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Losing Turkey?

Narrative traditions in Western foreign policy analysis

by

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A note on spelling

The spelling of Turkish names is not consistent in the data set with some articles using Turkish characters such as ğ, ü and ş and others replacing them with g, u and s. In order to accurately reference the sources, both the styles are used in this thesis.

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Declaration

I declare that this thesis is my own work and has not been submitted for a degree at another university.

Abstract

This thesis is about Western foreign policy analysis on Turkey as a second-order representation that is narratively constructed. The thesis argues that the scholarly field contains ideological antagonisms related to the West and is influenced by narrative traditions that offer apt metaphors and cultural resources to turn random foreign policy events into meaningful narratives. The thesis examines how Turkey is narrated in Western foreign policy analysis and how these narratives impact on debates over the idea of the West with the use of three theoretical approaches: the aesthetic approach is about representation, the narrative approach about the method of representation, and the interpretative approach about the relationship between representation and reality. There are two methodological foundations upon which the thesis is built: Hayden White's tropology and the interpretative approach of Mark Bevir and R.A.W. Rhodes that focuses on beliefs, traditions, and dilemmas. The thesis also employs Kenneth Burke's rhetorical tools as well as George Lakoff's seminal work on foreign policy metaphors. In the thesis, White's four master tropes are teased out with the use of three organising metaphors – the 'losing Turkey' metaphor, the 'Turkey at a crossroads' metaphor, and the 'Erdogan-for-Turkey' metaphor – that have been deduced from the data set using qualitative text analysis. Employing a paradigmatic method, the thesis identifies manifestations of the debate on the West in the data set, which includes over one hundred foreign policy analysis articles especially in *Foreign Affairs*, *The National Interest* and *Foreign Policy* but also in other journals, blogs, and books. The thesis follows the debate on Turkey to wherever it is taking place with the condition that the narrator speaks from a Western perspective, is familiar with the scholarly tradition of studying Turkey, and puts forward interpretations that resonate so widely that they have turned foreign policy imagination into facts and common sense.

Chapter 1 – Introduction

There is, plainly, no deep logic to the unfolding of time. But then we identify emollient patterns and noble purposes in history because evasions, suppressions and downright falsehoods have resulted, over time, in a massive store of defective knowledge – about the West and the non-West alike.¹

This thesis is about Western foreign policy analysis narratives on Turkey. There are several conceptual and analytical questions that arise from this one sentence alone. Who is a ‘Western’ narrator? What are narratives? Why to focus on foreign policy analysis instead of foreign policy? Why Turkey and not some other country? This introduction aims to answer all these questions and many more.

This thesis seeks to make an original contribution to the literature on (1) narrative representation in International Relations (IR) and foreign policy analysis (FPA) as well as on (2) the idea of the West. It also makes a meta-level contribution to foreign policy analysis by critically examining language and representation in the field. Finally, the thesis offers a unique metaperspective to area studies concerning Turkey in that it shows how discursive representations produce particular types of images of Turkey and its supposedly inherent qualities. This means that the thesis does not advance knowledge of Turkish foreign policy per se but how it is represented in the field of foreign policy analysis.

The contribution to narrative studies is unique in many ways, bringing Hayden White’s theoretical, methodological and conceptual contributions to the field of IR and focusing specifically on White’s tropology. Tropes are an understudied area in IR and should be located more firmly to the core of narrative

¹ Pankaj Mishra, *Age of Anger: A History of the Present* (Allen Lane, 2017), p. 48.

approaches in IR because they offer a novel method to access beliefs that represent a deeper cognitive structure than narrative types or metaphors.² This thesis is the first systematic study of the four master tropes in foreign policy analysis. It advances the existing literature on ontological approaches to narrative in IR, bringing a novel dimension to the literature. It builds upon David Campbell's work that focuses on the discursive nature of foreign policy, taking us beyond epistemic realism. While drawing upon the IR literature on critical discourse practices that focus on identity and power, this thesis goes beyond it, bringing narrative traditions and their tropological underpinnings to the core of the analysis. The triangle of beliefs, tradition, and dilemma of Bevir and Rhodes is introduced more firmly to the field of IR. In a wider sense, this thesis highlights the importance of studying narratives in IR because they provide an entirely different horizon to language than discourse or rhetorical analysis.

White's narrative approach opens up research avenues that allow for a systematic study of moral and aesthetic preferences by focusing on emplotment – the intersection of two events that have been tied in with a causal linkage. White's tropology pays particular attention to beliefs in general and the moralising impulse in particular, which are key aspects of foreign policy analysis language. In other words, as well as reiterating the importance of studying narratives in IR, the thesis also advances the field of narrative studies by developing a suitable method for studying tropes in foreign policy analysis.

In the thesis, tropes are teased out with the use of three organising metaphors that have been deduced from the data set using qualitative text analysis. Employing a paradigmatic method, the thesis identifies manifestations of the

² Tropes have been used to study scientific language in other disciplines. See for example, David J. Tietge, 'The Role of Burke's Four Master Tropes in Scientific Expression', *Journal of Technical Writing and Communication*, 28:4 (1998), pp. 317–324.

debate on the West in the data set. The most important aspect of White's tropology is that it provides a method to study how common sense is constructed. Because tropes that our understanding is based upon are much deeper in our cognition than narrative types, discourse, or metaphors, we take the worldview that they shape for granted. As such, the thesis also contributes to our understanding of common sense in IR; that we rely upon commonsensical notions that are, in fact, products of our imagination that tropes form.

The scholarly literature on the idea of the West is twofold, focusing either on the nature of the West or the West as a category. This distinction, as elaborated in the second chapter, is blurred, but can be used to organise the field of literature in a useful way. This thesis contributes to the literature on the West as a category, probing how the idea of the West is rendered meaningful in foreign policy analyses on Turkey. This means that the thesis is not seeking to define what the West is but to demonstrate how it is constructed in speech acts in foreign policy analysis. The contribution is unique in two ways.

Firstly, the literature on the West as a category focuses on speech acts that concern the West directly, examining texts in which the nature of the West is defined and discussed. The thesis does not examine texts concerning the West directly but texts on Turkey, showing that there is a deeper layer in those narratives. Secondly, the thesis contributes to the literature on the West as a narrative and attempts to demonstrate that the meaning of the West is contested, fluid, and intersubjective, and that it is a construction of the mind rather than an entity that can be objectively defined.

This contribution is important because we still talk about the West alongside China and Russia as if its definition was unproblematic and commonly shared. And when we read in the news that the West did this and the West did that,

we all know what the news refer to. This means that we have a strong cognitive and emotional relationship to the West and that it is a particularly meaningful ‘imagined community’ akin to a nation state.³ In doing this, the thesis advances the literature on ontological approaches to narrative as opposed to strategic and autobiographical narrative approaches.

One of the most interesting findings of the study is that the ironic trope has become more prevalent in Western foreign policy analysis concerning Turkey. The ironic trope is used in all three organising metaphors, often with the purpose of challenging the dominant narrative tradition in which the West represents a triumphalist actor in the international system. In the ironic narratives, in contrast, the West is approached from a self-critical perspective either to sympathise with Turkey that is seen as being subject to an unfair and patronising attitude in the West, or to make an urgent call to the West that is seen as being in decline in political, societal, cultural, or economic terms. The ironic narratives in foreign policy analysis can be seen as ‘frame-breaking moves’⁴ that attempt to put ‘oneself into the other’s place’.⁵ They can also be seen as a response to ‘an atmosphere of social breakdown or cultural demise’⁶ in the previously triumphalist West that was seen as representing high moral values.

Another key finding of the thesis is that metaphors in foreign policy analysis have multiple, even contrasting meanings, which means that it is not enough to locate certain metaphors in text analysis. We need to tap into the web of beliefs that generate the metaphors in order to truly tease out their meanings, which

³ See Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso Books, 1983).

⁴ See for example Nicholas Wheeler, ‘Investigating Diplomatic Transformations’, *International Affairs*, 89:2 (2013), p. 481.

⁵ The importance of showing empathy in international politics has been highlighted, inter alia, in relation to the security dilemma. See Nicholas Wheeler, ‘To Put Oneself into the Other Fellow’s Place’: John Herz, the Security Dilemma and the Nuclear Age’, *International Relations*, 22:4 (2008), pp. 493–509.

⁶ Ewa Domanska, ‘Hayden White: Beyond Irony’, *History and Theory*, 37:2 (May, 1998), p. 178.

require careful studies of the narrative traditions within which the metaphors are employed. At the same time, there are some metaphors in foreign policy analysis – such as ‘crossroads’ (see chapter 6) – that are limited to particular tropes, in this case to metonymical or ironic representations. As such, once we understand the narrative tradition and how certain metaphors are used to advance moral and aesthetic preferences, we can more readily tell their function and different ideological implications.

The thesis also finds that foreign policy analysis produces highly *moral* accounts of actors in the international system, which confirms Hayden White’s notion that where ‘in any account of reality, narrativity is present, we can be sure that morality or a moralizing impulse is present too’.⁷ In addition to providing valuable insights on Turkish politics and society, Western foreign policy analysis concerning Turkey can also be seen as a rhetorical appeal to the Western audience, localising and dramatising the principle of transformation that Kenneth Burke emphasises in his work.⁸ As such, the scholarly field is performative in nature in that it does not simply describe or represent reality but also active seeks change – even when it seems to only analyse the way things are.

Western foreign policy analysts and IR scholars have a long and exceptionally active tradition of narrating Turkey. This is not because Turkish politics and foreign policy are necessarily more fascinating than, say, Polish politics, or even because Turkey would have an exceptionally important role in the international system. It is rather because through Turkey, academic observers in the

⁷ Hayden White, *The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), p. 24. For Mark Bevir & R.A.W. Rhodes, people ‘act on habitual, unreflective beliefs about the nature of the world and about what is right in a given context. In other words, a perception ‘depends on the prior web of beliefs of the perceiver’. *Governance Stories* (Routledge, 2006), pp. 23; 27.

⁸ Kenneth Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives* (University of California Press, 1969).

West get to debate and narrate themselves and their role in the world.⁹ This is not a unique phenomenon. Gary Baker, for example, has shown that after the Second World War, scholars in the United States constructed ‘the American self’ in studies that analysed the national character of Germany. As Baker explains, ‘these studies helped create America’s conception of itself as the benevolent conqueror, the harbinger of a peaceful future as well as the exporter of the democratic, that is to say American, way of life’.¹⁰

In explaining this phenomenon of constructing the self through other actors, scholars often employ the academic buzzword of ‘othering’ that rests on the idea that state and national identities are constructed through the process of determining who we are not.¹¹ It is part of the identity scholarship that emerged within the Constructivist school of thought as a response to the Realist assumption that it is interests and material factors that drive state action in the international system.¹² The ‘othering’ thesis has been a popular way of explaining the relationship between the West and Turkey.¹³ In such studies, it is most often the West that treats Turkey as the ‘other’, but also Turkey constructs her identity vis-à-vis a

Michelle Fine has characterised academic research as ‘ventriloque – we use others’ voices to speak our message.’ This is a fitting metaphor of foreign policy analysis where the knowledge produced about the other always contains traces of the self. Michelle Fine, *Ventriloque, voices, or activism: positioning the politics in our research*. Invited address at the eleventh annual meeting of the Ethnography in Education Research Forum (March 1990), University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia.

¹⁰ Gary Baker, ‘German National Character and the Relaxing American’, *The Germanic Review*, 80:2 (2005), p. 141.

¹¹ Iver B. Neumann, ‘Self and Other in International Relations’, *European Journal of International Relations*, 2:2 (1996), pp. 139–174.

¹² Yosef Lapid & Friedrich Kratochwil (eds.), *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996); Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

¹³ See for example Hasan Kösebalaban, ‘The Permanent “Other”? Turkey and the Question of European Identity’, *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 18 (2007), pp. 87–111; Iver B. Neumann, *Uses of The Other: ‘The East’ in European Identity Formation* (University of Minnesota Press, 1998), pp. 39–40; Bulent Kucuk, ‘Europe and the Other Turkey: Fantasies of Identity in the Enlarged Europe’, *Eurosphere Working Paper Series*, 34 (2011); Ingrid Kylstad, ‘Turkey and the EU: A “new” European identity in the making?’, *LSE ‘Europe in Question’ Discussion Paper Series*, 27 (2010).

Western or European 'other'.¹⁴

These identity-based studies are interesting and useful, but they leave us in an analytical cul-de-sac as regards many crucial questions. First, the West is usually represented as a uniform, complacent, and stable actor in its actions towards Turkey. In her study of Turkey as the West's 'stigmatised other', Ayse Zarakol argues that the West as 'the master' and 'the established' in the international system completely side-steps the issue of its ontological condition because of its 'seeming naturalness'.¹⁵ However, engaging with the debate on the idea of the West, one hardly gets a sense that the West is either ontologically secure or unified in its supposed master identity.

Just a handful of topics in popular academic books and articles tell a very different story: *How the West was Lost*, *Suicide of the West*, *The Divided West*, *The End of the West*, *Is There Still a West?*, and *The West's Last Chance*.¹⁶ As Patrick Thaddeus Jackson aptly put it: 'The West is not, nor has it ever been, a particularly self-confident social actor.'¹⁷ Also Richard Ned Lebow reminds us that in foreign policy 'it is powerful states, not weak ones, who feel the most humiliation'.¹⁸ Of course, the West is not a state, but the same idea also applies to other entities in the international system. Similar titles as listed above are numerous in the expansive

¹⁴ Bahar Rumelili writes that there is 'a well-established identity discourse in Turkey that constructs Europe as a threat, flourishing on memories of the Ottoman Empire's dismemberment by European powers at the end of World War I. 'Constructing identity and relating to difference: understanding the EU's mode of differentiation', *Review of International Studies*, 30 (2004), p. 45.

¹⁵ Ayse Zarakol, *After Defeat: How the East Learned to Live with the West* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 254.

¹⁶ Dambisa Moyo, *How the West Was Lost: Fifty Years of Economic Folly – and the Stark Choices Ahead* (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011); Sophie Richardson, 'How the West Was Lost', *Foreign Policy*, 23 February 2015. http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/23/how-the-west-was-lost-china-terrorism-xinjiang-ughurs-obama-human-rights/?wp_login_redirect=0 (11 July 2015); James Burnham, *Suicide of the West: An Essay on the Meaning and Destiny of Liberalism* (New York: John Day Co., 1964); Jurgen Habermas, *The Divided West* (Polity, 2006); William Anthony Hay & Harvey Sicherman (eds.), *Is There Still a West? The Future of the Atlantic Alliance* (University of Missouri, 2007); Charles A. Kupchan, 'The End of the West', *The Atlantic* (November 2002), available at <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2002/11/the-end-of-the-west/302617/> (11 July 2015); Tony Blankley, *The West's Last Chance: Will We Win the Clash of Civilizations?* (Regnery Publishing, 2006).

¹⁷ Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, 'The Perpetual Decline of the West' in Christopher S. Browning & Marko Lehti (eds.), *The Struggle for the West: A Divided and Contested Legacy* (London: Routledge, 2010), p. 58.

¹⁸ Richard Ned Lebow, *A Cultural Theory of International Relations* (Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 69.

literature on the idea of the West, and they certainly do not confirm Zarakol's suggestion that the West's 'normalcy' in the international system leads to 'smugness' to view its own condition as 'natural', 'objective', and 'matter-of-fact'.¹⁹ It is needless to say that such a representation is a stereotypical image of the West, which derives not from a direct experience with the West – as the entity does not concretely exist²⁰ – but from narratives about the West that we encounter in discussions, newspapers, scholarly articles, and so on.²¹

Kathleen Margaret Heller rightly argues that in the discourse of contemporary theory, scholars that emphasise the constructed nature of civilisational or cultural categories fail to 'make the same kind of claim about the status of the West itself, which is clearly an imaginary cartography as well. That is, the West is not a cultural or political agent that has decided to create Others such as the Balkans in order to solidify its identity, but is itself a projection of ideological antagonisms'.²² This is the first building block in this thesis; that Western foreign policy analysis concerning Turkey contains ideological antagonisms related to the idea of the West. An identity-based approach to the relationship between the West and Turkey fails to take these antagonisms into account because, firstly, the West is

¹⁹ Zarakol, *After Defeat*, p. 241.

²⁰ As Jackson argues, the West is a very decentralised and disorganised actor with no front office, organisation or individual 'uniquely endowed with the authority to speak and act in its name', and it is therefore the act of referring to the West that calls the community into existence. Jackson, 'The Perpetual Decline', pp. 54; 57. Kathleen Margaret Heller similarly argues that the West 'does not refer to a location but a direction; the West therefore invokes a relational geography rather than a fixed and locatable space. What it names is therefore not comparable to the name of a nation, which at least can claim to be bound by recognized borders and by its institutional and legal frameworks. The line dividing those who belong to the West from those who do not is not an obvious one'. 'The Dawning of the West: On the Genesis of a Concept' (PhD Thesis, The Graduate College of the Union Institute & University, 2006), p. 4.

²¹ This is not to say that it is only the West that is represented in a stereotypical or generalised fashion in scholarly works. As Peter Berger & Thomas Luckmann demonstrated in their pioneering work in the 1960s, most human knowledge consists of typifications. But that does not mean that we should not challenge such representations. This insight makes it even more important to unravel the stereotypical representations that we take for granted. *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (New York: Anchor Books, 1966).

²² Heller, 'The Dawning of the West', p. 9. See also Dennis Porter, 'Orientalism and its Problems' in Francis Barker, Peter Hulme, Margaret Iversen and Diane Loxley (eds.), *The Politics of Theory: Proceedings of the Essex Sociology of Literature Conference* (Colchester: University of Essex, 1983).

represented as a far more homogenous and complacent entity than it really is, and second, identity is treated as a pre-political category.

In this thesis, Western foreign policy analysis regarding Turkey is re-politicised by demonstrating that it is not about neutral or objective knowledge production but rather a highly political undertaking from an aesthetic point of view. As Roland Bleiker argues: 'No representation, even the most systematic empirical analysis, can be identical with its object of inquiry. Any form of representation is inevitably a process of interpretation and abstraction. The power of aesthetics, and its political relevance, lies in this inevitability.'²³ This leads to Edward Bruner's important insight that narrative structures are 'not only structures of meaning but structures of power as well'.²⁴ Part of the task of showing the political aspect of representing Turkey in the field of foreign policy analysis is to move away from the concept of identity and focus on the ways in which foreign policy analysts narrate Turkey in their scholarly tradition.

The reason that we should not employ the concept of identity lies in its fuzziness.²⁵ As Brubaker & Cooper put it: the term identity is 'richly – indeed for an analytical concept, hopelessly – ambiguous'.²⁶ To argue that the West treats Turkey the way it does because it considers itself a master in the international system is not only an ambiguous argument but also a misleading one. This is because there are many Western 'identities' that interact with Turkey. One of them might indeed be a self-congratulatory one, but there are also others. In the foreign

²³ Roland Bleiker, 'The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory', *Millennium – Journal of International Studies*, 30 (2001), p. 532.

²⁴ Edward M. Bruner, 'Ethnography as narrative' in V.W. Turner & E.M. Bruner (Eds.), *The anthropology of experience* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1986), p. 144.

²⁵ Glenn Chafetz, Michael Spirtas & Benjamin Frankel, 'Introduction: Tracing the Influence of Identity on Foreign Policy', *Security Studies*, 8 (1998), pp. 7–22; Paul Kowert, 'Foreign Policy and the Social Construction of State Identity', in Robert A. Denemark (ed.), *The International Studies Encyclopedia* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2010), pp. 2479–2498; Rogers Brubaker & Frederick Cooper, 'Beyond "Identity"', *Theory and Society*, 29:1 (2000), pp. 1–47.

²⁶ Brubaker & Cooper, 'Beyond "Identity"', p. 6.

policy discourse in the United States alone there are several different ‘identities’ with some forming around the idea of global expansionism or isolation, and others around trade, security, or morals.²⁷

But the term identity does not correctly capture these accounts. Even if the participants in the discourse have a Western identity in that they refer to the West as ‘we’, they might have very different moral and aesthetic preferences.²⁸ And as narrativity is about moralising the represented events, the focus on identity inevitably misses this crucial element. Hayden White talks about our ‘moralising impulse’ when narrating reality.²⁹ The concept of identity, however, does not provide the right tools to unpack the ways in which foreign policy analysis produces morality in its narratives about the international system. Furthermore, in accounts such as Zarakol’s thesis, it is also unclear who in the West is stigmatising Turkey: political elites, academic or professional observers, producers of popular culture, or perhaps the general audience?

We should therefore employ the concept of narrative instead.³⁰

Margaret Somers argues that we can elude the essentialist nature of the concept of identity by focusing on the ontological aspect of narrative.³¹ In making a case for

²⁷ Walter L. Hixson, *The Myth of American Diplomacy: National Identity and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008); Henry R. Nau, *At Home Abroad: Identity and Power in American Foreign Policy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002); Walter Russell Mead, *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World* (New York: Random House, 2002).

²⁸ White writes that the ‘late R.G. Collingwood was fond of saying that the kind of history one wrote, or the way one thought about history, was ultimately a function of the kind of man one was. But the reverse is also the case. Placed before the alternative visions that history’s interpreters offer for our consideration, and without any apodictically provided theoretical grounds for preferring one (narrative) over another, we are driven back to *moral and aesthetic reasons* for the choice of one vision over another as the more “realistic”’. Hayden White, *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (Baltimore & London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), p. 433, emphasis added.

²⁹ White, *The Content of the Form*.

³⁰ Sometimes scholars use the term ‘identification’ to solve some of the methodological problems associated with the term ‘identity’. This has resulted in the former concept becoming increasingly popular also in International Relations. Most often, however, the terms are used interchangeably or as aspects of the same phenomenon. See for example William Bloom, *Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

³¹ Margaret Somers, ‘The narrative constitution of identity: A relational and network approach’, *Theory and Society*, 23 (1994), pp. 605–649.

the concept of ‘narrative identity’, Somers suggests that ‘social identities are constituted through narrativity, social action is guided by narrativity, and social processes and interaction – both institutional and interpersonal – are narratively mediated’.³² This is the second building block in the thesis: foreign policy analysis is narrative in nature.

We do not, however, need to talk about ‘narrative identities’ as Somers proposes.³³ We can simply talk about ontological narratives, which point to the constructive rather than simply representative or interpretative nature of narratives. The narrative approach is the most suitable method to study the way in which Turkey has been represented in foreign policy analysis because political science, as Mark Bevir and R.A.W. Rhodes argue, relies largely on a narrative form of explanation: ‘We account for actions, practices and institutions by telling a story about how they came to be as they are and perhaps also about how they are preserved. Narratives are thus to political science what theories are to the natural sciences.’³⁴

The introduction has thus far presented two building blocks of the thesis. First, Western foreign policy analysis regarding Turkey contains ideological antagonisms related to the idea of the West, and second, that analysis is narratively constructed. But why focus on foreign policy analysis instead of on, as Edward Said calls it, ‘political power in the raw’?³⁵ If we consider foreign policy acts such as presidential speeches or official policy formulations as ‘first-order representations’

³² Somers, ‘The narrative constitution of identity’, p. 621.

³³ Brubaker & Cooper argue that it is unclear in Somer’s otherwise compelling case as to why and in what sense ‘it is identities that are constituted through narratives and formed in particular relational settings. Social life is indeed pervasively ‘storied’; but it is not clear why this ‘storiedness’ should be axiomatically linked to identity. People everywhere and always tell stories about themselves and others, and locate themselves within culturally available repertoires of stories’. ‘Beyond “Identity”’, p.12.

³⁴ Mark Bevir & R.A.W Rhodes, *Interpreting British Governance* (London & NY: Routledge, 2003), p. 20. See also Mark Bevir, *The logic of the history of ideas* (Cambridge & NY: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 252–262; 301–308.

³⁵ Edward Said, *Orientalism* (London: Penguin Books, 2003), p. 12.

as they engage directly with the events and actors that they represent, then speech acts analysing those representations are ‘second-order representations’.³⁶ We can also call them ‘interpretations of interpretations’.³⁷ However, these categories should not be treated as hierarchical in that first-order representations were more relevant or important than second-order representations.

In fact, as Iver B. Neumann & Daniel H. Nexon emphasise, ‘for many people, second-order representations are often more significant sources of knowledge about politics and society’.³⁸ Consider hearing about a diplomatic deal being signed between two countries. You might ‘understand’ its meaning only after you have read an article that analyses its significance to the wider region and situates it in a historical context. What you have read is a second-order representation, but it influenced your basic assumptions not only about the diplomatic agreement but also about the two countries, their histories, characters, and intentions a lot more than the first-order representation. C. Wright Mills argues this eloquently:

The first rule for understanding the human condition is that men live in second-hand worlds. They are aware of much more than they personally experienced; and their own experience is always indirect ... Their images of the world, and of themselves, are given to them by crowds of witnesses they have never met and never shall meet.³⁹

³⁶ More on the second order of signification, see Roland Barthes, *Mythologies* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1972).

³⁷ Bevir & Rhodes, *Governance Stories*, p. 1.

³⁸ Iver B. Neumann & Daniel H. Nexon (eds.), *Harry Potter and International Relations* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006), p. 8.

³⁹ Cited in Neumann & Nexon (eds.), *Harry Potter in International Relations*, p. 7. Riikka Kuusisto similarly writes in relation to IR: ‘As foreign policy matters often concern distant countries, little-known cultures and abstract values, only very few members of the audience will normally be able to base their opinions and beliefs on immediate observations and personal experiences. Instead, on a large number of major questions, they have to rely on the labels and narratives of (prominent, trust-worthy, like-minded, well-informed) others and on

But as we understand the world through second-order representations, we also subject ourselves to the moral or aesthetic preferences of the ‘witness’, because interpretation is never value-free. The ‘moralising impulse’ that White refers to is always there. In Wittgenstein’s terms, it is our ‘tendency to assume a pure intermediary between the propositional *signs* and the facts’ that covers the interpretative nature of all knowledge.⁴⁰ It is argued in this thesis that we can better grasp the moral and aesthetic preferences guiding Western approaches towards Turkey by examining second-order representations rather than, say, President Obama’s speeches in Istanbul or the European Union’s progress reports on Turkey’s candidacy.

This is because the meaning that those first-order representations attain is gained from narrators who ‘rank events with respect to their significance for the culture or group that is writing its own history’.⁴¹ Or as Neumann & Nexon argue, ‘most of us gain our knowledge of foreign countries from journalists, scholars, and other people who have been to those places, who testify to the fact that those countries exist, and who tell us about the politics, beliefs, and customs of the people who inhabit them’.⁴² Foreign policy scholars are considered experts within their field of study, so it is often scholars that work on Turkish politics that shape our understanding of the country rather than its leaders or inhabitants. We have a closer cultural, political and moral proximity to a Western scholar writing in *Foreign Affairs* that ‘Turkey is lost’ than to a Turkish political leader declaring in Istanbul that Turkey is firmly committed to Western values. In such cases, it is

interpretations they have previously accepted in similar situations.’ Riikka Kuusisto, ‘Comic Plots as Conflict Resolution Strategy’, *European Journal of International Relations*, 15:4 (2009), p. 602.

⁴⁰ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (Oxford & Massachusetts: Blackwell, 1997), p. 44. Emphasis in original.

⁴¹ White, *The Content of the Form*, p. 10.

⁴² Neumann & Nexon (eds.), *Harry Potter in International Relations*, pp. 6–7.

often the second-order representation that takes precedence.

Furthermore, the acts of political elites that form most of our first-order representations in foreign policy analysis can be paradoxically considered less reliable sources because of their strategic nature. As John Mearsheimer put it, foreign political elites speak one language in public, but act according to a different logic.⁴³ This is paradoxical because first-order representations are often perceived as more ‘truthful’ accounts of reality in the same way as witnesses to an accident supposedly ‘know’ what happened. They are, of course, interpretations, but our tendency to assume a pure resemblance between language and reality is stronger in the case of first-order representations.

A typical analytical approach to the issue outlined by Mearsheimer is to work out what the political leader ‘really’ meant. For example, the Western scholar writing in *Foreign Affairs* might be analysing the speech given in Istanbul and argue that although the leader proclaims that Turkey is committed to the West, he does not actually mean in but is simply trying to cover other interests that are on a direct collision course with Western values. The scholar then outlines the ‘real’ interests that the leader harbours, concluding that Turkey is not committed to but in fact abandoning the West.

The thesis is able to bypass the question of purported and actual intentions in foreign policy discourses by focusing on foreign policy analysis instead. This is not to say the line between first-order representations and second-order representations is clear. As Neumann & Nixon argue, they ‘interact in a variety of ways. Moreover, sometimes one person’s second-order representation is another person’s first-order representation’.⁴⁴ Many foreign policy leaders also contribute to foreign policy analysis before, during, or after their political careers.

⁴³ *Conversations with History*, ‘Though a Realist Lense’ (Berkeley Interview Series, 2002).

⁴⁴ Neumann & Nexon (eds.), *Harry Potter in International Relations*, p. 8.

For example, Henry Kissinger (United States National Security Advisor and later Secretary of State during the 1960s and 1970s), Joschka Fischer (Foreign Minister and Vice Chancellor of Germany from 1998 to 2005), and Ahmet Davutoglu (Foreign Minister and later Prime Minister of Turkey from 2009 onwards) are also prominent academics and foreign policy commentators who frequently contribute to scholarly debates.

But the blurred line between foreign policy discourse and foreign policy analysis is not a methodological problem here because the thesis argues that there is a particular *tradition* of analysing Turkey in the scholarly field. As such, even if the narrator is also a political leader, he still exercises what Thomas Kuhn has famously called ‘normal science’, referring to the accepted practices of a research tradition.⁴⁵ Foreign policy analysis does not differ from other research traditions in that also in our field assumptions ‘are not to be questioned, concepts are already well defined and accepted. We are even encouraged to limit the kinds of research questions we ask’.⁴⁶

The thesis is interested in the accepted concepts and assumptions that form the tradition of researching Turkey in foreign policy analysis. It employs the term ‘tradition’ in the same sense as Bevir & Rhodes treat it: as a ‘first influence’ or ‘a social heritage’ that socialises us to the web of beliefs that influences the nature of the interpretation, but which can slowly change through dilemmas.⁴⁷ Foreign policy scholars are ‘situated agents’ who are influenced by their scholarly tradition but who can also push and pull the tradition to accommodate the

⁴⁵ Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1962). At the same time, Steve Fuller warns against using Kuhn’s thesis in the social sciences because it easily becomes its caricature. Kuhn was trained only in physics and was never concerned with paradigms in the social sciences. Steve Fuller, *Kuhn vs. Popper* (Icon Books, 2009), pp. 20–21.

⁴⁶ Mark Schafer, ‘Science, Empiricism, and Tolerance in the Study of Foreign Policymaking’, *International Studies Review*, 5:2 (June 2003), p. 19.

⁴⁷ *Governance Stories*, pp. 1–8.

dilemmas that they encounter in the empirical field.

The focus is therefore on beliefs, preferences and narratives, which moves us away from a more autonomous agency that is at the core of post-structuralist thought. The structure, in other words, is not all-empowering even if it strongly imposes a background to our actions. As Bevir & Rhodes put it: ‘We use the term “belief” not language or discourse to remind ourselves that these understandings are the properties of situated agents, not disembodied quasi-structures.’⁴⁸

It is argued in this thesis that in the scholarly tradition of foreign policy analysis, the moralising impulse that is present in all narrativity is manifested particularly in the predictions that are made.⁴⁹ Predictions in IR are inevitably grounded largely on imagination and fantasy because, as Stephen Dyson writes, ‘the study of international relations is, by necessity, as speculative as imaginative as a lot of sci-fi. As an intellectual enterprise, International Relations is built almost entirely on invented concepts and imagined notions’.⁵⁰ This is why foreign policy analysis predictions are most often presented through metaphors: Turkey will be ‘lost’ or is ‘at a crossroads’ with only two available options – the virtuous and the repugnant. Needless to say, the options are virtuous or repugnant from the perspective of the narrator’s belief system rather than in an objective or universal sense. Also, the moralising impulse is often tacit; it needs to be teased out by unpacking the accepted narrative practices and assumptions that it relies on.

As such, ‘power intellectual’ and ‘power moral’ – as Edward Said calls

⁴⁸ *Governance Stories*, p. 7.

⁴⁹ Predictions are an integral part of the foreign policy research tradition despite the fact that political scientists ‘cannot make predictions. All they can offer are informed conjectures that seek to explain practices and actions by pointing to the conditional connections between actions, beliefs, traditions and dilemmas. Their conjectures are stories, understood as provisional narratives about possible futures’. Bevir & Rhodes, *Governance Stories*, p. 26.

⁵⁰ Stephen Benedict Dyson, *Otherworldly Politics: The International Relations of Star Trek, Game of Thrones, and Battlestar Galactica* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015), p. 3.

them – go hand in hand in the Western tradition of analysing Turkish foreign policy. They interact in various ways with ‘power political’ and ‘power cultural’, which creates a web of beliefs that forms the background to all action.⁵¹ It would not make sense to treat them as separate categories and analyse the exact amount of influence that foreign policy analysis exerts over policy making, because they are fundamentally intersubjective. The third building block in the thesis is thus that by analysing the accepted concepts and assumptions in the tradition of studying Turkey in foreign policy analysis, we are able to gain a unique insight to moral preferences guiding Western actions.

Engaging with the topic from an aesthetic approach, the thesis seeks to understand the political aspect of representing Turkey, which is normally either hidden from our view or perceived as a methodological problem that can be solved through a more rigorous inquiry. We are often unaware of the politics of representation because, as Michael Shapiro note, ‘when a representation is regarded as realistic, it is because it is so familiar it operates transparently’.⁵² The contrasting mimetic approach, which continues to dominate the field of Political Science and is mainly concerned with establishing the impossible resemblance between language and reality, is largely oblivious to the politics of representation and as such misses the most important aspect of politics. The whole world of the social sciences has for a long time tasked itself with the impossible task of ‘distancing passion, of pursuing knowledge without being involved, of holding imagination at bay’.⁵³ The contrast to aesthetic approaches is significant:

⁵¹ Edward Said makes this distinction between four different site of power, *Orientalism*, p. 12.

⁵² Michael Shapiro, *The Politics of Representation: Writing Practices in Biography, Photography, and Policy Analysis* (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), p. xi.

⁵³ Catherine Emihovich, ‘Distancing passion: narratives in social science’, *Qualitative Studies in Education*, 8:1 (1995), p. 40.

Aesthetic approaches, by contrast (to mimetic approaches), embark on a direct political encounter, for they engage the gap that inevitably opens up between a form of representation and the object it seeks to represent. Rather than constituting this gap as a threat to knowledge and political stability, aesthetic approaches accept its inevitability. Indeed, they recognise that the difference between represented and representation is the very location of politics.⁵⁴

Given the increased attention that the role of popular culture in shaping world politics has received in recent years, one might also ask why not include representations in popular culture in the study of Western approaches towards Turkey?⁵⁵ Also popular culture is a second-order representation and influences our image of Turkey. For example, many observers have surely 'learned' more about Turkey and its politics through Orhan Pamuk's novels than from foreign policy speeches or foreign policy analysis.⁵⁶

There is, however, still a different ontological expectation when engaging with foreign policy analysis than with Pamuk's fictional novel. Although they both offer interpretations of the world, foreign policy analysis narrates actual events. Even if the reader recognises that foreign policy narratives are interpretations rather than mirror images of reality, he still assumes that the scholar has attempted to provide as accurate an interpretation of the events as possible. This is not the case with Pamuk's novel, which the reader treats as at least potentially fictional. This does not mean that Pamuk's writings cannot eventually

⁵⁴ Bleiker, *The Aesthetic Turn*, p. 512.

⁵⁵ See for example Federica Caso & Caitlin Hamilton (eds.), *Popular Culture and World Politics: Theories, Methods, Pedagogies* (E-International Relations, 2015); Kyle Grayson, Matt Davies & Simon Philpott, 'Pop Goes IR? Researching the Popular Culture–World Politics Continuum', *Politics*, 29:3 (2009), pp. 155–163.

⁵⁶ See for example Erdag Göknaar, *Orhan Pamuk, Secularism and Blasphemy: The Politics of the Turkish Novel* (Routledge, 2013).

have a more significant impact on the reader's image of Turkey, especially if they confirm prior assumptions and stereotypes. But the initial ontological expectation is different. Also, popular culture representations are not limited by similar scholarly constraints as foreign policy analysis as a 'normal science'. It might have its own limits of narration, but they follow a logic that is subject to a different set of questions than an academic tradition.

Finally, we arrive at the question of why Turkey and not some other actor or issue in the international system? Is Turkey treated differently than other states in foreign policy analysis? As the impulse to moralise events, as White maintains, is always present in narrativity, we can argue that all foreign policy analysis contains some traces of the narrator's beliefs because foreign policy analysis is narratively constructed and presented. There is always 'something that "the mind brings" to (past) reality and that is not part of the past itself'.⁵⁷ However, it can be argued that some states or geographies in the international system are subject to more intense narrativity than others.

For example, Maria Todorova has shown how South-East Europe has been discursively constructed as a pejorative political and culture category of 'the Balkans'.⁵⁸ Larry Wolff similarly argues that the idea of Eastern Europe has been invented to construct a Western European identity that represented the 'real' Europe.⁵⁹ A typical example of a state that is subject to particularly colourful imagination in foreign policy analysis is Russia and its predecessor the Soviet Union.⁶⁰ In these examples, the representations are often negative – either

⁵⁷ Frank Ankersmit, 'White's "New Neo-Kantianism"', in Frank Ankersmit, Ewa Domanska & Hans Kellner (eds.), *Refiguring Hayden White* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), p. 37.

⁵⁸ Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans* (Oxford University Press, 1997).

⁵⁹ Larry Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment* (Stanford University Press, 1994).

⁶⁰ See for example Iver B. Neumann, *Russia and the idea of Europe: a study in identity and international relations* (London: Routledge, 1995).

contemptuous or threatening. On the other side, there are also states or regions that are stereotypically positive or idealised, such as Scandinavia, which can be also called an imaginary geography in that its boundaries are contested and it is in many ways more like an ideal direction than a location.⁶¹

We can say that Turkey is one of the states that receive more attention than most other states in foreign policy analysis. As argued earlier in the introduction, many scholars explain this through Turkey being a significant ‘other’ to Europe and the West. The thesis argues that a more nuanced reading of the dynamics at play in representing Turkey in the West shows that it is rather because of the ‘dilemmas’ that Turkey presents to foreign policy scholars. Foreign policy narratives that arise from this do not always present Turkey as a negative or stigmatised ‘other’ but also as an example to follow, a partner, or a state that needs sympathy and respect.

Christer Pursiainen & Tuomas Forsberg call the misconception that ‘othering’ always means negative images of the other as ‘vulgar’.⁶² To invent an ‘other’ does not necessarily imply a dominating intention or a conscious effort to construct a hegemonic ‘self’ as it is often suggested in the scholarly literature.⁶³ Jacques Hymans shows that identity is not simply about ‘us’ versus ‘them’ but include also other categories of ‘equal’, ‘superior’, and ‘inferior’. The self can also feel ‘solidarity’ towards the ‘other’.⁶⁴ With respect to Turkey part of the issue here is that the country has been frequently represented as a hybrid and liminal entity,

⁶¹ See Peter Stadius & Jonas Harvard (eds.), *Communicating the North: Media Structures and Images in the Making of the Nordic Region* (Burlington: Ashgate, 2013). Michael Booth attempts to confront the idealist image of the Nordic region in his popular science book by arguing that the ‘Nordic miracle’ has a darker side that the Western media is not showing. *The Almost Nearly Perfect People: Behind the Myth of the Scandinavian Utopia* (Jonathan Cape, 2014).

⁶² Tuomas Forsberg & Christer Pursiainen, *Ulkopolitiikkaa norsunluutornista* (Tampere: Chan Puma House, 2015), p. 294.

⁶³ More on this argument, see J.G.A. Pocock, ‘Some Europes in Their History’, in Anthony Pagden (ed.), *The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 55.

⁶⁴ Jacques Hymans, *The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions and Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

thereby containing elements of ‘us’.⁶⁵ This also explains our continuing interest in narrating Turkey.

The thesis employs the term ‘dilemma’ in the sense that Bevir & Rhodes use it; that webs of beliefs need to be located against the background of traditions and dilemmas, and that it is dilemmas that can change traditions.⁶⁶ The key dilemma that Western foreign policy scholars keep returning to dates back to the early 1900s when the Republic of Turkey was founded as a modern and secular state. It was a ‘bewildering’ change and a ‘fantastic play of unrealities’.⁶⁷ It was a dilemma that created a new set of metaphors that Turkey continues to be narrated through. As White argues, metaphors ‘are crucially necessary when a culture or a social group encounters phenomena that either elude or run afoul of normal expectations or quotidian experiences’.⁶⁸

To many Western foreign policy observers, the republic of Turkey that was founded in 1923 continues to represent a key dilemma that the thesis calls the ‘Turkish dilemma’. At the core of the ‘Turkish dilemma’ is the contrast that the Kemalist ideology, around which the new republic was created, forms with its predecessor, the Ottoman Empire. If the Ottoman Empire had been Islamic, expansionist, and conservative, the republic became the very opposite: secular, embracing a ‘peace at home, peace abroad’ ideology, and an aspiring European state. However, although the dilemma still continues to shape the narrative tradition in foreign policy analysis and attract wide interest because of its potency to wield discussions about the idea of the West, it has been slowly changing the

⁶⁵ More on the role of liminal entities, see for example Anne Norton, *Reflections on Political Identity* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988); Bahar Rumelili, ‘Liminality and Perpetuation of Conflicts: Turkish-Greek Relations in the Context of Community-Building by the EU’, *European Journal of International Relations*, 9 (2003), pp. 213–48.

⁶⁶ *Governance Stories*, p. 20.

⁶⁷ E., ‘Turkish Facts and Fantasies’, *Foreign Affairs*, 3:4 (1925), pp. 589; 602.

⁶⁸ Hayden White, *Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism* (Baltimore & London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), p. 184.

tradition, which is part of its usefulness in the scholarly field.

The metaphors of hybridity and liminality are relevant here. The Turkish dilemma is not, in fact, very Turkish at all but contains elements of ‘us’, which makes it a particularly intriguing case in foreign policy analysis. In other words, Turkey is not the ‘ultimate other’ as it is sometimes suggested but instead located at the inside/outside border, which means that it raises all kinds of existential questions for the West. It can be argued that Turkey represents a sort of ‘ventriloque’ in foreign policy analysis that is used to address a variety of questions related to the West. Some voices are more useful in the process than others, and because of the liminal and hybrid meanings that have been attached to Turkey the country represents a particularly important channel through which to discuss the West and its idea.

It is therefore this dilemma, rather than Turkey’s abstract and often vaguely defined ‘otherness’ to the West, that makes Turkey a popular topic in foreign policy analysis. The West has many more ‘others’ from Africa to Asia that do not receive as intense narrative treatment as Turkey in foreign policy analysis because they lack an equally powerful dilemma.⁶⁹ And because of the dilemma, the moralising impulse in Western foreign policy analysis regarding Turkey is more apparent than in many other cases. It is for this reason that the thesis focuses on the case of Turkey. This forms the final building block of the thesis; that Turkey is subject to particularly intense narrativity in Western foreign policy analysis because it offers a potent dilemma that provides different generations of scholars with metaphors through which to narrate the West into existence.

⁶⁹ For example, Chinua Achebe writes about ‘the desire – one might indeed say the need – in Western psychology to set Africa up as a foil to Europe, as a place of negations at once remote and vaguely familiar, in comparison with which Europe’s own state of spiritual grace will be manifest’. ‘An Image of Africa: Racism in Conrad’s “Heart of Darkness”’, *Massachusetts Review*, 18 (1977). Or alternatively Japan, which is also the West’s stigmatised ‘other’ because of its status as a latecomer to the Westphalian state system. Zarakol, *After Defeat*.

Finally, to argue that there exists a Western tradition of narrating Turkey in foreign policy analysis is not to suggest that there are necessarily other non-Western traditions of practicing foreign policy analysis that the Western tradition differs from. In other words, the aim of the thesis is not to juxtapose a Western tradition with other possible foreign policy analysis traditions. It might well be that foreign policy analysis is conducted the same way everywhere. The idea in the thesis is rather to show how this particular tradition is intertwined with the idea of the West and what kind of tropes are employed in the task of narrating Turkey.

The thesis contrasts the assumption that there are two Western narratives – American and European – that can be distinguished in the literature and argues that the picture is much more varied.⁷⁰ There are, first, more than two Western narratives of Turkey, and second, they are not geographically determined but influenced by the fundamental beliefs that shape the Western scholarly tradition of representing Turkey in foreign policy analysis. The metaphors that arise from what the thesis refers to as the ‘Turkish dilemma’ may initially originate from one geographical location (often the United States) but are certainly not restricted to it. As such, when Wheatcroft reduces the question of representation to geography, arguing that ‘seen on either side of the Atlantic’ the question of Turkey ‘might be two entirely different stories’, he simplifies the picture. In demonstrating that foreign policy analysis, like all narrativity, is influenced by the beliefs of the narrator, the thesis aims to show that we need an aesthetic approach to unpack the

⁷⁰ Geoffrey Wheatcroft, for example, argues that ‘there was a wider gap than ever between European and American perceptions of the conflict. Merely to follow those wrenching events through the American or the European news media is to be jolted by the dissonance: seen on either side of the Atlantic, Gaza might be two entirely different stories. So might a number of other urgent topics of the moment. The question of Turkey, and the way that it has become such a cause of contention between the European Union and the United States, deserves treatment on its own and at length’. ‘Continental Drifts’, *The National Interest* (3 February 2009).

meanings that foreign policy analysis conveys.

Research question

The introduction has so far argued that Western foreign policy analysis is narratively constructed and contains moral and aesthetic preferences related to the idea of the West. We can gain a unique insight to those beliefs by analysing the accepted concepts and assumptions in the tradition of studying Turkey in foreign policy analysis. Turkey is subject to particularly intense narrativity in Western foreign policy analysis because it offers a potent dilemma that provides apt, meaningful, and often emotionally charged metaphors through which to debate the idea of the West.

Underlying these key arguments is the main research question: *How is Turkey narrated in Western foreign policy analysis and how do these narratives impact on debates over the idea of the West?*

Research statement and contribution

In order to tackle the research question, the thesis relies on theoretical insights from three overlapping approaches to IR: an interpretative approach, a narrative approach, and an aesthetic approach. These approaches are intertwined in many ways. A narrative approach can be both an interpretative approach and an aesthetic approach, an aesthetic approach is always an interpretative approach, and so on. To simplify their methodological roles in the thesis, we can say that the aesthetic approach is about representation, the narrative approach about the method of representation, and the interpretative approach about the relationship between

representation and reality. In terms of methodology, there are two foundations upon which the thesis is built: Hayden White's tropology and the interpretative approach of Mark Bevir & R.A.W. Rhodes that focuses on beliefs, traditions, and dilemmas. The thesis also employs Kenneth Burke's rhetorical tools as well as George Lakoff's seminal work on foreign policy metaphors.

It might seem odd to combine the first two given Bevir's occasional critique of White's work, but the thesis attempts to demonstrate that White's tropology complements the methodological framework of Bevir and Rhodes by giving substance to it.⁷¹ In other words, Bevir and Rhodes show that actions – including speech acts – are always constituted by beliefs, while White provides substance to those beliefs, arguing that they rely on the tropes of metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony. Both the theoretical frameworks hold that the key to understanding meanings and representations in the world is to engage with the concept of narrative.⁷²

It is difficult to determine the right structure to the thesis because it speaks to so many different fields of literature. There is, first, Turkish foreign policy analysis, which is what the thesis is *about* but does not directly contribute to. This field of literature is treated as data rather than as a field of knowledge that the thesis aims to advance. This means that the field of Turkish foreign policy analysis is reviewed in the analysis chapters, not in the literature review. Then there is the field of narrative studies where the thesis is located in. The field of narrative studies is hugely extensive ranging from literature theory to psychology and film studies, or as Molly Andrews, Corinne Squire and Maria Tamboukou aptly point out, 'it often seems as if all social researchers are doing narrative research in one way or

⁷¹ For an overview of the criticism, see Mark Bevir, 'Why Historical Distance is not a Problem', *History and Theory*, 50 (2011), pp. 24–37.

⁷² Mark Bevir, 'Narrative as a form of explanation', *Disputatio*, 9 (November 2000); Hayden White, 'The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality', in White, *The Content of the Form*, pp. 1–25.

another'.⁷³ The thesis therefore needs to focus on the most relevant contributions to narrative studies in the social sciences with a strong emphasis on narrative approaches in political science and international relations. Finally, there is the literature on the idea of the West, which stands at the centre of the thesis.

The research focus on the Western tradition of narrating Turkey in foreign policy analysis limits the data selection to scholarly literature that speaks from the perspective of the West. A 'Western' scholarly output does not mean that the output was, for example, simply published in the United States or Europe. It also needs to explicitly or implicitly refer to the West as 'we', confirming that the author identifies with the Western system. Alternatively, the author can refer to Europe or the United States as 'we' as it can be assumed that despite their divergent definitions of the exact boundaries of the West, American and European scholars consider their respective geographies to be included in the definition.

This methodological framing permits the thesis to avoid the impossible task of defining who counts as a Western scholar. The task would lead to questions such as is a professor who is residing in the United States but comes from a Turkish origin a Western or a Turkish scholar? These questions become irrelevant when the author identifies himself or herself as Western. This naturally puts considerable restrictions to data selection. It is mainly in the United States' scholarly tradition that authors explicitly identify with the West, which means that the thesis focuses predominantly on American foreign policy analysis. Another reason for this geographical focus is that most of the metaphors arising from the 'Turkish dilemma' outlined earlier – such as the 'losing Turkey' metaphor – originate from the United States. They are later acquired in Europe as well, but do not feature in more theoretically focused peer-reviewed journals but in discussion

⁷³ Molly Andrews, Corinne Squire and Maria Tamboukou (eds.), *Doing Narrative Research* (SAGE Publications, 2008), p. 1.

papers and academic commentaries.

There are two scholarly journals in the United States that have taken an active role in publishing analysis regarding Turkish politics: *Foreign Affairs* and *The National Interest*.⁷⁴ They are also deeply engaged in the debate over the idea of the West, and can be seen as journals that largely offer a *Western* perspective to international affairs. They have a global impact, and can be considered to be among the most influential foreign policy publications in the world. This is an important part of the data selection criteria. As the thesis is focusing on the accepted assumptions and concepts in Western foreign policy analysis, one needs to examine the dominant narratives in the scholarly field. Seeking to understand how common sense is constructed in Western foreign policy analysis, the thesis must examine those narratives that produce it – not alternative and marginal narratives that attempt to challenge it. *Foreign Affairs* and *The National Interest* are therefore naturally included in the data selection with 64 and 92 Turkey-related articles respectively over the time period stretching from the 1920s until the early 2010s.

Because the thesis examines *narrative traditions* rather than single narratives or policy discourses, the time period needs to cover different generations of foreign policy analysts. This is because the thesis seeks to how the narrative traditions influence the interpretation of events in Turkish foreign policy. The earliest article that is analysed in the thesis was published in the June 1924 issue of *Foreign Affairs* and was titled ‘The Downfall of the Khalifate’. Sir Valentine Chirol wrote the analysis only a year after the founding of the Turkish republic and as such

⁷⁴ The Council on Foreign Relations has published *Foreign Affairs* since 1922. The journal is not officially affiliated to any political ideology or party and claims that it ‘remains true to its credo, publishing authors of widely divergent views, searching for unifying themes and principles in an era where these are especially hard to find’. See <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/about-us/history> (1 June 2015). *The National Interest* was founded in 1985 and is associated with the Realist school of thought in IR. Its founder Irving Kristol was an influential neo-conservative thinker in the United States. As such, unlike *Foreign Affairs*, *The National Interest* has a pronounced ideological inclination.

provides very valuable data about Western narrative practices concerning Turkey almost 100 years ago. Similarly, an article titled 'Turkish Facts and Fantasies' published a year later in the July 1925 issue of *Foreign Affairs* under the pseudonym E. provides a unique perspective to how Turkey was represented right after the Ottoman Empire had collapsed. Remarkably, the same narrative traditions still exist in the 2010s, influencing our understanding of Turkish contemporary politics.

Other older articles in the data set include Hans Kohn's 'Ten Years of the Turkish Republic' in the October 1933 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, John S. Badeau's 'Islam and the Modern Middle East' in the October 1959 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, Fitzroy Maclean's 'The Eastern Question in Modern Dress' in the January 1951 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, Walter Livingston Wright, Jr.'s 'Truths About Turkey' in the January 1948 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, and George McGhee's 'Turkey Joins the West' in the July 1954 issue of *Foreign Affairs*. The reason why these articles are solely from *Foreign Affairs* is that it is the longest running foreign policy journal that provides a Western perspective to international affairs. Established in 1922, the journal provides the most valuable data to the thesis because it gives an opportunity to truly follow how the narrative traditions have developed generation after generation.

There are also other relevant publications that need to be included. A third influential foreign policy journal, *Foreign Policy*, is also a pivotal arena in the debate over the idea of the West.⁷⁵ There are eight Turkey-related articles in *Foreign Policy* that will be analysed in the thesis. There are a number of academic books in the data set including Bill Park's *Modern Turkey: People, state and foreign policy in a*

⁷⁵ Samuel Huntington and Warren Demian Manshel, who were ideologically conservative and neo-liberal respectively, established *Foreign Policy* in 1970. In 2000, under the ownership of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Foreign Policy* changed from an academic quarterly to a bimonthly glossy, but remained an influential arena for foreign policy debates both in the United States and globally. In 2008, the Washington Post Company (now Graham Holdings) purchased *Foreign Policy*, which is now part of the FP Group.

globalized world, Soner Cagaptay's *Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey* and Graham Fuller's *The New Turkish Republic*.⁷⁶

Academic debates are not restricted to foreign policy journals and books, and the thesis includes two influential academic commentaries in the data: Professor Juan Cole's blog *Informed Comment* and *Project Syndicate*, with the latter being a more global rather than characteristically American arena for scholarly debates.⁷⁷ There are also articles from the widely distributed newspapers *The Economist*, *Newsweek*, *The Washington Post*, *The New York Times*, *The Guardian*, and *The Times*. The thesis, in other words, follows the foreign policy debate on Turkey to wherever it is taking place with the condition that the narrator speaks from a Western perspective, is familiar with the scholarly tradition of studying Turkey, and puts forward interpretations that resonate so widely that there are many enough readers to accept them not as obscure or marginal interpretations but as commonsensical and factual accounts of Turkish foreign policy.

Thesis structure

The second chapter focuses on the debate on the idea of the West in order to map out the field of literature that the thesis primarily contributes to. The third chapter covers the most relevant literature on aesthetic and interpretative approaches in political science and IR with reference to narratives. The fourth chapter introduces the theoretical framework of the thesis, critically engaging with Hayden White's approach to narrative and the interpretative approach of Mark Bevir and R.A.W.

⁷⁶ These two particular books are included in the data set because the thesis focuses on the 'losing Turkey' narrative and Soner Cagaptay is 'a leading exponent of the "we are losing Turkey" school' while 'Graham Fuller's perspective is much more positive: his controversial book, *The New Turkish Republic*, interprets the new brand of Turkish policy as a natural correction, important for the Muslim world and the West'. Ian O. Lesser, 'What to Read on Turkish Politics', *Foreign Affairs* (23 September 2009), available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2009-09-23/what-read-turkish-politics> (1 July 2015).

⁷⁷ See <https://www.project-syndicate.org/about>.

Rhodes. The chapter also discusses the divergent views that the approaches have as regards to what can be taken as ‘facts’ that narratives are built from. Finally, the rhetorical analysis of Kenneth Burke and the metaphorical analysis of George Lakoff will be introduced.

In the fifth chapter, the thesis analyses the ‘losing Turkey’ debate and demonstrates that the metaphor of ‘losing’ is a particularly powerful metaphor that arises from the ‘Turkish dilemma’ and contains different moral calls for action to the Western audience. The sixth chapter examines the ‘crossroads’ metaphor in Western foreign policy analysis regarding Turkey and similarly shows that it is not based on neutral observations about Turkish policy options but derive from the impulse to moralise the subject of study with the West as its intended audience. In the seventh chapter, the thesis focuses on the ‘Erdogan-for-Turkey’ metaphor and analyses the ways in which the political figure of Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been narratively employed in Western foreign policy analysis on Turkey. Throughout the chapters, the aim is to provide a comprehensive, analytical and novel account of the interconnected nature of Western foreign policy analysis on Turkey and the debate on the West. The concluding chapter both summarises the main arguments presented in the thesis and reflects upon them in light of the more recent events in Turkish politics.

Chapter 2 – The idea of the West

Introduction

The concept of the West is of particular importance here because the thesis argues that the way in which Turkey is narrated in foreign policy analysis is manifestly *Western* in nature. What follows is that the foreign policy analysis discourse is more about the West than about Turkey. Therefore, we need to locate the tradition within the wider discourse about the West, which is an expansive and varied scholarly field. In the following sections, the attempt is to show the main currents in the scholarly field with a distinction being made between studies that probe the West's nature and those that are more focused on the West as a category.

The debate on the idea of the West is strange in many ways. It is strange because we assume that what we are discussing is clear when it is not. In other words, when we talk about the West, we assume that we have a shared understanding of what it means. This is the case also in the media, where the West is casually discussed in the same sentence with, say, Russia or China.⁷⁸ However, Russia and China can be defined in various ways: geographically, linguistically, ethnically, and so on. It does not mean that there are no disputes over the legitimacy of those definitions, but China and Russia still have a legal existence. The West, on the other hand, does not legally exist and cannot be neatly defined. As Owen Harries argues: 'Over the last half century or so, most of us have come to think of "the West" as a given, a natural presence and one

⁷⁸ See for example *The Economist*, 'Russia and the West: Alternative Reality' (30 May 2015), available at <http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21652339-vladimir-putin-concocts-new-story-ukraine-leaving-west-wondering-what-he-up> (10 July 2015); Natalie Nougayrede, 'The West is trying to understand China, but don't expect trust', *The Guardian* (26 March 2015); available at <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/26/west-understand-china-trust-xi-jinping> (10 July 2015); Adaobi Tricia Nwaubani, 'African Books for Western Eyes', *New York Times* (28 November 2014), available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/30/opinion/sunday/african-books-for-western-eyes.html> (10 July 2015).

that is here to stay. It is a way of thinking that is not only wrong in itself, but is virtually certain to lead to mistaken policies. The sooner we discard it the better.⁷⁹

But we still talk about the West alongside China and Russia as if its definition was unproblematic and commonly shared. And when we read in the news that the West did this and the West did that, we all know what the news refer to. This means that we have a strong cognitive and emotional relationship to the West and that it is a particularly meaningful ‘imagined community’ akin to a nation state. But yet when you ask someone who frequently talks about the West to actually define its limits, you rarely receive an answer. Is it about geography? Perhaps it is about values? Or is the West primarily a political community? Because of this strange situation where everyone ‘knows’ what the West is but cannot really define it, it is important to analyse ‘how the West is variously conceptualised and constituted, who has the power and capacity to define its contours, and not least why debates about the West are infused with high emotion’.⁸⁰

Harries argued earlier that we should discard the concept of the West, but he does not actually propose that the West as a category is redundant because of its unnaturalness, but rather advocates a particularly narrative about the nature of the West. For him, the West is a civilisation, not a political community. Harries’ argument is characteristic of the debate surrounding the concept of the West: even if the analysis is seemingly about the West as a category, it also contains a moral or aesthetic preference for a particular narrative about the nature of the West.

⁷⁹ Owen Harries, ‘The Collapse of the “West”’, *Foreign Affairs* (September/October 1993), available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/southeastern-europe/1993-09-01/collapse-west> (12 July 2015).

⁸⁰ Browning & Lehti, *The Struggle for the West*, p. 1.

Despite often being intertwined in analysis, the distinction between studies that probe the West's 'nature' and those that treat the West as a 'category' is a suitable way to describe the field of literature.⁸¹ The former approach is far more common than the latter with Jan Ifversen noting in 2008: 'While works have been written on the idea of the West, typically they deal with the core values of the West and do not question the chosen term or venture into more semantic reflections.'⁸²

Pocock challenges the strict distinction between the two approaches and argues that it is possible to accept that something is at the same time 'constructed' and 'real': 'I do not want to suggest that there is nothing to study here except constructions in the mind, framed with discreditable intentions. I have no difficulty in accepting "Europe" as a reality as well as a construction; many things in human history can be both at once.'⁸³ Still, to examine the West's 'nature' means that the research agenda is different from a more conceptual analysis of the West.

