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FLAUBERT’S AESTHETIC VALUES

AN ASSESSMENT OF A FORMAL PERSPECTIVE
UPON LANGUAGE AND REPRESENTATION

by
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DECLARATION

No part of this thesis is the result of collaboration.
SUMMARY

This thesis is conceived as a general study of Flaubert's major works and as an assessment of recent critical approaches to them.

Chapter 1. is an extensive evaluation of Sartre's *L'Idiot de la famille*, for which I claim the right to serious attention, before summarising its method and its argument that Flaubert's negative relationship to language becomes a positive one to style. This is set against Flaubert's own exposition, in both letters and works, of the problems of language and expression in the personal and artistic contexts. I show finally how other critics, in a very different perspective, have arrived at remarkably similar conclusions about Flaubert's concern for language as an opaque, material entity.

Chapter 2. argues that Flaubert's aesthetic aims are equally served by the building of an illusion, i.e. that he does not undermine the idea of the novel as representation. The journey to the East is indicated as the turning point in the emergence of an aesthetic ideal combining stupidity, rêverie and the aesthetic attitude to the world and to language. An examination of the formal organization of Flaubert's representations centre on the relationship between discourse and récit, with reassessment of such problems as impersonality, irony and point of view. A discussion of repetition leads to a consideration of the modernity of auto-representation.

Within this formal perspective the last chapter argues against the common modern belief in Flaubert's deconstruction of all stable meaning, reinstating the organizing function of character as a centre of value. Inarticulate and stupid characters; the traditional focus of Anglo-Saxon attacks on Flaubert's lack of moral complexity, are shown to have privileged status in relation to vital aspects of Flaubert's aesthetic as established in the first two chapters. A correct "moral" reading of the story will therefore have nothing to do with an attitude to real life, but will depend upon awareness of the work's formal intentions.
"Sais-tu que ma mère, il y a six semaines environ, m'a dit un mot sublime (un mot à faire la Muse se pendre de jalousie pour ne l'avoir point inventé); le voici, ce mot: 'La rage des phrases t'a desséché le cœur.'" Corr. IV, p. 78.
INTRODUCTION.

In the "état présent" which introduces her excellent collection of articles on Flaubert, Raymonde Debray-Genette distinguishes, beyond the essential establishment of reliable texts, two main layers in work upon Flaubert, the first labelled, with no derogatory intention, "traditional":

"Mettre les textes en place, rendre aux moins connus leur valeur, montrer par quel apprentissage, dans ses œuvres de jeunesse, Flaubert se dégager des influences, assimile ses expériences et acquiert sa technique, cela suppose un long travail de recherches et d'analyse. Mais par ce travail, déjà bien avancé, la critique traditionnelle s'est pour ainsi dire approprié, ou apprivoisé, l'œuvre de Flaubert." (1)

The second, represented by her own selection of some of the most original articles from Proust and Du Bos through to Foucault:

"s'est plutôt attachée à en faire apparaître l'éloignement, l'étrangeté, la spécificité: ce qui est peut-être encore une forme de l'exorcisme." (2)

She concludes with the suggestion of a new perspective needed to advance upon this second sort of criticism:

"Elle a travaillé à construire sous nos yeux l'univers flaubertien. On n'en a pas encore dégagé toutes les lois, tout le fonctionnement particulier; leur particularité même ne signifie pas leur autonomie: ils ne se comprennent qu'au regard des lois et des fonctionnements plus larges, qui régissent, entre autres, tout l'univers du récit. C'est peut-être dans cet espace et dans cette histoire qu'il reste encore à les inscrire." (3)

I should like to use these particular lines as a focus for my own thesis on Flaubert, which if it belongs to a line of works on "Flaubert's aesthetic" (theoretical and practical), aims to inscribe this in the broader perspective of contemporary theory of literature, and especially of "l'univers du récit".

Works which have attempted to "sum up" Flaubert's conscious body of aesthetic opinions and aims have often only really paraphrased a long list of sometimes contradictory quotations from Flaubert's correspondence, for
example the long chapter in Geneviève Bollème's *La Leçon de Flaubert*, ('La Poétique') (4), or the introductions of Carlut (5) and Sherrington, (underlining the latter's own reservations about the usefulness of such a procedure) (6). Genette claims, speaking of Proust, that the artist's aesthetic awareness is never at the level of his practice, but that the later critic has the advantage of knowing what literature his work gave rise to (7). All this might prove of course is that any study of a past writer is liable to be strongly prejudiced in the direction of the critic's own interests, and certainly marked by his theoretical presuppositions as to the essential areas of interest. But applied to Flaubert this remark raises clearly the central issue of his widely claimed modernity (8), and one general aim of this thesis is to assess his exemplary status as a forerunner of contemporary writing, and to review some traditional problems and interests in this now unavoidable context.

It might at least be said that whatever Flaubert's aesthetic awareness, his remarks on the future of criticism seem to invite the treatment he is now receiving. B.F. Bart's acknowledgment, prefacing his critical biography of Flaubert, that the master's hatred of literary criticism was so strong that he would have roared in pain and rage at the very idea of a critical work on himself (9), strikes me as an unnecessary reservation. For though he railed against criticism as he saw it practised around him (10), his ideas about what criticism should be often resemble some sort of structuralist manifesto, and even include a nice idea for Barthes that it is time somebody made an attempt at establishing the poetics of the language of fashion (11). While Debray-Genette quotes his demand for a very literary study of "the work in itself",

"Du temps de la Harpe, on était grammairien; du temps de Sainte-Beuve et de Taine, on est historien. Quand sera-t-on artiste, rien qu'artiste, mais bien artiste? Où connaissez-vous une critique qui s'inquiète de l'œuvre en soi d'une façon intense? On analyse très finement le milieu où elle s'est produite et les causes qui l'ont amenée; mais la poésie inscrite d'où elle résulte? sa composition, son style? le point de vue de l'auteur? Jamais!" (12),
there are more radical comments. Wanting criticism to come to terms with what he calls both the "physiologie" (13) and the "anatomie du style" (14), he claims that it will not advance in this direction until it has some sort of basis (15), conceived on an abstract level:

"Si les sciences morales avaient, comme les mathématiques, deux ou trois lois primordiales à leur disposition, elles pourraient marcher de l'avant." (16)

"C'est peut-être, comme pour les mathématiques, rien qu'une méthode à trouver." (17)

"l'Art sera quelque chose qui tiendra le milieu entre l'algèbre et la musique." (18)

The very frequent reference to Flaubert in the structuralist criticism that he would surely admire, has taken Flaubert studies firmly into the area recommended by Debray-Genette. However, discussions by theorists such as Ricardou and Barthes (19) tend to be brilliant but brief. In justification of yet another thesis on Flaubert, it seems to me that the enormous critical output of the past few years, and the appearance of Sartre's massive and provocative L'Idiot de la famille (20), has in fact created a need for reasonable assessment of what is going on, and especially for full length studies cutting across all this new ground. At the time of writing only Jonathan Culler's Flaubert: The Uses of Uncertainty (21) has attempted to carve a clear and thorough argument through this territory, and the originality of his book has added to the issues to be discussed. The frequency with which I refer to this work, though often to disagree with his central argument, will, I hope, be understood as an indication of my respect for its scope and general intention, and for the extreme interest of some of his analyses.

My perhaps idiosyncratic attempt to reconcile all this with some traditional beliefs and approaches, and in particular with Anglo-Saxon moral criticism, will steer me through a considerable amount of writing on Flaubert. The critical perspective which is most obviously missing is
the pseudo-existentialist criticism exemplified by Jean-Pierre Richard(22), Georges Poulet(23) and Geneviève Bollème(24), which I mention here because its basic presuppositions act as a foil for my own. Todorov offers a clear explanation of the irreconcilability of this "critique de la conscience" with structuralism, one basic stance of which is the belief that the unconscious is a logical, almost mathematical mechanism, that even the most archaic thought is highly abstract. Freud, Lévi-Strauss and French structuralism are therefore sharply opposed to the early Bachelard, Jung, Frye and Richard. Richard and Poulet seem to believe that only themes concerned with sensation are worthy of attention, that this is the most fundamental and authentic area, where the artistic image is necessarily born(25):

'La critique ne peut se contenter de penser une pensée. Il faut encore qu'à travers cette- ci elle remonte d'image en image jusqu'à des sensations."'(26)

This thematic criticism, which Poulet considers "plus proche à la fois des sources génétiques et des réalités sensibles"(27), using only concrete categories of description in what Todorov describes as inspired paraphrase rather than analysis(28), is by definition anti-universal, refusing abstraction as a matter of principle: "loin des théories, au cœur des choses mêmes"(29).

While it will be clear from what follows where my general sympathies lie, I am not taking a stand here on theoretical grounds simply for the sake of polemics. For though I find Richard's position theoretically weak, his belief that literature is an "aventure d'être"(30), (sharply opposed to Ricardou's that it is the "aventure d'une écriture"(31)), has in practice produced a very fine study of Flaubert's imagery. But since I shall be arguing frequently against the idea of literature as the expression of a pre-existing reality, (exterior: documentary realism or interior: "le mouvement d'une conscience"(32)), Richard and Poulet's belief in such expression cannot be accepted:
"une expression des choix, des obsessions et des problèmes qui se situent au cœur de l'existence personnelle." (33)

"Tous ces textes montrent que ce que Flaubert a conçu et réalisé, c'est une nouvelle façon de représenter les rapports entre l'être et ses objets, une façon plus vraie, en tout cas plus concrète, plus sensible, que celle de ses devanciers. Pour la première fois dans le domaine du roman, la conscience humaine apparaît telle qu'elle est le roman arrive à exprimer ce qu'on peut appeler la densité ou l'épaisseur de la substance humaine." (34)

But above all I would hope to illustrate that in the case of Flaubert to study a pre-linguistic consciousness is extremely suspect. Though Richard describes Flaubert's search for style as a progressive solidification and construction of the self, "L'effort de recherche de cette expression parfaite est donc en même temps un effort de construction de l'être" (35), the insistence upon style never really involves a discussion of language, and he can actually declare that Flaubert's greatness precedes his writing: "Cette grandeur nous paraît en effet résider, avant tout résultat, toute œuvre, dans une certaine nuance de tension intérieure" (36). This statement will emerge as heretical not least, paradoxically, through my chapter on Sartre's theory of Flaubert's style. It should become apparent that Sartre's work on Flaubert has little connection with this once fashionable branch of the "Nouvelle Critique" which has a basis in existentialism. While Sartre and structuralism may seem strange bed-fellows, (and perhaps neither party would thank me for my attempt to bring together their work on Flaubert), I shall argue that Sartre's thesis has much to contribute to a formal approach because he has deliberately centred it inside Flaubert's adventures with language.
In his extraordinarily dense article, 'Le travail de Flaubert', Genette defines the striking characteristic of Flaubert's mature writing as an evident refusal of eloquence, a "projet de ne rien dire", which could be seen as informing the whole movement of modern literature. My debt to Genette will be apparent throughout this thesis and the implications of the above definition will be discussed at length in connection with Flaubert's attitudes to language. But in the specific context of an introduction to L'Idiot de la famille it is the problem that he raises almost as an aside which is startling:

"Dégager les circonstances personnelles ou historiques de cette expérience, ce serait toute une étude, peut-être impossible, qui devrait suivre chez Flaubert le passage d'un certain refus de la vie ('Vivre n'est pas notre affaire') à un certain refus de l'expression considéré comme inaugurant la vérité littéraire. Que Flaubert ait eu quelques profondes raisons pour se taire et qu'il ait trouvé dans la littérature, en quelque sorte, le langage adéquat de ce mutisme, c'est du moins ce qui marque la rencontre heureuse d'une situation particulière et d'une forme universelle." (3)

Continuing this point in a footnote, Genette observes that although criticism has traditionally been interested in personal motivations, no one has yet pursued these through to a psychoanalysis of Flaubert, and that from the less popular historical point of view the systematic apoliticism of the mid-nineteenth century writers, so perfectly exemplified by Flaubert, must find its "sens" in those key dates of the century that they pretend to ignore.

This is as far as Genette goes, and it will be evident that for me the value of L'Idiot de la famille, at the most general level, lies in the fact that it addresses itself directly to these precise problems in their fullest scope. Indeed one wonders whether Genette wrote these
lines with Sartre in mind, since obviously he would know Sartre's schematic analysis of Flaubert and the "l'art pour l'art" writers in Qu'est-ce que la littérature?(5), and his more recent outline, in Questions de méthode(6), of his plan to integrate psychoanalysis into Marxism in order to evolve a suitable method for finding out everything about Flaubert.

Why should Flaubert be the one to emerge as such a privileged precursor of contemporary literature? Why did he aim at a sort of silence? Anyone at all interested in questions of intentionality cannot fail to pay some attention to Sartre's three thousand page meditation on such matters. At the same time it cannot be simply by chance that Sartre provides the answers to questions that are important from a modern point of view. Indeed the most surprising aspect of Sartre's thesis is its recognition and consideration of the perspective on Flaubert (and even on literature in general) precisely exemplified by Genette's article. For Sartre does not limit himself to explaining why Flaubert came to choose this particular sort of writing. In claiming that Flaubert's childhood relationship to language is not only the best way of understanding his work, but will lead to the best possible understanding of the man, (since it is the objective origin of his long journey to hysteria)(7), Sartre enters boldly into the former consideration as well, and his suggestive analyses of the way language functions in the actual works will be discussed at length in the second part of this chapter.

Thus when Jean d'Ormesson, for example, says

"Malgré l'analyse profonde de tant de textes de jeunesse, je ne crois pas que l'histoire littéraire ait beaucoup à tirer du dernier livre de Sartre"(8)

for me the emphasis is misplaced. For though it is certainly true that however the overall thesis is eventually judged, Sartre will have earned a right to a place in the body of Flaubert criticism with his readings
of the early works(9), certain extended analyses like those of the Garçon and "la bêtise"(10), and the shorter but very original ones of Dr. Larivière, Homais, and Saint Julien(11), nevertheless his most vital contribution must be the energy with which he follows the original pathological relationship with language right through to a sophisticated theory of style.

Sartre's interest in such a use of language is perhaps surprising, yet his careful references to contemporary linguistics(12) and to the "Nouveau Roman" show him to have understood them, despite a slight ambiguity of attitude.

"Gustave connaît un regain de faveur et les nouveaux romanciers voient en lui leur précurseur, ils l'adorent d'avoir, au milieu du siècle dernier, été droit au problème qu'ils tiennent pour essentiel et mis en question l'être même de la littérature, le langage. Jugement révocable, lui aussi, qui sera un jour révoqué et dont la révocation sera elle-même annulée."(13)

His description of the neurotic option of 1844 as defining a literary art involving a radical upheaval in the use of words(14), is an example of his deliberate attempts to bring himself into line with the attitude to words, (autonomy and materiality of the signifier etc.), so prevalent in present-day critical and creative writing in France(15). It is hard to gauge how seriously his contribution and willing effort to bring himself up to date will be taken in those quarters(16), but an indication of his possible "recuperation" might be seen in the fact that two papers on L'Idiot de la famille were read at the Cerisy Flaubert colloquium, one outlining some of the linguistic analyses(17), the other even seeking to present Sartre's study in an "optique lacanienne"(18).

I would agree with Michel Sicard that the general subject proposed by Sartre in his preface ("Que peut-on savoir d'un homme, aujourd'hui?"(19) might be better defined as "comment devient-on écrivain?"(20). For it has not been sufficiently realized, (in the reviews and articles that have appeared to date), that the long trek to an art involving an
upheaval in the use of language is the guiding thread of Sartre's thesis, such that Maurice Nadeau can actually say:

"'Que peut-on savoir d'un homme?' demande Sartre à propos de quelqu'un qui nous intéresse surtout en tant qu'écrivain." (21)

Thus while I am anxious to dispel Lecarme's reservation, that brilliant though L'Idiot de la famille may be, the lover and admirer of Flaubert will suffer in reading it (22), and to argue against the Times Literary Supplement review's unsubstantiated conclusion that

"The question whether Jean-Paul Sartre, so bitterly wary of the concept of literature, so intransigent about the sham aspects of art, will be able to conceptualize the innocent wonder of Flaubert's actual creations, is as yet open." (23),

(for if Sartre never got as far as his proposed textual analysis of Madame Bovary, I hope to show that he has certainly gone further than most critics in "conceptualizing the innocent wonder" etc.), the tone of these remarks perhaps suggests that it is more urgent to establish Sartre's right to be taken seriously at all. I shall therefore devote the first part of this chapter to a more general evaluation of L'Idiot de la famille, thereby, I would hope, establishing the right to take seriously the unexpected theory of Flaubert's style which I shall confront more directly in the main body of the chapter.
(i) A general evaluation of *L'Idiot de la famille.*

"GÉNIE (LE). Inutile de l'admirer, c'est une névrose." (24)

The attitude of many of the early reviews of *L'Idiot de la famille* ranges from mildly condescending to openly abusive(25). A good example of the former relatively harmless attitude is to be found in a double-page spread in *Les nouvelles littéraires* entitled 'L'Idiot de la famille, monstrueux, irritant et génial. Le dernier Sartre devant les critiques.' True to the tone of the title, the six "Flaubert experts", (Reiss, Durry, Douchin, Ritzen, Bancquart and Nadeau), contributed little more serious consideration of the work than the following comments worthy of a place in Flaubert's *Sottisier*:

"Je ne veux pas sourire..."

"qui veut trop prouver ne prouve rien."

"la mayonnaise est bien montée. Mais c'est l'authenticité des ingrédients de départ qui inquiète." (26)

In that the size of Sartre's study makes it inevitably inaccessible, particularly to those with an interest in Flaubert rather than Sartre himself, who might really want to know what it says, it is a shame that so few reviewers felt it necessary to bother to analyse the contents. Many, for example, took refuge in repeating what they felt must be true, that the book tells us more about Sartre than Flaubert(27). If I do not pass over some of the more silly reviews it is not for the sake of scoring an easy point, but because in view of the length of the original text they are likely to be taken notice of. Of course serious work has now been produced, but because of the inevitable time-lag(28), and the general prejudice against Sartre, it seems fairly important to point
out the more blatant misrepresentations.

It is disturbing to find a critic as well-known as Harry Levin calling the work "a furious and infuriating assault on nothing less than literature itself"(29). This is an extension of the concluding lines of his chapter on Flaubert in The Gates of Horn, where he argues that because Flaubert has established his right to the epithet "the novelist's novelist", to criticize him is to criticize nothing less than "the novel" itself(30). While Levin speaks mildly here, describing "some of our novelists" who "pursuing different aims and feeling pressures Flaubert never felt, wax impatient over his cult of stylistic perfection", such a comment, which I assume to be already an oblique allusion to Sartre(31), gives way, in his review of L'Idiot de la famille, to a virulent attack on the book as:

"the fulfilment of a life-long vendetta as dedicated a hatchet-job as can be encountered among the curiosities of literature. In other words, the political activist has been spelling out an elaborate rationalization of the positions he has been taking against the esthetic recluse all along." (32)

This description is so utterly inappropriate that Levin could not begin to prove it, nor does he make any attempt to do so.

But in exaggerated form these quotations from Levin illustrate two strains of preconception that can I think be dealt with - that Sartre hates all "non-committed" literature, and that he dislikes the man Flaubert so much that a long book on him must have malicious intentions(33). Marie-Jeanne Durry, for instance, reveals herself a suitable example of the latter by her refusal to believe in Sartre's declared new empathy, taking as proof of his continued antipathy his remark that he would not really choose to have dinner with Flaubert "qui devait être vraiment assommant"(34)! Yet Sartre has always been careful to be clear about his position towards Flaubert, and even the so-called former antipathy was hardly that offensive, (for example the little anthology
of Flaubert's more reactionary statements offered in a footnote of *Qu'est-ce que la littérature?* (35) It is only fair to recognize that in *L'Idiot de la famille* Sartre never introduces a critical dimension into his serious attempt to "comprendre une pensée bourgeoise dans son originalité" (36). One unusual reference to ethical attitudes comes with the description of the second school revolt which betrays all the ideals of the first, and here empathy even leads Sartre into an amusing sentimentality:

"Pauvres enfants, qui pourrait leur reprocher cette implacable défaite? Ne perdons pas notre temps à les plaindre; ils ont fait ce qu'ils ont pu, c'est vrai, mais nous n'y pouvons rien: l'histoire condamne d'avance." (37)

But the most convincing evidence of Sartre's good faith in trying to understand, in all their complexity, attitudes which from other points of view he would obviously condemn, must be the early and outstandingly interesting section 'La vassalité' (38). For this is precisely a subtle and persuasive attempt to understand Flaubert's hatred of egalitarianism. Analysing vassality as a relationship to the world and the way an inessential being gains the right to be essential, Sartre recognizes Flaubert's psychological need to be justified by a hierarchical society, and suggests that transmitted property, as a feudal person-to-person link, is similarly essential to his sense of his right to exist (39). Sartre actually states that there is no point in emphasizing how reactionary this is, that it is more useful to see that such an attitude has its roots in Flaubert's infancy, which made him for ever incapable of distinguishing "la propriété du don" (40). From the age of four years Flaubert's ontological dignity is founded upon the basic postulation "être un rentier" (41). This insight is essential to the development of Sartre's argument, but even if one wanted to suspend judgement on its relevance to the 1844 fit, it cannot be ignored as a way of understanding Flaubert's near
mental collapse when faced with economic ruin in the 1870's(42). The passage where Sartre describes the way in which riches are ennobled through transmission, taking on human qualities and spiritual depth, might well be compared, as evidence of Sartre's ability to adopt different attitudes, with the sustained and corrosive irony applied, in Qu'est-ce que la littérature?, to the turn of the century bourgeois writers and their attempt to "sauver la bourgeoisie en profondeur":

"Barres l'a montré: le bourgeois ne fait qu'un avec son bien, s'il demeure en sa province et sur ses terres, quelque chose passe en lui du mol vallonnement de la contrée, du frisson argenté des peupliers, de la mystérieuse et lente fécondité du sol, de la nervosité rapide et capricieuse des ciels; en s'assimilant le monde il s'en s'assimile la profondeur; son âme, désormais, a des sous-sols, des mines, des gisements aurifères, des filons, des nappes souterraines de pétrole."(43)

The other sort of unfounded prejudice about Sartre's interest in literature is best summed up by Thody's contention that:

"there is little doubt that he Sartre would have preferred Baudelaire to have been a third-rate early Socialist pamphleteer rather than a first-rate lyrical poet."(44)

This view, that the final criterion of Sartre's literary appreciation is political, is alarming in its prevalence, for it could not reasonably be illustrated by any of Sartre's writings, theoretical, biographical or critical(45).

Sartre's interest in aesthetics and purely literary phenomena can be traced from his earliest studies of the imagination (where phenomenological studies of various art forms play a vital rôle), to the essays printed in Situations 1(46), to the study of Baudelaire which depends upon Sartre's essential idea of the "en-soi-pour-soi enfin réussi", to the extended analyses of Genet's writings and imagery(47). L'Idiot de la famille, most of the work for which must have been done at a time when Sartre was certainly still "politically active"(48), subsumes all these earlier studies, which are much more closely linked to his purely
philosophical writings than to his political interests. In fact if Sartre does prefer a particular sort of literature, it is not that of propaganda so much as what he would call "cosmic" writing, that is literature whose permanent subject is the world(49). Much of Sartre's interest in Flaubert seems to stem precisely from his conviction that he is a cosmic writer who shows the "totalizing" relationship between microcosm and macrocosm. It is this ability to grasp the world in its entirety through an individual intuition that constitutes the sort of "engagement" in the world that interests Sartre in an artist(50).

The root of the "error" about Sartre is obviously *Qu'est-ce que la littérature?* In stressing once and for all that Sartre's highly intellectual interest in aesthetics must be separated from his practical political concerns, it must be emphasized that *Qu'est-ce que la littérature* belongs to the latter and not to the former category, and is best understood in terms of his intellectual development in the post-war years, of the need he felt to turn his attention from ontological to political freedom. Sartre cannot be accused of ever confusing these two sorts of freedom(51), for the new social awareness which comes to him with the war seems to me the beginning of a division in his concerns. Sartre's remark, in the *Le Monde* interview on *L'Idiot de la famille*, that he has never resolved the practical problem of how to make himself understood by a popular public while carrying an idea through to its limits, shows his unwillingness to sacrifice theoretical sophistication, even for the understanding of his desired audience(52). *Qu'est-ce que la littérature?,* true to its own theoretical basis, is very much written for the France of 1948, a post-war France full of practical problems to be solved and concrete decisions actually be taken(53). It is in such a situation that Sartre looks to the word as a potential weapon.

Of course Sartre is partly to blame in his choice of title, which
inevitably suggests that the book is aligning itself with his general ideas on literature. Yet although, from his own point of view, the decision to commit "serious" literature seems ill-advised(54), it is nevertheless clear even from the first chapter ('Qu'est-ce qu'écrire?'), where he distinguishes between poetry and prose(55), that the sort of literature that he will later analyse with such thoroughness, albeit in prose, belongs to his "poetry" category, where words are no longer transparent vehicles of meaning, but are considered as autonomous substances in their own right. The ethical/aesthetic divergence is an ambiguity which we shall come across again later(56). For the time being it is only essential to see that Thody's belief that Sartre thinks literature should concern itself with moral rather than aesthetic values, is based upon a fundamental misunderstanding of all of Sartre's work(57).

It is only by clearing away unreasonable and prejudiced objections to L'Idiot de la famille that one can perhaps do it the service of examining it in a more rigorous critical light. The main criticisms of a general nature which deserve attention could be summed up as considerations of presentation, (length, complexity, terminology), and problems of the status of Sartre's account.

From the academic point of view it is regrettable that Sartre's thesis is presented in so unscholarly a fashion. There are few footnotes, no index, and a table of contents applying only to the first two volumes and often enigmatic in its chapter headings. I personally found that by annotating this table with clearer references to the contents of each section, the whole work became suddenly easier to assimilate, for it was much more obvious that Sartre was building up a carefully constructed, relentlessly logical argument. Thus one feels that with relatively little effort Sartre could put himself on the road to solving his own dilemmas of making difficult ideas accessible, i.e. that rigorous clarity of
presentation might be the only thing required to make some of his outstanding digressions available to readers without the time to work through the whole book. One regrets the faults of presentation from his point of view, for they inevitably detract so much from the impact he might have made. Among various minor inaccuracies one can imagine how many British academics will not forgive him for his reference to Enid Sterkie!(58)

Though Sartre's generalized use of a sort of "style indirect libre" contributes to the charm of some of his very well written passages (and to the ironic effect of the *Qu'est-ce que la littérature?* extract quoted above), it is also true that one of Sartre's more regrettable characteristics has always been the imprecision of his references, his habit of paraphrasing without indicating the extent of his own intervention(59). In *Questions de méthode* he generalizes shamefully about Marxists(60) and psychoanalysis without giving the reader the chance to investigate his claims, and even criticizes individuals with a sweeping "l'un d'eux"(61), "un essayiste écrivait l'autre jour"(62) and so on. This is so contradictory to Sartre's avowed respect for specificity etc. that the speed at which he must write and the scope of his references no doubt serve as an explanation if not an excuse. Presumably one must prefer *L'Idiot de la famille* to exist in unscholarly form rather than not at all; if Sartre had presented the first two volumes a little more carefully we might have been deprived of the third volume which draws together so many threads, and I think many will eventually regret the loss of the fourth volume in any form whatsoever. All I would really argue is that such reservations be kept in perspective, for if Sartre does not always respect the conventions of academic activity, he clearly has a close acquaintance with Flaubert and his period which cannot be lightly dismissed.
But if Sartre is always in a hurry because he has so much to say, should one not rather locate the fault in the astounding length of his study? It is hard to decide if the length was inevitable or if he really enjoyed his work being so shockingly vast. In a discussion of the mid-nineteenth century conflict between literature and science there is an interesting digression on their differing methods, which centres, not accidentally one might suspect, on the very question of concision. Quoting Pascal who did not have time to "faire court", Sartre suggests in a footnote that concision is only inherently necessary to the sciences, whereas it can only be an exterior concern of the work of art, a stylistic consideration affecting neither construction nor appreciation. Taking into account a passing allusion to Proust, (would we wish he had been more concise?) one can only assume that Sartre is situating himself in the more lengthy literary camp(63). Jonathan Culler recommends Sartre's book for a sabbatical or a desert island(64), and no one is likely to forget Sartre's warning in *Questions de méthode*: "une étude qui doit être longue et difficile"(65).

In fact it seems to me that as much as being a methodological exposé, *Questions de méthode* really stands as an apology for difficulty and for long, complicated analyses, in its constant attacks on other people's analytic short-cuts, on stopping short at what is only the beginning of the problem, and on every form of intellectual laziness.

In his insistence upon the originality of facts, the specificity of individuals "Mais il s'agit de Valéry"(66), "c'est que ce Napoléon était nécessaire"(67), and of events (revolutionary "journées"cannot be reduced to concepts(68)), in his avowed intention to reduce the rôle of chance, abstraction and "non-Savoir", in his respect of multiple dimensions wherever his analyses lead him, Sartre sets himself such a vast task that one ought to be amazed at his success in keeping the
whole argument under control at all. For in his constant Kantian habit of seeking general conditions of possibility for each problem he unearths, (the scope of the problems he sets himself in this way for the fourth volume is alarming(69) ), he gathers up enough momentum to go on for ever, and yet he guides his work to an impressive number of conclusions in the third volume. Most literary histories inevitably make one of their terms (literary or historical) static, or they would have difficulty proceeding. Sartre allows both their dynamism, relates the individual project to both, and describes a moment in time (e.g. the publication of Madame Bovary) in terms of a juxtaposition of so many generations each with a different past and future to be taken into account. He seeks to unite synchrony and diachrony in a single work, and Kouchard suggests that theoretical reflexion and respect for lived experience could not have been linked in a coherent enterprise in a smaller work(70). Thus although Sartre is occasionally repetitive, as in his repeated explanations of what he means by the imaginary, (he himself would reject this, claiming that the same problems are being taken up at a different level of complexity and integration(71) ), I do not think, given an awareness of the comprehensiveness of his intentions, that one could expect him to be all that much briefer(72).

The last criticism of presentation often levelled at Sartre is the over-use of jargon. Thus of the fact that Flaubert "réalise la déréalisation du réel" Harry Levin asks "what does this word-play mean?"(73). I recall that when I first read Sartre's excerpts in Les Temps Modernes I was irritated and bewildered by "totalization", "the interiorization of the exterior"and vice versa, and so on. Yet as soon as one follows Sartre such terms are perfectly clear and appropriate, many of them acquiring meaning as the analysis proceeds. In fact some terms like "praxis" and the "pratico-inert" are unnecessarily over-
defined. Interestingly, Mary Warnock suggests that Sartre lets abstractions run riot in the *Critique de la raison dialectique*, with so many new terms and technicalities that the concrete world of real people and things vanishes. If this could be said of the *Critique*, this concrete world makes a decisive reappearance in *L'Idiot de la famille*. Perhaps it is true that Sartre's theoretical writing has always been weaker than his more usual method of arguing by example. In his early work on the imaginary and the "néant" his difficult ideas are easily grasped if one forces oneself to think through such examples as the impersonation of Maurice Chevalier. In teaching *Questions de méthode* as a theoretical text I found that my students had almost without exception "skipped" the extended examples of the French Revolution and of Flaubert as a Second Empire writer, regarding as mere "illustration" what is essential to the exposition of the actual theory. I suspect that *L'Idiot de la famille* is successful precisely because it is such a protracted example; the idea of seriality and the group, for instance, finds its best exposition in the dramatic tale of the schoolboy revolt and subsequent invention of the Garçon, and this is perhaps another reason why Sartre needs considerable space around his complex notions.

The important question of the hypothetical status of *L'Idiot de la famille* can be looked at from two angles - in his own terms can Sartre claim to have proved what he set out to prove, and to the interested onlooker can the analyses of Flaubert be considered valid? Sartre's stance is not in fact especially dogmatic; in the *Le Monde* interview he says that the Flaubert of *L'Idiot* is Flaubert as he imagines him, and yet he hopes that his method is rigorous enough for it to be a true portrait. Of course the story of the first six years is hypothetical, but if it fits the total pattern of Flaubert's later life it will be "useful". It is important to distinguish between the "regressive"
and the "progressive" steps in Sartre's method, for it is only the synthetic, progressive part, the chronological dimension that picks up the "project", telling the story through imaginative reconstructions, that is openly hypothetical. To make it plain that these linking details are deliberately conceived as fiction(79) Sartre writes them in the self-conscious style of fiction, using Christian names (Achille-Cléophas, Gustave, Alfred and Ernest), erecting a mythology(80) (the "Seigneur noir", "les Chevaliers du Néant"), and establishing archetypal events (the Fall). Yet in a sense it seems to me that Sartre plays on the idea of the "roman vrai"(81) to his own advantage. In terms of his overall argument he needs some of these imagined events to be true, and yet the playful manner of their recounting allows him to pretend that this part is only a game. Sartre claims only to suppose that Flaubert's father took over trying to teach him to read, and would often only say that something of the sort must have happened(82). And yet he makes it very clear in Questions de méthode that he values the progressive-regressive method because it is properly heuristic(83). Constantly accusing the Marxists of knowing in advance what they intend to "find out", Sartre could never accept this criticism of himself, insisting upon his "intention d'apprendre et non de retrouver"(84). He admits that he starts out with a very schematic abstract idea of what he wants to prove but would not think of considering it proven until it has been lived through from the inside as concrete experience.

The meaning of "apprendre" in the above quotation remains a little ambiguous. Sartre is avowedly trying to prove two major points, that given the appropriate methods and necessary documents it is possible to find out all about another man(85), and that any man "totalise son époque dans la mesure exacte où il est totalisé par elle"(86). But these
are precisely conceived as very general abstractions, which Sartre knows cannot take on any real meaning until the end of the work, and this seems to be what he means by "proving" here. Yet the emphasis is slightly different where he implies that what is conceived as a model of Flaubert, if it accounts for all the evidence, is valid, that when he reaches an intuition of having attained irreducibility, of accounting for and integrating (without ever forcing this integration) all the problematic phenomena unearthed by the regressive analysis, then he considers his hypotheses to have been verified(87). In claiming that the work is in this way its own proof, Sartre is surely setting up a complicated tautology.

Nevertheless I feel it is only because Sartre himself insists that his method is not tautologous that the accusation matters(88). To the reader the overall argument need only be rigorous and coherent, for any critical argument of reasonable sophistication is bound to be hypothetical. Hypothesis is hardly intellectual taboo(89) and as a concept needs careful handling. On the level of detail Sartre occasionally gets into amusingly silly tautologies. For example in his discussion of the "l'art pour l'art" writers he details a list of writers who may not all have been famous, but of which "none died in obscurity"(90). Since he has only picked the ones well-known in their period, the astute reader will find the reason for this quite simple(91). Further the debonnaire way in which Sartre sometimes handles hypothesis is well illustrated by a description of Alfred "Alfred lui tend les bras, souriant, gracieux, patient et si beau", immediately followed by a footnote saying that we do not know what Alfred looked like but that he must have been good-looking! (92) At the same time analyses of which one might expect to be wary can be very convincing in their power to explain, whatever their hypothetical status. For example Sartre sets about explaining
the prophetic quality of the early works (here *Novembre*) by his conviction that "toute vie prophétise, à tout instant, puisqu'elle se déroule en spirale" (93). Premonition would therefore be founded with reason upon the very structures of existence, where every new and irreversible change is at the same time repetition. The prophetic quality of the early works is so striking (for example the many epileptiform fits (94)), that an explanation really does seem to be needed, and Sartre's is after all the only one we have.

Marie-Claire Bancquart claims that the proofs from Flaubert's works were clearly "solicited" (95), but this I consider a misapplication of the hypothesis accusation. Nevertheless it is prevalent. Levin declares:

"Using a writer's work to interpret his life becomes a particularly circular procedure when one begins by reading into the work a prior speculation as to the life." (96)

But Sartre insists that he started from the early works, rather than looking for confirmation there (97). Apart from seeing no obvious reason for disbelieving him, one hardly needs to have read *L'Idiot de la famille* to see stories like *Matteo Falcone* (98) and *La Peste à Florence* (99) as rather alarming versions of Freud's "roman familial". A little attention to a major example, the "Père et fils" sequence, anyway shows Sartre to be giving a correct account of his method. In some 150 pages of regressive analysis Sartre examines these early stories for their "sens", and discovers that it is the father and not the mother whom the child considers to blame for his wretchedness and humiliation (100). He then picks up the progressive synthesis to reconstruct the story of the relationship of the father and son, to see how this error came about.

In general the hypothesis label needs to be kept in its correct perspective and where Mouchard claims that the thesis follows the law of "all or nothing" (101) I do not in fact agree. While I admire the comprehensiveness and intellectual brilliance of the overall argument,
and would be interested to accept most of it, obviously I recognize its hypothetical status and do not feel "compromised" by an active interest in it. But the part I gladly accept, and refuse to consider any more hypothetical than any interesting discussion, is the regressive movement, the vast bulk of phenomenological description, the unearthing and analysis of themes and problems. The three pieces of information from Flaubert's niece(102) are not the objective springboard for wild surmise, but an introduction to such essential themes as the relationship to language and truth, the problems of sincerity and belief. Sartre provides outstanding analyses, admirably argued with plenty of evidence, and I hope to have shown by the end of this chapter that the existence of these problems can be backed up from many other angles.

Even from the more general point of view which is not strictly my concern in this thesis, it seems to me that none of the above criticisms give the right to "ignore" Sartre's book. For though I would not expect everyone to agree with my contention that it is by centring his biographical approach in the relationship to language that Sartre has outdated all biographical and "intentional" approaches which do not do this, surely all future biographies and general studies of Flaubert must be under some obligation to criticize L'Idiot de la famille on its own terms. Where François Bondy refers us rather to Enid Starkie or Maurice Nadeau, I would argue that naive biographies will no longer be acceptable(103).

Since Sartre declares and spends a large part of his book arguing that the 1844 fit is at the very source of Flaubert's genius, it is no good Maurice Nadeau saying that one can discuss whether Flaubert's nervous illness was organic or neurotic indefinitely "sans éclairer la démarche qui a fait de Flaubert l'auteur de Madame Bovary"(104). For it is up to Nadeau to disprove him, to show why he has failed to show this.
The Times Literary Supplement's review uses exactly the same ploy of deliberately paraphrasing Sartre's intentions yet at no point arguing out these basic issues of his thesis:

"The very mass of Sartre's knowledge falls ironically short of explaining how this neurotic, bored young man, this 'family idiot', suffocating in the mendacities of the mid-nineteenth century bourgeois order, should have composed Madame Bovary and created the modern novel."(105)

But the worst offender from this point of view is surely Bardèche, whose L'Oeuvre de Flaubert, written after L'Idiot de la famille, contains a series of oblique allusions to Sartre without ever naming him or venturing actually to take him on:

"Et il faut assurément beaucoup d'imagination pour inventer des complexes ou des amertumes que tous les documents contredisent"(106)

"ne cherchons donc pas dans cette Première Éducation sentimentale les traces de la foudre d'où a pu naître le génie."(107)

A relevant example of a biographical assumption that Sartre has successfully challenged is Flaubert's attitude to his father. One of the greatest received ideas of Flaubert criticism is to offer Dr. Larivière in Madame Bovary as a respectful portrait of Dr. Flaubert, an assumption with so little evidence to back it up that Sartre's interpretation seems to elicit stunned refusal. Calling Sartre "an ineptly amateurish biographer" Levin declares: "Flaubert, on the other hand, is well-known to have been a devoted son"(108), quoting Lucie Chevalley-Sabatier in support, along with the "affectionate tribute" of Souvenirs, Notes et Penseés intimes. This rare tribute,"Je n'ai aimé qu'un homme comme ami et qu'un autre, c'est mon père"(109), is perhaps the worst cliché of all in a collection of often second-hand juvenile reflexions, and as such, at least not overwhelming evidence. But Sartre also "defers the question of Dr. Larivière, one of the few admiring portraits in Madame Bovary"(110). Not only does Sartre spend considerable time discussing the very same Dr. Larivière(111), but I would certainly not
accept that Sartre is arguing against the obvious. If none of the medical profession comes off too well in *Madame Bovary*, the Dr. Larivièren episode resembles, if anything, a circus act, from his noisy mock-epic arrival, (too late), in a carriage drawn by three filthy horses, to his hasty exit from the scene of tragedy, the stated intention of which is to avoid having Emma "mourir entre ses mains"(112).

It requires considerable good will to believe in a Dr. Larivièren "who in face of social or metaphysical complexities is well aware that he can provide no abstract or absolute solution, but directs both clear intelligence and deep feeling to making what he can of circumstances as they are."(113)

In fact for Alison Fairlie the biographical explanation is not sufficient, yet the steely surgeon is erected into "a symbol for the novelist and his art"(114). That the portrait is fiercely ironic seems on the evidence so much more likely that Sartre must surely at least be out-argued in future. But Bardèche, in a position to attempt this, devotes only a footnote to Flaubert's father: "Flaubert, qui l'aimait beaucoup, a toujours parlé de lui avec admiration et respect"(115).

In what precedes I have often had occasion to refer to general considerations of methodology, and before passing on to a summary of what Sartre says about Flaubert there are perhaps a few points to be clarified. The most important statement of intent, summing up the proposals of *Questions de méthode*, is offered at the point in *L'Idiot* where Sartre is discussing whether or not Flaubert's own attitude to 1844 is relevant. Sartre insists that from the beginning of the study he has always sought to understand Flaubert from the inside, that is in complicity with him:

"s'il a pu nous arriver de transcrire ses confidences en un autre langage — c'est-à-dire d'en faire une 'lecture' qui nous situe nous-même comme vivant après lui, dans la seconde moitié du XXᵉ siècle — si notre méthode implique que nous sollicitions le discours sans en privilégier aucun moment, il est sûr, en tout cas, que nous ne l'avons jamais traité en extériorité, comme pur objet de savoir conceptuel: tout ce que nous avons su de lui, il l'a vécu et l'a dit."

(116)
His aim has been to situate himself at the point where the interiorization of the exterior is transformed into exteriorization of the interior, whilst enumerating and organizing the objective conditions to show them as maintained and transcended towards objectivation by the subjective movement, "cet irréductible"(117).

In aiming to reintroduce concrete man into Marxism, Sartre argued in Questions de méthode that there is a whole series of intermediate stages between individuals and events, between a book like Madame Bovary and the period in which it is published, and suggests Freudian psychoanalysis and American sociology as attempts to define these levels. In L'Idiot de la famille the family, close friends, school, Romantic literature, the social situation of Flaubert's father (i.e. the beliefs and value systems of the professional bourgeoisie) all emerge as important mediating contexts, and every available theory is applied to understanding each as well as possible. But for Sartre the really privileged context is the family, which he locates as the true point of insertion of the individual into his class(118), and it is his sudden interest in the family which causes him at long last to pay serious attention to psychoanalysis.

Sartre's position as regards psychoanalysis has changed so drastically that it is not really worth bringing out his old quarrels with Freud from L'Être et le Néant(119). Many of his early objections seem to have been based on misunderstanding of what is meant by the "unconscious". In his rejection of all underlying psychic causality, of the "mechanistic explanations" which he would replace with a complex choice of being, it has always surprised me that Sartre took no interest in the intentional structures of neurosis and hysteria, with their evident use of the body. His reference, in L'Être et le Néant, to his plan to one day write existential psychoanalyses of Flaubert and Dostoevsky.
is curious(120), because it throws up the possibility that Sartre had read Freud's article describing Dostoevsky's epilepsy as hysterical, the result of a classic father fixation with the fits as a "fausse-mort" and symbolic murder of the father(121). This is so close to one layer of Sartre's interpretation of the 1844 fit that it is difficult to imagine that Sartre had not read the original at some stage; the interesting point would be to know when.

In his 1963 preface to Laing and Cooper's Reason and Violence, Sartre shows himself still a long way from sympathizing with Freudian psychoanalysis:

"Je pense comme vous qu'on ne peut comprendre les troubles psychiques du dehors, à partir du déterminisme positiviste ni les reconstruire par une combinaison de concepts qui restent extérieurs à la maladie vécue."(122)

Psychoanalysis is allowed its results only if it obtains them by "comprehension" and empathy; unconscious fantasy must be conceived in its reality as experience, not as a series of mechanisms imposed on a subject. When one realizes that by L'Idiot de la famille Sartre has more or less come to accept the Freudian unconscious(123), at the same time as clinging to this former view, one senses the full extent of his dilemma, expressed, I think, by the declaration of intent with which I started this particular digression. For it is the preeminence of the signifier over the subject, the exteriority of the symbolic order in relation to the subject, which is the very notion of the Freudian unconscious. If the symbolic order is in no way the work of the human consciousness, a clear rejection is implied of Sartrean existentialism, whereby the self is an active phenomenological subject, endowing the world with meaning. The structural-psychoanalytical and existential perspectives seem irreconcilable because of this argument over the status of the subject(124). Yet in L'Idiot, despite his claim that "je ne crois toujours pas à l'inconscient sous certaines formes"(125),
references suggest that Sartre has been influenced by Lacan, but above all by the arch-Freudian Octave Mannoni, whose analysis of the "Je sais bien...mais quand même" syndrome Sartre uses to explain Flaubert's fetichisation of the imaginary, perhaps the most essential point of his whole argument, as will be illustrated at length below(126).

In other words psychoanalysis has become much more for Sartre than just a particularly rigorous study of family relationships. But in an attempt to argue against the possibility of anything unconscious in consciousness he insists upon a distinction between "connaissance" and "compréhension", for example Gustave "ne se connaît pas mais nul ne se comprend mieux que lui"(127). This distinction is subsumed in Sartre's notion of "le vécu", defined as "la vie en compréhension avec soi-même, sans que soit indiquée une connaissance, une conscience théétique"(128). Sartre now admits that L'Être et le Néant's insistence upon rationality had failed to take account of

"des processus intervenant 'en dessous' de la conscience, processus également rationnels mais qui sont vécus comme irrationnels. L'introduction de la notion de vécu représente un effort pour conserver cette 'présence à soi' qui me paraît indispensable à l'existence de tout fait psychique, présence en même temps si opaque, si aveugle à elle-même qu'elle est aussi 'absence de soi'. À l'aide de cette notion, j'ai essayé de dépasser la traditionnelle ambiguïté psychanalytique du fait psychique — à la fois télologique et mécanique — en montrant que tout fait psychique implique une intentionnalité dirigée vers quelque chose, mais que certains de ces faits ne peuvent exister que s'ils sont l'objet d'une simple compréhension sans être nommés ni connus."(129)

Yet it seems to me that this distinction is not particularly relevant to his argument, and that statements like the following do not really get him anywhere: "Aussi ne faut-il pas comprendre la comédie comme si Gustave avait conscience de la jouer. Mais il n'en est pas non plus inconscient"(130). Whereas when Sartre speaks of the pithiatic depths where for some "se faire" and "se subir" are indiscernable, or of the dark corridors of Flaubert's soul, where, although he pretends to have reached
no decision, "on a décidé pour lui", he has surely himself admitted defeat(131).

By way of solution he seems to allow that the subject may not always be the explanatory cause(132), as long as the situation can be reconstructed as grasped by the individual as well. Thus in his vastly changed position as regards causation it is his own theory of consciousness which is on the defensive. The Freudian unconscious can be accepted along with theoretical Marxism; he will accept any means of furthering "Savoir" (the theoretical body of knowledge existing at a given moment), as long as it can be "lived" from the inside as well, which, as we have seen, seems to be what Sartre would call "proving" it. Mouchard speaks of Sartre's "dream" of an anthropomorphic reduction of the dispersion of knowledge(133), and one feels that there might indeed be an element of the "je sais bien... mais quand même" in the position Sartre has got himself into, with the "quand même" of the "indépassable" elements, the irreducible human project, finally reduced to the fictional pole, (though insisted upon all the more vigorously), in his vast synthesis of theoretical knowledge and lived experience.

Accusations of a general nature are so often used as an excuse for not taking any of L'Idiot de la famille seriously, that the foregoing considerations seemed to have a more vital claim to space than any lengthy summary of Sartre's argument. As I have indicated, it is certain parts, (albeit very important ones), of this argument which are essential to my own thesis, and these could, I think, be extracted from the whole. However from Sartre's point of view there is an intimate connection between all levels of his argument, the structure of which should perhaps be explained to situate the more detailed discussion
of language and the choice of the imaginary which will follow.

The progressive-regressive method, outlined (specifically for Flaubert) in *Questions de méthode*, involves as its first stage phenomenological description and analysis informed by every available theory, based on a to-and-fro cross-reference between period, biography and literary works, which will not be artificially integrated at this stage, this being Sartre's chief criticism of the usual run of "Marxist" analysis. (Indeed Sartre does not allow the three poles to come together until the third volume). The aim is to differentiate Flaubert, to go as far as possible into his historical singularity, unearthing the themes and problems which will only be properly understood in the second stage, the "progressive synthesis" (134).

This picks up Sartre's favorite perspective of the individual project, which, he claims, far from sympathizing with individual fantasies, involves a rigorously objective empathy: "la restitution de cette existence considérée comme totalisation en cours" (135). Sartre's belief in totalization is essential. Since a man, once dead, can be viewed as a totality, it does not matter where one begins trying to understand him, since every detail will be related to the whole, and a later stage can legitimately be used to illuminate an earlier one (136). The constant subsuming synthesis will continually rediscover the present elucidated by the whole procedure.

Yet this indicates only the general theoretical background of *L'Idiot de la famille*. Sartre's practical method, true to his heuristic intentions, will depend upon the problems encountered (137). In fact the main divisions of the work do not specifically relate to regressive analysis and progressive synthesis, for within a broadly chronological movement these intermingle (138).
The evident pivot of the three volumes is the "hysterical" fit of January 1844, reached chronologically, towards the end of the second volume. Sartre is not original, of course, in his interest in Flaubert's illness, for there have been various discussions on its status (physical or psychological)(139). It is generally accepted that the nervous disorder was in fact some form of epilepsy(140), but if the treatment of epilepsy has progressed since Flaubert's day there is still endless disagreement about its causation. To suggest that Flaubert's first major fit was psychosomatic is not especially controversial in the medical context, and it is perhaps a shame, from his own point of view, that Sartre avoids discussing medical evidence(141). One wonders about the reasons for his inconsistent attitude, for, though later in the book he quite simply refers to the disorder as epilepsy, he starts out from a quite rigorous distinction between hysteria and epilepsy: "Mais ces dispositions biologiques, à supposer qu'elles existent, qui prouve qu'elles soient premières?"(142). One might almost suspect him of subconsciously sharing Maxime du Camp's view that epilepsy is a somatic disorder involving a mental deficit:(143) The most rigorous medical proof (anyway unavailable) could hardly affect Sartre's case, and might equally give it firmer backing(144).

What is original and controversial is the use to which Sartre puts the neurosis, which becomes central to his "proof" of the symbiotic relationship between man, work and period. The first section 'La Constitution', examines and seeks the origins of the original disturbance, which is traced to a passive constitution, (caused by the devoted chilliness of the mother but blamed on the father, who at the age of six or seven Flaubert thinks suddenly stops loving him), and to the jealousy and exasperation of a child caught between the lack of capacity given him from birth, and the family ambition which he has already interiorized by
the time of this second "weaning" from his father's affection. From the outset the infant Flaubert's passivity involves hebetudes, credulity, a pathological relationship to language and truth, "comédies" and deliberately upheld beliefs, in all a good apprenticeship in hysteria(145).

The second and much longer section, 'La Personnalisation', shows how Flaubert chooses to live this abstract conditioning. In insisting upon Flaubert's basic passivity Sartre sets himself, in the existential perspective, a fascinating problem. For if all men are defined by their projects, obliged "de se poser pour soi comme transendance et comme entreprise"(146), what is the meaning of passive choice and action? The only answer is that Flaubert will have to use his passivity, adopting passive action, the manipulation of self by self, as a tactic. The vital link between passive constitution and hysterical vocation is belief, passivity's chief resource, (which explains the care with which Sartre establishes the importance of belief and credulity in the first section). To use his body to act upon others Flaubert needs a hysterical belief in his own "comédies". From early childhood he is able to produce hebetude, exaggerated passivity, as a weapon of defence. The eventual fit is only a violent radicalization of these trances, of which fainting was always the secret and ultimate aim. There are several pieces of objective evidence for the prevalence of Flaubert's trances, and overwhelming proof of the subjective importance of the theme can be found in the early stories, which abound in autistic poses and trances, in faintings and pseudo-epileptic fits(147).

Symptoms are both suffered and exploited, intentionally structured as a means. However this self-defensive "stress", an attempt to dissolve or neutralize the basic problem, in fact only increases the disorder(148). For Flaubert's reaction to his non-valorisation, to
being an "être-de-mauvaise-qualité", is actually to radicalize his maladjustment to reality by a gradual hysterical valorisation of his privation, a fetishisation of the subjective life which involves choosing himself as an imaginary being(149). This move reinforces rather than compensates for his anomaly, and leads Flaubert through various incarnations of imaginary beings (generous "seigneur", rôle player, comic actor, author-actor, poet), up to the final decisive attempt to unify his contradictions (his own "lack of reality" and what seem to be the demands in the practical world of his family and class) by becoming an "être-écrivain" and consolidating the unreal in literary works.

In seeking, in the first two volumes, the subjective teleology structuring Flaubert's neurosis, Sartre distinguishes between two levels of intention. The first, considered the more superficial, is a level of dialogue with his father, a short-term tactic, (if long-since prepared), to resolve the pressing problem of his career, to allow him to give up studying law and as a semi-invalid to be a writer. This is again not original to Sartre, since discussions of 1844 have often revolved around this basic idea. Since the illness benefited Flaubert, biographers have tried to decide if it was intentional or if it was merely turned to advantage after the event(150). But Sartre's exhaustive analyses (even of far more familiar areas than this), are always interesting to follow. Here the emphasis particularly essential to other parts of his argument is the importance to Flaubert of acceding to the condition of "rentier"(151), of parasitic writer living off an unearned income, reintegrating the old feudal structure of the family with the father as patriarchal head, and Flaubert instituted as an "eternal minor" with a wonderful alibi for his premature enjoyment of his inheritance(152).

But if this level of explanation were sufficient there would be
only a coincidental connection between writing and neurosis, for writing would not express the neurosis and the intention of writing could not found the neurosis. Inevitably Sartre will not accept this; there is bound to be a unity of the neurotic and artistic intentions, if not only the man but the future masterpiece \textit{(Madame Bovary)} is to be explained, and this of course is always Sartre's guiding aim. Thus the neurosis seeks not only to win the leisure to write but to make Flaubert \textit{internally capable} of writing. Its deepest meaning is a positive reply to the necessity and impossibility of being an artist\textsuperscript{(153)}.

This strategic long-term intention only emerges clearly in the three years that follow January 1844, where by developing to extremes the "sens" of the original fit, when the actual illness is in fact abating, Flaubert rationalizes and lucidly assumes (privately) the essential neurotic intention of plunging himself into abjection to change himself into an artist. Flaubert is living on two levels during these years: an absolute pessimism masks a deeper optimism actually feeding on the former, for he is basically gambling upon the link between failure and genius\textsuperscript{(154)}. Whereas previously he had an ambivalent attitude to success, (despite valorising the unreal there is the constant suspicion that literature is a "pis-aller", chosen only because he is incapable of success in the "real" world), Flaubert now cuts off all bridges to valorisation through "normal" worldly paths.

An analysis of Jules shows that radical failure is \textbf{enough} to produce genius, for Jules' literary activity is not a left-over from his early activity but the direct result of his failures\textsuperscript{(155)}. Flaubert, for whom neither language nor the world is real\textsuperscript{(156)}, establishes that one is converted to genius by a radical choice of unreality, a step so vital that it is not possible for a practical man to become a genius.

In the gap between finishing the first \textit{éducation sentimentale} and
starting La Tentation de Saint Antoine, Flaubert seems to be wasting
time, (by reading and rereading), so as not to write, but of course
this is really so as to be able to write. He is intentionally waiting,
renewing and consolidating his failure by patient resignation, thereby
proving that he is not made to act. It is because he has passed from
constant failure to a consciousness of the impossibility of being,
that Flaubert accedes to this option for non-being which is precisely
the essence of art, for as explained in an analysis of style as an
imaginative attitude to language, which will be considered at length
below(157), the belief that he is imaginary is essential to the sort
of works he wants to produce. Not only are his relations with art the
real key to his neurosis, but inversely it is neurosis which allows
him to "reinvent the art of writing", the sort of writing which only
a passive agent could produce(158).

Yet in the first two volumes being a writer is treated more or
less subjectively and we are still a long way from seeing how Sartre
will engineer his ultimate demonstration that the literary object
contains the period as the period contains the object, understood within
the most general framework of the familiar definition of Dialectical
Reason: "de comprendre l'homme-événement en tant qu'il subit l'histoire
et que, du même mouvement, il la fait"(159). The turning point is indicated in the "Scripta manent" chapter (where Flaubert makes the definitive
decision to write), when Sartre observes that literature is not a
deserted beach but a sector of the "Esprit objectif"(160), elaborated by
specialists for thousands of years. The vital mediation between the
individual project (writing) and the particular structures and character-
istics of the exterior world is what Sartre calls "la littérature
faite", the literary context in which Flaubert will have to define
himself against his predecessors (distant and immediate) and contemporaries
"Being a writer" also involves being published and being read:

"Au terme de la conversion il se retrouve dehors, au milieu des autres, et ce sont les autres qui lui apprennent son statut, même s'il veut les dépasser tous". (161)

Thus the third volume, to be a rigorous totalization by Marxist methods of what preceded, treats the neurosis as a historically dated fact, and sets out to evaluate it objectively, asking how a work founded upon neurosis (and containing aesthetic norms often resembling almost psychotic symptoms), could become integrated into the "Esprit objectif" and join in "la littérature à faire" (162).

Sartre will naturally reject the consideration with which he opens the discussion, Maxime du Camp's contention that Flaubert's mental powers and talent suffered as a result of his illness, that without it he would have been a better writer. In this case if art provided personal salvation neurosis must still suggest an impoverishment of that art. But of course demonstrating a private relationship with art is not Sartre's ultimate concern, and he sets about proving that Flaubert is not just a neurotic artist (who might have been a better one if he had not been neurotic), but that he becomes an exemplary artist of the period precisely because he is neurotic. His art is a neurotic response to a subjective malaise but it is also a response to an objective malaise of literature, for the only solution to the contradictory demands of the "Esprit objectif" is a neurotic one (163).

Sartre pursues a long and involved analysis of the literary situation of the "post-Romantic apprentice author", born into Flaubert's generation around 1820, at school during the 1830's and writing his main works during the Second Empire. Pressures emerge from the conflicting demands of "la littérature faite" (eighteenth-century and Romantic), and the historical "conjoncture", the requirements of contemporary society. These might be reduced to a major insoluble contradiction -
the eighteenth-century insistence on autonomy and a break with class seems imperative just as their natural readers are discovered to be a bourgeois class public. To write they are required to declass themselves but it is not possible for them to do so at this stage in the nineteenth century without adopting a new perspective (e.g. working-class sympathy) which they are still unwilling or unable to do(164). Sartre argues that the imaginary attitude emerges from this “impasse” as a rigorous demand of literature, the only way to maintain autonomy when the bourgeoisie wants a class literature. The post-Romantics choose the imaginary to be able to write at all, neurosis emerging as the only way of upholding the vow of unreality, the implied failure, solitude, non-communication and derealization, the quasi-hysterical belief in Art as “realized unreality”. "L'art pour l'art" implies a vicious circle of unrealitys (the work, the man, the artist), the basis of Sartre's claim that to be an artist around 1850 one needs to be neurotic(165).

For Flaubert there is a perfect coincidence with the aims of his personal neurosis, but Sartre would never relegate this to chance. The culmination of the third volume is to establish the objective "sens" of the neurosis, through an answer to the question: how could the bourgeois, utilitarian, "scientiste" public of the Second Empire, against whom Flaubert is writing, not only accept but apparently welcome that incarnation of the unreal(166), Madame Bovary? It is with special pleasure, I should imagine, that Sartre, always interested, (in his own perspective of defining literature less by the social situation of the writer, than by the socio-historic structures of the intended audience), in the problem of the nineteenth-century "lost public"(167), guides his argument towards Flaubert's meeting with his Second Empire readership as "le public retrouvé"(168).

The "misunderstanding" whereby the Second Empire makes a success of
Madame Bovary is traced essentially to a shared misanthropy. Flaubert's work exudes a hatred of himself and the bourgeoisie with which the bourgeois reader identifies because of his hatred of the working classes and his desire to put behind him recent historical events. If everyone is bad then the bourgeoisie is absolved. (Flaubert, by refusing the human condition to escape his class fails to realize that the essence of that class ideology is to base the social hierarchy on a refusal of the universal human condition). Since the once honest man of 1848 has been turned into a man of hatred, the "inert Eternity" which founds the aesthetic attitude of Flaubert and the "l'art pour l'art" writers, has obvious appeal for a public desperate to be rid of its historicity, to forget 1848 and pretend that history has stopped progressing altogether.

Thus the sense of the February Revolution comes to the public from a writer who did not actually take part in its events, but whose misanthropy has motivations in his "protohistoire". But if Flaubert's relationship to his period is not to be simply contingent, there must be a genuine double-determination. The profound and distant causes of Flaubert's personal misanthropy must be located in February 1848 as well (169).

The ultimate objective significance of the 1844 fit is described as a prophetic demand for Second Empire society, a definitive choice of the only social environment in which Flaubert could be happy. (Sartre easily, and extremely interestingly, proves, in his last section on Flaubert's relations with the Empire, that the Liberal Empire was his optimum society, a return of the "golden age" of vassality, which explains his extreme distress in 1870 and 1871 and his insistence to his friends that it is "the end of their world" (170)). The bourgeoisie chooses this society because of events originating in the class struggle, abdicating political power willingly as long as it can keep its property, just as
Flaubert, in 1844, chooses the diminished responsibility of the "eternal minor" (171). In realizing the objective neurosis through a subjective fit, Flaubert seeks an objective alibi for his property-owning condition four years before the bourgeoisie needs one, which is why, explains Sartre in a final master-stroke, Flaubert "misses" the "rendez-vous" of his generation with 1848. For 1844 is Flaubert's 1848, he has already presented himself as a subject of the Second Empire (172).

Sartre explains this chronological "décalage" by his idea of "programmation". Flaubert emerges as a sort of individual microcosm of the historical macrocosm. Since the two are determined by the same factors there is an actual symbiotic link between the two, with no reason why the microcosm cannot operate ahead of the macrocosm, since its pace will be regulated by an individual programme, involving a subjective response to interiorized contradictions based on various biological and psychological, as well as social, factors, whereas the movement of the historical sequence will be determined by an even more complicated combination of pressures. But because the programme has the same ultimate conditioning as the global sequence, the individual will realize, albeit in his own time scale, the diachronic totality of the period. It is this diachronic link which is essential, for where Leconte de Lisle is shown to resume his society by one event (1848) in a merely synchronic relationship, Sartre insists that it is Flaubert's whole life which resumes his period, that he has the same past and the same destiny. The period and the individual life will not necessarily end at the same time, thus Flaubert merely survives himself after 1870, whereas a brief life would be particularly oracular (173).

While there is a sort of diachronic advance in all of the "l'art pour l'art" writers, who in their "communion of the unreal" provide a
"cover" for the Second Empire bourgeoisie, it is where the neurosis is genuine, as in Flaubert and Baudelaire, and not just an aesthetic option, as in Leconte de Lisle(174), that it becomes exemplary and most willingly accepted because convincing in its own terms.

Sartre builds up his proofs layer by layer in the third volume of L'Idiot de la famille, setting out to improve upon the "Marxists" crude handling of the idea of a man expressing his period, such that by the end he feels entitled to say that he has proved the reciprocal relationship between writer and society, man and period, on a real rather than simply abstract basis. Whatever one's attitude to the ultimate status of this impressive demonstration, one must surely be grateful that Sartre should have undertaken this "proof" for Flaubert, and acknowledge that future discussions of his life cannot reasonably ignore Sartre's massive contribution, a claim which I shall extend, in the rest of this chapter, to future discussions of Flaubert's actual works.
The recent interest in Flaubert as an important precursor of the modern French novel, as a novelist concerned with the problems of "writing" (175), would normally have taken Flaubert far away from the now somewhat disreputable realm of biographical studies, of which Sartre's attempt to understand a human life is after all only an updated and lengthy example. Yet by concentrating on Flaubert's relationship to language, by tracing the gradual adoption of a conception of art involving the deliberate maintenance of language as an opaque, autonomous order, Sartre offers a surprising mediation between these two extremes. For whether or not one accepts his account of Flaubert's infant backwardness, the importance of the area he focuses upon could hardly be denied. Everyone knows, through hearsay or the most summary acquaintance with the Correspondance, about Flaubert's life-long struggle with "les affres du style". The struggle for expression is the well-known context of Flaubert's writing, interesting as the recurrent theme of his letters, and is also, as will often be illustrated below, a vital theme of that actual writing. Language, then, is the point of intersection of many approaches to Flaubert, and the general aim of this section is to set Sartre's argument, (that a negative relationship to language becomes a positive one to style), in the more general context of Flaubert's own exposition of the problems of language and expression, (in his letters and his works), and to show finally how other critics, in a very different perspective, have arrived at conclusions remarkably similar to those of Sartre.

The image of the dumb man foaming with rage, "Serai-je condamné toute ma vie à être comme un muet qui veut parler et écume de rage?" (176),
hinting at a link between fits and dumbness, is interesting evidence for Sartre's argument that Flaubert's "epilepsy" originated in an initial "mauvaise insertion" into the world of language(177). The idea originates in the Souvenirs of Caroline Commanville, Flaubert's niece, who, since she omits any mention of Flaubert's epilepsy, is unlikely to be inventing or exaggerating the importance of the child's suspected idiocy. If anything she is probably playing down her three pieces of evidence(178).

The first, that Sartre makes a key event in his reconstruction of Flaubert's childhood, is the fact that he was several years behind his age in learning to read, and that for some time he was actually thought by his family to be backward. It would seem that he could never understand what was required of him, that words on the page simply meant nothing to him, and that attempts to teach him would merely upset him. He finally did learn at the same time as his sister, who was four years younger, and we know from the first letter to Ernest that he could write by the time he was nine(179). Mme Commanville also describes his life-long naïveté, particularly apparent in childhood. Her example of old Pierre's "Va voir... à la cuisine si j'y suis", willingly carried out and explained to the cook in the same terms, which Sartre suggests is only an invented example of the way the family would amuse themselves at the child's expense, is obviously also related to language. The final story of his hebetudes, "Ma grand'mère m'a raconté qu'il restait de longues heures un doigt dans sa bouche, absorbé, l'air presque bête" suggests that his passivity, for Sartre the controlling factor of his constitution, did indeed run disturbingly close to an almost psychotic autism(180).

Sartre traces the setting in of the autistic pattern to Flaubert's mother. For reasons elaborated in typical detail, Flaubert, as a baby, is an unfortunate mixture of "mal aimé" and "bien soigné"(181). His mother at this stage badly wants a daughter, and is very disappointed
at the birth of yet another boy, yet because his birth is preceded by
the death of two brothers, his childhood is extremely overprotected.
Normally it is maternal love which fixes the objective category of
"otherness". A baby's first external experiences are related to feeding,
as relief from hunger becomes linked with the associated pleasures of
cuddling and watching the mother, the first environmental object which
he will learn to distinguish from himself (182). The first communication
should be the reciprocity of caresses, yet Flaubert's first "élan sexuel
et alimentaire vers une chair-nourriture" (183) is never reciprocated
by a warm caress. Not understanding the concept of active emotion,
ever pressed by any necessity to communicate needs, (because "bien
soigné"), he fails to grasp himself as a subjective force with his own
individual value and potential (184). To like oneself one must interior-
ize another's affection and for Flaubert this absence of maternal warmth
is directly felt as a subjective unease. (His life-long "ennui" is
suggestively traced to his "non-valorisation ressentie", to "peine
d'amour qui s'ignore" (185) ).

In depriving the child of the connected categories of his own
reality and external reality his mother's most significant crime is
to deprive him of the affirmative use of language. For the child's
linguistic universe is precisely the social world of the family. But
since his first experience of it is passive, with no needs, active
affection or sense of his own worth to communicate, Flaubert misses
out the vital step to understanding the function of language (186).
Sartre reasonably assumes that his failure to grasp the written word
must be related to an earlier difficulty with the spoken one, the
origin of Flaubert's belief that language is something already there,
coming to him from outside (187), belonging to other people rather than
serving as the instrument of his own attempt at self-expression, at
establishing a relationship between himself and the world. Of course he does learn to speak, yet even in assimilating language he never masters it as something of his own. He learns to understand what is said to him, to form sentences and reply, yet he never properly connects words with everyday life. Rather than referring to things and concepts, their meaning seems somehow embedded in them. This ability to decode a message without really understanding the content, as in the naïveté story referred to above (188), is rather like having learned the rules of algebra without being able to apply them to solving mathematical problems. Language remains a law unto itself, a separate and self-sufficient order.

Inarticulacy, which I shall discuss at length in my final chapter, in the form of an obvious linguistic disadvantage, is a striking feature of many major Flaubertian characters, from the seemingly dumb, illiterate Djaliach, and silent, incommunicative Giacomo (obsessed with books and the physical qualities of certain words but who can't read), through to such important characters in the mature works as Charles, Justin, Dussardier and Félicité. In fact it was through an interest in the evident theme of inarticulacy that I first became involved in L'Idiot de la famille, such that I would argue that without any biographical interest at all, the discussion of the topic is still relevant and interesting. And the vital point at this stage of Sartre's argument, namely the failure to understand the frame of reference of language, even if one completely rejected the account of its pathological origin, and took it as a deliberately assumed stance, is nevertheless an attitude to language illustrated by two outstandingly relevant remarks. The first is in a letter to Alfred le Poittevin, written in 1845:

"je m'étonne parfois d'entendre dire les choses les plus naturelles et les plus simples. Le mot le plus banal me tient parfois en singulière admiration. Il y a des gestes, des sons de voix dont je
ne reviens pas, et des niaiseries qui me donnent presque le vertige. As-tu quelquefois écouté attentivement des gens qui parlaient une langue étrangère que tu n'entendais pas? J'en suis là".(189)

Here there is perhaps a hint of a cultivated attitude ("écouter attentivement") as Sartre himself will later suggest in using it as an example of the aesthetic attitude to language(190). But even more pertinent is the digression on the man who works the telegraph in Par les Champs et par les Grèves, which Sartre does not himself quote(191):

"Quelle drôle de vie que celle de l'homme qui reste là, dans cette petite cabane à faire mouvoir ces deux perches et à tirer sur ces ficelles; rouage inintelligent d'une machine muette pour lui, il peut mourir sans connaître un seul des événements qu'il a appris, un seul mot de tous ceux qu'il aura dits... Un peu plus, un peu moins, ne sommes-nous pas tous comme ce brave homme, parlant des mots qu'on nous a appris et que nous apprenons sans les comprendre."

