Bosnia Abroad: Transnational Diaspora Mobilization

by

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TAKEN FROM HERE TO WHERE IT CAME FROM AND TAKEN TO A PLACE AND USED IN SUCH A MANNER THAT IT CAN ONLY REMAIN AS A REPRESENTATION OF WHAT IT WAS WHERE IT CAME FROM

- Lawrence Weiner, 1980, Art Institute Chicago
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All the best,

Dženeta Karabegović
Declaration of Authenticity

I declare that this thesis is the result of my own research. To the best of my knowledge and belief, this thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference has been made. Moreover, this thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university, and is less than 80,000 words in length. In preparing this thesis, I followed the guidelines established in the Guide to Examinations for Higher Degrees by Research of the University of Warwick.
Abstract

There has been excellent academic research, not only on diaspora, but also on post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina in regards to transitional justice and peace-building. However, the factors that play a role vis-à-vis diaspora mobilization and transitional justice have been explored less. Theorizing has been ad hoc. Thus, the guiding question of this thesis is: How do diaspora utilize the political environments in their hostlands when they mobilize towards issues of transitional justice, in what ways and why? I develop a typological theory of diaspora mobilization, focusing on transitional justice claims, to systematize understanding and to develop mid-range level explanations. Four types of diaspora mobilization (engaged, involved, reactive, and inactive) are theorized based on three independent variables: citizenship regimes, collective claims, and the presence or absence of ‘translocalism’ within diaspora communities. In particular, the more open citizenship regimes are, the higher the potential for diaspora mobilization will be. The thesis builds on the idea of translocal communities being an important factor in helping to determine the level of diaspora mobilization, along with the presence of collective claims in relation to transitional justice processes in the post-conflict homeland environment. The study is based on a qualitative research design using a unique two-level comparative lens, focusing on three countries in Europe (Sweden, France, and Germany) as well as four different cities within Bosnia and Herzegovina (Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Prijedor, and Srebrenica). The research methods include semi-structured interviews, participant observation, and process tracing with multi-sited fieldwork. Thus, transnational, translocal, host country, and homeland influences are incorporated into analysis. The study provides comparative rigor to research on diaspora mobilization that is particular and rare. It establishes diaspora as an important actor to consider in transitional justice based efforts and provides a new perspective on the idea of translocalism.
A Note on Diacritical Marks

Throughout the thesis, I have used letters with diacritics, as in the original languages from which these names and words come from. This was done purposefully as sources were used in original languages, interviews were conducted mostly in local languages, and generally reflects on the author’s fluency in these same languages. French was used sparingly during fieldwork as well as writing, and is thus not included.

The letters with diacritical marks in Bosnian/Croatian/(Montenegrin)/Serbian, locally referred to as BC(M)S, are as follows:
- Ć is pronounced as a soft 'ch' as in the word 'church'
- Č is pronounced as a hard 'ch' as in the word 'chimney'
- Đ is pronounced as a soft 'dj' as in the word 'jackal'
- Đž is pronounced as a hard 'dʒ' as in the word 'jeans,’ or by pronouncing the author’s first name correctly.
- Š is pronounced as 'sch' as in the word 'shimmer'
- Ţ is pronounced as 'zh' as the 's' in the word 'pleasure'

The letters with diacritical marks in German, better known as Umlauts, are as follows:
- Ä is pronounced as the ‘a’ in the word ‘day’ or the ‘e’ in ‘get’
- Ö is pronounced as the ‘u’ in the word ‘burn’
- Ü is pronounced similar to the sound ‘ew’ in ‘stew’

The letters with diacritical marks in Swedish are as follows:
- Å is pronounced as the ‘au’ in the name ‘Paul’
- Ä is pronounced as the ‘a’ in the word ‘care’
- Ö is pronounced as the ‘u’ in ‘purr’
Chapter 1 Introduction

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH or Bosnia from here on out) today is a country often recognized and remembered for the war that followed the breakup of Yugoslavia and its subsequent bloodshed (1992 – 1995). It remains outside of the European Union (EU), marred by economic problems such as high unemployment, endemic corruption, as well as a host of domestic challenges since the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995. A myriad of published work analyzes the breakup of Yugoslavia and the resulting challenges of the Bosnian state. Particular attention is paid to issues of ethnic politics, genocide, democratization, peacebuilding, and transitional justice. These remain at the center of its contested sovereignty within the Western Balkans, a direct result of the constitutional structure set up by the Dayton Peace Accords.

Often considered the diaspora, a large number of Bosnian citizens were displaced and ultimately resettled in numerous countries in Europe and the world as a result of the 1992-1995 conflict. Their mobilization has not been examined in a systematic, comparative way, particularly around issues of transitional justice. This dissertation addresses this gap both empirically and theoretically. It deepens discussions and bridges different strands of academic scholarship on diaspora,

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3 This scenario serves as the starting point for this thesis project within the framework of the larger ERC Project entitled “Diasporas and Contested Sovereignty.”
transnationalism, transitional justice, and the Balkans with multi-sited fieldwork in BiH and three host countries in Europe.

While there has been previous academic research on diaspora and much literature on post-conflict BiH in regards to transitional justice, peace-building and international governance, how diaspora mobilize around these issues has not been addressed in detail, especially vis-à-vis diaspora mobilization. As a result, theorizing has been ad hoc. However, considering the continued stalemate when it comes to issues of transitional justice and ultimately, reconciliation in BiH, as well as the size of the country’s diaspora, it is important to understand the process of diaspora mobilization on these efforts.

This thesis adopts a working definition of diaspora based on Adamson and Demetriou’s work which encompasses the agency diaspora have when mobilizing politically in order to generate support for their causes. “A diaspora can be defined as a social collectivity that exists across state borders and that has succeeded over time to (1) sustain a collective national, cultural or religious identity through a sense of internal cohesion and sustained ties with a real or imagined homeland and (2) display an ability to address the collective interests of members of the social collectivity through a developed internal organizational framework and transnational links.”

This definition highlights that to be diaspora, there is a certain level of activity required with a sense of urgency to mobilize towards issues, usually sustained through the development of links amongst diaspora members.

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Bosnians who live abroad have been studied with a particular focus on their ethnic belonging, and whether this influences their reconciliatory attitudes for example. Less often, research has examined other cleavages such as urban vs. rural backgrounds. The predominance towards focusing on individuals’ ethnic belonging remains relevant in research undertaken by Bosnian authors as well, who most often focus on discussing the Bosniak diaspora and focusing on religious ties. Alternatively, they stress individuals whose ethnic backgrounds are Croat or Serb as being more aligned with Croatian and Serbian diaspora associations. The idea of a unified Bosnian diaspora, as with any diaspora, is usually contested due to its, in part, ‘imagined’ nature. Diaspora research has previously focused on the autonomy of voices within diaspora groups and the lack of perceived homogeneity among diaspora populations, regardless of their origins. Hence, the definition utilized throughout this thesis focuses on a diaspora’s ability to channel particular claims and represent collective interests, in this case those focused on BiH as the homeland. Even though there are three main ethnic groups in BiH (Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Serbs), this thesis focuses on diaspora

mobilization which considers the homeland to be BiH, regardless of its members ethnic belonging, and which mobilizes predominantly as ‘Bosnian’ diaspora.

Bosnian diaspora associations place an emphasis on their multi-ethnic character and their ties to the Bosnian state as some of the main characteristics of their establishment, and in turn, their ties to each other and the homeland.\(^\text{11}\) The diaspora individuals interviewed for this thesis identified themselves as Bosnians firstly, and in turn joined and organized diaspora associations as Bosnians, regardless of their ethnic background. When interviewees explicitly identified themselves as Bosniaks, they did not deny they were also Bosnians, unless they had a different citizenship, such as those from the Sandžak region in Serbia for example.\(^\text{12}\) Others noted they were Bosnian, but not Bosniak, even when they sometimes had a Muslim background.\(^\text{13}\) Still others noted they came from a Bosnian Serb or Bosnian Croat background, but were Bosnians firstly, and that BiH is their homeland, rather than Croatia or Serbia.

Throughout the thesis, ‘Bosnian’ is used to describe diaspora members who identify as such, regardless of their ethnic background. ‘Bosniak’ is used for Bosnian Muslims who explicitly identify as such and mobilize through religiously based diaspora organizations. The comparative element of examining the Bosnian diaspora in different host land contexts highlights the similarities and differences in their mobilization. While this includes a primary focus on conflict-generated Bosnian diaspora members, each of the chapters also highlights the Bosnian

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\(^{12}\) This is further discussed in Chapter 7 on France, where Bosniak diaspora members were often from the Sandžak region in Serbia, rather than from BiH proper.
\(^{13}\) Respondents in all three countries noted this throughout their interviews when asked about their ethnic background.
diaspora population in the hostland as a whole in order to provide a complete picture of the diaspora mobilization processes.

Bosnian diaspora individuals, organizations and associations across Europe are increasingly invested in engaging with their homeland, both on a political as well as a social basis. They collaborate with nongovernmental organization, find creative solutions, and want to make their voices heard not only in the homeland and different host lands, and also through online resources and social media. The mechanisms that lead otherwise passive members to become mobilized are thus increasingly important. However, this is not to say that these mechanisms will always be the same, but rather that they will help to trigger mobilization in different ways. This is important when considering the investment of diaspora in their homelands, especially beyond financial incentives. In countries recovering from conflict, diaspora can utilize transitional justice mechanisms and potentially have an effect on transitional justice and peacebuilding, on the local or national level. Thus, examining diaspora mobilization towards the homeland becomes increasingly important as diaspora emerges as a potentially powerful new political actor.

Discussions of diaspora have gained momentum in international relations over the last fifteen years. There is an increased discussion of diaspora in regards to issues of conflict, security and the potentials of mobilization, resulting from initial debate about the relationship between transnationalism and diaspora. Thus, the relationship between diaspora and International Relations as a discipline is found somewhere between strictly statist, liberal, and constructivist
interpretations. Further, Lyons and Mandaville make a cogent argument for the importance of considering transnational perspectives when looking at comparative politics, in particular diaspora actors who engage in homeland politics from abroad. They state that one of the distinctions of diaspora “is that they challenge contemporary notions of how political life should be organized.”

Nonetheless, the diaspora literature is at times sporadic and requires more theoretical grounding and further rigorous comparative empirical research. In particular, diaspora populations cannot be examined outside of the contexts in which they find themselves, most obviously the host countries in which they are settled. These affect their political views which, combined with their previous political experiences, result in different diaspora political engagement. In other words, diaspora’s political perceptions in one country develop in parallel with diaspora’s political understandings in another country, and with homeland populations. While this does not guarantee there will not be overlap and similarities, it highlights these develop through slightly different processes. This pertains not only to the geopolitical understanding of BiH as a whole country rather than one separated into two entities or in any other way, but also perceptions of identity of the diaspora, played out in the host countries as well as in BiH with local populations. Hence, the comparative analysis of this thesis is particularly relevant.

To place this into perspective, while less than 3% of BiH’s citizens lived in a strictly monoethnic settlement prior to the war. Since the war, there has been a

16 Ibid., 126.
‘reorganization of power relations through ethnic expulsion,’ which in turn also contributes to relations between the diaspora and BiH. Considering that the country is divided into two entities, the Federation, mostly Bosniak-Croat controlled, and the Republika Srpska, controlled by Bosnian Serbs, the relationship between the diaspora and each entity brings the diversity of political aims and views to the forefront. It thus also brings a new dimension to bottom-up approaches to transitional justice as well as peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts. Hall recognizes it is particularly relevant to examine the political attitudes, activities, and motivations of diaspora populations, who are distanced from daily ethnonationalist politics and instead often live in liberal states with functioning democracies and minority rights. This thesis examines in which ways diaspora mobilize amidst ethnonationalist politics in the homeland around issues of transitional justice including memorialization from different host countries.