The West's nature

The studies that are concerned with the West's nature focus on what the West really is or should be; they attempt to define the 'inside' or the essential nature of the West and impose a hegemonic narrative. The early 2000s witnessed a proliferation of such analysis for two main reasons. Firstly, the event of 9/11 in New York was widely perceived, especially in the United States, as an attack against the West and its values. This triggered a wave of analysis re-considering the basic tenets that the West was seen to represent and its relations to the

⁸¹ Heller, 'The Dawning', p. 18.

⁸² Jan Ifversen, 'Who are the Westerners?', *International Politics*, 45 (2008), p. 238.

⁸³ Pocock, 'Some Europes', p. 55.

Islamic world.⁸⁴ Secondly, the Iraq War that followed in 2003 exposed a huge gap between European and American perspectives on the international system. Robert Kagan famously declared that ‘on major strategic and international questions, Americans are from Mars and Europeans from Venus’.⁸⁵

This opened a whole new chapter in the debate about the West. There were those who argued that Europe and the United States are simply too different to form a united entity called the West, and might even become enemies.⁸⁶ There were economic, political, cultural, and historical differences that were emphasised in arguing that the West is no more what it was during the Cold War when Europe and the United States shared a common vision and enemy: fighting against totalitarian regimes and advancing democracy and free market globally.

Now it was suggested that two Wests – European and American – have emerged.⁸⁷ If the events of 9/11 formed the new formative moment in the United States, Europe’s political, economic and moral vision was tied to the 1989 experience that re-united the European continent. It was argued that the lessons of the Second World War no longer provided enough symbolism to

⁸⁴ See for example Richard Koch & Chris Smith, *Suicide of the West* (Bloomsbury Academic, 2007); Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong? The Clash Between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East* (Harper Perennial, 2002); Roger Scruton, *West and the Rest: Globalization and the Terrorist Threat* (Bloomsbury Academic, 2003).

⁸⁵ Robert Kagan, ‘Power and Weakness’, *Policy Review*, 113 (June/July, 2002). See also Kupchan, ‘The End of the West’; Thomas L. Friedman, ‘The End of the West?’, *The New York Times* (2 November 2003), available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/02/opinion/02FRIE.html> (20 July 2015); Jeffrey Anderson, G. John Ikenberry & Thomas Risse (eds.), *The End of the West? Crisis and Change in the Atlantic Order* (Cornell University Press, 2008); Anatol Lieven, ‘End of the West’, *Prospect*, 78 (September 2002); P.H. Gordon, ‘Bridging the Atlantic Divide’, *Foreign Affairs*, 82:1 (2003), pp. 70–83; Hanspeter Neuhold, ‘Transatlantic Turbulences: Rift or Ripples?’, *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 8 (2003), pp. 457–468.

⁸⁶ Kupchan, for example, writes that ‘Europe will inevitably rise up as America’s principal competitor. Should Washington and Brussels begin to recognise the dangers of the growing gulf between them, they may be able to contain their budding rivalry. Should they fail, however, to prepare for life after Pax Americana, they will ensure that the coming clash of civilizations will be not between the West and the rest but within a West divided against itself. ‘The End of the West’. Kagan argued that Europe’s idealism and its ‘postmodernist utopia’ of a world of peace, negotiations and international law was only possible because the realist United States provided for its security. ‘Power and Weakness’.

⁸⁷ Dominique Moisi, ‘Reinventing the West’, *Foreign Affairs* (November/December 2003), available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2003-11-01/reinventing-west> (15 July 2015);

bring them together to work for a common cause.⁸⁸ In other words, a synecdochal representation of a united West was overtaken by a metonymical representation that emphasised conflict and difference.

Jurgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida famously argued that Europe and the United States are indeed very different, and that Europe should cherish the gap: 'In this world, the reduction of politics to stupid and costly alternative of war or peace simply doesn't pay. At the international level and in the framework of the UN, Europe has to throw its weight on the scale to counterbalance the hegemonic unilateralism of the United States.'⁸⁹ Europe's utopian idealism that Kagan presented as its main weakness was re-framed as a strong position both morally and politically. Others were more optimistic and saw the rupture in the alliance as an opportunity to 'reinvent' the West and increase cooperation.⁹⁰ Andrew Moravcsik proposed a 'new transatlantic bargain':

To get things back on track, both in Iraq and elsewhere, Washington must shift course and accept multilateral conditions for intervention. The Europeans, meanwhile, must shed their resentment of American power and be prepared to pick up much of the burden of conflict prevention and postconflict engagement. Complementarity, not conflict, should be the transatlantic

⁸⁸ Friedman, 'The End of the West'.

⁸⁹ Jurgen Habermas & Jacques Derrida, 'February 15, or What Binds Europeans Together: A Plea for a Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in the Core of Europe', *Constellations*, 10:3 (2003), p. 293.

⁹⁰ Moisi, 'Reinventing'; Timothy Garton Ash, *Free World: Why a Crisis of the West Reveals the Opportunity of Our Time* (Allen Lane, 2004); Jonathan Stevenson, 'How Europe and American Defend Themselves', *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 2003), available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2003-03-01/how-europe-and-america-defend-themselves> (20 July 2015).

watchword.⁹¹

The debate over the ‘nature’ of the West is, then, essentially a battle over how to correctly represent its true essence.

The West as a category

The literature on the West as a ‘category’, on the other hand, focuses on the practice of representing the West. If the former scholarly practice is more positivist in that it attempts to provide a realistic image of the West, the literature that treats the West as a ‘category’ is influenced by the constructivist thought. The West is perceived as an ‘idea’,⁹² a ‘rhetorical claim’,⁹³ a ‘direction’,⁹⁴ a ‘concept’,⁹⁵ a ‘semantic configuration’,⁹⁶ a ‘trope’,⁹⁷ a ‘metaphysical civilization’,⁹⁸ a ‘metageographical concept’,⁹⁹ a ‘cult’,¹⁰⁰ or a ‘narrative’.¹⁰¹ The underlying claim is that the meaning of the West is contested, fluid, and intersubjective, and that it is a construction of the mind rather than an entity that can be objectively described. They focus primarily not on the nature but the meaning of the West. In other words, to treat the West as a category is to

⁹¹ Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Striking a New Transatlantic Bargain’, *Foreign Policy* (July/August 2003), available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2003-07-01/striking-new-transatlantic-bargain> (20 July 2015).

⁹² Hall, ‘The West and the Rest’, p. 278; Loren Baritz, ‘The Idea of the West’, *American Historical Review*, 66 (1960–61), pp. 618–40.

⁹³ Christopher GoGwilt, ‘True West: The Changing Idea of the West from the 1880s to the 1920s’ in Silvia Federici (ed.), *Enduring Western Civilization: The Construction of the Concept of Western Civilization and Its ‘Others’* (Westport: Praeger, 1995). See also Christopher GoGwilt, *The Invention of the West: Joseph Conrad and the Double-Mapping of Europe and Empire* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995).

⁹⁴ William McNeill, ‘What We Mean by the West’, *Orbis*, 41:4 (1997), pp. 513–25.

⁹⁵ Heller, ‘The Dawning’, p. 62.

⁹⁶ Ifversen, ‘Who are the Westerners?’, p. 238.

⁹⁷ Naoki Sakai, ‘The West – a Dialogic Prescription or Proscription?’, *Social Identities*, 11:3 (2005), pp. 177–95.

⁹⁸ John McCumber, ‘Dialogue as Resistance to Western Metaphysics’, *Social Identities*, 11:3 (2005), p. 1999.

⁹⁹ Martin W. Lewis & Kären E. Wigen, *The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).

¹⁰⁰ Geoffrey Barraclough, *History in a Changing World* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1955).

¹⁰¹ David Gress, *From Plato to NATO: The Idea of the West and Its Opponents* (New York: Free Press, 1998); Browning & Lehti (eds.), *The Struggle for the West*.

examine how and when it has been invented and for what purposes.

Stuart Hall was one of the first scholars to analyse the West as a category, treating it as an idea that is discursively produced rather than as a natural entity.¹⁰² It was, in a sense, a meta-analysis of different historical discourses about the West. However, in arguing that the discourses he analysed produced the idea of the West as ‘modern’ and as such superior to the ‘rest’, Hall also reiterates the narrative of the West as a value-based entity. As Heller puts it,

Unfortunately, Hall is not exact about what terms were used in the historical texts he cites, and thus he treats the West, modernity, and Europe as close synonyms ... While complaining that the idea of the West employs stereotypes that split the world into the more and less valuable, Hall himself employs stereotypes that split the world into the dominating and the dominated.¹⁰³

Most studies of Occidentalism focus on the West as a category and pay attention to how the West is represented in discourses both within and outside the West. The edited volume *Occidentalism: Images of the West* is a classic work within the field.¹⁰⁴ Occidentalism brings together Western postcolonial scholars and Third World intellectuals that take a critical approach towards the hegemonic role of the West in shaping our images of reality. The field of literature has been

¹⁰² Stuart Hall, ‘The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power’ in Bram Gieben & Stuart Hall (eds.), *The Formations of Modernity* (Polity, 1993).

¹⁰³ Heller, ‘The Dawning of the West’, pp. 25–26.

¹⁰⁴ James Carrier (ed.), *Occidentalism: Images of the West* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). See also Wang Ning, ‘Orientalism versus Occidentalism’, *New Literature History*, 28:1 (Winter 1997), pp. 57–67; Ian Buruma & Margalit Avishai, *Occidentalism: The West in the Eyes of Its Enemies* (New York: Penguin Books, 2004); Robin D. Gill, *Orientalism and Occidentalism: Is the Mistranslation of Culture Inevitable?* (Paraverse Press, 2004); Couze Venn, *Occidentalism: Modernity and Subjectivity* (London & Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2000).

criticised for wielding animosity towards the West both within and outside it by representing the West in a stereotypical and overtly negative fashion.¹⁰⁵

Many poststructuralist theorists that examine the meaning of the West are equally critical of the concept and seek to deconstruct it in order to challenge its hegemony.¹⁰⁶ These studies are often intertwined with works that claim that the West as a global hegemon is uniquely evil and causes unforeseen economic, political, social, and moral destruction through Westernisation. Serge Latouche's *The Westernization of the World* is a well-known work of this kind and argues that with the West 'there emerges a face unlike any known to us and which must infallibly astonish or even frighten us: a very monster, half-mechanic, half-organic, which fits none of our categories for the definition of species'.¹⁰⁷

Although more interested in the West's nature, Latouche's work has a strong moralising impulse similar to many works that probe the meaning of the West that argue that it is employed as an ideological tool designed to advance particular interests.¹⁰⁸ Thomas Patterson, for example, argues that the Western civilisation advances the interests of capitalism, which means that it is an ideology above all.¹⁰⁹ White's moralising impulse is evident in most works that discuss the West. The West is not only represented as being a triumphalist or a declining entity but either deservingly or wrongly so. In most cases, these discussions are channelled through three alternative narratives of the West's nature: the West as a civilisation, a value-based community, or a political

¹⁰⁵ Buruma & Avishai, *Occidentalism*.

¹⁰⁶ Robert Young, *White Mythologies: Writing History and the West* (London: Routledge, 1990); McCumber, 'Dialogue'.

¹⁰⁷ Serge Latouche, *The Westernization of the World: The Significance, Scope, and Limits of the Drive Towards Global Uniformity* (Polity Press, 1996), p. 26. A more positive interpretation of Westernisation include J.M. Roberts, *The Triumph of the West* (London: British Broadcasting Company, 1985).

¹⁰⁸ See for example Norman Davies, *Europe: A History* (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Barraclough, *History*.

¹⁰⁹ Thomas Patterson, *Inventing Western Civilization* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1997).

union.¹¹⁰ The following sections will discuss these three narratives.

The 'civilisation West' narrative

The 'civilisation West' narrative is a particularised understanding of the West in several different ways. The West is particular rather than universal in a historical, geographical, and cultural sense with roots dating back to ancient Greece and Rome, boundaries limiting it to particular continents, and cultural traditions deriving from the Judeo-Christian legacy. Different authors emphasise some of these aspects more than others, but what they have in common is the idea that there are civilisations in the world and that the West is one of them.¹¹¹ The 'civilisation West' narrative is largely temporal in that the West as a civilisation is represented as having survived due to different generations of Westerners from the antique, through the Enlightenment, to the modern times that have 'passed the torch'.

The most famous scholarly contributions that present the West as a civilisation are Oswald Spengler's *The Decline of the West* and Arnold Toynbee's *The Study of History*.¹¹² Spengler's pessimistic view of the West as a civilisation that will inevitably decline precisely because it has matured from being a culture to becoming a world-historical force of civilisation, was important in 'popularising' the concept of the West.¹¹³ At the same time, it represents a

¹¹⁰ Browning & Lehti, *The Struggle*. See also Ifversen, 'Who are the Westerners'. Ifversen refers to the 'Civilization West' narrative as the 'Old West' configuration and to the 'Modern West' narrative as the 'New West' configuration. He also includes a fourth category, Westernisation, in his list of different semantic configurations of the West.

¹¹¹ See for example Gerhard Masur, 'Distinctive Traits of Western Civilization: Through the Eyes of Western Historians', *American Historical Review*, 67 (1962), pp. 591–608.

¹¹² Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West*, Vol. 1–2 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1926–28), Arnold Toynbee, *The Study of History*, Vol. 1–9 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1934–1954); see also Arnold J. Toynbee, 'The Siege of the West', *Foreign Affairs* (January 1953), pp. 280–286.

¹¹³ Michael Allen Gillespie, 'Liberal Education and the Idea of the West' in Ralph C. Hancock, *America, the West, and Liberal Education* (Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), p. 9.

‘declinist’ narrative of the West, which can be said to be as old as the idea of the West.¹¹⁴ In fact, the declinist narrative in many ways establishes the whole concept.

As Michael Allen Gillespie aptly argues, ‘the idea of the West in its fullest sense arises as the idea of the end of the West, as the retrospective recognition of a horizon that we have now transcended’.¹¹⁵ Patrick Thaddeus Jackson shows that there are different narratives of the West’s decline, all of which represent ‘an inheritance of the “West” tradition, a kind of fundamental anxiety that accompanies debate and discussions about Western action; this makes an appeal to the West’s immanent demise an attractive trope for advocate of particular policies to deploy, since the audience – raised in the same “West” tradition – is already familiar with the basic line of argument’.¹¹⁶ It is clear that strategic and ontological narratives are deeply intertwined in debates about the West. At the same time, Browning & Lehti remind us that the question of whether the West is declining or even dying is ‘difficult to answer since it is unclear which West we are talking about’.¹¹⁷

Toynbee’s West as a civilisation is about the West’s creative power to face challenges of the modern era. Similarly to Spengler, Toynbee’s theory of civilisations is structuralist in that he outlines different stages through which civilisations pass. In Toynbee’s model, however, the West is not destined to

¹¹⁴ Today the declinist narrative is particularly popular among the ‘Eurabia’ scholars, who argue that the West and its values will vanish because of unchecked immigration, especially from Islamic countries, to the United States and Europe as well as the declining birth rates among the white populations across the West. Perhaps the most famous example of this field of literature is Patrick Buchanan’s *The Death of the West: How Dying Populations and Immigrant Invasions Imperil Our Culture and Civilization* (St. Martin’s Griffin, 2002), which is a fiercely conservative – anti-immigration, anti-feminist and pro-Christian – contribution to the debate about the West. See also Timo Vihavainen, *Länsimaiden tuho* (Otava, 2009). Jukka Koskelainen argues that the idea of decline and decay represents an ‘ideal’ in the West and has always been present in discussions about Western culture and society. Jukka Koskelainen, *Rakas Rappio: Pelastus ja perikato länsimaisessa ajattelussa* (Jyväskylä: Atena Kustannus, 2012).

¹¹⁵ Gillespie, ‘Liberal Education’, p. 11.

¹¹⁶ Jackson, ‘The Perpetual Decline’, p. 67.

¹¹⁷ Browning & Lehti, *The Struggle*, p. 18.

decline but can remain together if it retains its creative energy.¹¹⁸ If Toynbee is mildly optimistic about the future of the Western civilisation, J.M. Robert's *The Triumph of the West* is a greatly optimistic representation that shows confidence in the West's continuity and as such can be described as a 'triumphant West' narrative. Like most studies of the West, Robert's work is not only descriptive but also morally charged: the West will and *should* triumph as a civilisation well in to the future because of its inherent qualities.

The 'civilisation West' narrative is perhaps the most criticised narrative of the West because it is arguably an essentialist representation and treats the West as a distinct and isolated entity.¹¹⁹ Furthermore, and as earlier noted, postcolonial and poststructuralist scholars largely conceive the Western civilisation as a construct that is designed only to advance the hegemonic interests of the few and to make Westerners to feel superior to others.¹²⁰ These 'postmodern' critics, as they are often refer to, are in turn criticised for ending up reproducing the very idea of the West that they meant to challenge. Furthermore, in their quest to challenge the supreme nature of the West, they simply turn the dichotomy around and lift the non-West to a superior role. As Gillespie writes,

¹¹⁸ Also H.G. Wells belongs to the same tradition and argues in *Foreign Affairs* only a few years prior to the Second World War: 'Is it not still possible for the English and the Americans to get a little closer together, to conceive some sort of common purpose, and to bring their common traditions into effective action in time to save the civilization of the world? ... Because so far we have not shown the intellectual power and vigor to take the higher, more difficult way, because we have not had sense enough to discover what to do with our accumulation of social energy, is why at the present time we are drifting and sliding back towards destruction. If humanity fails, it will fail for the lack of organized mental effort and for no other reason.' H.G. Wells, 'Civilization on Trial', *Foreign Affairs* (July 1935), pp. 597; 599.

¹¹⁹ See for example Eric Wolf, *Europe and the People without History* Berkeley (University of California Press, 1982); Marshall G.S. Hodgson, *Rethinking World History: Essays on Europe, Islam, and World History*, ed. Edmund Burke III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Challenging specifically Spengler's work, Hans Weigert argued in 1942: 'If our youth should succumb to the seduction of Spenglerism and view the vital crisis of our time as the death agony of the West, then indeed Spengler would have been right in seeing his philosophy as more than a German philosophy ... Spengler was blinded by what he believed to be the decadence of the Anglo-American world. His basic mistake was to fail to realize that the infected bodies of nations may develop antitoxins strong enough to save their lives'. Hans Weigert, 'Oswald Spengler, Twenty-five Years After', *Foreign Affairs* (October 1942), pp. 124; 129.

¹²⁰ See for example Davies, *Europe: A History*, pp. 28–29.

It sets off in search of enemies and find them in the famous Dead White European Males who, it argues, have produced and sustained the Western tradition as a hierarchy of power at odds with the greater good of the majority, be they blacks, women, gays, or the peoples of the non-Western world ... The initial premises of postmodernism in this respect seem as compatible with oppression as with liberation, with the same as with the other. The postmodernist privileging of diversity is thus either the result of a theoretical confusion or camouflage for a new form of the will to power.¹²¹

Neil Lazarus similarly criticises postcolonial scholars for ‘fetishising’ the West in their attempt to challenge the concept, which in the end reinforces the idea of the West as the key agent in world history.¹²²

Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis in the early 1990s brought the idea of the West as a civilisation back to the popular agenda and has been employed also by those that seek to challenge Huntington’s notion.¹²³ For example, the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC) was proposed in 2005 as a response to the then popular idea that what we see in

¹²¹ Gillespie, ‘Liberal Education’, pp. 17–18.

¹²² Neil Lazarus, ‘The Fetish of “The West” in Postcolonial Theory’ in Crystal Bartolovich & Neil Lazarus (eds.), *Marxism, Modernity, and Postcolonial Studies* (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 43–64.

¹²³ Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996). The idea of clashing civilisations emerged in the early 1900s when Basil Matthews first used it in his book *Young Islam on Trek: A Study in the Clash of Civilisations* (Kessinger Publishing, 1926). In a few decades, it travelled to foreign policy analysis as well as to Orientalist approaches with for example Bernard Lewis arguing that ‘we are facing a mood and a movement for transcending the level of issues and policies and the governments that pursue them. This is no less than a clash of civilizations – the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both’. ‘The Roots of Muslim Rage’, *The Atlantic Monthly* (September 1990), p. 60.

the world is a battle between different – particularly the Western and the Islamic – civilisations. But the need for an alliance between civilisations in practice confirms not only the existence of different civilisations but also a clash between them.¹²⁴

The idea of the West as a civilisation that dates back to ancient history has also been criticised for being ahistorical. As many authors note, the notion of the West is actually a recent invention that can be traced back to the late 1800s.¹²⁵ As Alastair Bonnett notes, it is intimately connected to the articulation of the modern world, and as such it is a decisively modern rather than an ancient idea. Christopher GoGwilt argues that the West as a rhetorical claim was part of the European identity making exercise in the late 1800s.¹²⁶ In the next section, this ‘modern West’ narrative will be reviewed more closely.

The ‘civilisation West’ narrative is also prominent in the rhetoric of the rising right-wing movements in European politics, represented by political parties such as Front National in France, the UK Independence Party in the United Kingdom, Sverigedemokraterna in Sweden, and the Finns Party in Finland. Although they are generally against the European Union, they still emphasise common Western values that are under threat of Islamic influences. In the rhetoric of European populism, the civilisation West narrative goes often hand in hand with the declinist view of the West. According to this view, the West is in decline because of its weakness to defend itself as well as its naïve appraisal of multicultural policies that allow Islam to gain more public space in

¹²⁴ Ali Balci, ‘The Alliance of Civilizations: The Poverty of the Clash/Alliance Dichotomy?’, *Insight Turkey*, 11:3 (2009), pp. 95–108.

¹²⁵ Alastair Bonnett, *The Idea of the West: Culture, Politics and History* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p. 25.

¹²⁶ GoGwilt, *The Invention of the West*, p. 1. The idea of the West also influences identity discourses on a national level as Loren Baritz has shown in relation to English and American perceptions of national identity. Baritz, ‘The Idea of the West’.

Europe. In France this concern has led to actual policy changes, most notably the much-publicised ban on face-covering headgear associated with Muslim women.

The 'modern West' narrative

As always, the distinction between the 'civilisation West' narrative and the 'modern West' narrative is not clear-cut. That the West is inseparable from modernity is often a fundamental component of the 'civilisation West' narrative. The 'modern West' narrative is, however, distinctively about values and 'locates the essence of the West as lying in the legacy of the Enlightenment, industrialisation, capitalism and colonialism'.¹²⁷ David Gress, for example, holds that the West is about reason, liberty, and prosperity.¹²⁸ Typically to the scholarly debate on the West, Gress argues that the West cannot be neatly defined but then attempts to do precisely that and offer a 'true' narrative of the West. William H. McNeill, similarly, argues that the West has multiple meanings but then goes on to nail down one true meaning: the value of liberty.¹²⁹

The founding ideology of Turkey, Kemalism, is based upon the modern West narrative, embracing Western values including democracy, civil and political rights, and secularism. Many advocates of the 'civilisation West' narrative have challenged Turkey's Western credentials – especially during its bid to join the European Union – by arguing that a Muslim country that is mostly located in the Asian continent and has different cultural and historical roots to Europe cannot join the union. The policy debate surrounding Turkey's EU accession negotiations can thus be seen as a battle between different narratives

¹²⁷ Browning & Lehti (eds.), *The Struggle for the West*, p. 21.

¹²⁸ Gress, 'From Plato to Nato'.

¹²⁹ McNeill, 'What We Mean by the West'.

about the West.

If Huntington popularised the ‘civilisation West’ narrative in the early 1990s, Francis Fukuyama’s work was an important ‘modern West’ contribution.¹³⁰ Fukuyama’s thesis is based upon an assumption that there is a Western culture and that it has developed the most successful organising principle in politics in the form of liberal democracy. W.W. Rostow’s five-stage model of development followed a similar line of argument, proposing that the Western model of modernisation is the highest developmental stage in human history.¹³¹ As the subtitle of Rostow’s book, *A Non-Communist Manifesto*, suggests, his work was closely tied in with the Cold War. But it was the ‘political West’ narrative – discussed in more detail in the next section – that was really the most prominent narrative of the West during the Cold War years.

The ‘political West’ narrative

The last of the three narratives, the ‘political West’, is a Cold War narrative in that it connects the idea of the West to the key post-war institution, NATO, and perceives the West as an institutional entity forming around the security community. Again, it cannot be completely divorced from the metonymical ‘civilisation West’ and the synecdochal ‘modern West’ narratives as they are often interlinked. The creation of NATO was very much premised on the idea that Western Europe and the United States formed a civilisation with shared values.¹³² The ‘political West’ is still a different narrative because it has an institutional focus unlike the other two.

¹³⁰ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (Free Press, 1992).

¹³¹ W.W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960).

¹³² Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, ‘Defending the West: Occidentalism and the Formation of NATO’, *The Journal of Political Philosophy*, 11:3 (2003), pp. 240–241.

The 'political West' narrative is discursively framed around peace and security, and has a strong anti-communist affinity attached to it. The debate about the relationship between Europe and the United States, which was discussed earlier in the chapter, is an important element in the 'political West' narrative because its founding idea was to find an appropriate alliance between the two powers.¹³³ The United States ended up assuming the leading role in NATO with Europe being preoccupied with post-war reconstruction. In the 'political West' narrative the declinist interpretation was tied in with the external threat of the Soviet Union and the internal threat of Communism, which were interlinked in that the Russian Army's presence in European countries were seen as an exacerbating factor in the spread of Communism across Europe.

Walter Lippmann, for example, was concerned that the Russian influence might seriously hamper Western efforts to reconstruct the war-torn European economies and called for the removal of the Soviet armies from Europe.¹³⁴ If Lippmann saw internal unity within Western states as the primary security measure against decline, George Kennan stressed the importance of international political unity of the West to counter the Soviet Union. This was Kennan's position during the intense years of the Cold War in the late 1950s.

By the 1970s, Kennan's emphasis had turned from external threat to internal decay as he argued in the German newspaper *Die Zeit* that the West was 'sliding into debility on the slime of its own self-indulgent permissiveness: its drugs, its crime, its pornography, its pampering of the youth, its addition to bodily comforts, its rampant materialism and consumerism.'¹³⁵ This zigzagging between perceiving the West as facing an existential threat from outside and

¹³³ Harries, 'The Collapse of "the West"'; Kupchan, 'The End of the West'.

¹³⁴ Walter Lippmann, *The Cold War* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947).

¹³⁵ Martin Herz (ed.), *Decline of the West? George Kennan and His Critics* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University, 1978), p. 8.

perceiving it as fundamentally broken inside has been a defining feature in the debate about the West.

It was during the Cold War that the West really began to have a tangible meaning in the minds of people both within and outside the imagined West. As Ifversen notes, the 'political West' configuration is 'the most familiar West to many of us'.¹³⁶ It was therefore astonishing to many observers to witness how thin the unity of the West really was once the common enemy, the Soviet Union, ceased to exist. The West seemed much more natural during the Cold War than it does in the post-Cold War years, especially after the events of 9/11. As earlier in the chapter noted, the West began to be increasingly seen as being divided between a European West and an American West.

Of course, coinciding with the rapid developments in the international system was the rise of constructivist theories in international relations, which made the constructed nature of the West even more explicit. It was easier to argue that the West is not a natural category as was often assumed during the Cold War but a constructed idea that is sustained through discourse and narratives. The impact of such scholarly debates has been less pervasive in policy debates that continue to often form around the three narratives about the West. In fact, the narrative battle is often most fiercely fought in policy debates rather than in scholarly circles.

In the European context, the debate is particularly pronounced in Finland and Sweden, which unlike most EU states have stayed out of NATO in their quest for neutrality in foreign policy. In Finland, the 'political West' narrative continues to create ontological insecurity as regards Finland's status as a Western state. This is because Finland's 'West-ness' is narrated through the

¹³⁶ Ifversen, 'Who are the Westerners', p. 241.

‘modern West’ and partly through the ‘civilisation West’ narratives. If the ‘political West’ narrative is applied in its strictest sense, Finland as a non-NATO country is not part of the West. As such, the employment of a particular narrative can be an instrumental decision to undermine a country’s Western credentials, especially in countries where the Western identity is weak.

The issue was given prominence after Zbigniew Brzezinski, United States National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter from 1977 to 1981 and Professor of American Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins University, suggested in *The Financial Times* in February 2014 that Finland could be a model for Ukraine, which at the time was in conflict with Russia over the Crimean peninsula.¹³⁷ Also Henry Kissinger, United Secretary of State from 1973 to 1977, suggested that Ukraine should follow Finland’s example.¹³⁸ These suggestions caused an immediate backlash in Finland. Jaakko Iloniemi, Finnish Ambassador to the US (1977–83) argued in *The Financial Times* that, first, Ukraine cannot possibly copy Finland because of its different cultural and historical background and, second, Finland’s decision not to join NATO has nothing to do with Russia.¹³⁹ René Nyberg, Finnish Ambassador to Russia (2000-04) wrote similarly in *The Financial Times* that Brzezinski’s argument is ‘misleading because the history of Finland’s relations with Russia is so different from Ukraine’s’.¹⁴⁰

The fierce reaction can only be explained through the idea of the

¹³⁷ Zbigniew Brzezinski, ‘Russia needs a “Finland option” for Ukraine’, *Financial Times* (23 February 2014), available at <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7f722496-9c86-11e3-b535-00144feab7de.html#axzz3kUmZbwvp> (15 August 2015).

¹³⁸ Henry Kissinger, ‘To settle the Ukraine crisis, start at the end’, *Washington Post* (5 March 2014), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/henry-kissinger-to-settle-the-ukraine-crisis-start-at-the-end/2014/03/05/46dad868-a496-11e3-8466-d34c451760b9_story.html (15 August 2015).

¹³⁹ Jaakko Iloniemi, ‘The Finnish experience is very difficult to copy’, *Financial Times* (10 March 2014), available at <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a0855748-a857-11e3-a946-00144feab7de.html#axzz3kUmZbwvp> (15 August 2015).

¹⁴⁰ René Nyberg, ‘Finland’s history is so different from Ukraine’s’ *Financial Times* (24 February 2014), available at <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f28c2e30-9a4d-11e3-8232-00144feab7de.html#axzz3kUmZbwvp> (15 August 2015).

West paradigm. In suggesting that Ukraine is comparable to Finland rather than, say, the Baltic states, was seen to question Finland's Western location. Rene Nyberg attempted to explicitly shift the comparison to a more 'Eastern' location when he argued: 'Instead of comparing Finland and Ukraine, we should all, and the Russians in particular, consider instead the remarkable achievements of the central European and Baltic countries over the past two decades.' A more logical reaction would have been to celebrate the possibility of being a role model, which most states in the international system desire, but because of the inherent conflict of being put in the same category with a non-Western country, the suggestion was simply rejected.

Both Iloniemi and Nyberg emphasised Finland's historical and cultural ties to Western Europe and as such advanced the 'civilisation West' narrative. They argued, in short, that Finland is a Western state and therefore cannot represent a model to the non-Western Ukraine. They also tried to minimise the political impact of the 'political West' narrative in defining the West with Iloniemi arguing: 'True, we are not a member of Nato. That has been our own free and carefully deliberated choice. Not because we would see Nato as institutionally hostile towards any country, Russia included. The very contrary is true.'

Conclusion

The chapter focused on the scholarly debate on the idea of the West, which is an expansive field of literature. It was shown in the chapter that the West has been approached both in terms of its nature and as a category. Three narratives of the West were discussed in more detail with the first one representing the West as a civilisation, the second one as a project of modernity, and the third one as a

political union. In the following analysis chapters, it will be shown that Western foreign policy analysis concerning Turkey engages with all the three narratives about the West. It is therefore necessary to know their background as well as how the debate on Turkey represents a continuum with the idea of the West. In the following chapter, narrative approaches in the social sciences are discussed in detail with the purpose of showing that they offer a unique theoretical and empirical horizon to foreign policy analysis and its Western manifestations.

Chapter 3 – A narrative approach

Introduction

The previous chapter focused on the concept of the West, which is central to the thesis – essentially what the thesis is about. It distinguished between two approaches towards the concept. The first approach treats the West as an entity that needs to be defined in terms of its nature and characteristics. The second approach takes a meta-level perspective to the concept and treats it as a category that is contested and fluid. As noted in the introduction, the thesis seeks to understand how the West is narrated and rendered meaningful in the foreign policy analysis tradition.

This chapter explains why a narrative approach is the most appropriate methodological tool to examine foreign policy analysis and its Western manifestations. The argument is structured around a literature review of narrative studies in the social sciences in general and in political science in particular. It will be shown that the concept of narrative brings together two interlinked approaches: the interpretative approach and the aesthetic approach. It is through narrative that both the approaches manage to tease out what is the most significant part of their tradition; that ‘political science is about *meanings*, as we might say, all the way down’.¹⁴¹ Because of the importance of this theoretical position, the introduction prepares the ground for the forthcoming literature review by firstly explaining how it arrives at narratives.

Mark Bevir demonstrates how the role of narrative in political studies

¹⁴¹ Bevir & Rhodes, *Governance Stories*, p. 2, emphasis added.

has oscillated in different eras in history.¹⁴² Bevir argues that starting from 1880, there have been three major ruptures in our understanding of the nature of narrative in political studies. Bevir characterises the period between 1880 and 1920 as an era of ‘developmental historicism’, which fused narratives with the science of politics – narrative was seen as integral to understanding the complex realities of the social world. Bevir notes that as ‘developmental historicists fused narrative and science in these ways, they almost never made a sharp distinction between political science and history. Political scientists thought of their subject matter as thoroughly historical’.¹⁴³

The status of narrative in political studies changed after the senseless years of the First World War that, as Bevir writes, ‘undermined the faith in progress and reason that had informed developmental historicism’.¹⁴⁴ The period of ‘modernist empiricism’ in 1920–1960 overlooked or even abandoned narrative in favour of ‘atomization, classification, statistical correlations or even identification of functions within a system’.¹⁴⁵ Narrative began to represent a method that was not properly scientific but historical or even fictional. The positivist concept of science – consisting of quantification and classification – became the accepted standard of rigorous and impartial science, which ‘appealed to social scientists in part because it legitimized their claims to expertise’.¹⁴⁶

Somers similarly argues that narrative has served as the ‘epistemological other’ in the social sciences to prove the research field’s theoretical

¹⁴² Mark Bevir, ‘Political Studies as Narrative and Science, 1880–2000’, *Political Studies*, 54 (2006), pp. 583–606.

¹⁴³ Bevir, ‘Political Studies as Narrative and Science’, p. 587.

¹⁴⁴ Bevir, ‘Political Studies as Narrative and Science’, p. 588.

¹⁴⁵ Bevir, ‘Political Studies as Narrative and Science’, p. 591.

¹⁴⁶ Bevir, ‘Political Studies as Narrative and Science’, p. 592. More on this argument, see Margaret R. Somers & Gloria D. Gibson, ‘Reclaiming the Epistemological “Other”’: Narrative and the Social Construction of Identity’, in Craig Calhoun (ed.), *Social Theory and the Politics of Identity* (Oxford & Cambridge, US: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 37–99.

and scientific credentials.¹⁴⁷ As Patterson & Monroe argue, ‘because narrative is inextricably intertwined with the idea of story, as a methodological tool it became unavoidably imbued with the aura of fiction. This position can be uncomfortable for political scientists, because the drive for scientific rigor can serve as a wedge between the discipline of political science and innovations in the humanities’.¹⁴⁸

Bevir argues that today we are witnessing a return to narrative, which has been driven by a third tradition that he refers to as ‘radical historicism’. This tradition challenges both ‘developmental historicism’ and ‘modernist empiricism’, standing ‘in contrast to the typologies, correlations and models of social science, and to the elder narratives of a gradual unfolding of principles or character. Its leading motifs are dispersal, difference and discontinuity, all of which appear in the prominence given to transnationalism, pluralism and contingency’.¹⁴⁹ Radical historicism brings narrative back to political studies but in a more sceptical way, focusing not on universal ideals but the role of agents in using language to express those ideals, reaching ‘beliefs only under the influence of an inherited tradition or discourse’.¹⁵⁰

It is the epistemological position of radical historicism that this thesis advances. The concept of narrative is brought back to the study of international politics but not to map out grand narratives in the field but to tease out the beliefs that agents in the field rely upon. The concept of narrative offers a more reflexive

¹⁴⁷ Somers, ‘The narrative constitution of identity’, p. 606.

¹⁴⁸ Molly Patterson & Kristen Monroe, ‘Narrative in Political Science’, *Annual Review of Political Science*, 11 (2003), p. 317. Also Bevir writes about the fear in the discipline that ‘all narratives are constructed in part by the imagination of the writer, so if the human sciences deploy narratives, they lack proper epistemic legitimacy’. ‘Narrative as a form of explanation’, p. 10. The juxtaposition between ‘science’ and ‘narrative’ is often explicit in literature. For example, Robert H. Bates et al. talk about ‘analytic narratives’ because they combine ‘analytic tools that are commonly employed in economics and political science with the narrative form, which is more commonly employed in history. Our approach is narrative; it pays close attention to stories, accounts, and context’. Robert H. Bates, Avner Greif, Margaret Levi & Jean-Laurent Rosenthal (eds.), *Analytic Narratives* (Princeton University Press, 1998).

¹⁴⁹ Bevir, ‘Political Studies as Narrative and Science’, p. 600.

¹⁵⁰ Bevir, ‘Political Studies as Narrative and Science’, p. 601.

approach towards foreign policy analysis that as a field of study continues to be studied and represented ‘as realistically and authentically as possible’ with the aim ‘to capture world politics as-it-really-is’.¹⁵¹ This mimetic approach, which is in line with ‘modernist empiricism’, has formed the orthodox tradition in the scholarly field for a long time and has been treated as criteria through which to measure the quality of research.¹⁵² The closer the study resembles reality, the more scientific it is. An aesthetic approach to political science has a very different approach. It recognises that representation is never objective or realistic – it is a perception.

A popular metaphor employed to describe the perceptual nature of all representation is ‘spectacles’ or a ‘mask’.¹⁵³ We are always wearing spectacles – our prior categories and experiences – when representing the world. This is a fact that we cannot possibly escape the same way as in the natural sciences where phenomena can be isolated and measured with accurate precision, and we should therefore not only recognise the gap between a representation and the represented but also embrace it. This is because, as Bleiker argues,

Some of the most significant theoretical and practical insight into world politics emerges not from endeavours that ignore representation, but from those that explore how representative practices themselves have come to constitute and shape political

¹⁵¹ Bleiker, *The Aesthetic Turn*, p. 510. See also Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, *The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011); Christine Sylvester, ‘The Elusive Arts of Reflexivity in the “Sciences” of International Relations’, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 41:2 (2013), pp. 309–325.

¹⁵² See Max Weber, ‘Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy’ in *Max Weber on the Methodology of the Social Sciences*, Translated and edited by Edward Shils and Henry Finch (Glencoe: Free Press, 1949), pp. 49–112.

¹⁵³ Wittgenstein writes about the ideal that is ‘like a pair of glasses on our nose through which we see whatever we look at’. *Philosophical Investigations*, p. 45. For Wittgenstein, reality is an ideal that we can only access through meanings, not as a pure experience. Hayden White argues that ‘reality wears the mask of a meaning, the completeness and fullness of which we can only imagine, never experience. Insofar as historical stories can be completed, can be given narrative closure, can be shown to have had a plot all along, they given to reality the odor of the ideal’. *The Content of the Form*, p. 21.

practices.¹⁵⁴

This approach has a significant impact on our research task, in which knowledge becomes not a relation to the world but *an epistemic practice*.¹⁵⁵ This means that the main research task in the thesis is not to examine whether Turkish foreign policy analysis correspond with reality but to analyse the ways in which it is rendered meaningful.¹⁵⁶ Or as White put it, the main aim is not to study whether one of the narratives is a ‘better, or more correct, account of a specific set of events or segment of the historical process’ but to ‘identify the structural components of those accounts’¹⁵⁷ This means that our representations must be judged by their verisimilitude rather than verifiability.¹⁵⁸ David Campbell similarly argues that ‘through the clash of competing narratives are we likely to assemble justifiable

¹⁵⁴ Bleiker, *The Aesthetic Turn*, p. 510.

¹⁵⁵ See Bevir & Rhodes, *Governance Stories*, p. 30.

¹⁵⁶ It needs to be emphasised that the debate on whether reality can be represented objectively is one of the oldest discussions in the history of intellectual thinking. The early-modern dispute between Ancients and Moderns concerned the very question with Dion Chrysostom challenging Homer’s record of the Trojan War as ideologically biased. Beverley C. Southgate, *History, What & Why?: Ancient, Modern, and Postmodern Perspectives* (Routledge, 1996), pp. 209-210. Other ‘defenders of history’ include Leopold von Ranke, writing in the 1800s, who argued that historians ought to show *wie es eigentlich gewesen* (‘what actually happened’), and Herbert Butterfield, the author of *Whig Interpretation of History*, who located himself within the ‘empirical’ tradition against the ‘theoretical’ tradition. Southgate refers to their position as a ‘long-lived anti-philosophical tradition’ lacking of self-awareness. *History, What & Why?*, pp. 212–13. The most notable opponents to this tradition in the 1800s were Hegel, Droysen, Nietzsche, and Croce who all ‘rejected the myth of objectivity prevailing among Ranke’s followers’ and ‘viewed interpretation as the very soul of historiography’. White, *Tropics of Discourse*, p. 52. They all created their own classifications of knowledge structures and rejected ‘the Rankean conception of the “innocent eye” of the historian and the notion that the elements of the historical narrative, the “facts,” were apodictically provided rather than constituted by the historian’s own agency’. White, *Tropics of Discourse*, p. 53. More recent debates include E.H. Carr’s sociological approach to the past and G.R. Elton’s contrasting belief in objective historical truths; and Richard J. Evans’ defence of history and Keith Jenkins’ ethical approach to postmodernity, which holds that ‘the past as history always has been and always will be necessarily configured, troped, emplotted, read, mythologised and ideologised in ways to suit ourselves’. Keith Jenkins, *Why History? Ethics and Postmodernity* (Routledge, 1999), p. 3. Similarly, in his *Writing history: Essay on Epistemology*, Paul Veyne writes that ‘human events are true occurrences with man as the actor. But the word ‘man’ must not frighten us. Neither the essence nor the goals of history require the presence of that actor; they depend on the *perspective* chosen’. Paul Veyne, *Writing History: Essays on Epistemology* (Manchester University Press, 1984), p. 3, emphasis added.

¹⁵⁷ Hayden White, *Metahistory*, pp. 3–4.

¹⁵⁸ Jerome Bruner, ‘The Narrative Construction of Reality’, *Critical Inquiry*, 18:1 (1991), p. 13.

knowledge. Continual contestation, rather than the aspirations of synthesis and totality, should be the aim of inquiry'.¹⁵⁹

Catherine Emihovich is concerned with the same methodological question when she writes: 'Once we decide to take narrative seriously as a means of representing knowledge, the most pressing issue is that of authenticity and, ultimately, of truth value in narratives and in science.'¹⁶⁰ Also Emihovich contends that truth is both a product of excluding contradictory evidence and a style of writing. Similarly to Kenneth Burke to whom the rhetorician and the moralist become one not only in fictional but also in scientific works, Emihovich argues that the key to understanding social science narratives is 'an identifiable moral purpose'. She proposes that 'all researchers become rhetoricians, whose claims are no more substantive than those who use other rhetorical strategies'.¹⁶¹

We arrive back at White's notion that there are always aesthetic and moral preferences that guide the act of narration. Or as Hayward R. Alker frames it, 'all social-scientific research paradigms or theoretical traditions do have mythopoetic or moral-ideological elements explicitly or implicitly embedded in their "models of men" and of what they, and women, can or should become'.¹⁶² This thesis is particularly interested in this aesthetic and moral dimension in Western foreign policy analysis on Turkey and how it is connected to the idea of the West. Different narratives do not need to be seen as competing or clashing with each

¹⁵⁹ David Campbell, 'MetaBosnia: Narratives of the Bosnian War', *Review of International Studies*, 24 (1998), p. 281.

¹⁶⁰ Emihovich, 'Distancing Passion', p. 43.

¹⁶¹ Emihovich, 'Distancing Passion', p. 44; Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives*, p. 26. Emihovich cites Neil Postman who argues: 'Both a social scientist and a novelist give unique interpretations to a set of human events and support their interpretations with examples in various forms. Their interpretations cannot be proved or disapproved but will draw their appeal from the power of their language, the depth of their explanations, the relevance of their examples, and the credibility of their themes. And all this has, in both cases, an identifiable moral purpose.' Neil Postman, *Technopoly: the surrender of culture to technology* (New York: Knopf, 1992), p. 154.

¹⁶² Hayward R. Alker, *Rediscoveries and Reformulations: Humanistic Methodologies for International Studies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 270.

other but as a web of beliefs that constitute our research tradition in international relations and foreign policy analysis. As Barry Buzan & Richard Little write:

IR scholars already know how to tell Hobbesian, Kantian and Grotian stories but as things stand they prefer to tell them in opposition to each other. IR thinking needs to shift in order to recognise these stories not as alternative, mutually exclusive, interpretations, but as an interlinked set of perspectives, each illuminating a different facet of reality. The interesting question is not which of these stories are right, but what kind of configuration the combination of them all produces.¹⁶³

This approach leads to narratives, which will be discussed in the following sections.

Narratives

When tracing back the origins of narrative research in the social sciences, there are different epistemological and temporal paths one can follow. One can, for example, return to the classical work of Thucydides and discuss his emphasis on paying attention to who focalises an event, or alternatively focus on the challenges to the primacy of the realistic novel and its emphasis on impersonal narration. These would both be perfectly valid paths, but they pose the danger of getting lost in the wealth of literature concerning narratives. The same applies to an Aristotelian approach to narrative that emphasises rhetorical style.

¹⁶³ Barry Buzan & Richard Little, 'Why International Relations has Failed as an Intellectual Project and What to do About it', *Millennium*, 30:1 (2001), p. 38. In the quote, Buzan & Little argue that different IR stories 'illuminate' a different facet of reality, which would be better formulated as 'constitute' a different facet of reality. These questions are ontological in nature and divide different schools of thought both in IR and across the social sciences.

A better choice is to return to the 1960s when the study of narrative became international and interdisciplinary. And as it was through international and interdisciplinary routes that narratives arrived in the social sciences, it is also a logical route. There are two waves that can be distinguished here. The first wave includes structural anthropologists,¹⁶⁴ French structuralists,¹⁶⁵ and Russian formalists¹⁶⁶ who share the fundamental view that ‘all stories are variations on a few universal plots and that the study of such narratives can provide insight into universals of human nature and experience’.¹⁶⁷

The second wave was dominated by post-structuralism and largely influenced by the French intellectual tradition that challenged formalist epistemologies and attempted to dismantle their essentialist assumptions about truth and reality.¹⁶⁸ The concept of narrative provided a fitting methodology to discuss the constructivist nature of our ‘truths’ and their role in the making of the self. Before the constructivist turn in narrative studies in the 1980s, narrative had been studied primarily as a linguistic category that shows how stories are structured. The edited volume *On Narrative* that was published in 1981 influenced a growing group of scholars to treat narrative as a more fundamental concept in human understanding and action with Jerome Bruner notably arguing that our reality is narratively constructed and Paul Ricoeur asking how ‘could a subject of action give an ethical character to his or her own life taken as a whole if this life were not gathered together in some way, and how could this occur if not, precisely in the

¹⁶⁴ See especially the classical works Joseph Campbell, *The Hero with a Thousand Faces* (Pantheon Books, 1949); Claude Lévi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind* (University of Chicago Press, 1966).

¹⁶⁵ Roland Barthes, *Elements of Semiology* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1968); Barthes, *Mythologies*; Algirdas Julien Greimas & Joseph Courtés, *Semiotics and Language: An Analytical Dictionary* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982).

¹⁶⁶ Vladimir Propp, *Morphology of the Folktale* (University of Texas Press, 1968); Mikhail Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays* (Austin and London: University of Texas Press, 1981).

¹⁶⁷ Patterson & Monroe, ‘Narrative in Political Science’, p. 318. See also, Alker, *Rediscoveries and Reformulations*.

¹⁶⁸ See for example Jean-Francois Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984); Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology* (Baltimore & London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976); Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1: An Introduction* (Vintage, 1990).

form of a narrative?’¹⁶⁹

Defining narratives

We can begin to unpack the concept of narrative by examining what *is* a narrative? Sometimes narrative is used interchangeably with ‘story’, which can eventually mean that it gets ‘emptied of all semantic content: if everything is narrative, nothing is’.¹⁷⁰ But because this tradition is so prevalent, it cannot be used as a measurement stick in defining narratives. This means that although this thesis uses the term ‘narrative’ with a particular meaning that is not captured in ‘story’, it still engages with many scholarly interventions that refer to narratives as stories.

For example, Phil Salmon argues that ‘a fundamental criterion of narrative is surely contingency. Whatever the content, stories demand the consequential linking of events or ideas. Narrative shaping entails imposing a meaningful pattern on what would otherwise be random and disconnected.’¹⁷¹ Here Salmon employs ‘narrative’ and ‘story’ interchangeably but provides valuable knowledge about the nature of narrative. Or as Erik Ringmar argues: ‘To assemble metaphors into sequences and to organise the continuity of life around them is to render an interpretation into *narrative* form, to tell a *story* about the metaphors we have come to embrace.’¹⁷² Also Ringmar uses the terms as synonyms, which is not methodologically as rigorous as it could be, but his contribution to narrative understanding in IR is nevertheless very valuable and has been inspirational to this

¹⁶⁹ Jerome Bruner, *Actual Minds, Possible Worlds* (Cambridge & London: Harvard University Press, 1986); ‘The Narrative Construction’; Paul Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, 3 vols, (Chicago University Press, 1984, 1985, 1988); W.J.T. Mitchell (ed.), *On Narrative* (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1981).

¹⁷⁰ Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan, ‘Concepts of Narrative’, in Matti Hyvärinen, Anu Korhonen & Juri Mykkänen (eds.), *The Travelling Concept of Narrative* (Helsinki: Helsinki Collegium of Advanced Studies, 2006), p. 11; 17. See also Catherine Riessman, *Narrative Methods for the Human Sciences* (Sage Publications, 2008), p. 3.

¹⁷¹ Phil Salmon in Andrews et al. (eds.), *Doing Narrative Research*.

¹⁷² Erik Ringmar, *Identity, Interest, Action: A Cultural Explanation of Sweden’s Intervention in the Thirty Years War* (Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 72, emphases in original.

thesis.

Starting from the most fundamental level in defining narratives, most narrative researchers, including those outside the constructivist tradition, would agree that for a narrative to exist there must be, first, more than a single metaphor and second, some sort of ordering of those metaphors. Michael Mann formulates this in an even more straightforward way: 'History seems just one damned thing after another. If the damned things are patterned, it is only because real men and women impose patterns.'¹⁷³ Barbara Herrnstein Smith provides an even simpler definition of narrative as 'someone telling someone else that something happened'.¹⁷⁴ Here we are still moving in the realm of stories: also most stories have patterns, contain metaphors and are something that we tell one another in everyday situations. All narratives, in other words, are stories, but not all stories are narratives. Narratives have a more specific set of criteria that will be discussed in this chapter.

Another way of approaching narrative is to use Wittgenstein's concept of family resemblance: not everything called narrative is the same thing but there are certain similarities.¹⁷⁵ Rimmon-Kenan proposes that different concepts of narrative across disciplines and medias can be said to form a family with a potential network of similarities.¹⁷⁶ Narrative can also be treated as a prototype, which is a more universal approach to narrative in that it allows for more variety than more narrow and particularised definitions.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷³ Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power: A History of Power from the Beginning to AD 1760* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 532.

¹⁷⁴ Barbara Herrnstein Smith, 'Narrative Versions, Narrative Theories', in W.J.T. Mitchell (ed.), *On Narrative*, p. 228.

¹⁷⁵ More about the concept of 'family resemblance', see Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, p. 32.

¹⁷⁶ Rimmon-Kenan, 'Concepts of Narrative', p. 16.

¹⁷⁷ David Herman, *Basic elements of narrative* (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009); Matti Hyvärinen, 'Prototypes, Genres, and Concepts: Travelling with Narratives', *Narrative Works: Issues, Investigations, & Interventions*, 2:1 (2012), pp. 10–32.

Narrative criteria

As noted in the previous section, there are different criteria that can be outlined in the task of defining a narrative. Kenneth J. Gergen distinguishes four features in a well-formed narrative.¹⁷⁸ First, a narrative must have an established goal, *a valued endpoint*. This endpoint can be an event that needs an explanation or a state that is to be reached, and it is often saturated with either positive or negative value. In terms of classical narrative types, a positive endpoint corresponds with romance, and a negative endpoint with tragedy.¹⁷⁹ Without a valued endpoint, a story lacks the narrative form.

For example, stating that the Turkish president travelled to Armenia to watch his national football team to beat the Armenian team is not a fully formed narrative because an established goal is lacking. However, telling that as a result of that visit, diplomatic relations between Turkey and Armenia were being restored, the event begins to function as a narrative.¹⁸⁰ There are events that lead to a positive endpoint of former enemies solving their antagonistic relationship with a football match serving as a powerful symbol that the reader can relate to.

Second, a well-formed narrative recounts *events relevant to the endpoint*. As Gergen explains, ‘an intelligible narrative is one in which events serve to make the goal more or less probable, accessible, or vivid’.¹⁸¹ In other words, the endpoint dictates the narrative. In explaining how Turkey’s relations with Armenia witnessed a diplomatic turn towards the end of the 2000s, mentioning Turkey’s simultaneous

¹⁷⁸ Kenneth J. Gergen, *An Invitation to Social Construction* (London: Sage Publications, 1999).

¹⁷⁹ There are four classical narrative types that Herman Northrop Frye classifies in his famous work: romance, tragedy, comedy, and satire. Herman Northrop Frye, *Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays* (Princeton University Press, 1957). Many scholars that work with narratives employ the four types in their work. See for example Erik Ringmar, ‘Inter-Textual Relations: The Quarrel Over the Iraq War as a Conflict Between Narrative Types’, *Cooperation and Conflict*, 41:4 (December 2006), pp. 403–421; Alexander Spencer, *Romantic Narratives in International Politics: Pirates, Rebels and Mercenaries* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016).

¹⁸⁰ The example refers to an actual event of Turkey’s former president Abdullah Gul visiting Armenia in 2008 as the first modern Turkish leader. See *The Economist*, ‘Football diplomacy’ (3 September 2009), available at <http://www.economist.com/node/14380297> (29 July 2015).

¹⁸¹ Gergen, ‘An Invitation’, p. 69.

policies on the Kurdish question would make the narrative less accessible. Instead, the narrative includes more suitable events such as ‘several months of Swiss mediation and arm-twisting by America’.¹⁸² Events that do not fit the narrative are either left out or added to highlight the fragility or questionability of the valued endpoint: ‘Yet days later the Turkish prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, reverted to previous policy by insisting that peace with Armenia would come only if the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was solved’.¹⁸³

Third, events dictating the endpoint are placed in an *ordered arrangement*, which is often a linear line. The ‘football diplomacy’ narrative of reconciliation between Turkey and Armenia focuses on old animosities that are slowly being replaced by more friendly relations. It begins by placing the endpoint in a historical context: ‘After decades of fierce animosity, are Turkey and Armenia getting closer to peace?’¹⁸⁴ There is a past rivalry, the present attempts to reconcile, and a possible future peace, which is still uncertain: ‘Turkey and Armenia are at the start of a “long process.” How long is anybody’s guess.’¹⁸⁵ Fourth, a well-formed narrative provides a sense of explanation, *causal linkages*. Turkish President attending a football match in Armenia seems like an event with no particular significance, but once the explanation is ‘woven into the narrative tissue’ like Ricoeur describes the process, a causal linkage is established.¹⁸⁶ This linkage is reinforced when the event is granted a formative role in a narrative: ‘football diplomacy’.

Somers and Gibson provide another set of criteria to define narratives.¹⁸⁷ Their emphasis is more on the relational aspect of narratives than with

¹⁸² *The Economist*, ‘Football diplomacy’.

¹⁸³ *The Economist*, ‘Football diplomacy’.

¹⁸⁴ *The Economist*, ‘Football diplomacy’.

¹⁸⁵ *The Economist*, ‘Football diplomacy’.

¹⁸⁶ Paul Ricoeur, *Hermeneutics & the Human Sciences: Essays on Language, Action & Interpretation* (Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 278.

¹⁸⁷ Somers & Gibson, ‘Reclaiming’.

Gergen. Single events are given meaning by linking them to other events, or as they argue: ‘Narrativity demands that we discern the meaning of any single events only in temporal and spatial relationship to other events.’¹⁸⁸ In their definition, narrative is about connectivity. Similarly to Gergen, Somers & Gibson emphasise causal emplotment as a central narrative feature. They talk about selective appropriation, which is what Gergen refers to as events relevant to the endpoint.

According to Somers and Gibson, narratives feature temporality, sequence, and place. Again, this is similar to Gergen’s ordered arrangement and a valued endpoint where the former is about sequencing the events and the latter about creating temporality – an ending. Somers and Gibson summarise their model as ‘*constellations of relationships* (connected parts) embedded in *time and space*, constituted by *causal emplotment*’.¹⁸⁹ Gergen’s emphasis is on the endpoint; other features in narrative gear towards or support the endpoint. Somers and Gibson, for their part, emphasise emplotment as it ‘gives significance to independent instances, not their chronological or categorical order’.¹⁹⁰ These two focuses are interlinked: emplotment always contains an endpoint, and there can be no endpoint without emplotment. Also the other features are intertwined: Gergen’s ordered arrangement and causal linkages are similar to Somers and Gibson’s causal emplotment and relationality.¹⁹¹

¹⁸⁸ Somers & Gibson, ‘Reclaiming’, p. 59.

¹⁸⁹ Somers & Gibson, ‘Reclaiming’, p. 59.

¹⁹⁰ Somers & Gibson, ‘Reclaiming’, p. 59.

¹⁹¹ Jerome Bruner offers a third useful set of narrative features that is grounded on his central concern that is ‘not how narrative as text is constructed but rather how it operates as an instrument of mind in the construction of reality’. Bruner’s approach can be said to be both structural in that he outlines ten features of narrative and ontological as he is concerned with the ways in which we use narrative to construct our realities. In Bruner’s framework, narratives contain a unique pattern of events over time. Even if a narrative, including non-verbal media, is seemingly non-linear, it is presented in durative terms. Narrative is also particular in that it achieves ‘its emblematic status by its embeddedness in a story that is in some sense generic’ as well as relevant to the narrator’s beliefs, theories, and values. In connecting narration to beliefs, Bruner confirms one of the central arguments of the thesis: that narratives always reflect the narrator’s pro-attitudes that are built upon a particular moral outlook. According to Bruner, narratives include canonicity with its breaches that are ‘often highly conventional and are strongly influenced by narrative tradition’. It seems that the breaches that Bruner refers to resemble what Bevir and Rhodes call dilemmas; they are also very much influenced by

These two models are particularly suitable for studying foreign policy narratives because they emphasise emplotment – both in form and content. They offer a useful and clear tool set for studying foreign policy narratives. The main weakness in both the models is that they treat the concept of event unproblematically. It remains unclear how events are ontologically constructed in the process of narration? Do they become events only after they have been tied in with a narrative or are suitable events ‘out there’ to be selected and included in a narrative?

It seems that they both advocate the latter alternative with Somers and Gibson writing that ‘it is emplotment which translates events into episodes’.¹⁹² Their distinction between emplotment and categorisation is useful in this context, and offers an interesting thinking tool when studying narratives – especially foreign policy analysis narratives concerning Turkey.¹⁹³ Sometimes categorisation and emplotment can be difficult to separate. For example, a typical foreign policy argument could be something like ‘Turkey is a Middle Eastern country. It cannot therefore be part of the West’. This is clearly a categorisation based on a particular

traditions but can also shape them. This is connected to narrative being normative, context dependent, and negotiable. According to Bruner, ‘the very context dependence of narrative accounts that permits cultural negotiations which, when successful, makes possible such coherence and interdependence as a culture can achieve’. Bruner talks about narrative accruals that enable cultures and traditions to exist. The main strength in Bruner’s model comes with the final feature: narrative accruals. He connects narration with the creation and maintenance of cultures and traditions, which is one of the central tenets in the thesis. There is, first, a Western culture that comes into being through narration. It can be argued that also cultures have what Anthony Giddens has termed ‘a feeling of biographical continuity’, and it is maintained through constant narration. Like individuals, cultures ‘must continually integrate events which occur in the external world, and sort them into the ongoing “story” about the self’. Anthony Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991), p. 54. This includes foreign policy events, which are narrated and rendered meaningful in the tradition of foreign policy analysis that debates the idea of the West. There is, then, also the foreign policy analysis tradition that negotiates coherent and convincing representations through narratives. It can be argued that the scholarly tradition forms a ‘domain of social beliefs and procedures’ that puts limits to what can be considered a verisimilar representation of world politics. The main weakness in Bruner’s model is its complexity. It comprises ten different features, which cannot all be effectively utilised when studying foreign policy narratives – simply because there are so many of them. A less complex model is easier to internalise and employ in practice. The best way to utilise Bruner’s model is to focus on one or two of the narrative features in more detail rather than carry all the ten features in the analysis. See Bruner, ‘The narrative construction’, pp. 5–20.

