Hatay 2008). Hatay argues that the effects of this confusion is discriminatory attitudes and practices painted with political and social resistance rhetoric to an extent that “even parties and organisations that claim to work for equality and human rights do not include the immigrant labour force in the scope of their struggle, and indeed often cast those immigrants as a group that they must struggle against” (Hatay 2008:147).

However, the perceptions of self and other are not a given and they are not distant entities, nor are they timeless conceptualisations. In İlter’s words, “Difference thus persists throughout continuity and sameness” (İlter 2015:33). As such, Turkish-Cypriots can feel more Cypriot in their interactions and relationships with people from Turkey and in their daily politics and routines. Comparatively, when their identity is negotiated within the context of the Cyprus Problem in relation to Greek-Cypriots, their Turkishness may receive more emphasis. This varied expression of self in itself is by no means problematic. In fact, it is rather natural, as identity is subjectively negotiated temporally, spatially and with the other. It becomes problematic when the enemy becomes part of self, and when subjective identity expressions and narratives create othered-selves. In the case of Turkish-Cypriots, self and other exists in one, simultaneously and uncomfortably, creating anxiety and insecurity. Where the Turk can become self in the context of the Cyprus Problem and in relation with Greek-Cypriots, it can become the other disconnected from it. Consequently, securitised ‘Turkishness’ can become the othered-self for Turkish-Cypriots.

We can draw a parallel between the case of the Åland Islands presented by Pertti Joenniemi, Freud’s narcissism of minor differences and the case of Cyprus. Joenniemi writes about the Ålandars, who are part of Finland as a state, which has become an acceptable similarity, but at the same time, they seek to maintain some space for dissimilarity to simultaneously remain part Swedish (Joenniemi 2015). In Joenniemi’s analysis, “Efforts to impose full similarity, such as denying or diminishing their autonomy, distinctiveness, and ‘exceptional features’ are bound to be met by profound resistance as such efforts would endanger and challenge the differences that form the backbone of Aland’s very being” (Joenniemi 2015:139). Although,
Ålandars do not fear the threat of ‘demographic re-engineering’ of their society posed by Finland (i.e. to make them more Finnish) and their uncontested autonomy allows them to construct a geographical actuality for their collective identity, it could be argued that the relationship with their Finnishness or Finland is maintained, at least partly, based on the ideal state of security-as-being and a security-as-survival because their distinctness is recognised by the other. Comparably, the empirical data suggests that Turkish-Cypriots accept and narrate an ethnic ancestral kinship with the mainland Turks that focuses on language, cuisine and folklore, but it is crucial for them to maintain a distinctiveness and dissimilarity as well. However, lacking geographic actuality, a sense of home and recognition by the other, they reproduce this dissimilarity by resorting to securitisation.

Joenniemi explores how the in-betweenness of Ålandars is perceived both as a power and vulnerability, but is generally regarded as an advantage. Their in-between position, that is an amalgamation of Swedishness, Finnishness, Westernness, Europeanness and Easternness all at once, is narrated rather comfortably and had become part of their ‘essence’ (Joenniemi 2015:142). “... [Ålandars] were denied the option126 of acquiring identity-related safety by seeking shelter and purity [under Sweden] as a local and non-sovereign entity ... What was initially resisted [the Ruling of the League of Nations], depicted as a betrayal and viewed as a move undermining Aland’s ‘real’ being has gradually turned into the bedrock of Alandish identity” (Joenniemi 2015:150). Extrapolating this to the Turkish-Cypriot case, who too first failed to achieve Taksim with Turkey, then to be recognised or to be independent in their own state, and finally were refused their European membership dreams, I argue that they can only amalgamate their Cypriotness, Turkishness and Europeanness comfortably all in one through desecuritising their Turkishness, which is in conflict with the other layers of their identity. Desecuritisation of Turkishness could help them to find comfort in their ambiguity without feeling forced to make a choice between their Turkishness and Cypriotness and finding comfort in that ambiguity will go hand in hand with the adaptation of historic identity narratives established in opposition to Greek-Cypriots.

126 After World War 2, the League of Nations ruled that the Aland Islands should remain part of Finland with significant autonomy despite the overwhelming majority of the islanders wanted to be part of Sweden and considered Sweden their motherland.
Another parallel could be drawn with the more familiar case of Linobambakoi, which represents a comfortable case of ambiguity in religious identity that provided security in its uniqueness in Cyprus. Although Turkish-Cypriots are technically Muslims, they are mainly agnostic and do not prioritise their religious identity in their collective self-image; in fact, Turkish immigrants’ Sunni identity is highlighted as an element of difference and symbol of orientalism. The case of Linobambakoi demonstrates that religious identities that are often narrated based on exclusivity can in effect be amalgamated. Linobambakoi were Cypriots with hybrid religious beliefs, who mixed and matched Christian Orthodox and Muslim religious practices in their daily lives. As Costa Constantinou explains:

“These people participated in each other’s religious rituals and festivities, partook in the surrounding spiritual menu, without necessarily or consciously becoming ‘Muslims’ or ‘Christians’, or even Linobambakoi, which in any case was rarely a self-designation. Associating religion with exclusivist ethnic identity rendered strange such theological hospitality” (Constantinou 2007:252).

Constantinou writes about the illuminating case of Fatma Usta from the village of Potamia, noting that “she very consciously transversed ethno-religious boundaries and fully embraced a hybrid culture” (Constantinou 2007:264). Usta, a Turkish-Cypriot who had remained in the RoC after 1974 until her death, was a Muslim, who also wore the typical black attire of Greek-Orthodox widows.

“She had not been baptized, but she crossed herself, smoked the house in Christian fashion and occasionally joined mass. She also tried to receive communion, though this was denied to her. She still visited the mosque when she went to the North and has been buried in the Turkish cemetery of Potamia. In her single-room house, three pictures were prominent and quite revealing: Archbishop Makarios, Kemal Atatürk and King George” (Constantinou 2007).

In his article titled “Aporias of Identity”, Costas Constantinou, borrowing from postcolonial literature, talks about ‘strategic essentialism’ in Cyprus, where communities like Linobambakoi strategically utilised performed aspects of identity to work power structures in their favour and quickly and comfortably moved across different aspects of their identity
depending on the circumstances, policies or power shifts (Constantinou 2007:226). Nevertheless, neither the case of Linobambakoi, nor the case of Ålandars can be reduced to strategic essentialism. Constantinou, who points to a cosmopolitan spirituality in identity expressions of the Linobanbaki, agrees that there is more to Linobambakoi than strategic essentialism. Thus, besides strategic essentialism that happens on the level of consciousness to avoid religious persecution, military conscription or taxes, it seems that the Linobambakoi were also a “genuinely syncretistic” community (Constantinou 2007:252). It is this genuine syncretistic notion that made Linobambakoi comfortable in their flexible and ambiguous identity narratives, as their sense of belonging to both Christianity and Islam, and hence both to the Hellenic world and the Turkic/Ottoman world was not simply because they devised a strategy to deal with and circumvent power structures and oppression, but because their distinctiveness was based on their in-betweenness and fluid identity narratives, where they comfortably accommodated both differences and similarities in two religions.

Even though the case of Linobambakoi has been excluded from the historiographies across the island, it shows that, along with the case of Ålandars, identities that are assumed to be mutually exclusive, can be and have been adapted and merged comfortably into one. Desecuritisation of Turkishness may allow Turkish-Cypriots to be comfortable in their own skin, so to say, without essentialising or securitising one part of their identity. Desecuritisation through reconfiguration of identity narratives would facilitate reconciliation by allowing Cypriots to feel secure in and with Turkishness, and from Derrida’s perspective, allow them to extend hospitality to people from Turkey and to each other. As a result, being Cypriot would not necessarily mean to securitise Turkish immigrants as an obstacle for a better Cyprus and as spoilers of an idealised state of ‘peace’; and being a Turk would not necessarily mean embodying the enemy for Greek-Cypriots, or to be backward and non-European. Similarly, for Greek-Cypriots, making peace and living side by side with Turkish-Cypriots will not mean that they legitimised all wrong-doing and injustices inflicted by Turkey and Turks.

According to İlter, difference does not have an undivided point of origin, “Our individual and collective identities are thus formed ‘in-between,’ or in excess of, the sum of the ‘parts’ of difference” (İlter 2015:22). However, complexity and alterity of difference both internal and
external to the self, confuses the binary oppositional logic of bicommunality in Cyprus and underlines peacebuilding. With Turkishness desecuritised, making peace with Turkish-Cypriots, will no longer be a concession, a tolerated state of affairs for some political or economic gain, but it will be a reconciled state of affairs that can allow more room for compromise and pave the way for transformative peace; which is concerned with altering the entire structure of a polity, rather than merely ending violence or signing an ‘agreement’ (see Mitchell 2014). Consequently, by desecuritising Turkishness, we can reformulate Cypriotness to accommodate hyphenated identities comfortably under a broader common narrative, rather than limiting it to bicommunality along ethnic lines, which as proven highly problematic.

Yet, in addition to other-others (Turkish immigrants) and othered-selves (Turkishness), there is another layer that needs to be added to the equation, which is the ‘other-selves’. Those Turkish-Cypriots who emphasise their Cypriotness and the desire for a comprehensive settlement on the island, equate a potential peace agreement to the idealised state of ‘peace’. This strong association between Cypriotness and peace is based on the assumption that ‘real’ Cypriots want peace and those who are not Cypriot enough (Turkish immigrants and those who prioritise their Turkishness over their Cypriotness) are obstacles to peace. ‘Real’ Cypriots desire peace because without it they cannot continue to exist as who they are. This view does not differentiate between ‘peace’ as a concept that defines an idealistic end and the concept that refers to the process of transforming a conflict. Within the context of peacebuilding, peace should be understood as an ongoing process, and a subjective feeling of security and continuity where actors can manage anxieties, rather than an objective end, an idealised heaven or a ‘perfect solution’ that can make all anxieties disappear. As fears and anxieties about the future are anchored in the Cyprus Problem and lined with the worst case scenarios revolving around Turkey, Turkification, assimilation, colonisation and extinction, it is not surprising to see that the perceived salvation is locked in the vision of a comprehensive settlement. Serdar Atai, a respondent from Famagusta Initiative and Famagusta Walled City Association, illustrates this idealised idea of peace very aptly: “I think our fears and anxieties will all evaporate once we start working and living together. And if [we] manage to keep the
Turkish settlers’ population at a moderate level we’ll overcome most of the existing obstacles” (CSOS-TCc:2014).

With this idealised view of ‘peace’, anyone who does not support a comprehensive settlement for whatever reason becomes a spoiler of ‘peace’, which creates other-selves who are dissents, or who are not self enough. Consequently, the peacebuilding process in Cyprus inadvertently creates gatekeepers that comfortably fit the peacebuilding framework, and those who are left out are regarded as not Cypriot enough, as collaborators of the colonialist imperial powers, as the puppets of Turkey or right-wing fascists. In response to the question “which groups need to be involved in reconciliation efforts?”, Cyprus Academic Dialogue board member Demetrios Nicolaides talks about the ‘other-selves’ among the GCc in the same way (CSOS-GCc:2014):

“Greek Cypriots see Turks as the most significant ‘other’. It is highly necessary to have reconciliation activities between Greek Cypriots and Turks. Turkish Cypriots and Greeks also require reconciliation, which will help broader reconciliation between Greeks and Turks. I have also noted, [reconciliation between] Greek Cypriots & Greek Cypriots. There are many ‘others’ in the Cyprus dynamic and (for the Greek Cypriots) I find that the biggest obstacle to reunification and peace is themselves. Intra-group differences are highly divisive and require their own reconciliation.”

Mitchell writes about the multiple selves and others in Northern Ireland and how those, who were excluded by the peacebuilding process because they did not fit the framework, were labelled as the ‘spoilers’ (Mitchell 2015). Mitchell argues that, although the Belfast Agreement is heralded as the one of the most successful peace processes, the peace process itself can become a source of threat that magnifies violence, or even a source of indirect violence itself. In line with the criticism in this thesis regarding the narrow dual-ethnic approach to the

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127 Similarly, Loizides and Sandal underlines how the center-right parties and their constituents have been left out of the picture. Loizides suggests that an open elite socialisation process that shifts the focus on ‘logic of consequences’ to ‘logic of appropriateness’ within the norms of socialising community can bring the centre-right on board to play a constructive role in peace process. Desecuritisation of Turkishness and socialisation at the civil society level can open the peace process to those who are left out of the current narrow framework Sandal, N. and Loizides G. N. (2013).
Cyprus Problem, Mitchell argues that conflict resolution does not account for dynamics outside of the primary self/other dyad (Mitchell 2015). With the addition of othered-selves, Mitchell’s analysis that focuses on the dynamics between other-selves and other-others bears resemblance to the case of Turkish-Cypriots. These nuances are not necessarily external to the primary self/other relationships; on the contrary, how other-selves, other-others and othered-selves (or enemy-selves) can shape the primary self/other relationship and the peace process is crucial for successful and sustainable peacebuilding processes.

Mitchell elaborates on how a broad range of republicans who did not agree with the Belfast Agreement were framed as spoilers, and were censored and excluded from the process, which had social repercussions as they were also ostracised in their communities (Mitchell 2015). The peace process framework that decided on who is included or excluded based on their ‘malleable’ identity narratives, turned Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) leaders into gatekeepers of both the peace process and peace funding. Those who were included became the peaceful selves and those who were excluded were securitised as a risk and a threat to the process. Mitchell argues that their exclusion hindered the achievement of a wholesome transformative peace and eventually led to violence and confrontation (Mitchell 2015). Consequently, while the peace process desecuritised the primary self/other relationships, it resulted in the securitisation of ‘other-selves’. That is not to say that peace processes can only succeed if they have ‘everyone’ on board. There is no perfect peace that matches everyone’s expectations and desires. Nonetheless, the key point is that taking ontological security into consideration and having a more nuanced understanding of identity can allow peacebuilding to become more inclusive and effective in its outreach and in building a constituency for peace, which could facilitate transformative peace and prevent resecuritisation of old relationships or securitsation of new groups. And, in the case of Cyprus, it can help Turkish-Cypriots escape the limbo of embodying enemy and self in one.

The peace process in Cyprus too provides a framework too narrow, where other-selves and other-others are left out by the gatekeepers, who are ‘more’ Cypriot. The gatekeepers in the case of Cyprus are those civil society people involved in bicommunal efforts, who can speak English fluently, who can write project proposals, who have RoC passports to travel freely and
who emphasise their Cypriotness over their ethnic identity, and to a certain extent, those who are based in the capital where majority of the peacebuilding activities take place. In their comprehensive analysis of island-wide peacebuilding activities in Cyprus, Hadjipavlou and Kanol confirm that the majority of participants in peacebuilding workshops and mediation training come from educated groups who can speak English\textsuperscript{128} (Hadjipavlou and Kanol 2008). As a result, despite having inspiring outcomes and creating a pool of highly skilled individuals equipped to contribute to the peace process, the process itself becomes strictly academic and elitist, and exclusivist towards those that do not fit the framework. Participation in the peace process is even more difficult for people from Turkey, as they are effectively excluded from the definition of reconciliation due to the strictly dual-ethnic approach of the peacebuilding framework on the island.

This narrow understanding of reconciliation is especially true for peace funding because the donors, specifically the UNDP and the EU limit reconciliation funding to those projects that are between Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots, and those initiatives that fall outside of this definition of reconciliation cannot receive funding. The eligibility criteria set for project applicants can illustrate this narrow dual-ethnic approach. For example, the European Commission’s ‘Cypriot Civil Society in Action’ grant programmes\textsuperscript{129} launched respectively in 2007, 2008, 2009, 2013 and 2015 all specify eligible reconciliation and confidence building initiatives to those between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots. The Guidelines for the call for proposals\textsuperscript{130} state that “To promote the role of civil society in the northern part of Cyprus in the development of trust, dialogue, cooperation and reconciliation between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities as an important step towards a solution of the Cyprus Problem”. This constricted perception that boxes Cyprus into the language of ‘ethnic conflict’ limited to Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots results in the creation of gatekeepers and the exclusion of Turkish immigrants from the reconciliation and peacebuilding efforts. The Civic Mapping of the Mahallae Initiative, which charts the goals and impact of civil society contributions to peacebuilding in Cyprus from 1980 to 2013 can help clarify the above

\textsuperscript{128} English is the common language used in bi-communal initiatives in Cyprus.
\textsuperscript{129} Overall budget allocated for reconciliation and confidence building activities under the said aid programmes was 5,885,000€.
\textsuperscript{130} The Guidelines are published on: https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/europeaid/online-services/index.cfm?do=publi.welcome&userlanguage=en
argument further. As such, out of 681 civil society projects logged by the Mahallae Initiative, only 7 included people from Turkey in one way or another in their efforts\textsuperscript{131} (Mahallae 2013).