Learning language without understanding can only mean learning by heart. Thus Charles, who, however hard he listens to his medical lectures, can make nothing of the content, soon passes his exams once he resorts to learning them "parrot-fashion"(193). Which of course introduces Loulou, who learns a set of phrases which are repeated with no regard as to their content(194), just as his mistress Félicité learns the catechism, which she cannot understand, by hearing it repeated(195). In general it is the case that the more exactly a phrase is repeated, the less likelihood there is that it has been assimilated and properly understood, and the connection between not-understanding and repetition will be significant to the discussion of the final chapter(196).

There are actual references to listening to incomprehensible foreign languages, as in the early part of Salammbo(197), and the Voyage en Orient, where the reader is subjected to Flaubert's habitual experience by the use of strange-sounding foreign words(198). In L'Education sentimentale Frédéric picks up nothing from his law lectures
but the monotonous sound of the lecturer's voice, and if he is frustrated by the ridiculous Spaniard at the "Club de l'Intelligence" he sometimes actually spends an hour listening to a Chinese lesson at the College de France. Bouvard and Pécouchet rival this by attending an Arabic lesson at the same establishment ("et le professeur fut étonné de voir ces deux inconnus qui tâchaient de prendre des notes"); Flaubert has obviously deliberately picked the strangest possible languages to the French ear. The experience of listening to any language is often conveyed in a confused, fragmented way. At the "Comices agricoles" M. Lieuvain's voice "vous arrivait par lambeaux de phrases", and a gathering at the Dambreuses' is experienced by Frédéric as so many disjointed phrases:

"— Ah bah!
— Eh! eh!" (204)

For Giacomo, on a Sunday walk through the town, language is quite literally experienced as a baffling string of noises:

"il ramassa dans la route quelques bribes de phrases, quelques mots, quelques cris, mais il lui semblait que c'était toujours la même son, la même voix, c'était un brouhaha vague, confus, une musique bizarre et bruyante qui bourdonnait dans son cerveau et l'accablaît." (205)

But against this shattering experience of being unable to read meaning into sound, Flaubert actually builds up an enjoyment of the precedence of sound over meaning. Often it is the fascination of the voice of a loved one which makes meaning irrelevant, "Maria se mit à parler. Je ne sais ce qu'elle dit, je me laissais enchanter par le son de ses paroles" (206), and when Maria describes her artistic tastes we are not told what she says, but only the way in which she says it (207). When Emma and Léon return from a visit to her baby "les paroles qu'ils se disaient" function only as sounds in a careful juxtaposition of the rhythm of their footsteps, the sound of the voices and the rustling of
Emma's dress (208); in the first *Éducation sentimentale*, at the height of Henry and Émilie's love:

"Quand il parlait, elle se taisait et écoutait le son de sa voix, comme on écoute chanter, sans chercher le sens des mots quand la musique est belle." (209)

The reference to the irrelevancy of meaning in music will obviously be significant to Flaubert's overall aims, and already in this novel Jules seems to abandon discussion and verbiage for a musical conception of language, since "la justesse d'une note ne se critique pas" (210).

When Mme Arnoux, showing Frédéric around the factory, uses an ugly word ("patouillards") to explain a piece of machinery, he is shocked and finds it somehow wrong (211). The fact that the content is correct, that it is specifying a meaning, does not come into consideration. In fact, where Mélie listens to the play readings in *Bouvard et Pécuchet*, it is her lack of comprehension which largely creates her enjoyment:

"La petite bonne s'amusait sans y rien comprendre, ébahie du language, fascinée par le ronron des vers." (212)

Words tend to go their own way, quite happily as objects in their own right, taking on a material existence such that they can actually be watched coming out of the speaker's mouth:

"Je l'avais écouté avec avidité, j'avais regardé tous les mots sortir de sa bouche" (213)

"je regardais les mots qui sortaient de ta bouche, je te considérais avec étonnement" (214)

and even more explicitly, where Frédéric listens to Mme Arnoux at her first dinner:

"Chaque mot qui sortait de sa bouche semblait à Frédéric être une chose nouvelle, une dépendance exclusive de sa personne" (215).

In a less celestial context, one ghastly sort of weapon, invented during the siege of Carthage, suggests a macabre parody of the material power and life-of-their-own of words:
"Ces atroces projectiles portaient des lettres gravées qui s'imprimaient dans les chairs; et, sur les cadavres, on lisait des injures, telles que pourreau, chacal, vermine, et parfois des plaisanteries: attrapé ou je l'ai bien mérité."(216)

According to Sartre, Flaubert's essential alienation from himself operates through language precisely because he continues to see words from the outside, as things, even when he produces them himself. He sees that language operates in him, yet does not feel personally instrumental in the operation: "À ce niveau, Flaubert ne croit pas qu'on parle: on est parlé"(217). Because his subjective awareness is passive and vegetative ("pur écoulement supporté"(218)), and never expressed, it seems to him quite unconnected with language. His first hebetudes, a disturbing sign that something has gone wrong with his language acquisition, are presented, in Quidquid Volueris, as incommunicable ecstasies(219).

Assimilating language seems to be presented as the transition from nature to culture, an abdication of inborn poetry, with childhood as an animal category of which culture is the negation(220). Sartre insists of course that this sense of a schism between the inner life and language, between the intuitive and the discursive, though not just a Romantic cliché, (since Flaubert really seems to have seen his childhood in this way), is nevertheless not a precocious insight, but a child's strange adventure, since there is no real incommensurability of the two orders(221).

Since such experiences are not verbalised, Flaubert does not recognize himself in adults' linguistic operations upon him. He believes that meanings only pass through him and that others always decipher him, (unaware that for him as for everyone "le dépassement vivant du vécu"(222) is the foundation of signification). Designated by strange sentences, he assumes that this "réalité autre" is his true reality, even though it does not seem to relate to his feelings, alienating his obscure sense of existing to what he believes to be other people's (and especially his
father's) knowledge of him. (Sartre would say that in only understanding himself as an object for other people Flaubert fails to grasp the reciprocity of the other's guarantee(223)). At the age where everyone speaks, Flaubert is still at the stage of imitating speech, for speech is an act of intellection which this passive child cannot accomplish, (as is learning to read, which brings the problem to a head). The child has to be trained to speak, carrying out, trustingly, an activity the point of which only the trainer understands.

Sartre makes the fascinating suggestion that it is this relationship to language, "L'amour enseigne, s'il fait défaut, c'est le dressage" (224), that lies behind the curious sympathy for animals which Flaubert often refers to: "les fous et les animaux je les comprends j'entre dans leur monde"(225). He shares their nostalgia because he too is domesticated. For domesticated animals, living in close proximity to humans, language is the major frustration. They are talked about, even spoken to, given a half-understanding of language which suggests what it might be to be human, yet such a possibility is implicitly denied them. This, for Sartre, is the reason for the boredom of domestic animals; the contact with culture spoils their natural life for them.

The episode in Madame Bovary, where Emma discovers the bored melancholy of her pet greyhound, certainly supports this belief in Flaubert's feeling for the boredom of animals:

"Puis, considérant la mine mélancolique du svelte animal qui baillait avec lenteur, elle s'attendrissait, et, le comparant à elle-même, lui parlait tout haut, comme à quelqu'un d'affligé que l'on console "(226),

and the famous dog of the first Éducation sentimentale assumes human qualities precisely through an exemplary display of boredom: "un homme n'eût pas soupiré avec un ennui plus douloureux"(227).

The naming ceremony remains a grown-ups' privilege, yet Flaubert
must have some sort of social relation. This can only be one of belief. Adults' signs must be accepted on faith: "Socialisé, il est habité par la pensée des autres, il subit comme une croyance ce qui est leur assertion" (228). What others say is affirmed in him but not by him. Thus in disturbing his relationship with language his mother has also disturbed his relationship with truth. It is because the verbal act remains suspect in him that Flaubert will never express what he feels nor feel what he expresses. His gestures and actions organize themselves in him as what others want him to be or as what he would like to be for them. But to be felt as true his emotions need to be designated by witnesses, they can only seem genuine if they convince others. Thus the father, the important social object who might have rescued the child from autism, by refusing sincerity to his "élan de tendresse" (229), in fact reinforces his derealization. For since his father holds his truth and necessarily "a raison contre lui" (230), his sarcasm derealizes the child's behaviour, turning him into a permanent impostor, without however telling him what he really is.

Flaubert accepts this principle of authority for so long that once he finally gets suspicious, instead of learning to judge for himself and to assess the content of statements, he simply stops believing altogether. Whereas his one-way belief might have been rejected for a reciprocity in fact the other just loses his authority. He will never entirely believe either what he says himself or what others say to him:

"Il n'y a ni idée vraie ni idée fausse. On adopte d'abord les choses très vivement puis, on réfléchit, puis on doute et on reste là" (231).

Bouvard and Pécuchet's alternations between naïveté and suspicion:

"-L'arboriculture pourrait être une blague! 
-Comme l'agronomie! répliqua Bouvard." (232)

nicely illustrate Sartre's principle, but Flaubert is doomed not simply to scepticism about the other, but more seriously to insincerity
in what concerns himself, for his insincerity is the lived form of his
derealization (233).

The eternally "joué" aspect of Flaubert's character, (the rôles, the
laugh, the heavy humour and ironically adopted clichés), is
brilliantly highlighted by such an analysis. It is this facet of Flaubert
which intrigues and frustrates the Goncourts. On 2nd November 1863 his
opinions are declared quite simply insincere, on 3rd May 1873 it is his
fury at being so ordinary, at his bourgeois resemblance with everyone
else, that he seeks to hide by "toutes les idées reçues et acceptées" (234).

But the following descriptions perfectly sum up the ambiguity:

"Flaubert a toujours un peu de cette vanité là acting for
ce qui fait qu'avec une nature franche, il n'y a
jamais une parfaite sincérité dans ce qu'il dit sentir, souffrir,
aimer." (235)

"Il y a dans Flaubert de la conviction et de la blague mêlées. Il
a des idées qu'il a, des idées qu'il force et des idées qu'il
joue." (236)

One is reminded of Barthes' characterization of Flaubert's irony
as "frappée d'incertitude", operating what he calls "un malaise salutaire
de l'écriture", because one cannot tell if he is responsible for what
he is writing (237). Irony will be discussed in a different perspective
in the next chapter, but what is interesting for the moment is that
Sartre, who himself speaks of "une prinçante ambiguïté jamais rencontrée
jusque-là dans le roman européen" (238), traces this to a real malaise.
The reader cannot situate himself comfortably in relation to characters
precisely because they were created in discomfort, and because Flaubert
is not sure, quite literally, "qui parle?" (239). In trying to gain some
consistency for his inconsistent affections, by writing them down and
grappling them as "other", Flaubert only escapes disintegration by
personalizing himself as he whose job it is to transcribe the voices
he hears. For reduced to monologue, speaking alone, he neither knows
who is speaking in him nor to whom, nor what in him really means(240).

The vehicle of this verbal malaise is in fact his voice, which seems both to escape him and to give him away. In a suggestive discussion of Flaubert's relationship to his voice, Sartre supposes that acting was seen as an opportunity to reappropriate his being by fascin­ating others with his voice. When this vocation is frustrated and he passes to writing plays and a weekly journal, he remains for ever alien­ated from his voice, fixed at the oral stage of discourse. Sartre pro­poses viewing Flaubert's whole creative project as a polyvalent relation­ship to his voice, from the rhetoric of the early works to the "refused eloquence"(241) of the major novels.

Writing in fact was always regarded as an audio-visual medium. The insistence upon reading his work out aloud to himself as he writes it ("gueuler des phrases") is more than a stylist's quirk, indeed reading his works out aloud to his friends seems always to have been the supreme moment for Flaubert, rather than publication. Though the reader will presumably use his eyes, being most unlikely actually to use his voice, the pun would be a good example of the way the reader can be forced into an at least imaginary reading-aloud. For the essence of the pun is that it does not work if just spoken or just read – one has to imagine the missing dimension, and in the written pun the reader works the two meanings by reading the words out loud in his head. (The pun is also of course a good example of language which is a law unto itself, an easily grasped illustration of what a passive experience of language must be like, since unintended results may be produced through one, yet "all on their own").

Although his perspective is so very different, Barthes' analysis of 'La Voix du texte' in S/Z is actually rather relevant to this dis­cussion of Flaubert's voice. Barthes sets out to demonstrate that writing
cannot be a communication of a message from author to reader, since
the voice of the text, the interweaving strands of "speaking" codes,
is precisely the voice of the reader. His examination of minute detail
is designed to show that the text works basically in the interest of
the reader, who lends his voice as if by procuration. The reader is
called upon to produce the text, almost as if the writer were taking
dictation from the reader(243). Barthes shifts his emphasis in Le Plaisir
du texte, and here ends with an interest in the voice and the audio-
visual, within his context of an erotic "jouissance"(244). The final
point of Sartre's discussion is actually to suggest that one of Flaubert's
deepest intentions as a stylist is to find a written equivalent of oral
seduction. While Flaubert always tends to "talk" in his letters ("Causons
un peu"(245) etc.), in such a way that the meaning in fact seems a
marginal intention, in the novels too it is paradoxically the very
refusal of eloquence which is at the basis of the seduction attempt. It
is likely that Flaubert seeks to induce the same ecstasy that he himself
felt before certain works or sentences(246):

"Des phrases me font pâmer" (247)

"Des phrases qui me ravissent" (248)

of which the following are obviously examples:

"Je donnerais toutes les légendes de Cavarni pour certaines
expressions et coupes des maîtres comme 'l'ombre était nuptiale,
 auguste et solennelle' de Victor Hugo, ou ceci du président
de Montesquieu: 'Les vices d'Alexandre étaient extrêmes comme
ses vertus. Il était terrible dans sa colère. Elle le rendait
cruel.'(249)

The latter "gem" is surely the model for Flaubert's own extensive use
of the tripartite asyndeton, for example:

"On avait reconnu Iakukanam. Son nom circulait. D'autres
accoururent."(250)

But this positive solution, hinted at by the erotic fascination
of voices illustrated above, is as yet only a distant possibility. For
if the answer will be the deliberate intensification of the materiality and autonomy of language, for the time being its divorce from any practical function simply makes it stupid. The way stupidity becomes an integral part of Flaubert's aesthetic, (through its ability to induce the aesthetic attitude), will be discussed in the next chapter. For now, reference need only be made to Sartre's highly original (and much needed) analysis of "la Bêtise"(251), a difficult concept originating as a quality of language, which might be characterized by a refusal to synthesise. Stupidity is essentially an attitude making things stupid, powerful because no position can be adopted to combat it. (If anything, it was evolved as a bulwark against the father's corrosive "raison analytique"). Identifying it has nothing to do with formulating a more sensible alternative view, of opposing preferable opinions to the silly ones of the bourgeoisie. Intelligence is not only not used to break it down, or as a plain alternative, it is actually offered as a sub-species of stupidity itself. In my final chapter, where "stupid" characters will be discussed along with inarticulate ones, I shall demonstrate the continuity with which Flaubert, from his earliest works through to his last one, undermines not only verbosity and pedantry, but the intellectual attitude in general. Herein lies all the subtle difference between a Balzacian bourgeois fool like Célestin Crevel and M. Homais. For as Sartre shows in an outstanding analysis of Homais(252), Flaubert's master-stroke is to make Homais the incarnation of intelligence(253).

The best-known repository of stupidity, and precisely of stupid language, is the Dictionnaire des idées reçues. Clichés are an example of language which is not a spontaneous response to the world, which is not lived but given. It was inevitable that such an attention to cultural language made natural and eternal(254) should have been considered by modern critics(255) in the context of the proliferating interest in
literary and social forms of the "stereotype" which has grown out of Barthes' *Mythologies* (256). The consideration of clichés within the general area of "intertextuality" is bound to lead to interesting analyses of Flaubert's excessively citational style (257). Yet it seems to me that one should move cautiously in too readily offering Flaubert as an admirable example of the "undoing of the stereotype", (as, for example, in Christopher Prendergast's excellent article (258)).

The analyses of *Mythologies* define and take apart petit bourgeois ideology and rhetoric in a way far-removed from Flaubert's joyful and "stupid", (in the sense defined above), repetition of them. Flaubert certainly plays with the stereotype but I wonder if he can be said to "undo" it. Sartre suggests that the *Dictionnaire* shows his awareness of the cliché to be diffuse and confused, he feels it everywhere yet it escapes him. Because his passivity makes him unable to take an objective viewpoint on himself or even on others, Flaubert is quite unable to define his class ideology. The intention is there but the entries are not well chosen, since the dimension of critical activity is denied him (259). Of course it is not certain that the intention is there, since Flaubert so often deliberately adopts the "stupid", aesthetic attitude to banal language. But Sartre is probably right that he would be unable to do anything else.

It is here that a comparison with Barthes' obsession with stupidity and "la doxa" becomes particularly interesting, for it seems to me that it has been largely reinforced by his own reading of Flaubert. Thus the entry in *Roland Barthes par Roland Barthes*, 'De la bêtise, je n'ai le droit', so closely resembles what he says about *Bouvard et Pécuchet* in *S/Z*, ("comment épingler la bêtise?" etc. (260)), that without mentioning Flaubert it is clearly Flaubertian in inspiration. In fact it captures the spirit of Flaubertian stupidity so aptly that I quote the whole section:
"D'un jeu musical entendu chaque semaine à F.M. et qui lui paraît 'bête', il tire ceci: la bêtise serait un noyau dur et insécable, un primitif: rien à faire pour la décomposer scientifiquement (si une analyse scientifique de la bêtise était possible, toute la TV s'effondrerait). Qu'est-elle? Un spectacle, une fiction esthétique, peut-être un fantasme? Peut-être avons-nous envie de nous mettre dans le tableau? C'est beau, c'est suffocant, c'est étrange, et de la bêtise je n'aurais le droit de dire, en somme, que ceci: qu'elle me fascine. La fascination, ce serait le sentiment juste que doit m'inspirer la bêtise (si on en vient à prononcer le nom): elle m'étreint (elle est intraitable, rien n'a barre sur elle, elle vous prend dans le jeu de la main chaude)."(261)

At the same time, from Barthes' point of view, it seems to me thoroughly insincere. For while one suspects that Bouvard et Pécuchet is the novel that Barthes would have liked to have written himself, and although he may now prefer to share Flaubert's aesthetic fascination with stupidity, still, in Mythologies, he has shown himself perfectly capable of decomposing it "scientifiquement", indeed "semiologicallement"(262). One can perfectly imagine an entry in Mythologies wherein Barthes would have put his subtle finger on all that was going on in the silly musical quiz which sets off the above meditation. His attitude here, if amusingly helpful to our attempt to understand Flaubertian stupidity, is surely a deliberate renunciation of outstanding analytic powers(263). So I think one has to be wary of generalizing Sartre's point that intelligence is a useless weapon against stupidity, and actually gets in the way. Indeed if the Goncourts were quite unable to define such manifestations as the Garçon, Sartre has shown himself quite adequate to the task!(264)

Whereas what was once felt to be merely complacent satire of the bourgeoisie has been raised to an important phenomenon of intertextuality, the permanent preoccupation with clichés remains essentially a familiar and obvious manifestation of Flaubert's linguistic unease. For if by Bouvard et Pécuchet the problem has been neutralized by its submergence in a text which is virtually all citation, the status of the content of clichés requires some consideration.
As has been shown, language itself seems to operate in the manner of a never-ending cliché:

"non comme un ensemble structuré d'instruments qu'on assemble ou désassemble pour produire une signification, mais comme un interminable lieu commun qui ne se fonde jamais ni sur l'intention de donner à voir ni sur l'objet à désigner."(265)

It seems to dominate Flaubert to the extent of organizing his thought for him, rather than the thought governing the words. Hence a series of "pseudo-thoughts" are produced which do not really belong to him, nor, he imagines, do they belong to others who produce them. Yet there is a considerable problem with individual instances, as the phrase "pseudo-thoughts" suggests. Flaubert's attitude to them is often ambiguous. He seems unable to decide whether to put faith in them or not, whether they are reducible to pure stupidity or whether perhaps they express a genuine reaction.

Sartre maintains quite dogmatically, in particular in his discussion of the "Chemins de fer" entry in the Dictionnaire(266), that Flaubert judges clichés on the purely linguistic level whereby they are often reduced to ridiculous tautologies, and does not understand that they express a common spontaneous reaction, (that is amazement at the speed of a new form of transport). The conviction behind the Dictionnaire des idées reçues is that words are firstly "vocables", secondly "liaisons" and only lastly "sens"(267). Certainly Flaubert's actual handling of clichéd conversations testifies to this. Their content is largely irrelevant, what is most striking is the sound of the words and the voice (discussed above(269)), and the establishment of some sort of relationship, ("vocables" then "liaisons"). This is evident in the early conversations of Henry and Émilie in the first Éducation, where contact is established by outworn platitudes: "car ils étaient déjà un peu amis, non par ce qu'ils s'étaient dit, mais par le ton dont ils se l'étaient dit"(269). There is an exact parallel in Madame Bovary: Emma
and Léon's commonplace conversation on sunsets and reading by the fire is heavily satirized, but at the same time it is made explicit in the text that a genuine communication is taking place, such that the actual words used are not really significant: "une de ces vagues conversations où le hasard des phrases vous ramène toujours au centre fixe d'une sympathie commune"(270). Such situations are to be found in all of Flaubert's novels, (their function will be reconsidered in the last chapter), but nowhere is the irrelevancy of content so vividly underlined as in Félicité's endless conversations with her parrot:

"Ils avaient des dialogues, lui, débitant à satiété les trois phrases de son répertoire, et elle, y répondant par des mots sans plus de suite, mais où son cœur s'épanchait."(271)

However, it is by no means always true that Flaubert considers the content of clichés irrelevant. Of the more pretentious variety of seemingly unspontaneous expression he declares: "il n'est pas encore absolument prouvé qu'il soit impossible d'aimer la femme que l'on appelle sa déité ou son bel ange d'amour"(272), and in the same work, (Par les Champs et par les Grèves), he describes the reaction of a convict who had never seen the sea before:

"'C'est curieux tout de même, ça donne tout de même un aperçu de ce qui existe', appréciation que j'ai trouvée profonde et aussi émue par le sentiment de la chose même que toutes les expressions lyriques que j'ai entendu faire à bien des dames."(273)

The very well-known "chaudron fêlé" intervention in Madame Bovary, "comme si la plénitude de l'âme ne débordait pas quelquefois par les métaphores les plus vides"(274), as a response to Emma's pathetic string of attempts to express her most genuine passion(275), is the clearest statement of the possibility of clichés conveying particularly deep-felt emotion. A brief comparative excursion into George Eliot is perhaps interesting at this point, for an evaluation of Mr. Casaubon's "passion" for Dorothea in Middlemarch:
"No speech could have been more thoroughly honest in its intention; the frigid rhetoric at the end was as sincere as the bark of a dog, or the cawing of an amorous rook. Would it not be rash to conclude that there was no passion behind those sonnets to Delia which strike us as the thin music of a mandolin?" (276)

In The Mill on the Floss, a conversation actually on the subject of commonplace forms of expression, between Stephen and Maggie, also rings a typically Flaubertian note,

"I suppose all phrases of mere compliment have their turn to be true. A man is occasionally grateful when he says "thank you". It's rather hard upon him that he must use the same words with which all the world declines a disagreeable invitation - don't you think so, Miss Tulliver?"

"No", said Maggie, looking at him with her direct glance; "if we use common words on a great occasion they are the more striking, because they are felt at once to have a particular meaning, like old banners, or everyday clothes, hung up in a sacred place'." (277),

for if Stephen's comment is reminiscent of Frédéric's insincere linguistic seduction of Mme Dambreuse "Elles [les femmes] se moquent de nous quand on leur dit qu'on les aime, simplement!" (278), one could almost imagine Mme Arnoux making Maggie's reply (279).

This hint of a special function for clichés emerges too in Flaubert. For example even where he is less concerned with the intensity of the emotion expressed, at one particular point in the first Education where typical bourgeois clichés are exploited for comic purposes in Henry's father, he nevertheless shows in the same work that he is aware that such a stock of expressions has a certain use:

"Mais la postérité, qui contemple tout de profil et qui veut des opinions bien nettes pour les faire tenir dans un mot, n'a pas le temps de songer à tout ce qu'elle a repoussé, oublié, omis; elle a saisi seulement les traits saillants des choses, puis, au risque d'incohérence ou d'absurdité, elle les a réunis sous un trait et fondus dans une seule expression." (280)

There is even a clear textual warning against misinterpretation:

"Jules faillit tomber dans l'excès contraire, à force de voir chaque jour la fausseté des jugements de la foule, la niaiserie de ses admirations et la bêtise de ses haines, il aurait admis ce qu'elle méprise et détesté ce qui la charme, s'il n'avait pas vu, le plus souvent, un fond d'utilité pratique pour l'avenir à toutes les idées plus ou moins justes qu'elle se fait sur le passé." (281)
An excellent article by Crouzet on the "epic style" of Madame Bovary follows up this line of approach to clichés. Though with an ironic slant that is hard to define, Crouzet offers them as part of the nation's linguistic heritage and of an almost epic tradition. The epic is a repository of general values, of common feelings, attitudes, and expressions handed down from generation to generation. The Dictionnaire des idées reçues is therefore supposed to link the contemporary public to its tradition:

"l'épopée sera justement l'expression du liturgique dans l'homme, du rituel, la pensée et l'idéal du 'on', la poésie de la foule, qui par son existence seule développe des 'formes de bêtise' aux effets incalculables; c'est le degré inférieur du style et de l'homme, l'homme tout fait requiert le style tout fait pour le chanter" (282) /.../ par là aussi se vérifie la parenté de l'épopée et du déjà dit." (283)

This leads us back into the realm of Flaubert's operation of the stereotype, but it is perhaps Flaubert's own use of clichéd language in his writing that it is hardest to assess. The main problem of the Dictionnaire des idées reçues is of course that the irony is directed against many of Flaubert's own phrases and recurrent themes. Sartre suggests that his own ideas, developed in the correspondence with ample rhetorical movements, and the genuine product of his reflexions, as lived from the inside, once discovered from the outside, in others, or after a time-lag in his own writing, suddenly appear as clichés. Sartre gathers together an impressive anthology of clichés, inane comments and generalizations, offered with apparent sincerity in the Correspondance, juxtaposed with strikingly similar entries in the Dictionnaire (284). However, where Sartre claims that the "Docteur" entry ("Toujours précéder de 'bon'") is simply a caricature of Flaubert's own tic ("ce bon Gautier", "ce brave parrain") (285), it seems just as likely that Flaubert always uses these phrases ironically. Where a particularly hackneyed form of expression is used, its conveyance via "style indirect libre" often makes
it impossible to be sure if it is the character's phrase or Flaubert's own (286), and where it is openly assumed as his own, as in his letters, he takes care to point it out, as in Sartre's illustrations, for example "comme dirait M. Prudhomme" (287) and "je déclare...(comme M. Prudhomme)" (288). In the first Éducation sentimentale he builds an image on a cliché and then justifies it ironically:

"De même que le navire se laissait pousser par le vent et fendait la mer, elle se laissait aller au souffle de l'amour qui lui faisait traverser la vie — comparaison qui n'est pas neuve, mais la circonstance l'exigeait; c'était là sa place." (289)

In the end Flaubert mystifies us in the same way as Mme Dambreuse in the later Éducation:

"et, s'il lui échappait des lieux communs, c'était dans une formule tellement convenue, que sa phrase pouvait passer pour une dévotion ou pour une ironie." (290)

The problem of Flaubert's attitude to his own use of words raises the whole question of his artistic struggles with language, his apparent anguished quest for perfection. There would seem to be a discrepancy between his fluency as a precocious (291) adolescent writer, and throughout his life as a correspondent, and the devouring "affres du style" which form the recurrent content of that same correspondence. In fact, given some familiarity with Flaubert's ideals and the impossible tasks he constantly set himself, not to mention the vast amount of research that he seemed to feel obliged to undertake, it is not especially surprising that his major novels should have taken him an average of five years each to write, and it strikes me as rather presumptuous to suggest that he could have written them more quickly. Nor is it particularly surprising that in childhood Flaubert should be more anxious about saying lots of things than about how he said them.

Discussions of extraneous reasons for Flaubert's "difficulté" have been frequent however. Maxime du Camp blames his epilepsy, claiming that this really caused a diminishment of his mental powers, whereas
Lemaître, in an article significantly entitled 'La Paresse de Flaubert', suggests that his anguish is pretty much a pose, and that his idea of "atrocious labour" involved long hours of lying on his couch "thinking about it" (292). The commonly held view, following Descharmes (293), of a discrepancy between a deeply subjective "Romantic" brand of writing, and an impersonal "realistic" style in which Flaubert struggles to check his own personality, has been convincingly outargued by Roger Huss' thesis that the elements of distance and control in Flaubert's "mature aesthetic" are actually built upon facets of his own temperament (294).

Sartre too is implicated in Roger Huss' criticism of the received view of Flaubert's early spontaneity, for the second part of his 'Du poète à l'artiste' section discusses a sudden change in his conception of literature (295). Sartre describes Flaubert here as a once lyrical writer with a belief in inspiration whose spontaneity is destroyed by a new demand for taste and "le réfléchi" - the difference between the poet, defined by his ecstasy more than by its linguistic expression, and the artist, who produces a beautiful object. The crisis is felt, as by the narrator of Novembre, as a loss of originality (296). The characterization of the early Flaubert as the most "irréfléchi" of men is certainly strange and is not really discussed or backed up (297).

Sartre relates this new desire "to be an artist" to Flaubert's belated discovery of his class and the crisis over choosing a career. The only way to change his "être-bourgeois", since he cannot change the fact that he is a bourgeois, is to change his "être" by finding an official "end" which escapes all class. He therefore wants to be "called" to an élite of artists. If he simply writes spontaneously he will only be a bourgeois and insincere writer, who anyway suddenly discovers that he has nothing original to say. He needs to be called as a genius, but has discovered that he is not one after all. In fact
he gets caught in a vicious circle when he tries to decide if patience and determination can replace genius. If they can, then no one is called, and Flaubert cannot escape his class. But if people are called, then Flaubert obviously is not, and will always remain a second-rate writer. The only way out is to make patience and will-power the sign of genius. That Flaubert really did this is certainly backed up by the obsessive references to Buffon’s “Le génie est une longue patience”, and particularly by the "je sais bien...mais quand même" terms in which it is phrased:

"Je ne crois pas que ce soit le génie, la patience; mais c’en est le signe quelquefois et ça en tient lieu."(298)

"Le mot de Buffon est un blasphème, mais on l’a trop nié; les œuvres modernes sont là pour le dire."(299)

"le génie n’est pas une longue patience. Mais il a du vrai de nos jours surtout."(300)

"Plût à Dieu que le mot impie de Buffon fût vrai! Je serais sûr d’être un des premiers."(301)

The life-long wager on patience and labour in fact seems to me Flaubert’s real "Qui perd gagne", perhaps more than his wager on failure(302), and another "je sais bien" type comment to Louise Colet would make a fine epigraph for L’Idiot de la famille:

"Comment, en supposant seulement que l’on soit né avec une vocation médiocre (et si l’on admet avec cela du jugement), ne pas penser que l’on doit arriver enfin, à force d’étude, de temps, de rage, de sacrifices de toute espèce, à faire bon? Allons donc! Ce serait trop bête! La littérature (comme nous l’entendons) serait alors une occupation d’idiot."(303)

The essential demand of art that "much work be put into it", is interesting precisely as an example of the influence on Flaubert of the ethos of his own class, however hard he pretends to escape it. A non-productive writer who is not a genius would certainly not come in the bourgeois catalogue of permissible careers, and if Flaubert’s illness exempts him from the need to choose one, he nevertheless could be seen as a sort of craftsman for whom language is the raw material from
which he produces an object. The amount of hard work put into it justifies the perhaps gratuitous end, (which as Sartre so often shows, Flaubert needs as well), just as the rich businessman justifies his fortune with his migraines and ulcers.

This coincides absolutely with Barthes' discussion of "L'artisanat du style" in *Le Degré zéro de l'écriture* (304). Here the matter is discussed on the literary-historical rather than personal level. Flaubert is seen as the major and typical example of a crisis and turning point in literary history (around 1850), brought about by the emergence of modern capitalism. A whole generation of writers needs to justify itself. Anxious to assume to the full the responsibility for their tradition, recognizing that literature has lost its "valeur d'usage", they set about replacing this with a "valeur de travail". Literature is saved by virtue of the work that has gone into producing it, labour indeed replaces genius as a value, and claims to arduous but loving craftsmanship become a form of ostentation. Society gladly accepts this self-confessed art, not for its dreams but for its methods (305).

Naturally one would not expect Flaubert to be aware of explanations posed on such a general level, or at least if he were obscurely aware of them, he would not be able to admit them. Yet Flaubert seems to need to find reasons for his difficulty in producing satisfactory prose, and one might suggest that it is to this end that he erects a whole inherent problematic of language. For instance in my final chapter I shall suggest that the function of spoken language as an instrument of self-expression and communication is consistently undermined. While Flaubert shows sympathy for inarticulate characters there is uncertainty as to whether their problem is due to a psychological difficulty or the fault of language itself. On several occasions inarticulacy is described as the human weakness:
"Pauvre faiblesse humaine! avec tes mots, tes langues, tes sons, tu parles et tu balbuties; tu définis Dieu, le ciel et la terre, la chimie et la philosophie, et tu ne peux exprimer, avec ta langue, toute la joie que te cause une femme nue... ou un plum-pudding!" (306)

The bathos at the end actually suggests despair rather than humour, and many statements which start on a general note end in similar desperation:

"et cette impuissance à rendre tout cela est le désespoir éternel de ceux qui écrivent, la misère des langues qui ont à peine un mot pour cent pensées, la faiblesse de l'homme qui ne sait pas trouver l'approchant et à moi particulièrement mon éternelle angoisse." (307)

The most psychologically framed comments, such as the image of the dumb man foaming with rage quoted earlier, strike a note of pure frustration:

"Il y a peu de positions aussi atroces" (308). Such statements would be important if only for their connection with the theme of inarticulate characters, or in following through the contradictions with which Flaubert's self-conscious exposition of the problems of language in an artistic context is riddled. But while I am arguing that one could by-pass the biographical problem, the tone of such statements, and their unsophisticated expression in the early works, does I think suggest a personal relevance. The problem only ceases to be a personal one, (surviving as an important theme), when the unhappiness with language has been resolved by its positive assumption in a particular sort of writing.

Never quite sure if it is only himself that cannot find the right words, it is safer to blame language itself. Clear statements of this attitude are most common in Mémoires d'un Fou, Smarh and Novembre. Of course such statements fall into the category of a particularly familiar Romantic cliché, especially where the writer claims that his feelings are not of the same order as language:

"Comment rendre par des mots ces choses pour lesquelles il n'y a pas de langage?" (309)

"Pouvez-vous dire par des mots le battement du cœur?" (310)

"Est-ce que jamais des vers diront tous les miracles d'un sourire ou toutes les voluptés d'un regard?" (311)
with endless claims for the poet's superior sensibility, for the debasing of the infinite when poetry stoops to try to turn itself into language (312). But although this is such a thinly disguised Romantic commonplace, (especially given its prevalence in the works most "Romantic" in inspiration), it can hardly be disregarded for this reason, for it fits so absolutely with the original relationship with language as described by Sartre's claim that his childhood sense of poetry really is non-verbal in the same way as Djaliho's, that his hebetudes are cultivated as deliberately non-communicable ecstasies (313). Certainly Flaubert would be delighted to find his own experience, so pathological in the family context, generalized in literature into the poet's privilege. But Flaubert's obsession with the theme far outlives his imitations of Romantic literature.

At this stage Flaubert is undoubtedly trying to convey his poetic ecstasies; only later will he see that his experience of language as a distinct order has aesthetic possibilities. Often he maintains that language actually distorts what it is supposed to be expressing, as in Souvenirs, Notes et Pensées intimes:

"Il y a un axiome assez bête qui dit que la parole rend la pensée - il serait plus vrai de dire qu'elle la défigure. Est-ce que vous énoncez jamais une phrase comme vous la pensez? Écrivez-vous un roman comme vous l'auriez conçu?" (314)

This is perhaps well-known as an important theme of Madame Bovary. Emma and Léon, in the early days at Rouen, distort their thoughts on their first passion by defining them, "D'ailleurs, la parole est un laminoir qui allonge toujours les sentiments" (315), while Emma is of course constantly misled by language:

"Et Emma cherchait à savoir ce que l'on entendait au juste dans la vie par les mots de fêlicité, de passion, et d'ivresse, qui lui avait paru si beaux dans les livres." (316)

In the light of this, her mother-in-law's attempts to stop her from reading have some significance (317). The distorting powers of language obviously
relate to the now familiar argument of the way language seems to operate in Flaubert to the extent of controlling his thought. But more normally words are quite simply such a feeble echo of the thoughts that they seek to convey that the poet eventually prefers not to bother. The first-person narrator of Novembre apparently gives up because the resources of language have run dry,"Il faut que les sentiments aient peu de mots à leur service, sans cela le livre se fut achevé à la première personne"(318), and the final decision on the matter might be given to the would-be poet Smarh: "tout ce que j'ai de plus poétique à vous dire est de ne rien dire"(319), since Flaubert, it will be shown, could be seen as taking such advice quite literally, if in an unexpected way.

In Souvenirs, Notes et Pensées intimes, Flaubert brings the problem of expression to the level of the much discussed connection between form and content:

"vous ne savez rien de tout cela parce qu'il n'y a pas de mots pour le dire - l'art n'est autre chose que cette étrange traduction de la pensée par la forme."(320)

This statement is often quoted, usually by those who wish to take it at face value. In fact although the strictly formal perspective on Flaubert is surprisingly recent, the lip-service which has always been paid to his concern for style usually appears in the shape of hazy definitions of the relationship between form and content, as in the meaningless formula provided by Percy Lubbock:"The best form is that which makes the most of the subject - there is no other definition of the meaning of form in fiction"(321). The extremely prevalent "mot juste" myth, largely started by Maupassant:

"Quelle que soit la chose qu'on veut dire, il n'y a qu'un mot pour l'exprimer, qu'un verbe pour l'animer et qu'un adjectif pour la qualifier. Il faut donc chercher, jusqu'à ce qu'on les ait découverts, ce mot, ce verbe et cet adjectif, et ne jamais se contenter de l'à-peu-près, ne jamais avoir recours à des super-cheries, même heureuses, à des clowneries de langage pour éviter la difficulté."(322)
is continued by Auerbach's influential claim that Flaubert's artistic practice relies on a conviction of the "truth of language, responsibly, candidly and carefully employed"(323), and Stratton Buck, a well-meaning defender of Flaubert against Leavis-type accusations of amoral aestheticism, follows Proust's view that Flaubert's stylistic innovations have renewed our vision(324), with his insistence that the interest in form is not

"subtle hyper-aestheticism fending with words and sounds but the struggle of a responsible artist to give the fullest possible expression to his vision of the truth."(325)

So many critics now agree that Flaubert was never trying to render a vision, a world-view, or any sort of pre-existing reality, but was concerned with language as an opaque entity in its own right, that the above sort of definition has been somewhat discredited. This of course has occurred in the context of a thoroughgoing rejection of the idea of any literature as representation or expression, a view which will more appropriately receive consideration from the theoretical point of view in the next chapter, (in justifying a formal approach to Flaubert and looking at modern pronouncements on "realism"), for it surpasses the desired scope of the present discussion. Brief reference is however helpful to the old problem of form and content.

The general structuralist position is an outright rejection of the distinction in favour of treating content as a form, and form as a system of "articulations". In his article 'Raisons de la critique pure', Genette usefully applies to literature Hjelmslev's linguistic distinction between form and substance(326). Substance includes both the inert mass of extralinguistic material (substance of content) and the means (phonic or otherwise) used by language (substance of expression). What constitutes language as a system of signs is the way in which content and expression are cut up and structured in a global reciprocal relationship, determining a joint appearance of the form of the content and the form of the expression.
Thus form and content are no longer understood as a simplistic opposition between words and things, language and life, but content and expression, both elements of substance, are both articulated (cut-up) by form. This redefinition of form is essential, for whereas Russian Formalism, because of its attention to poetry, seems to have been accused of just "counting feet",

"un formalisme tel que nous l'envisageons ici ne s'oppose pas à une critique du sens (il n'y a de critique que du sens), mais à une critique qui confondrait sens et substance, et qui négligerait le rôle de la forme dans le travail du sens." (327)

Being openly formal does not mean staying on the surface, since only the supporters of representation believe that form lies on the surface, and style is defined as cutting across both "technique" and "vision", neither a simple sentiment, (expressing itself as best it can), nor a simple manner of speaking (which would express nothing), but precisely a form, "une manière qu'a le langage de diviser et d'ordonner à la fois les mots et les choses" (328).

In suggesting, in 'Flaubert et la phrase', that Flaubert's endless struggles with the sentence involve a "linguistics" rather than a "stylistics" of correction, Barthes shows clearly the way in which any idea of style as the last ornament of ideas is redundant for Flaubert, for whom writing and thinking are all one (329). In his very dense article 'Style and its image', he generalizes such a position, in pressing the argument that structuralism does attack the work at the level of semantics, although it is the forms and organizations of content which it seeks to apprehend, he directly relates this view to traditional ideas of style. Again the text is not a binary structure of content and form, whereby an outer stylistic film can be stripped off to reveal content, for such stripping off reveals only another form, another layer (330). Whereas a text was previously seen as a fruit like an apricot with the flesh as the form and the pit
as the content, Barthes proposes a new image, the onion, a construction of layers, (or levels, or systems), whose body contains finally no kernel, no heart, no secret, but only the infinity of its own envelopes (331).

And yet in beginning this discussion of the particular image of style (332) which opposes content to form, although he will go on to say that the error consists in beginning the stripping-off of style too soon, Barthes admits of this view "There is no doubt that it contains a certain irreducible grain of truth" (333). This interesting admission perhaps allows us to see not only why the "image" is still so widespread, but also why Flaubert himself should have given credence to it. In affirming that Flaubert is extremely incoherent about what he means by "style", Genette rejects the Correspondance as a source of information (334). For if the letters leave no doubt as to Flaubert's passion for writing, his theory cannot be found there, since the only unambiguous statement on style is that it requires atrocious labour. Indeed the partisans of both the formalist and the "mot juste" camps can (and obviously always will) find plenty of Flaubert's own comments to back up their view. And although I would like to suggest that recourse to the works themselves, and even an overall assessment of the Correspondance backs up a formalist approach, it is clearly true that collected together Flaubert's own pronouncements upon style are thoroughly contradictory.

Nor does it help to attempt to sort them out chronologically, for a letter written to George Sand as late as 1876 is an amazing example of Flaubert's muddled intimations of his own activities:

"Je crois que l'arrondissement de la phrase n'est rien, mais que bien écrire est tout, parce que bien écrire c'est à la fois bien sentir, bien penser et bien dire" (Buffon). Le dernier terme est donc dépendant des deux autres, puisqu'il faut sentir fortement afin de penser, et penser pour exprimer... Enfin je crois la forme et le fond deux subtilités, deux entités qui n'existent jamais l'une sans l'autre. Ce souci de la beauté extérieure que vous me reprochez est pour moi une méthode. Quand je découvre une mauvaise assonance
ou une répétition dans une de mes phrases, je suis sûr que je patauge dans le faux. À force de chercher, je trouve l'expression juste, qui était la seule et qui est, en même temps, l'harmonieuse. Le mot ne manque jamais quand on possède l'idée."(335).

Here we find confused the idea of "mot juste" as perfect expression of an idea, and as the only suitable word to fit into the overall structure, conceived as an arrangement so delicate that changing one word might mean changing several pages(336). In fact it covers the three strains in Flaubert's thinking on the subject, of which the first, attributed variously to Boileau, Buffon and Goethe(337), seeks adequate rendering of an "idea", and places faith in clarity and concision of thought:

"Si vous savez précisément ce que vous voulez dire, vous le diriez bien"(338) .

"il est fort difficile de rendre clair par les mots ce qui est obscur encore dans votre pensée"(339)

"La difficulté est de trouver la note juste. Cela s'obtient par une condensation excessive de l'idée"(340).

This merges into the second notion, that form and idea cannot be separated at all:

"Où la Forme, en effet, manque, l'idée n'est plus. Chercher l'un, c'est chercher l'autre. Ils sont aussi inséparables que la substance l'est de la couleur"(341)

"Cette prétendue forme extérieure!... Mais non! La forme est la chair même de la pensée, comme la pensée en est l'âme, la vie"(342)

"C'est comme le corps et l'âme; la forme et l'idée, pour moi, c'est tout un et je ne sais pas ce qu'est l'un sans l'autre"(343).

This is accompanied by an occasional feeling of being "carried away" by the stylistic level, generally considered a danger:

"Ce livre, qui n'est qu'en style, a pour danger continu el le style même. La phrase me grise et je perds de vue l'idée"(344)

"Quand on aime trop le style, on risque à perdre de vue le but même de ce qu'on écrit!"(345),

yet nevertheless, sometimes assumed as a virtue:

"On reproche aux gens qui écrivent en bon style de négliger l'Idée, le but moral; comme si le but du médecin n'était pas de guérir, le
but du peintre de peindre, le but du rossignol de chanter, comme si le but de l'Art n'était pas le Beau avant tout!" (346)

The latter early remark aligns itself with the intention which one would like to be able to privilege:

"Je voudrais faire des livres où il n'y eût qu'à écrire des phrases (si l'on peut dire cela), comme pour vivre il n'y a qu'à respirer de l'air"(347),

though it must be admitted that such an ideal tends to be offered nostalgically, with the reservation that although the subject might be irrelevant, it has to exist and does affect the form(348). Yet nevertheless, (and more proof of this will be offered in due course), one cannot ignore Flaubert's obsession with what would now be called the level of the signifier. The importance which Flaubert attached to settling on suitable names is well-known, as in his anguish when asked to change Le Journal de Rouen into Le Progressif de Rouen. There is no doubt of Flaubert's sincerity that the uncertainty over whether to give in, ("ça va casser le rythme de mes pauvres phrases!"(349)), is making him quite ill, and the ultimate proof, (if only we could disregard the rest), would certainly be the admission that he often sacrifices the details of the content to the demands of his prose:

"Sérieusement, je crois que jamais on n'a entrepris un sujet aussi difficile de style. À chaque ligne, à chaque mot, la langue me manque et l'insuffisance du vocabulaire est telle, que je suis force à changer les détails très souvent." (350)

It is not surprising that anyone who has tried to arrive at a synthesis of these remarks should have got in a muddle, from Maupassant's confused and contradictory explanations in his Étude(351), to Sherrington's final description of Flaubert's style as "the whole complex range of mechanical processes which together give complete expression to the Idea, the basic conception"(352). In one way this is an intelligent reaction against slight suspicion of the supposed intimate connection between thought and expression, but Sherrington is so convinced that Flaubert is ultimately
only putting across "a fundamental psychological fact" (i.e. "Bovarysme"),
that he resorts to a devious, or for a book written in 1970, strangely
misinformed, way of ignoring the opposite attitude:

"Some of his more outrageous statements about style - 'de la forme
nait l'idée' for example - are no longer taken seriously." (353)

An article by Pontalis at least attempts to argue its way through
the contradiction (354). As many references show, Flaubert is keenly aware
of the attention paid to language by the classical writers. Yet he is
mistaken in thinking that he too is seeking perfect expression of an idea,
for his "rage des phrases" is not that of the orator or the purist but
that of a painter for his paints. Whatever Flaubert thinks or wishes he
is quite simply unable to refer to anything preceding style, and without
ever really ceasing to wish to refer to a psychological or social reality,
he actually alienates himself in language, a position which leaves him
oscillating between Mallarmé and Zola. Pontalis suggests, and is very close
to Sartre here, that on the one hand Flaubert does not want to make lan-
guage a system of signs serving a reality, but on the other neither does
he want to change reality, the "pâte des choses", into discourse. Flaubert's
difficulties, passions, psychological and social "impasses", must all be
read in his acts of expression, for language is a prison we must penetrate
to understand him, (as in Madame Bovary Emma's malady is a linguistic one,
for she bathes in a verbal world, seduced by words: the continual exchange
of books with Léon, the warmth of Rodolphe's "langage").

This presents, ordered in the reverse direction, a similar argument
to that of Bersani's excellent article 'Flaubert and Emma Bovary: The Haz-
ards of Literary Fusion' (355), to which the following brief summary will do
inadequate justice. Bersani offers a most salutary interpretation of the
theme of Emma's reading, which has been badly handled over the years, from
the traditional view that her convent education has given her aspirations
above her station in life, (even Flaubert was not that reactionary...), and
that it is the reading of Romantic novels that leads her to "expect too much" of life and love, to this strange evaluation by Sherrington, (who shares this view of Madame Bovary), of Mme Arnoux's personal excellence:

"other traits noted are that 'elle ne s'exaltait point pour la littérature' — it is difficult to imagine a more complete condemnation by Flaubert than this: she is apparently not even as far along the road to salvation as Emma!" (356)

That critics are still unhappy about what to make of this important theme is exemplified by what I would consider the one "blunder" of Flaubert: the Uses of Uncertainty, where Culler, who, in passing, takes the preface to La Nouvelle Héloïse quite seriously (357), also seems to believe that Flaubert is blaming everything on life not being like a novel, and sees the theme of Emma corrupted by her reading as the novel's "greatest flaw":

"In short, there was no reason for Flaubert to accept in so unquestioning a way the theory of the corrupting novel; if it were to be made a central theme it might at least have been examined in a way which would enable us to discern the limits of its validity. As it is, those who are fond of the book tend to divert their gaze from its one explicit theme, which would so reduce its scope if granted a central place, and explore rather the areas of thematic indeterminacy where more important themes are adumbrated, deflected, turned over, questioned." (358)

Given Culler's most sophisticated discussion of Flaubert's use of irony this rather pious digression seems a little strange.

In a tautly constructed argument which one imagines Culler would in fact admire, as it resembles his "uses of uncertainty" orientation (359), Bersani sets out to explain the awkward and occasionally "boring" quality of Flaubert's writing, by assuming that Emma provides an object-lesson in "how not to read literature". Bersani describes Emma as so mediocre that she is even unaware of the superior refinement of her senses, such that literature performs a service for her intense but random sensuality, organizing her ill-defined ecstasies into clichéd forms that she can easily understand. But Emma is frustrated by books because of her lack of understanding of the way they operate. She waits for experience to duplicate her reading, unaware that her reading never really duplicated life. The
romantic codes that organize popular romantic fiction, (nightingales in thicket etc.), all have love as their evident referent. But Emma believes that this arbitrary connection is natural and love can therefore only seem real to her when surrounded by its conventional trappings. This explains both her misunderstanding of Charles, who she thinks cannot love her because he does not adopt such conventions(360), and Rodolphe's opposite misunderstanding of herself, when he fails to understand the genuine connection between cliché and love in Emma's case. Literature helps make sense of Emma's experience for her (because she cannot do this on her own), but of course experience could not confirm the sense she brings to it.

But as Bersani most intelligently suggests, Flaubert finds life so little worth bothering about that the superficial argument for literature's violation of experience has little force. Flaubert is clearly more sensitive to the violation of literature, the critique is of Emma's expectations concerning literature itself. For Emma tells Léon that she finds poetry boring, she only enjoys stories of non-stop action "which frighten you"(361). Her need to get some sort of personal profit even from her reading, (in line with her general rejection of everything which does not contribute to the immediate gratification of her heart), is amusingly offered by Bersani as a parody of all the western claims for the relevance of art to life. In encouraging readers to search in life for the abstractions invented in books, the moral tradition could be seen as contributing to the sins of inferior literary romance, the realistic claims of which depend upon ignoring their own mediating processes, ignoring the work of the writer.

Thus Flaubert's writing is offered as a continuous correction, through stylistic example, of Emma's confusions, for it constantly draws attention to its own nature as a composed written document. The stylistic opacity, the awkward heavy quality of being continually worked over, refute Emma's claims for a literature of pure sensation. Indeed the actual
descriptions of Emma's sensations (as on the last night with Rodolphe by the river), highlight literary images as a sign of their distance from the sensations they describe. Emma may actually see the serpent and the candelabra, but Flaubert only tells us what it is like, with a deliberately clumsy "cela ressemblait aussi à" to draw attention to the work of comparison(362). Thus it is not the content of Flaubert's metaphors that is not beautiful(363), but the glaring obviousness of their presentation, the abandoned campfire on the Russian steppe being the famous example(364). Flaubert is determined to maintain a sharp distinction between art and the rest of life, and the heaviness of much of his writing therefore has a special function: "The Flaubertian workshop is one in which a master craftsman - somewhat at the expense of his own craft - teaches us to read" (365).

This idea of an almost heroic sacrifice of ease of expression, the foregrounding of a deliberately awkward use of prose, (the deformations of syntax, the unusual use of tense, conjunctions, prepositions and adverbs that Proust describes so well(366)), in order to disturb any idea of language as a natural vehicle, is both a brilliant interpretation of Flaubertian "difficulté", and an excellent introduction to what Genette means by "le travail de Flaubert".

Genette regards "difficulté" as a last level of form distinguishing the works from the Correspondance, the finished pages from the "brouillons", and the mature works from the early ones. While Valéry sees Flaubert's obsession with "l'accessoire" as a fault, such that in his opinion La Tentation de Saint Antoine, (nevertheless his favorite Flaubertian work), lacks the unity and conviction of a masterpiece(367), Genette emphasizes his passion for the insignificant detail. Whereas Balzac's details normally signify, (with an explanatory or metaphorical function), Flaubert's "heroic" renunciation of expression operates through the characteristic shift in accent whereby an insignificant detail is placed in the foreground, drawing
attention to itself and tending to despoil the story of the meaning the reader might have attributed to it, as where the description of the cab careering around Rouen gives way to detail with no apparent function:

"Et aussitôt, reprenant sa course, elle passa par Saint-Sever, par le quai des Curandiers, par le quai aux Meules, encore une fois par le pont, par la place du Champ-de-Mars et derrière les jardins de l'hôpital, où des vieillards en veste noire se promènent au soleil. Le long d'une terrasse toute verdie par des lierres."(368)

So while Flaubert's tone, his perpetual use of a sort of indirect discourse, might be seen as operating a permanent holding in question of values, a suspension of attitude(369), the foregrounding of detail is a far more radical device which contests meaning itself:

"Interposant cette lourde porte opaque, ces ombres du soir, cette petite lyre d'ébène entre un réseau de signes et un univers de sens, il défait un langage et instaure un silence."(370)

The subtle trace of boredom, the refusal of the more normal demands of novelistic discourse, are seen as the essence of Flaubertian writing, the reason for his statut as a precursor of the modern novel. Levaillant, also using Balzac as a point of comparison, speaks of a rivalry in Flaubert's texts between "matière" and "récit". Whereas in Balzac the descriptions are dynamic in the same way as the récit, in Flaubert they form a "discours objectif et séparé" which holds it back and suspends it in mid-air. The frame of reference tends to remain in the background while what really matters stands out in a different plane(371).

Genette sees Flaubert as someone who had plenty to say, (attributing to the Correspondance and the early works a verbal facility packed with meaning), who one day decides, "comme par surcroît"(372), to say nothing. The first éducation sentimentale contains all Flaubert except this vital negation of ease, which sets in around 1850 and explains his new slowness and torment after that date. If Flaubert never wrote a book about nothing, he covered all the subjects he did treat with a sort of "petrified" language, with the "trottoir roulant" of imperfects and adverbs alone capable
of paralysing them and reducing them to silence (373). The Correspondance is full of the aesthetic aspect of this writing (the effort at perfection), but passes over its semantic aspect: the "désamorçage" of expression, the transformation of the signifying discourse into an opaque and silent object. Flaubert's project seems to have been to die in the world to be reborn in literature, yet it is a literature that makes special demands of language, requiring it to lose its meaning to accede to the silence of the work. Thus Genette describes the "death of language" as "un peu aussi le travail de Flaubert" (374).

These articles show clearly that the uneasy relation to words and meaning, pathological in terms of personal biography, (of Flaubert and many of his characters), is seen, in the different perspective of the creation of an aesthetic, to have an original and positive function, indeed to be something of a personal triumph. Such that it is certainly time to return to Sartre's discussion of the relationship between positive and negative in Flaubert, which turns out to be so relevant at all of its stages to the often better-known discussions of other critics, and finally to offer an exact parallel to Genette's account of the loss of meaning and "death" of language. For Sartre's final definition of Flaubert's style will be the adoption of the aesthetic attitude not just to experience but to language itself. Proper understanding of what Sartre means by the aesthetic or imaginary attitude is essential to the whole of his thesis, and especially to the definition of Flaubert's conception of art. (It is also so apt an explanation of vital aspects of Flaubert and his works that I shall often use it myself, in my own descriptions of both in later chapters, as if Flaubert himself understood the phrase, but really as an economical means of referring to all that it implies).

In his useful Le Monde interview Sartre says that his greatest problem in writing L'Idiot de la famille was to introduce the imaginary as the
cardinal determination of a person(375). Something of the vital importance of this notion has already been seen in the earlier accounts of Flaubert's "personnalisation", the progressive incarnation of himself as various sorts of imaginary being(376), and of the vicious circle of irrealties involved in the "l'art pour l'art" demanded by the "objective neurosis". Sartre also suggests that the real key to understanding L'Idiot de la famille is his pre-war work L'Imaginaire(377). These early phenomenological descriptions of the imagination and associated activities (memory, actors, looking at photographs, paintings, reading books, watching impersonators etc.) prefigure L'Être et le Néant, since their basic philosophical concern is to establish and explain Sartre's essential concept of "le néant". (Which is why, although L'Idiot is generally seen as an application of the Critique de la raison dialectique, it really can be said to contain "all of Sartre").

Sartre starts from a phenomenological description of what imagining is like, and from a vital distinction between perception and imagination as two alternating modes of consciousness, he goes on to pose the familiar Kantian questions - what are the characteristics that can be attributed to consciousness from the fact that it is a consciousness capable of imagining, what must its general nature be for the construction of an image always to be possible? The conclusion is that it must possess the possibility of positing an hypothesis of unreality, must be able to escape from the world by its very nature. Imagination is not a source or an accidental characteristic, a super-added power of the mind, but an essential and transcendental condition of consciousness, the whole of consciousness as it realizes its freedom, (since freedom is precisely this negating power).

As a primary structure of consciousness imagining is still consciousness of something, (the image is not a simple content of consciousness but a mental form(378)), but it involves forming objects which possess a certain
trait of nothingness in relation to the whole of reality (379). The distinction is between being "given-as-absent" and being "grasped-as-nothing", that is, "grasped-as-nothing-for-me". It is because nothingness cannot be posited for itself, but only "lived", that Sartre's complicated analyses are necessary, for example looking at the photograph of Pierre:

"Je pense, disions-nous, Pierre dans le tableau. Ceci veut dire que je ne pense pas du tout le tableau; je pense Pierre. Il ne faut donc pas croire que je pense le tableau 'comme image de Pierre'. Ceci est une conscience réflexive qui dévoile la fonction du tableau dans ma conscience présente. Pour cette conscience réflexive, Pierre et le tableau font deux, deux objets distincts. Mais dans l'attitude imageante, ce tableau n'est rien qu'une façon, pour Pierre, de m'apparaître absent." (380)

But the "attitude imageante" is hard to maintain, and the "object as image" acquires a discontinuous, jerky character, for it constantly appears and disappears. The long analysis of our understanding of an impersonation, (Franconay doing Maurice Chevalier), is particularly helpful to understanding this, for Sartre shows that we operate a continual to-and-fro between perception and imagination, between what Franconay is, (a small woman making faces or wearing a straw hat), and what she is not, (Maurice Chevalier as image) (381). Though overall we may feel this as a mixed, ambiguous condition, we are at any moment free to adopt either attitude (382).

But there can be no question of analysing the details of the image for there is by definition "no imaginary world". What is at stake is rather a matter of belief. Images remain isolated from each other, for there can be no other relationship between them except the ones consciousness can conceive at each moment in constituting them (383).

"L'objet n'est pas individué: voilà une première raison pour que l'irréel ne se constitue pas en monde. En second lieu, tout objet irréel éparpillé avec lui son temps et son espace se présente sans aucune solidarité avec aucun autre objet. Il n'est rien que je sois obligé d'accepter en même temps que lui et par lui: il n'a pas de milieu, il est indépendant, isolé - par défaut et non par excès; il n'agit sur rien, rien n'agit sur lui: il est sans conséquence au sens fort du terme." (384)

The relevance of this discussion may perhaps begin to appear through the
juxtaposition of the above quotation with one of Flaubert's answers to Taine in their exchange of letters on the difference between the real and the artistic hallucination:

"Dans l'hallucination artistique, le tableau n'est pas bien limité, quelque précis qu'il soit. Ainsi je vois parfaitement un meuble, une figure, un coin de paysage. Mais cela flotte, cela est suspendu; ça se trouve je ne sais où. Ça existe seul et sans rapport avec le reste, tandis que, dans la réalité, quand je regarde un fauteuil ou un arbre, je vois en même temps les autres meubles de ma chambre, les autres arbres du jardin, ou tout au moins je perçois vaguement qu'ils existent. L'hallucination artistique ne peut porter sur un grand espace, se mouvoir dans un cadre très large. Alors on tombe dans la rêverie, et on revient au calme, c'est même toujours comme cela que cela finit.

Vous me demandez si elle s'embôite dans la réalité ambiante? non. — La réalité ambiante a disparu. Je ne sais plus ce qu'il y a autour de moi. J'appartiens à cette apparition, exclusivement. Au contraire, dans l'hallucination pure et simple, on peut très bien voir une image fausse d'un œil, et les objets vrais de l'autre." (385)

The illusion and reality are on two different planes, and it is not possible to grasp both at once. One can imagine that Sartre might quite happily have used Flaubert's description to explain what he meant. Flaubert also refers to the "fleeting" characteristic of the image, which is reminiscent of the to-and-fro involved in maintaining, for example, "Maurice Chevalier as image". But Sartre puts the "perpetual evasion" of the image in a slightly different perspective, where he claims that it may seem to offer an escape not just from present preoccupation and boredom, but almost from all worldly constraints, that is that it acts as a negation of the actual condition of being-in-the-world (386).

It is here that the difficult question of an evaluation of the imaginary attitude poses itself. For while every perception of the real has the possibility of reversing itself in imagination, which is simply the normal transcendental relationship to reality, it presumably requires a constant return to affirmative existence to valorise it. (Thus, in Questions de méthode, praxis is defined as negativity in relation to the given situation, but positivity with respect to what is aimed at (387)).
When the imaginary attitude is adopted all the time, from preference, it becomes unhealthy, as is seen in Sartre's long analysis of the category of individuals who prefer to lead an "imaginary" life. For the schizophrenic adopts "imaginary" feelings for the sake of their unreal nature, he chooses an impoverished, unnatural, congealed and formalized life not only as an escape from the content of the real, (poverty, failure etc.), but from the very form of reality, (the characteristic of presence and the sort of positive reaction it demands of us). Now while it is obviously possible to recognize elements of Flaubert, and certainly of Emma and Frédéric, in this psychotic extreme, "irréalisation" has also been demonstrated to be a norm of art. Thus while it becomes clear from these early analyses why Sartre should understand Flaubert so well, and while it is because of the function of "irréalisation" in art that Flaubert's adoption of the unreal as the supreme value is not simply pathological, one senses a slight ambiguity in Sartre's position. For example in establishing the vicious circle of realities that he plays upon so often, having distinguished from the outset between the real imaginative consciousness and the unreal object, Sartre explains that there cannot be a causal relationship going from the object to consciousness: "L'irréel ne peut être vu, touché, flairé, qu'irréellement. Réciproquement il ne peut agir que sur un être irréel". This would suggest that every experience of an aesthetic object is "neurotic", which in the sense of Sartre's definitions could be accepted. But it calls into question the supposed malice of Flaubert's "demoralizing" intention, for he can only be deliberately intending an inevitable result.

However, that elucidation of what is involved in such demoralization is required is perhaps shown by what I take to be a misunderstanding in Jonathan Culler's otherwise lucid review of the first two volumes of \textit{L'Idiot de la famille}. Explaining how Flaubert, accepting his own
"irréalisation", seeks to extend this negative definition to the rest of the world, Culler equates this "irréalisation du réel" with "systematic demoralization", which he claims "shows the fundamental gratuitousness of the world by describing it in concrete detail" (393). This is the starting point of his "uses of uncertainty" argument, which begins from stupid and boring passages which cannot be recuperated by symbolic readings or point of view. Culler makes his own development of this sort of demoralization work very well, (though I am personally unhappy with its starting point because it contradicts what Genette says about the pleasure of getting lost in insignificant details (394)). But what matters here is that it is not at all what Sartre means by an unreal Flaubert making the world and everyone unreal through unreal works of art. His desire to affect his readers with unreality, (malevolently or otherwise), is for Sartre a desire to affect them with the aesthetic attitude, (or with "short neuroses" as he sometimes puts it), and has nothing to do with frustrating them by bogging them down in meaningless detail.

The "malevice" of such contagion is also called into question by the evident "joy" that so often accompanies the aesthetic attitude, such that the poison could equally be seen as a gift. As explained, the aesthetic attitude can be taken to ordinary experience, as well as being involved in imaginary or aesthetic phenomena as such. The disinterested contemplation of real events or objects produces a sort of recoil whereby they seem to slip into nothingness. They are no longer perceived, but like the artistic image, function as an "analogon" of themselves. In other words impressions are received as if they were being imagined (395). Sartre's analysis of Flaubert's description of meeting the caravan in Égypt is an excellent reading of that passage, while the passage itself is the best possible explanation of what Sartre means:

"une caravane nous croise, les hommes entourés de coufiehs (les
femmes très voilées) se renchent sur le cou des dromadaires; ils passent tout près de nous, on ne se dit rien, c'est comme des fantômes dans des nuages. Je sens quelque chose comme un sentiment de terreur et d'admiration furieux me couler le long des vertèbres, je ricane nerveusement, je devais être très pâle et je jouissais d'une façon inouïe. Il m'a semblé, pendant que la caravane a passé, que les chameaux ne touchaient pas à terre, qu'ils s'avançaient du poitrail avec un mouvement de bateau, qu'ils étaient supportés là dedans et très élevés au-dessus du sol, comme s'ils eussent marché dans des nuages où ils enfouaient jusqu'au ventre."

This meeting with the caravan gives joy because it presents reality as Flaubert would wish it. His ideal relationship with the world would be that man should be similarly out of reach, for the meeting implies no contact, just a simple coexistence, a confusion of "être" and "apparition". Aesthetic joy is generalized from this to embrace any event which realizes the derealization of the real and reveals experience as a product of the imagination.

It is in this 'Du poète à l'artiste' section, (discussed in its less satisfactory aspects above), that Sartre at least resolves the ambiguity over evaluation for Flaubert. For if everyone possesses the faculty of imagination, it is only for the artist that it becomes a "categorical imperative". Flaubert's "calling" is to anchor the impossible in the real by tearing himself from the world, by carrying an "existence" of impossibility actually within himself, by never deserting the artist's "Weltanschauung"; always to consider reality from the point of view of the unreal. Pride becomes both an ethical and an aesthetic imperative, for pride will give the individual this aesthetic vision. In this development to extremes of "totalisation en extériorité" and the "conscience de survol", the points of view of death, the infinite and the absolute, all become synonymous with the aesthetic attitude, for while mysticism means declassing the finite by the infinite, artistic creation means declassing the real by the imaginary. This rigorous totalization is defined by Sartre as beauty, (his interpretation of Flaubert's "Qu'est-ce que le beau sinon l'impossible?"), which becomes the dialectical link between Being and Non-Being.
Art's devaluation of reality through the realization of the imaginary is defined as totalizing the world to destroy it (401), but the equation of beauty and evil is perhaps only to emphasize the former's radical refusal of reality. Indeed Guido Morpurgo-Tagliabue makes the salutary suggestion that equating this with "a conscious destruction" is nothing more than an instance of "hyperbolic psychology" (402), a "dramatic" resolution of the problems of a would-be artist who cannot in fact present reality at all without making it formally imaginary.

But such a solution is only perfected in the era of the "prénévrose", and Flaubert's first self-incarnation as an imaginary being is through his vocation as actor. Of course this is another favorite Sartrean stamping-ground, yet once again there is plenty of objective evidence of Flaubert's early passion for the stage:

"Le fond de ma nature est, quoi qu'on dise, le saltimbanque. J'ai eu dans mon enfance et ma jeunesse un amour effréné des planches. J'aurais été peut-être un grand acteur, si le ciel n'avait fait naître plus pauvre." (403)

Just as the aesthetic object is something unreal, (i.e. it is not that unreal ideas or an image are made real on canvas, but that real materials are used to produce an imaginary object), so Sartre makes his own contribution to the paradox of the actor by offering him, like the statue of Venus in an explanatory analysis (404), as a "real and permanent centre of 'irréalisation'". Diderot is right that the actor does not really feel his character's feelings, but he does not express them "de sang froid" either (405). Rather he feels them "irreally", sacrificing himself so that an appearance can exist, he chooses to be the support of non-being. Reducing himself publicly to an exterior appearance, like Xeen and Hamlet, Gustave becomes an analogon of Harpagon. Only an imaginary child, says Sartre, could have had the idea of guaranteeing in his person the victory of the image over reality, and this heroic nightly self-derealization, to lead the audience into its own collective derealization, is seen partly as the
ultimate act of generosity, (as are all of Flaubert's roles from the Garçon to Saint-Polycarpe), and partly, especially in the case of the comic actor, as the ultimate act of masochism, for Flaubert is introducing into himself the value judgements of the enemy (406). An interesting analysis of the laugh shows it to have a similar function to the imaginary attitude, since it achieves the derealization of its object by reducing it to pure appearance, a spectacle without practical consequence (407). Acting is seen ultimately as a lost chance of sociality, whereby Flaubert would at least have been instituted as a centre of "irréalisation" in his body, which on the frustration of this first vocation, (too lowly an occupation to even be seriously considered), is returned to its "réalité animale", and Flaubert to his autism (408). His only hope now is to be a creator of centres of "irréalisation" "through certain combinations of graphènes" (409).

But although, as already suggested by the long analysis of Flaubert's relationship to his voice (410), mere writing is seen from some angles as a "pis-aller", the written, as opposed to the spoken word, is nevertheless seen to have positive advantages. The "Scripta manent" chapter, beginning with an analysis of Flaubert's new fascination with the word as such, traces the evolution of the attitude to language which is now commonly seen as founding Flaubert's art (411). That the written word should "remain" is important not for its own sake, (immortality etc.), but because it can be dwelt on at length and tends to force the reader into an attitude of contemplation. The written word is ultimately preferred as a superior agent of derealization.