¹⁹² Somers & Gibson, ‘Reclaiming’, p. 59.

¹⁹³ See also, Alan Cienki, ‘Bringing concepts from cognitive linguistics into the analysis of policies and the political’, *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 16 (2013), pp. 301–306.

cultural understanding of what being Western entails.

A similar presupposition, which is frequently yet often only implicitly present in foreign policy analysis literature, could be that ‘Turkey is a torn country and it can therefore be lost at any time’. Is this a narrative? It has temporality in that it sets the horizon in the future but is grounded in the past. It employs sequenced metaphors: a ‘torn country’ that can be ‘lost’. A country can be torn or lost only metaphorically and we therefore need some prior employment – narrative resources – to make sense of it.¹⁹⁴ It certainly has a valued endpoint: the act of losing is laden with negative connotations. Finally, there is an explicit causal linkage between being torn and the possibility of getting lost. But are there any actual events involved? Being torn is clearly a categorisation, not an event. As such, even if there is a possible future event of getting lost, the statement is lacking events relevant to the endpoint. The statement is therefore a categorisation rather than a narrative, even if it might be sometimes difficult to imagine categorising statements that do not refer, at least implicitly, to certain events.

However, to state that ‘Turkey brought back capital punishment and is therefore lost’ counts as a narrative. The statement has an event – bringing back capital punishment – that leads to the valued endpoint. Inbuilt in the endpoint is the idea that being Western means that the country has adopted a set of Western

¹⁹⁴ There are different ways to describe the ‘stuff’ that constitutes narratives and often includes cultural or historical references specific to a particular group. Kuus, for example, talks about a ‘set of assumptions and approaches that define the limits and forms of what can be said, remembered, re-activated, and appropriated’. Merje Kuus, ‘European Integration in Identity Narratives in Estonia: A Quest for Security’, *Journal of Peace Research*, 39:1 (2002), p. 94. Michael Barnett refers to such sets as a ‘cultural stock’ and argues that ‘in order for actors to have a sense of how they should proceed, they must have some understanding of where they have been, and those narrative understandings constitute the cultural stock that individuals use to reason, calculate probabilities and estimate the consequences of their actions for the future’. Michael Barnett, ‘Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change: Israel’s Road to Oslo’, *European Journal of International Relations*, 5:1 (1999), p. 14. Joenniemi talks about ‘narrative resources’ that are ‘neither indefinite nor unstructured; they are, instead, historically constructed and confined. They represent a form of layered social and symbolic power. They bolster efforts of claiming particular identities and impact the granting or denying them to others’. Pertti Joenniemi, ‘Introduction by guest editor’, *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 11 (2008), p. 121. As such, they all argue that there are spatial and temporal limitations to narratives, but that they can be shifted and stretched.

values including the abolishment of capital punishment. Abolishing one of those values would cause the country losing its status as a Western state. Again, this statement is intelligible only to someone with the appropriate cultural and social knowledge. The statement cannot be logically solved. In other words, as Somers and Gibson write, ‘the chief characteristic of narrative is that it renders understanding only by connecting (however unstably) parts to a constructed configuration or a social network (however incoherent or unrealizable) composed of symbolic, institutional, and material practices’.¹⁹⁵ Without adequate symbolic, institutional, and material references, one would be left to wonder, for example, why the United States is not considered ‘lost’ although it still exercises capital punishment. And without knowing the symbolic practice of representing Turkey as a country in between, the single act of bringing back capital punishment would seem like an insufficient reason for its loss.

These structural approaches to narrative are not utilised in this thesis in a comprehensive manner because it focuses on ontological approaches to narrative, but they nevertheless provide important thinking tools for understanding what narratives entail and how they function. In the following section there are three approaches to narrative that are distinguished to further map out the field of narrative research in the Social Sciences in general and IR in particular. The distinction between different approaches is not clear-cut with autobiographical, strategic and ontological narrative elements often sliding past one another. It is still a useful categorisation that shows that the study of narratives can mean many different things in the same discipline.

¹⁹⁵ Somers & Gibson, ‘Reclaiming’, p. 59.

Three narrative approaches

In the previous section, the concept of narrative was reviewed in terms of its structure. Another way to approach the concept is to focus on what it does. The thesis makes a distinction between three approaches to narrative: (1) autobiographical, (2) strategic, and (3) ontological narrative dimension. These approaches are not specific to political science and IR but are shared across the social sciences. Here the concern is not exactly what a narrative is but its relation to reality and the function as a tool of representation. They are, unlike purely structural approaches that are concerned with what technically constitutes a narrative, grounded in ethical and aesthetic considerations.

Autobiographical narratives

Autobiographical narratives have become more popular in recent decades as a result of the growing human rights movements and the aim to challenge ‘official’ or ‘mainstream’ versions of political events. They are sometimes referred to as ‘counter narratives’.¹⁹⁶ These narratives are often collected from local or marginalised sources through oral interviews or fieldwork. The narrator might be a local peasant, a black woman, or a child soldier. They can also be people’s everyday stories – narratives that would not otherwise end up in the history pages. There is an emphasis on the lack of other channels for these narratives to come out, and the ethical need to ‘give people a voice’ and raise consciousness.¹⁹⁷ The tradition is

¹⁹⁶ See for example Michael Bamberg & Molly Andrews (eds.), *Considering Counter-Narratives: Narrating, Resisting, Making Sense* (Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins).

¹⁹⁷ Hyvärinen, *The Travelling Concept of Narrative*, p. 19; Jennifer L. Pierce, ‘Special Issue Introduction’, *Qualitative Sociology*, 26:3 (Fall 2003), p. 307. See also *Journal of Narrative Politics*, which is ‘committed to human dignity, fairness, and peace’ and ‘aims to imagine futures free from colonial, racial, gendered, and economic violences’. <http://journalofnarrativepolitics.com/> (28 July 2015).

particularly strong in feminist and post-colonial studies.¹⁹⁸

For example, in *Transnational blackness: navigating the global color line* there are *women's* narratives, *resistance* narratives, *black* narratives.¹⁹⁹ The emphasis is on the marginality of these narratives in the hegemonic discourses. Catharine A. MacKinnon has warned that the seemingly benevolent aim to give voice to marginalised actors in international politics might end up consolidating the existing power structure.²⁰⁰ The narrators accept their place at the margin by simply telling 'narratives' about their lives whereas the powerful elite provides 'facts' and 'insights' about the world. This has an ontological dimension, which moves autobiographical narratives closer to ontological narratives. The autobiographical narrator can be seen as constituting his or her place in the social reality through speech acts that are narratively constructed. Regardless of this overlap between different categories, autobiographical approaches to narrative should be treated separately from ontological ones because they capture a wide variety of narratives that are not included in the ontological category.

These narratives include approaches that emphasise the researcher's personal engagement in the study.²⁰¹ These autoethnographic narratives are premised on a belief that the scholarly tradition of distancing oneself from one's own study is a practice that restricts or even averts research.²⁰² As Naeem

¹⁹⁸ See for example Clare Hemmings, *Why stories matter: the political grammar of feminist theory* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011).

¹⁹⁹ Manning Marable & Vanessa Agard-Jones (eds.), *Transnational blackness: navigating the global color line* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). See also M. Daly, *Darfur's sorrow: the forgotten history of a humanitarian disaster* (Cambridge University Press, 2007), emphases added.

²⁰⁰ Catherine A. MacKinnon, *Women's Lives, Men's Laws* (Harvard University Press, 2007).

²⁰¹ Morgan Brigg & Roland Bleiker, 'Autoethnographic International Relations: exploring the self as a source of knowledge', *Review of International Studies*, 36:3 (July 2010), pp. 779–798; Elizabeth Dauphinee, *Politics of Exile* (Routledge, 2013); Naeem Inayatullah (ed.), *Autobiographical International Relations: I, IR* (Routledge, 2011).

²⁰² Michael Billig addresses this question when analysing the language of critical discourse analysis: 'With effort, we can try to avoid the standard habits of academic writing. This will not be easy. As I know from drafting this article, at each point passive impersonal clauses seem readily available; it is so easy to mobilize unthinkingly the available technical words, which, like 'nominalization', often end in '-ization'. It requires extra effort to turn the passives into actives, or to resist the technical vocabulary. When writers do so, they must fill in blanks, supply extra information and consider more carefully the social relations that they are

Inayatullah put it: As scientists, we seem to exist in a space beyond the world and therefore are not somehow part of the world we study. This fiction can be counter-productive, if not dangerous.’²⁰³ Researcher’s personal experiences can provide important insights into politics and offer reflections that cannot be found in traditional studies that ‘silence’ the scholar. Also the autoethnographic narrative has a strong ethical dimension that emphasises the need to let the scholar’s own voice to come out in his or her research.

The ethical dimension means that it is difficult to challenge these narratives because they are considered valuable in their own right. The main research task is to offer a personal account to balance the more hegemonic narratives, and hence their relation to reality is less relevant. In other words, the value in autobiographical narratives does not come from verisimilitude but their countering effect; that they provide an alternative perspective to international relations and reflect the role of the self in the research process. This can be problematic because, as Bevir & Rhodes argue, ‘narrative must meet the tests set by its critics’, which involves comparing ‘bundles of narratives, or, if you prefer, theories, in terms of their success in relating various facts to one another by highlighting pertinent similarities and differences, continuities and disjunctions’.²⁰⁴

The autobiographical narrative tradition is still an important research avenue in international relations, and although this thesis similarly argues that a scholar’s writing emerges from a particular point of view, it approaches the question from a different perspective, focusing on the tradition of foreign policy analysis with its dilemmas and beliefs rather than the personal characteristics and biography of the scholar.

describing. Michael Billig, ‘The language of critical discourse analysis: the case of nominalization’, *Discourse & Society*, 19:6 (2008), p. 797.

²⁰³ Inayatullah, *Autobiographical International Relations*, p. 5.

²⁰⁴ Bevir & Rhodes, *Governance Stories*, p. 28.

Strategic narratives

There are also studies in IR that treat narrative as a strategic tool employed by political elites. In this tradition the focus is on how narratives are mobilised and framed to discursively create space for new policy options.²⁰⁵ Narrative framing is particularly intense during changes in foreign policy when internal or external conditions are seen to be fluctuating to a different direction.²⁰⁶ Political, academic and diplomatic circles are seen as ‘narrative entrepreneurs’ that attempt to create narratives that are eventually accepted and internalised by the public.²⁰⁷

The strategic approach towards narrative is more cynical than the autobiographical approach that perceives narrative as an important tool in the ethical quest to giving voice to marginalised actors. But also strategic narratives can be premised on an ethical need to strategically essentialise a marginalised group as Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak has famously argued.²⁰⁸ Spivak’s argument derives from her insight that ‘since it is not possible not to be an essentialist, one can self-consciously use this irreducible moment of essentialism as part of one’s strategy’.²⁰⁹ That anti-essentialism is not even possible is an important ontological claim that needs to be acknowledged when discussing strategic narratives. It means that narratives are always, to a certain extent, strategic because ‘the subject is always centered’.²¹⁰

²⁰⁵ See for example Barnett, ‘Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change’; Jelena Subotic, ‘Narrative, Ontological Security, and Foreign Policy Change’ *Foreign Policy Analysis*, doi: 10.1111/fpa.12089; Johanna Nykänen (Vuorelma), ‘Identity, narrative and frames: Renegotiating “firmness” in Turkey’s Kurdish initiatives’, *Insight Turkey*, 15:2 (Spring 2013), pp. 85–102.

²⁰⁶ More on strategic framing, see for example Robert D. Benford & David A. Snow, ‘Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment’, *Annual Review of Sociology*, 26 (2000), pp. 611–639.

²⁰⁷ Helene Sjursen, *The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Quest for Democracy* (Routledge, 2013); Subotic, ‘Narrative, Ontological Security, and Foreign Policy Change’.

²⁰⁸ Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, *The Post-Colonial Critic: Interviews, Strategies, Dialogues*, edited by Sarah Harasym (New York & London: Routledge, 1990), p. 109.

²⁰⁹ Spivak, *The Post-Colonial Critic*, p. 109.

²¹⁰ Spivak, *The Post-Colonial Critic*, p. 109.

There are, however, significant differences in the level of strategic-ness, which is why strategic narratives need a separate category; some strategic narratives are more essentialist than others. Furthermore, essentialism ‘can be used as part of a “good” strategy as well as a “bad” strategy and this can be used self-consciously as well as unselfconsciously’.²¹¹ The same applies to the use of strategy in narratives, which is something that is not always apparent in the literature concerning strategic narratives. They are sometimes premised on a belief that strategic narratives are political elites’ conscious effort to distort reality in their benefit. Here Mearsheimer’s view, presented in the introduction, that foreign political elites speak one language in public but act according to a different logic is apparent.

The idea is that political elites strategically frame their public narratives to justify their foreign policy action.²¹² Deriving from this notion, the ethical need in the tradition becomes one that is centred on the need to expose the ways in which strategic narratives are designed to turn the public opinion in favour of policies that are not actually benefiting the people. Inbuilt in the research agenda, then, is a morally charged premise that strategic narratives are always bad and self-conscious strategies, in Spivak’s terms. There are, however, equally many narrative strategies that are good and sometimes even unselfconscious. The New Deal programme that was enacted in the United States in the 1930s, for example, is widely considered a good strategy that was designed to provide better welfare and social security for the less advantaged as well as to reform the poorly performing economy. It still needed to be strategically narrated to the wider public in order to

²¹¹ Spivak, *The Post-Colonial Critic*, p. 109.

²¹² Barnett argues that ‘actors strategically deploy frames to situate events and to interpret problems, to fashion a shared understanding of the world, to galvanize sentiments as a way to mobilize and guide social action, and to suggest possible resolutions to current plights’. ‘Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change’, p. 15.

gain enough legitimacy and support.

Strategic framing is particularly intense in conflict situations when strategic narratives are constructed to create enemy images and mobilise the public opinion in support of military interventions.²¹³ It is about ‘securitising’ policy issues and representing them as security threats.²¹⁴ Such representations are often called ‘security narratives’. There are also narrative framings that seek to construct or strengthen particular identities in the international system – institutions, states, or other collective entities. The European Union is a good example where strategic attempts have been made in political, academic, and diplomatic circles to consolidate a hegemonic narrative about the EU’s self and its actions in the world.²¹⁵

The relationship between narrative and reality is sometimes unclear in the strategic approach to narratives. There is often an underlying assumption that strategically designed narratives are covering a ‘truth’ that can be revealed by exposing the constructed nature of the representation put forward by narrative entrepreneurs. There is also, as noted earlier, an implicit sense that strategic narratives are designed only to advance the interests of the few, often political elites. From an ontological perspective, these assumptions are problematic because they propose that there is an objective and accessible reality that exists outside strategic narratives and that the role of narrative is to hide that reality.

A scholar’s role is then to show how things *really* are behind the

²¹³ Alexandra Homolar, ‘Rebels without a conscience: The evolution of the rogue states narrative in US security policy’, *European Journal of International Relations*, 17:4 (December 2011), pp. 705–727. More generally on the ‘rogue state’ rhetoric and its role in shaping a conflict, see Roland Bleiker, ‘A Rogue is a Rogue is a Rogue: US Foreign Policy and the Korean Nuclear Crisis’, *International Affairs*, 79:4 (2003), pp. 719–737.

²¹⁴ There is an expansive literature on securitisation but it has traditionally focused more on discourse than narrative. See for example Lene Hansen, *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War* (Routledge, 2006); David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Manchester University Press, 1998).

²¹⁵ Christian Nitoiu, ‘The narrative construction of the European Union in external relations’, *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, 14:2 (2013), pp. 240–255.

fabricated world of strategic narratives. It is argued in this thesis that there is no objective reality beyond narratives, and we only perceive our world as 'real' because the narrative form is 'so familiar and ubiquitous that it is likely to be overlooked'.²¹⁶ The question is essentially about what is considered common sense and taken for granted. White argues that it is a set of 'commonplaces comprised of beliefs about the meaning or ultimate nature of reality, shared by the average members of any given culture – what we call common sense'.²¹⁷

Also autobiographical narratives have contributed to the commonsensical idea that there are truthful representations that are hidden behind the fabricated representations of narrative entrepreneurs; that a personal narrative is more truthful than a political narrative. Because of this commonsensical notion and its ethical dimension, it can be difficult to accept that they are both narratives and that they should be judged by their verisimilitude rather than verifiability. In other words, they should be compared and contrasted with other narratives and not declared as 'real' or 'unreal' simply because they are products of personal or political narration.

Also foreign policy scholars can be seen as narrative entrepreneurs in that they produce and frame narratives that justify foreign policy action including military interventions. In many ways, foreign policy scholars are a particular potent group of narrative entrepreneurs as their practice is considered to be neutral and objective when it is actually strongly influenced by beliefs and traditions. They also regularly provide and are encouraged to provide policy recommendations and make predictions that have actual political effects. As such, the literature on strategic

²¹⁶ Bruner, 'The narrative construction', p. 4.

²¹⁷ Hayden White, 'The Narrativization of Real Events', in Mitchell (ed.), *On Narrative*, p. 253. Also Louis O. Mink argues that there is a cognitive link between the narrative form and common sense. 'Narrative form as a cognitive instrument', in Robert H. Canary & Henry Kozicki (eds.), *The Writing of History* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1978).

narratives is very useful for this thesis. Its most relevant contribution is to show how narratives are and can be framed in policy debates.

However, the thesis treats narratives as less intention-focused than the field of strategic narratives does. The way in which Turkey is narrated in foreign policy analysis is not always or even often intentional narrative framing. There is rather a set of beliefs that influences the scholar in his or her representation of Turkey. It might be that the scholar does not even recognise the moral preference that guides the narrative and assumes that the narrative simply recounts how things really are. The narrative, in other words, has become the author's common sense. Narrative entrepreneurs, in contrast, narrate and frame issues in such a way as to support a particular outcome. This can be the case also with foreign policy analysis, but certainly not always.

Ontological narratives

Finally, the third way to treat narrative is to study how it constitutes rather than simply describes or strategically frames reality. The previous sections have made references to this ontological category, suggesting that narrative has a fundamental role to play in the construction of reality.²¹⁸ If the previous two approaches to narrative – autobiographical and strategic – were primarily concerned with heterogeneous voices in IR and strategic framing, the ontological approach specifically focuses on how narrative turns seemingly random and disconnected

²¹⁸ See for example Michael C. Williams & Iver B. Neumann, 'From Alliance to Security Community: NATO, Russia, and the Power of Identity', *Millennium*, 29:2 (2000), pp. 357-87; Christopher Browning, *Constructivism, Narrative and Foreign Policy Analysis: A Case Study of Finland* (Peter Lang 2008); Geir Hønneland, *Borderland Russians: Identity, Narrative and International Relations* (Basingstoke & New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010);

events into coherent ‘facts’ about the self and the world.²¹⁹

Somers and Gibson define ontological narratives as something that ‘are used to define who we are; this in turn is a precondition for knowing what to do. This “doing” will in turn produce new narratives and hence new actions; the relationship between narrative and ontology is processual and mutually constitutive’.²²⁰ Unlike the autobiographical and strategic approaches to narrative, the ontological approach commences the analysis from the notion that reality can only be accessed through narratives. Erik Ringmar, for example, argues that we should no longer make scholarly attempts to tackle the impossible task of finding a way to talk about what something ‘really’ is and instead talk about what it resembles.

This metaphorical ‘being as’ is not ‘mere’ metaphor but the closest resemblance of reality – of ‘being’ – we can get to. We can only think of something in relational terms, under a certain description. Ringmar argues that this is the only reality that we can access, and therefore the ontological status of the self becomes a question of ‘being as’ rather than of ‘being’. But a metaphor is not enough because as a still picture it cannot explain events and life as it happens. We need to order the single metaphors into a sequence and form narratives: ‘first we see something as *some-thing*, in other words, and then we construct a narrative about this something. In this way narrative becomes the process through which human beings make sense of the unfolding of their lives’. This means that subjects are ‘neither more nor less than the total collection of stories that we tell and that are told about us. Our selves

²¹⁹ At the same time, some argue that all narratives are ontological in one way or another. Matti Hyvärinen and Jens Brockmeier, for example, argue that the whole term ‘ontological narrative’ is confusing because all narratives are in some ways concerned with ontological aspects and being. ‘Narrative, Memory, Identity’ Workshop, *University of Tampere*, 26 May 2015.

²²⁰ Somers & Gibson, ‘Reclaiming’, p. 61.

thus understood are neither the shadowy denizens of some metaphysical non-space, nor merely the physical attributes of our bodies'.²²¹

The thesis follows Ringmar's line of treating narrative as a fundamental process through which we construct reality. In a similar vein, Hidemi Suganami sees narratives as an intrinsic part of reality construction: 'without narratives, we signify nothing'.²²² Like Ringmar, Suganami stresses that both agents and societies are narratively constructed. Suganami employs the 'remarkable trinity' of mechanistic processes, chance factors, and deliberate actions to explain world events and argues that these three explanatory ingredients of narrative, used in various forms by classical thinkers such as Plato, Aristotle, Hegel, and Dante, provide a comprehensive tool kit for analysing causative factors in IR.

The main weakness in Suganami's model is in its looseness. Although Suganami conceptualises narratives in a sound way, his method of 'narrative intelligibilizing' does not really provide concrete tools to examine the international system. Suganami argues that his method is a less restrictive model than some others but this is precisely its main shortcoming: it is too broad to provide a meaningful framework within which to discuss specific narratives. It remains very theoretical and is largely a review of earlier works in narrative research across different fields.

David Campbell shows in his work how events can be narrated in markedly different ways with significantly different effects.²²³ Similarly to this thesis, Campbell's ontological approach to narrative is informed by Hayden White whose work is 'important when it comes to making judgments about competing accounts

²²¹ Erik Ringmar, 'On the Ontological Status of the State', *European Journal of International Relations*, 2:4 (1996), p. 452.

²²² Hidemi Suganami, 'Agents, Structures, Narratives', *European Journal of International Relations*, 5:3 (1999), p. 381.

²²³ David Campbell, *National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity, and Justice in Bosnia* (Minneapolis & London: University of Minnesota Press, 1998). p. 33.

of contentious events and issues [that have] been complicit in the constitution of realities they merely claim to describe'.²²⁴ It can be said that this thesis grew out of similar frustrations that are present in Campbell's work on narratives of the Bosnian War; that Western foreign policy analysis claims to merely describe the reality it actually constitutes. This should not, however, be seen as a threatening but a soothing ontological insight because without narratives our social world would seem chaotic and coherent. As Christopher Browning argues, 'it is only through emplotting ourselves in constitutive stories differentiating the self from others that we are able to attribute meaning to the social world and to construct a sense of our identity and interests'.²²⁵

Events in narration

Most narrative definitions talk about events that are somehow ordered into a coherent form to construct a narrative. However, this begs the question of what constitutes an *event* in narration? This is an important question because the thesis specifically focuses on different events that foreign policy analysts construct and represent. There are many ways in which the question has been approached in different scholarly traditions. One approach is to make a distinction between actual events that take place in reality and fictional events that are products of the narrator's imagination. There are, however, problems with this approach. As there are many scholars that dispute the distinction between and the meanings of fact and fiction, a definition based on that bifurcation becomes difficult.²²⁶ Dorrit Cohn, for

²²⁴ Campbell, 'MetaBosnia', p. 263.

²²⁵ Browning, *Constructivism, Identity and Foreign Policy Analysis*, p. 11.

²²⁶ Hayden White has famously claimed that historical narratives are 'verbal fictions' and as such comparable to narratives in literature. *Tropics of Discourse*, p. 82. Jeromer Bruner argues that the difference between narrative fiction and narrative truth is 'nowhere nearly as obvious as common sense and usage would have us

example, shows that the word ‘fiction’ has multiple meanings ranging from ‘untruth’ to all literature.²²⁷

If we then talk about fictional events to separate them from actual events, are we referring to events that are untrue, events that have been described in literature, or something else? Despite these conceptual challenges, Hayden White separates ‘historical events’ from ‘fictional events’ and argues:

Historians are concerned with events which can be assigned to specific time-space locations, events which are (or were) in principle observable or perceivable, whereas imaginative writers – poets, novelists, playwrights – are concerned with both these kinds of events and imagined, hypothetical, or invented ones.²²⁸

White’s ‘fictions of factual representation’ concerns ‘the extent to which the discourse of the historian and that of the imaginative writer overlap, resemble, or correspond with each other. Although historians and writers of fiction may be interested in different kinds of events, both the forms of their respective discourses and their aims in writing are often the same’.²²⁹ White is not interested in the nature of the event or the way in which it is constructed in language but the act of emplotment that turns it into a narrative. This is because it is emplotment that gives events their *meaning*. In other words, events are simply ‘raw data’ that is turned into ‘facts’ through emplotment.

White’s vocabulary is somewhat confusing but reflects the

believe’. ‘The narrative construction’, p. 139. See also Dorrit Cohn, *The Distinction of Fiction* (JHU Press, 2000), pp. 8–9.

²²⁷ Cohn, *The Distinction of Fiction*, p. 2.

²²⁸ White, *Tropics of Discourse*, p. 121.

²²⁹ White, *Tropics of Discourse*, p. 121.

ontological fuzziness that is, perhaps unavoidably, present in the debate on the nature of events. White argues that there are ‘events’ and ‘facts’ that represent the narrator’s ‘stuff’ before and after emplotment. There are events that can be taken as given – events that can be assigned to specific time-space locations – that are given different meanings. Those meanings are our ‘facts’ about the world with some being more verisimilar than others. White explains that ‘Barthes’s statement that “facts have only a linguistic existence” I construe as an assertion that “facts” – unlike events – are linguistic entities; and by this I would mean that, as the philosopher Arthur Danto puts it, “facts” are “events under a description”’.²³⁰

White thus employs the term ‘fact’ in line with the philosophical tradition preceding his work.²³¹ But what remains unclear is how can we recognise an event that is yet to be turned into a fact? The French Revolution or Renaissance are surely ‘facts’ rather than ‘events’ in that they have been narrated into existence through multiple and overlapping emplotments, but what about the 9/11 attack in New York? Can we treat it as an event? The answer is surely ‘no’, because language itself, as Wittgenstein argues, is about interpretation.²³²

The way in which we describe reality is not neutral, and what happened in New York in September 2001 can be given various different meanings with some interpretations having more verisimilitude and accuracy than others. We have come to treat the ‘act of terror’ interpretation as a fact because it is the most convincing narrative for various reasons, but it is still an interpretation. There is,

²³⁰ Hayden White, ‘Response to Arthur Marwick’, *Journal of Contemporary History*, 30 (1995), p. 239.

²³¹ White explicitly argues that ‘events have to be taken as given; they are certainly not constructed by the historian. It is quite otherwise with ‘facts’ ... that are unstable, subject to revision and further interpretation, and even dismissable as illusions on sufficient grounds’. White, ‘Response’, pp. 238–239.

²³² Wittgenstein provides various examples of the fundamental difference between an object ‘existing in its own right’ (which it cannot) and having a ‘meaning’. One of the examples is the seemingly clear sentence ‘Moses did not exist’ that in fact has various meanings; ‘It may mean: the Israelites did not have a *single* leader when they withdraw from Egypt – or: their leader was not called Moses – or: there cannot have been anyone who accomplished all that the Bible relates of Moses – or: etc. etc. – We may say, following Russell: the name “Moses” can be defined by means of various descriptions.’ *Philosophical Investigations*, pp. 36–37, emphasis in original.

however, still the problem of how to refer to the physical occurrence of a plane hitting the World Trade Center in New York. The act itself was not discursively constructed because we have an extensive amount of physical evidence of it. We cannot describe it in any objective way without imposing our pro-attitudes in the description but we can say that the act took place in reality.

Bevir explains this with a concrete example: 'Perhaps we can describe some actions in purely physical terms: we can say "Susan crossed the road". As soon as we try to explain an action, however, we necessarily place it, at least implicitly, in the context of beliefs and pro-attitudes.'²³³ But here we have the issue of interpretation and meaning again: perhaps she crossed a wide street, a narrow ally, or a muddy path? The description that Bevir employs is not, as he proposes, 'purely physical' but already contains interpretation of something that can be said to have physical existence. These are central questions in phenomenology, but here they are discussed in relation to White in order to relate them directly to the thesis.²³⁴

White has been criticised for his unproblematic stance towards 'events', but his critics do not offer an alternative term for physical acts that can be said to have taken place but which cannot be described without simultaneously imposing a subjective meaning upon them. His critics come from very different theoretical traditions. There is, first, Arthur Marwick who is an aforementioned 'defender of history' and as such a fierce positivist.²³⁵ Marwick writes that events do

²³³ Bevir, 'Narrative as a form of explanation', pp. 11–12.

²³⁴ The central figures in phenomenology that also provide valuable theoretical insights to political science include Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida. Post-structuralist approaches to political science and international relations have particularly gained from their theories.

²³⁵ Arthur Marwick infamously attacked White for arguably undermining the scientific credentials of history as a discipline and defended historical writing against 'postmodernists'. Arthur Marwick, 'Two Approaches to Historical Study: The Metaphysical (Including 'Postmodernism') and the Historical', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 30 (1995), pp. 5–35. Marwick's intervention has been widely challenged with for example Christopher Lloyd writing that Marwick's defence 'is flawed on empirical and philosophical levels'. Christopher Lloyd,

not 'sit there already set out in chronicle form' but it is historians that sort them out by scientific means and accuracy.²³⁶

One of the most interesting aspects arising from the debate between Marwick and White is the blurring line between the two seemingly distant traditions of mimetic and aesthetic forms of representation. A closer reading of Marwick's article reveals that instead of delivering a blow to what he refers to as 'postmodernism,' he is in fact advocating a constructivist position. It is not that reality exists in its own right but that it is historians who construct it. It is, as White and Lloyd argue, a very constructivist, even a 'post-modernist' position.²³⁷

Coming from a post-structuralist position, Michael Shapiro similarly criticises White for his separation between 'fictional' and 'real' events.²³⁸ Shapiro writes that in contrast to White's statement of narrative becoming a problem only when we wish to give real events the form of a story,

'For Realism and Against the Inadequacies of Common Sense: A Response to Arthur Marwick', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 31 (1996), p. 191. See also F.R. Ankersmit, 'Hayden White's Appeal to the Historians', *History and Theory*, 37:2 (1998), p. 185, and Wulf Kansteiner, 'Searching for an Audience: The Historical Profession in the Media Age – A Comment on Arthur Marwick and Hayden White', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 31:1 (1996), p. 215. White, for his part, responded to Marwick that his characterization of postmodernism is simply 'bizarre and uninformed'. White, 'Response', p. 233.

²³⁶ Marwick, 'Two Approches', p. 19.

²³⁷ White, 'Response', p. 237; Lloyd, 'For Realism', p. 203. Marwick's theoretical position is unclear because he does not properly define 'post-modernism' and wrongly assumes that White represents a post-modernist thinker. Although ontologically White's position might be close to the postmodern or post-structuralist tradition in that there are no *a priori* foundations to reality, his epistemological position is in contrast to them. As Wulf Kansteiner writes: 'On the level of the single event/fact White retains an element of positivist stability which stands in contrast to the epistemological arbitrariness that he posits on a second level, the level of the conceptual framework of the historical writing'. Wulf Kansteiner, 'Hayden White's Critique of the Writing of History', *History and Theory*, 32:3 (1993), p. 284. While postmodernism is 'the anti-philosophy and the anti-metatheory of the information age' (Lloyd 1996: 198), White's metahistory is firmly structuralist, based on a methodology that outlines the deep structure of the Western historical imagination. See Lloyd, 'For Realism', p. 198. In his 1976 article, White called post-structuralism 'the absurdist moment in contemporary literary theory and as Lloyd argues, post-structuralism 'adamantly rejects structuralism, which Marwick seems not to understand'. Ibid. It is not the first time that White's theoretical position has been misrepresented. During the narrative turn in the social sciences in the late 1970s and early 1980s, White 'was characterized both as a structuralist and a post-structuralist and put into the same bed as all those "absurdist" critics he had criticized'. Richard T. Vann, 'The Reception of Hayden White', *History and Theory*, 37:2 (1998), p. 155. Also Bevir argues that White 'relies on a naïve positivist faith in pure facts, a reliance that seems odd given his broad sympathy for post-structuralist critiques of representation'. 'Narrative as a Form of Explanation', pp. 17–18.

²³⁸ Personal discussions with Michael Shapiro at the Gregynog Ideas Lab in Wales (July 2012).

there are no ‘events’ outside of the spacing, connectivity, and the other meaning-giving dimensions that are part of producing narratives. Although there is a wide variety of narrative forms, any genre producing intelligibility – the writing of history for example – contains a narrative component, which helps construct meanings and relevance, and without which there are no facts and events.²³⁹

Shapiro aligns himself with Jean-François Lyotard in this regard, but it still remains unclear how to refer to physical acts that take place in reality.²⁴⁰ As Vann puts it, White

goes on to recapitulate Arthur Danto’s point that ‘we cannot refer to events as such, but only to events *under a description*.’ But if this is so, it is hard to see how historians could be equally well warranted in writing about the very same ‘event’ in different ways. White is apparently saying that there are indefinitely many ways of redescribing events, but he has not produced any argument that there is a substrate of unit or basic events that can exhibit some sort of sameness no matter how variously they are described.²⁴¹

This is valid criticism, but it applies equally to White’s critics as they also fail to provide any meaningful way to refer to physical acts. There are acts in international politics – bombs thrown, diplomatic deals signed, boundaries re-drawn – that we must be able to discuss with a shared understanding of whether they have actually

²³⁹ Michael Shapiro, *Reading "Adam Smith": Desire, History and Value* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), pp. 48–49.

²⁴⁰ See Bevir, ‘Narrative as a Form of Explanation’, pp. 17–18.

²⁴¹ Vann, ‘The Reception of Hayden White’, p. 154.

taken place or not. Whether it is ‘events’ as White proposes or another term can be debated but it is a different question than the issue of language. This is something that also White acknowledges. He writes that ‘the language used to *describe* a field of historical occurrences in effect constitutes the field itself and sets limits to the kinds of methods that can be used to analyse the events occurring within the field’.²⁴²

It seems that White’s critics ignore his actual theoretical standing and represent a caricature of his thinking. It might also be that White has simply formulated his position unclearly, which has led to misunderstandings. But it seems that what Shapiro really means to say is exactly what White argues: that ‘the relation between facts and events is always open to negotiation and reconceptualization, not because the events change with time, but because we change our ways of conceptualizing them’.²⁴³ It is unlikely that Shapiro would deny the events of the Vietnam War – to use his example²⁴⁴ – and argue that the war did not actually take place at all, but challenge the ways in which they are conceptualised and represented.

David Carr also criticises White position but from a different perspective than Marwick and Shapiro. Carr argues that we cannot talk about narration or emplotment as something that comes after an event. Narrative is inbuilt in human everyday experience and structurally continuous with it, which means that narrative is experienced rather than told. Carr’s phenomenological approach challenges most narrative scholars including Louis Mink, Frank Kermode,

²⁴² White, ‘Response’, p. 239, emphasis in original.

²⁴³ White, ‘Response’, pp. 239–240.

²⁴⁴ Shapiro writes that ‘in the United States, recent professional and media attention is constructing a different ‘Vietnam War’ than the one produced by the official discourse during the administration of President Johnson and in subsequent official and popular culture narratives right after the “fall of Saigon”’. *Reading*, p. 49.

Roland Barthes and Paul Ricoeur who perceive narrative as a function of cognition.²⁴⁵

Analysis of narratives and narrative analysis

Donald E. Polkinghorne makes an important distinction between narrative analysis and analysis of narratives. At first, this might sound like a semantic difference but in fact these two methods are significantly different. Narrative analysis derives from narrative cognition and represents a 'procedure through which the researcher organizes the data elements into a coherent developmental account'.²⁴⁶ This means that the data is not in a narrative form but gathered from different sources with the purpose of constructing a coherent narrative. As Polkinghorne writes, narrative analysis 'relates events and actions to one another by configuring them as contributors to the advancement of a plot'.²⁴⁷ The key purpose in narrative analysis is to understand human action.

Analysis of narratives, in contrast, focuses on existing narratives and represents paradigmatic reasoning. This means that the purpose is to 'identify particulars as instances of general notions and concepts. The paradigmatic analysis of narratives seeks to locate common themes or conceptual manifestations among the stories collected as data'.²⁴⁸ This thesis is a paradigmatic study of narratives, analysing a collection of narratives in foreign policy analysis, seeking to 'discover which notions appear across them'.²⁴⁹ Polkinghorne further divides the analysis of narratives to two types. The first type employs prior theories and paradigms to the

²⁴⁵ David Carr, *Time, Narrative, and History* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1986).

²⁴⁶ Donald E. Polkinghorne, 'Narrative configuration in qualitative analysis', *Qualitative Studies in Education*, 8:1 (1995), p. 15.

²⁴⁷ Polkinghorne, 'Narrative configuration', p. 16.

²⁴⁸ Polkinghorne, 'Narrative configuration', p. 13.

²⁴⁹ Polkinghorne, 'Narrative configuration', p. 13.

data to ‘determine whether instances of these concepts are to be found’.²⁵⁰ In the second type ‘concepts are inductively derived from data’.²⁵¹

This thesis represents the first type with White’s tropology being applied to the data set consisting of Western foreign policy analysis articles. There are also other concepts that are applied to the data, most notably Kenneth Burke’s notion of the scapegoat and the principles of transformation and division. Also George Lakoff’s foreign policy metaphors are made use of in the task to analyse the data set. This means that the thesis will be able to ‘develop general knowledge about a collection of stories. This kind of knowledge, however, is abstract and formal, and by necessity underplays the unique and particular aspects of each story’.²⁵² This might elicit some criticism, especially as the tropes are not clear-cut – the data consists of narratives that might contain elements of more than one trope, which means that locating a single article within one trope requires overlooking some less significant elements in the narrative. This is, however, inevitable because the data is a collection of rich and sometimes self-contradictory pieces of foreign policy analysis. It is impossible to draw paradigmatic knowledge from it without making generalisations.

At the same time, the purpose of the thesis is ‘not simply to discover or describe the categories that identify particular occurrences within the data but also to note relationships among categories’.²⁵³ The thesis seeks to analyse how the different tropes connect not only to one another but also to different foreign policy metaphors, narrative types and ideas. Do some tropes, for example, lead to particular narrative types? Are certain metaphors employed only with a particular trope? These questions are important in studies in paradigmatic cognition whereas

²⁵⁰ Polkinghorne, ‘Narrative configuration’, p. 13.

²⁵¹ Polkinghorne, ‘Narrative configuration’, p. 13.

²⁵² Polkinghorne, ‘Narrative configuration’, p. 15.

²⁵³ Polkinghorne, ‘Narrative configuration’, p. 14.

narrative analysis is more interested in questions such as ‘How did this happen?’ and ‘Why did this come about?’²⁵⁴ To summarise the difference between the methodologies, ‘analysis of narratives moves from stories to common elements, and narrative analysis moves from elements to stories’.²⁵⁵

Narrative analysis versus discourse analysis

There are many concepts that are central to Hayden White’s work: narrative, tropes, and modes of emplotment, argument and ideological implication with elective affinities among others.²⁵⁶ Not all of them need or should be simultaneously included in research because their explanatory power depends on the type of questions asked. White frequently talks about ‘discourse’, but his method is not discourse analysis but narrative analysis. The concepts of ‘narrative’ and ‘discourse’ do not exclude each other; scholars sometimes talk about ‘narrative discourse’.²⁵⁷

To Hayden White, discourse is where reality is rendered meaningful and as such it represents a ‘movement’ that constructs our social world. As White writes, ‘discourse is intended to *constitute* the ground whereon to decide *what shall count as a fact* in the matters under consideration and to determine *what mode of comprehension* is best suited to the understanding of the facts thus constituted’.²⁵⁸ In other words, discourse is a practice through which our hegemonic meanings – our ‘common sense’ and what is ‘taken for granted’ – are constituted through narratives. A hegemonic practice does not imply an inherently negative intention to dominate; it is a representational practice that seeks ‘to create the fixedness of

²⁵⁴ Polkinghorne, ‘Narrative configuration’, p. 15.

²⁵⁵ Polkinghorne, ‘Narrative configuration’, p. 12.

²⁵⁶ White, *Metahistory*, p. 29.

²⁵⁷ David K. Elson, ‘Modeling Narrative Discourse’ (PhD thesis, Columbia University, 2012).

²⁵⁸ White, *Tropics*, p. 3, emphases in original.

meaning'.²⁵⁹ Tropes, as Hayden White argues, have a pivotal role in this discursive practice as 'troping is the soul of discourse, therefore, the mechanism without which discourse cannot do its work or achieve its end'.²⁶⁰

It is paradoxical that although our motivation to act – including speech acts – is very much influenced by our beliefs, political scientists often avoid talking about them. There are many reasons for this. Many discourse analysts consider beliefs as a category that is either too positivist or methodologically very hard to capture. The early interventions in discourse analysis were structured around a critique of the positivist treatment of beliefs in IR that meant that beliefs were studied 'in a non-relational way, as unconnected elements of thought'.²⁶¹ Discourse was seen as a more accessible unit of analysis than beliefs because we cannot get into the heads of people and truly understand their beliefs and intentions. Furthermore, people are not always sure what they believe themselves, and many of the things we do are driven by subconscious processes.

The concern that we cannot truly know the web of beliefs that influences the tradition that we study needs to be taken seriously and re-visited throughout the thesis. However, it is also a concern that is at the very core of interpretative approaches – namely how can we access the social reality within which we operate and which we can only access through language? Our analysis of beliefs – just like discourse analysis or any other qualitative methodology – produces interpretations of the world around us. Interests are equally perilous to

²⁵⁹ Roxanne L. Doty, *Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations* (The University of Minnesota Press, 1996), p. 8.

²⁶⁰ White, *Tropics*, p. 2.

²⁶¹ Henrik Larsen, *Foreign Policy and Discourse Analysis: France, Britain and Europe* (London & New York: Routledge, 1997), p. 7. See also Lene Hansen & Ole Wæver, 'Identity, Communities and Foreign Policy: Discourse Analysis as Foreign Policy Theory', in Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver (Eds.), *European integration and national identity: the challenge of the Nordic states* (London & New York: Routledge, 2001), pp. 20–49.

capture because we cannot measure or identify them outside the language we use. In the end, even if we cannot quantify them, we know that beliefs exist, they can be interpreted, and they are often intertwined with interests.

Let us consider a foreign policy scholar whose interest is to represent the United States as a triumphant actor in the international system. We cannot adequately talk about this without exploring the beliefs that constitute the interest: that the United States is or should be a morally superior actor in international relations; that China needs to be contained; that without the United States the international system would become anarchic, and so on. These beliefs, as Bevir & Rhodes argue, can be accessed through narratives.²⁶² The defining feature of narratives is ‘that they explain actions by the beliefs and preferences of the actors’.²⁶³

Instead of, then, only implicitly invoking the beliefs and desires of narrators, we should bring them to the core of our research agenda. The concept of belief is central to the thesis because it argues that they form the Western tradition of analysing Turkish foreign policy. In order to tease out the web of beliefs influencing the scholarly field, the concepts of tradition and dilemma are also important. As Bevir & Rhodes note, ‘political scientists cannot read-off beliefs and desires from objective social facts. Instead they have to interpret beliefs as part of webs of beliefs and, we would add, locate these webs against the background of traditions and dilemmas’.²⁶⁴

Political scientists can neither deny the narrative aspects of their studies and the influence of different webs of personal, collective, and paradigmatic beliefs within the traditions that they operate. Even if a study is not

²⁶² Bevir & Rhodes, *Governance Stories*, p. 20.

²⁶³ Bevir & Rhodes, *Interpreting*, p. 20.

²⁶⁴ Bevir & Rhodes, *Governance Stories*, p. 6.

narrative analysis but more paradigmatic in the sense that Polkinghorne describes, it still often puts forward a coherent narrative – just like this thesis. In other words, the thesis both analyses narratives paradigmatically and produces a narrative.

Narrative as a methodology allows the thesis to tap into the sequenced nature of foreign policy analysis, which is central to the discipline; foreign policy analysis is typically arranged in a linear fashion with a clearly defined and normatively charged past, present and future. Discourse analysis is a fitting analytical framework when researching more specifically the subject position, predication and presupposition in texts in foreign policy analysis. It is not a matter of choosing one method over another when researching foreign policy analysis texts, but to find the right methodology in each case depending on the particular study focus.

Narrative as an aesthetic and interpretative approach

The chapter has so far engaged with different definitions and approaches to narrative and its relation to reality. The last part of the chapter will focus on narrative as an aesthetic and interpretative approach to political science and international relations. This is necessary because, as noted in the introduction, the thesis is located at the intersection of three different approaches: a narrative approach, an aesthetic approach, and an interpretative approach.

The aesthetic approach is based on a conviction that reality cannot be represented realistically. This means that our representation is never ‘mimetic’ – it is not ‘point-of-viewless’.²⁶⁵ This applies to all representation from art to politics.²⁶⁶

²⁶⁵ Bruner, ‘The Narrative Construction’, p. 3.

²⁶⁶ Frank Ankersmit, *Aesthetic Politics: Political Philosophy Beyond Fact and Value* (Stanford University Press, 1997).

Not all approaches to narrative are aesthetic. Autobiographical narratives, for example, are sometimes treated as mimetic representations of the self: authentic, realistic, and truthful. An aesthetic approach to narrative both acknowledges and praises the subjective nature of representation. There is no methodological attempt to close the gap between a representation and the represented like in the mimetic tradition. As White writes, ‘every mimesis can be shown to be distorted and can serve, therefore, as an occasion for yet another description of the same phenomenon, one claiming to be more realistic, more “faithful to the facts”’.²⁶⁷

The assumption that there are ‘misperceptions’ in world politics, as Robert Jervis has famously argued, suggests that a realistic representation – a correct perception – is possible.²⁶⁸ The aesthetic approach, in contrast, emphasises the interpretative nature of all representation, which means that we should not talk about pure perceptions but different interpretations of reality. Some of them are more accurate than others, and this is why our scholarly task is to judge research based on its verisimilitude rather than its falsifiability. In other words, knowledge is not discovered but created.²⁶⁹ The aesthetic approach is, then, an interpretative approach.

The interpretative approach concentrates on ‘meanings, beliefs, languages, discourses and signs, as opposed to, say, laws and rules, correlations between social categories or deductive models’.²⁷⁰ It focuses on meaning rather than knowledge with the latter being concerned with whether something is true and the former with its meaning. The interpretative approach to political science recognises two major problems with mimetic approaches that hold a positivist

²⁶⁷ White, *Tropics of Discourse*, p. 3,

²⁶⁸ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton University Press, 1976).

²⁶⁹ R.G. Collingwood, *Essays in the Philosophy of History*, ed. William Debbins (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1965), p. 99.

²⁷⁰ Bevir & Rhodes, *Governance Stories*, pp. 1–2.

research agenda. Firstly, as Bevir & Rhodes argue, ‘political scientists efface the contingency of social life when they attempt to ground their theories in apparently given facts about the nature of reasoning’.²⁷¹ Secondly, As Bleiker argues,

relatively little practical knowledge has emerged from these efforts, even after successive generations of social scientists have refined their models and methods. Our insights into the international have not grown substantially, nor our abilities to prevent deadly conflicts. From Kosovo to Afghanistan violence remains the *modus operandi* of world politics.²⁷²

We could, of course, turn Bleiker’s argument around: the fact that little practical knowledge has emerged from mimetic research efforts has taught us an important lesson: that international politics cannot be explained, predicted, or managed simply by rational models or methods. As such, they have actually taught us a great deal about foreign policy analysis. At the heart of the interpretative approach is the conviction that actions should be explained by beliefs rather than simply interests. In challenging the traditional interests-based research methodology, the interpretative approach is located in the wider turn to ideas in political science.²⁷³ The thesis employs an aesthetic approach to narrative because it is not concerned with the ‘true nature’ of Turkish foreign policy but with meanings conveyed when representing it. It adopts an interpretative approach because it is interested in the beliefs that influence the representations.

²⁷¹ Bevir & Rhodes, *Governance Stories*, p. 3.

²⁷² Bleiker, ‘The Aesthetic Turn’, p. 510.

²⁷³ See for example Mark Blyth, ‘Structures Do Not Come with an Instruction Sheet: Interests, Ideas, and Progress in Political Science’, *Perspectives on Politics*, 1:4 (December 2003), pp. 695–706.

Conclusion

The chapter has introduced and critically engaged with different approaches to narrative in the social sciences in general and political science in particular. It has argued that narratives can be studied by focusing on their structure or on what they do. In the latter approach there are autobiographical, strategic, and ontological research agendas. The chapter attempted to show that the ontological approach to narrative is the most appropriate tool for the thesis, because its aim is to explore the ways in which Western foreign policy analysis connects to and constitutes the debate over the idea of the West. To adequately contextualise this, the thesis needs to elaborate on its theoretical position in a more analytical manner.

The first part of the following chapter, therefore, outlines the theoretical approach utilised in the thesis. Hayden White's approach to narrative, which is both aesthetic and interpretative, will be discussed first, followed by the interpretative approach of Mark Bevir and R.A.W. Rhodes that focuses on traditions, beliefs, and dilemmas. After this the theoretical approaches of Kenneth Burke and George Lakoff will be introduced with the purpose of explaining how they will be utilised in the forthcoming analysis chapters.

Chapter 4 – Methodology and literature review

Introduction

The previous chapter reviewed and critically engaged with the concept of narrative, showing how it is defined and employed in the social sciences. Narrative is a central concept in the thesis, because it focuses on Western foreign policy analysis that is, as the thesis argues, narratively constructed. This chapter continues from where the first chapter ended and introduces the narrative approach that guides the thesis. The first part of the chapter focuses on the interpretative approach to narrative as proposed by Mark Bevir and R.A.W. Rhodes. It then discusses Hayden White's tropology that gives content to Bevir and Rhodes' methodology. Finally, it shortly introduces the approaches of Kenneth Burke and George Lakoff.

Bevir and Rhodes: An interpretative approach

In their co-authored books *Interpreting British Governance* and *Governance Stories*, Mark Bevir and R.A.W. Rhodes ask 'how we know what we know about British governance?'²⁷⁴ They continue that

The easy answer to this question is that we describe key institutions like the prime minister, cabinet and the civil service using the conventional repertoire of social science theories to guide us. One problem with easy answers and conventional theories is they often produce sterile agendas and boring findings.

²⁷⁴ Bevir & Rhodes, *Governance Stories*, p. 1.

To compare Tony Blair with Napoleon is to resurrect the presidentialization of the prime minister thesis yet again. We need some new spectacles.²⁷⁵

In a similar vein, the easy answer to the question ‘how we know what we know about Turkish governance’ would be to explain that Turkey is a liminal state that is balancing between the East and the West, and as such we would end up resurrecting the ‘bridge thesis’ once again. There are better ways to answer the question, and the thesis will employ the spectacles provided by Bevir and Rhodes to provide a more nuanced answer. In the following sections, their interpretative approach will be discussed in more detail and it will be shown how the analytical framework is utilised in the forthcoming analyses chapters.

Bevir and Rhodes situate themselves in the wider scholarly field of interpretative approaches to political science, which has in common its focus on meaning rather than knowledge. Within the wider group of interpretative approaches, or the ‘interpretative family’ as Bevir and Rhodes refer to it, there are discourse analysts, post-structuralists, and some social constructivists among others.²⁷⁶ What makes the interpretative approach of Bevir and Rhodes a distinct contribution is its specific focus on beliefs, tradition, and dilemmas.

Also, their idea of agency differs from a post-structuralist agency; it is situated rather than autonomous as the latter suggests.²⁷⁷ To treat agency as situated is to bridge the gap between agency and structure. As Geoffrey Roberts argues, ‘individuals are unique and particular while at the same time being inseparable from their conditions and contexts. There can be no agency without

²⁷⁵ Bevir & Rhodes, *Governance Stories*, p. 1.

²⁷⁶ Bevir & Rhodes, *Governance Stories*, p. 2. See also Bevir & Rhodes, *Interpreting British Governance*, pp. 20–24.

²⁷⁷ Bevir & Rhodes, *Interpreting*, pp. 23; 32; *Governance Stories*, pp. 4–5.

structures and no structures without agency'.²⁷⁸ The following sections discuss the concepts of belief, tradition, and dilemma in more detail.

Beliefs

Beliefs are central to the interpretative approach of Bevir and Rhodes, and they are closely connected to the idea of situated agency. The focus on beliefs solves the problem associated with positivism on the one hand that is committed to the idea that we can objectively explain human behavior, and post-structuralism on the other hand, that sometimes goes too far in denying the role of agency. As Bevir & Rhodes explain

An emphasis on interpreting beliefs in their webs acts as a counter to the lukewarm positivism of much political science. Equally, it helps to remind us that meanings arise not as parts of disembodied quasi-structures like paradigms and epistemes, but rather as subjective and inter-subjective understandings. Meanings are always the beliefs of specific people. Of course, when we use belief in this way, we define the concept broadly to include the subconscious and unconscious as well as the conscious.²⁷⁹

The approach of Bevir and Rhodes has been criticised for providing a 'caricature' of the post-structuralist understanding of agency and structure.²⁸⁰

²⁷⁸ Geoffrey Roberts, 'History, theory and the narrative turn in IR', *Review of International Studies*, 32:4 (October 2006), p. 711.

²⁷⁹ Bevir & Rhodes, *Governance Stories*, pp. 6–7.

²⁸⁰ Jason Glynos & David Howarth, 'Structure, Agency and Power in Political Analysis: Beyond Contextualised Self-Interpretations', *Political Studies Review*, 6 (2008), p. 157; 161–162. See also Martin J. Smith, 'Re-centring British Government: Beliefs, Traditions and Dilemmas in Political Science', *Political Studies Review*, 6, pp. 143–154.

Jason Glynos and David Howarth argue that unlike Bevir and Rhodes as well many other critics of the post-structuralist position propose, human agency is not 'reduced to reified discursive structures' but can represent a 'radical subject' in situations of structural failure.²⁸¹ They continue that

Instead of total indeterminacy, social actors (whether individual or collective) are always partially situated in a particular social context, in which their 'decisions' involve the foreclosure of some political options.²⁸²

While it is true that Bevir & Rhodes sometimes represent post-structuralist agency in too simplistic a way, it is unclear how the agency that Glynos & Howarth describe differs from the situated agency of Bevir & Rhodes. This also what Bevir & Rhodes probe in their response to Glynos & Howarth:

We must admit to being surprised to learn that the entire post-structuralist and post-Marxist furore over the death of the subject, Man, and author meant so little. But, instead of quibbling over how best to interpret Foucault or Laclau, we welcome other post-foundationalists, such as Glynos and Howarth, who openly recognise situated agency. Once other post-foundationalists recognise agency, we suspect the differences between them and us will mainly be terminological.²⁸³

²⁸¹ Glynos & Howarth, 'Structure, Agency and Power', p. 162.

²⁸² Glynos & Howarth, 'Structure, Agency and Power', p. 162.

²⁸³ Mark Bevir & R.A.W. Rhodes, 'Authors' Response: Politics as Cultural Practice', *Political Studies Review*, 6 (2008), p. 171.

There are also other differing terms that might hide the fact that the two positions are actually very similar. It seems that the ‘*dislocatory* events’ where ‘it is no longer clear how the subject is to “go on”’²⁸⁴ represent the ‘dilemmas’ of Bevir & Rhodes that are discussed later in this section. The dislocatory events open up ‘gaps’ and ‘spaces’ in the social structures, enabling the radical agency to emerge and identify with beliefs, ideologies, and discourses. The dilemmas of Bevir & Rhodes, similarly, enable change in the prevailing tradition, which explains how beliefs evolve over time. Post-structuralists prefer terms such as hegemony, structure, and power, which to Bevir & Rhodes are often too vaguely defined. They argue that ‘we have been cautious about using the word ‘power’ since, like ‘structure’, it often ignores the meaningfulness of action and resorts to reification and essentialism. On the other hand, we can unpack a concept of power to make it compatible with our post-foundational analysis of politics as cultural practice’.²⁸⁵

This is a reasonable position, and one that is more methodological than ontological. The claim that the model of Bevir & Rhodes represents ‘an underdeveloped social ontology’²⁸⁶ is surprising because, as earlier noted, they largely share the ontological premises of Glynos & Howarth. In the end the choice of terminology is more a question of the research task at hand than an ontological conviction. In some studies the concepts of hegemony and power might serve the purpose, while in others the trilogy of tradition, beliefs, and dilemmas provide better methodological tools and result in a more nuanced case study.

²⁸⁴ Glynos & Howarth, ‘Structure, Agency and Power’, p. 162, emphasis in original.

²⁸⁵ Mark Bevir & R.A.W. Rhodes, ‘Authors’ Response: Politics as Cultural Practice’, p. 174.

²⁸⁶ Glynos & Howarth, ‘Structure, Agency and Power’, p. 161.

Traditions

In talking about beliefs, we need to also take the social context into account. Beliefs do not arise independently as manifestations of personal preferences but are strongly influenced by tradition, which is a 'first influence on people' and a 'social heritage'.²⁸⁷ This means that traditions carry beliefs but they are contingent rather than fixed. The role of agency is central to traditions because it is individuals as the carriers of tradition that make them meaningful. As Bevir & Rhodes argue, they 'settle its content and variations by developing their beliefs and practices, adapting it to new circumstances, while passing it on to the next generations. We can only identify the beliefs that make up a tradition by looking at the shared understandings and historical connections that allow us to link its exponents with one another'.²⁸⁸

The Western practice of narrating Turkish foreign policy is a tradition *par excellence*. There are beliefs that are passed on from one generation to another with some shared understandings and historical connections. There are also elements that have changed over time when scholars encountered dilemmas that did not fit the shared assumptions. It is a 'Western' tradition of narrating Turkey because the scholars make explicit references to the West as 'us' and build their narratives on a set of beliefs about the West and its role in the world. Tradition is similar to what Roxanne Lynn Doty calls a 'larger social order' and argues that policymakers are 'performing according to a social script which is itself part of a larger social order. By virtue of thus performance they are involved in a ritual reproduction (or repudiation) of that social order'.²⁸⁹

It is important to note, however, that in describing the tradition of

²⁸⁷ Bevir & Rhodes, *Governance Stories*, p. 7.

²⁸⁸ Bevir & Rhodes, *Interpreting*, p. 33.

²⁸⁹ Roxanne Lynn Doty, 'Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-positivist Analysis of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines', *International Studies Quarterly*, 37:3 (1993), p. 301.

narrating Turkey in Western foreign policy analysis, the thesis is also constructing that tradition. This is because, as it was noted earlier, traditions do not have a fixed essence. If we are serious about our anti-foundationalist approach, this needs to be properly emphasised. The Western tradition of narrating Turkey in foreign policy analysis is an interpretation that the thesis proposes after a careful study of historical connections and shared narrative resources that have been passed on over several decades in hundreds of foreign policy analysis articles.

The foreign policy analysis narrators that the thesis has examined might even dispute the claim that their contribution is part of a Western tradition, arguing that it was an independent input in the scholarly field. Also, as pointed out earlier, our beliefs can be unconscious or subconscious, which means that we might not be able to connect them to a tradition that has had a first influence on them. This is less a methodological concern and more a matter of justifying the purpose of the thesis, which raises the question of why and on what grounds the interpretations put forward should be valued higher than possible alternatives. As Bevir & Rhodes argue,

Political scientists may construct traditions but that does not mean traditions are unacceptably subjective. Whether an account of a tradition is judged objective depends on the adequacy of our understanding of the components and links by which we define that tradition. An account of a tradition must identify a set of connected beliefs and habits that intentionally or unintentionally

passed from generation to generation at some time in the past.²⁹⁰

As noted earlier in the thesis, the question is part and parcel of the research agenda in the interpretative approach, and one that continues to cause contestation between positivists and post-positivists. Bevir defends the narrative approach by arguing that ‘we must judge the epistemic legitimacy of a form of explanation by reference to the reasonableness of the theories, concepts, or categories it embodies’.²⁹¹ This ‘reasonableness’ means that although ‘political scientists do not have access to pure facts that they can use to declare particular interpretations or narratives to be true or false, they can still hang on to the idea of objectivity. Political scientists can retain a concept of objectivity defined by shared facts – as opposed to given facts – and by shared normative rules and practices that set criteria for comparing accounts’.²⁹²

It must be reiterated here that the thesis does not share Bevir’s critique of White’s position, which Bevir calls ‘naïve positivism’ and against which he defends the epistemic legitimacy of narrative. It seems that Bevir constructs a caricature of White’s thinking to create a basis for his defense, or that White has simply formulated his position unclearly. For when following White’s line of argument, his argument is very similar to Bevir. This also applies to other parts of White’s oeuvre. Bevir and Rhodes’ beliefs are what White refers to as different ‘moral and aesthetic preferences’, influencing narratives. They also both rely on narrative as the most natural and ubiquitous form of explanation. They both argue that beliefs derive not from pure experiences but a prior social setting within which the narrator operates. Finally, they are both

²⁹⁰ Bevir & Rhodes, *Interpreting*, p. 34.

