Contending cultures of counter-terrorism: 
Transatlantic divergence or convergence?

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The July 2005 terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom have re-focused attention on the threat from Islamic extremists. Parallels have been drawn with the attacks on Madrid in 2004 and the 9/11 attacks on the United States. Yet the attacks also underline the differing circumstances and responses that characterise the experiences of Europe on the one hand, and the United States on the other. This article elucidates these differences and seeks to place them within the broader context of historically determined strategic cultures.

The context in which the attacks occurred was very different in the cases of the UK and Spain compared to the United States. The two European countries have long experience of fighting a serious domestic terrorist menace, whilst the US had no such history. The presence of sizeable Muslim populations at home was a factor in the European attacks in contrast to the United States. Prior to 2003, most European countries were seen as indifferent supporters of American policy in the Middle East and were not identified by Islamicists as a main source of aggression against Muslims around the world.

The responses to the attacks illustrated the remarkable gulf in strategic culture between the two sides of the Atlantic. The US-declared a ‘global war on terrorism’ and directed the full resources of a ‘national security’ approach towards the threat posed by a 'new terrorism'. Overseas policy has been shaped by the identification of a nexus between international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and ‘states of concern’. At home the US has undertaken major changes to its governmental structure, tightened the sources of entry into the country, granted greater powers to its law enforcement officers and courts and overhauled its intelligence and security agencies.
In contrast, Europe has conceived the problem differently. It has conceptualized radical Islam in less absolute terms and accordingly its approach to counter terrorism has emphasised 'regional multilateralism' rather than 'global unilateralism'. Its military forces have attempted to encourage peacekeeping, reconstruction and security sector reform as well as partaking in gruelling counter-insurgencies. Their foreign policies have continued to emphasize the containment of risk, consensus building and balance of power. Domestically, legal changes relating to surveillance and civil rights have been less sweeping, while the enhancements to internal security architecture have been more modest. Underpinning this different approach is not only a European desire to draw on some of the lessons from decades of counter-terrorism but also a growing conviction that the 'newness' of the threat posed by Al-Qaeda has been exaggerated. The implications of these divergent cultures are enormous for the future of the relationship between Europe and the United States.

Since the Spring of 2005 there has been evidence that the US is moving closer to the European position by adopting a new strategy of counter-terrorism and seeking greater multilateral engagement. In March, the NSC began a review of US national policy designed to address a more 'diffuse' terrorism and a new national security presidential decision directive on counter-terrorism is expected before the end of the year. Meanwhile the Pentagon adopted a new strategic plan that emphasised non-military instruments and more co-operation with allies. In bureaucratic terms the arrival of Condoleezza Rice at the State Department has had a catalytic effect, accelerating this change. To what extent does this presage a more convergent transatlantic approach to international terrorism? This article suggests that while strategic doctrines may change, the more immutable nature of strategic culture will make convergence difficult. Moreover, while some officials have begun to identify the shape of current problems more accurately, their slippery nature mean that neither Europe nor America yet has convincing answers.
Strategic Cultures

Strategic culture remains an ill-defined and under-utilised concept. Its employment must be accompanied by an acknowledgment of its limitations, accepting that even amongst political sociologists, ideas such as ‘culture’ remain contested. Strategic culture is based on the understanding that states are predisposed by their historical experiences, political system and culture, to deal with security issues in a particular way. Other factors may influence a state’s strategic choices, such as its level of technological development, but its preferences will be shaped most strongly by its past. These institutional memories will help to determine how threats are perceived, as well as conditioning the likely responses.

Officials quickly absorb the unspoken norms associated with a strategic culture, which may be as important in ruling out policy options that are ‘inappropriate’, as they are in determining the precise nature of paths taken.

The idea of a strategic culture or strategic personality has been most closely connected with defence issues and above all war-fighting problems. Caroline Ziemke, one of the first to make use of this approach, has suggested that it is about a state’s self-conception, mediated though the historical experience of its past conflicts. Historical experience and strategic culture are often connected though a process of reasoning by analogy. Decision-makers tend to focus strongly on the commanding heights of their past strategic experience, navigating in terms of major episodes which are regarded as successes or failures. These seminal experiences have burned themselves deeply into the national psyche and have significant unconscious meaning. Munich and Suez, more recently Vietnam and Somalia - perhaps soon Afghanistan and Iraq - are all examples of what Dan Reiter has called the 'weight of the shadow of the past'.

It is difficult to apply the concept of strategic culture to the phenomenon of international terrorism because it crosses a number of established boundaries. First, international terrorism blurs the boundaries between external security and internal security: the perpetrators may originate from abroad but commit acts of violence against citizens in the homelands of their targets. Second, state responses are likely to be mixed: ranging from
the use of force against the sources of terrorism to increasing internal security measures such as law enforcement and judicial action.\textsuperscript{10}

Nevertheless, the classical literature on counter-terrorism identifies, at least in outline, typologies of state-response to terrorism. Traditional ways of addressing terrorism might be grouped into three broad categories: first, military-led approaches focused on a mixture of pre-emption, deterrence or retribution; second, regulatory or legal-judicial responses that seek to enhance the criminal penalties for terrorist activities and improve civil/police co-operation; and third, appeasing options ranging from accommodation to concession.\textsuperscript{11}

The United States has evolved a sharply defined strategic culture. Its approach has been shaped by a belief in American exceptionalism, that its political and moral values are superior to those of the rest of the world and justify its position of leadership. This has given it a sense of mission in the world and a confidence that its actions are in the broadest interests of humanity.\textsuperscript{12} This self-belief has been allied to strategies that seek ways to leverage its vast material and technological power. It has predisposed American policymakers toward a national security culture that privileges a military response. As a superpower, the US sees the use of force as an important signal of resolve within the international community. Its military gives the US a global reach and ensures that no targets are beyond its ability to strike. Since 9/11, increased American spending on defence (and especially defence research) relative to other major powers has accentuated this phenomenon.