In the incantatory repetition, described in Novembre, of magic words like "femme" and "maîtresse", Sartre suggests that the word, as the mediation between the narrator and the mysterious desire, becomes itself the real source of fascination. This is even more obvious in the verbally rich meditation on India and other distant places:
"Oh! l'Inde! l'Inde surtout! ... puisse-je périr en doublant le Cap, mourir de choléra à Calcutta ou de la peste à Constantinople." (412)

Rather than expressing the wish, the rich sounds actually satisfy it, and false desires are created so as to bring the word into being. The true desire is not to live or die in Calcutta, but to create a "mot-assouvissement", to trace the letters and to shut himself inside them. While some rudimentary knowledge of the romantic charms of Calcutta is required, the meaning of the sentence will not actually be lost but will be subsumed, for the desire, which is only in the words, is satisfied by their non-signifying part. To apprehend a "vocable" as a sign is to pass through it to meaning, (obviously not the normal linguistic use of "sign", but this is not important here), and is an activity similar to perception, whereas to grasp it in its material singularity is to imagine it. Writing and reading are normally pursued through a subtle dialectic of the two, but to adopt the imaginary attitude is to conserve and emphasize their sumptuous materiality (413).

An analysis of Mallarmé's "sans mâts, sans mâts", shows that any word can in fact be grasped in this way. In this case the effect is achieved by repetition. The first "sans mâts" gives the meaning, the second cannot therefore operate as a "sign". For it is thrown into relief, made obviously important, yet it can offer nothing more to the reader in the way of meaning. He is therefore forced to grasp it in a different way. The verbal matter is exalted, forced upon his attention, and in opening himself to the material riches of the sentence, the reader himself is "irrealized". With particularly rich words this process happens all on its own, but Flaubert makes it happen for all language; the attitude of derealization forces it to deliver up its materiality (414). Thus what others might prefer to call the foregrounding of the signifier is equated, in a crucial step, with the adoption of the imaginary attitude to language.

Style, then, is in no sense a gift or ornament, but simply an attitude
to language. The artist, already required to adopt the aesthetic attitude to the world and to experience, discovers an imaginary use of language as the essential way of making things imaginary, which is Sartre's contribution to interpretation of Flaubert's remark that style is a "manière absolue de voir les choses" (415). However coherent the discourse, it will be derealized by its formal beauty, for the aesthetic attitude will turn language away from any practical aims:

"Les informations sont du domaine des signes mais le sens d'un ouvrage de l'esprit nous est communiqué indirectement par sa beauté formelle." (416)

The very meaning of style comes to be the systematic derealization of speech, a silent discourse: "le silence dans le discours, le but imaginaire et secret de la parole écrite" (417). A novel will be something of the order of a constructed trap, the outline of the story will be read to know what happens, but this signifying synthesis will be maintained in "insignificiance", it will be operated without passion, as inessential as the subject-matter in contemporary nineteenth-century painting (418). As this comparison and a reference to Baudelaire (419) suggest, though Flaubert had his own reasons for basing a literature on such an attitude to language, still this could not have become a positive definition of style if the overthrowing of practical discourse, the furnishing of "silent'sur-communications'transmitting no conceptual signification" (420), had not been a general problem of the period. Or as Flaubert's quite unwonted status as a precursor of modern writing suggests, and as Genette alluding to Blanchot actually states, a more general problem of literature itself:

"ce projet de ne rien dire, dont Blanchot a montré qu'il était le dessein, secret à elle-même, de toute littérature, et dont la prise de conscience progressive, depuis un siècle, ferait tout le mouvement de la littérature moderne." (41)

But such an assertion, while returning this chapter too neatly to its starting-point, also quite surpasses its intended scope.
CHAPTER 2. A formal perspective on Flaubertian representation.

In an analysis of the cab-scene in *Madame Bovary*, a "gratuitous" change in camera angle is described by Sartre as "là mort de l'illusion"(1). Jonathan Culler finds it ironic that the theoretically sophisticated Sartre, in calling upon cinematic metaphors, should reveal his continued commitment to the notion of dramatic illusion and the theory of the novel it implies.

"Indeed, it is especially ironic that Flaubert's attempt to 'irréaliser le réel' should be made to depend in this way on maintaining illusion when his heirs have made the destruction of illusion one of their principal techniques. Flaubert discovered in his later work that dramatic illusion was not necessary to his project. Will Sartre be able to follow him here or will he show himself, finally, incapable of distinguishing, in literary terms, between Flaubert and Mauriac?"(2)

Leaving aside the cab-scene itself (I do not myself find Sartre's point a good one), and the rather uncharitable equation of Sartre's literary awareness with what was certainly one of his worst articles, the issue of Flaubert's attitude to illusion seems to me a central one, which should not be so easily dismissed by reference to modern writing. For I shall argue that whatever else Flaubert's work may be, the creation of an illusion of reality is nevertheless important to him right up until *Trois Contes*. Certainly it is only officially abandoned in *Bouvard et Pécouhet*, conceived of by Flaubert as a new departure for which the term "novel" was not really an adequate description(3). Thus, although this "new departure" may turn out to be detectable in the other major novels, Culler's phrase, "in his later work", surely begs many questions.

Perhaps the most general problem that this thesis seeks to confront is that of how far Flaubert's "modernism" should be taken. Or as Graham Falconer puts it in an interesting paper, we must decide which Flaubert
is the precursor of the modern French novel. For while Falconer accepts Bouvard et Pécuchet as a "fragmented, vertiginous descent into nonsense", he finds Madame Bovary an entirely coherent fiction, a masterpiece of unity, which may have a "drama of the interstice" but nevertheless also has a fairly solid subject: "Sérieusement lézardé, l'édifice de la littérature représentative reste encore debout" (4). Similarly Claudine Gothot-Mersch, who gallantly sums up the mood of the Cerisy colloquium with a ruling for "la faillite de l'illusion représentative",

"c'est donc dans un jeu de déplacement (décalage, discordance, hiatus, écart, intervalle...) dans un glissement perpetuel, que nous avons cherché le sens" (5),

adds her own timid, but clearly more sincerely felt suggestion, that realism was actually far more important to Flaubert than the colloquium had suggested, that Flaubert did not just construct the deconstruction of meaning, but equally things as solid as "bovarysme" (6).

If Flaubert was furious that Madame Bovary should be hailed by its contemporary critics as a masterpiece of realism (7), a long critical tradition has always felt Flaubert to be a "realist", a view inevitably supported by the frequent references in the Correspondance to the importance of illusion and "vraisemblance" (8). That Flaubert can both aim at an illusion of reality and declare that he had undertaken Madame Bovary out of a hatred of reality and realism (9), is not in itself contradictory, it merely emphasizes the confusingly different ways in which the term realism is used. When Flaubert says that he hates realism this follows his declaration of abhorrence for "la vie ordinaire" (10). In so plainly equating realism with the portrayal of ordinary everyday life, it is obviously the Champfleury brand of realism that Flaubert rejects, equating it with the later Naturalism which he labels a similar if not the same "ineptie" (11). Hence his annoyance with those who sought models for his characters and settings. In fact Flaubert's obsession with documentation raises
interesting problems which will be discussed in due course, but it is surely clear from the consistent attitude revealed in the Correspondance that he would have been immensely amused by the sort of interest in the "origin" of Madame Bovary so ridiculously exemplified by the society of "Les Amis de Flaubert" (12). The functioning of that subtitle, "mœurs de province", will be considered in a different perspective later in this chapter, but in terms of the rôle and status of Flaubert's illusion of reality. In other words, I do not really consider the view of the novel as a Normandy village anecdote based on Germinal-type documentation to be worth serious consideration.

Nor do I consider that it gets in the way of the more important questions of literary theory that after all underlie an abuse of the word "realism" such as to render it virtually useless as a term of description. Thus although I would not in the least claim to be offering any solutions to such problems on a theoretical level, it seems necessary to at least situate my own discussion of Flaubert's "formalism" both against the various statements about illusion and realism, and against some more recent critical pronouncements on literary realism. It is too early to clarify this issue, which I offer as one general context of my thesis. But the direction of this chapter and the one that follows may be explained if I suggest at this stage that although I find Gothot-Mersch's dilemma an extremely important one, it seems to me to arise out of a common oversimplification of the theoretical problem involved, even if she intentionally offers it in schematic form.

The problem is stated as the need to choose between the Flaubertian novel as reproduction or production, reproduction equated with an ideological "sens plein", and production understood as the constant calling into question, (by the "work" of the language), of any stable meaning at all (13).
with language as an opaque, independent entity, obviously aligns itself with the second alternative. However, in examining the possibilities of reading Flaubert's novels in a strictly formal way, I intend to suggest that within the sphere of production, of a foregrounded work of writing and construction which does not attempt to hide itself or pass itself off as the innocent, transparent "medium" for an inner "core" of content and truth, a certain permanent validity of meaning is nevertheless created on the level of the formal organization of the supposed fiction. Todorov, for example, defines the literary work as "le lieu où naît un sens qui ne peut exister ailleurs"(14), that is containing a "sens" which is in no way the translation of a preexisting thought or external reality. I find this most appropriate as a description of the Flaubertian novels which depend upon maintaining an illusion — it is because they have no responsibility to any external reality that their meaning and values, established by the interrelation of an imaginary fiction and its formal organization, are in a sense inevitably "permanent".

This anticipation of my final argument is only to underline what I consider an important starting point — that however modern our perspective it would be misleading to abandon the sphere of representation. The degree to which representation of an imagined reality comes to resemble the auto-representation of the "Nouveau Roman" (in the sense of Ricardou's excellent analyses) will be examined at length, but it seems doubtful that auto-representation ever becomes anti-representation(15). Once language used largely to create a self-defining tautologous work gives way to a more radical literary work, Bouvard et Pécuchet, which might be felt to be more or less based on language quite simply imitating itself, then it is quite possible, as Genette would I think suggest, that we have moved out of the realm of mimesis altogether(16). But such self-representation is surely pure tautology rather than anti-representation.
Such questions will be confronted at particular later stages of my discussion. But it should be apparent that the chronological development of Flaubert's aesthetic practice needs always to be borne in mind. Such dating is not just a problem in the modern perspective; there have of course been many traditional discussions of the development of Flaubert's aesthetic. The necessarily very brief reference which will be made to these inevitably raises the problem of what is meant at all by "Flaubert's aesthetic". Contradictory pronouncements can usually be explained when we realize that critics are actually dating quite different things.

The aesthetic may be understood as the literary expression of a particular idea or world-view, as Flaubert's artistic theory or his practice, as a combination of these or perhaps as a combination of our own theory with his practice. Since there is no reason why a combination of these interpretations should necessarily raise insoluble contradictions, rather than attempting to justify a reading of Flaubert clearly influenced by twentieth century formalist criticism, it seems more relevant to preface such readings with a brief consideration of traditional dating and definition of the aesthetic, and a rather summary examination of Flaubert's own literary pronouncements and declared aims, along with my own extremely schematic general feeling on the dating of the aesthetic. I cannot over-emphasize that my references to traditional Flaubert criticism, the perspective of which is different from my own and which I generally cite to situate myself rather than to dismiss it, would not claim to do justice to the original arguments.
Roger Huss suggests that use of a single term "mature aesthetic"
"to refer to a large and scattered body of comment produced at
different moments of the writer's life is justified by Flaubert's
fidelity to his aesthetic principles and by the regularity with
which he returns to the same preoccupations". (17)

In taking as central to his "mature aesthetic" the position of Jules in
the first *Éducation sentimentale*, he argues that Flaubert's later pron-
ouncements on art, (found mainly in the *Correspondance*, the *Notes de
Voyage*, and the preface to Bouilhet's *Dernières Chansons*), merely consol-
idate this exemplary standpoint. But it seems to me that Roger Huss'
chosen definition of the mature aesthetic is the only thing that leads
him to privilege Jules in this way. For if his exploration of Jules'
artistic stances (in particular as seen developing through the artist's
exploration of his own temperament in the early works) is pursued in a
most interesting way, the most perfect understanding of Jules contributes
little to the definition of Flaubert's mature aesthetic practice, as
Roger Huss' own later article on Flaubert's anomalous use of the imperfect
tense anyway surely suggests (18). Thus just as Sherrington argues that the
only final statement of Flaubert's aesthetic lies in the novels themselves,
which he refuses to see as some sort of practical application of the
theories of the *Correspondance* (19), so I could not agree that "After the
first *Éducation sentimentale* the essential problem will be one of realisa-
tion, of putting theories into practice" (20).

That Flaubert's statements on art revolve throughout his life
around the same issues is certainly generally true, but perhaps only
because they are posed on such a general level. Thus the Bouilhet preface,
which Flaubert saw as his only public profession of personal artistic
faith (21), is actually even more abstract than the analysis of Jules' art,
for the references to unity, harmony and impersonality have disappeared, and there is no longer any hint of any attitude to the world informing the artistic ideal. The preface is basically an apology for an ennobling "l'art pour l'art", a declaration of devotion to literature acknowledging an eclectic literary taste, a preference for skilled and patient labour over facility. More specifically Flaubertian facets are included in this homage — the belief that plasticity is the most important quality of art, the aim of which is to produce "une exaltation vague" (22), a reference to Apuleius (23), the claim that prose must be tested by its ability to be read aloud (24), a dislike of the general practice of literary criticism (25).

But the fact that such general (if important) principles can apply equally to Bouilhet and to Flaubert, whose literary productions are so vastly different, (Bouilhet was after all mainly a poet), suggests how little practical guidance such pronouncements give for the reading of Flaubert's actual novels.

Thus Roger Huss' chapter on impersonality (26) is particularly interesting in his own perspective of a consideration of the complex attitudes (sympathy, detachment etc.) which are involved in it, but in suggesting that the artistic doctrine of impersonality is a conscious aesthetic equivalent of an uneasy relationship to the self and the world, only the psychological attitudes are really illuminated. There is fascinating analysis of fictional characters who exemplify the impersonal stance, (e.g. Isambart and Yuki (27)), but such an approach would not be able to tell us how impersonality actually operates at the level of formal practice.

Jean Bruneau, who is perhaps the best-known exponent of the view that Flaubert's aesthetic is set up for life after its exposition in Jules, "Flaubert conservera toujours les idées philosophiques de Jules, il ne changera rien non plus à son esthétique" (28), has a particularly strange argument in that it is based upon a study of Flaubert's aesthetic practice
up to January 1845, concluding that by this date Flaubert is in full possession of his novelistic technique, and yet admitting that he is omitting Flaubert's interest in writing which does not start until after this date. His citation of Pierre Moreau's view of the first Éducation, "Tout Flaubert est là; mais son art n'y est pas encore"(29), aptly underlines my general view that if his art is not there, how can "all of Flaubert" possibly be there at this stage?

It seems to me therefore that in my perspective Jules cannot be considered any sort of permanent mouthpiece, for through him Flaubert merely defines an abstract artistic stance. Jules' aesthetic only really embodies a set of rules of conduct for the artist, the schematic presentation of which is responsible for many long-standing received ideas of Flaubert criticism, for example the form/content relationship referred to in the previous chapter(30). Pantheism and universal sympathy are perhaps the most important ideas(31), but what is being described is very much an attitude to the world without which the artist cannot proceed with his task, as really are impersonality and irony:

"panthéisme immense, qui passe par lui et réapparaît dans l'Art"(32)

"Arrêtant l'émotion qui le troublerait, il sait faire naître en lui la sensibilité qui doit créer quelque chose"(33)

"Mais je crois qu'il y a quelque chose au-dessus de tout cela, à savoir: l'acceptation ironique de l'existence et sa refonte plastique et complète par l'Art"(34), the latter in fact a later quotation from the Correspondance, which perfectly sums up Jules' position as regards irony(35), yet, as I have suggested of his impersonality, has literally no connection with the complex workings of irony in the major novels(36).

Such generalities can tell us nothing about the sort of novels Flaubert will write. Indeed the discussion of Jules' art does not even mention novels, for after his play it is not even very clear what exactly
Jules is supposed to have written. At one stage we learn that he has divided his life into two parts, since at the same time he is writing a history of Asian migrations and composing a volume of poetry. It is interesting that Jules actually has quite contradictory aesthetic ideals for each:

"Il avait pour son histoire un plan simple et fécond, il la voulait tailler en larges masses [sic], la diviser par groupes bien composés, et dominer le tout par une unité puissante et réelle; quant à ses vers, il travaillait à assouplir le rythme à tous les caprices de la pensée, c'était une couleur en relief, avec des fantaisies saisissantes, une musique aérienne."(37)

This suggests at least that the final much quoted principle of Jules' aesthetic, unity and harmony, should not have been so unambiguously accepted even as a part of an analysis of Jules(38). Indeed if the discovery of harmony is most important in the sense of Jules making sense of his whole life, the aesthetic hinted at by the poetry plan might be highlighted as an important early mention of the potential aesthetic value of rêverie and dispersion(39).

I can far more happily accept Jules in Sartre's sense of an empty glorification of the artist, a deliberately pathetic character who has to be a puny failure in order to become an artist at all(40). In 1866 Flaubert himself says to George Sand "Je ne crois pas (contrairement à vous) qu'il y ait rien à faire de bon avec le caractère de l'Artiste idéal"(41). Paradoxically it is the handling of Henry which seems to me far more interesting, for the Mme Renaud affair is written in a way that my later argument will consider particularly important, i.e. in terms of the practical development of Flaubert's aesthetic, not in Bruneau's sense that it is a "roman dramatique" where an invisible artist pulls the strings(42), but for the emergence of what will later be discussed as vital aesthetic values - "béance" and "stupeur", privileged silences and rêverie, of which the presentation of Marie in Novembre is perhaps the
first important attempt, and Salammbo the fullest accomplishment(43). This brief reference to my later argument is to underline my belief that whereas the affair with Mme Renaud is properly written, the Jules passage by contrast is more like a rather smug essay, interestingly rejected by Flaubert in an essential letter to Louise Colet:

"Les pages qui t'ont frappée (sur l'Art etc.) ne me semblent pas difficiles à faire. Je ne les referai pas, mais je crois que je les ferai mieux. C'est ardent, mais ça pourrait être plus synthétique. J'ai fait depuis des progrès en esthétique, ou du moins je me suis affermi dans l'assiette que j'ai prise de bonne heure. Je sais comment il faut faire. Oh mon Dieu! si j'écrivais le style dont j'ai l'idée, quel écrivain je serais!"(44)

Although Flaubert describes himself here as "affermi dans l'assiette que j'ai prise de bonne heure" this letter, significantly dated 1852, surely indicates rather a quite new sense of direction. The ecstatic ideal of style is unspecified because he has not really even tried it yet, let alone achieved it, but he does at last seem to have a firm sense of what he wants to do, and many future letters define, albeit in the vaguest way, an ideal conception of writing placed by Flaubert at the very limits of possibility(45). It seems to me that it is only here, with the beginning of work on Madame Bovary, that Flaubert can really be said to have entered his "mature" period(46). His correspondence shows him now thinking about the sort of novel, in the sense of an aesthetic object, that he will write. Many of the vital Correspondance quotations are from 1852 and 1853, and though there are obviously non-literary reasons for this as well, (the main period of writing to Louise Colet), a new sense of the agony and difficulties of producing a "written" novel only emerges as he embarks upon Madame Bovary. In other words Flaubert's real aesthetic problems can only be said to start here.

It is worth noting that Flaubert would not publish anything written before this date, for this seems to me to be anyway one sensible way of dating his mature aesthetic practice. Mason, who studies the way Flaubert
uses his early works in the later ones, suggests that he does not publish
the former so that he can use them(47). Yet Flaubert does not speak as
if he takes his early work seriously in retrospect. Although he shows
Novembre to the Goncourts he declares his relief that he had had the sense
not to publish it(48), the rejection of the first Éducation has already
been mentioned, and his remarks on the Tentation de saint Antoine, what-
ever his original disappointment over it, do not suggest that he considers
it that important: "Je crois qu'il y a peut-être moyen de rendre cela
lisible"(49). Though he often returns to it, this seems to be because he
really enjoys its atmosphere and feels at home in its subject matter:

"je n'ai pas besoin d'être soutenu, un pareil milieu me plaît
naturellement"(50)

"C'est une extravagance complète, mais qui m'amuse"(51)

"mon Saint Antoine que je suis bien décidé, à ne pas publier quand
il sera fini, ce qui fait que je travaille en toute liberté d'espi-
rit"(52),

and when he suggests seeing George Sand so as to read Saint Antoine to
her, it is actually "puis pour vous parler d'un autre livre plus impor-
ant"(53).

In his letters written before his return from the East Flaubert
describes himself as having been in training for twenty years and suddenly
impatient and anxious to get started:

"J'éprouve, par rapport à mon état littéraire intérieur, ce que
tout le monde, à notre âge, éprouve un peu par rapport à la vie
sociale: 'Je me sens le besoin de m'établir'."(54)

To resolve the problem of why Flaubert should suddenly feel ready to start
writing seriously one is naturally led to consider the significance of
the journey to the East. But while several critics have emphasized its
importance for Flaubert's artistic formation I find myself in disagree-
ment with their reasons for doing so. For example, Mason claims 1851 and
the start of Madame Bovary as the essential date(55), describing it as
the end of a period of intellectual and aesthetic formation in which the Eastern journey played a vital part. But in fact she equates this influence with a new discovery of "la poésie en tout", illustrated by Flaubert's letter about the mixed odours of lemon trees and dead bodies which he describes as "la grande synthèse"(56). Thus Flaubert is supposed to have found the real Orient more real than the idealized Orient of Byron and Victor Hugo, and to have at last discovered the "poetic realism" which distinguishes Madame Bovary from the Œuvres de jeunesse, including the Tentation(57). Naaman exemplifies further this rather typical view of the sort of influence the East was supposed to have had:

"En méditant, il finit par découvrir sa voie et par inaugurer une nouvelle période dans sa vie-d'artiste. Il se libère de ses entraves romantiques et substitue aux rêves de son imagination débordante 'la vision de la réalité', en s'initiant à la technique de la photographie, avec Maxime du Camp, et à celle du Panorama, avec le colonel Langlois. En observant, il acquiert un très riche bagage d'expériences vécues, de mouvement et d'images."(58),

part of this view recalling Bart's study of Flaubert's landscape descriptions, for Bart obviously detects much progress in his descriptive technique in the travel notes written in the East(59).

Thibautiet, rather than detecting a switch from "Romanticism" to "realism", argues instead for the final emergence of Flaubert's "vision binoculaire":

"Le voyage d'Orient était d'ailleurs pour Flaubert le lieu bénit de cette vision binoculaire, faite de ces deux éléments, l'Orient qu'il voyait et la Normandie qu'il rêvait (comme il avait rêvé l'Orient en Normandie), et Madame Bovary s'élabore en son inconscient."(60)

It is interesting to compare this quotation with Sicard's brief reference to Sartre's intended consideration of the importance of the Eastern journey in Volume IV of L'Idiot de la famille:

"Mais, c'est dans le Voyage en Orient (objet d'une seconde étude) que l'on découvrira comment Flaubert devient l'auteur de Madame Bovary: en Orient, en effet, 'la Normandie lui paraît imaginaire', devient un objet de rêve; en cherchant l'antique, il est amené aussi à observer le contemporain."(61)
This seems very much Thibaudet's point, and it is interesting to think of Flaubert having to get away from his own environment to be able to experience it in an imaginary way. (One recalls the well-known passage in which he daydreams about Croisset(62)). But Sicard continues:

"Surtout le spectacle est le point de départ pour un style: on apprend que Flaubert récrit ses notes, que ce qui compte, c'est avant tout la forme, le langage. Nous avons une coupure très nette d'avec la réalité et il faudra étudier à cette égard le système des corrections qui ont pour but de cacher la causalité."(63)

The important point that I would extract is less that Flaubert spends a lot of time on carefully written description, than that he not only experiences contemporary France in a derealized way, but his actual present experience of being in the Orient is experienced as a dream as well. This is overwhelmingly evident from the way Flaubert describes his experiences in the travel notes and letters, Egypt in particular representing a constant discovery of the joys of opaque situations, that is of real experience lived as if it were imaginary. Flaubert both falls into and tends consciously to adopt this attitude which was analysed in the last chapter as Sartre's "point de vue esthétique", for which Flaubert's account of meeting the caravan served precisely as the privileged example. It is because the whole trip turns out to be an aesthetic experience that its chief features, not understanding situations and language, "stupid" contemplation and rêverie, merge constantly into a sort of aesthetic ecstasy.

The most important catalyst of such ecstasy, of particular relevance to the argument of the last chapter, seems to be precisely the constant presence of a particularly strange-sounding foreign language. Much of the pleasure of sleeping with Arab prostitutes appears to stem from the impossibility of communicating with them:

"Les mots arabes que je ne comprenais pas. C'étaient des questions de trois et de quatre mots et elle attendait la réponse; les yeux entrant les uns dans les autres, l'intensité du regard est doublée. - Mine de Joseph au milieu de tout cela. - Faire l'amour par interprète."(64)
Indeed Flaubert spends a night of "intensités rêvées infinies" contemplating the sleeping Ruchiouk-Hâmem(65) and recalling "sa voix qui chantait des chansons sans signification ni mots distinguables pour moi"(66).

From explicit statements of particular delights:

"J'entendais Joseph et les gardes qui causaient à voix basse; je me suis livré là à des intensités nerveuses pleines de réminiscences"(67),

one infers the intended effect of less stressed passages:

"Je m'endors dans ma pelisse, savourant toutes ces choses; les Arabes chantent un canzone monotone, j'en entends un qui raconte une histoire: voilà la vie du désert."(68)

It is particularly interesting to note with what frequency Flaubert inserts strange words into his text:

"Couvent Copte. Moines à l'eau descendant tout nus de la montagne: 'Cawadja christiani, batchis, cawadja christiani'; et les échos dans les grottes répètent 'Cawadja, cawadja'."(69)

"Femme voilée d'un grand morceau de soie noire toute neuve, et son mari sur un autre âne. 'Taiêb', et l'on répond 'Taiêb, tâlêb' sans s'arréter."(70),

and also that as an absolutely predictable tic of style he will record such words twice:

"'In ny a oh! in ny a oh!'"(71)

"'El Kods, el Kods'"(72)

"'Gawon! Gawon!'")(73)

"'tâe! tâe!"(74).

Recalling Sartre's analysis of Mallarmé's "sans mâts, sans mâts"(75), it would seem that the reader is led doubly into adopting the imaginary attitude to language, (grasping it in its materiality), by the rich unusual sounds, and by their repetition. The way this induces rêverie will be reconsidered in the final chapter in connection with Salammî, for the moment I would point out that when Flaubert tries to convey in language the effect of such privileged moments, he often resorts to repeating a phrase, as in meeting the caravan "qâ marche...qâ marche...", or
in describing his admiration for camels "ça avance, ça avance"(76), or
approaching Beirut from the sea: "on repart, on s'arrête, la lune est
couchée, étoiles, étoiles."(77) In the major novels we shall see that
repetition often appears as a privileged sign of not-understanding, and
while these special Eastern descriptions are characterized by a complete
lack of thought(78), (let alone comprehension), they are frequently
actually brought about by not understanding the meaning of language.
Thus Flaubert's autistic characteristics, the aesthetic potential of
which was often hinted at in the last chapter, emerge most fully as some-
thing positive in the notes and letters written in the Orient,

"Je tombe dans des rêveries et des distractions sans fin. Je suis
toujours un peu comme si j'avais trop bu; avec ça de plus en plus
inept et inapte à comprendre ce qu'on m'explique"(79),

for such blank "stupidity" is moulded into something more valuable:

"Si tu savais quel calme tout autour de nous, et dans quelles
profondeurs paisibles on se sent errer l'esprit! Nous paressons,
nous flanons, nous rêvassons."(80)

Maxime du Camp's account of his travelling companion highlights,
through its evident disdain for such behaviour, the uniqueness of Flaub-
ert's enjoyment of 'mindless' passivity:

"Gustave Flaubert n'avait rien de mon exaltation, il était calme
et vivait en lui-même. Le mouvement, l'action lui étaient anti-
pathiques. Il eut aimé à voyager, s'il eût pu, couché sur un divan
et ne bougeant pas, voir les paysages, les ruines et les cités
passer devant lui comme une toile de panorama qui se déroule méca-
niqument .../ Les temples lui paraissaient toujours les mêmes,
les paysages toujours semblables, les mosquées toujours pareilles"(81).

Flaubert confesses such an attitude most explicitly to his mother:

"On se dérange pour voir des ruines et des arbres; mais entre la
ruine et l'arbre c'est tout autre chose que l'on rencontre; et de
tout cela, paysages et canailleries, résulte en vous une pitié
tranquille et indifférente, sérénité réveuse qui promène son regard
sans l'attacher sur rien (parce que tout vous est égal et qu'on se
sent aimer autant les bêtes que les hommes, et les galets de la mer
autant que les maisons des villes). Plaine de coucheurs de soleil,
de bruits de flots et de feuillages et de senteurs, de bois et de
troupeaux, avec des souvenirs de figures humaines dans toutes les
postures et les grimaces du monde, l'âme ressueillie sur elle-même
sourit silencieusement en sa digestion, comme une bayadère engourdie
d'opium."(82)
This illustrates absolutely that Flaubert's supposed fascination with the local colour and the whole "côté moral" of his journey is far from that of the probing, curious tourist. The very way in which customs and people are described suggests that they are grasped in the aesthetic attitude, or at least that attempted closer observation inevitably slips back into admiring, immobile contemplation:

"Je médite très peu, je rêvasse occasionnellement. Mon genre d'observation est surtout moral. Je n'avais jamais soupçonné ce côté au voyage. Le côté psychologique, humain, comique y est abondant. On rencontre des balles splendides, des existences gorge-pigeon très chatoyantes à l'œil, fort variées comme loques et broderies, riches de saletés, de déchirures et de galons. Et, au fond, toujours cette vieille canaillerie immuable et inébranlable. C'est là la base. Ah! comme il vous en passe sous les yeux!" (83)

Human beings, prostitutes and slaves are seized in exactly the same way as the desert and the camels (84), for it is the "immuable" and "inébranlable" qualities of "les mœurs arabes" that Flaubert prizes so highly, the very qualities which found the aesthetic potential of his ideal conception of "la Bêtise", of which Thompson of Sunderland's contribution is but one example:

"La bêtise est quelque chose d'inébranlable; rien ne l'attaque sans se briser contre elle. Elle est de la nature du granit, dure et résistante." (85)

It should now be more evident why some of the vital aesthetic declarations from the early days of writing Madame Bovary seem to me so directly traceable to the aesthetic experience of Egypt. The 1852 meditation on Apuleius' The Golden Ass, (Flaubert's aesthetic ideal is often best expressed where he tries to analyse his own literary admirations (86)), is exemplary in this respect:

"Il me donne à moi des vertiges et des éblouissements. La nature pour elle-même, le paysage, le côté purement pittoresque des choses sont traités là à la moderne et avec un souffle antique et chrétien tout ensemble qui passe au milieu. Ça sent l'encens et l'urine, la bestialité s'y marie au mysticisme. Nous sommes loin encore de cela, nous autres, comme faisandage moral, ce qui me fait croire que la littérature française est encore jeune. Musset aime la gaudriole. Eh bien! pas moi. Elle sent l'esprit (que je l'exécute en art!). Les chefs-d'œuvre sont bêtes; ils ont la mine tranquille comme les productions mêmes de la nature, comme les grands animaux et les montagnes. J'aime l'ordure, oui, et
quand elle est lyrique, comme dans Rabelais qui n'est point du tout un homme à gaudriole."(87)

The effect on Flaubert ("des vertiges et des éblouissements"), the whole effect of the Orient, is something he will aim to reproduce for his readers (so often referred to as spectators):

"Que l'on sente dans tous les atomes, à tous les aspects, une impassibilité cachée et infini. L'effet, pour le spectateur, doit être une espèce d'ébahiissement. Comment tout cela s'est-il fait? doit-on dire, et qu'on se sente écrasé sans savoir pourquoi."(88),

as is seen even more clearly in the very well-known declaration that the aim of art is to "faire rêver", that is to act in the same way as nature:

"Aussi les très belles œuvres ont ce caractère. Elles sont sereines d'aspect et incompréhensibles. Quant au procédé, elles sont immobiles comme des falaises, houleuses comme l'Océan, pleines de frondaisons, de verdure et de murmures comme des bois, triste comme le désert, bleues comme le ciel. Homère, Rabelais, Michel-Ange, Shakespeare, Gœthe m'apparaissent imitéoyables. Cela est sans fond, infini, multiple. Par de petites ouvertures on aperçoit des précipices; il y a du noir en bas, du vertige. Et cependant quelque chose de singulièrement doux plane sur l'ensemble! C'est l'éclat de la lumière, le sourire du soleil, et c'est calme! c'est calme! et c'est fort, ça a des fenons comme le bœuf de Leconte."(89)

From experiencing the Orient in an imaginary way Flaubert seems to pass naturally to the potential of the image to provoke a similar reaction, and to a new insistence on illusion as the aim of art. Indeed an early reference to illusion in Novembre suggests that the quality of the reaction to an illusion (as opposed to something real) was already amazed: "elle se rapprocha de moi avec étonnement et, me prenant par le bras, comme si j'étais une illusion qu'elle voulut saisir"(90). The many references to illusion in the Correspondance require some analysis of Flaubert's use of the concept. An excellent article by Christopher Prendergast argues from an understanding of illusion in the sense of a relative construct ("Il n'y a pas de Vrai! Il n'y a que des manières de voir"(91) and "Il n'y a de vrai que les 'rapports'"(92)), to an interpretation of the "book about nothing" which is completely in line with the Cerisy orientation discussed above, a work of writing which is never "concluded", with no "transcendental
signifié" (93) or fixed presence, only a "néant" beneath it. Though the article is powerfully argued, (and the discussion of the proposed Homais mirror scene is an impressive final "proof" (94)), I am nevertheless a little unhappy with the use of "illusion" here, in fact very different from Sartre's connection of image and "néant" discussed in the previous chapter, where a confrontation of Sartre's and Flaubert's respective descriptions of the artistic image revealed remarkable similarities. While Prendergast sees such illusion as totally undermining any idea of the novel as representation, I feel that it involves the more traditional incarnation of a plastic image which is clearly a representation without however being the reproduction of an already existing reality, which Flaubert tends to see as getting in his way. For example, he refuses to stop work on L'Education sentimentale to visit George Sand, so as to avoid the inevitable weeks of rêverie when he returns, in which "real" images would replace the carefully composed "images fictives" (95). For the benefit of his readers Flaubert refused to have his novels illustrated:

"Ce n'était guère la peine d'employer tant d'art à laisser tout dans le vague, pour qu'un pignouf vienne démolir mon rêve par sa précision, inerte."

"Une femme dessinée ressemble à une femme, voilà tout [...] tandis qu'une femme écrite fait rêver à mille femmes." (96)

The references to Salammbô are perhaps the most interesting in this connection, given the amount of research undertaken for it and the polemic which arose over the accuracy of the historical details (97), for Flaubert makes it perfectly plain that he was only intending to "fixer un mirage" which would not contradict the current "image" of Carthage (98):

"Dieu sait jusqu'à quel point je pousse le scrupule en fait de documents, livres, informations, voyages, etc. ... Eh bien, je regarde tout cela comme très secondaire et inférieur [...] Nous croyez-vous assez godiche pour être convaincu que j'ai fait dans Salammbô une vraie reproduction de Carthage, et dans Saint Antoine une peinture exacte d'Alexandrinisme? Ah! non! mais je suis sur d'avoir exprimé l'idéal qu'on en a aujourd'hui." (99)

"Quant à l'archéologie, elle sera probable!" (100)

"Je crois avoir fait quelque chose qui ressemble à Carthage" (101),
and one recalls Bouvard and Pécuchet's craze for Walter Scott's historical novels: "Sans connaître les modèles, ils trouvaient ces peintures ressemblantes, et l'illusion était complète" (102).

Documentation is only superficially concerned with historical or geographical accuracy. On the one hand Flaubert clearly enjoyed the "research for its own sake ("car lire et prendre des notes c'est de la débauche")", and as is well-known wanted a reproduction of the Saint Julien stained glass window in Rouen Cathedral to be placed after the text of the Légende, not as an illustration but as a historical document, so that the reader would wonder how he could have drawn his story from it (104). It is also true that despite his lack of interest in historical details as such, he was afraid of making himself vulnerable through silly mistakes, and felt a basic accuracy to be an aesthetic necessity, as we see from his attack on Les Misérables:

"L'observation est une qualité secondaire en littérature, mais il n'est pas permis de peindre si faussement la société quand on est le contemporain de Balzac et de Dickens." (106)

Moreover of the fifteen hundred books or eight inch high pile of notes which precede the actual writing of Bouvard et Pécuchet, Flaubert declares "Mais cette surabondance de documents m'a permis de n'être pas pédant; de cela, j'en suis sûr" (107), a paradoxical position already evident in "par combien d'études il faut passer pour se dégager des livres, et qu'il en faut lire!" (108). This must be recognized as an accurate description of his work method, which must have been a continuous sacrifice of previous effort.

In asserting that the chief aim of documentation is to reinforce the artistic illusion rather than the accuracy of the detail, Flaubert suggests that it is a secondary prop for a more essential work of the imagination:

"Voilà ce qui fait de l'observation artistique une chose bien différente de l'observation scientifique; elle doit surtout être
But in fact it seems likely that Flaubert, so good at derealizing his actual surroundings, had a relatively poor "imagination" in the traditional sense, and that in fact he badly needed these "secours étrangers" to be able to imagine at all:

"L'important avant tout est d'avoir des images nettes, de donner une illusion, or, pour y arriver, il faut une abondance de plans secondaires dans lesquels je m'embourbe."

It is when no written props exist, that Flaubert finds inventing a "realistic" story most tiresome, as when he is planning to put Emma in a ball, but has not been to one for so long that it will demand enormous efforts of his imagination. The Goncourts, with their ever acute understanding of Flaubert, perfectly appreciated the laborious and applied ingenuity of this work method which sought so paradoxically to build an illusion with plans and notes:

"Il veut faire une fée [Le Château des Coeurs] et avant de la faire, il lira toutes les fées faites jusqu'à lui. Le singulier procédé d'imagination."

Saint Antoine is described precisely as "De l'imagination faite avec des notes," and Salammô as

"une invention par vraisemblance, une déduction de toutes les couleurs locales des civilisations antiques et orientales, très ingénieuse et qui arrive par son profusion de tons et de parfums à être quelque chose d'entêtant."

The Goncourts end up suffering from an "étourdissement" almost certainly intended by Flaubert for Salammô at least, which he refers to variously as "un lourd roman" and "embêtante à crever." This deliberate "heaviness" is the essential quality for lulling the reader into the dazed state in which he will be most amenable to the claims of rêverie. Thibaudet's discussion of Salammô is particularly interesting for its appreciation of Flaubert's intentions in the novel.
He suggests that the misunderstanding with the public arose because of the contemporary conception of the historical novel, whereas Flaubert was not in the least trying to "passionner son lecteur" but to subject him to an aesthetic experience, (which we have seen involves "ébahissement", réverie and vague exaltation). He therefore chose an already opaque subject outside the mainstream of Western culture, Carthage, which even classical antiquity figures as

"un bloc isolé, un aérolithe étranger par sa civilisation à ce qui l'entoure, un type de cité singulier qui a disparu, semble-t-il, sans laisser quoi que ce soit dans le courant commun de la culture." (118)

Salammbô's essential opaqueness, which I shall reconsider at a later stage, is particularly evident in the use of the shifting viewpoint technique. It seems to me that it is the recourse to an exterior point of view which is most significant here, for I suspect that it is used to actually undermine empathy (119). For whereas an inner view of both warring parties is an almost clichéd way of involving the viewer of an "epic" film like Bridge over the River Kwai or Waterloo in both sides, in Salammbô, though this inevitably happens to a certain extent, the constant switches from following events with one side to suddenly sharing an external viewpoint (and even more obviously, a long shot upon them), tends to make all languages, races, customs and even the main characters opaque, and hence, in the Flaubertian terms now emerging, to increase their aesthetic impact.

Thibaudet offers Salammbô as a precise fulfilment of Flaubert's aim to write novels which would seem suspended in infinity by their own force, complete in themselves and quite independent of their actual producer, who as far as the reader is concerned, might well never have existed (120). This further reminder of Sartre's and Flaubert's twin descriptions of the artistic image as seeming to float in the air, almost in another dimension since entirely disconnected from the surrounding
reality, dominates my own approach to the now quite over-worked "book about nothing" quotation. This has meant many things to many critics, from the psychological orientation exemplified by a work like Duquette's Flaubert ou l'architecture du vide, where L'Éducation sentimentale is seen as the ultimate presentation of "un monde en creux", a "roman de la dépossession, de la déperdition des forces" (121), to the excellent explanations of Prendergast (as outlined above) (122) and of Jonathan Culler (as a "signifier without signified") (123). I would prefer to emphasize (perhaps unnecessarily but to situate the discussion that follows in the rest of the chapter), not so much the insignificance or rather ideal lack of subject matter (which, as should already be clear, I do find very important), but the fact that this ideal book (and Flaubert is at the time working on Madame Bovary, not Salammbo), was to be completely "sans attache extérieure" (124).
(ii) Constructing a representation.

In that the aesthetic significance of this production of a solid, heavy, opaque object, Thibaudet's "bloc isolé", has now been underlined, (its importance may be more fully grasped in my final chapter); the rest of this chapter will be largely concerned with the ways in which this severing from the exterior is achieved, and then with the implications of defining a novel as not referring to "anything" outside itself. But before passing to actual analysis on the level of formal organization, (the merits of such an approach will be evaluated at the end of this chapter but only ultimately through my final argument about values), the very attempt to discuss the construction of a formal object poses problems that might be briefly confronted at this stage, as background to their occasional later elucidation in connection with more specific analyses.

We have seen that Flaubert seeks to produce an aesthetic impact, of which rêverie is a vital component, in two ways: on the one hand by an emphasis on the material, non-signifying qualities of language itself in the sense of Sartre's special concept of style. It is here that the many quotations on the desired insignificance of the subject matter, on the sounds and rhythms of language which will cause the reader to swoon, the whole desire to write a book in which he would have only to write sentences, as to live one has only to breathe(125), find their place.

On the other hand we have seen that the extent to which Flaubert is caught up in trying to create a fairly traditional illusion of reality cannot be ignored. Indeed, even in a formal perspective, it would be regrettable to ignore it. For the effect of a solid object hanging in the air is achieved by the reading of the fiction as much as by the creation of a physical pyramid of blocks of language(126), in other
words the "illusion" has an aesthetic impact as well. I shall eventually show the ways in which Flaubert's "illusion" cannot be equated with what Ricardou calls "illusionisme": reducing the presence of the text by fascinating the reader with events(127). We have seen that Flaubert foregrounds his working of language (Ricardou's "fonction critique"(128) or Prendergast's "negativity"(129)), and in line with Ricardou's excellent analyses of Flaubertian description (in particular in showing up the way in which Flaubert deliberately emphasises the artificiality of the Madame Bovary wedding cake description(130)), we shall see that Flaubert seems always to foreground the conventionality of his means of representation.

Ricardou defines "architecture" and "écriture" as the two contradictory "rêvandeur" of literature, a struggle between the referential and literal illusions, between, in Ricardou's aphoristic formula, "the writing of an adventure" and the "adventure of a writing"(131). Whereas he describes the "Nouveau Roman" as falling within the latter tendency of the adventure of a writing, in which if fiction uses a vision of the world it is to obtain a universe obeying the specific laws of writing, wherein fictional psychologies and sociologies can only return us constantly to the functioning of the book(132), Flaubert is described as insisting methodically upon the opposition between the two tendencies(133).

The object described is inevitably unstable since the reader oscillates between two sorts of perception which cannot both be grasped at once. Yet if either is actually refused the reader will fall into one of the above illusions — either words hiding meanings or meanings hiding words. This is very like Barthes' analysis of myth where the "to-and-fro" between the two semiological systems which are hooked together is myth's chief resource since it is unavoidable(134). It also
recalls the oscillating movement between perception and imagination, support and analogon, described by Sartre and most obvious in the Maurice Chevalier impersonation(135). In both cases the point is that it is not quite possible to grasp both at once. Thus while the denoted fiction cannot help but retain something of the pseudo-innocence of Barthes' myths, (which seems to me to be potentially a vital insight into literary "realism", a point I shall take up again later(136)), Flaubert does his best not to hide what we might call the "myth-work", precisely by his insistence upon Ricardou's opposition.

In the wedding cake passage Ricardou demonstrates that a tension is set up between the referential tendency, the simultaneity of the different parts of the cake in the imagined reality, and the literal tendency, the unalterable successivity on the page of the parts of the written description of the cake, emphasized particularly by Flaubert's use of connecting adverbs of time "À la base, d'abord... puis... au second étage... et enfin, sur la plate-forme supérieure"(137). Whereas Homer would motivate the inevitable temporal dimension of a description(138) Flaubert actually underlines its written quality, and for Ricardou the theme of such a description is potentially its own functioning(139). Without being sure about going this far I find that his point is excellently made, and the wedding cake is certainly not an isolated instance of this method of description. Variations on the "d'abord... puis... ensuite" formula can be found for instance in the descriptions of Charles' hat(140), Mme Aubain's house(141) and Julien's château(142).

The conflict between inevitable successivity and implied simultaneity highlighted by these set-piece descriptions is an important literary problem and one of considerable relevance to Flaubert, who frequently discusses it in his Correspondance, desiring that prose should
form both "une grande ligne unie" and "la pyramide" (143). It would seem perhaps that through language and writing linear successivity emerges as the real dimension, while the simultaneous perception of a solid piece of architecture is paradoxically only an illusion. In a "nouveau roman" like L'Emploi du temps or La Jalousie puns and word associations perhaps direct the reader along the successive path of the signifier, while "mise en abyme" (144) is used to establish a simultaneous perception of the whole (145). Whether or not this "overall" perception can be maintained, (frequent use of mise en abyme certainly helps), is an interesting problem for Flaubert, which I shall try to resolve later when my discussion of repetition picks up the same point (146).

Certainly the metaphors of walls, cliffs, mountains and pyramids suggest that Flaubert did aspire to some sort of simultaneous perception. Roger Huss' chapter on "Flaubert's preoccupation with incoherence in his early work" (147), begins an interesting discussion of the ways in which Flaubert considers problems of form in terms both of "the continuous and logical development of the narrative through time, and of the total effect of the work of art when considered as a whole" (148). He is seen to have a more than merely pragmatic (149) desire for an inclusive, simultaneous apprehension of the separate moments of his work. This turns into an interesting consideration of the tension between plurality and unity, between detail and "ensemble", which regrettably he decides cannot be regarded "solely as an aesthetic problem" (150), turning to its moral and psychological relevance without really arriving at any aesthetic conclusions. However the problem is fortunately reconsidered (though again slightly in passing), in his excellent article on Flaubert's anomalous use of the imperfect tense, where

"The contemplative gaze evoked by the anomalous imperfect is thus a partial reflection of an impossible larger gaze with which Flaubert's ideal reader, drawing the successive pages together into a single astonished perception, would meet the novel itself." (151)
Flaubert's art is suggested to have little affinity with progressive forms developing in time, moving rather towards "a static aesthetic ideal, by definition impossible to realise in a narrative form, yet capable of modifying that form profoundly" (152). My own feeling at this stage would be not to play down the temporal perspective so vital to the desire of "just writing", but at the same time to wonder if the static ideal which reemerges when Flaubert talks about novels is necessarily so impossible to achieve, and later discussions of repetition and mise en abyme will suggest ways in which an illusion of simultaneity is perhaps perfectly possible, which precisely because an illusion, might not really be in contradiction with the linear path of writing (153).

Any discussion of the formal organization of the diegetic content of a novel must surely take account of Genette's 'Discours du récit' in Figures III. For though centred upon à la recherche du temps perdu, with its many references to other works and constant unearthing of new problems, it provides a vital framework for any study of narrative discourse, and the following section of my thesis is clearly indebted to it. A brief theoretical digression is therefore perhaps helpful (154).

The sphere of literary critical activity known broadly as "Poetics" stands approximately to literature as Saussurian linguistics to language, i.e. as "langue" to "parole". While Jonathan Culler organizes his discussion around the conventions and reading expectations involved in different literary genres, the more usual approach has been quite simply to try to establish the properties of literary discourse. Whereas linguistics proper stops at the sentence, poetics proposes to treat larger units of discourse, the method it proposes being more or less to treat these units quite simply as big sentences, and the poetics propounded by theorists like Genette and Todorov (155) is a sort of new rhetoric or general science of discourse (156). They therefore keep the old divisions of
classical rhetoric: elocutio or lexical choices, dispositio or syntax, and inventio or semantics. All three areas have been the object of structuralist research. While Genette's main interest lies in tropes and verbal aspect, Barthes' well-known contribution to the *Communications* special number on the analysis of narrative concentrates more on the second category, syntax, which deals with the logic of actions and plot on the "story" level (157). Barthes tends to play down discourse as such (the use of which term he restricts to "aspects, tenses and moods pertaining to narrative" (158)), since he is seeking a model of narrative which might be able to deal with popular literature, fairy tales, myths without authors and so on, where the level of discourse would be more or less missing or at least far from sophisticated. Indeed he eventually decides that a transcendentanl narrative model could only possibly be found for oral "récits" and proposes to restrict the use of the term "structural analysis" for these. Since the written narrative is no longer thought to be the "parole" of a narrative "langue", he proposes a new activity "textual analysis" (159). In trying to establish the forms or logical grammar of content Barthes already found himself dealing largely with the articulation of meaning, and with *S/Z* he shifts his attention openly to the third category of rhetoric, semantics. The problem of how a text makes meaning becomes a question of how the reader makes the text make meaning, or simply of how we read a text.

The elaboration of a new object of study, "le texte", can be seen in retrospect to have operated a major theoretical shift of semiological perspective - Barthes claims that in changing the level of perception of the object he changed the object itself (160). The escalation of work in the general area of textual semiotics, which tends to follow through the actual work of signification (rhetoric of the signifier, puns etc.), in a properly Freudian and Lacanian manner, rather than looking into the
more general properties of literary discourse or literature as a sign-system, has been so overwhelming that Genette's work, which perhaps stands somewhere between the two Barthean approaches, has I feel received far less attention than it deserves. Yet Genette, who never tried to set up an abstract model of the récit to account for all récits, has always been interested in sophisticated written texts, and in establishing a vocabulary and a degree of generalization in which to talk about them.

In poetics grammatical categories are more or less metaphorically transposed to a grammar of discourse, while fully retaining their original meanings. With verbal aspect the traditional grammatical support is particularly relevant. Taking any récit as a linguistic production assuming the relation of one or several events, verbal aspect deals largely with the relationship between the discourse and the fiction. Genette's work is important to my argument because it is at this point of intersection (of the "told" and the "telling") that Flaubert's "pushing away" of content and creation of an opaque object takes place, (i.e. in the sphere of representation), through various devices to be examined in due course. Genette defines three levels in the narrative discourse: the supposed events of the fiction, (histoire), the arrangement of these events into a récit, and the act of narration of the récit. He then proposes to formulate the various relations between these levels according to categories borrowed from the grammar of the verb, namely tense(161), mood and voice(162). The three main sections of 'Discours du récit' correspond to this division of aspects of the verb.

Tense is to do with temporal relations between the récit and the supposedly real events, between the telling time and the told time, and is subdivided into three sorts of temporal relationship: order, frequency and duration. In terms of his essay on Proust this is certainly Genette's
most exciting chapter, for it is here that he argues most convincingly (in a truly Ricardolian manner), that any abstract theory of time and memory serves a formal interest in the organization of time in the novel, that the experiences recounted (e.g. the "madeleine" incident), are actually allegories for the more essential involvement in metaphor and metonymy, (i.e. not the other way round). It is here that Genette challenges his critics to show how a "purely formal" interpretation of this kind constitutes any sort of impoverishment of the reading of Proust's novels (163). In that Genette's approach is often, I suspect, considered a little dull, I would offer my full support for his point here, finding that in my experience at least his approach opened up exciting and almost alarmingly vast horizons in the possibilities of reading À la recherche du temps perdu, which is my private justification for examining the potential of an equally "arid" approach to Flaubert's novels. Time and tense are obviously central to a study of Proust; for Flaubert the sub-division "frequency" turned out to be the most important, as will be seen later in the discussion of repetition which adopts some of Genette's working vocabulary (164).

In terms of excitement it is the second category, mood, that seems to me potentially vital to the study of Flaubert. Mood in literature is essentially concerned with the forms and degrees of narrative representation, with the degree of presence of the events evoked in the text. Littré defines the strictly grammatical meaning of mood as "the name given to the different forms of the verb used for different degrees of affirmation, and to express the different points of view from which the thing or action is considered" (165). Thus the conditional is used to convey unconfirmed information, the infinitive for ordering, the subjunctive for wishing and so on (166). A metaphorical transposition of the grammatical category of subjunctive mood, (even where not necessarily
expressed through actual use of a subjunctive form), will be essential to defining the way Flaubert handles the status of his representations, for it seems to me to embrace both the "point de vue esthétique" and the enigmatic ironic stance written into Flaubert's novels, two attitudes to events which will be shown to be ultimately related. Mood also takes in the degree of accuracy with which speech is reported, from maximum accuracy in direct speech to a minimum evocation of the words actually used in certain forms of indirect speech, such as Genette's imagined example: "J'informai ma mère de ma décision d'épouser Albertine" (167). Between these stands of course the "style indirect libre", well-known as an essential feature of Flaubert's writing (168), and precisely a way of building in an attitude to the speech or thoughts that are being reported. The final area covered by mood is point of view, the distance and perspective involved in the presentation of persons and events. Flaubert has often been studied from this angle (169), and I myself shall be applying some of Boris Uspensky's ideas from his outstanding study of the composition of the artistic text (170). But the surprising point to me is that "style indirect libre" and point of view are the only aspects of mood to have been systematically applied to Flaubertian texts, and in general, despite the Littré definition with its emphasis on the importance of attitude, both Todorov and Genette, (who quote it), only discuss distance and perspective, putting the reporting of speech into this category (171). In his 'Le travail de Flaubert' Genette does talk about the suspension of attitude implied by Flaubert's continual use of a sort of indirect discourse, which as will be seen seems to me absolutely right, but in offering mood as a theoretical framework in 'Discours du récit' he omits the question of attitude altogether, losing therefore its vital potential for accounting for the actual working of irony (172).
The last category, voice, examines the relationship between Genette's two levels, récit and narration, that is looks at the presence of the narration in the récit, at the degree and nature of the narrating presence. For instance the first-person narrator may be the main character in his own story (like Adolphe), a more or less discrete witness (Dr. Watson or the Edgar Allen Poe narrators on whom he is based), a person to whom events have been told, a person openly inventing events, and so on. This is obviously a vast theoretical area for literature in general, though in terms of the study of Proust it is the temporal relations between the moment of narration and the fiction which present the most fascinating problems, rather than the status of the narrator, and as such I find the general and the particular studies less well integrated in this part.

a) Voice

Although it seems to me that the traditional Flaubertian problems of impersonality and absence of narrator might be better organized by the category of mood rather than the perhaps more likely category of voice, it is nevertheless on the level of voice that Flaubert's first vital "severing from the exterior" might be seen to take place, through the use of deictics or shifters. Shifters have been discussed in a well-known article by Jakobson(173), but particularly clearly by Benveniste, for whom they are the signs of what he calls a "personal" rather than "apersonal" system of narration(174). Shifters are words depending directly on their context, potentially tautologous in that they relate back to message rather than to code. Thus perhaps the most interesting shifter, the first person pronoun je (and the corresponding tu), is defined as a characteristic sign of active discourse. Whereas a proper name
or the third person pronoun might refer to an objectively known entity, the sum of occasions on which je can be used does not constitute a class of reference. While the word tree implies a concept to which all uses of the word tree must relate, there is no concept "je" accounting for all uses of the word je, which signifies only the person using it, so can only be defined by the containing discourse. A series of adverbs of time and place, such as ici, maintenant, aujourd'hui, hier and demain rely similarly on the actual instance of discourse in which they are produced, for when a language wishes to refer to "objective" positions in time and space it adopts a different set of terms: je becomes il, ici becomes là, maintenant: alors and so on. Shifters are therefore a unique class of empty signs, filled only when assumed in active discourse, simply reflecting their own usage, and described by Benveniste as "indicateurs auto-referentiels"(175).

Flaubert's use of shifters is particularly striking in Madame Bovary, because the instances are both rare, (and therefore all the more noticeable), and crucially positioned. For example the peculiar first person of the opening sentence "Nous étions à l'étude quand le proviseur entra", has been accounted for in various ways, from the rather ridiculous belief that the "I" is Flaubert because he went to the Collège de Rouen himself, to bringing the reader into the atmosphere of the novel, to making Charles appear more of an outsider(176). But an external viewpoint on Charles could easily have been created in other ways. The narrator seems to be one of Charles' class-mates and after the recounting of the opening classroom scene and an initial description of Charles, he presumably reappears with "Il serait maintenant impossible à aucun de nous de se rien rappeler de lui"(177). Since someone then proceeds to precisely remember all that subsequently happens to Charles, the first narrator has to have disappeared. The generally elusive narration of Madame Bovary highlights this use
of shifters which may be aligned with other references to an actual present moment of discourse. "Depuis les événements que l'on va raconter, rien, en effet, n'a changé à Yonville" (178), stands in an obvious position near the beginning of the second part of the novel (with its present tense description of Yonville), and the novel ends with a switch in temporal perspective to tell us what has happened to various characters, ending with "Il vient de recevoir la croix d'honneur" (179). It is not possible to reduce the speaking subject of these shifters to one and the same subject, nor to connect the "maintenant" of "Il serait maintenant impossible à aucun de nous" with the present moment assumed by "Il vient de recevoir".

The almost cheeky foregrounding of these shifters seems to me important to the "sans attache extérieure" argument, making plain that the novel is a self-contained representation containing no reference to any exterior reality. For the oddities of first person and temporal reference are clearly subjective ones in Benveniste's linguistic sense (180), they are internal to the narration and cannot be clarified by the objective situation of writing—Flaubert the man and the actual dates at which the novel is begun or finished.

Jonathan Culler's discussion of the use of deixis in lyric poetry, (in Structuralist Poetics), is particularly relevant and helpful in this connection. The lyric "I" is clearly a shifter in the sense described above, and impersonality operates as a vital convention presenting no problem for the reader, whose complicity is a basic necessity for the construction of the poetic persona:

"even in poems which are ostensibly presented as personal statements made on particular occasions, the conventions of reading enable us to avoid considering that framework as a purely biographical matter and to construct a referential context in accordance with demands of coherence that the rest of the poem makes" (181).

It is generally only very unsophisticated readers of poetry who do not
grasp this essential point, while the novel, as a less obviously conventional form, has more often been thought to refer to an "objective" situation.

To understand Flaubertian impersonality as basically only an essential convention seems to me both obvious and a point in need of underlining.

Of course from different points of view many things are involved in his impersonality, the need to attain a state of calm to be able to write at all or to write well:

"Tu as écrit tout cela avec une passion personnelle qui t'a trouble la vue sur les conditions fondamentales de toute œuvre imaginaire. L'esthétique est absente." (182),

the hatred of judging that makes him refuse to include explicit moral comment, and which seems also to embrace a certain anxiety to forestall possible criticism of his own work by outsiders: "Pourquoi as-tu blâmé ces sinistres imbéciles, quand tu les représentes si blâmables? C'est naïf! tu leur permets de récrimer contre toi" (183), and the ambivalent psychological relationships to characters analysed by Roger Huss (184). But all such considerations remain exterior to the understanding of impersonality as a narrative mode. Sherrington defines Flaubert's impersonality as a method of presenting his subject matter in such a way that the reader cannot know if the views of the novel are his own or not (185). Thus the shifting viewpoint technique is introduced as a way of including moral criticism which will remain implicit. But Sherrington's standpoint in this explanation is similarly extraneous, for by "his subject matter" he means Flaubert's personal belief in "Bovarysme", the fundamental psychological fact that he believes Flaubert is trying to express in a manner consistent with his artistic dogma (186). This preconception about Flaubert's main theme and reason for writing leads him to mishandle his argument and to get caught up in contradictions, though Sherrington's study does have the merit of not assuming that impassibility dominates the content.
of his fictions. In other words an attitude to events is not precluded, but Sherrington is unable to get beyond Flaubert's personal attitudes to the sort of attitude which is in fact a narrative construct.

A more interesting new perspective on impersonality arises from S/Z and Barthes' definition of "le texte" as a long operation by which the author substitutes a "ça parle" for the more traditional "je parle" (187). This is applied to Flaubert in the article by Pierre Bergounioux, 'Flaubert et l'autre', where the 'autre' is the "otherness" of language. Impersonality is not to be understood as a means of increasing the artistic "illusion", (the analogy of God invisible in his world), but as submission to the voice of the other. Bergounioux speaks of

"pure juxtaposition de discours, cohabitation arbitraire et toujours fluctuante d'énoncés-énonciations désorlinés, sans autre liaison que leur commune présence dans l'espace du livre."(188)

This might work as a description of Bouvard et Pécuchet, of which Barthes suggests that the irony is such as to make it impossible to answer the question "Qui parle?"(189), but is here strangely applied to the "Comices agricoles" juxtaposition of dialogues in Madame Bovary, which seems to me a singularly unmodern passage, not actually meriting the nevertheless interesting claim:

"La voix de l'autre s'énonce dans son indécidable plénitude, et dans l'effacement du scripteur qui à aucun moment ne prend en charge la vulgarité, la vanité ou plus largement la 'naïveté' du texte qu'il met en scène."(190)

Jonathan Culler's attempt to sort out the problem of poems which block the construction of a coherent enunciative act is again helpful if not conclusive. Thus he disputes Julia Kristeva's claim that poetic language involves a constant passage from subject to non-subject, that

"in this other space where the logic of speech is unsettled, the subject is dissolved and in place of the sign is instituted the collision of signifiers cancelling one another."(191)

Culler insists that it is only the empirical individual speaker who is
dissolved or rather displaced into a different and impersonal mode, that
while the poetic persona is a construct, a function of the language of
the poem, it nonetheless fulfills the unifying rôle of the individual
subject, and that "even poems which make it difficult to construct a poetic
persona rely for their effects on the fact that the reader will try to
construct an enunciative posture"(192), thereby underlining Henri
Meschonnic's critique of Kristeva, that it is more fruitful to stress the
impersonality of writing and the meaning that is produced by the attempt
to construct a fictional persona than it is to speak of the disappearance
of the subject(193).

In fact I tend to find Barthes' solution to the problem of tonal
instability and voices which refuse to belong to anyone the most satis-
factory. Of the phrase in Sarrasine, "c'était la femme avec ses peurs
soudaines" he wonders if it should be attributed to the narrator, the
author, Balzac the man, the common wisdom of the bourgeoisie, and concludes
that it is the "croisement" of all these origins which produces "écriture"
(194). (The same point, could, incidentally, be made of Flaubert's occas-
ional generalisations, for example the first person "chaudron fâlé"
intervention on language in Madame Bovary(195) — in our perspective of
deixis these form no problem and there can be no question of having
"caught Flaubert out" here breaking his rule of "no personal reflexions").

But in Barthes' 'La Voix du texte' section already mentioned in the last
chapter(196), the analysis of the phrase "comme frappée de terreur" reveals
that the modalisation "comme" can only work in the interests of the reader,
such that the atonal voice of the text can be equated with the voice of
the reader(197). This seems to me an essential insight, removing the
need to construct a unified fictional persona, and Sollers' definition(198)
of "le texte" as a two-way reversible circuit between writing and reading
cannot be restricted to the modern novel. In the case of Flaubert it means
in particular that it is the reader who operates, (not sees as Flaubert's own), the various attitudes to the fiction built into the text itself.

It should be clear from the foregoing discussion that Flaubert's use of a conventional impersonality is at the basis of my understanding of his work as a personal system of narration in Benveniste's sense (199). This point cannot be overemphasized, for the opposite view is perhaps the received understanding of Flaubert's impersonality, (stemming I assume from Auerbach and Maupassant (200)), that Flaubert's powers of expression are so amazing that his stories "just tell themselves", that quite literally, (i.e. not at all in Barthes' sense of an indefinable voice), no one speaks (201). This of course is Benveniste's definition of an impersonal narration or of récit as opposed to discourse, but though his distinction introduces broadly helpful categories for the classification of literary texts, (through use of past historic, frequency of shifters etc.), Genette's critique of this distinction, in his article 'Frontières du récit', is surely indisputable. As he shows, a pure récit, devoid of any elements of discourse, is in practice a virtual impossibility:

"La moindre observation générale, le moindre adjectif un peu plus que descriptif, la plus discrète comparaison, le plus modeste peut-être, la plus inoffensive des articulations logiques introduisant dans sa trame un type de parole qui lui est étranger, et comme réfractaire" (202).

Indeed, convincing examples of literary récits according to Benveniste's definition have yet to be suggested; in fact the usual one, L'Étranger, (on account of its arid, "unloaded" style), is particularly bad, given the flurry of shifters of its opening "Aujourd'hui maman est morte. Ou peut-être hier, je ne sais pas", with the ambiguous telegram which cannot provide clarification offered almost "en abyme" as an indication of the lack of "objective" orientation (203).

Even Flaubert's most serene works (e.g. Un Cœur simple), are always discourse - on the plane of representation with their constant inbuilt
attitude to what is related, and on the plane of "writing" because of
the constant foregrounding of the work of the language, as in the delib-
erately clumsy comparisons discussed by Bersani(204). Genette suggests
that the current obsession with an extreme form of discourse, (of which
the "Nouveau Roman"'s playing with shifters, e.g. the opening of Dans le
labyrinthe: "Je suis ici maintenant", is a good example), is literature's
attempt to rid itself altogether of the 'spectre of"representation", through
its attack on the "naturalness" of the récit(205). Though Flaubert does
not reach the tautologous extreme of Barthes' supposed postcard from an
comme utopie' in Roland Barthes par Roland Barthes(206), the ridiculous-
ness of which lies in its briefness and the resulting lack of an explan-
atory support in the message itself, it seems to me that he does probably
use shifters deliberately, but less to undermine representation than to
make very evident the fact that his novels are self-contained systems of
meaning, to emphasise yet again the essential break between art and life.

b) Mood and irony

My emphasis on an inbuilt internal attitude to events, quite consist-
et with "conventional impersonality" and operated by the reader in his
capacity as "voice of the text", takes us from the category of voice to
that of mood, and inevitably raises the question of irony. Of course
irony is a difficult concept with a vast literature, not reducible to
simple definitions(207). Even restricting ourselves to "Flaubert's use
of irony" we could be carried off in all sorts of directions, so rather
than attempting any exhaustive coverage of its various uses I am restrict-
ing my discussion to a particular and simplified notion, but one that has
seemed to me helpful in explaining the general functioning of attitude in
the Flaubertian text.
Most discussions of irony might be subtitled "with constant reference to Kierkegaard" and inevitably I have found much of what Kierkegaard says extraordinarily relevant to Flaubert. It is also clear that he is close to Sartre's imaginary attitude with the "infinite absolute negativity" which he defines as the standpoint of Socrates: negative because it only negates, infinite because it negates not this or that phenomenon but the whole of actuality, absolute because it negates by virtue of a higher which is not(208). Like Sartre's "néant", irony is equated with sheer possibility, but this subjective freedom is only worth having if the subject returns to actuality and a larger context to valorise it in a responsible way(209).

Jonathan Culler's discussion of Flaubert's irony(210) in one way follows Kierkegaard right through to this culminating "irony as a mastered moment"(211), in that he sees Flaubert's "corrosive irony" as destroying in the name of something. For irony is used as the turning point of his "uses of uncertainty" argument, where it is seen as one of many mechanisms used to block the normal, easy ways of reading and understanding a novel, of setting up an empty space or uncertain area, (Kierkegaard's irony used to suck out apparent content and leave only an emptiness), of which the reader can only make sense by passing to the formal organizing category which he calls"the sacred", the only possible ordering where meanings are arbitrary but guaranteed, where understanding is secure because fully self-conscious. This irony only undercuts the easy construction of meaning, by producing an absence which the reader "essays to fill up", it ultimately promotes a more correct interpretation.

His analysis of Un Cœur simple, for example, sees Félicité as a "perfectly feudal serf"(212) who does not herself succeed in organizing and interpreting her experience, the victim of all Flaubert's ironies, yet he suggests that the closing line of the story can only be seen as
transcending irony if we suggest an order making the identification of
the parrot and the Holy Ghost "worthy and appropriate" (213). The reader
is left with an incomplete structure which he must fill to feel satisfied,
he therefore allows the arbitrary connection of parrot and Holy Ghost so
that the potentially "sentimental" can become "sacred". Thus a positive
value emerges from an irony which tests itself; natural organizations of
experience (Félicité's, Salammbo's) are subjected to the "crucible of irony"
(214), because emptied of content the sentimental passes over into the
more acceptable sacred.

The exchange of clichés during the final meeting of Frédéric and
Mme Arnoux is allowed a "sacramental purity" because they have succeeded
in severing these clichés from experience (where they would be sullied),
because they are seen by Culler as a quite arbitrary conferral of meaning
on the past, a purified fiction despite life, and so on. As such, the poor
quality of their relationship, which was originally seen as a mechanism
for foiling the reader, (his "weak vessels" section), is now saved by
the deliberate falseness of their memories, a "fundamentally allegorical
procedure" (215).

In general it seems to me that Culler is misled by his keenness
on reintroducing allegory into critical readings, (since allegory is an
arbitrary form stressing the separateness of levels, a respectable
structuralist position from which to attack apparently "natural" forms
and the "symbolic" approach which tends to underline fusion and unity (216),
and as a result occasionally forces his reading of Flaubert into a precon-
ceived and slightly inappropriate mould. This general destruction of
natural links to replace them with arbitrary links which are however the
same ones, (e.g. Félicité's association of the parrot and the Holy Ghost),
strikes me as a peculiarly artificial argument - one would prefer him to
be a little less arbitrary himself and to question his original readings,
especially that of Kme Arnoux(217). Explaining Flaubert's irony by almost didactic motives also seems to me singularly suspect, as does any suggestion that Flaubert would have approved a move towards a "fully self-conscious understanding" and the reader's resulting awareness of man as "homo significans"(218).

But curiously I find myself near to agreement with the way Jonathan Culler and Veronica Forrest-Thomson equate the irony of the endings of Un Cœur simple and Salammbô with a formal distancing technique(219). It seems to me to have exactly this function, but in terms of my "sans attache extérieure" emphasis. Such irony does not destroy meaning, and sucks it out only in the sense of suspending content, of pushing content away from the reader and from the real world of evaluations. In other words my own understanding of Flaubert's irony is something resembling Culler's concept of the sacred, but missing out the intermediary step of the assassination of the sentimental in what he calls the crucible of irony.