²⁹¹ Bevir, ‘Narrative as a form’, p. 18.

²⁹² Bevir & Rhodes, *Interpreting*, p. 38. See also the earlier discussions on the truth value of narratives in chapter 3.

interested in not only the conscious but also the subconscious levels of reasoning that influence situated agents.

However, their way of conceptualising the prior setting is different, and this is where White's work proves particularly valuable. Bevir & Rhodes provide little substance to their traditions other than arguing that they contain webs of beliefs. They show that in British political science there are traditions such as Idealism and Socialism but one is left to wonder whether we could gain a more nuanced understanding of those traditions and the beliefs that constitute them. It seems that there is more to it than the all-too familiar labels of different political ideologies. Bevir & Rhodes juxtapose their 'tradition' and 'practice' with concepts such as 'cultural scheme' and 'structure' to emphasise the idea of a situated agency and to pay attention to the social context, but such a typology does not really work in White's case. White talks about both 'structure' and 'tradition' to explain the way in which we prefigure the historical field we aim to describe, but his structure refers to the mind and his agency is very much situated. White writes that

In order to relate these different styles to one another as elements of a single *tradition* of historical thinking, I have been forced to postulate a deep level of consciousness on which a historical thinker chooses conceptual strategies by which to explain or represent his data'.²⁹³

Juxtaposing 'tradition' with 'structure', then, is only really helpful when we talk about positivism or post-structuralism at their purest. In White's work, the

²⁹³ White, *Metahistory*, p. x, emphasis added.

distinction is not meaningful because ‘tradition’ and ‘structure’ are part of the same phenomenon of a narrator performing ‘an essentially *poetic* act, in which he *prefigures* the historical field and constitutes it as a domain upon which to bring to bear the specific theories he will use to explain “what was *really* happening” in it’.²⁹⁴ This means that there is a tradition that influences the individual, but that tradition represents as a social heritage within which the individual operates. It is difficult to see a significant conflict between the theoretical underpinnings forming the works of Bevir & Rhodes and White.

Indeed, White’s tropology, discussed later in this chapter, provides the needed nuance to the idea of traditions that carry webs of beliefs. White’s tropes can be located somewhere in the intersection between tradition and belief because it is to do both with the mind (belief) and the social structure (tradition). Interestingly, in Bevir’s article ‘Political Science as Narrative and Science, 1880–2000’, his ‘story’ – as he calls it – of the dominant approaches to political studies take the form of White’s tropes. Surely Bevir did not mean to narrate the development in a tropological fashion, which only attests to its power in influencing our thinking.

Dilemmas

The third concept that is important when studying a tradition influencing the web of beliefs behind action is dilemma. The concept of dilemma is particularly important in the thesis because it explains why Turkey is subject to such an intense amount of narration in foreign policy analysis. As earlier argued, it is neither Turkey’s abstract ‘otherness’ nor the country’s role in the international system that explains the phenomenon, but the ‘Turkish dilemma’ that continues

²⁹⁴ White, *Metahistory*, p. x, emphasis in original.

to provide powerful metaphors through which to narrate beliefs about the West and its future direction.

Dilemmas explain how change takes place in tradition, and allows for a fluid understanding of tradition. Bevir & Rhodes explain that a dilemma ‘arises for an individual or group when a new idea stands in opposition to existing beliefs or practices and so forces a reconsideration of the existing beliefs and associated tradition. Political scientists can explain change in traditions and practices, therefore, by referring to the relevant dilemmas’.²⁹⁵ This is where the idea of a situated agency becomes important; tradition as a structure can be shaped by creative individual acts. This thesis focuses on speech acts, which means that the ethnographic methods that Bevir & Rhodes utilise in their study of British governance are not applicable here. Their ethnographic method is not central to the triangle of belief, tradition, and dilemma because meaning is carried in all actions, and speech acts cannot be separate from other forms of action.

It is important to note that political scientists cannot separate ‘real’ dilemmas from imaginative ones. As Bevir & Rhodes argue, a dilemma exists ‘irrespective of whether or not it reflects pressures that political scientists believe to be real’.²⁹⁶ Indeed, the framework of Bevir & Rhodes ‘does not prescribe a particular methodological toolkit for generating data. Instead, it prescribes a particular way of treating data of any type. An interpretative approach suggests that political scientists should treat data in ways consistent with the philosophical analysis of the task of interpreting interpretations’.²⁹⁷ This means that this thesis seeks to ‘reveal the contingency and contestability of narratives

²⁹⁵ Bevir & Rhodes, *Governance Stories*, p. 9.

²⁹⁶ Bevir & Rhodes, *Governance Stories*, p. 10.

²⁹⁷ Bevir & Rhodes, *Governance Stories*, p. 22.

that present themselves as fixed and natural'.²⁹⁸

Martin Smith criticises Bevir and Rhodes for 'proposing monotheism and suggesting that there is only one way to do political science'.²⁹⁹ It is true that sometimes Bevir and Rhodes are too uncompromising when dictating what political scientists can or should do, drawing very strict methodological boundaries. For example, their claim that political scientists 'cannot make predictions' does not reflect the scholarly field because clearly they can and they do.³⁰⁰ We can certainly say that predictions that political scientists make are very different from predictions in the natural sciences, but as the research data of this thesis shows, predictions are an integral part of the discipline.

Dilemmas are acutely relevant in the case of Turkish foreign policy analysis in the Western tradition. The events that trigger the 'Turkish dilemma' to be re-narrated seem arbitrary if a political scientist considers their material weight in a realist fashion. Seen from an international perspective that is filled with heavy material concerns such as violent conflicts, famine, and the threat posed by nuclear arms, the United States' Congressional vote on the Armenian Genocide in October 2007, for example, does not seem like a potent enough dilemma to provoke speculations about losing Turkey.³⁰¹ Yet, the event did prompt Juan Cole to pose the question and locate it in a passionate narrative of the United States mistreating Turkey.³⁰² It is clear that the dilemma that Cole discusses arises from predominantly moral rather than material considerations.

²⁹⁸ Bevir & Rhodes, *Governance Stories*, p. 25.

²⁹⁹ Smith, 'Re-centring British Government', p. 153.

³⁰⁰ Bevir & Rhodes, *Governance Stories*, p. 26.

³⁰¹ As David Campbell note, the 'process of interpretation does not depend on the incidence of "objective" factors for its veracity'. *Writing Security*, p. 2

³⁰² Juan Cole, 'Who Lost Turkey?', *Informed Comment* (12 October 2007), available at <http://www.juancole.com/2007/10/who-lost-turkey.html> (1 August 2015).

Bevir & Rhodes aptly argue that dilemmas ‘can arise from theoretical and moral reflection as well as from experiences of worldly pressures’.³⁰³

The forthcoming analytical chapters will tie the political events that prompt the ‘Turkish dilemma’ to be re-narrated to the beliefs that constitute the Western tradition of analysing Turkey in foreign policy. It is important to bring the empirical level to the analysis in order to show that in foreign policy analysis events are narrated in very different ways and that those representations do not derive primarily from material but ideational factors. They also frame policy in such a way as to narrow it down to a limited number of different alternatives – often the virtuous and the repugnant option. As Bevir & Rhodes argue, the ‘new idea will open ways of adjusting and close down others. People have to hook it on to their existing beliefs, and their existing beliefs will present some opportunities and not others’.³⁰⁴ The purpose of the forthcoming analysis is to show what David Campbell has eloquently argued; that ‘danger is an effect of interpretation. Danger bears no essential, necessary, or unproblematic relation to the action or event from which it is said to derive’.³⁰⁵

Hayden White: Tropology

Unlike Bevir & Rhodes, Hayden White is not a political scientist, but there are many overlaps with White’s aesthetic approach to narrative and the interpretative approaches in political science and international relations. As an anti-foundationalist historian, White is also concerned with meaning and language with a specific focus on narrative as a mode of explanation. White’s most famous works are his magnum opus *Metahistory* (1973) and two collections of articles: *The Content of*

³⁰³ Bevir & Rhodes, *Governance Stories*, p. 10.

³⁰⁴ Bevir & Rhodes, *Governance Stories*, p. 10.

³⁰⁵ Campbell, *Writing Security*, p. 2

the Form (1987) and *The Tropics of Discourse* (1978) where the former is mostly concerned with narrative and the latter with tropes. The thesis utilises White's tropology in mapping out the different beliefs that constitute the Western tradition of narrating Turkey in foreign policy analysis, but his thinking has had a much wider impact on the way in which the thesis approaches key ontological and methodological questions. It is therefore necessary to briefly review White's contribution to narrative research before discussing his tropology that forms the backbone of the thesis.

It is not difficult to see why there has been such a powerful reaction to White's work with *Metahistory* being hailed, even by his critics, as one of the most significant works on the philosophy of history in the 1900s.³⁰⁶ White's critical approach towards the positivist notion of reality has paved the way for constructivist approaches to become more popular also in political science. The starting point in White's thinking is that every narrative contains traces of the narrator's morality: 'every historical narrative has its latent or manifest purpose the desire to *moralize* the events of which it treats'.³⁰⁷ In other words, there is 'a *need* or an *impulse* to narrate events with respect to their significance for one's own culture of group'.³⁰⁸

The emphasis on the desire to moralise events connects White's thesis to the work of Bevir & Rhodes who talk about beliefs that often contain moral reflections. The implication of White's notion that the way in which we narrate events is influenced by our social context is of particular relevance here because the thesis proposes that foreign policy scholars who narrate Turkey do so

³⁰⁶ See for example David Carr, 'On the Metaphilosophy of History' in Ankersmit et al. (eds.), *Refiguring Hayden White*, p. 15 and Andrew Baird, 'Metahistory as *Anabasis*' in Ankersmit et al. (eds.), *Refiguring*, p. 124; Vann, 'Reception', p. 148.

³⁰⁷ White, *Metahistory*, 19, emphasis in original.

³⁰⁸ White, *The Content of the Form*, p. 10, emphases added.

with respect to the West. It is argued in this thesis, in line with White, that ‘it is the *value* accorded to the current social establishment’ that shapes representations of Turkey.³⁰⁹ This means that foreign policy analysis representations derive not from direct and neutral counters with Turkey but from a much more complex web of beliefs that contain moral and aesthetic values concerning the West. White argues that ‘narrative is not merely a neutral discursive form that may or may not be used to represent real events in their aspect as developmental process but rather entails ontological and epistemic choices with *distinct ideological and even specifically political implications*’.³¹⁰

Four tropes

There are two primary reasons why the thesis focuses particularly on tropes rather than some other concepts that White proposes. Firstly, tropes are key to understanding how events that seem arbitrary occurrences in world politics are made to function as meaningful and politically potent elements in foreign policy analysis narratives of Turkey. As White explains,

Understanding is a process of rendering the unfamiliar, or the ‘uncanny’, in Freud’s sense of the term, familiar; of removing it from the domain of things felt to be ‘exotic’ and unclassified into one or another domain of experience encoded adequately enough to be felt to be humanly useful, nonthreatening, or simply known by association. This process of understanding can only be *tropological* in nature, for what is involved in the rendering of the unfamiliar into

³⁰⁹ White, *Metahistory*, p. 25, emphasis in original.

³¹⁰ White, *The Content of the Form*, p. ix, emphases added.

the familiar is a *troping* that is generally figurative.³¹¹

White's tropes, then, allow for a more analytical study of the web of beliefs that constitute the Western tradition of narrating Turkey in foreign policy analysis. The second reason for using White's tropology in the thesis is that the pattern of tropological configuration is a manifestly Western tradition, which makes it acutely relevant, even necessary, to a thesis that explores a Western tradition of representation.³¹² More specifically, White argues that the 'theory of tropes provides a way of characterizing the dominant mode of historical thinking which took shape in Europe in the nineteenth century'.³¹³ White seem to employ the terms 'Western' and 'European' interchangeably, which is neither atypical to the scholarly field nor a methodological problem here. What is more important is that White employs the term 'West' in talking about 'the Western discourse about consciousness' and 'the modern Western cultural tradition', which means that the idea of the West – rather than merely 'Europe' – is key to his thinking.³¹⁴

There are four tropes in White's tropology: metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony, as formulated by Giambattista Vico in *The New Science* in the early 1700s and later refined and developed by many scholars especially in literature and rhetoric studies but also in other fields of the social sciences.³¹⁵ Thinkers from Carl Popper to Michel Foucault and Richard Rorty have employed tropes in

³¹¹ White, *Tropics*, p. 5, emphases added.

³¹² See White, *Tropics*, pp. 12–13.

³¹³ White, *Metahistory*, p. 38.

³¹⁴ White, *Tropics*, pp. 12; 13.

³¹⁵ Thomas G. Bergin and Max H. Fisch, *The New Science of Giambattista Vico*, revised translations of the third edition of 1744 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1948). See also Kenneth Burke, *A Grammar of Motives* (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 503–17; George Lakoff & Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (University of Chicago Press, 1980); John S. Nelson, *Tropes of Politics* (University of Wisconsin Press, 1998).

studying meaning and language.³¹⁶ Tropes can be studied as something to do with language alone, but they can also be seen – as White and many other scholars do – as fundamental to our cognition. As Lakoff & Johnson note, metaphor as one of the tropes is ‘not just a matter of language, that is, of mere words. We shall argue that, on the contrary, human *thought processes* are largely metaphorical’.³¹⁷

Similarly, White’s tropes can be seen as ‘forms of cognition and not forms of the “real”’.³¹⁸ White writes that ‘each of these modes of consciousness provides the basis for a distinctive linguistic protocol by which to prefigure the historical field and on the basis of which specific strategies of historical interpretation can be employed for “explaining” it’.³¹⁹ In other words, the empirical field is prefigured – constituted as ‘an object of mental perception’ – before it is narrated.³²⁰ In the following four sections, the four tropes will be introduced, followed by critical reflections about their methodological role in explaining representation in international relations.

Metaphor

The first trope, metaphor, is the most frequently discussed trope because it can be detected so easily and employed to discuss a variety of issues.³²¹ As Giambattista Vico has argued, metaphor is ‘the most necessary and frequent’ of the tropes.³²²

³¹⁶ See Karl Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (HarperCollins Publishers, 1942), pp. 84–114; Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (Vintage, 1983); Richard Rorty, *Contingency, irony, and solidarity* (Cambridge University Press, 1989).

³¹⁷ Lakoff & Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, p. 6.

³¹⁸ Hyvärinen, ‘Prototypes’, p. 23.

³¹⁹ White, *Metahistory*, p. xi.

³²⁰ White, *Metahistory*, p. 30.

³²¹ See for example, Andrew Ortony, *Metaphor and Thought* (Cambridge University Press, 1993); Donald Davidson, ‘What Metaphors Mean’, Reprinted in *Inquiries Into Truth and Interpretation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); Trevor J. Barnes & James S. Duncan, *Writing Worlds: Discourse, Text and Metaphor in the Representation of Landscape* (Routledge, 2013); David Punter, *Metaphor* (London: Routledge, 2007); Paul Ricoeur, *The Rule of Metaphor: Multi-disciplinary Studies of the Creation of Meaning in Language*, trans. Robert Czerny (University of Toronto, 1981).

³²² As cited in White, *Tropics*, p. 205.

Metaphor is a ‘primal’ trope in that it ‘constitutes the basis of every fable’.³²³ It is about representation and correlation, or as Kenneth Burke notes, ‘a device for seeing something *in terms of* something else’.³²⁴ The meaning of metaphor, then, is similar to its vernacular connotation: it is about comparing two things in order to show their similarities. As White writes, ‘in metaphor, phenomena can be characterized in terms of their similarity to, and difference from, one another, in the manner of analogy and simile, as in the phrase “my love, a rose”’.³²⁵

When it comes to analysing Turkish foreign policy, the scholarly field is filled with different metaphors: Turkey is represented as a ‘bridge’, ‘at a crossroads’, ‘lost’, and so on.³²⁶ For example, Wolfgang Schäuble writes in *Foreign Affairs* that “Turkey is an extraordinarily important *bridge* between Europe and the Middle East’.³²⁷ Bruce R. Kuniholm argues that ‘as NATO’s only Muslim country, Turkey also provided a cultural *bridge* between Europe and the Middle East’.³²⁸ Helena Kane Finn writes: “Turkey is indeed at the *crossroads*. By making right choices now, it can proceed to fulfil the dreams and aspirations of the Turkish Republic.”³²⁹ Or as Zeyno Baran argues: “Turkey was initially seen as a tremendous asset for the new Iraq and even the new Middle East, while it is now sees as a liability in stabilizing Northern Iraq. So, who *lost* Turkey?”³³⁰

³²³ White, *Tropics*, p. 205.

³²⁴ Burke, ‘Four Master Tropes’, p. 421, emphasis in original.

³²⁵ White, *Metahistory*, p. 34.

³²⁶ Also Turkish political elites have exploited the metaphor of Turkey as a bridge in their effort to highlight Turkey’s ‘exceptionalism’. Lerna K. Yanik, ‘Constructing Turkish “exceptionalism”: Discourses of liminality and hybridity in post-Cold War Turkish foreign policy’ *Political Geography*, 30 (2011), pp. 80–89.

³²⁷ Wolfgang Schäuble & David L. Phillips, ‘Talking Turkey’, *Foreign Affairs* (November/December 2004), available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2004-11-01/talking-turkey> (1 March 2015), p. 135, emphasis added.

³²⁸ Bruce R. Kuniholm, ‘Turkey and the West’, *Foreign Affairs* (Spring 1991), p. 39, emphasis added.

³²⁹ Helena Kane Finn, ‘The U.S.-Turkish Relationship: Blueprint for the Future’, *The National Interest* (9 July 2003), available at <http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-us-turkish-relationship-blueprint-for-the-future-2380> (15 August 2015).

³³⁰ Zeyno Baran, ‘Turkish-American Strategic Partnership on the Brink – Who is to Blame?’, *The National Interest* (30 April 2003), available at <http://nationalinterest.org/article/turkish-american-strategic-partnership-on-the-brink-who-is-to-blame-2326> (15 August 2015), emphasis added.

To analyse Turkey employing figurative language is to ascribe particular meanings as well as a *direction* to Turkish action in foreign policy. It will be argued in the forthcoming chapters that such a tropological framing exercise sets limits to what can be said about Turkey and as such shapes the scholarly tradition of narrating Turkey in foreign policy analysis. It is based upon a particular moral and aesthetic preference regarding Turkey's position vis-à-vis the West. White argues that there is an emotional element involved in the process of troping:

That which is experienced most vividly is the body and its various parts on the one hand and the emotions and their various states on the other. These provide the references for the most primitive kind of metaphorical identification and the bases for the ascription to a natural process, such as thunder, of the attributes of the emotional state resembling it in human experience. Once thunder is particularized as anger, it becomes the subject of further specification by two kinds of tropological reduction: metonymy and synecdoche.³³¹

The thesis treats the trope of metaphor as the basis upon which the other three tropes – metonymy, synecdoche, and irony – are built. In other words, in the tradition of narrating Turkey in foreign policy analysis, Turkey is first particularised as a bridge, for example, and then subjected to further specification by the other three tropes, which will be used as the primary analytical categories in the analytical chapters. The trope of metaphor will feature in the analysis but it will not be employed as systematically as metonymy, synecdoche, and irony. That Turkey is represented as a bridge rather than something else arises, as the thesis has argued,

³³¹ White, *Tropics*, p. 206.

from the dilemma of Turkey having eluded normal expectations and consequently located 'in between' two forces.

Metonymy

While metaphor is simple to identify, metonymy and synecdoche are less so. Many argue that metonymy and synecdoche are not two separate categories but 'can slide into one another, and both can be seen as species of metaphor'.³³² Also White argues that the three other tropes are 'kinds of Metaphor, but they differ from one another in the kinds of *reductions* or *integrations* they effect on the literal level of their meanings and by the kinds of illuminations they aim at on the figurative level'.³³³ The characteristic feature of the trope of metonymy is its reductionist and oppositional mode of thinking, which is in fact very different from the trope of synecdoche that is, as the following section shows, integrative and conflict-avoiding. In that sense, it is actually very easy to distinguish between the two. White uses the Enlighteners as an example of metonymical thinkers. As White writes, metonymy is about invoking

a paradigm of representation and explanation which took the fact of schism and severance, of conflict and suffering, as given realities. The *opposition* of forces, of which schism and conflict are manifestations, determined the modalities of their experience of history conceived as a process of transition from past to present. The past to them *was* unreason, the present was a conflict of reason and unreason, and the

³³² Vann, 'The Reception', p. 151. See also Burke, 'Four Master Tropes', pp. 421; 423.

³³³ White, *Metahistory*, p. 34, emphases in original.

future alone was the time which they could envision as that of the triumph of reason over unreason, perfect unity, redemption.³³⁴

We can see metonymical representations everywhere: in theories, scholarly analysis, popular culture, and everyday conversations. For example, the Realist paradigm in international relations is based upon a metonymical worldview of an irresolvable conflict between power-seeking states that operate in an anarchical system. Similarly, the positivist assumption in the social sciences that objective facts can be separated from fiction is also a metonymical representation. As Herman Paul notes, White's metonymy denotes a binary opposition between reason and imagination or history and myth.³³⁵

When Turkish foreign policy analysis is examined from a tropological perspective, it becomes clear that the metonymical and synecdochic modes of representation are both present and identifiable. A metonymical representation typically focuses on religion as a fundamental category that separates Turkey from 'others', most importantly Europe and the West. Samuel Huntington's 'clash of civilisations' thesis is the most obvious example of such a metonymical geopolitical imagination with Turkey being classified as a 'torn country' and located between two opposing forces, Islam and the West. Narratives that employ metonymical explanatory tools usually engage in 'boundary-producing political performances' that 'construct the external realm as different, inferior, and threatening'.³³⁶

Metonymy, then, has a different ontology than a synecdoche. The core ontological assumption in metonymy is that the whole (reality) is made up of distinctive parts (human groups, cognitive categories, time periods) that are in

³³⁴ White, *Metahistory*, p. 62.

³³⁵ Herman Paul, 'Hayden White and the Crisis of Historicism' in Ankersmit, Domanska & Kellner, *Refiguring*, p. 64.

³³⁶ Campbell, *Writing Security*, p. 69; Rumelili, 'Identity, difference and the EU', p. 35.

opposition with one another. Herman Paul notes that the ‘metonymical mode works well as long as its adherents are so convinced of the power and promise of their rationalism as to be able to reject its opposites’.³³⁷ There is a strong moral element that influences metonymical imagination: the part-whole relationship can be seen as an ideal state or as a state that needs to be corrected.

The Enlightenmenters saw a future based on reason as the ideal state, while Realists argue that a balance of power between states in the anarchic international system is the best possible outcome both politically and morally. The underlying conflict, in other words, does not disappear but is contained. In synecdoche, on the other hand, conflicts can be made to disappear altogether with higher unity and integration, which is not only a political project but also a moral responsibility, as shown in the following section.

Synecdoche

White’s third trope, synecdoche, is integrative and as such in contrast to the reductive trope of metonymy. As White explains, ‘the essentially *extrinsic* relationship that is presumed to characterize the two orders of phenomena in all Metonymical reductions can by Synecdoche be construed in the manner of an *intrinsic* relationship of shared *qualities*’.³³⁸ Burke talks about synecdoche as a road that *connects* two sides, while in metonymy the road can be followed only one way.³³⁹ In discussing the Enlightenment thinkers as representatives of metonymical imagination, White argues that Leibniz represents a contrasting synecdochal mode that emphasises harmonious co-existence: ‘When Leibniz surveyed the remote past he saw there precisely the same powers at play which he saw all around him in the

³³⁷ Paul, ‘Crisis of Historicism’, p. 63.

³³⁸ White, *Metahistory*, p. 35, emphases in original.

³³⁹ Burke, ‘Four Tropes’, p. 428, emphasis added.

present, and in the same proportions. These forces were neither those of reason exactly nor those of unreason exclusive, but rather the harmony of opposites.³⁴⁰

For White, Leibniz perfectly embodies the trope of synecdoche with his conviction that ‘the world was one and continuous among its parts ... The same process of transition-in-unity and unity-in-transition is at work in all the parts, whether the individual part is construed as a person, a ruling family, a principality, a nation, an empire, or the whole human race’.³⁴¹ Like metonymy, the trope of synecdoche is ubiquitous both in theory and practice. If Huntington’s clash of civilisations was a metonymical representation of reality, Francis Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ thesis represents a synecdochal mode of explanation with its idea that human intellectual history has reached a stage of unity. White articulates his tropology as a ‘closed-cycle development’ and argues that

For each of the modes can be regarded as a phase, or a moment, within a tradition of discourse which evolves from Metaphorical, through Metonymical and Synecdochic comprehensions of the historical world, into an Ironic apprehension of the irreducible relativism of all knowledge.³⁴²

In the thesis, however, the tropes are treated not as phases but as different webs of beliefs about Turkey and the West. This is because tropes are not always cyclical as White proposes but can also exist simultaneously and intersubjectively. Although irony always requires an existing trope, as shown in the following section, metonymy and synecdoche are not necessarily phases that follow one another. It is

³⁴⁰ White, *Metahistory*, p. 62.

³⁴¹ White, *Metahistory*, p. 61.

³⁴² White, *Metahistory*, p. 38.

not different eras – such as the Cold War – that dictate the type of tropes that are employed in narrating Turkey but the narrative tradition. This does not mean that the era does not influence the representation, but a more thorough influence comes from the scholarly tradition of narrating Turkey. The trilogy of belief, tradition, and dilemma as formulated by Bevir & Rhodes is very important in understanding this.

It might have already become clear that the trope of synecdoche can be described as an idealist or even a utopian worldview. It is also about merging the categories of fact and fiction, and as such a manifestly aesthetic representation. In synecdoche, imagination is not a threat to reason but an integral part of comprehending the world. In other words, there is no conflict between reason and imagination like in metonymy but a perfect unity that is characterised by an aesthetic approach to meaning and knowledge. Because of the idealist nature of the trope of synecdoche, it easily turns to the trope of irony. Equally, the trope of metonymy quickly turns to irony, which will be discussed in the next section.

In practice, the main difference between metonymical and synecdochal tools of representation often boils down to the way in which Turkey's essence is narrated vis-à-vis the Western self: are there inherent or acquired differences between them? As Rumelili argues: 'The discourses that emphasise the exclusive aspects of European identity based on geography and culture construct Turkey as inherently different. On the other hand, the discourses that emphasise the inclusive aspects of European identity construct Turkey as different from Europe solely in terms of acquired characteristics.'³⁴³ This means that a synecdochal approach does not always produce harmonious or integrative narratives. In other words, synecdochal representations can also focus on difference, but narrate it as

³⁴³ Rumelili, 'Identity, difference and the EU', p. 44.

temporary or sporadic. In synecdoche unlike in metonymy the narrative horizon is usually set in a positive future where the prevailing difference has been solved.

Irony

White's final trope is irony, which is a very different mode to metonymy and synecdoche. Vann, for example, writes that irony 'always threatens to burst any bounds and become a "super-trope", either engulfing the others or undercutting the entire typology'.³⁴⁴ Also White notes that irony is 'in one sense metatropological, for it is deployed in the self-conscious awareness of the possible misuse of figurative language'.³⁴⁵ Despite some reservations, White considers irony as a trope of its own, and it is a particular significant mode of consciousness.³⁴⁶

At the heart of White's irony are both a self-critical and a bitter approach towards the world. It can be seen, as James Brassett argues, as a coping mechanism that in the British context is about dealing with 'their collective sense of loss: loss of empire, loss of the moral high ground, loss of economic and military credibility, loss of ignorance to Empire's excesses. In this way, irony can be more than merely playful recognition of our own certain fragilities then'.³⁴⁷ Irony is always, as White notes, 'negational' in that it attempts to challenge the hegemonic representation of reality and turn it around in a carnivalesque sense.³⁴⁸ It has a

³⁴⁴ Vann, 'The Reception', p. 151.

³⁴⁵ White, *Metahistory*, p. 37.

³⁴⁶ See also *Storia Della Storiografia*, 23 (1993), which is devoted to White and irony. It includes, amongst others, Ewa Domanska's interview with Hayden White, and Hans Kellner's widely-quoted article 'Twenty Years After: A Note on Metahistories and their Horizons'.

³⁴⁷ James Brassett, 'British irony, global justice: a pragmatic reading of Chris Brown, Banksy and Ricky Gervais', *Review of International Studies*, 35 (2009), p. 221.

³⁴⁸ More on the theory of carnivalesque, see Mikhail Bakhtin, *Rabelais and his world*, transl. Helene Iswolsky (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008).

‘potential to de-stabilise and de-naturalise hegemonic discourses of globalisation’ as well as to address questions of global ethics.³⁴⁹

There are often inbuilt hierarchies in ironic representations that attempt to either lift or lower the social and moral status of some actors in the international system. Alker notes that when we ‘describe political or social actors in terms of laughable inadequacies or ironically criticize them for redeemable failures, we place them beneath us’.³⁵⁰ These representations are often a reaction to perceived moral failings in the hegemonic order. Ewa Domanska argues that the ‘ironic apprehension of the world arouse in an atmosphere of social breakdown or cultural demise’.³⁵¹

The trope of irony also highlights the limits of our linguistic capacities to deal with our surrounding reality. Domanska further argues that ‘irony tends to turn into word play, to become a language about language, to conceive the world as trapped within a prison made of language, the world as a “forest of symbols”’.³⁵² Or as White writes, irony is ‘radically self-critical with respect not only to a given characterization of the world of experience but also to the very effort to capture adequately the truth of things in language’.³⁵³ Because of the reactionary nature of irony, it always requires a prior trope to build upon. It often produces satirical narratives of the international system that aim to reverse the unjust and hypocritical moral order.³⁵⁴ Erik Ringmar argues that since satire assumes

³⁴⁹ Brassett, ‘British irony, global justice’, p. 220.

³⁵⁰ Alker, *Rediscoveries and Reformulations*, p. 295.

³⁵¹ Domanska, ‘Beyond Irony’, p. 178.

³⁵² Domanska, ‘Beyond Irony’, p. 178.

³⁵³ White, *Metahistory*, p. 37.

³⁵⁴ More on satirical narratives in IR, see for example Ian Hall, ‘The satiric vision of politics: Ethics, interests and disorders’, *European Journal of International Relations*, 20:1 (2014), pp. 217–236; Payne, ‘Laughing off a Zombie Apocalypse: The Value of Comedic and Satirical Narratives’, *International Studies Perspectives*, doi: 10.1093/isp/ekv026

an ironic stance towards the world, it is parasitic on other narrative forms, and since it lampoons the established social order its aims are subversive rather than constructive. The basic strategy is to turn other plot structures inside-out, upside-down, or to deconstruct and reassemble them in unrecognizable patterns.³⁵⁵

White similarly writes that the ‘aim of the Ironic statement is to affirm tacitly the negative of what is on the literal level affirmed positively, or the reverse. It presupposes that the reader or auditor already knows, or is capable of recognizing, the absurdity of the characterization of the thing designated in the Metaphor, Metonymy, or Synecdoche used to give form to it’.³⁵⁶ Richard Rorty reminds that irony is, ‘if not intrinsically resentful, at least reactive Ironists have to have something to have doubts about, something from which to be alienated’.³⁵⁷ In the Western tradition of narrating Turkish foreign policy, the ironic mode is strongly present and built upon earlier analyses, which means that it cannot stand on its own. The ironic trope is, therefore, the most powerful trope in constituting the representative tradition as ‘Western’ as it presumes a shared cultural stock of narrative resources.

For example, Andrew Moravcsik and Kalypso Nicolaidis argue in *Foreign Policy* that ‘Americans pressure the EU to let Turkey into the club, but they would be astonished if Mexican President Vicente Fox asked the United States to “share” Supreme Court justices, trade negotiators, and agricultural subsidies the way Europeans do’.³⁵⁸ This is clearly an ironic statement as its aim is to reverse the

³⁵⁵ Erik Ringmar, ‘Inter-textual Relations’, p. 5.

³⁵⁶ White, *Metahistory*, p. 37.

³⁵⁷ Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*, p. 88.

³⁵⁸ Andrew Moravcsik & Kalypso Nicolaidis, ‘How to Fix Europe’s Image Problem’, *Foreign Policy* (May–June 2005), p. 72.

hierarchy between Europe and United States by highlighting the inbuilt hypocrisy in the actions of the United States. Many Western foreign policy analysts use satire as a form of irony to ‘call attention to the hypocrisy of elites that preach one thing and practice’ another with the purpose of either challenging or defending the dominant social order.³⁵⁹ To comprehend the narrative, the reader needs to know more political and historical background and the way in which the trope of irony is employed to challenge the prior tropological configurations: what is the relationship between Mexico and the United States; why is the EU referred to as a ‘club’; what is the meaning of self-sovereignty in the United States; and so on.

The aim of the narrative is to forge a stronger relationship between the United States and Europe and as such to re-unite the West, but it could be told in the trope of synecdoche too with an explicit emphasis on their similarities and shared interests. The trope of irony, however, represents a different strategy that is built around a presupposition that the reader already possesses a sense of Westness. The aim of the narrative, then, is to trigger out that emotional attachment to the West in a more complex way than in synecdoche. It is a *Western* narrative *par excellence* as it is directed primarily to a Western audience as a call for more unity.

The West serves here as an ‘idea of a social system to serve as a fixed reference point by which the flow of ephemeral events can be endowed with specifically moral meaning’.³⁶⁰ The reader is invited to ‘affirm the (often implicit) *moral code* of the satirist and perhaps even to uphold it in his or her own behaviour’.³⁶¹ Or as Dustin Griffin point out, ‘satire usually proceeds by means of clear reference to some moral standards or purposes’.³⁶² The moral call for a more united and stronger West is reiterated throughout the narrative that in the end turns

³⁵⁹ Hall, ‘The satiric vision of politics’, p. 223.

³⁶⁰ White, *The Content of the Form*, p. 22.

³⁶¹ Hall, ‘The satiric vision of politics’, p. 229, emphasis added.

³⁶² Dustin Griffin, *Satire: A Critical Introduction* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1994), p. 1.

to a synecdochal representation: ‘This concept of positive as well as negative liberties – this “European Dream” – is one that appeals to the world as much as the libertarian conception that reigns in the United States. Pragmatically advancing this vision is something Europeans owe themselves, and the world.’³⁶³

We can say that irony is the most developed trope because it requires prior knowledge and understanding in order to be comprehensible. Inter-textuality is a typical strategy in irony, and without an adequate understanding of the inbuilt references in ironic utterances the wider audience cannot properly engage with the trope. The ‘loss of the sacred’ that is associated with the ironic trope can also be interpreted as a loss of a shared meaning; when language becomes a word play that only few can decipher, its meaning is not meant to be widely shared but to enhance a more narrow group identity such as the West.

White’s own approach is ‘meta-ironical’ as he ironises irony that he sees as a mode of consciousness that the Western historical and philosophical tradition should transcend.³⁶⁴ For White, ironic or postmodern representations of history and meaning are deeply problematic because of the ‘burden of history’: the existential terror of meaningless, absurd, and formless history devoid of any myths that maintain metaphysical security.³⁶⁵ White criticises the ‘absurdist moment’ in the modern Western thought ‘which raises the critical question only to take a grim satisfaction in the contemplation of the impossibility of ever resolving it or, at the extreme limit of thought, even of asking it’.³⁶⁶ Jacques Derrida, in particular, is discussed in relation to this ironic tradition. In a sense, then, White joins Bevir & Rhodes in their criticism of an autonomous agency that is central to

³⁶³ Moravcsik & Nikolaidis, ‘Europe’s Image Problem’, p. 76.

³⁶⁴ Baird, ‘Anabasis’, p. 125.

³⁶⁵ White, *Tropics*, pp. 27–50; 261–282. See also Dirk Moses, ‘White, Traumatic Nationalism, and the Public Role of History’, *History and Theory*, 44:3 (2005), pp. 312–313.

³⁶⁶ White, *Tropics*, p. 262.

poststructuralist thought. Even more so, White calls for a sublime and aesthetic understanding of history where ‘reason and unreason coexist’ and ‘within this far from perfect reality, a courageous moral life is possible’.³⁶⁷

Understanding tropes

White’s tropes have been considered one of the most problematic areas of his work. Vann, for example, writes:

One reason why early reviews may have avoided using the word ‘tropes’ is they did not understand what they were. If so, they had plenty of company. Scholars as well acquainted with literary theory as Fredric Jameson and Dominick LaCapra confessed themselves uncertain about how ‘deep’ in consciousness the tropes are; their relationship to emplotments, modes of argument, and ideological implications; and whether they form any necessary historical or logical sequence.³⁶⁸

Similarly, Kansteiner wonders whether tropes should be considered ‘as preconceptual figures of thought which already determine the initial processing of the material, or are they more adequately described as master concepts which only guide the writing process proper, the actual emplotting of the facts?’³⁶⁹ Of course, White would be quick to replace Kansteiner’s term ‘facts’ with ‘unprocessed data’ or ‘events’, but these concerns are relevant. One way to conceptualise White’s tropes is to treat them as *projections* that are ‘always rooted in the cultural milieu of

³⁶⁷ Paul, ‘Crisis of Historicism’, p. 69.

³⁶⁸ Vann, ‘The Reception’, pp. 150–151.

³⁶⁹ Kansteiner, ‘Hayden White’s Critique’, p. 281.

the reader'.³⁷⁰ John Dryzek does not talk about tropes when he uses the term 'cultural milieu of the reader' but the political aspects of a discourse. It is still relevant here in trying to understand what White's tropes are and where they are located in relation to representation and imagination. The cultural milieu of the reader is akin to Bevir & Rhodes' 'tradition' in that we do not represent, get represented, or interpret representations outside our set of beliefs. This is what is at the core of White's tropology.

With this fundamental insight in mind, the exact location of tropes in our cognitive process becomes irrelevant. Also Bevir & Rhodes choose to talk about a wider web of beliefs and a tradition that serves as a first influence rather than precise correlations. To once more reiterate their position, Bevir & Rhodes argue that to 'explain an action, we cannot merely correlate it with an isolated attitude. Rather, we must interpret it as part of a web of beliefs and desires'.³⁷¹ The same idea is expressed in an eloquent way in White's article 'Narrativity in the Representation of Reality', which captures the essence of the issue at stake here. It seems apt to conclude the section with a quote from the article before moving on to the concept of the West that is central to the tradition of narrating Turkey. White writes that the value attached to narrativity in the representation of real events

arises out of a desire to have real events display the coherence, integrity, fullness, and closure of an image of life that is and can only be imaginary. The notion that sequences of real events possess the formal attributes of the stories we tell about imaginary events could only have its origin in wishes, daydreams, reveries. Does the world really present itself to perception in the form of well-made stories,

³⁷⁰ John S. Dryzek, 'The Mismeasure of Political Man', *The Journal of Politics*, 50 (1988), p. 708.

³⁷¹ Bevir & Rhodes, *Governance Stories*, p. 3.

with central subjects, proper beginnings, middles, and ends, and a coherence that permits us to see ‘the end’ in every beginning? ... And does the world, even the social world, ever really come to us as already narrativized, already ‘speaking itself’ from beyond the horizon of our capacity to make scientific sense of it? Or is the fiction of such a world, capable of speaking itself and of displaying itself as a form of a story, necessary for the establishment of that moral authority without which the notion of a specifically social reality would be unthinkable?³⁷²

Kenneth Burke’s rhetorical tools

Kenneth Burke was an influential American literary theorist (1897–1993) who focused on rhetorical theory, aesthetics, and philosophy in his extensive oeuvre. He challenged the orthodox understanding of language, focusing on its symbolic action in persuading the audience and the dramatic language of identification and division in rhetorical discourse. Also Burke was interested in tropes and specifically ‘with their role in the discovery and description of “the truth.”’³⁷³ Like White, Burke focused on the four master tropes of metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony. Burke applied tropes to scientific language because it is in the field of science that the discovery of ‘truth’ is set as the ultimate aim of the whole practice. Burke called the mimetic approach ‘scientific realism’ and the aesthetic approach ‘poetic realism’, noting that

³⁷² White, *The Content of the Form*, pp. 24–25.

³⁷³ Burke, *A Grammar of Motives*, p. 503.

as soon as you move into the social realm, involving the relation of man to man, mere *correlation* is not enough. Human relations must be *substantial*, related by the copulative, the 'is' of 'being'. In contrast with 'scientific realism,' 'poetic realism' is centred in this emphasis. It seeks (except insofar as it is affected by the norms of 'scientific realism') to place the motives of action, as with the relations between seminal (potential) and the growing (actualized). Again and again, there have been attempts to give us a 'science of human relations' after the analogy of the natural sciences. But there is a strategic or crucial respect in which this is impossible; namely: there can be no 'science' of substance, except insofar as one is willing to call philosophy, metaphysics, or theology 'sciences' (and they are not sciences in the sense of the positive scientific departments).³⁷⁴

Here Burke summarises the dilemma that characterises the mimetic approach in International Relations. There is a deep-seated conviction in the field that we can eventually represent human action in a scientific way if only we can create the right method for that – or that we should at least aim towards that. The aesthetic approach – or poetic realism – accepts that this is and never will be possible precisely because, as Burke notes, there can be no science of substance the same way as there is a science of correlation. When we study human action, we are ultimately interested in understanding human motivation, which is the central theme in Burke's *A Grammar of Motives*.

In the book Burke demonstrates how the four master tropes are employed as a heuristic strategy in poetic realism to make sense of human

³⁷⁴ Burke, *A Grammar of Motives*, pp. 505–506, emphases in original.

motivation, which can be considered in terms of a number of different things such as ‘conditioned reflexes, or chemicals, or the class struggles, or the love of God, or neurosis, or pilgrimage, or power, or movements of the planets, or geography, or sun spots, etc’. This thesis aims to demonstrate that the master tropes provide a meaningful direction to the motive and situate it in a cognitive location that turns it credible and eventually truthful and commonsensical. This process is not strategically driven but almost instinctive; we are often driven towards certain motives more than others. The thesis aims to understand how Turkey is represented in foreign policy analysis through various contrasting motives – some of which Burke lists above – that provide reflections about the nature of the West.

Burke emphasises that ‘the seeing of something in terms of something else involves the “carrying-over” of a term from one realm into another, a process that necessarily involves varying degrees of incongruity in that the two realms are never identical’.³⁷⁵ This is the central tenet of poetic realism and exactly what Roland Bleiker asserted earlier in the thesis in relation to the aesthetic approach in international relations; that no representation, even the most systematic empirical analysis, can be identical with its object of inquiry. That any form of representation is inevitably a process of interpretation and abstraction.

The thesis applies several notions from Burke’s oeuvre to the data set in the thesis. Firstly, Burke analyses the intertwined nature of identification and division in his *A Rhetoric of Motives*, and his insight will be used to understand how Turkey is often constructed both as a special friend and a potential enemy in Western foreign policy analysis. It will be argued later in the thesis that identifying with Turkey is, as Burke shows, ‘to confront the implications of *division*’.³⁷⁶

³⁷⁵ Burke, *A Grammar of Motives*, p. 504. See also, Kenneth Burke, *Permanence and Change: An Anatomy of Purpose* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1954).

³⁷⁶ Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives*, p. 22.

Secondly, the thesis utilises Burke's notion of 'localizing or dramatizing the principle of transformation'.³⁷⁷ This theme runs through the whole thesis, because it captures the persistent strategy in Western foreign policy analysis concerning Turkey. All the three metaphors – 'losing Turkey', 'Turkey at a crossroads', and 'Erdogan-for-Turkey' – that are examined in the thesis depict transformation in one form or another; Turkey is depicted through movement from one motive or location to another. The movement itself is laden with moral implications, which gets its figure through tropes. Permanence and change are discursively constructed in foreign policy analysis, and narrative traditions influence the ways in which change is attached to certain states. Turkey is one of those states that are persistently and generation after generation imagined through metaphors of transformation, change, and movement.

Thirdly, there are a number of important concepts in Burke's work that will be used to analyse the data set. One of these concepts is the 'all-pervasive generating principle', which means that a text reduces the complexity to one essential strand and isolates this one element as the dominant motive. The thesis also utilises Burke's term 'moralistic prophecy', which is essentially what White refers to with his term 'moralising impulse' – the moralistic nature of our speech acts. The thesis also locates instances of what Burke refers to as 'personalizing of essence', especially in the sixth chapter that focuses on the 'Erdogan-for-Turkey' metaphor. Also Burke's notion of 'scapegoat' will be applied to the data, particularly to tease out the direction on the moralising gaze: who is narrated as the main scapegoat in the analyses?

³⁷⁷ Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives*, p. 17.

George Lakoff's metaphors

In 1980 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson published a seminal book *Metaphors We Live By*, which paved the way to a whole new field in the Social Sciences that was characterised by a cognitive perspective to conceptual language. Lakoff and Johnson aim to show how conceptual metaphors frame our reality and are, as such, a question not only of representation but ontology. The concepts that we employ shape our cognition in such a fundamental way that we require critical efforts to unpack them. In his later works Lakoff has continued to analyse the hidden cognitive functions of the natural-seeming metaphors that we employ in our everyday language.

It is precisely his focus on the ostensibly commonsensical nature of our language that makes Lakoff's work so central to this thesis – it is speech acts that seem neutral to us that are used to legitimise policies. Lakoff's research on foreign policy metaphors is particularly relevant here, and the thesis utilises many of his insights in the forthcoming analysis chapters. Lakoff's metaphors that are applied to the data set include 'path to democracy', 'rational actor', 'container', 'leader-for-country', and 'state-as-person'. Also Lakoff's idea of a hidden moral order in conceptual metaphors is used to unpack the inbuilt assumptions in metaphors of foreign policy and the international system.

Conclusion

The chapter focused on the theoretical and methodological underpinnings of the thesis. The chapter first introduced the interpretative approach of Mark Bevir & R.A.W. Rhodes that focuses on beliefs, traditions, and dilemmas. It was shown that the framework is particularly suitable for a thesis that deals with the scholarly tradition of representing Turkey in foreign policy analysis. In order to tap more

closely into those beliefs, the thesis utilises Hayden White's tropology and especially its three tropes of metonymy, synecdoche, and irony. The chapter demonstrated that those three tropes represents different ways of narrating reality, and enable the thesis to form a more nuanced picture of the way in which Turkey has been narrated in foreign policy analysis.

The following chapter attempts to demonstrate how that continuum operates and, for its part, renders the West meaningful. The chapter focuses on the 'losing Turkey' narrative that has been a popular way of representing Turkey in foreign policy analysis. The chapter shows that the narrative is engaged with from different moral perspectives depending on the author's tropological choice and imagination.

Chapter 5 – The ‘losing Turkey’ metaphor

Introduction

Students in IR are taught that the ancient thinker Thucydides is the father of scientific realism with the Melian dialogue in his *History of the Peloponnesian War* representing a prime example of the realist logic of reasoning. F.M. Cornford shows in his eloquent book *Thucydides Mythistoricus* in 1907 that instead of being a textbook in strategy as usually suggested, Thucydides’ magnum opus is a lesson in morality.³⁷⁸ It is, as Cornford and many others after him argue, narrated in a tragic mode of explanation.³⁷⁹

The aim of the following chapters is similar: to show that instead of neutrally, scientifically, or purely analytically examining Turkey and its actions in the international system, Western foreign policy analysis provides a lesson in morality. It will be shown that in Western foreign policy analysis concerning Turkey also the West is represented as either a virtuous or a repugnant actor in the international system. There is a web of beliefs influencing the narrative tradition with a moral value attached to the explanatory factors: class, religion, ethnicity, political geography, history, or the style of governance.

This chapter analyses the way in which Western foreign policy analysis has narrated Turkey as a ‘lost’ country and show that there are different tropological strategies employed in the narrative tradition.³⁸⁰ There are several

³⁷⁸ F.M. Cornford, *Thucydides Mythistoricus* (London: Edward Arnold, 1907).

³⁷⁹ See especially Richard Ned Lebow, *The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests and Orders* (Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 41–44; David Bedford & Thom Workman, ‘The tragic reading of the Thucydidean tragedy’, *Review of International Studies*, 27 (2001), pp. 51–67.

³⁸⁰ In many ways, ‘losing’ is an unusual metaphor to use in foreign policy analysis and requires good knowledge of the cultural context within which the narrative resources are employed. That the metaphor is employed in foreign policy analysis is a clear sign that the analysis is speaking to a Western audience, which is envisioned as a close community that shares cultural symbols. A few examples of the metaphor are in order. Andrew Mango, for example, asks: ‘Is the West “losing” Turkey?’ The question has been prompted by the accession to power in Ankara in June 1996 of a coalition government in which the Islamist Welfare Party

arguments that the chapter proposes. Firstly, the scholarly debate – which represents a continuum with journalistic and foreign policy think tank narratives – represents an important element of the discourse concerning the idea of the West. In other words, in narrating Turkey, foreign policy scholars and analysts are also narrating the West.

This continuum is a type of ‘resonance machine’ where ‘diverse elements *infiltrate* each other, metabolizing into a moving complex. Spiritual sensibilities, economic presumptions, and state priorities slide and blend into one another, though each also retains a modicum of independence from the others.’³⁸¹

The process forms what Bevir & Rhodes call tradition that hosts a web of beliefs and that can slowly change through dilemmas.

Secondly, the representations rely on narrative resources that have been passed down from generation to generation in the tradition of narrating Turkey in foreign policy analysis. Thirdly, the debate concerning Turkey is not neutral or objective analysis but a highly moral and aesthetic undertaking and

(Refah Partisi, or RP) is the senior partner, with its leader, Necmettin Erbakan, the prime minister.’ Andrew Mango, ‘From Ataturk to Erbakan’, *The National Interest*, 46 (Winter 1996–1997), pp. 84–89. Or as Mustafa Akyol writes: ‘These days, most of Washington is asking, “Who lost Turkey?” rather than envisioning more extensive cooperation with it.’ Mustafa Akyol, ‘An Unlikely Trio’, *Foreign Affairs*, 89:5 (2010), p. 124). Also Henri J. Barkey employs the ‘losing’ metaphor when he notes that ‘Israel, already isolated in the region, found that losing Turkey – a country with which it had built a strong relationship and whose fortunes were on the rise – was more damaging psychologically than materially’. Henri J. Barkey, ‘The Apology Heard ‘Round the World’, *The National Interest* (2 April 2013), available at <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-apology-heard-round-the-world-8294> (1 July 2016). The metaphor of losing in foreign policy analysis is not limited to Turkey. One of the earliest and most well known cases of narrating the loss of a country is the case of ‘losing China’ in the 1940s when it was frequently argued in foreign policy analysis that America lost China. Noam Chomsky connects the losing metaphor to the global decline of the United States, arguing that ‘American decline is real, though the apocalyptic vision reflects the familiar ruling-class perception that anything short of total control amounts to total disaster. Despite the piteous laments, the US remains the world dominant power by a large margin, and no competitor is in sight, not only in the military dimension, in which, of course, the US reigns supreme’. Noam Chomsky ‘“Losing” the world: American decline in perspective’, part 1, *The Guardian* (14 February 2012), available at <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2012/feb/14/losing-the-world-american-decline-noam-chomsky> (15 August 2015). In foreign policy analysis, the journal *Foreign Affairs* has been particularly active in employing the metaphor of losing. For example, only in 2006–2007 there were articles published with titles such as ‘Is Washington Losing Latin America?’ (Peter Hakim, January/February 2006), ‘Losing Russia’ (Dimitri K. Simes, November/December 2007), and ‘Who Lost Iraq?’ (James Dobbins, September/October 2007).

³⁸¹ William Connolly, *Capitalism and Christianity, American Style* (Duke University Press, 2008), p. 39.

narrated through different tropes. The chapter employs White's tropology to most effectively tease out the web of beliefs that influences the tradition of narrating Turkey in foreign policy analysis. Finally, it will be shown that the tropes of metonymy, synecdoche, and irony are not entirely separate categories of thought and (speech) action but often overlap and complement each other. This is partly because there are different levels of analysis operating in the narrative tradition. Some narratives focus on and moralise the nature of Turkey as a structure and others on the agency of Turkish governance.

This means that there can be, for example, a metonymical ontology with a synecdochal representation of the agency. In other words, even if Turkey is represented in a metonymical fashion as a torn country that is inherently different from the West, its leadership might be narrated as a force that can contain that torn-ness and aim to integrate Turkey into the West. Like all the other elements in this representational tradition, also the choice of the level of analysis is influenced by the narrator's moral and aesthetic preferences.

The triggering events

To examine the tradition of narrating Turkey in foreign policy analysis means that one also needs to map out the events it refers to and engages with. In other words, the analysis needs to be located in the relevant political context. The purpose is not to analyse the weight or significance of the events but to show how they are made to function as part of a foreign policy analysis narrative. Still, it can be noted that when judged from a material or realist perspective, the events that have triggered the 'losing Turkey' narrative seem insignificant, which only confirms that the way in which Turkey is represented is influenced more by the

narrator's web of beliefs than by purely material or rational factors.³⁸² It also shows that there are certain cultural, historical, and political symbols in the international system that can trigger a strong reaction, which can only be comprehended through an ideational rather than a realist approach.

There are many events that have triggered the 'losing Turkey' narrative: The election victory of the religiously inspired Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002, Turkey's opposition to the Iraq War in 2003, Armenian genocide resolution in the United States that was introduced but postponed in 2007 and later passed in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives in 2010, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan leaving the stage prematurely at the World Economic Forum in 2009, Turkey voting against the UN sanctions on Iran in 2010, and the Gaza flotilla raid in which the Israeli military killed nine activists of Turkish and Turkish American origin. To state that these events 'triggered' the interpretation of Turkey being potentially 'lost' is to argue that these events were woven into an existing narrative rather than independently provoking the interpretation.

Also speech acts have been employed as narrative resources in foreign policy analysis concerning Turkey. One of the most prominent one has been the statement by United States Defence Secretary Robert Gates in 2010: 'I personally think that if there is anything to the notion that Turkey is, if you will, moving eastward, it is, in my view, in no small part because it was pushed, and pushed by some in Europe refusing to give Turkey the kind of organic link to the

³⁸² Owen Matthews argues that in the question of 'losing Turkey', the 'proximate causes are numerous as they are petty, from bickering over Cyprus to a vote by the French Parliament criminalizing denial of American "genocide" at the hands of the Turks in 1915'. Owen Matthews, 'Who lost Turkey?', *Newsweek* (11 December 2006), available at <http://www.newsweek.com/who-lost-turkey-105633> (20 August 2015).

West that Turkey sought.’³⁸³ Gates’ statement was widely used as a narrative resource in the debate about the nature of the West as a transatlantic relationship (see pages 90–92). These events will be discussed in the forthcoming sections in reference to the different waves of the ‘losing Turkey’ narrative.

It is sometimes suggested that the ‘losing Turkey’ narrative is a conservative or neoconservative representation in the United States. For example, Bill Park argues that ‘Turkey’s apparent embrace of two of the more radical Middle Eastern states has caused some conservative commentators in the USA to suspect that Turkey is being “lost” to the West altogether’.³⁸⁴ Or as Nick Danforth writes in *Foreign Policy*: ‘Lately, some on the right in Washington have fretted that Turkey’s religiously oriented Justice and Development Party, the AKP, will distance the country from its Western allies, eroding secularism as it seeks tighter bonds within the Middle East.’³⁸⁵ The chapter shows that the conservative ‘losing Turkey’ narrative represents only one particular interpretation, often based on metonymy. There are also other ‘losing Turkey’ narratives – arising from the tropes of synecdoche or irony – that provide very different representations of Turkey and the West.

Finally, it has also been suggested that the ‘losing Turkey’ narrative is particularly popular with foreign policy think tanks. Mark Steyn, for example, writes: ‘As the think-tankers like to say: “Who lost Turkey?”’³⁸⁶ It is true that the ‘losing’ rhetoric is ubiquitous in the foreign policy think tank and policy circles, but the narrative resources that they employ are shared with foreign policy

³⁸³ ‘US Defence Secretary Gates blames EU for Turkey “drift”’, *BBC News* (9 June 2010), available at <http://www.bbc.com/news/10275379> (15 August 2015).

³⁸⁴ Bill Park, *Modern Turkey: People, state and foreign policy in a globalized world* (London & New York: Routledge, 2012), pp. 115–116.

³⁸⁵ Nick Danforth, ‘How the West Lost Turkey’, *Foreign Policy* (25 November 2009), available at <http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/11/25/how-the-west-lost-turkey/> (20 August 2015).

³⁸⁶ Mark Steyn, ‘Who lost Turkey?’, *The Washington Times* (4 June 2010), available at <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/jun/4/who-lost-turkey/> (20 August 2015).

scholars with a strong continuum between them. Most foreign policy think-tankers also publish with foreign policy journals, and policy makers contribute to the scholarly debate. One of the early uses of the 'losing' narrative appeared not in a think tank environment but in a Harvard University working paper 'Turkey Lost? An Attempt to Find a Roadmap for Turkey's Integration into Europe' by Friedrich Gröning.³⁸⁷

The chapter first discusses the metonymical representation of the 'losing Turkey' narrative, analysing not only the events that it treats but also its political and moral underpinnings. It then examines the narrative from a synecdochal perspective, showing that it derives from a very different moral and political consideration than the metonymical representation. Finally, the chapter engages with the 'losing Turkey' narrative from an ironic perspective and aims to demonstrate that the trope of irony brings in a whole new level to the debate with a different set of aesthetic preferences.

Metonymy: Turkey is lost despite the West

The trope of metonymy could also be called a 'reductive' or 'conflict-focused' interpretation because it is based upon a conviction that the international system is made up of conflicting parts that are inherently different from each other. The division can be religious, ethnic, cultural, civilisational, or any other, but the main emphasis is on that difference and its political consequences. This conviction, then, influences the narrator's web of beliefs concerning his or her subject of study. This means that the question of 'losing Turkey' becomes a question of Turkey simply being too different from the West and sooner or later inevitably

³⁸⁷ Friedrich Gröning, 'Turkey Lost? An Attempt to Find a Roadmap for Turkey's Integration into Europe', *Weatherhead Centre for International Affairs, Harvard University* (Cambridge, May 1999).

breaking away from the unnatural Cold War alliance with the West. The assumption is that Turkey never was or can become Western, and that the political project of making Turkey a Western state will and should fail.

The thesis argues that the way in which Turkey is narrated in foreign policy analysis is very much influenced by the ‘Turkish dilemma’ of an Islamic empire turning into a secular and European state in 1923. In the metonymical reading, the Turkish dilemma is a particularly important narrative resource with a powerful moral preference: the break away from the Ottoman Empire was necessary because Islam explains Turkey’s weakness in the international system. In other words, religion is given a formative role in the narrative and represented as the main dividing factor in the international system. It follows that Turkey should but cannot eradicate Islam, because it is so inherent to the country, which means that Turkey is always on the brink of being ‘lost’.

The metonymical representation is particularly popular with conservative foreign policy analysts both in the United States and Europe. Soner Cagaptay of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy is one of the most prominent narrators of the metonymical interpretation. Cagaptay’s narrative is teleological in that everything that the AKP government does is a sign of its ‘creeping Islamisation’ and anti-Western tendencies. As such, the formative event is the AKP’s electoral victory in 2002, and all subsequent events are interpreted as evidence of the government’s Islamic and anti-Western agenda. There is nothing that the West can do to influence that agenda because the religious identity is so inherent to the agency of AKP and its leader. In metonymy, then, Turkey is lost *despite* the West. For example, writing in the *Jerusalem Post* in 2009, Cagaptay argues: ‘Despite Obama’s efforts, Turkish foreign policy is drifting further away from the US. The cause of this is the Justice and Development Party (AKP)

government in Ankara seeing the world very differently than the US administration.’³⁸⁸ About seven months later Cagaptay writes in the *Wall Street Journal*:

The real problem is that the ruling Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) doesn’t share the dream of a liberal, Western Turkey ... the reason Turkey will not join the EU any time soon is not because of European reservations toward a Muslim country but because of the Turkish government’s reservations toward European values.³⁸⁹

How is Cagaptay contributing to the debate on the West as the thesis suggests? In his analysis, the West is represented as morally superior to Turkey that under the AKP is ‘becoming more like Russia than Europe’.³⁹⁰ In other words, Turkey turning its foreign policy attention to the Middle East, as Cagaptay suggests, is not a sign of the West’s failure to inspire and act as a moral and political example to follow in the international system but the result of the AKP’s religious impulse that guides it toward other Muslim countries and away from the West.