The identities and groups that are excluded and marginalised by peace processes can become reproduced, reinforced, defensive or even radicalised. While conformists assume moral superiority because they want ‘peace’, all non-conformists become generalised and categorised as not wanting peace, as other-selves. Mitchell suggests that resurgence of violence in conflict environments or post-conflict scenarios do not necessarily mean that the traditional conflict based on the essentialised primary self/other is back or remains unresolved, but it may mean that the transformative peace process was incomplete in making sure that it included other-selves and other-others (Mitchell 2015). Transformative peace processes promise to provide physical and ontological security for those who are included through reconciliation. However, as peace processes may fragment, shift, multiply and re-define selves, others, other-selves and othered-selves, actors who are not/cannot be integrated into the process may become marginalised and more insecure. Recognising other-others, other-selves and othered-selves helps us better understand protracted conflicts and violence that does/may erupt even after a successful peace agreement is reached. It also justifies the need for a more inclusive peace process beyond a normative humanitarian commitment, because recognising the importance of ontological security for transformative peace can help us devise more inclusive and effective desecuritisation strategies.

\textsuperscript{131} Three out of seven projects’ involvement of people from Turkey was within the scope of building closer relationships between Turkey and Greece without broadening the ‘dual-ethnic’ lens on the Cyprus Problem (e.g. Seeds of Peace youth camps). The remaining were; (1) Two academic initiatives with the participation of Turkish-Cypriot, Greek-Cypriot, Turkish, and Greek participants, one focused on textbook and curriculum analysis and the other on cooperation between universities across the divide; (2) A documentary called Akamas that focused on the personal stories of individuals from different ethnic backgrounds; and (3) A youth camp with the participation of Greek-Cypriot, Turkish-Cypriot, Greek and Turkish youth. Apart from these isolated civil society activities, other efforts that involved people from Turkey remained limited to charity work for underprivileged families and were not bicommunal in their nature.
7.5 Conclusion

This chapter unpacked the empirical findings with regards to Turkish-Cypriots’ perceptions of identity, threat and anxiety of as well as their attitudes towards a potential solution and the role of Turkishness and Turkish immigrants in that solution scenario. Based on empirical evidence, the chapter argued that Turkish-Cypriots are increasingly prioritising their Cypriotness over their Turkishness and are becoming less motherland-centric. This shift that underplays their ethnic signifiers is also exacerbating the securitisation of Turkish immigrants, who are perceived as oriental, backward and non-European. As such, empirical data shows that feelings of Cypriotness and perceptions of threat posed by Turkish immigrants have a positive relationship. Although those Turkish-Cypriots who prioritise their Cypriotness feel more anxiety about their current situation, which intensifies their sense of urgency and desires for a comprehensive settlement, it does not make compromise easier due to ontological dissonance. Failing to reconcile their more European Cypriot identity with their Turkishness, Turkish-Cypriots find themselves in an identity dilemma latent with anxieties about their biographical continuity and the future. When the primary other, that is the generalised Greek-Cypriot majority on the island, is added to this equation, we observe ontological dissonance, where attempts to manage anxieties at one level of their identity exacerbate the anxieties at another level.

Drawing from Derrida’s concept of home and hospitality and Volkan’s concept of geographical actuality, the chapter argues that Turkish-Cypriots, who lack a sense of home, who feel disempowered and disenfranchised and who failed to provide a geographical actuality for their identity narratives, cannot extend hospitality to Turkish immigrants. Turkish immigrants, who are differentiated from other migrants and seen as agents of Turkey, who are taking away Turkish-Cypriots political will and control over their own destiny, are integral to the peace process in Cyprus. Consequently, as the securitisation of this group cannot be separated from the peace process, desecuritisation strategies need to be integrated within the peacebuilding efforts as well. Considering that the securitisation of this group is institutionalised, bottom-up and horizontal, desecuritisation strategies aimed at reconfiguring
identity narratives need to account for ontological security implications to provide actors with the tools to manage resulting anxieties and to reflexively adapt their routines.

It is important that these desecuritisation attempts are focused at the societal level and that they reformulate the narratives bottom-up as well as top down in order to facilitate reconfiguration of routines and daily lives, rather than ‘fermenting’ at a political level for a long time without much societal resonance. Considering that institutionalised securitisations create a cognitive and behavioural change among the audience, failing to institutionalise desecuritisation strategies is likely to prove ineffective in reconfiguring identity narratives. Desecuritisation strategies that do not take ontological security into account, that do not have a more nuanced understanding of identity and that are not inclusive and holistic can create existential anxieties that result in compulsive attachment to routines, resecuritisation and conflict producing routines.

For example, the attempt to revise the history textbooks to reformulate friend-enemy narratives was a very significant step that combined both political will and societal implications, but it was a leap too far into the unknown that existentially challenged identity narratives and hence saw the return of the old textbooks in the TCc and rejection of the revision attempts all together in the GCc. Revision of the history textbooks could be facilitated if complimented by desecuritisation of Turkishness, such as their inclusion in reconciliation efforts by breaking free from the dual-ethnic approach in peacebuilding.

While hyphenated identities have often been seen as what binds America together, in Cyprus they manifest as a major problem and key dividing factor. The growing sense of Cypriotism on the island failed to become an inclusive narrative that can comfortably accommodate Greekness and Turkishness with Cypriotness. Reformulating what it means to be a Cypriot more inclusively and allowing for ambiguity, like the case of Linobambakoi, can be the way forward to facilitating a comprehensive settlement. To that end, the chapter calls for the inclusion of Turkish immigrants in the peace process to desecuritise their relationship with Cypriots, and Cypriots’ relationship with Turkishness. Based on the argument that securitisation of Turkish immigrants and Turkishness creates ontological dissonance, the
chapter suggests that institutionalised desecuritisation strategies can help escape the vicious cycle and the identity dilemma, where Turkish-Cypriots while desiring a comprehensive settlement to maintain their biographical continuity as a distinct identity, simultaneously securitise the part of their identity that legitimises their claims for that desired future. Desecuritisation of Turkishness can help Turkish-Cypriots find comfort in their in-betweenness and ambiguity, and hence facilitate transformative peace on the island.
Chapter 8. The Securitisation Dynamics and Identity Narratives in the Greek-Cypriot Community

8.1 Introduction

In 1971 President Archbishop Makarios declared, “Cyprus has been Greek since the dawn of her history and will remain Greek. Greek and undivided we have inherited her. Greek and undivided we shall keep her, and Greek and undivided we shall hand her over” (quoted in Dodd 2010:96). According to Peter Loizos, the prevalence of motherland centric identity narratives and the ultimate goal of Enosis hindered the construction of an inclusive Cypriot identity (Loizos 1975). The desires for Enosis were very much alive in the GCc up until the Greek junta and the Turkish invasion. However, the consequences of 1974 not only reconfigured the Greek-Cypriot consciousness, but also their goals for Enosis. Many scholars including Neophytos Loizides and Michalis Michael argue the feelings of betrayal due to the Greek junta, who led to the invasion and then ‘abandoned’ the island to the Turks, and the trauma of 1974 accelerated the growth of Cypriotism at the expense of Greek ethno-nationalism (Loizides 2007, Michael 2011).

Even though nationalism and ethnic identity was effectively identified with Enosis pre-1974, in the post-1974 period many scholars document a growing sense of Cypriotism that emphasises territorial and civil loyalties to Cyprus rather than Greece (Stamatakis 1991, Mavratsas 1997, Papadakis, Peristianis et al. 2006). Cypriotism, adopted by left-wing circles, coexisted uncomfortably with ethno-nationalism after independence in 1960; but once Enosis was abandoned, Cypriotism, underpinned by historic amnesia, was actively promoted with the distinct purpose of safeguarding Cyprus’s independence. Mavratsas and Loizides note that motherland-centric ethnic identity narratives made a comeback in the 1980s when the junta was dismantled in Greece and democracy was restored, but loyalty to the RoC did not lose ground to Enosis (Mavratsas 1999, Loizides 2015). As Turkey was condemned for its actions and as the Turkish-Cypriots remained the illegitimate secessionist community, the RoC became the source of legitimacy and self-esteem for Greek-Cypriots. However, despite growing Cypriotism, reunification of the island has proven very elusive and the general category of the Turk remains the primary enemy other in Greek-Cypriot narratives.
The empirical evidence corroborates the argument that Greek-Cypriots perceive existential threats to their identity and desired future posed by Turkey and Turkish immigrants. Following the logic of the previous chapter, Chapter 8 of this thesis focuses on the growing sense of Cypriotism, perceptions of threat and feelings of anxiety in the GCc. Drawing on the fieldwork data that was carried out in 2014-2015 and enriching it with secondary data sets that stretch back to 2008, this chapter unpacks the securitisation dynamics and their implications for the peace process and demonstrates four interesting findings: 1) A sense of Cypriotism is growing in the GCc; 2) Compared to Turkish-Cypriots’ relations with Turkey, Greek-Cypriots consider Greece their motherland to a lesser extent; 3) Greek-Cypriots, who distinguish between Turkish-Cypriots and people from Turkey, perceive greater levels of threat posed by people from Turkey; and 4) Securitisation of Turkish immigrants and Turkishness creates unmanageable peace-anxieties for Greek-Cypriots, as perceptions of threat and peace-anxieties have a positive relationship.

The second section of the chapter that follows this introduction explores the growing Cypriotist narrative on a temporal timeline and discusses declining attachment to Greece as the motherland. Borrowing from anthropology and psychoanalysis and engaging with the concepts of ‘hollow categories’ and ‘chosen traumas’, the section analyses the way Turks and Turkishness is securitised in Greek-Cypriot narratives. The third section of the chapter explores Greek-Cypriots’ peace-anxieties, the ways they differentiate Turkish-Cypriots from people from Turkey and draws parallels with Lupovici’s analysis of ontological dissonance and the Israeli example. Lastly, based on the argument that the exclusion of Turkish immigrants from the peace process and their securitisation creates ontological insecurity and dissonance, the chapter suggests that institutionalised desecuritisation strategies of Turkishness can provide a way out of the vicious cycle and present an opportunity for frequent revelatory incidents that can challenge the engrained identity narratives based on enmity, and hence facilitate transformative peace.
8.2 Cypriotism and the Primordial Enemy Other

The growing sense of Cypriotism in the post-1974 period did not necessarily mean reconfiguration of the friend-enemy distinction that has Turkey and Turkishness at its epicentre, nor did it necessarily include the Turkish-Cypriots in its narratives. While some Cypriotist accounts promote a shared Cypriot identity and focus on territorial and civic commonalities as a unifying factor, others see the RoC as essentially a Greek-Cypriot entity independent from Greece (see Mavratsas 1999, Peristianis 2006). Trimikliniotis calls the latter ‘Hellenised Cypriotism’. He maintains that Cypriotism still has ethnicity as the element of unity at its base that promotes the perceived links with Hellenism (Trimikliniotis 2007:151). Maintaining the Hellenic elements in Cypriotism grounds Greek-Cypriot identity narratives in the classical tradition of an ancient civilisation, which provides a source of esteem, pride and prestige that establishes Cyprus in the heart of the Western world. Compared to Turkish-Cypriots, whose presence on the island is much more recent, links with the ancient Hellenic civilisation also strengthens their claims on the island.

Michael notes that “Greek-Cypriots had always been uneasy with the concept of ‘equality’, on the basis of their numerical superiority but also because of their sense of being the indigenous inhabitants of Cyprus” (Michael 2011:183). Especially following their rapid economic growth post-1974 and their changing social-economic status, Greek-Cypriots unsurprisingly questioned the benefit of federalism on the basis of political equality rather than minority status. It is not uncommon to hear criticisms about the ‘irrationality’ of political equality among Greek-Cypriots, where to some, Turkish-Cypriots want both ‘to be partners in the Republic and masters in the north’. Makriyianni and Psaltis note that, the ‘majoritarianistic’ discourse, which dictates that Greek-Cypriots should be the main decision makers and “have the first and last word on the governance of Cyprus” is premised on the same dialectic of intolerance (Makriyianni and Psaltis 2007:60).
This is also demonstrated in the New Cyprus Association survey\(^{132}\) (NCA 2015). Greek-Cypriots express particularly more negative sentiments about having a Turkish-Cypriot president (70%) compared to Turkish-Cypriots’ feelings about having a Greek-Cypriot president (49%), which can be explained by the difficulty Greek-Cypriots have with the notion of political equality as the majority. Despite their strong desires for a solution, due to their minority complex Turkish-Cypriots express more concerns about Greek-Cypriots when it comes to daily life, such as having neighbours, friends, business partners and bosses. However, when it comes to marriage, Greek-Cypriots tend to express more concerns (72%), which is most likely due to their religious convictions to Orthodox Christianity, whereas Turkish-Cypriots religiosity is not only low, they only get married through civil ceremonies.

Chart No 9: Comparative concerns of Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriots

History education in both communities reproduces Cyprus as rightfully Turkish or rightfully Greek and the other community as the invader, occupier, or the greedy, barbaric other

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\(^{132}\) It should be noted that compared to the quantitative survey carried out in September 2014, New Cyprus Association’s survey carried out in November 2014, reports more positive attitudes towards having friends and neighbours from the other community. For instance, according to QTS:2014, 59% and 61% of Greek-Cypriots would be open to having Turkish-Cypriot friends and neighbours respectively; whereas, New Cyprus Association survey reports that 82% and 81% of Greek-Cypriots would feel positive about having Turkish-Cypriot friends and neighbours respectively. In addition to the fact that the questions are posed differently, the main reason behind this difference in the two surveys that were conducted only a couple of months apart is due to the fact that while QTS:2014 provided 6 answer options ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree including neutral and I don’t know options, New Cyprus Association survey only provided 4 answer options ranging from very positive to very negative. If we were to assume that all ‘neutral’ and ‘I don’t know’ responses from the QTS:2014 would be more positive leaning if not given alternative options, then we would get 71% and 76% respectively.
(Papadakis 1998, Hadjipavlou 2002, Kızılyürek 2002, Papadakis 2008, Tamcelik 2009). Looking at the role of history textbooks in perceptions and identity narratives, Makriyianni and Psaltis write that the RoC Ministry of Education unilaterally catered for Greek-Cypriots’ needs, excluded Turkish-Cypriots from the history, geography and decision making processes, and promoted that they were Hellenes who happened to live in Cyprus (Makriyianni and Psaltis 2007). The Greek-Cypriot textbooks systematically ignore multi-ethnic or multicultural pasts and establish an unbroken Hellenic continuity on the island constructed from 12 BC to the present day (Hadjipavlou 2002, Kızılyürek 2002). Consequently, a potential settlement that is based on a bicommunal and bizonal federation challenges the Greek-Cypriots’ ontological security as their identity narratives rely on the island’s Hellenic heritage and their sovereignty over the whole of Cyprus.

In general, both Greek-Cypriot and Greek identity narratives, perceive Turkey as the complete opposite of Greece. The Cyprus Problem is solely appropriated to the expansionist occupier Turkey, the history of inter-communal strife is ignored and the pre-1974 era idealised (Makriyianni and Psaltis 2007). As the eternal enemy, Turks lack both in history (because it is of recent origins compared to ancient Greece) and in civilisation (because they are tribal, barbarous and oriental) (Bryant 2006). The Turkish invasion in 1974 is read from this analysis and thus, is seen as a logical expression of the enemy’s violent and expansionist essence compared to the goodness and innocence of the collective self (Papadakis, Peristianis et al. 2006). Even though the 1974 rupture coincided with education reforms based on the principle of ‘democratisation’ with a growing focus on Cypriotism, they still placed Cyprus as the ‘outpost of Hellenism (Makriyianni and Psaltis 2007:53). Despite the reconciliation and peacebuilding efforts of the last 5 decades, this assumption remained largely unchallenged especially among public education institutions.

Yet, irrespective of the varying degrees of motherland-centricism and ethnic identification, we can talk about a growing sense of Cypriotism in the GCc with certainty. Despite acknowledging close ties and kinship with Greece, a temporal comparison of the fieldwork data from 2014 with the Cyprus-2015-Initiative surveys show Greek-Cypriots prioritise their Cypriotness over their Greekness. As such, although 92% consider having Greek cultural roots, only 7% consider
themselves as mostly/only Greek compared to 51% who identify as Greek and Cypriot to the same degree and 41% who identify as mostly/only Cypriot\textsuperscript{133} (Cyprus-2015-Initiative 2009, 2010, 2011, QTS:2014).