Diaspora, while sometimes disagreeing with certain factions within its homeland, nonetheless has the potential to challenge narratives and encourage dialogue that not only addresses the past but also looks to the future of the country in a more productive way. In this sense, diaspora can aid political actors in the homeland as well as undermine their efforts through its own mobilization in host countries. For homelands such as Bosnia and Herzegovina and other states facing contested sovereignty, understanding a diaspora’s engagement thus becomes even more important. In the Bosnian case, such issues include Bosnia’s accession

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19 This is one of the driving ideas behind the case selection for the greater ERC ‘Diasporas and Contested Sovereignty’ project which primarily includes Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, Kosovo, and Palestine.
process to the EU or its shared international and domestic governance structures through the Office of the High Representative (OHR from here on out). Bosnian diaspora members in different host countries can advocate for policies within those countries that motivate the accession process of BiH towards the EU. They can act as partners to help their homelands. In fact, Bosnian born politicians in Europe have already done so.\(^20\) A Bosnian American lobby group, the Advisory Council for Bosnia and Herzegovina, has set up a Congressional Caucus on Bosnia and Herzegovina, which has resulted in legislative activities in the United States on account of BiH.\(^21\) Diaspora members act as ambassadors of their homeland to the rest of the world when it comes to lobbying and other activism, while on the other hand serving as potential partners for EU accession processes and similar political engagements.

Nonetheless, how diaspora connect to EU accession processes of potential member states is a topic, while worthwhile to study, one that should be considered once a country begins the accession process in earnest, unlike BiH at the time of writing. Instead, the ways in which diaspora members organize around political processes in their homeland, wielding their influence in their homeland as well as the hostland, is particularly interesting. Traditionally, this has been analyzed through remittances,\(^22\) but this thesis addresses further processes such as remembrance and transitional justice.

\(^{20}\) A recent example is Aida Hadžialić, Sweden’s Minister for Upper Secondary School, Adult Education and Training, who traveled to Bosnia and Herzegovina and spoke about the importance of education reform on the EU path, offering resources from Sweden to help Bosnia and Herzegovina on this path as well.

\(^{21}\) The members of the Congressional Council on BiH can be found here: http://acbih.org/?page_id=26.

\(^{22}\) This is a vibrant literature. See for example: Newland, Kathleen, and Erin Patrick. 2004. “Beyond Remittances: The Role of Diaspora in Poverty Reduction in Their Countries of Origin.” Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.; Riddle, Liesl, Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff, and Tjai M.
So far, the diaspora’s engagement in the politics of its homeland, in particular through transnational means, as well as the group’s potential for helping to shape local communities in their homeland, has not been considered to its full extent. From a scholarly perspective, the diasporic community of BiH has been examined through cross-country analysis and engagement with their political mobilization, usually by focusing on the dynamics such as levels of integration within the host country. Incidentally, the Bosnian diaspora is continuously touted as the most integrated within Swedish society, with low unemployment rates and high education rates, especially among its youth. However, this places such research more in line with migration scholarship with the focus on a particular hostland, rather than on diaspora, the actors, themselves. More comprehensive research endeavors, while welcome in the discipline, have engaged with Bosnian diaspora on a largely exploratory scale.

Diaspora is understood to consist of different groups within it, with dominant actors as well as competing narratives and claim-making which can help to unify or further differentiate factions within the group. The different practices of diaspora members that act on behalf of their respective transnational community is understood to encompass diaspora in scholarly literature. At the same time, there is increasingly an understanding of how these practices differ based on the hostlands.

in which diaspora groups settle. I build on Koinova’s idea of politically relevant environments (PRE) in hostlands. This helps to explain how diaspora mobilize based on their embeddedness in various hostlands, including global and supranational levels.  

In particular, I am interested in how diaspora mobilize, how they make claims, around issues of transitional justice and reconciliation from the hostland. The post-conflict environment of Bosnia and Herzegovina as the homeland offers a particularly relevant diaspora community to examine.

This research is timely not only in addressing the gaps in the academic literature, but also when considering the Bosnian diaspora case study. Over the last few years, diaspora has started to strengthen its relationships with political structures in BiH and is increasingly lobbying for a stronger political voice and influence. In turn, this has been recognized within the Bosnian government. While there is no Ministry of Diaspora, there is a division within the Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees that focuses on diaspora and fostering relationships between the diaspora and the state. Additionally, there are several non-profits in BiH that aim to foster better relationships between the diaspora and the homeland.

The Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees has organized academic conferences in order to raise awareness about the Bosnian diaspora, including both conflict-generated individuals and those who have migrated in prior waves during Yugoslavia. A roundtable policy discussion, attended ten different localities within Bosnia, several Ministries at the federal level, and members of the diaspora from a variety of countries presented another particularly interesting attempt at reaching

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out to diaspora actors by the sending state. This demonstrates that there is an understanding from the homeland for a need for better understanding of diaspora engagement even though there is limited institutional capacity to support this. Thus, this thesis brings useful insights about diaspora mobilization that has potential to influence policy perspectives in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also beyond.

I am interested in how diaspora utilizes the political environment in their host countries and homelands in order to further their claims, in particular in relation to transitional justice efforts. In other words, the central questions this thesis seeks to answer are: **How do diaspora utilize the political environments in their hostlands when they mobilize towards issues of transitional justice and peace? In what ways and why?**

Thus, the thesis will contribute to theory building in regards to diaspora mobilization, provide valuable comparative research, and illuminate policy discussions regarding diaspora. Sub-questions include: Do diaspora entrepreneurs use the same arguments to mobilize diaspora transnationally or are they specific to the host countries? How do host countries help or hinder diaspora mobilization?

This thesis will thus focus on the conditions inherent in the host countries that lead to diaspora mobilization towards its homeland, but also transnationally. I am interested in the pathways that lead to diaspora mobilization and how these differ in certain host countries. Each of the three countries with diaspora populations will be examined in relation to the levels of diaspora mobilization in order to bring about a more complete picture of the relationship of host countries to diaspora mobilization. While the comparative method gives leverage to understand

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28 Respondent BH3 (2013) Interview in July, Sarajevo, BiH.; Respondent BH16 (2013) Interview in July, Sarajevo, BiH.
the factors which have crucial importance for diaspora mobilization, process tracing is applicable as a method to account for the pathways which lead from these combinations of factors to the specific outcomes of diaspora mobilization. Process tracing also allows for the examination of alternative explanations.\textsuperscript{29} Multi-sited fieldwork in the three hostlands and BiH is combined with interviews and participatory observation. Using triangulation with secondary sources further helps to develop the typology and in turn, amend it. The following section explores in detail how the remainder of the thesis is organized.

The following chapter will focus on the situation in BiH at present, giving a brief political overview, in particular the institutional framework of the country today, a result of “peace-building without politics.”\textsuperscript{30} To grasp the impact of diaspora mobilization on BiH, it is important to understand the dynamics within the country in the post-conflict period. This chapter provides some background on the 1995 Dayton Peace Accord (henceforth Dayton) which ended the 1992 – 1995 war in BiH. It also highlights some of the remaining challenges due to the complicated constitutional framework that resulted. The chapter draws on the politicization and instrumentalization of ethnonationalist rivalries that continue in BiH to this day and help to mobilize as well as frustrate diaspora members. Here in particular it is important to consider local dynamics within communities in BiH as well as national dynamics as the political structures in the country differ and create an impact on how diaspora mobilizes. The second chapter will also review some of the previous research on Bosnian diaspora communities internationally, including diasporas


from former Yugoslavia. This research helps put into perspective the contribution of this thesis to this highly relevant case study of conflict-generated diaspora.

The third chapter grounds the puzzle among research on diasporas, transitional justice, and peace and conflict debates, while also noting the inherent interconnectedness between these literatures, particularly in the post-Yugoslav region. Diaspora research draws from a variety of topics including peace and conflict literature, migration, transnationalism. The chapter will provide an overview of transitional justice as an increasingly established scholarly field, before juxtaposing some of the existing literature on peacebuilding with it. Ultimately, this chapter traces the development of this scholarship from initial debates to the more bottom-up, localized perspectives that are increasingly being integrated into them. It then positions the thesis’ puzzle within the chapter by bringing in the diaspora dimension, thus establishing its contribution.

The fourth chapter focuses on research design and methodology in more detail, outlining the research process including the comparative case study and process tracing. The diaspora in these three countries (Sweden, Germany, and France) has developed within varied political environments and incorporation regimes, providing a comparative range for this thesis to explore. One of the main components of the political environments is that the three countries represent three different points on a continuum of citizenship regimes. This chapter will thus establish the dependent variable, diaspora mobilization, as well as the three independent variables: citizenship regimes, translocal community, and collective claims. Based on this framework, the chapter will introduce a typology of diaspora

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mobilization and discuss the hypotheses generated as a result. The chapter also addresses the importance of considering researcher positionality as well as explores in more detail the fieldwork process including semi-structured interviews before delving into the empirical chapters.

The following three chapters form the empirical core of the thesis. Each focuses on a particular host land comparatively, examining the types of mobilization theorized as well as empirically examined within them. Chapter 5 focuses on Bosnians in Sweden, chapter 6 on Bosnians in Germany, and chapter 7 on Bosnians in France. These chapters provide background on the way that countries have incorporated their migrant populations as well as the relationships those countries have built with the homelands. Semi-structured interviews tease out how the interplay of different independent variables in each of the three countries influences diaspora mobilization. By examining each of the three countries in particular, Germany, Sweden, and France, the empirical chapters shed light on how the three different independent variables influence diaspora mobilization in the three different hostlands. Each of the chapters addresses the hypothesized types of diaspora mobilization introduced in Chapter 4 and juxtaposes this with the fieldwork in each of the three countries, respectively.

In particular, these chapters will provide new data on unique diaspora initiatives as well as the diaspora’s integration and participation in hostland politics around issues of transitional justice. Considering the alternative integration schemes of the three countries in question, this will work towards building a more cohesive theory of diaspora mobilization, in particular, causal mechanisms. It will also showcase differences among the three countries’ citizenship regimes. These chapters will explain how the factors of each host country lead to different
mobilization initiatives. The types of diaspora mobilization will be highlighted through different diaspora initiatives. Some of these are focused on local communities in BiH, while others on the homeland as a whole. Still others examine the diaspora community in the hostland or engaging it transnationally.

Analyzing the translocal levels of diaspora mobilization will provide new insights about the mechanisms that lead to diaspora mobilization. “Research on translocality primarily refers to how social relationships across locales shape transnational migrant networks, economic exchanges and diasporic space.” It is in these spaces that translocal connections can happen and thus also aid diaspora mobilization in multiple locations in different ways. This thesis contributes to an understanding of how translocal communities influence diaspora mobilization and is explored in more detail in the second chapter.

The final chapter will summarize the findings of the thesis project as well as suggest further research agendas. It will also include lessons learned from BiH diaspora mobilization that can serve as foundations for future work as well as some policy recommendations. It will exhibit the ways in which hostland contexts can influence transnational diaspora mobilization and to what extent this makes a difference for strengthening the sovereignty of weak states but at the same time, validating the importance of diaspora as a player within that process. Ultimately, the last chapter will also highlight the validity of the typology developed in the thesis and provide some guidelines for future research on these and similar topics.