This needs to be located in the context of the post 9/11 environment that was characterised by serious doubts in the West concerning the values that the West was seen to represent (see pages 102–104). What Cagaptay is saying is that there is nothing wrong with Western values – the problem is with Islamic values. It is Muslims that are dividing the world to ‘us’ (Muslims) versus

³⁸⁸ Soner Cagaptay, ‘As Turkey Pulls Away’, *Jerusalem Post* (5 December 2009), available at <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/as-turkey-pulls-away> (20 August 2015).

³⁸⁹ Soner Cagaptay, ‘Turkey Lost Turkey’, *Wall Street Journal* (12 July 2010), available at <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704911704575326712932649550> (20 August 2015).

³⁹⁰ Cagaptay, ‘Turkey lost Turkey’.

‘them’ (the West).³⁹¹ He advocates a secular Turkey and sees a ‘glimmer of hope’ in the prospects of the secular opposition in Turkey forming a more powerful force that can challenge the AKP.³⁹²

The link between morality and narrative that Hayden White emphasises in his work is particularly explicit in Cagaptay’s later oeuvre. As White argues: ‘One can never move with any politically effective confidence from an apprehension of “the way things actually are or have been” to the kind of moral insistence that they “should be otherwise” without passing through a feeling or repugnance for and negative judgment of the condition that is to be superseded.’³⁹³ The agency of AKP is judged negatively with cognitive cues being employed to forge a historical link to a past that has a repugnant image in the West. Referring to Erdogan as the new Sultan is the most powerful of such cues because it connects Erdogan to a governance tradition that is usually characterised as corrupt and violently religious.

Even if Cagaptay advocates secularism as an important Western value, his metonymical representation is still a ‘civilisation West’ narrative because it is only Islam, not religions in general, that he sees as problematic. The West, then, is a Judeo-Christian community that cannot accommodate Islam. Turkey therefore needs to be secular in order to be Western, and that is also ‘what Atatürk would have wanted’.³⁹⁴ References to Atatürk and the Turkish dilemma are frequent: ‘If Atatürk’s dream is ever to come true, Turkey will need a new government.’³⁹⁵ There are few other leaders that would be referred to in

³⁹¹ Soner Cagaptay, ‘Sultan of the Muslim World’, *Foreign Affairs* (15 November 2010), available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2010-11-15/sultan-muslim-world> (25 August 2015).

³⁹² Cagaptay, ‘Turkey lost Turkey’.

³⁹³ White, *The Content of the Form*, pp. 72–73.

³⁹⁴ Soner Cagaptay, ‘Where Goes the U.S.-Turkish Relationship?’, *Middle East Quarterly*, 11:4 (Fall 2004), p. 52.

³⁹⁵ Cagaptay, ‘Turkey lost Turkey’. See also Soner Cagaptay, *Islam, Secularism and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who is a Turk?* (Routledge, 2006); Soner Cagaptay, ‘Is Turkey Leaving the West?’, *Foreign Affairs* (26 October

contemporary foreign policy analysis as frequently as Atatürk who acts more as a metaphor than an actual political actor in the narratives.

Similarly, one of the early narratives of 'losing Turkey' by Owen Matthews in *Newsweek* represents the relationship between secularism and Islam as the deepest 'war' that 'have long raged beneath the surface of the Turkish republic'. Matthews continues that 'since the founding of the Turkish republic on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire by Gen. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Turkey's rulers have looked to the secular West rather than the more religious East' but with the AKP government 'that line has been blurred'.³⁹⁶ Another European commentator, French ambassador and journalist Eric Rouleau, dedicates several pages of his *Foreign Affairs* article to Atatürk and his legacy that is 'broadly positive in content'.³⁹⁷ It is almost like one hundred years had not passed in foreign policy analysis; so similar are the narrative resources employed in representing Turkey then and now. Robert Montagne, for example, writes in *Foreign Affairs* in the 1950s: 'Salvation seems to lie only in the formation of strong governments, and the legendary figure of Kemal Atatürk of Anatolia shines as a desirable model.'³⁹⁸

Anti-Western masses vs. educated elites

If we compared the foreign policy analysis terminology then and now, we could see how the norms and accepted discourse practices evolve in the scholarly tradition through dilemmas. Foreign policy analysis in the early part of the 1900s would not be politically correct today – to talk about racial characteristics, for example, is no longer part of the accepted narrative tradition. But that does not

2009), available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2009-10-26/turkey-leaving-west> (20 August 2015).

³⁹⁶ Matthews, 'Who lost Turkey?'

³⁹⁷ Eric Rouleau, 'Turkey's Dream of Democracy', *Foreign Affairs* (November/December 2000), p. 103.

³⁹⁸ Robert Montagne, 'Modern Nations and Islam', *Foreign Affairs* (July 1952), p. 587.

mean that the moral and aesthetic preference that influences the narrative is any different.

For example, Robert Montagne wrote in the aforementioned foreign policy analysis in 1951 of the ‘ignorant and emotional masses’ that ‘exerted strong influence in both foreign and domestic affairs’.³⁹⁹ Steyn argues in his *Washington Times* article 60 years later that ‘Ataturk and most of his supporters were from Rumelia, and they imposed the *modern* Turkish republic on a reluctant Anatolia, where Ataturk’s distinction between the state and Islam was never accepted. Now the Anatolians don’t have to accept it. The *swelling* population has *spilled out* of its *rural* hinterland and into the once solidly Kemalist cities’.⁴⁰⁰

The metonymical battle here is between the primitive masses and the modern elite that seek to prevent the former from spilling out of its rural areas. As such, it uses *class* as an explanatory factor with rural Anatolians being represented as what Susan Harding has famously called the ‘repugnant cultural other’: ‘They are clinging to traditions. They are reacting against rapid social change. They are unfit for modern life.’⁴⁰¹ Again, In Steyn’s analysis the problem is not universal but specific to weak and unconfident countries such as Turkey: ‘A confident cultural can dominate far larger numbers of people, as England did for much of modern history.’⁴⁰² There is no analytical definition as regards what ‘confidence’ exactly entails, which points towards Zarakol’s critique of the masters in the international system seeing their condition as ‘natural’ and ‘matter of fact’ (see pages 2–3). It seems that Western states such as the United Kingdom simply are more ‘confident’ than others.

³⁹⁹ Montagne, ‘Modern Nations and Islam’, p. 587.

⁴⁰⁰ Steyn, ‘Who lost Turkey?’, emphases added.

⁴⁰¹ Susan Harding, ‘Representing Fundamentalism: The Problem of the Repugnant Cultural Other’, *Social Research*, 58:2 (Summer 1991), p. 373.

⁴⁰² Steyn, ‘Who lost Turkey?’

There is an assumption inbuilt in the metonymical narrative of Turkish elites needing to contain the primitive masses that the masses are inherently anti-Western. Again, it is an assumption that has been passed down from generation to generation. Writing in *Foreign Affairs* in 1924–1925, E., using a pseudonym, argues:

A few doctrines strive to ram Western ideas, including laicism, down the throats of a people essentially anti-Western and intensely reactionary. And there is little result from it all. The truth is that among Turkey's eight million people the number of intelligent, progressive and capable men are very few indeed. They are attempting to make the country pull itself up by its own boot-straps, and incompetence, inertia and a certain childish form of chauvinistic xenophobia meet them at every turn.⁴⁰³

Employing similar narrative resources, Nick Danforth argues in *Foreign Policy* in 2009: 'Understanding Erdogan's political calculus starts with understanding that in Turkey anger at the West is near universal. Where Islamists see a global crusade against their faith, secular leftists see global capitalism and U.S. imperialism.'⁴⁰⁴ It needs to be reiterated here that to represent Turkish masses as inherently anti-

⁴⁰³ E., 'Turkish facts and fantasies', p. 602.

⁴⁰⁴ Danforth, 'How the West Lost Turkey'. Most commonly the narrative of Turkey as fundamentally anti-Western is connected to religion; that Muslims have an inherent repugnance towards the West. Aram Bakshian Jr. argues that a 'strong residue of sentiment remained in the country that resisted any impulse toward Westernization and longed for a return to that golden age of Islam that lit up the world before the West's inexorable rise'. The author's analysis is strongly influenced by his web of beliefs that are profoundly against Islam. He argues that Islam has had no positive or progressive political or cultural impact: 'the intellectual, spiritual and aesthetic roots of the short-lived golden age of Islamic culture were almost entirely pre-Islamic in their origin and nature'. There is a strong metonymical division between the morally righteous Ataturk who advocated secularism and the morally repugnant Erdogan who is a devout Muslim. Bakshian Jr. describes Ataturk as one of the 'twentieth century's most remarkable leaders' and a 'man of iron will and incredible vision' while Erdogan is cited as being a 'strange joke'. 'Erdogan, the Anti-Ataturk', *The National Interest* (September/October 2013), available at <http://nationalinterest.org/article/erdogan-the-anti-ataturk-8958> (1 September 2015).

Western is to make a metonymical claim that if Turkey is lost it is not because of but *despite* the West. The West in other words, retains its moral leadership and the ignorant Anatolian peasant is made responsible for the situation. It is not a self-critical mode of Western explanation but the very contrary: an anti-Western stance equals an ignorant attitude, which is an inherent quality of Turkish masses rather than a reaction to Western actions. As it will be shown later in the chapter, in the trope of irony the situation is interpreted in a reverse way with the West and its supposed values being challenged.

Too different to understand each other

Part of the metonymical imagination is the idea that Turkey and the West cannot understand each other because they belong to different civilisations or follow a different set of morals. In the metonymically inclined foreign policy analysis narratives, Turkey is also often presented in an Orientalist fashion as being an emotional – angry, proud, and sensitive – as opposed to a rational actor in the international system.⁴⁰⁵ Samuel J. Brannen, for example, writes that

⁴⁰⁵ There is an emerging field of literature concerning emotions in international relations, and the way in which Turkey is represented as an emotional actor in foreign policy analysis would merit an entire thesis chapter. There is not enough space here for a detailed analysis, but a few examples are in order. Dankwart A. Rustow writes in his article ‘Turkey’s Travails’ (*Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1979, p. 82) that ‘Turks themselves are proud, sometimes too proud to explain themselves to others’. Also Zeyno Baran refers to Turkey’s pride when he notes: ‘As a charismatic and handsome young leader, he (Cem Uzan) seems to be imitating Turkey’s founder Ataturk in giving Turks back their pride ... While such domestic intrigues may not interest senior policy makers in Washington, these officials need to better understand the field they are playing so we do not end up discussing “who lost Turkey” in a few years.’ ‘The U.S.-Turkey Partnership: Looking to the Future’, *The National Interest* (9 July 2003). And in a different article: ‘Turks understand that they are fairly dependent on the United States for political and economic reasons, but they are also a proud people and opinion may shift in an unpredictable direction if the perception grows that Turkey is trapped, with no feasible choices.’ Zeyno Baran, ‘Turkey’s Difficult Balancing Act’, *The National Interest* (29 January 2003). Also Morton Abramowitz writes that the Armenian genocide issue is ‘a matter of national honor in a country where nationalism remains very strong and politically potent’. ‘The Never-Ending Armenian Genocide Resolution’, *The National Interest* (19 March 2010). Turkey is also frequently represented as ‘angry’, ‘fearful’ or ‘nostalgic’ in foreign policy analysis. For example, Bruce R. Kuniholm explains that the Turkish Government ‘looks to Europe and fears the consequences of rejection’. ‘Turkey and the West’. Oded Eran (‘Israel-Turkey Reconciliation Still Remote’, *The National Interest*, 18 April 2013) talks about Erdogan’s ‘fury’ and ‘anger’ while Zeyno Baran (‘The Dating Game’, *The National Interest*, Spring 2004) notes that ‘Turkey, *upset* at receiving an unclear date, felt once more that the EU had snubbed them’. For Ariel Cohen (‘Mr. Erdogan Goes to

The Obama administration believed it was showing a more inclusive U.S. approach that could *heal wounds* and build consensus on emerging crises. It was wrong. To Erdogan and his *cronies*, the engagement consistently affirmed that the United States needed Turkey more than Turkey needed the United States ... senior U.S. officials and many Washington foreign policy elites continue to observe as a tenet of unswerving faith that the United States might *inadvertently 'lose Turkey'* if its leaders are ever pressed too hard or disagreed too publicly. This is not true.⁴⁰⁶

Brannen connects the question of 'losing Turkey' to a lack of understanding between Turkey and the United States. At the same time, the way in which Turkey is narrated reflects a strong repugnance towards the AKP government that is presented as an aggressive, dangerous, power-hungry, and disillusioned actor in the international system, 'a pariah with a regional policy most akin to Iran's'.⁴⁰⁷

The moral focus is on the agency of the AKP rather than the political or cultural

Shanghai', *The National Interest*, 18 February 2013), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 'fits Erdogan's Islamist impulse to defy the West and dream of an alternative to it'. Finally, Aram Bakshian Jr. represents Turkey in emotional terms in his article 'Erdogan, the Anti-Ataturk': 'Why this nostalgia for a romanticized, not to say imaginary, Ottoman-Islamic past? Perhaps it begins with a *deep sense of grievance* on the part of Turkish Islamists, shared by their brethren throughout the Middle East'. Dominique Moïsi argues in his *Foreign Affairs* article 'The Clash of Emotions' (2007) that geopolitics today is characterised by a clash of emotions with the Middle East being driven by a culture of humiliation that is quickly devolving into a culture of hatred. It should be rather argued that in foreign policy analysis Muslim countries are *represented* as being emotion-driven in general and feeling humiliated and angry in particular. In the article and later in his book *The Geopolitics of Emotions: How Cultures of Fear, Humiliation, and Hope are Reshaping the World* (London: The Bodley Head, 2009), Moïsi does not limit emotional foreign policy behavior only to Turkey and other Muslim countries but argues that also other regions are driven by emotions with Europe being fearful and Asia hopeful. A good overview of the literature on emotions on IR, see Brent Sasley, 'Emotions in International Relations', *E-International Relations* (12 June 2013), available at <http://www.e-ir.info/2013/06/12/emotions-in-international-relations/> (1 September 2015).

⁴⁰⁶ Samuel J. Brannen, 'Troublesome Erdogan Feeding on U.S. Indulgence', *The National Interest* (21 August 2013), available at <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/troublesome-erdogan-feeding-us-indulgence-8926> (1 September 2015), emphases added.

⁴⁰⁷ Brannen, 'Troublesome Erdogan'.

structure of Turkey that characterises the previous metonymical narrative explaining Turkey through the class prism of uneducated masses. Even though the masses consist of individual agencies, they are represented as an unchanging structure that dictates Turkey's past, present, and the future. There are two different levels of analysis at play here, which will be discussed in more detail in the fifth chapter.

In Brennan's analysis, Turkey is represented as an emotion-driven actor that needs its wounds to be healed but is too proud to understand it. Also Henri J. Barkey writes that 'Turkish leaders seem incapable of understanding that while many in the West may be extremely frustrated with Israel policy, the burden of history limits and shapes the nature of their discourse on the subject'.⁴⁰⁸ Barkey seems to suggest that Turkey does not share the same cultural significations with the West. Similarly, Zeyno Baran writes:

On a recent trip to Turkey with the Transatlantic program of the Council on Foreign Relations, I realized that at the root of the problem was the *inability* of Turkish decision makers to *fully grasp* what a trauma the attacks of September 11, 2001 were for the Americans in general and, especially, for Washington policymakers [...] *Not understanding* the rules of the game led Turkey to play by the old ones.⁴⁰⁹

⁴⁰⁸ Henri J. Barkey, 'The Apology Heard 'Round the World'.

⁴⁰⁹ Baran, 'The U.S.-Turkey Partnership: Looking to the Future', emphases added. Dankwart A. Rustow's similarly writes: 'No nation that has maintained close relations with the United States for the last generation is *so little understood* by *well-informed* Americans as is Turkey ... it requires a larger *effort of the imagination* than most of us are accustomed to making to grasp *the seeming contradiction* of a country that is part in Europe, part in Asia, bordering on the Soviet Union in the north and the Arab countries in the south; a developing nation that is dedicated and vociferous democracy; a Muslim population in a secular state; not to mention a country with a Central Asian language written in the Roman alphabet.' 'Turkey's Travails'.

Again, the article is based upon a conviction that Turkey and the West have different cultural symbols that resonate. The attacks of 9/11 were widely represented as an offensive against the West and its values with the bombings in Madrid (2004) and London (2005) linked to the same narrative. That Turkey does not share the ‘Western narrative’ is a sign of the country belonging to a different cultural or even a civilisational sphere. As it has been argued, the ‘civilisation West’ is always told through the trope of metonymy, which becomes the most pronounced in the idea of a ‘fortress Europe’; that the European Union is an entity that cannot be joined but born into. Turkey is an important resource in the narrative, which is why there was such a strong foreign policy analysis reaction to Robert Gates’ statement about Turkey’s loss being the EU’s fault.

Europe as a metonymical fortress

The early 2000s witnessed a fierce debate on Turkey’s possible EU membership, intensifying towards the opening of the accession talks in 2005. A year earlier there was a ‘Talking Turkey’ exchange published in *Foreign Affairs* between Wolfgang Schäuble, German cabinet minister, and David L. Phillips, Director of the Program on Peace-building and Rights at Columbia University’s Institute for the Study of Human Rights. The exchange well illustrates the interplay between metonymical and synecdochal narrative elements. Wolfgang Schäuble first puts forward a metonymically inclined ‘civilisation West’ narrative:

The EU is, after all, European. Although Australia or Japan could fulfill its accession criteria, no one has proposed them as potential EU members. Similarly, countries such as Turkey and Russia only partly share Europe’s *heritage* and *geography*; in other parts, they

definitely do not ... This will not be what many in Turkey want to hear, and there are good strategic reasons to get Ankara as close to Brussels as possible. But Europe's top priority should be the success of its own integration.⁴¹⁰

In his response, David L. Phillips advocates a more synecdochal 'modern West' narrative:

Schäuble, by expressing his doubt that Turkey could ever become truly 'European,' voices the view of Europe's older generation. They may still think that Europe is homogenous. But *times have changed*. Today's Europe is a *rich* mosaic of cultures, ethnicities, and religions. It is *a community of values*, in which democracy is *strengthened* by diversity.⁴¹¹

The next section discusses synecdochal narrative elements in more detail, but it can be noted here Phillips' focus is on integration and harmony instead of reduction and division, and he strengthens his narrative by presenting Schäuble's interpretation as belonging to a past that represents less progressive values and norms. This means that there is an interesting interplay between metonymical and synecdochal narrative elements: Phillips presents a more synecdochal representation but uses metonymical narrative strategies. His narrative is more universalistic than Schäuble's, but there is still a moral repugnance towards the

⁴¹⁰ Schäuble & Phillips, 'Talking Turkey', p. 136, emphases added.

⁴¹¹ Schäuble & Phillips, 'Talking Turkey', p. 137, emphases added. See also David L. Phillips, 'Turkey's Dreams of Accession', *Foreign Affairs* (September/October 2004), pp. 86–97.

‘elitists’ in Europe than he implicitly represents as prejudiced, outdated, and lacking in higher understanding of values and humanity.⁴¹²

It is still not an Enlightenment-type metonymical representation, because although the Enlightenment perceives the past as an era of unreason, it was their present that was a battle for a future of reason and higher ideals. In Phillips’ narrative, the ideal Europe is already here, not in an imaginary future. As such, the focus is not on a present conflict but on the present harmony. It is also a strategic narrative that seeks to draw a line between different generations within Europe. The difference is that Phillips is not seeking to deny Schäuble’s Europeaness – it is about difference on the inside – whereas Schäuble is denying Turks their Europeaness – which is about inside/outside dynamics.

In order to further illustrate the difference between metonymical and synecdochal elements in foreign policy analysis concerning Turkey, the chapter moves on to analyse more examples of narratives that employ synecdochal elements. It will be shown in the next sections that one needs to be careful with the nuances in narrating morality in foreign policy analysis. For example, the seemingly harmony-seeking claim of Turkey finally having been *found* as an Islamic regional power essentialises Turkey’s identity in such a way that the narrative is more conflict-driven than integration seeking. The trope of synecdoche is, in many ways, the most difficult of the three tropes because purely integrative or harmonious aims and outcomes rarely exist in foreign policy analysis. A synecdochal representation of Turkey is more about Turkey being a state like any other in the international system and not inherently ‘different’ or ‘unique’ like the metonymical representation suggests.

⁴¹² Phillips writes that ‘Europe should make itself a magnet for those seeking a better life, not a target for groups that resent its elitism’, Schäuble & Phillips, ‘Talking Turkey’, p. 137.

Synecdoche: Turkey as a 'normal' state

We can begin to unravel the challenging nature of the trope of synecdoche by shortly discussing it in relation to the realist paradigm in international relations – which, one must add, is not the only paradigm in IR that might have a tendency towards metonymy. One would assume that realism is a typical metonymy because it is focused on conflict between states and represents, as John Mearsheimer notes, a highly pessimistic worldview.⁴¹³ At the same time, as Mearsheimer continues, it does not discriminate between ‘good’ states and ‘bad’ states because all states simply act according to the same logic dictated by the structure of the anarchic system.

There are different interpretations of this logic in realist traditions, but Mearsheimer argues that it explains why many Americans dislike realism – they see America as a ‘highly moral country that behaves according to a different logic than most other states’.⁴¹⁴ In seeing all states as equal in terms of their morality and the logic of action, realism is closer to synecdochal harmony that emphasises similarity over difference. As such, realism is a good example of how different tropes are not entirely separate categories but can and do overlap and intertwine. This is why we need the interpretative approach to analyse narratives and the tropes that they are built upon; without the interpretive research agenda they task of examining the overlapping, intertextual, and complex webs of meaning becomes difficult.

Another misconception concerns the idea that Europeans would represent a synecdochal worldview with their ‘idealism’ and Americans a metonymical worldview with their ‘realism’ (see chapter 2). In the extensive data

⁴¹³ ‘Conversations with History: John Mearsheimer’.

⁴¹⁴ ‘Conversations with History: John Mearsheimer’.

set of the thesis, such a division is not present. The synecdochal representation is equally if not more popular in the United States as in Europe. As earlier noted, it is more a question of different set of beliefs rather than geography. What is apparent, however, is that the trope of synecdoche is less prevalent than metonymy and irony, and that it was more popular during than after the Cold War years. This is only natural because Turkey was politically part of the West through NATO, and as such widely considered a 'Western' state as stipulated by the 'political West' narrative. There were no 'losing Turkey' narratives during the Cold War years and Turkey was widely consider a 'normal' Western states.

For example, Fitzroy Maclean, Scottish soldier, writer, diplomat, and politician, wrote in *Foreign Affairs* in 1950–51 that

Driving down through the Balkans to Istanbul and on into Asia Minor, one passes from Europe to Asia, though one notices no sudden change. But Istanbul is today a Western town and so in the main is Ankara, with its fine new official quarter and wide streets and modern buildings.⁴¹⁵

In Maclean's narrative, Turkey has finally *become* Western, which means that he perceives the West as a *direction* that is defined by a way of living rather than the style of governance or the qualities of the population. Religion is no longer what defines Turkey. Similarly, John S. Badeau, American diplomat and academic, writes in *Foreign Affairs* in 1959–60 that national interest, 'rather than shared

⁴¹⁵ Fitzroy Maclean, 'The Eastern Question in Modern Dress', *Foreign Affairs* (January 1951), p. 239.

religious tradition, is as much the basis of foreign policy in the Middle East as in the West'.⁴¹⁶

Badeau continues that Turkey represents this the most vividly, deliberately repudiating 'the Islamic basis of the state in favor of Western secular concepts. In so doing it did not abandon Islam, but attempted to "Turkify" it in the same way that the English Reformation "Anglicized" the medieval Catholic heritage by creating a separate Church of England'.⁴¹⁷ Both the narratives derive from a belief that is strongly influenced by a synecdochal understanding of the relationship between Turkey and the West. This means that they perceive Turkey as a state that can integrate to the West with Badeau further accentuating Turkey's 'normalcy' by comparing it to another Western state, the United Kingdom. There are no inherent dividing lines that separate Turkey from the West.

What the authors have in common is their close cultural proximity to Turkey and the Middle East with Badeau being fluent in Arabic and spending half of his life in the Middle East and Maclean being born in Cairo, Egypt, and traveling extensively across the Middle East. This does not mean that metonymical representations arise from ignorance regarding the region, but surely the cultural proximity to Turkey on the one hand and the multiple perspectives on the other play a prominent part in the web of beliefs of Maclean and Badeau.

It is true that although all the three tropes – metonymy, synecdoche, and irony – are represented in what can be considered Turkish or Middle Eastern narratives in *Foreign Affairs*, the trope of synecdoche is more prevalent than in Western narratives. Iranian-American Dariush Zadehi and Turkish Gokhan Bacik, for example, completely dismantle the dominant metaphorical division between

⁴¹⁶ John S. Badeau, 'Islam and the Modern Middle East', *Foreign Affairs* (October 1959), p. 65.

⁴¹⁷ Badeau, 'Islam and the Modern Middle East', p. 67.

Ataturk and Erdogan and argue that in fact the AKP largely represents ‘an actual fulfillment of Ataturk’s notion of Kemalism’.⁴¹⁸

Similarly, Turkish writer Mustafa Akyol writes that ‘warnings about Turkey’s neo-Ottomanism are more sensational than factual, and miss a broader point. Like any major power, Turkey bases its foreign policy on calculations of hard national interests, and coats it in value-laden rhetoric that reflects popular sentiments’.⁴¹⁹ Similar arguments are presented in the West, and as such we still cannot talk about ‘Turkish’ and ‘Western’ narratives as representing different sets of beliefs. A Turkish narrator that emphasises the role of religion or class in explaining Turkey’s role in the international system is likely to put forward very similar narratives as a Western narrator that holds similar beliefs.

Metonymical representations of integration

Dominique Moisi analyses the question of ‘losing Turkey’ from a primarily synecdochal viewpoint and argues that if “Turkey has indeed been “lost”, those responsible include the European Union, the United States, Israel, and Turkey itself.’⁴²⁰ Moisi’s synecdochal elements arise from treating all the actors equally and assigning responsibility to all of them when most answers to the question of ‘who lost Turkey’ point toward a single culprit. In this sense, Moisi’s narrative is rare: Turkey is not lost simply *despite* or *because* of the West but because of a number of

⁴¹⁸ Dariush Zahedi & Gokhan Bacik, ‘Kemalism Is Dead, Long Live Kemalism: How the AKP Became Ataturk’s Last Defender’, *Foreign Affairs* (23 April 2010), available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2010-04-23/kemalism-dead-long-live-kemalism> (5 September 2015).

⁴¹⁹ Mustafa Akyol, ‘Turkish Maturing Foreign Policy: How the Arab Spring Changed the AKP’, *Foreign Affairs* (7 July 2011), available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2011-07-07/turkeys-maturing-foreign-policy> (5 September 2015). See also Mustafa Akyol, ‘Turkey Vs. Iran: The Regional Battle for Hearts and Minds’, *Foreign Affairs* (21 March 2012) and Akyol, ‘An Unlikely Trio’. In the early 2010s, however, Akyol began to voice more criticism towards the AKP government that he was defending during the 2000s.

⁴²⁰ Dominique Moisi, ‘Who lost Turkey?’, *Project Syndicate* (24 February 2009), <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/who-lost-turkey> (5 September 2015).

factors and actors. But outside the question of who lost Turkey, Moisi still relies on metonymical tools of representation: Turkey's 'emotions are increasingly Middle Eastern' and 'in Istanbul, the most Westernised of Turkey's cities, as soon as one leaves the main arteries, one seems to be immersed in a Middle Eastern or Asian culture'.

In Moisi's narrative, the Middle East and Europe are essentialised to an extent that they serve as metaphors that are meant to trigger mental images of the fundamental difference between the West and the East. The narrative is a very typical foreign policy analysis representation of Turkey. Bill Park's narrative in his book *Modern Turkey: People, state and foreign policy in a globalized world* represents the same tradition – it also talks about integration and Turkey's potential as a bridge but heavily relies on metonymical narrative resources. Park talks about 'civilisations', Turkey 'rediscovering' her 'true' identity in the East and 'normalising' its foreign policy under the AKP, 'the ever-sensitive Arab world', and describes Turkey as a country that 'hurtles, stumbles, muddles and seeks to steer its way towards an unpredictable future'.⁴²¹

Park clearly argues that the East is a more 'natural' location to Turkey and better reflects its 'true identity'. As such, even though he talks about Turkey's potential as a bridge between the East and the West, the analysis is strongly based on a belief that there are different civilisations – even if Park superficially questions that.⁴²² By representing Turkey in an essentialist fashion as a state that is Eastern in nature, emotional in action, and unpredictable in its future endeavors, Park provides a particularly strong metonymical representation in which the Western self is juxtaposed with the 'Turkish other'. Park's analysis represents the standard form of foreign policy analysis with a four-tier model that

⁴²¹ Bill Park, *Modern Turkey*, pp. 10; 103–104; 109; 119; 125; 130–131.

⁴²² Park, *Modern Turkey*, pp. 130–131.

includes the historical, the paradigmatic, the predictive, and the policy advisory part. Park's policy advice is particularly pronounced when he writes that

Turkey must achieve a harmonious balance between its secularism and modernity, on the one hand, and the Islamic faith of its people on the other ... The second requirement for the 'Turkish model' to become more marketable in the Middle East demands that Ankara distance itself from the USA and Israel in its regional policies ... Pursuit of the 'Turkish model' does not constitute a 'quick fix' solution to the region's problems, any more than it has for Turkey itself. Nor need it put an end to such civilizational conflict as exists between the West and the Muslim World.⁴²³

Park's analysis is based upon a conviction that religion is not only what defines Turkey and the Middle East but also explains its problems. Park considers the 'Western civilisation' as a successful model that cannot be copied; therefore neither Turkey nor the wider Middle East should try to become 'Western' but to embrace their 'true' Eastern identity around which to form their – preferably secular – political structure.

In such narratives, the Middle East in general and Iran in particular are employed as metaphors to situate Turkey in a battle between powerful yet repugnant forces. Iran's role in the narratives is to represent the worst-case scenario of what happens if Turkey gets lost.⁴²⁴ There is very little analysis of

⁴²³ Park, *Modern Turkey*, pp. 128–129.

⁴²⁴ Christopher Ferrero argues that the 'Iran narrative' of the United States 'is comprised of the vast collection of frames, myths, caricatures, news reports, "expert" analyses, and ideas that cohere and portray Iran as a uniquely evil, hostile, and irrational enemy of the United States'. 'The Iran Narrative: The Ideational

Iranian politics as such – there is an expectation that the reader knows what ‘becoming Iran’ entails, which is a common discursive practice in foreign policy analysis. For example, Erik Meyersson & Dani Rodrik write in *Foreign Affairs* in 2014: ‘Turkey’s institutions now look more like those of Russia and Iran than those of members of the European Union, to which the country once aspired to join.’⁴²⁵ Daniel Pipes, a Conservative American foreign policy analyst who has advanced the metonymical ‘losing Turkey’ narrative, argues that the true clash between civilisations is not between the West and Islam but within Islam:

On one side stand those Muslims *confident* to learn from outsiders, oriented toward *democracy* and ready to *integrate* into the world; on the other stand those who are *fearful*, who seek strong rule, and who hope to *withdraw* from the world.⁴²⁶

Again, although Turkey is being represented as potentially the most important Western ally in the civilisational battle against the ‘Iranian mullahs’, the narrative is based upon a strong metonymical division between forces of evil and good – a ‘Muslim drama’ in which the West has only ‘a limited role’ and can simply ‘let the Turks know, again and again, that we stand by them in their travails with Tehran’.⁴²⁷ In other words, the West is represented as a neutral actor that has had no role to play in the political developments in the region.

Similar metonymical narrative resources that divide the Middle East to opposing elements are used in many analyses that propose Turkey as a bridge

Context of US Foreign Policy Decision-Making toward the Islamic Republic of Iran’, *Iran and the Caucasus*, 17 (2013), p. 41.

⁴²⁵ Erik Meyersson & Dani Rodrik, ‘Erdogan’s Coup’, *Foreign Affairs* (26 May 2014), available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2014-05-26/erdogans-coup> (21 April 2016).

⁴²⁶ Daniel Pipes, ‘Islam’s Intramural Struggle’, *National Interest*, 35 (Spring 1994), emphases added.

⁴²⁷ Pipes, ‘Islam’s Intramural Struggle’.

between the West and the East and should not be confused for synecdochal representations. Eric Rouleau, for example, describes Turkey's Cold War as the 'years of claustrophobia' and presents Turkey's 'ethnic and religious kinship' with its neighbours as a more natural tie.⁴²⁸ F. Stephen Larrabee, similarly, argues that 'Turkey is *rediscovering* the region of which it has historically been an integral part. Especially under the Ottomans, Turkey was the dominant power in the Middle East; its republican period – with its emphasis on non-involvement in Middle Eastern affairs – was an *anomaly*. Turkey's current activism is a *return* to a more *traditional* pattern'.⁴²⁹ Again, there is a belief that Turkey's essential nature is Eastern and that a return to that identity is a positive development. In other words, Turkey is not lost but *found* as a Middle Eastern state that can and should embrace its true identity.

In arguing this, the authors advocate a 'civilisation West' narrative and provide a metonymical interpretation of Turkey's role in the international system. They adopt a Huntingtonian worldview and suggest that respecting the existing civilisational boundaries is not only politically but also morally right thing to do. That Turkey belongs to the Islamic civilisation should be finally acknowledged and celebrated, and to pretend otherwise is a deceitful practice that has unfortunate political consequences. Their seeming focus on integration and harmony hides the strong metonymical division between different civilisations as well as the 'triumphant West' representation that is inbuilt in the narratives.

Kenneth Burke discusses this dilemma in his analysis of identification and division. He argues that identification 'is affirmed with earnestness precisely because there is division. Identification is compensatory to

⁴²⁸ Eric Rouleau, 'The Challenges to Turkey', *Foreign Affairs* (November/December 1993), p. 111.

⁴²⁹ F. Stephen Larrabee, 'Turkey Rediscovered the Middle East', *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 2007), p. 111, emphases added.

division. If men were not apart from one another, there would be no need for the rhetorician to proclaim their unity'.⁴³⁰ Burke further argues that 'even antagonistic terms, confronting each other as parry and thrust, can be said to "cooperate" in the building of an over-all form'.⁴³¹ Sometimes a clear enemy relationship based on strong 'othering' is actually more cooperative than an ambiguous friendship based on assumed similarities. Freud introduced the concept 'narcissism of minor differences' to address the strange situation where actors that are most alike are in more conflict with each other than actors that are far apart.⁴³²

These important nuances can only be recognised with the right narrative tools and by focusing on the narrative tradition rather than single speech acts. Burke connects the intertwined nature of the concept of identification and division to irony, arguing that 'one need not scrutinize the concept of "identification" very sharply to see, implied in it at every turn, its ironic counterpart: division'.⁴³³ It is highly ironic that by turning the coin around one finds a contrasting principle that is part of the same motive.

Towards synecdoche

It is not always difficult to tease out the underlying moral and aesthetic preference in Western foreign policy analysis. For example, Walter Livingston Wright Jr.'s analysis 'Truths about Turkey' in *Foreign Affairs* in 1947–48 represents a clear example of the 'triumphant West' narrative, celebrating the role of the West as an entity that can aspire and should lead the way in the international system. He writes:

⁴³⁰ Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives*, p. 22.

⁴³¹ Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives*, p. 23.

⁴³² Anton Blok, 'The Narcissism of Minor Differences', *European Journal of Social Theory*, 1:1 (1998), 33–56.

⁴³³ Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives*, p. 23.

But the Turkish Republic's credits far outweigh its debits. It has moved an almost incredible distance along the road from the Ottoman Middle Ages toward western democracy. The tremendously significant fact is that to the Turks the west does represent the good society.⁴³⁴

It is clear that the narrative is more about the West than about Turkey. The author represents the West as a triumphant and inspiring entity, arguing that 'Turks believe that our immense power is not merely the result of luck but is somehow the product of our society and government'.⁴³⁵ The aim of the narrative is to celebrate the role of the West in leading by example and showing states such as Turkey how to lead a good life.

The narrative is told in a linear fashion with the West representing the highest form of political organisation and the Ottoman Empire the most repugnant: 'feeble, corrupt, insolvent and on the verge of dissolution'.⁴³⁶ Turkey is not presented as part of the West – not even close – but as an actor that struggles in the nearly impossible path of becoming more like the West: 'It is struggling toward democracy against tremendous obstacles, and making progress. We may properly be pleased at her friendship'.⁴³⁷ Turkey, then, is a troubled friend that must be assisted and guided with patience and understanding.

In George C. McGhee's narrative only a few years later, Turkey has finally become 'an integral part of Europe and the West'.⁴³⁸ The formative event is

⁴³⁴ Walter Livingston Wright Jr., 'Truths about Turkey', *Foreign Affairs* (January 1948), p. 359.

⁴³⁵ Livingston Wright Jr., 'Truths about Turkey', p. 359.

⁴³⁶ Livingston Wright Jr., 'Truths about Turkey', p. 350.

⁴³⁷ Livingston Wright Jr., 'Truths about Turkey', p. 359.

⁴³⁸ George C. McGhee, 'Turkey joins the West', *Foreign Affairs* (July 1954), p. 617.

Turkey joining the newly founded NATO, and as such McGhee's article is a 'political West' narrative. It is a synecdochal representation with Turkey represented as having emerged as 'a full and responsible member of the Western alliance'.⁴³⁹ It is also a 'triumphant West' narrative that represents the West as an alliance between the most progressive, developed, and free nations of the world. Again, the narrative is told in a linear fashion with the Ottoman Empire representing the repugnant past and the Republic of Turkey a progressive present.⁴⁴⁰

Finally, there are narratives that simply reject the dichotomous idea that Turkey is being lost. Referring to Turkey opposing the overthrow of Egypt's elected president, Mohamed Morsi, Paul R. Pillar argues: 'We have a *tendency* to see the posture of the Erdogan government as an Islamist thing; it is at least as much a democratic thing.'⁴⁴¹ Or as Andrew Mango writes in 1996–97, 'the central point is that the nexus of economic, political, and diplomatic relations that bids Turkey to the West remains in place, but that within it, Turkey has its own national interests, now as before'.⁴⁴² This was years before the AKP government, and yet the discourse of losing Turkey is identical to the 2000s. Towards the end of his analysis, Mango makes an ironic note of the tradition of representing Turkey in foreign policy analysis:

⁴³⁹ McGhee, 'Turkey joins the West', p. 617.

⁴⁴⁰ McGhee, 'Turkey joins the West', p. 618. Focusing on economic factors instead of culture or ethnicity is a viable synecdochal strategy that represents Turkey as a 'normal' state whose policies are driven not by religious or cultural impulses but economic considerations. See for example, Kemal Kirisci, 'The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State', *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 40 (2009), pp. 29–57.

⁴⁴¹ Paul R. Pillar, 'Ruffled Relations with Turkey', *The National Interest* (25 December 2013), available at <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/paul-pillar/ruffled-relations-turkey-9632> (20 September 2015), emphases added.

⁴⁴² Mango, 'From Ataturk to Erbakan'.

Such liberal criticism of the Turks has a long pedigree. In the past, it concentrated on the maltreatment of non-Muslim minorities, while disregarding the sufferings of the Muslims elsewhere ... Religious bigotry has long poured from liberal English mouths in the guise of racial generalizations ... In Turkey's case, being European is more a matter of choice than of geography, and that choice is most sensibly left to the Turks themselves.⁴⁴³

Here we can see how the tropes of synecdoche and irony overlap with Mango advocating a synecdochal 'modern West' narrative but at the same time turning the ironic gaze towards the West and its questionable representational traditions. Graham Fuller belongs to the same narrative tradition and writes in his book *The Future of Political Islam* (2004) that when it comes to Islamists including those in Turkey,

Their pre-occupations reflect the ongoing concerns of much of the rest of the world, even if we are at different stages of managing them ... political Islam is not an exotic and distant phenomenon, but one intimately linked to contemporary political, social, economic and moral issues of near universal concern.⁴⁴⁴

Fuller aims to show that there are no inherent differences between the Islamic world and the West – there are just different manifestations of economic, cultural and political questions that people across the world struggle with. As Fuller

⁴⁴³ Mango, 'From Ataturk to Erbakan'.

⁴⁴⁴ Graham Fuller, *The Future of Political Islam* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p. xii; see also Graham Fuller, *The New Turkish Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2008).

continues: 'All human beings are faced with these issues and are compelled to provide some answers for themselves, including those who do not consider themselves religious. Political Islam is very much at the heart of this quest in the Muslim world.'⁴⁴⁵

Just like in Mango's analysis, there is a strong ironic element in Fuller's otherwise synecdochal understanding of Turkey in the world. Fuller notes that it is ironic that although the West is critical towards Islam, it does not recognise or is blind to the religious nature of its own society. He writes that

We in the West are often uncomfortable with the presence of religion ... Americans in particular feel understandable ambivalence about the relationship of religion to politics. The American secular tradition, ironically, is not due to an American indifference to the role of religion in life. On the contrary, it emerged from the concerns of those passionately committed to religion and the preservation of its diverse forms that brought its adherents early on to the American continent; their goal was precisely to preserve their faith and its expression from the power of the state that had oppressed it back home.⁴⁴⁶

Fuller goes on to remind that 'America today remains the most religious country in the industrialized world', noting that 'the most emotional features of American politics are exactly those that entail religious concerns, even if they are not expressed in explicitly religious terms'.⁴⁴⁷ There is a tropological interplay here

⁴⁴⁵ Fuller, *The Future of Political Islam*, p. xiii.

⁴⁴⁶ Fuller, *The Future of Political Islam*, pp. xii–xiii.

⁴⁴⁷ Fuller, *The Future of Political Islam*, p. xiv.

between synecdochal and ironic elements, which is a typical feature in foreign policy analysis that aims to *understand* rather than distance different state in the international system. It is a reaction to metonymical representations that create a conflictual relationship between different parts – in this case the Islamic and the Western world.

Often inbuilt in the narrative is a reference to the metonymical tradition, which is shown to be an inaccurate and superficial analysis of the dynamics between the two parties. Also Fuller refers to the metonymical tradition that represents Islam as inherently different from the West, arguing that ‘to the casual observer political Islam may be an exotic and remote world, seemingly locked in a time warp linked to seventh century values and struggles. The reality is rather different’.⁴⁴⁸ Here a metonymical conviction is identified with ‘casual observing’, suggesting that it is an analytical position that lacks depth and as such cannot be taken seriously.

In the following sections, the thesis will turn more closely to the ironic trope and show how it represents an entirely different approach to the question of ‘losing Turkey’. In the ironic narratives, it is not Turkey but the West that is lost. The ironic trope is the most advanced interpretation of the ‘losing’ question because it requires prior knowledge and more sophisticated narrative resources to be narrated or understood. It is also the most profoundly ‘Western narrative’ because the moral gaze is directed solely towards the West and its role in the international system.

Irony: Turkey is lost because of the West

⁴⁴⁸ Fuller, *The Future of Political Islam*, p. xii.

What is distinct about the trope of irony is that it is a manifestly postmodern mode of representation with most of the ironic foreign policy analyses appearing in the 2000s and the 2010s. This does not mean that there were no ironic narratives in the 1900s but that they were few in numbers. Today ironic narratives in Western foreign policy analysis concerning Turkey are far more prevalent than synecdochal representations and almost as popular as metonymical representations. This can be partly because of the turn to postmodernism in the contemporary era but also because of the dominant and largely accepted representations of the events taking place after the Cold War, in particular the notion that the West began to witness a relative global decline in the new millennium, the wide opposition to the Iraq War, and the rising anti-Americanism. Of course, the postmodern turn and the ironic interpretation of events are very much interlinked.

We can begin to unravel the ironic interpretation of the ‘losing Turkey’ narrative by shortly discussing how the trope of irony influenced early foreign policy analysis in the first part of the 1900s and as such start tracking down the scholarly tradition that later came to produce the overwhelming wave of ironic analyses in the 2000s. Walter Livingston Wright, Jr. employs an ironic narrative strategy in his *Foreign Affairs* article in 1947–1948 when he writes that ‘tolerance is, after all, one of the democratic virtues, and that although Turkey is by no means a perfect democracy *neither are we*, though we have been at the business much more than a short quarter of a century’.⁴⁴⁹ Similarly, Hans Kohn argues in his *Foreign Affairs* article in 1933–1934:

⁴⁴⁹ Livingston Wright, Jr., ‘Truths about Turkey’. p. 359, emphases added.

Indeed, the defensive measures of the new Turkish nationalism often assume economic forms which are *harsh and undesirable*. It should not be forgotten, however, that in this respect too *the west has been the teacher of the east*, and that the latter has only been persuaded by *bitter experience* to relinquish its former passivity and to replace it by a new attitude which fills the west with astonishment and sometimes calls forth censure.⁴⁵⁰

In both the analyses, the ironic strategy means reversing or at least challenging the ‘triumphant West’ narrative and focusing not only on the weaknesses within the West but also on Turkey’s ‘normalcy’ as a state that is battling with the same problems as the West. Irony is employed as a narrative strategy both with metonymy and synecdoche, and it is particularly prevalent in the ‘two Wests’ narratives with either Europe or the United States being represented as a hypocritical actor. What is distinct about these narratives is that it is often not Europeans blaming Americans or vice versa, but Europeans blaming Europeans or Americans blaming Americans.

The West as a morally weak actor

Already in 1998, Michael Portillo, Conservative cabinet minister in the United Kingdom, argued in *National Interest*:

The Turkish case serves to illustrate a broader truth. Those who are most influencing the progress of Europe have become dreadfully confused. They believe that European integration is the only

⁴⁵⁰ Hans Kohn, ‘Ten Years of the Turkish Republic’, *Foreign Affairs* (October 1933), p. 150, emphases added.

guarantee of future security, and they are pursuing the objective *with a single mindedness that borders on fanaticism*. They are wrong.⁴⁵¹

Portillo's narrative is a good example of an ironic representation. In the narrative, it is not Turkish or Middle Eastern actors that are 'fanatics' but Europeans who 'see the EU as a subset of Christendom'.⁴⁵² Furthermore, it is not Turkey but the EU that has a problem with democracy. Portillo takes advantage of the metonymical narrative resources in the foreign policy analysis tradition and employs them to highlight the moral and political weakness of the EU that is causing hindrance to the ability of 'our Atlantic and European institutions' to act effectively. Conservatives in the United Kingdom are known for their ideological repugnance towards the idea of European integration and it seems that the web of beliefs influencing Portillo's narrative is in line with that. It is also a call for action to strengthen the West through transatlantic cooperation rather than through European integration.

It is both a modern West and a political West narrative, which are often interlinked: the West should unite politically because it shares the same values. Or as Portillo put it: 'We should use our Atlantic and European institutions in every way we can to spread democracy and nurture it where it takes root.'⁴⁵³ The narrative of another political actor, German Joschka Fischer, similarly represents the West in general and Europe in particular as a morally weak actor that has treated Turkey unfairly:

⁴⁵¹ Michael Portillo, 'Europe on the Brink: Democratic Values and the Single Currency, *The National Interest* (Spring 1998), available at <http://nationalinterest.org/article/europe-on-the-brink-democratic-values-and-the-single-currency-332> (20 September 2015).

⁴⁵² Portillo, 'Europe on the Brink'.

⁴⁵³ Portillo, 'Europe on the Brink'. Using European institutions, however, does not mean to increase European integration: 'In the interests of security, tolerance, and harmony among nations, in the interests of preserving the most valued gain of the postwar period, which is democracy, we should turn away from the headlong rush toward European political integration.'

I believe that these fears (of losing Turkey) are exaggerated, even misplaced. And should things work out that way, this would be due more to a self-fulfilling prophecy on the West's part than to Turkey's policies.⁴⁵⁴

Fischer argues that despite Turkey's strategic importance and its efforts to modernise the country, the West has treated Turkey as a 'Western client state' with the EU in particular causing damage with its demeaning attitude in Turkey's accession negotiations.⁴⁵⁵ In arguing this, Fischer joins Gates in his criticism: 'Gates had hit the nail on the head.'⁴⁵⁶ In Fischer's narrative, both Russia and Iran are used as metaphors that signify a particular *direction* that Turkey is being pushed into by the morally weak West: 'European policy is driving Turkey into the arms of Russia and Iran.'⁴⁵⁷ Fischer's ironic narrative is a typical 'declinist West' narrative that calls for the West to strengthen its moral and political position in foreign affairs because otherwise it will face a dramatic decline: 'Life has a way of punishing those who come too late.'⁴⁵⁸

⁴⁵⁴ Joschka Fischer, 'Who "Lost" Turkey?', *Project Syndicate* (1 July 2010), available at <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/who--lost--turkey> (1 October 2015).

⁴⁵⁵ Dominique Moisi similarly argues in his analysis: 'Not only did the EU reject the Turkish bid for membership, but it classified Turkey in a dunce-like category of its own, behind weaker applicants such as Bulgaria and Slovakia. The snub only furthered the unfortunate impression first seen in Bosnia, and now in Kosovo, that Islam is not welcome on the European continent.' 'Dreaming of Europe', *Foreign Policy*, 115 (Summer, 1999), p. 47. Like Fischer, Moisi's ironic emplotment is intertwined with the trope of synecdoche: 'Turkey is not only Western, it is wholly European. Europe seems to have forgotten that Turkey has long been a key player in its history, especially in the nineteenth century.'

⁴⁵⁶ Fischer, 'Who "Lost" Turkey?'.

⁴⁵⁷ Fischer, 'Who "Lost" Turkey?'. Owen Matthews similarly argues that 'with the EU as a guiding light, Turkey now risks careering off on an entirely different geopolitical trajectory, the direction and consequences of which can only be guessed at'. 'Who lost Turkey'. The difference between Fischer and Matthews is that Fischer calls for more sympathy towards Turkey whose treatment has been tragically unfair, whereas Matthews' tragedy is 'the failure of vision that has scuppered one of the greatest civilizational projects of our times', the European Union.

⁴⁵⁸ Fischer, 'Who "Lost" Turkey?'.

It is an ironic narrative because it turns the critical gaze towards the self and challenges the idea of the West as a morally and politically triumphant actor in the international system. Here we can see how the ‘othering’ thesis is, as was argued earlier (see the thesis introduction), frequently employed erroneously to suggest that it is always the ‘other’ who represents the repugnant actor vis-à-vis the righteous ‘self’. In the Western foreign policy analysis tradition, the ironic narrative is a prevalent mode of representation with the Western self often narrated as the repugnant actor vis-à-vis the righteous others. This is particularly true with narratives of Turkey.

As argued earlier in the thesis (see chapter 4), the trope of irony is particularly popular with postcolonial and poststructuralist scholars who in turn have been criticised for wielding animosity towards the West with their stereotypical and overly negative representations of the West. The self-critical mode of employment is a distinct feature of Western foreign policy analysis, which is connected to the need and expectation of the West to do, as Saara Jantunen argues, penance – self-flagellation, public inquests, apologies – when its actions and words are in conflict. Jantunen juxtaposes the West to Russia that simply ignores such public pleas and insists on its righteousness even if the discrepancy between its actions and words is apparent.⁴⁵⁹

If Fischer is a good example of an ironic emplotment of a European narrative of ‘losing Turkey’, Doug Bandow represents an American version, which well illustrates one of the main tenets of the thesis: that there are many more narratives than simply ‘American’ and ‘European’ interpretations of events and that such a division does not make sense in light of the research data. Responding

⁴⁵⁹ Saara Jantunen, *Infosota* (Otava, 2015), pp. 21–22.

to Gates' speech act, Bandow, a Conservative foreign policy commentator who worked in the Reagan administration, writes:

EU membership is not Washington's business. It is not a geopolitical plum that U.S. policymakers get to give to America's allies. Imagine the German Foreign Minister showing up in Ottawa or the British Foreign Secretary visiting Mexico City and declaiming about Washington's irresponsible failure to form a North American Union.⁴⁶⁰

Bandow employs a typical ironic strategy of turning the narrative upside down and as such attempting to show its moral weakness: the United States should not advise others because, first, it would not like to be subject to a similar treatment, and second, its own policies are politically and morally weak: 'But given the foreign policy messes routinely created by U.S. governments, American policymakers should be appropriately humble before blaming other nations for today's problems.'⁴⁶¹ Even though their political preferences are different, the

⁴⁶⁰ Doug Bandow, 'Who Lost Turkey? Not Europe', *American Spectator* (14 June 2010), available at <http://spectator.org/articles/39421/who-lost-turkey-not-europe> (25 September 2015). See also Doug Bandow, 'Young Turks', *The National Interest* (9 April 2009), available at <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/young-turks> (1 October 2015). The ironic strategy of reversing roles is also employed in relation to Europe. For example, Norman Stone, a British historian, writes: "'This is a suppression of freedom of speech", cried the Europeans, "we shall have to reconsider Turkey's membership." But here is what Dr. Erbakan actually said: The slave regime that is part and parcel of the economic system in Turkey did not come about by its own accord. It is a consequence of ... colonial initiatives of the Imperialist and Zionist forces of this earth ... in how many European countries today would such talk be allowed? Witness the Europeans themselves, who lay down sanctions against Austria for producing a right-wing government, with an allegedly proto-Nazi component, hostile to immigrants.' In Stone's narrative, it is the morally weak Europe rather than the dynamic Turkey that needs to reform: 'Two-dimensional Europeans will no doubt hold up their hands in horror at the idea of such a people calling themselves European. Wrong, and wrong again: the dynamism that made Europe in the first place has now been transferred to Turkey. And it is Europe, not Turkey, that will have to come to terms.' 'Talking Turkey', *The National Interest* (Fall 2000), available at <http://nationalinterest.org/article/talking-turkey-905> (1 October 2015).

⁴⁶¹ Bandow, 'Who Lost Turkey? Not Europe'.

ironic narratives of Fischer and Bandow are similar: they both turn the critical gaze towards the self and highlight the West's moral weakness.

While Fischer defends Gates' speech act, Bandow opposes it and attempt to frame it in such a way as to make Gates seem ridiculous: 'Defense Secretary Robert Gates is upset. And he is vocal with his complaints. Not with the North Koreans or Iranians. Not with the Chinese or Russians. Not with the Palestinians or Israelis. And not with the Turks. He is upset with the Europeans.'⁴⁶² Again, Iran is used as a metaphor to trigger a particular response in the audience, which is clearly imagined as Western.

It is a call for a more united West to act as a counter balance to its more obvious adversaries in the international system: Iran, North Korea, China, and Russia. But even more importantly, Bandow advocates an American foreign policy that is less interventionist and more moral in a Kantian sense; that the United States should act the same way as it wants to be treated in the international system.⁴⁶³ In its current state, the United States 'has become a caricature of itself.'⁴⁶⁴ Fischer's narrative is similarly based on Kantian morals: the EU needs to treat Turkey fairly if it wants to receive positive political outcomes.

Juan Cole's 'losing Turkey' narrative is similarly critical towards the American self and strongly sympathises with Turkey, asking 'what Ankara ever did to us that we are treating them so horribly'.⁴⁶⁵ Cole, Professor of History at the University of Michigan and a prominent American commentator on Middle Eastern affairs, argues that if Turkey will turn away from the West, it is because of

⁴⁶² Bandow, 'Who Lost Turkey? Not Europe'.

⁴⁶³ More about different narratives of American foreign policy, see page 6. See also, Nau & Leone, *At Home Abroad*; Ole R. Holsti & James N. Rosenau, 'Liberals, Populists, Libertarians, and Conservatives: The Link Between Domestic and International Affairs', *International Political Science Review*, 17 (1996), pp. 29-54.

⁴⁶⁴ Doug Bandow, 'Butt Out of Britain', *The National Interest* (15 January 2013), available at <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/butt-out-britain-7967> (1 October 2015).

⁴⁶⁵ Cole, 'Who Lost Turkey?'.

the way in which the United States has treated it. Also Cole employs the ironic strategy of reversing the roles: ‘Imagine what things look like from a Turkish point of view’ – ‘the strongest ally that the United States has had in the Middle East since the end of WWII.’⁴⁶⁶

As discussed earlier, Cole’s narrative forms around the Armenian genocide vote in the United States, but there are also other events that are connected to the narrative, particularly the Iraq War that caused instability on Turkey’s borders. Cole offers a particularly emotion-laden narrative in which the United States represents a morally and politically repugnant actor in international politics:

But no dispassionate observer could avoid the conclusion that the Congressional vote condemning Turkey came at a most inopportune time for US-Turkish diplomacy, at a time when Turks were already *raw* from watching the US *upset* all the apple carts in their neighborhood, unleash existential threats against them, cause the rise of Salafi radicalism next door, coddle terrorists killing them, coddle the separatist KRG, and strengthen the Shiite ayatollahs on their borders.⁴⁶⁷

Cole’s narrative represents the United States almost as a similar ‘monster’ as Serge Latouche’s image of the West.⁴⁶⁸ Cole’s interpretation of the ‘losing Turkey’ narrative is clearly a declinist representation that lifts Turkey to a superior moral role vis-à-vis the West. In Cole’s narrative, however, it is not the inherent nature

⁴⁶⁶ Cole, ‘Who Lost Turkey?’.

⁴⁶⁷ Cole, ‘Who Lost Turkey?’, emphases added.

⁴⁶⁸ See chapter 2.

of the West or the United States that is the problem but the agency of governance, especially the Bush administration.

The West as a politically weak actor

There are also ironic counter narratives to the idea that the moral weakness of the West is that it does not practice the high ideals of Kantian morality in the international system. In the counter narrative the weakness of the West is that it is too soft in its foreign policy. In Mark Steyn's analysis, for example, part of the reason that Turkey is moving away from the West is that it simply does not respect a weak United States:

Mr. Erdogan would not be palling up to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Iran and Boy Assad in Syria and even Sudan's genocidal President Omar al-Bashir, the Butcher of Darfur, if he were mindful of Turkey's relationship with the United States. But he isn't. He looks at the American hyperpower and sees, to all intents, a late Ottoman sultan – pampered, decadent, lounging on its cushions, puffing a hookah but unable to rouse itself to impose its will in the world.⁴⁶⁹

This is a typical 'declinist West' narrative that focuses on internal decay (see chapter 2) as the cause of the West's failure to lead in the international system. It does not call for more sympathy to Turkey or lift Turkey to a superior role politically or morally but argues that it is only natural that Turkey is no longer

⁴⁶⁹ Steyn, 'Who lost Turkey?'

aspiring to become Western because the West has become weak.⁴⁷⁰ Caroline Glick narrates this even more strongly in the *Jerusalem Post*, arguing that the West is *blind* to the dangers posed by Islamists and as such fails to understand that their moral and political values are completely different from the West. The blindness derives not only from the West's naivety but also its elitism, which leads to Turkey being pushed away from the West. Both the United States and the EU are causing the loss of Turkey:

President Barack Obama paid a preening visit to Ankara where he effectively endorsed the Islamization of Turkish foreign policy that has moved the NATO member into the arms of Teheran's mullahs ... By forcing Turkey to curb its military's role as the guarantor of Turkish secularism, the EU took away the secularists' last line of defense against the rising tide of the AKP.⁴⁷¹

Glick's dramatic metaphors – Erdogan being 'a wolf in sheep's clothing' and Turkey having become 'a full member of the Iranian axis' – are strongly metonymical and draw the fundamental dividing line between the righteous but tragically naïve Westerners and the repugnant and cunning Islamists. The same division also runs through Turkey with its 'Westernised Turks' who have been abandoned by the West and left at the mercy of the 'fanatic Islamists'. Glick's

⁴⁷⁰ In his analysis, Herb Greer paraphrases a Turkish man in Kayseri to wield a similar narrative of the West's political weakness: 'America looks weak now. Europe is telling Clinton what to do in the Balkans, and that means do nothing, and he accepts it. He leaves the Moslems to be killed like dogs. A weak man! Who will respect a weak man?'. 'Turkish Journey', *The National Interest* (Winter 1993–1994), available at <http://nationalinterest.org/article/turkish-journey-1019> (1 October 2015).