Kierkegaard suggests that with a mere twist of the wrist irony can turn history into "myth, poetry, sâra, fairy-tale"(220). This seems to me exactly right. The closing sentences of Salammbô, Un Cœur simple and La Légende de Saint Julien l'Hospitalier:

"Ainsi mourut la fille d'Hamilcar pour avoir touché au manteau de Tanit"(221)

"elle crut voir, dans les cieux entr'ouverts, un perroquet gigantesque, planant au-dessus de sa tête"(222)

"Et voilà l'histoire de saint Julien l'Hospitalier, telle à peu près qu'on la trouve, sur un vitrail d'église, dans mon pays"(223)

and even the "C'est là ce que nous avons eu de meilleur!" of L'Éducation sentimentale(224), though naïve summaries, allow the fictions thus sealed off to accede precisely to the status of a naïve legend or opaque myth. I would entirely disagree that the "elle crut voir" of the last line of Un Cœur simple contains "the appropriate scepticism"(225), it seems to
me that Flaubert uses "crut" rather than the more likely "croyait" (226) to underline the function of this tailpiece as a signing-off, a mark of the ending, whereby the reader passes out of the atmosphere of Félicité's world into another dimension in which one might expect to evaluate that experience, yet having made the move such evaluation becomes inappropriate, the reader is left quite simply gazing at a story unconnected with real life. In other words the function of such irony is officially to designate such evaluations as irrelevant, to found the story as literature (227). We might suggest that such irony is self-conscious in that it involves the story taking the aesthetic attitude to itself.

This is what I assume Kierkegaard to mean by the theoretical or contemplative aspect of irony, in a passage extremely relevant to Flaubert:

"Were we to consider irony an inferior moment, we might allow it to be a sharp eye for what is crooked, wry, distorted, for what is erroneous, the vain in existence. In conceiving this it might seem that irony were identical with ridicule, satire, persiflage, etc. Naturally, it has an affinity with this insofar as it, too, perceives what is vain, but it differs in setting forth its observation. It does not destroy vanity, it is not what punitive justice is in relation to vice, nor does it have the power of reconciliation within itself as does the comic. On the contrary, it reinforces vanity in its vanity and renders madness more mad. This is what might be called irony's attempt to mediate the discrete moments, not in a higher unity but in a higher madness." (228)

Applied to Flaubert this apt description of irony solves in particular the problem of his attitude to "bêtise" and clichés which was raised in the first chapter. The irony is not analytic, does not break down what it directs its gaze at (229), but by the intensity of that gaze increases the intensity of the "madness". Consider the joyful and "hurlant" meditation on Plouharnel's hat in Par les Champs et par les Grèves, which is surely the prototype for Flaubert's "setting forth of the observation" of irony in his major novels:

"Qu'était-ce par devant? qui donc? le chapeau. Quel chapeau! un vaste et immense chapeau qui dépassait les épaules de son porteur et qui était en osier, quel osier! du bronze plutôt, planisphere dur et compact fait pour résister à la grêle, que la pluie ne
traversait point, que le temps ne devait que durcir et fortifier. L'homme qu'il recouvrait disparaissait dessous et avait l'air d'y être entré jusqu'au milieu du corps, et il le portait cependant (je l'ai vu tourner la tête). Quelle constitution! quel tempérament il avait donc! Quelles muscles cervicaux! Quelle force dans les vertèbres! Mais aussi quelle ampleur! quel cercle, ce chapeau! Il projette une ombre tout à l'entour de lui, et son maître ne doit jamais jouir du soleil. Ah! quel chapeau! C'est un couvercle de chaudière à vapeur surmonté d'une colonne, ça ferait un four en y pratiquant des meurtrières! Il y a des choses inébranlables: le simplon et l'impudence des critiques, des choses solides: l'arc de l'Étoile et le français de Labryère, des choses lourdes: le plomb, le-bouilli et M.Nisard, des choses grandes: le nez de mon frère, l'Hâmlet de Shakespeare et la tabatière de Bouilhet, mais je n'ai rien vu d'aussi solide, d'aussi inébranlable, d'aussi grand et d'aussi lourd que ce chapeau de Plouharnel. Et il avait une couverture en toile cirée!

The familiar one sentence paragraph with which it ends summarizing, increasing and somehow suspending the intensity of the effect of stupidity in the reader's gaze.

Flaubert's frequent use of the exclamation mark is essential to his "setting forth", and Crouzet's excellent article on the "epic style" of Madame Bovary defines it as the chief mechanism of a double admiration, a fusion of an inner and outer viewpoint similar to that of the "style indirect libre", ("Mais ce qui attire le plus les yeux, c'est, en face de l'auberge du Lion d'or, la pharmacie de M.Homais!"), of the extreme points of imbecility and esté, an epic admiration paralleling satiric verve, a use of hyperbole somehow fixing the idea of Bêtise. The stupidity is fixed, I would suggest, because the exclamation marks are actually worked by the reader; though they are often attributable to the viewpoint of a particular character, local community etc., the astonishment and delight are offered to the reader in all their opaque solidity, for example in Bouvard et Pécuchet:

"Quelle joie, le lendemain en se réveillant!" (234)

"Mais le plus beau, c'était, dans l'embrasure de la fenêtre, une statue de saint Pierre!" (235)

In Mythologies, Barthes offers a semiological analysis of Bouvard et Pécuchet as a self-conscious "myth of a myth" (in his sense).
which defines the final sense of the novel as "naïveté regardée" (237).

This very apt description of the effect of Flaubertian irony which I have been trying to suggest, is arrived at in the following way. The first semiological system (as in any literature) is simply language (signifier: the words on the page, signified: the meaning of the words). This empty form, (their discourse), becomes the signifier of the first myth, (signified: their behaviour), of which the signification is what Barthes calls their "bouvard-et-pécuchéité"; (their special ideology, the relationship between their rhetoric and their panicking alternation of apprenticeships). But Flaubert turns this into the signifier of a third hooked-on semiological system, thus producing a second myth by his "regard" on the "bouvard-et-pécuchéité" they had constructed for themselves.

Barthes describes the form of this second myth as the subjunctive order, which seems precisely the modal effect: Bouvard et Pécuchet founds its own fiction as naïve myth by introducing a simple look upon itself.

Though Barthes never uses the word irony here it seems to me that what he has provided is a semiological definition of the working of irony which is exactly what is needed to orientate the many attempts at defining Flaubert's irony. (For example the Cerisy colloquium papers often circle around the idea of irony, with frequent reference to "style indirect libre" and italics as signs of intertextuality, and Claudine Gothot-Mersch sums up the proceedings with a call for more work on irony (238)). The instant prestige of Barthes seems to be so great that many critics have followed his specific reference to Flaubert's irony in S/Z, (the impossibility of answering the question "Qui parle?" (239)), and have thereby overlooked what I consider the far more essential insight of Mythologies, now some twenty years old.

The simple idea of "naïveté regardée" is an exciting perspective in which to look at all of Flaubert's novels, not just through "style
indirect libre" and all the formal marks of irony like exclamation marks and italics, which operate on a local level, but especially through an analysis of the all-inclusive gaze and attitude to the text operated by closing lines and especially titles and subtitles, for example the clichés of the titles of *Un Coeur simple*, *Mémoires d'un Fou* (240), and *L'Éducation sentimentale*, and the innocence of subtitles like "Mœurs de Province" and "Histoire d'un jeune homme" (241). Space will not permit me to undertake a study involving a high degree of detail here, and I would hope to develop these ideas elsewhere. My concern here is only to highlight this essential aspect of mood.

In suggesting that such irony increases the power of the naïve illusion, I could not of course agree with Jonathan Culler that irony is used to undermine representation. In fact the idea of the first mythological system (the fiction) founded as myth (as literature) by the subjunctive order, must have interesting implications for the theory of literary realism, indeed Barthes' analysis of *Bouvard et Pécuchet* is orientated towards showing that the merit of the second artificial myth is to give the problem of realism a "frankly semiological solution" (242). While an ideological approach might emphasize Bouvard and Pécuchet as representatives of a certain bourgeoisie in conflict with other layers of the bourgeoisie, the semiological approach will show up the method of realism. Barthes discusses "realism" in *S/Z* as a sort of ruse depending upon the same "to-and-fro" idea of his analysis of the pseudo-innocence of myths (243). His suggestion that denotation, ("vieille déité vigilante, rusée, théâtrale"), is not actually the first "sens", is essential (244). Suggesting that the existence of two reputedly different systems (denotation and connotation) allows the text to function as a game, "chaque système renvoyant à l'autre selon les besoins d'une certaine illusion" (245), the innocence of the classical text is exposed as a sophisticated
trick, denotation is described not as the first literal meaning which it pretends to be, but really as the last of connotations, that which both founds and closes our reading (246).

c) Framing

Boris Uspensky's *A Poetics of Composition* studies the formal devices of composition in literature and the pictorial arts, seeking common structural principles of internal organization of the artistic text. With its emphasis upon point of view it might anyway prove useful to the consideration of the literary category of mood, while its general discussion of the organization of representation is very helpful to our perspective on Flaubert's realism, (though Uspensky's own literary examples are all taken from the nineteenth century Russian novel).

Uspensky suggests that it is possible to compare the compositional devices of the literary work and the work of representational art because both seem to possess the features of a closed system (247), each work presenting a unique microworld organized according to its own laws and characterized by its own spatial and temporal structure, its own ideological system and standards of behaviour (248). He therefore pays particular attention to the problem of the frame or borders of the artistic work, which he sees essentially as marking off the transition from reality to the world of the representation with its special semantic significance. Traditional theatre, for example, is an obvious example of the importance of framing; there the representation is marked off by stage devices such as the curtain and footlights (249). While deliberate attempts to violate this line of demarcation might be understood as attempts to bring together the represented world and the real world, an emphasized frame clearly aims at the deliberate separation of art and life. Accordingly Uspensky
suggests that while it is appropriate to the artistic image that it should possess the ultimate degree of "incarnation, concreteness and living truth", the wise artist probably spends his greatest effort to keep his images from "slipping from their pedestals of aesthetic isolation and mixing with life, like elements which are homogeneous with it" (250), quoting E. Florenskii in support:

"The representations which extend beyond the frame, the naturalistic paintings so real that you are almost tempted to reach into them, the onomatopoeic imitations of sounds in music, factuality in poetry - generally speaking every substitution of art by a copy of life is an offence both against art and life." (251)

It is in this sense that I feel that Jonathan Culler actually destroys his own "arbitrary" argument with his final claim for the relevance of art to life, (Flaubert's novels revealing man as "homo significans" etc.). It is interesting to note Barthes' claim in Le Plaisir du texte that any semiotic which keeps desire enclosed is a semiotic of representation, that representation can actually be defined in these terms: "when nothing jumps out of the frame, the picture, the book, the screen" (252). This underlines once again the way in which Flaubert's desire to create an illusion of reality which would be "sans attache extérieure" puts him in the representational camp.

Uspensky's classification of the various framing devices typically found at the beginning or end of narratives is constantly relevant to the techniques actually employed by Flaubert. In accordance with the painting analogy the position of the reader is essential; just as pictorial perspective is organized by viewing position, the problem of the literary frame is allied to transitions between "internal" and "external" points of view.

"If a painting is structured from the point of view of an outside observer, as though it were a 'view from a window', then the frame functions essentially to designate the boundaries of the representation. In this instance the artist's position concurs with that of the spectator. However, if the painting is structured from the point
of view of an observer located within the represented space, then
the function of the frame is to designate the transition from an
external point of view to an internal point of view, and vice
versa."(253)

The shift from external to internal point of view is obviously a reading
convention which might pass almost unnoticed. Our first perception of
the "special world" of a work of literature is that of an alien spectator,
and necessarily external. But as we become accustomed to its standards we
begin to perceive it from within, assuming an internal viewpoint until
faced with the necessity of shifting out of it at the end, back to a
world external to the representation.

Traditional opening and closing formulae are perhaps most marked
in forms of narrative with the least pretension to being a "slice of life", the "Once upon a time" and "they lived happily ever after" of fairy tales
for example. Flaubert's rather evident insistence upon framing devices
would thus appear as yet another instance of the "respectable" modern
position I am trying to establish for him: a self-conscious foregrounding
of his means of representation. The discussion of his use of shifters is
particularly relevant here. Uspensky discusses the frequent use (especially
in folk-tales) of a first person narrator who either quickly disappears
at the beginning of the story or is suddenly introduced at the end, who
could not possibly have participated in the action described, and often
does not even have a conventional function in the story(254). He simply
provides a frame(255). The unexpected introduction of a first person
narrator at the end of Saint Julien is the most striking instance of this
in Flaubert. In connection with this story, Uspensky's mention of the
frequent incidence of a miracle as a typical beginning of a Russian
"bylina" is interesting, for he suggests that it has a compositional
function. Within the fantastic world of the bylina the miracle would
not be a surprising event but an ordinary one; the unusual quality can
therefore only be conceived from a point of view external to the
narration(256). The supernatural visitations so near the beginning of Saint Julien might possibly have a different function from that of the stag's prediction, for by this time the reader is established inside the atmosphere of the story. But it is the closing apotheosis of the leper into Jesus that is most relevantly highlighted by this observation, in line with Loulou's apotheosis and the strange death of Salammû. For an understanding of the compositional function of these closing events repeats our conclusion about them in the perspective of irony— they represent a transition to (and sealing off with) a fixed external perspective.

In Salammû the framing of the story is emphasized by the use of "long-shots" on events. On the micro-level individual chapters frequently open or close with long shots(257). It is also interesting that Salammû is the only novel to be given chapter titles, which operate compositionally and ironically as a frame in the same way as overall titles and subtitles, (the fact that Barthes refers to chapter titles as "résumés dénominatifs" (258) reiterating the earlier point). The frequent temporal framing of stories perhaps follows the same principle as the broad horizon or bird's eye view. The use of temporal shifters in Madame Bovary would be significant(259), and the opening line of Un Cœur simple, "Pendant un demi-siècle, les bourgeoises de Pont l'Évêque envirèrent à Mme Aubain sa servante Félicité"(260), is an excellent example for Uspensky's discussion of narratives which begin with hints of the "dénouement" of the plot which has not yet begun, thus indicating a point of view external to the story, that is located in the future with respect to the time which unfolds within the narrative(261). The narration then adopts a broadly internal position, following Félicité and assuming her limited knowledge about what is to come, so that the reader forgets about the predetermined course of events in the story, despite allusions already made to it.
a slightly different perspective I suppose this same point would be relevant to the opening predictions of Saint Julien and their function in the temporal organization of the story(262), though the title's announcement that we are about to read a saint's story fulfils this function more obviously.

But the clearest example of all of a temporal shift used as a frame must be L'Éducation sentimentale, where there is actually a whole series of frames. The title itself, the subtitle, and the closing "C'est là ce que nous avons eu de meilleur" have already been discussed as typical ironic summaries, and the repetition of the closing line in particular marks the end of the text. This reference to an incident not only first discussed at the beginning of the novel, but actually taking place before the novel even started, obviously tends to put the whole novel in brackets (263). But I feel that the opening and closing pairs of chapters, where the last two so clearly repeat the first two, (meeting with Mme Arnoux, discussion with Deslauriers), operate as brackets themselves for the story contained between them. The huge temporal gap before the penultimate chapter is well known as Proust's "blanc" (264), and is followed by a striking shifter preceding the final chapter: "Vers le commencement de cet hiver" (265). It is however echoed by a lesser but still noticeable gap in the narrative between the first two chapters of the novel (a more or less continuous account of one day) and Frédéric's official "arrival" in Paris. Rather like the "absurd" plays which the audience only knows have ended, because "they go back to the beginning" (266), the repetition evident in the final two chapters tends to underline the cessation of time that Uspensky sees as a typical function of the frame, (as for example where the death of the hero, usually the main vehicle of authorial point of view, necessitates a final shift to an external position (267)).

An acceleration (or condensation) of time relating to the broadened
temporal span of the ending of narrative is a characteristic sign of the
epilogue of a story - the synchronization of the time scale of a particular character with an all-embracing temporal point of view is a compositional commonplace of which the endings of *Madame Bovary* and *L'Éducation sentimentale* are examples.

When we follow up Uspensky's suggestion that the principle of framing by a shift in point of view may apply to parts of the work as well, with frames formed on all four of the levels of narrative defined - ideological, phraseological, spatial-temporal and psychological - the possibilities of application to Flaubert's work escalate to unmanageable proportions:

"Thus, the whole narrative can be sequentially divided into an aggregate of smaller and smaller microtexts, each framed by the alternation of external and internal authorial positions [ ... ] When either space or time is defined in this way [as a series of separate and discrete scenes, each of which is presented from the point of view of a synchronic observer, and characterized by its own special microtime] the frame is found at the seams of these separate pieces, marking the transition between them." (268)

This obsessive framing on an ever more minute level is a bit like the "tree of description" with which Ricardou accounts for Flaubert's "goût immodéré pour les petites choses":

"En fait, les minuties descriptives découlent, non pas d'une manière de voir, mais d'une façon d'écrire. Elles proviennent de la pratique descriptive, en laquelle l'écrivain subit une tentative permanente: celle de toujours descendre jusqu'aux microscopies, l'arbre logique de la description [ ... ] au niveau de la ligne descriptive, il n'y a jamais d'objets secondaires: la description porte tout au premier plan. Quel que soit l'objet secondaire interne qui survienne, cet élément bénéfice, au moment de sa venue, du plein feu de l'attention et devient à son tour objet principal digne de recevoir tout l'intérêt descriptif. La description est ainsi une machine à enfreindre les hiérarchies convenues. Faire intervenir tel élément de l'ensemble à décrire, c'est s'ouvrir au vertige de la description infinie: celle de ses éléments, puis innombrablement, des éléments de ses éléments." (269)

Thus Flaubert will even change the viewpoint within a sentence, for example where he describes Léon's isolated visit to Yonville in the hope of seeing Emma through his point of view, but then slips into a
sudden switch: "Il la vit seule, le soir, très tard, derrière le jardin, dans la ruelle; - dans la ruelle, comme avec l'autre!" (270), for Léon has no knowledge of this "autre" (271).

Analysis becomes even more complicated when microdescriptions on different planes overlap one another, a traditional ironic device, as Uspensky notes (272). His suggestion that shifts between inner and outer viewpoint on the psychological, spatial and phraseological planes be compared with the movement of the narrator's sympathy towards or away from his characters would naturally be fruitful for the study of Emma (273), and the potential of such discussions is so vast that they will not be properly considered here. However I would suggest that whereas the spatial and phraseological shifts have now received considerable critical attention (274), (and to some extent in their interactions with the plane of ideology (275)), the area of temporal shifts, for example on the detailed level of alternation between past historic and imperfect tense usage, might well be further explored. Flaubert's anomalous use of the imperfect tense, to which Roger Huss pays such interesting attention (276), would be seen by Uspensky as essentially a shift from a retrospective to a synchronic viewpoint, an invitation to the reader to perceive events from within. As such I suppose it need not necessarily alter the status of the action described, though it does inevitably have the effect of immobilising it, and as Roger Huss' analysis of the description of Nâtho running along the uplifted shields implies, (by its reference to the iconographical sea-god), what Uspensky would call a frame, (the switch in temporal viewpoint), quite literally produces a picture (277).

Flaubert's tendency to describe in the form of a series of tableaux has often been noted (278), and rather than getting lost in the virtually continuous succession of frames in the sense of constant shifts in viewpoint (279), I should prefer to emphasize the startling incidence of
explicit and often literal frames. The pictures of Whistler are a good example of paintings which often contain a framed painting as part of the representation, and seventeenth century Dutch interior paintings are full of pictures, framed maps and mirrors, doorways and window frames(280). The characteristic pose of Emma by a window, which has often been noted and given a symbolic or psychological interpretation(281), might equally be seen as an example of literal framing:

"Elle se mettait à la fenêtre pour le voir partir; et elle restait accueillie sur le bord, entre deux pots de géraniums, vêtue de son peignoir, qui était lâche autour d'elle."(282)

On closer examination it can be seen that a considerable number of descriptions, especially but by no means only of Emma, are given a pictorial-type frame, often by a doorway, as in the first view of her:

"Une jeune femme, en robe de mérinos bleu garnie de trois volants, vint sur le seuil de la maison"(283)

or, habitually, as Charles' visits near their end: "Elle était sur le seuil"(284), and watching over her dead body Charles remembers her "sur le seuil de leur maison"(285). Often she is set in relief by what surrounds her, "Entre la fenêtre et le foyer, Emma cousait"(286), or walking with Rodolphe at the Comices agricoles:

"Son profil était si calme, que l'on n'y devinait rien. Il se détachait en pleine lumière, dans l'oeuvre de sa capote qui avait des rubans pâles."(287)

It is interesting that Flaubert only once attempts to motivate his quite excessive use of window frames ("elle s'y mettait souvent: la fenêtre, en province, remplace les théâtres et la promenade"(288)); important framings occur around Léon's departure from Yonville(289), the first view of Rodolphe(290), Emma's view of the Comices agricoles from the town hall (291), and an ironic glimpse of Emma's child seen through the window, (blowing her mother a kiss), as Emma rides off to the forest with Rodolphe(292). The set-piece view of Rouen is actually described as having
"l'air immobile comme une peinture", its framing further emphasized by the fact that Emma views it through the carriage window(293).

My habitual recourse to S/Z will not be apologised for here, for Barthes' "modèle de la peinture" perfectly illuminates this obsessive technique:

"Toute description littéraire est une vue. On dirait que l'énonciateur, avant de décrire, se poste à la fenêtre, non tellement pour bien voir, mais pour fonder ce qu'il voit par son cadre même, l'embrasure fait le spectacle. Décrire, c'est donc placer le cadre vide que l'auteur réaliste transporte toujours avec lui (plus important que son chevalet), devant une collection ou un continuum d'objets inaccessibles à la parole sans cette opération maniaque (qui pourrait faire écrire à la façon d'un gag); pour pouvoir en parler, il faut que l'écrivain, par un rite initial, transforme d'abord le 'réel' en objet peint (encadré); après quoi il peut décrocher cet objet, le tirer de sa peinture: en un mot: le dé-peindre (dépeindre, c'est faire dévaler le tapis des codes, c'est référe, non d'un langage à un référent, mais d'un code à un autre code). Ainsi le réalisme (bien mal nommé, en tout cas souvent mal interprété) consiste, non à copier le réel, mais à copier une copie (peinte) du réel; ce fameux réel, comme sous l'effet d'une peur qui interdirait de le toucher directement, est remis plus loin, différe, ou du moins saisi à travers la gangue picturale dont on l'enduit avant de le soumettre à la parole: code sur code, dit le réalisme. C'est pourquoi le réalisme ne peut être dit 'copieur' mais plutôt 'pasticheur' (par une mimesis seconde, il copie ce qui est déjà copié)."(294)

If Emma's miniature, which Rodolphe not insignificantly already encases in his biscuit box, might be seen as the ultimate symbol of this painterly means of representation(295), there are a few other actual paintings in Flaubert's works, such as the portrait of Rosanette, (at one point framed in the shop window(296) ), Bouvard's father, (whom Bouvard resembles(297) ), and the Épinal Holy Ghost which by association becomes a picture of Loulou(298). Nor should we forget Pécouhet's attempt to imitate the pose of the gardener of the frontispiece of his gardening manual(299), or the way in which Frédéric mentally replaces the portraits he visits in the Louvre with one of Mme Arnoux: "Coiffée d'un hennin, elle priait à deux genoux derrière un vitrage de plomb"(300). Indeed Mme Arnoux is just about always described in static tableau form, often framed by light or shadow effects:
"Le regard tourné vers les cendres et une main sur l'Épaule du petit garçon, elle défaisaît, de l'autre, le lacet de la brassière: le mioche en chemise pleurait tout en se grattant la tête, comme M. Alexandre fils." (301)

"et, comme Mme Arnoux était assise auprès de la fenêtre, un grand rayon, frappant les acroche-coeur de sa nuque, pénétrait d'un fluide d'or sa peau ambree." (302)

"Et elle se tenait debout, sur le seuil de sa chambre, avec ses deux enfants à ses côtés." (303)

It is not surprising, (or insignificant), that the essence of Frédéric's memory of Mme Arnoux should be as an image:

"C'était Mme Arnoux telle que vous étiez, avec ses deux enfants, tendre, sérieuse, belle à éblouir, et si bonne! Cette image-là effaçait toutes les autres" (304),

nor that his, (and the reader's), last view of her should be through an open window, indeed the "Et ce fut tout" with which the image is abolished operates inside this final frame as she climbs into a carriage and it moves out of the picture (305).

The way in which Frédéric grasps and maintains Mme Arnoux as an image, and the way in which they take the aesthetic attitude to their relationship, will be reconsidered in the final chapter (306). Discussing their use of the future anterior in the penultimate chapter ("nous nous serons bien aimés" and "Quel bonheur nous aurions eu!" (307)), Brombert suggests that there is a way of envisaging life in the future anterior (308), and is surely looking for a term like the aesthetic attitude here.

Nor, as he is presumably suggesting, is this limited to their final meeting - it is not, (as Culler suggests (309)), that they are suddenly turning their life into a fiction by relating it to each other ("Ils se racontèrent leurs anciens jours" (310)), since they actually lived it in this way, as will be demonstrated later (311). The final scene merely adds an excellent instance of "naïveté" (the way they already see their relationship) "regardée" by the reader or by the text itself, (another myth of a myth). This is a clear example of what I suggested earlier:
that irony and aesthetic attitude can often be equated (312). Dédoublement, 
the awareness of self as both subject and object, is often a way of 
adopting the aesthetic attitude to oneself. The example of Flaubert 
conquering his actual seasickness by imagining himself on dry land thinking 
about himself being seasick (313), could be seen as a way of 
derealizing 
the self self-consciously from the outside, (whereas the natural state 
of autistic unreality is just subjective awareness as in Sartre's analysis 
of boredom (314)). Dédoublement means grasping oneself rather specifically 
as an image, or in our perspective as a representation and therefore 
implicitly as a picture.

I was therefore extremely interested to notice Claude Perruchot's 
regrettably very brief intervention in one of the Cerisy discussions, 
because in different terms he makes this precise point in connection 
with Emma (315), whose lack of aesthetic awareness is such that one might 
not have expected her to fulfil this privileged function (316). Perruchot 
considers the passage at La Vaubyessard when a servant breaks two window 
panes to let in some air, and Emma sees the face of the peasants looking 
in at the ball. The first movement of dédoublement in fact causes her to 
resee herself on her father's farm, but the significance of this frame 
is actually that Emma is framed for those looking in:

"Mais, aux fulgurations de l'heure présente, sa vie passée, si nette 
jusqu'alors, s'évanouissait tout entière, et elle doutait presque 
de l'avoir vécue. Elle était là; puis autour du bal, il n'y avait 
plus que de l'ombre, étalée sur tout le reste. Elle mangeait alors 
une glace au maresquin, qu'elle tenait de la main gauche dans une 
coquille de vermeil, et fermait à demi les yeux, la cuiller entre 
les dents" (317).

It is only in the eyes of the peasants looking in that Emma, shutting her 
eyes on the mareschino ice, attains her imaginary identity, a "prise de 
conscience" of this long desired realization of a type, expressed in 
particular by the "style indirect libre" phrase "elle était là". Perruchot 
describes this as a:
and referring to the "allure fuyante du cheval noir platonicien" suggests that when Emma gazes at herself in her mirror on her return from the first ride with Rodolphe, the mirror serves to contest Emma's repeated "J'ai un amant!" with an implicitly understood "J'aurai eu un amant"(319). All that I can add to this excellent observation is that already as Emma rides back to Yonville "On la regardait des fenêtres"(320). Emma's establishment of herself as an artistic representation involves seeing herself framed in the very same painterly way described by the long quotation from S/Z.

It may be recalled that Frédéric also looks at himself in his mirror after the first dinner at Madame Arnoux's(321). In fact the general incidence of frames in L'Éducation sentimentale, (with its proliferation of interior settings and endless reference to pictures, mirrors, doorways etc.) is so great that it can in no way be covered here. What interests me rather is a whole series of the "rooms within rooms" effect. The precise effect of an "enfilade" of three or four rooms occurs too frequently to be accidental:

"Il traversa une antichambre, une seconde pièce, puis un grand salon à hautes fenêtres / .../
Enfin il arriva dans un appartement ovale, lambrissé de bois de rose, bourré de meubles mignons, et qu'éclairait une seule glace donnant sur un jardin."(322)

"et, en face, après une seconde pièce plus petite, on distinguait, dans une troisième, un lit à colonnes torses, ayant une glace de Venise à son chevet."(323)

The frames within frames effect established by the single perception of a series of rooms surely relates to the nest of tables effect of layers of copies in Barthes' "modèle de la peinture", and where these rooms are actually walked through this perhaps represents the effect of perspective created by a linear reading. This might throw light on our underlying problem of the simultaneity or successivity of the literary work, indeed
a frame in the sense of a change in viewpoint could presumably only be recognized in a linear reading. When Bouvard and Pécuchet turn their house into a museum:

"Pécuchet, de son lit, apercevait tout cela en enfilade, et parfois même il allait jusque dans la chambre de Bouvard, pour allonger la perspective."(324)

and Salammbô offers us Mâtho and Spandius actually swimming through a succession of rooms when they enter Carthage via the aqueduct:

"Des arcades, les unes derrière les autres, s'ouvraient au milieu de larges murailles séparant des bassins... Spandius et Mâtho se remirent à nager, et passant par l'ouverture des arcs, ils traversèrent plusieurs chambres à la file. Deux autres rangs de bassins plus petits s'étendaient parallèlement de chaque côté."(325)

But returning to more static images of the frames within frames effect of Flaubert's deliberate manner of representation, we might include Emma's burial in a nest of three coffins (326), (which surpasses her miniature in the biscuit box), and the "hearts of women" passage in L'Éducation sentimentale, the unusual rhetoric of which provides the excuse for a fine formal set-piece - an image for a "layering" of representations built into a book about nothing:

"Les cœurs des femmes sont comme ces petits meubles à secret, plein de tiroirs emboités les uns dans les autres, on se donne du mal, on se casse les ongles, et on trouve au fond quelque fleur desséchée, des brins de poussière - ou le vide!"(327)

both examples reminiscent of Barthes' image of the onion (328). Final reference can only be made to perhaps the most formal construction of all, the fortress which contains John the Baptist in Hérodiades. Already encased in the four valleys which surround the citadel of Machaerous, the fortress inside which Antipas' palace is situated contains a complex of underground chambers constructed like a bee-hive:

"et comme la montagne allait en s'élargissant vers sa base, évidée à l'intérieur telle qu'une ruche d'abeilles, au-dessous de ces chambres il y en avait de plus nombreuses, et d'encore plus profondes."(329)
Here is a symbol for the work of art as pyramid, already three-dimensional in its interlocking representations. Contained in the courtyard, (and neatly situated in the middle of the central chapter), under a double cover, we find the source of the prophetic voice which reverberates throughout the story:

"Sous le couvercle double de bois, s'étendait une trappe de même dimension. D'un coup de poing, elle se replia en deux panneaux; on vit alors un trou, une fosse énorme que contournait un escalier sans rampe; et ceux qui se penchèrent sur le bord aperçurent au fond quelque chose de vague et d'effrayant:"

Flaubert could certainly not be accused of trying to hide his means of representation, or to pass off his illusion as in any way natural, and one final reference to Uspensky is relevant to Flaubert's evident foregrounding of the conventions of representation. In the first instance discussing painting, Uspensky suggests that a "representation within a representation" is in most cases constructed in an artistic system which is different from the rest of the painting. Thus the background may be more stylized, (as in medieval painting where functionally less important parts are portrayed with a characteristic ornamentalism), or represented through a different system of perspective, (making a single viewing position an impossibility). In the theatre it is particularly common for secondary characters to be simplified into types; in extreme cases they may be almost puppet-like. The tendency towards stereotyping which increases in the background of a narrative may also appear, he suggests, in the naming of minor characters:

"What takes place here is an enhancement of the semiotic quality of the representation. The description is not a sign of represented reality, as it is in the case of the central figures, but a sign of the sign of this reality. It is a reinforcement of the conventionality of the description. Accordingly, the central figures (the figures in the foreground) are opposed to the secondary figures by the fact that there is a lesser degree of semiotic quality or of conventionality in their description. A lesser degree of semiotic quality is naturally associated with a greater degree of realism (verisimilitude) in the description; the central figures, as opposed to the secondary ones, are less semiotic (conventional) and accordingly, more lifelike."
Though one might suggest that Homais, Lheureux and Cisy are secondary characters with stereotyped names, the above account clearly does not work as a description of Flaubert's novels, where the foreground is equally occupied by stereotypes, e.g. the name Félicité, and Félicité's automaton-like behaviour and mechanical repetitions, increased rather than set in "realistic relief" by the "background" parrot, or the puppet-like nature of Bouvard and Pécuchet. There are no obvious central representations with a "higher degree of naturalness", in fact like the increased conventionality which Uspensky attributes to the theatrical device of the play within a play, if there is any hierarchy of representation in Flaubert it tends constantly towards an increase in semiotic quality. In a footnote Uspensky says that he defines conventionality elsewhere in terms of the sign as a reference to the expression, rather than to the content, the degree of conventionality being determined by the order of the components in the sequence: the sign of a sign of a sign... and so forth. Manifestations of conventionality in description are illustrated by unexpected reference to the code, for example addressing the public in the middle of a play. Recalling Bersani's emphasis on Flaubert's "cela ressemblait aussi à" and the multitude of references to the pictorial code in the foregoing discussion, it is evident that Flaubert would get a high overall score for "semiotic quality". In the context of Ricardou's "Dénaturation", ('De natura fictionis'), and the "crime" of artifice, it is clear that Flaubert shows up the artificiality of his foregrounds too, or rather, as Ricardou has insisted all along, that there are no such hierarchies in Flaubert.
(iii) Auto-representation and repetition.

One begins to realize the appropriateness of Ricardou's frequent recourse to Flaubert as an example, and at this stage we are perhaps in a better position to consider how far the evident auto-representation of some of the foregoing examples approaches the extreme auto-representation by which Ricardou defines the Nouveau Roman. In claiming that the Nouveau Roman is the adventure of a writing (and definitely not the opposite) auto-representation is underlined as the only representation. The novel depicts itself constantly, that is themes and fictions offer a self-conscious dramatisation of the novel's own formal concerns. This process is radicalized by the process we have referred to as the "mise en abyme", to which Ricardou pays particular theoretical attention. A simple instance of this is the Shakespearean subplot, an offshoot and miniature replica of the main plot, a double action reflecting it "en petit". Gide is responsible for the actual term "mise en abyme", an essential operation of his own Les Faux Monnayeurs. He refers to the paintings of Memling or Metays, (Ricardou suggests the better known example of Van Eyck's portrait of the Arnolfini), where a little, dark, convex mirror contained in the picture reflects the whole scene. The mise en abyme reflects the proportions of the whole, and the reading to Roderick in The Fall of the House of Usher is an excellent example of the potentially peculiar effect of this internal "dédoubllement", defined by Ricardou as the "structural revolt of a fragment of the récit against the whole which contains it" (338).

Originally a play within a play, a story within a story, or a picture within a picture, the device escalates in the Nouveau Roman into a profusion of explanatory metaphors, from the relatively straightforward references to the novel as a formal entity of La Jalousie, (the native's song,
the insects around the lamp, A...'s hair etc. (339), to the highly complicated series of internal references of L'Emploi du temps, (the cathedrals, the tapestries, the fires, the copies of the detective story (340), the latter a very good example of what constitutes for Ricardou a major work: a book composed in such a way that it can support its own dédoublement and the inclusion of various fragments of itself, ideally achieving the seemingly impossible notion of a "book within a book" (341).

It seems to me that Flaubert's ideal "book about nothing", "sans attache extérieure", if it cannot refer to anything outside itself can logically only refer to itself. Of course such a book will still depend upon the production of meaning, but meanings will necessarily circulate in a self-enclosed system, (as in Prendergast's explanation of the Flaubertian novel as no longer a fixed mirror, but a "play of mirrors" (342)). The book about nothing tends inevitably towards a vast, highly organized tautology (343), a complicated structure of internal references, reflections and repetitions. It does not therefore seem to me logically far-fetched to apply Ricardou's criteria to Flaubert's novels. While elsewhere we have considered (and will continue to do so) ways in which the "modernity" of Flaubert has been overplayed, (and the next chapter will set out from a post traditional perspective), we shall allow ourselves here to see how far the auto-representation analogy can be taken.

In discussing L'éducation sentimentale as an important example of Flaubert's undermining of the linear plot, of a récit founded upon juxtaposition and repetition rather than logical progression, Joëlle Gleize dismisses Madame Bovary as a perfectly traditional construction (344). While there have now been several excellent articles on Flaubert's use of repetition in his later works (e.g. Felman on Un Cœur simple (345) and Bernheimer on Bouvard et Pécuchet (346)), I would prefer for the moment to reverse my earlier emphasis on the need for a chronological consideration
of the development of Flaubert's modernity. For while it depends absolutely on the creation of an "illusion of reality", Madame Bovary seems to me already a novel controlled by the desire to reflect and repeat itself, a formal organization of many different mechanisms of repetition. The overall effect is most precisely illustrated by a very evident mise en abyme which as far as I am aware has not been properly noticed (347), the description of the barrel-organ near the end of the first part of the novel, which is part of the long development of Emma's increasing depression following the ball at La Vaubyessard.

"Dans l'après-midi, quelquefois, une tête d'homme apparaissait derrière les vitres de la salle, tête hâlée, à favoris noirs, et qui souriait lentement d'un large sourire-doux à dents blanches. Une valse aussitôt commençait, et, sur l'orgue, dans un petit salon, des danseurs haut comme le doigt, femmes en turban rose, Tyroliens en jacquette, sirènes en habit noir, messieurs en culotte courte, tournaient, tournaient entre les fauteuils, les canapés, les consoles, se répétant dans les morceaux de miroir que raccordait à leurs angles un filet de papier doré." (348)

It will not by this stage pass unnoticed that just as the opera at Rouen is framed for Emma by the stage and curtains (349), this three-dimensional model and representation "en abyme" is framed by the window through which it is watched (and into which it appears). It is clearly a replica of the ball at La Vaubyessard, and more precisely of the waltz with the Vicomte, the actual words used, (themselves a repetition), "tournaient, tournaient", picking up the "Ils tournaient: tout tournait" of the original waltz description (350). In fact a similar construction reappears at other stages of the novel as in the "Ils allaient, ils allaient" of Emma's already repeated night-dreams of escape with Rodolphe (351), the reverie (inspired by her father's letter) of a memory of a repeated series of summer's evenings where the foals "galopaient, galopaient" (352), and in the description of Binet's lathe "les deux rous tournaient, ronflaient" (353). It is repeated literally when Emma has just left Rodolphe for the last time and has an hallucinatory experience of being surrounded by balls of
fire which "tournaient, tournaient", with Rodolphe's face appearing in the middle of each and proliferating to infinity(354). Perhaps the most striking aspect of the barrel-organ description is precisely the fact that the scene and all its implied repetitions are reflected to infinity in an arrangement of concentric mirrors: "se répétant dans les morceaux de miroir que racordait à leurs angles un filet de papier doré" – the infinite internal reflections which I am suggesting operate on the macro-level through an intense organization of repetitions. But we can go still further, for the man with the barrel organ does not appear behind the window on just one afternoon, but "quelquefois", so the actual description in its entirety is already an iterative one, that is contains within itself its own repetition.

This example plunges us into many different kinds of repetition. To sort them out recourse to Genette's discussion of "frequency" in 'Dis cours du récit' is helpful(355), and it will be recalled that frequency was one of the subsections of his first major category of verbal aspect: tense, the temporal relations between"récit"and "histoire". (I have treated the three categories of verbal aspect in the reverse order to that of Genette). The repetition of events in a novel is related to two sorts of frequency, that of the event recounted and that of its recounting. In practice this seems reducible to two basic uses – an event can happen once in the "histoire" and be recounted 'n' times by the récit, (Genette calls this the repetitive récit), or it can actually happen 'n' times in the fiction but only be recounted once, that is not so much "une fois" as "en une fois", and this he labels the iterative récit(356). Both mechanisms are as vital to Madame Bovary as to Flaubert's later works, and where they have been recognized they seem to have been given an exclusively psychological interpretation. 'My own argument will be that the functioning of repetition as a formal device does not exclude but tends to subsume many thematic readings.
The repetitive récit is perhaps easier to deal with and is most commonly associated with memory sequences. A frequent device, working like Genette's "analepses répétitives" (357), is a sudden simultaneous influx of past memories, as in the rêverie set off by the smell of Rodolphe's hair-dressing at the Comices agricoles, which fuses memories of the Vicomte and Léon with the presence of Rodolphe, and through the mention of the "Hirondelle" equally refers to the story to come (358), or where Emma finds herself outside her convent:

"Les premiers mois de son mariage, ses promenades à cheval dans la forêt, le Vicomte qui valsait, et Lagardy chantant, tout repassa devant ses yeux." (359)

There are other well-known examples in L'Éducation sentimentale, Salambô and Un Cœur simple in particular (360), and J.C.Lapp has accurately conveyed the effect of these passages. However his conclusion is that such an influx is an example of the "sickness of memory", and of the "final triumph of the past over the present" (361). Similarly Poulet, in his article in Études sur le temps humain, discusses these very memory sequences as instances of Flaubert's portrayal of "time", of his ability to create "spatial and temporal density" and "depth of duration" (362).

In other words he reduces questions of chronology to the nature of Flaubert's perception, assuming that the artistic problem is then only to "convey" this intimation: "Dès lors le problème du temps n'est plus qu'un problème de style" (363).

It seems to me that in these passages it is not only the character who is reliving his past, but that also the novel is deliberately retracing its steps. The unmotivated "reprises" of La Jalousie (where an attempt to attribute these solely to a deranged mind would surely be a misreading), are not conceivable in such a classical tradition, indeed even a writer like Faulkner, who undertakes radical experiments in the repetition of events from a different or sometimes the same point of view (364), still
allows a reconstitutable chronology of sorts. Nevertheless I would maintain that the aesthetic effect of Flaubert's "reprises" is not so different from those of *La Jalousie*.

Closely related to the return of past memories, (to which any reader must surely allow the function of an elliptical summary of events at least), is a profusion of instances of what might be called the *inventory*. The financial ruins of *Madame Bovary* and *L'Éducation sentimentale* provide the necessary excuse for an inventory of furniture, ornaments and personal effects which have played a vital part in the novel. Victor Brombert describes the auction sale of Mme Arnoux's furniture as the liquidation of an entire life (365), and such scenes might well be attributed to the theme of fetishism:

"Quand Frédéric entra, les jupons, les fichus, les mouchoirs et jusqu'aux chemises étaient passés de main en main, retournés; quelquefois, on les jetait de lin, et des blancheurs traversaient l'air tout à coup. Ensuite, on vendit ses robes, puis un de ses chameaux dont la plume cassée retombait, puis ses fourrures, puis trois naires de bottines; et le partage de ces reliques, où il retrouvait confusément les formes de ses membres, lui semblait une atrocité, comme s'il avait vu des corbeaux déchiquetant son cadavre... Le grand tapis bleu semé de camélias, que ses pieds mignons frôlaient en venant vers lui, la petite bergerie de tapisserie où il s'asseyait en face d'elle quand ils étaient seuls; les deux écrans de la cheminée, dont l'ivoire étaient rendu plus doux par le contact de ses mains; une pelote de velours, encore hérisée d'épingles." (366)

But just as fetishistic episodes are themselves concerned with the traces and reflections left in rooms where loved ones have sat and touched things, (for example, when Mme Arnoux has just visited Frédéric's house(367)), and make their contribution to repetition by repeating characters in their absence and recalling earlier passages, (surely the function of the vast network of internal references in *L'Éducation sentimentale*, in particular of the movement of objects like the chandelier and the silver "coffret", and of the identical furnishings of Rosanette's and Mme Arnoux's houses), so these inventories and "autopsies" work as repetition twice over, but most clearly emerge as an inventory of the novel itself.
The description of Félicité's room, in *Un Cœur simple*, as a chapel or bazaar full of religious objects and "chooses hétéroclites", given the highly organized network of minute connecting detail and metonymic processes in the story(368), is perhaps the best example of the inventory-type description gathering together and repeating every element that has been important: a shell box given by Victor, the picture-book geography, Virginie's plush hat which hangs down in front of a mirror which presumably reflects all these objects(369). *Madame Bovary* contains an actual inventory scene when the bailiffs come to Emma's house(370), but it is the last rites passage which has an even more obvious repeating function, albeit ironically:

"d'abord sur les yeux, qui avait tant convoité toutes les somptuosités terrestres; puis sur les marines, friandes de brises tièdes et de-senteurs amoureuses; puis sur la bouche, qui s'était ouverte pour le mensonge, qui avait semi d'orgeuil et crié dans la luxure; puis sur les mains, qui se délectaient aux contacts suaves, et enfin sur la plante des pieds, si rapides autrefois quand elle courait à l'assouvissement de ses désirs, et qui maintenant ne marcheraient plus"(371)

One could add many other variations on the repetitive récit here, for example the list of all the times Emma has slept in a new place(372), Rodolphe summarizing Emma's story prior to planning her seduction(373), Charles' morbidly fetishistic behaviour at the end of the novel which repeats Emma after her death(374), and Homais' newspaper articles which provide an ironic written repeat of the club-foot(375) and Comices Agricoles episodes(376), indeed a reference in the Correspondance to the latter:

"Je ne suis pas mécontent de mon article de Homais (indirect et avec citations). Il rehausse les comices et les fait paraître plus courts parce qu'il les résume."

(377)

suggests that Flaubert at least had a functional conception of the rôle of these passages as well.

But although the repetitive récit is so important to *Madame Bovary*, (and will be developed to extremes in *L'Éducation sentimentale*, to a degree far exceeding Jollile Gleize's already impressive list of plot
repetitions (378), the most startling aspect of repetition in *Madame Bovary* is perhaps its virtual take-over by the use of the iterative récit, which by use of the frequentative imperfect tense, repeats "en une fois" what happens many times over. (Of course there is also the possibility of the repetitive récit picking up iterated events, dreams etc.) Genette, discussing the overwhelming importance of this sort of repetition in Proust, especially in *Combray* and *Un Amour de Swann* (379), in fact refers to its use in *Madame Bovary*, for example during the last period at Tostes (380), and Roger Huss discusses the "Thursdays at Rouen" chapter, which beginning "C'était le jeudi", describes in most specific detail and only once what is supposed to have happened every Thursday, picking up details like the wet roofs in the description of the view of Rouen, which surely cannot literally have been there every Thursday (381). Genette accounts for such peculiarities (e.g. actual conversations, sudden movements of emotion with Léon (382), similar to the detailed gossip of Tante Léonie which is supposed to occur daily), by a sort of conventional artistic licence, whereby it is assumed that "something similar happened every time, of which the following detailed account is a typical example" (383).

Roger Huss suggests rather that there is a possibility that interference might take place between the iterative imperfect and the grammatically anomalous imperfect (replacing the more normal past historic) which he has been analysing; that the reader, influenced by the specificity of events presented as repeated, might disregard the information in temporal adverbs like "souvent", reinterpret events as singular, and accommodate the imperfect by reading it as an anomalous imperfect (384). In his suggestion that this sort of imperfect (the iterative) has the same effect as the anomalous one on the status of events in Flaubert's novels, he offers

"the provisional suggestion that Flaubert's use of the iterative
imperfect to convey highly particularized events is consistent
with a sense of déjà vu and tedium, with an inability to believe
in the originality of any event."(385)

I would personally be more inclined to agree with Genette that an
"invraisemblable" degree of detail is not in fact a problem for the reader,
who can easily enter into the spirit of what the writer is doing here. At
the same time the general attitude to repetition implied by Roger Huss'
article, that it is at the service of a metaphysical world-view that
"nothing ever changes", is I suspect a common one that in my perspective
must be out-argued, given that I am trying to establish an aesthetic
role for repetition. Bruce F. Kawin's Telling it Again and Again. Repetition
in Literature and Film(386), makes a useful working distinction bet-

ween "repetitious": "when a word, percent, or experience is repeated with
less impact at each recurrence; repeated to no particular end, out of a fail-
ure of invention or sloppiness of thought", and "repetitive": "when a word,
percent, or experience is repeated with equal or greater force at each
occurrence"(387). For me Flaubert falls so much into the latter positive
category that, without wishing to detract from the excellent analysis of
the anomalous imperfect, I would actually make my own provisional suggest-
on that Roger Huss' remark on the possibility of confusion between the
two sorts of imperfect might be reversed, that the anomalous imperfect
might be sensed as an iterative one(388).

The problem is that in Madame Bovary at least the "repetitious" is
an important part of Emma's experience of life, (refinding in adultery
the platitudes of marriage etc.)(389). Obviously boredom and monotony are
powerfully conveyed by the iterative imperfect, and if one wanted to
suggest that this was its main use Emma's walks with her greyhound during
her first miserable period at Tosies would be an excellent example. The
fact that these walks are repeated multiplies the depressing set of
repetitions they already contain. Each time Emma begins by looking around
in the hope that something has changed but nothing ever has, she repeats to herself "Pourquoi, mon Dieu, me suis-je mariée?" (390), and recalls her life at school (a reprise of the chapter recalling her early life) (391), a passage itself ending with the repeated "Comme c'était loin, tout cela! comme c'était loin!" (392). Her actual conversation with her greyhound illustrates an instance of dédoublement; his bored yawns cause her to liken him to herself and he operates as her double, his circles in the countryside specifically complementing those of her depressed rêverie (393).

But I feel that one would only be justified in putting the iterative imperfect at the service of the theme of monotony if it were used solely in this connection, and such a generalization does not in fact work. That repetition serves boredom in Madame Bovary and, for example, obsession in Saint Julien, already suggests that it is repetition that requires extracting as the common denominator. But even in Madame Bovary repetition just as frequently coincides with moments of intense pleasure and satisfaction. This is true of all sorts of repetition, (the repetitions of the ball, for instance, never devalue it), and we have already referred to Emma's return from the ride in the forest where she resees and relives the scene in an almost hallucinatory manner, looks at herself in the mirror, repeats "J'ai un amant! un amant!" and recalls the heroines of the books she has read, (in itself a reprise) (394).

The iteration of the Thursdays at Rouen can hardly be seen as an attack on the non-originality of events, for it is the high point of Emma's affair with Léon (395), as illustrated by the agony of the return to Yonville; and the view of Rouen description which is so specific in its details of the weather is one of the rare moments for Emma of joyful pantheistic expansion of the self (396). Similarly the evenings spent with Rodolphe at the bottom of the garden by the river illustrate an outstandingly lyrical use of the iterative imperfect, the effect of which is
multiplied, en abyme, by the further degrees of iteration contained inside the description, by subdivision into various adverbs such as "sometimes", "occasionally" and from "time to time":

"Les étoiles brillaient à travers les branches du jasmin sans feuilles. Ils entendaient derrière eux la rivière qui coulait, et, de temps à autre, sur la berge, le claquement des roseaux secs. Des massifs d'ombre, ça et là, se bombaient dans l'obscurité, et parfois, frissonnant tous d'un seul mouvement, ils se dressaient et se penchaient comme d'immenses vagues noires, qui se fussent avancées pour les recouvrir. Le froid de la nuit les faisait s'éteindre davantage; les soupirs de leurs lèvres leur semblaient plus forts; leurs yeux, qu'ils entrevoyaient à peine, leur paraissaient plus grands, et, au milieu du silence, il y avait des paroles dites tout bas qui tombaient sur leur âme avec une sonorité cristalline et qui s'y répercutaient en vibrations multipliées." (397)

"Multiplied vibrations" seems to sum up the effect of such passages. When Léon has left Yonville Emma is plunged into

"cette douleur, enfin, que vous apportent l'interruption de tout mouvement accoutumé, la cessation brusque d'une vibration prolongée." (398)

Reverberation is suggested by the little phrase which appears almost as a tic of style, "ça et là", itself a repetition of sounds which Nathalie Sarraute, (discussing the sunrise in Salammô), calls precisely "a brief souiver" (399). Emma's "honeymoon" with Léon again describes once what actually happens three days running, and contains a profusion of tiny repeated sounds standing out in the evening silence. Where this iteration is made to contain one specific occasion on which the moon appeared, this, in its turn, contains a sentence beginning "parfois", in which Emma constantly disappears and reappears in alternating shadow and moonlight (400). What we have here, after Flaubert's "tree of description" and "tree of frames" (401), is surely an equally obsessive "tree of repetition". The iterative imperfect is the major discovery in that it is responsible for the "en abyme" effect, containing all other sorts of repetition inside it, while within that framework, subdivision into new sorts of repetition seems to be a potentially infinite process.
I shall not discuss repetition in the later works at this stage, despite its extreme importance there, since there will be important analyses of its function in Un Cœur simple and Bouvard et Pécuchet in the final chapter(402). Further, the written repetition or copying of Bouvard et Pécuchet seems close to the perfect mimesis of language tautologically imitating language which Genette suggests, equating mimesis with diegesis in 'Frontières du récit', cannot in fact be considered mimesis or representation at all(403). I have preferred therefore, in this chapter, to keep to my perspective of consideration of the presentation of the representation or illusion of reality, and therefore only really to consider the way repetition intervenes in the aesthetic organization of the "histoire" by the "récit".

While I have not attempted to offer very rigorous categories of different mechanisms of repetition, (a study which might be undertaken elsewhere), the global distinction between iterative and repetitive récits is obviously related to a broad division between "histoire" and "récit". Thus the iterative imperfect, by a simple morphological addition to the verb, potentially creates multiple repetitions of the illusion, within which plane all reference to repetition as a theme or an aspect of plot, all mirror images, reflections and echoes within the diegetic content, might be classified. On the other hand our consideration of the repetitive récit might include any literal linguistic repetitions, (such as the "tournaient, tournaient" analysis of the barrel organ passage(404)), since the repetition of the same word in the same sentence, and the picking up of a word, phrase or even whole sentence either immediately ("C'est là ce que nous avons eu de meilleur!"(405)), or much later in the same work (e.g. Mâtho repeating Salammbô's opening song(406)), is fairly common in all of Flaubert's works. Flaubert's repetition of a few recurrent stylistic effects, which originally caused Bersani to conclude that the
"high priest of style is thus the master of the rhythmical tic" (407), and Michel Picard to suggest that "la magie du style flaubertien" is essentially a source of esoteric pleasure for a few well practised ears (408), but which were taken more seriously by Proust and Thibaudet (409), would also come under this heading.

While repetition is obviously a basic means of organization of any formal art, (music for example), it is also surely the basic means of pleasure in poetry (410). While repetition and variation are clearly closely related (variation cannot mean anything without the idea of repetition, so is therefore surely dependent upon it), the "laissez simili"es" of the Chanson de Roland are perhaps a good example of acute aesthetic effect achieved solely by repetition. When Emma goes to the opera in Madame Bovary, she gains her acutest pleasure not from Lucie but from the chorus: "les voix de femmes, répétant ses paroles, reprenaient en chœur, délicieusement" (411). Similarly, in his Notes de Voyage, Flaubert describes a sort of shadow theatre which he sees in Carthage, where the main character is not the chief cause of enjoyment:

"Ce qu'il y avait de beau, c'étaient les trois musiciens qui, de temps à autre et à intervalles réguliers, reprenaient ce qu'il disait, ou mieux réfléchissaient tout haut à la façon du chœur; cela était très dramatique et il me sembla que j'avais compris." (412)

It seems to me, though I am here moving into the area of vast generalizations (413), that one of the most important implied repetitions in literature is perhaps the repeated reading of the whole book. Flaubert's adherence to "l'art pour l'art" was after all largely to a non-commercial sort of literature (414), and whereas consumer literature requires that one should throw away a book once read and presumably buy another one, one would not think of reading a poem just once. Surely the novel as work of art really depends upon the idea that its reading will be repeated an infinite number of times. We do not reread for enlightenment, (to get nearer each time to the "true" text), but become addicted to the same
text, suggests Barthes in his section of S/Z entitled 'Combien de lectures?' (415). Suspense is only an illusion and the functioning of the sort of mise en abyme which predicts events perhaps suggests that this is true of the first reading as well (416). Barthes claims that we "forget as we read" and "read because we forget", and can therefore (ideally) read the same text an infinite number of times (417). Certainly repetition is precisely something which there is no reason to stop in one place rather than another.

The reference to "forgetting" is interesting in this connection, for while Barthes dismisses the notion of a "first reading", Proust's narrator, referring to his first hearing of the Vinteuil sonata, discusses the problem of hearing "une musique un peu compliquée" for the first time:

"Aussi n'a-t-on pas tort de dire 'entendre pour la première fois'. Si l'on n'avait vraiment, comme on l'a cru, rien distingué à la première audition, la deuxième, la troisième seraient autant de premières, et il n'y aurait pas de raison pour qu'on compri quelque chose à la dixième. Probablement ce qui fait défaut, la première fois, ce n'est pas la compréhension, mais la mémoire. Car la notre, relativement à la complexité des impressions auxquelles elle a à faire face pendant que nous écoutons, est infime, aussi brève que la mémoire d'un homme qui en dormant pense mille choses qu'il oubli aussitôt, ou d'un homme tombé à moitié en enfance qui ne se rappelle pas la minute d'après ce qu'on vient de lui dire. Ces impressions multiples, la mémoire n'est pas capable de nous en fournir immédiatement le souvenir. Mais celui-ci se forme en elle peu à peu et, à l'égard des œuvres qu'on a entendues deux ou trois fois, on est comme le collégien qui a relu à plusieurs reprises avant de s'endormir une leçon qu'il croyait ne pas savoir et qui la récite par cœur le lendemain matin." (418)

This curious insight into the relationship between memory and repetition in À la recherche du temps perdu might be set against Kierkegaard's idea of repetition, which Butor defines as:

"le terme précis par lequel nous cherchons à désigner à l'époque moderne ce que les Grecs visaient à travers la notion de réminiscence" (419)

and Uspensky also makes a contribution to the problem, important in that it reveals why I am pursuing the point in such detail:

"The perception of the literary work is closely connected with the processes of memory. In general, the characteristics of human
memory impose a series of circumscriptions on the literary work which condition its perception; the perception of a work of pictorial art, on the contrary, is not necessarily determined by memory processes. Thus the direct connection between memory and temporal perception should not be disregarded." (420)

In a short but excellent article, 'Space and time of the text' (421), Cesare Segre openly confronts the problem to which we have so often referred - that of the simultaneity or successivity of our perception of the literary text. Segre suggests that a purely linguistic reading along the time axis is impossible, since sentences already read have been disposed into a memory sequence which affects the way we read. The careful reader does not only register subject matter, he also develops a formal memory for words, stylemes, constructions etc. Reading each new sentence thus becomes an act of recognition, recognition of formal elements often actually forging definition of the plane of connotation, since if a word or sentence reappears in identical form the fact that we recognize it means that its value is changed. Segre quotes Riffaterre's analysis of the reader's progressively changed understanding:

"each new element confers a new dimension on earlier elements which it repeats or contradicts or develops. Awareness of one of these echoes involves a double reading of that particular part of the text, the second reading retroactive. A third perception, all-enveloping and at the level of memory, takes place when the reading is ended." (422)

Segre is however unhappy with the implication here that a gradual awareness finally adds up to a "total" awareness, which is, as it were, outside time, insisting that the order of the succession of its parts must be included in this "total awareness":

"even after the refined analyses we should none the less be left with a (temporal) reading capable of highlighting what these analyses have gained." (423)

He is therefore reiterating Barthes' point with which this digression started (424).

To take a small example which might be relevant to Flaubert, Genette makes a distinction between "amorces" and "annonces". "Amorces" are details
which are picked up later in the narrative but are not presented as having any significance at the time of their first mention, whereas "annonces" present themselves as significant(425). Flaubert actually discusses the problem of introducing "amorces":

"Mais il faut que tout cela soit rapide sans être sec, et développé sans être épâté, tout en me ménageant, pour la suite, d'autres détails qui là seraient plus frappants."(426)

Now it is surely the case that on a re-reading of the novel, such "amorces" actually turn into "annonces", for example two details of the Bovarys' new house at Yonville:

"Une porte sur l'Allée, qui permet d'entrer et de sortir sans être vu"(427)

"Une tonnelle tout exprès pour boire de la bière en été"(428), and Barthes, I imagine, would not make a distinction. Riffaterre's suggestion that awareness of these echoes involves a double reading of that particular part of the text, should not, (I fully agree with Segre here), lead to a third all-enveloping reading in the memory, (when actual reading has stopped). On the temporal plane memory can only be equated with actual rereading, which the writer is surely entitled to expect, and which I take as an assumed convention.

If an illusion of simultaneity is created it is precisely on the plane of representation, and Flaubert's general conflict between the attempt to present the text simultaneously or consecutively perhaps comes to a head with the use of repetition. The frequent tension between movement and immobility in Flaubert's set-piece descriptions, e.g. the "grands poissons noirs arrêtés" of the view of Rouen(429), has often been commented upon by critics(430). Perhaps the fact that this contradiction is itself contained in the iterative "Thursdays at Rouen" chapter suggests that the use of the iterative imperfect solves at least one problem, how to achieve an illusion of simultaneous repetition in a successive text. The deliberate underlining of such contradictions would then align itself with the wedding
cake description - yet another example of the récit "showing its hand".

Further, if one accepts the idea that the novel should actually be reread an infinite number of times, then every rereading turns a singular event into an iterated one, and in this sense there would inevitably be a confusion between the anomalous and frequentative uses of the imperfect tense. It would also make it most unlikely that Flaubert would have found the non-uniqueness of events a hindrance from the aesthetic point of view (431); and this perhaps rather heavy digression might be ended with a rather frivolous reference to L'Emploi du temps, where Butor is surely at the heart of such problems:

"'Vous ne reliriez pas un roman policier, Jenkins!' [...
'Il y en a que j'ai relu jusqu'à six fois, monsieur Revel'" (432).
(iv) An exemplary illusion.

I should like to close this chapter, which has sought both to emphasize the importance of Flaubert's "illusion of reality" but also to take a formal perspective upon its presentation, with a brief analysis of *La Légende de Saint Julien l'Hospitalier*. My reasons for choosing this story are that it is a relatively late work, and therefore perhaps formally more sophisticated, while still depending absolutely upon the maintenance of an illusion. Perhaps because of its shortness, it offers a quite exemplary illustration of many of the formal mechanisms I have been discussing, (framing, mise en abyme, repetition), and I should like to offer it as a brief example of the way in which a Flaubertian work can in fact be read on a purely formal level. This demonstration is perhaps doubly relevant in that the story could, in a different perspective, be seen as the most personal of all Flaubert's works, a masturbatory drama and Oedipal story corresponding closely with the family drama as lived through by Flaubert in Sartre's dramatisation at least - the killing of an entire family before and after a mysterious illness (433), the scene by the fountain underlining the link between epilepsy as a "fausse mort" and the murder of the father, as in Freud's article on Dostoevsky to which I referred in the first chapter (434). But the extreme stylization of such personal material emphasizes that it is only being used. There is a complete lack of psychological exploration, and *Saint Julien*, essentially a story, tells us repeatedly that this is how it sees itself.

Working alongside the title, which reveals the story as that of Julien's accession to sainthood, are the three major predictions which precede and control the working out of the story. For Ricardou, the oracle, (and *Oedipus Rex* is his major example), by containing the story in
concentrated form, is a basic instance of the mise en abyme (435). In Saint Julien these predictions are themselves fragmented throughout the story, before being gathered in again to other concentrated images.

For example the prediction to Julien's mother "Réjouis-toi, ô mère! ton fils sera un saint!" (436), is dispersed along a chain of religious references. The household, we learn, is as well regulated as a monastery by Julien's mother (437), who often passes her time embroidering altar cloths (438). Over her bed hangs a religious relic, (a martyr's bone), in a carbuncle frame (439), and over Julien's cradle hangs a dove-shaped lamp (440). The baby Julien resembles, we are told, a little Jesus (441), and passing pilgrims tell tales of the Holy Crèche and the Sepulchre (442). Julien commits his first sadistic murders at mass (443), and is in fact praying when he hears the fox yelping which tempts him out on the second fatal hunting expedition (444). A cock crows just before the murder (445), an ivory Christ hangs blood-splattered in the death chamber (446), and Julien leaves written instructions for the funeral on a "prie-Dieu" (447). When he sets off over the river to fetch the leper the stormy water goes suddenly calm, the leper has a regal bearing and is covered in a sort of shroud (448). He eats bread, turns Julien's water into wine, and is finally transformed into Jesus Christ (449).

The father's prediction "Ah! ah! ton fils!...beaucoup de sang!...beaucoup de gloire!...toujours heureux! la famille d'un empereur" is curiously referred to by the récit as "ces mots sans suite" (450). Essential is, the prophecy of much blood, which disguised by its association with the promise of glory and power, is in fact the blood which Julien will spill in the course of the story. This mise en abyme is fragmented into a widespread network of images of blood, redness, fire, sparks and light (451), in a way reminiscent of the fragmentation of the fire mise en abyme in L'Emploi du temps (452). The "prunelles flamboyantes" of the beggar
who speaks the prediction(453) are passed to other key figures of the series, the father stag(454) and the corpse of Julien's father(455), and finally to the leper(456). The blood references are gathered into a further mise en abyme in the death chamber:

"Le reflet écarlate du vitrail, alors frappé par le soleil, éclairait ces taches rouges, et en jetait de plus nombreuses dans tout l'appartement"(457)

The"vitrail", obviously an important reference in itself, sheds a scarlet reflection which in turn lights up and multiplies the red stains throughout the room.

The connection between the hunting lust and the desire to kill his parents is underlined by the fact that Julien's father is "toujours enveloppé d'une pelisse de renard"(458), and that, as already mentioned, it is hearing a fox which finally tempts Julien back into hunting(459). Further it is mistaking his mother for a stork which causes Julien to nearly kill her with a javelin, and it should not pass unnoticed that despite his resolve not to kill any animals, he had intended to kill this "stork"(460). The family of deer which Julien kills are themselves a miniature replica of Julien's family: mother, father and child. Their murder foreshadows the main murder, so that curiously the murder is in a sense already accomplished before it is even prophesied. This is typical of the way in which the mise en abyme actually upsets the récit.

The father stag's prediction, repeated three times to the accompaniment of a striking bell, is itself a set-piece of formal repetition:

"— Maudit! maudit! maudit! Un jour, cœur féroce, tu assassineras ton père et ta mère."(461)

This scene is exactly repeated at the end, where the leper calls three times to Julien in a voice with the intonation of a church bell(462). Julien is obsessed with the stag's prediction, (as were the parents with theirs), and after his marriage this becomes an obsessive dream of killing
animals, with an endless replaying of the actual massacre inside each dream(463). After the actual murder a dream repeatedly repeats the actual event:

"Le soleil, tous les soirs, étalait du sang dans les nuages; et chaque nuit, en rêve, son parricide recommençait."(464)

When Julien recalls his youth he sees himself, by an effect of dédoublement, as he was at the beginning of the story, standing between his parents, and framed in a vine arbour. Each time this becomes an obsessive hallucination of the two corpses, on the appearance of which Julien repeats the lament: "Ah, pauvre père! pauvre mère! pauvre mère!"(465)

A final pattern of images again suggests a formal mechanism of the story. These culminate in the final face to face apotheosis of Julien and Jesus, the ex-leper. This actual position is used at various points in the story. On the first important hunting expedition Julien kills a wild goat, its companion jumps into a precipice and Julien, trying to stab it:

"tomba sur le cadavre de l'autre, la face au-dessus de l'abîme et les deux bras écartés"(466).

When Julien returns from his second sterile hunting expedition he bends over the bed to kiss his wife: "Alors il sentit contre sa bouche l'impression d'une barbe"(467). The result here is that he actually kisses his father(468), and when later, resolved on suicide, he leans over a fountain to judge its depth and comes face to face with his own mirror image, he mistakes it for his father because of the white beard(469).

One recalls that the father stag also had a white beard(470), and perhaps it could be suggested that the face à face which is missing, that with the stag itself, is displaced to that with the wild goat.

This position, also that of the penitent:

"Il resta, pendant la messe, à plat ventre au milieu du portail, les bras en croix, et le front dans la poussière."(471)
recurs finally where Julien lies down on the corpse-like leper "bouche contre bouche, poitrine sur poitrine" and is carried up to heaven "face à face avec Notre-Seigneur Jésus" (472).

The conclusion must I think be that Julien is still face to face with his own image. The detail that Julien is "nu comme au jour de sa naissance" means that the story has come full circle and recalls the comparison of the baby Julien with the infant Jesus (473). Julien, the leper and Jesus are all parts of the same figure. From the two early predictions stem both a saintly and a horrific Julien. The remark "sa propre personne lui faisait tellement horreur" (474) exactly precedes the introduction of the repulsive leper, and the final merging of all three parts at the end suggests that the whole conte might be seen essentially as an ambitious experiment in the process of dédoublement.

Various frames have been pointed out to which one might add the wife's "ghost" framed in "l'encadrure de la porte" (475), and the nostalgic view of intimate families seen "par le vitrage des rez-de-chaussée" (476). The story is divided into three distinct chapters, of which the very end of the first and the beginning of the second have a short set of one sentence paragraphs set out like poetry, thereby creating a sort of frame effect around their respective chapters (477). Similarly there is an odd little framed paragraph (containing Julien framed in the church doorway) at the end of the second chapter, and the "poetry" effect at the beginning of the third (478).

The whole story is obviously perfectly contained within the title and the closing line. The title announces that it is a legend and a saint's story, while the closing tailpiece repeats this title, and completes the severing of connections by the use of the first-person shifter and familiar naïve summary of the story:

"Et voilà l'histoire de saint Julien l'Hospitalier, telle à peu près qu'on la trouve, sur un vitrail d'église, dans mon pays" (479).
By telling us that the story is contained in a stained glass window an effect is achieved whereby the story contains the window, but the window contains the story, and so on ad infinitum. The window cannot be seen as an external source, but as part of a process rigorously orientated towards the interior of the story. When Julien's wife puts his parents to bed:

"Le jour allait paraître, et derrière le vitrail, les petits oiseaux commençaient à chanter" (480).

This "vitrail inside a vitrail", preceding the switch to Julien's viewpoint, clearly operates as a frame for the hunting expedition, (especially with its reference to the birds singing), and the murder that follows, and reference has already been made to the scarlet reflections thrown by the vitrail into the death chamber, again a double mise en abyme.