Although the United States has been involved in counter-terrorism since the mid-1960s, it was only after the Iran hostages crisis of 1979 that this subject featured regularly on the presidential agenda. The US has consistently displayed an under-developed and somewhat two-dimensional counter-terrorism culture. In part this is because counter-terrorism has been seen as an unattractive political issue. In the White House there was a fear of encouraging public expectations that could not be fulfilled and a tendency towards blame-avoidance. Meanwhile the US intelligence community was narrowly focused on
the Cold War, playing to its strengths in technical collection, and relying on allied expertise for coverage of less important subjects. Terrorism was frequently perceived as something sponsored by the Soviet bloc and was regarded as a minor subset of the ‘real problem’.

American counter-terrorist operations have been adversely affected by a diet and binge approach to covert action and aggressive human intelligence collection. After the largesse of the first three decades of the Cold War, covert action became mired in the foreign policy struggles between the Congress and the White House during the 1970s. Special activities were shackled under President Carter and covert action appeared to be a dying art form. The Reagan era heralded the ‘unleashing of the CIA’ only for it to become bogged down once again in the Iran-Contra fiasco of 1986. During the late 1980s covert action was rehabilitated partially by success in Afghanistan against the Soviets, only to meet a renewed downturn after the end of the Cold War. A risk-averse culture in the CIA was reinforced by a decision in the mid-1990s to drop agents that were either ‘unsavoury’ or politically risky. Inevitably, 9/11 signalled a further swing of the pendulum.

The US experience of terrorism has been confined principally to its presence overseas. Attacks upon its armed forces have been frequent and occasionally devastating, for example, the loss of 241 US Marines in Beirut in 1983. Yet it was not until the attack on the World Trade Centre in 1993 and the federal building in Oklahoma City in 1995 that the US experienced serious terrorism on its own shores. This absence of a sizeable domestic threat resulted in domestic counter-terror capacity being allowed to languish: there was a feeling that the country was invulnerable. This misperception was cruelly exposed by the attacks of 9/11. The intensity of the US reaction to 9/11 was a reflection of the enormous loss of life and gave the US the political will to use force more readily on the international stage. Although the United States has long been perceived as 'trigger happy' in reality, prior to 9/11, all presidents - even Ronald Reagan - have agonised before taking action in the realm of counter-terrorism. After 2001 the constraints that hitherto made America a ‘reluctant sheriff’ were stripped away and a new predisposition towards pre-emptive action was inaugurated.
US strategic culture has also led to international terrorism being linked to a nexus of other threats. America’s sense of its global responsibilities has meant that it has long been concerned with the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and states that reject the prevailing order. Even prior to 9/11, the Clinton administration was warning of the potential linkages between international terrorist groups and ‘states of concern’. It was clear that the interaction between these issues were regarded by some as the foremost threat to American security. Once again, military power was perceived to be the principal instrument to address these challenges.

In contrast to the United States, a European strategic culture is more elusive. The most obvious reason for this is that Europe comprises a mix of nations, each with their own particular histories. Although they all now share important attributes – liberal democracies, market economies and adherence to the rule of law – they have diverged in their experiences of terrorism. Many countries, such as France, Spain, and the UK have contended with significant domestic terrorist movements while others, such as the Netherlands and Belgium, have been spared a major domestic threat. Some European countries have more historic associations with counter-insurgency and terrorism in an ‘end-of-empire’ context, but these experiences are each rather different. Moreover, the fact that terrorism was usually a national problem meant that it rarely resulted in sustained cooperation between European states. Individual European states possessed sophisticated internal security systems for combating terrorism and there was often significant bilateral intelligence exchange, but comparatively little effort was invested in trying to build inter-state structures.

Another factor is that attempts to galvanise a coherent European identity in foreign and security affairs only recently met with success. It was not until the Treaty on European Union, ratified in November 1993, that a foreign and security policy, as well as an internal security policy, became an avowed goal. Yet the challenge of terrorism has suited the EU’s particular attributes. Its pre-existing role in the internal security of its member states and its activities in the field of Justice and Home Affairs ensured that the
EU would be the mechanism chosen for regional counter terrorism. Since 9/11 there has been momentum to build a more robust system of international cooperation.\(^{20}\)

Notwithstanding these complications, elements of a European style, focused on regulatory responses and the judiciary might be said to have emerged during efforts against Baader-Meinhof and the Red Brigades in the 1970s and 1980s. This was a hallmark of French responses to Islamist extremism during the 1980s and 1990s.\(^{21}\)