Chart No 10: Greek-Cypriot identity narratives

![Chart showing Greek-Cypriot identity narratives](image)

Chart No 11: Temporal comparison of Greek-Cypriot perceptions of identity

![Chart showing temporal comparison](image)

Similar to Turkish-Cypriots, we can observe a gradual decrease in Greek-Cypriots’ attachment to Greece as their motherland where 48% of Greek-Cypriots considered Greece as their motherland in 2014 compared to 52% in 2008 (Cyprus-2015-Initiative 2009, 2010, 2011,

\textsuperscript{133} These values are 88%, 8%, 63% and 28% for Turkish-Cypriots respectively.
QTS:2014). Yet, compared to Turkish-Cypriots’ relations with Turkey and their attachment to Cyprus, Greek-Cypriots consider both Greece and Cyprus as their motherland to a lesser extent (QTS:2014)\textsuperscript{134}.

\textbf{Chart No 12: Temporal Comparison of Greek-Cypriot perceptions of motherland}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{chart12}
\caption{Temporal Comparison of Greek-Cypriot perceptions of motherland}
\end{figure}

\textbf{Chart No 13: Comparison of perceptions of motherland between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots (QTS:2014)}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{chart13}
\caption{Comparison of perceptions of motherland between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots (QTS:2014)}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{134} The visible drop in attachment to Greece as the motherland also owes much to the financial crisis in this period as it reinforced feelings of betrayal and blame similar to the feelings from 1974. The same can be said for Turkish-Cypriots, who are increasingly disassociating themselves from Turkey, due to the more Islamic and less secular direction of the country under the AKP government. This demonstrates that shifts in identity narratives are highly dependent on the dynamics of the respective motherlands in particular as the self-identity narratives have an inter-subjective relationship with self’s significant others.
Although Greeks and Greekness is not securitised as a threat to Greek-Cypriot identity like Turks and Turkishness is in the TCc, Mavratsas recognises the identity dilemma in the Greek-Cypriot identity narratives, where they call the Greeks “kalamarades”, who are deceitful, who talk a lot and are inferior, but simultaneously maintain a more idealised form of Greek ancestry that is inseparable from their Cypriotness (Mavratsas 1999). This dilemma shows itself in an inherent tension in the social construction of Greek-Cypriotness and on the level of individual consciousness, where it polarises Greek-Cypriot society between ‘Hellenic/Greek ethno-centrists’ and ‘Cypriotists’. Mavratsas argues that while ethno-centrism sets the parameters of ideological orthodoxy and is the mainstream political and theoretical consciousness, Cypriotism occupies Greek-Cypriots on the level of everyday consciousness (Mavratsas 1999). Yet, despite the declining appeal of ethnic identity narratives and motherland-centrism, people from Turkey are securitised as a threat across the spectrum.

A civil society representative from the political party EDEK (The Movement for Social Democracy) corroborates this perception of threat; “People from Turkey are illegal, and colonisation is a crime against humanity. They should leave the island. ...[However], what about those that are from mixed marriage? I can accept those, but the general rule is the above. My biggest fear is Turkish imperialism. For me [it] is clear that Turkey wants to control the whole island, and this is something that really scares me” (CSOS-GCc:2014). Consequently, the ontological security of Greek-Cypriots is further challenged by the presence of the Turkish immigrants in north Cyprus and that any settlement for a unified Cyprus would include and legitimise their existence regardless of the numbers that are allowed to stay after a settlement. In conflicts, ontological security of the dominant self rests on the assumption that the minority other is not legitimate (Zarakol 2010, Celik 2013), and in the case of Cyprus, the Greek-Cypriot narrative maintains that the illegitimacy of ‘Turkishness’ on the island stems from the illegality of the administration in the north and the Turkish invasion of 1974. Accordingly, a great majority of Greek-Cypriots (80%) demand their repatriation to Turkey in a post-settlement scenario.

According to the UN sanctioned comprehensive peace settlement known as the Annan Plan of 2004 capped the number of persons of Turkish origin who would become citizens of the united Cyprus as 45,000 (See Hatay 2007, Dodd 2006).
Alecos Tringides, co-founder of IKME (Socio-political Studies Institute) and the Greek-Cypriot chair of the Cypriots’ Voice think-tank, explains that the reason for his involvement in bi-communal initiatives is based on his guilt because the older people are responsible for the current situation. He stresses the difficulty of talking to people about issues that are particularly ‘demonised’ and are sources of hostility. Although Tringides states that there are “too many people from Turkey in the northern part of Cyprus”, he strongly supports their integration in society and their involvement in the reconciliation efforts. While Tringides adopts a highly tolerant attitude towards citizenship issues in a post-settlement scenario where he believes “All people in the north are citizens of the future northern constituent state, thus all should be allowed to remain”, he simultaneously thinks “they pose security concern for political and social life. They participate in elections so they can swing the developments accordingly. With their dependence on religion they contaminate the society with backward turning obstacles” (CSOS-GCc:2014). Fittingly, fieldwork findings show perceived threat levels posed by people from Turkey is alarmingly high among the GCc, where 78% agree with the statement that Turkish immigrants threaten their Cypriot identity and 83% think that there are too many people from Turkey in north Cyprus (QTS:2014).

136 A 4 minute short interview with Tringides can be found here: http://www.ikme.eu/index.php/en/
Theodossopoulos writes that the Greeks are obsessed with the imprecise, all-inclusive, generalised category of the Turk, where the undifferentiated Turk is presented as the indispensable ingredient of nation building both in Greece and Cyprus. This presentation is one of the most representative examples of a ‘national other’ used as a key anchor for imagining the ‘national self’ (Theodossopoulos 2007). In parallel with the concepts of ‘justificatory rhetoric’ and ‘minor narcissistic differences’, Theodossopoulos provides a comprehensive attempt to study the inconsistencies and paradoxes of the perceptions of self and other from an anthropological perspective using the concept of ‘hollow categories’. Drawing on Adener and Chapman, Theodossopoulos describes ‘hollow categories’ as the
forever incomplete and malleable ways of seeing the world, which can be supplemented with additional meaning at any base and time to mould it into something that can accommodate the paradoxes of change (see Ardener and Chapman 1989, Theodossopoulos 2007). Hollowness in the concept is not a value judgement on validity or on importance of the categorisations, but reflects the subjectivity and externality of the image produced for the other. It denotes the image of an out-group that is reinvented and reproduced by the self, or other-selves that are in some way in close proximity to the out-group. These meanings and distinctions that are externally produced are then imposed upon the out-group as ‘real’ and ‘valid’ and are not only reflected in self-narratives but also in relationships and routines.

Evidence of difference that justifies the self-narrative as distinct from the generalised categorisation of the Turk is abundant in what Theodossopoulos calls the ‘Greek political cosmology’ (Theodossopoulos 2007:6). This difference is unchallenged by the response of the ‘other’, as the political cosmology of the Turks also differentiates the generalised categorisation of the Greeks, hence reinforcing the identity of the self. For Theodossopoulos, “The Turks, in whatever capacity they are discussed, inspire the moral and national imagination of many people in mainland Greece and the island of Cyprus. And in this respect the Greeks appear to be preoccupied with the all-inclusive, generalised category of the Turk” (Theodossopoulos 2007:2). This hollow categorisation facilitates ‘common sense’ interpretation of old and new realities, which are in turn reproduced as primordial and inescapable categorisations that are taken for granted; the self then reads and interprets all events and relationships from this ‘external’ window.

We can find evidence of this in political psychology as well. Volkan explains, “chosen trauma is a large group’s mental representation of a historic event that resulted in collective feelings of helplessness, victimisation, shame, and humiliation at the hands of others, and typically involves drastic losses of people, land, prestige and dignity” (Volkan 2006:173). Hence, the chosen trauma is located in the sense of ‘we-ness’ and becomes a symbol of ‘who we are’. It is subsequently inherited by the next generations and deposited into the developing selves of children, who are expected to reverse the helplessness and humiliation. Examining the case of Georgia, Volkan studies how perceived threats can reactivate chosen mythologised traumas;
just like Rumelili’s peace-anxieties that can reproduce conflicts, Volkan explains how reactivation of chosen traumas can manifest into a stubborn resistance to peaceful resolution of conflicts (Volkan 2006).

Within the context of the Cyprus Problem, this chosen trauma for Greek-Cypriots is the Turkish invasion, where everything before it is idealised as good and peaceful, and everything after it is presented as chaos, loss and deprivation. Underpinned by the trauma of the 1974, both civil society representatives and the general population perceive Turkish immigrants as an obstacle to their desired future. According to the quantitative surveys, 68% of Greek-Cypriots agree with the statement that people from Turkey are a major obstacle to reaching a comprehensive settlement on the island (QTS:2014).

Chart 17. Greek-Cypriot perceptions of Turkish immigrants in relation to a settlement (QTS:2014)

To appreciate the impact of 1974 on the Greek-Cypriots’ psyche and self-esteem, Michalis Michael turns to the emotionally charged weeks before the April 2004 referendum three decades later. He argues that U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell’s comment in an interview that ‘it is 2004 and not 1974’, unleashed the fears and insecurities of Greek-Cypriots, reactivating their chosen symbolic trauma and hence causing them to withdraw to their entrenched positions of exclusive ‘we-ness’ (see Michael 2011). The trauma of 1974 was exacerbated by parallels drawn with the loss of Constantinople in 1453 and then the Asia
Minor Catastrophe of 1922. Considering that their EU membership was unconditional and that Turkey and people from Turkey were still part of the equation\textsuperscript{137} in a potential comprehensive settlement, with lack of alternative narratives to challenge the perception of the enemy, Greek-Cypriots read the Annan Plan from the windows tinted by their chosen trauma. Michael writes how 2004 triggered the memories of 1974, which “perpetuated the image of the ‘unspeakable’ Turk as Orthodox Hellenism’s eternal enemy, out to expel them from their ancestral homeland, in a melancholic fatalism coloured by betrayal, defeat, and loss” (Michael 2011:33).

Thus, securitisation of Turkey, people from Turkey and Turkishness is rooted in the historical narratives of Greek-Cypriots and is reproduced with the memory of the trauma of 1974. Consequently, while Turkey is seen as the sole responsible actor for the Cyprus Problem, people from Turkey and by extension Turkishness is seen as an obstacle to peace. As a result, despite their desires for peace, accepting a potential peace agreement that includes Turkish immigrants and Turkey’s guarantorship creates peace-anxieties for Greek-Cypriots as it challenges their disassociation\textsuperscript{138} from Turkey as a strategy to manage their anxieties that stem from 1974. Without the involvement of people from Turkey in reconciliation efforts and desecuritisation of Turkishness, the events of 1974 will continue to aggravate Greek-Cypriots’ peace-anxieties and haunt their decision-making throughout the peace process.

\textsuperscript{137} Be it the issues about guarantors, number of settlers that were to remain, property and return of IDPs or the Turkish military.

\textsuperscript{138} Such as not allowing Turkish immigrants to cross to the RoC or not having economic and political relationship with Turkey.
8.3 Perceptions of Difference and Peace Anxieties

Spyros Spyrou’s work on ethnic identity of Greek-Cypriot children demonstrates that despite declining motherland-centrism among the GCc, Cypriotness is still founded upon Hellenism, makes imagining the ‘Turkish-Cypriot’ difficult (Spyrou 2001, 2006, 2007). Spyrou discusses how Greek-Cypriot school children do not know where to place Turkish-Cypriots; when asked about Turkish-Cypriots, Greek-Cypriot children provide answers like “they are our own people, but they are being held by the Turks” or that “their mother or father was Greek”, because they find it difficult to denote Cypriotness without implying Greekness (Spyrou 2006:129). This illustrates how the difference inside the self confuses the binary and oppositional logic of ethno-centrist identity narratives that do not leave room for complexity and ambiguity. Spyrou highlights a structural ambiguity in the category of ‘Turkish-Cypriot’, where the first part designates them as complete others, as ‘Turks’ who are their barbaric nemesis and the second part designates them as part of the self, leading him to conclude that ‘Turkish-Cypriot’ is a “contradiction in terms” (Spyrou 2006).

Nevertheless, the perception that Turkish-Cypriots are part-self is demonstrated in the tendencies of Greek-Cypriots to differentiate between Turkish-Cypriots and Turkish immigrants. This differentiation is not dissimilar to the Turkish-Cypriots’ own perception that is based on modernity, Europeanness and superiority. Like Turkish-Cypriot civil society representatives, Greek-Cypriot civil society representatives cite religion, backwardness, orientalism and opposing political interest as the key elements in their reasoning. For example, George Pachis\(^{139}\) argues that it is highly desirable for all people who came from Turkey after 1974, including their descendants, to return to Turkey except for those who intermarried [with Turkish-Cypriots]. He also adds that Turkish immigrants “are completely different to the Turkish Cypriots in all aspects” (CSOS-GCc:2014). Similarly, Joseph Bayada from New Cyprus Association, who defines himself as “only Cypriot and not at all Greek”, strongly disagrees with the statement that ‘people from Turkey are no different than other

\(^{139}\) George Pachis is an active member in Estia (Focus) Cultural Group, SMMK (Cyprus Mechanical Engineers Association), ETEK (The Cyprus Scientific and Technical Chamber, an umbrella Chamber for all engineers) and the Cypriots’ Voice think-tank.
migrants in Cyprus’. Bayada highlights the differences between Turkish-Cypriots and Turkish immigrants, and between Greek-Cypriots and Greeks:

“They pose a threat both in political and social terms, so long as their allegiance is with Turkey rather than Cyprus. Moreover, because of their different and lower cultural niveau\textsuperscript{140} compared to Turkish-Cypriots, [they are] downgrading our society as a whole. ... I think that mentality wise we are different to Greeks, we are less religious, less deceitful, less distrustful and [more] naive. Save for the language, we are closer to Turkish-Cypriots, mentality wise, sharing the same values but [we are] more religious unfortunately.”

The uncertainty about the numbers of Turkish immigrants in the north, the dependency of the Turkish-Cypriots on Turkey and the perceived threats posed by Turkish immigrants are effectively used as a ‘stick’ to create a sense of urgency around reaching a comprehensive settlement on the island. The RoC and Greek-Cypriots, use of the term settler to refer to all Turkish nationals present on the island creates the appearance that all of these persons have citizenship, voting rights, and so the ability to influence elections and politics in the north. The RoC estimates 130,000-160,000 ‘settlers’ and 85,000 indigenous Turkish-Cypriots, suggesting that almost two-thirds of the Turkish Cypriot electorate is now of Turkish mainland origin (Hatay 2007). These figures, which are mainly calculated based on entries and exists from the ports are highly problematic because they include those Turkish-Cypriots who hold Republic of Turkey passports as well, exacerbate the securitisation of Turkish immigrants and hence Greek-Cypriots’ peace-anxieties. The suggestion that Turkish-Cypriots are ‘outnumbered’ and the ‘TRNC’ being so dependent on Turkey might gradually come to be a Turkish province, implies that Greek-Cypriots and the RoC would then not have the Turkish-Cypriots and the ‘TRNC’, but Turkey as their neighbour\textsuperscript{141}, which is ‘of course’ less desirable than Turkish-Cypriots, who are at least more European and part-self (see Morgan 2002). Similarly, Greek-Cypriot civil society representatives, who argue that immigrants outnumber Turkish-Cypriots

\textsuperscript{140} A level or plateau (as of existence or achievement) especially in a progression (i.e. cultural niveau/level and religious niveau/level.