⁴⁷¹ Caroline Glick, 'How Turkey Was Lost', *The Jerusalem Post* (16 October 2009), available at http://carolineglick.com/how_turkey_was_lost/ (1 October 2015). Soeren Kern similarly writes: 'By demanding that the Turkish military be subordinate to civilian leadership, the EU effectively put an end to the army's historic role in preventing the Islamists from undermining the secular nature of the Turkish Republic.' 'How Europe Lost Turkey', *Gatestone Institute* (14 July 2010), available at <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/1403/how-europe-lost-turkey> (15 October 2015).

narrative resources are highly ironic in their apparent endorsement of the AKP government: 'You have to hand it to Turkey's Islamist leaders. They sure know how to get their way.'⁴⁷²

The aim of the ironic mode of emplotment is to highlight the weakness of the West as a soft and diplomacy focused actor who is being tricked by the strategically clever Islamists who understand the importance of hard power politics.⁴⁷³ Caroline Glick represents the American neoconservative belief in hard power, aggressive leadership, and the incompatibility between Islam and democracy.⁴⁷⁴ Glick's narrative is a particularly strong 'declinist West' representation of internal political decay that will lead to the fall of the West. It is not the nature of the West but the agency of its governance that is narrated as the main problem:

Obama and his European colleagues may believe that they will not be blamed for the loss of Turkey. After all, its transformation into Iran's best friend started seven years ago. But they are wrong. If they continue to sit on their elitist laurels, Turkey will be lost on their watch and they will not be forgiven by their own peoples for their failure to act in time.

⁴⁷² Caroline Glick, 'Who Lost Turkey?', *The Jerusalem Post* (21 September 2010), available at http://carolineglick.com/who_lost_turkey/ (10 October 2015).

⁴⁷³ Glick highlights the cunning nature of Islamists who take advantage of the West and its soft values: 'Turkey's Islamist leaders have used the Western language of democracy and freedom not only to abandon the West. They have used that language to destroy the foundations of Turkey's Western-style secular democracy and transform the governing system of NATO's sole Muslim member into a hybrid of Putinist autocracy and Iranian theocracy.' Glick, 'Who lost Turkey?'

⁴⁷⁴ Stephen Mcglinchey, 'Neoconservatism and American Foreign Policy', *E-International Relations* (1 June 2009), available at <http://www.e-ir.info/2009/06/01/neo-conservatism-and-american-foreign-policy/> (15 October 2015).

We can see how the trope of irony is an emplotment that always comes *after* metonymy or synecdoche, and as such, it is built upon them. Irony's carnivalesque strategy of reversing the supposedly hegemonic role of the Western self is a particularly effective way to narrate the international system because such an emplotment is more unexpected than metonymy or synecdoche. As argued earlier (see chapter 4), irony is clearly different from the other tropes and in some sense, as White suggests, 'metatropological'. Irony also holds a more diverse set of beliefs as the previous sections have attempted to demonstrate. Although the narratives have in common the conviction that Turkey is lost *because* of the West, some elevate Turkey to a superior role vis-à-vis the West or call for a more sympathetic attitude towards Turkey while others represent Turkey as a country that remains inferior to the West.

Similarly, there are a host of political ideologies that are represented in the ironic narratives: liberal, conservative, neoconservative, and so on. What they have in common is their self-critical attitude towards the West, which leads to a 'declinist West' narrative as opposed to a 'triumphant West' narrative that is narrated both through metonymical and synecdochal representations. In teasing out this diversity in the web of beliefs influencing the Western tradition of foreign policy analysis concerning Turkey, the thesis challenges the idea that there are merely 'American' and 'European' narratives or that the 'losing Turkey' narrative is an interpretation of events that is manifestly conservative in nature.

Finally, not only are different events made to function as elements in very different types of narratives, they also often do not play the dictating role in the process of narration. In other words, it is not the events but the tradition that primarily dictate which events are woven into the narrative. As Rorty so eloquently argues in one of his famous works on irony: 'The world does not

speak. Only we do. The world can, once we have programmed ourselves with a language, cause us to hold beliefs. But it cannot propose a language for us to speak.⁴⁷⁵ It is therefore our beliefs and the tradition they form that we should focus on when examining human action.

Conclusion

Kenneth Burke brings up 'losing' as an example of an image that is employed to localise the principle of transformation.⁴⁷⁶ This chapter has analysed how it has been used in representing Turkey's foreign policy in Western scholarly and academic writings. Three different tropological emplotments were examined in more detail with the aim of showing that although they all localise the principle of transformation either to Turkey or the West, they represent different moral and aesthetic preferences and have diverging ideas about the West.

There are, first, metonymically driven narratives that assert that Turkey is lost despite the West. These narratives are usually premised on a belief that Turkey is inherently different from and does not share the same historical and cultural resources with the West. They feed into the 'civilisation West' tradition and produce policy recommendations that direct Turkey's foreign policy more towards the East, which is represented as a more natural location for the country. The West maintains its moral and political leadership and is not made responsible for any negative transformations in Turkish foreign policy. In other words, if Turkey decides to turn away from aspiring to become a Western state, it is because her innate qualities are pulling the country in the opposite direction – not because there is something wrong with the West.

⁴⁷⁵ Rorty, *Contingency, irony, and*, p. 6

⁴⁷⁶ Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives*, p. 11.

Then there are more synecdochal interpretations of 'losing' Turkey that are often intertwined with metonymical elements but nevertheless provide a different image of Turkey's nature. In these narratives Turkey is not inherently different from the West but a state like any other in the West, which connects them to the 'modern West' tradition. Also here many of the narratives represent the West as a triumphalist entity but as one that Turkey can join if it decides to. This narrative tradition was particularly popular during the Cold War when Turkey was suddenly 'found' in the West, which strengthened idea that the West is, above all, a political union that unites like-minded states in foreign and security policies.

The third narrative tradition provides an entirely different image of what 'losing' Turkey entails and arises from a set of beliefs that are manifestly critical towards the West. Here 'losing' is an image that is ironically attached to the West and its alleged hypocritical and unjust nature. The question becomes not of losing Turkey but losing the West. These narratives require more understanding of the cultural and political context because they often contain intertextual references and discursive strategies of reversed meaning. As such, the tradition is a pronouncedly Western in that the imagined audience is expected to understand and share the subtleties put forward in the narratives – they are imagined as a community that has been educated in the same language.

In order to properly understand the function and role of metaphorical language in Western foreign policy analysis, the thesis next examines another popular metaphor in the field: being 'at a crossroads'. It is also a dialectic narrative resource but opens policy horizons that are not available with the 'losing' metaphor. Also the 'crossroads' metaphor localises the principle of

transformation, but it taps into a different set of mental images and provides more narrative resources to the debate on the West.

Chapter 6 – The ‘crossroads’ metaphor of Turkey

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to examine another popular metaphor in Western foreign policy analysis tradition concerning Turkey: being at a ‘crossroads’. The chapter proposes that similarly to the ‘losing’ metaphor, the ‘crossroads’ metaphor is employed to advance different, often conflicting interpretations of the West. It is important to analyse this multiplicity of meanings contained in a single metaphor because only then can we adequately tease out the ideological and moral preference that influence the narrative process in Western foreign policy analysis of Turkey.

Keith Shimko rightly argues that ‘the same metaphor might have different implications for various people’.⁴⁷⁷ Or as Claudia Strauss writes, ‘allies may be using conventional discourses with different policy implications and seeming opponents may espouse some of the same discourses’.⁴⁷⁸ Murray Edelman formulates the same idea in a more poetic way: ‘In the domain of political language there are many mansions, and they often defy the laws of physics by occupying the same semantic space.’⁴⁷⁹ The most effective way to unpack these nuances is to analyse the way in which a particular web of belief concerning the West is advanced with the use of tropes that are localised in popular metaphors.

⁴⁷⁷ Keith Shimko, ‘Metaphors and Foreign Policy Decision Making’, *Political Psychology*, 15:4 (1994), p. 658.

⁴⁷⁸ Claudia Strauss, ‘How are language constructions constitutive? Strategic uses of conventional discourses about immigration’, *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 16 (2013), p. 270.

⁴⁷⁹ Murray Edelman, ‘Political Language and Political Reality’, *Political Science*, 18:1 (Winter, 1985), p. 17.

One of the most common metaphors found in international relations discourses are ‘path’ and ‘journey’.⁴⁸⁰ The ‘crossroads’ metaphor belongs to this group of ‘source domains’, which refers to conceptual domains that are used to understand a ‘target domain’ – a foreign policy event. Being at a crossroads means that you are on the road and searching for the right direction. Situating a country at a crossroads is a particular powerful discursive act because it not only represents a country, in this case Turkey, as a state that is currently not ‘stable’ in terms of its location but possibly even ‘lost’ in case it cannot find the right road. As such, the metaphor of ‘crossroads’ is connected to the ‘losing’ metaphor discussed in the previous chapter. Even more importantly, the metaphor opens a number of framing opportunities to the narrator.

Firstly, through the ‘crossroads’ metaphor Turkey can be given advice as to which road to choose, making the Western foreign policy analyst a policy advisor to Turkey that needs guidance. This is connected to the Western concept of the world community where some states are less developed than others and require ‘both paternalistic help and a strong hand to keep them in line if they get naughty’.⁴⁸¹

Secondly, the metaphor enables Turkey to be represented as a state that is standing at a crossroads but not moving anywhere, which means that the West can only wait for Turkey to make the right decisions. If the previous narrative framing shifts the main responsibility to the West to act as a policy guide to Turkey, this framing in contrast shifts the responsibility to Turkey that needs to

⁴⁸⁰ Paul Chilton, *Security Metaphors: Cold War Discourse from Containment to Common House* (New York: Peter Lang, 1996); George Lakoff & Mark Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought* (New York: Basic Books, 1999); Edward Slingerland et al., ‘Collision with China: Conceptual Metaphor Analysis, Somatic Marking, and the EP-3 Incident’, *International Studies Quarterly*, 51:1 (2007), pp. 53–77.

⁴⁸¹ Paul Chilton and George Lakoff further argue that in this cognitive framing, such states are seen as ‘metaphorical children, who need the help of their elders if they are to grow up to be mature adults’. ‘Foreign Policy By Metaphor’, *CRL Newsletter*, 3:5 (June, 1989), p. 7.

choose the correct road. In other words, it justifies Western inaction and effaces any interconnectedness between Western action and the narrated event in question.

Thirdly, the 'crossroads' metaphor can also be used in an ironic way to argue that, in fact, it is the West that is standing at a crossroads because of its political and moral weakness in dealing with Turkey. All three framings are discussed in the chapter in reference to the tropes that they rely on and the different ideas of the West that they strengthen.

There are several arguments in the chapter, which derive from two key notions. The first notion concerns the fact that, as White explains, a 'narrative account is always a figurative account, an allegory. To leave this figurative element out of consideration in the analysis of a narrative is to miss not only its aspect as allegory but also the performance in language by which a chronicle is transformed into a narrative.'⁴⁸²

The purpose of this chapter is to tease out the figurative elements in the foreign policy analysis narrative tradition. To view foreign policy analysis as a neutral science that simply describes foreign policy processes misses the most important aspects of the meanings that it produces. It is precisely the commonsensical nature of the most popular metaphors in foreign policy analysis that makes them so powerful. As Chilton and Lakoff argue, 'natural-seeming metaphors help to structure and legitimize policies and programmes'.⁴⁸³ At the same time, we need to focus on the narrative tradition, not simply on single narratives or metaphors, to unpack those meanings.

⁴⁸² White, *The Content of the Form*, p. 48.

⁴⁸³ Paul Chilton & George Lakoff, 'Metaphor in Foreign Policy Discourse', in Christina Schaffner & Anita L. Wended (eds.), *Language and Peace* (Dartmouth: Aldershot, 1995), p. 43. Keith Shimko argues that certain metaphors 'are so taken for granted that they usually slip into our everyday expressions and actions undetected and unrecognized'. Shimko, 'Metaphors and Foreign Policy Decision Making', p. 657.

The second notion concerns the persuasive nature of the ‘crossroads’ metaphor, which is connected to the ideological nature of the narrative tradition. In international relations, the focus is traditionally on the way in which politicians persuade the public with the use of framing, rhetoric, and narratives.⁴⁸⁴ Also foreign policy analysis should be seen as persuasive language and ‘a form of ideological elaboration’.⁴⁸⁵ Foreign policy analysis is performative in nature and not only represents but also seeks change. The chapter aims to demonstrate the complex nature of the Western foreign policy analysis narrative tradition concerning Turkey: it is both performative and figurative. This means that it not only performs narrative acts but also foreign policy in actively, even assertively, framing and limiting policy options to foreign policy audiences. It also uses figurative language to transform disconnected events into a coherent narrative.

The chapter first analyses the ‘West needs to guide Turkey’ narrative that employs the ‘crossroads’ metaphor. It contains metonymical elements in that the focus is on the *difference* between Turkey and the West. What we have here is a ‘modern West’ narrative that relies on two foreign policy metaphors that George Lakoff outlines: the ‘Path to Democracy’ metaphor and the ‘Rational Actor’ metaphor.⁴⁸⁶ The chapter will show that they are at interplay in that Turkey is represented as a rational actor *if* it follows the policy line dictated by the foreign policy analyst, and rational action is to follow a path to democracy. In other

⁴⁸⁴ Jonathan Charteris-Black, *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Power* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

⁴⁸⁵ Roland Barthes, ‘The Discourse of History’, *Comparative Criticism*, 3 (1981), pp. 16–17. See also Veronika Koller, *Metaphor and Gender in Business Media Discourse: A Critical Cognitive Study* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p. 201; Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives*, p. xiv.

⁴⁸⁶ George Lakoff, ‘Metaphorical Thought in Foreign Policy: Why Strategic Framing Matters’, *The Frameworks Institute* (December, 1999), pp. 15; 32.

words, rationality is tied in not with a more universal or ethical logic of reasoning but with performing in line with Western recommendations.

The second part of the chapter analyses the ‘Turkey is not moving anywhere’ narrative and shows that it is connected to the idea that Islam is not compatible with the Western civilization. As such, it represents a ‘civilisation West’ narrative and is premised upon one of the most prevalent concept in foreign policy discourse, the ‘container’ metaphor. Lakoff explains that states are imagined as ‘containers and their contents have a tendency to get out, say, by leakage, spillage, boiling over or even explosion’.⁴⁸⁷

In the narrative of Turkey being stuck at a crossroads, Turkey is usually represented as a container of Islam that cannot progress further before it abandons its Islamic government. Furthermore, Islam is represented as a force that can and will get out and spread across the region and all the way to Europe unless Turkey’s secularists manage to contain it. Needless to say, the positive role of Atatürk is strongly emphasised in the narrative. Also this narrative represents a ‘triumphant West’ belief but advocates less active foreign policy engagement than the ‘West needs to guide Turkey’ narrative.

A conservative web of belief in which *inaction* represents moral strength influences this narrative tradition. As Lakoff explains, conservative values are premised upon a belief that ‘it is immoral to be a “do-gooder,” since not seeking your own self-interest upsets the system and does not maximize well-being for all’.⁴⁸⁸ Situating Turkey at a crossroads, then, is in line with the moral order of the world, because as long as Turkey actively practices political Islam, it is not in Western interests to engage but to contain. Part of the conservative moral

⁴⁸⁷ Lakoff, ‘Foreign Policy By Metaphor’, p. 11. See also Eric M. Blanchard, ‘Constituting China: the role of metaphor in the discourses of early Sino-American relations’, *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 16 (2013), pp. 177–205.

⁴⁸⁸ Lakoff, ‘Metaphorical Thought in Foreign Policy’, p. 6.

order is that 'the moral are those in power. There is thus a natural hierarchy of morality based on forms of power'.⁴⁸⁹ Within this hierarchy, Lakoff argues, Western culture is above nonwestern culture and Christians are above nonchristians. Turkey as an Islamic state, then, is naturally below the West, which in this narrative is depicted as Christian.

The third narrative is an ironic response to the 'triumphant West' tradition and challenges not only the notion that being rational is to follow Western policy recommendations but also the moral system based on the supremacy of the West. The 'West at a crossroads' narrative turns the plot upside down and situates Turkey at a crossroads only *ironically*. What the narrative really suggests is that it is not Turkey but the West that is at a crossroads. The narrative belongs to the 'declinist West' tradition and employs an ironic strategy to highlight inadequacies in Western action.

Finally, there are two important findings that will be discussed throughout the chapter. Firstly, the metaphor of being at a crossroads is employed in narratives of Turkey that have mainly metonymical or ironic elements. All the foreign policy analysis texts that employ the 'crossroads' metaphor to narrative Turkey emphasise difference instead of integration or harmony between Turkey and the West. It can thus be argued that the metaphor has a strong metonymical or ironic function in Western foreign policy analysis.

In narratives that rely on metonymical elements, Turkey is represented as an actor that has two opposing policy ends. Those ends are morally charged: Turkey can choose either the repugnant road or the virtuous road. The moralising impulse derives from the narrator's web of beliefs and reflects ideas about the West: the ends are judged from the perspective of their effect upon the

⁴⁸⁹ Lakoff, 'Metaphorical Thought in Foreign Policy', p. 6.

West's interests, values, and international status. In narratives that rely on ironic elements, the dominant plot is turned around with the aim of providing a counter narrative that exposes the moral and political weakness of the West. As such, the chapter continues to argue that, as Paul Davidson notes, in 'the realm of political discourse, metaphors create common sense assumptions about how the world is or should be. Such assumptions are underpinned by political interests'.⁴⁹⁰

Secondly, there are different 'all-pervasive generating principles' in Western foreign policy analysis narratives that rely on the metaphor of Turkey at a crossroads. The most common dominant motives that do the explanatory work in the narratives are religion and class with the former being connected to the 'civilisation West' tradition and the latter to the 'modern West' tradition. The chapter argues that the metaphor of Turkey at a crossroads serves as a rhetorical appeal to the Western audience to act or not to act now and as such it localises and dramatises the principle of transformation, which is at the heart of Burke's oeuvre.

Burke notes that 'we do not want to ignore the import of the imagery in its own right, first as needed for characterizing a given motivational recipe, and second for its rhetorical effect upon an audience'.⁴⁹¹ The purpose of this chapter is to tease out the narrative strategies of motivating and persuading the audience to support the foreign policy options put forward in the narratives.⁴⁹² The purpose is tied in with the attempt to reveal the ideological elements in the seemingly neutral foreign policy analysis language.

⁴⁹⁰ Paul Davidson, 'The role of "social exclusion" and other metaphors in contemporary British social policy: a cognitive critical approach', *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 16 (2013), p. 223.

⁴⁹¹ Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives*, p. 17.

⁴⁹² See Davidson, 'The role of "social exclusion" and other metaphors', pp. 209–210.

How is the 'crossroads' metaphor different from 'losing'?

There are similarities between the metaphors of 'losing' and 'crossroads'. They both refer to 'a development *from* one order of motives *to* another'.⁴⁹³ This means that both the metaphors concern transformation in one form or another. The notion of transformation is valued either negatively or positively – as a promise or a threat. Transformation may be narrated as a necessary action for Turkey to continue on its path to become Western. But it can also be represented as a threat that will lead to Turkey being lost. The central point is that both the metaphors localise the principle of transformation to Turkey, often depicting it in dramatic language.

The thesis argues that the reason lies in the tradition of narrating Turkey, which relies upon a set of narrative resources that have been passed down from generation to generation since the 'bewildering'⁴⁹⁴ and 'amazing'⁴⁹⁵ transformation of the Ottoman Empire into the Republic of Turkey in 1923. In other words, the principle of transformation is an integral part of the Turkish dilemma that influences the way in which Turkey is narrated in foreign policy analysis. Turkey allows the West to reflect upon its identity by representing Turkey as a hybrid state. Like the previous chapter, also this chapter aims to demonstrate that it is more the narrative tradition than actual events taking place in the international system that influences the way in which Turkey is represented in foreign policy analysis.

The metaphors of 'losing' and 'crossroads' are also similar in that they are both charged with futurity. Turkey is represented as a state that is in a process of 'becoming' rather than 'being' a solid actor in the international system.

⁴⁹³ Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives*, p. 11, emphasis in original.

⁴⁹⁴ E., 'Turkish Facts and Fantasies', p. 589.

⁴⁹⁵ Chirol, 'The Downfall of the Khalifate', p. 572.

Consider how practically none of the narratives analysed in the previous chapter argued that Turkey *is* lost or found but rather that it *will* be lost or *will* become Western. The ‘crossroads’ metaphor is even more explicitly charged with futurity because it leaves the final verdict open depending on the road Turkey or the West choose – their present actions dramatically determine and close off their future location and options. The fundamental narrative principle of forming a narrative around a past, present and future is clearly followed. All the foreign policy analyses examined in the chapter are very much narratively structured with a valued endpoint and sequencing of events.

There are also differences between the metaphors of ‘losing’ and ‘crossroads’, and therefore they merit their own chapters. The main difference is that while the ‘losing’ metaphor was closely intertwined with questions about identity – especially with the idea that Turkey is or is not inherently different from the West – the ‘crossroads’ metaphor focuses on Turkey’s actions. Another difference between the metaphors of ‘losing’ and ‘crossroads’ is that the latter is narrated through fewer tropes than the former. As noted earlier, there are no synecdochal elements employed with the ‘crossroads’ metaphor.

If the ‘losing’ metaphor was more about what Turkey and the West are or should be, the ‘crossroads’ metaphor is about what they should do. It is explicitly about Western foreign policy scholars giving policy advice to Turkey and Western actors. The metaphor of ‘crossroads’ provides ironic resources to Turkish commentators precisely because of its lecturing tone. The most typical response from Turkish commentators is to argue that it is not Turkey but the West that is at a crossroads. In other words, they turn the plot upside down, lecture back, and point to moral and political weaknesses in Western action, as shown at the end of the chapter.

Turkey is not the only actor that is continuously situated at a crossroads in Western foreign policy analysis. For example, George Schwab edited a volume titled *United States Foreign Policy at the Crossroads* in 1982 in which scholars discussed the legacy of Hans Morgenthau as the father of realism.⁴⁹⁶ Similarly, the Wilson Center organised a conference titled ‘Is the United States at a Crossroads? Domestic and Global Dimension’ in 2015.⁴⁹⁷ The examples are numerous, but not entirely symmetrical with narratives on Turkey. The main difference seems to be that Western narratives that place the United States at a crossroads stem more often from events in the external environment – such as immigration or rising security and economic threats – than with Turkey where triggering events are more often domestic. Situating Turkey at a crossroads is so common in Western foreign policy analysis that the International Financing Review notes in its ‘IFR Turkey Special Report 2015: At a crossroads’: ‘To say that Turkey is at a crossroads and must choose its future direction is simply to state an age-old truth: it always has been.’⁴⁹⁸

The statement reflects the multiplicity of meanings that are contained in the ‘crossroads’ metaphor. On the one hand, it implies that Turkey is choosing its future path. But on the other hand, Turkey is represented as an actor that is not moving anywhere – and never will. Paradoxically, as noted earlier, being at a crossroads can imply both a temporary location where a future direction is negotiated and a permanent location where Turkey is forever stuck.

The purpose of this chapter, then, is to examine how the ‘age-old truth’ of situating Turkey at a crossroads plays out in Western foreign policy

⁴⁹⁶ George Schwab (ed.), *United States Foreign Policy at the Crossroads* (Praeger, 1982).

⁴⁹⁷ See <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-united-states-crossroads-domestic-and-global-dimensions> (20 November 2015).

⁴⁹⁸ Available at <http://www.ifre.com/ifr-turkey-special-report-2015-at-a-crossroads/21198165.fullarticle> (20 November 2015).

analysis, why the metaphor is such a common narrative resource, how it is connected to the Turkish dilemma, how the West is represented in those narratives, and what is the web of beliefs influencing the discursive traditions. Kenneth Burke refers to the statement of ‘being at a crossroads’ as a ‘hot item’, and the chapter aims to show that it is ‘hot’ also in Western foreign policy analysis.⁴⁹⁹

Turkey needs to be guided at a crossroads

This narrative tradition that postulates that Turkey needs Western guidance at a crossroads belongs to the group of ‘path’ and ‘journey’ metaphors in international relations and has a long tradition in foreign policy analysis. The belief that Turkey is on a journey of *becoming* rather than in a state of *being* has been an integral part of Western foreign policy analysis since the early 1900s. Hans Kohn, for example, writes in his *Foreign Affairs* article in 1933–1934:

The entire east is in process of *transition* from one cultural stage to another. It is a *process* which deeply affects all categories of social and industrial life; it works great changes in human beings and in their habits and ideas. Turkey is in the forefront of the *movement*.⁵⁰⁰

The ‘crossroads’ metaphor forms a continuum with the narrative tradition that relies on ‘journey’ metaphors, but became popular only after the Cold War. This shows that a tradition, as Bevir and Rhodes argue, can slowly change over time. But even if new metaphors arise, the central feature – the principle of localising

⁴⁹⁹ William H. Rueckert (ed.), *Letters from Kenneth Burke to William H. Rueckert, 1959–1987* (Parlor Press, 2002), p. 186.

⁵⁰⁰ Kohn, ‘Ten years of the Turkish Republic’, p. 154, emphases added.

transformation to Turkey – remains. It is such a central feature of Kohn’s analysis that if it were to be removed from the text, the analysis would no longer be coherent or comprehensible. Kohn employs terms such as process, transition, stages, changes, and movement, which all render *movement* meaningful and as such ‘hide some features of reality and foreground others’.⁵⁰¹

The West, in contrast, is represented as a stable actor that can guide less developed states such as Turkey that are still in the path of becoming like the West. The West, in other words, has already arrived at the right location, whereas Turkey is still in the perilous journey. The responsibility of the West is to guide Turkey to the correct road. Lakoff explains: ‘Once a country is on the *Path to Democracy*, it will continue on that path and eventually become a full-fledged democracy. Thus, even countries that may currently have dictators should be supported if they are seen as being “on the path”’.⁵⁰² The interesting part is that more than 80 years later, Turkey is still on the path, which pegs the question of whether Turkey is ever even meant to arrive at the destination?

This is where the nexus between the ‘civilisation West’ tradition and the ‘modern West’ tradition becomes blurred. The ‘modern West’ tradition holds that Turkey *can* become Western as long as it adopts a set of values that define the West. It is a journey – perhaps even a long one – but a journey that Turkey can manage to travel with the guidance of the West. That Turkey is still on the path in the 2010s can be because the West has not provided enough guidance or because of political setbacks in Turkey.

In the ‘civilisation West’ tradition, the journey itself is impossible for Turkey, because Turks are lacking the adequate historical and cultural understanding that underpins the West. Situating Turkey at a crossroads, then, is

⁵⁰¹ Blanchard, ‘Constituting China’, p. 182.

⁵⁰² Lakoff, ‘Metaphorical Thought in Foreign Policy’, 32, emphasis in original.

not a genuine discursive act but either a politically motivated move to exert influence over Turkey or an ironic strategy to highlight the discrepancies in the West's approach towards Turkey. This becomes more apparent when we continue with Kohn's analysis:

It goes without saying that such *periods of transition* have their disadvantages and drawbacks. It may well be that the peoples undergoing a *transformation* like that in *process* in the east today do not grasp the *real* nature of western humanism or the intellectual foundations of science and scientific investigation; they may merely adopt out of western life what happens to suit their purposes.⁵⁰³

Here we can see that Kohn moves away from the initial 'modern West' tradition and closer to the 'civilisation West' tradition, implying that any seeming 'progress' on Turkey's path might only be superficial and it is perhaps impossible for Turkey to ever complete the journey. The suggestion that to become Western requires some deeper sense of understanding – not just the adoption of a set of values – implies that the West is a civilisation that one needs to be born into. The promise contained in the former formulation becomes emptied in the latter, rendering the 'crossroads' metaphor an insincere narrative tool. This paradox will be discussed in more detail in the second section of the chapter.

More recent examples of Turkey being narrated through the 'path' and 'journey' metaphors include Norman Stone who writes that an 'extremely important *process* is now under *way* to turn Turkey into a modern, democratic and more or less European country, and the first step in the process is to stabilize the

⁵⁰³ Kohn, 'Ten years of the Turkish Republic', pp. 154–155, emphases added.

currency'.⁵⁰⁴ The metaphor of 'process' is at the heart of the 'modern West' narrative, implying that Turkey can gradually become a Western state as oppose to being eternally 'stuck' at a crossroads. As Ari-Elmeri Hyvönen argues in relation to European interpretations of the Arab Spring: 'The processual imaginary reaches even more deeply into the Western imagination ... The framing in which the Arabs are seen as striving for the "same" freedoms and rights "we" already have is an act of turning the interpretations of the uprising towards processuality.'⁵⁰⁵

Also Hugh Pope relies on 'journey' source domains, arguing that 'when the AKP came to power in 2002, it was handed the reins to a country that was already heading in the right *direction*'.⁵⁰⁶ Stone's Turkey – 'say "Turkey" and various problems are at once on offer'⁵⁰⁷ – was represented in a far worse condition than Pope's Turkey two years later, but they both narrate the country as being in a state of transformation, which is potentially positive and certainly a 'process'. Also Morton Abramowitz and Henri J. Barkey argue that the 'West should not act as if Turkey is moving in the right *direction* in all respects, but it can help keep Turkey *on track* to *becoming* a tolerant liberal democracy'.⁵⁰⁸

Eric Rouleau describes Turkey as a state that 'having emerged from a long isolation into a new international conjuncture fraught with opportunities and risks, pulled in various *directions* by the *conflicting* aspirations of a *diverse* population, stands before a number of *choices*'.⁵⁰⁹ Piotr Zalewski argues that

⁵⁰⁴ Norman Stone, 'Talking Turkey', emphases added.

⁵⁰⁵ Ari-Elmeri Hyvönen, 'From Event to Process: The EU and the "Arab Spring"' in *Spreading Protest: Social Movements in Times of Crisis* (ECPR Press, 2014), p. 110.

⁵⁰⁶ Hugh Pope, 'Pax Ottomana? The Mixed Success of Turkey's New Foreign Policy', *Foreign Affairs* (November/December 2010), p. 163, emphasis added.

⁵⁰⁷ Norman Stone, 'Talking Turkey'.

⁵⁰⁸ Morton Abramowitz & Henri J. Barkey, 'Turkey's Transformers: The AKP Sees Big', *Foreign Affairs*, 88:6 (2009), p. 128, emphases added.

⁵⁰⁹ Rouleau, 'Challenges to Turkey', p. 125, emphases added.

previously Turkey did not have a foreign policy but an *orientation*.⁵¹⁰ Finally, Benny Morris talks about a ‘protracted *process*’ that ‘may soon give way to something that may resemble Teheran more than Paris or London’.⁵¹¹ This shows that ‘process’ can also go backwards and as such represent a negative transformation.

Having now established that the first narrative tradition that employs the ‘crossroads’ metaphor forms a continuum with metaphorical images of Turkey on a journey towards becoming a Western state, the present section analyses specific cases of situating Turkey at a crossroads. Helena Kane Finn writes in her *National Interest* article in 2003 that

Turkey is now at an important *crossroads*. There are *worrying* indications that Turkey will *miss* the opportunity to reclaim its *rightful* position on the world stage if the AK Party continues to make the same kinds of *mistakes* it has made already with the United States and Europe. Turkey must respond with a full-fledged and sincere attempt to *repair the damage*.⁵¹²

The initial observation to be made about the text is that Kane Finn’s analysis is written in dramatic and persuasive language. It is not an unusual observation because, as the thesis argues, foreign policy analysis is often both dramatic and persuasive. As Edelman writes: ‘The human mind readily rationalizes any political position in a way that will be persuasive for an audience that wants to be convinced.’⁵¹³ Kane Finn aims to persuade the reader to perceive Turkey’s parliamentary vote against participating in the Iraq War alongside the United

⁵¹⁰ Piotr Zalewski, ‘Turkish Populism Goes to the Polls’, *Foreign Affairs* (10 June 2011).

⁵¹¹ Benny Morris, ‘Turkey’s Islamic Revolution’, *The National Interest* (1 August 2011), emphasis added.

⁵¹² Helena Kane Finn, ‘The U.S.-Turkish Relationship’, emphases added.

⁵¹³ Edelman, ‘Political Language and Political Reality’, p. 13.

States in 2003 as an immoral and irrational act. As such, Edelman's notion of rationalising political language is particularly relevant in this case, because Kane Finn utilises not only the 'crossroads' metaphor but also the 'rational actor' source domain, valuing Turkey's foreign policy action in relation to its compliance with Western recommendations.

The analysis provides a 'moralistic prophecy'⁵¹⁴ for Turkey, condemning Turkey's decision to act independently and democratically in subjecting the question of whether to join the 'coalition of the willing' to a parliamentary vote. There is an inbuilt moral paradox in Kane Finn's analysis in that there was a widespread moral argument against the war in Iraq, which was widely advanced also in the West. The European Parliament and several European states, for example, opposed unilateral military action against Iraq.⁵¹⁵ But that did not result in foreign policy analysts situating them at a crossroads. This means that the moral reasoning that Kane Finn applies stems from considerations that are not connected to the moral justification of the war itself.

It is argued in this thesis that they are premised upon the belief that the United States as a world hegemon has the right to define what is moral behaviour, and less developed states such as Turkey are obliged to follow.⁵¹⁶ But this moral order only applies to states that are still in the process of 'becoming' – the metaphorical children of the world community – not to equal states that have already 'become' metaphorical adults, Western states. And following the same path is rational behaviour. Blanchard explains that metaphors are crucial in this process because they 'place objects into contexts, often using spatial reasoning to

⁵¹⁴ Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives*, p. 5.

⁵¹⁵ Most polls suggest that the majority of populations globally opposed the Iraq war. See for example, William Horsley, 'Polls find Europeans oppose Iraq war', *BBC* (11 February 2003), available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2747175.stm> (20 December 2015).

⁵¹⁶ See Lakoff, 'Metaphorical Thought in Foreign Policy', pp. 5–6; 11.

describe certain relationships constituting them according to relations of power'. This results in 'ownership' and 'infantilisation' of certain countries and regions in the international system.⁵¹⁷

Turning the widely opposed military approach towards Iraq into a virtue and the more democratic non-military response into a vice is also a practice whereby 'brutality is made "virtuous," through dramatic pretexts that justify it in terms of retaliation and righteous indignation'.⁵¹⁸ The purpose of the 'crossroads' metaphor, then, is to educate Turkey on what is virtuous foreign policy behaviour. As Kane Finn continues:

Turkey is indeed at the crossroads. By making *right choices* now, it can proceed to fulfil the *dreams* and *aspirations* of the Turkish Republic. *We hope* that those choices will include a conscious decision to reestablish the *strategic partnership* with the United States, and to deepen and expand our *friendship* of the past fifty years so that it will *endure* over the coming decades of this new Millennium.⁵¹⁹

The function of the 'crossroads' metaphor becomes more apparent here. It simultaneously moralises Turkey's action and offers a virtuous solution, but does this in a seemingly descriptive language – as if Turkey's position at a crossroads was simply a fact that was being described. The language employed to define the difference between the crossing roads is metonymically charged with two opposing ends. The morally and politically repugnant road is narrated through descriptions such as 'worrying indications', 'missed opportunity', 'mistakes', and 'damage repair'.

⁵¹⁷ Blanchard, 'Constituting China', p. 189.

⁵¹⁸ Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives*, p. 18.

⁵¹⁹ Kane Finn, 'The U.S.-Turkish Relationship'.

The virtuous road, in contrast, is about ‘right choices’, ‘fulfilling the dreams and aspirations’, ‘hopes’, ‘partnership’, ‘friendship’, and ‘endurance’. Edelman was right in arguing that political language ‘consists very largely of promises about the future benefits that will flow from whatever cause, policy, or candidate the writer or speaker favors’.⁵²⁰

The purpose of the ‘crossroads’ metaphor is to open the horizon for promises, but in such a way as to include a hidden moral judgement in the narrative. Edelman continues that the ‘performative function of language is all the more potent in politics when it is masked, presenting itself as a tool for objective description’.⁵²¹ This is particularly the case in foreign policy analysis because it is treated as a field of study, not as political language of persuasion. It can be argued that in Kane Finn’s analysis, ‘the rhetorician and the moralist become one’.⁵²²

In light of the dramatic and almost threatening rhetoric employed in the analysis, the suggestion that Turkey would *deepen* and *expand* her *friendship* with the United States is not convincing. It well illustrates the frequent tendency in Western foreign policy analysis to bind identification and division together in narratives of Turkey, representing the country both as a potential partner and a potential adversary. Burke describes the process as putting ‘identification and division ambiguously together, so that you cannot know for certain just where one ends and the other begins’.⁵²³ He further illustrates this with an apt example: ‘When two men collaborate in an enterprise to which they contribute different kinds of services and from which they derive different amounts and kinds of profit, who is to say, once

⁵²⁰ Edelman, ‘Political Language and Political Reality’, p. 16.

⁵²¹ Edelman, ‘Political Language and Political Reality’, p. 16.

⁵²² Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives*, p. 26.

⁵²³ Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives*, p. 25.

and for all, just where “cooperation” ends and one partner’s “exploitation” of the other begins?”⁵²⁴

This is why one needs to be particularly careful when analysing foreign policy narratives of Turkey. A speech act in foreign policy analysis cannot be unpacked without situating it in the narrative tradition that influences it. For example, a European commentator calling Turkey a ‘privileged partner’ might sound like a close and equal relationship between two European states, but if the speech act is located in the narrative continuum concerning Turkey’s EU membership candidacy and historical relations with Europe, it attains a very different meaning – which is closer to rejection than integration. Language in foreign policy analysis is therefore like political language in general, entailing ‘a wide range of resonances that are both present and absent, available for recognition and also for denial’.⁵²⁵

In addition to providing Turkey with the right policy option, Kane Finn’s analysis also takes a position on the ‘two Wests’ debate. As discussed earlier in the thesis the early part of the 2000s was a period of fierce debate on the nature and direction of the West. Kane Finn’s analysis, published in 2003, participates in the debate and emphasises the role of the United States as the most natural and rightful leader of the West. It treats the United States as the only actor that can fulfil the dreams and aspirations of Turkey, almost ignoring the role of Europe in the process. The moral considerations in Europe concerning the Iraq war are not even mentioned in the text, which is to demonstrate that they do not matter. The analysis also relies on the notion, discussed in the previous chapter, that disagreements result not from any inherent qualities but a lack of understanding. As Kane Finn writes

⁵²⁴ Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives*, p. 25.

⁵²⁵ Edelman, ‘Political Language and Political Reality’, p. 18.

it is essential that a true intellectual dialogue be established through academic and cultural contacts so that Turks and Americans are able to *successfully communicate with one another*. There is no question that there will be areas of disagreement in the future, but differences between friends are more easily resolved when those *friends understand one another*.⁵²⁶

Kane Finn's analysis represents a 'triumphant West' narrative, not only positioning the West as the world hegemon but also framing the analysis in such a way as to suggest that a rational Turkey will look upon the West as the key inspiration. As such, it is also an attempt to construct the West as entity that other states want to join. The hegemonic role, however, comes with moral and political responsibilities: the West needs to guide Turkey to find a way out of the crossroads.

Is the crossroads a permanent location?

There are also other ways to perceive Turkey's position at a crossroads, which lead closer to the 'civilisation West' tradition. To examine such cases, we return a few years back to 1996 when Eric Rouleau, former French ambassador to Turkey and Tunisia, argued that Turkey is at a crossroads because of the Kurdish question, which refers to the Kurdish population in Turkey demanding more rights and includes the

⁵²⁶ Kane Finn, 'The U.S.-Turkish Relationship', emphases added. Soner Cagaptay belongs to the same narrative tradition with his article 'Turkey at a Crossroads: Preserving Ankara's Western Orientation' in *Policy Focus*. Cagaptay writes that 'Ankara will continue to need significant U.S. lobbying to help improve its membership prospects. Whatever the nature of the accession talks, both the American and Turkish policy elite should emphasize the shared values between Turks, Americans, and the wider Western world, highlighting Turkey's unique status as a secular, Muslim-majority democracy with strong ties to the West'. Cagaptay's metonymical division in Turkey runs through religion rather than class, which means that the military should be embraced rather than contained: 'In order to win back Turkey's heart, Washington should focus on secular Turks'. They include, as Cagaptay continues, the military. Soner Cagaptay, 'Turkey at a Crossroads: Preserving Ankara's Western Orientation', *Policy Focus*, 48 (October 2005), pp. ix; 18. Available at <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/turkey-at-a-crossroads-preserving-ankaras-western-orientation> (1 February 2016).

military campaign of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) that has been ongoing since 1984. Rouleau writes:

Turkey is *at a crossroads*. It is not enough for its leaders to update their domestic policy, tinker with the economy, and clarify their direction in foreign policy. The task that awaits them is far more *fundamental*, at least if they want to get at the root causes, and not merely the symptoms, of the *sickness* eating away at the republic.⁵²⁷

We can again begin by noting that just like Kane Finn, Rouleau employs dramatic and persuasive language: Turkey is facing a *fundamental* task to cure its *sickness*. Metaphors of disease and sickness are popular in foreign policy analysis because they are effective in framing policy issues and orientating moral and political thinking.⁵²⁸ They also provide cognitive cues to the reader as to which actor is the subject of moralising and needing cure. In Rouleau's analysis it is Turkey, but as we will see later in the chapter, it can also be the West as in Leon Hadar's analysis of the United States as suffering from a bi-polar disorder. In both the cases, the patient is not represented as an innocent and pitiful victim of a disease but as an actor that has failed to stay strong and upright. Davidson points out that 'disease' metaphors in political discourse highlight personal responsibility and culpability.⁵²⁹

Lakoff argues that this type of reasoning concerning moral strength represents a conservative tradition in which morally 'is being upright. Evil is a force in the world. You must be morally strong to keep from falling to the force

⁵²⁷ Eric Rouleau, 'Turkey: Beyond Ataturk', *Foreign Policy* (Summer 1996), p. 70, emphases added.

⁵²⁸ See Donald Schon & Martin Rein, *Frame Reflection: Towards the Resolution of Intractable Policy Controversies* (New York: Basic Books, 1994); Lakoff & Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*; Johanna Vuorelma, 'A Narrative Battle: Debating Finland's EU Policy During the Economic Crisis', *National Identities*, 19:1 (2017), p. 7.

⁵²⁹ Paul Davidson, 'The role of "social exclusion" and other metaphors in contemporary British social policy', p. 221.

of evil. If you are morally weak, you are bound to fall; that is, you are bound to do evil, and so moral weakness is itself a form of immorality'.⁵³⁰ Just like sickness is an orientational metaphor – 'health and life are up; sickness and death are down'⁵³¹ – evil is represented as 'falling' down.

As we can see, the narrative elements that are employed here are metonymical in many ways. There are a number of opposing forces that Rouleau relies on: sickness and health; good and evil; and a repugnant past that needs to be overcome to allow for a virtuous future. Rouleau's Turkey is 'in *desperate* need of an overhaul'.⁵³² Rouleau continues that some of Turkey's 'most basic assumptions must be rethought in light of the changes that have transformed the world'.⁵³³ This means that Turkey has failed to keep pace with the rest of the progressive states. The reason is Turkey's 'dogmatic' principles of Kemalism that 'frequently serve as the pretext for a retreat into a prickly conservatism, thus contributing to a *sclerosis* in republican institutions while undermining Turkey's role in international affairs'.⁵³⁴

Rouleau's narrative resources are not very different from Kohn's even though the *essence* that Rouleau describes is different. While they both represent Turkey as a state that is struggling with modernity, Kohn proposed that it is because of its religious and cultural heritage and Rouleau maintains that the root cause is Turkey's political model. Burke notes that 'depicting of a thing's *end* may be a dramatic way of identifying its *essence*'.⁵³⁵ It is precisely this dynamic that can be recognised in Western foreign policy narratives of Turkey. What makes the 'crossroads' metaphor particularly useful in this regard is that it reduces policy

⁵³⁰ Lakoff, 'Metaphorical Thought in Foreign Policy', p. 6.

⁵³¹ Lakoff & Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, p. 16.

⁵³² Rouleau, 'Turkey: Beyond Ataturk', p. 70, emphasis added.

⁵³³ Rouleau, 'Turkey: Beyond Ataturk', p. 70.

⁵³⁴ Rouleau, 'Turkey: Beyond Ataturk', p. 70, emphasis added.

⁵³⁵ Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives*, p. 17, emphases in original.

options to two alternative *ends*. The audience is mobilised to support the policy road that leads to the righteous end and materialises in essence that is in line with the narrator's web of beliefs.

In his conclusion, Rouleau continues to narrate Turkey in such a way as to render the present time critical in terms of turning Turkey's future destiny: 'Hopes for the future ... surely lie with a new generation, a generation that is not beholden to the myths of the past and can set Turkey on a new course.'⁵³⁶ In Rouleau's narrative, Turkey's Kemalist heritage represents a past that must be overcome to allow for a Western form of governance to spread. Rouleau's idea of the West appears to be a 'modern West' narrative with its emphasis on values of democracy and human rights.

What makes Rouleau's 'crossroads' different from Kane Finn's 'crossroads' is not only that his moralising gaze is directed towards the Kemalist tradition in Turkey rather than towards the compliance with the United States' policies but also that Rouleau shifts the responsibility to Turkey. The responsibility of the West is not necessarily to actively guide Turkey towards modernity but to wait until Turkey's new generation 'can set Turkey on a new course'.

The function of the 'crossroads' metaphor, then, changes here in that Turkey is not standing at a crossroads because the country is in a process of being guided to the right destination by the West but instead stuck there until the new generation modernises the country. As such, Rouleau's 'crossroads' is not a call for Western action to guide Turkey but more a justification for possible inaction as regards Turkey's political development. The vague language of an ambiguous 'new course' serves the function; it does not offer any concrete

⁵³⁶ Rouleau, 'Turkey: Beyond Atatürk', p. 87.

options to Turkey to continue the path and to get rid of the ‘myths of the past’. The most obvious explanation to the difference between Kane Finn and Rouleau is that the former advocates a United States led Western alliance and calls for Turkey to continue pursuing membership in the European Union. Kane Finn argues that

After the U.K. and France, Turkey is certainly the most serious military power in Europe. Turkey has a great deal to offer Europe in terms of security. Turkey's dynamic young population, if appropriately educated for the modern technological world, can make a great contribution to a Europe with aging populations and low birth rates.⁵³⁷

Kane Finn’s Turkey – dynamic, educated and with a great deal to contribute to Europe – is in stark contrast to Rouleau sick and desperate Turkey. This is because Rouleau analyses the question from a different moral and political position, framing it around the European integration project, which becomes more apparent in his analysis four years later in 2000.

In his article ‘Turkey’s Dream of Democracy’ in *Foreign Affairs*, Rouleau once again places Turkey at a crucial crossroads: ‘Turkey today stands at a crossroads. Few other moments in the 77-year history of the Turkish republic have been so decisive.’⁵³⁸ This time the formative event is the European Parliament soon beginning to consider the documentation concerning Turkey’s accession. Turkey had been granted the EU membership candidacy a year earlier in 1999, and would commence the actual negotiations five years later in 2005.

⁵³⁷ Kane Finn, ‘The U.S.-Turkish Relationship: Blueprint for the Future’.

⁵³⁸ Eric Rouleau, ‘Turkey’s Dream of Democracy’, p. 100.

It is highly likely that this particular event was not considered formative or even mildly significant in most other narrative circles in the United States or Europe. But to Rouleau this is a crucial moment because it might bring Turkey closer to the European Union. Here the ‘modern West’ tradition gets more intertwined with the ‘civilisation West’ tradition. In other words, Turkey is situated even more firmly at a permanent crossroads that becomes more like a container than a passage. As Rouleau argues

Will Turkey *miss the boat* for the European Union? Some of the pashas, jealous of their power, hope that it will ... But all that is certain today – as Turkey stands facing two very different paths forward – is that the negotiations between Ankara and Brussels will be *difficult, painful*, and will most likely last for many years to come.⁵³⁹

There are many observations to be made from the analysis. Firstly, Rouleau’s earlier emphasis on the importance of acting immediately to cure the sickness is now defined as a process that will ‘last for many years to come’. This means that Turkey will not be leaving the crossroads anytime soon. Also Turkey’s sickness is now of a different type. The metonymical division between a Turkey that is stuck in a Kemalist dogma and an enlightened West has transformed into a battle between two Turkeys: the repugnant ‘Kemalist republicans’ and the virtuous ‘Kemalist democrats’. The battle is even more explicitly an internal battle within Turkey, which further cuts the West out of the picture.

⁵³⁹ Rouleau, ‘Turkey’s Dream of Democracy’, p. 114, emphases added.

Another remarkable change in the narrative is the sudden focus on *class* as the explanatory factor.⁵⁴⁰ It is apparent that the ‘sickness eating away at the Republic that Rouleau described in his narrative in 1996 is no longer just the Kemalist heritage but a particular version of it, which is upheld by the masses that are yet to adopt a Western mind. It is the masses – the Kemalist republicans – that allow the army to maintain its privileged position and prevent Turkey from becoming a modern, Western state. The Kemalist democrats are represented as the progressive elites that are enlightened and Western, but simply lack enough power to provide adequate counterweight to the populous masses that do not understand what the best future for Turkey is. In other words, the ignorant masses need to be educated to see the benefits of Turkey becoming a Western state. Rouleau represents the task as monumental, especially as the masses have the backing of the military – the ‘pashas’.⁵⁴¹

Finally, the narrative tradition that Rouleau represents has been later used as narrative resources in Western foreign policy analysis of Turkey, which illustrates the constitutive nature of foreign policy analysis as political language. Consider, for example, how Caroline Glick argued in the earlier chapter that by ‘forcing Turkey to curb its military’s role as the guarantor of Turkish secularism, the EU took away the secularists’ last line of defense against the rising tide of the AKP’ (see chapter 5).

⁵⁴⁰ Rouleau writes: ‘On the one side stands the Turkey of what can be called the “Kemalist republicans,” those who see the military as the infallible interpreter of Atatürk’s legacy and the sole guardian of the nation and the state. This side has formidable power; the military enjoys not only enormous constitutional and legislative advantages but also unrivaled prestige among *large sectors of the population*. As a university professor in Istanbul remarked this summer, “If the Turkish people had to choose between the European Union and our army, they would choose the army!” On the other side stand – rather cautiously – what could be called the “Kemalist democrats.” They are proud of the revolution carried out by the founder of the republic eight decades ago, but at the same time they believe that the regime should adapt to *modernity* and *Western norms*. This group includes *intellectuals* who maintain that Turkey needs democratization regardless of EU requirements, business circles in favor of the globalization of the economy, and (perhaps ironically) Kurds and Islamists hopeful that Brussels will ensure that their legitimate rights are recognized and guaranteed’. Rouleau, ‘Turkey’s Dream of Democracy’, p. 113, emphases added.

⁵⁴¹ Rouleau, ‘Turkey’s Dream of Democracy’, p. 102.

It is the narrative tradition that Rouleau represents that Glick identifies as a *cause* for the AKP's rise. It is clear that we have moved far from the 'modern West' tradition that we began with as manifested in the 'crossroads' metaphor of Kane Finn. We are now closer to the West rejecting Turkey and containing rather than guiding the country at a crossroads. The central idea that influences the 'modern West' is challenged but not explicitly rejected. Describing this tradition, Lakoff poses a question: 'Are there sinkholes on the path to democracy?'⁵⁴² And he continues:

Doubts have been raised as to whether the *Path to Democracy* metaphor is apt. Countries to which we have given aid to move them toward democracy seem not to be becoming democratic. As the internal nature of states becomes part of foreign policy, culture is seen as playing a huge role, and the question has been asked: Do some states just not have the right cultural conditions for democracy?

The 'crossroads' metaphor has been employed to provide contrasting answers to the question. This chapter aims to show that the discursive space is a continuum where answers are not separate categories of thought but can sometimes slide into each other like in the narrative tradition that Rouleau represents. This is possible because the narratives are charged with futurity and often presented as future 'promises' and 'hopes'. The metaphor of 'crossroads' allows the narrator to present scenarios that construct the moral and political nature of the subject without committing to that representation.

⁵⁴² Lakoff, 'Metaphorical Thought in Foreign Policy', p. 35.

This is particularly the case in narratives that sit at the intersection of the ‘modern West’ tradition and the ‘civilisation West’ tradition, giving rise to ironic interpretations that focus on this discrepancy. This Burkean interplay between identification and division is sometimes singled out as the dominant motive for the West’s ‘loss’ of Turkey.⁵⁴³ Here we can see how also the metaphors of ‘losing’ and ‘crossroads’ are sometimes intertwined and provide narrative resources to one another. Dvora Yanow and Marlen van der Haar argue that the integration discourse in the Netherlands is ‘powerful for being carried out in disguise’.⁵⁴⁴ Yanow and van der Haar claim that underlying the ‘seemingly neutral policy and administrative terms’ there is a suggestion that ‘integration is not and never will be possible’.⁵⁴⁵ They further note that the integration discourse ‘brings ancient ideas of place and behaviour into play’.⁵⁴⁶

This is the case with the second narrative tradition discussed here: it only hints at the possibility that Turkey might never become Western, which is possible because the metaphor of ‘crossroads’ lacks specificity, is slippery, and can be constantly reasserted to claim that Turkey still has not made its definite choice. The criteria laid out for Turkey to continue on the road change depending on the narrator’s web of beliefs, which means that Turkey can be kept waiting at a crossroads permanently. Yanow & van der Haar conclude that a policy discourse is ‘all the more dangerous for carrying its meanings in silence, which is the power

⁵⁴³ Cagaptay, for example, argues in his article ‘Turkey at a crossroads’ that ‘Turkish euphoria over accession faces serious challenges in 2005–2006. This heightened pessimism is due largely to the EU’s increasing recalcitrance towards Ankara’s candidacy’. The EU’s perceived ‘condescension’ could even provoke a ‘nationalist backlash’ in Turkey, Cagaptay continues. Cagaptay, ‘Turkey at a Crossroads’, p. ix.

⁵⁴⁴ Dvora Yanow & Marlen van der Haar, ‘People out of place: allochthony and autochthony in the Netherlands identity discourse – metaphors and categories in action’, *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 16 (2003), p. 229.

⁵⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁶ Yanow & van der Haar, ‘People out of place’, p. 245.

of metaphors and of the unspoken, yet tacitly known, organising logic embedded in category structures'.⁵⁴⁷

The third narrative tradition discussed here is more explicit in its rejection and makes it clear that an Islamic Turkey can never become Western. It represents a 'civilisation West' tradition and presents Islam as fundamentally incompatible with the West. The tradition often contains ironic elements because the notion of a naïve and weak West is an important part of the dominant motive in the narratives. As such, the narrative tradition normally produces 'declinist West' interpretations. The following section focuses on this narrative tradition at the other end of the continuum that relies on ironic elements in rejecting and challenging the idea of the West as a guide to Turkey at a crossroads.

Ironic crossroads

The use of 'journey' metaphors to narrate Turkey as a country that is 'stuck' rather than 'on the move' has been popular since the early 1900s, and they are premised on the same skepticism that Lakoff describes as a 'sinkhole' to democracy. Robert Montage, a French sociologist (1893–1954), wrote in his *Foreign Affairs* article in 1951–1952:

Optimists will perhaps feel that this analysis shows too little faith in Islam's ability to play its rôle in a modern *civilization*. If so, it is because the regeneration of Islam, so earnestly desired by all who have faith in spiritual values, seems to *us* still *hypothetical*. Though Islamic society is *gradually* adopting Western techniques in the fields

⁵⁴⁷ Yanow & van der Haar, 'People out of place', p. 251.

of economic and state organization, it clings too closely to medieval forms of thought and religion to be able to resume its forward *journey*.⁵⁴⁸

Here the ‘modern West’ tradition is defined as an optimistic rather than a realistic idea. The forward journey is defined not just a potentially ‘painful’ and ‘difficult’ promise as in the analysis of Rouleau, another Frenchman, but ‘hypothetical’. This begs the question of whether such a hypothetical chance is anymore a journey at all but a constant location that is defined through religion? In other words, we have moved even closer to the ‘civilisation West’ tradition; perhaps so close that we can already say that Montage belongs to that tradition. The ironic trope is connected to this tradition in two different ways: it either ridicules the Western idea of Turkey on a path to democracy, representing the West as naïvely idealistic or highlights the aforementioned discrepancy between discursively situating Turkey on a path but representing its position as fixed.

The analysis of Benny Morris represents a dramatic version of the interpretation that the West has been naïve in the face of the threat posed by political Islam. Morris describes the ‘Turkish paradigm as a process in which ‘a state is gradually subordinated to Islam and removed from the West’s orbit by a slow, incremental *process*, stretching over years or even decades, which the West barely notices and finds itself unable to counter’.⁵⁴⁹ That Turkey cannot become a Western state with an Islamic government is stated in a matter-of-fact way. Here the focus is on weak and naïve Westerners who are unwilling to, as Morris put it, ‘look reality in the eye’.⁵⁵⁰ Radical Islamists are represented as an inevitably evil

⁵⁴⁸ Robert Montage, ‘Modern Nations and Islam’, pp. 591–592, emphases added.

⁵⁴⁹ Morris, ‘Turkey’s Islamic Revolution’, emphases added.

⁵⁵⁰ Morris, ‘Turkey’s Islamic Revolution’.

force that cannot be contained so it is the West that had the responsibility to build a strong defense to defeat them.

The same narrative has been framed around the ‘crossroads’ metaphor. Toni Alaranta, Senior Researcher at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, situates Turkey at a crossroads in his article ‘Turkey’s Islamic-Conservative State Project at a Crossroads’, arguing that the triggering event was the June 2015 parliamentary elections in which the AKP failed to attain enough votes to form a majority government. A strong metonymical division is drawn between the repugnant religious actors and the virtuous secular class in Turkey with the Kemalists represented as the only political force upholding the true Western values.⁵⁵¹ Alaranta concludes that ‘the radical, authoritarian Islamic-Conservative state project is now in jeopardy if not completely exhausted. With regards to Turkish parliamentarism and democratic consolidation, this truly is a positive *direction*’.⁵⁵² This means that Turkey *can* move forward from the crossroads, but only if it abandons political Islam.

Also Alaranta blames the West for not understanding the real nature of political Islamists in Turkey and allowing Islam to creep in. Alaranta argues that ‘all the reforms of the AKP’s first term were very much instrumental. Their purpose was to delegitimize their political opponents and to consolidate the AKP in power. So I would definitely say that the EU and the U.S. should look in the mirror and take at least some responsibility for the legitimization of the AKP within this liberal democratic discourse’.⁵⁵³

⁵⁵¹ See also Shireen T. Hunter, ‘Turkey At the Crossroads: Islamic Past or European Future?’, *CEPS Paper*, 63 (1985).

⁵⁵² Toni Alaranta, ‘Turkey’s Islamic-Conservative State Project at a Crossroads’, *FILA Comment* (12/2015), emphasis added. See also Toni Alaranta, *National and State Identity in Turkey: The Transformation of the Republic’s Status in the International System* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2015).

⁵⁵³ William Armstrong, ‘Interview: West misread AKP and Erdogan, legitimized crude power grab’, *Hurriyet Daily News* (29 August 2015). Available at <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/interview-west-misread-akp->

Although Alaranta represents the West as too weak and naïve to understand the Islamic threat in Turkey, the main scapegoat in his narrative is still the AKP government that employs ‘tactical maneuvering’ to advance its Islamic agenda, including ‘support for the Muslim Brotherhood forces all over the Middle East at whatever cost’.⁵⁵⁴ Any signs of contrasting motivations are only a cover to the AKP’s ‘creeping Islamisation’. In this sense, Alaranta’s narrative elements are more metonymical than ironical. Conflict is taken very seriously, and the future of Turkey under the AKP is represented in a tragic light. In Alaranta’s analysis, Islam serves as the ‘all-pervasive generating principle’ in a Burkean sense:

important modifications, or qualifications, are dropped when we reduce the complexity to one essential strand, slant, or ‘gist,’ isolating this one reflexive element as the implicitly dominant motive, an all-pervasive generating principle.⁵⁵⁵

It is especially in the trope of metonymy that the complexity of the international system and the motives that influence the behavior of its actors is reduced to an all-pervasive generating principle. In ironic interpretations there might also be a dominant motive but the narrative strategy often intentionally undermines it by representing the dominant motive as either irrelevant or simply unchangeable, which means that the tragic power of the narrative is weakened. Furthermore, as none of the idealism of synecdoche is rarely included in ironic narratives, their purpose is far less persuasive and appealing than in metonymy and synecdoche. The purpose of the

[and-erdogan-legitimized-crude-power-grab.aspx?PageID=238&NID=87678&NewsCatID=338](http://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/425-turkey-and-erdogan-legitimized-crude-power-grab.aspx?PageID=238&NID=87678&NewsCatID=338) (20 December 2015).

⁵⁵⁴ Toni Alaranta, ‘Turkey is Not Going to Be “Normalized” Under the AKP’s leadership’, *Turkey Analyst*, 8:14 (2015). Available at <http://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/425-turkey-not-going-to-be-normalized-under-akp-leadership.html> (20 December 2015).

⁵⁵⁵ Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives*, p. 5.

ironic narrative is to show the hidden inadequacies in our own value system and representational practices. This does not mean that ironic narratives always seek change; sometimes their aim is to show that the West is and will always be a hypocritical and immoral actor in the international system.