Even the UK, which engaged in a long military campaign against the Provisional IRA, gradually allocated more responsibility for counter-terrorism to civilian agencies. The repeated assertions by Gijs de Vries, the EU’s counter-terrorism co-ordinator, that Eurojust and Europol have a leading role in the EU’s counter-terrorist effort underlines this European regulatory approach with its focus on civil agencies.\(^{22}\) The regulatory response has suited current European needs remarkably well because of its strong domestic dimension. The 9/11 attacks brought home to Europe its own vulnerability. Not only were many of the perpetrators of the attacks formerly resident in Europe, but concentrations of Muslim populations in western Europe far exceed those of the US. For example, the Netherlands is home to one million Muslims, the UK one and a half million, Germany just over four million and France some six million.\(^{23}\) Whilst the vast majority of those citizens are law abiding, the July 2005 bombings in London demonstrated that small pockets of second generation resident Muslims can be won over to the cause of suicide bombing.

**Assessing the nature of the ‘New Terrorism’**

Strategic cultures, and indeed cultures of counter-terrorism, are to some degree historically determined and represent significant elements of continuity in a realm of change. Few things underline this better than the different ways in which the United States and Europe have conceived of the ‘new terrorism’. One of the historic traits associated with American strategic culture has been a tendency to assert the importance of new developments that break with past. In the 1990s this was most clearly illustrated by the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) debate. After 9/11 the assertions of a ‘strategic revolution’ were quickly transferred to the field of terrorism. Al-Qaeda was
deemed to be an example of 'new terrorism' – perhaps even a ‘catastrophic terrorism’ - that confounded the old lessons about this seemingly well-understood phenomenon. Indeed, more recently, commentators in both the United States and Europe have begun to speak of a 'new Al-Qaeda' that is different yet again from the 'new terrorism' of 9/11.  

The most plausible assertions about the emergence of 'new terrorism' were made in the mid-1990s by Bruce Hoffman, a senior analyst with RAND. Hoffman argued that terrorism was changing, with 'new adversaries, new motivations, and new methods', which challenged many of our most fundamental assumptions about terrorists and how they operate. Hoffman noted that while instances of attacks were going down, casualties were going up. He explained this in terms of a new religious terrorism which defied the old dictum that terrorist wanted only a few people dead, but many people watching. Now, it appeared, killing was no longer an ugly form of political communication, or a form of bargaining with violence, instead it was becoming a religious duty. In other words the new terror was more apolitical and casualties were themselves the objective. This conjured up an alarming world without restraint in which the realist world of bargains, deterrence and rational behaviour evaporated, offering the prospect of terrorists who might seek to use weapons of mass destruction, if they could obtain access. It also implied that militant Islam might attack the developed states of the West, not because of what it was doing in the Middle East, but simply because of what it was. The catastrophic events of 9/11 seemed to herald such an era and offered an obvious rationale for a hard-nosed military response. 

There is now some disagreement about the newness of the ‘new terrorism’ and four years after 9/11 the picture stands in need of reassessment. On the one hand, the rise of religious terrorism generally, since the early 1990s, and of terrorism by Islamicist groups in particular, is undeniable. A quarter of a million trained and radicalised Mujahadeen exiting from South Asia at the end of the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan has fuelled this development. They headed for their home countries, from the Mahgreb to Indonesia, or for new conflicts in Chechnya or Bosnia. Their organisation is more fissiparous than the old terrorism, an ideological community rather than a fixed hierarchy.
Al-Qaeda has tended to invest sporadic training and expertise in particular groups, rather than directing them. For many radical Islamicist groups, Osama bin Laden is an icon rather than leader.\textsuperscript{26}

However, important elements of the old terrorism remain. Since 9/11, terrorist attacks have often been smaller and have been targeted on members of the coalitions fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq. Indeed, the overwhelming balance of effort by radicalised groups since 2003 has been to provide volunteer foreign fighters for the conflict in Iraq. The much vaunted use of WMD by terrorists has not materialised. Increasingly it appears that Al-Qaeda and its affiliates see themselves less as terrorists and more as a global insurgency with certain objectives. They may lack an explicit list of political desiderata, but they are waging an effective war of political communication, most obviously via the Internet.\textsuperscript{27}

Europe has been more sceptical of the idea of 'new terrorism', instead suggesting that the rise of Islamicist terrorism remains rooted in some old political and economic problems. It has suited European attitudes to interpret this phenomenon more in terms of a reaction to specific policies and military deployments, rather than a general anathemising of the West. Gijs de Vries has pointed specifically to lack of progress on the Middle East peace process and in Iraq as key factors in terrorist recruitment.\textsuperscript{28} Others have been inclined to talk about a situation in which there is not so much a new terrorism, but a new and more globalized environment which presents our enemies with enhanced opportunities. There is a globalised world in relation to communications, ideologies and capacity for violence. Newness may be more about context, specifically the ability of social and religious movements to exploit opportunities provided by globalisation. In other words, developed states have encouraged a porous world in which networks move elegantly, but states move clumsily. The internet as the ‘network of the networks’ is a good example of this.\textsuperscript{29}

Certainly, the 'new terrorism' of 2001 does not look quite so innovative in retrospect. There are likely to be few further 9/11s, but sadly more attacks similar to Bali, Madrid and London. Politicians on both sides of the Atlantic have been quick to seize on the rhetoric
of ‘new terrorism’ because it mobilized elected assemblies, delivering enhanced budgets and robust packages of security legislation. However it has also provided a convenient excuse to forget awkward lessons expensively learned in past decades. Europeans have argued that in the rush to address the ‘new terrorism’, the United States in particular has neglected some of the basic conventions governing the related fields of counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency and intelligence. These concern the primacy of political warfare and minimum force, a doctrine that is greatly enhanced by good human intelligence. History, in almost any decade, underlines that few low intensity conflicts have been successfully resolved by a predominantly military approach, and never by applying large scale formal military power.