\textsuperscript{141} Akıncı used the same ‘stick’ to create a sense of urgency around reaching a comprehensive settlement and said: “if no deal, Greek Cypriots could find themselves ‘neighbours with Turkey’” (CyprusMail, 19 September 2016).
in north Cyprus, actively voice their concerns for the ‘endangered’ Turkish-Cypriot identity (CSOS-GCc:2014):

“...I think they pose a social concern to Turkish Cypriots, who may soon be a minority in their own country.” (Anonymous, Cans for Kids)

“They are multiplying in a way that in a few years Cypriots, Greek and Turkish Cypriots will be a minority” (Anonymous, Peace Centre)

“... since the TRNC is not internationally recognised, the Turkish immigrants live in a gilded cage, outnumbering native Turkish Cypriots and distorting the political and social situation.” (Anonymous, ACCEPT and Cyprus Family Planning Association)

Furthermore, fieldwork data also shows that Greek-Cypriots, who securitise people from Turkey significantly more than Turkish-Cypriots and feel less victimisation from Turkish-Cypriots, are more willing to engage in social and professional relationships with Turkish-Cypriots compared to Turkish immigrants. For example, while 59% of Greek-Cypriots stated they would be open to making Turkish-Cypriot friends, only 29% were open to making Turkish friends; and while 65% of Greek-Cypriots do not want Turkish neighbours, this value is only 24% when it comes to Turkish-Cypriots (QTS:2014).
In addition to the perception that Turkish-Cypriots are half-self, this stark difference Greek-Cypriots draw between Turkish-Cypriots and Turkish immigrants can also be attributed to the success of reconciliation and confidence building efforts. Over the last 5 decades, Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots moved from a polarised point where they saw themselves as the continuation of their motherlands and where their desires about the future were mutually exclusive, to a point where they recognise their similarities and loyalties to Cyprus rather than to the ‘motherlands’. Yet, the Cyprus Problem is still ongoing and reaching a comprehensive settlement on the island had proven elusive. Despite the peacebuilding efforts and the shifting identity narratives, Turkish-Cypriots still remain part compatriot, part-enemy and mainly the minority who is not Cypriot enough in Greek-Cypriots’ narratives. This contradiction raises the question if Turkish-Cypriots are part-self, then are people from Turkey part-self or are they the enemy other for Greek-Cypriots? Thus, securitisation of Turkish immigrants and Turkishness is creating peace-anxieties for Greek-Cypriots not only because accepting a solution means accepting to live with the enemy-other as Turkey and Turkish immigrants are part of the reality in Cyprus, but also because the ambiguity of the term ‘Turkish-Cypriot’ challenges their ontological security and creates dissonance.
The quantitative data corroborates that the feelings of anxiety voiced by civil society is shared across the community. The first chart below confirms that Greek-Cypriots’ anxiety about the prospect of reaching a settlement (47%) is higher that their anxiety about living next to a Turkish-Cypriot (37%), and Greek-Cypriots voice highest levels of anxiety about living next to a Turk (62%). The second table shows the relationship between anxieties about a potential settlement and perceived levels of threat to their Cypriot identity\textsuperscript{142}, illustrating that those who perceive more threats from people from Turkey also feel more peace-anxieties. To confirm the dependence between both values, a chi-square test is used, which confirms this positive relationship and dependence between the two statements. As such, 51% of those who stated that the prospect of reaching a settlement makes them anxious feel threatened by people from Turkey (QTS:2014).

\textbf{Chart No 19: Greek-Cypriot feelings of anxiety (QTS:2014)}

\begin{table}
\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{GCc - The prospect of reaching a settlement makes me anxious.} & \textbf{GCc - The prospect of living next to a Turkish-Cypriot makes me anxious.} & \textbf{GCc - The prospect of living next to a Turk makes me anxious.} \\
\hline
0.0% & 10.0% & 20.0% \\
10.0% & 20.0% & 30.0% \\
20.0% & 30.0% & 40.0% \\
30.0% & 40.0% & 50.0% \\
40.0% & 50.0% & 60.0% \\
50.0% & 60.0% & 70.0% \\
60.0% & 70.0% & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{142} The questionnaire did not ask the respondents about their perceived levels of ‘physical threat’. Thus, it should be noted that that the relationship between anxieties about a potential settlement and perceived levels of threat only pertains to perceived threats to Greek-Cypriots’ Cypriotness and not to their perceived physical threats, such as pertaining to the Turkish military or living next to a Turk. The first chart clearly demonstrates that 62% of Greek-Cypriots feel anxious about living next to a Turk.
Table No 9: Cross-tabulation between Greek-Cypriot fears and anxieties about a settlement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q5.5 People from Turkey are threatening our Cypriot identity</th>
<th>Q10.1 The prospect of reaching a settlement makes me anxious</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strongly/ Somewhat disagree</strong></td>
<td>Strongly/ Somewhat disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>count</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>35.82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Neutral</strong></td>
<td>count</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>42.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strongly/ Somewhat agree</strong></td>
<td>count</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>31.88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>count</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-Square Tests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Chi-Square</td>
<td>99,770a</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N of Valid Cases</td>
<td>496</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The civil society questionnaires and the quantitative survey data demonstrate that Greek-Cypriots peace-anxieties are underpinned by the securitisation of Turkishness as a threat, which highlights the need for desecuritisation strategies to help manage these peace-anxieties. Focusing only on the relationship between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots, the peacebuilding efforts on the island has been unsuccessful (or unaware) in addressing the multiplicity of identities, tug-of-war between ethnic and civic/cultural expressions of identity and ‘secondary’ self-other relationships. As previously discussed, in addition to accepting to live side by side with their enemy other, Greek-Cypriots also feel anxiety about a potential no-solution or partition scenario that challenges their identity-narratives founded upon the Hellenic heritage and unity of the island. Similar to the Turkish-Cypriots ontological dissonance\textsuperscript{143}, competing anxieties and fears of Greek-Cypriots also create dissonance where addressing one exacerbates the other. An important parallel can be drawn between Lupovici’s analysis of the ontological dissonance that stem from the multiplicity of Israeli identities and the inability of the peace process to simultaneously address them, and the case of Cyprus (Lupovici 2015).

\textsuperscript{143} Turkish-Cypriots’ anxieties about being stuck in a stalemate and their biographical continuity as a distinct identity among the growing number of Turkish immigrants and dependence on Turkey contradicts their identity-narratives as ethnically Turkish, as Turks who live in Cyprus and as Turks of Cyprus who were saved by Turkey. Their insistence on Turkey’s guarantorship and military presence on the island as part of a settlement scenario in turn exacerbate their anxieties by being one of the major issues that draw the negotiations to an impasse.
Lupovici’s argument that the Israeli policy based on encouraging a separation between Fatah and Hamas provides a way to deal with this dissonance resembles the differentiation Greek-Cypriots make between Turks and Turkish-Cypriot (Lupovici 2015). The Turkish-Cypriot is the better version of the Turk, like Fatah is the better, less threatening version of Hamas; the Turkish-Cypriot is also a victim of the Turk, just like Fatah. Although still the other and still uncomfortable, the Turkish-Cypriot is more familiar, more self, and less enemy, and hence generates less anxiety than the Turk. Simultaneously, reconfiguring Turkish-Cypriots as friends and compatriots may exacerbate feelings of insecurity pertaining to people from Turkey by bringing the ‘enemy’ closer to the definition of the self/friend. This splits the identity of the other and means that a Turkish-Cypriot needs to primarily be Cypriot to be a friend to the Greek-Cypriot.

For Lupovici, the presentation of the conflict with Hamas enables Israel to alleviate some anxieties while engagement in conflict resolution with Fatah appeases others. Similarly, institutionalised securitisation dynamics that define Turkey and Turkishness as unruly, aggressive, expansionist and non-European preserve the national identity narratives for Greek-Cypriots. Simultaneously, maintaining their commitment to the peace process with Turkish-Cypriots by engaging in negotiations appeases anxieties about partition and about losing half of their home/land to Turkey, and preserves the narrative that if not for the Turkish invasion, Cypriots would have lived peacefully. The differentiation between the Turkish-Cypriot and the Turk also allows Greek-Cypriots to shift the blame to Turkey and maintain the myth of return and the myth of a peaceful ancient island of Aphrodite. Lupovici suggests that while this helps to contain the contradictions in Israeli identity and manage some of the anxieties in dissonance, it thwarts meaningful and comprehensive resolution attempts (Lupovici 2015). Similarly in Cyprus, dissonance and lack of desecuritisation of Turkishness shows itself as a crucial element that is missing from the peace process. As such, it contributes to a deadlock about practical issues at the negotiation table such as citizenship, repatriation of Turkish migrants, limitations upon the return of Greek-Cypriot IDPs and Turkey’s guarantees, and undermines meaningful reconciliation among those that do not fit the narrow dual-ethnic approach.
Lupovici explains that for Israelis while the burden of moving to peace is too heavy given the ensuing anxieties stemming from the challenges to self/other narratives; not moving towards peace brings moral questions and anxieties based on condemnation as well as the insecurities of an unpeaceful situation (Lupovici 2015). Faced with ontological dissonance, a new reality can be constructed based on elements of both peace and conflict, where the conflict is maintained but there is a constant effort towards peace. Subsequently, conflicts become protracted because the conflict itself becomes a source of ontological security, a way to deal with the insecurities created by reaching the either end of the spectrum, peace settlement vs. partition/giving up on ‘peace’. Such an in-between reality also creates peace fatigue and frustration about the process, fuelling indifference or the spoilers of ‘peace’ that paint the other as uncompromising.

However the contradiction that Turkish-Cypriots are part-enemy and part-self offers hope and opportunity for desecuritisation of Turkishness. Theodossopoulos explains that ‘revelatory incidents’ are very important for hollow categories of threatening others as their hollowness allows for reconfiguration based on experience. He argues that on top of already available existing information about ‘the others’, there is hollow capacity to add new data and new experiences to customise the political cosmologies that are inherited and passed down through official narratives, history and myths. For example, encounters can create new routines and new experiences, and challenge and radically transform the generalised categories of the other. In Theodossopolous’ words “Such is the hollowness of political cosmologies that it allows for the incorporation of the unexpected: accidental encounters with the Other, ‘revelatory incidents’ … charged with the meaningfulness of social relationships” (Theodossopoulos 2007:6). In order for revelatory incidents to not only challenge the hollow category but also help reformulate it, they need to be inclusive and frequent enough to create an impetus. This bares similarity with the (de)securitisation framework. Institutionalised securitisation practices that are interpreted from the tinted window of the hollow categories, also reinforce the hollow categories by adding more meaning. Thus, revelatory incidents that challenge these also need to be institutionalised enough to result in reconfiguration of the hollow category from one that is latent with the perceptions of enmity to one where difference is not translated into threat and danger.
Therefore, I argue that the failure to include Turkish immigrants in reconciliation efforts to desecuritise Turkishness and to take ontological security implications into consideration creates significant peace-anxieties for Greek-Cypriots and thwarts peacebuilding.

The generalised categorisations that reproduce the self in opposition to an enemy other can be challenged and reconfigured through confidence building and reconciliation initiatives that can act as revelatory incidents; but these not only challenge the identity of the self but also the routines and relationships that are taken for granted. Mitzen explains a critical situation that causes ontological insecurity may arise from deep uncertainty, such as a sudden change in identity definitions (Mitzen 2006). A potential peace agreement is an example of a critical situation that generates uncertainty, because it essentially reconfigures the enemy, creating a sudden change in identity definitions. Faced with critical situations that create peace-anxieties, such as the 2004 referenda, the self is tempted to fortify the borders of its identity, more often than not by turning to exclusivist rhetoric to differentiate between members and non-members. If actors cannot adapt their routines reflexively and are not given the tools to manage the anxieties effectively, they resort to xenophobic, fundamentalist and populist accounts of nationalism, ethnicity and religion to remedy the fractures in their self-narratives as an ontological security seeking strategy (Kinnvall 2004).

This argument can be supported by the accounts of Greek-Cypriot civil society representatives, who underline their desires for peace but also voice their anxieties about a comprehensive settlement (CSOS-GCc:2014):

“It [prospect of a solution] makes me a bit anxious because the prospect of armed conflict and political stagnation is always looming over the island. ...No-solution does not make me anxious since it is the status quo I grew up with. Anxiety is usually the product of thinking of the unknown and the dividing line is not unknown. No solution makes me feel miserable, disappointed and sad. (Anonymous, AHDR (Association for Historical Dialogue and Research), KISA (The Movement for Equality, Support, Anti-Racism), Transparency Cyprus, NGO Support Centre)
“A prospect of a solution makes me anxious because it will be a new system, very much different to the one we both have now, and I'm not certain how our politicians but also fellow citizens will react to it, even if they vote for it. However, if there's a high percentage of people from both communities in favour of a solution, ... I believe I will be less anxious. A possibility of a no solution doesn't make me very anxious, because this is the environment I grew up in... If things radically change, in terms of a decision being taken to re-unite the island or officially decide to endorse, in some way, the current status quo then, I would be anxious on how people in the 'extreme' part of the society may react.” (Anonymous, UNDP-Action for Cooperation and Trust)

Linking ontological security to conflict resolution, Rumelili argues, if we do not address these peace-anxieties that challenge the self-other narratives, we create a distrustful environment conducive to political manipulation, which acts to re-channel this anxiety into specific and habituated fears (Rumelili 2015). As a result, parties in conflict may elevate minor issues to existential ones; find outstanding aspects of the negotiations too difficult to compromise on; or generate new issues of discord to reinforce their positions and self-image. Rumelili and Mitchell also argue that ontological insecurity, if not addressed, would also empower spoilers of the peace processes both during or after a settlement is reached (Mitchell 2015, Rumelili 2015). This points to a gaping hole in the mainstream approach to peacebuilding, where not considering ontological (in)securities and excluding Turkish immigrants limits our capacity to deal with the affective, emotional, and perceptual realm of peacebuilding.

Stories and revelatory incidents that unsettle the compulsive, exclusive narratives that reinforce the sense of distinction at the expense of the other can provide alternative narratives. These can be effective tools of desecuritisation as part of a bigger, more inclusive and nuanced peacebuilding. As a result, the two ‘polar’ stories create a spectrum that can be filled with other alternative narratives about other-selves and other-others who are both distinct but similar, without imposing an all-inclusive similarity like the ‘babyland’ rhetoric or an all-inclusive difference like the ‘Turk as the primordial enemy’ or an exclusive Cypriotism that transcends difference and essentialises Cypriotness. Providing alternative self-other
narratives would also provide uncertainty and ambiguity, but coupled with holistic and institutionalised desecuritisation strategies.\footnote{Such as collaborative civil society initiatives that include Turkish immigrants in their efforts, school initiatives that increase interaction and socialisation between Cypriots and Turkish immigrants, alternative media platforms that challenge misinformation.} I argue the self can find comfort this ambiguity.

Comparable to the case of Linobambakoi, and to the case of Ålandars in terms of ambiguous self-identities, Ilay Romain Örs provides an anthropological study of Greek Istanbulians, who she calls Rum Polites. She describes the ways in which Rum Polites, who were initially exempt from the population exchange of 1920s but were gradually ‘expatriated’ to Athens, speak of the ‘homeland’ they long for (Örs 2007). In her analysis, the ‘homeland’ for Rum Polites is not Athens of Greece, but is Istanbul/Constantinople of Turkey; where they think the city belongs to them and they belong to the city as the true natives along with other true Istanbulians, be it Turks or Armenians (Örs 2007). Anatolian Turks are not part of ‘self’ and Athenian ‘Greeks’ are different to self too. It is the city and the natives of the city that is within their self-narrative. They are a non-Muslim minority in the Turkish narratives and a diaspora who ‘returned’ in the Greek narratives; but for Rum Polites themselves, they are not at home in Athens, but in fact, away. Rum Polites, who acknowledge the kinship with Greece but do not consider themselves Greek because they do not have a ‘pure bloodline’, base their ontological security in their ambiguous in-betweenness like Ålandars. Örs’ emotive analysis of Rum Polites, unsettles the distinctions ethnic and religious categorisations prescribe, where the polarised self-other distinctions of Greekness and Turkishness exist in one narrative; the loyalty is not to their ethnicity or religion but it is to The City (i Poli) itself. Unlike Rum Polites that have found comfort on the Greek-Turkish spectrum or like the Ålandars that found theirs on the Finnish-Swedish spectrum without resorting to securitisation, due to a securitised relationship with Turkishness, Turkish-Cypriots are yet to comfortably exist on their Cypriot-Turkish spectrum. This creates peace-anxieties that prove hard to accommodate for Greek-Cypriots and ontological dissonance for Turkish-Cypriots.
8.4 Conclusion

This chapter explored growing Cypriotism among the GCc on a temporal timeline and their declining attachment to Greece as the motherland. The chapter analyses the way Turks and Turkishness is securitised in Greek-Cypriots’ narratives by borrowing from anthropology and psychoanalysis and engaging with concepts such as ‘hollow categories’ and ‘chosen traumas’, which are highly relevant for the ontological security framework as they are integral to identity narratives and the conception of the self. These concepts outside of the IR literature enrich the analysis and help us unpack the concept of identity. They also help demonstrate the inter-subjective nature of self-identity narratives, which allows for reconfiguration and adaptation through desecuritisation (i.e. challenging chosen traumas with alternative accounts or adding meaning to hollow categories with revelatory incidents). Demonstrating that Greek-Cypriots differentiate Turkish-Cypriots from Turks and that they perceive more victimisation and threat posed by Turks than Turkish-Cypriots, the chapter argues that despite this differentiation, securitisation of Turkishness turns Turkish-Cypriots into a contradiction in terms and creates peace-anxieties for Greek-Cypriots. These peace-anxieties are further exacerbated by the presence of Turkish immigrants in north Cyprus and the involvement of Turkey and the Turkish military in the Cyprus Problem.