The stained glass window is obviously the most exemplary "frame" in all of Flaubert's works, not least because although inviting a simultaneous perception it is actually an example of an art-form that has to be read successively as well, i.e. panel by panel. Moreover since the window is opaque, the viewer or reader should be left in Flaubert's ideal state of rêverie, of which the above reference, "derrière le vitrail, les petits oiseaux commençaient à chanter", seems to exactly catch the mood. In fact it reminds me of the closing line of Sarrasine, "Et la marquise resta pensive" (481), which Barthes offers precisely as an emblem of "le texte pensif", and which certainly provides an appropriate final comment for this chapter:

"À quoi pensez-vous? a-t-on envie de demander, sur son invite discrète, au texte classique; mais plus retors que tous ceux qui croient s'en tirer en répondant: à rien, le texte ne répond pas, donnant au sens sa dernière clôture: la suspension." (482)
CHAPTER 3. The value system of Flaubert's works.

(i) Character and value

In venturing into the problematic area of values, I find myself in a strange position between two contradictory approaches to Flaubert's work, representing very opposed attitudes to literature itself, and yet arriving at somewhat similar conclusions. On the one hand an extreme appreciation of Flaubert's "modernity" leads critics of the Cerisy orientation to insist on the deconstruction of all stable meaning(1), on the other, a whole Anglo-Saxon tradition finds Flaubert's novels severely wanting in human interest and moral complexity(2). Evaluation of Flaubert's status as a major writer is clearly at stake for both sides - the modern French writer or critic finds Flaubert's writing exemplary, the Leavisite seeker of an appeal to the adult mind cannot honestly appreciate Flaubert at all, since he must find him "immature"(3). The latter critical approach is in fact unable to account for the merit which it nevertheless half recognizes in Flaubert, and gets caught up in strange contradictions, as where F.R.Leavis insists that he is not saying that Flaubert is less good a writer "than a George Moore"(4), but is actually unable to say why. An interesting recent article by David Gervais on 'James' reading of Madame Bovary' centres on the rather unconvincing division into two extreme responses - moral criticism balanced by exaggerated aesthetic praise and eulogy of form - suggesting that this is only an attempted rationalization of a more divided overall response, a tugging of attraction and repulsion cutting across these avowed boundaries(5).
It will be clear from the preceding chapters that I do not align myself with the "relevance to life" approach to literature in general, and that in any case the whole direction of my argument about Flaubert has been such as to make such evaluations, for his work at least, totally irrelevant. At the same time, in discussing the modern readings of Flaubert that I admire, I have hinted at my unease with the emphasis on the complete destruction of meaning. One general context of this chapter is therefore an attempted reconciliation of a pseudo-structuralist approach with more traditional moral readings. In my own experience of reading Flaubert I have never felt the two strands to be contradictory or mutually exclusive, and hope to demonstrate in this chapter ways in which the reader is engaged with the book on the level of values and evaluations, though within his awareness of reading as an aesthetic experience and of the novel as an aesthetic object.

My own problem, in the formal perspective that I have sought to adopt, is to theorize what happens to familiar readings of content, stories and characters in such an approach. While I have argued that reading Flaubert's novels does not involve recognition of an external reality or relevance to life, nevertheless the imaginary world of the illusion is still organized and given meaning. So I am still arguing against Jonathan Culler's "Uses of Uncertainty" argument, in attempting to reinstate the organizing function of character, theme and moral values. My basic argument will be that values are not "expressed by form", but that character and theme are part of the formal intention, that a correct "moral" reading of the "story", a correct evaluation of the diegetic universe, can only be obtained through a fairly sophisticated formal awareness.

If we accept the Flaubertian novel as a closed system(6), this seems to me inevitably the case. In his preface to Bouilhet's Dernières Chansons, arguing that art is not a means but has its reason in itself, Flaubert
emphasizes that "dénouements" are not conclusions, that moral positions cannot be generalized, since whatever view is "proved" with a story another story can always prove the opposite(7). In other words meanings and values are self-contained.

Sartre in fact makes a useful distinction between moral and aesthetic values, where the difference that operates is the same as that between the two realms of the real and the imaginary(8). Moral values concern ethical choices in the real world, whereas aesthetic ones are by definition imaginary, the distinction between "le bien" and "le beau". Thus within the derealized plane of the story there will of course be ethical choices etc., but they will be read as imaginary and therefore without connection with the real world. This is what I mean by moral values actually coming into being through aesthetic ones.

A reasonably formal awareness actually alters the way we read characters, and my general intention in this chapter, in arguing against the rather common "weak vessels" criticism(9), is precisely to challenge traditional readings of many Flaubertian characters. For the very characters dismissed by the moral approach as "weak vessels", will emerge from my argument as exemplary, through the attribution of privileged aesthetic status because of their special rôle in relation to what have already been established as vital aspects of Flaubert's aesthetic: the opaqueness of language, stupidity, repetition, and the aesthetic attitude which often originates in a pathological relationship to reality.

In a discussion of Graham Falconer's paper at Cerisy, Maurice Delcroix wonders:

"si l'attention que vous accordez à ce que vous avez appelé la psychologie du personnage est conciliable avec une sémiology du personnage, c'est-à-dire si on peut réintroduire ce concept de psychologie à l'intérieur des études de narrativité?"(10)

I would hope, by the end of this chapter, to have given the beginnings of
an affirmative reply to this very important question. In a similar context, in S/Z, Barthes contends that while characters should not be made psychological, (that is taken away from the paper), they should not be wiped out either, for characters are "des types du discours", produced by the discourse so that it can play with them, (rather than to let them play with each other)(11). Character and discourse are accomplices, and clearly Barthes' own"semic code" is a way of reintroducing psychological facets in a more properly semiotic fashion(12) - giving characters characteristics does not mean assuming that they are real people.

The assumption that characters really are real people does not seem to be as rare as one might have expected. Consider for example Martin Turnell's ridiculous idea that Flaubert "hides" Emma's better qualities:

"We cannot help noticing that Flaubert displayed a marked reluctance to give due weight to what was valid and genuine in Emma. She was not, as Henry James alleged, a woman who was 'naturally depraved'. She possessed a number of solid virtues which were deliberately played down by the novelist ... We cannot withhold our approval from her attempts to improve her mind or from the pride that she took in her personal appearance and in the running of her house. The truth is that Flaubert sacrificed far too much to his thèse."(13)

The quite contradictory view on "the truth about Emma" which is offered by Gregor and Nicholas in The Moral and the Story, is simply a variation on the same peculiar assumption:

"We have at least the illusion that Flaubert has come to this world with an open mind and is trying to extract the maximum of beauty and interest from it, that he is forced to his conclusions by the evidence itself ... The question already presents itself, why doesn't he look further, or deeper?"(14)

Such assertions arise of course from a particularly naïve version of the belief that form is an outer envelope or casing, and it is interesting that so many critics who argue for the moral approach insist upon this particular form/content interpretation. Leavis, who actually defines form as "responsibility towards a rich human interest, or complexity of interests, profoundly realized"(15), as a preoccupation with human value and
moral interest, in putting Flaubert in the "form as beautiful decoration" camp, reveals the reason for his complete misunderstanding of Flaubert:

"For the later Aesthetic writers, in general, represent in a weak kind of way the attitude that Flaubert maintained with a perverse heroism, 'form' and 'style' are ends to be sought for themselves, and the chief preoccupation is with elaborating a beautiful style to apply to the chosen subject."(16)

Similarly, Graham Hough's discussion of moral theories of literature, which concludes:

"We feel, rightly I believe, that any attempt to reduce critical discourse to formal dialectic or scientific method would lose more in comprehensiveness and sensitivity than it could possibly gain in rigour"(17)

reveals its reasoning when he says that "The moral and the formal are irreducibly different. The one cannot be explained in terms of the other" (18), for he sees them as springing from different impulses: the formal from a delight in rhythm and pattern, the moral from a desire for expression(19).

Ricardou, discussing a letter from Flaubert to Sainte-Beuve on Salambô, in which he suggests that the pedestal,(the novel), is too big for its statue, (Salambô herself), gives a quite different twist to the weak vessels argument. Ricardou argues that it is not possible that this is an unavoidable fault, it can only be Flaubert's subterfuge for saying the novel is no longer comparable to a statue on a "socle"(20). Thus Ricardou would see the use of limited reflectors not in the sense that I shall later expound (deliberate on moral/aesthetic grounds), but more as a metaphor for the function of character in a modern text, in line with his view that the whole notion of "character" is on the path of decline.

Jonathan Culler, in an interesting discussion in Structuralist Poetics, suggests that character is the major aspect of the novel to which structuralism has paid least theoretical attention, and which it has been least successful in treating:
"Although for many readers character serves as the major totalizing force in fiction - everything in the novel exists in order to illustrate character and its development - a structuralist approach has tended to explain this as an ideological prejudice rather than to study it as a fact of reading." (21)

Ricardou's comment is obviously illuminated by the following explanation:

"the general ethos of structuralism runs counter to the notions of individuality and rich psychological coherence which are often applied to the novel. Stress on the interpersonal and conventional systems which traverse the individual, which make him a space in which forces and events meet rather than an individuated essence, leads to a rejection of a prevalent conception of character in the novel: that the most successful and 'living' characters are richly delineated autonomous wholes, clearly distinguished from others by physical and psychological characteristics. This notion of character, structuralists would say, is a myth." (22)

Structuralist theory has therefore tended to attempt to define characters in terms of what they do rather than what they are, and Culler suggests, rightly I feel, that this desire to get away from psychological essences has gone too far to the other extreme, that in making character so dependent on plot, it has left too much unexplained (23).

At the same time, a historical overview of the modern novel shows such a clear undermining of the notion of coherent character, that both the theory and practice of reading must come to terms with a changed convention. Culler suggests, therefore, that it might be worth trying to read, for example, Flaubert's novels, in a different way:

"Although it is possible to treat L'Education sentimentale as a study in character, to place Frédéric Moreau at the centre and to infer from the rest of the novel a rich psychological portrait, we are now at least in a position to ask whether this is the best way to proceed. When we approach the novel in this way, we find, as Henry James complained, an absence or emptiness at the centre. The novel does not simply portray a banal personality but shows a marked lack of interest in what we might expect to be the most important questions: what is the precise quality and value of Frédéric's love for Mme Arnoux? for Rosanette? for Mme Dambreuse? What is learned and what is missed in his sentimental education? We can, as readers and critics, supply answers to these questions and this is certainly what traditional models of character enjoin us to do. But if we do so we commit ourselves to naturalizing the text and to ignoring or reducing the strangeness of its gaps and silences." (24)

The last sentence refers us to the Uses of Uncertainty, where Culler
basically agrees with Henry James' assessment of Flaubert's weak vessels, but interprets it as one more deliberate ploy for setting up an indeterminate space of uncertainty, for "demoralizing" the reader by blocking his search for coherence, for challenging the easy construction of meaning. Readers will quite simply be defeated by the banality of characters, and will be obliged to organize their reading in a different way (25).

The extent of my theoretical dilemma may be evident at this stage, for while I admire the very fine logic of Culler's argument I am quite in disagreement with his original reading of Flaubertian character, and feel actually that he too has escaped the very interesting problem raised by his recognition that structuralism has not yet come to terms with the vital convention of character as "the major totalising force in fiction". In that, as Culler says in The Uses of Uncertainty, character has always been the focus of defences of the novel as a humanizing influence, I find myself both trying to defend Flaubertian characterization against Jonathan Culler's initial attack, and in danger, in suggesting to the Henry James tradition that it has not understood ways in which Flaubert's characters are open to a moral reading, of getting caught up in their "humanizing influence" and "relevance to life" approach.

My paradoxical position of finding both James and Culler both right and wrong in quite different ways, and of wishing to steer a precarious course between their approaches, (allowing character as an important organizing centre of value, but insisting that such value is ultimately aesthetic and therefore not "real" or "relevant to life"), will, I hope, be clarified by the end of this chapter. But the important starting point of my disagreement with both in fact centres on a particular area, that of their presuppositions as to the value of intelligence.

In the case of Jonathan Culler it seems to me that there is actually a major contradiction in his overall argument, which becomes apparent in
his excellent discussion of the Flaubertian concept of "la bêtise"(26). He explains very well that this complex notion of stupidity, (whereby incomprehension, deliberate or otherwise, creates opaqueness and hence réverie), is a source of aesthetic value. But at the same time we have seen that in his"weak vessels" section he attributes a demoralizing function to "characters who are themselves stupid in their perceptions and responses"(27). It seems to me strange to have such a sophisticated grasp of the positive function of stupidity and then to apply norms of intelligence to an assessment of the stories, and this is a disagreement which I shall develop at length in this chapter.

The problem for the Anglo-Saxon tradition is posed initially in terms of Flaubert's obvious lack of the "reverent openness before life" which Leavis attributes to the"Great Tradition"(28). Amélie Bosquet, infamous as the perpetrator of the "Madame Bovary c'est moi" myth(29), might well be the initiator of this view too:

"Mais non! Ce n'est pas l'art, ce procédé sans sympathie et sans chaleur qui affaisse l'âme, qui tarit l'émotion, qui pétrifie à mesure qu'il crée, qui ne connaît ni l'enthousiasme ni la gaîté, qui ne sait pas renouveler la vie par un atome de vertu ou de bonheur, qui ne semble avoir d'autre but que d'exciter en nous un dégoût universel"(30),

a view developed to extremes by Turnell:

"in spite of its superficial moral orthodoxy, it is an onslaught on the whole basis of human feeling and on all spiritual and moral values."(31)

Obviously, given the use to which we have put Sartre's thesis in Chapter 1, there is no question of suggesting that Flaubert displays the enthusiasm for life which subtle moral ramifications apparently demand. But if Flaubert hated"life"and himself, his attitude to humanity is far less easily categorized, and several critics have offered assessments which completely contradict that of Leavis and Turnell. Even Lukacs, despite seeing Flaubert as one of the initiators of the "dehumanization
of life" in the nineteenth century novel, (because of his lack of an historical perspective), speaks of "the extraordinarily sensitive and highly moral Flaubert" (32), and Redfern claims that:

"Beneath all the viscous sluggishness, a permanent nerve runs through all Flaubert's work: his stamina and devotion to what he thought valuable. It is this need for embracing the living which prevents his work from succumbing to complete thinghood." (33)

Faguet describes Flaubert as:

"un de ces moralistes amers et moroses, de sens juste cependant, qui sont très salutaires à ce titre et même nécessaires, quelque chose comme la conscience chagrine de l'humanité." (34)

This seems to me to capture the atmosphere of Flaubertian "morality". It is undeniably present at many points, often quite strongly, and yet it is rather morbid. The moral feeling is sound, but there is no faith or optimism (no "reverent openness") controlling it, only a negative attitude and the constant temptation of cynicism.

That critics who are interested in moral readings should not have detected it, (even if it is not presented with any enthusiasm), seems to me strange, and I would suggest that Flaubert is really rejected for his lack of sophistication. Claiming that all of Flaubert's characters come from the limited range of "simpler souls", Henry James objects to the lack of "civilisation", of "finesse" of states of mind, "L'âme française at all events shows in him but ill" (35). This is clearly true, but merely illuminates all the difference between James' moral intensity (the constant subtle moral dilemma, the endless delicacies of sophisticated human consciousness), and Flaubert's, which is inevitably of a very different sort.

When the Goncourts declare that they have at last discovered what is "wrong" with Flaubert's writing, "son roman manque de cœur, de même que ses descriptions manquent d'âme" (36), they hastily add that this is of course not the same as "cœur dans la vie, qui est parfois à l'opposé".
Flaubert had constantly to defend himself against George Sand's sense of his lack of sensibility (37), and the nature of his admiration for Tourgéniev seems to be sincere:

"Mais ce qu'on n'a pas assez loué en vous, c'est le cœur, c'est-à-dire, une émotion permanente, je ne sais quelle sensibilité profonde et cachée." (38)

But James seems to refuse a sensibility which differs from his own. Just as Emma Bovary is considered 'altogether' too small an affair"(39), of Frédéric he asks "why, why him?"(40) He finds Mme Arnoux a mistake "somehow moral", a "compromising blunder" the worse in that Flaubert does not realize it:

"We do not pretend to say how he might have shown us Mme Arnoux better— that was his affair. What is ours is that he really felt he was showing her as well as he could, or as she might be shown."(41)

In answer to this criticism of Flaubert's handling of his hero and heroine, one has only to point out the author's own defence of the scene in which Frédéric listens in deep admiration and ecstasy to an elaborately described excerpt of Mme Arnoux's singing: "Notez, pour me disculper, que mon héroïnne n'est pas un musicien et que mon héros n'est pas un musicien et que mon héroïne est une personne médiocre." (42)

Clearly the characters are intended to be all that Henry James thinks he has spotted. Unlike Jonathan Culler, who offers them an aesthetic function, (albeit one with which I disagree), Henry James hesitates when he discusses the intentionality of such limited reflectors. For, quite unable to appreciate why Flaubert should deliberately have produced such characters, he dismisses them as a defect of Flaubert's mind, either because such characters must be the best that Flaubert can "manage", or if not, for the very intention! Either way they indicate Flaubert's "lack of reach" (43), and this view is reiterated less condescendingly, (James feels he "owes it" to Flaubert to point out this lack of reach), and also less tactfully, by Turnell:

"I think we must go on to say that his sensibility was not simply limited and intermittent, but was undoubtedly defective. It was a
sensibility which only touched life at comparatively few points." (44)

"We cannot fail to be struck by his fundamental uncertainty on all major issues, by an incapacity for social thinking and by a lack of what can only be called intelligence." (45)

It seems to me that the way to defend Flaubert is not in fact to disagree with this assessment of his intelligence. Sartre claims that there is not a single original idea in the Correspondance (46), and many commentators have insisted on his lack of any intellectual system, his disinterest in anything other than literature (47). The Goncourts' view of Flaubert's clichéd ideas would be typical (48), and Wetherill quotes Huysmans' extreme version of the general feeling about Flaubert's divided talents: "Quand ce grand écrivain ne tient pas la plume il est imbécile comme un charcutier" (49). While one may be a little uneasy about such an assertion, it is nevertheless perhaps more convincing than Maupassant's eulogy of Flaubert's intelligence. Referring to his conversations on art, his marvellous knowledge of humanity, the originality of his thought, his exact and striking maxims, Maupassant quotes Schopenhauer that when a man dies a world dies, the one in his head, that the more intelligent the head, the more distinct, clear, important and vast the world (50). It seems to me quite obvious that Flaubert did not carry a world in his head, for if he had a moral system it cannot be said that he had a philosophical one. Genette's reference to Proust's contention that Flaubert's stylistic innovations had renewed our "vision" is also relevant, for noting that Proust does not attempt to suggest in what the vision consists, he adds a sly "et pour cause" (51).

An equally unhelpful way of arguing back at Flaubert's Leavisite critics seems to me to be Peter Cortland's comment that the value of L'Éducation sentimentale lies in an exposition of the moral-sentimental atmosphere of life, whereby surface details are given human meaning and we can rearrange Frédéric's life to make a better one of our own, for we will be persuaded of the need for a dependable code of action (52). This
excellent example of exactly what I don't mean about moral values in Flaubert is summed up by Alison Fairlie's equally well-meaning answer to Henry James etc.: "it might be suggested that an author may convey vision and value not simply by reflection in his characters but by refraction from them" (53). Thus intellectual and aesthetic discrimination are two qualities which Flaubert deliberately does not allow his main characters, (I shall personally be distinguishing between "intellectual" and "aesthetic" discrimination), but these values are required of the reader. Flaubert's novels become:

"a probing and uncomfortable instrument for analysing both ourselves and the nature of things. His characters are rarely allowed to combine for long those qualities that through interplay and implication may be suggested as potential values: intelligence, sensibility, unpretentiousness, disinterestedness." (54)

As Alison Fairlie's reference to her admiration for Flaubert's "rich illusion of life" suggests (55), she in fact shares the conviction that literature is concerned with the "possibilities and limitations of the human condition" (56). She therefore shares the presuppositions as to the value of intelligence with the very critics against whom she is trying to defend Flaubert, and it seems to me that her slightly uneasy argument would be open to David Gervais' interpretation of the ambiguous rationalization of Henry James' divided response, the only way to account, without deserting a particular approach to literature, for a very evident liking for Flaubert (57).

A personal detail of how I first came across Leavis' attack on Flaubert might actually be relevant to this discussion. In reading George Eliot and Joseph Conrad I was struck by certain thematic similarities with Flaubert, and was interested, at one stage, in comparative possibilities. I therefore turned to The Great Tradition to read what Leavis had to say about these writers, and was genuinely surprised to find Flaubert presented as the arch-villain, as the worthless foil for all that is valuable in them. I should therefore like to offer a few examples, in a short digression, to
back up my surprise at the virulence of the attack on Flaubert, and to indicate the possibility of defending him even from this unlikely angle.

Let us start, controversially, with a reference to Henry James' *The Bostonians* where Olive Chancellor's mental torment is conveyed in the following way:

"'I am sure of it'. And her enjoyment of the situation becoming acute, there broke from her lips a shrill, unfamiliar, troubled sound, which performed the office of a laugh, a laugh of triumph, but which, at a distance, might have passed almost as well for a wail of despair. It rang in Ransom's ears as he quickly turned away."(58)

Turning to the character whom James finds "a compromising blunder", Mme Arnoux, and the very scene, (where she and Frédéric are "caught" by Rosanette), which Jonathan Culler chooses to illustrate the way in which Flaubert "deliberately" and brutally misses opportunities for moral exploration(59), we find the following:

"— Ah! oui! c'est une occasion! Partez! partez! dit Mme Arnoux. Ils sortirent. Elle se pencha sur la rampe pour les voir encore; et un rire aigu, déchirant, tomba sur eux, du haut de l'escalier. Frédéric poussa Rosanette dans le fiaire, se mit en face d'elle, et, pendant toute la route, ne prononça pas un mot."(60)

Similarly, when Deslauriers makes a pass at her "Elle partit d'un éclat de rire, un rire aigu, désespérant, atroce"(61), and one might note that the particularly deep-felt suffering of other inarticulate characters is also conveyed by terrible laughs, for example Djalich when he kills Adèle's baby(62), and Giocomo when he loses the Latin bible to Baptisto(63). While the torments of such characters generally pass unsuspected, and they tend to gain an added dignity in the eyes of the reader from this uncorrected misinterpretation of themselves, this is largely because the reader is allowed this glimpse into their moral depths.

When Conrad's Winnie, in *The Secret Agent*, hears what has happened to her brother Stevie

"The perfect immobility of her pose expressed the agitation of rage and despair, all the potential violence of tragic passions, better than any shallow display of shrieks, with the beating of a distracted head against the walls, could have done"(64),
one thinks of the always silent, immobile suffering of Flaubert's early heroes and heroines, Marguerite in her jealousy(65), Giocomo in court(66), and Djali in his useless passion, remaining "debout, immobile et muet":

"Ce n'était point une frénésie brutale et expansive, mais l'action se passait intimentement, sans cris, sans sanglots, sans blasphèmes, sans efforts."(67)

Silence and immobility become signs of value, as does the concentration of love on one object exemplified by Marguerite, Mazza, Djali, Alvarés, Charles and Justin, an ideal expressed by Dussardier when asked to reveal his *tastes* in women: "— Eh bien, fit-il, en rougissant, moi, je voudrais aimer la même, toujours!"(68). How can the same critics who would presumably admire the ethic of fidelity so important to *The Mill on the Floss*, and to Mary in *Middlemarch*,

"When a tender affection has been storing itself in us through many of our years, the idea that we could accept any exchange for it seems to be a cheapening of our lives. And we can set a watch over our affections and our constancy as we can over other treasures."(69),

find the albeit impotent adherence of Frédéric to Mme Arnoux, (organized by Flaubert almost despite Frédéric himself), a weakness or banality?

Flaubert's discussions of charity as an *imaginative* act of sympathy on behalf of others are well-known:

"cette faculté de s'assimiler à toutes les misères et de se supposer les ayant est peut-être la vraie charité humaine. Se faire ainsi le centre de l'humanité, tâcher enfin d'être son cœur général où toutes les veines éparse se réunissent, ... ce serait à la fois l'effort du plus grand et du meilleur homme?"(70)

and define the essential quality of Daniel Deronda:

"*Possibilities beyond the common, enlarged by his early habit of thinking himself imaginatively into the experience of others*"(71)

"a subdued fervour of sympathy, an activity of imagination on behalf of others, which did not show itself effusively, but was continually seen in acts of considerateness that struck his companions as moral eccentricity."(72)

Again, Daniel's imaginative fervour on behalf of other civilisations is exactly captured by Flaubert's contention:

"La curiosité, l'amour qui m'a poussé vers des religions et des
peuples disparus, a quelque chose de moral en soi et de sympathique, il me semble"(73)

In the actual works this privileged quality is particularly attributed to the least erudite, most inarticulate characters, such as Félicité, at the First Communion of Virginie: "avec l'imagination que donnent les vraies tendresses, il lui sembla qu'elle était elle-même cette enfant"(74),

dumb and ignorant Djalich: "où l'intelligence finissait, le cœur prenait son empire; il était vaste et infini, car il comprenait le monde dans son amour"(75), and finally Dussardier, equally uneducated and wordless, who cannot bear the sight of injustices and who is described by Flaubert as "de ceux qui se jettent sous les voitures pour porter secours aux chevaux tombés"(76).

The similarities between Flaubert's handling of Dussardier and Conrad's of the actual idiot Stevie, who quite evidently emerges as the moral centre (though ironically) in The Secret Agent, are apparent in the following passages, which I quote at length to close this digression.

Stevie's encounter with the cabman, the horse and the policeman is described in terms of a moral enlargement:

"He had formed for himself an ideal conception of the metropolitan police as a sort of benevolent institution for the suppression of evil. The notion of benevolence especially was very closely associated with his sense of the power of the men in blue. He had liked all police constables tenderly, with a guileless trustfulness. And he was pained. He was irritated, too, by a suspicion of duplicity in the members of the force. For Stevie was frank and open as the day himself; What did they mean by pretending then? Unlike his sister, who put her trust in face values, he wished to go to the bottom of the matter. He carried on his inquiry by means of an angry challenge."(77)

Compare Dussardier's attitude to authority which is described as refining his sensibility:

"Dussardier ne la chérissait pas moins [La République], car elle signifiait, croyait-il, affranchissement et bonheur universel. Un jour, - à quinze ans, - dans la rue Transnonain, devant la boutique d'un épicer, il avait vu des soldats la bâtonnette rouge de sang, avec des cheveux collés à la crosse de leur fusil: depuis ce temps-là, le Gouvernement l'exaspérait comme l'incarnation même de l'Injustice. Il confondait un peu les assassins et les gendarmes; un mouchard valait à ses yeux un parricide. Tout le mal répondu sur la terre, il l'attribuait naïvement au Pouvoir; et il la haïssait d'une haine essentielle, permanente, qui lui tenait tout le cœur et raffinait sa sensibilité."(78)
Jonathan Culler insists that in Flaubert silence is never allowed to figure profundity (79). Certainly it does not mask hidden intellectual powers, but there is such a clear disassociation of the intellectual and the moral throughout Flaubert's works that inarticulacy tends to emerge as the privileged access to value. If Flaubert never achieves this so finely as Conrad in Stevie, (and regardless of whether Conrad might have been influenced by Flaubert in this), Stevie's meditation on the wretched horse, through which Conrad indicates "the tenderness of his universal charity" (80), might stand as a point of reference against which to attempt our reading of Flaubertian values in the next section.

"Poor! Poor! stammered out Stevie, pushing his hands deeper into his pocket with convulsive sympathy. He could say nothing; for the tenderness to all pain and all misery, the desire to make the horse happy and the cabman happy, had reached the point of a bizarre longing to take them to bed with him. And that, he knew, was impossible. For Stevie was not mad." (81)

"The contemplation of the infirm and lonely steed overcame him. Jostled, but obstinate, he would remain there, trying to express the view newly opened to his sympathies of the human and equine misery in close association. But it was very difficult. 'Poor brute, poor people!' was all he could repeat. It did not seem forcible enough and came to a stop with an angry splutter: 'Shame!' Stevie was no master of phrases, and perhaps for that very reason his thoughts lacked clearness and precision. But he felt with greater completeness and some profundity. That little word contained all his sense of indignation and horror at one sort of wretchedness having to feed upon the anguish of the other - at the poor cabman beating the poor horse in the name, as it were, of his poor kids at home. And Stevie knew what it was to be beaten. He knew it from experience. It was a bad world. Bad! Bad!" (82)

If the Flaubertian characters that I shall offer as exemplary have normally been prejudged on account of preconceptions about desirable characteristics such as intelligence and articulacy, let us hope that this passage about Stevie, who surpasses even Giocomo, Djalioh, Charles, Justin, Dussardier and Félicité in his evident lack of linguistic and intellectual grasp, might go some way towards challenging received notions of moral value in literature (83).
Given the importance attributed, in the first chapter, to Flaubert's attitude to language and the way this becomes the positive basis of his aesthetic practice, the relationship of his characters to language will obviously be significant. If language should ideally be felt as opaque, then characters with linguistic difficulties, who already experience it as opaque, must surely be aesthetically privileged. If the Flaubertian récit is based upon a refusal of eloquence, then inarticulacy cannot be a fault or a disadvantage.

Graham Falconer suggests that the endless clichés of Madame Bovary, and the gap between words and ideas so often referred to, do not in any way undermine the text itself, since the narrator who recounts the impotence of language has full command of it. The "chaudron fêlé" intervention shows that he knows that such distinctions exist, and that he will be able to make them intelligible.

"Rien de plus banalement romantique, du reste, que cette notion d'une pensée ineffable que l'on essaie, quand même, de capter au moyen de mots hêlas inadéquats."(84)

The extent to which these remarks represent a trivialization of the theme of inarticulacy will, I hope, become evident. In fact it seems to me that Flaubert's handling of inarticulate characters does not really coincide with the Romantic cliché of thoughts lying too deep for expression, of thought and speech as two incommensurable orders. Although in the first chapter we examined ways in which, in the context of artistic creation, language itself tends to be blamed for expressive difficulties, the characters we are dealing with here are in the first instance presented as having a more psychological problem. It is not that the words do not exist, but that they quite simply do not have access to them. Inarticulacy is a
part of their make-up; they are unable to translate their experience of the
world into speech, and are especially unable to use language to communicate
with other people. But this is not because their thoughts are too "profound"
for expression; the same characters clearly lack intellectual capacity as well.

The value of the experience of such characters lies in its moral
rather than intellectual nature. They are reinstated in that they become
the embodiment of important Flaubertian values. In the next section we shall
see that the most exemplary characters incarnate vital aesthetic values, but
for the time being we shall be looking at characteristics which might in
a more traditionally straightforward way be felt as valuable in the moral
sense, (although there are already aesthetic connections), silence,
immobility, pantheistic love and understanding, and an experience which is
essentially concentrated and coherent, as opposed to diffused (85).

In this context eloquence and intelligence tend to emerge as a dis-
advantage. It may be recalled that Sartre's analysis of Flaubertian "bêtise"
detected a stroke of genius in the creation of Homais, in whom intelligence
is not only not used as a foil for stupidity, but is actually presented as
a sub-species of it (86). In fact a debunking of intelligence and eloquence
as a value is deliberately pursued right through Flaubert's works. Easy
eloquence, verbosity and pedantry are constantly criticized; Flaubert found
echo "une chose qui me laisse absolument froid" (87), and had no liking
for "les doctrinaires d'aucune espèce" (88). In his works he presents a long
line of complacent smooth talkers: Ernest, Paul, the later Henry, Lheureux,
Rodolphe, Homais, Demouchel and the pedant Bourais in Un Cœur simple.
Generally it is such characters who appear to succeed:

"Non! ce qui m'embête le plus profondément, ce n'est pas de ne pas être applaudi, ni compris, mais de voir les imbéciles applaudis,
exaltés." (89)

though in Un Cœur simple, perhaps the most important single reinstatement
of inarticulacy, the very same pedant who originally found reason to laugh
at Félicité's ignorance and simplicity is himself humiliated by the parrot, who turns out to have been the only one to see through him. The intellectual attitude which is so consistently played down is contrasted unfavorably with a simpler imaginative capacity for understanding.

In general the accepted function of spoken language as an instrument of self-expression and communication is undermined in various ways. Where it cannot be by-passed inarticulate characters are helped. For example for the reader they are bound to some extent to express themselves verbally, and one function of the much discussed "style indirect libre" would be to help such characters express themselves and appear to comprehend their own experience, of which they might in fact have only an intimation. Auerbach's brief analysis of the meal-time scenes in Madame Bovary captures the importance of "style indirect libre" to the portrayal of Emma. While the unfolding of her thoughts in fact remains entirely subjective, the subtle narrating intervention turns a vague, undefined malaise into a powerful feeling of dissatisfaction of which the causes are more or less put together(90). The passage concerning Emma's desire that her baby should be a boy is a good example of the way this works. It begins "Elle souhaitait un fils; il serait fort et brun; elle l'appellerait Georges". This is probably as much as Emma would be directly aware of, yet the text continues:

"et cette idée d'avoir pour enfant un mâle était comme la revanche en espoir de toutes ses impuissances passées. Un homme, au moins, est libre; il peut parcourir les passions et les pays, traverser les obstacles, mordre aux bonheurs les plus lointains. Mais une femme est empêchée continuellement. Inerte et flexible à la fois, elle a contre elle les mollesses de la chair avec les dépendances de la loi. Sa volonté, comme le voile de son chapeau retenu par un cordon, palpité à tous les vents, il y a toujours quelque désir qui entraîne, quelque convenance qui retient."(91)

This surely goes far beyond the actual thoughts in Emma's mind, bringing in issues of which she could at best have been only dimly aware, and in the last sentence even introducing a poetic image of the veil of her hat.
pulled away by the wind and yet still held back, which is obviously contributed by Flaubert and yet still seems offered by Emma herself. In Bibliomanie the silent and secretive Giacomo's passionate longing for the Latin bible seems like a sudden eloquent outpouring (though in suitably simple language), starting indirectly and with the typical exclamation marks reinforcing the ambiguity:

"Jamais, non plus, il n'avait tant désiré. Oh! qu'il eût voulu alors, même au prix de tout ce qu'il avait, de ses livres, de ses manuscrits, de ses six cents pistoles, au prix de son sang, oh! qu'il eût voulu avoir ce livre! Véndre tout, tout pour avoir ce livre; n'avoir que lui mais l'avoir à lui; pouvoir le montrer à toute l'Espagne, avec un rire d'insulte et de pitié pour le roi, pour les princes, pour les savants, pour Baptisto, et dire: À moi, à moi ce livre! et le tenir dans ses deux mains toute sa vie, le palper comme il le touche, le sentir comme il le sent, et le posséder comme il le regarde!"(92)

This usage is even more striking with Djalioh, whose only suggestions that he can speak at all are two relatively human "laughs" and some confused mutterings, and who apparently cannot even reason. For his fullest expression of the agony of not being able to speak is spelled out, as if directly, by himself:

"Djalioh ne répondit pas; seulement il bégaya et frappa sa tête avec colère. Quoi! ne pouvoir lui dire un mot! ne pouvoir énumérer ses tortures et ses douleurs, et n'avoir à lui offrir que les larmes d'un animal et les soupirs d'un monstre! Et puis, être repoussé comme un reptile! être hâ! de ce qu'on aime et sentir devant soi l'impossibilité de rien dire! être maudit et ne pouvoir blasphémer!"(93)

In the first chapter, we examined in some detail the ways in which Flaubert often builds up the preferability of sound over meaning, even in spoken exchanges, especially during "privileged moments" in special relationships, such that clichéd conversations often serve as well as any (94). But equally, where characters act in their own world rather than for the reader, eyes and looks often take precedence over spoken language as a means of establishing relationships and communicating. While it might occasionally be possible to give the theme of "le regard" an existential interpretation, (as in the "judging" gazes of Le Légende de Saint Julien
l'Hospitalier(95), John the Baptist's head(96), and M. Dambreuse's corpse(97) in the first instance it is simply an expressive love language of the eyes, as in Novembre: "nous restâmes longtemps nous regardant sans rien dire"(98). But Marie's eye becomes a dilating pupil, exercising a strange trance-like attraction, setting up a soporific amazement which will later be seen as essential to establishing an atmosphere of "ébahissement" and rêverie, vital to the affair between Henry and Mme Renaud, and to Salammbô(99). Indeed it is Mâtho's eyes which are finally able to convey his feelings to Salammbô:

"Il n'avait plus, sauf les yeux, d'apparence humaine de ses orbites sortaient deux flammes qui avaient l'air de monter jusqu'à ses cheveux; et le misérable marchait toujours! ces effroyables prunelles la contemplaient, et la conscience lui surgit de tout ce qu'il avait souffert pour elle."(100)

The infamous dog of the first Education sentimentale, (which I shall certainly not attempt to "interpret"!), is particularly interesting to the relationship between eyes and communication. Clearly the dog is supposed to be trying to tell Jules something:"le chien le regardait avidement comme s'il avait voulu lui parler"(101). At first he combines powerful looks with barkings and howlings, but as this fails to make itself understood the emphasis becomes centred purely on his "regard", which seems to be almost material:

"il semblait dans la nuit, sortir de chacun de ses deux yeux de flammes minces et flamboyants, qui venaient droit à la figure de Jules et se rencontraient avec son regard; puis les yeux de la bête s'agrandirent tout à coup et prirent une forme humaine, un sentiment humain y palpait, en sortait; il s'en déversait une effusion sympathique qui se produisait de plus en plus, s'élargissait toujours et vous envahissait avec une séduction infinie

Il n'y avait plus de cris, la bête était muette, et ne faisait plus rien que d'élargir cette pupille jaune dans laquelle il lui semblait qu'il se mirait; l'étonnement s'échangeait, ils se confrontaient tous deux, se demandant l'un à l'autre ce qu'on ne se dit pas."(102)

Even when Jules thinks that the dog has gone his two eyes suddenly appear in the dark, he is finally no more than a "regard". But the message is obviously supposed to have got through where the attempt at communication
via a coherent system of noises failed, an important aesthetic lesson, one might suspect.

In a letter to Alfred le Poittevin, Flaubert says:

"Il fut un temps où j'aurais fait beaucoup plus de réflexions que je n'en fais maintenant /.../ j'aurais peut-être plus réfléchi et moins regardé. Au contraire, j'ouvre les yeux, sur tout, naïvement et simplement, ce qui est peut-être supérieur." (103)

One sees that "le regard" is a creative concept here, related to the downgrading of an intellectual interpretation of the world, and again it is interesting that it is so often the inarticulate characters who are allowed to share these special powers. It is difficult to imagine them extended to the complacent, talkative characters. Even Charles is given one brief moment of victory (a look killing speech) over Rodolphe:

"il y eut même un instant où Charles, plein d'une fureur sombre, fixa ses yeux contre Rodolphe, qui, dans une sorte d'effroi, s'interrompit." (104).

Communication with nature or the material world often seems as intense as that with other people, and there are well-known Flaubertian quotations in this context. The establishment of a relationship seems to depend upon the generosity of the beholder:

"J'admire cette manière à la fois violemment et contenue, cette sympathie qui descend jusqu'aux êtres les plus infimes et donne une pensée aux paysages. On voit et on rêve." (105)

and something is received in return:

"La sève des arbres entre au cœur par les longs regards stupides que l'on tient sur eux [ ... ] les communications ent'humaines ne sont pas plus intenses." (106)

Jean Levaillant in fact suggests that "matière" takes over altogether, such that it is often the material world which gazes at the character rather than vice versa. While Frédéric waits in vain for Mme Arnoux he has the feeling that this is happening:

"Les objets les plus minimes devenaient pour lui des compagnons, où plutôt des spectateurs ironiques; et les façades régulières des maisons lui semblaient impit-yables." (107)

and the Flaubertian récit often adopts versions of the pathetic fallacy.
Mme Arnoux's personal trinkets are described as "presque animés comme des personnes" (108), and the pieces of furniture in Henry's room become "ces muets témoin de leur bonheur" (109). In this relationship material objects become particularly significant for their silent expressive powers, "en contemplant cette nature inerte et pourtant expressive par les souvenirs qui s'en exhalait" (110), and it is in the inarticulate context that fetishism, which in many ways suggests a pathological relationship to objects, might be seen as having a positive, even healthy function.

But it is above all nature which is given the responsibility for expression, at particularly emotional moments where characters would not know how to express the experience, or where direct narrative comment perhaps seems inadequate. In Un Cœur simple, when Félicité goes off to work enveloped by silent grief for Victor's death "les prairies étaient vides" (111). At the time of Emma's first depressions nature takes a sinister turn, and her real melancholy and boredom are later expressed by a howling dog and a monotonous distant chiming (112). Allowing particularly momentous occasions to have their reverberations in nature is a literary commonplace of course. But whereas in Shakespeare it might be symbolic, (e.g. the storm in King Lear), or used to underline the universality of events, Flaubert often uses it in a rather special way, namely to help his inarticulate characters, by passing over some of the expressive burden to the natural surroundings. The most momentous of these occasions coincide with Emma and Rodolphe's meetings by the river, and Frédéric and Rosanette's "honeymoon" in the Fontainebleau forest, which will be analysed later (113).

Such moments are invariably characterized by deep silence, whereby the contrast with the relative expressive poverty of speech is made obvious, especially as they are often preceded by short exchanges of clichéd conversation. The first "meeting" between Harr'Havas and Salammbô is perhaps a good example of the récit's constant rejection of speech.
Narr'havas, we are told, "se mit à raconter toute la campagne" (114). But instead of following him, the récit immediately dissolves into a description of the atmosphere of the garden. Finally Narr'havas arrives at a clichéd declaration of his love:

"Mais Narr'havas, poursuivant, compara ses désirs à des fleurs qui languissent après la pluie, à des voyageurs perdus qui attendent le jour. Il lui dit encore qu'elle était plus belle que la lune, meilleure que le vent du matin et que le visage de l'hôte. Il ferait venir pour elle, du pays des Noirs, des choses comme il n'y en avait pas à Carthage, et les appartements de leur maison seraient sablés avec de la poudre d'or. Le soir tombait, des senteurs de baume s'exhalaient. Pendant longtemps il se regardèrent en silence, et les yeux de Salammbô, au fond de ses longues draperies, avaient l'air de deux étoiles dans l'ouverture d'un nuage. Avant que le soleil fût couché, il se retira." (115)

These are the very moments analysed by Genette as moments of silence in the story coinciding with the récit's own dissolution into silence:

"Moments ... doublement silencieux; parce que les personnages ont cessé de parler pour se mettre à l'écoute du monde et de leur rêve, parce que cette interruption du dialogue et de l'action suspend la parole même du roman et l'absorbe, pour un temps, dans une sorte d'interrogation sans voix ... ces instants musicaux où le récit se perd et s'oublie dans l'extase d'une contemplation infinie." (116)

Not only are inarticulate characters all the more likely to bring about such aesthetically privileged moments, but at such moments the downgrading of language as an expressive instrument is surely complete.

In running through Flaubert's work chronologically, and pointing out examples relevant to the preceding generalizations, I shall not attempt to offer exhaustive coverage of these themes. But I should like at least to convey a sense of their prevalence, for if themes of language and expression have frequently been mentioned in passing, they do not seem to me ever to have received adequate critical attention. Though consideration of the gap between language and experience, for example for Emma and for Bouvard and Pécouchet, can at last be found in excellent articles like those of Bersani and Bernheimer (117), the more straightforward theme of inarticulacy
which is obviously so important to this and to most modern assumptions about Flaubert, has quite simply been omitted.

The earliest instance is the simple ill-treated Marguerite of Un Parfum à sentir, who is invested with a sort of compensatory "poésie", for Flaubert makes it explicit in his "Moralité" (118) that she is intended as a moral centre. When Pedrillo returns from gambling away his last money her sympathetic power of understanding removes the need for words:

"elle comprit la sueur qui coula de son visage; elle vit pourquoi ses yeux étaient rongés de colère, elle devina les choses qu'il pensait, à travers la pâleur de son front, et elle savait ce que voulaient dire ses claquements de dents. Ils restèrent tous deux ainsi, sans rien dire, sans se communiquer ni leurs peines ni leur désespoir, mais leurs yeux pourtant avaient parlé et s'étaient dit des pensées tristes et déchirantes." (119)

When Marguerite becomes unbearably jealous of Isabellada "elle souffrait, elle pleurait en silence" (120), and essentially she is the first of the long line of characters of simple aspirations, whose capacity for feeling is concentrated on one particular object.

I am constantly surprised that so little attention has been paid to Giacomo, who in the Sartrean (or even Ricardolian perspective) is such an ironic echo of Flaubert himself. (Sartre himself concentrates on the rivalry between Giacomo and Baptisto). The title Bibliomanie reveals his Balzacian "idée fixe", his whole life is completely centred on his passion for books, but this passion by-passes their content:

"Oh! il était heureux, cet homme, heureux au milieu de toute cette science dont il comprenait à peine la portée morale et la valeur littéraire; il était heureux, assis entre tous ces livres, promenant les yeux sur les lettres dorées, sur les pages usées, sur le parchemin terni; il aimait la science comme un aveugle aime le jour. Non! ce n'était point la science qu'il aimait, c'était sa forme et son expression; il aimait un livre parce que c'était un livre, il aimait son odeur, sa forme, son titre. Ce qu'il aimait dans un manuscrit, c'était sa vieille date illisible, les lettres gothiques bizarre et étranges..." (121)

Above all he loves the word "Finis"; ironically we learn just a few lines later that "Il savait à peine lire" (122). Giacomo is above all a silent
man, apparently by choice:

"Cet homme n'avait jamais parlé à personne, si ce n'est aux bouquinistes et aux brocanteurs; il était taciturne et rêveur."(123)

This causes him to be misunderstood and laughed at, and when he stands in court, accused of arson, theft, murder etc. "il était calme et paisible, et ne répondit pas même par un regard à la multitude qui l'insultait"(124), this dignified silence is set in relief by the prosecutor’s speech which precedes it:

"le Procureur se leva et lut son rapport; il était long et diffus, à peine si on pouvait en distinguer l'action principale des parenthèses et des réflexions"(125)

and that of his own "clever" lawyer: "il parla longtemps et bien; enfin, quand il crut avoir ébranlé son auditoire..."(126), who in fact makes the mistake of producing the second bible.

A similar contrast is set up in Quidquid Volueris between Djalioh, whose exemplary inarticulacy we have often referred to, and Paul. Djalioh cannot read or write, and while it is not made clear if he is actually dumb, for all practical purposes he obviously is(127). He is quite unable to make himself understood, and while his strange incoherent violin music at the wedding seems to be a form of self-expression, it in no way explains Djalioh to his audience(128). Djalioh is always misunderstood, yet the richness which lies behind his inarticulacy is made explicit for the reader:

"Si c'était un mot ou un soupir, peu importe, mais il y avait là-dedans toute une âme!"(129)

"Oh! son cœur était vaste et immense, mais vaste comme la mer, immense et vide comme sa solitude"(130)

"il avait en lui un chaos des sentiments les plus étranges, des sensations les plus étranges; la poésie avait remplacé la logique, et les passions avaient pris la place de la science."(131)

He is all poetry, passion and capacity for love, while Paul is a cold, rational person, who indeed has created Djalioh by way of a scientific experiment(132), a monster of civilisation, "et qui en portait tous les symboles, grandeur de l'esprit, sécheresse du cœur"(133). Paul is verbal,
while Djalioh's experience is always non-verbal, non-formulated:

"Autant l'un avait d'amour pour les épanchements de l'âme, les douces causeries du cœur, autant Djalioh aimait les rêveries de la nuit et les songes de sa pensée." (134)

Mazza and Ernest, of Passion et Vertu, often seen as a first sketch for Emma and Rodolphe, represent the same dichotomy, for Mazza lives in a world of feeling and emotion, while Ernest is all judgement and reason. Like Rodolphe, Ernest is a clever talker who knows how to exploit language for seductive purposes. He knows just how to flatter Mazza and persuade her out of her scruples (135). Once he feels it necessary he is even able to reason himself out of any feelings of love he may have, (again, similar to Rodolphe regretfully giving up Emma):

"La lettre était longue, bien écrite, toute remplie de riches métaphores et de grands mots;... Pauvre Mazza! tant d'amour, de cœur et de tendresse pour une indifférence si froide, un calme si raisonné!" (136)

The moral lesson behind the eloquent/ineloquent contrast is again spelled out: "Quel trésor que l'amour d'une telle femme!" (137)

In the 1845 L'éducation sentimentale Alvarès' silent love for Mlle Aglaé rings a typical note:

"il aurait épuisé l'éternité à tourner, comme un cheval au manège, autour de cette idée fixe et immobile, il n'en parlerait plus, mais dans le silence de son cœur il se consumait solitairment." (138)

and I feel that Flaubert comes near to doing something important with Shahutsnischbach, who is not just awkward but perhaps Flaubert's first really stupid character. He makes his first appearance arriving late to Mme Renaud's dinner party, in his everyday clothes and covered in chalk:

"étonné, confus, ébahî, ne sachant s'il devait s'en aller ou rester, s'enfuir ou s'asseoir, les bras ballants, le nez au vent, ahuri, stupide." (139)

Later we learn why Shahutsnischbach is the only young man of the household not to be in love:

"il travaillait toujours aux mathématiques, les mathématiques
devoraient sa vie, il n'y comprenait rien. Jamais M. Renaud n'avait eu de jeune homme plus studieux... ni plus stupide; Mendès lui-même le regardait comme un butor."(140)

When M. Renaud makes a silly joke he starts to laugh, "Alvarès et Mendès rirent, Shahutsnischbach ne comprit pas"(141), and at Mme Renaud's ball we find the stupid but good-natured Shahutsnischbach who "resté dans l'anti-chambre, aidait les domestiques à passer les plateaux de la salle à manger dans le salon(142). For in the strange interlude where Henry "beats up" M. Renaud in the street, Shahutsnischbach, who happens to be passing ("pour une commission que Mme Renaud lui envoyait faire"(143)), shows a contrasting and exemplary kindness:

"Et le bon Allemand, en effet, le réconfortait de son mieux, il alla lui-même dans la cour, y mouilla son mouchoir sous la pompe, revint auprès de M. Renaud et lui essuya le sang qui était resté le long de sa figure; il s'offrit pour courir lui chercher un médecin, pour acheter quelque drogue s'il en avait besoin, pour aller avertir chez lui, pour tout ce qu'il voudrait, n'importe quoi. En songeant que, jusqu'à cette heure, à peine s'il l'avait regardé et qu'il le méprisait-même pour son manque d'esprit, le père Renaud se sentait le cœur navré et était pris de l'envie de le serrer dans ses bras, de l'embrasser comme son fils."(144)

Built into the final development of Henry and Jules is a very marked contrast between apparent eloquence and apparent ineloquence. Henry ends up by becoming a man of the world, only really believing in feelings which can be expressed. His superficial intelligence is characterized by its verbal facility:

"Il croit bien connaître le théâtre, parce qu'il saisit à première vue toutes les ficelles d'un mélodrame et les intentions d'une exposition il passe pour avoir le tact fin, car il découvrira l'épithète heureuse, le trait saillant ou le mot hasardeux qui fait tache;"

"Il a un avantage sur ceux qui voient plus loin et qui sentiment d'une façon plus intense, c'est qu'il peut justifier ses sensations et donner la preuve de ses assertions; il expose nettement ce qu'il éprouve, il écrit clairement ce qu'il pense, et, dans le développement d'une théorie comme dans la pratique d'un sentiment, il écrase les natures plus engagées dans l'infini, chez lesquelles l'idée chante et la passion rêve."(145)

While such articulacy is typically combined with a complete inability to
understand people different from himself (146), his opposite, Jules, is seen to have moved right away from verbiage, especially as an artist:

"La discussion lui était devenue impossible, il n'y avait à son usage de mode de transmission psychologique que l'expansion, la communication directe, l'inspiration simultanée." (147)

But paradoxically Henry's earlier love affair with Mme Renaud is the first thorough exploration of the sort of relationship which becomes typical in Flaubert, (already tried out in Novembre), with emphasis on eyes and looks and immobility, but especially significantly on privileged moments of silent communion, sometimes following exchanges of clichéd love-talk:

"Mais les plus doux moments étaient ceux où, ayant épuisé toute parole humaine et se taisant, ils se regardaient avec des yeux avides, puis ils baissaient la tête et, absorbés, songeaient à tout ce qui ne se dit pas." (148)

On the boat to America the intensity of these silences escalates:

"ils ne se parlaient pas, mais, les bras passés autour de la taille, ils se serreraient étroitement l'un contre l'autre; on eût dit que, sans le secours de la parole, ils voulaient se faire passer dans le cœur l'un l'autre leurs souvenirs communs, leurs espérances faites à deux, leurs vagues angoisses, leurs regrets, leurs inquiétudes peut-êret, et mettre tout cela à l'unisson." (149)

In passing on to Madame Bovary, the outstanding inarticulate figure is obviously Charles. In that he is one of my main examples of characters of exemplary aesthetic importance, to be analysed later in this chapter (150), his analysis here is only a first sketch, indicating the extent of his linguistic failing rather than its full significance. For such a major character, his inarticulacy, vital to Emma's story, is certainly extreme. Critics seem to have more readily noticed that he speaks in clichés than that he is barely able to speak at all. It is not that Charles is a secretive, deliberately silent person, in fact he is by nature relatively expansive and tells Emma everything. He quite simply has no command of language. The novel opens with an introduction to Charles as "un nom inintelligible" (151) — he cannot even pronounce his own name. He only gets through his medical studies by dint of extreme application, for though he is mystified
by the sound of the subjects he is to take, he never understands anything of their content, and has to resort to learning by heart. Indeed one wonders if he ever really understood the content of his motto, "ridiculus sum", after simply copying it out twenty times (152). He has very little imagination and even when Emma begins to occupy his thoughts constantly he cannot imagine her in any other situations (153). He is enchanted by her voice, but does not get as far as the meaning of what she is saying: "Charles reprend une à une les phrases qu'elle avait dites, tâchant de se les rappeler d'en compléter le sens" (154). While Emma is having the time of her life at La Vaubyessard, Charles spends five hours by the card-tables "à regarder jouer au whist, sans y rien comprendre" (155). When he takes Emma to the opera at Rouen he cannot follow what is going on: "Il avouait, du reste, ne pas comprendre l'histoire - à cause de la musique, qui nuisait beaucoup aux paroles" (156). An important aesthetic issue is obviously at stake here, especially when one notes how easily Emma can follow the story of the opera. For when Flaubert describes her life at school and tells us that she likes music for the contents of the songs (157), he also points out that she is "de tempérament plus sentimentale qu'artiste" (158).

Charles is aware of his own inarticulacy to the extent that he dare not ask to marry Emma, "la peur de ne point trouver les mots convenables lui collait les lèvres" (159) - indeed he is right and when the time comes can only manage to stammer "Père Rouault...Père Rouault" (160). He is a social failure at his wedding since he is unable to keep up with the jokes, puns and obligatory allusions, their medium being essentially linguistic. It is amusing that to the extent that Charles is a new man the next morning, it is his powers of speech which are temporarily improved by his new confidence: "Nais Charles ne dissimulait rien. Il l'appelait ma femme, la tutoyait, s'informent d'elle à chacun" (161). What is surprising on closer examination of the text is that although Charles plays an important role
in the first part of the novel, he hardly ever actually speaks. Flaubert takes some pains to avoid Charles expressing himself in direct speech, and on the rare occasions where he does his stuttering is all the more poignant. The first reported conversation between Charles and Emma takes place at the ball, and shows how easily Emma can out‐argue him:

"- Les sous‐pieds vont me gêner pour danser, dit‐il.
- Danser? reprit Emma.
- Oui!
- Mais tu as perdu la tête! on se moquerait de toi, reste à ta place. D'ailleurs, c'est plus convenable pour un médecin, ajouta‐t‐elle. Charles se tut."(162)

Charles seems to be a little more confident in conversation with Homais, but his sentences are always short and simple, contrasting with Homais' lengthy and verbose speeches(163). When Charles learns that Emma is pregnant he is unable to contain his love and joy, but as usual is only able to express it by clumsy words and actions(164).

His distracted, wordless grief when Emma poisons herself is what makes the whole ending really moving in the way that Flaubert explicitly intended (165). He is quite unable to speak at all, and has to write a letter with his wishes for the funeral. His moral worth, surely always intended to be evident, is heavily underlined. Hardly able to speak to Emma "il la regardait avec des yeux d'une tendresse comme elle n'en avait jamais vu"(166).

One interpretation of the cruelly ambiguous finding of the autopsy on Charles, (they find nothing), would surely be that it sets the seal on his worth. Less dramatic than Salambô's death, it might be equally significant.

Emma herself is not inarticulate as such, though her language is clichéd(167), and it has already been emphasized that her tragedy is very much one of language(168). But Emma can understand all the difficult parts of the catechism at school, can out‐argue Charles, send out well‐phrased letters to his clients, and generally feels at home in a linguistic atmosphere. It is because she needs to talk to someone that she first gets dissatisfied with Charles, (the greyhound turns out to be a poor substitute).
and though at first she wishes that he would realize her need, he is more or less officially written off when "il ne put, un jour, lui expliquer un terme d'équitation qu'elle avait rencontré dans un roman"(169). Emma, then, really serves as a contrast for Charles here. It is because Charles is incapable of using the clichéd language of love with which she is familiar that she never can understand that he loves her. Her real personal failing is described as being her total inability to understand any experience other than her own: "guère tendre cependant, ni facilement accessible à l'émotion d'autrui"(170), and

"incapable, du reste, de comprendre ce qu'elle n'éprouvait pas, comme de croire à tout ce qui ne se manifestait pas par des formes convenues, elle se persuada sans peine que la passion de Charles n'avait plus rien d'exorbitant. Ses expansions étaient devenues régulières; il l'embrassait à de certaines heures."(171)

At the height of her disgust with him she denigrates him as "cet homme qui ne comprenait rien, qui ne sentait rien!"(172), and for Flaubert her mistake is obviously to think that the two activities of intellectual understanding and feeling have any necessary connection. Flaubert's rough notes make it clear that Charles is supposed to adore Emma far more than Léon and Rodolphe ever do, and that although clumsy and without imagination, he is "sensible"(173). Critical discussions of Charles as the clumsy, rather stupid husband who cannot cater for Emma's needs surely miss at least half of the point. Sartre in fact quotes an interesting description of Charles from the Nouvelle Version, where at their final meeting Rodolphe scorns Charles for not hating him:

"Car il ne comprenait rien à la passion vide d'orgueil, sans respect humain, ni conscience, qui plonge tout entière dans l'être aisé et touche presque aux proportions d'une idée pure, à force de largeur et d'impersonnalité!"(174)

This is precisely the moral ideal of universal sympathy which Emma is so far from, and my own interpretation of the much commented upon "C'est la faute de la fatalité"(175) would be that of course it is the ultimate
cliché, but it is also the ultimate act of generosity. As seen in his changed behaviour after Emma's death, Charles actually succeeds in understanding Emma, "raising"his ideal to the level of a great literary romance, passionate affairs etc., and these words seem to represent the final insight into her world, a generous act, in that Charles himself is not so trite.

But if Charles lies awake all night after Emma's funeral, (contrasted with Léon and Rodolphe), it is in fact Justin's eloquently silent grief which is given the privileged position as he lies sobbing at the graveside. Justin is almost a caricature of Charles in that he is even more linguistically incompetent. When Homais calls him a "petit sot" when he faints "Justin ne répondait pas" (176), when in disgrace over the arsenic his only response to Homais' "Parle, réponds, articule quelque chose?" is a few stutterings (177), and like Félicité's geography book, his copy of L'Amour conjugal has pictures by way of explanation (178). In fact Justin really is Charles' silent shadow in that he echoes his value, and as Flaubert makes quite specific in the text, he offers the other half of the adoring but silent devotion of which Emma remains quite unaware (179). He comes and goes so quietly that it is indeed easy to overlook him: "Il montait avec eux dans la chambre, et il restait debout près de la porte, immobile, sans parler" (180), and just as on the Sunday expedition his rôle is to carry the umbrellas and wipe the children's shoes clean (181), his devotion is never articulated, but like Félicité's it shows itself in acts of service:

"et Justin, qui se trouvait là, circulait à pas muets, plus ingénieux à la servir qu'une excellente camériste. Il plaçait les allumettes, le bougeoir, un livre, disposait sa camisole, ouvrait les draps." (182)

His greatest satisfaction is always to watch Emma, and his imaginative sympathy has the power to transform reality:

"Et aussitôt il atteignait sur le chambranle les chaussures d'Emma tout empâtées de crotte - la crotte des rendez-vous - qui se détachait en poudre sous ses doigts, et qu'il regardait monter doucement dans un rayon de soleil." (183)
That Flaubert regards such a power as an aesthetic one is suggested where he writes to Guy de Maupassant: "La poésie, comme le soleil, met l'or sur le fumier" (184), and while, like Charles, it is the erotic and sensuous qualities of Emma which fascinate him, for example her hair, he is ahead of Charles in understanding her value system, as we see in Emma's desire for a tilbury and groom, attributed precisely to Justin:

"C'était Justin qui lui en avait inspiré le caprice, en la suppliant de le prendre chez elle comme valet de chambre." (185)

One might also mention Père Rouault as an essentially simple man, given two or three directly expressed quite moving speeches, as where he comforts Charles on the loss of his first wife (186) or recalls his own wedding (187). There is no irony here, and his letter to Emma with its spelling mistakes and gaps where he goes off into rêverie contrasts strikingly with the letter he himself receives from the journalistic genius Homais, announcing Emma's poisoning: indeed it is so eloquently and skilfully worded that the meaning is not clear (188).

Père Rouault's grief is perhaps best summed up by the dye stains left on his face when he wipes his tears on his new smock (189), just as the old peasant woman is summed up by her hands. The passage where Catherine Leroux receives her medal is often commented upon, usually with emphasis on the contrast between the complacent bourgeoisie and "ce demi-siècle de servitude" (190). But I should like to point out in particular her silence and immobility. By frequenting animals all her life she has assumed their dumbness and placidity. Whereas the silly gaping crowd is shown drinking in the ridiculous speeches against a background of mooing cows etc., Catherine Leroux is so frightened by the noise, bustle and confusion, that her reaction is simply to stand quite still and silent, not knowing what else to do (191). In a scene carefully constructed so as to oppose the ridiculous parallel exploitations of language of the official speeches
(to seduce the crowd), and of Rodolphe (to seduce Emma), and both are shown to be equally effective, the implicit moral worth of the old woman who does not even understand language must be striking. Abuse of language for various reasons is so widespread throughout the novel - Lheureux's techniques of persuasion, Homais' journalistic powers, the campaign against the blind beggar, the one to persuade Charles to operate on the club-foot - that characters who do not speak might be prized quite simply for not mis-using language, even leaving aside their aesthetic significance. But one might offer Binet as a last example of a character who does not speak, for the passage in which we learn that Homais disapproves of him for this reason is preceded by an ironic introduction to him as an artist, (his lathe, his beautiful handwriting): 

"pendant tout le temps que l'on fut à mettre son couvert, Binet resta silencieux à sa place, auprès du poêle; puis il ferma la porte et retira sa casquette, comme d'usage. 
— Ce ne sont pas les civilités qui lui usèrent la langue! dit le pharmacien, dès qu'il fut seul avec l'hôtesse. 
— Jamais il ne cause davantage, répondit-elle; il est venu ici, la semaine dernière, deux voyageurs en draps, des garsçons pleins d'esprit qui contaisnt, le soir, un tas de farces que j'en pleurais de rire: eh bien! il restait là, comme une alose, sans dire un mot. 
— Oui, fit le pharmacien, pas d'imagina tion, pas de saillies, rien de ce qui constitue l'homme de la société!" (193)

Against the general down grading of language evident in all of these passages, there is a proliferation of expressive silences. Charles' early meetings with Emma often dissolve into a silence in which the first real contact is established (194), and he too is occasionally allowed to lead the novel into its own dissolution into silence, as where he first conceives the idea of marrying Emma (195). While Emma and Léon's feelings for a long time go unspecified, they experience "un murmure de l'âme, profond, continu, qui dominait celui des voix" (196), and at the moment of Léon's farewell there is a deep silence "et leurs pensées, confondues dans la même angoisse, s'étreignaient étroitement, comme deux poitrines palpitantes" (197). The superiority of silence over speech is often suggested: "Elle ne parlait pas;
il se taisait, captivé par son silence comme il eût été par ses paroles" (198), and their hotel room at Rouen not only acts as a recipient for their emotion but plays an active part in expressing it. At a moment of silent communion "la nuit s'épaississait sur les murs" (199), and the emotion and lyricism of one of their best moments, the evening on the water during their "honeymoon" at Rouen, is also characterized by silence (200). With Rodolphe these moments are if anything even more intense, with nature and silence clearly taking over part of the expressive burden, as in the well-known scene in the forest (201), but especially during their evening meetings at the bottom of Emma's garden by the river, already analysed in connection with the use of the lyrical iterative imperfect (202). Their last evening together is an outstanding example:

"La nuit douce s'étalait autour d'eux; des nuées d'ombre emplissaient les feuillages. Emma, les yeux à demi clos, aspirait avec de grands soupirs le vent frais qui soufflait. Ils ne se parlaient pas, trop perdus qu'ils étaient dans l'envahissement de leur rêverie. La tendresse des anciens jours leur revenait au cœur, abondante et silencieuse comme le riviére qui coulait, avec autant de mollesse qu'en apportait le parfum des seringa, et projetait dans leurs souvenirs des ombres plus émues et plus mélancoliques que celles des saules immobiles qui s'allongeaient sur l'herbe. Souvent quelque bête nocturne, hérissou ou belette, se mettait en chasse, dérangeait les feuilles, ou bien on entendait par moments une pêche mure qui tombait toute seule de l'espalier." (203)

Since there will be an important analysis of Salammô late in the chapter (204), it will not be discussed here, except to note that while there is no theme of inarticulacy as such, there is constant reference to language which seems to be regarded with superstition, (and therefore as having a life of its own). Of the various strange religious practices of the Barbarians, one is to repeat a name over and over "sans même chercher à comprendre ce qu'il pouvait dire" (205), and Atho, trying to rid himself of the "curse" of Salammô, engraves her name on a piece of copper and plants it in the sand at the door of his tent (206). Salammô herself seems both afraid of language:
"En effet, Salammô ne parlait pas de Jiscon, car, les mots ayant par eux-mêmes un pouvoir effectif, les malédictions que l'on rapportait à quelqu'un pouvaient se tourner contre lui"(207),
and a little uneasy in its use, taking some of Schahabarim's religious conceptions for realities:

"elle acceptait, comme vrais en eux-mêmes de purs symboles et jusqu'à des manières de langage, distinction qui n'était pas, non plus, toujours bien nette pour le prêtre".(208)

The multi-racial mercenaries introduce a theme of foreign languages at the root of misunderstandings important to the plot(209), as does Hamilcar's vow not to speak to Salammô about whatever may have happened with Kâtho in his absence(210).

While the relationship between Frédéric and Mme Arnoux will be discussed in a different way in the next section, it seems to me that the sort of values we have been examining are very clearly built into the presentation of character in L'Éducation sentimentale, in particular silence and stillness, and a concentration or coherence of experience. Frédéric's story is most obviously seen as embodying a tension between concentrated and diffused experience, as he dabbles in painting, literature, politics and business, dividing his energies between four women between whom he is incapable of choosing, and ending up with nothing and ad infinitum. Arnoux, Rosanette and many of Frédéric's Parisian acquaintance clearly provide the temptation of diffusion, and the "fidelity" despite everything to Mme Arnoux must surely emerge in this context as a value. More and more value is in fact built into Mme Arnoux as the novel progresses, both through the things Frédéric notices and clings to in her, and the way Flaubert builds up her aesthetic presentation. A whole theme of coherence is erected around her.

Without being inarticulate Mme Arnoux is essentially quiet and gentle, simple and unaffected. When Frédéric criticizes her for using bourgeois maxims she protests spontaneously that she has no pretensions to anything
else (211), she has no special love of literature (212), uses simple language, is superstitious, has clichéd pleasures like walking bareheaded in the rain (213). The first vision of her on the boat is offered against a background of the noise, bustle and confusion of the departure. The talkative Arnoux fits naturally into this scene, involving everyone in his dispersed conversation, giving advice, exposing theories, relating anecdotes (214). In even more pointed contrast her "apparition" is immediately preceded by a particularly squalid description of the mess on the deck, of the noise and constant movement of the passengers:

"Le pont était sali par des écailles de noix, des bouts de cigarettes, des pelures de noix, des détritus de charcuterie apportés dans du papier [...], on entendait par intervalles le bruit du charbon de terre dans le fourneau, un éclat de voix, un rire; et le capitaine, sur la passerelle, marchait d'un tambour à l'autre, sans s'arrêter."

While everyone else mixes, laughing, joking, and drinking together, dressed in old, worn and stained travelling clothes, Mme Arnoux sits alone and silent, her light coloured dress standing out against the blue sky. She is sewing, that is doing something useful, but above all, (unlike the captain), she is still: Frédéric observes her for some minutes in the same pose, and on his last view of her as the boat arrives:

"Elle était près du gouvernail, debout. Il lui envoya un regard où il avait tâché de mettre toute son âme; comme s'il n'eût rien fait, elle demeura immobile."

The immobile pose of this first scene is established almost as a leitmotif which appears throughout the novel. The many outstanding descriptive scenes in which Mme Arnoux's essential stillness is emphasized are those in which we have already seen that the récit invariably frames her (217), portraying her in static tableau form, highlighted by falling light or silhouetted, usually with her children, like a painting of the Madonna. On one occasion the continuity is even pointed out:

"Elle se tenait dans la même attitude que le premier jour, et cousait une chemise d'enfant."
Perhaps most striking of all is the description of her in the sunset at her fête at Saint-Cloud, where she is placed on a rock with the flaming sky behind her, while the other guests wander around somewhat aimlessly and Hussonnet on the river bank plays ducks and drakes(219).

In his *Correspondance* Flaubert in fact twice uses the image of playing ducks and drakes to imply moral dispersion:

"Ah! mes richesses morales! J'ai jeté aux passants les grosses pièces par la fenêtre et, avec les louis, j'ai fait des ricochets sur l'eau."

(220)

and of Louise Colet's idea of a communally directed review:

"On bavarde beaucoup, on dépense tout son talent à faire des ricochets sur la rivière avec de la menu monnaie, tandis qu'avec plus d'économie on aurait pu par la suite acheter de belles fermes et de bons châteaux."

(221)

But it is especially interesting that in the contrast that throws Mme Arnoux's value into relief, the less favorable highlight is put upon Hussonnet, for in the diffusion/coherence context Hussonnet often emerges as an anti-value, dispersing his talents and attention in all directions:

"Hussonnet ne fut pas drôle. A force d'écrire quotidiennement sur toute sorte de sujets, de lire beaucoup de journaux, d'entendre beaucoup de discussions et d'émettre des paradoxes pour éblouir, il avait fini par perdre la notion exacte des choses, s'aveuglant lui-même avec ses faibles pétards."