Chapter 2 Contributions of Previous Research on Bosnia and Bosnian Diaspora

This chapter will provide an overview of the historical and political situation in BiH to show the environment that has resulted in both a conflict-generated diaspora as well as diaspora mobilization. It will address a few of the most salient issues within the country today, which will, in turn, contextualize the diaspora initiatives examined at the heart of this thesis. In large part, this chapter examines the continued struggle to constitute Bosnian identity as well as solidify citizen representation and rights within a multietnic setting.

The chapter will first provide a quick historical outline of BiH followed by a section about the salient features of the Dayton Peace Accords, which continue to dictate how the country operates. A section about the geopolitics of the diaspora in BiH will follow before concluding remarks about BiH today. This chapter provides the background to the ongoing transitional justice process and the politics of memory that continue to be relevant in BiH politics today. It will examine how more recent developments including civil society initiatives, protests since 2013, and the floods of May 2014 have factored into discussions about diaspora influence and mobilization in BiH.

2.1 Demise of Yugoslavia

Much research has discussed the demise of Yugoslavia and the reasons for its breakup, its history, as well as the consequences thereof.33 This short overview serves to situate the reader in the broader context for how this situation influenced

33 Laura Silber and Allan Little’s Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation provides a useful entry point. More recently, Catherine Baker has written a short introductory text titled The Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s.
the demographic changes in the country, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It speaks briefly to the history of Yugoslavia and the political identities with which some individuals in the diaspora identify with, harking back to the memory and nostalgia of a country that encouraged multi-ethnic belonging amidst other flaws.³⁴

Yugoslav national identity was represented by the Partisan political movement and reaffirmed through ‘brotherhood and unity.’³⁵ It resulted in a federation of different constituent republics with Belgrade as the capital following WWII. “In BiH, the Partisan movement was particularly popular, and citizens of all nationalities and religions joined it.”³⁶ BiH was established as one of the six constituent republics (the others were Serbia, Croatia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Slovenia). It encompassed a mini-Yugoslavia by being multinational and multiethnic. Subsequent changes in the Yugoslav Constitution allowed for nascent Muslim nationalist factions to allow for Bosnian Muslims to declare themselves as ‘Muslim, in the sense of a nation,’ reflecting the tendency for Orthodox and Catholic Bosnians to call themselves Serbs and Croats. Malcolm explains, “once they had made that move, it became impossible for the Muslims to take the logical course, which would have been to describe their religion as Muslim and their ethnic substratum as Bosnian. That would have had the effect of setting up “Bosnian” as a third term in the contradistinction to “Serb” and “Croat” – which would be like the use of “Muslim” as a third term, only even more divisive, since at least the three

³⁶ Ibid.
groups can now still be referred to as Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats.”

Tito’s death in 1980 left the country in shock and led to a downward political spiral which resulted in the demise of the country throughout the 1990s. National groups were increasingly played off each other, with Serb nationalism being revived throughout the country. By 1989, Yugoslavia was in economic turmoil, in large part due to its financial debt to the West. By the early 1990s, Yugoslavia faced numerous crises: an increasingly weak political system that could not balance powerful political figures, an economic and geopolitical crisis over the territory of BiH which fueled a rise of ethnic nationalism. Rivalries between Yugoslavia’s constituent republics increased as each competed for more autonomy from the federal government in Belgrade. New political parties emerged to compete with the Communist Party, emphasizing ethnic belonging over political platforms. An increasingly republic-oriented media pursued nationalist goals which exacerbated the unstable political situation. In BiH, ‘Yugoslavs’ and by extension those who considered themselves ‘Bosnians,’ became ‘stateless persons’ as the very Yugoslav state started to disintegrate.

Bosnia became embroiled in war, which resulted in close to 100,000 deaths between 1992 and 1995. “Suddenly one had to be Slovene, Croat or Serb – or almost by default, Muslim. Of all people I talked with between 1995 and 1998, the

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40 The Bosnian Book of the Dead consolidated information compiled by the Research and Documentation Centre in Sarajevo and contained 96,895 cases with each relating to a victim who was killed, disappeared, or died as a result of the war. It is considered an approximation, and not the complete total.
Muslims in Bosnia seemed most grounded – even now – in a cosmopolitan “Yugoslav” identity. “The idea of ‘Bosnian’ in an outside world that perceived only ethnic conflict and unidimensional concepts of national self-determination was too complex.” This continues today with Bosnia’s citizens often declaring themselves by their ethnonational identity as Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim), Croat, or Serb. Outside of the country, between 1 and 2.2 million are estimated to belong to a Bosnian diaspora. These individuals escaped the fates of many of their compatriots including ethnic cleansing, genocide, rape, being under siege, hunger – in short, conflict and war, that left the newly independent country devastated.

Their recognition of themselves as Bosnians firstly rather than the ethnonational identity is in turn a particular political statement, a response to the political environment of their homeland and region which continues to promote limited concepts of belonging or not belonging to it.

2.2 BiH since 1995

A journalist once described Bosnia and Herzegovina as “Absurdistan.” The General Framework Agreement, better known as the Dayton Peace Accords, was signed in Dayton, OH in November 1995 and ratified in Paris in December 1995, marking the official end of the war. In an effort to appease ethnonationalism as well as find a peaceful solution to end the conflict, the country became a consociational

41 Ibid., 47.
43 This number varies depending on what is considered diaspora, as second generation individuals might not have their citizenship papers all in order, or be registered to vote in the homeland. In this thesis, I use Bosnian or Bosniak for the diaspora actors because, depending on what they indicated to me during interviews and how they present themselves.
democracy.\textsuperscript{46} The Dayton Peace Accords were signed with support and the engagement of multiple international actors invested in the area including the United States and the EU. In fact, previous research has argued that Bosnia’s governmental power is in effect in the hands of international institutions, a ‘neotrusteeship.’\textsuperscript{47} However, over the last two decades, this international influence has waned and the country’s political elites have effectively been left to co-opt the state without much incentive to move towards liberal democracy. Over time, this has led to external actors that are unable “to prevent local insurgents from wrestling control of regions and the countryside.”\textsuperscript{48} This section will briefly outline the political environment of BiH today.

On the subnational level, there are two so-called entities, the Federation and Republika Srpska. The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH), which compromises 51% of the country’s territory, is dominated by Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, while Republika Srpska (RS), 49% of BiH’s territory, is mostly dominated by Bosnian Serbs. These territorial demographics are a direct result of the mass exodus of individuals during the war and the ethnic cleansing of the 1990s, which created the conflict-generated diaspora at the center of this thesis.\textsuperscript{49} The Federation is further divided into ten ‘cantons,’ in an effort to ensure that Bosnian Croats’ political voices are dominant in certain parts of the Federation where they are demographically dominant. Cantons are further divided into municipalities, \textit{opštine}, that are assigned to deliver basic government functions at the local level,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{48} Ibid., 36.
\end{itemize}
further decentralizing governmental functions. The RS is managed as one canton from Banja Luka, its capital, centrally.

The Dayton Peace Accords envisioned a governance system that would enable ethnic divisions to be overcome, over time, through multilevel mechanisms that give voice and agency to different groups within the country. While authors such as Bache and Flinders argue for the importance of considering multi-level governance as a system of overlapping networks, it is also important to acknowledge that the concept has not been applied effectively or researched in depth when looking at the Balkan region. “In other words, the double silence is complete: the multi-level governance literature is silent on the specifics of South East Europe, and even the best literature on governance in South East Europe is silent on the concept of multi-level governance.” Instead, it has resulted in an effective political structure that benefits and maintains the current political elites in power. The fragmentation of the country has further weakened the state rather than instilling more democracy.

Neither of the entities has historical basis and both are the product of “last-minute creative cartography.” “Dayton has been a poor foundation for peace-building because it institutionalized unresolved conflict, ethnic division, and fragmentation at the heart of the Bosnian state. Given the war crimes involved in its creation, the Republika Srpska is a difficult reality for most Bosniaks to countenance.” Ultimately, ‘Dayton’ BiH, in an effort to maintain peace which has

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52 Adis Merdanović’s book talks about this at length.
54 Ibid., 310.
been its greatest success since 1995. However, it has resulted in continued political stalemates due to the complicated governmental structures overviewed in this section. The political elites, belonging to ethnonationalist parties that led the country to war, have maintained their grips on power and have not helped to forward democratization and peacebuilding processes. Ethnoterritorial political forces have, over the last two decades, learned how to obstruct the state’s functions for their own benefit. This is ironic as BiH was the least homogenous republic within Yugoslavia prior to the war, where integrated notions of identity were embraced.

In the case of BiH, consociationalism by means of the Dayton Peace Accords have led to a dysfunctional state without much accountability for governmental institutions. To cite an example, it took thirteen different steps to start a business in BiH, as opposed to 6 for the countries in the region with an average of 40 days rather than the average 16 in the region in 2012. The same data in 2016 reflects that it takes twelve different steps, and approximately 50 more days to start a business in BiH than the rest of the European region. Of particular interest for this thesis, this governance structure has maintained a perpetual state of post-

conflict transition for the last two decades, with little reconciliation or justice (further elaborated on in the following chapters). More importantly, integration with EU policies as well as the potential accession of BiH to the EU is continuously hindered by issues of internally contested sovereignty.\footnote{Toal, Gerard, and Carl T Dahlman. 2011. *Bosnia Remade: Ethnic Cleansing and Its Reversal.* New York: Oxford University Press. 310 – 314.; The RS Referendum in 2016 as well as the 2016 elections only further exposed the lack of EU influence in the country and local politicians’ disdain for state-level institutions, particularly judicial ones.} Without a unified and central state organization, most of the functions of the cantonal institutions become ineffective, if not redundant, and implementation of any policies is thus increasingly difficult. To cite just one example, the region experienced the largest flooding of the last 120 years in the spring of 2014. A state of emergency was not declared on the national level due to infighting and disagreement on the entity level. The implementation of emergency and subsequent humanitarian aid after the floods were uncoordinated. Citizens continue to note their low confidence levels for their government across ethnic lines.

The country has, in effect, five heads of state. There is a rotating presidency on the country level made up of a Bosniak, a Croat, and a Serb. Those serving currently are Bakir Izetbegović, Mladen Ivanić and Dragan Ćović. Both entities also have their own president, currently Milorad Dodik (RS) and Marinko Čavara (Federation). There is a High Representative who serves as the head of the Office of the High Representative (OHR), a peace implementation organization set up by Annex 10 of the Dayton Agreement in order to help stabilize the country. The mission of the OHR consists of helping the country implement the peace settlement and to ensure that all of its institutions function in accordance to Dayton. Since Carl Bildt’s original tenure which started in 1995, there have been seven High Representatives. The current High Representative, Valentin Inzko, has been in
office since 2009. Depending on the mandate of the OHR as well as on the personality of individual High Representatives, their day-to-day involvement in the country’s political affairs has differed. Inzko is considered as one of the more disengaged High Representatives. The OHR’s mandate has been difficult to implement as monitoring the variety of provisions and rules Dayton set up in BiH is a task too broad for the size and reach of the organization. Regardless of the efforts and initiatives taken by the High Representatives, this becomes even more so the case in situations in which the OHR comes up against barriers at each of the different levels of government within BiH.\(^\text{61}\)

To further complicate the bureaucracy of the country, there are more than 100 officially registered political parties within the country and 136 ministries at different levels of government. To cite an example, including both federal, entity and cantonal levels, there are usually more than ten of the same ministries, which rarely coordinate or cooperate with one another in terms of policies and financing of different services provided. Few political parties have been able to reach across ethnic lines and recruit candidates of different backgrounds, though there are a few exceptions such as the SDP (Social Democratic Party) or more recently, Naša Stranka, although its stronghold is Sarajevo.\(^\text{62}\)

Previous research has noted the challenges moderate political parties face in elections as they are competing with dominant nationalist parties in post-conflict environments.\(^\text{63}\) Ethnic tensions within the country continue to be played out in

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\(^{61}\) Ibid., 239 – 243.