The evidence suggests that securitisation of people from Turkey has a positive relationship with peace-anxieties. Thus, desecuritisation of Turkishness can help Greek-Cypriots manage their existential peace-anxieties without translating difference into exclusive identity categories and behavioural othering and facilitate transformative peace on the island. Accordingly, the chapter suggests that inclusion of Turkish immigrants in the peace process can present an opportunity for frequent and diverse ‘revelatory incidents’ that can help mould hollow categorisations and reconfigure the engrained identity narratives based on enmity. Although this sounds like a simple “Add Turks and stir” suggestion, its ontological implications are more nuanced. If not diverse and frequent enough or not institutionalised, the revelatory incidents can be interpreted as odd experiences disconnected from daily routines and moulded to fit around the mainstream generalised category like an exception to the rule. Or, simply adding people from Turkey to the peace process without ontological
security considerations could result in incapacitating anxieties rather than revelatory incidents that prompt self-reflexivity, and in turn trigger compulsive attachment to routines or resecuritisation as an ontological security seeking practice. These desecuritisation strategies should be devised and timed carefully, ideally with the participation and integration of civil society both in the design and implementation phases.

Desecuritisations that bridge the political level with the societal level do not need to reinvent the wheel of peacebuilding. However, in order to achieve transformative peace in Cyprus, different layers of ‘otherness’, beyond the primary self/other approach, need to be taken into account to include other-selves, other-others and othered-selves and to open up alternative understandings of Greekness, Cypriotness, Turkishness and Europeanness. CMBs that helped shift the identity narratives of Cypriots can be expanded to include Turkish immigrants and Turkishness. The CBMs that receive the highest support from Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots include measures such as restoration of cultural and historical sites and mutual official apologies for past mistakes and hurts (Cyprus-2015-Initiative 2011). However, the design and implementation of CBMs as well as the public opinion polls regarding the CBMs only focus on Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots. Inclusion of Turkish immigrants in public opinion surveys to gauge their support and willingness towards certain CBMs and their inclusion in the design and implementation of some CBMs can be a way to institutionalise desecuritisation strategies. For example, complimenting the efforts on missing people in Cyprus, which can reinforce the cruelty of the other and the victimhood of the self, with stories about intermarriages can provide an alternative narrative that adds ambiguity to the image of the other in a positive way. Challenging the exclusive identity narratives through revelatory incidents and adding ambiguity can provide more room for reconfiguration of the image of the enemy-other along the lines of different-other, where both differences and similarities are acknowledged and celebrated.

From a psychological perspective, Volkan argues that large group identities by default necessitate enemies and allies (Volkan 2006). As previously discussed, this approach is similar

145 For example, Emel Akcali reports the environmental confidence building measures based on civic participation in Cyprus were among the most effective (Akçali and Antonsich 2009).
to the one Behnke and Roe takes, where difference is translated into a discourse of security. For example, while Behnke, argues that ‘inclusion and community can only be had at the price of exclusion and adversity’ (Behnke 2006:65); Roe, arguing that desecuritisation of minorities would undermine their distinctiveness, reads identity configurations from an essentially ‘securitised’ lens (Roe 2006). Conversely, Rumelili, who argues that what identities necessitate is difference not a securitised relation based on survival, suggests that desecuritisation of minority rights would not necessarily undermine their collective distinctiveness, but it can end the reproduction of this distinctiveness through the representation of the majority as a threat (Rumelili 2004, Rumelili 2013). Thus desecuritisation of the ‘other(s)’ in the case of Cyprus to foster an inclusive large-group identity for a long-lasting peace settlement on the island would not necessarily minimise and diminish the existing variant identities (ethnic, religious etc.). Instead, it may mean more ontological security as it will reinforce their sense of biographical continuity and their faith in the future.

Exploring what we are not helps us define what we are, and identity narratives draw borders and boundaries that by default leave some out and keep some in. However, identity is not singular or absolute, nor is it ‘complete’; it can find comfort in ambiguity. Agreeing with Rumelili, and Browning and Joenniemi, I too argue that difference is simply difference and does not have to translate into a black and white representation of enemy and friend (see Rumelili 2004, Browning and Joenniemi 2013). Although making peace with an enemy-other is bound to challenge actors’ comfort zones and create anxieties by associating the self with what is ‘outside’ of the identity narratives that is rationalised and engrained as dangerous and threatening, peacebuilding would be most effective if it reconfigures relationships with the nuances of difference as well as similarity. In other words, bringing salient parties in conflict based on an imposition of sameness underestimates nuances of identity and ontological security. Therefore, growing Cypriotism if not imagined in inclusive and ambiguous terms that allow for hyphenation and variance, challenges actors’ ontological security by imposing sameness, which makes Turkish-Cypriots insecure due to their fears about assimilation, and makes Greek-Cypriots insecure by adding Turkishness into Cypriotness. As such, reconciliation efforts that emphasise sameness by underplaying other identity signifiers such as ethnicity and do not acknowledge and celebrate nuances of identity, not only create gatekeepers by
excluding those who prioritise their ethnic identities but also exacerbate peace-anxieties by ‘resisting’ perceived differences.

Constantinou links the essentialism in Cypriot identity narratives that reify difference to the advent of modern governmentality, which sought to divide, classify and categorise the population on the island, and reify fluid and ambiguous ethno-religious boundaries that existed, like in the case of Linobambakoi (Constantinou 2007). For Constantinou, the Cyprus Problem “progressively abnormalised or exoticised” the hybrid communities that complicated and transgressed the binary framework of modern governmentality and essentialised classifications (Constantinou 2007:247). Subsequently, bicommunalism became the dominant form of thinking about the destiny of collectivities in Cyprus and in Constantinou’s terms it “has been entrenched to such an extent that, realistically, it can no longer be challenged directly” (Constantinou 2007:265). Nevertheless, the empirical evidence suggests Cypriots are growing more Cypriot, away from their ethno-centrists identity narratives. Although this shift provides an opportunity to cultivate a more flexible and ambiguous sense of Cypriotness, without desecuritisation of people from Turkey and Turkishness, it may simply become another essentialised Cypriotist narrative that becomes perceived as the road to a solution by uniting Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots against a common enemy without effectively reconciling identities and facilitating transformative peace on the island.
Chapter 9. Comparative Analysis: Room for Convergence and the Way Forward

9.1 Introduction

This short chapter builds on the previous two chapters by comparatively illustrating the ontological dissonance and peace-anxieties of the two main communities on the island to search for an intervention point where we can break the vicious cycle that had contributed to the protractedness of the Cyprus Problem. The chapter then scrutinises Cypriots’ willingness to include Turkish immigrants in the peace process and the Turkish-immigrants’ willingness to be included. Although the quantitative data shows that there is very little room for compromise when it comes to the status of the Turkish immigrants after a potential settlement due to strong peace-anxieties and feelings of fear that portrays Turkish immigrants and Turkishness as the primordial enemy of Greeks/Greek-Cypriots, it also illustrates the significant need for desecuritisation strategies. Subsequently, the chapter explores points of convergence by looking at what is tolerable and desirable about different settlement scenarios pertaining to the status of the Turkish immigrants and citizenship in order to suggest a way forward for peacebuilding efforts. As such, according to the civil society surveys, both Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot civil society representatives demonstrate tolerance and willingness to compromise on the issue of Turkey immigrants and explicit readiness to include them in the peace process. This can provide a starting point for desecuritisation as it shows that there is room to include Turkish immigrants in the peacebuilding efforts if we are willing break free of the dual-ethnic approach.
9.2 Comparative Mapping of Dissonance

The empirical data illustrates a case of ontological dissonance for both Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots, and peace-anxieties particularly for Greek-Cypriots. Based on the analysis presented in Chapters 8 and 9, addressing Turkish-Cypriots’ fears about losing their distinct identity among growing numbers of people from Turkey by, for instance, rejecting Turkey’s role as a guarantor or by damaging ties with Turkey, would increase their feelings of insecurity as a minority compared to Greek-Cypriots. Furthermore, rejecting and distancing themselves from the Turkish part of their identity to reproduce their Cypriotness and Europeanness undermines their legitimacy and claims to political equality under a bicomunal, bizonal federation at the negotiation table. Considering that bizonality and bicomunality is a crucial element in negotiations that ‘protects’ the TCc from the majority GCc, this dissonance becomes even more apparent. On the other hand, addressing Greek-Cypriot insecurities about Turkey/Turkishness by, for instance, rejecting a plan where Turkey maintains its guarantorship in Cyprus increases their insecurities about partition. Similarly, considering that their identity narratives are anchored upon the unity of Cyprus and the temporary nature of the division, the prospect of partition challenges the very foundation of this narrative. Equally, saying yes to a comprehensive settlement based on bizonality and bicomunality legitimises the enemy, turns the enemy into a partner at ‘home’ and challenges the Hellenic heritage of Cyprus. Thus, peace negotiations that rely on the reunification of Cyprus based on a bicomunal, bizonal federation based on political equality, single sovereignty and single citizenship, by default, challenge the self-narrative and consequently the ontological security of both Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots.

However, my aim is not to challenge the foundations of peacebuilding based on bicomunality and bizonality, or to argue that the movement on the ontological security spectrum towards the more secure end is easy and fast (that it can be achieved simply by changing the historical textbooks or changing the constitution). Rather, my aim is to emphasise that understanding and analysing the role of ontological security, exploring and investigating different sources of ontological security, and considering anxiety-generating practices that come with peacebuilding is crucial for finding a comprehensive and sustainable
settlement in Cyprus. Failing to understand and consider the nuances of identity, its link with ontological security and the latter’s link with peacebuilding has kept the Cyprus Problem in a deadlock for over four decades. It is time to broaden our understanding of the Cyprus Problem and what it means for variant identities rather than reducing it to merely a negotiation between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots. It is also time to include people from Turkey in our understanding of peacebuilding not only for righteous humanistic purposes but also because of the vital role they play in the stability and continuity of self-narratives and ontological security of Cypriots. The prospect of peace ought to challenge the fears, deprivations and isolations of groups in conflict, which consequently challenges the ontological security of the actors involved by reconfiguring the representation of and the relationship with the other. The anxieties stemming from these challenges, if not managed or challenged constructively, would result in an intensified state of ontological insecurity which would in turn deem desecuritisation of identities and peacebuilding unsustainable; or it would result in the re-securitisation of the other to reinforce and reproduce the identity of the self.

The process of peacebuilding does/needs to entail practices that challenge the narratives of, feelings towards, and understandings of the other. However, peacebuilding efforts in Cyprus has strictly focused on the ‘other’ Cypriot community and disregarded the role Turks/Turkishness play in the Cypriots’ identity narratives and consequently their ontological security. As a result, both communities find themselves in self-perpetuating (in)security cycles resulting in dissonance as they do not know where to place Turkey, people from Turkey and the “Turkishness” of Turkish-Cypriots. According to Rumelili, the success and sustainability of desecuritisation processes depend on whether they are able to construct an altered state of ontological security in order to maintain and/or re-establish the certainty and continuity of being for the actors involved (Rumelili 2013:14). For example, in order for Greek-Cypriots to accept Turkey’s guarantorship or that Turkish immigrants are now part of the reality in the Cyprus Problem and their repatriation to Turkey en masse is an expectation/desire that cannot be realised, desecuritisation strategies need to include reconfiguration of identity narratives pertaining to Turkishness instead of limiting reconciliation between the two ‘Cypriots’ by relying on the differentiation between the Turkish-Cypriot and the Turk. Thus, desecuritisation of Turkishness and inclusion of people from Turkey in the peacebuilding
efforts would facilitate a solution by addressing ontological dissonance and peace-anxieties and contribute to the implementation and sustainability of a peace settlement by reinforcing ontological security of Cypriots. The table below summarises the fears, anxieties, response of the other and suggests that desecuritisation of Turkishness is the way forward to address the ontological dissonance for both communities.
Table No 10: Comparison of ontological dissonance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity</th>
<th>Security as-s-being</th>
<th>Other(s)</th>
<th>Fear/ Anxiety</th>
<th>Response of the other</th>
<th>Safeguards against others</th>
<th>Result</th>
<th>Effects on ontological security</th>
<th>Solution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkish-Cypriot community</td>
<td></td>
<td>Greek-Cypriot community and Greeks</td>
<td>Survival among the majority, the trauma of the enclaves and being a minority</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Turkey, Turkish military and Turkishness</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Desecuritisation of Turkishness to help manage existential anxieties in relation to Turkish immigrants and help reconcile Turkish and Cypriot part of Turkish-Cypriot identity narratives in order to contribute to an improved state of ontological security and physical asecuray and to facilitate compromise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish immigrants, Turkey and Turkishness</td>
<td></td>
<td>Extinction, biographical continuity as a distinct identity</td>
<td>Turks/Turkey: Association (dependence and intervention based on guardian/children configuration) and resistance (rejection of distinctiveness)</td>
<td>Cypriotness and Europeanness (i.e. RoC passports)</td>
<td>Undermining ontological security</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ontological dissonance due to discrepancies between interwoven existential anxieties and fears underpinned by the difficulty to accommodate Turkishness and Cypriotness in one narrative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek-Cypriot community</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Partition, invasion and the trauma of 1974</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>EU membership and legitimacy of RoC compared to illegitimacy of the ‘TRNC’ and Turkish military in Cyprus</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish immigrants, Turkey and Turkishness</td>
<td></td>
<td>Peace anxieties (adding the identity of the enemy-other both to the image of the self and to ‘peace’)</td>
<td>Turks/Turkey: Distancing and disassociation (unrecognition and lack of bilateral relations), and recognition of distinctiveness</td>
<td>Turkish-Cypriots: Association (negotiations based on bicommmunality and bizonality)</td>
<td>Reinforcing ontological security</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ontological dissonance due to a clash between what is desirable and what is feasible; desires to re-establish full sovereignty and to rid the Island of Turkey/Turkish military contradicts the need to accept Turkish-Cypriots as partners with political equality.</td>
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9.3 Convergence and Potential for Desecuritisation

The argument that people from Turkey and Turkishness needs to be desecuritised has been reiterated throughout the thesis and supported with literature and empirical evidence. Nonetheless, the thesis refrained from making specific policy recommendations about desecuritisation strategies as such a delicate issue necessitates further research and preferably comparative analysis of different conflict environments. Yet, before calling for further research to formulate specific desecuritisation strategies, it is also crucial to establish that in addition to the need for desecuritisation there is also some room and willingness for desecuritisation. A good place to start such an analysis would be to look for convergence points within civil society that can present an opportunity for collaboration.

In this regard, fieldwork data shows that there is a clear enthusiasm on the part of Cypriot civil society to include Turkish immigrants in their efforts and on the part of Turkish immigrants to be included. Civil society representatives, who tend to distinguish between threats posed by the government of Turkey and Turkish politics from those posed by individual Turks living on the island, recognise the current discriminatory environment and adopt an open attitude towards inclusion and desecuritisation of people from Turkey. 73% of Turkish-Cypriot and 55% of Greek-Cypriot civil society representatives agree, “people from Turkey are discriminated and marginalised in the society”. Across the divide, many civil society representatives emphasise that the involvement of Turkish immigrants is crucial for the sustainability of peacebuilding efforts and a comprehensive settlement:

“Whether we like it or not, the Turks from Turkey are in Cyprus and they are here to stay. We have to include them in the reconciliation activities if we want to reach a tolerant multicultural society. Otherwise, a settlement without involving all relevant parties in the process will not be sustainable. First of all, these people, all three groups [Turkish-Cypriots, Greek-Cypriots and Turks] should come together and start talking to each other.” (Derya Beyatlı, KAB and CMIRS)

“Many Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots are racist against Turkish immigrants and they refuse to acknowledge their human rights. There needs
to be a re-humanisation process for these groups’ perceptions of immigrants.” (Anonymous, Gender and Minorities Institute)

Fittingly, despite the general belief that Turkish immigrants are ‘shepherded’ by the Turkish embassy and that they are all right-wing nationalists who are against a solution, focus group findings demonstrate they have collective and individual political agency, they want to be represented and they are not simply ‘shepherded’ by the Turkish embassy. While most focus group participants want to be part of a comprehensive solution on the island and show no desire to return to Turkey, they also raised their concerns and uncertainty about their status in a post-settlement scenario. Especially referring to the cap set under the Annan Plan, many focus group participants insisted that they want to know who is on the ‘list’, and who will be allowed to stay. All participants agreed that their biggest anxiety is uncertainty about their future, not knowing if they are on ‘the list’ stops them from ‘rooting’ and halt their lives in a purgatory where they can not even invest in their houses because they fear they will be forced out. While some participants do not want to go back to Turkey under any conditions, some said that if they were not welcomed in Cyprus after a solution they would go back. Still, almost all participants implied or expressed a ‘longing’ to cross to the south. This division between who can cross and who cannot has penetrated families; for example, creating stark differences between immigrant siblings, where those who marry Turkish-Cypriots can cross and have ‘European’ kids and those who marry other migrants, cannot. Considering the economic status of the majority of the migrants, and that it is hard for them to travel to Europe due to visa restrictions, they consider crossing to the RoC as going to Europe or becoming part of Europe, which is denied to them. Lastly, while some participants supported peace because they feel that it cannot get worse than this, some voiced their concerns about being marginalised further as third, and fourth class citizens (FG1-F; FG2:N; FG3-K:2014).