(222)

The dispersion here is specifically linguistic, but as the newspaper owner he emerges as a rival to Mme Arnoux for Frédéric's time, attention and money(223), and in general he distracts Frédéric from a coherent path, getting in his line of vision and interrupting his thoughts. This is perhaps made explicit at Rosanette's ball where the basket that Arnoux is carrying on his head nearly crashes into the chandelier. Frédéric looks up at it and recognizes it as the chandelier that used to be at the "Art industriel". This brings back memories and renews the value feeling that by attending this ball he is somehow betraying Mme Arnoux, but suddenly "un fantassin de la Ligne en petite tenue", who turns out to be Hussonnet in fancy dress, plants himself in front of Frédéric, congratulating him and calling him "colonel"(224).
Deslauriers of course has an even more distracting effect. When Frédéric arrives in Paris it is only on accidentally passing Arnoux's shop that he realizes that he had amazingly forgotten all about Mme Arnoux, and he mentally blames Deslauriers (225), whose contrasting value system is shown up particularly in the scene where he dismisses his mistress:

"Elle se planta devant la fenêtre, et y resta immobile, le front contre le carreau.
Son attitude et son mutisme agaça Deslauriers." (226)

that is, her stillness and her silence actually get on Deslauriers' nerves. In the context of the group of friends reference must obviously be made again to the one exemplary character, the inarticulate and loyal Dussardier, whom we first meet stammering "Où est mon carton? Je veux mon carton! Mon carton!" (227), who is unable to understand the implications of Frédéric and Hussonnet's pantomime and stories to help him out of trouble, whose erudition is limited to two books (228), but whose hatred of authority is single-minded and unswerving (229), and who is struck down at the end in a quite immobile pose ("restait sans plus bouger qu'une cariatide" (230)), faithful, (unlike the others) to his earlier cry of "Vive la République!" (231), and who dies a martyr's death "les bras en croix" (232). As indicated already, he is instinctively aware of the guiding moral thread of the novel in his desire always to love the same woman (233).

In terms of the actual plot it is probably Arnoux who most consistently leads Frédéric in the direction of dissipation, and the constant comparison between Frédéric and Arnoux is perhaps more interesting than that between Frédéric and Deslauriers, for Frédéric is described as coming to resemble Arnoux more and more (234). The scene where Frédéric first visits the "Art industriel" is typical of Arnoux's moral atmosphere - the apartment is packed, no one can move or breathe amidst the cigar smoke and dazzling light. All is bustle and activity against a background of different conversations (235). This moral chaos is carried over into the description
of the evening at the Alhambra, where even the talkative Arnoux is outdone:

"Mais ses paroles étaient couvertes par le tapage de la musique; et, sitôt le quadrille ou la polka terminés, tous s'abattaient sur les tables, appelaient le garçon, riaient; les bouteilles de bière et de limonade gazeuse détonaient dans les feuillages, des femmes criaient comme des poules; quelquefois, deux messieurs voulaient se battre; un voleur fut arrêté."(236)

and even more obviously into Rosanette's ball where Frédéric is taken by Arnoux and first meets Rosanette. This party-cum-orgy which is superficially so enjoyable clearly represents a diffused and worthless experience, which, interestingly, is at one point specifically related to language:

"Une horloge allemande, munie d'un coq, carillonnant deux heures, provoqua sur le coucou force plaisanteries. Toutes sortes de propos s'ensuivirent: calembours, anecdotes, vantardises, gageures, mensonges tenus pour vrais, assertions improbables, un tumulte de paroles qui bientôt s'éparpilla en conversations particulières."(237)

When the whole party collapses in exhaustion and the scene is transformed by light pouring in when somebody opens the shutters, it is the moment of sudden silence which causes the real value of the ball to become apparent. The frenzied excitement is no more than a sordid chaos, the costumes and flowers are all wilting, there are drink stains everywhere, the hair-styles have collapsed and make-up runs down perspiring faces. On returning home, Frédéric, half drunk and half asleep:

"voyait passer et repasser continuellement les épaules de la Poissarde, les reins de la Débardeuse, les mollets de la Polonaise, la chevelure de la Sauvagère. Puis deux grands yeux noirs, qui n'étaient pas dans le bal, parurent, et légers comme des papillons, ardents comme des torches, ils allaient, venaient, vibraient, montaient dans la corniche, descendaient jusqu'à sa bouche. Frédéric s'acharnait à reconnaître ces yeux sans y parvenir."(238)

Frédéric fights throughout the novel against distraction from Mme Arnoux, such that when he tells Rosanette "Je n'ai jamais aimé qu'elle!" (239), or when he tells Mme Arnoux herself:

"Est-ce que j'y pensais, seulement; puisque j'avais toujours au fond de moi-même la musique de votre voix et la splendeur de vos yeux!" (240)

I would prefer not to interpret this as a final pathetic act of weakness on his part. For if the presence of Rosanette's portrait reminds us that
he is rearranging the past to pretend that it was like this, still this is
how he would like to see it and is almost how it was, and in fact I feel
that Flaubert does make Mme Arnoux emerge in this ideal way for the reader.
Part of his problem is to build moral value into her despite the vulgarity
or mediocrity of those around her, and even, up to a point, despite Frédéric
When Flaubert describes Frédéric's awareness of Mme Arnoux as "une manière
générale de sentir" (241), it seems to me that in building the whole novel around
her, (by a complicated network of reminders (242)), he obliges the reader
to join in Frédéric's original desire to "vivre dans son atmosphère" (243),
an atmosphere which is not only poetic and emotional, but essentially moral.

"la contemplation de cette femme l'énervait, comme l'usage d'un
parfum trop fort. Cela descendit dans les profondeurs de son
temperament, et devenait presque une manière générale de sentir,
un mode nouveau d'exister." (244)

As might be expected, Frédéric's relationship with Mme Arnoux is most
fully consummated by expressive silences. There are several outstanding
moments displaying the usual features of a relatively banal conversation,
followed by a privileged suspension of everything in the stillness and
silence. When Frédéric visits Mme Arnoux before they are interrupted by
Rosanette:

"Mme Arnoux tourna son beau visage, en lui tendant la main, et ils
fermèrent les yeux, absorbés dans une ivresse qui était comme un
bercement doux et infini. Puis ils restèrent à se contempler, face
tà face, l'un près de l'autre." (245)

When Mme Arnoux visits Frédéric's house they exchange a few banalities
on their health and then the conversation falters into silence (246). On
another occasion, when they unexpectedly meet in the street, there is a
minute of complete silence during which neither of them speaks, followed
by a description of Mme Arnoux standing in the sun, followed by another
short series of clichés on the family and the weather before they go their
separate ways. She had not given him her hand, had not said one affectionate
word, but Frédéric, we learn, would not have exchanged this meeting 'pour
la plus belle des aventures"(247). Here at last is a specific declaration that such passages are more valuable than the "story" as such, and a fine example of how silence or even clichés where the meaning is virtually irrelevant can be as emotion-laden as any eloquently expressed speech.

Just as all three lovers were allowed access to these privileged moments in Madame Bovary, so they are given to all four women in L'Éducation sentimentale, for instance where Frédéric and Louise walk through the sand by the river at Nogent(248), and where Mme Dambreuse's seduction is followed by "une suspension universelle des choses"(249). But the most memorable of these passages is perhaps the Fontainebleau episode with Rosanette.

Rosanette is of course a subtle characterization in her own right, and not simply a foil for Mme Arnoux, (Mme Arnoux as the "grand amour" and Rosanette as "l'amour joyeux et facile"(250)). She is not made into the stock figure of the "harlot with a heart of gold", her vulgarity remains until the end, and in the tour of the palace she has just proved her complete ignorance and lack of culture(251). And yet, even though she clearly prefers the carp and the souvenir stall selling wood carvings to the beauty of the palace and the forest, Rosanette is in fact allowed the privilege of the most intense experience of the novel. For although Frédéric's very presence at Fontainebleau during the June Days, his fetishisation of the history of the palace and of Diane de Poitiers(252) contrasting with his complete indifference to the historical events happening around him, seems to invite an ironic reading, in fact the pages of lyrical description of the forest seem to be taken seriously. It is here above all that the burden of expression is passed to the natural surroundings. The whole forest is enveloped in silence, the only sounds come from nature and seem to add even more expressiveness:

"Quand la voiture s'arrêtait, il se faisait un silence universel; seulement on entendait le souffle du cheval dans les brancards, avec un cri d'oiseau très faible, répété."(253)
Rosanette, for Frédéric, becomes almost a part of the forest (254). At times they lie on the grass, gazing at each other in silence, "ne parlant plus" (255). Rosanette for the first time gives some details of her early life, less significant in themselves than the will to speak about herself and the suggestion of inexpressible emotion. As her story breaks off at the vital point:

"Les feuilles autour d'eux susurraient, dans un fouillis d'herbes une grande digitale se balançait, la lumière coulait comme une onde sur le gazon; et le silence était coupé à intervalles rapides par le broutement de la vache qu'on ne voyait plus."(256)

Flaubert's final comment on the passage is to point out how incomplete verbal expression is: "il est difficile d'exprimer exactement quoi que ce soit"(257). But the lyrical description of nature takes over from Rosanette's ineloquence, she loses the expressive responsibility, and the trees and rocks of the forest that seem to move and take on a life of their own surely contribute to this(258).

Language is a central theme of all three of the Trois Contes, and with Félicité, who will be rediscussed in the final section of this chapter, a completely inarticulate character is raised to a central position. She is quite uneducated apart from Paul's explanations of a picture book geography; she cannot read. Where she speaks directly in the text, as in the bull incident, it is in very short sentences (259), and she is so silent and orderly that she seems to function automatically (260). Her life is made up of regular work and devoted service, at times of sorrow her reaction is to keep on working and her devotion to those around her is constantly shown in small acts of kindness (261). When she hears about Victor's death she keeps her grief hidden and silent (262), and when Virginie dies she repeats the same prayers for two nights (263). As she gets more deaf she appears more and more stupid (264).
The chief foil for Félicité is Bourais, the pedant, the culmination of Flaubert's long line of self-satisfied, "knowledgeable" characters. The contrast is underlined when Félicité asks Bourais to show her where Victor is on the map. Bourais, wrapped up in lengthy explanations of longitudes etc., is enormously amused when she asks him to point out Victor's house (265). But Flaubert makes it plain whose understanding is really the more valuable. Félicité does not need Bourais' intellectualism for she has been following Victor in her imagination. She is thirsty on his behalf when it is hot (266), frightened for him when there is a storm (267), and her simplicity is enhanced by a genuine interest and desire to know; her attempts to visualize Havana involve clouds of smoke "à cause des cigares" (268). Félicité's heart and imagination dominate her whole conception of reality; because Virginie and Victor are linked in her heart she imagines that their destiny must be the same (269). Similarly her understanding of religion takes place on the level of imagination and emotion, as she reduces everything to the level of her own life:

"Les semaines, les moissons, les pressoirs, toutes ces choses familières dont parle l'évangile, se trouvaient dans sa vie; le passage de Dieu les avait sanctifiées; et elle aima plus tendrement les agneaux par amour de l'Agneau, les colombe à cause du Saint-Esprit." (270)

"C'est peut-être sa lumière qui voltige la nuit aux bords des marécages, son haleine qui pousse les nuées, sa voix qui rend les cloches harmonieuses; et elle demeurait dans une adoration, jouissant de la fraîcheur des murs et de la tranquillité de l'église!" (271)

When the priest gives the history of the bible she can imagine vividly Paradise, the Great Flood etc., but when it comes to dogma "elle n'y comprenait rien, ne tâcha même pas de comprendre" (272).

Her sympathetic understanding is such that she can forgive Kme Aubain for sending Virginie away to the convent, and for thinking Virginie so much more important than Victor (273). The height of this power comes during Virginie's First Communion where Félicité identifies with Virginie.
to such an extent that she feels she actually becomes her (274). This is the first sense in which Félicité emerges as a sort of artist figure, for sympathy is the quality which Flaubert insists the artist needs in vast quantities (275). Though a recluse from the world, and without being articulate, she is able to experience the fullness of the world more completely. Like Justin's her love can transform reality however ugly it might be — she forms a fetichistic attachment to Virginie's hat although it has been eaten by vermin, she loves Loulou even more and kisses him when he has become worm-eaten, and she lovingly tends the cancer-ridden Père Colmiche. Certainly Emma could not have sympathetically accepted the hideous blind beggar, and the importance of this particular theme emerges when Julien's accession to sainthood seems to be made ultimately dependent upon his willing and selfless embrace of the repulsive leper. There is a fascinating point of reference for this in Dostoyevsky's The Brothers Karamazov, which I quote at length for its pertinence:

"I must make a confession to you", Ivor began. 'I never could understand how one can love one's neighbours. In my view, it is one's neighbours that one can't possibly love, but only perhaps those who live far away. I read somewhere about 'John the Merciful' (some saint) who, when a hungry and frozen stranger came to him and begged him to warm him, lay down with him in his bed and, putting his arms around him, began breathing into his mouth, which was festering and fetid from some awful disease. I'm convinced that he did so from heartache that originated in a lie, for the sake of love arising from a sense of duty, for the sake of a penance which he had imposed upon himself. To love a man, it's necessary that he should be hidden, for as soon as he shows his face, love is gone." (276)

This precise insight into Julien's psychological motivation, with its sense of the enormous effort over self required, sets in full relief Félicité's entirely spontaneous selflessness, which is completely without personal motivation. While Félicité's "sainthood" emerges largely by an effect of metonymic association with the saints of the other two stories of the Trois Contes, this quotation perhaps indicates the extent to which Flaubert would consider it deserved (277).
The parrot is so important that we shall be looking at him again later. He is certainly the most amazing feature of Félicité's gradual sanctification. As the circle of her life and experience closes in to centre exclusively upon Loulou, he becomes everything to her, a son, lover, and her only remaining means of understanding the religion that is now so important to her, as turning him into a somewhat dubious fetish she comes to saying her prayers in front of him. It is through his supposed similarity to the parrot that the Holy Ghost becomes more intelligible to Félicité, and she decides that God must have used a parrot to announce his coming rather than a dove (278). This illustrates that Félicité regards Loulou as a means of communication, and Loulou's significance to the theme of language is obviously vital. He can be taught to repeat phrases, but will have no conception of content, except that he can be trained to respond in certain ways to external stimuli such as the door-bell (279). The endless conversations between Félicité and the parrot based on the three phrases she has taught him have no apparent coherence (280), but a mutual communication nevertheless takes place. He only ever talks to Félicité, always refusing to "perform" for the neighbours, and even tries to entertain her when she goes deaf:

"Tous les êtres fonctionnaient avec le silence des fantômes. Un seul bruit arrivait maintenant à ses oreilles, la voix du perroquet!" (281)

The parrot is not only an important centre of experience and communication, but as an extreme caricature of Félicité herself, (in his linguistic ability), he is also the real foil for Bourais, for it is Loulou's privilege to see through him from the start, laughing at him every time he sees him and humiliating him to such an extent that he has to arrive at the house by stealth, with his hat covering his face (282). And of course the "truth" about Bourais does come out in the end (283), underlining Loulou's moral victory.
La Légende de Saint Julien l'Hospitalier has already been analysed at length, but in this particular context it is perhaps worth pointing out the theme hinted at in *Salammbô*, that of language as misunderstanding (284). Julien's mother and father deliberately do not tell each other of their visitations (285), and when Julien feels the first urges to kill, he keeps the incident of the mouse to himself (286), although he is potentially displaying the qualities that his father prizes so highly. Julien leaves home without telling his parents why, and it is a long time before he is able, with great difficulty, to tell his wife of the stag's prediction. She, in contrast, "la combattit, en raisonnant très bien" (287), yet she hides it from Julien's parents in her turn (288). Finally Julien, like Charles, is obliged to write down his wishes for his parents' funeral.

In the first instance there seems to be a real psychological block behind the inability to speak. Julien only actually speaks once in the text, ("C'est pour t'obégir!" etc. (289)), and his parents only contribute one startlingly simple direct speech: "Oh bien! c'est nous!" (290). While the whole story is engulfed in a deep silence (that of the château and the forest, especially when Julien goes off on his last fatal search for blood (291)), the only confident speeches are supernatural - the beggar, the hermit, the father stag, the "loup". Though all the events take place in a supernatural atmosphere of absolute necessity, which could not be altered by the silencing of fears, this inability to speak might equally be included as a part of the necessity. Discussing the problem of *Phèdre* as to tell or not to tell, Barthes suggests that things are guilty because they are hidden rather than hidden because they are guilty (292). It seems to me more than possible to apply this idea to *Saint Julien*, where there seems to be an actual taboo on the spoken word. When this taboo, and the hidden desire to kill the parents, is transgressed by the récit, this not only operates through a supernatural manifestation, (an animal speaks), but also through
a quite amazing pun. In cursing Julien three times "maudit! maudit! maudit!" (293), the stag makes it clear that he knows what he is doing: "Mot dit! mot dit! mot dit!" (294). Here is a fine example of the reader's vital rôle as voice of the text, needing to provide the "spoken aloud" dimension which makes the written pun work (295).

In cursing Hérodias for her incest, John the Baptist also uses the words "maudit! maudit! maudit!" (296), and it is evident, as Maurice Delcroix remarks, that the beheading of Iaokann in Hérodias should be understood as a silencing of speech (297). As the head of the corpse sits on the plate it still seems to speak, "Par l'ouverture de leurs cils, les prunelles mortes et les prunelles éteintes semblaient se dire quelque chose" (298), and it is ironically noted by Iaokann's supporters that "Il est descendu chez les morts annoncer le Christ!" (299). As the story of a prophet the theme of Hérodias is inextricably connected with that of language, and when Vitellius uncovers Iaokann's prison the doves which Féliçité would replace with parrots circle above his head (300). In fact Maurice Delcroix makes the most interesting observation that in repeating all the old prophecies Iaokann in fact speaks in clichés (301), indeed his words are repeated and echo around the story without anyone really understanding them. Their power is rather in their apparent solidity and materiality. The first curses which are spat out at Hérodias fall like "une pluie d'orage" (302), and the major prophecy, so beautifully framed in the centre of the story (303), hits the crowd like a series of "grands coups" (304). When Antipas orders Iaokann to "se taire", it is emphasized that it is the voice which replies (305), and all this has to be interpreted into another language for the official visitors, who also have to have the word "Messiah" explained to them. When Jacob yells out that "Élie" has already come and that his name is Iaokann, "Antipas se renversa comme frappé en pleine poitrine" (306). To keep Iaokann's prophecy, which he does not
really understand, hidden, Antipas resorts to trying to keep Iaokanann himself hidden. Along with this theme of things hidden, Hérodias has never in the history of their marriage spoken about her daughter(307), and when Phanuel reads the prediction of an important man's death in the stars Antipas is careful not to tell Hérodias about it(308). Clearly it is not only Iaokanann's speech which is feared as powerful, for Iaokanann as prophet is perhaps, in Flaubert's story, feared as an incarnation of speech itself. Mannaei vents his hatred on the Jewish temple by swearing at it, believing, like Salammbo(309), "que les mots avaient un pouvoir effectif"(310), and it is of course ironic that Antipas, who is afraid to do anything about Iaokanann and will not give the word for him to be beheaded, is finally, on account of Salomé, "contraint par sa parole"(311).

Finally, to deal in a preliminary way with Bouvard et Pécuchet, both are shown as simple and rather inarticulate figures, often contrasted with their "clever" acquaintances. For instance after M. de Faverges' dinner they are sickened by their inability to contest the ridiculous things that are said:

"Tout ce qu'ils n'avaient pu dire s'échappa en exclamations.
— Quels idiots! quelle bassesse! Comment imaginer tant d'entêtement! D'abord, que signifie le droit divin?
L'ami de Demouchel, ce professeur qui les avaient éclairés sur l'esthétique, répondit à leur question dans une lettre savante."(312)

In their philosophical studies there is another apparent plea against pedantry and intellectualism:

"Tant d'embarras pour démontrer des platitudes, le ton pédantesque de l'auteur, la monotonie des tournures ... enfin tout ce verbiage les écrssa tellement que, sautant par-dessus la faculté de vouloir, ils entrèrent dans la Logique."

But however many times this lesson is underlined for them, they do not seem to realize their own "superiority", for a long time failing to learn and returning for more(314).

One of the most memorable aspects of the novel is perhaps their
relationship and their mutual understanding, which never more than superficially needs language to express itself. As a pair they are not understood by the outside world, but together they always have the same idea at the same time. In the "scénarios" we find that the second chapter was to start with "un grand mouvement lyrique pour exalter leur amitié" (315). This is presumably the splendid passage which occurs during the period of landscape gardening, where each prepares a surprise for the other on the same morning. Pécuchet has got up at dawn, and "tremblant d'être découvert" (316), surpassing all previous efforts, has trimmed the yew trees into the shape of peacocks. Bouvard, acknowledging this with "de grands éloges", modestly pretending to have forgotten his spade:

"entraîna son compagnon dans le labyrinthe, car il avait profité de l'absence de Pécuchet, pour faire, lui aussi, quelque chose de sublime. [.....]

— Comprends-tu mon impatience?
— Je crois bien!
Eh, dans leur émotion, ils s'embrassèrent."

While this exchange captures the special flavour of their friendship, in the rough notes Flaubert also says:

"Ce ne sont pas précisément des imbéciles. Ils ont beaucoup de sentiments et d'embrions d'idées qu'ils ont du mal à exprimer. [.....] Leur grotesque est surtout dans leurs discours et leurs façons plus que dans leurs idées."

Pécuchet is given a moment of pantheistic understanding of the universe, whereby, rather like Félicité, he understands matters on his own level, quite without rationalization:

"l'atmosphère était lourde; et Pécuchet, dans une sorte d'abrutissement, rêvait aux existences innombrables éparse autour de lui; aux insectes qui bourdonnaient; aux sources cachées sous le gazon, à la sève des plantes, aux oiseaux dans leurs nids, au vent, aux nuages, à toute la nature, sans chercher à découvrir ses mystères, séduit par sa force, perdu dans sa grandeur." (319)

Simple rêverie gains superiority over intellectual comprehension. Bouvard, too, is given his own special moment, as he walks home with Mme Bordin after the play reading:

"D'abord ils marchèrent le long des quenouilles, sans parler. Il
etait encore ému de sa déclamation, et elle éprouvait au fond de l'âme comme une surprise; un charme qui venait de la littérature. L'art, en de certaines occasions, ébranle les esprits médiocres, et des mondes peuvent être révélés par ses interprètes les plus lourds."(320)

What was seen as a peculiar phenomenon in the man who works the telegraph in Par les Champs et par les Grèves(321), seems now to be the essential privilege of the inarticulate artist. And though what Flaubert is doing with stupidity in Bouvard et Pécuchet cannot be simply defined, it should now at least be clear that we could not possibly accept Bardèche's recent assessment of what Flaubert is saying about intelligence in the novel.

Bardèche describes Bourget's view, that it deals with the derisory impact of thought on imbeciles who think that they are "instruits" as: "a brilliant and profound interpretation"(322). From the ravages accomplished by science on two beings whom nothing has prepared to receive the formidable shower of all new ideas, he praises Flaubert for decrying our modern sin of inundating minds of all orders with books and newspapers:

"avons-nous bien calculé l'ébranlement produit dans les âmes par cette exagération de jour en jour plus forçée de la vie consciente?"(323)

This return to the old idea of Emma Bovary as one whose troubles are caused by "too much education", illustrates the confusion caused by Flaubert's complicated modal stance of an irony "which makes madness more mad"(324), for his intended subtitle, "Du défaut de méthode dans les sciences"(325), has clearly caused critical havoc(326). But it seems to me that the possibility, which we have been outlining in this section, of assessing his presentation of the intellectual attitude and of linguistic facility in terms of his overall value system, in fact offers a way of beginning to sort out the ironic chaos. 
(iii) Aesthetically exemplary characters.

a) The status of reality

In our discussion of what Sartre means by the aesthetic or imaginary attitude we saw that it essentially involves the adoption of a different mode of consciousness whereby the real is derealized, that is experienced as if it were imaginary(327). Those characters whose relationship to reality is pathological therefore potentially have instant access to the aesthetic realm, and our evaluation of the status of reality in Flaubert's work will reveal another area in which supposedly pathological characters, (ranging from neurotic to near psychotic), become privileged. As we saw there is anyway a problem for Sartre of evaluating the aesthetic attitude, which seems to be an unhealthy preference for a particular way of life, yet a normal way of experiencing a work of art(328). Strictly speaking, of course, Sartre's way out is always to refuse to evaluate a neurosis, and looking at Flaubert's behaviour in Egypt we found a good example of the two possible attitudes that might be taken. While Maxime du Camp describes Flaubert as being permanently in a daze and "not quite there", and Flaubert describes his own state of mind as that of someone who has constantly had too much to drink, for the former this is negative but for the latter it is clearly something positive, and it was here that we located the first conscious enjoyment of this ability to experience life as a dream(329).

In Flaubert's work it seems possible to trace a devaluation of objective reality, for values are directed so that neuroticism almost becomes an indicator of value. Certainly if it can be suggested that something is wrong with reality neuroticism will have to be assessed in a different way. Though complete stillness and silence could be seen as
rather morbid features of personality we have seen that they are presented as aesthetically desirable. Similarly other dangerous symptoms of hebetude, avid contemplation or a more passive attitude of docile perception whereby thought becomes strange to itself, are aesthetically important because they seek to preserve the opaqueness and strangeness of the object, and this appears to be the ideal relationship, based on contemplation, that Flaubert would establish between reader and work of literature. We therefore find that the many autistic poses and "stupid" stares of the central characters of the early works, (such as Djalich, Julietta, Smart and Saint Antoine), turn through a characteristic "ébahissement" to aesthetic amazement, and so into a fully developed and ultimately self-conscious aesthetic attitude. Roger Huss suggests that the frequent use of the word "stupide" in the early works "conveys above all an absence of reaction, a refusal or inability to sympathise". The deliberate or non-deliberate preservation of opaqueness which Flaubert seeks in an aesthetic context therefore develops naturally out of this. In Giacomo's experience of reality as "une fantasmagorie dont il ne comprenait pas l'étrange", of the people in the streets as "ombres chinoises", reality is already presented as something of a 'spectacle'. By journal d'un Fou, the narrator is beginning to enjoy his "hélétement stupide", and in November "béance" is accompanied by astonishment rather than unease. With Henry in the first Education sentimentale we find both kinds of "hélétement", a dullness and stupidity caused by the strangeness of his new surroundings, which is depressing and emphasizes his loneliness:

"les yeux tout grands ouverts, il contemplait d'un air stupide les quatre pieds de cuivre d'une vieille commode en acajou plaqué qui se trouvait là" (336)

"il entrait dans un café et restait une heure entière à lire la même ligne d'un journal." (337)

and a stupified "enivrement" and "avidité" of amazed contemplation in his
affair with Emé Renaud, which now characterizes enjoyment and yet shares remarkably similar qualities. — "dans l'environnement d'eux-mêmes... Ils se regardaient, avides et stupéfaits" (338).

Our brief analysis of Emma Bovary in the last section suggested that she had little aesthetic awareness, and was in that sense a foil for the more privileged values of Charles and Justin (339). The evaluation of Emma as a character therefore raises an interesting problem. It seems to me that her dissatisfaction with reality is presented as a positive moral value, and this being an important theme of the novel she therefore does emerge as a privileged character. But though a reversal of the status of the real and the imaginary does take place through Emma, she is never allowed to turn this into the aesthetic attitude. Flaubert lends his aesthetic support to Emma's world-view, (that there is something "wrong" with reality), but refuses to allow her the artist's way out. Her experience therefore remains negative, and unlike Frédéric, who will be discussed below (340), she is not "saved".

The only way to evaluate Emma's experience is obviously through the novel itself, for that Flaubert might have shared Emma's world-view will not be considered relevant here. To reiterate my basic point, it is not that Flaubert thought up a story to convey a particular experience, and then spent some five years making its expression beautiful, but that the two dimensions of the experience of reading, the aesthetic and the moral, are inseparable, the first creating the second. We must therefore inevitably pass to the level of aesthetic organization.

The question of Emma's status as heroine of the novel is most apparent at the level of the ambivalent narrative attitude to her. Do we sympathize with her very real plight, or are we led to either openly laugh at her or at least to adopt a critical stance towards her foolish "romantic" aspirations, her selfish concern with herself and her constant histrionic self-
dramatization? The case might be argued either way, for her presentation is certainly ambiguous. For a large part of the novel we are obliged to share her viewpoint on the world and the events of her life, to some extent to live through the reasons for her unhappiness and to participate in her depression - at other points she is suddenly withdrawn from the foreground and her rôle as privileged consciousness, the changing viewpoint technique turning her into an object and introducing an ironic, critical dimension. This ambivalent presentation is even carried into the presentation of her thoughts by the use of the "style indirect libre", for while we have seen that this can be used to aid our understanding of Emma's feelings (341), it remains, in its mimetic potential, a way of introducing a note of irony, which prevents us from becoming completely and uncritically immersed in her consciousness.

But I feel that it is possible to move beyond the tension between sympathy with her viewpoint, (just sharing her experience, hence inevitable sympathy), and overall ironic treatment of her silliness. For there is a tendency towards a more fundamental (even intellectual, if the word were not misleading in our context) sympathy, which goes beyond superficial sympathy or criticism, constituting a moral "message" of sorts, or at least a moral experience. If Emma is dissatisfied with her life and with reality, it is reality which is blamed, not Emma. Written into her story is the suggestion that although her hopes and dreams seem almost inevitably to wither into lies and disappointments, this is only marginally a critique of Emma, for it implies rather that there is something fundamentally wrong with reality. In other words, despite her silliness her metaphysical unease is taken seriously, for she is the only character to feel it, except perhaps for the "perruquier" at Tostes whom she watches through the window at the height of her depression:

"Lui aussi, le perruquier, il se lamentait de sa vocation arrêtée, de son avenir perdu, et, rêvant quelque boutique dans une grande ville,
comme à Rouen, par exemple, sur le port, près du théâtre, il restait toute la journée à se promener en long, depuis la mairie jusqu'à l'église, sombre, et attendant la clientèle." (342)

It is not just that her convent education has given her aspirations above her status in life, or that she has read too many novels and as a consequence expects too much from life and love. Nor is she just the victim of mediocre surroundings or of a stifling bourgeois society, for if Flaubert paints a fiercely satirical portrait of the inhabitants of Yonville, Emma's short-lived flights into spirituality are underlined as somewhat suspect (343). It is Emma's own mistake to blame the immediate circumstances of her life, to think it is the boring farm-life, then Tostes and her marriage to Charles, then Yonville that are holding her back. By placing Emma in different settings Flaubert hammers home the lesson that the environment makes no difference, that all real experience is equally sterile. Emma herself only grasps this idea that it is life itself which is at fault, and not just her situation, as she sits on a bench outside her old convent at Rouen, towards the end of her story. Reliving the outstanding moments of her past, Léon, whom she has just left, suddenly seems as distant as all the other men:

"- Je l'aime pourtant! se disait-elle. N'importe! elle n'était pas heureuse, ne l'avait jamais été. D'où venait donc cette insuffisance de la vie, cette pourriture instantanée des choses où elle s'appuyait?... Mais, s'il y avait quelque part un être fort et beau, une nature valeureuse, pleine à la fois d'exaltation et de raffinements, un cœur de poète sous une forme d'ange, lyre aux cordes d'airain, sonnant vers le ciel des épithalames épiques, pourquoi, par hasard, ne le trouverait-elle pas? Oh! quelle impossibilité! Rien, d'ailleurs, ne valait la peine d'une recherche; tout mentait! Chaque sourire cachait un bâillement d'ennui, chaque joie une malédiction, tout plaisir son dégoût, et les meilleurs baisers ne vous laissent sur la lèvre qu'une irréalisable envie d'une volupté plus haute." (344)

This is also, of course, a splendid example of "style indirect libre", introducing the possibility that Emma's view of reality is shared by the narration. The old definitions of "bovarysme" as deluding ourselves as to what we are and as to life's potential (345), would surely be better
defined as 'knowing life's potential and refusing to be satisfied with it'.

Dreams and anticipation are presented as having more value than real experience. Thinking of Paris, for example:

"C'était une existence au-dessus des autres, entre ciel et terre, dans les orages, quelque chose de sublime. Quant au reste du monde, il était perdu, sans place précise et comme n'existant pas."(346)

It is only the faraway imaginary existence which seems real; the nearer things are, the more quickly they wither into nothingness. This reversal of the normal place of the real and the imaginary is carried into the relationship with Léon, where reality emerges as inferior. Even in the early days of their unrevealed love at Yonville, we learn that Emma prefers the image and thought of Léon to his actuality:

"Elle était amoureuse de Léon, et elle recherchait la solitude, afin de pouvoir plus à l'aise se délecter en son image. La vue de sa personne troublait la volupté de cette méditation. Emma palpait au bruit de ses pas, puis, en sa présence, l'émotion tombait, et il ne lui restait ensuite qu'un immense étonnement qui se finissait en tristesse."(347)

But this preference for irreality, this voluptuous lingering over an image, is never made positive for Emma, for it cannot yet hold off undermining by a return to reality.

Just as it is Flaubert's skilful juxtapositions which build up the unrelenting ironies of Emma's existence - she burns her wedding bouquet, in the very next line we learn that she is pregnant; she longs for a son, the baby is born in the next paragraph and is a girl, (and note that it is Charles who is made to announce this) - so Flaubert reserves his lyricism for Emma's dreams and rare moments of extreme pleasure, where there is an identity between her state of mind and her surroundings, lending all the lyrical descriptive support that we have already examined(348), as in the well-known forest scene, or with the stillness and silence of the three-day "honeymoon" with Léon.

By using "style indirect libre" for the presentation of Emma's dreams and rêveries, Flaubert lends them an immediate air of objective reality.
This is backed up by his manipulation of tenses. Through the use of imperfect tenses to convey Emma's thoughts through "style indirect libre", the imaginary events of her dreams become confused with the imperfect tense descriptions of real events which we have already examined(349).

I was delighted that two or three students, in a discussion of this, claimed that they had mistakenly taken the major dream passage for narrative, and had been "fooled" for several lines. This excellent example occurs where Charles and Emma lie beside each other in bed, each dreaming different dreams of the future. While Charles' dreams of Berthe growing up into a second Emma are described in the conditional tense - "elle porteraît,

comme elle [...], de grands chapeaux de paille; [...], elle lui broderait des pantoufles"(350) - Emma's more fantastic dreams are both introduced, "elle se réveillait en d'autres rêves", and then described, in the imperfect:

"Au galop de quatre chevaux, elle était exportée depuis huit jours vers un pays nouveau [...]. Ils allaient, ils allaient, les bras enlacé, sans parler. Souvent, du haut d'une montagne, ils apercevaient tout à coup quelque cité splendide avec des dômes, des ponts, des navires, des forêts de citronniers et des cathédrales de marbre blanc, dont les clochers aigus portaient des nids de cigognes. On marchait au pas à cause des grands dalles, et il y avait par terre des bouquets de fleurs que vous offraient des femmes habillées en corset rouge [...]. Et puis ils arrivaient, un soir, dans un village de pêcheurs, où des filets bruns séchaient au vent, le long de la falaise et des cabanes."(351)

It is above all the extraordinary detail of this evocation of what is supposed to be only a regular nightly dream, (kept up for nearly a page), which gives it its peculiarly real status. As Genette observes, these dream passages are conveyed with the same conviction that a film sequence of a dream invariably possesses, since short of introducing the sequence by a device such as a sudden "waviness" of the screen or a ripple of music, there is no way of giving a filmed dream or fantasy an inferior status(352). The fact that Flaubert tends not to do this is perhaps another indication of his "modernity", and Ricardou, refusing literature/reality hierarchies, would doubtless say that any written dream description must emerge in this
way. But what is so strange is that subjective visions, by tense and degree of detail, are frequently given a more objective status.

It is because Flaubert so clearly lends Emma his aesthetic support, that I feel it trivializes the novel as a whole to present her as a particular case of delusion, ("a case-history of frustration" (353)), of a woman who has read too much and comes to a bad end, however much such critics may admire the way the novel is written. Percy Lubbock claims that there is not enough in Emma to make her the main character in a drama, and that all the interest lies in the way Flaubert presents a simple case, that while the "fact" of Emma is entirely serious her value is quite a different matter, that Flaubert always knows her to be worthless (354). We are back to Henry James here (355), whereas for me the choice of a mediocre vehicle in Emma is obviously a positive quality. Flaubert's wager is precisely the choice of a rather silly woman as the mouthpiece for a serious world-view, and this is what gives the actual story-level of Madame Bovary its interest. The theme of lost illusions and dissatisfaction with the world is common enough in literature, but what is so different here is that the heroine's suffering and sense of aloneness is not at all compensated for with superiority - compare Julien Sorel, so much a stranger to his environment and even to his century, yet so intelligent, so talented, so much an exceptional being. It is not just a case of choosing a heroine from a lower class than usual, but of picking a woman who is not only not especially intelligent but who is actually silly and shown as such, and then of raising her to problematic existence and allowing her to carry one branch of the moral weight of the novel (356).

Turning to L’Éducation sentimentale we find that Frédéric's maladjustment to reality is both more extreme and more positive, and I would like to suggest that it is presented as creative. It is not that Frédéric
prefers the thought of Mme Arnoux to her reality, for through her presence as well he is able to create and sustain an imaginary relationship. This is evident in the first view of her: "Ce fut comme une apparition" (357). Mme Arnoux is real but Frédéric perceives her as if she were an image, that is in the aesthetic attitude. In the first chapter we looked at Sartre's claim that for the construction of an image always to be possible, consciousness must possess the possibility of positing an hypothesis of unreality, must be able to escape from the world by its very nature (358). I would suggest therefore that like Sartre's actor who feels "irreally", who sacrifices himself so that an appearance can exist, who acts as a support for non-being (359), Frédéric chooses to exist in a permanently derealized state so as to maintain Mme Arnoux as an image. His whole relationship is therefore defined by his initial aesthetic perception. Flaubert describes him as immediately seized with something more than the desire for physical possession: "une envie plus profonde ...] une curiosité douloureuse qui n'avait pas de limites" (360). Frédéric seems to enter into a sort of infinite ecstasy of contemplation embracing everything associated with Mme Arnoux. Flaubert's prized quality of amazement before the work of art is so evident in Frédéric's perceptions, that it actually turns Mme Arnoux and her belongings into opaque "works of art":

"Il considérait son panier à ouvrage avec ébahissement, comme une chose extraordinaire." (361)

"Il ne parlait guère pendant ces dîners; il la contemplait. [ ... ] son paine, ses gants, ses bagues étaient pour lui des choses particulières, importantes comme des œuvres d'art." (362)

We have already seen that a chance meeting in the street with Mme Arnoux has all the qualities of an amazing adventure (363), and when she happens to come to his own house, it is "un événement extraordinaire, presque une bonne fortune" (364).

The power of the imagination over reality is evident in Frédéric's rêveries with their clear tendency to hallucination: "Et sa rêverie devint
tellement profonde, qu'il eut une sorte d'hallucination" (365). But while, thinking of suicide, Frédéric has a morbid hallucination of his body floating in the river (366), and before the duel, of his mother in mourning (367), this tendency is usually more positive. Flaubert invariably lends these visions the same aesthetic support as Emma's: through tense and degree of detail they are presented as real (368). In the following two examples, the way he delays the "sans doute" is particularly striking:

"La diligence roulait, et, enveloppée dans le châle sans doute, elle appuyait contre le drap du coupé sa belle tête endormie." (369)

"Elle était en chemin de fer, sans doute, le visage au carreau du wagon... Puis il la voyait dans une chambre d'auberge, avec des malles par terre, un papier de texture en lambeaux, la porte qui tremblait au vent." (370)

The final detail is a fine example of Genette's point about the foregrounding of insignificant details (371), which is perhaps even more important if it is such a common feature of imaginary sequences as well. During the first river journey Flaubert at one stage lends objective reality in an even more startling way. As the boat glides along Frédéric's dream is conveyed in "style indirect libre":

"Quel bonheur de monter côte à côte, le bras autour de sa taille, pendant que sa robe balayerait les feuilles jaunies, en écoutant sa voix, sous le rayonnement de ses yeux!" (372)

Apart from the relevance of this dream to the actual nature of the relationship, (especially the afternoons at Auteuil), as the boat passes a château:

"À ce moment, une jeune dame et un jeune homme se montrèrent sur le perron, entre les caisses d'orangers. Puis tout disparut." (373)

While the effect of this, (given the sudden appearance and disappearance), is rather that of an hallucination, Frédéric's intense wish is actually transposed into a narrative fact.

When Frédéric hears about his inheritance he sees himself, "Avec la netteté d'une hallucination", delivering a present to Mme Arnoux:

"tandis qu'à la porte stationnerait son tilbury, non, un coupé plutôt: un coupé noir, avec un domestique en livrée brune." (374)
He is clearly "working" on the details here, and later in the same episode he is compared to an architect in his mental arrangement of his life (375). When he does the National Guard duty with Arnoux, and imagines Arnoux dead and himself living with Mme Arnoux:

"IL s'arrêta même à des calculs de ménage, des dispositions domestiques, contemplant, palpant déjà son bonheur" (376),

and here we are told that he "s'étendit sur cette idée, comme un dramaturge qui compose" (377). In this sense the contemplation cannot be seen as passive, but the price for this creativity seems to be the reality of the rest of the world and of Frédéric himself. In the first example above his contemplation is so profound "que les objets extérieurs avaient disparu" (378), and in the second:

"Dans la fureur de sa rêverie, le reste du monde s'effaçait; et il n'avait conscience de lui-même que par un intolérable serrement à la poitrine." (379)

One recalls Flaubert's distinction between the different relationships to reality of the artistic and psychotic hallucinations (380), (in the first the real world disappears), and Sartre's constant emphasis on the vicious circle of irrealities into which the artist must necessarily enter (381). Frédéric is never properly integrated into the events around him, (as in his awareness of the smoking of the Palais Royal as a "spectacle" (382)), and another version of his potential loss of reality, (Frédéric is not susceptible to fits or faintings like so many other Flaubertian characters), occurs during his extreme depression after his "rejection" by Mme Arnoux at Creil, where he "se laissa pousser" into the railway carriage, and promptly falls asleep (383). In fact an original description of Léon's attitude to Emma acts as an excellent comment upon Frédéric's to Mme Arnoux:

"À force de se renouveler, son émotion donc s'affaiblit ou elle s'immobilisa plutôt. Madame Bovary devint pour sa pensée une aventure permanente. // Les autres objets du monde flottaient confondus comme des brumes matinales dans un soleil levant, et sa propre conscience même semblait l'abandonner, tant elle se penchait tout entière, en dehors de lui, sur cette contemplation." (384),
displaying all the features of derealization inherent in aesthetic contemplation.

One might recall that Henry, at one stage of his love for Mme Réalaud wished that

"toute sa vie, en un mot, eût été comme une mélodie secrète et particulièr qu'il eût composée avec ses mains" (385),

for this is also a rather specific reminder of Swann's "imaginary" love for Odette, in *Un Amour de Swann*, which establishes him only as a "near-miss" as an artist figure, in that he finally writes it off as so much wasted effort (386). But in his final meeting with Mme Arnoux, Frédéric precisely underlines the imaginary nature of their relationship, in claiming that "Cette image-là effaçait toutes les autres", and that "Je n'imaginais rien au delà" (387). It is in this sense that, as already mentioned in the last chapter's discussion of the way they see themselves "en représentation" (388), I cannot agree with Jonathan Culler that the way they turn their "affair" into a great literary event in this penultimate chapter is "an arbitrary conferral of meaning" on the past. (389) For all the self-conscious-aesthetic qualities of this meeting, the use of the future anterior, the "Ils se racontent leurs anciens jours", Mme Arnoux's "il me semble que vous êtes là, quand je lis des passages d'amour dans les livres" (390), are present throughout their relationship, and nowhere more evidently than in the description of the iterated meetings at Auteuil, the nearest they come to a consummation of their love, in which the very genuine ecstasy emerges through ritual and repetition.

The mood of these meetings is established by the convention that, although they could not possibly be surprised by unwelcome visitors, they will not belong to each other (391). Their conversations revolve around the years of their acquaintance:

"Il lui manquait d'insignifiants détails, la couleur de sa robe à telle époque, quelle personne un jour était survenue, ce qu'elle
avait dit une autre fois; et elle répondait tout émerveillée:
— Oui, je me rappelle!
Leurs goûts, leurs jugements étaient les mêmes. Souvent celui des
deuX qui écoutait l'autre s'écriait:
— Moi aussi!
Et l'autre à son tour reprendait:
— Moi aussi"(392)

Remembering, sharing tastes, echoing each other is turned into an enjoyable
ritual, with accompanying ritualistic elaboration:

"—Pourquoi le ciel ne l'a-t-il pas voulu! Si nous nous étions
rencontrés!...
— Ah! si j'avais été plus jeune! soupirait-elle.
— Non! moi un peu plus vieux.
Et ils s'imaginaient une vie exclusivement amoureuse"(393).

This sort of thing happens each time; the encounters always follow a
controlled pattern. To increase the ritualistic aspect they exchange gifts
and give each other special names. Finally they cut out the surprise element
in the timing of his visits; she can now go and meet him each time at the
same spot; and throughout the whole period she always wears the same dress
(394). In this ecstasy of repetition:

"le charme de sa personne lui troublait le cœur plus sur les sens.
C'était une béatitude indéfinie, un tel envivement, qu'il en oubliait
jusqu'à la possibilité d'un bonheur absolu."(395)

But the piquancy of the game really comes from the underlying sexual
"trouble": "Par l'exercice d'un tel mensonge, leur sensualité s'exaspéra"
(396). The "trouble" is in fact transferred to nature: "Ils jouissaient
delicieusement de la senteur des feuilles humides"(397), and at the slight-
est sound they are terrified as if they had been guilty(398). Mme Arnoûx
on each occasion accuses herself of being a "coquette", and begs Frédéric
not to come any more; he, each time, "répétait les mêmes serments, — qu'el1
écoutait chaque fois avec plaisir"(399).

It is important, I think, to see that this love is not consummated
not because they conceive of it as a literary Platonic love, or simply
because Frédéric is to weak to act, but because although the attraction
is physical and sexual, it is derealized in the aesthetic attitude. The
constant danger is part of the game, and it is Mme Arnoux who deliberately introduces it into the final meeting, with the way she reveals that she had been hiding when Frédéric had called with the money:

"Alors, d'une voix tremblante, et avec de longs intervalles entre les mots:
— J'avais peur! Oui... peur de vous... de moi!
Cette révélation lui donna comme un saisissement de volupté. Son cœur battit à grands coups."(400)

The delicate balance is so nearly destroyed at the last meeting that Mme Arnoux's closing

"Elle le contemplait, tout émerveillée.
— Comme vous êtes délicat! Il n'y a que vous! Il n'y a que vous!"(401)
does finally ring a little insincere. It is time for the game to stop, and as the image of Mme Arnoux is abolished with the same magical stroke with which it appeared — "Et ce fut tout"(402) — it is the whole aesthetic episode which is calmly sealed off, and which can therefore be discussed in a different way in the last chapter of the novel(403).

b) Réverie

We have already examined the well-known quotation in which Flaubert claims that the highest, if most difficult, aim of art should be to "faire rêver"(404). Masterpieces should be "bête", they should have serene surfaces hiding infinite depths, and the stupidity/réverie connection clearly depends upon the quality of opaqueness. Réverie tends to start from material stimuli, not, as Poulet claims, because this is the only sort of réverie that can be kept under control(405), but because of the ideal dense opaqueness of objects. Jonathan Culler defines réverie as

"the result of contemplating the object under another aspect, denying or failing to reach the purpose which would integrate it. Treating potentially purposive objects as mere material stimuli, réverie rejects understanding and seeks stupidity."(406)
In the realm of events and language, incomprehension is undoubtedly the privileged access to reverie, and it is because reverie is aesthetically desirable, as Culler himself explains (407), that I find the final turn of his *Uses of Uncertainty* thesis strangely illogical, my disagreement with this argument centering on his final analysis of *Salammbo*.

Culler's overall thesis is that Flaubert's novels must be read as a challenge to the easy construction of meaning, that in demoralizing his readers by making them read his works as autonomous verbal objects, he will eventually lead them to try to fill this "absence" with a "fully self-conscious understanding":

"In place of the novel as mimesis we have the novel as structure playing with different modes of ordering, and enabling the reader to understand how he makes sense of the world." (408)

When the reader is forced to see how the text resists his attempts to make sense of it, he will be led into questioning of the self and of ordinary social modes of understanding; his sense of the comprehensible and the incomprehensible will be sharpened. Now *Salammbo* is seen as a perfect allegory for this process of reading, for the formal desire for connection and meaning, for Culler claims that the characters are engaged in a desperate attempt to understand their relationship to their situation, recognizing strangeness but trying to overcome it. Their bewilderment is a metaphor for that of the reader, since for characters and readers alike, difference and strangeness are a gap to be bridged by self-conscious interpretation:

"The strange, the formal, the fictional, must be recuperated or naturalized, brought within our ken, if we do not want to remain gaping before monumental inscriptions." (409)

The wording of this remark is particularly fortunate for it seems to me that to leave his readers "gaping before monumental inscriptions" would have been Flaubert's idea of perfect success. It therefore sums up the strands of my disagreement with Culler's overall argument. In the first
place his contention that the novel as "genre" is to do with the interpretation of experience or the attempt to make sense of the world seems to me unproven, and I would not agree that a novel which frustrates our normal reading procedures would necessarily lead to a questioning of social modes of understanding. I would have thought it more likely to increase our literary sophistication, to make us more able to cope with novels with an even more sophisticated form. But, more important, it seems to me especially strange to attribute such didactic aims to Flaubert, who seems rather far from caring about any sort of "self-conscious understanding". My own argument has been to point out the consistency with which he seeks to preserve the difference and strangeness of literature.

But a more straightforward disagreement is with the actual reading of Salammbo, and it seems to me desirable to actually reverse Culler's argument. For while he sees the characters as doing little other than attempt to give meaning to their experience, I would say that they are more or less deliberately not trying to understand, (usually because they would be incapable). We have suggested that Flaubert uses a traditional illusion, but largely with a view to creating an aesthetic experience (410), and the incomprehension of characters might be seen as an ideal model for the reader's relationship to the novel.

For the whole novel positively wallows in an atmosphere of rêverie, and the general bewilderment of characters invariably resembles the now familiar aesthetic amazement. This attitude depends absolutely upon opaqueness and not understanding of experience and language, of which the repetition of language is very frequently a sign (411). We have seen that Flaubert describes Salammbo as "un lourd roman" (412) and his heroine as "embêtante à crever" (413). The Goncourts are disappointed with it because it wears them out, because the monotony of its methods produces "une lassitude où l'attention roule et se perd" (414). Yet this is clearly
exactly the desired effect on the reader, and defines the essential atmosphere of the "illusion". The characters suffer constantly from "torpeur" and "accablement":

"un accablement qui était plein de délices" (415)
"comme le souvenir d'un rêve accablant" (416)
"Ses bras retombèrent, et il baissa la tête, accablé par une rêverie soudaine." (417)

I have already commented upon the way in which the viewpoint technique is used, in Salambô, to increase rather than to break down strangeness (418), especially, perhaps, in the presentation of peculiar customs. Thus the sacrifice of the children leaves the Barbarians, who watch it over the wall, "béants d'horreur" (419), and the crucified lions cause them a "long étonnement" (420). The first appearance of Salambô at the "festin" establishes a context of mutual incomprehension and hence "ébahissement":

"Les soldats, sans comprendre ce qu'elle disait, se tassaient autour d'elle. Ils s'ébahissaient de sa parure; mais elle promena sur eux tous un long regard épouvanté, puis g'enfonçant la tête dans les épaules en écartant les bras, elle répeta plusieurs fois:
- C'avez-vous fait! ou'avez-vous fait!" (421)

Salambô's "C'avez-vous fait!" implies stunned amazement rather than a desire to know, and although she is described as wishing to penetrate the depths of the doma of Tanit, dull incomprehension dominates all attempts. Thus she learns Tanit's adventures and names, and repeats them over and over "sans qu'ils eussent pour elle de signification distincte" (422), the following exchange with Sjahabahâm typical of her "lessons":

"- Elle inspire et gouverne les amours des hommes.
- Les amours des hommes! répeta Salambô en rêvant." (423)

The effect of Salambô on Mâtho is described as "une surprise infinie, un étourdissement" (424), and their two encounters are imbued with "béance" and rêverie:

"- C'est le voile de la Déesse!
- Le voile de la Déesse! s'écria Salambô."

"ils restèrent béants à se regarder.
Sans comprendre ce qu'il sollicitait, une horreur la saisit." (425)
As Taanach prepares Salammô for Mâtho the atmosphere of rêverie begins to be built up:

"— Tu ne seras pas plus belle le jour de tes noces!
— Mes noces! répéta Salammô; elle rêvait, le coude appuyé sur la chaise d'ivoire." (426)

and it is above all the scene "Sous la tente" which is marked by a whole series of stupified, uncomprehending, incantatory repetitions:

"Il la regardait de bas en haut, en la tenant ainsi entre ses jambes, et il répétait:
— Comme tu es belle! comme tu es belle!" (427)

"— À moins, peut-être, que tu ne sois Tanit?
— Moi, Tanit? se disait Salammô." (428)

"Une lassitude l'accablait; elle écoutait avec stuneur le cri intermittentsentinelles qui se répondaient." (429)

"— Je m'en retourne à Carthage. [...]
— T'en retourner à Carthage! Il balbutiait, et répétait, en grinçant des dents:
— T'en retourner à Carthage!" (430)

The opaque quality of language, so vital to this grasping incomprehension, is constantly underlined by reference to the presence of many different foreign languages, and by the deliberate use of strange foreign words and names:

"Siv! Sivan! Tammouz, Eloul, Tischri, Schebarî!" (431)

"À moi, Taanach, Kroum, Ewa, Nicipsa, Schaoûl." (432),

which can only be seen, (like the textual repetitions), as an incitement to rêverie in the reader (433). While all this is put to very erotic use in the "Sous la tente" chapter, which for this reason does not need specific sexual reference (434), the idea of a literature based on this erotic pleasure of rêverie is a suitable candidate for Roland Barthes' "jouissance du texte" (435), already so close to Flaubert's own ideal of "des phrases qui me font pâmer" (436).
c) Repetition

It is because the bêtise/rêverie connection depends upon the quality of opaqueness, that Charles, with his sense of the opaqueness of language and situations, might be seen as an exemplary character. Repetition, we have seen, is generally a sign of not understanding, and Charles, Félicité, and Bouvard and Pécuchet, whom we shall be considering in this last section, are all caught up in their own repetitions and in the repetitive mechanisms of the works in which they appear. In our discussion of auto-representation in the second chapter we saw that straightforward repeating, reflecting and copying are all related to an ideal of the novel cut off from any exterior ties, and therefore reflecting only itself (437). It is for their rôle in these operations that these characters must finally be pushed to the foreground.

Our previous discussion of repetition in Madame Bovary tended to centre upon Emma (438). Whereas Emma perhaps plays a passive part in this, with the novel pursuing repetitions through her, Charles invariably creates repetitions on his own. The very first view of him establishes him in an environment of repetition. It is because he is so stupid and inarticulate, as illustrated in the opening scene where he is made to copy out twenty times the verb "ridiculus sum" (439), (what other punishment could Flaubert invent?), that he accedes immediately to the realms of repetition, (and actually of written repetition, an aesthetic lesson which will not be fully assumed until Bouvard et Pécuchet). Returning from seeing Emma at Les Bertaux, he "reprit une à une les phrases qu'elle avait dites" (440), finds he cannot understand them, so just repeats them over and over. He always imagines her just as he first saw her (441), and after their marriage, when he returns home in the evenings, he recounts one after another all the people he has met, the villages he has visited, and the prescriptions
he has written(442). Further "Ses expansions étaient devenues régulières; il l'embrassait à de certaines heures"(443). As early as the first ride to Les Bertaux he is allowed to operate a dédoublement, not only into the perceiving and the perceived self, but with himself as object already split into two: the past student and the recent husband(444). A later iterative dédoublement, "Il aimait à se voir arriver dans la cour", contains the "tree" of repetitions discussed in the last chapter, with a lyrical play on the reflections on Emma's face, and the tiny repeated sounds of the melting snow dripping on her silk sunshade(445).

Unlike Emma and Homais, who already choose names for their children after certain models(446), Charles wants the baby's name to be exactly the same as Emma's(447). This is clearly because he wants her to be an exact replica of Emma, as proved by his own iterated night dreams in which he imagines them side by side like two identical sisters(448). Of course this contrasts ironically with Emma's desperate desire not to be repeated, yet after her death we find Charles coming to resemble her more and more (449), dressing the maid up in Emma's clothes, and seized by the illusion he has created, repeating "Oh! restez! restez!"(450). It is Charles' fetishism in the last part of the story which is responsible for the echoes of Emma which fill the last pages. When he meets Rodolphe he even manages to see Emma in him, and wishes he could be Rodolphe so as to achieve the actual identification(451). When his powers of recall start fading, still he dreams about her every night, and each night it is inevitably the same dream, such that his stupified repetitions when Emma is poisoned, "Empoisonnée: empoisonnée!"(452), and "faites! faites! sauvez-la..."(453), or his moronic echo of the for once embarrassed Homais' "Tiens, voilà M. Tuvache qui passe":

"Charles répeta comme une machine:
— M. Tuvache qui passe"(454),

through dreams and especially fetishism emerge as a more creative power of metonymy(455).
There are other interesting details in connection with artistic representation. The beauty and fascination of Emma, once the reader has access to her mind and to her selfishness, her nevertheless slightly mysterious opaque quality, is precisely created by Charles' stupidity. The less Charles understands her ways, the more he is seduced by them, thus his desire increases as the novel progresses. While he first began to desire her when he thought she was by definition unattainable, (because he was married), once she is dead his desire again becomes infinite: 

"Elle lui en parut plus belle; et il en conçut un désir permanent, furieux, qui enflammait son désespoir et qui n'avait pas de limites, parce qu'il était maintenant irréalisable." (457)

If Charles to a limited extent creates Emma, we also find him creating Lévi-Strauss's "modèles réduits" to amuse Berthe in the garden, with toy trees made of privet surris, and rivers made with a watering can (458). He also, as we have seen, with his written instructions for Emma's funeral, creates her finest framing of all in the nest of coffins, which as Emma herself inevitably disintegrates will stand as a fine mise en abyme for a novel about nothing, or for Barthes' "text" as an onion with no "cœur": Finally, given all the importance of the dimension of the signifier, we must remember that it is Charles himself who actually creates the very fine "Charbovari", and the joyful and "hurlant" minor work of art that it gives rise to:

"Le nouveau, prenant alors une résolution extrême, ouvrit une bouche démesurée et lança à pleins poumons, comme pour appeler quelqu'un, ce mot: Charbovari.

Ce fut un vacarme qui s'élança d'un bond, monta en crescendo, avec des éclats de voix aigus (on hurlait, on aboyait, on trépignait, on répétait: Charbovari! Charbovari!), puis qui roula en notes isolées, se calmant à grand'peine, et parfois qui reprenait tout à coup sur la ligne d'un banc où saillissait encore, çà et là, comme un pétard mal éteint, quelque rire étouffé." (458)

Therefore, while Sherrington, for example, has a good understanding of Charles, and is interesting on his similarities to Emma (459), I must distinguish my own argument that he is not just a very kind, much maligned
person, but that for the very reasons which cause him to be maligned, he is aesthetically privileged.

Jonathan Culler's discussion of *Un Cœur simple* suggests that the reader is obliged to find an order making the identification of the parrot and the Holy Ghost "worthy and appropriate"(460). He feels that Félicité's arbitrary connection is finally allowed for this reason alone. In this analysis he refers to Thorlby's discussion of *Un Cœur simple* which asks:

"Has Flaubert at last discovered a virtue [her charity] that can survive the worst that reality can ever be? Or is Félicité too simple-minded in her idea of the 'order of things' ever to be capable of disillusion, as her naive incomprehension of religious doctrine (and perhaps of geography) was surely intended to show?"(461)

His conclusion is that:

"the resolution of such suffering and love as Félicité's is made in heaven, and across the very threshold Flaubert draws his most darin-line."(462)

Culler finds this "exactly right", whereas I feel that it slightly misses the point, (although one sees what he means). Perhaps the confusion comes from the hinted rôle of religion, which creeps into Culler's analysis too, presumably unintentionally, but because his analyses of the "sacred" order use two religious examples. For me the identification of the parrot and the Holy Ghost is totally appropriate because it is an aesthetic identification, and one which all the processes of the story build up to.

The repetitions of language itself are most fully explored in Loulou. Whereas we are told that parrots are supposed to be called Jacquot(463), it comes as no surprise to find that this one is called Lou-lou, a name based upon repetition. Félicité teaches him to repeat a set of three phrases, (which he of course learns by hearing them repeated), which are not as meaningless as they might at first seem, for they actually sum up and repeat the important aspects of Félicité's story: "Charmant garçon! Serviteur, monsieur! Je vous salue, Mariel."(464) Félicité and Loulou have
conversations based on the endless repetition of these phrases (465), and just as Loulou's laughter echoes through the village at the sight of Bourais (466), so they echo through the story. The parrot is personally responsible for this mechanism of internal reflections; and when he entertains Félicité in her deafness, he imitates voices and sounds themselves containing repeated sounds, for example the "tic tac du tournebroche" and Mme Aubain shouting "la porte! la porte!" to Félicité (467). When Loulou dies he appears of course as a splendid replica—repetition of his former self (468).

The infinite repeating function of the parrot contains Félicité, but she is already caught up in repetition. She herself learns the catechism "parrot-fashion", by hearing it repeated, (at one remove since she listens to the children learning it in this way). When Victor dies she repeats "Pauvre petit garçon, pauvre petit garçon!" (469), and gets on with her regular work, for we have already seen that Félicité functions almost automatically in her regular habits and unchanging daily routine, and that when Virginie dies she repeats the same prayers throughout two nights (470).

Félicité's story is a repeated cycle of loves, deaths, and displacements of affection. Raymonde Debray-Genette has written an excellent article on the "en abyme" effect of figures of speech in Un Cœur simple. Thus even the title represents an accumulation of these—heart for being, heart for goodness or courage, and the metaphorical use of the adjective. Similarly the Holy Ghost is both a part and the whole of God, both synecdoche and metaphor (471). Her fine analysis of metonymic processes might be pursued in even greater detail, for the fact that Paul one day blows cigar smoke into Loulou's face is a good example of the minute network of reference at work: Victor, Havana (472), America, the prefect who had been consul in America, Loulou himself. While the name Virginie seems to be ironically connected with the Paul and Virginie of literature, one tends to miss the
metonymic association with Félicité herself - the description of the affair with Théodore specifies that she remains a virgin(473), the description of Virginie's First Communion during which Félicité achieves complete identification with her uses the word, ("le trouceau des vierges"(474)), and Félicité at one stage wants to join "les demoiselles de la Vierge"(475). Nor should we forget the very important mise en abyme of the stained glass window in the church, in which "le Saint-Esprit dominait la vierge"(476).

But the essential point that I should like to underline is that the story's formal mechanism of repetition and substitution takes place with Félicité's aid. Flaubert describes her in his scenarios as having "Manières de penser comme en rêve. Les idées les plus disparates se succèdent"(477). It is her constant tendency to distraction(478), and her fetishistic attachments, (since fetishism is already metonymy), that keep the substitution mechanism going. It is the discovery of Virginie's plush hat that finally allows the transfer of affection to Mme Aubain, (with whom she had not previously got on that well), and the tears that she sheds on Mme Aubain's death - "Félicité la pleura, comme on ne pleure pas les maîtres"(479) - act as a displacement of her suppressed grief for Victor and Virginie. Thus the final merging of the parrot and the Holy Ghost, the climax of all the metonymic processes of the story, is something Félicité has been working on all along. Where, earlier, she is convinced that because Victor and Virginie are linked in her heart their destiny must be the same, this prophesies and perhaps controls events - when Victor dies Virginie's death follows straight on. When Félicité is "stupidly" worried that Victor will not come back because his voyage has taken him so far away, she is right - he doesn't. A further interesting detail in this respect concerns an almost literary clichéd idea that Félicité has when she is waiting for news of Virginie: "Puis elle resta dans l’auberge, croyant que des inconnus
apporteraient une lettre" (480). This does not happen here, but her clichéd idea is later integrated into the narrative where: "Une nuit, le conducteur de la malle-poste annonça dans Pont l'Évêque la Révolution de Juillet" (481). The metonymic process happens automatically in Mme Aubain's obsessive dream after Virginie's death, where her long-dead husband is transposed into the recently deceased Victor – he is dressed as a sailor (482). Mme Aubain needs these dreams to make connections, but Félicité, as Flaubert's scénario tells us, already thinks in this way, and she is constantly shown creating instinctive associations and repetitions.

Félicité's rôle is therefore an aesthetic one, and while she is responsible for teaching Loulou the three phrases and therefore takes the credit for much of the auto-representation of the story, and while the quality of her mind leads to formal displacements, the gathering together of all the objects which have so far been important to the story, where she turns her room into a sort of chapel or bazaar, is her own idiosyncratic and original creation. She even manages to create a fine mise en abyme by hanging the all-important Virginie's hat from a nail in front of the mirror (483). Finally she creates the two important representations of Loulou, firstly, in setting him stuffed in such a splendidly grandiose manner, (484), and then in presenting him framed as a picture. From an initial association with the "Épinal" picture:

"Sa ressemblance lui parut encore plus manifeste sur l'image d'Épinal, représentant le baptême de Notre-Seigneur, avec ses ailes de pourpre et son corps d'émeraude, c'était vraiment le portrait de Loulou." (485)

she goes on to buy the picture and to hang it in place of the portrait of the Comte d'Artois, next to Loulou himself. Since she is then able to embrace them both with one look, this confusion between them leads to an actual sense of juxtaposition, such that Loulou really seems framed in the picture himself.
Bouvard et Pécuchet seems the logical conclusion of so much repetition, for a combination of auto-representation and the separation of language from the world leads to written repetition. This is essentially copying, the too perfect mimesis which Genette suggests cannot strictly be considered mimesis at all. The novel would seem to be founded upon the copying which it ultimately recommends, for both "histoire" and "récit" are full of copies and repetitions. The outline of the story is well-known. An inheritance allows Bouvard and Pécuchet, two copy clerks with beautiful handwriting, to give up their jobs and retire to the country. A long process sets in whereby they explore and unsuccess fully apply to practical life various branches of knowledge, each time basing their experiments on a different set of reference books, an exploration of Romaine's dictum: "Croyez-vous qu'il faille, pour être agronome, avoir soi-même labouré la terre ou engraisé des volailles?" (486) Their resilient capacity for adopting a new venture when faced with failure finally wanes, (there cannot be many left), and they simultaneously decide, with excitement, to take up copying again this time the quite random copying of any written material - old newspapers, food labels, anything they come across, including their own notes from all the books they had previously read. This indiscriminate copying was intended to form the second volume of Bouvard et Pécuchet, and amongst material which it is assumed Flaubert meant to include in it have been found something resembling Gueneau's Exercices de Style, and besides other collections of written stupidities, the well-known Dictionnaire des idées reçues (487).

It is known that the first volume was to end with the two clerks hunched over a specially made wooden desk, copying in ink. Ricardou makes a typically clever observation; that in the opening paragraph there is a description of the canal Saint-Martin "couleur d'encre", with, in the middle of it, a boat loaded with wood (488). This is an exact reversal of
the ending and is surely deliberate. For the opening paragraphs are an absolute set-piece of careful writing and symmetrical construction, with a whole series of syntactic parallels establishing Bouvard and Pécuchet as a copy of each other:

"L'un venait de la Bastille, l'autre du Jardin des Plantes. Le plus grand, vêtu de toile, marchait le chapeau en arrière, le gilet déboutonné et sa cravate à la main. Le plus petit, dont le corps disparaissait dans une redingote marron, baissait la tête sous une casquette à visière pointue.

Quand ils furent arrivés au milieu du boulevard, ils s'assirent, à la même minute, sur le même banc.

Pour s'essuyer le front, ils retirèrent leurs coiffures, que chacun posa près de soi; et le petit homme aperçut, écrit dans le chapeau de son voisin: Bouvard; pendant que celui-ci distinguait aisément dans la casquette du particulier en redingote le mot: Pécuchet.

L'aspect aimable de Bouvard charma de suite Pécuchet.

L'air serein de Pécuchet frappa Bouvard."(489)

They have the same job, same age, same number of Christian names, same or parallel attributes and opinions. Language clearly establishes them and tends to control their behaviour, the way they pass from one activity to another resembling Félicité's mental displacements. We have already seen that these seem to follow the laws of Freud's "dream-work" of rhetorical procedures which actually control the subject(490). It is only Bouvard and Pécuchet's attempts to apply language outside its own field, for instance in the practical world, which cause so many failures, and the decision to return to pure copying is obviously a sort of aesthetic wisdom.

Bouvard and Pécuchet are established as ironic artist figures, involved initially in representations and illusions as well as pure wallowing in language. And their "works of art" are in the best Flaubertian tradition, especially those from the period of landscape gardening, the following precisely constructed in the manner of Flaubert's ideal masterpiece as pyramid, laboriously constructed(491):

"Ils avaient été sur les rives de l'Orne choisir des granits, les avaient cassés, numérotés, rapportés eux-mêmes dans une charrette, puis avaient joint les morceaux avec du ciment, en les accumulant les uns par-dessus les autres, et au milieu du gazon se dressait un rocher, pareil à une gigantesque pomme de terre."(492)
Nor should Ricardou disapprove of their foregrounding of artificiality:

"Les deux premiers ifs de la grande allée, qui, la veille encore, étaient sphériques, avaient la forme de paons, et un cornet avec deux boutons de porcelaine figuraient le bec et les yeux."(493)

"Le rocher, comme une montagne, occupait le gazon, le tombeau faisait un cube au milieu des épinards, le pont vénitien un accent circonflexe par-dessus les haricots, et la cabane, au-delà, une grande tache noire, car ils avaient incendié son toit de paille pour la rendre plus poétique. [ ... ] La pagode chinoise, peinte en rouge, semblait un phare sur le vignoble."(494)

Bearing in mind the origins of the pagoda:

"Au sommet du vignoble, six arbres équarris supportaient un chapeau de fer-blanc à pointes retroussées, et le tout signifiait une pagode chinoise"(495),
it can be seen that here we have an example of imitation at one remove, and it is of course important that the whole thing is constructed with the aid of Boitard's L'Architecte des Jardins(496). It is also most specifically framed, for it is actually unveiled for the visitors: "Pécuchet fit un signe, les rideaux s'ouvrirent et le jardin apparut(497), and the total effect is the ideal aesthetic one: "quelque chose d'effrayant"(498).