\(^{62}\) While central-left parties won overall more votes than ethnonational parties, due to the fact that they are divided and thus split the vote, they are unable to get elected. The local elections in October 2016 are a prime example of this.

\(^{63}\) Hulse, John W. 2010. “‘Why Did They Vote for Those Guys Again?’ Challenges and Contradictions in the Promotion of Political Moderation in Post-War Bosnia and Herzegovina.” *Democratization* 17 (6): 1141.
the political sphere, only further benefiting the political elites. Rather than developing political platforms meant to foster more progressive policies and implementation of initiatives that help local populations, these ethnically based parties often simply compete with one another in order to gain votes as the “outbidding for ethnic support is a constant possibility.” This stalls transitional justice processes due to a lack of political will.

The vigilant perseverance of three different ‘constituent’ nations – Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims), Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Serbs, has hampered the development of national unity among BiH citizens, simplifying them to their national belonging. Individuals who identify as ‘Bosnian’ find they have little political space to exercise their political identity amidst the ethnonational political environment. Rather, one must fit themselves within one of the ‘constituent nations’ categories in order to be able to receive state benefits of any kind. The political climate in BiH reflects a divided society in which nationalist parties dominate the political conversation and the people themselves have to an extent lost the option of being simply “Bosnian” within a political system in which ethnic belonging remains the dominant priority. For those in the diaspora, it is a challenge to navigate the political structures within the country. The bureaucracy of the current system, not to mention the lack of representation many in the diaspora feel within Bosnian parliamentary and governmental structures, ensures they remain frustrated.

when they need to resolve any legal issues in their homeland. Further, it limits their political engagement in formal institutions.\textsuperscript{67}

While the local population has largely been dormant, protests in the country between February and June of 2014 indicated the citizens’ dissatisfaction with the governmental institutions and politicians in place. Protesters’ demands focused on the economic recession, extreme social stratification, in particular in regards to abolishing the ‘white bread’ privilege,\textsuperscript{68} high levels of unemployment, and low standards of living. The protests presented the most severe domestic crisis of governance and openly questioned the legitimacy of dominant political actors on both the national and subnational levels. Citizens were finally, almost two decades after war, standing up against the exploitative political elite and the divided political society in which they live. However, the protests ultimately fell short of instilling lasting change in Bosnian politics and bridging the ethnically divided society. The country remains stranded in a contingent socio-economic situation. Nonetheless, the protests demonstrated that while large-scale citizen mobilization across the country was not yet possible, BiH’s citizens have shown that they can unite and engage in civic activism.\textsuperscript{69}

This short overview provides some context about the political environment in the homeland functions and in turn how diaspora members experience it. It is noteworthy that change in the homeland, particularly civic engagement which creates opportunities for local actors to cooperate with diaspora, can potentially

\textsuperscript{67} Respondent BH16 (2013) Interview in August, Sarajevo, BiH. Respondent UK2 (2014) Interview in May, Birmingham, UK. Participant Observation at World Diaspora Congress, Sarajevo, May 2014.

\textsuperscript{68} Protesters were particularly upset in regards to a law that allows officials in all levels of government to continue to receive their salaries for a year after leaving office. This was dubbed the white bread privilege.

\textsuperscript{69} Arsenijevic, Damir, ed. 2014. \textit{Unbribable Bosnia and Herzegovina The Fight for the Commons}. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
trigger diaspora engagement as it opens up the political environment for actors besides political parties to be influential. For example, the floods during 2014 elicited a diaspora response to fundraise in order to help homeland communities, demonstrating diaspora’s continued interest and engagement in its homeland. The following section will provide an overview of the Bosnian diaspora and their role in BiH today.

2.3 The Status of Diaspora and Returnees in BiH

The Dayton Peace Agreements have provisions for the return of refugees to their former regions after the end of the conflict. Annex 7 explicitly grants the right to return home safely, regain lost property, or to obtain just compensation among other things.\(^{70}\) However, many individuals, having begun new lives abroad and having experienced their villages and homes destroyed as a result of the war have been reluctant to return. This has in turn benefited those in power after the war, solidifying the demographic shifts which happened during the war as a result of ethnic cleansing.\(^{71}\) Between 1995 and 1998, more than 300,000 individuals returned to their homes.\(^{72}\) Others rebuilt their homes, and continue to spend at least a few weeks in the homeland each year, usually during the summer period. Returnee communities have been firmly established in certain portions of the country such as the Bratunac/Srebrenica area as well as the Kozarac area near Banja Luka and Prijedor.

For those who remain outside of the country, the structural set-up and political representation in their former localities is new and unfamiliar and diaspora

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members feel disenfranchised and frustrated with the political realities of their post-conflict homeland. These individuals are the main focus of this thesis – conflict-generated members of the Bosnian diaspora – although particular attention will also be paid to guest workers and children of conflict-generated individuals who also mobilize as Bosnian diaspora.

An estimated 2 million Bosnians live outside of its territory, across Europe, Australia, the United States and Canada, creating an incredible amount of potential for influence if mobilized. According to the BiH Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees, the number of those in the diaspora registered to vote dropped to 38,000 for the 2012 elections from 458,000 in 1996, a drastic change, despite many retaining their citizenship and returning to BiH on a regular basis. In these communities, there have been notable initiatives such as Prvi Mart73 that have campaigned in order to maximize voter registration among returnees as well as citizens abroad. Nonetheless, they maintain cultural ties and identities with BiH. Over the last 20 years, they have evolved from refugees to citizens of the countries in host countries, have built successful lives abroad, but have nevertheless continued to maintain networks amongst each other encouraging cultural production, political engagement, and generating foreign investments. They are often vocal when it comes to issues they feel strongly about, and increasingly understand how to influence media sources to cover this.

When asked about political participation in BiH, whether it is through voting or by other means, such as political party membership or adherence to party politics, diaspora interviewees almost exclusively answered they felt unrepresented

73 Translated, this means March First, which commemorates the day of the referendum on which Bosnians voted to secede from former Yugoslavia in 1992.
by the existing political parties in BiH. They consider the voting process complicated as most feel unsupported by the embassies in their countries of settlement. “I have to re-register for every election, even though I’ve voted before. It’s like they don’t want us to vote from abroad.”74 The low rate of voter turnout signals the discontent many feel with the current political party structures. For local elections, moderate political choices are unavailable as many of the places from which diaspora members come from are now part of the RS where Bosnian Serb parties dominate the political scene, both in local as well as federal elections.

When asked to pick a politician they identity with, interviewees often cited moderate politicians who endorse a multi-ethnic BiH as candidate. This is striking considering that candidates who do not participate in ethnic outbidding in BiH are negatively viewed by their respective ‘constituent people.’ The prime example of this is the former Bosnian Croat head of the presidency, Željko Komšić who attempted to moderate political rhetoric within the country. Komšić’s election as the Bosnian Croat President, who was elected in 2005 largely by non-Croats in BiH, could be considered a step towards reconciliation and as a subversion of the Dayton Peace Accords.75 Governance focused on practical solutions for the country that allocates services rather than focusing on ethnic tensions remain rare.

How does diaspora mobilization make an impact, if any, in the peacebuilding and transitional justice processes? How do they mobilize amongst each other? On one hand, recent protests, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, combined with citizen solidarity in light of recent floods in May 2014 indicate that

74 Respondents BH6 and BH10 (2013) Interview in July, Sarajevo, BiH; Other espondents such as SWE8 and SWE9 (2014) Interview in June, Malmö and Gothenburg, Sweden.; Respondents DE22 and DE23 (2014) Interviews in October, Munich, Germany echoed similar sentiments.
BiH’s population is relying more and more on each other, sensing the divide between the political elite and ordinary citizens rather than embracing ethnonationalism. On the other hand, finding avenues where action is possible, whether by embracing national institutions at risk, or mobilizing in domains where the state is unable to do so or where diaspora influence can create change. Examples include mobilizing in order to reopen the National Museum of Bosnia or lobbying for policies on a national basis, regardless of citizens’ background, to renaming streets, to seemingly banal shows of solidarity such as inclusive national festivals, cross-national support for the football team.\footnote{Ivie, Robert L., and Timothy William Waters. 2010. “Discursive Democracy and the Challenge of State Building in Divided Societies: Reckoning with Symbolic Capital in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” Nationalities Papers 38 (4): 462.} Often, creating social capital among different civil society organizations has more positive effect for rebuilding communities in post-conflict society than political parties.\footnote{Pickering, Paula. 2006. “Generating Social Capital for Bridging Ethnic Divisions in the Balkans: Case Studies of Two Bosniak Cities.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 29 (1): 79–103.} Diaspora mobilization aims for a similar impact.

While the Bosnian state remains in political gridlock, there are nonetheless efforts to include the diaspora within larger frameworks within the country. In May 2014, the Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in cooperation with the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation and the United Nations Development Program organized a roundtable discussion entitled “Migration and Development.” Diaspora from several countries, representatives from Bosnian and Herzegovinian institutions at different levels of government, local nongovernmental organizations and international agencies met to discuss how best to implement policies in order to encourage more socio-economic
development. A policy on diasporas has been spearheaded in the BiH government by several local politicians who are interested in implementing a diaspora strategy that will foster better relationships between BiH and its diaspora.

Events like this bring together both diaspora and local actors in order to discuss the potential of working together. However, often times there is a limited engagement with peacebuilding and transitional justice, with the focus on economic development. For example, 2014 also marked the second Bosnian and Herzegovinian Diaspora Business Forum, bringing together members from the diaspora willing to invest with local actors, in an effort to ensure that investment happens in a transparent and efficient way, in order to benefit both the diaspora investor as well as the homeland by bringing revenues, employment to some citizens, and profit for the region.

Other events gain little engagement with local political actors. For example, the Bosnian World Congress was held at the Bosnian Parliament building in June of 2014, and attended by diaspora representatives living in sixteen different countries. They echoed their commitment to the country and their desire to remain involved. On the first day, Bosnian politicians who are committed to the diaspora in BiH attended, in part to mobilize them to vote for their own parties, and in part to reconfirm their commitment to diaspora engagement in the homeland. However,

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78 Participant Observation, Migration and Development Roundtable Event, Sarajevo, May 2014.
81 Respondent BH17 (2014) Interview in June, Sarajevo, BiH.; The website for the 2nd Annual BhDiaFor is bhdiafor.org.
two of the country’s presidents who were scheduled to speak, cancelled at the last moment.\textsuperscript{82}

These examples illustrate that Bosnians living outside of Bosnia remain attached to their homeland and continue to contribute to the country, in transnational ways regardless of the fact that there is not an adequate Ministry of the Diaspora or a similar governmental organ that organizes and channels this engagement. The remittance contributions make up 11% of the country’s GDP as of 2012, a figure that has been maintained over the last decade.\textsuperscript{83} Yet, up to now, both academic as well as governmental engagement has been limited in regards to the diaspora in more productive ways. Instead, the Bosnian diaspora is mentioned in regards to its financial contributions or in regards to its cultural associations and successful integration abroad.\textsuperscript{84} In fact, the Bosnian government has only recently taken to cataloguing prominent diaspora members across the globe in a kind of ‘Who’s Who’ index, published and updated on a haphazardous basis.\textsuperscript{85}

Bosnian diaspora activists cite their potential political power if engaged effectively through mechanisms such as voting and economic development. They are also keen to help build the country’s capacity as they see both financial benefit for themselves, feel the desire to give back, and see the potential for their homeland to prosper.\textsuperscript{86}

\textsuperscript{82} Participant Observation, Sarajevo, June 2014.
political power in BiH, amidst international organizations, ethnonationally focused politicians, and other state actors represents a delicate balance between competing interests in a transitional state after conflict, something under-explored in within the academic literature.