Contrasting Counter Terrorism Cultures Post 9/11

The different strategic cultures of the US and Europe have resulted in contending approaches to combating terrorism. In the realm of external security, the most striking difference has been in their preparedness to use force. As part of its integrated plan for countering terrorism, founded on the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, the US has accorded priority to its military and intelligence assets. The experience of 9/11 galvanised the US into a willingness to use its military power pre-emptively against a range of threats, in particular alleged state sponsors of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

The Pentagon has been in the driving seat of policy execution. The military leads the ‘war on terror’ not only because of the war in Iraq and ongoing operations in Afghanistan, but also because of the wider pattern of counter-terror operations elsewhere. Special forces have increasingly been deployed in a military role and are now more the preserve of the Pentagon than the CIA. They are assisting in the retraining of local security forces in dozens of countries, with large contingents in Djibouti and the former Soviet Republic of Georgia. A vast military deployment in Colombia is also increasingly justified on the grounds of counter-terrorism rather than counter-narcotics. Training operations are under
way in dozens of other countries. Most recently in North Africa, a stream of newly-arrived advisers are seeking to upgrade the capabilities of local forces. Underpinning all this is a substantial development of overseas bases to allow the greater projection of force.\textsuperscript{31}

European governments have tended to assert that military force is a blunt instrument in the face of the elusive and disparate targets presented by an increasingly transnational terrorism. Europe has been more circumspect than the US in identifying a nexus between states of concern, WMD and international terrorism. This was the core of the difference between the Bush administration and France and Germany over the war in Iraq. The US alleged a link between Al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein and alleged that the threat from Iraq’s attempt to develop WMD was imminent. Paris and Berlin were unconvinced by the evidence and argued that the International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors should be granted a longer period to do their work. They were justifiably suspicious that American pressure for military action against Iraq owed more to its desire to remove a regime that the Washington had long regarded as destabilizing in the region. The cost, however, was an iciness in transatlantic relations that has not been easy to overcome. As the US position in Iraq has deteriorated, France and Germany have barely contained their schadenfruede over the deepening quagmire.

Sections of American elite opinion have viewed the European reluctance to resort to force as a reflection of the structural disparity in power between the transatlantic allies. They have seen this as consistent with the past predilection of Europe to rely on the United States to take care of global threats, such as nuclear proliferation. Neoconservative critics in Washington have argued that the Europeans choose to ignore threats because of their relative military weakness. In the words of Kagan, ‘The incapacity to respond to threats leads not only to tolerance. It can also lead to denial’.\textsuperscript{32}

The significance accorded to multilateralism is the second major transatlantic difference. Europe’s experience of overcoming its own internal rivalries has led it to pursue policies based upon building consensus and adhering to the rule of law. This leads it to
demonstrate the legitimacy of its actions by working for the broadest degree of international support. It was perception of European opponents to the war that America had abandoned these principles when it attacked Iraq. That is not to say that Europe has always opposed the use of force. If an action has appeared to be proportionate to the aggression and if it is in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter on self-defence, then Europe has been willing to support the use of coercive means. For example, there was universal support in Europe for the actions the US took against the Taliban government in Afghanistan in 2001. The only European criticism was that the US did not draw on the military forces they had offered for the operation and thereby limited the breadth of the coalition that toppled the regime.

In contrast, the US has become fearful of being constrained by the veto-power of allies. It has come to question the relevance of organisations such as NATO in the face of radically new threats that have emerged since the end of the Cold War. The Bush administration has expressed its preference for the informality of ‘willing coalitions’ to tackle crises rather than recourse to structured alliances. The administration has been selective about its international partners and been openly critical about the value of the United Nations.

The third difference has been European advocacy of long-term strategies aimed at conflict prevention. Overseas aid and poverty reduction have come to be perceived as instruments to remove some of the underlying causes of terrorism. Such funding can help to alleviate some of the factors that lead to the radicalisation of politics. This is also a sphere in which the EU can wield significant strength: it now disburses approximately 55% of the world’s official development assistance. In post-conflict situations, the Europeans have been willing to provide troops for protracted peace building projects, such as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, and they have provided the lion’s share of resources to re-build functioning societies. The US, for its part, has tended to be more sceptical about the value of ‘foreign policy as social work’. The US, and particularly the Pentagon, has been wary of tying down large numbers of US
troops in peace-keeping and post-conflict situations. The rapid drawdown of the US military presence in Afghanistan after 2001 is testament to this thinking.