But while Flaubert specifically calls them artists here(499), they also surpass themselves in the construction of their museum, which we have already considered as a formal mise en abyme of the frames within frames effect. To complete this they lay on a special act for privileged visitors:

"Bouvard s'éloigna et reparut affublé d'une couverture de laine, puis s'agenouilla devant le prie-Dieu, les coules en dehors, la face dans les mains, la lueur du soleil tombant sur sa calvitie; et il avait conscience de cette effet, car il dit:
— Est-ce que je n'ai pas l'air d'un moine du moyen âge?
Ensuite il leva le front obliquement, les yeux noyés, faisant prendre à sa figure une expression mystique. On entendit dans le corridor la voix grave de Pécuchet:
— N'aie pas peur, c'est moi.
Et il entra, la tête couverte d'un casque: un pot de fer à oreillons pointus.
Bouvard ne quitta pas le prie-Dieu. Les deux autres restaient debout. Une minute passa dans l'ébahissement."(500)

While on their first night in the garden the récit copies Bouvard and Pécuchet, by making two shadows on the wall both enlarge and repeat their movements(501), their ability to create repetitions on their own
emerges where the garden landscaping accidentally produces an echo\(^{(502)}\). The way they play with this echo, (which, like Loulou, who refuses to perform for the neighbours, disappears at the grand showing of the garden\(^{(503)}\)), is an important indication of their aesthetic pleasure in playing with the signifier. When they take up acting their chief concern is with training their voices, and lying on their beds in their separate rooms they simultaneously follow exercises to increase their vocal range and subtlety\(^{(504)}\). Similarly, when they turn to teaching, even here the emphasis is on the sound rather than the content of this joint performance:

"Les maîtres professaient à la même heure, dans leurs chambres respectives, et, la cloison étant mince, ces quatre voix, une flûtée, une profonde et deux aiguës, composaient un charivari abominable."\(^{(505)}\)

Indeed when they decide to write a play there is an amusing passage on their attempts to think up a subject\(^{(506)}\), and they would clearly do better to follow their natural inclinations of enjoying the material qualities of language. As Bernheimer illustrates in his excellent analysis of the fruit-picking episode\(^{(507)}\), this is the primary cause of the disaster, and while pointing this out Flaubert is already getting aesthetic effect from his ironic repetition of the fantastic names which had beguiled them:

"Les passe-colmes étaient perdus, comme le bœuf-des-vétérans et les triomphes-de-jordaine. À peine s'il restait parmi les roses quelques bons-papas; et douze tétons-de-Vénus."\(^{(508)}\)

Similarly, while deflating the "symbolic" approach of their historical work on the duc d'Angoulême, (an imbecile), Flaubert is achieving an effect from the repetition of the word "pont", which quite destroys its interrogative potential:

"On doit y relever l'importance qu'eurent les ponts. D'abord, il s'expose inutilement sur le pont de l'Inn; il enlève le pont Saint Esprit et le pont de Lauriol; à Lyon, les deux ponts lui sont funestes, et sa fortune expire devant le pont de Sèvres."\(^{(509)}\), and their historical research was anyway dominated by an interest in
"tous ceux dont les noms étaient bizarres ou agréables" (510). The "tout devint phallus" episode, in which they gather together a collection of chair legs, old bolts etc. and ask visitors "À quoi trouvez-vous que cela ressemble?" (511), clearly deflates the idea of the motivated symbol, and when they invent their own mnemonic system based upon their house and garden, (based on advice from a book provided by Damouchel), they might finally be congratulated for assimilating reality itself into an arbitrary system of signs, which since they forget what everything stands for, is certainly non-referential!

"Pour plus de clarté, ils prirent comme base mnémotechnique leur propre maison, leur domicile, attachant à chacune de ses parties un fait distinct, et la cour, le jardin, les environs, tout le pays n'avaient plus d'autre sens que de faciliter la mémoire. Les bornages dans la campagne limitaient certaines évoquer, les nommiers étaient des arbres généalogiques, les buissons des batailles, le monde devenait symbole. Ils cherchaient sur les murs des quantités de choses absentes, finissaient par les voir, mais ne savaient plus les dates qu'elles représentaient." (512)

The finest excuse for playing with the signifier is the experiment in spiritualism, when they try to get in touch with Bouvard's dead father, which produces the following:

"Pécouhet, bien vito, souffla les mots, notés sur un carton. Ischyros, Athanatos, Adonai, Sadaï, Elyo, Messiasos (la kyrielle était longue), je te conjure, je t'observe, je t'ordonne, ô Béchet! Puis, baissant la voix: Où es-tu, Béchet? Béchet! Béchet! Béchet! (513)

This evident corruption of the names Bouvard and Pécouhet is produced in the story by themselves, but also gives the récit, (and Flaubert's attachment to his proper names has already been mentioned (514)), an excellent opportunity to play with its two main characters (515).

Following Valéry (516), Alison Fairlie describes Bouvard et Pécouhet as a combination of both maximum documentation and maximum stylization, a contradiction of "submission to the real" and "stylization of the real" (517). But it would be a misunderstanding to regard Flaubert's vast note-taking prelude to the writing of this work as "submission to the real." As
Bernheimer shows, it is impossible to follow up references to sources, for Flaubert uses the "style indirect libre" in such a way as to cut all statements off from their speaker. We cannot tell whose account we are reading, nor if it is accurate; the original and its repeat are deliberately confused (518). The only submission is to the written document (519), not to its status as verifiable knowledge of practical application, and this is not at all at odds with literary stylization. Not only does Flaubert not try to persuade the reader that he is not reading words, that he is looking through a transparent window on to reality, but he ultimately does not even try to represent anything which was not already written. In fact I wonder if Flaubert's method of working not only from notes taken from books, but also from a series of plans and rough draughts, could not be seen as a way of making his own writing into the mere copying of his own "déjà-écrit" (520).

If re-presentation were only re-writing then we would have to agree with Genette that it is no longer representation at all (521). Yet Bouvard et Pécuchet still has an important "histoire", the discourse relies on its characters to make its aesthetic points, and copying and the preeminence of the signifier are thematic in many of the examples we have given. Flaubert still hovers on the brink of a radical modernity, and since we have so often borrowed Barthes' ideas, we will leave him the last word on what seems to be his favorite novel, for it sums up precisely the point I have been trying to make:

"Thibaudet avait remarqué qu'il existe souvent dans la production des très grands écrivains, une œuvre-limite, une œuvre singulière, presque génante, dans laquelle ils déposent à la fois le secret et la caricature de leur création, tout en y suggérant l'œuvre aberrante qu'ils n'ont pas écrite et qu'ils auraient peut-être voulu écrire; cette sorte de rêve où se mêlent d'une façon rare le positif et le négatif d'un créateur, c'est la Vie de Rancé de Chateaubriand, c'est le Bouvard et Pécuchet de Flaubert." (522)
Perhaps the most obvious trend in Flaubert criticism in recent years has been the extraordinary convergence of interest in certain areas, and it is hoped that this thesis has helped to clarify some of the essential issues even if my own attempted solutions remain open to discussion. I have attempted to argue that although, as Sartre and many structuralist critics have shown, Flaubert experienced and treated language as an opaque, material entity, it would nevertheless be wrong to suggest that he undermines the idea of the novel as representation. An examination of the organization of his representations suggests that his always formal intentions are equally served by the building of a traditional illusion. While Jonathan Culler’s argument is based upon the belief that Flaubert’s novels resist all attempts to organize and give meaning in traditional ways, (through theme, symbolism, character, point of view etc.), such that the reader will eventually learn the proper, difficult way to arrive at a positive reading, (through the formal organizing category which he calls "the sacred"), I have attempted to reinstate the organizing function of character as a centre of value, though claiming that this relies upon the reader’s formal awareness, not his recognition of the world. In other words, while the reader still engages with the work’s value systems, a correct "moral" reading of the story has nothing to do with the "relevance to life" dear to Anglo-Saxon moral criticism, but can only be obtained through a fairly sophisticated formal awareness.

I suspect that I have been occasionally ambiguous in my discussion of values, particularly in my use of the word "moral". In my attempt to sort out the relationship between moral and aesthetic values, I have used "moral" for values pertaining to the pretended real life of the illusion,
(still not connected with Flaubert's or our own beliefs about real life ethics), even where such values have aesthetic connotations (e.g. silence and stillness). These have been subsumed into the aesthetic values of the work as a whole. Perhaps it would be desirable to find a word without the ethical flavour of "moral", as what is really required is simply a positive adjective to convey the meaning of the noun "value", since "valuable" contains its own ambiguities. In any case it is apparent at this stage that the whole discussion of values requires more adequate theorization. While I shall perhaps attempt this elsewhere, I should like to conclude with one or two remarks on this same general theme.

I.A. Richards banishes the reader who "attempts to assume the peculiar attitude of disregarding all but some hypothetically named aesthetic elements" (1) to a particularly original version of the ivory tower:

"The common avoidance of all discussion of the wider social and moral aspects of the arts by people of steady judgement and strong heads is a misfortune [ ... ] So loath have they been to be thought at large with the wild asses that they have virtually shut themselves up in a paddock." (2)

This might be countered by the approach of Culler and Prendergast, who seem to see the demystification of the reading of the realist text as a moral process in itself, as having an edifying function. This is specifically stated in The Uses of Uncertainty:

"But this mocking and undercutting activity carries one to a level of interpretation which may be called allegorical rather than symbolic, where Flaubert's activity is indeed, as he hoped it might be, a matter of writing sentences and where possible themes emerge as versions of the problems of composition and interpretation. And one should say further that the move to this level is not to be justified simply by the convention that modernist literature is always, ultimately, about literature, but rather by the fact that the self-awareness which is created at this level and obscured at others - awareness of what one does when trying to come to terms with the world in languages that determine the forms of that encounter - seems the only moral value sufficiently formal and comprehensive to subsume whatever more restricted goals and values might be cited in support of other types of reading." (3)

But I am unhappy that this sort of comment should be applied to Flaubert for two reasons. Firstly what Culler and Prendergast demand,
(summed up by Stephen Heath's splendid phrase, the "shattering of the passive readability of realist writing"(4), is a very active participation from the reader. This stands in overt contradiction to my claim that the experience of reading Flaubert's novels was intended to be the same passive gaping as that of Flaubert's characters at the world and at language. The meditations on passive states, and the images of liquidity and dissolution so admirably detailed by Charles du Bos(5) and J.-P. Richard(6), would serve as an excellent description of reading, as where Richard describes Flaubert's experience of taking a Turkish bath as "une passivité bienheureuse"(7):

"je pensais à un tas de choses; tous mes pores tranquillement se dilataient. — C'est très voluptueux et d'une mélancolie douce..." (8)

Above all Flaubert returns to the image of ruminat. When Frédéric has a "special" meeting in the street with Mme Arnoux, "il en ruminait la douceur tout en continuant sa route"(9); in his early Travel Notes Flaubert speaks of:

"un grand mélange suave de sentiments et d'images où la mémoire se reporte toujours avec bonheur, vous replace vous-même et vous les donne à remâcher, embaumés cette fois de je ne sais quel parfum nouveau qui vous les fait chérir d'une autre manière"(10),

and the connection with reading is made specific in the Correspondance:

"Où sont-ils ceux qui trouvent du plaisir à déguster une belle phrase?"(11)

But secondly Culler's argument seems to have taken a slightly pious turn, which Barthes, whose Mythologies is probably behind the claims of Culler, Heath and Prendergast, (with its apparent suggestion that a "good" sign is an arbitrary one), has certainly not followed himself. For while I.A. Richards insists that

"No hedonic theory of value will fit the facts over even a small part of the field, since it must take what is a concomitant merely of a phase in the process of satisfaction as the mainspring of the whole"(12),

Barthes has deliberately evolved a hedonic theory of value in Le Plaisir
du texte, a self-conscious demand for a margin of frivolity:

"Cependant la place du plaisir dans une théorie du texte n'est pas sûre. Simplement, un jour vient où l'on ressent quelque urgence à dévisser un peu la théorie, à déplacer le discours, l'idolecte qui se répète, prendre de la consistance, et à lui donner la secousse d'une question. Le plaisir est cette question. Comme nom trivial, indigne (qui, sans rire, se dirait aujourd'hui hédoniste?), il peut générer le retour du texte à la morale, à la vérité: à la morale de la vérité: c'est un indirect, un 'dérapant', si l'on peut dire, sans lequel la théorie du texte redeviendrait un système centré, une philosophie du sens."(13)

Equating pleasure with contentment and "jouissance" with "évanouissement", (and regretting that there is no French word to cover both), he asks:

"Qu'est-ce que la signification? C'est le sens en ce qu'il est produit sensuellement"(14). My earlier references to the erotic function of the voice and of Flaubert's ideal prose, summed up by the now doubly apt phrase, "des phrases me font pâmer"(15), certainly suggest that Barthes' new textual ethic of pleasure is exemplified in Flaubert's writing. And one final long quotation from Le Plaisir du texte offers a specific solution to my dual interest in Flaubert's fascination with the material qualities of language, and in the value system that might result from this:

"ce que le plaisir suspend, c'est la valeur signifiée: la (bonne) Cause. 'Darmès, un frotteur qu'on juge en ce moment pour avoir tiré sur le roi, rédige ses idées politiques...; ce qui revient le plus souvent sous la plume de Darmès, c'est l'aristocratie, qu'il écrit haristaukrassie. Le mot, écrit de cette façon, est assez terrible...' Hugo (Pierres) apprécie vivement l'extravagance du signifiant; il sait aussi que ce petit orgasme orthographique vient des 'idées' de Darmès: ses idées, c'est-à-dire ses valeurs, sa foi politique, l'évaluation qui le fait d'un même mouvement: écrire, nommer, désorthographier et vomir. Pourtant: comme il devait être ennuyeux, le factum politique de Darmès! Le plaisir du texte, c'est ça: la valeur passée au rang somptueux de signifiant."(16)

"Haristaukrassie" reminds us of course of Flaubert's own trick of inventing splendid words, from "Charbovari", "Béchêt" and "manustirper", to those made magnificent by their misspelling, "po-hê-tique", "HHHindigné" and "HÉNAURME", evidently intended to contain their own value. While there is still the need to sort out which values are suspended in the realm of the
signified, and which subsumed into that of the signifier, in Barthes' suggestion lies the possibility, (and not necessarily a frivolous one), of beginning to theorize the problem of aesthetic value familiar even to Bouvard and Pécuchet:

"— Je comprends, dit Bouvard, le Beau est le Beau, et le Sublime le très Beau. Comment les distinguer?"(17)
Notes to Introduction

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., my underlining.
8. As indicated by the title of the number of Littérature devoted to Flaubert: Modernité de Flaubert, (No.15, Oct.1974).
19. Many references below.


27. Ibid.


29. Poulet's preface to Stendhal et Flaubert, p.12, quoting Sartre on Francis Ponge.


31. See below pp.113-114 and p.151.


33. Richard, op.cit., p.13, my underlining. Richard in fact claims "l'œuvre n'a pas été ici considérée comme un message ou comme un résidu, comme la simple traduction de quelque méditation intérieure ou comme la trace à demi effacée de quelque ineffable extase. L'écriture fait elle aussi partie de l'expérience la plus intime; elle en épouse les structures, mais c'est pour les modifier, les infléchir." (ibid.) But I am suggesting that Richard is nevertheless clearly committed to literature as the expression of an inner experience.


36. Ibid., p.250, my underlining.
Notes to Chapter 1.

2. Jean-Paul Sartre: L'Idiot de la famille, Paris, Gallimard, 1971-72, (3 volumes). In future the title will be abbreviated to L'Idiot, with upper-case Roman numerals to indicate the appropriate volume.
7. L'Idiot I, p.177.


10. L'Idiot II, pp.1214-1464 (the Garçon); I, pp.612-648 (la bêtise).
11. L'Idiot I, pp.454-460 (Dr. Larivièvre); I, pp.642-644 (Homais); II, pp.2106-2135 (Saint Julien).
12. See for example L'Idiot III, p.100: "c'est bien ainsi que le linguiste d'aujourd'hui la considère, c'est-à-dire comme un système de signes ayant une origine conventionnelle et des rapports intérieurs indépendamment de toute locution concrète." (referring to language)
13. Ibid., p.15.

15. For a discussion of Sartre's attitude to such a use of language in literature, see the whole of 'L'écrivain et sa langue' in his Situations IX, Paris, Gallimard, 1972, pp.40-82.


25. E.g. Alfred Fabre-Luce: 'Sartre par Flaubert (Critique sous la forme d'un Pastique)', La Revue des deux mondes (Oct./Dec.1972) pp.44-61, which mixes and confuses everything it can think of against Sartre, and is full of personal abuse against Sartre and even Simone de Beauvoir.

26. 'L'Idiot de la famille monstrueux, irritant et génial', p.16,(Marie-Jeanne Durry, Françoise Reiss, Marie-Claire Bancquart respectively).
27. There are examples of this in the review cited in the last note, e.g. "À la recherche de lui-même autant que de son modèle" (Reiss, p.16), "une quantité d'analyses qui intéressent et qui sont très suggestives. Elles appor tent beaucoup sur Flaubert. Et... sur J-P. Sartre." (Bancquart, p.17). See also Harry Levin: "A literary enormity: Sartre on Flaubert", Journal of the history of ideas, vol. 33 (1972), p.647: "In consequence we learn much less about Flaubert than we do about Sartre."

28. Examples of serious work which has appeared are the two articles already referred to in notes 18. and 20. by Michel Sicard, who has access to Sartre's notes for the unwritten fourth volume and who is apparently writing a book on L'Idiot, and Chapter 5 (pp. 263-326) of Michael Scriven: J-P. Sartre and Literature: The Writer as the Writer's Critic, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Wales, 1974.


31. Of the eminent persons asked to name their most "underrated" and "overrated" authors for the 75th anniversary edition of the Times Literary Supplement, 3906, (21st Jan. 1977), we find the following entry provided by Harry Levin: "Overrated: Jean-Paul Sartre. A man of courage and sympathy, but essentially an intellectual muddler, whose philosophy has been mostly casuistry and whose literary work has been mainly café table talk, he has contributed to the inflation of the French language and has traded its traditions of clarity and rigour for an eclectic mess of German metaphysics and Marxist dialectics." (p.67)


33. In 'Sartre par Sartre' in Situations IX, (pp. 99-134), Sartre explains his reasons for choosing Flaubert so well that one feels that the choice is if anything over-motivated (see pp. 115-122).

34. Durry, 'Le dernier "Sartre" devant les critiques': "Je ne crois pas à "l'empathie" en laquelle se serait mûse l'antipathie fameuse de Sartre pour son héros" (p.16). For Sartre's remark see Situations X, p.102, "Aujourd'hui je me dis que je n'aimerais pas dîner avec lui parce qu'il devait être vraiment assommant, mais je le vois comme un homme."

35. Sartre, Qu'est-ce que la littérature? p.197, note 6., introduced by: "On m'a si souvent reproché d'être injuste pour Flaubert que je ne puis résister au plaisir de citer les textes suivants, que chacun peut vérifier dans la Correspondance".

36. Sartre, Questions de théor. p.70.

37. L'Idiot II, p.1463.

39. "Bref la vassalité, pour l'enfant Flaubert, c'est le moyen choisi par un être inessentiel pour gagner le droit d'être essentiel en renchérisant sur son inessentialité" (p.336). "Pour le petit Flaubert, l'amour et la propriété ne sont pas séparables: l'une est mesure de l'autre. Mieux, puisque ce petit intrus ne dispose de son droit d'être née que dans son rapport au Géniteur, il le fonde même sur son rapport possessif avec l'ensemble matériel qui représente celui-ci: la propriété féodale, c'est-à-dire le lien de personne à personne à travers la chose donnée, devient pour Gustave, à l'âge d'Or, une structure fondamentale de son droit de vivre" (p.341, L'Idiot I).

40. Ibid., p.343.
41. Ibid., p.344.

42. There are many references in the Correspondance which testify to this. (All future references to Flaubert's letters will be to the Conard edition: Correspondance, Paris, Conard, 1926-33, 9 volumes, and Supplément, Paris, Conard, 1954, 4 volumes. These will be abbreviated to Corr. and Suppl. with volume indicated by upper-case Roman numerals.) "Eh bien! je n'en peux plus: je me sens à bout. Les larmes rentrées m'étouffent et je lâche l'écluse. Et puis l'idée de n'avoir plus un toit à moi, un home, m'est intolérable." (Corr. VII, p.245, 9th July 1875, to his niece). "J'ai été habitué à une grande indépendance d'esprit, à une insouciance complète de la vie matérielle. Or à mon âge on ne refait pas sa vie, on ne change pas d'habitudes. J'ai le coeur broyé et l'imagination aplatie. Voilà mon bilan." (Suppl. III, p.214, 3rd Oct. 1875, to George Sand).

43. Sartre, Qu'est-ce que la littérature? p.213. For the milder passage see L'Idiot I, p.343: "de toute manière l'or est annobli par la transmission. Gagnée, la richesse est un être incomplet, hideux encore; transmise, elle s'épanouit, s'humanise, le don la métamorphose et l'achève, elle atteint, dans les mains de l'héritier, à la plénitude spirituelle." and "À son tour il se transformerà: créature du hasard, il vivait sans but ni raison; une adorable générosité désigne, un mort lui donne mandat de vivre par une inflexible et dernière volonté qui le pénètre et le fonde: le voilà consacré."


48. For an account of the main periods of work see 'De Flaubert aux maos', pp. 70-83 of On a raison de se révolter (Discussions with Philippe Gavi and Pierre Victor, Paris, Gallimard, 1974). Sartre seems to have worked on it on and off since 1954, and was certainly writing the final version in 1968. The discussion sets L'Idiot against Sartre's political concerns and he attempts to justify his determination to finish it.
49. "Cette pulsion vers le Tout qui fera plus tard de lui, dans Madame Bovary autant et plus peut-être que dans les trois Saint Antoine, un écrivain cosmique." continued in footnote: "Je n'entends point par ces mots un penseur ou un philosophe mais très exactement un auteur dont le sujet permanent est le monde." (L'Idiot I, p.863.)

50. "L'important, c'est que Flaubert se soit engagé a fond sur un certain plan, même si celui-ci implique qu'il ait pris des positions blâmables pour tout le reste. L'engagement littéraire c'est finalement le fait d'assumer le monde entier, la totalité. ... Prendre l'univers comme un tout, avec l'homme dedans, en rendre compte du point de vue du néant, c'est un engagement profond, ce n'est pas simplement un engagement littéraire au sens où l'on s'engage à faire des livres." (Situations X, pp. 112-113.)

51. A criticism which I would make of Simone de Beauvoir's Pour une morale de l'ambiguïté (Paris, Gallimard (Idées), 1947), which, written during the same period, takes a different perspective upon the same problems.

52. Situations X, p. 115.

53. E.g. how to deal with traitors, whether to join the Communist Party. Pour une morale de l'ambiguïté is full of specific references to this context, see especially pp. 186-224.

54. There is little consideration of popular culture or the potential of new media like television, and one cannot imagine Sartre writing this book a few years later.

55. Sartre, Qu'est-ce que la littérature? pp. 11-48. Poets are defined as men who refuse to use language for other than aesthetic ends, while prose is essentially "utilitarian": "la poésie est du côté de la peinture, de la sculpture, de la musique" (p.17).

56. E.g. in the discussion of the imaginary attitude, see below, pp.80-85.


59. Remarkably similar to Flaubert's own handling of his sources in Bouvard et Pécouchet! See discussion in Chapter 3, pp. 255-256.

60. Psychoanalysis will be discussed below (pp.27-30). Perhaps the most interesting point about Sartre's Marxism is the insistence with which he replaces the primacy of the economic with praxis and the class struggle, (which is what keeps him so far apart from Tel Quel's association of Marxism and literature, with its emphasis upon theories of exchange etc.). The assessment of Marxism in Questions de méthode is fairly poor in that Marx himself is always excluded from Sartre's criticisms. (It is recognized that he did engage in difficult, subtle analyses). Even the progressive-regressive method with which Sartre proposes to put Marxism right is taken from Lefebvre, a Marxist historian! (See Sartre's note on pp. 73-75.)

62. Ibid., p201.

63. L'Idiot III, pp 95-96.


65. Questions de méthode, p.207.

66. Ibid., p.77.

67. Ibid., p.117.

68. Ibid., p.177.

69. "Quel est l'être-de-classe d'un écrivain né au milieu des capacités et qui produit Madame Bovary?" (L'Idiot III, p.150) "Dans quelle mesure la forme romanesque, dans sa généralité, exprime au XIXe siècle les contradictions infrastructurelles de la société bourgeoise prises comme ensemble synchron, c'est ce que nous étudierons quand le temps sera venu de proposer notre 'lecture' de Madame Bovary" (III, p.342). "Toutefois l'Art pour l'Art n'est pas une école. Chacun des écrivains considérés fait ce que nul autre n'a fait. Flaubert, en particulier, n'est absolument pas poète. S'il a fait quelques vers, du temps d'Alfred, il n'en est rien resté. Il déclare aussi qu'il n'est pas romancier, encore qu'il n'ait écrit que des romans et La Tentation. 'Je suis écrivain' dit-il. Que faut-il entendre par là? Comment expliquer que l'idée, commune à tous, de l'Art pur ait produit chez lui ces œuvres? C'est ce que nous tenterons de décider en relisant Madame Bovary." (III, p.665)


71. See his discussion of the way a life unfolds in spirals in Questions de méthode, pp. 149-151, for which Flaubert once again serves as example.

72. Or that considerations of length form the basis of a very relevant criticism. A rather ridiculous remark in the Times Literary Supplement review (see note 23.) "Yet Sartre can be, as we know from Les Mots, a master of sparsity" (p.1135) perhaps sets the problem in perspective.


75. See below p.81.

76. This is so much Sartre's method that from the philosophical point of view the literary medium is unusually apt.

77. L'Idiot II, pp.1331-1464.

78. L'Idiot I, pp.56-57.
79. See Situations IX p.123 where Sartre is trying to explain why he no longer writes novels: "Un écrivain est toujours un homme qui a plus ou moins choisi l'imaginaire: il lui faut une certaine dose de fiction. Pour ma part je la trouve dans mon travail sur Flaubert, qu'on peut d'ailleurs considérer comme un roman. Je souhaite même que les gens disent que c'est un vrai roman. J'essaie, dans ce livre, d'atteindre un certain niveau de compréhension de Flaubert au moyen d'hypothèses. J'utilise la fiction - guidée, contrôlée, mais fiction quand même - pour retrouver les raisons pour lesquelles Flaubert, par exemple, écrit une chose le 15 mars, puis le contraire le 21 mars, au même correspondant, sans se soucier de la contradiction. Mes hypothèses me conduisent donc à inventer en partie mon personnage."

80. There is something of an ambiguity in the use of mythology, i.e. is it really Flaubert's way of understanding events, or Sartre's own organizing device, and part of the "roman"? For example "l'enfant centenaire" could be indirectly attributed to Flaubert, but "les Chevaliers du Néant" must surely go to Sartre.

81. "Je voudrais en même temps qu'on le lise en pensant que c'est la vérité, que c'est un roman vrai."(p.94)

82. L'Idiot I, p.367.
83. Questions de méthode, p.186.
84. Ibid.,p.229.
85. L'Idiot I,p.7.
86. L'Idiot III, p.426.
87. Questions de méthode, p.205.
88. Though in support of Sartre's claim that the method is heuristic, it is true that the skeleton analysis of the application of the method to Flaubert (pp. 194-209, Questions de méthode) gives no hint of the answers that he will come up with in L'Idiot de la famille.
89. Despite the Sur Racine controversy.
91. A typically suspect sentence:"Nul doute, pourtant; si l'on veut écrire, c'est cette littérature-là qu'il faut faire; et réciproquement, l'Art de 1850 ne peut être fait que par ces Artistes." ibid., p.157.
92. "À ma connaissance, nous ne disposons d'aucun portrait de lui. Mais Gustave a un tel dégoût de la laideur, une telle attirance pour la beauté visible qu'il n'a pu vouer un tel amour qu'à un jeune homme avantageux. N'a-t-il pas dit, plus tard, que Maupassant était l'image vivante de son oncle? Or le neveu, comme on sait, était un fort bel homme"(I,p.1064). This sort of argument certainly does more harm than good.
93. L'Idiot II, p.1726. See also Questions de méthode, pp.149-151.

94. E.g. Rêve d'enfer: "Et Satan bondissait sur le pavé, il écumait de rage et, dans ses sauts convulsifs, il allait se frapper les reins sur le plafond" (Int. I, p.99); "sa bouche était entr'ouverte et comme contractée par un mouvement des lèvres involontaire et convulsif" (Julietta, p.100); Smarh: "Alors j'eus peur, je me suis mis à trembler comme si j'allais mourir" (the savage, p.200); "le monde était fou, il bavait, il écumait, il courait comme un enfant dans les champs, il suait de fatigue, il allait se mourir." (p.187)

95. "Sans doute, les écrits de Flaubert sont ensuite cités à l'appui de la thèse de départ, mais ils sont évidemment sollicités," L'Idiot de la famille monstrueux, irritant et génial", p.16.

96. Levin, 'A literary enormity', p.647.

97. Situations X, p.98.

98. Flaubert's spelling: treacherous act leading to punishment (death) by the father, mother's suicide as a result, (Int. I, pp.45-46). The fact that this is copied from Mérimée's story of the same title does not lessen the significance of Flaubert's interest in it.

99. Ibid., pp.74-78; murder of elder brother from jealousy, killed by father with sword.

100. L'Idiot I, pp.180-331.

101. Mouchard, art.cit., p.1041: "Ici, c'est la loi du tout ou rien, la force de ce flux qu'est le livre ne se maintient que dans la possibilité d'une avancée continue."

102. See below p.43.


104. 'L'Idiot de la famille monstrueux, irritant, et génial', p.17. Sartre, L'Idiot I, p.361: "ces états ambigus préfigurent la crise de Pont l'Evèque qui n'est, en fin de compte, que leur radicalisation; ils sont donc - si le mot a un sens - à la source même du génie de Flaubert et l'un des objectifs de ce livre est de le démontrer."


107. Ibid., p.98. (An obvious reference to Sartre's analysis of Jules, see below, p.35.)


111. L'Idiot I, pp.454-460.

112. "Il sortit, comme pour donner un ordre au postillon avec le sieur Canivet, qui ne se souciait pas non plus de voir Emma mourir entre ses mains." Int. I, p.685, my underlining.


114. Ibid.

115. Bardèche, op. cit., pp.7-8. Sartre's argument is supported by his recourse to the original draughts, for pp. 605-610 of the Nouvelle Version, ("Madame Bovary"). Nouvelle version précédée des scénarios inédits. Compiled with an introduction and notes by Jean Pommier and Gabrielle Leleu. Paris, Corti, 1949.), show that the final version was considerably toned down. "À part les maladies et les cadavres, il n'existait rien pour cet homme. Il était despot dans son hôpital. [...] il eût presque passé pour un saint si la finesse voltairienne de son esprit, qui s'échappait en sarcasmes, ne l'eût pas fait redouter comme un démon." (Int. I, p.606); "Et il sortit sous prétexte de donner un ordre à son postillon, mais pour s'en retourner à Rouen, et Canivet, qui ne se souciait pas non plus de voir Mme Bovary mourir entre ses mains, profita de la circonstance pour décamper." (p.607)


117. Ibid., my underlining.

118. Questions de méthode, p.88.

119. Sartre: L'Être et le Néant, Paris, Gallimard, 1943, especially pp.656-663. See also Situations I, p.188: "je ne pense pas ici aux méthodes grossières et suspectes de Freud, d'Adler et de Jung; il est d'autres psychanalyses."

120. L'Être et le Néant, p.663.


123. Sartre gives an interesting account of the history of (and reasons for) his attitude to psychoanalysis, and of his present position, in Situations IX, pp.103-112.

124. This basic disagreement is made very explicit in Jean-Marie Benoist's La Révolution structurale, Paris, Bernard Grasset, 1975, which constantly defines structuralism in opposition to Sartrean existentialism.
125. Situations X, p.110. This remark is followed by a typically ambiguous reference to Lacan: "bien que la conception de l'inconscient chez Lacan soit plus intéressante" (see back to note 18).


129. Situations IX, p.112. Other definitions of "le vécu": "le terrain sur lequel l'individu est constamment submergé par lui-même, par ses propres richesses, et où la conscience a l'astuce de se déterminer elle-même par l'oubli," (ibid., p.108); "l'ensemble du processus dialectique de la vie psychique, un processus qui reste nécessairement opaque à lui-même car il est une constante totalisation, et une totalisation qui ne peut être consciente de ce qu'elle est. On peut être conscient, en effet, d'une totalisation extérieure, mais non d'une totalisation qui totalise également la conscience. En ce sens, le vécu est toujours susceptible de compréhension, jamais de connaissance." (ibid., p.111).

130. L'Idiot I, p.171.


132. Which is, of course, a considerable concession.

133. Mouchard, art. cit., p.1048-49.

134. See Questions de méthode, p.194.


136. As in the analysis of the relationship with Laporte, ibid., pp.738-761.

137. See Sartre's preface, ibid., p.8.

138. An example of this: the first chapter, 'Un problème', is a phenomenological description of a childish sensibility (language, naïveté, belief). The reader is then sent back to Flaubert's origins, while Sartre retraces the genesis of this sensibility from birth to the age of six. He then repeats this double movement for the paternal cycle.

139. There is a considerable bibliography for discussions of Flaubert's "illness" over the years, in both the literary and the medical worlds. In particular there was a whole series of articles by various doctors in the Chronique médicale between 1900 and 1903. René Dumesnil's Flaubert, son hérité, son milieu, sa méthode, containing an important discussion, was published in 1905, (Paris, Société française d'imprimerie et de Librairie, a thesis for the "doctorat en médecine"). Another polemic arose over Jean Pommier's 'Les maladies de Flaubert', (in Dialogues avec le passé, Paris, Nizet, 1967, pp.281-299). Another medical work, Quel diagnostic aurions-nous fait si nous avions soigné Flaubert?, Paris, Foulon et Cie, 1960, Thèse médicale, Univ. Paris, 1960, is discussed by Dr. Gallet, 'Notes pour l'analyse de l'ouvrage de Dr. Gallet', in Les Amis de Flaubert (1962) No.20 pp.6-10 and 21, p.69. (cont.)
Although I originally consulted a large number of these rather obscure discussions of Flaubert's symptoms etc., they are intrinsically interesting rather than very relevant. I have therefore only included a small selection in my bibliography.

140. A chapter on epilepsy in a manual of psychiatry, Clinical Psychiatry, by Mayer-Gross, Slater and Roth, London, Baillière, Tindall & Cassell, 1974, (Chapter VIII: 'The Epilepsies') is very interesting (and not especially technical) on the whole topic of epilepsy, and anyone familiar with the history and details of Flaubert's fits might well consult it. Considerable attention is paid to hysterical simulation of epilepsy, but it is fascinating reading above all because the typical facets of personality and behaviour which are attributed to the epileptic often read almost as a deliberate description of Flaubert himself, especially pp.468-472.

141. The same work actually says that "The mistake of taking the epileptic to be a hysteric is much commoner than its converse."(p.475)

142. L'Idiot I, p51. On p.158 of vol. I Sartre makes a firm distinction between hysteria and epilepsy: "la pathologie de la croyance relève de l'hystérie plutôt que de cette épilepsie dont on l'a si longtemps affligé."

143. See for example the extracts from the Souvenirs littéraires on 'La Maladie de Flaubert', Int.I, pp.122-123: "Lorsque son système nerveux manquant d'équilibre lui infligea le supplice que l'on sait, Flaubert s'arrêtera; on eut dit que son esceveau intellectual s'était embrouillé subitement: il resta stationnaire. On peut dire de lui ce que les nourrices disent de certains enfants interrompus au milieu de leur croissance: il a été noué./// Ma conviction est inébranlable: Gustave Flaubert a été un écrivain d'un talent rare; sans le mal nerveux dont il fut saisi, il eut été un homme de génie."

144. His inconsistent attitude to epilepsy resembles his ambiguous use of the term "autism", sometimes in the sense of a serious, almost psychotic disorder, at others, e.g. in the discussion of Post-Romantic schoolboy reading habits(II,pp.1372-1387), almost metaphorically.

145. 'La Constitution', I, pp.13-648. For this particular summary see p.178.

146. Ibid.,p.147.

147. See note 94. Djalich (Quidquid Volueris) is perhaps the most "autistic" character, while Giocomo faints at three vital points of Bibliomanie, and Garcia faints with jealousy of his brother at the ball in La Peste à Florence. For Flaubert's own trances, see below, p.43.

148. L'Idiot III, pp.9-10. See I, p.395 for a definition of "stress": "l'unité de son mal intérieurisé en souffrance et de l'aménagement intentionnel de celui-ci en tant que cet aménagement,qui peut se manifester, en certains cas, par un comportement réflexif et une
distanciation, se glisse, de toute manière, dans la souffrance la
plus immédiate à titre d'intention de souffrir."

149. The discussion of Mannoni in the section entitled 'Le monde de l'envie'
(L'Idiot I, pp.422-452), examines in detail this "fetichisation of
the imaginary".

150. As Dumesnil believes (op.cit.).

151. Hence the importance of the feudalism discussion, see above, pp.13-14.

152. See the section 'La névrose comme régression', II, pp.1862-1882.

153. L'Idiot II, p.1920. Also p.1924: "Gustave aura plongé dans l'abjection,
à Pont-l'Evêque, pour se metamorphoser en Artiste."

154. This is what Sartre calls the "Qui perd gagne", a neurotic gamble
with a structure resembling Mannoni's "je sais bien, mais quand même".
Sartre's analysis of Saint Julien reveals the most radical
version of this strategy (L'Idiot II, pp.2106-2135) which has always
interested him. Flaubert's neurosis is his "Qui perd gagne": "Un peu
plus tard nous le verrons jouer l'éternité contre le Temps: c'est
qu'il veut arrêter son Destin. Il y parviendra d'ailleurs, au prix
d'une névrose."(L'Idiot I, p.335)

155. The part of the first Education sentimentale which concentrates on
Jules as an artist was written after Flaubert's illness.

156. This will be explained at length below.

157. See pp.87-89.

158. "Il aura utilisé sa constitution pithiatique pour réinventer l'art
d'écrire."(L'Idiot II, p.1920.)

159. L'Idiot III, p.342.

160. L'Idiot I, p.975.

161. Ibid.

162. L'Idiot III, p.32 and p.41.

163. The basic argument of Book 1. of the third volume, 'La névrose
objective'.

164. My account of Sartre's argument here is extremely schematic, since
it is less relevant to my particular interest. It is developed at
considerable length by Sartre in Chapter 3 of the third volume,
beginning p.66. It should perhaps be pointed out that the belief in
the eighteenth century demand for autonomy is a misunderstanding,
(since the demand for universality is naturally presented by Sartre
as the basis of a class ideology: bourgeoisie as the universal class).

165. See especially section D., 'La solution névrotique', pp.133-201.

166. In Sartre's definition, that is.
167. See Qu'est-ce que la littérature? pp. 148-179, also Jameson, *cit.*, p.215, on this "new type of examination which would describe the work of art in terms of the public which it implies."


169. *L'Idiot III*, p.344. It is difficult to give specific references for the detailed analysis of the shared misanthropy, but one might consult in particular pp.206, 227-228, 301-302, 306-307, 310, 332, 427-429.

170. *L'Idiot III*, Livre II: 'Névrose et Programmation chez Flaubert: le Second Empire', pp. 447-665. Flaubert's distress at the fall of the Empire is very well documented in the correspondence of those years. "Vous dire ce que j'ai souffert est impossible; tous les chagrins que j'ai eus dans ma vie, en les accumulant les uns sur les autres, n'égalent pas celui-là. Je passais mes nuits à râler dans mon lit comme un agonisant; j'ai cru par moments mourir et je l'ai fortement souhaité, je vous le jure. Je ne sais pas comment je ne suis pas devenu fou! Je n'en reviendrai pas! a moins de perdre la mémoire de ces abominables jours." (Corr. VI, p.199, 18th Feb. 1871, to Princesse Mathilde): "Et je ne croyais pas voir arriver la Fin du monde. Car c'est cela! nous assistons à la fin du monde latin. Adieu tout ce que nous aimons!" (Corr. VI, p.201, 11th March 1871, to Mme Régnier); "Le 4 septembre a inauguré un état de choses qui ne nous regarde plus. Nous sommes de trop!" (Corr. VI, p.437, 28th Oct. 1872, to Ernest Feydeau)

171. See above p. 34.


173. Ibid., p443. The difference between Leconte de Lisle's and Flaubert's relationship to their period is made explicit on pp.432-3. The idea of "programmation" is explained from approximately pp.434-443: "des facteurs biologiques, sociaux, métapsychologiques - universaux qui se font vivre par nous dans leur réalité singulière - sont pour chacun à l'origine d'un programme de vie qui naît des contradictions intérieures et que freine ou accélère le mouvement général de la Société." (p.441)

174. The extensive analysis of Leconte de Lisle runs from p.345 to around p.414.

175. Examples of critical attention to this will be very frequent in the rest of this thesis.

176. *Agonies*, Int. p.158, used here in the context of the writer who cannot find his words, but see also *La Danse des Morts*, Int., p.165, "on eut dit un muet en colère qui balbutie et écume de rage: c'était la terre qui parlait."


178. For Caroline Commanville's three stories see her *Souvenirs* (1886), which head the first volume of the Conard *Correspondance*, pp. X-XI.


180. See also the Goncourts' *Journal* (Edmond et Jules de Goncourt: *Journal*).

181. See ch.3, 'La mère', pp.82-102, and ch.5, 'Naissance d'un cadet', especially pp.130-136.

182. Lucie Chevalley-Sabatier's Gustave Flaubert et sa nièce Caroline, Paris, La Pensée universelle, 1971, relates a story told by Caroline which is a perfect account of what Sartre suggests never happens for Flaubert: "Je me suis mise à dire tout haut: 'tu es Caroline' et je répétait 'Oui je suis Caroline'. J'étais tout étonnée de ma découverte, je prenais conscience d'être moi-même, et de me dégager du monde extérieur dont jusqu'alors je faisais partie." (pp.138-139)

183. L'Idiot I, p.140.

184. Ibid., p.142. This explanation of the autistic syndrome is classic but by no means proven. Mayer Gross, Slater and Roth, (Clinical Psychiatry) say there is as yet no evidence for blaming it on "chilly" mothers(p.680).

185. L'Idiot I, p. 151 and p.149 respectively.

186. Ibid., p.151. "L'amour donne, attend, reçoit: il y a réciprocité de désignation. Sans ce lien fondamental, l'enfant est signifié sans être signifiant. Les significations le traversent et parfois s'installent mais lui demeurent étrangères; par elles, l'Autre le déchiffre; autres, elles fuient vers l'Autre; dans le même temps, inertes, demicloses, elles manifestent la puissance de cet invisible occupant. Réduit à la contemplation de sa passivité, l'enfant ne peut savoir qu'il a la structure d'un signe et que le dépassement vivant du vécu est, en lui comme en chacun, le fondement de la signification. Ainsi le langage lui vient du dehors: le dépassement signifiant est l'opération de l'Autre et s'achève par une signification qui le détermine de l'extérieur."

187. Sartre discusses his own experience of this sensation in Situations IX: "Le langage est une espèce d'immense réalité, que j'appellerais un ensemble pratico-inertie; je suis constamment en rapport avec lui: non pas dans la mesure où je parle, mais précisément dans la mesure où c'est d'abord pour moi un objet qui m'enveloppe et dans lequel je peux prendre des choses, ensuite seulement je découvre sa fonction de communication pour moi le langage n'est pas en moi. Je crois que les gens disent qu'ils ont l'impression, quelle que soit leur opinion après, qu'il y a des mots dans leur tête. Tandis que moi, j'ai l'impression qu'ils sont déhors, comme une espèce de grand système électronique: on touche des machines et puis ça donne des résultats."pp.40-41. Sartre relates this to his childhood confusion of words and things, as described in Les Mots.

188. Similar to another anecdote related by Flaubert himself and reported by the Goncourts, (Journal, vol.II, p.1134, 5th May 1876): "Il y avait à la noce une petite fille. Je suis revenu à la maison amoureux d'elle. Je voulais lui donner mon cœur, — une expression que j'avais entendue. Dans ce temps, il arrivait tous les jours, chez mon père, des bourraches de gibier, de poisson, de choses à manger, — que lui
envoyaient des malades qu'il avait guéris, - des bourriques qu'on déposait le matin dans la salle à manger. Et en même temps, comme j'entendais sans cesse parler d'opérations ainsi que de choses habituelles et ordinaires, je songeais très sérieusement à prier mon père de m'ôter le cœur. Et je voyais mon cœur apporté dans une bourrique par un conducteur de diligence, à la plaque, à la casquette garnie de frisure de peluche; je voyais mon cœur posé sur le buffet de la salle à manger de ma petite femme. Et dans le don matériel de mon cœur il n'y avait en ma pensée ni blessure ni sang." Telling the same story to George Sand, (Corr.VI, pp.12-13), Flaubert says he was five or six at the time.


191. It is quoted usefully by Culler, Uses of Uncertainty, p.166, but in a quite different context by Douchin, (Le Sentiment de l'absurde chez Gustave Flaubert, Paris, Minard, 1970, p.44), where it is used as an example of absurd experience, rather than of the curious nature of language.

192. Int. II, p.484, my underlining.


194. Int. II, p.174. For himself, that is; they obviously have an ironic function in summing up the story.

195. Ibid., p.170. "Ce fut de cette manière, à force de l'entendre, qu'elle apprit le catéchisme."

196. See below,especially discussions of Salammbo and Charles, pp.239-247.

197. "On entendait, à côté du lourd patois dorien, retentir les syllables celtiques bruissantes comme des chars de bataille, et les terminaisons ionniennes se heuraient aux consonnes du désert, après comme des cris de chacal."(Int. I, p.694)
"Ils déliraient en cent langages" (ibid.,p.697)
"Les soldats, sans comprendre ce qu'elle disait, se tassaient autour d'elle."(ibid.)
"Elle chantait tout cela dans un vieil idiome chamanéen que n'entendaient pas les Barbares."(ibid.,p.698)
There is also the scene where Hannon cannot make himself understood by the army of mercenaries, where Spendius deliberately mistranslates, ibid., pp.705-706.

198. See below p.102-104.

199. Int. II, p.15.

200. Ibid., p.120.

201. Ibid., p.17.

202. Ibid., p.204.

19. "Souvent, en présence des forêts, des hautes montagnes, de l'océan, son front plissé se déridait tout à coup, ses narines s'écartaient avec violence, et toute son âme se dilatait devant la nature comme une rose qui s'épanouit au soleil; et il tremblait de tous ses membres, sous le poids d'une volupté intérieure, et la tête entre ses deux mains il tombait dans une léthargique mélancolie; alors, dis-je, son âme brillait à travers son corps, comme les beaux yeux d'une femme derrière un voile noir." (ibid., p.105). The whole portrait of Djaliad on p. 105 is important.

201. Ibid., p.330.
202. Ibid., p.360.
203. Ibid., p.246.
204. Int. II, p.79.
206. Ibid., p.295.
207. Ibid., pp.25-26.
208. Ibid., p.773.
209. Ibid., p.606.
211. Ibid., p.623.
212. Ibid., p.40.
213. Ibid., p.49.
214. Ibid., p.147.
215. Ibid., p.151. For full quotation see note 186. above.
216. Ibid., p.147.
218. Ibid., p.518.
219. "C'est la Vérité qui est en cause; pour qu'il la reconnaisse et l'affirme - ne fut-elle que le déguisement d'une erreur ou d'un mensonge - il faut et il suffit que l'Autre l'aie estampillé. Et bien entendu, il ne se tromperait guère s'il envisageait le Vrai comme une œuvre commune et comme une exigence de réciprocité: je ne saurais jamais rien que l'Autre ne me garantisse mais il faut ajouter que le Savoir d'autrui n'a d'autre garantie que moi. Or c'est la récipro- cité que Flaubert ignore: nous avons vu, nous verrons mieux encore que
cette relation lui échappe; absente, il ne peut la concevoir; présente, il ne la comprend ni ne l'approuve ni ne peut s'y tenir: il fait si bien qu'elle casse ou qu'il la transforme en relation féodale."(ibid., p.159.)

224. Ibid., p.146.


227. Ibid., p.352.

228. L'Idiot I, p.165.

229. Ibid., pp.676-677.

230. Ibid., p.476. For detailed explanation see pp.674-684.

231. Souvenirs, Notes et Pensees intimes, p.96.


233. "Ce qui se parle est joué, ce qui se vit ne se parle pas."(L'Idiot I, p.171)

234. "Sur toutes choses, il a des thèses qui ne peuvent être sincères, des opinions de parade et de chic délicat, des paradoxes de modestie", (Journal, vol. I, p.1350); "cette ressemblance bourgeoise de sa cervelle avec la cervelle de tout le monde, - ce dont il enrage, je suis sûr, au fond, - cette ressemblance, il la dissimule par des paradoxes truculents, des axiomes dépopulateurs, des beuglements révolutionnaires, un contre-pied brutal, mal élevé même, de toutes les idées reçues et acceptées."(vol. II, p.932); "Maintenant, ment-il absolument, quand il est en si complète contradiction avec son for intérieur? Non, et le phénomène qui passe en lui est assez complexe. ... mon ami Flaubert arrive à se griser presque sincèrement des contre-vérités qu'il débite."(ibid.)


238. L'Idiot I, p.957.

239. Barthes' phrase, loc. cit.

240. L'Idiot I, p.901.

241. Ibid., p.885. "Nous verrons plus tard que le secret du style dans les grandes œuvres de Flaubert, c'est qu'il est l'eloquence refusée." This idea is taken from Thibaudet, (Gustave Flaubert, Paris, Gallimard, 1935); "Flaubert, dont la nature est essentiellement oratoire, et que toutes ses œuvres de jeunesse nous manifestent comme un talent oratoire, l'élimine de plus en plus à partir de Madame Bovary."(p.226) "Il est le seul des prosateurs du XIXe siècle dont le style ait eu besoin de
ce contact dernier avec la parole, avec les timbres de la voix et le rythme de la respiration. C'est que, comme nous l'avons vu, le fond de ce style est oratoire, se définit comme l'oratoire qui, à partir de Madame Bovary, se dépouille, est mis au point, se résout en dissonances pour se reformer en consonances." (pp.278-279)


244. "S'il était possible d'imager une esthétique du plaisir textuel, il faudrait y inclure: l'écriture à haute voix. Cette écriture vocale, (qui n'est pas du tout la parole), mais c'est sans doute elle que recommandait Artaud et que demande Sollers. Eu égard aux sons de la langue, l'écriture à haute voix n'est pas phonologique, mais phonétique; son objet n'est pas la clarté des messages, le théâtre des émotions; ce qu'elle cherche (dans une perspective de jouissance), ce sont les incidents pulsionnels, c'est le langage tapisssé de peau, un texte où l'on puisse entendre le grain du gosier, la patine des consonnes, la volupté des voyelles, toute une stéréophonie de la chair profonde: l'articulation du corps, de la langue, non celle du sens, du langage." (Roland Barthes, Le Plaisir du texte, Paris, Seuil, 1973, pp. 104-105).


246. Which along with his metaphors for writing as masturbation, makes literature a very erotic experience in its way: "aller vivre avec toi, en toi, et [...]/ reposer ma tête entre tes seins au lieu de me la masturber: sans cesse pour en faire éjaculer des phrases" (Corr.III p.378, 28/29th Oct. 1853, to Louise Colet); "J'y crèverai, mon vieux, j'y crèverai. N'importe, ça commence à m'amuser bourrement. Enfin l'érection est arrivée, monsieur, à force de me masturber. Espérons qu'il y aura fête." (Corr. IV, p.287, 19th Dec. 1858, to Ernest Feydeau)


251. L'Idiot I, pp. 612-648. Very well explained by Culler in the Uses of Uncertainty, in his own analysis of stupidity, pp.157-184, though it will be seen later that I disagree with the use to which he puts this analysis.

252. Of whom good analyses are rare. Perhaps the best is Crouzet's in 'Le style épique dans Madame Bovary', (Europe Sept/Nov. 1969), see pp. 166-167.


254. See Culler, Uses of Uncertainty, pp.160-161, where he establishes a link with Barthes' Mythologies: "If stupidity is cultural language made natural, where can one stand to combat it?" (p.161) "To analyse the contemporary myths of bourgeois culture is not to claim that they are necessarily false but only that their historical and conventional character has been obscured by a society which attempts to transform
its particular culture into a universal nature."(p.160) "There are, therefore, many items which merit their entry in the dictionary only when they are considered not as responses in a particular situation but as possible responses which society has, in its infinite wisdom, elevated to the status of natural meanings."(p.161)

255. Culler, Prendergast, Heath, Felman for example,(various references below.).


"From these precarious and almost impromptu remarks I would simply draw a working hypothesis: that of considering the stylistic features as transformations derived either from collective formulae (of unrecov­erable origin, either literary or pre-literary), or, by play of meta­phor, from idiolectical forms. In both cases what would have to control the stylistic work is the search for models, of patterns: sentence structures, syntagmatic clichés, divisions and clausulae of sentences; and what would inspire such work is the conviction that style is essentially a citational process, a body of formulae, a memory (almost in the cybernetic sense of the word), a cultural and not an expressive inheritance!(p.9). "These models are only the depositaries of culture (even if they seem very old). They are repetitions, not essential elements; citations, not expressions; stereotypes, not archetypes"(p10).

258. "It is a way of saying that what the text operates is a subversion of fixity, a negation of fixed, absolute or, better, stereotyped definit­ions of reality. What fascinates Flaubert, what animates and nourishes the negative impetus in his imagination, is the figure of the Stereotype, those diverse forms of attitude, behaviour, language, all the activity of which is to transform provisional constructs of reality into the stereotyped certitudes of absolute Truth. In this sense, it is preferable to speak of the Flaubert text not as "destructive" (in the sense of some blind nihilistic rage), but, adopting a term from Jacques Derrida, as 'de-constructive', as systematically deconstructing all those particular constructions of reality that are hypostasized, uncritically and complacently, as the Real tout court, the Real in some absolute, fixed sense." (Christopher Prendergast: 'Flaubert: Writing and Negativity', Novel 8, (Spring 1975), No. 3), pp.203-204.


262. In my next chapter I shall suggest that Barthes' "semiological" approach has achieved the most successful definition to date of that equally mystifying entity, Flaubert's irony. See pp.133-136.

263. Though given the fictional flavour of Roland Barthes par Roland Barthes it is perhaps unreasonable to assume sincerity.
264. Though it is true that he does less well with Thompson of Sunderland, (L'Idiot I, pp. 626-629).

265. Ibid., p.622.

266. Ibid., pp.620-621. "S'extasier sur l'invention et dire: 'Moi, monsieur, qui vous parle, j'étais ce matin à X; je suis parti par le train de X, là-bas, j'ai fait mes affaires, etc., et à X heures, j'étais revenu!" (Int. II, p.305).

267. "Disons qu'il voit les mots du dehors, comme des choses, même quand ils sont en lui: c'est cette disposition d'esprit qui sera plus tard à l'origine du Dictionnaire des idées reçues; les vocables sont d'abord des réalités sensibles; leur liaisons sont opérées au-dehors - accidents, coutumes, institutions -,. le sens vient en troisième lieu, résultat rigoureux des deux premiers moments mais, en lui-même, quelconque." (L'Idiot I, p.622)


270. Ibid., pp.602-603.

271. Int. II, p.175.

272. Ibid., p.488.

273. Ibid., p.499.


275. "Oh! c'est que je t'aime!" etc., (ibid.).


278. Int. II, p.141.

279. See the analysis of Mme Arnoux below, pp. 210-212.


281. Ibid.


283. Ibid.


285. Ibid., pp.635-636.


290. Int. II, p. 139.

291. Despite not being able to read until he was nine.

292. For Maxime du Camp's view see note 143 above. Lemaître: 'La Paresse de Flaubert', Les Annales politiques et littéraires, No. 1199, 17th June 1906, p. 379: "Avec cela je le soupçonne d'avoir été très flâneur, très paresseux, quoi qu'il dise. Bouquiner au hasard à travers sa bibliothèque, s'étendre sur son divan et y funer d'innombrables petites pipes, en songeant vaguement à la page commencée et en ruminant des épithètes, c'est là ce qu'il appelait 'travailler comme un nègre'. [...] je suis persuadé qu'il prenait souvent le rêve, la vague idée d'une idée parmi la fumée du tabac, pour un travail réel. Ainsi s'explique que, n'ayant pas autre chose à faire et vivant dans une solitude presque complète, il ait pu passer cinq ou six ans sur chacun de ses livres. Il est vrai qu'il n'en valent que mieux. Et c'est bien pour avoir été faits lentement, mais non, comme il le croyait, sur un chevalet de torture et parmi des sueurs d'agonie." p379.

293. René Descharmes: Flaubert. Sa vie, son caractère et ses idées avant 1857, Paris, Ferroud, 1909, p546. "Il s'est forgé artificiellement une nature opposée à celle que peut-être l'héritité, et certainement son éducation première, son entourage, les influences extérieures avaient façonnée en lui. Et le plus remarquable, c'est de voir que concurremment et alternativement, il a développé ses facultés et exercé son talent, tantôt dans le sens de ses tendances originelles, tantôt à l'encontre de ces tendances."


295. L'Idiot II, pp. 1467-1766.

296. "Il m'a semblé autrefois que j'avais du génie, je marchais le front rempli de pensées magnifiques, le style coulait sous ma plume comme le sang dans mes veines; [...] mais quand je retrouvais chez d'autres les pensées et jusqu'aux formes même que j'avais conçues, je tombais, sans transition, dans un découragement sans fond; je m'étais cruellement égal et je n'étais plus que leur copiste!" (Int. I, p. 254)

297. L'Idiot II, p. 1471. A more essential distinction between poetry and art is made later in the chapter, where poetry is defined as an escape from the real into the imaginary, but leaving reality intact, while art is seen as devalorising reality by "realizing the imaginary", an essential idea of Sartre's to be discussed below pp. 85-86.


302. See note 154. above.


305. Though compare Walter Benjamin's fascinating Marxist analysis of the origin of the demand for taste in "l'art pour l'art" writers, where it is related to the preponderance of "commodity production", to the fact that the consumer is not knowledgeable when he appears as a buyer, and that mass production must be bent upon disguising bad quality. "In the same measure as the expertness of the customer declines, the importance of his taste increases - both for him and for the manufacturer. For the consumer it has the value of a more or less elaborate masking of his lack of expertness. Its value to the manufacturer is a fresh stimulus to consumption which in some cases is satisfied at the expense of other requirements of consumption the manufacturer would find more costly to meet." It is precisely this development which literature reflects in *l'art pour l'art*. This doctrine and its corresponding practice for the first time gives taste a dominant position in poetry. [ ... ] In *l'art pour l'art* the poet for the first time faces language the way the buyer faces the commodity on the open market. He has lost his familiarity with the process of its production to a particularly high degree. The poets of *l'art pour l'art* are the last about whom it could be said that they come 'from the people'. They have nothing to formulate with such urgency that it could determine the coining of their words. [ ... ] The poet of *l'art pour l'art* wanted to bring to language above all himself - with all the idiosyncrasies, nuances, and imponderables of his nature. These elements are reflected in taste. The poet's taste guides him in his choice of words. But the choice is made only among words which have not already been coined by the object itself - that is, which have not been included in its process of production. [ ... ] In point of fact, the theory of *l'art pour l'art* assumed decisive importance around 1852, at a time when the bourgeoisie sought to take its 'cause' from the hands of the writers and the poets. [ ... ] At the end of this development may be found Mallarmé and the theory of poésie pure. There the cause of his own class has become so far removed from the poet that the problem of a literature without an object becomes the centre of discussion. This discussion takes place not least in Mallarmé's poems, which revolve about blanc, absence, silence, vide." Here of course we are back to the Genette quotation with which this chapter began. (Walter Benjamin: Addendum to 'The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire', in Charles Baudelaire: *A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism*, London, NLB, 1973, trans. Harry Zohn, pp. 104-106).


307. Souvenirs, Notes et Pensées intimes, p.66.


309. Ibid., p.238, (Mémoires d'un Fou).
310. Ibid., p.247.

311. Ibid., p.216, (Smarh).

312. "Oh poète! se sentir plus grand que les autres, avoir une âme si vaste qu'on y fait tout entrer, tout tourner, tout parler, comme la créature dans la main de Dieu." (ibid.)

313. See note 219. above.


315. Int. I, p.635.

316. Ibid., p.586.

317. Ibid., p.617, but see further discussion below, pp.75-77.

318. Ibid., p.272.

319. Ibid., p.211.

320. Souvenirs, Notes et Pensées intimes, p.110.


323. Erich Auerbach: Mimesis, Princeton, P.U.P., 1973: "Flaubert does nothing but bestow the power of mature expression upon the material which she affords, in its complete subjectivity." (p.484) "His rôle / the writer's / is limited to selecting the events and translating them into language; and this is done in the conviction that every event, if one is able to express it purely and completely, interprets itself and the persons involved in it far better and more completely than any opinion or judgement appended to it could do. Upon this conviction - that is, upon a profound faith in the truth of language responsibly, candidly and carefully employed - Flaubert's artistic practice rests." (p.486)


327. Ibid., pp.19-20.

328. Ibid., p.20.


331. Paraphrase of Barthes' words, ibid. p.10.

332. The other image of style, also very relevant to Flaubert, is outlined in note 257. above, (style as a citational process).

333. Ibid., p.4.


337. See *Corr.* III, p.21, 13th Sept. 1852, to Louise Colet, for a typical reference to Goethe's "Tout dépend de la conception"; and *Corr.* III, p.360, 30th Sept. 1853, to Louise Colet, for one to Boileau: "Ce que l'on conçoit bien, etc."


348. E.g. *Corr.* II, p.422, 30th May 1852, to Louise Colet: "Quelque indifférent que soit le sujet en soi, il faut qu'il existe néanmoins."


351. E.g. "Car il n'imaginait pas des 'styles' comme une série de moules particuliers dont chacun porte la marque d'un écrivain et dans lequel on coule toutes ses idées; mais il croyait au style, c'est-à-dire à une manière unique, absolue, d'exprimer une chose dans toute sa couleur et son intensité." (p.LXI); "Le style devait donc être, pour ainsi dire, impersonnel et n'emprunter ses qualités qu'à la qualité de la pensée et à la puissance de la vision." (p.LXII).

353. Ibid., p.18.


356. Sherrington, op.cit., p.293.

357. Without wishing to commit myself either to Rousseau's "real view", it is surely the case that the dialogue form with its playful exchanges invites the reader to engage in ironic debate, and that no one remark in isolation can be read in a straightforward way, (J-J. Rousseau 'Préface de Julie ou Entretien sur les Romans', pp.737-757, Julie ou la Nouvelle Héloïse, Paris, Garnier, 1960).

358. Culler, Uses of Uncertainty, p.147.

359. See Uses of Uncertainty, p.203: "In Bouvard et Pécuchet and Trois Contes the compositional clumsiness which had always marked Flaubert's style becomes so pervasive that one can no longer doubt its rôle as a deliberate distancing device. Calling attention to sentences as sentences but without providing any supplementary meaning to compensate that attention, awkwardness becomes a feeble sign of the written." Culler's book, prefaced in 1973, was presumably written first, though both were published in 1974.


361. "J'adore les histoires qui se suivent tout d'une haleine, où l'on a peur. " (ibid., p.602).

362. Ibid., p.641.

363. Thibaudet on the abandoned campfire: "Jules Lemaître appelle certain sonnet de Soulary une noix de coco sculptée par un forçat. Ne pourrait-on en dire autant de cette métaphore, la plus longue peut-être et la plus laborieuse de toute la langue française?" (op.cit., p.228). Proust claims "il n'y a pas peut-être dans tout Flaubert une seule belle métaphore" (art.cit.pp.193-194), a view shared by John Middleton Murry: 'Gustave Flaubert, 1821-1880' in Countries of the Mind, London, Collins,1924, (written 1921): "Flaubert's use of imagery is almost invariably strained or commonplace, and often both." (p.204) "The true faculty of metaphor was denied him." (p.205)


366. Proust, art.cit.

368. Genette, 'Silences de Flaubert', in his *Figures*, Paris, Seuil, 1966, pp. 223-243 (this article contains part of 'Le travail de Flaubert'). This quotation is cited and analysed by Genette on p.239.


370. Ibid., p.57.


373. Ibid. Genette is quoting Prévost and Malraux.

374. Ibid.


376. "Dans mon livre sur Flaubert, j'étudie des personnes imaginaires, des gens qui, comme Flaubert, jouent des rôles. Tout homme est une fuite de gaz par laquelle il s'échappe dans l'imaginaire. Flaubert était constamment cela. Pourtant il devait aussi regarder la réalité en face puisqu'il la haïssait, et c'est tout le problème des rapports entre le réel et l'imaginaire que j'essaie d'étudier à partir de sa vie et de son œuvre." (*Situations IX*, p.118)

377. His third important reason for undertaking this work on Flaubert: "c'est que l'étude de Flaubert représente pour moi, une suite à l'un de mes premiers livres, *L'Imaginaire*." (ibid.) "Le livre, tel qu'il se présente maintenant, se rattache d'une certaine façon à *L'Imaginaire*, que j'ai écrit avant guerre." (*Situations X*, p.101)


379. Ibid., p.232. For further explanation see *Situations IX*, p.118. "J'essayais de montrer, dans ce livre, qu'une image n'est pas une sensation réveillée, ou remodelée par l'intellect, ni même une ancienne perception altérée ou atténuée par le savoir, mais quelque chose d'entièrement différent, une réalité absente, révélée dans son absence même à travers ce que j'appelais un 'analogon': un objet servant de support analogique et traversé par une intention."


381. Ibid. pp.40-45.

382. Similar analyses are applied to various aesthetic phenomena, for example looking at a portrait painting of Charles VIII, (pp.38-39 and 239-240). This involves a similar to-and-fro between "blobs of paint on a canvas", and "Charles VIII as image": "Ainsi le tableau doit être conçu comme une chose matérielle visitée de temps à autre (chaque fois que le spectateur prend l'attitude imageante) par un irréel qui est précisément l'objet peint."(p.240)

383. Ibid., p.215.
384. Ibid., pp.174-175.


387. Sartre, Questions de méthode, p.129.

388. Sartre, L'Imaginaire, especially pp.189-191, but also pp.191-226.

389. Ibid., p.189.

390. See Ch. 3, pp. 228-239.

391. One should of course be wary of sharing Sartre's sometimes strange definitions of art, whatever their explanatory function.


393. Culler, review of L'Idiot de la famille, p.421.

394. With which I agree, see above p. 77-78

395. Sartre, L'Imaginaire, p.245: "Dire que l'on 'prend' devant la vie une attitude esthétique, c'est confondre constamment le réel et l'imaginaire. Il arrive cependant que nous prenions l'attitude de contemplation esthétique en face d'événements ou d'objets réels. En ce cas chacun peut constater en soi une sorte de recul par rapport à l'objet contemplé qui glisse lui-même dans le néant. C'est que, à partir de ce moment, il n'est plus perçu; il fonctionne comme analogon de lui-même, c'est-à-dire qu'une image irréelle de ce qu'il est se manifeste pour nous à travers sa présence actuelle."


397. L'Idiot II, p.1564: "l'être comme apparition, l'apparition réduite à l'apparence, l'essence de la communication se dévoilant comme non-communication absolue, l'imaginaire et le réel confondus, voilà ce qui, tout à coup, fait trembler Flaubert de terreur et de joie. On aura déjà compris que cette joie est celle de l'esthète: elle lui est donnée quand les conditions sont réunies pour que l'événement réalise la déréalisation du réel et lui montre l'espèce humaine comme un produit de son imagination."

398. See above p. 63.

400. Corr. I, p.27, 24th June 1837, to Ernest Chevalier. See L'Imaginaire, p. 245: "le réel n'est jamais beau. La beauté est une valeur qui ne saurait jamais s'appliquer qu'à l'imaginaire et qui comporte la néantisation du monde dans sa structure essentielle."


402. Guido Morpurgo-Tagliabue: 'Literature and Poetry' in Sartre: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Edith Kern, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, 1962, pp.129-135. "The imaginative is evil because it is unreal, because it is only an appearance. Beauty is precisely this refusal of reality, to the extent that being is a form. For the moment let us pass over the hyperbolic psychology that makes this act a conscious destruction, and, as is the case for all perversion, a voluntary failure and consequently an abnegation."(p.134)


405. Ibid., pp.662-663. For whole discussion see pp. 662-665. There is also a brief discussion of the paradox of the actor in L'Imaginaire, pp. 242-243.

406. See the section 'Du comique considéré comme masochiste', L'Idiot I, pp. 809-853, e.g. "Le défi du petit Gustave est une impuissante provocation en ceci qu'il revendique dans l'orgueil ce qu'il a vécu dans la honte: tu m'as déréalisé? Fort bien, je serai le Seigneur de l'Irréel"(p.834).

407. Ibid., p.834.

408. Ibid., p.905.

409. "Il se retotalise comme celui qui doit atteindre à la gloire en créant des centres de déréalisation par certaines combinaisons de graphèmes." (ibid., p.659)

410. See above pp. 53-54.


413. L'Idiot I, especially p.929.

414. Ibid., p.931.


417. Ibid., p.1618.


420. Ibid.

Notes to Chapter 2.


2. Culler, review of L'Idiot, p.421. He is referring to Sartre's article in Situations I, 'M. François Mauriac et la liberté', pp. 36-57. (1939)


4. La production du sens chez Flaubert, p.416.

5. Ibid., p.432.

6. Ibid., p.434.

7. The "misunderstanding" which Sartre talks about in vol. III of L'Idiot, see above pp.38-39.

8. Examples will be given below, pp.106-109.

9. "On me croit épris du réel, tandis que je l'exècre; car c'est en haine du réalisme que j'ai entrepris ce roman", Corr. IV, p.134, October or November 1856, to Miss Roger des Genettes.


12. Picnics at Ry etc.

13. La production du sens chez Flaubert, p.431.


15. See below, at length. Ricardou equates the Nouveau Roman with auto-representation, and Tel Quel with anti-representation: "La tendance à l'autoreprésentation du Nouveau Roman", par laquelle le récit, notamment par l'intense effet de la mise en abyme qui retouche la fonction représentative, se désigne lui-même. La tentative d'antireprésentation pratiquée à Tel Quel/sic/ et très sensible dans Personnes et dans Nombres. C'est, par exemple, le violent remplacement du personnage par de parfaites personnes grammaticales rebelles à toute appropriation représentative." ('Fonction critique', in Tel Quel's Théorie d'ensemble, Seuil, Paris, 1968, p.265). "Nous noterons qu'en leur commun conflit

16. "Nous sommes donc conduits à cette conclusion inattendue, que le seul mode que connaisse la littérature en tant que représentation est le récit, équivalent verbal d'événements non verbaux et aussi d'événements verbaux, sauf à s'effacer dans ce dernier cas devant une citation directe où s'abolit toute fonction représentative, à peu près comme un orateur judiciaire peut interrompre son discours pour laisser le tribunal examiner lui-même une pièce à conviction. La représentation littéraire, la mimesis des anciens, ce n'est donc pas le récit plus les 'discours': c'est le récit, et seulement le récit. Platon opposait mimesis à diegèse comme une imitation parfaite à une imitation impa­raite; mais l'imitation parfaite n'est plus une imitation, c'est la chose même, et finalement la seule imitation, c'est l'imparfaite. Mimesis, c'est diegèse." Genette: 'Frontières du récit', Communication No. 8 (1966) pp.155-156.