As such a vibrant group with a variety of elements and mechanisms for engagement, they remain an underutilized resource of their homeland. This thesis pools some of the initiatives they have organized as well as provides an overview of existing research on Bosnian diaspora, which can help inform the homeland about the potential of its diaspora, with a particular focus on mobilization that is focused on transitional justice and peacebuilding understood more broadly. At the same time, this research offers insight into theory building in regards to diaspora and fragile states such as BiH. Diaspora mobilization often addresses poorly functioning governmental and political institutions in the country and thus can sometimes also be at odds or in direct opposition to local governments. In post-conflict environment, it is thus imperative that the mechanisms which influence diaspora mobilization are understood better.

2.4 Previous Scholarly Work on Bosnian Diaspora

Scholarly work on the Bosnian diaspora often focuses on individuals within that population, and their lives in the host country, rather than collective actions undertaken by the diaspora within a larger context. Several monograph-length works based on empirical research with Bosnians, or individuals from former Yugoslav states, exist, detailing their links to their host land and, increasingly, their attachments to the homeland. This thesis builds on this work in part, but also expands it in several ways. Firstly, I bring typological theorizing in order to move beyond case studies and attempt to forward some potentially generalizable
observations, both for the Bosnian case study and beyond. Secondly, I combine the focus on the host country, which often focuses on integration and citizenship regimes, with the reality of the lived experiences of many diaspora individuals, translocalism, a transnational community that exists both in the host land but also beyond based on former localities in the homeland, in a comparative perspective. Finally, I do this through a systematic look at three countries with diaspora populations, focusing on how the collective claims they make to mobilize, usually based on grievances, can lead to different types of diaspora mobilization, in particular focusing on transitional justice and peacebuilding. The following paragraphs will provide an overview of the existing field of research around Bosnian diaspora.

Valenta and Ramet’s book on Bosnian diaspora is perhaps the most comprehensive collection of work on the population, incorporating research from several countries across Europe as well as Australia and North America. 87 Halilovich’s chapter on Bosnian diaspora in Australia highlights how diaspora often organize in ‘local’ clubs and associations which are, to various degrees, multi-ethnic or mixed (i.e. include members of all Bosnian ethnic groups).” 88 He argues that the general Bosnian diaspora population in Australia maintain a distance between larger umbrella organizations they consider as too nationalistic or victim-centered around a certain ethnicity. Thereby, they further stress their independence in regards to political pursuits differentiating between the larger organizations’ pursuit of “the political and business agendas of their leaders than with the real local

issues “‘back there at home’” or “‘over here in exile’” of those on whose behalf they claim to be acting.”

This reflects on their lack of interest in being identified as ‘victims’ or otherwise taken advantage of by one of the existing political agendas in their homeland. In this way, the lack of activity in regards to larger diaspora organizations becomes a political stand as they do not want to be associated with the political dynamics present in the homeland.

Halilovich expands his ideas about Bosnian diaspora in his own monograph. He argues articulately about how Bosnian communities across the United States, Europe, and Australia have integrated into their respective host communities, while nonetheless expressing some attachment to the previous homeland. For many, the homeland remains marred by a lack of economic opportunities and political agendas that do not align with their own views. The country they remember does not exist anymore, and the communities in which they find themselves become central to their identity construction. He adapts this belonging, with a focus on the shared past, as ‘trans-local,’ due to ‘deliberate and informed decisions when choosing destinations for their resettlement.’

‘They are rather both increasingly imagined as well as made up of concrete social relations.’

As such, they challenge, but at the same reinforce national identities of the larger diaspora group, and might not be recognized, or in other words, are seen as competing with larger umbrella organizations. This extends to individuals from Brčko, Mostar, the Podrinje region, and Prijedor, and is based on shared memories

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89 Ibid. 170.
90 Ibid.
92 Ibid., 135.
of the local place of origin combined with those of the hostland. 'Displaced Bosnians are not only members of their broader ethnic or national diasporas, nor simply refugees waiting to return to their original homelands.'93 This thesis utilizes this thinking by treating this translocality as an independent variable rather than a framework to help think about diaspora. Thus, I examine the work of the translocal community in influencing diaspora mobilization across different host-lands.

Korac, in exploring Bosnian communities in Rome and Amsterdam, has also touched on the importance of how diaspora build their communities. Rather than naming this 'translocal,' for her it is a matter of 'emplacement,' a process of pluralization which moves beyond citizenship and incorporation regimes, embracing both national borders within host countries as well as transnational processes of these communities across state borders. She stresses the importance of considering social networks and contextualizing relationships between places of origin and destination. Valuable in its empirical insights and rich interview material, Korac focuses on the individual agency of refugees from former Yugoslavia in building and reconstituting their communities, both in the respective cities she researched, as well as transnationally.94

Nonetheless, this research focuses on how the lives of individuals are rebuilt and remade in the host countries, beyond the dichotomies of citizenship or non-citizenship, assimilation and integration, and others, rather than also looking at the individuals' agency towards their homeland. She is much more focused on the migratory patterns refugees decide on when fleeing or choosing to settle in certain places, rather than their potential to mobilize once they have. This thesis takes these

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93 Ibid., 151.
questions on, examining how once these communities are shaped and take hold in particular host countries, this shapes their mobilizations towards their homelands.

Other research has provided particular insight into Bosnian communities in particular countries. Franz’s research examines integration schemes in both Austria and the United States and the Bosnian immigrants and their assimilation processes through a comparative lens. She also stresses the importance of agency among the Bosnian refugees she interviews for her case study, around 25 from Austria (Vienna) and 20 from the United States (New York City). However, this kind of research demonstrates a limited engagement with the post-conflict dynamics of the homeland. Rather, the interest remains on integration in the host country, rather than post-conflict processes in the homeland and the politics as a result of which diaspora mobilize. Still, it provides a useful comparison of the challenges Bosnian refugees encountered between political legal frameworks in the United States and Austria. She brings to light the importance of the host land contexts and opens up the field to examine how diaspora mobilization is influenced by host country policies, as further examined throughout this thesis.

Perhaps the most concentrated research on Bosnian diaspora focuses on the case study of Bosnians in Sweden, often placed within the larger context of an ongoing discourse on integration within Swedish society and the welfare system. Eastmond notes Bosnians used the system to their advantage sometimes, gaining further entitlements based on their status as refugees, whether job placement or social benefits. She notes how Bosnian diaspora members were not interested in

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being labeled as victims, but wanted their prior lives and potential skills acknowledged in their new homeland.97

Further research has also focused on transnationalism and returnee dynamics with a particular look at the importance of local community dynamics. This research in turn speaks to the translocality research mentioned previously by examining the difficulties and risks associated with repatriation and reconstruction of one’s homeland.98 It calls into question that individuals might not consider themselves ‘diaspora’ because of the continued time they spend in BiH despite also living in their host countries. This becomes particularly salient for individuals who continue to be involved in their local communities in BiH, and who are in many ways more involved in their homeland as citizens than in their host land. It calls into question whether one can delineate clearly between homeland and host country and between individuals as diaspora or non-diaspora due to the time spent in BiH and, in many cases, the continued relationships they maintain on a local level within BiH.99

Different models for the homeland to connect with diaspora populations have been considered, if briefly, with circular migration, or diaspora retiring back in the homeland.100 This is also relevant when considering second-generation diaspora individuals, as relationships to the homeland can change depending on future generations, who have more ties to Sweden, as younger individuals have closer ties to Sweden and their Bosnian Swedish acquaintances rather than those

97 Ibid.
from the homeland. Eastmond also notes the negative impact Bosnians felt when they were separated in different parts of Sweden, away from others who had arrived with them from their respective hometowns. Hence, tracing the translocality variable, as will be done in the following chapters, is relevant in helping to examine how diaspora mobilization is shaped in different hostlands. For example, it can mean maintaining dual citizenship, two homes, and seasonal returns to a particular community in the homeland. The empirical chapters address these questions further with a particular emphasis on mobilization.

Further research on Bosnian diaspora in Sweden has addressed questions about the relationship between diaspora and conflict. It demonstrates reconciliatory attitudes are actually stronger and that identity politics seems to play a smaller role in diaspora members’ lives than previous theories indicate. They explain this through increased structural integration in diasporas’ host countries, primarily inclusion into societal institutions as well as the labor market. This data relies on a national survey of diaspora from former Yugoslavia, rather than interviewing, offering a more comprehensive look at attitudes within the population. Hall and Kostić stress that socio-cultural integration does not play a role in affecting reconciliatory attitudes. Socio-cultural integration refers to informal social ties with both Swedes but also with their host societies.

As such, their conclusion has potentially lasting impacts on how host

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countries look at diaspora groups and the effect they can play in mitigating the negative aspects of diasporic activity. Additionally, through surveys conducted in Sweden with Bosnian diaspora, as well as in BiH simultaneously, these authors show that diaspora favor multiculturalism and have a greater propensity towards forgiveness. In fact, due to certain exposures in the host country, diaspora can develop different views of conflict from homeland populations.\(^{105}\) This conclusion points to the fact that issues of transitional justice and the importance of these processes for post-conflict environments potentially have more importance to diaspora members.

Kostić and Hall’s research opens up the space for research on diaspora mobilization in light of transitional justice initiatives that seek to address post-conflict homelands, particularly considering that reconciliatory attitudes are higher than expected. This indicates the potential of diaspora as being more prone to cooperative initiatives that seek to reconcile relationships in the homeland as well. Hall furthers this thesis through his doctoral work using survey data, adding to the argument by also addressing the levels of biculturalism in Sweden, the host state country.

Biculturalism is ‘simultaneous identification with both one’s heritage culture and the dominant culture in the settlement country,’ as an acculturation strategy which is one of the most difficult, but also promising when considered in regards to diaspora’s reconciliatory attitudes.\(^{106}\) Here, Hall’s research points to the importance of recognizing the complexity of identity identification among Bosnian


diaspora in Sweden who ‘nurture a separate but inclusive Yugoslav (rather than ethnic) heritage.’\textsuperscript{107} By examining this individual-level variation among migrants within the Swedish incorporation regime, Hall’s research touches on similar themes to this thesis by examining initiatives of diaspora mobilization with the homeland in mind. This thesis departs from his research in an effort to examine actions rather than attitudes. Further, this dissertation also contributes to empirical knowledge through the French and German case studies, and brings new evidence to the already well researched Swedish case study.

More ethnographic studies of Bosnian refugees in Sweden present their integration challenges in finding employment. While limited in scope, they nonetheless also point to the importance of integration in the homeland. However, it also correctly notes that this is not the only validation for diaspora individuals. “One could say that especially those who experienced downward mobility make up for it, or “catch up” with their former status, through their children’s “appropriate” achievements in Sweden.”\textsuperscript{108} Today, their employment rates are comparable and higher, depending on the municipality in Sweden, than other refugee groups.\textsuperscript{109} For those who were unable to find work or were underemployed, the education opportunities and potential for their children gave them an impetus to remain in Sweden.

My own previous research has also focused on Bosnians in the United States and Sweden by documenting a specific example of transnational cultural production in response to the commemoration of the Srebrenica genocide. I argue that diaspora

\textsuperscript{107} Ibid. 99.
\textsuperscript{109} Ibid.
cultural production can help move beyond ethnonationalist public political debates evidenced in Bosnia and Herzegovina while reaffirming belonging to the diaspora in respective host countries. Through their emphasis on the importance of genocide recognition within a Bosnian context rather than within a particular Bosniak political narrative, diaspora communities differentiate themselves and their commemoration activities from many of those that are dominated by ethnonationalist discourses in the homeland.