Representing a clearer case of the ironic tradition, Michael C. Desch employs the 'crossroads' metaphor to challenge the 'triumphant West' tradition but in contrast to Alaranta, Desch ridicules the idea that Islam poses a threat to West. Desch begins his article 'Turkey's Doing It Without the Fez On' by noting that Turkey is at a crossroads.⁵⁵⁶ Desch aims to show that not only is the fear of Turkey becoming an Islamic state exaggerated but also that the West's approach towards Turkey is marked with double standards. In a sense, Desch situates Turkey at a crossroads only ironically to mock the narrative resources that Western commentators frequently employ when representing Turkey. It is more the West than Turkey that is, in fact, at a crossroads. Desch criticises both the EU and the United States for their policies that are arguably morally questionable and politically ineffective if not harmful.

Desch, for example, writes that the 'AKP project of reconciling Islam and modernity is probably not helping Turkey's admittedly slim chances of joining the European Union, given Europe's *militant secularism* and *growing Islamophobia*'.⁵⁵⁷ One of the values attached to the idea of the West, secularism, is narrated as an inflexible and intolerant principle, which hinders Europe's efforts to become a truly accommodating and inspirational example of multiculturalism. Desch also argues that Turkey's more critical approach towards Israel is a positive sign and one that the United States should use as an example: 'Turkey's more assertive stance on behalf of Palestinian self-determination probably does more to advance the two-state solution

⁵⁵⁶ Michael C. Desch, 'Turkey's Doing It Without the Fez On', *The National Interest* (26 October 2010).

⁵⁵⁷ Desch, 'Turkey's Doing It Without the Fez On', emphases added.

than does our own country's default strategy of serving, in longtime U.S. government official Aaron David Miller's apt phrase, as "Israel's lawyer."⁵⁵⁸

Desch further questions the effectiveness of the Israel policy of the United States: "It is also not clear that one-sided support of Israel by the United States has done much to advance the peace process, which is ultimately in the interest of Turkey, the rest of the region, the United States and Israel itself."⁵⁵⁹ Similarly, Turkey's closer relations with Iran should not be seen as a threat but as an opportunity to the United States:

And instead of regarding Turkey's overtures to Iran and Syria as indicative of its desire to join the 'Axis of Evil,' we in the United States would do better to see it as part of an effort to neutralize Iranian influence in the region by presenting an alternative model to that of the Islamic Republic, one based on Islamic values but also committed to the principles of the modern world like democracy and free trade.⁵⁶⁰

In his narrative, Desch turns around all the dominant narratives of what threatens the West in foreign and security policies and instead highlights the inadequacies within the West. Instead of worrying about Turkey's policies becoming more globalised, more Islamic, and more assertive, the West should embrace any such development and recognise that it might be Turkey, not the EU or the United States, that will bring peace and prosperity to the Middle East.

⁵⁵⁸ Desch, "Turkey's Doing It Without the Fez On".

⁵⁵⁹ Desch, "Turkey's Doing It Without the Fez On".

⁵⁶⁰ Desch, "Turkey's Doing It Without the Fez On".

Belonging to the same narrative tradition, Leon Hadar argues in his article that the problem is not the AKP and its Islamic agenda but the West that fails to follow the moral and political standards it claims to represent.⁵⁶¹ Hadar argues that the reason that Turkey has not joined the European Union ‘has to do with German and French opposition and not with the alleged anti-Western inclinations of the AKP and Erdogan’.⁵⁶² The United States is similarly blamed for having an unstable approach towards Turkey: ‘it is time for U.S. officials to stop applying a manic-depressive approach towards the relationship with Turkey.’⁵⁶³ Diagnosing the United States with a ‘bipolar disorder’, Hadar reflects the identification–division dynamic that Burke describes: today Turkey is a friend, tomorrow an enemy.⁵⁶⁴ In his article ‘Turkey’s Syria Imperative’ a month earlier, Hadar similarly employs an ironic strategy of attempting to show the inbuilt weakness in the policies of the United States by applying them in a different context:

The idea that you can condense and transplant all these and other historical changes to Egypt or neighboring Syria – just because it is a Muslim society – makes as much sense as trying to have Mexico adopt the American way of life because it is a neighboring country that also has a Christian majority.⁵⁶⁵

Hadar’s ironic strategy of highlighting the discrepancy between reality and narrative is an effective way to undermine the West’s moral and political ground.

⁵⁶¹ Leon Hadar, ‘The Bipolarity of U.S.-Turkish Relations’, *The National Interest* (28 March 2012).

⁵⁶² Hadar, ‘The Bipolarity of U.S.-Turkish Relations’.

⁵⁶³ Hadar, ‘The Bipolarity of U.S.-Turkish Relations’.

⁵⁶⁴ See earlier discussions in the thesis on metaphors of illness and health in political language.

⁵⁶⁵ Leon Hadar, ‘Turkey’s Syria Imperative’, *The National Interest* (8 February 2012).

White writes that ‘an ironic utterance is not merely a statement about reality, as metaphor, metonymy, and synecdoche are, but presupposes at least a tacit awareness of the disparity between a statement and the reality it is supposed to represent’.⁵⁶⁶ Hadar’s narrative demands a different level of awareness than the narratives of Morris or Rouleau, for example. White continues that ironic sciences ‘consciously seek not only to make true statements about the world but also to expose the error or inadequacy of any given figurative characterization of it’.⁵⁶⁷ In light of this, it seems that an ironic narrative strategy is a particularly suitable trope for the social sciences. However, if we perceive irony as a trope that is relativistic in nature and does not commit to its central claims, if there even are any, then irony seems unsuitable for any sciences.

To Burke, the idea that irony is relativistic is simply false and means that it has been confused with the dialectic.⁵⁶⁸ A truly ironic strategy is contributory, which means that it is not enough to turn the plot around and argue that it is not Turkey but the West that is at a crossroads. The narrative needs to be taken further to produce a ‘total development’ in which ‘none of the participating “sub-perspectives” can be treated as either precisely right or precisely wrong’.⁵⁶⁹ The clarity of opposites that defines metonymy and most often includes a scapegoat is missing. From this perspective, the narrative tradition that Hadar and Desch represent is not relativist but truly ironic. They do not simply argue that it is the West that should be blamed for the instability in regional and global politics, but show that also Turkey has a responsibility and can influence the total development. Hadar argues:

⁵⁶⁶ White, *Tropics of Discourse*, p. 208.

⁵⁶⁷ White, *Tropics of Discourse*, p. 208.

⁵⁶⁸ Burke, *A Grammar of Motives*, p. 512.

⁵⁶⁹ Burke, *A Grammar of Motives*, p. 512.

Turkey has the second-largest armed forces in NATO after the United States and one of the ten largest militaries in the world. It is time for Ankara to demonstrate that it is willing to put its political-military power where its somewhat loud mouth has been in recent years.⁵⁷⁰

Here Turkey is not denied actorship like in some other ironic interpretations that provide a counter narrative simply because Turkey is perceived as a deserving underdog that needs to be lifted above the politically and morally repugnant West. Such narratives are still ironic but they do not aim at a dialectic conclusion. They are neither relativistic because there is a moral hierarchy involved in the plot, which is premised on the discrepancy between reality and representation.

The ironic employment of the ‘crossroads’ metaphor provides plenty of narrative resources to Turkish commentators because of the discrepancy that Desch and Hadar describe. The ironic strategy here is to reverse the ‘triumphant West’ tradition by employing the same language. For example, Cemil Ertem writes in his *Daily Sabah* column ‘The EU at a crossroads: A great crisis or Turkey’s full membership’:

Turkey-EU relations have entered a new period where Turkey, not the EU, is the decision-making party ... The West, particularly Germany, must attach importance to Turkey’s stability and start top-level cooperation with Turkey to overcome *its own crisis* and to avoid political crises that are spreading from the Middle East.

⁵⁷⁰ Hadar, ‘Turkey’s Syria Imperative’.

Turkey's full membership into the EU is *the only way out* for the EU; otherwise, it *cannot survive* and will be *doomed* to disintegration.⁵⁷¹

The dramatic language of Turkey facing a fundamental crisis that defined the first tradition described in the chapter is replicated here in a reverse order: the West is in crisis, at a crossroads, and desperately needs Turkey to survive.

That the nature of the West is not a battle between Europeans defending themselves against the American 'other' or vice versa is most apparent in foreign policy analysis narratives that employ ironic elements. Both European and American narrators use Turkey instrumentally to advance their particularly web of beliefs, and we cannot draw a line to distinguish between 'European' and 'American' ways of being 'Western'. The narrative reality is much more complex, which is partly because of the strong tradition of self-criticism in the West, which is also present in foreign policy analysis.

For example, Christopher Patten, Chancellor of Oxford University, asks in his article in *National Interest*: 'Can we in the EU now put our policies where our mouths have been for most of the last decade?'⁵⁷² Critically analysing the relationship between Europe and the United States, Patten implicitly engages with the 'two Wests' debate and employs Turkey as a narrative resource to advance his argument that it is the EU that needs to reform itself both politically and morally. The narrative is charged with futurity and narrated as a moralistic prophecy:

⁵⁷¹ Cemil Ertem, 'The EU at a crossroads: A great crisis or Turkey's full membership', *Daily Sabah* (21 October 2015), available at <http://www.dailysabah.com/columns/cemil-ertem/2015/10/21/the-eu-at-a-crossroads-a-great-crisis-or-turkeys-full-membership> (20 November 2015), emphases added.

⁵⁷² Christopher Patten, 'The Federalists Go to Brussels', *The National Interest* (November/December 2009).

If Turkey meets all the reasonable negotiating requirements that are set but is still denied membership because of its majority religion or its size within an enlarged EU, then Europe's credibility as a geostrategic power will be shredded, and its relationship with the Islamic world will be badly damaged. Europeans who lectured President Bush on the sensibilities of Muslims might do well to reflect a little harder on the same subject.⁵⁷³

Conclusion

Scholars of IR and politics have produced immensely important knowledge of the political and constitutive aspects of language. However, we also need to focus on our own language – the language we employ in Western foreign policy analysis – because it is as much ideological as any other speech that has multiple meanings. Edelman reminds us: 'If there are no conflicts over meaning, the issue is not political, by definition.'⁵⁷⁴ Or as Shimko argues, 'international relations and foreign policy metaphors are used by scholars and policymakers alike'.⁵⁷⁵

This chapter focused on one metaphor that is frequently employed in Western foreign policy analysis on Turkey: the metaphor of 'being at a crossroads'. The chapter analysed three different traditions in which the 'crossroads' metaphor has been used and showed that they formed a continuum with earlier generations of foreign policy analysts. Traditions, as Bevir & Rhodes maintain, are influential but can slowly change over time. The metaphor of 'crossroads' is the more recent elaboration of the 'journey' and 'container' metaphors that have defined the field since the early 1900s. That 'fundamental

⁵⁷³ Patten, 'The Federalists Go to Brussels'.

⁵⁷⁴ Edelman, 'Political Language and Political Reality', p. 10.

⁵⁷⁵ Shimko, 'Metaphors and Foreign Policy Decision Making', p. 655.

metaphors become resistant to change⁵⁷⁶ becomes evident when we trace back the employment of these metaphors in Western foreign policy analysis.

Ringmar urges political scientists to investigate the limits of metaphor because it is a precondition for political criticism.⁵⁷⁷ The critical approach in the chapter towards Western foreign policy analysis has been inspired by the idea that as political scientists we need to be not only critical but also self-critical. The whole thesis is written from a Western perspective, because that is the only perspective available to me in this context. This does not mean that a critical approach is not possible, and the chapter has aimed to follow Chilton & Lakoff's suggestions for theorists in the area of foreign policy: 'Learn to analyze the metaphorical nature of the conceptual tools you are using and learn the consequences of those metaphors.'⁵⁷⁸ This is because

The concepts used by our government and our international relations experts are of vital concern to us all. Those concepts are metaphorical through and through. The metaphors have important entailments for our lives and for the lives of millions of others. Yet the metaphors and their entailments have largely gone unrecognized and unexamined. The reason is simple. It concerns the structure of our profession. In the social sciences, the technical seems to drive out the nontechnical: international relations scholars must appear as scientific and objective as possible, and metaphorical concepts seem neither objective nor scientific. The result is a set of concepts that

⁵⁷⁶ Blanchard, 'Constituting China', p. 185.

⁵⁷⁷ Erik Ringmar, 'Metaphors of Social Order' in Terrell Carver & Jernej Pikalo (Eds.), *Political Language and Metaphor: Interpreting and Changing the World* (New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 67.

⁵⁷⁸ Chilton & Lakoff, 'Foreign Policy by Metaphor', p. 19.

are not only inadequately examined, but are also very far from the realism that is claimed for them.⁵⁷⁹

The chapter showed that, indeed, situating Turkey at a crossroads appears to be a narrative strategy that is used to construct different moral and political positions for Turkey and the West. Turkey can be narratively located at a crossroads to emphasise the West's rightful hegemony in the international system and to create a paternalistic relationship between Turkey and the West: the West needs to guide Turkey at a crossroads.

The metaphor can also function as a legitimising tool for Western inaction towards Turkey, depicting Turkey as a state that is stuck at a crossroads and needs to first find a way out. In both the narratives, the West is represented as a morally and politically triumphant actor in the international system – the main difference is that the former assigns more responsibility to the West and the latter to Turkey. There is also discursive movement between the 'modern West' tradition and the 'civilisation West' tradition, making it even more important to the reader to recognise the cognitive cues that render a particular tradition meaningful.

The chapter also examined narratives that employ ironic narrative resources to highlight not only that Turkey is and definitely should be stuck at a crossroads as long as it practices political Islam, but also that the West can blame its hypocritical, naïve, and weak nature for this development. In other words, the declinist West faces a crucial crossroads to overcome its moral and political weakness. While metaphors 'create social realities for us through selective

⁵⁷⁹ Chilton & Lakoff, 'Foreign Policy by Metaphor', p. 19.

representation of aspects of the social world',⁵⁸⁰ narratives and tropes give them a direction. They can be seen in a hierarchical sense: metaphors provide resources to narratives, and narratives are used as elements in tropological world making. All the three analytical concepts are equally important in understanding how political language conveys meanings, but they operate on different levels. The 'crossroads' metaphor is employed in narratives that rely on metonymical and ironic elements, focusing on difference and discrepancy between actors in the international system. This is an important observation because it helps us to shed light on their ideological dimensions.

The following chapter focuses on a third case of metaphorical imagination in Western foreign policy analysis of Turkey and analyses the tradition of personalising the essence, as Burke describes it. The chapter will examine how the late 2000s and the early 2010s witnessed a narrative turn in Western foreign policy analysis in that Turkey's political leader began to embody the whole state. While it might be tempting to argue that such a narrative practice concerns states that turn more authoritarian, the chapter argues that it reflects a more fundamental tropological process that is connected to the idea of the West.

⁵⁸⁰ Davidson, 'The role of "social exclusion" and other metaphors', p. 219.

Chapter 7 – The ‘Erdogan-for-Turkey’ metaphor

Introduction

This chapter focuses on a third metaphor in foreign policy analysis concerning Turkey, which George Lakoff calls the Leader-for-Country metonymy.⁵⁸¹ Here ‘metonymy’ refers to its linguistic usage as a figure of speech that substitutes the thing described. In foreign policy analysis the discursive practice of discussing a state by referring to its leader is connected to what Lakoff calls the State-as-Person metaphor.⁵⁸² States are imagined as persons that think and act independently. H.G. Wells wrote in *Foreign Affairs* in 1934–1935 that such a practice is ‘a romantic simplification of what is really happening in human affairs, and I think that it leads to disastrous results’:

I read an article which talks about ‘France’ and the objectives of ‘Japan,’ and the purposes of ‘Russia,’ and what ‘Germany’ intends to do. I have never been able to get over a certain scepticism about these matters. I can’t succeed in translating nationalities into personalities.⁵⁸³

William Bloom echoes such scepticism, noting that in ‘international politics, people, government and state fuse into one image’ that results in statements where ‘academic integrity and intellectual credibility are severely strained’.⁵⁸⁴ Also Lakoff argues that metaphors that represent the state as a person can be disastrous. Referring to the

⁵⁸¹ Lakoff, ‘Metaphorical Thought in Foreign Policy’, p. 27.

⁵⁸² Lakoff, ‘Metaphorical Thought in Foreign Policy’, p. 27. See also Ringmar, ‘On the Ontological Status of the State’. See also, Blanchard, ‘Constituting China’.

⁵⁸³ H.G. Wells, ‘Civilization on Trial’, p. 595.

⁵⁸⁴ Bloom, *Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations*, p. 1.

Gulf War, Lakoff writes that ‘the U.S. media and the policy-makers used the *Leader-for-Nation*⁵⁸⁵ metonymy and the *State-as-Person* metaphor in a disastrous way: They spoke and thought of the bombing and later sanctions as “hurting Saddam,” as if he was personally harmed. Other Iraqis were killed and harmed, but the ruler himself was not’.⁵⁸⁶

It is argued in this chapter that the ‘Erdogan-for-Turkey’ metaphor has, first, become increasingly popular in Western foreign policy analysis in the 2010s. Secondly, the metaphor forms a continuum with the tradition of narrating Turkey, serving different narrative strategies that are tropological in nature. As such, the ‘Erdogan-for-Turkey’ metaphor is similar to the ‘losing’ metaphor and the ‘crossroads’ metaphor in that it is employed to advance different interpretations of Turkey and the West. By focusing on different ways that Erdogan has come to represent the whole of Turkey the chapter is able to tease out the web of beliefs that influence the narrative tradition. There are several questions arising from this that will be dealt with in the next sections.

The first question concerns why there was a sudden shift in Western foreign policy analysis from analysing Turkey to focusing on Erdogan. The narrative turn in the early 2010s was so notable that it clearly stands out in the data set. In *Foreign Affairs*, there were 23 articles between 2013–15 that had ‘Erdogan’ in the title or subtitle and only one such article before that time frame. Even that single article is from the post-2010 period – from 2011. This means that the narrative turn took place more than ten years after the Erdogan-led AKP government had assumed office in 2002.

⁵⁸⁵ Lakoff employs the *Leader-for-Country* metonymy and the *Leader-for-Nation* metonymy interchangeably.

⁵⁸⁶ Lakoff, ‘Metaphorical Thought in Foreign Policy’, p. 29, emphasis in original.

The *Foreign Affairs* articles in 2013–15 include titles such as ‘Erdogan Loses it’,⁵⁸⁷ ‘The End of Erdogan-omics’,⁵⁸⁸ ‘Keep Calm, Erdogan’,⁵⁸⁹ ‘Erdogan’s War’,⁵⁹⁰ ‘Erdogan’s Coup’,⁵⁹¹ ‘Erdogan’s Achilles’ Heel’,⁵⁹² ‘Erdogan’s Victory’,⁵⁹³ and ‘Erdogan’s Tightrope Act’.⁵⁹⁴ The trend is very similar in *The National Interest* that published at least 26 articles with ‘Erdogan’ in the title in 2011–2016. The titles included ‘Turkey’s Erdogan Has a Hitler Problem’,⁵⁹⁵ ‘Sultan of Turkey: Erdogan’s Shameless Power Play’,⁵⁹⁶ ‘Erdogan at a Crossroads’,⁵⁹⁷ ‘Erdogan’s Kurdish Dilemma’,⁵⁹⁸ ‘Erdogan as Putin’,⁵⁹⁹ ‘Erdogan’s Democracy’,⁶⁰⁰ ‘How Erdogan Fell From Grace’,⁶⁰¹ and ‘Erdogan, the Anti-Ataturk’.⁶⁰²

⁵⁸⁷ Halil Karaveli, ‘Erdogan Loses It: How the Islamists Forfeited Turkey’, *Foreign Affairs* (9 February 2014), available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2014-02-09/erdogan-loses-it> (28 March 2016).

⁵⁸⁸ Piotr Zaleski, ‘The End of Erdogan-omics: Turkey’s Prime Minister Loses the Battle For Cheap Credit’, *Foreign Affairs* (9 February 2014), available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2014-02-09/end-erdogan-omics> (28 March 2016).

⁵⁸⁹ Steven A. Cook, ‘Keep Calm, Erdogan: Why the Prime Minister Has Nothing to Fear’, *Foreign Affairs* (3 June 2013), available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2013-06-03/keep-calm-erdogan> (28 March 2016).

⁵⁹⁰ Joshua W. Walker & Andrew J. Bowen, ‘Erdogan’s War: The Turkish President’s Big Gamble’, *Foreign Affairs* (29 July 2015), available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2015-07-29/erdogans-war> (28 March 2016).

⁵⁹¹ Erik Meyersson & Dani Rodrik, ‘Erdogan’s Coup: The True State of Turkish Democracy’, *Foreign Affairs* (26 May 2014), available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2014-05-26/erdogans-coup> (28 March 2016).

⁵⁹² Halil Karaveli, ‘Erdogan’s Achilles’ Heel: Why the Prime Minister Will Win the Election, but Lose the Economy’, *Foreign Affairs* (8 August 2014), available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2014-08-08/erdogans-achilles-heel> (28 March 2016).

⁵⁹³ Michael J. Koplow, ‘Erdogan’s Victory: Why the Election Wasn’t a Loss for the President and the AKP’, *Foreign Affairs* (7 June 2015), available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2015-06-07/erdogans-victory> (28 March 2016).

⁵⁹⁴ Micha’el Tanchum, ‘Erdogan’s Tightrope Act: Between Democracy and State Monopoly in Turkey’, *Foreign Affairs* (20 May 2015), available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2015-05-20/erdogans-tightrope-act> (28 March 2016).

⁵⁹⁵ Steven A. Cook, ‘Turkey’s Erdogan Has a Hitler Problem’, *The National Interest* (5 January 2016), available at <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/sultan-turkey-erdogans-shameless-power-play-12574> (28 March 2016).

⁵⁹⁶ Gabriel Mitchell & Merve Tahiroglu, ‘Sultan of Turkey: Erdogan’s Shameless Power Play’, *The National Interest* (8 April 2015), available at <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/sultan-turkey-erdogans-shameless-power-play-12574> (28 March 2016).

⁵⁹⁷ Omer Zarpli, ‘Erdogan at a Crossroads’, *The National Interest* (18 February 2014), available at <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/erdogan-crossroads-9890> (28 March 2016).

⁵⁹⁸ Morton Abramowitz & Omer Zarpli, ‘Erdogan’s Kurdish Dilemma’, *The National Interest* (9 September 2013), available at <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/erdogans-kurdish-dilemma-9015> (28 March 2016).

⁵⁹⁹ Emma M. Ashford, ‘Erdogan as Putin’, *The National Interest* (13 June 2013), available at <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/erdogan-putin-8598> (28 March 2016).

⁶⁰⁰ Brent E. Sasley, ‘Erdogan’s Democracy’, *The National Interest* (4 June 2013), available at <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/erdogans-democracy-8545> (28 March 2016).

⁶⁰¹ Kemal Kirisci, ‘How Erdogan Fell From Grace’ *The National Interest* (4 June 2013), available at <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/how-erdogan-fell-grace-8549> (28 March 2016).

It would seem natural to argue that the narrative turn reflects the popular observation in Western foreign policy analysis that Erdogan's governing style began to turn more authoritarian in the early 2010s. However, this chapter argues that the explanation is inadequate for a number of reasons. Firstly, Erdogan is by no means the first leader with authoritarian tendencies in Turkey. In fact, it is a difficult task to find a period in the republic's history that was characterised by genuinely democratic forms of governance. The 1980s was a turbulent period that was dominated by the legacy of the third coup d'état in 1980 that resulted in a constitution that put severe restrictions on civic and political rights. The 1990s were similarly a violent and largely undemocratic period with the Kurdistan Workers' Party involved in an armed conflict with the Turkish army, demanding civic and cultural rights to the Kurds.

It was only in the early 2000s, paradoxically during Erdogan's early era, that Turkey began democratising the political system. Therefore, our sudden interest in the figure of Erdogan cannot be explained simply by pointing to his authoritarian politics – they are not specific to Turkey or new in the country. Many other undemocratic leaders both in Turkish recent history and elsewhere in the world get barely a mention in our foreign policy analysis. There is something more about the case of Erdogan that make foreign policy analysts shift their analytical focus on him rather than on Turkey. The way in which Ataturk was represented as the embodiment of Turkey in the early 1900s is similar to the treatment of Erdogan in the 2010s. Erdogan might be represented as the polar opposite of Ataturk, 'the Anti-Ataturk',⁶⁰² or as Ataturk's modern equivalent: 'Why Erdogan is like Ataturk'.⁶⁰⁴ The

⁶⁰² Aram Bakshian Jr., 'Erdogan, the Anti-Ataturk'.

⁶⁰³ Bakshian Jr., 'Erdogan, the Anti-Ataturk'.

⁶⁰⁴ Nick Danforth, 'Why Erdogan is like Ataturk', *Politico* (28 December 2015), available at <http://www.politico.eu/article/president-erdogan-like-ataturk-turkey-democracy-nationalism/> (10 April 2016).

narrative continuum skips other authoritarian leaders between them – such as Kenan Evren, the leader of the 1980 coup and President of Turkey for nine years from 1980 to 1989. Evren’s exceptionally authoritarian policies had an immense impact on Turkish politics, but in foreign policy analysis he remains a distant figure both symbolically and politically.

The focus on Erdogan’s figure could also be explained by his own attempts to seek global attention and present himself as the state. Morton Abramowitz argues that ‘Erdogan puts himself forward as the embodiment of Turkey’.⁶⁰⁵ This, however, cannot explain why same metaphors are applied to both Erdogan and Turkey; also Erdogan is located ‘at a crossroads’⁶⁰⁶ and presented as an emotional actor that is driven by pride and anger. In other words, the narrative traditions that influence the way we represent Turkey can also be recognised in Western foreign policy analyses on Erdogan. These analyses are often intertwined with predictions of Turkey becoming the next ‘superpower’:

Turkey’s rise has been engineered by its brilliant, proud, and often prickly prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. A devout Muslim, Erdogan has revolutionized Turkish politics by challenging his country’s historic commitment to secularism and introducing a greater role for Islam in Turkish politics.⁶⁰⁷

But once again, in the ‘rising powers’ discourses, the personalities of state leaders are rarely represented as significant factors that can solely explain the political change.

⁶⁰⁵ Morton Abramowitz, ‘The Real Recep Tayyip Erdogan’, *The National Interest* (19 October 2011), available at <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-real-recep-tayyip-erdogan-6031> (28 March 2016).

⁶⁰⁶ Zarpli, ‘Erdogan at a Crossroads’.

⁶⁰⁷ Nicholas Burns, ‘The Rise of Turkey as a superpower’, *The Boston Globe* (27 April 2012), available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/21970/rise_of_turkey_as_a_superpower.html (10 April 2016).

From Brazil's Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva to China's Xi Jinping, our foreign policy analysis is less concerned with the leaders' personalities and more with the structural changes in global politics and internal policies that explain the rise of Brazil or China. So the puzzle is why Turkey's Erdogan has been subject to such an intense narration in Western foreign policy analysis, widely represented as the embodiment of Turkey and treated as a metaphor through which to narrate changes in Turkish foreign policy and Western actions?

Kenneth Burke talks about 'personalizing of essence', which is at the heart of this chapter.⁶⁰⁸ This means that the essence of Turkey is personalised in the figure of Erdogan who is represented as a force that can alone determine the future of Turkey: 'The Kurdish issue isn't a matter of selling something to the voters. It's a matter of selling it to Erdogan.'⁶⁰⁹ The Erdogan-for-Turkey metaphor is also used to distance certain characteristics from Turkey to Erdogan. As such, the metaphor can be used in two opposing ways: to argue that Erdogan embodies and performs the essence of Turkey or to demonstrate that there is nothing specifically Turkish about Erdogan; that he is an exceptional rather than a traditional Turkish leader. The chapter argues that there are four all-pervasive generating principles that can be recognised in the narratives.

The first narrative forms around religion and relies on a strong metonymical division between the prior administrations and Erdogan's AKP administration that came to power in the general elections in 2002. In this narrative, which represents the 'civilisation West' tradition, Islam serves as the dominant motive for different events taking place and is represented as a tragic force that will eventually bring Turkey down. Erdogan is depicted as a leader that is strategically and

⁶⁰⁸ Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives*, p. 15.

⁶⁰⁹ Aliza Marcus, 'Erdogan vs. The Kurds', *The National Interest* (18 July 2012), available at <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/erdogan-vs-the-kurds-7209> (21 April 2016).

determinedly executing a project of turning Turkey into an Islamic or an 'Islamofascist' state.⁶¹⁰ The policies that the AKP introduces are part of this great 'cause' rather than reactive or pragmatic decisions to political events. This narrative ties in with the 'civilisation West' narrative and represents Erdogan as a living proof that Islam and democracy are simply incompatible.

The second narrative forms around Turkish political culture and is similarly relying on metonymical elements to separate Turkey's form of governance from the Western political tradition. In this narrative, Erdogan is a product of Turkish political culture that brings up strong men and is authoritarian in nature. It suggests that the nature of Erdogan's style of governance is not specifically Islamic but distinctly Turkish, continuing the line of authoritarian regimes that have always characterised the country's politics. Here the narrative resources often include references to the Ottoman Empire, which is represented as a particularly brutal and backward period in human history. Also Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the republic's founder and first president, is represented as a dictator rather than an enlightened Westerniser.

The third narrative relies on synecdochal elements and represents Erdogan as a leader that has a universal character trait, a hunger for power. In this narrative the all-pervasive generating principle is power, which explains why Erdogan has turned more authoritarian during his term as Prime Minister and later as President. In other words, there is no hidden Islamic project or a pervasive political culture that determines Erdogan's actions; they are better explained through universal human attributes that are shared among all political leaders including those in Western countries. This narrative is closer to the 'modern West' narrative,

⁶¹⁰ Toni Alaranta, 'The AKP and Turkey's long tradition of Islamofascism', *Turkey Analyst* (11 February 2015), available at <http://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/374-the-akp-and-turkey-s-long-tradition-of-islamofascism.html> (10 April 2016).

focusing on values that can be shared across different countries regardless of their cultural, historical, or religious roots.

Finally, the fourth narrative employs an ironic strategy to argue that it is only natural for Erdogan to act the way he does because Turkey is subject to unjust treatment in the international system, which hurts Turkish pride. The narrative of injustice is also advanced in Erdogan's own rhetoric, and it covers both domestic and international affairs. In the domestic arena pious Muslims are depicted as a suppressed community that for decades prior to the AKP's era were subject to discrimination and needed a political representative in the secular society. The same sense of injustice is attached to the international arena with images of Western hypocrisy and deceit. In this narrative the fact that Erdogan acts against Western interests is represented as a natural and morally rightful response to Western action that is fundamentally immoral, hypocritical, and unjust.

The chapter will be structured around these four generating principles – Islam, political culture, power and injustice – in Western foreign policy analysis that utilises the 'Erdogan-for-Turkey' metaphor. It will be shown in the following sections how these narratives contain elements of the tropes of metonymy, synecdoche, and irony. The chapter attempts to demonstrate that the narrative continuum that the previous two chapters have sketched out is also localised in the metaphor of 'Erdogan-for-Turkey'. In other words, by examining the metaphor, we can identify a set of moral and aesthetic preferences that influence Western foreign policy analysis of Turkey.

Islam as the all-pervasive generating principle

Kenneth Burke argues that 'the essence of a thing can be defined narratively in terms of its *fulfilment* or *fruition*'. Thus, you state a man's timeless essence in temporal terms

if, instead of calling him “by nature a criminal,” you say, “he will end on the gallows”.”⁶¹¹ Burke’s insight is at the heart of the narrative tradition that employs Islam as the all-pervasive generating principle in Western foreign policy analysis. The narratives told here are almost always tragic in nature, predicting an inevitable downfall of either Erdogan or Turkey. They are premised on a belief that Islamisation ‘creeps in’ and that Erdogan is executing a grand ‘project’ in a determined manner.

The principle of transformation is an integral part of this narrative tradition, representing both a challenge and an opportunity. The challenge is to stop the transformation of Turkey into an Islamic state, and the opportunity is to change the current leadership so that the West can once again identify with it. These are, in Burke’s terms, ‘different families of images in terms of which the processes of transformation in general might be localized, or particularized’.⁶¹²

This narrative tradition is a popular frame of explanation in Western foreign policy analysis concerning Turkey. Already in the late 1940s, Walter Livingstone Wright wrote in *Foreign Affairs*:

Ruin did come to the Empire. But the central fact of the whole matter, so far as *our problems* are concerned, is that, at long last, reform came to Turkey ... The Turkey of Lord Salisbury’s time was the 600-year-old Ottoman Empire, a medieval Moslem anachronism straight from the pages of the ‘Arabian Nights.’ Its rule was the *despotic* sultan-caliph, who claimed to be the Shadow of Allah on earth, successor of the Prophet Mohammed as head of state and religion ... But then the *grim*

⁶¹¹ Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives*, p. 13, emphases added.

⁶¹² Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives*, p. 11. See also p. 20.

determination of the Turkish people to survive wrought an almost *miraculous change* in the situation.⁶¹³

The analysis is followed by a high appraisal of the virtues of the new leader: ‘Ataturk was a man of extraordinary acuteness, vigor and ambition. He developed a capacious grasp of national and world affairs, unerring judgment as to what the Turkish people would approve or at least tolerate, and qualities of restraint which saved him from political or military adventures. His personal prestige was immensely well-deserved.’⁶¹⁴ The narrative is built around a strong metonymical division between the Islamic Empire and the secular republic, and the principle of transformation is localised to one man, Ataturk.

The narrative tradition continues to influence Western foreign policy analysis today. In his article in *The National Interest* in 2013, Aram Bakshian Jr. describes Erdogan as ‘the Anti-Ataturk’ that represents all the opposite traits to the heroic Ataturk. An observer had apparently told him in Istanbul: ‘If Kemal Ataturk had had an evil twin, it would have been someone exactly like Mr. Erdogan.’⁶¹⁵ Bakshian Jr. characterises Erdogan as a leader that is driven by an Islamic mind-set that is fundamentally irrational and undemocratic. Erdogan, he argues, is ‘an unashamed – a historically uninformed – admirer of an idealized version of the Ottoman-Islamic past that exists mainly in his own imagination’.⁶¹⁶

Bakshian Jr. even suggests that heavy medication could explain Erdogan’s behaviour, which demonstrates what Burke argued in the beginning of this chapter: that the essence can be defined narratively. Instead of saying that Erdogan is an insane leader, Bakshian Jr. argues that ‘(h)evy medication could

⁶¹³ Livingston Wright, Jr., ‘Truths about Turkey’, p. 350, emphases added.

⁶¹⁴ Livingston Wright, Jr., ‘Truths about Turkey’, pp. 351–352.

⁶¹⁵ Bakshian Jr., ‘Erdogan, the Anti-Ataturk’.

⁶¹⁶ Bakshian Jr., ‘Erdogan, the Anti-Ataturk’.

explain some of Erdogan's odder statements in recent weeks'.⁶¹⁷ And Erdogan's supposed insanity is narratively connected to the idea of Islam that represents a mind-set that 'has a built-in hostility to the spirit of inquiry and the desire to subject prescribed notions of faith and fate to the tests of intellectual rigor'.⁶¹⁸ In other words, an Islamic leader cannot be sane because the faith that he believes in is irrational.⁶¹⁹

This narrative tradition always employs a tragic mode of emplotment, either predicting the overly confident Erdogan's tragic downfall or a tragic transformation of Turkey into an Islamic state. The outcome will be tragic either to Turkey and the West or Erdogan, depending on which actor is positioned as the 'hero' in the narrative.⁶²⁰ The predictive elements in these narratives are highly moral in nature, reflecting what Burke describes through the principle of transformation: 'For the so-called "desire to kill" a certain person is much more properly analysable as a desire to *transform the principle* which that person *represents*.'⁶²¹ This means that the political figure of Erdogan needs to be 'killed' – removed from office – so that the tragic transformation of Turkey into an Islamic state can be stopped. It can be argued that in predicting future outcomes, foreign policy analysts do not state *how things are*

⁶¹⁷ Bakshian Jr., 'Erdogan, the Anti-Ataturk'.

⁶¹⁸ Bakshian Jr., 'Erdogan, the Anti-Ataturk'.

⁶¹⁹ Speculating on foreign leaders' mental health is also a distancing strategy in foreign policy analysis with the case of Putin's alleged Asperger's syndrome representing a well-known case. See Daniel Bates, 'Vladimir Putin suffers from Asperger's syndrome, Pentagon report claims', *The Telegraph* (5 February 2015), available at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/vladimir-putin/11392680/Vladimir-Putin-suffers-from-Aspergers-syndrome-Pentagon-report-claims.html> (21 April 2016); Mark Lawrence Schrad, 'Putin Has Asperger's? Don't Flatter Him', *Politico* (6 February 2015), available at <http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/02/putin-has-aspergers-dont-flatter-him-114978> (21 April 2016). Ian Roberts also writes: 'In April, North Korean President Kim Jong-Un threatened nuclear strikes against the U.S., causing an international crisis and speculation about the motives and mental health of this inexperienced 30-year-old. Some writers posited a personality disorder; other commentators just sneered. Prominent BBC broadcaster Jeremy Paxman, for instance, declared that he "looks like a haggis." But the bald fact is that this young dictator's threatening posturing is rational.' Ian Roberts, 'Person of Interest: Sane Man, Insane Bind', *Psychology Today* (2 July 2013), available at <https://www.psychologytoday.com/articles/201308/person-interest-sane-man-insane-bind> (21 April 2016).

⁶²⁰ Northrop Frye has shown that different narrative forms can also be distinguished from each other on the communitarian basis with the hero either becoming isolated from his society (tragedy) or being incorporated into it (comedy). Alker, *Rediscoveries and Reformulations*, p. 290.

⁶²¹ Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives*, p. 13, emphases in original.

but either put forward a vision of *how things ought to be* or issue a call for action to *prevent the repugnant outcome*.

The analysis of Bakshian Jr. represents the former predictive tradition when he concludes with a tragic prediction for Erdogan: ‘Whatever Erdogan’s physical life expectancy may be, the mass demonstrations made it clear that time is not on his side ... the vanguard of a rising generation of Turks who care about personal freedom (and) will not be bullied into silence ... Except for the ones in the Dolmabahce Palace, the clocks in Turkey have started ticking again.’⁶²²

It is a moralistic prophecy of stating that the enlightened and righteous masses – ‘prodemocracy’, ‘overwhelmingly nonviolent’, and ‘well behaved’ – *must* win the battle against the Islamic tyrant because that is the only *just* outcome. The prophecy is not explained by any empirical observations but by the virtuous nature and motivations of the demonstrations. The tragic outcome for Erdogan becomes a romantic emplotment for the West: after a long and difficult battle to overthrow Erdogan, democracy and freedom will prevail in Turkey.

Emma Ashford’s analysis ‘Erdogan as Putin’ in *The National Interest* in 2013 represents the latter predictive tradition of issuing a call for action to the West, specifically to the United States: ‘If U.S. leaders do not wish Turkey to start *down the slippery slope* to autocratic governance and semi-authoritarian rule, they *must act quickly*.’⁶²³ The metaphor of Putin provides strong cognitive cues that direct the audience’s moral and aesthetic imagination: act now or face a new autocrat in the international system.

⁶²² Bakshian Jr., ‘Erdogan, the Anti-Ataturk’.

⁶²³ Emma Ashford, ‘Erdogan as Putin’.

Erdogan as a product of Turkey's political culture

The second explanation forms around the idea that Turkey's political culture produces 'strong men' like Erdogan. Again, this mode of explanation is pervasive in Western foreign policy analysis of Turkey and can be traced back to the early 1900s. It is often intertwined with other metonymical interpretations of Turkey's political system with references to both the Islamic form of governance and an endless hunger for power. The resulting narrative is often a hybrid form of metonymical tools of representation that results in division from rather than identification with Turkey. The analysis of the pseudonym E. in *Foreign Affairs* in 1924–25 is a good example of a narrative that makes use of different metonymical elements that continues to influence the tradition. He argues that

There is in Turkey what there has often been in the past – *a strong man*. He at least is *no sham*. He *knows exactly* what he wants, and he gets it ... Radical Westernization and laicism are Kemal's tools, just as secrecy and intrigue were those of Abdul Hamid. The real issue is *personal power*, as it was in the days of the Sultans ... The Turk's labors to construct a nation on ultra-Western lines are *wholly foreign to his blood and to his traditions*. Our Western foundations become in his hands mere camouflage for the things which are to him *racially inborn* – the personal struggle of the few, the political indifference of the many.⁶²⁴

The citation begins with a temporal framing that suggests that there is a political continuum in Turkey – a continuum of 'strong men' that dictates politics in

⁶²⁴ E., 'Turkish facts and fantasies', pp. 602; 603, emphases added.

Turkey. It seems that what the analysis argues is that this is an outcome of Turkey's masculine and authoritarian culture, and even though the concept of 'political culture' was introduced only three decades later, already here the emphasis is on cultural *patterns* rather than pathologies.

Just like the author here, also Gabriel Almond relied on a metonymical division between Western and non-Western patterns of orientation to political action when he introduced the term 'political culture' in his seminal article in 1956: 'We are dealing with a political system in which large groups have fundamentally different "cognitive maps" of politics and apply different norms to political action. Instability and unpredictability are not to be viewed as pathologies but as inescapable consequences of this type of mixture of political cultures.'⁶²⁵ 'We' here refers to the West and the 'difference' means comparing it to a Western system: 'What this means is that as a minimum we have two political cultures, the Western system with its parliament, its electoral system, its bureaucracy and the like, and the pre-Western system or systems.'

Turkey, undoubtedly, would have belonged to the pre-Western system where 'there may be a parliament formally based on a set of legal norms and regulations; but operating within it may be a powerful family, a religious sect, a group of tribal chieftains, or some combination of these. These are elements of the traditional role structure operating according to their own traditional norms. The student of these political systems would be greatly misled if he followed Western norms and expectations in describing such a decision-making system'⁶²⁶. This means that although Almond's model of political culture is not racially

⁶²⁵ Gabriel Almond, 'Comparative Political Systems', *The Journal of Politics*, 18:3 (1956), p. 402. See also Gabriel Almond & Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (SAGE Publications, 1963); Stephen Chilton, 'Defining Political Culture', *The Western Political Quarterly*, 41:3 (1988), pp. 419–445.

⁶²⁶ Almond, 'Comparative Political Systems', p. 402.

determined like E.'s analysis in *Foreign Affairs*, there is a common emphasis on particular patterns that influence the structure.

The analysis in *Foreign Affairs* combines the idea of cultural patterns with a conviction that the real explanation is power. But unlike in most foreign policy analysis narratives that focus on power as the all-pervasive generating principle, here it is not represented as a universal principle but a particular feature of Turkish politics. As such, it is not really a personal characteristic of the political leader but a structural feature of the system – one that has produced authoritarian leaders since ‘the days of the Sultans’. The idea that Islam leads to authoritarian forms of governance is challenged and replaced with an equally metonymical representation of Turkey’s political system as a structure that is and will remain fundamentally non-Western in nature.

The narrative reality in the 2010s does not look markedly different from that in the 1920s, and there is clearly a continuum that has been passed down from generation to generation of Western foreign policy analysts. Turkey in the 2010s is *still* struggling to fix the fundamental defects that characterise her political culture: ‘As the AKP goes, so will the Turkish population. Since the modernizing days of the Ottoman sultans, the political culture of the population has been imposed by the elite.’⁶²⁷ Henri Barkey similarly argues in his analysis ‘The Sick Man’ in *The National Interest* in 2010 that the AKP ‘has yet to grow into a classical liberal party that embraces openness, freedom of thought and the rule of law. Instead, it has *replicated all the ills* of Turkish parties past, including one-man domination, the use of government power to squelch the opposition, and the lack

⁶²⁷ Cagaptay, ‘Sultan of the Muslim World’.

of a comprehensive vision that transcends the immediate concerns of its own pious core constituency'.⁶²⁸

Just like in the *Foreign Affairs* analysis of E. almost 90 years earlier, the idea that Turkey's political culture produces 'one-man domination' is intertwined with the principle of power as the explanatory motive. As Barkey writes in his article 'All the Prime Minister's Yes-Men' in *The National Interest* in 2013: 'At the root of the problem is the combination of both his personality, which brooks little dissent and assumes that all problems can be solved not by dialogue but rather by just persisting on his way, and the emergent de facto one-party, one-man political system'.⁶²⁹

The seeming contradiction between the universalistic idea that a hunger for power orients political action and the particularistic understanding of political culture as the primary orienting force can be explained by the narrative form that, as has been pointed earlier in the thesis, renders a complex and often contradicting reality into a commonsensical account that is convincing and even persuasive. As White notes, common sense is a set of beliefs 'about the meaning or ultimate nature of reality, shared by the average members of any given culture' (see chapter 4). This requires some 'narrative smoothing'⁶³⁰ to ensure that the representation is coherent enough, but the narrative tradition is more pertinent here; it allows for greater inconsistencies because the web of beliefs that influence it defines the limits to verisimilitude.

⁶²⁸ Henri J. Barkey, 'The Sick Man', *The National Interest* (3 March 2010), available at <http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-sick-man-3397> (21 April 2016). Emphases added. Halil Karaveli similarly writes: 'Coalitions may come and go, but authoritarianism is forever – or so it seems in Turkey'. Karaveli, 'Erdogan Loses It'. Or as Jenny White writes in *The American Interest*, we are witnessing 'a recurrent cycle of conceptual patterns and associated roles – those of the "bigman", selfless hero, and traitor – that have long characterized and destabilized Turkish political culture. These roles and their interactions are driven not simply by competing ideologies, but by on-the-ground rivalry between network hierarchies and a general fear of social chaos'. Jenny White, 'The Turkish Complex', *The American Interest*, 10:4 (2015).

⁶²⁹ Henri J. Barkey, 'All the Prime Minister's Yes-Men', *The National Interest* (4 June 2013), available at <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/all-the-prime-ministers-yes-men-8546> (1 September 2015).

⁶³⁰ Polkinghorne, 'Narrative configuration in qualitative analysis', p. 16.

Also Barkey predicts a tragic turn of events for Erdogan with a clear narrative structure with a valued endpoint. The young Erdogan was cooperative, even humble, and yet to be corrupted by power: ‘the Erdogan of today is not the same Erdogan who was in power in 2002. In the early days, he listened to his advisors, and more importantly, he allowed himself to be challenged and corrected.’⁶³¹ Erdogan’s tragic fault was that he ‘surrounded himself with yes-men’ and as a result ‘has become a victim groupthink. His advisors only reinforce what he has already decided to do’. This has led to the present situation where ‘Erdogan finds himself all-knowing and all alone’ with ‘success having gone to his head’.

The tragic fault of failing to be humble or seeking advice has serious repercussions for Erdogan: ‘Erdogan has now suffered a deep and self-inflicted wound’.⁶³² The tragic narrative has a classical structure: a humble man finds fame and fortune, turns overconfident, and falls as a result. The triggering event here is the Gezi Park protests that erupted in the summer of 2013 and resulted in an unprecedented wave of demonstrations throughout Turkey. The protest first began as a peaceful sit-in demonstration against a planned shopping mall in Istanbul but rapidly spread after the government’s violent reaction. Many argue that the underlying cause of the civic unrest was Erdogan’s authoritarianism and issues intertwined with human rights, freedom of speech and growing religiosity in Turkey.⁶³³ Others connected it to the Occupy movement as a critical response to neoliberal policies.⁶³⁴

⁶³¹ Barkey, ‘All the Prime Minister’s Yes-Men’.

⁶³² Barkey, ‘All the Prime Minister’s Yes-Men’.

⁶³³ See for example Tayfun Atay, ‘The Clash of “Nations” in Turkey: Reflections on the Gezi Park Incident’, *Insight Turkey*, 15:3 (2013), pp. 39–44.

⁶³⁴ E. Gurcan & E. Peker, *Challenging Neoliberalism at Turkey’s Gezi Park: From Private Discontent to Collective Class Action* (Palgrave 2015).

To Barkey, Erdogan's reaction to the Gezi Park protests was his 'big error', meaning that his 'aura of perfect stewardship is over. He will pay for it'. Finally, a policy option is offered to turn the forthcoming tragedy into a brighter political future for Erdogan: 'he should offer a genuine olive branch and show *contrition*. Otherwise the next crisis is just around the corner.'⁶³⁵ White's moralising impulse is explicit in the narrative: unless Erdogan shows contrition, his career is over. Again, Barkey seems to offer a moral account of how things *ought* to be rather than how they are; it is *just* rather than *rational* that unless Erdogan confesses his sins, he falls.

This is not different from other tragic narratives of Erdogan. Daniel Lakin writes that 'Turkey under the leadership of the AKP and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan demonstrated a *remarkable capacity* to blend democracy and Islam' but then the hero, Erdogan, was '*blindsided* by the Arab Spring'.⁶³⁶ Piotr Zalewski, similarly, first recounts how since 2002, 'Erdogan's first year in power, GDP has grown by an average of five percent annually. Foreign investment (FDI) has poured in at unprecedented levels.'⁶³⁷ Then, however, comes the tragic turn with 'concerns that the new wealth has been misspent' and 'structural reforms have been lagging behind', meaning that 'Turkey may have *wasted a golden opportunity*'.⁶³⁸

This means that in the near future, there may be 'rough seas ahead for Erdogan and the AKP' and 'Erdogan will have to live not only with the effects of the interest rate hike but also with a political crisis partially of his own

⁶³⁵ Barkey, 'All the Prime Minister's Yes-Men'.

⁶³⁶ Daniel Lakin, 'The Leaderless Middle East', *The National Interest* (11 September 2013), available at <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-leaderless-middle-east-9036> (28 April 2016).

⁶³⁷ Zalewski, 'The End of Erdogan-omics'.

⁶³⁸ Zalewski, 'The End of Erdogan-omics'. Emphasis added. Also Halil Karaveli talks about a *golden opportunity* turning into a 'security nightmare for Turkey'. Halil Karaveli, 'Erdogan Pays for His Foreign Policy', *The National Interest* (12 November 2012), available at <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/erdogan-pays-his-foreign-policy-7719> (28 April 2016).

making'.⁶³⁹ The overconfident hero, Erdogan, committed a tragic fault and will have to pay for it. Or as Omer Zarpli argues, the 'unrepentant Erdogan' is now facing 'an uncertain future'.⁶⁴⁰ Again, the analysis contains a moralising impulse with religious rhetoric suggesting that only genuine repentance could turn the tragic prediction around.

Part of the tragic narrative is that even Erdogan's supporters will turn against him because they will eventually see his repugnant nature. Halil Karaveli, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Security and Development Policy, writes that 'it would be a mistake to assume that Erdogan's supporters are with him for the long haul. In the end, the Taksim Square protests – and the prime minister's response to them – have likely marked *the end of an era*'. He continues that 'even if that constituency is not about to abandon the AKP, which still represents its interests, it might abandon Erdogan'.⁶⁴¹

This analysis was written in 2013, after which Erdogan was elected the president of Turkey and the AKP won both the local and general elections in 2014 and 2015. The era did not end, but once again it can be seen how '*end*' is a formal way of proclaiming its *essence* or *nature*'.⁶⁴² Most analysts that follow Turkish politics and rely on empirical evidence would not have shared the prediction that the Erdogan era was truly facing its end. A report by the German Marshall Fund of the United States, for example, notes: 'Considering his exceptionally successful track record as a political strategist, Recep Tayyip Erdogan's victory in the presidential elections in August was hardly surprising to anyone.'⁶⁴³

⁶³⁹ Zalewski, 'The End of Erdogan-omics'.

⁶⁴⁰ Omer Zarpli, 'Erdogan Weakened, Turkey Polarized', *The National Interest* (8 July 2013), available at <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/erdogan-weakened-turkey-polarized-8699> (27 April 2016).

⁶⁴¹ Halil Karaveli, 'Erdogan in Trouble', *Foreign Affairs* (6 June 2013), available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2013-06-06/erdogan-trouble> (27 April 2016).

⁶⁴² Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives*, p. 13.

⁶⁴³ Emre Erdogan, 'Erdogan's Final Countdown to Absolute Power?', *The German Marshall Fund of the United States* (19 February 2015).

However, what did end towards the mid-2010s was the romantic narration of Erdogan in Western foreign policy analysis. The narrative turn can be clearly recognised in visual images of Erdogan between 2011 and 2015 that accompany Western foreign policy analysis. Consider, for example, the images here taken from different foreign policy analysis pieces in Western journals and newspapers.



Illustration 1: Erdogan as the cover of *Time*, 2011. From Bobby Ghosh, 'Erdogan's Moment', *Time* (28 November 2011), pp. 24–31.



Illustration 2: Erdogan wearing a fez, 2012. From Halil Karaveli, 'Erdogan Pays for His Foreign Policy', *The National Interest* (12 November 2012).



Illustration 3: Erdoğan in a black and white illustration, 2014. From Sinan Ulgen, 'Sleepless in Ankara: The Post-Erdogan Government's Big Challenges', *The National Interest* (4 August 2014).



Illustration 4: 'Tyrannical' Erdoğan wearing a king's crown, 2015. From Daniel Pipes, 'Turkey's unimportant election: The only question is the reach of Erdoğan's tyrannical influence', *The Washington Times* (4 June 2015).

The four images that accompany foreign policy analyses of Turkey in *Time*, *The National Interest*, and *The Washington Times* in 2011–2015 are revealing in many ways. They show that, as Erik Ringmar argues in relation to foreign policy narratives: 'When comedies and romances fail, tragedies and satires are the obvious fall-back options. The stories, that is, are likely to turn both darker and more ironic.'⁶⁴⁴

The first image in 2011 shows Erdoğan as a virtuous leader who has lifted Turkey on the world stage and has the potential to transform the whole Middle

⁶⁴⁴ Ringmar, 'Inter-textual relations', p. 415.

East region to Turkey's image – Islamic but secular, democratic, and Western-friendly. Here Erdogan is presented as a leader that proved all his prejudiced critics wrong: Islam and democracy are compatible and an Islamic leader can become 'one of the world's most influential leaders'.⁶⁴⁵ As Bobby Ghosh continues in the article: 'For some Western observers, the rise of political Islam conjures up visions of extremist, reactionary states, like Afghanistan under the Taliban or Iran. That limited view informed the anxiety that greeted the AKP's 2002 election victory ... But AKP's critics were wrong: Turkey didn't become another Iran.'⁶⁴⁶

The danger in such romantic narratives in foreign policy analysis is that they can be challenged more easily than tragic and ironic narratives. Ringmar therefore argues that 'tragedies and satires are not necessarily more accurate descriptions of world politics, or of the Iraq War, but they are less likely to suffer reversals and are for that reason alone more attractive. In this sense it is easy to understand why the most persuasive stories of international relations have often been told in these two modes'.⁶⁴⁷ Such a reversal took place in Western foreign policy narratives of Turkey, which is clear in the images above. The second image only a year later already presents an entirely different narrative of Erdogan.

Here the audience is invited to form a cognitive link between Erdogan and Islam as the all-pervasive generating principle. In this image, Erdogan is no longer wearing a Western-style suit like in the previous image but a fez, which is a powerful and often threatening symbol of the Ottoman Empire in Western minds.⁶⁴⁸

⁶⁴⁵ Ghosh, 'Erdogan's Moment', p. 24.

⁶⁴⁶ Ghosh, 'Erdogan's Moment', pp. 27–28.

⁶⁴⁷ Ringmar, 'Inter-textual relations', p. 415. On the other hand, Rodger A. Payne argues: 'Among the four standard narrative types identified by literary theorists, IR scholars very commonly employ two of them – romantic adventure stories and tragedies'. Payne, 'Laughing off a Zombie Apocalypse', p. 4. Ian Hall, for his part, notes that satire 'is arguably less obtuse and more palatable mode of conveying ideas for moralists with political intentions and partly for that reason, political satire is far more common in Western and (arguably) non-Western literature than overtly political tragedies'. Hall, 'The satiric vision of politics', p. 219.

⁶⁴⁸ Although sometimes the fez is used by comedians for comic effect. See for example the British comedian Tommy Cooper who was known for his red fez that was meant to make him look ridiculous and funny.

It serves as metonymical tool to distance Erdogan from the West: Erdogan is not a Western leader but an Islamic leader that seeks to bring back the Islamic Empire. The style of the image is more ironic than tragic, and it is clearly influenced by the narrative tradition that emphasises the ‘creeping’ nature of Islam.

This was before Erdogan’s brutal reaction to the Gezi Park protests in 2013, after which it became almost impossible to employ a romantic emplotment of Erdogan. The only feasible counter narrative had to be ironic, arguing that the West can only blame itself for Erdogan’s policies or that, yes, Erdogan might be authoritarian but so are Western leaders. The idea that political culture dictates Erdogan’s policies can be widened to apply to the whole region with the effect of strengthening the link between Turkey and the historical Ottoman region: ‘When the Arab spring burst onto the Middle East three years ago, hopeful democrats in search of a model were drawn to Turkey as a country that seemed to combine moderate Islam with prosperity and democracy. Unfortunately, the Arabs did not follow the Turkish path. Instead, Turkey has set off down *the old Arab road* to corruption and autocracy.’⁶⁴⁹

In the 2013 image in *The National Interest* the visual narrative is already more tragic, representing Erdogan in a dark and menacing manner. The article analyses how an Erdogan-less government could potentially ‘pull Turkey out of its slump’ and ‘mend relations with the West’. The article is written prior to Erdogan’s presidential election victory and presents Erdogan’s departure from the government as a possible ‘moment for Turkey to reposition itself as a valued member of the Western community of nations’.⁶⁵⁰ The final image two years later shows what Erdogan’s presidency really means; it is a satirical image of a power-hungry ‘king of

⁶⁴⁹ ‘The Arab road’, *The Economist* (4 January 2014), available at <http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21592614-government-recep-tayyip-erdogan-has-grave-questions-answer-arab-road> (1 May 2016), emphasis added.

⁶⁵⁰ Ulgen, ‘Sleepless in Ankara’.

Turkey’ who ‘wants powers so wide-reaching that he actually compares them to those wielded by absolute Saudi monarchs’.⁶⁵¹ The generating principle here is power, and Erdogan is represented as a leader that cannot get enough of it. He is an ‘egomaniac’ and ‘lord of all he surveys’ while Western governments are standing by and being naïvely ignorant of his real nature: ‘As he transforms a flawed democracy and NATO ally into a rogue state, ostrich-like Western governments sentimentally pretend it’s still the 1990s, with Ankara a reliable ally, and abet his growing despotism’.⁶⁵²

Here, too, is a tragic narrative turn, which shows that irony and tragedy are often intertwined in foreign policy analysis.⁶⁵³ The analysis continues that some ‘foreign policy blunder on Mr. Erdogan’s part, perhaps with Russia (in Ukraine) or Israel (in Gaza), perhaps in the killing fields of Syria or the gas fields of Cyprus, will likely bring the Erdogan era to its *shuddering and inglorious demise*’.⁶⁵⁴ The moral and political preferences are clearly stated here with actual political advice to the audience: ‘I invite readers to join me in the unwanted experience of rooting for a left-wing party, the HDP, to gain 10 percent of the vote, to win parliamentary representation, and then, one hopes, cleverly to obstruct Mr. Erdogan’s power grab in what small ways it can.’⁶⁵⁵ There is no attempt to distance the narrator from politics – quite the opposite. The following section continues to analyse power as the third generating principle in narratives that employ the Erdogan-for-Turkey metaphor.

⁶⁵¹ Pipes, ‘Turkey’s unimportant election’.

⁶⁵² Pipes, ‘Turkey’s unimportant election’.

⁶⁵³ Although Hall argues that the satirical vision of politics ‘appears much more readily and obviously political than the tragic’. ‘The satiric vision of politics’, p. 226.

⁶⁵⁴ Pipes, ‘Turkey’s unimportant election’, emphasis added.

⁶⁵⁵ Pipes, ‘Turkey’s unimportant election’.

Erdogan as a power-hungry leader

The Erdogan-for-Turkey metaphor is employed not only to render Islam or Turkish political culture as the most meaningful ways to understand Turkish foreign policy but also to advance a power-based explanation of the international system. If the former representations produced narratives that are more metonymical in their effect of distancing Turkey away from the West, the focus on power as the motivating principle is more synecdochal in nature because it offers a universalistic rather than a particularistic representation of Turkey and its leadership.