“There isn’t anything wrong with the migrants who come here, they aren’t bad, or controversial, they could have gone anywhere else in the world. ... What matters is to live like a human, live well and good. It doesn’t matter where and with whom we live, what matters is that we learn to live together. ... You get battered/beaten based on where you come from, based on your class, based on your occupation... or because they see themselves as the rightful owners, rightful citizens [of Cyprus]... But at the
end of the day we are from here, I’m from here. We won’t become migrants again, so we have to find a common denominator. ... We came here to live, not to discriminate [against Greek Cypriots]. When we first came, we lived in Ziyamet¹⁴⁶; we had both Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot neighbours and my mother learned Greek from them. My mom was an uneducated lady, a primary school graduate, if she could live with Greek-Cypriot neighbours... [then the rest of us can too]. ... If they [TRNC] are going to continue to govern us this way, I rather have a solution under which Greek Cypriots govern us.” (Ahmet, a high school teacher in Famagusta, who came to Cyprus in 1975)

“Do you really think, people of Turkish origin will really be able to cross to the other side after a solution? No, no such thing will happen. For example my boss is a pure Cypriot, they have really good close friends in the south... Solution won’t be a problem for them, the problem will be for us. ... What will we become? 3rd class citizens? 4th class citizens? I want peace, but I don’t know why I want peace. For the sake of peace, I want it. For me to support a solution, I need transparency and full information, I need the TRNC government to be certain, to be open and honest with me and to tell me what would happen to me, what my status and rights would be. ... I don’t want to leave. ... My kids were born here, I invested here, I don’t want to be forced into another migration. I would never support that solution.” (Necati, a shopkeeper in the old city Nicosia, who came to Cyprus in 2006)

“I would leave in a heartbeat if it meant peace for Cyprus. I think being pro-solution should have more humane underlying reasons, not only about economic gains but for brotherhood, for humanity, for peace itself. When we look at our discussions we are assessing how well the Euro is doing, which has become a benchmark to how we assess a peace-agreement, ...based on interests and gains. ...I want a solution where no one is ‘othered’ and discriminated, no one tries to change each other, that we feel part of the same team. ...I don’t think we will have a problem with Greek Cypriots...

¹⁴⁶ A village in the north-east Karpasia region where mixed villages still exist.
These are scaremongering rumours, ... these are people ‘demonising’ their neighbour, indoctrinating their kids about the ‘enemy’, when the kids have no idea why and no reason to hate the ‘enemy’. (Hasan, a newspaper journalist in Nicosia, who came to Cyprus in 1993)

I want peace and I support an agreement. All my Cypriot friends want union. Since 1964, they always had the question mark of ‘what would have happened if Turkey didn’t save us?, “what would have happened if Green Line was not drawn?” ... They think they lost their roots and their ancestry... that is why they see people from Turkey as a threat. If I put myself in their shoes, I’m baffled by the same question too. This is an unsolved puzzle, a pandoras box for them. So I say lets open the box...

(Aycan, a lawyer married to a Turkish-Cypriot in Nicosia, who came to Cyprus in 2004)

It is possible to deduce from the above anecdotes that migrants are a diverse group and they are not collectively against a bicomunal, bizonal settlement. Considering their concerns as well as Cypriots’ concerns, their involvement in the process can effectively help all parties to be more in favour of a solution by addressing anxieties. Fieldwork data also shows Turkish-Cypriots’ explicit support for desecuritisation of Turkishness and involvement of Turkish immigrants in the peace process. While 63% of Turkish-Cypriots think people from Turkey need to be integrated into society, 72% agree that they should be involved in the reconciliation efforts. Similarly, Greek-Cypriot civil society supports Turkish immigrants’ integration into society (63%) and involvement in the peace process (79%). However, we can see that neither the integration of this group (14%) or involvement (22%) is supported among the GCc.
Comparably, when it comes to negotiating the issue of citizenship with regards to the Cyprus Problem, we can observe that the two communities are highly divided on the future of the Turkish immigrants and there is very little room for compromise. Yet, there is significant convergence particularly at the civil society level, where Turkish-Cypriot civil society representatives are more willing to accept harsher ‘compromises’ about the Turkish immigrants, and Greek-Cypriot civil society is willing to tolerate less strict scenarios. In fact, it is interesting to note that there is more divergence between the civil society representatives and their communities than the civil society representatives across the communities. Compared to the Turkish-Cypriot general population, even though Turkish-Cypriot civil society is eager to integrate and include the Turkish migrants in the reconciliation efforts, they are more concerned about the number of Turkish migrants that are allowed to stay following a comprehensive settlement and more open to compromise on their repatriation. For example, the second most unacceptable option for Turkish-Cypriot civil society representatives is interestingly, for all people in north Cyprus, to become the citizens of the future northern constituent state; on the contrary this is the second most supported option by the Turkish-Cypriot general public, when it comes to the issue of citizenship.

Hence, it can be argued that the levels of securitisation of people from Turkey as a threat to their desired future is higher among Turkish-Cypriot civil society compared to the Turkish-Cypriot general population, which supports the horizontal securitisation thesis.
This trend is reversed when we look at the Greek-Cypriot respondents, where Greek-Cypriot civil society seems to adopt a more tolerant approach towards the people from Turkey compared to the Greek-Cypriot general population\textsuperscript{147}. We can unpack these inverse tendencies from the perspective of peace desires. Across the island, even though there are anti-Turk/Greek civil society organisations as well, civil society is more likely to be politicised and to participate in bicomunal events, which means the Cyprus Problem is a bigger part of their lives and daily routines, and their exposure to the ‘other’ is increased. Thus, they also tend to support and desire a comprehensive settlement more than the general population. Consequently, on the issue of Turkish immigrants civil society representatives are more open to tolerate the sensitivities of the ‘other’ to facilitate a compromise. While Turkish-Cypriot representatives are ready to tolerate stricter policies on Turkish immigrants after a settlement compared to the rest of the TCC, Greek-Cypriot representatives are ready to tolerate more open policies compared to the rest of the GCC. For example, the most desirable option with high convergence among the Turkish-Cypriot respondents seems to be for ‘those people from Turkey who have already lived in Cyprus for many decades with their families to be allowed to remain after a settlement’. This option received support 76% support from Turkish-Cypriot civil society, and 81% from Turkish-Cypriot general population; it is also supported by 73% of Greek-Cypriot civil society, but by only 20% of the Greek-Cypriot general population.

\textsuperscript{147}Researcher bias with regards to the Greek-Cypriot civil society survey needs to be acknowledged here. It could be argued that those Greek-Cypriot civil society representatives who agreed to participate in the questionnaire prepared by a Turkish-Cypriot researcher in English may be inherently more pro-solution and thus more willing to engage in a discussion about the Cyprus Problem and people from Turkey. However, the ethnicity of the researcher was not revealed, although could have been guessed from the name considering the respondents received the questionnaire link via email. All respondents were given the option to respond in their mother tongue.
Chart No 21: Convergence between Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot civil society
(citizenship)

- All people who came from Turkey after 1974 including their descendants should return to Turkey after a settlement except for the case of people who have intermarried and their offspring.
- Some people from Turkey could be allowed to stay after a settlement, but only with a residence permit and work permit – not as citizens with voting rights.
- People from Turkey who have already lived in Cyprus for many decades with their families should, after a settlement, be allowed to remain.
- A cap or upper limit of 50,000 persons originally from Turkey to be naturalized citizens of a reunited Cyprus.
- People from Turkey should be given incentives to go back to Turkey after a settlement but those who wish to remain should be allowed to stay.
- All people in the north are citizens of the future northern constituent state, thus all should be allowed to remain.
Over the years, issues pertaining to Turkish immigrants, Turkey's guarantorship, property and governance have been the most critical and controversial issues of the peace process. Unfortunately, the empirical analysis above shows that compromise between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots on the issue of Turkish immigrants will continue to be chronically arduous; as the most desirable option for the Greek-Cypriot general population seems to be the most unacceptable option for the Turkish-Cypriot general population\textsuperscript{148}. Yet, we can turn to desecuritisation as a facilitating tool for reconciliation, both at the societal level to manage insecurities and anxieties and at the political level to support

\textsuperscript{148} "All people from Turkey since 1974 including their descendants should return to Turkey after a settlement except those people who have intermarried and their offspring."
compromise at the negotiation table. The desecuritisation of Turkishness and people from Turkey would facilitate a compromise and create more convergence among and between Cypriot communities by addressing the perceptions of threat posed by this group and reformulating the friend/enemy narratives. And seeing that there is room for convergence and collaboration as well as willingness to include people from Turkey in the peace process, we can start with civil society.

Volkan claims that the official and unofficial policy of the international community with regards to the Cyprus Problem was centred around the ‘creation’ of a ‘new’ large-group identity (Cypriot), which aimed at minimising the existing ethnic identities of being a Turkish or a Greek-Cypriot (Volkan 2008:100). For Volkan, this approach has failed because there has never been a Cypriot ethnicity or nationality. I essentially disagree with Volkan that there has never been a ‘Cypriot’ ethnicity or nationality on the basis that this is a deterministic and an essentialist approach to identity. This view conceptualises identity as homogeneous, unchanging and historically determined rather than as internally diverse and dynamic. As the evidence suggests, there is a distinct Cypriot identity beyond legal terms (that there is an internationally recognised Cypriot nationality), despite the religious, linguistic and ethnic differences. It is evident that both Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots differentiate themselves from Greeks and Turks, though to varying degrees, and link their understanding of home to the island of Cyprus.
9.4 Conclusion

One of the key empirical questions this thesis is interested in beyond a general interest in identity and in exploring the role of Turkish immigrants in the Cyprus Problem and Cypriot identity narratives, was to investigate whether their securitisation by Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots as an existential threat would facilitate a solution by bringing the two communities in Cyprus closer together against a common enemy; or whether their desecuritisation can have a transformative effect on peacebuilding. The belief that Turkey is encouraging immigration from Turkey to change the demographic balance on the island, and to distort the democratic will of the ‘indigenous’ ‘real’ Turkish-Cypriots is prevalent among both the Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots (see Hatay 2005, Loizides 2011). The increasingly authoritarian and Islamicised direction of the Republic of Turkey is intensifying the delicacy of this demographic balance, and existential fears and anxieties attached to it. Even though their securitisation by the GCC does not come as a surprise considering the history of the island and the history of Greece-Turkey relations where similar enemy-other constructions can be found, it is particularly interesting to explore the securitisation of this group by Turkish-Cypriots despite their shared ethnicity, language and religion. Notwithstanding the morality of the empirical question regarding the vilification of a collective identity as a way to facilitate ‘peace’ on the island; exploration of the case of Cyprus and Cypriot identity narratives within the framework of ontological security, and its relationship with peacebuilding reveals that is not the case. Thus, securitisation of Turkish immigrants and Turkishness on the island does not facilitate peacebuilding and reconciliation by bringing the two communities closer together against a common enemy. Instead it creates ontological dissonance and incapacitating peace-anxieties both for Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots.

Consequently, despite reconciliation and peacebuilding efforts that have succeeded in bringing Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots who identify as only/mostly Cypriot closer together and reformulating friend-enemy distinctions to an extent, they have failed to provide a more nuanced understanding of identity, security and self/other relationships, and hence, not only remained limited in their outreach but also, inadvertently created gatekeepers and dissidents/spoilers of peace. This failure and lack of a more nuanced approach thwarted the effectiveness of efforts in facilitating a comprehensive settlement
on the island, created a discrepancy between what is feasible and what is desirable in relation to the potential outcome of the peace negotiations, and contributed to deep anxieties about the future and self-identity of Turkish-Cypriots and strong fears directed at the Turkish immigrants in north Cyprus.

The group is so generalised and essentialised that at a first glance it may look like blatant xenophobia towards migrants that is observable all across Europe (Huysmans 2000, Huysmans 2006). However, under closer examination, it becomes certain that Cypriots distinguish ‘Turkiyeliler’ from other migrants and perceive significantly higher levels of victimisation, fear and anxiety posed by this group. For example, research shows that Greek-Cypriots are more willing to cohabit with Turkish-Cypriots than with people from Turkey, have more negative attitudes toward people from Turkey, perceive more social-identity differences between themselves and people from Turkey and perceive more victimisation from people from Turkey than from Turkish-Cypriots (see Danielidou and Horvath 2006). Similarly, according to the research conducted by the Cyprus-2015-Initiative, when Greek-Cypriots were asked about their main concerns regarding return to their properties under the Turkish-Cypriot administration, 61.7% stated that not wanting to live next to settlers is a major issue, while only 21.3% of Greek-Cypriots cited the same reason when they were asked about living next to native Turkish-Cypriots (Cyprus-2015-Initiative 2011). The thesis empirical data supports these findings and shows that Greek-Cypriots express higher feelings of anxiety towards people from Turkey than Turkish-Cypriots, and they explicitly differentiate between the two groups.

Taking a closer look, the empirical data suggests that Cypriots are becoming more Cypriot, meaning their identity narratives are moving away from organic ties to the ‘motherland’ and motherland nationalism. Even though the securitisation of the Turkish immigrants as a common threat to those who emphasise their Cypriotness is creating a common denominator, securitisation and exclusion of Turkish immigrants and Turkishness hinders the peacebuilding process by; a) locking our understanding of identity in essentialised dichotomies and inflexible exclusive categorisations; b) allowing for the reproduction and maintenance of an existential threat that cannot be fully eliminated in a post-settlement scenario hence remaining as a source of insecurity; c) creating an essentialised identity dilemma and contradiction for the ‘Turkish-Cypriot’ by uncomfortably conflating both ‘the
enemy’ (Turk) and ‘the self’ (Cypriot) and hence increasing the intensity of peace-anxieties for Greek-Cypriots and creating ontological dissonance mainly for Turkish-Cypriots but also for Greek-Cypriots. Consequently, this does not leave any room for ambiguity and fluidity in the identity narratives of Cypriots, as Turkish-Cypriots become both self and enemy in one, Turkish immigrants become other-others for Cypriots and the Turkishness of the Turkish-Cypriot identity becomes the othered-self.

As Rumelili argues, desecuritisation can be used as a tool to manage peace-anxieties in a conflict-in-resolution and post-settlement scenario, and thus desecuritisation of people from Turkey and their inclusion in reconciliation efforts would contribute to achieving a state of physical asecurituity, and to address the ontological security challenges arising from the peace negotiations (Rumelili 2015). However, despite the fact that the ‘settler issue’, or rather the ‘Türkiyeliler’ issue has been on the agenda of inter-communal peace negotiations since 1974, the debate remained limited to a negotiation about their numbers. Thus, we need to open our analysis beyond a dual-ethnic focus on the primary self/other narratives to include multiple identity narratives of other-others, other-selves and othered-selves. This is particularly crucial considering that Turkey, Turkish migrants and Turkishness is integral to conflict resolution on the island, and they will essentially remain a part of the new reality in a post-settlement scenario.

Peace research as a field of study should be cross-pollinated with other disciplines and literature, particularly with ontological security. Current theories of peace research seem to rest on the assumptions supported by John Rawls and Wallensteen, that discord among humans can be settled by means of a fair allocation of limited set of available resources and seem to be grounded in the idea that people in liberal societies ‘have nothing to go to war about’ once their basic needs and fundamental interests are satisfied (Rawls 2001, Wallensteen 2011). However, as Roberto Farneti argues, this notion of ‘peace by satisfaction’ is problematic as it reduces conflict and hence peace to objective and measurable desires of contenders that can be satisfied by negotiations moderated by third parties who are disinterested in the contested resources (Farneti 2009). Classical approaches to conflict resolution fail to address ontological security needs of individuals and collectives in conflict, and hence disregard the fluidity of identities and peace-anxieties. Consequently, they fail to account for deep-rooted psychological habits that are
intertwined with collective self-image and self-esteem, and conflict reproducing routines ingrained in representations of history and historical narratives of the self (see Farneti 2009). Cross-pollination of conflict resolution with ontological security shifts the focus away from the issues and resources at stake to the underlying processes of conflicts, narratives, habits and the routines that shape the practical consciousness of actors in conflict (Rumelili 2015). It provides a more reflective and normative rather than natural and material approach to conflict resolution, where the aim is more towards achieving transformative peace rather than a political settlement at a political level.