The comparative element of not only different localities within the homeland but also varied host-states is an important contribution of this thesis. In particular, how certain collective claims gain more prominence in particular hostlands or among different diaspora communities is also explored. Koinova has discussed the importance of ‘unresolved traumatic issues,’ particularly Srebrenica remembrance in the Dutch hostland context. The involvement and inaction of Dutchbat soldiers in the events leading up the Srebrenica genocide are considered a contentious issue for diaspora individuals, particularly Bosniaks, in the Netherlands. Koinova shows that this leads to more sustained diaspora mobilization rather than episodic diaspora mobilization, furthering victim-based approaches of mobilization. She acknowledges the need for further comparison in other cases besides the Dutch one in an effort to examine whether traumatic contentious issues in which the hostland is not directly affected have an impact on the types of diaspora


mobilization.

Building on the importance of contextualizing and comparing diaspora mobilization across hostlands, in a joint article with Koinova, we linked diaspora mobilization with transitional justice, which will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter.\textsuperscript{113} The importance of this work in the context of literature on the Bosnian diaspora is that it emphasizes the spatial dynamics of diaspora mobilization, hence, the understanding of diaspora that they can try to affect change not just on the local level in the homeland, but also in the hostland, nationally, as well as globally. This will prove to be an interesting topic to pursue in more detail in future research as well and is addressed to a degree in this thesis through transnational diaspora initiatives. On a final note, this research informs the typology created in the following chapters and the variables which are examined more systematically in the empirical chapters.

2.5 Conclusion

With more than 2 million individuals who live outside of its borders, the Bosnian diaspora accounts for over half of the less than 4 million individuals who are considered to be living within BiH’s borders. While they are not a homogenous group, understanding the demographics and the historical background of this population, particularly its variations, including conflict-generated diaspora and guest workers, contributes to a better understanding about how individuals mobilize. BiH as a post-conflict state, while stable, does not provide the economic conditions for individuals to return, thus ensuring that BiH will continue to have a significant diaspora population for the foreseeable future. Bosnian citizens continue

\textsuperscript{113} Koinova, Maria, and Dženeta Karabegović. 2016. “Diasporas and Transitional Justice: Transnational Activism from Local to Global Levels of Engagement.” \textit{Global Networks}. 
to emigrate outside of the country in order to pursue better lives rather than face deteriorating economic conditions which include a 42% unemployment rate according to the Agency of Statistics in BiH, only further ensuring this.\textsuperscript{114} This chapter provided an overview of the politics of BiH as well as previous research on its diaspora.

The following chapter will review the existing literature on transitional justice as it relates to diaspora and diaspora mobilization, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the former Yugoslav states in more detail. It will examine the interconnections of diaspora research with transitional justice and peacebuilding in post-conflict states. Both host states as well as, increasingly, certain actors within the homeland, recognize the potential of engaging the diaspora population. Understanding the objectives of diaspora actors and their persistence about initiatives is imperative in better understanding how diaspora mobilization develops. It also informs about the role diaspora can play in their post-conflict homelands when it comes to issues of transitional justice and peacebuilding.

\textsuperscript{114} This information can be accessed on the Agency’s website at www.bhas.ba/ and is regularly updated, though has remained relatively stable around 42% over last few years.
Chapter 3 Insights from Diaspora Research on Peace and Conflict and Transitional Justice

The Bosnian diaspora is in large measure a conflict-generated diaspora, as the previous chapter has demonstrated. As a result of the conflicts that ensured due to the breakup of Yugoslavia, the region has generated a trove of empirical research from peace and conflict, transitional justice, democratization, and state-building literature. Research on diaspora has been focused in peace and conflict studies more thoroughly than it has in transitional justice literature. This chapter provides a review of diaspora literature within the context of peace and conflict followed by a section on transitional justice. A section that covers a variety of transitional justice research in the region follows, with a particular stress on Bosnia and Herzegovina considering the importance of the case study, both for these literatures as well as for the thesis. The aim of the chapter is to elucidate on the links between diaspora and transitional justice research in order to demonstrate how diaspora actors can influence these processes and should be considered as valuable potential partners.

Although the research examined naturally seems aligned to address each other, the following section lays out this intersection between the literatures more explicitly before concluding the chapter. The Bosnian diaspora case study can help to illuminate the lacuna of research at the intersection of these fields, which is burgeoning. At the same time, it posits the importance of the deeper theoretical and empirical interconnection between peace and conflict and transitional justice literature that come into focus when examining diaspora as mobilizing actors in post-conflict homelands.

Using the case study of Bosnian diaspora in a comparative perspective to show the influence of diaspora in transitional justice settings serves to bridge in more detail two strands of scholarship, but also provides the empirical evidence that demonstrates there is much greater potential to address relevant questions inherent in post-conflict weak states by doing so. Diaspora actors bring their own perspectives and attempt to influence post-conflict domestic politics, framing their activities within peacebuilding or transitional justice. It is worthwhile to examine in more detail how their activities differ from local governments and whether there are tensions.

3.1 Diaspora Research in Peace and Conflict Debates

Diaspora research has flourished due to its interdisciplinary nature. This section focuses on diaspora literature that falls more broadly within peace and conflict literature, tracing some of the trends. Diaspora in peace and conflict studies has evolved from dichotomous views as diaspora either being more extreme in their outlooks or encouraging peacebuilding, to a more nuanced understanding of diaspora.116

This academic debate can be traced back to the now infamous Collier and Hoeffler study at the World Bank in 2000. It offered a critical approach in relation to diaspora by focusing on the impact of remittances made by diaspora that support terrorist and criminal activity.117 Similarly, Kaldor reinforced this with the idea that diaspora groups are essential in the politics of new wars, with unrealistic notions and beliefs about their homeland that only serve to exacerbate conflicts.118 This led

to a number of responses, case study research, and new avenues of research into diaspora studies which continue to flourish amidst academic debates on migration, conflict, and peace, as well as policy discussions considering the more recent refugee crisis in Europe and the Middle East. This research has been integral in better understanding how diaspora mobilization can impact post-conflict processes in homelands as well as how host countries help to influence this diaspora mobilization.

A seminal volume analyzing the importance of diaspora in peace and conflict included a chapter drawing on numerous case studies and offering a rather comprehensive overview of diasporas as emerging important international actors. One of the chapters called for the development of a conceptual framework to look at the relationship between diasporas and homeland which incorporates different features in order to evaluate conflict process. This reflected an effort to include diaspora actors as part of conflict resolution. In each particular phase of a conflict, diaspora actors could be influential and thus improve knowledge about the complex relationships between diaspora, homeland and conflict. The framework takes into account political and diplomatic measures, economic and military support and socio-cultural impact, noting that diasporic influence can be positive, negative or neutral.

This conceptual framework represents a leap towards classifying diaspora involvement, signaling that diaspora influence is not on a binary spectrum simply between peace and conflict. It opens the field for diaspora in transitional justice,

economic development, and other post-conflict processes. At the same time, it emphasizes that diasporas can be both peace wreckers as well as peace makers, sometimes within the same conflict, depending on how conflict and post-conflict environments develop. Thus, nuanced understandings of diaspora as actors before, during, and after conflicts in their homeland need to be considered as there are dynamics in the homeland which influence these mobilizations. Overall, the book highlights how future research can typologize the influence of diaspora in light of pre and post-Cold War contexts, and then, following the events of September 11, 2001. It is worthwhile that the emphasis is often on the homeland rather than the hostland, where diaspora mobilization is initiated and can grow, something this thesis in turn explores, while nonetheless taking into account the homeland environment.

Other research analyzes the intricate, often complicated nature of different diaspora groups. Through their comparative case studies using Irish and Sri Lankan diaspora, Cochrane, Baser, and Swain demonstrate that diaspora groups are not inherently good or bad, but rather act in response to developments around them. This research demonstrates the complex relationships between diaspora and their home and host countries, especially over time. This is an important distinction to consider when examining diaspora within a comparative context. The impact of diaspora on both politics within the host country, in regards to immigration and integration debates, and within homelands on political and social change has been explored when it comes to conflict-generated diasporas. It is also an important

methodological distinction to make when studying diaspora actors, but also the process of diaspora mobilization.

Based on research with Kurdish, Irish, Ethiopian and Tamil diaspora populations, Østergaard-Nielsen’s work argues for political plurality and an increased dialogue between host country and diaspora representatives. She sees this as practical means to maximize diaspora’s interaction and role in conflict resolution, but also to minimize the perceived threat diasporas might represent in today’s securitized societies. In essence, by incorporating diasporas into conflict resolution, they can become part of the solution.

This approach is more amenable to addressing transitional justice scholarship as well, reviewed in further sections. It emphasizes how hostlands can help influence and steer diaspora mobilization in homelands through particular citizenship and integration policies which encourage maintenance of ties in the homeland as well as hostland. The connection between diaspora and peacebuilding potential can be considered as part of a ‘diaspora ethos,’ “defined as the attitude prevalent toward homeland as represented by the values and beliefs held by diaspora members or perpetuated by diaspora groups and organizations.”

Orjuela examines the different roles diasporas play in exacerbating conflict, but also examines how diaspora networks could ultimately encourage peace. Diaspora remittances only exacerbate problems between ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ in the local population in addition to not being used with long-term development as a goal but for personal and short-term needs. As such, she views that remittances

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often fuel violent conflicts further rather than encouraging peace. Regardless, Orjuela remains optimistic about diaspora development and humanitarian initiatives in the future that can work towards peace, in particular, diversity among diaspora populations. She argues coherently that identities are shaped differently in the conflict zone and the host country. As a result, the diaspora experience can “transcend” nationalist and highly politicized rhetoric as a result of the diversity in the host country or its policies, depending on context.\textsuperscript{125} Hence, the host land context increasingly comes into perspective when considering diaspora mobilization from a theoretical perspective.

When considering the engagement of diasporas within peace and conflict frameworks, Shain explores the relationships both along the lines of different case studies and how they operate within the US context, especially the difference between the Cold War and shortly thereafter. In effect, the lobbying efforts of different diaspora groups on behalf of their homelands is particularly important in this context, and Shain’s comparative analysis stresses the importance of understanding the influence of both the diaspora experience in the homeland and the hostland.\textsuperscript{126} The typology developed in the following chapter takes this into account with the citizenship regime variable which examines the host land context and its importance for diaspora mobilization.

Koinova builds on this by emphasizing the importance of hostland politics in which diaspora finds themselves, differentiating between ‘ad-hoc,’ ‘discursive,’ and ‘sustained’ diaspora mobilization. She finds that political developments within


\textsuperscript{126} Shain, Yossi. 1999. \textit{Marketing the American Creed Abroad: Diasporas in the U.S. and Their Homelands}. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
host countries, such as her compelling discussion and consideration of the effect of the rise of Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, can have an impact on reactions of the diaspora and result in increased levels of diaspora mobilization. Such work highlights the importance of the context in which diaspora finds itself embedded, and that this, in turn, affects how it will position itself and how it will act. This goes to show that while mobilization is increasingly becoming transnational, the influence and focus of politics remains local in many ways.

Baser’s monograph on diasporas and homeland conflicts elucidates this by focusing on how diaspora approach the Kurdish and Turkish questions in Sweden and Germany. By examining second generation diaspora members in both countries comparatively, she demonstrates how diaspora interpret and translate the politics of their homeland into the hostland. The transnational space and generational difference translates the conflict of the homeland into the host land space, sometimes ‘importing conflict,’ from the homeland, in particular in Germany. She demonstrates how diaspora continue to mobilize for their homelands, in essence reinterpreting grievances of their parents, even though they might not necessarily have connection to these homelands, as is the case for second generation diaspora members.