Consistent with their reluctance to sanction the use of force, Europe has preferred to offer positive incentives to states accused of supporting terrorism to reform their behaviour. Trade, diplomacy and cultural contacts have been viewed as more likely instruments to modify the errant behaviour of governments such as Libya and Iran and Syria during the 1990s, rather than the threat of the use of force. Individual European states, as well as the European Union, pursued regular interaction in the name of a ‘critical dialogue’. In the case of dealings with President Ghaddafi and the government in Libya, Europe could point to real achievements in the relationship.\textsuperscript{35} In 2004, Libya announced that it was suspending its attempts to acquire WMD and was establishing a compensation fund for the families of the Lockerbie victims, in return for the suspension of economic sanctions.

A less favourable outcome has been forthcoming in relation to Iran. Three European countries – the UK, France and Germany (‘E3’) - have offered trade benefits and possible admission to the World Trade Organisation in return for an Iranian commitment to abandon its alleged programme to develop nuclear weapons. Iran has appeared to spurn the opportunities presented to it by the E3, thereby increasing the risk that the case will be referred to the UN Security Council. The White House has been persistent in its public saber-rattling towards Tehran.\textsuperscript{36} However in August 2005 it was revealed that a major U.S. intelligence review had concluded that Iran is approximately a decade away from manufacturing the key ingredient for a nuclear weapon. This is twice the previous estimate, which had suggested a time period of five years. The sum of assessments by more than a dozen U.S. intelligence agencies directly contradict the dramatic statements by the White House and underline scope for diplomacy with Iran over its nuclear ambitions.\textsuperscript{37}

Internal security has also revealed some remarkable contrasts between Europe and America. Both sides of the Atlantic believe in the importance of combating terrorism through law-enforcement, judicial and intelligence cooperation. The Europeans place
more emphasis on these instruments because they do not accord the military instrument
the prominence it is given by the Americans. The Europeans are also predisposed towards
weighing the balance that is struck between more stringent security measures against
terrorism and the penalties that are incurred in terms of human rights. They are more
wary about investing law enforcement personnel with powers that could damage the core
values of their society.\footnote{38}

Nevertheless, the effort of the US in homeland security, since 9/11, should not be
underestimated.\footnote{39} The National Strategy for Homeland Security has sought to construct a
layered defence system. Overseas the US has relied upon its FBI legal attaches working
in embassies and customs officials, deployed in European ports, monitoring the cargo
destined for America. The next security circle concerns entry into US territory by
foreigners and here the US has enhanced the security of airlines, introduced biometric
identifiers into travel documents, reappraised its visa waiver programmes and tightened
its borders. Since November 2002, the various agencies responsible for US domestic
security have been amalgamated into the Department of Homeland Security, the largest
reorganisation of the federal government since 1947. America’s last line of defence has
focused on promoting cooperation between its plethora of police and intelligence
agencies, emergency responders and the enhancement of security of critical infrastructure
such as power plants and refineries. However, the main focus has been upon
strengthening borders, with less emphasis on capabilities for dealing with domestic
events.\footnote{40}

As for Europe, steps have been taken since 2001 to close some of its vulnerabilities to
terrorist activity. Several EU member states have drafted new legislation to prosecute
terrorist activities and afforded greater operational powers to their police forces:
information has been circulated more freely amongst intelligence services: new policies
to target fund raising have been undertaken and there has been a tightening of border
dcontrols. A common definition of terrorism, that hitherto eluded agreement, was reached
in draft form in December 2001 and entered into force in June 2002. As well as defining
the types of crimes that comprise terrorism it also determined stiff penalties to be
imposed for terrorist offences. Furthermore, efforts to speed up the process of continent-wide extradition were achieved with the signing of a European Arrest Warrant (EAW). This designated thirty-two offences including terrorism, punishable by at least three years’ duration, on which an arrest warrant could be invoked in one country and then carried out in the territory of another member.

Weaknesses in Europe’s internal security have persisted in spite of greater resources and attention over the last four years. First, the priority attached to counter terrorism varies amongst EU states. Whilst countries such as Spain, the UK, France and Germany have made strenuous efforts to address the new challenges, other countries have languished because they do not perceive an imminent threat to themselves. This is reflected in the second factor, namely the reluctance of some countries to implement agreements that have been made. Whilst all states have ratification processes that have to be respected, some countries have made little effort to draft domestic legislation to bring EU-wide conventions into effect. For example, in the case of a Framework Decision on the freezing of terrorist assets, the measure was agreed in March 2002, but as late as mid-2004 there were still states that had not enacted its provisions. Third, the European Commission still struggles to coordinate counter terrorism measures between the member states and the level of the Union. The EU has no internal security structure with the equivalent remit of the US Department of Homeland Security.

**Convergence or Divergence in Transatlantic Counter Terrorism?**

What are the prospects for transatlantic convergence on counter-terrorism? The practical business of everyday internal security cooperation and joint intelligence operations has continued in spite of transatlantic political storms. Moreover, there has been no simple split comprising America versus Europe: the UK, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands all deployed troops to Iraq. Yet longer-term tensions across the Atlantic have remained undiminished. The absence of WMD in Iraq confirmed suspicions that American explanations of the war were a smokescreen and the exposure of prisoner treatment at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib prisons appeared to confirm the worst fears about its
actions. At the same time, tensions over Iran have every prospect of escalating as Tehran seeks to play off European and American positions.