According to Rumelili, the state of ontological security and physical asecurity is the most attractive state of security from a normative point of view and “although securitisation does generate ontological security, the latter is not dependent on the former” (Rumelili 2013:63). Security communities in international relations, such as the Nordic community constitute the best examples of such a normative state of security; where a collective large-group identity discourse makes it possible to maintain the us/them distinctions while acknowledging similarities, which are necessary for the certainty and stability of being, while remaining in a state of physical asecurity vis-à-vis one another (Browning and Joenniemi 2013). Therefore, desecuritising Turkishness would not only help achieve humanitarian normative ends by addressing xenophobia, discrimination and marginalisation, but it would also facilitate a comprehensive settlement and transformative peace by opening up room for compromise on the negotiations table by creating a more inclusive and functional platform. As the empirical evidence presented in this chapter shows, convergence and willingness of civil society to include Turkish immigrants in their efforts across the divide presents us with a vital window of opportunity to formulate inclusive desecuritisation strategies with the help of ontological security literature.
Conclusion

This thesis adopts the problematique that is based on the lack of success stories in conflict resolution and peacebuilding studies and the narrow dual-ethnic approach of peacebuilding efforts in Cyprus as its departure point. In order to critically engage with this problematique, the thesis unpacks the relationship between (de)securitisation, ontological security and identity in protracted conflict environments. Looking at the implications of securitisation of identities on ontological security and on peacebuilding, the thesis builds a theoretical framework that amalgamates the Copenhagen and Paris Schools of security and enriches it with the ontological security literature. Overall, the theoretical and empirical analysis embraces a normative position both for desecuritisation and for reaching a comprehensive settlement in Cyprus.

In this concluding section of the thesis, I will first discuss reiterate the primary theoretical and empirical thesis contributions before discussing and summarising my underlying theoretical and empirical arguments. I will then consider the empirical implications for Cyprus in terms of desecuritisation strategies and make some recommendations to inform peacebuilding efforts. Lastly, I will consider the broader empirical and theoretical research implications and reflect on possible future research agendas and research questions emanating from this thesis.

Theoretical and Empirical Contributions

The primary contributions of this thesis include three domains of research: critical security studies, peace research and the case of Cyprus. Firstly, the thesis bridges (de)/(in)securitisation with ontological security, adds flesh to institutionalised securitisations, and contributes to the increasingly popular ontological security literature. In this regard, the thesis contributes to the debates about desecuritisation and institutionalised securitisations by providing a more nuanced understanding of identity with the help of ontological security and empirically contributes to the ontological security literature by employing mixed-methods analysis. Exploration of the (de)securitisation, ontological security and peacebuilding nexus through a mixed-methods analysis also provides a base for further research in this area that could be adapted and applied in other non-violent protracted conflicts. Hence, the thesis has an added-empirical and
methodological value for both for peacebuilding and ontological security literatures. Secondly, the thesis contributes to peace research by using Cyprus as a case study to apply the theoretical framework that builds a nexus between ontological security, desecuritisation and peacebuilding. Lastly, by challenging the dual-ethnic approach of peacebuilding in Cyprus, by expanding its analysis to include other-others, other-selves and othered selves, and by adopting a normative preference for desecuritisation, the thesis contributes to empirical research on Cyprus with the aim of informing and supporting peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts on the island.

The case of Cyprus has a dual function for the thesis: The first one is to provide a strong and a coherent case for application of the theoretical framework built upon two pillars, namely (de)(in)securitisation and ontological security, which are studied in relation to reconciliation and peacebuilding. The non-violent and the protracted nature of the conflict make Cyprus a good case study for this purpose because; a) lack of immediate physical threats and violence provides a favourable and an enabling environment to explore the ontological security, (de)securitisation and reconciliation nexus149; b) reconciliation and peacebuilding is very conducive in violent conflicts, where the main concern is peacemaking; and c) protracted conflicts provide a fertile ground for institutionalised securitisations, where securitisation becomes a tool for reproducing and reinforcing identity narratives and hence ontological security and, becomes as performative as it is discursive. In other words, it is the non-violent and protracted nature of the case that calls for a marriage between Copenhagen and Paris Schools to better theorise institutionalised securitisations, and for a marriage between ontological security and (de)securitisation to explore the potential of desecuritisation as a facilitating tool for transformative peace. The second function of the case study is normative, which is underpinned by personal research motivations pertaining to desecuritisation, inclusivity and a reflexive understanding of identity. As such, the normative commitment for the case of Cyprus is to provide theoretical and empirical support for moving away from a strictly bicomunal and binary understanding of the Cyprus Problem, which aims to break the vicious cycle by breaking free of the dual-ethnic analysis.

149 Lack of violence provides a favourable and an enabling ground because: 1) it is easier for individuals and collectives to establish daily routines and a sense of normality in non-violent environments; 2) ingroup and outgroup consolidation in the face of physical threats and fear about survival reifies exclusive identities and positions at the extremes, making it even harder to for desecuritisation and reconfiguratin of friend/enemy relationships; 3) in violent conflicts, it is usually not possible to pursue reconciliation and peacebuilding before ending the violence and achieving peacemaking.
Summary of Underlying Arguments

Part 1 of the thesis establishes the theoretical framework that builds a nexus between (in)/(de)securitisation, ontological security and peacebuilding. Amalgamating Copenhagen and Paris Schools of security, I theorise ‘institutional securitisations’ as a process that is located both within discursive practices of actors and within routinised acts or performances. The first main underlying argument is that institutionalised can escape the security discourse and performatives of the power holders/security professionals and become multi-directional (horizontal and bottom-up), multi-acted (with the involvement of media, civil society, and individuals) and multi-layered (discursive, performative and routinised). As such, they are inter-subjective and negotiated, and their institutionalised nature that narrates enemies means they have an intricate relationship with collective identities. Subsequently, the second underlying argument in Part 1 is based on the problematique that conflates difference with danger and security with survival. Maintaining that the discourses of security are not necessarily an inescapable tool for (re)producing identity narratives, I argue that relationships do not have to be locked into a friend-enemy dichotomy. Theorisation of the distinction between security-as-being and security-as-survival helps us better analyse the identity-security nexus, and it also makes desecuritisation in the ‘societal sector’ normatively desirable. By establishing and arguing for this distinction, I discuss the concept of peace-anxieties that illustrate the delicate relationship between (de)securitisation and ontological security, which can turn peace into an insecure experience (Rumelili 2011:8).

Part 2 of the thesis that provides a contextual background for the case study illustrates the dynamic and kaleidoscopic nature of Cypriot identity based on historical analysis. Mapping the shifting identity narratives on a chronological timeline organised around major milestones that have (re)shaped and (re)configured the two main identity narratives on the island, I unpack the varying sense of Cypriotness across the island. The underlying arguments in Part 2 are based on the problematique that peace efforts in Cyprus have locked the conflict into one of ethnicity. In order to break free of this essentialist dual-ethnic approach, I look at the perceptions towards people from Turkey and Turkishness, and introduce ‘other-others’, ‘other-selves’ and ‘othered-selves’ to the historical analysis of identity narratives. Accordingly, the main original contribution of Part 2 is the adoption
of a broader and more nuanced lens that includes Turkish immigrants and ontological security considerations to our understanding of identity narratives in Cyprus.

Part 3 of the thesis that follows the theoretical and contextual parts, analyses the empirical data collected as a result of the extensive fieldwork based on mixed-methods that included quantitative surveys, focus groups and online questionnaires. The empirical data clearly corroborates the prevalent perception that Turkish immigrants in north Cyprus pose a threat to Cypriots, Cypriot identity and to their desired future. Their presence is a constant reminder of the Greek-Cypriot traumas of 1974, the Turkish invasion and the illegality of the administration in the north that is the cause of their victimisation. On the other hand, Turkish-Cypriots see this group as inferior, oriental and non-European and voice their anxieties about ‘extinction’ that are tied to their frustrations about the status quo and their paternalistic relationship with Turkey. As such, the ‘agents of the coloniser’ perception is shared across the border. The empirical findings presented in Part 2 can be summarised as follows:

Table 11: Underlying empirical arguments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Turkish-Cypriot community</th>
<th>Greek-Cypriot community</th>
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<tr>
<td>Turkish-Cypriots are becoming more Cypriot and less motherland centric.</td>
<td>A sense of Cypriotism is growing in the Greek-Cypriot community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish-Cypriots’ feelings of Cypriotness and perceived levels of threat posed by Turkish immigrants have a positive relationship.</td>
<td>Compared to Turkish-Cypriots' relations with Turkey, Greek-Cypriots consider Greece their motherland to a lesser extent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish-Cypriots who prioritise their Cypriotness feel higher levels of threat to their identity and also feel more anxiety about their current situation.</td>
<td>Greek-Cypriots, who distinguish between Turkish-Cypriots and people from Turkey, perceive greater levels of threat posed by people from Turkey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher levels of anxiety about their current situation intensifies the desires for a comprehensive settlement but does not make compromise easier due to ontological dissonance.</td>
<td>Securitisation of Turkish immigrants and Turkishness creates unmanageable peace anxieties for Greek-Cypriots, as perceptions of threat and peace anxieties have a positive relationship.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The underlying empirical argument in Part 3 is focused on peace-anxieties and ontological dissonance that is intertwined with the peace process on the island. Unpacking Turkish
Cypriots’ concerns about existence and extinction and adding the primary other (the
generalised Greek-Cypriot majority on the island) to this equation, we observe that
Turkish-Cypriots need their Turkishness to claim legitimacy in the peace process and to
maintain their distinctiveness from the majority Greek-Cypriots, but coupled with their
orientalised and securitised relationship with people from Turkey and Turkishness, this
identity dilemma creates ontological dissonance. On the other hand, although Greek-
Cypriots differentiate Turkish-Cypriots from people from Turkey, Turkishness of Turkish-
Cypriots, the presence of Turkish immigrants in north Cyprus and the involvement of
Turkey and the Turkish military in the Cyprus Problem creates unmanageable peace-
anxieties and ontological dissonance. In order to break the vicious cycle that had
contributed to the protractedness of the Cyprus Problem, and the potential for
desecuritisation, I investigate points of convergence pertaining to the to the status of the
Turkish immigrants after a potential settlement. Although there is very little room for
compromise, strong peace-anxieties and feelings of fear that portrays Turkish immigrants
and Turkishness as the primordial enemy of Greeks/Greek-Cypriots and as threats to
Turkish-Cypriots biographical continuity also illustrate the significant need for
desecuritisation strategies. Thus, the overall argument of the thesis that ties in all the
underlying arguments in all three parts is suggests that desecuritisation Turkishness and
people from Turkey would act as a facilitating tool for transformative peace on the island.

Findings, Observations and Implications

One of the key empirical questions this thesis sought to explore was whether the
securitisation of the Turkish immigrants would bring Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots
closer together against a common enemy and produce a sense of urgency for reaching a
comprehensive settlement on the island; or whether their desecuritisation can have a
transformative effect on peacebuilding. The empirical chapters in Part 3 overwhelmingly
illustrate that although securitisation of Turkish immigrants and Turkishness on the island
may seem to be bringing the two Cypriot communities closer together against a common
enemy, it does not facilitate peacebuilding efforts. Instead it creates ontological
dissonance and incapacitating peace-anxieties and hence hinders the peacebuilding
process by; a) locking our understanding of identity in essentialised dichotomies and
inflexible exclusive categorisations; b) allowing for the reproduction of an existential
threat that cannot be fully eliminated in a post-settlement scenario hence remaining as a
source of insecurity; c) creating an identity dilemma and contradiction for the ‘Turkish-Cypriot’ by uncomfortably conflating both ‘the enemy’ (Turk) and ‘the self’ (Cypriot) and hence increasing the intensity of peace-anxieties and creating ontological dissonance.

Even though peacemaking might be achieved at the ‘state’ level once an agreement on governance is reached among elites, the ontological foundations of the conflict requires reconciliation at the micro level to reconfigure relationships and reflexively adapt identity narratives (Bulent and Dagli 2016). A signed agreement can only ever be a small part of a wider, inclusive and deliberative process of social reconciliation towards transformative peace (see Jarraud 2012, Kay 2012). Whether or not a political agreement will produce an environment of insecurity and fear by asking people to live with those they believed were their existential enemies depends on whether peacebuilding at the grassroots level has managed to reconfigure all ‘self’ and ‘enemy-other’ dynamics through practices of confidence building and reconciliation.

The empirical evidence suggests desecuritisation of people from Turkey and their inclusion in reconciliation efforts would contribute to achieving a state of physical asecurity, and to address the ontological security challenges arising from the peace negotiations. However, despite the fact that the issue of the Turkish immigrants has been integral to inter-communal peace negotiations since 1974, despite the securitisation of people from Turkey and Turkishness by both Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots, and despite the fact that Turkish immigrants will essentially remain a part of the new reality in a post-settlement scenario, this group has been excluded from the reconciliation efforts and the debate has been limited to a negotiation about their numbers. Thus, we need to open our analysis beyond a dual-ethnic focus on the primary self/other narratives to include multiple identity narratives of other-others, other-selves and othered-selves.

As such, the overall thesis argument is based on both an empirical and normative preference for desecuritisation of the Turkish immigrants and Turkishness. This would not only help achieve humanitarian normative ends by addressing xenophobia, discrimination and marginalisation, but it would also facilitate a comprehensive settlement and transformative peace by opening up room for compromise on the negotiation table by creating a more inclusive and functional platform. As the empirical evidence shows,
Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot civil society representatives demonstrate convergence and willingness to compromise on the issue of people from Turkey and explicit readiness to include Turkish immigrants in peace efforts across the divide. The quantitative opinion polls also point to a need in this regard, which presents us with a vital window of opportunity as it shows that there is room to include Turkish immigrants in the peacebuilding efforts if we are willing break free of the dual-ethnic approach.

Critically analysing the mainstream discourses on settlers and colonisation in the context of Cyprus, Loizides argues that ethnopolitical frames are strategically important for identity narratives because they legitimise subsequent courses of action by combining past–present–future and suggests that novel institutional arrangements\(^\text{150}\) can facilitate reaching a comprehensive settlement on the island (Loizides 2011). Furthermore, antagonistic frames that portray Turkish immigrants as inherently threatening can create self-fulfilling prophecies by instigating actions that transform the external environment and initiate cycles of confrontation (Loizides 2015). We can observe this self-fulfilling prophecy in the way demography in north Cyprus is used as a tool by politicians across the divide to foster their agendas, with head-counts serving as ammunition in public debates, and in the lack of convergence in the peace negotiations on the issue of the Turkish settlers (Hatay 2005, Lordos, Kaymak et al. 2009, Loizides 2011).

Those committed to peace on the island, including civil society and politicians, repeatedly frame the presence of Turkish immigrants and their growing numbers as a reason to create a sense of urgency. Looking back to the Annan Plan, and in line with the thesis argument that Greek-Cypriots’ peace-anxieties were partly the reason behind their ‘no’ vote, Loizides argues that the provisions about citizenship and the status of the settlers/immigrants were framed not only “as unfair but also as dysfunctional, limiting the potential for a compromise” (Loizides 2015:181). Thus, desecuritisation of Turkish immigrants and Turkishness would facilitate and support the formulation and legitimation of these novel institutional arrangements by addressing peace-anxieties and ontological security and in turn creating room for cooperation and compromise.

\(^{150}\) Such as asymmetrical citizenship, alternative compensation schemes and reserved territories for natives.
Desecuritisation strategies that do not take ontological security into account, that do not have a more nuanced understanding of identity and that are not inclusive and holistic can create existential anxieties that result in compulsive attachment to routines, resecuritisation and conflict producing routines. Institutionalised securitisations need institutionalised desecuritisation strategies\(^{151}\) to reconfigure engrained relationships defined by perceptions of threat, fear and danger. Although making peace with an enemy-other is bound to challenge actors’ comfort zones and create anxieties, peacebuilding would be most effective if it reconfigures relationships with the nuances of difference as well as similarity. Reconciliation on a societal level means dealing with a history of relationships, perpetrators, victims, and beneficiaries (Bar-Tal 2000). In protracted conflicts these relationships are securitised, institutionalised and engrained in identity narratives. Challenging the dual-ethnic approach to the Cyprus Problem where reconciliation efforts singularly adopt a dual-ethnic approach and focus on imposing a sense of similarity at the expense of ontological security (and inadvertently at the expense of Turkish immigrants) could be the key to understanding the potential of desecuritisation for transformative peace.