My thesis furthers this discussion by examining the effect of diaspora mobilization in a post-conflict environment in which peacebuilding continues and

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the transition to democracy and a market economy is ongoing.130 Understanding the influences of diaspora mobilization can in turn influence host country policy decisions in an attempt to channel diaspora in more productive ways. On one hand, this can strengthen state infrastructures after a conflict, but also engage with transitional justice and peacebuilding processes.

The following section introduces transitional justice scholarship, including empirically based work in the Balkans. By highlighting some of the significant developments in this literature, this thesis draws out parallels as well as different approaches to very similar questions, particularly involving homelands and post-conflict states.

3.2 A Brief Overview of Transitional Justice Scholarship

Ruti Teitel initially defined transitional justice as “the conception of justice associated with periods of political change, characterized by legal responses to confront the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor regimes.”131 In times of continuous transition, usually understood from authoritarianism towards more democratic regimes, transitional justice has increasingly come to the forefront not only of scholarship but also of policy discussions. The prevalence of transitional justice in both academic and policy debates has, over the last few decades, become increasingly mainstream and interdisciplinary, moving beyond the legal remedies towards an understanding of other mechanisms and broader conceptions of what transitional justice is.

Rather than wondering about transitional justice and its applicability, research has instead shifted to the details of implementation and programming of transitional justice mechanisms. New research trends in transitional justice can help to incorporate questions of power, gender, and inequality, introducing critical dimensions that have traditionally not been considered in detail. The field has achieved not only recognition but also legitimacy. This is perhaps notable most recently by the inclusion of transitional justice mechanisms in negotiations for peace in Colombia through the work of organizations such as the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ). Headquartered in New York City, it was founded in 2001 in order to address accountability after mass atrocity and human rights abuses through promoting the use of transitional justice mechanisms and frameworks.

The ICTJ defines transitional justice as a set of judicial and non-judicial measures implemented following grave human rights abuses by governments. As part of a holistic approach, they note that measures can include criminal prosecutions, truth commissions, reparations programs, institutional reforms, gender justice and memorialization efforts. This only highlights some of the ways a society can address transitional justice as most find a combination of approaches to be most effective.

From an academic perspective, Olsen et al. lay out the mechanisms of transitional justice focusing on the importance of the process about the timing as

133 The work of the International Center for Transitional Justice is most prominent here and their work in Colombia can be accessed in more detail here https://www.ictj.org/our-work/regions-and-countries/columbia.
well as their effectiveness. “These mechanisms fall into three broad overlapping categories: mechanisms of accountability for past crimes, including trials, truth commissions, and lustration policies; victim-oriented restorative justice mechanisms, including reparations, construction of monuments, and public memory projects; and mechanisms of security and peace, including amnesties and pardons, constitutional amendments and institutional reform.”

Thus, transitional justice is increasingly understood to encompass more than legal mechanisms such as war crimes trials, lustration, and amnesties. Rather than only retributive mechanisms, restorative justice mechanisms that involve more incremental societal changes that help to foster the transition after conflict or atrocity are also considered as part of the transitional justice ‘toolkit.’ Scholars have proposed studying the importance of broader societal changes, both through the lens of education as well as a more general lens including local and national levels of engagement as well as institutional change. This moves the implementation of transitional justice beyond the state to include a wider number of actors who can influence and shape transitional justice, and in turn, peace building projects.

Widening the field of potential transitional justice actors does not make ease these processes. Often, transitional periods can take decades, and it might not always be clear in which direction a transition is moving, whether towards a more amenable way of resolving past abuse or not. Each country, depending on timing,  

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the political will and the number of grievances, approaches transitional justice and peacebuilding efforts in different ways, adopting strong or weak measures, cooperating with international institutions, or coming up with alternative creative responses. Practical challenges arise which cause mounting criticism, regardless of the effectiveness of these mechanisms. Discussions about how ‘truth’ and historical narratives are difficult to resolve, particularly in countries that incorporate former perpetrators back into society. Tribunals are costly legal measures that do not penetrate on all societal levels. The Balkans are perhaps one of the best contemporary examples of this, with ongoing transitional justice processes that include both the traditional legal mechanisms such as the ICTY as well as wider approaches and attempts at traditional justice, explored in the following sections.

While there are maximalist, minimalist, moderate and holistic approaches, scholars agree that a balanced, cooperative approach is most effective. Olsen et al. present a systematic analysis of transitional mechanisms encompassing 161 countries’ approaches between 1970 and 2007 – a transitional justice database. These 161 cases include 848 examples of transitional justice mechanisms, with amnesties and trials being the most common (50% and 32% respectively). They conclude that the justice balance, the most effective way to get to transitional justice results, defined by safeguarding human rights and democracy, should include trials and amnesties, with truth commissions as an added benefit. They differentiate between negotiated transitions and regime collapse, noting that there is a difference in the implementation of transitional justice efforts depending on the way a

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transition has occurred. Thus, the importance of looking at transitional justice situations from a broader perspective, and in more inclusive rather than exclusive ways, becomes pertinent.

Transitional justice efforts often focus on governmental actors, or the implementation of mechanisms themselves, rather than transnational actors. This is in part because states or international institutions supported by states are traditionally understood as the actors who undertake transitional justice efforts. However, drivers for change in transitional justice processes, as evidenced by states after conflict or human rights abuses can also be based on the individual level.\(^\text{139}\) This has led to more recent scholarship, both in academia as well as in policy discussions, to understand how to approach transitional justice from below, or from local perspectives, rather than from legal, top-down, and often, ill-fitted approaches, can create impact.

These localized efforts at transitional justice have been the focus of scholarship more recently. In particular, the intersection of civil society and transitional justice and the impact of such efforts on the overall development of countries in transition is an important caveat to consider.\(^\text{140}\) The field has moved from more legalistic approaches to incorporating wider mechanisms as part of achieving transitional justice. Ruti Teitel notes the same in an essay in which she discusses the field in phases. This first phase of transitional justice is usually understood to incorporate the Nuremberg trials immediately following WWII


between 1945 and 1946 and the understanding that in order to deal with human rights abuses of past regimes, there was a need for international cooperation.\textsuperscript{141}

Teitel emphasizes that the second phase of transitional justice was characterized by a move towards more national solutions to transitional justice, balancing out approaches.\textsuperscript{142} It is during this period, from the 1980s to the 1990s in particular, that there is an increase in the number of truth and reconciliation commissions, as well as amnesties and pardons, igniting the debate in transitional justice between the importance of peace vs. justice and truth vs. justice.\textsuperscript{143} The debate about whether peace vs. justice, while far from resolved, is increasingly considered to be intertwined with peace and conflict studies in the sense that transitional justice mechanisms play a role recently concluded conflicts or those still ongoing. Instead, it increasingly incorporates peace and conflict approaches into the transitional justice literature, as evidenced in the following sections.\textsuperscript{144}

The third phase of transitional justice is notable for representing transitional justice as understood to be part of the process that states have to address following human rights abuses and conflict. There has been a proliferation of transitional justice, thus this phase can be considered as representative of ‘normalized’ and ‘global’ transitional justice.\textsuperscript{145} By no means are each of these phases exclusive from one another, rather they are thought to represent layers and the progression of the

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\textsuperscript{142} Ibid.
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\textsuperscript{144} For a more detailed account of this debate please see: Kersten, Mark. 2016. \textit{Justice in Conflict: The Effects of the International Criminal Court’s Interventions on Ending War and Building Peace}. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
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field. “They pile up and intermingle as new concerns and debates arise and are added to the mix.”\textsuperscript{146} Along these lines, there have increasingly been efforts to incorporate the ‘local’ into transitional justice efforts, with Sharp noting that it is represents both a ‘fourth turn’ in transitional justice as well as an ambivalence between local, bottom-up approaches and top-down, international approaches.\textsuperscript{147}

However, the emphasis on past abuses and finding ways to come to terms with these abuses has remained, regardless of the actors involved in these processes.\textsuperscript{148}

Before focusing on local approaches to transitional justice in the Balkans, it is important to lay out in more detail what this entails for scholars of transitional justice and beyond. This importance of engaging with localities in which the practical work of transitional justice happens is important. As McEvoy advocates, by embracing ‘thicker’ versions of transitional justice that incorporate more than legal measures, sophisticated theoretical understandings about justice can prevail, leading to intellectual development of the field as well as better understandings of the practical nature of applying transitional justice mechanisms in local communities.\textsuperscript{149} Using a more place-based approach in addressing these concerns ties well into topics of translocality this thesis addresses in future chapters as well.

In effect, examining transitional justice from local perspectives contributes to “a nuanced understanding of what justice, redress, and social reconstruction look


like from place-based standpoints.”

It opens up the field to address not only the legal responses as in the first phase of transitional justice, but also addresses wider questions intertwined with socioeconomic justice and ‘the periphery.’

Through this intertwining and exploration of the, at times, conflicting perspectives between the international and local points of view, the processes of transitional justice and post-conflict environments become more clear. As Sharp argues, this approach seeks to democratize the field “yielding a more just distribution of political and economic power in post-conflict societies,” as well as better integrate and learn from local approaches to, in turn, be able to utilize them in other contexts.

However, while localizing transitional justice is thought of as advancing the field, there remains ambivalence about what this means, and a critical perspective about whether it is necessarily better. Diaspora actors who mobilize both in their host countries and are intertwined in the local processes in their homeland are thus particularly relevant in order to theoretical as well as practical perspectives. Thus, per Sharp, I concur that “local and global therefore retain utility for purposes of both analysis and policymaking, even if they do not accurately describe the full complexity of transitional justice processes.”

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152 Ibid. 178.
By utilizing these lenses, transitional justice can draw on potential lessons between top-down processes as well as bottom-up processes. Weinstein and Fletcher demonstrate how legal professionals from a local area view the international mechanism of justice in which they are involved, questioning its effectiveness. After all, power dynamics remain in communities, regardless of their size and scope, and the importance of understanding particular contexts, particularly in transitional justice settings, remains at the very center of debates about bottom-up or top-down approaches.

The following section explores transitional justice research and local contexts by reviewing some of the relevant works related to the Balkans which touch on many of the theoretical developments in the field discussed in this section. While the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) remains one of the most prominent traditional transitional justice mechanisms, there is increasingly more research that provides layers and nuance to the region through the transitional justice lens, whether through civil society actors or transnational initiatives. In the remaining sections, I will incorporate diaspora potential in transitional justice.

3.3 Transitional Justice Research in the Context of the Balkans

The Balkans feature prominently in transitional justice research as the region is an important site of many transitional justice interventions. Scholars have been concerned with the importance of contextualizing transitional scholarship in the

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region. While the ICTY has traditionally been central to research in this area, this is not to discount other regional and local mechanisms that have had varied levels of success.\(^{157}\) In fact, much like elsewhere, today, local ownership is encouraged throughout the Balkans, whether as a means of peacebuilding, regarding transitional justice, or in order to resolve political stagnation.

The implementation of transitional justice and peacebuilding is particularly difficult in the post-conflict environment of BiH. A unified national narrative is not present in BiH, as the state itself is split into two entities with governmental figureheads advocating for their own versions of the truth. Thus, transitional justice and peacebuilding processes are difficult to implement on the national level. Memorialization efforts glorify one group while discounting the other, polarizing already fragile post-conflict countries.\(^{158}\) In BiH, this is especially the case, as memorialization processes are often the result of local initiatives and official narratives about memory are antagonistic and do not acknowledge or apologize for past abuses, a critical step in the transitional justice process.