Contrasting cultures have also thrown up persistent difficulties in both the internal and external security domains. First, America and Europe differ over issues such as the use of electronic surveillance. The recent decision by the US government to end the separation between information obtained by the law enforcement and intelligence communities could prove to be a major obstacle to cooperation as it could risk undermining a prosecution in a European court if it could be shown that the information on which it was based was inadmissible. Second, the US has expressed exasperation with the length of time it takes to obtain judicial cooperation with European countries. Third, there has been tension over sharing intelligence. The Europeans have been alarmed by what they perceive to be the inadequate American attention to issues of data protection. This resulted in lengthy negotiations between the US and the European police office (Europol) before personal data could be transferred. Again, the media has been a factor since European security agencies fear leaks of operationally sensitive information to the American press.

Media attention has also heightened European anxieties about the troublesome issue of ‘extraordinary rendition’. This focuses on the shadowy issue of the American treatment of detainees who have been moved to prisons in third countries, including Syria, Jordan and Egypt. Initially developed in the 1980s to bring foreign terrorists to trial in the United States for crimes overseas, human rights groups have asserted, with considerable evidence, that ‘extraordinary rendition’ now represents a system for outsourcing torture. It is increasingly clear that this is a substantial programme. In 2002, the Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, told Congress that even prior to 9/11, some 70 people had undergone rendition. Congressman Edward J. Markey has suggested that since 9/11 the number is approximately 150. Confirmation of this has come from unexpected sources. On 16 May 2005, Egyptian Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif told a press conference that more than 60 suspects had been rendered to his country since September 2001. Cases such as Benyam Mohammed, a former London schoolboy accused of being a
dedicated Al-Qaeda terrorist, illustrate the problem. For two years US authorities moved him between Pakistan, Morocco and Afghanistan, before he was sent to Guantanamo Bay in September last year.  

These issues scare European intelligence and security officials because this runs contrary to their own culture. Since the end of the Cold War, European’s clandestine agencies have undergone a quiet revolution. Legality and regulation have been at the centre of this, with services being placed on the statute books and the elements of the European Convention on Human Rights being written into their regulations. European services have embraced the new approach which has increased their legitimacy and allowed them to develop a wider customer base and conduct more operations. It is not only that the utility of these US renditions is unclear, it also that the European culture of public expectations is very different. As recently as July 2005, intelligence officials in Washington expressed dismay that their British counterparts blocked their efforts to have a suspect Harron Rashid Aswat seized in South Africa and moved to one of these undisclosed detention centres run by allied states, possibly Egypt. As a British citizen of Indian descent, London hesitated at the idea of an extraordinary rendition of someone with a UK passport.  

Yet despite these public indicators of continued trouble, privately there have been sustained efforts at transatlantic convergence. At the centre of this a substantial re-shaping of American counter-terrorism strategy. Even in 2003, it was obvious that alongside the dominant military culture of American counter-terrorism was an alternative view. This alternative view was propounded largely by officials in the CIA and the State Department who emphasised political warfare, economic instruments, patient diplomacy and counter-proliferation as an alternative to interventions. There was a growing recognition that while the core terrorist groups may be impervious to political engagement, they draw support from a wider ocean of anti-Westernism throughout the Middle East, and indeed Muslim communities throughout the world. Specific policies in the Middle East were thought to be a substantial part of the problem. There was perceived to be too much emphasis on Osama bin Laden and not enough on the wider hostility that
was developing in the Muslim world towards the US. By 2004 this alternative view had been given a higher profile by a number of vocal figures who were concerned about the lack of progress in the ‘global war on terror’. This included an 'anonymous' CIA officer, soon revealed as Michael Scheuer, who was formally head of the CIA's unit specialising on Al-Qaeda. In February 2004 it was echoed by no other than George Tenet in a statement given to the Senate Committee on Intelligence, who urged less focus on Al-Qaeda and more attention to the general growth of extremism.

In March 2005 there was evidence that this alternative view was receiving official attention. The NSC’s Frances Fragos Townsend and her deputy, Juan Carlos Zarate, began a wide ranging policy review. The arrival of Condoleezza Rice at the State Department was central to this shift. Shortly afterwards, Philip Zelikow, former 9-11 Commission Staff Director and now special adviser to Rice, was put in charge of a ten member committee to reassess policy. Its meetings, which began in June, have taken it to London and Paris with the support of the White House. Privately there have been admissions that this initiative owed much to European influence. These moves have been complemented by the renewed emphasis on public diplomacy at the State Department, under the leadership of Karen Hughes.