18. Roger Huss: 'Some anomalous uses of the imperfect and the status of action in Flaubert', French Studies vol. XXXI (April 1977) No.2, pp. 139-148. This article will often be referred to below.


21. "Je me soulagerai un peu en dégoûtant deux ou trois opinions dogmatiques sur l'art d'écrire. Ce sera l'occasion d'exprimer ce que je pense: chose douce et dont je me suis toujours privé." Corr. VI, p.115, May 1870, to George Sand. (quoted by Huss, ibid., note 7.)

22. "La plastique étant la qualité première de l'Art", Int. II, p.764. "il pensait que l'Art est une chose sérieuse ayant pour but de produire une exaltation vague, et même que c'est là toute sa moralité", ibid., p.763.


24. "Il s'enivrait du rythme des vers et de la cadence de la prose qui doit comme eux, pouvoir être lue tout haut. Les phrases mal écrites ne résistent pas à cette épreuve", ibid.

25. As Flaubert saw it being practised around him that is, (ibid., p.759). See discussion of Flaubert's views on criticism in my introduction, pp.3-4.


27. Ibid., pp.60-61 (Isambart) and pp.83-85 (Yuk).


30. See above pp.68-73.

31. See discussion in Ch. 3, pp.187-189.


33. Ibid.


35. Though there are other aspects of Jules' irony: "Par moments encore il avait des tentations de vivre et d'agir, mais l'ironie accourait si vite se placer sous l'action qu'il ne pouvait l'achever, l'analyse suivant de si près le sentiment qu'elle le détruisait aussitôt"(Int. I, p.362); "Il porta dans les arts l'habitude, qu'il avait contractée dans l'étude du monde et insensiblement dans l'analyse de lui-même, de parodier ce qui lui plaisait davantage, de ravalier ce qu'il aimait le mieux, abaissant toutes les grandeurs et dénigrant toutes les beautés, pour voir si elles se relèveront ensuite dans leur grandeur et leur beauté première."(ibid., p.358)

36. For my discussion of this, see pp.128-136.


38. Though see Roger Huss' chapter, 'Flaubert's preoccupation with incoherence in his early work', pp.118-166 of The Early Work of Gustave Flaubert, and Jonathan Culler's discussion of this in the Uses of Uncertainty, p.57.

39. For discussion of rêverie, see below, pp.102-106 and 239-243.

40. See ch.1, pp.35-36.


42. "Le genre du roman dramatique lui permet de mettre en scène ses personnages avec toute la précision et le détail voulus. Puisque les personnages se révèlent ainsi eux-mêmes dans toute la profondeur de leur personnalité, l'auteur peut disparaître, rentrer dans les coulisses les traiter comme des marionnettes dont il tire les ficelles." (Bruneau op.cit. p.466.)

43. See discussion of Salammbô below, pp.239-243.


45. "Il y a une chose dont je suis sûr, c'est que personne n'a jamais eu en tête un type de prose plus parfait que moi; mais quant à l'exécution..."(Corr. II, p.469, no date, to Louise Colet); "L'idéal de la prose..."
est arrivé à un degré inouï de difficulté." (Corr. II, p.434, no date, to Louise Colet); "Je n'ai (si tu veux savoir mon opinion intime et franche) rien écrit qui me satisfasse pleinement. J'ai en moi, et très net, il me semble, un idéal (pardon du mot), un idéal de style; dont la poursuite me fait halter sans trêve. Aussi le désespoir est mon état normal." (Corr. IV, p.215, August 1857, to Ernest Feydeau); "Il me semble dans mes moments de vanité, que je commence à entrevoir ce que doit être un roman. Mais j'en ai encore trois ou quatre à écrire avant celui-là (qui est d'ailleurs fort vague) [...]. J'ai des idéaux contradictoires. (Corr. VI, p.2, 1st Jan. 1869, to George Sand). It seems to me that any of the quotations could be used against those who say that Flaubert's aesthetic is quite clear-cut by this stage and that the "only" problem is one of "execution".

46. Genette claims of the first Éducation sentimentale: "Oui, tout Flaubert est dans ce roman. Tout Flaubert, sauf peut-être l'essentiel" ('Le travail de Flaubert' p.52). "Pour être pleinement flaubertien, il lui manque, précisément, la difficulté." (ibid., p.53). This "proper" Flaubert is seen as setting in only after 1850.


48. "J'ai relu Novembre, mercredi, par curiosité. [...]. Cela m'a paru tout nouveau, tant je l'avais oublié; mais ce n'est pas bon, il y a des monstruosités de mauvais goût, et en somme l'ensemble n'est pas satisfaisant. Je ne vois aucun moyen de le récrire, il faudrait tout refaire. Par-ci, par-là une bonne phrase, une belle comparaison, mais pas de tissu de style. Conclusion: Novembre suivra le chemin de l'Éducation sentimentale, et restera avec elle dans mon carton indéfiniment. Ah! quel nez fin j'ai eu dans ma jeunesse de ne pas le publier! Comme j'en rougirais maintenant!" (Corr. III, p.379, 28/29th Oct. 1853, to Louise Colet). (The Goncourts however claim of Flaubert: "Regrette de ne pouvoir publier un roman d'environ 150 pages, écrit tout au sortir du collège: visite d'un jeune homme, qui s'ennuie, à une putain, roman psychologique trop plein de personnel", Journal vol.1, p.711, 25th Feb. 1860, my underlining. The reasons given to Louise Colet sound rather more important, the Goncourts however, consider Novembre, which Flaubert reads to them in 1863, "une chose qu'il pourrait signer à l'heure qu'il est", vol.1, p.1348, 1st Nov. 1863.).

49. Suppl. I, p.203, 7th July 1856, to Louis Bouilhet.


55. Mason, op. cit., p.10. She dismisses any dating before 1851, (e.g. Dumesnil's suggested 1843), as premature, on the grounds of the vast difference between the Tentation and Madame Bovary, but equally rejects Descharmes' extension of the period right up until 1857. (p.10)

57. Mason, op. cit., pp.7-11.


60. Thibaudet, op. cit., p.90.


62. *Int. II*, p.553. "Là-bas, sur un fleuve plus doux" etc.


64. *Int. II*, p.561.

65. Flaubert's spelling.


67. *Int. II*, pp.574-5.

68. Ibid., p.562.

69. Ibid., p.571.

70. Ibid., p.558.

71. Ibid., p.586.

72. Ibid., p.607.

73. Ibid., p.614.

74. Ibid., p.655.

75. See above p.88.

76. *Int. II*, p.596, and *Suppl. I*, p.104, 7th Sept. 1850, to Dr Cloquet.

77. *Int. II*, p.602.

78. "Je me sentais fortuné par la pensée, quoiqu'il me semblât pourtant ne penser à rien; c'était une volupté intime de tout mon être." ibid., p.573.


81. *Int.I*, p.28.


85. Corr. II, p.243, 6th Oct. 1850, to his uncle Parain. A particularly splendid example of these qualities is Plouharnel's hat, see below, pp. 132-133.

86. E.g. Corr. III, p.53, 22nd November 1852, to Louise Colet: "En fait de lectures, je ne dé-lis pas Rabelais et Don Quichotte, le dimanche, avec Bouilhet. Quels écrasants livres! Ils grandissent à mesure qu'on les contemple, comme les Pyramides, et on finit presque par avoir peur. \[...\] Quels nains que tous les autres à côté! Comme on se sent petit, mon Dieu! comme on se sent petit!"


90. Int. I. p.262


93. In Derrida's sense. For an excellent introduction to Derrida's attack on the "metaphysics of presence" see his article 'Le Différence' in Tel Quel's Théorie d'ensemble, pp.41-68. "On en tirera cette première conséquence que le concept signifié n'est jamais présent en lui-même, dans une présence suffisante qui ne renverrait qu'à elle-même. Tout concept est en droit et essentiellement inscrit dans une chaîne ou dans un système à l'intérieur duquel il renvoie à l'autre, aux autres concepts par jeu systématique de différences."


100. Corr. IV, p.211, late July/early August 1857, to Ernest Feydeau.


115. Ibid., p.912, 6th May 1861.


118. Thibaudet, op.cit., p.131. This is perhaps taken from Flaubert's own description of the novel: "Le livre que j'écris maintenant sera tellement loin des mœurs modernes qu'aucune ressemblance entre mes héros et les lecteurs n'étant possible, il intéressera fort peu. On n'y verra aucune observation, rien de ce qu'on aime généralement. Ce sera de l'Art, de l'Art pur et pas autre chose."

119. Contrary to the usual interpretation of it.


123. Culler, Uses of Uncertainty, p.65. This is the conclusion of an excellent discussion of Jules' dog.

124. "Un livre sur rien, un livre sans attache extérieure, qui se tiendrait de lui-même par la force interne de son style, comme la terre sans

125. See Chapter 1, note 347, for this quotation.


127. "L'illusionnisme représentatif de style balzacien". (Ricardou, 'Fonction critique', p.265) "Enfin, la fiction, nous l'avons vu, est soumise à deux mobiles contraires: l'un illusionniste, tend à réduire la présence du texte en fascinant le lecteur avec les événements". (ibid., p.264).

128. "Flaubert fait paraître, pure de toute succession anecdotique, le mouvement descriptif lui-même. Pour cet index, le récit s'offre plutôt comme l'aventure d'une écriture. L'action critique de la littérature, nous le comprenons, est liée à ce lent, difficile, périlleux surgissement. Le signifié n'est alors nullement refusé (comme l'affirmait Pingaud un peu vite) mais soumis mot à mot, par le jeu de l'écriture, à une permanente critique qui l'empêche de coaguler et de cacher le travail qui le forme. Ainsi, au centre de la littérature, l'écriture est la contestation même. C'est ce pouvoir critique, on s'en doute, en la littérature toujours travestie, qui est sévèrement occulté." (ibid., p.265)

129. Prendergast, art.cit.


131. Ricardou, 'Fonction critique', p.265., for example. These important ideas recur throughout Ricardou's theoretical writing.

132. Ricardou: Problèmes du Nouveau Roman: "Loin de se servir de l'écriture pour présenter une vision du monde, la fiction utilise le concept de monde avec ses rouages afin d'obtenir un univers obéissant aux spécifiques lois de l'écriture", (p.25). "La psychologie ou la sociologie fictives, par exemple, impliquées dans l'ensemble des relations issues de l'écriture et renvoient à son fonctionnement." (pp.25-26)

133. Ricardou, Pour une théorie du Nouveau Roman, p.34.

134. "L'objet décrit est un être instable, oscillant continûment entre deux tensions inconciliables. La dimension référentielle et la dimension littérale sont en effet dans un rapport inversement proportionnel; l'attention du lecteur ne peut privilégier l'une qu'au détriment de l'autre." (ibid., p.36) I quote Barthes at length because his point is so vital to my overall argument;
"Mais le point capital en tout ceci, c'est que la forme ne suprime pas le sens, elle ne fait que l'appauvrir, l'éloigner, elle le tient à sa disposition. On croit que le sens va mourir, mais c'est une mort en sursis: le sens perd sa valeur, mais garde la vie, dont la forme du mythe va se nourrir. Le sens sera pour la forme comme une réserve instantanée d'histoire, comme une richesse sommaire, qu'il est possible de rapeler et d'éloigner dans une sorte d'alternance rapide: il faut sans cesse que la forme puisse reprendre racine dans le sens et s'y alimenter en nature; il faut surtout qu'elle puisse s'y cacher. C'est ce jeu intéressant de cache-cache entre le sens et la forme qui définit le mythe." (Barthes: Mythologies, p.203) "Le mythe est une valeur, il n'a pas la vérité pour sanction: rien ne l'empêche d'être un alibi perpétuel: il lui suffit que son signifiant ait deux faces pour disposer toujours d'un ailleurs: le sens est toujours là pour présenter la forme; la forme est toujours là pour distancer le sens. Et il n'y a jamais contradiction, conflit, éclatement entre le sens et la forme: ils ne se trouvent jamais dans le même point. De la même façon, si je suis en auto et que je regarde le paysage à travers la vitre, je puis accommoder à volonté sur le paysage ou sur la vitre: tantôt je saisirai la présence de la vitre et la distance du paysage; tantôt au contraire la transparence de la vitre et la profondeur du paysage; mais le résultat de cette alternance sera constant: la vitre me sera à la fois présente et vide, le paysage me sera à la fois irréel et plein. De même dans le signifiant mythique; la forme y est vide mais présente, le sens y est absent et pourtant plein."(ibid.,p.209)

135. See above p.81.

136. See below pp.135-136.


138. Ricardou, Pour une théorie du Nouveau Roman, p.38. "Ainsi arrive-t-il à Homère de dissimuler la nécessaire succession descriptive sous une contingente suite de gestes." (Fonction critique',pp.264-265) 'Lessing, nous le savons, a montré comment, renonçant à décrire d'une traite le costume d'Agamemnon, Homère nous propose les diverses phases d'un habillage par lesquelles la complexité d'un objet statique est transformée en une simple suite d'actions: 'Il revêtit sa belle tunique, fine, neuve, et s'enveloppa de son grand manteau; à ses pieds, il mit sa belle chaussure et attacha son glaive à son épaule par des clous d'argent; puis il reprit le sceptre ancestral et impérissable'."(ibid., p.252)

139. "Il faut marquer, au contraire, une fois encore, l'activité moderne d'une description se désignant elle-même." Pour une théorie, p.34.

140. "Elle commençait par trois boudins circulaires; puis s'alternaient, séparés par une bande rouge, des losanges de velours et de poil de lapin; venait ensuite une façon de sac qui se terminait par un polygone cartonné." Int. I, p.575, my underlining.


142. "D'abord un verger d'arbres à fruits, ensuite un parterre où des combinaisons de fleurs dessinaient des chiffres, puis une treille avec des berceaux pour prendre le frais." Int.II,p.178, my underlining.

144. "Mise en abyme" will be defined below, pp.151-152.


146. See below pp.163-167.


148. Ibid., p.118.


150. Ibid., p.120.

151. Huss, 'Some anomalous uses of the imperfect', p.146.

152. Ibid.

153. See below pp.166-167.


156. The deliberate link with the old rhetoric is emphasized by Todorov: "On peut bien rappeler, pour la défense de ce terme 'poétique' que la plus célèbre des Poétiques, celle d'Aristote, n'était pas autre chose qu'une théorie concernant les propriétés de certains types de discours." ibid., pp.20-21.


158. "L'histoire (l'argument), comprenant une logique des actions et une 'syntaxe' des personnages, et le discours, comprenant les temps, les aspects et les modes du récit."(ibid.,p.5) Barthes is referring to Todorov's 'Les catégories du récit littéraire', Communications 8 (1966) pp.125-151, which has the following subsections: 'Les aspects du récit' pp. 141-143, and 'Les modes du récit' pp.143-147.


French "temps", covering both "tense" and "time".

Introduction to 'Discours du récit', Figures III, pp.71-76.

"Ainsi dans la Recherche du temps perdu, toutes les expériences (madeleine, pavés, etc.) et idéologies (esthétique picturale d'Elstir, psychologie amoureuse de Swann, etc.) proposent une allégorie de la métaphore dont on sait qu'elle est seule capable, selon Proust, de 'donner une sorte d'éternité au style'." 

See p.154.

Quoted by Genette, Figures III, p.75, note 3.

According to language of course.

Genette, Figures III, p.191. For his series of transformations of the actual "Il faut absolument que j'épouse Albertine" see pp. 190-192.

As analysed, for example, by Stephen Ullmann, Style in the French Novel, Oxford, Blackwell, 1964, pp. 94-120.


Reference should however be made to Raymonde Debray-Genette: 'Du mode narratif dans les Trois Contes', Littérature 1971, No.2, pp.39-62. Yet even this interesting article does not really come to terms with attitude, and does not discuss irony.

See pp. 128-136.


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See pp. 128-136.


Ibid., p.255.

Int. I, p.575. Culler gives a little summary of various interpretations of the opening in the Uses of Uncertainty, pp.110-111, referring to Starkie, Brombert and Sartre. To this can be added Sherrington, op.cit. (to increase sense of immediacy and authenticity of the scene described).

For Culler's own interpretation of the opening oddity of narration see pp.111-112. For him it is a case of "parody and obfuscation"(p.111), another means of demoralization; "the text is not narrated by anyone \[\ldots\] the attempt to read it as if it were can only lead to confusion."(p.112). This is obviously much more satisfactory than the
conclusion of Gregor and Nicholas in *The Moral and the Story* (London, Faber & Faber, 1962): "an oddly paradoxical statement for the narrator...another echo of the private Flaubert, of the artist superior to his subject, uncertain of its value and fitfully disgusted by it...A personal protest at the triviality of the subject". They feel that the opening illustrates the paradox of the whole book, the "declared insignificance and unmemorability of the subject, yet the exhaustiveness with which it is remembered and rehearsed over several hundred pages." (pp.36-37). For the actual "Il serait maintenant impossible" phrase, see Int I, p.577 (my underlining).

179. Ibid., p.692.
180. Benveniste, op. cit.
183. Suppl. IV, p.204, 16th April 1879, to Maxime du Camp.
185. Sherrington, op.cit., p.41.
186. "Flaubert, we must repeat, regarded this unwillingness coolly to examine reality - to 'voir les choses comme elles sont' - as a social disease." (ibid., p.169) "people confused because they are unwilling or unable to look at facts" (ibid., pp.229-230). Likening Sherrington to Mr. Gradgrind, Culler does a very fine hatchet-job on Sherrington's point: "one might well wonder why he should have bothered to resuscitate Carthage if it was only to show that Carthaginians were prey to religious delusion and refused to face facts." (Uses of Uncertainty, p.217)
189. See above p.52.
190. Bergounioux, loc.cit. The attempted Lacanian perspective of this article contains many similarities to Sartre's analysis of Flaubert's uneasy relation to his voice and speech acts, and seems to me potentially interesting for this reason.
192. Culler, loc.cit.
193. Ibid.

196. See above pp. 53-54.


199. Benveniste, op.cit.

200. See above, pp.68-69.

201. Thorlby also attacks this idea that Flaubert lets reality "speak for itself"(Gustave Flaubert and the Art of Realism, London, Bowes and Bowes, 1956), p.38.


203. Albert Camus: L'Etranger, Paris, Gallimard(Livre de Poche),1957, p7. Both Genette,('Frontières du récit'pp.162-163), and Benveniste, (op. cit.p.244), refer to Sartre's well known discussion of the use of the perfect tense in L'Etranger. Benveniste himself suggests that the novel is a good example of how the perfect tense is "peu apte à con- voyer la relation objective des événements". (Sartre: 'Explication de L'Etranger' in Situations I, pp.99-121:"voilà pourquoi M.Camus, en écrivant L'Etranger, peut croire qu'il se tait: sa phrase n'appartient pas à l'univers du discours, elle n'a ni ramifications, ni prolongements, ni structure intérieure".p.119)

204. See above p. 77.


207. Wayne Booth's The Rhetoric of Irony is a good general introduction to the topic, with a useful bibliography.(University of Chicago Press, 1974)


209. "As irony contrives to overcome historical actuality by making it hover, so irony itself has in turn become hovering. Its actuality is sheer possibility. In order for the acting individual to be able to fulfill his task in realizing actuality, he must feel himself assimilated into a larger context, must feel the seriousness of responsibility, must feel and respect every rational consequence. But irony is free from all this.Irony is free, to be sure, free from all the cares of actuality, but free from its joys as well, free from its blessings." ibid.,p.296.

211. Kierkegaard, op.cit., p.336. (There is an error in the pagination; this is the second p.336, which should be p.346).


214. Ibid., p.221.

215. Ibid., p.226.

216. See for example his most interesting article, 'Literary History, Allegory and Semiology', New Literary History, VII(1976)No.2, pp.259-270


221. **Int. I**, p.797.

222. **Int. II**, p.177.

223. Ibid., p.187.

224. Ibid., p.163.


226. It is interesting to note that Flaubert uses "elle croyait voir" earlier in the story: "Elle croyait voir le paradis" etc., **Int. II**, p.170.

227. Culler speaks of the ironic evasion of Flaubert's novels when we try to offer elaborate interpretations: "'What is all this fuss?' they might say. 'We are just novels: stories of Emma Bovary and Frédéric Moreau, of Salammô, Bouvard et Pécuchet, and Saint Antoine. What has all this to do with us?'" (**Uses of Uncertainty**, p.24).


229. The idolization of Loulou or simple examples such as Mme Aubain being chased by the bull: "voilà qu'il galopait maintenant!" (**Int. II**, p.168)

230. Ibid., p.504.

231. Presumably also the intention of the closing line of Madame Bovary: "Il vient de recevoir la croix d'honneur." **Int. I**, p.692. Thibaudet, in his discussion of tableau construction, refers to a passage from a letter from Flaubert to the Goncourts, about Germinie Lacerteux: "Ce dernier morceau (sur le cimetières) rehausse tout ce qui précède et
met comme une barre d'or au bas de votre œuvre" Corr., V, p. 163, Jan. 1865. "Flaubert terminera le récit historique de Salammbô par la 'barre d'or; mais il l'exclura de Madame Bovary et de L'Éducation, qui doivent traduire une existence ordinaire et quotidienne sans commencement ni fin. Où plutôt la barre d'or y est parodisée; dans Madame Bovary, par la légion d'honneur d'Homais, et dans l'Éducation par le 'C'est peut-être ce que nous avons eu de meilleur'" (Thibaudet, op. cit., p. 230). While I would obviously disagree with the point he starts to make about Madame Bovary and L'Éducation, he is near to the essential point that the 'barre d'or' always has a function close to parody.

235. Ibid., p. 233.
236. See his very important theoretical section of Mythologies, 'Le mythe, aujourd'hui', pp. 193-247.
237. Ibid., p. 223.
238. La production du sens chez Flaubert, p. 435.
239. See above, p. 52.
240. See Shoshana Felman: 'Thématique et Rhétorique ou la Folie du texte', in La production du sens chez Flaubert, pp. 16-40, with discussion, pp. 41-54, a paper on the irony of Mémoires d'un Fou.
241. Subtitles of Madame Bovary and L'Éducation sentimentale.
244. Ibid., p. 16.
245. Ibid., pp. 15-16.
246. Ibid., p. 16.
248. Ibid., p. 132.
249. Ibid., p. 138.
250. Ibid., p. 139.
251. Ibid., pp. 139-140. (P. Florenskii: 'Simvolicheskoe Opisanie' (Symbolic Description, Moscow, Feniks, 1922, pp. 90-91).

254. Ibid., p.146.

255. The unexpected address to a second person whose presence had been completely ignored until that moment would operate in the same way, e.g. the "envoi" of a Villon ballade. (Ibid., p.147)

256. Ibid., p.146.

257. E.g. end of Ch.1, Int.I, p.700 (Salammbo with floating veil on the horizon); end of Ch.3, p.710 (Barbarian army on horizon); opening of Ch. 7, p.728 (Hamilcar's boat out at sea, at first too distant to be distinguished).

258. S/Z, p. 163.

259. See above 122-123.


261. Uspensky, op.cit., p.149.

262. Sartre says that Saint Julien is inevitably read on two temporal levels at once. "Ainsi chaque événement se présente avec un double sens: vécu, c'est un maillon dans un enchaînement de forfaits et de catastrophes qui conduisent Julien à la déchéance terminale, il a donc un avenir terrestre que l'on ne peut séparer de lui; raconté, il représente inexplicablement mais surement une étape sur la voie sacrée qui mène à la canonisation. En d'autres termes il a un avenir céleste que nous connaissons d'avance parce qu'il est déjà réalisé." L'Idiot III, p.2122


266. E.g. Ionesco's La Cantatrice Chauve et La Leçon.

267. Like the "coda" of Shakespearean tragedy. (Uspensky, op.cit., p.148)

268. Ibid., p.153.


270. Int.I, p.662, my underlining.

271. Culler analyses an early passage from Madame Bovary, where a view of Emma at Les Bertaux, which might seem to be wholly attributable to Charles' viewpoint, contains a tiny descriptive detail of flies climbing up the sides of empty cider glasses and buzzing as they drown in the dregs, which, he argues, cannot be part of Charles' vision. Uses of Uncertainty, p.114.

272. "Irony occurs when we speak from one point of view, but make an evaluation from another point of view." (Uspensky, op.cit., p.103).
273. Ibid., p.104.

274. See references in notes 168. and 169.


276. Huss, 'Some anomalous uses of the imperfect'.

277. Ibid., p.141.

278. "To Flaubert the situation out of which he made his novel appeared in another light. It was not as dramatic as it was pictorial", (Lubbock, The Craft of Fiction, p.83). E-L. Ferrère devotes a whole chapter of L'Esthétique de Gustave Flaubert, Geneva, Slatkine Reprints, 1967, to 'La composition des tableaux'(pp.149-180), but by "tableau" he really means a scene as from a drama, rather than a pictorial effect in the sense of the static tableaux of Diderot's aesthetic theory: "Le tableau, c'est pour Flaubert une des scènes essentielles d'un roman, scène où sont présentés, dans leur attitude et avec leurs gestes les plus caractéristiques, les personnages principaux; on y trouve aussi, le plus souvent, le décor choisi par l'auteur pour y faire mouvoir ses personnages, en sorte que le tableau est pour ainsi dire le résumé et la vie même du roman. Lorsque Flaubert travaillait, il composait 'par tableaux', ainsi qu'en fait foi la correspondance, non par chapitres, sauf toutefois pour Salammbô, qui est conçu, nous le verrons, comme une suite infinie, comme une galerie de tableaux." (p.155).

279. To which temporal shifts from past historic to imperfect inside a description or even a sentence add a further alarming dimension.

280. For example Whistler's painting of his mother, and virtually all the interiors of Vermeer.

281. Most notably by Rousset, op. cit. "La fenêtre est un poste privilégié pour ces personnages flaubertiens à la fois immobiles et portés à dériver, engloutis dans leur inertie et livrés au vagabondage de leur pensée; dans le lieu fermé où l'âme moisit, voilà une déchirure par où se diffuser dans l'espace sans avoir à quitter son point de fixation."(p.123)


283. Ibid., p.579.

284. Ibid., p.580.

285. Ibid., p.687.

286. Ibid., p.581, my underlining.

287. Ibid., p.620.

288. Ibid., p.617.

289. Ibid., p.615.
290. Ibid., p.617.
291. Ibid., p.622.
292. Ibid., p.627.
293. Ibid., p.663. There are also many framed views in the Travel Notes, e.g. "Paysage grandiose et dur, encadré (lorsqu'on arrive) par deux vieux gazis." (Int. II, p.578); "Effet du soleil vu par la porte du grand temple à demi comblé par le sable; c'est comme par un soupirail." (ibid. p.581); "Rien n'est joli comme la campagne vue dans l'encadrement d'une arche d'un de ces ponts ou d'un aqueduc, surtout quand passent dessous des chameaux ou des mulets." (ibid. p.604)
295. "Il y avait auprès, se cognant à tous les angles, la miniature donnée par Emma; sa toilette lui parut prétentieuse et son regard en coulisse du plus pitoyable effet; puis, à force de considérer cette image et d'évoquer le souvenir du modèle, les traits d'Emma peu à peu se confondirent en sa mémoire, comme si la figure vivante et la figure peinte, se frottant l'une contre l'autre, se fussent réciproquement effacées." Int.I, p.642.
296. Int.II, p.93.
297. Ibid., p.203.
298. Ibid., p.176.
299. Ibid., p.214.
300. Ibid., p.33.
301. Ibid., p.47.
302. Ibid., p.57, my underlining.
303. Ibid., p.81, my underlining.
304. Ibid., p.161.
305. "Quand elle fut sortie, Frédéric ouvrit sa fenêtre. Mme Arnoux, sur le trottoir, fit signe d'avancer à un fiacre qui passait. Elle monta dedans. La voiture disparut." ibid.
306. See pp.233-239.
308. "Mais si j'ai insisté sur le futur antérieur dans L'Éducation, ce n'est pas que cette phrase-là me paraisse une clé unique, c'est qu'il correspond à un mode, à une perspective, et qu'il est en soi une métaphore. Il y a une façon d'envisager la vie au futur antérieur sans même qu'il y ait nécessairement futur antérieur grammatical." La production du sens chez Flaubert, p.74.
309. "Their lives must be organized as a fiction by these statements. Since Flaubert will not oblige they must attempt for themselves to organize their lives as a nineteenth century novel told from the point of view of order." Uses of Uncertainty, p.155.


311. See below pp.237-238.

312. See above p.132.

313. "Je me dédoublais et je me figurais être à terre, en plein jour, assis sur l'herbe, fumant à l'ombre et pensant à un autre moi couché sur le dos et vomissant dans une cuvette de fer blanc." Int. II, p.442.

314. See above p.44.

315. La production du sens chez Flaubert, pp.428-429.

316. See my discussion below of her rôle with regard to Flaubert's aesthetic values, pp.228-233.


318. La production du sens chez Flaubert, p.429.


320. Ibid.


322. Ibid., p.55.

323. Ibid., p.49.

324. Ibid., p.233, my underlining.


326. Ibid., p.685.

327. Int. II, p.149.

328. See above, pp.70-71.


330. See notes 126. and 143. for pyramid quotations.


333. Especially in the opening passage, see below, p.252.

335. Ibid., p.167.
336. See Ch. 1, p.77.
337. See above, p.114.
344. Gleize, art.cit., p.76.
347. Alison Fairlie refers to it as a rather general symbol: "the barrel-organ and its mechanical dancing figures, symbol at the same time of the automatism of her daily life and of the longing for exotic places called up by the tunes", (Madame Bovary, p.50). Since typing this chapter I have found an equation of the barrel organ and the ball in the excellent article by Michel Picard: 'La prodigalité d'Emma Bovary', Littérature, May 1973, p.86: "Plus raffinés sont les effets produits par la succession, à plus ou moins longue distance dans la lecture, de deux évocations dont la seconde propose une interprétation de l'autre: les danseurs de la Vaubyessard, les automates de l'orgue de Barbarie, par exemple."
349. Ibid., p.650: "et le rideau, se levant, découvrit un paysage."
350. Ibid., p.650. Note that the imperfect is the frequentative in the barrel-organ passage, whereas it was an anomalous descriptive one (and an excellent example of a "frame") in the original waltz passage. Obviously it could be this here but it is absorbed by the more inclusive iterative imperfect. It is a good instance of the confusion between the two that is referred to below, pp.158-159 and p.167.
351. Ibid., p.640.
354. Ibid., p.680.

356. For these definitions see Genette, *ibid.*, pp. 146-148. An event can also happen 'n'times in the fiction and be repeated 'n'times in the récit of course.


358. *Int. I*, p.624.


360. "Carthage, Mégara, sa maison, sa chambre et les campagnes qu'elle avait traversées tourbillonnaient dans sa mémoire en images tumultueuses et nettes cependant. (*Int.I, p.760); "Mais, peu à peu, ses espérances et ses souvenirs, Nogent, la rue de Choiseul, Mme Arnoux, sa mère, tout se confondait." (*Int.II, p.45); "Alors une faiblesse l'arrêta; et la misère de son enfance, la déception du premier amour, le départ de son neveu, la mort de Virginie, comme les flots d'une marée, revinrent à la fois, et, lui montant à la gorge, l'étouffaient!" (*Int.II, p.175)

361. J.C. Lapp: 'Art and Hallucination in Flaubert', *French Studies* 10, (1956),p.326: "the action itself can be described in terms of Emma's futile struggle against the 'sickness of the memory', ending in a final triumph of past over present."

"la profondeur de la durée" (p.316).

363. *Ibid.*, p.326. A good example of the sort of approach to Flaubert that I would argue against. Note the typical conciliatory reference to style in what is the closing sentence of the article.

364. *The Sound and the Fury* is the best known example (*Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1972*).


366. *Int.II*, p.158.

367. "Quand il fut remonté dans son cabinet, il contempla le fauteuil où elle s'était assise et tous les objets qu'elle avait touchés. Quelque chose d'elle circulait autour de lui. La caresse de sa présence durait encore." *ibid.*, p.76.


369. "Et au clou du miroir, accroché sur ses rubans, le petit chapeau de peluche!" *ibid.*

370. *Int. I*, p.674.

372. Ibid., p.603.
373. Ibid., p.618.
374. Ibid., pp.689-690.
375. Ibid., p.634.
376. Ibid., p.626.
380. "Comme la description, le récit itératif est, dans le roman traditionnel, au service du récit 'proprement dit', qui est le récit singulatif. Le premier romancier qui ait entrepris de l'émanziper de cette dépendance fonctionnelle est évidemment Flaubert dans Madame Bovary, où des pages comme celles qui racontent la vie d'Emma au couvent, à Tostes avant et après le bal à la Vaubyessard, ou ses jeudis à Rouen avec Léon, prennent une amplitude et une autonomie tout à fait inusitées." Ibid., p.148.
381. Huss, 'Some anomalous uses of the imperfect', p.145.
382. Ibid., see note 30.
383. "Dans tous ces cas et quelques autres encore, une scène singulière a été comme arbitrairement, et sans aucune modification si ce n'est dans l'emploi des temps, convertie en scène itérative. Il y a là évidemment une convention littéraire, je dirais volontiers une licence narrative, comme on dit licence poétique, qui suppose chez le lecteur une grande complaisance, ou pour parler comme Coleridge une 'suspension volontaire de l'incredulité'. ... bref, le pseudo-itératif constitue typiquement dans le récit classique une figure de rhétorique narrative, qui n'exige pas d'être prise à la lettre, bien au contraire: le récit affirmant littéralement 'ceci se passait tous les jours' pour faire entendre figurément: 'tous les jours il se passait quelque chose de ce genre, dont ceci est une réalisation parmi d'autres'. (Figures III, p.152)
384. Huss, loc.cit.
385. Ibid., p.146.
387. Ibid., p4.
388. See below p.167.
389. See below pp.228-233.
391. Ibid.
392. Ibid.
393. Ibid.
394. Ibid., p.629.
395. It seems to me that the rot only begins to set in after this chapter.
396. "Quelque chose de vertigineux se dégageait pour elle de ces existences amassées, et son cœur s'en gonflait abondamment, comme si les cent mille âmes qui palpitaient là eussent envoyé toutes à la fois la vapeur des passions qu'elle leur supposait. Son amour s'agrandissait devant l'espace, et s'emplissait de tumulte aux bourdonnements vagues qui montaient. Elle le renversait au dehors, sur les places, sur les promenades, sur les rues, et la vieille cité normande s'étalait à ses yeux comme une capitale démesurée, comme une Babylone où elle entrait." Int.I, p.663.
397. Ibid., p.631, my underlining.
398. Ibid., p.616.
400. Int. I, p.661.
401. See above p.141.
402. See pp.247-256.
403. See note 16. of this chapter.
404. See above p.151.
405. Int.II, p.163.
406. Int.I, p.698 and p.704,"'Il poursuivait dans la forêt le monstre femelle" etc.
408. Picard, art.cit., p.79.
409. "Il était nécessaire d'entrer dans ce détail pour prouver que le respect avec lequel on parle du 'style de Flaubert' ne vient pas d'une erreur ou d'une illusion. Flaubert a été, en matière de style, un des plus grands créateurs de formes qu'il y ait dans les lettres françaises. Aucun prosateur, si ce n'est, sur des registres très différents, Rabelais et La Bruyère, n'a mieux connu la nature de notre prose, n'en a exploité plus délibérément et plus subtilement les ressources." Thibaudet, op.cit.p.269.
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410. It is interesting that I.A. Richards describes rhythm and repetition as poetry's chief device for framing itself: "Through its very appearance of artificiality metre produces in the highest degree the 'frame' effect, isolating the poetic experience from the accidents and irrelevancies of everyday existence." *Principles of Literary Criticism*, London, Kegan Paul, 1930, p.145.


412. Int.II, p.710.

413. Offered only as speculation but too dear to exile to a footnote!

414. "Comme si l'argent était la récompense du travail, et pouvait l'être!" (Corr.VI, p.458, 12th Dec.1872, to George Sand); "Or, je maintiens qu'une œuvre d'art (digne de ce nom et faite avec conscience) est inappréciable, n'a pas de valeur commerciale, ne peut pas se payer." (Corr.VI, p.458, 12th Dec. 1872, to George Sand).


416. See analysis of Saint Julien below, pp.68-173.


420. Uspensky, op.cit., p.77.


422. Ibid., p.40.

423. Ibid., p.41.


428. Ibid.

429. Ibid., p.663.

430. "Une tension dialectique entre le mouvement et l'immobilité qui est peut-être la grande inspiration thématique de Flaubert." (Brombert: 'Lieu de l'Idylle et lieu de bouleversement dans l'Éducation sentimentale.' *Cahiers de l'Association internationale des études françaises*, No.23 (May 1971), p.279.)
431. In contrast to Roger Huss' view, the conclusion of his attention to the excessive use of the iterative imperfect: "I would like to confine myself for the moment to the provisional suggestion that Flaubert's use of the iterative imperfect to convey highly particularized events is consistent with a sense of déjà vu and tedium, with an inability to believe in the originality of any event." ('Some anomalous uses of the imperfect', p.146.)


437. Ibid.

438. Ibid.

439. Ibid.

440. Ibid., p.179.

441. Ibid.

442. Ibid.

443. Ibid.

444. Ibid., p.183.

445. Ibid., p.184.

446. Ibid., p.185.

447. Ibid.

448. Ibid., pp.186-187.

449. Ibid., p.187.

450. Ibid., p.178.

451. "Dans l'illumination des flambeaux" (ibid.); "les prunelles flamboyantes" (ibid.); "le ciel était rouge comme une nappe de sang" (p.181); "Il traversa des régions si torrides que sous l'ardeur du soleil les chevelures s'allumaient d'elles-mêmes, comme des flambeaux" (p.182); "le soleil, tous les soirs, étalait du sang dans les nuages" (p.186); "les deux yeux plus rouges que des charbons" (ibid.).

452. See Ricardou's analysis of this, Problèmes du Nouveau Roman, pp.185-188.


455. "Une prunelle éteinte qui le brûla comme du feu", ibid., p.185.

456. "les deux yeux plus rouges que des charbons", ibid., p.186; "et ses yeux tout à coup prirent une clarté d'étoiles", ibid.

457. Ibid., p.185.

458. Ibid., p.178.

459. Ibid., p.183.

460. Ibid., p.182.

461. Ibid., p.181, my underlining.

462. Ibid., p.186.

463. Ibid., p.183.

464. Ibid., p.186.

465. Ibid.


467. Ibid., p.185.

468. That is, in view of the fountain scene, almost himself.

469. Int. II, p.186.

470. Ibid., p.181.

471. Ibid., p.185.

472. Ibid., p.187.

473. Ibid.

474. Ibid., p.186.

475. Ibid., p.185.

476. Ibid.

477. Ibid., p.182.

478. Ibid., p.185.

479. Ibid., p.187.

480. Ibid., p.184.

481. See Barthes, S/Z, pp.222-223.

482. Ibid., p.223.
Notes to Chapter 3.

1. See Claudine Gothot-Mersch's summing up, La Production du sens chez Flaubert, pp. 430-435, especially p.432.

2. Henry James, F.R. Leavis, Martin Turnell, Gregor and Nicholas. All these will be discussed below.


4. F.R. Leavis: The Great Tradition, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1972, p.18. George Steiner's brief discussion of Madame Bovary, (Tolstoy or Dostoevsky? Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1967, pp.50-59), similarly locates "an atmosphere of constriction and inhumanity" (p.54) which for him makes the novel (for that reason alone) inferior to Anna Karenina, yet half recognizes, (or should), the weakness of his argument where he claims: "If this were altogether true, Madame Bovary would not be the work of genius which it so obviously is." (p.55)


6. See last chapter.


8. "Le réel n'est jamais beau. La beauté est une valeur qui ne saurait jamais s'appliquer qu'à l'imaginaire et qui comporte la néantisation du monde dans sa structure essentielle. C'est pourquoi il est stupide de confondre la morale et l'esthétique. Les valeurs du Bien supposent l'être-dans-le-monde, elles visent les conduites dans le réel." (Sartre: L'Imaginaire, p.245)

9. Culler's phrase, title of a section of Ch. 2, (pp.122-134), of the Uses of Uncertainty.

10. La production du sens chez Flaubert, p.426.


12. "Le sème (ou signifié de connotation proprement dit) est un connotateur de personnes, de lieux, d'objets, dont le signifié est un caractère. Le caractère est un adjectif, un attribut, un prédicat (par exemple: hors-nature, ténébreux, vedette, composite, excessif, impie, etc.)" S/Z, p.196. See all of the section 'Voix de la personne' (pp.196-197) on the relation of the semic code to the notion of character, e.g. "le sème est lié à une idéologie de la personne (inventorier les sèmes d'un texte classique n'est donc qu'observer cette idéologie): la personne n'est qu'une collection de sèmes." (pp.196-197)


15. Leavis, op.cit., p.41.
16. Ibid., p.17, my underlining.
18. Ibid., p.39.
19. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., p.232.
24. Ibid., pp.231-232.
25. Culler, Uses of Uncertainty, pp.122-134.
27. Ibid., p.157.
29. See Thibaudet, op.cit., for the origin of this myth (from Descharmes): "Une personne qui a connu très intimement Mlle Amélie Bosquet, la correspondante de Flaubert, me racontait dernièrement que..." (p.92).
30. From her article on L'Éducation sentimentale, see Les Amis de Flaubert, 26 (May 1965), p.22.
37. "Non! la littérature n'est pas ce que j'aime le plus au monde, je me suis mal expliqué (dans ma dernière lettre). Je vous parlais de distractions et de rien de plus. Je ne suis pas si cuitre que de préférer des phrases à des êtres. Plus je vais, plus ma sensibilité s'exaspère." (Corr.VI, p.356, March 1872, to George Sand); "Je me suis mal exprimé
en vous disant 'qu'il ne fallait pas écrire avec son cœur'. (Corr. V, p.257, 15/16th Dec. 1866, to George Sand).

38. Suppl.I, p.318, 16th March 1863, to Tourgueneff.


40. Ibid., p.200.

41. Ibid., p.204.

42. Suppl.IV, p.278, 19th Nov. 1879, to Tourgueneff.

43. Henry James, art.cit., p.211.

44. Turnell, op.cit., p.295.

45. Ibid., p.315.


47. Faguet puts this typical view very clearly: "Surtout il n'aime pas les hommes intelligents, les auteurs dont le mérite est d'avoir des idées. Il est limité de ce côté-là d'une manière incroyable." (op.cit. p.30) "Le domaine des idées, évidemment, lui est absolument fermé, et un homme intelligent lui paraît un être anormal et quelque chose comme un malfaiteur." (p.31) Of the Correspondance he claims "Il y est sans cesse question de littérature et il n'y a pas une idée générale." (ibid.

48. See above, p.52.


53. Alison Fairlie, Madame Bovary, p.13.

54. Ibid., pp.76-77, my underlining.

55. Ibid., p.77.

56. Ibid., p.79.

57. See above p.174.


60. Int.II, p.138.
61. Ibid., p.98.
63. "Un homme qui riait amèrement de ce rire des damnés du Dante." ibid., p.81.
66. "Quand au moine, il était calme et paisible, et ne répondit pas même par un regard à la multitude qui l'insultait." ibid., p.82.
67. Ibid., p.106.
68. Int.II, p.29.
72. Ibid., p.132.
73. Corr. V, p.67, 23/24th Dec. 1862, to Sainte-Beuve. Similar quotes from Daniel Deronda: "What I have been most trying to do for fifteen years is to have some understanding of those who differ from myself." (p.473) "Impossible for men of duller fibre - men whose affection is not ready to diffuse itself through the wide travel of imagination, to comprehend, perhaps even to credit this sensibility of Deronda's." (p.542)
75. Int.I, p.105.
76. Int.II, p.59.
78. Int.II, p.93.
79. Culler, Uses of Uncertainty, p.127.
81. Ibid., p.167.
82. Ibid., pp.170-171.
83. It would also have been possible to use Mrs Schomberg from Conrad's Victory for the same demonstration. Mrs. Schomberg combines ugliness,


85. There may seem to be a contradiction here with the aesthetic values of rêverie outlined above, e.g.p.106. But excessive concentration on an object seems to be an essential step to inducing rêverie. (See section on rêverie below, pp.239-243, and the final discussion of Frédéric and Mme Arnoux, pp. 233-239.)

86. See above p.55.


88. *Suppl.* IV, p.84, 3rd June 1878, Camille Lemonnier.

89. *Corr.* III, p.226, 6/7th June 1853, to Louise Colet.

90. "He organizes into compact and unequivocal discourse the confused impressions of discomfort which arise in Emma at sight of the room, the meal, her husband." Auerbach, *Mimesis*, p.488.

91. *Int.* I, p.604.

92. Ibid., p.81.

93. Ibid., p.112.


95. "Et il apercut, entre ses paupières mal fermées, une prunelle éteinte qui le brûla comme du feu." *Int.* II, p.185.

96. "Par l'ouverture de leurs cils, les prunelles mortes et les prunelles éteintes semblaient se dire quelque chose." Ibid., p.199.


98. *Int.* I, p.259. See also "Je me sentis d'abord frappé du regard brillant de ses deux grands yeux; quand je pus relever mon front affaissé sous le poids de ce regard..."(ibid.); "ses yeux brillaient, m'enflammaient, son regard m'enveloppait plus que ses bras, j'étais perdu dans son œil."(ibid.); "tandis qu'elle me regardait fixement, face à face, les yeux dardés contre les miens. Dans cette pose immobile, sa prunelle parut se dilater, il en sortit un fluide que je sentais me couler sur le cœur; chaque effluve de ce regard béant, semblable aux cercles successifs que décrit l'orfraie, m'attachait de plus en plus à cette magie terrible."(ibid., p.261)

99. See below, pp.239-243.

100. *Int.* I, p.796.
101. Ibid., p.352.
102. Ibid., p.353.
105. Suppl.I, p.318, 16th March 1863, to Tourgueneff.
108. Ibid., p.28.
110. Ibid., p.331.
111. Int.II, p.172.
115. Ibid., pp.788-789. For this reason I would not agree with Veronica Forrest-Thomson that Narr'Havas fits neatly into the category of speech/action/power which she opposes to the different sort of understanding which she calls vision. ("If we take Nâtho's gaze to symbolize the possibility of vision, while Narr'Havas represents the level of corrupted, political understanding" - 'The Ritual of Reading Salammbô', p.795.) Nevertheless this is a very interesting article.
117. See pp.74-77 and 254-256.
118. "Quant à ce que j'ai mis comme titre, Un parfum à sentir, j'ai voulu dire par là que Marguerite était un parfum à sentir; j'aurais pu ajouter: une fleur à voir, car pour Isabella la beauté était tout." Int.I, p.66.
119. Ibid., p.61.
120. Ibid., p.62.
121. Ibid., p.79, my underlining.
122. Ibid.
123. Ibid., p.78, my underlining.
124. Ibid., p.82.
125. Ibid.
126. Ibid.
127. See p.193.
129. Ibid., p.104.
130. Ibid., p.105.
131. Ibid.
132. Ibid., pp.107-108.
133. Ibid., p.105.
134. Ibid.
136. Ibid., p.119.
137. Ibid., p.123.
138. Ibid., p.319.
139. Ibid., p.286.
140. Ibid., p.293, my underlining.
141. Ibid., p.295.
142. Ibid., p.301.
143. Ibid., p.349.
144. Ibid.
145. Ibid., p.365.
146. "Il n'estimait pas ceux qui se grisent avec de l'eau-de-vie, parce qu'il préférait le vin; il trouvait le goût de la pipe trop fort, parce qu'il fumait des cigarettes ... il ne comprenait pas les gens qui meurent d'amour, lui qui avait tant aimé et qui n'en était pas mort." Ibid., p.364.
147. Ibid., p.360.
148. Ibid., p.292, my underlining.
149. Ibid., p.332.
150. See references on p.32.
152. Ibid.
153. "Mais jamais il ne put la voir en sa pensée différemment qu'il ne l'avait vue la première fois, ou telle qu'il venait de la quitter tout à l'heure." ibid., p.582.

154. Ibid.

155. Ibid., p.592.

156. Ibid., p.650.

157. Ibid., p.587.

158. Ibid., p.586.

159. Ibid., p.582.

160. Ibid.

161. Ibid., p.584.

162. Ibid., p.591.

163. E.g. Int.I, p.615, where Charles and Homais discuss Léon's departure to Paris.

164. Ibid., p.604.


167. The analysis could not, I feel, stand another reference to the "chaudron fâlé" passage, ibid., p.639.

168. The way she is misled by certain words, the continual exchange of books with Léon, the way she is specifically seduced by Rodolphe's verbal "galanterie".


170. Ibid., p.597.

171. Ibid., p.589.

172. Ibid. p. 637.


176. Ibid., p.618.
"Elle ne se doutait point que l'amour, disparu de sa vie, palpitait là, près d'elle, sous cette chemise de grosse toile, dans ce cœur d'adolescent ouvert aux émanations de sa beauté." ibid., p.647.

"Et Justin les accompagnait, portant des parapluies sur son épaule." ibid., p.608; "tandis que Justin lui essuyait ses chaussures avec un torchis de paille." ibid.

"En rentrant, Charles se déshabilla, et le père Rouault repassa sa blouse neuve. Elle était neuve, et, comme il s'était, pendant la route, souvent essuyé les yeux avec les manches, elle avait déteint sur sa figure; et la trace des pleurs y faisait des lignes dans la couche de poussière qui la salissait." ibid., p.689.

"On s'était dit adieu, on ne parlait plus; le grand air l'entourait, levant pêle-mêle les petits cheveux follets de sa nuque, ou secouant sur sa hanche les cordons de son tablier, qui se tortillaient comme des banderoles. Une fois, par un temps de dégel, l'écorce des arbres suintait dans la cour, la neige sur les couvertures des bâtiments se fondait. Elle était sur le seuil; elle alla chercher son ombrelle, elle l'ouvrit. L'ombrelle, de soie gorge-de-pigeon, que traversait le soleil, éclairait de reflets mobiles la peau blanche de sa figure. Elle..."
souriait là-dessous à la chaleur tiède; et on entendait les gouttes d'eau, une à une, tomber sur la moire tendue." ibid., p.580.

195. Ibid., p.582.
196. Ibid., p.606.
197. Ibid., p.614.
198. Ibid., p.609.
199. Ibid., p.654.

200. "La barque suivait le bord des îles. Ils restaient au fond, tous les deux cachés par l'ombre, sans parler. Les avirons carrés sonnaient entre les tolets de fer; et cela marquait dans le silence comme un battement de métronome, tandis qu'à l'arrière la bauce qui trainait ne discontinuait pas son petit clapotement doux dans l'eau." ibid., p.661.

201. Ibid., p.629.
204. See pp.239-243.
206. Ibid., p.703.
207. Ibid., p.772.
208. Ibid., p.753.

209. E.g. where Spendius mistranslates Hannon, ibid., p.706.

210. Ibid., p.733.
211. Int.II, p.81.
212. Ibid., p.60.

213. "Elle croyait aux songes", ibid., p.38; "Elle aimait les voyages, le bruit du vent dans les bois, et à se promener tête nue sous la pluie." ibid., p.60.

214. Ibid., p.9.
215. Ibid.
216. Ibid., p.11.
217. See pp.144-145.

218. Int.II, p.56. See also the scene on the boat: "Comme elle gardait la même attitude", p.10.
219. Ibid., p.38.
222. Int.II, p.84.
223. For example over the 15,000 francs that Hussonnet is promised to turn L'Art industriel into a political newspaper, which Frédéric would prefer to spend on presents for Mme Arnoux, and which finally goes to pay Arnoux's debts, indirectly at the request of his wife: "Sa femme! elle me prit!" ibid., p.74.
224. Ibid., pp.49-50.
225. "Comment n'avait-il pas songé à elle, plus tôt? La faute venait de Deslauriers." ibid., p.15.
226. Ibid., p.73.
227. Ibid., p.19.
228. Ibid., p.59.
229. See p.188.
230. Ibid., p.160.
231. Ibid., p.160. (First time: p.114)
232. Ibid., p.160.
234. Ibid., pp.148-149. (Identical lies, identical presents to both women, etc.)
235. "À mesure que l'heure avançait, les occupations d'Arnoux redoublaient; il classait des articles, décachetait des lettres, alignait des comptes au bruit du marteau dans le magasin, sortait pour surveiller les emballages, puis reprenait sa besogne; et, tout en faisant courir sa plume de fer sur le papier, il ripostait aux plaisanteries. Il devait dîner le soir chez son avocat, et partait le lendemain pour la Belgique. Les autres causaient des choses du jour: le portrait de Chérubini, l'hémicycle des Beaux-Arts, l'Exposition prochaine. Pellerin déblaitait contre l'institut. Les cancans, les discussions s'entre-croisaient. L'appartement, bas de plafond, était si rempli, qu'on ne pouvait remuer; et la lumière des bougies roses passait dans la fumée des cigares comme des rayons de soleil dans la brume." ibid., p.21.
236. Ibid., p.35.
237. Ibid., p.53.
238. Ibid., p.54.
239. Ibid., p.157.
240. Ibid., p.161.
241. Ibid., p.32.
242. See p.156.
244. Ibid., p.33, my underlining.
245. Ibid., p.138.
246. Ibid., p.75.
247. Ibid., p.103.
248. Ibid., p.99.
249. Ibid., p.141.
250. Ibid., p.83.
252. "Tous ces symboles confirment sa gloire; et il reste là quelque chose d'elle, une voix indistincte, un rayonnement qui se prolonge. Frédéric fut pris par une concupiscence rétrospective et inexprimable." ibid., p.125.
253. Ibid., p.126.
254. "Il lui découvrait enfin une beauté toute nouvelle, qui n'était peut-être que le reflet des choses ambiantes, à moins que leurs virtualités secrètes ne l'eussent fait s'épanouir." ibid., p.127.
255. Ibid.
256. Ibid., p.128.
257. Ibid., p.129.
258. Ibid., p.127.
259. Ibid., p.168.
260. Ibid., p.166.
261. E.g. the thoughtful little presents for Virginie when she leaves for the convent, ibid., p.170.
262. Ibid., p.172.
263. Ibid.
264. Ibid., p.175.
Ibid., p.171. Discussing this Culler claims: "We are amused, no doubt, but we do not want to class ourselves with Bourais by joining in his amusement. We prefer to be won over by her innocence and unpretentiousness, valuing the sense of our own broadmindedness that comes from protecting or defending one so charmingly vulnerable." Uses of Uncertainty, p.209. I feel some comment on my part to be necessary here lest my discussion of inarticulacy should leave me open to the charge of "protecting the charmingly vulnerable"! However, having disassociated myself from this comment, I can only hope that my position will be clear by the end of this chapter.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., p.170.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., p.170 and p.171 respectively.

"Il lui sembla qu'elle était elle-même cette enfant." ibid., p.170.

"Je ne veux avoir ni amour, ni haine, ni pitié, ni colère. Quant à de la sympathie, c'est différent; jamais on n'en a assez." Corr. V, p.397, 10th August 1868, to George Sand.


Dostoevsky's novel was written between 1878 and 1880, so it is possible that he could have read Flaubert's version of the Saint Julien story. But the interesting point really is the excellence of this passage as a commentary on Flaubert's story, whether known to Dostoevsky or not. To refer once again to Freud's article, 'Dostoevsky and Parricide', which sounds so very relevant to Flaubert's own case, one would certainly expect Dostoevsky to be fascinated by the psychological implications of the tale, even though he does not actually mention parricide in the reference in Karamazov, a main theme of which is of course already parricide.

Int. II, p.176.

"Et, aux coups de la sonnette, imitait Mme Aubain: 'Félicité! la porte! la porte!'" ibid., p.175.

"Des mots sans plus de suite", ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., p.174.

286. "Et ne dit rien à personne." ibid, p.179.

287. Ibid., p.183, my underlining.

288. "Ils firent mille questions sur Julien. Elle répondait à chacune, mais eut soin de taire l'idée funèbre qui les concernait." ibid.

289. Ibid.

290. Ibid.


294. I am extremely grateful to Michael Evans for noticing this, especially as I happened to be reading aloud the "maudit" curse at the time.

295. See p.53.
For a justification of the legitimacy of such a critical procedure, see Ricardou's defence of his analysis of Charles' hat, (La production du sens chez Flaubert, pp. 103-124. The paper itself, 'Belligérance du texte' is on pp. 85-102). "L'important, c'est que le texte est fabriqué comme cela, même à l'insu de l'écrivain."(p.112) See in particular p.104 on the graphic/phonic conflict.


297. La production du sens chez Flaubert, p.354.


299. Ibid.

300. Ibid., p.193.


303. See pp.148-149.


305. Ibid.
306. Ibid., p.196.
308. Ibid., p.195.
310. Int.II, p.188.
311. Ibid., p.198, my underlining.
312. Ibid., p.256, my underlining.
313. Ibid., p.271.
314. The first quotation above (note 312) a good example of this repeated structure of appealing to a new authority.
316. Int.II, p.216.
317. Ibid.
318. Cento, "Bouvard et Pécuchet" Edition critique., pp.4-5 (normalised spelling) and p.7 respectively.
320. Ibid., p.246.
321. See p.46.
323. Ibid.
324. See p.132.
325. For the letter mentioning this subtitle, see Corr. VIII, p.336, 16th Dec. 1879, to Mme Tennant.
326. Descharmes arrives at a similarly ridiculous conclusion: "la grande leçon critique qui se dégage du roman, c'est en somme qu'il faut pratiquer la Science avec autant de patience, de respect, de méthode, de désintéressement qu'on doit, par ailleurs, en avoir pour l'Art pur." Autour de "Bouvard et Pécuchet". Étude documentaire et critique. Paris, Librairie de France, 1921, p.270. I would suggest that Descharmes could only have derived this interpretation from a misreading of the subtitle.
327. See pp.84-85.
328. See pp.82-83.
329. See pp.102-105.
330. See pp.105-106.
333. Ibid., p.119.
334. Ibid., p.239.
335. "Quelque temps encore je restai, béant, à savourer le battement de mon cœur et le dernier tressaillement de mes nerfs agités", ibid.,p.260; "elle se rapprocha de moi avec étonnement et, me prenant par le bras, comme si j'étais une illusion qu'elle voulait saisir..." ibid., p.262.
336. Ibid., p.278.
337. Ibid., p.279.
338. Ibid., p.314. See also "Et il en restait là, béant et affamé devant ce mets qui fumait pour lui seul".(Describing Mme Renaud, ibid., p.296).
339. See p.203.
340. See pp.233-239.
342. Int. I, p.596, my underlining - his dreams an indication of his specific relationship to Emma.
343. See Culler's analysis of her desire to "devenir une sainte", Uses of Uncertainty, pp.188-189.
347. Ibid., p.610, my underlining. See also in the first Éducation: "Quand ils étaient séparés, quand ils étaient loin l'un de l'autre, leur image réciproque s'offrait à leur esprit, rayonnante d'excitations irrésistibles; mais lorsqu'ils se retrouvaient, un étonnement subit leur arrivait au cœur à se revoir, simples comme par le passé et déjà mille fois connus. Ces sorts de désillusions inavouées se tournaient en désirs nouveaux." ibid., p.330.
348. See pp.208-209.
349. See pp.158-161.
351. Ibid., pp.640-641. Genette opens his 'Silences de Flaubert' article by quoting and discussing this passage.(p.223)
352. 'Silences de Flaubert', p.228.
"The beautiful idealisations of romantic love turn into a case history of frustration." Thorlby, Gustave Flaubert and the Art of Realism, p.40

"The fact of Emma is taken with entire seriousness, of course; she is there to be studied and explored ... But her value is another matter; as to that Flaubert never has an instant's illusion, he always knows her to be worthless." Lubbock, The Craft of Fiction, p.89.


I recognize that I am probably using the word "moral" in a rather ambiguous way. I think on the whole I am simply using it as the adjective from the noun "value". But for further remarks on this see my conclusion.

Int.II, p.9.

See p.80.

See pp.86-87.

Int.II, p.10.

Ibid.

Ibid., p.28.

See pp.215-216.

Int.II, p.76.

Ibid., p.139.

Ibid., p.36.

Ibid., p.90.


Int.II, p.12, my underlining.

Ibid., p.156.

See pp.77-78.

Int.II, pp.10-11.

Ibid., p.11.

Ibid., p.43.

Ibid., p.44.

Ibid., p.123, my underlining.

Ibid.

Ibid., p.44.
382. "Les blessés qui tombaient, les morts étendus n'avaient pas l'air de vrais blessés, de vrais morts. Il lui semblait assister à un spectacle.
Int.II, p.112.

383. Ibid., p.81.


386. "La petite phrase continuait à s'associer pour Swann à l'amour qu'il avait pour Odette. Il sentait bien que cet amour, c'était quelque chose qui ne correspondait à rien d'extérieur, de constatable par d'autres que lui; il se rendait compte que les qualités d'Odette ne justifiaient pas qu'il attachât tant de prix aux moments passés auprès d'elle. Et souvent, quand c'était l'intelligence positive qui régnait seule en Swann, il voulait cesser de sacrifier tant d'intérêts intellectuels et sociaux à ce plaisir imaginaire. Mais la petite phrase, dès qu'il l'entendait, savait rendre libre en lui l'espace qui pour elle était nécessaire, les proportions de l'âme de Swann s'en trouvaient changées; une marge y était réservée à une jouissance qui elle non plus ne correspondait à aucun objet extérieur et qui pourtant, au lieu d'être purement individuelle comme celle de l'amour, s'imposait à Swann comme une réalité supérieure aux choses concrètes. Cette soif d'un charme inconnu, la petite phrase l'éveillait en lui, mais ne lui apportait rien de précis pour l'assouvir. De sorte que ces parties de l'âme de Swann où la petite phrase avait effacé le souci des intérêts matériels, les considérations humaines et valables pour tous, elle les avait laissées vacantes et en blanc, et il était libre d'y inscrire le nom d'Odette." (Proust: Du côté de chez Swann, Paris, Gallimard (Livre de Poche), 1954, pp. 282-283). It would obviously be interesting to compare Swann's love for Odette, and Proust's intention in these very specific references to writing, with Frédéric's love for Madame Arnoux, which does not seek to involve Frédéric in its writing down. This is an idea I would hope to pursue elsewhere.


388. See p.145.


392. Ibid., my underlining.

393. Ibid.
394. Ibid.
395. Ibid.
396. Ibid.
397. Ibid.
398. Ibid.
399. Ibid.
400. Ibid., p. 160.
401. Ibid., p. 161.
402. Ibid.

403. Deslaurier's "Et toi, ta grande passion, Mme Arnoux!" (ibid., p. 162) acting as the familiar naïve summary.

404. See p. 106.


407. Ibid., p. 184.

408. In fact this quotation is taken from Structuralist Poetics, p. 238. But it acts as a perfect summary of Culler's argument about Flaubert.

409. Ibid., p. 134. For the specific application of these two quotations from Structuralist Poetics to Salammbo, see the Uses of Uncertainty, p. 212: "Here, more than in any other of Flaubert's works, the reader finds in the activity and bewilderment of the characters a metaphor for his own process of reading. The characters, that is to say, are trying to understand themselves and their world just as the reader is; they are not committed to language but are trying to find a language, and the rebuffs they encounter or solutions they discover offer an explicit thematization of the problems of reading."

410. See chapter 2.

411. See analysis of Charles and Félicité below.


413. See p. 109.


416. Ibid., p.773.
417. Ibid., p.758.
418. See p.110.
420. Ibid., p.702.
421. Ibid., p.697.
422. Ibid., p.709.
423. Ibid.
424. Ibid., p.766.
425. Ibid., p.720.
426. Ibid., p.756.
427. Ibid., p.758.
428. Ibid., p.759.
429. Ibid.
430. Ibid.
431. Ibid., p.697.
432. Ibid., p.720.
433. See above p.103, (and a·ain, in Sartre's terms, as an invitation to adopt the imaginary attitude to language.)
434. Though see Flaubert's comments on the function of the serpent: "Il n'y a ni vice malicieux ni bagatelle dans mon serpent. Ce chapitre est une espèce de précaution oratoire pour atténuer celui de la tente qui n'a choquée personne et qui, sans le serpent, eût fait pousser des cris. J'aime mieux un effet impudique (si impudeur il y a) avec un serpent, qu'avec un homme. Salammô, avant de quitter sa maison, s'enlace au génie de sa famille, à la religion même de sa patrie en son symbole le plus antique. Voilà tout." (Letter to Sainte-Beuve, Dec. 1862, Int.II, p.753).
435. See Le Plaisir du texte.
436. See p.54.
437. See p.152.
438. See pp.159-161.
440. Ibid., p.582.
441. Ibid.
442. Ibid., p.588.
443. Ibid., p.589.
444. Ibid., p.578.
445. Ibid., p.580.
446. Ibid., p.604.
447. Ibid.
448. "Ressemblant à sa mère", ibid., p.640.
449. "Pour lui plaire, comme si elle vivait encore, il adopta ses prédictions, ses idées, il s'acheta des bottes vernies, il prit l'usage des cravates blanches. Il mettait du cosmétique à ses moustaches, il souscrivit comme elle des billets à ordre." ibid., p.690.
450. Ibid., p.689.
452. Ibid., p.681.
453. Ibid.
454. Ibid., p.685.
455. "Chaque nuit, pourtant, il la rêvait; c'était toujours le même rêve", ibid., p.691.
456. Ibid., p.595.
457. Ibid., p.690.
458. Ibid., p.672.
461. Thorlby, op.cit., p.58.
462. Ibid., pp. 58-59, quoted by Culler, Uses of Uncertainty, p.211.
464. Ibid.
465. Ibid., p.175.
466. Ibid., p.174.
467. Ibid., p.175.
468. Shoshana Felman details all sorts of repetitions of this kind in her article on Un Cœur simple, 'Illusion réaliste et répétition romanesque'. However she adopts an ideological perspective which is rather different from my own.


470. Ibid. See above, p. 217.


472. "À cause des cigares, elle imaginait La Havane un pays où l'on ne fait pas autre chose que de fumer." Int. II, p.171.

473. Ibid., p.167.

474. Ibid., p.170.

475. Ibid., p.176.

476. Ibid., p.169. (Another window portrays "saint Michel terrassant le dragon", perhaps an ironic reference to Félicité's encounter with the bull.)


478. E.g. going back (although rushing to the dying Virginie) because she remembers she has left the door open, Int. II, p.172.

479. Ibid., p.176.

480. Ibid., p.172.

481. Ibid., p.173.

482. Ibid.

483. Ibid., p.175.

484. Ibid.

485. Ibid., p.176.


491. See chapter 2, note 126.
493. Ibid., p. 216.
494. Ibid., p. 217. My underlining. The "grande tache noire" makes a nice full-stop.
495. Ibid., p. 215.
496. Ibid.
497. Ibid., p. 217.
498. Ibid.
500. Ibid., p. 235.
501. "Quelquefois, une araignée fuyait tout à coup sur le mur, et les deux ombres de leurs corps s'y dessinaient agrandies, en répétant leurs gestes." Ibid., p. 207.
503. Ibid., p. 217.
504. Ibid., p. 244.
505. Ibid., p. 289.
506. Ibid., p. 246.
507. Bernheimer, 'Linguistic Realism in Flaubert's Bouvard et Pécuchet,' pp. 144-145.
509. Ibid., p. 241.
510. Ibid., p. 240.
511. Ibid., p. 237.
512. Ibid., p. 240, my underlining.
513. Ibid., p. 268.
514. See p. 73.
515. See p. 177 for Barthes' discussion of character and discourse.
516. Valéry, 'La Tentation de (Saint) Flaubert'.
Alison Fairlie: 'Flaubert et la conscience du réel', Essays in French Literature 4 (1967) pp.1-12. "Dans Bouvard et Pécuchet les deux tendances qui furent mon point de départ - soumission au réel et transfiguration du réel - se rencontrent à leurs extrêmes." (p.6); "Ce roman marque en même temps l'effort vers le maximum de documentation et vers le maximum de stylisation." (p.7)

See Bernheimer's excellent geology example, art.cit., pp.154-155.

See the discussion of Jacques Neefs' paper at Cérisy ('Le parcours du Zaimph', Le production du sens chez Flaubert, pp.227-241), which centres on the role of Flaubert's documentation for Salambô and Bouvard et Pécuchet. Claude Mouchard notes: "Quand Sainte-Beuve interroge Flaubert sur la réalité des pierres de l'urine de lynx, Flaubert répond: c'est dans Théophraste. Ce qui compte donc, ce n'est pas de renvoyer à un réel, mais de renvoyer à une autre représentation." (p.247).


See chapter 2, note 16.

Barthes: Essais Critiques, Paris, Seuil, 1964, p.80. Perhaps I should have allowed Thibaudet's own quotation his privileged position. But actually Barthes puts his point much better, and it is clear from Thibaudet's chapter on Bouvard et Pécuchet that he is talking about something rather different. "Bouvard et Pécuchet termine en satire et en parodie l'œuvre de Flaubert. Lui dont la jeunesse même avait eu certaines parties du vieillard, il fallait que l'esprit de la parodie, esprit à la fois puéril et vieux, lui fournît comme figures de la vie ces vieillards qui ont manqué leur vie, qui essayaient de refaire une avec des fantômes-livresques et sociaux, et qui, déjà des ombres, nettoient avec des ombres de brosses une ombre de carrosse. Une existence littéraire, depuis Rousseau, se conclut volontiers sur ces œuvres qui scandalisent le conformisme de la critique, mais où un artiste, à l'heure de la vieillesse et de la mort, a au moins la satisfaction d'ouvrir toute son arrière-boutique, et de parler net, avant de partir. Ce sont les Réveries du promeneur solitaire, c'est la Vie de Rancé, c'est l'Abesse de Jouarre, c'est Bouvard et Pécuchet." (Thibaudet, op.cit., p.219-220).
Notes to Conclusion

2. Ibid., p.35.
6. J-P. Richard, 'La création de la forme chez Flaubert'.
7. Ibid., p.155.
10. Ibid., p.451, (Pyrénées et Corse). See also "savourant ainsi dans ma dégustation reveuse et nonchalante", ibid.p.478, (Par les Champs et par les Grèves).
12. I.A. Richards, op. cit., p.70.
15. See p.54 and p.243.
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