Once again, these representations are not specific to Erdogan but can be recognised already in the early 1900s with, for example, Hans Kohn comparing Mustafa Kemal's Turkey to Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy: 'Just as in Italy in 1922, and as in Germany since early in the present year, the conduct of political affairs in Turkey rests today on the personality of a leader.'⁶⁵⁶ Representing Turkey's authoritarian governance as similar to Italy or Germany increases Western identification with rather than division from Turkey; it is a country like any other in the West. Atatürk's leadership is depicted in a universal fashion as a manifestation of Max Weber's charismatic authority.⁶⁵⁷

Michael J. Koplow and Steven A. Cook explain Erdogan's governance style through the principle of power. In their article 'The Turkish Paradox' in *Foreign Affairs*, they argue that the 'key to understanding democracy under the AKP lies with the meaning of democracy itself.'⁶⁵⁸ Referring to Robert Dahl's definition of democracy, Koplow and Cook argue that compared to previous administrations in Turkish politics, under the AKP 'Turkish citizens have enjoyed far higher levels of

⁶⁵⁶ Kohn, 'Ten Years of the Turkish Republic', p. 141.

⁶⁵⁷ More on the classic concept of charismatic authority, see Tony Waters et al. (eds.), *Weber's Rationalism and Modern Society* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

⁶⁵⁸ Michael J. Koplow & Steven A. Cook, 'The Turkish Paradox', *Foreign Affairs* (27 June 2012), available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2012-06-27/turkish-paradox> (1 May 2016).

participation. But their power to contest the government has come under attack. Over the last five years, Erdogan and the AKP have proved relentless in their targeting of anyone perceived to contest their power or be a threat to their dominance'.⁶⁵⁹ The paradox that they describe is that the first steps of the AKP government resulted in 'more Turks to participate in civic life than any time in the modern republic's history', later turning to a tragic 'culmination of a highly undemocratic campaign to intimidate, harass, and imprison the AKP's opponents'.⁶⁶⁰

The tragic turn is explained by a universal characteristic in political leaders, hunger for power, followed by a prediction that seems to be grounded not on empirical analysis but on moral preferences as well as 'wishes, daydreams, (and) reveries'.⁶⁶¹ The article concludes that 'an autocratic slide *will undermine* its international standing, built largely on its democratization. Should Turkey's liberalization falter, the country may *quickly lose* that influence, suggesting that there are *consequences* to having it both ways'.⁶⁶² The prediction is not supported with any evidence, which begs the question of its analytical origins: is it based on a moral assumption that undemocratic regimes *ought* to falter or on an empirical analysis of the likelihood of such a scenario?

This chapter argues that it is more a moral than an analytical prediction that is formulated narratively. It is similar to Soner Cagaptay's conclusion that the June 2011 elections 'may be the most important battle for Turkey's soul in over two centuries, since the Ottoman sultans first turned Turkey to the West'.⁶⁶³ Again, the principle of transformation is highly dramatised and localised here, but the suggestion that the 2011 elections in Turkey represent the 'most important battle' in

⁶⁵⁹ Koplw & Cook, 'The Turkish Paradox'.

⁶⁶⁰ Koplw & Cook, 'The Turkish Paradox'.

⁶⁶¹ White, *The Content of the Form*, pp. 24–25.

⁶⁶² Koplw & Cook, 'The Turkish Paradox', emphases added.

⁶⁶³ Cagaptay, 'Sultan of the Muslim World'.

over two centuries appears to have roots in the moral and aesthetic preference of having the AKP overthrown by Kemalists⁶⁶⁴. As Cagaptay argues: ‘In other words, the AKP will have its cake and eat it too unless Turks stop believing in a Huntingtonian clash between the Muslim world and the West – or unless Kemalism reemerges to assert the nationalist, secular aspects of Turkey’s identity.’

Narratives that employ power as the generating principle have a different temporal framing than narratives that focus on Islam or political culture when emplotting Turkey’s foreign policy using the Erdogan-for-Turkey metaphor. In the former case, the outcome is predetermined by the structure, which means that the formative moment is located with a different temporal logic. In the case of Islam-generated explanations, it is embedded in the election victory of the AKP. In analyses that focus on political culture, it dates further back in history – usually to the Ottoman era – when the very culture was being formed. Using power as the generating principle means that the formative moment is more recent and follows the well-known principle of power corrupting; that Erdogan initially had good intentions but turned authoritarian as a result of his growing powers.

An editorial in *The Times* analyses Erdogan with the title ‘Power Corrupts’ and takes a strong moral position against Erdogan: ‘For the first time in more than a decade, Recep Tayyip Erdogan may be about to lose an election. It would be *a good thing* for Turkey and its neighbours if he did’.⁶⁶⁵ The ‘power corrupts’ explanation is very different from the idea that ‘Turkey’s institutional deterioration is not a recent matter ... Ever since Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP)

⁶⁶⁴ Cagaptay, ‘Sultan of the Muslim World’.

⁶⁶⁵ ‘Power Corrupts’, *The Times* (10 March 2014), available at <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/opinion/leaders/article4028157.ece> (1 May 2016), emphases added.

came to power in 2003, executive discretion has crept into the public procurement process'.⁶⁶⁶

It can be argued that the three generating motives produce different ideas of the human nature. In the power explanation human nature is depicted as intrinsically good but feeble whereas the Islam-generated explanation largely externalises the repugnant and immoral features in human nature to a particular religion and its political embodiment. The explanation based on political culture takes a structural perspective and represents humans as passive agents that cannot escape the context in which they operate. As such, it understands human nature as intrinsically weak, submissive, and lacking in true political potency.

There is a fourth generating principle that will be discussed in the final section. In ironic narratives the human potential to truly transform the world that we live in is carnivalised with the effect of rendering idealistic interpretations of the international system nigh impossible and naïve. Its pessimism as regards the role of political leaders in world politics is close to the power explanation discussed above. They both point towards the tendency of political leaders to advance their own interests and rely on 'age old truths' about humans and power. Above all, the ironic narrative tradition explains Erdogan's foreign policy behavior as an understandable reaction to the immoral policies of the West in the international system.

Ironic emplotment of the Erdogan-for-Turkey metaphor

The analyses of Morton Abramowitz and his co-authors in *The National Interest* in 2009–2013 provide an interesting case study of how narratives evolve over time and get intertwined with different narrative types and generating motives. Because it well illustrates the ironic turn in foreign policy analysis, it will be dealt with in greater

⁶⁶⁶ Meyersson & Rodrik, 'Erdogan's Coup'.

detail, which means that the case largely dominates this section. Starting from 2009, the focus was still more on Turkey as a polity than Erdogan as a political actor. For example, in a 2009 analysis, Morton Abramowitz and Henri J. Barkey argue that

the fear that Turkey is parting with the West for the Muslim world or Putin's Russia is *inflated* and *misguided*. It is *prudent* and *appropriate* to move from cold relations to profitable friendship. Ending years of enmity *makes sense*. One can be both a reliable NATO ally and maintain good relations with Russia or the Muslim world. Moreover, Erdogan's ambitious agenda to build on Turkey's geostrategic location, economic prowess and alliances may be also helpful to the West, especially in areas where Western efforts have failed.⁶⁶⁷

Here the narrative is still more romantic, representing the 'modern West' tradition that has produced the idea that Turkey can be a role model to the wider Middle East region in how to successfully unite Islam and democracy. There is an ironic undercurrent that directs our critical gaze towards the West, which becomes more apparent in subsequent pieces of analysis. In an article in 2010 they write that 'Turkey is a growing power and possesses assets we do not have. Where we can get their help we should elicit it. Where we differ we can acknowledge their interests ... The U.S. government does not and should not question whether Turkey is part of the West. Any Turkish government will pursue its own interests as it defines them at any point in time'.⁶⁶⁸ The ironic elements here are similar to the ones discussed earlier in the thesis; the West needs to treat Turkey in a more just and equal manner, and refrain

⁶⁶⁷ Morton Abramowitz & Henri J. Barkey, 'Talking to Turkey', *The National Interest* (7 December 2009), available at <http://nationalinterest.org/article/talking-to-turkey-3323> (1 May 2016), emphases added.

⁶⁶⁸ Morton Abramowitz & Henri J. Barkey, 'The Turkish-American Split', *The National Interest* (18 June 2010), available at <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/turkish-american-split-3641> (3 May 2016).

from imposing its moral and political preferences upon other states in the international system.

They further argue that the fact that the killings of Turkish citizens in the flotilla in 2009 caused ‘widespread public anger’ is ‘understandable’. At the same time, the U.S. is criticised for having been too weak and naïve towards Turkey, which is another typical feature in ironic narrative strategies: ‘For many years, we treated the Turks with kid gloves and carried their water in Europe on issues ranging from European accession to muzzling the PKK – and demanded little in return, such as domestic reforms.’⁶⁶⁹ The West in general and the U.S. in particular should better understand Turkey that, as they argue in *Foreign Affairs*, ‘has always been a conservative country’.⁶⁷⁰

In 2011 the narrative began to change with Erdogan shifted to the centre of analytical attention. The change is apparent only by looking at their titles in 2011–2013: ‘The Real Recep Tayyip Erdogan’,⁶⁷¹ ‘The Year of Erdogan’,⁶⁷² ‘Erdogan’s Juggling Act’,⁶⁷³ ‘Erdogan’s Hypocrisy on Sudan’,⁶⁷⁴ ‘Erdogan’s Kurdish Issues’,⁶⁷⁵ ‘Erdogan’s Kurdish Dilemma’,⁶⁷⁶ and ‘Erdogan’s Troubles Endanger Kurdish Peace’.⁶⁷⁷ Here the narratives do not represent Erdogan as the embodiment of Turkey but an exception, which allows the earlier ‘modern West’ narrative to

⁶⁶⁹ Abramowitz & Barkey, ‘The Turkish-American Split’.

⁶⁷⁰ Abramowitz & Barkey, ‘Turkey’s Transformers’.

⁶⁷¹ Abramowitz, ‘The Real Recep Tayyip Erdogan’.

⁶⁷² Morton Abramowitz, ‘The Year of Erdogan’, *The National Interest* (27 December 2011), available at <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-year-erdogan-6301> (3 May 2016).

⁶⁷³ Morton Abramowitz, ‘Erdogan’s Juggling Act’, *The National Interest* (8 June 2012), available at <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/erdogans-juggling-act-7030> (3 May 2016).

⁶⁷⁴ Morton Abramowitz, ‘Erdogan’s Hypocrisy on Sudan’, *The National Interest* (23 July 2012), available at <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/erdogans-hypocrisy-sudan-7228> (3 May 2016).

⁶⁷⁵ Morton Abramowitz & Jessica Sims, ‘Erdogan’s Kurdish Issues’, *The National Interest*, available at <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/erdogans-kurdish-issues-8024> (3 May 2016).

⁶⁷⁶ Abramowitz, ‘Erdogan’s Kurdish Dilemma’.

⁶⁷⁷ Morton Abramowitz & Omer Zarpli, ‘Erdogan’s Troubles Endanger Kurdish Peace’, *The National Interest* (11 June 2013), available at <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/erdogans-troubles-endanger-kurdish-peace-8580> (3 May 2016).

remain salient. As such, the ironic strategy allows for exceptions to the rule, and representing Erdogan as an exception in Turkey's political culture serves the purpose.

In 2011 Abramowitz, for example, writes ironically: 'Apparently Erdogan's animosity toward dictators who attack their people does not apply to his support of the indicted war criminal who rules Sudan and gets significant Turkish investment.'⁶⁷⁸ Erdogan is represented as a hypocritical leader that cannot be trusted, which is fused with a critical interpretation of the West's foreign policy behaviour. The West's weakness is seen as a contributing factor in the tragic development: Erdogan 'clearly wants, and thinks he can have, a strong relationship with the United States, even in the Middle East. The Obama administration has given him no reason to doubt that. His fierce ambition, his solipsism and his religious worldview, however, blend into a combustible mixture that makes him an unpredictable ally.'⁶⁷⁹

Or as Abramowitz writes a year later: 'Sitting in Washington, it is difficult to carp about the political discourse of another country as it wades into issues that for decades have divided Americans. But the always-visceral Erdogan never fails to attract attention by providing advice on numerous issues – he is a continuing guide to good Turkish living.'⁶⁸⁰ Here, too, is a double strategy of gazing critically both towards the West and its own domestic problems, as well as towards Erdogan and his authoritarian governing style. In another analysis written a month later Abramowitz notes in reference to Erdogan that hypocrisy 'is not limited to the West'.⁶⁸¹ In the same month, Abramowitz writes that on Sudan, 'Erdogan's performance disgraces Turkey and far exceeds U.S. hypocrisy'.⁶⁸² It is clear that the

⁶⁷⁸ Abramowitz, 'The Year of Erdogan'.

⁶⁷⁹ Abramowitz, 'The Real Recep Tayyip Erdogan'.

⁶⁸⁰ Abramowitz, 'Erdogan's Juggling Act'.

⁶⁸¹ Morton Abramowitz, 'Turkey's Unending Syria Problem, *The National Interest* (11 July 2012), available at <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/turkeys-unending-syria-problem-7179> (4 May 2016).

⁶⁸² Abramowitz, 'Erdogan's Hypocrisy on Sudan'.

same moral judgment that the U.S. is subjected to is applied to Erdogan, but Turkey escapes the ironic moralising gaze.

Also here is a tragic prediction for Erdogan with criticism directed to the West as well. In 2011 Abramowitz argues that the ‘new year is likely to be more difficult one for Erdogan’, but at the same time he concludes that it is ‘unfortunate that the EU continues to give Turkey the cold shoulder’, which suggests that the EU’s allegedly unfair treatment of Turkey plays a role in Erdogan’s repugnant foreign policy actions.⁶⁸³ A year later Abramowitz notes: ‘Events and domestic politics will determine what Erdogan does next – but it does not look promising. Too bad for Turkey and its *mute American friends*’.⁶⁸⁴ Again the tragic prediction is accompanied with a critical judgment of the U.S. that allows Erdogan to act in an authoritarian manner without consequences. Finally, in the same year the tragic prediction is repeated with reference to the classic fault of the tragic hero, becoming overconfident:

When the Arab Spring emerged, Erdogan quickly adjusted, touring the region preaching democracy and secularism and creating an *impressive* reputation for Turkey and himself. He became something of a rock star in the early months of Arab political change. While Turkey is still an influential player in the Middle East, Erdogan *read too much* into the approving editorials and exaggerated both his own personal standing and the extent of Turkish influence in the area.⁶⁸⁵

⁶⁸³ Abramowitz, ‘The Year of Erdogan’.

⁶⁸⁴ Abramowitz, ‘Erdogan’s Juggling Act’, emphasis added.

⁶⁸⁵ Morton Abramowitz, ‘Turkey’s Precarious Position’, *The National Interest* (20 September 2012), available at <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/turkeys-precarious-position-7494> (4 May 2016), emphases added.

Erik Ringmar's definition of tragedy can be recognised in these narratives. Ringmar writes that in tragedy 'there is a hero, but a tragic hero is someone who rebels against the established order and who is destroyed as a result. The tragic hero – Oedipus, Antigone, Arthur Miller's Willy Loman – has a 'flaw' that sets him apart from others; he is proud, passionate or obsessed with some fanciful idea'.⁶⁸⁶ Ringmar concludes that 'tragedy leaves the audience with the sense that justice has been done – "the hero must fall!" – but also a feeling of profound pity – "why did the hero have to fall?"'⁶⁸⁷ In most of the tragic narratives of Erdogan in Western foreign policy analysis he is represented as proud, passionate, overconfident, and obsessed with power or religion.

In ironic narratives Erdogan's pride and passion are represented as just and understandable emotions either because of the historical experience of Muslims in Turkey or due to the West's unfair treatment of Turkey. Brent E. Sasley, for example, writes in his article 'Erdogan's Democracy' in *The National Interest* that the 'Islamist experience in Turkey is one of repression, more so than in any other of the regional Muslim states'.⁶⁸⁸ Erdogan is represented as a leader that rebels against the established Kemalist order that since the founding of the republic had deprived Islamist parties of a true political representation in Turkey.

Sasley continues that the Obama administration 'can't threaten punishment for the police crackdown if it didn't when Canadian police cracked down on anti-G20 protestors in 2010. It should not threaten sanctions, which would be inappropriate given that clashes between protests and police are not uncommon to the United States either. Turkey shouldn't be treated like Syria but *like a normal*

⁶⁸⁶ Ringmar, 'Inter-textual Relations', p. 405.

⁶⁸⁷ Ringmar, 'Inter-textual Relations', p. 405.

⁶⁸⁸ Sasley, 'Erdogan's Democracy'.

Western ally.⁶⁸⁹ Here we can recognise the ‘feeling of profound pity’ that Ringmar describes; that the audience should feel empathetic towards Erdogan and his plight. As Kemal Kirisci writes in his article ‘Erdogan’s Obama Agenda’: ‘Hopefully, Obama will listen to Erdogan with patience and empathy.’⁶⁹⁰

Ringmar further notes that the tragic hero ‘comes to conflict with the laws of society or nature, and as the social or natural order is re-established the hero is relentlessly crushed’.⁶⁹¹ Ironic narratives that employ the Erdogan-for-Turkey metaphor are often premised on the belief that the West represents the hegemonic order, and however unjust that state of affairs is, it is an established fact of the international system. Hence, they already foresee the tragic fall of Erdogan because he rebels against the established order by challenging Western hegemonic (yet unjust) ideals and policies. As such, if the previous generating principles discussed in the chapter – Islam, political culture, and power – predicted Erdogan’s tragic fall with the sense that justice will prevail, the ironic interpretation is more pitiful in its tragic prediction.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined how the Erdogan-for-Turkey metaphor is employed in Western foreign policy analysis on Turkey. Using a tropological approach, the chapter distinguished between four different narrative traditions. The first tradition is premised upon a belief that Islam explains Erdogan’s actions and represents a prism through which to analyse the AKP government’s policies. The narratives in this tradition contain strongly metonymical elements, drawing a formative line between

⁶⁸⁹ Sasley, ‘Erdogan’s Democracy’.

⁶⁹⁰ Kemal Kirisci, ‘Erdogan’s Obama Agenda’, *The National Interest* (16 May 2013), available at <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/erdogans-obama-agenda-8475> (3 May 2016).

⁶⁹¹ Ringmar, ‘Inter-textual Relations’, p. 405.

the West and Turkey's current government and often strengthening the 'civilisation West' narrative. All Erdogan's actions are filtered through the all-pervasive generating principle of Islam, which means that even his democratic policies in the early 200s become part of the motive to covertly Islamise Turkey.

The second tradition forms around a belief that Erdogan is a product of Turkey's political culture that brings up authoritarian leaders such as Ataturk or Erdogan. If the former tradition represented Ataturk in an idealised manner, this tradition maintains that he was an authoritarian leader just like most other leader before and after the establishment of the republic in 1923. Authoritarian leaders are represented as a 'Turkish thing', which is narrated with metonymical tools. Once again, the line between Turkish and Western forms of governance is meaningful, rendering Western political culture as the ideal type. As such, also these narratives often feed into the 'triumphant West' tradition, often treating the West's superior nature in a matter-of-fact fashion.

The third tradition is more synecdochal in that there is a more universalistic rather than a particularistic approach towards Erdogan and his style of governance. The generating principle here is power, and Erdogan is represented as a leader that – just like those in the West – has grown more power-hungry during his term in office. Erdogan was arguably at first genuine in his reforms but became more corrupted by power the further he went. Here the web of beliefs is based upon a conviction that the corrupted nature of power is something that we see across the international system – and Turkey is no exception to that.

Finally, there is an ironic tradition in the Erdogan-for-Turkey emplotment that attempts to highlight the allegedly repugnant nature of the West that has lead to Erdogan to act in a more critical manner towards the West. Here the idea of justice takes the centre role with Erdogan treated with more understanding

and sympathy. And even when Erdogan is criticised for his policies, they are brought side-by-side with Western policies in order to show that Western leaders are equally hypocritical in their action. The notion of Jan Nespov and Liz Barber that academic texts 'are always written for specific audiences' is the most apparent in the ironic tradition because the audience is expected to understand the cultural and moral cues that are embedded in the narratives.⁶⁹² Just like the previous chapters have shown, the ironic tradition re-produces the 'declinist West' narrative, pointing towards weaknesses within the West.

The thesis began the analysis of Western foreign policy analysis concerning 'Turkey from the 'losing Turkey' metaphor, moved on to the 'Turkey at a crossroads' metaphor, and ended at the 'Erdogan-for-Turkey' metaphor. What the thesis has tried to demonstrate in these chapters is that 'there is a link from language to conceptual framing to action', which can be anything from speech acts to policy acts.⁶⁹³ This is important for two primary reasons.

Firstly, as Lakoff continues: 'How we act in a situation depends on how we understand it.'⁶⁹⁴ Foreign policy analysis as a second-order representation plays a particularly important role in shaping our understanding of the international system because we tend to treat it as factual analysis about the world. A foreign policy analysis that explains Turkish actions is often considered a dispassionate and neutral observer even though a closer study of the field shows that there are several narrative traditions that influence the accounts. Those traditions contain divergent moral and aesthetic preferences that often have less to do with Turkey than with the narrator's

⁶⁹² Jan Nespov & Liz Barber, 'Audience and the Politics of Narrative', *Qualitative Studies in Education*, 8:1 (1995), p. 51.

⁶⁹³ Lakoff, 'Metaphorical Thought in Foreign Policy', p. 3.

⁶⁹⁴ Ibid.

web of beliefs concerning the West. It is clear that narrative links emotion and reason in a very effective and meaningful way.⁶⁹⁵

The link between language and action is also important because, as Lakoff argues, ‘one can learn a lot about how people frame situations from how they talk. Conversely, having effective language to express ideas is extremely powerful. Merely hearing the language again and again plants in the mind a mode of understanding.’⁶⁹⁶ It is precisely this that the thesis has tried to show by focusing on narrative traditions in Western foreign policy analysis on Turkey. When generations of foreign policy analysts employ particularly effective language to represent Turkey, our mental horizons are limited to perceiving Turkey in a certain way. And when we hear the popular metaphors again and again, we begin to see them as natural, matter-of-fact, and realistic. They slowly get disconnected from the beliefs that give rise to them, rendering them commonsensical accounts of Turkish foreign policy.

⁶⁹⁵ Emihovich, ‘Distancing Passion’, p. 40.

⁶⁹⁶ Lakoff, ‘Metaphorical Thought in Foreign Policy’, p. 3.

Chapter 8 – Conclusions

During my study and research stays in Istanbul and Ankara in the late 2000s and early 2010s, the discrepancy between what I read about Turkey and what I witnessed in the country never failed to puzzle me. Foreign policy journals and newspapers published articles saying that Turkish pride and anger explain its politics when what I witnessed around me was a deep sense of self-irony and a sober attitude towards political developments both within and outside the country. Islam was meant to be the all-pervasive generating principle of the Turkish political landscape when to my eyes there were also other equally important political movements based on class, geography, nationality, environment, human rights, and so on. Newspapers were talking about the educated urban elites that were liberal in their outlook when it seemed to me that at universities conservative family values and traditional gender roles were more the norm than an exception.

At first I put the conflict between my observations and expert analyses down to the limits in my capacity to understand the bigger picture. I thought that my daily encounters in Istanbul are something different to a long and detailed study of the country's politics and society. However, once I began to conduct research and got more familiar with the methods of investigation in the social sciences, I realised that the studies, analyses and reports that I read are equally limited in their capacity to really grasp the real nature of Turkish politics. This was not only because of the impossible task of mimetically capturing human action but also because our analysis of human action is inevitably intertwined with pro-beliefs. It occurred to me that the issue at stake was not about observation but representation.

As a result of this realisation I began to shift my focus on the interplay between the events analysed and the patterns of representation. It soon became clear

that, as Edelman rightly argues, ‘the continuous bombardment of news about a changing political spectacle contrasts sharply with the static pattern of value allocations’.⁶⁹⁷ Foreign policy events in and around Turkey were and continue to be abundant but the patterns of representation in Western foreign policy analysis remain static. The more I examined the gap between representation and the represented, the closer I moved towards the representer, which seemed to offer the key to understanding the puzzle.

When people ask me what this thesis is about, I sometimes have trouble in explaining that it is about Turkish foreign policy but actually not about it at all; it is actually about the static patterns of representing Turkish foreign policy in the West. If you were looking for a detailed analysis of Turkish foreign policy and its future direction, you would be disappointed in not finding that in this thesis. Instead, at the core of the thesis is the idea of the West that is being debated and narrated through Turkey. The thesis is about Western foreign policy analysis on Turkey as a second-order representation that is narratively constructed. It contains ideological antagonisms related to the West and is influenced by narrative traditions that offer apt metaphors and cultural resources to turn random foreign policy events into meaningful narratives. Guiding the research task has been Hayward R. Alker’s notion that

Life is not a myth or a fairy tale with a guaranteed happy ending; neither is it an inevitable tragedy, one that encompasses all of Western civilization or the human species. Nor are most political or cultural leaders successfully heroic. Should one then refrain from attempting to give meaningful interpretations to world history? Or should one only

⁶⁹⁷ Edelman, ‘Political Language and Political Reality’, p. 12.

try to refrain from being ‘ideological’ in making such efforts, if it is indeed possible to do so? Can we indeed refrain from mythical, poetic or moralistic and ideological elements in writing scientific histories of the challenges, the limits and the potentialities of our times?⁶⁹⁸

There are two important principles here. Firstly, we think narratively, structuring events around us into coherent narratives that slowly turn imagination into common sense. Secondly, this is not an issue that needs to be solved but acknowledged and explored. This means that it is not our cognitive framing that is the problem that needs to be overcome but our blindness to it that arises from the positivist conviction that our perception can be mimetic.

In March 2012 I attended a narrative conference at the British Museum in London. In the discussion session one of the speakers noted that Europe has ceased to imagine and become an entity devoid of powerful political ideas, functioning as an uncreative bureaucratic machine designed to implement practical policies. For the speaker, this was a worrying sign – the continent that invented democracy no longer engaged in political imaginary. Europe was no longer thinking big but focusing on measurement, administration and surveillance with political science having become subservient to public administration. She seemed to suggest that our European reality existed outside the realm of imagination because, as I would argue, she had come to take the prevailing political order for granted.

My task is to show that not only does Europe in general and the West in particular imagine but that it imagines big. These debates on the notions of Europe and the West are not carried out only in internal discussions but also in external action. The West imagines and re-imagines itself in foreign policy analysis

⁶⁹⁸ Alker, *Rediscoveries and Reformulations*, p. 270.

debates. Turkey offers a particular potent ground for imagination because of the dilemma that the country represents a hybrid and liminal entity. As such, the big questions about Europe and the West have not been subdued by bureaucratic practices but discussed furiously through Turkey.

The data of the thesis that contains more than one hundred articles in foreign policy analysis in scholarly journals, newspapers, blogs and books shows that Western foreign policy analysis on Turkey is narratively framed. The analyses contain Gergen's valued endpoint, events relevant to the endpoint and their ordered arrangement as well as causal linkages. The narrative form together with powerful metaphors creates meaningful interpretations that are tropological in nature. This means that language in foreign policy analysis is highly constitutive. As Edelman argues: 'Language consists of sound waves or of marks on paper that become meaningful only because people project some significance into them, not because of anything inherent in the sounds or the marks.'⁶⁹⁹

The most important question is how to tease out the meanings that Western foreign policy analysis on Turkey constructs? The thesis relies upon a triangle of three methodological approaches: a narrative approach, an interpretative approach, and an aesthetic approach. Bevir and Rhodes write that when political scientists interpret practices 'they lump beliefs together in discourses, ideologies, or traditions. They abstract from the beliefs of particular individuals to depict aggregates – the patterns of thought that inform a political practice'.⁷⁰⁰ The thesis has followed the approach of Bevir & Rhodes in doing precisely that, which Polkinghorne calls a paradigmatic analysis of narratives. This means that the thesis has analysed existing narratives on Turkish foreign policy, identifying beliefs that feed into narrative traditions related to the ideas about the West. In this research task, the thesis has

⁶⁹⁹ Edelman, 'Political Language and Political Reality', p. 12.

⁷⁰⁰ Bevir & Rhodes, *Interpreting British Governance*, pp. 1–2.

employed primarily Hayden White's tropology but also Kenneth Burke's rhetorical tools and George Lakoff's metaphorical approach to foreign policy language.

There are different traditions, as laid out by Christopher Browning and Marko Lehti, in the debate about the West that are employed to the data to determine whether instances of them were to be found. The first set of narrative traditions concern the nature of the West and include three categories: 'civilisation West', 'modern West' and 'political West'. The second set of traditions concern the future of the West and are referred to as the 'triumphant West' tradition and the 'declinist West' tradition. In order to understand the different webs of beliefs that influence these traditions, the thesis employs the tropes of metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche and irony that, as White argues, 'permit us to mediate between contending ideologues, each of who regards his own position as scientific and that of his opponent as mere ideology or "false consciousness"'.⁷⁰¹

This is important not only because the tropes provide analytical rigour and clarity to the research task but also because it makes it easier to build some distance to my own web of beliefs that inevitably influences the research setting. I can recognise an ironic tendency in my approach to International Relations, which is why ironic and satirical narratives always seem so appealing to me. I have always been drawn to writers such as Rebecca West who notes in her famous work *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon* (1941) that 'in this mechanized age I am as little unable to understand my environment as any primitive woman who thinks that a waterfall is inhabited by a spirit, and indeed less so, for her opinion might, from a poetical point of view, be correct'.⁷⁰² She continues that 'the man who comes down the gangway of the ship and travels on the tender to the quay, him I can understand, for he is

⁷⁰¹ White, *Tropics of Discourse*, p. 22.

⁷⁰² Rebecca West, *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon: Journeys through Yugoslavia* (Edinburgh: Canongate Books, 2006), p. 15.

something that is not new. Always the people have had the idea of the leader, and sometimes a man is born who embodies this idea'.⁷⁰³

In her ironic comprehension, West does not mean to say that she is lacking in knowledge – quite the opposite. She is self-critically challenging our truths and accepted discourse practices that are often premised upon a metonymical comprehension of the world that render the present age decisive and bestow upon it inherent moral qualities. A synecdochal comprehension is equally concerned with the idea of progress even if it approaches it from an idealist position. It is not difficult to see how the anti-foundationalist philosophy of White and others has had such an immense impact on my intellectual thinking. Inbuilt in the model of Bevir & Rhodes is a conviction that traditions travel through generations because even when circumstances change, people continue to impose upon them meanings that are familiar and comforting. Similarly, Turkish foreign policy continues to be analysed in line with traditions that were invented long before the current generation of foreign policy analysts.

In her famous words, West continues: 'Violence was, indeed, all I knew of the Balkans – all I knew of the South Slavs. I derived the knowledge from memories of my earliest interest in liberalism, of leaves fallen from this jungle, of pamphlets tied up with string, in the dustiest corners of junkshops, and later from the prejudices of the French, who use the word Balkan as a term of abuse, meaning a rastaquouere type of barbarian.'⁷⁰⁴ The second-order representations that Western foreign policy analysts produce in newspapers, journals, books and blogs similarly derive from a complex web of ideological positions, scientific findings, prejudices, empirical observations and tropological imagination.

⁷⁰³ Ibid.

⁷⁰⁴ West, *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon*, p. 21.

The research aim is not to focus on individual beliefs but their connections to the traditions that influence the way in which Turkey is narrated in Western foreign policy analysis. This is what Bevir & Rhodes mean when they note that the ‘distinction between aggregate and individual analysis is artificial. An interpretive approach moves back and forth between aggregate concepts and the beliefs of particular individuals. Whether we focus on aggregates such as traditions or on the beliefs of individuals will depend on the questions we seek to answer’.⁷⁰⁵ To this end, the analysis in the thesis is formed around three metaphors in Western foreign policy analysis on Turkey: the ‘losing’ metaphor, the ‘crossroads’ metaphor, and the ‘Erdogan-for-Turkey’ metaphor. The metaphors provide a good premise upon which to build the paradigmatic study of narratives as they offer an anchor to the traditions. They also offer a channel through which to reflect upon one of the most fundamental questions concerning the study of beliefs:

We must first recognise that metaphors are sometimes nothing more than clever wording, a means of dramatizing issues to certain audiences in terms they will understand and support. This inevitably raises one of the perennial problems associated with the study of beliefs and how they influence behaviour – how do we know if subjects’ statements reflect what they are thinking or merely what they are saying?⁷⁰⁶

This thesis is not trying to get inside the heads of individual foreign policy scholars but to map out the traditions that their narratives are influenced by and intertwined with. As such, the focus is not on what causes certain narratives to arise but their effect, which means that the primary aim is to show that we are all situated agents

⁷⁰⁵ Bevir & Rhodes, *Interpreting British Governance*, p. 2.

⁷⁰⁶ Shimko, ‘Metaphors and Foreign Policy Decision Making’, p. 662.

who operate in a social context that consists of taken-for-granted metaphors, narrative resources, tropological frames and familiar analogies. There exists a Western discursive space where meanings are shared and turned into common sense, which becomes evident in the data set of the thesis.

Furthermore, the ‘perennial problem’ in the study of beliefs is present in different forms in all studies of human interaction. Human interest, for example, is equally slippery despite the common assumption that human beings are rational and can separate their true interests from emotional or ontological motives to act. Similarly, discourse analysis was meant to solve the methodological problems related to the study of beliefs but faces the same challenge as metaphor: ‘How do we know whether a metaphor is a matter only of speech or of both speech and thought?’⁷⁰⁷

There are three traditions that can be recognised in Western foreign policy analysis narratives that employ the ‘losing’ metaphor. The first tradition is based upon a belief that Turkey is lost despite the West, representing the West as a triumphant entity and employing metonymical tools of representation. Here the Burkean scapegoat is the AKP government that is moving Turkey away from the West and towards a repugnant and menacing future. The formative moment is located in the decisive election victory of the AKP in 2002 that allowed Islam to start ‘creeping in’ to Turkey’s politics and society. There is a stark metonymical contrast between the two poles: the West that represents an inspirational entity and the AKP that acts irrationally in not aspiring to turn Turkey fully Western. Here the Westernised elites in Turkey are represented as the virtuous force in the country that is trying to battle against the anti-Western and irrational masses that support the AKP.

⁷⁰⁷ Shimko, ‘Metaphors and Foreign Policy Decision Making’, pp. 662–663.

The second tradition that employs the 'losing' metaphor emphasises that Turkey is a normal state that can rationally decide to turn away from the West for strategic reasons. The tradition ties in with the 'modern West' and the 'civilisation West' narratives. There are synecdochal narrative elements here that focus on harmony, integration and similarity instead of conflict and difference. The thesis has showed that one needs to be particularly careful when analysing this tradition because the line between identification and division, in Burke's terms, is very thin here. Seemingly integrative narratives can result in strong division, which is often the case with narratives that embrace Turkey's 'true' identity in the West: celebrating Turkey's turn away from the West towards its more 'natural' location in the East means that a decisive line is drawn between two distinct civilisations. Such a discursive practice strengthens the 'civilisation West' tradition but does it in a more subtle way that requires a narrative approach to be unpacked.

The third 'losing Turkey' tradition employs ironic tools of representation and argues that it is not Turkey but the West that is lost. A related assumption is that even if Turkey is lost, it is because of the repugnant West. The narratives tie in with the 'declinist West' tradition and take a self-critical approach towards Western action and inaction concerning Turkey. Here the web of beliefs relies upon an image of the West as a hypocritical and unjust actor in the international system that is only seeking its own benefits at the expense of others such as Turkey. Turkey is treated with sympathy and understanding and often lifted to a superior moral and political position vis-à-vis the West. This tradition attempts to highlight the discrepancies in Western foreign policy action by turning around the notion of the West as a triumphant and inspirational entity. Here the West becomes the main scapegoat that needs to show contrition and overcome its hegemonic impulse in the international system.

There are a number of events that have triggered the 'losing' metaphor, including Turkey's parliament opposing the Iraq War, the Armenian genocide resolutions, Turkey's Iran sanctions vote, and the Gaza flotilla raid. The same events can lead to different traditions, confirming the influence of narrative traditions on how events are interpreted in Western foreign policy analysis. The moral impulse that, as White argues, is present in all narrativity and inbuilt in different narrative traditions, fluctuates between the tropes and has a significant impact upon the narrative.

The second metaphor that the analysis in the thesis is framed around situates Turkey 'at a crossroads'. Here too are different tropological formulations that are influenced by narrative traditions related to the idea of the West, but what is distinct about the 'crossroads' metaphor is that it is a manifestly metonymical or ironic tool of representation. There are rarely synecdochal elements employed in advancing the metaphor that has a metonymical opposition built in it: there are two contrasting roads available to Turkey. As such, it is not surprising that if the author holds a more synecdochal set of beliefs about Turkey's nature and role in the international system, the 'crossroads' metaphor does not offer the right narrative tools.

At the heart of the 'crossroads' metaphor is the notion of transformation that is judged either negatively or positively and attached to either Turkey or the West. There are three different traditions that can be distinguished here. Firstly, there are narratives that create a paternalistic relationship between Turkey and the West, suggesting that the West needs to guide Turkey at a crossroads. This narrative tradition is connected to the 'triumphant West' tradition, representing the West as an inspiring entity that has moral and political legitimacy to lead the international system. The 'West needs to guide Turkey' tradition often slides into the

‘modern’ West tradition, but can also move closer towards strengthening the ‘civilisation West’ formulation, which is when the discursive space reaches the second tradition that functions as a legitimising tool for Western inaction towards Turkey.

In the second tradition, then, the ‘crossroads’ metaphor is employed to depict Turkey as a state that is not temporarily but permanently at a crossroads. Also here the West is represented as a triumphant actor but in this case the responsibility for any setbacks in Turkey’s ‘journey’ towards Western principles of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law is not assigned to the West but Turkey. This means that, yes, Turkey is currently at a crossroads, but it needs to find a way out by herself, not with the guidance of the West that has patiently waited Turkey to arrive at the destination for a very long time. Turkey’s place at a crossroads is narrated as an unfortunate but an inevitable fact that reflects inherent qualities: Turkey simply cannot arrive at the destination of becoming a Western state because it does not have what it takes to be Western.

The tradition ties in with the ‘civilisation West’ tradition but in a covert way; the use of the ‘crossroads’ metaphor suggests that Turkey is moving towards the West but almost any political development can be narrated as evidence that it is still stuck at the crossroads. Such events can be related to the Kurdish question, the EU accession talks, Erdogan’s authoritarianism, the role of Islam in the public sphere, economic forecasts, and so on. Even if similar trends can be seen in states that identify themselves as Western – such as the United States or the United Kingdom – they are often narrated using different metaphors, allegories, cultural cues, and narrative resources. This is where the third tradition that employs the metaphor of ‘crossroads’ comes in. The purpose of the third tradition that ties in with the ‘declinist West’ tradition is to highlight this discrepancy in narrating foreign policy events related to Turkey on the one hand and the West on the other.

The third tradition, which uses ironic narrative strategies, is concerned with turning the hegemonic plot upside down and suggesting that we should direct our critical gaze towards the West instead – just like in the ironic treatment of the ‘losing’ metaphor. There are many different forms that these narratives take. They can ridicule the West for its paranoia and prejudice towards Islam, show that the West is just as corrupt and disorganised as Turkey, or represent the West as a naïve and weak actor that cannot live up to its role as a hegemon in the international system. All these narratives are grouped under the ironic tradition because their aim is somehow subversive and self-critical; they challenge the idea of the West as a moral and political leader that can inspire states in the international system. They are based upon a belief that either the West should strive towards a more multilateral system and acknowledge that non-Western systems are equally valuable or that it needs to get its moral and political act together if it seeks to live up to its own standards.

Finally, the third organising metaphor is called ‘Erdogan-for-Turkey’, and it arises from the fundamental tendency in foreign policy analysis to treat states as persons and leaders as nations. In the case of Western foreign policy analysis on Turkey, the ‘Erdogan-for-Turkey’ metaphor became very popular in the early 2010s and has resulted in different narratives that, once again, reflect older traditions in the field. There are four emplotments that can be distinguished in the data set and are analysed as generating principles: Islam, political culture, power, and injustice. They contain different tropological configurations and result in diverging moral and political positions. In each case the policy predictions are framed in a tragic format that is intertwined with moral and political preferences.

When Islam is used as the all-pervasive generating principle, the narrative elements are highly metonymical and localise transformation to the AKP

government that won the general elections in 2002. The role of the ‘Erdogan-for-Turkey’ metaphor is to represent Erdogan as the embodiment political Islam that is judged negatively as corrupt, cunning, and dangerous. The ‘Turkish dilemma’ triggers the interpretation that, once again, political developments in Turkey need to be examined as a battle between Islam and secularism. The complex nature of political realities in Turkey is reduced to a single motive: Islam. Erdogan is juxtaposed with Ataturk with the former being represented as the polar opposite of the latter: a repugnant leader that is driven by a fundamentally irrational conviction. The tradition is intertwined with narratives of the West as a civilisation and a triumphant entity that represents rationality, secularism, and other virtues of the Enlightenment.

The second principle emphasises political culture in explaining Erdogan’s action and is premised upon a belief that Turkish political culture produces ‘strong men’ like him or Ataturk. In this tradition Erdogan is not juxtaposed with Ataturk but set side by side to show that since the beginning of the republic and even before, strong men have led Turkey. Also this tradition contains metonymical elements but they draw the decisive line between pre-Western patterns of orientation that rely on masculine leadership and Western patterns that are built upon softer principles. This means that the tradition feeds into the ‘triumphant West’ narrative, often being intertwined with the ‘civilisation West’ tradition. In this interpretation, Turkey has not managed to overcome the pre-Western pattern, which means that its political culture continues to produce authoritarian leaders such as Erdogan. Here the focus is not on the agency of Erdogan but the structure of Turkey’s political system.

In the third case, Erdogan is depicted as a leader that is driven by a universal characteristic: a hunger for power. As such, even if Erdogan is represented as a repugnant leader, there are synecdochal narrative tools that are employed to put

forward the narratives. If the first two narrative traditions employed the ‘Erdogan-for-Turkey’ metaphor to show that Erdogan embodies a political ideology or culture, this formulation distances Erdogan from Turkey. Political developments in Turkey that are judged negatively are explained by the personal characteristics of Erdogan, positioning him in line with other authoritarian leaders in the world, including in the West. There is, then, nothing particularly Turkish or Islamic about Erdogan – he is a universal leader type that can be found anywhere in the world. Such a framing ties in with the ‘modern West’ narrative, emphasising similarities between Turkey and the West – or at least acknowledging that there are no inherent differences between them.

Finally, the fourth principle is an ironic formulation that is based upon a belief that the West is the main scapegoat for Erdogan’s authoritarianism. In the ironic emplotment, the West needs to self-critically acknowledge that it has either driven Erdogan to become more authoritarian or been too weak and naïve to realise the danger that Erdogan poses. In both the cases, it is the West that is the tragic hero that has failed to stay strong – either morally or politically. Just like in the previous cases of ironic formulations, the tradition here is influenced by the ‘declinist West’ idea. The all-pervasive generating principle is justice, which is brought to the fore in many forms. It can be used to argue that the West needs to be more just in the international system to prevent the rise of authoritarianism. It can also be framed as a moral principle that is connected to the nature of international action of states: it is moral and just to be strong and uncompromising towards authoritarian leaders.

When I was finalising this thesis in July 2016, an extraordinary event took place in Turkey. On 15th July, soldiers, tanks, and fighter jets took to the streets and airspace in Istanbul and Ankara, aiming to overthrow the democratically elected government. After some initial hedging, there was a universal condemnation of the

coup attempt. The event was extraordinary because despite the long history of military coups in Turkey, most analysts predicted that, first, the army was no longer powerful enough to carry out a coup, and second, Turkey's democratisation had ended the long era of military coups in the country. The event was also extraordinary because we were able to follow it real-time through different media channels, especially in social media. On top of everything, President Erdogan appeared on TV during the coup attempt through FaceTime, which is a videotelephony product that allowed him to address the public directly when the pro-coup soldiers were occupying the state television station.

The period following the coup attempt and its aftermath has been both horrifying and intriguing. It has been horrifying to see how Turkey's democracy was put under direct threat, with more than 200 people losing their lives. The aftermath of the coup has been equally tragic with excessive purges, an emergency rule and a highly polarised society. At the same time, it has been intriguing to see how the narrative traditions analysed in this thesis were activated immediately after the coup attempt began. Once again the interpretations that were offered in the West followed the moral and aesthetic preferences that have for decades influenced the foreign policy analysis field. One might have thought that an extraordinary event would trigger unique interpretations, but in contrast they were tied in with existing narratives on Turkey.

There were, firstly, those who immediately tied the coup event with the 'creeping Islamisation' idea, representing the aftermath of the coup attempt as the formative moment for religious fanatics in Turkey. In *The Spectator*, Yvo Fitzherbert declared that 'Erdogan's Islamist mobs know that their moment has finally

arrived'.⁷⁰⁸ In the analysis, published less than two days after the coup attempt, there is a strong metonymical line drawn between a secular Turkey and its Islamic threat, with vivid descriptions of the 'hundreds of supporters of President Erdogan [that] swarmed into Taksim Square – the pulsating heart of *secular, modern Turkey* – to celebrate their victory with *shouts of Takbir – 'Allahu Akbar'*, meaning 'God is Great'.⁷⁰⁹

The 'Islamic mob' is depicted as an aggressive and inhuman force – almost that of nature – that can only be contained with force and fierce determination. The metonymical conflict is explicit here and reduced to religion: 'The Kemalist beast has dared to rear its head again – Erdogan will cut it off.'⁷¹⁰ During the same day, Soner Cagaptay similarly presented the coup attempt as an Islamic menace, comparing the situation to Iran's Islamic revolution in 1979.⁷¹¹ Here the familiar 'crossroads' imaginary is applied to yet again situate Turkey at a 'pivotal point' in history, but where the options are notably dark and pessimistic: Turkey can become either an authoritarian or Islamic fundamentalist country.

The official narrative of the Turkish state that irrefutably claims that it was the Pennsylvania-based Islamic cleric Fethullah Gülen, who masterminded the coup, does not fit with this narrative tradition. The conflict in the official narrative is not between secularism and Islamism as suggested by this narrative tradition, but between two Islamic leaders. Because the appropriate causal linkage is missing, the crossroads metaphor loses its power; the roads that Cagaptay describe do not represent the virtuous and the repugnant options. As the narrative tradition focuses

⁷⁰⁸ Yvo Fitzherbert, 'Erdogan's Islamist mobs know that their moment has finally arrived', *The Spectator* (17 July 2016), available at <http://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2016/07/erdogans-islamist-mobs-know-moment-finally-arrived/> (1 September 2016).

⁷⁰⁹ Fitzherbert, 'Erdogan's Islamist mobs', emphases added.

⁷¹⁰ Fitzherbert, 'Erdogan's Islamist mobs'.

⁷¹¹ Soner Cagaptay, 'Turkey Faces Its Iran 1979 Moment', *Wall Street Journal* (17 July 2016), available at <http://www.wsj.com/articles/turkey-faces-its-iran-1979-moment-1468797632> (1 September 2016).

solely on the conflict between secularism and Islamism in Turkey, it cannot accommodate Gülen in its causal linkages. As a result Gülen's role in the coup attempt is diminished and reduced to a 'useful word': 'Erdogan has accused Gülen of being behind the coup. Considering the Turkish military have long been defenders of the secular Kemalist tradition, such an accusation is unlikely. In reality, Gülenists has simply become a useful word for Erdogan to use against anyone who dares to disagree with him.'⁷¹²

Most of the other narrative traditions accept Gülen's role and do not narrate the event as a battle between secularism and Islamism but through other dominant motives that have been discussed in the previous chapters. One of the most prominent ones is the narrative tradition that focuses on power as the all-pervasive generating principle and employs more synecdochal narrative elements. Here Turkey is not exceptionalised with the use of Islam and its 'creeping' nature but compared to other states that have been led by a power-hungry leader. The most popular metaphor that was employed already during the coup attempt was 'Reichstag Fire', which refers to the attack on Germany's parliament in 1933 that allowed Hitler to turn the country into a full dictatorship. Matthew Karnitschnig, for example, wrote in *Politico* less than two days after the coup attempt:

As with the Reichstag fire, which the Nazis blamed on a Dutch anarchist, it may prove impossible to say with certainty who was behind the weekend coup attempt. If the Turkish leadership uses the event to amend the constitution to give Erdoğan sweeping authority, as now seems likely, that may not matter in the long run. Confident in the knowledge that the West needs his help in the fight against the so-

⁷¹² Fitzherbert, 'Erdogan's Islamist mobs'.

called Islamic State and to harbor refugees from Syria, Erdoğan has largely ignored the criticism from Europe and the U.S.⁷¹³

Here the focus turns to the personality of Erdoğan who becomes an archetypal power-hungry leader – a universal figure rather than an exclusively Turkish or Islamic character. As such, the narrative employs synecdochal elements that do not juxtapose Turkey with the West but set them alongside each other as victims of authoritarian individuals who seek power at whatever cost. Today's Erdoğan is represented as a cunning leader who is a threat to Turkish democracy. The role of Gülen in the coup attempt can be accommodated in this narrative tradition with causal linkage being formed through the idea of power. Gülen is set side by side with Erdoğan as a power-hungry leader that is doing whatever it takes to gain more power. Their personalities take the centre stage and are juxtaposed with the people who represent true democracy: 'The rivalry between Erdoğan and Gülen is more about personal power than different interpretations of political Islam ... The power struggle between Erdoğan and Gülen is harmful to Turkish people who opted for democracy.'⁷¹⁴

Erdoğan was not only compared to historical dictators but also to current political figures, namely the Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump in the United States. Here the synecdochal strategy of focusing on similarities between Turkey and the West get fused with an ironic attempt to turn the critical gaze towards the self. Thomas L. Friedman wrote in the *New York Times* just days

⁷¹³ Matthew Karnitschnig, 'Erdoğan's Reichstag fire', *Politico* (17 July 2016), available at <http://www.politico.eu/article/erdogans-reichstag-fire-turkey-coup-attempt/> (1 September 2016).

⁷¹⁴ Ayla Gol, 'Turkey's clash of Islamists: Erdoğan vs Gülen', *Open Democracy* (3 August 2016), available at <https://www.opendemocracy.net/dr-ayla-gol/turkey-s-clash-of-islamists-erdogan-vs-gulen> (1 September 2016).

after the coup attempt that ‘Erdogan and Donald Trump were separated at birth’.⁷¹⁵

Here, too, power is used as the dominant motive:

Here’s the real tragedy: Erdogan was an outstanding leader [during] his first five years and truly lifted the country’s economy and middle class. But since then it’s *all gone to his head*, and he has gotten away with increasingly bad behavior by creating an us-versus-them divide between his loyal, more religious followers, and the more secular communities in Turkey.⁷¹⁶

It is clear that here Erdogan is represented not as an intrinsically bad and cunning leader who always had a project of turning Turkey into an Islamic state. He changed with power, and this continues to happen to leaders around the world, also in the United States. As such, authoritarianism is not an Islamic thing but a universal thing – and temporarily with us still today, not only in our history pages. Friedman continues that if Trump gets elected,

Americans will regularly be in the streets, because they are not going to follow — on any big issue — a man who lies as he breathes, who has not done an ounce of homework to prepare for the job and who generates support by conspiracy theories and making people afraid of the future and one another. If you like what’s going on in Turkey today, you’ll love Trump’s America.⁷¹⁷

⁷¹⁵ Thomas L. Friedman, ‘Trump and the Sultan’, *The New York Times* (20 July 2016), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/20/opinion/trump-and-the-sultan.html?_r=0 (1 September 2016).

⁷¹⁶ Friedman, ‘Trump and the Sultan’, emphasis added.

⁷¹⁷ Friedman, ‘Trump and the Sultan’.

The narrative effect here is very different from the previous narrative tradition that represented the coup attempt as a particularly Turkish problem that is defined by ‘creeping Islamisation’. In the more synecdochal representation there are universal manifestations of the same political developments and character traits, which unite Turkey with rather than separates from the West.

After the coup attempt, Sweden’s previous prime minister and foreign minister Carl Bildt became the most visible advocate of the ironic tradition, assuming the same moral and aesthetic position as Germany’s Joschka Fischer in the late 2000s (see the fourth chapter). In this tradition Erdogan’s actions can be understood, not through Islam or power, but as a justified reaction to the West’s unfair treatment. The focus, like that shown in the previous chapters, is on the repugnant nature of the West that drives Turkey away with its selfish and hegemonic actions. Bildt wrote in a self-critical manner just weeks after the coup attempt that the West’s ‘lack of empathy for Turkey during this traumatic period has been astonishing’.⁷¹⁸ Bildt’s criticism concerns not only the lack of adequate support for Turkey’s democracy in the EU – ‘Is Brussels asleep, or just ignorant?’⁷¹⁹ – but Europe’s alienating attitude towards Turkey in general. He writes that

Turkey’s accession talks with the EU have ground almost to a halt, owing partly to outright hostility against Turkey in some EU member states. The motives behind this animus vary, but the overall effect has been to alienate many Turks, who now feel rejected by a Europe that

⁷¹⁸ Carl Bildt, ‘Taking Turkey Seriously’, *Project Syndicate* (12 August 2016), <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/turkey-geopolitical-importance-by-carl-bildt-2016-08> (15 September 2016).

⁷¹⁹ Carl Bildt, ‘Europe, stand up for Erdoğan’, *Politico* (2 August 2016), available at <http://www.politico.eu/article/europe-stand-up-for-erdogan-brussels-greece-coup-european-union/> (15 September 2016).

once inspired them. Not surprisingly, some Turks now look for inspiration and opportunities elsewhere.⁷²⁰

The critical gaze is directed firmly towards the EU that is hypocritically applying different standards to ‘them’ Turks than ‘us’ Europeans. Bildt notes that no one ‘should be surprised that Turkey is now trying to purge Gülenists from positions of power. Any state faced with insurrection from within would do the same.’⁷²¹ Finally, Bildt employs the ‘crossroads’ metaphor and makes a clear moral and political distinction between the two roads. It is the West that is standing at the crossroads and facing a virtuous road that involves understanding for and engagement with Turkey, leading to reform, modernity and a bright future for Turkey, the West, and the wider region. The repugnant road, on the other hand, means further alienation and a lack of understanding, leading to conflict and authoritarianism:

Turkey is at a historical crossroads ... Western diplomats should escalate engagement with Turkey to ensure an outcome that reflects democratic values and is favorable to Western and Turkish interests alike. A *democratic* and *European* Turkey could be a bridge to deliver *reform* and *modernity* to the Muslim world; an *alienated* and *authoritarian* Turkey could bring *conflict* and *strife* back to Europe’s eastern borderlands. What happens on the Bosphorus *affects us all*.⁷²²

⁷²⁰ Bildt, ‘Taking Turkey Seriously’.

⁷²¹ Bildt, ‘Taking Turkey Seriously’.

⁷²² Bildt, ‘Taking Turkey Seriously’, emphases added.

The decision that the West is faced with is represented in dramatic language with localised effects: ‘What happens on the Bosphorus affects us all.’ The EU’s lack of empathy for Turkey is emphasised with equally dramatic language:

A successful coup in Turkey would in all probability have engulfed the country in civil war. And the consequences would have been immense. Millions of Turkish citizens fleeing violence, chaos and death would have joined the more than 2 million Syrian refugees hosted in Turkey in setting sail for Europe. The EU would now be facing a refugee disaster of even larger magnitude than in 2015.⁷²³

Bildt’s ironic strategy is to turn the situation upside down in order to reveal the EU’s hypocritical and prejudicial nature that might lead to Europe ‘losing its moral authority’.⁷²⁴ Bildt notes that the EU does not understand what it is like when democracy is truly threatened and that the EU reacted to France’s emergency acts after the November terror attacks in Paris in a very different way than to Turkey’s post-coup situation.⁷²⁵ The EU’s ‘shameful reaction to the 2013 coup in Egypt’ is brought up with the purpose of strengthening the valued endpoint of moralising the West. Finally, Bildt creates a causal linkage with the EU’s reaction and Turkey’s post-coup attempt political atmosphere:

The EU would be in *a far better position today* if EU leaders had gone to Turkey immediately to express their horror at the coup, congratulate the people of Turkey for defeating it and sit down with the President,

⁷²³ Bildt, ‘Europe, stand up for Erdoğan’.

⁷²⁴ Bildt, ‘Europe, stand up for Erdoğan’.

⁷²⁵ Bildt, ‘Europe, stand up for Erdoğan’.

the government, the leaders in the Grand National Assembly and others to discuss how to collectively ensure a democratic and European path for Turkey.⁷²⁶

What we witnessed immediately after the coup attempt in Turkey, then, was a discursive movement to the familiar interpretations that created causal linkages to the narrative traditions that have been introduced and analysed in this thesis. The causal linkages, in turn, produced valued endpoints with the use of the four master tropes. David Campbell has argued convincingly that IR scholarship is dominated by epistemic realism and largely represented in two analytic forms, ‘a *narrativizing historiography* in which things have a self-evident quality that allows them to speak for themselves, and a *logic of explanation* in which the purpose of analysis is to identify those self-evident things and material causes so that actors can accommodate themselves to the realm of necessity they engender’.⁷²⁷ Campbell continues that

Riven with various demands, insistences, and assertions that things ‘must’ be either this or that, this disposition is the most common metatheoretical discourse among practitioners of the discipline of international relations.⁷²⁸

While taking Campbell’s assertion as the analytical starting point, this thesis has gone beyond the concept of identity that limits our understanding of the intrinsically tropological nature of our narrative traditions in the scholarly field. Foreign policy analysis is even more strongly committed to epistemic realism than IR, which means

⁷²⁶ Bildt, ‘Europe, stand up for Erdoğan’, emphasis added.

⁷²⁷ Campbell, *Writing Security*, p. 4, emphases in original.

⁷²⁸ Campbell, *Writing Security*, p. 4.

that even to raise the question of the epistemic practices and their narrative forms is an invitation to criticism that calls for pure facts and truths about the international system. To challenge epistemic realism is still a dissident position in foreign policy analysis, and can be responded to in the same way as Campbell did in the 1990s:

It is a form of dissent that is not concerned to seek a better fit between thought and the world, language and matter, proposition and fact. On the contrary, it is a form of dissent that questions the very way our problems have been posed in these terms and the constraints within which they have been considered, focusing instead on the way the world has been made historically possible.⁷²⁹

Let us return to Rebecca West who once wrote: ‘Politics, always politics. In the middle of the night, when there is a rap on our bedroom door, it is politics.’⁷³⁰ West talked about politics in a tangible way – that there are diplomatic deals and political decisions that change world history and people’s destiny. An aesthetic approach to politics perceives all representation as political because there is always a gap between the represented as the representation. This is why we need interpretative methods to make sense of the profoundly political nature of our language. But does this mean – as Alker wondered in the beginning of this chapter – that we should therefore give up trying to give meaningful interpretations of political realities?

The answer that the thesis has tried to convey is ‘no’. The fact that our language in foreign policy analysis and beyond cannot be mimetic – it cannot represent the world as it really is – does not mean that we should give up analysing foreign policies of Turkey and other states. We desperately need analyses and ideas

⁷²⁹ Campbell, *Writing Security*, p. 5.

⁷³⁰ West, *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon*, p. 104.

about current affairs and their linkages to other historical, cultural and political events. It is inevitable that these representations reflect our prior beliefs and assumptions that are part of wider traditions of the social context that we are influenced by as situated agents. What we do need is to pay attention to and carefully analyse our representations because that gives us an opportunity to understand the self in a more reflexive way. Just like West writes:

‘Is it so wonderful there?’ he asked. ‘It is more wonderful than I can tell you,’ I answered. ‘But how?’ he said. I could not tell him at all clearly. I said, ‘Well, there is everything there. Except what we have. But that seems very little.’ ‘Do you mean that the English have very little,’ he asked, ‘or the whole of the West?’ ‘The whole of the West,’ I said, ‘here too’.⁷³¹

In this conversation between West and her husband, the West becomes meaningful only in juxtaposition with the Balkans. The idea of the West is tied in with moral and political preferences that are ironic in nature. The West is represented as an idea that embodies the paradox between material and spiritual wealth; that material richness does not necessarily lead to spiritual well being. In other words, there is an internal decay in the West in that there is abundant wealth but spiritual poverty. As West puts it: ‘Really, we are not as rich in the West as we think we are. Or, rather, there is much we have not got which the people in Balkans have got in quantity. To look at them you would think they had nothing.’⁷³²

You would think that *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon* is a book about Yugoslavia. In its over 1000 pages West certainly documents several important

⁷³¹ West, *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon*, p. 23.

⁷³² Ibid.

observations and analyses about Yugoslavia in the 1930s. But it is also a book about the idea of the West. The West is rendered meaningful in reflections about its nature and future direction vis-à-vis the Balkans through narratives that are premised on particular moral and political preferences. If the observer had belonged to the 'triumphant West' tradition, the analysis would have resulted in very different interpretations not only about the West's nature but also the political developments in the Balkans. The purpose of this thesis has been to show that the same goes for Western foreign policy analysis. As foreign policy analysts we are situated, self-reflexive, and influenced by our narrative traditions, and that is something that needs to be first acknowledged, then critically explored, and finally embraced.

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