These changes reflect a disillusionment with the war in Iraq and fears about Afghanistan. In Iraq, the Pentagon has accepted that the insurgency is growing more violent, resilient and sophisticated. Economic reconstruction has been slowed, Arab diplomats have been targeted in Baghdad and the prospect of an early drawdown of US forces has been slipping away. The last year has seen approximately 500 suicide attacks. Military leaders are also anxious about the war in Afghanistan. Although $11 billion per annum is spent on keeping 22,000 troops in the field, the shift of attention to Iraq allowed the local insurgency a crucial breathing space. Meanwhile the G8 five-pillar reconstruction programme has stalled. More broadly, the State Department's most recent statistics paint a gloomy picture, showing that across the world there were three times as many terrorist attacks in 2004 as against 2003.
A major overhaul of Pentagon strategy has been underway over the last year triggered by a growing appreciation of the diffuse nature of Islamic terrorism. One example of this was a conference in June 2005 at the Special Operations Command headquarters in Tampa, Florida. Special forces commanders and intelligence directors from the US and many of its allies were gathered together to discuss the substance of the new counter-terror strategy. The keynote address was given by General Bryan D. Brown, Head of US Special Operations Command, who said that there had been an unambiguous change in American thinking and a recognition that 'we will not triumph solely or even primarily through military might.' Brown is an authoritative voice, given that the Pentagon has designated Special Operations Command as the global 'synchronizer' for its new strategy. Another example is that of General Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who since July 2005, has expressed criticism of the idea that military instruments can offer the main solution to countering terrorism. He has instructed the Pentagon to join the State Department in emphasising the 'war of ideas'. The Pentagon has announced contracts amounting to $300 million awarded to companies that will work to enhance its psychological operations.

Have there been corresponding changes in Europe? Restored confidence in transatlantic approaches will certainly require a change of attitude on both sides. In December 2003, the European Council published a ‘European Security Strategy’ (ESS) that attempted to concert policy amongst the EU member states. There was some evidence in the European Security Strategy that EU states have moved closer to American thinking on security threats by acknowledging that terrorist acquisition of WMD was a priority consideration and that Europe would have to play a bigger part in addressing security challenges outside of its region. Too often in the past European countries left matters such as nuclear proliferation to the US. In the earliest draft of the paper, reference was made to the possibility of military pre-emption, thereby narrowing the gap with US thinking, but in the final draft this was diluted to talk of ‘preventive engagement’. Furthermore, the ESS remained wedded to UN approval for military interventions which remained at odds with the US.
In 2004 and 2005, the US has shown a new willingness to consult with its European allies at an early stage of its policy process. The achievements made by the EU in internal security have made them a more important partner for the US. In recognition of this, a new US-EU forum entitled the ‘High Level Policy Dialogue on Borders and Transport Security’ has been created. This draws together the US Departments of State, Justice and Homeland Security with the EU Directorate General for Justice and Home Affairs and the European Commission. It is a concerted attempt to build transatlantic cooperation from an early stage through the sharing of ideas.

**Conclusion**

Strategic culture remains the biggest challenge to transatlantic convergence on counter-terrorism. Security doctrines are matters of fashion, but strategic culture is much more firmly embedded. In the Spring and Summer of 2005 there was clear evidence of new thinking in Washington. Yet sceptics doubt whether the new strategy being prepared by the White House will result in genuine convergence across the Atlantic. Policy and implementation are two different things. Here again, history intertwines with strategic culture and past experience points the way. As some of the most insightful US commentators on counter-insurgency have remarked, one of the many ironies of America’s long engagement with low intensity conflict in Vietnam was that the high-level strategy was exemplary. However strategic concepts and work-a-day practice were worlds apart. The civilian agencies did not wish to touch the dirty business of counter-insurgency and, on the ground, mid-level military commanders determinedly ignored pious exhortations about the value of social engagement. At the operational level, the Army in Vietnam remained wedded to high technology and brute force.

Some Europeans remain sceptical about whether the United States is capable of implementing the new strategy because kinetic activities have always tended to be America's instinctive first response. Officials in Europe also note that the sort of information operations that now seem to form the cutting edge of recent American thinking have a nasty habit of backfiring if they are not done well. The available linguists and regional experts are already over-stretched by the expanded intelligence effort and it
is hard to see where the personnel will come from for sophisticated political operations. In short, it is clear that the United States has changed its mind, but they are unsure whether the United States is capable of, or indeed has the capacity for, a change of heart. There are also sceptics in Washington. Few believe that the White House can persuade the many agencies and departments to work more closely together. The new strategies have been long in the making for the very reason that Washington has been unable to resolve awkward debates over whether Iraq is making more terrorists and whether the United States needs to change its policy towards the Palestinian-Israeli dispute. Some observe that resolving to sell existing policies in the region better is an easier bureaucratic option than changing them.  

Looking to the future, the implementation of any new strategy will be especially hard because some of the problems are now so slippery that no-one in America or Europe really knows what to do about them. The new problems may not be a new global terrorism, but more the nature of globalisation itself. As early as February 2003, George Tenet warned the Senate intelligence committee that globalisation, which had been the driving force behind the expansion of the world economy, had simultaneously become a serious threat to US security. The problem was not so much a new enemy, but a new medium. A globalized world favours insurgents groups and puts developed states at a disadvantage. The greatest challenge for both European and American strategic thinking may be that a range of transnational threats are accelerated by globalisation. The uncomfortable truth is that while 'globalization works', it works best for Al-Qaeda and its admirers.