A Cypriotist narrative based on sameness makes Turkish-Cypriots insecure due to their fears about assimilation and becoming a minority, and makes Greek-Cypriots insecure by adding Turkishness into Cypriotness. Considering that the growing sense of Cypriotism on the island failed to become an inclusive narrative that can comfortably accommodate Greekness and Turkishness with Cypriotness, we need a collective non-essentialised narrative for a larger Cypriot identity that neither reduces Cypriotness to ethnicity adopted from the respective motherlands nor one that seeks a pure ‘Cypriot’ identity by turning ethnicity into an enemy. A more inclusive and fluid Cypriotness that simultaneously celebrates similarities as well as the differences of people who call Cyprus home can be the way forward for achieving certainty and stability of being, while remaining in a state of physical asecurity vis-à-vis one another. The inclusion of Turkish immigrants in the peace process to desecuritise their relationship with Turkishness can present an opportunity for frequent revelatory incidents that can challenge the engrained identity narratives based on enmity and can be step in the right direction in terms of reconfiguring a more inclusive and accommodating Cypriot identity narrative.

\(^{151}\) Such as more inclusive peacebuilding efforts, CBMs, sustainable civil society initiatives that bring Turkish-Cypriots, Greek-Cypriots and people from Turkey together.
Desecuritisation: What does it look like? What’s next for this research?

This thesis argues that desecuritisation of Turkish immigrants and Turkishness is desirable to facilitate a comprehensive solution and to achieve transformative peace on the island but does not go as far as to devise desecuritisation strategies and mechanisms specific for the case of Cyprus. Even though this sounds like an “add Turkishness and Turkish immigrants and stir” strategy, it is needs to be more nuanced and carefully devised than that. We need to formulate strategies that can provide opportunities for institutionalised revelatory incidents that can create a favourable room for self-reflexivity and adaptation in order to preserve ontological security while reconfiguring friend/enemy relationships. Revelatory incidents that are not institutionalised can prove to be ineffective desecuritisation strategies as they can be dismissed as ‘exception to the rule’ or insufficient in amply challenging the mainstream perceptions and narratives. On the other hand, sudden isolated actions152, such as a drastic revision of history books that removes the enemy other from consolidated identity narratives, can destabilise the sense of self. In Giddens’ terms, they can create critical situations, which challenge self-identity by imperilling the sense of basic trust and elicit incapacitating anxieties (Giddens 1991). Without successful desecuritisation strategies that can preserve ontological security, we risk resecuritisation and compulsive attachment to routines as a means to reproduce self-identity. Peacebuilding efforts that recognise the role of ontological security for reconciliation and include other-selves and other-others can help build trust and facilitate reconfiguration of identity narratives.

Nonetheless, we do not need to reinvent the wheel of peacebuilding for the case of Cyprus. Rather, we can broaden the existing peacebuilding efforts and projects to add ontological security considerations to their approach and to include people from Turkey. As a result, we can institutionalise desecuritisation of Turkishness and increase the intensity of the revelatory incidents independent of the Track 1 level political negotiations to reconfigure identity narratives. For example, some broad recommendations could include the following initiatives:

• The CBMs that receive the highest support from Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots include measures such as restoration of cultural and historical sites and

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152 Isolated actions refer to those that are not part of a more coordinated and holistic peacebuilding strategy.
mutual official apologies for past mistakes and hurts (Cyprus-2015-Initiative 2011). However, the design and implementation of CBMs as well as public opinion polls regarding the CBMs only focus on Turkish-Cypriots’ and Greek-Cypriots’ perceptions. CBMs, by default need to engage all groups that need confidence building instead of only focusing on the primary self/other relationships. Inclusion of Turkish immigrants in public opinion surveys to gauge their support and willingness towards certain CBMs and their inclusion in the design and implementation of CBMs can be a way to institutionalise desecuritisation strategies and create room for cooperation and collaboration.

- ‘ENGAGE-Do your part for Peace’ project’s Active Dialogue Networks that conducted numerous bicommunal and monocommunal workshops report that both Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots support “translation of all formal documents and signs related to central and local government offices into Turkish and translation of all road signs into three languages (TR/GR/ENG)” as a confidence building priority (Bulent and Dagli 2016). Realisation of this CBM would not only create a stronger sense of a multilingual society and diminish the difficulties created by language barriers, but considering the strong visibility and audience base of such an action, it would also serve as an institutionalised desecuritisation strategy that routinises Turkish language as part of daily life. “Ontological security is an emotive identification and not always an overt cognitive experience” (Noble 2005) as it is about the trust we have in the continuity of our self-identity and in our social and material environments (Giddens 1990).) By changing road signs and official documents, we can, in part, transform daily routines that reinforce and reproduce our ontological security by inserting a part of the ‘other’s’ identity into those routines and material environments.

- In line with the above recommendation, making learning the ‘other’ language (Greek and Turkish) accessible and affordable, such as organising free and mobile language classes island-wide and subsidising simultaneous translation services for reconciliation and peacebuilding efforts would facilitate cooperation and constructive dialogue, and increase the feasibility and practicality of peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts that are almost exclusively limited to those who are
fluent in English. In their comprehensive analysis of island-wide peace-building activities in Cyprus, Hadjipavlou and Kanol confirm that the majority of participants in conflict resolution workshops and mediation trainings came from educated groups who could speak English (Hadjipavlou and Kanol 2008). This almost automatically exclude majority of people from Turkey\textsuperscript{153} and prompts the prevalent criticism among the public that peace-building efforts are too academic and elitist.

- Complimenting the efforts of the Committee of Missing Persons\textsuperscript{154} (CMP) in Cyprus with positive stories, which would provide an alternative narrative that challenges victimhood of the self and the perception that the other is ‘cruel’ and ‘barbaric’. Although CMP is a strong and effective CBM as it provides closure for the families of the missing persons as well as acknowledgement that suffering and loss is not limited to the one side, it also reminds people of their suffering and victimisation at the hands of the other. Thus, complimenting the efforts of the CMP with stories such as oral histories about inter-marriages or acts of good will in times of dire situations can act as revelatory narratives to challenge the barbaric, uncivilised or aggressive nature of the Turkish immigrants can be another desecuritisation strategy.

- Creation of counter narratives to transform routines and mainstream narratives, and to increase actors’ reflexive capacities:
  a) Publication and creation of children story books, cartoons, puppet shows, novels, theatre performances, TV shows, soaps, adverts and movies that have Greek, Turkish and Cypriot characters as the main protagonists;
  b) Creating open access platforms and alternative media platforms to challenge the misinformation regarding Turkish immigrants and propaganda such as media monitoring and fact-check websites similar to \url{http://factcheckeu.org}.
  c) Creating and supporting strong access to information laws would also benefit what Brent Steele calls a “post-structural archaeology” by laying

\textsuperscript{153} Considering the economic and educational background of Turkish immigrants, they are less likely to communicate in English compared to Turkish-Cypriots.

\textsuperscript{154} \url{http://www.cmp-cyprus.org}
bare the self of a state, by facilitating self-reflexivity and by exposing discrepancies between agents/state’s actions and their biographical narrative and in turn allowing us to experience shame (Steele 2008:65). Counter narratives expose shame, uncover processes and allow us to experience shame (i.e. truth and reconciliation committees, accepting and apologising for war crimes, showing remorse and empathy). According to Steele, shame is crucial for reflexivity, just like anxiety; it is “a necessary condition for the realisations of a new self” (Steele 2008:68). Effective access to information mechanisms can also help increase transparency and accountability of the peace process, and help challenge misinformation, stereotypes, myths and propaganda (i.e. such as challenging exaggerated statistics about demography, criminality of immigrants)155. As such, they can help reconfigure narratives and approximate the social reality.

- Informing and lobbying international donors (i.e. the EU and the UNDP) to include Turkish immigrants in their reconciliation and peacebuilding grant guidelines in order to challenge the exclusively binary bicommunal approach of the grant programmes. This would also allow CSOs to formulate bottom-up strategies and create new partnerships, thus add to the sustainability and institutionalisation of the efforts.

- Creating incentives, grants, awards and ‘peace loyalty schemes’ for individuals, joint ventures and initiatives to encourage more institutionalised and sustained collaboration among Cypriots and people from Turkey. A similar award scheme is organised by the Stelios Foundation annually since 2009 but is only limited to Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot entrepreneurs156.

- Organising inclusive reconciliation programmes based on ‘soft’ issues that address common concerns such as the environment and animal rights to contribute to

155 UNESCO initiatives have demonstrated that value of open access to information empowers citizens, stimulates entrepreneurship and fosters innovation. As such, UNESCO confirms that greater access to information and improved communication among different sectors of the population are vital for building a culture of peace. (see http://en.unesco.org/themes/access-information). Access Info Cyprus project funded by the EU also reports that improved access to information mechanisms will not only increase transparency and accountability, but are also vital for a healthy civil society and inter-communal collaboration including the public, civic and private sectors (see http://www.access-info.org/wp-content/uploads/Open_Cyprus_Report_and_Recommendations.pdf.)

156 http://stelios.org/stelios-award-cyprus/blog.html
collaboration between Greek-Cypriots, Turkish-Cypriots and people from Turkey. Emel Akçali argues that the UNDP discourse about ‘nature knows no boundaries’ is most effective when it generates solutions that are perceived to be beneficial to all parties involved, rather than when it uses the environment to discursively construct a common ‘patriotism’ beyond ethnic identities. As such, these ‘soft issue’ CBMs should be expanded to include people from Turkey to avoid the construction of a common Cypriotist patriotism at the expense of securitising other groups (Akçali 2009).

- Organising inclusive public participation platforms and youth councils to encourage civic participation of Turkish-Cypriots and Turkish immigrants. This will not only contribute to the empowerment of Turkish immigrant groups and recognise the diversity of their needs, backgrounds, political positions but it will also address the growing polarisation between Turkish-Cypriots and people from Turkey.

- Providing accessible and affordable occupational life long development programmes for teachers and journalists on topics such as peace education and peace journalism.

- Conducting voluntary DNA tests to illustrate that ethnicity signifiers are not ‘pure’ and perceived differences and similarities are subjective, which would help participants to reflexively engage with their self-identity and past. A similar initiative was conducted with 67 participants by a Danish travel search site Momondo\textsuperscript{157} and with 8 participants by Channel Four\textsuperscript{158} that challenged their prejudices and ‘clear’ perceptions about their pure ancestral origins. The Momondo initiative in particular garnered strong positive reactions from the participants, who voiced that the results have changed their perception of and attitudes toward the other and was extended to include 500 more individuals. This can be replicated in Cyprus to demonstrate that both diversity and similarity are inherent and there is no one single and pure way of being a Cypriot.

\textsuperscript{157} http://aplus.com/a/dna-journey-momondo-shocking-reveal
\textsuperscript{158} http://www.andrewgrahamdixon.com/archive/100-per-cent-english.html
• Creating diversified zones of reconciliation similar to the Home for Cooperation in the Nicosia buffer-zone (i.e. in Lefka/Lefke and in Famagusta/Magusa buffer-zones), which would not only facilitate communication and participation, but would also increase the feasibility and practicality of peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts mainly take place in Nicosia. One of the main criticisms of the reconciliation efforts and bi-communal initiatives in Cyprus is that they fail to incorporate people and perspectives outside the capital. According to the civic map created by the Mahallae initiative, out of 684 bi-communal civil society projects completed between 1979 and 2013, only 49 were implemented by CSOs from outside of Nicosia or had branches outside the capital (see Mahallae 2013). This makes the involvement of civil society outside of Nicosia is relatively more difficult. It is imperative that more people are engaged in peace and reconciliation efforts and social reconciliation takes place not only in Nicosia but island-wide, with the involvement and participation of different groups and rural communities.159

• Promoting intercommunal initiatives rather than bicommunal ones, and locating Cyprus in the broader regional context that includes Greece and Turkey as well as other Mediterranean countries.

• Creating opportunities and organising events that not only bring Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots together but also people from Turkey, such as including Turkish immigrant children and students in peacebuilding youth camps and events, and integrating joint volunteer and charity work into extra-curricular activities at schools across the divide and organising intercommunal internships.

• And finally, devising a political solution that enables Turkish immigrants with ‘TRNC’ citizenship to cross to the RoC. Although this cannot be achieved independent of the Track 1 level negotiations and calls for significant political will, it would significantly increase ‘friendly’ encounters and to address the ‘not fit for

159 It is important to note that there are big Turkish settler and migrant communities particularly in Famagusta and Kyrenia.
Europe/not European enough’ stigma that adds to the discourse of polarisation and othering.

Broader research implications and future research directions

The research has broader empirical implications for non-violent protracted conflicts such as Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Similarly, it can be expanded to other conflict environments where settlers and immigrant groups are perceived as an obstacle for peace such as Tibet and Western Sahara (see Loizides 2015) or for conflict environments where identities are highly securitised such as Crimea. Moreover, the thesis has broader research implications for peace research and security studies as well as migration and integration as it unpacks the concepts of identity and nonmaterial needs in policy actions, where self-identity rather than survival becomes an operative analytical concept for the future of security studies. It contributes to multi-disciplinary studies that combine psycho-political analysis, anthropology, sociology and IR, where concepts such as self-esteem, identity, trust and home can be cross-pollinated. It also has implications for ethics scholars and research that focus on concepts of honour, just war, deliberation and moral driven action as it engages with concepts such as guilt, shame, fear, anxiety, and calls for increased reflexivity and self-interrogation processes in analysing and developing policies.

On the state and collective level, self-awareness, self-interrogation and reflexivity is crucial for adaptability and resilience. A reflexive society normatively makes a better world, a more open world where we can reflect on and adapt our identities, interests and security. Although ‘too much’ self-reflexivity and ‘digging too deep’ can result in dizziness, feeling lost and disembodied identities (see Laing 1971, Steele 2008), it helps us understand the meaning we attach to security beyond survival and better understand ‘who we are’ and ‘who we want to be’. Self-reflexivity challenges the consolidated singular version of identity narratives and the status quo, and better equip us to scrutinise and adapt. Without self-reflexion, routines, habits, identities are reified within a perceived narrative that is made static. We need to fight the temptation to internalise and emotionalise the prevailing view of self-identity and the temptation to silence discourses that challenge it through self-reflexivity. As Steele puts it, “the irony of self-interrogative reflexivity is that it may disturb before it heals” because it disembeds actors from comfortable routines and requires them to question, reflect and adapt (Steele 2008:151).
As Giddens argues, a consistent biographical narrative can be transformed by being “altered and reflexively sustained” through “debates” and “contestations” (Giddens 1991:215). To that end, Brent Steele makes three propositions to trigger self-reflexivity: 1) Reflexive discourse (i.e. counter discourse to point to the discrepancies between the self narrative and actions); 2) reflexive imaging (i.e. counter images to support counter discourse); 3) confronting meta-narratives and scholarly self-interrogation (i.e. democratic peace, survival, nation-state) (Steele 2008). More empirical research that collates reconciliation ideas directly from the audience and conducts comparative analysis that looks into evaluation and success of peacebuilding strategies and programmes in different conflict environments is needed to formulate specific policy recommendations. More specifically, the thesis could lead to further research on the following areas:

- Comparative empirical analysis using the same methodology and adaptation of research questions to explore the role of other-others, other-selves and othered-selves in other conflict environments;

- Empirical research on potential desecuritisation strategies and their reception at the audience level in order to formulate specific desecuritisation strategies that include other-others, other-selves and othered-selves for the case of Cyprus;

- Empirical research with the Turkish immigrant/settler population to explore their perceptions of fear, threat and anxiety, as well as assessing how they envision their participation in the peace process (i.e. extension of the quantitative surveys that focused on Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots due to research limitations to Turkish immigrants);

- Comparative analysis and evaluation of peacebuilding and reconciliation initiatives in different non-violent conflict environments with a lens that distinguishes between security-as-being and security-as-survival;

- Impact and policy based research and recommendations to inform donors, policy makers, civil society and relevant stakeholders based on a participatory and
deliberative approach that brings together CSOs, mediation scholars, peacebuilders, researchers and migrant groups.
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