Nevertheless, the EU and the US must redouble their efforts to arrive at common perceptions of threats and responses in relation to countering international terrorism. They are two international actors that have a history of the closest cooperation and only if they act together can this persistent and growing menace be addressed effectively. If they fail to work together, if their strategic cultures cause them to continue to diverge, then the prospects for the West’s ability to address one of the most important issues on its security agenda are bleak.
The research for this article was supported by awards from the Leverhulme Trust and the British Academy which are gratefully acknowledged. It has benefited from conversations with officials in Europe and the United States. The authors would also like to thank Matthew Aid, Paul Lashmar, Timothy Naftali, Martin Rudner and the anonymous reviewers for information and suggestions. All errors remain the responsibility of the authors.


2 The Pentagon document finalised in March was entitled the 'National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism', see, Linda Robinson, 'Plan Of Attack: The Pentagon has a secret new strategy for taking on terrorists--and taking them down', *US News and World Report*, 1 August 2005.


10 An interesting use of the concept that crosses the international-domestic divide is that of intelligence culture, see Philip H.J. Davies, ‘Intelligence Culture and Intelligence Failure in Britain and the United States’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 17, 3, October 204, pp.495-519.


15 Revelations about Central America had resulted in a ‘scrub order’ which required high-level and somewhat laborious approval for the CIA recruitment of agents with an unsavoury past, typically with strong terrorist connections or association with human rights violations. The rise of a ‘play it safe’ culture during the 1990s is documented in Robert Baer’s See No Evil The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA’s War on Terrorism, (New York, NY: Crown Publishing Group, 2002). See also Paul Pillar Terrorism and US Foreign Policy, (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001).

16 Although Richard Clarke, America’s Counter Terrorism Coordinator in the 1990s, has contrasted the seriousness with which the Clinton Administration treated the threat from international terrorism with the lower priority that was attached by the Bush Administration prior to 9/11, there are also underlying continuities. See Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror (New York: Free Press, 2004).

17 This somewhat counter-intuitive observation is persuasively argued in Naftali, Blind Spot, 117-65.


20 The extensive co-operation between the British, Dutch and German security services against IRA activities in continental Europe during the 1980s is an example of this previous pattern.
French efforts have placed particular emphasis upon magistrates and their close co-operation with the intelligence services, see, Jeremy Shapiro and Benedicte Suzan, 'The French Experience of Counter-terrorism', *Survival*, 45, 1, Spring 2003, pp.67-98.


29 This thesis is most clearly explored in Roger Scruton, *The West and the Rest: Globalization and the Terrorist Threat* (London Continuum, 2002).

30 The Pentagon boasts a wide variety of special forces, while the CIA also has its own soldiers in the form the Special Activities Division (SAD). Their modus operandi are different.


35 The initial dialogue with Libya over WMD was developed by the overseas intelligence services of the UK and Libya, see Julian Coman and Colin Brown, 'Revealed: The Real Reason for Libya's WMD Surrender', *The Telegraph*, 21 December 2003.

36 These were accompanied by private explorations of options. In 2002, Bush's deputy national security adviser, had commissioned a paper which looked at options for regime change in Iran citing WMD issue as the driver.


38 On the issue of values see Alex Danchev, 'How Strong are Shared Values in the Transatlantic Relationship', *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 7, 3, August 2005, pp. 429-36.

Hurricane Katrina has confirmed what many commentators have feared, namely that American domestic agencies remain ill-coordinated and four years after 9/11 the United States is still not capable of dealing effectively with a mass casualty event.

Leading a terrorist group was liable to a sentence of at least 15 years whilst financing its operations was liable to a punishment of at least 8 years. There are close parallels with the Italian ‘deep-freeze’ approach of long sentences for terrorism, adopted in the late 1970s.

See in particular the discussion of multinational 'Alliance Base' activities run out of Paris, described in Dana Priest, 'Help From France in Key Covert Operations', Washington Post, 3 July 2005.


Jean-Paul Brodeur, Peter Gill, Dennis Töllborg (eds.), Democracy, law, and security : internal security services in contemporary Europe (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), The process began as a Europe-wide response to the Leander case brought by the European Court initially against the Swedish Security Service.

The matter has been complicated by arguments over the relative advantages of long-term observation of suspects, versus capture and interrogation, see Jimmy Burns, Stephen Fidler and Demetri Sevastopulo, 'Different approach to tackling terrorism exposed', Financial Times, 12 July 2005.

There were many alternative views, even within the Pentagon, and no effort can be made to catalogue them here. However, they were accentuated by anxieties in State and at Langley about the prominence of the Pentagon - often expressed as the 'eight hundred pound gorilla problem'.

Anonymous [Michael Scheuer], *Imperial Hubris: Why the West is loosing the war on Terror* (New York: Brassey's, 2004).


Recently the Saudi government commissioned a study of Saudi foreign fighters making their way to Iraq. It found that it was the invasion of Iraq that was prompting jihadists to volunteer and most had not been in contact with radical organisations before 2003. Patrick Coburn, 'Iraq: This is Now an Unwinnable Conflict', *Independent on Sunday*, 24 July 2005.


61 Some diplomats fear that the new strategy may remove the State Department's control over foreign security programs in favour of the Pentagon, while the CIA worries about the military interest in expanding its human intelligence capabilities. Interviews, Washington DC, June 2005.