Twenty years since the dissolution of Yugoslavia, each of the countries continues to cling to its own notions of what happened during the war, with the ICTY and other modes of transitional justice seen as ineffective both by the local population and some individuals in the diaspora due to the political agendas that fuel continued tensions regionally. Subotić eloquently coins this as ‘hijacked justice.’ Expectations for the ICTY were initially high yet the process of transitional


justice and the interplay between domestic politics and the political impact of the international institutions put into place did not converge with those expectations.159

The International Court for the Former Yugoslavia headquartered in The Hague has been the traditional, judicial, transitional justice mechanism in the region. While it has, in combination with local courts, brought about convictions and apprehended high-profile individuals including Ratko Mladić, the court’s impact on Bosnian society has indeed been difficult to pinpoint, in part due to competing domestic voices. Much of the population had high expectations in regards to the ICTY’s potential to achieve results regarding transitional justice, change within society, and reconciliation. Over the years, these expectations have dissipated, especially following the acquittal of Croatian Generals Gotovina and Markac in 2012.160

However, the Court’s primary objective is to try individuals within its limited appointment, not to explicitly serve as the main source of information and reconciliation efforts within Bosnian society, as authors have pointed out.161 Gordy’s monograph, for example, addresses this gap by examining the Serbian case. He chronicles how international transitional justice institutions are perceived and responded to in the domestic context, noting important nuances among the Serbian population despite prominent denial in the political sphere.162

In BiH, most of the population is unaware and uninformed of the number of cases that have gone through the judicial process. The OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina has only recently, in the spring of 2014, created an interactive map of war crimes cases adjudicated in BiH, thus providing citizens a tool to learn more about individual cases. For the diaspora, field work has shown that most members are similarly misinformed or unaware of proceedings unless covered extensively in the media, or if they are personally involved. Koinova has shown that those who live in the vicinity of the Hague and thus come into more frequent contact with the court’s activities, are generally more informed.

When asked about transitional justice, diaspora members involved in mobilizing usually scoff, noting that efforts of the courts have not brought any justice while everyone already knew the ‘truth.’ “Transition?! Ha! And justice? No, there is none. There is a long way to go,” one interviewee noted emphatically for example. This will be further discussed in the empirical chapters of the thesis, but is worthwhile to mention here to establish already existing links between how conflict-generated diaspora view transitional justice efforts in the region and perceive the need to act.

More recent research emphasizes transnational approaches that also stress the importance of local actors, particularly civil society. Over the last two

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decades, international institutions and governmental bodies such as the European Union have struggled to ensure that there are appropriate changes in the Bosnian system which lead to transitional justice mechanisms being implemented. Instead, civil society actors within the country have attempted to move these agendas forward, without much success due to a lack of political will by local politicians. There is ‘top down discourse embellished by a rhetoric of bottom-up empowerment’ when it comes to the relationship between NGO vs. civil society development in BiH.\textsuperscript{169} Nonetheless, smaller initiatives, often locally based and working towards building communities in a post-conflict environment foster relationships among citizens within that community but also a view towards a more viable economic future. They have proven to be relatively efficient, even though they remain understudied.\textsuperscript{170}

Scholars have contextualized the importance of the region, moving beyond considering it problematic and ‘other.’ Banjeglav suggests that a regional truth commission that would deal with atrocities of the past, how monuments are chosen, and how the narrative of the conflict that led to the breakup of Yugoslavia is discussed within public discourse would be relevant and provide a way to openly address and depoliticize pain suffered.\textsuperscript{171} Further research has suggested the development of RECOM, “a regional commission for the establishment of facts


about war crimes and other serious violations of human rights committed in the former Yugoslavia from January 1, 1991 until December 31, 2001.”

While it had much civil society support, without a proper mandate supported by politicians in the region, the RECOM coalition’s success remains questionable due to the lack of wider societal support across the region.

Duthie advocates to maximize transitional justice efforts and to increase their efficacy in general, regardless of the difficulties it might impose with additional actors. He advocates for engagement with those displaced by context within transitional justice efforts, something that it is usually not focused on due to “the practical challenges of addressing such a massive and complicated problem and of coordinating with other actors – with different mandates – already doing so.” This is particularly interesting as diaspora actors operate transnationally and can potentially partner with civil society actors, although this is not a topic explored by this research.

In the case of BiH, there are competing versions of history in each entity as well as within each ethnic group. The ICTY is a particularly contested institution. Much of the Serb population believes the ICTY and the Bosnian War Crimes Chamber have continuously targeted them. Fletcher and Weinstein echo this in

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172 The initiative’s website can be found at http://www.recom.link/.
175 Ibid.
their scholarship focused on a survey of legal professionals working on trials concerning the Bosnian context. “The truth is something that trials can acknowledge, but not something that legal processes are needed to discover.” 178 They stress the importance of synergy with other mechanisms in addition to trials in order for social repair within a community after conflict. They note that trials are limiting since they do not address the whole society, rather focusing on certain figureheads.

Ethnonationalist discourses on the topic within the country only serve to further antagonize the population and to separate public opinion and the Bosnian population rather than forwarding the society towards reconciliation through a more holistic approach. 179 Clark puts forth an argument that a locally based fact-finding commission using the model of a truth and reconciliation commission should be established in BiH, to further the capacity of the state. 180 This more inclusive process on a societal level implemented within BiH would give voice to those who felt slighted by purely judicial processes whose mandates do not include restorative justice mechanisms. At the same time, it would enable victims to share their stories.

When discussing transitional justice mechanisms that go beyond the judicial mechanisms of the ICTY, there have been civil society based initiatives dealing with issues of transitional justice who have, through a variety of efforts, implemented change, if not on a national, at least on a local level within BiH. At particularly relevant example is the Investigation and Documentation Center (IDC)

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179 Ibid.
which forwards a transitional justice agenda.  

Perhaps the biggest contribution of the IDC has been the so-called ‘Bosnian Book of the Dead,’ which has helped to establish the number of dead and missing (close to 100,000) as a result of the war in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995. This has in turn been verified by several international organizations and has become authoritative. Further, their work has been digitized and put online in a project called the Bosnian War Crimes Atlas, an online database which uses Google Earth technology to provide information about different sites where violence occurred during the war in BiH. It is interactive in that BiH citizens can submit information to the portal, which is then verified by the team, thus making the effort collaborative and public to anyone with access to the site.

Transitional justice scholarship has benefited from a rich number of cases in the former Yugoslavia, both examining international and legal mechanisms, as well as national responses, domestic and cross-border collaborations, and civil society initiatives. This section has laid out some of the more prominent among them. Considering the richness of the case studies, it is interesting to note that diaspora involvement has not been considered in this region, both from a theoretical or practical perspective as it has in countries such as Liberia. The potential influence of diaspora actors, while touched upon in this section, has not been

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addressed in a more systematic way in relation to transitional justice, though there has been some research on select diaspora members’ role in conflict in the region.185

3.4 Transitional Justice and Diaspora Research

Diaspora have previously proven effective partners in transitional justice processes and have thus demonstrated potential for change in their homelands with the resources they have learned or imported from their host countries. A prime example of this can be in collaborating in building truth commissions, participating in similar processes, and raising awareness of transitional justice efforts both abroad and at home.186 Focusing on the agency and importance of mechanisms in transitional justice, diaspora mobilization can greatly increase the potential of transitional justice processes. Such efforts can help to lead to the ultimate goal of transitional justice, reconciliation, which, in many ways, is only possible through the involvement of several actors on the ground, diaspora included.187

Most research to date has included case studies of diaspora involvement in transitional justice processes without much theoretical background or framing of how such mechanisms can be incorporated into a larger literature. Integrating diaspora and transitional justice scholarship is particularly salient when considering that most conflicts today generate large diaspora groups who have an increased impact on transitional justice throughout post-conflict processes. Duthie advocates

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for engagement with those displaced even though he understands that there are “the practical challenges of addressing such a massive and complicated problem and of coordinating with other actors – with different mandates – already doing so.”\textsuperscript{188} The applicability and implementation of transitional justice mechanisms in post-conflict settings is under examined, though it is a necessity advocated for by several scholars.\textsuperscript{189} Previous research on post-conflict BiH in regards to transitional justice and reconciliation has been slow to link it to its diaspora mobilization even though many diaspora mobilize in regards to transitional justice claims.

However, very little research addresses diaspora in these wider societal contexts as having the potential to further transitional justice objectives. For example, the Liberian Truth Commission gathered more than 1,600 statements from diaspora members living abroad and not only collaborated but also engaged diaspora members in the process in order to increase its effectiveness and also boost the legitimacy of the process. There was an inherent understanding that diaspora members are affected by the results of conflict and citizens who remain within the country, and that building a rapport with the Liberian diaspora community would, while being challenging, bring with it further benefits such as increased economic development.

The implementation of transitional justice within a society largely depends on the political will of the country’s political elite as bottom up processes of transitional justice, though successful in some countries, are usually more intensive due to the larger number of participants, and time consuming processes. Thus, the


politics of transitional justice, about the implementation of what mechanisms and when remains a contentious topic for pragmatic reasons but is an academically rife topic to explore. In particular, the discussion about which actors can play key roles in transitional justice, or even be spoilers, thus either blocking, mismanaging, or devolving the process, is one increasingly explored in the literature on transitional justice, yet the focus has not been on diaspora beyond case-specific research. This is relatively disappointing, as diaspora actors have particular insights into local processes. They understand how important interconnected processes of transitional justice and peacebuilding are in their post-conflict homelands.

Previous scholarship has addressed the relationship between diaspora and transitional justice using case studies and focusing on more traditional mechanisms of transitional justice such as truth commissions. Young and Park focus on truth commissions in East Timor and Sierra Leone, noting that diaspora participation has been incorporated.\textsuperscript{190} The US-based Liberian community helped to set up the Truth and Reconciliation Mission, as the majority became a diaspora directly related to the human rights violations for which the commission was set up for. Thus, by participating, they felt empowered in their homeland as well as participating in the transitional justice process.\textsuperscript{191} Hoogenboom and Quinn expand on the role of diaspora in transitional justice mechanisms as having potential to influence post-conflict homelands. They examine the diaspora influence in initiating the development of a Haitian Truth Commission from their diaspora community in

\textsuperscript{191} Ibid.
Montreal, Canada.\textsuperscript{192} The diaspora influence is further noted in bringing to justice Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet. A diaspora based lawyer who was responsible for filing a suit in order to invoke universal jurisdiction in Spain.\textsuperscript{193} More recently, comparative work on diaspora influence and transitional justice has begun to address the potential of diaspora in influencing transitional justice processes in post-conflict homelands. This kind of empirical work begins to unpack how diaspora influence in a variety of transitional justice processes is impacted. It focuses on the outcomes of the conflict, the diaspora profile, the nature of the human rights abuses, and the global contexts in which these processes play out.\textsuperscript{194}

In a joint paper with Koinova, we link transitional justice and diaspora mobilization at the site of a former concentration camp near Prijedor, Omarska, in an effort to show the development and evolution of diaspora efforts combined with returnee and local activists in BiH in a homeland context where a conflictual relationship with the local government exists. On a more theoretical basis, the paper demonstrates how through diaspora involvement moves from local, national, and global scales utilizing transnational actors who raise awareness and advocate for action.\textsuperscript{195}

Taking into account the burgeoning research at the intersection of diasporas and transitional justice, it is also important to examine the variation in diaspora mobilization comparatively across different host countries. This kind of


comparative work offers an interesting theoretical engagement with the field that has previously not been examined in more detail.

The Bosnian diaspora, a largely untapped resource that continues to keep up with developments in its homeland, is involved in its homeland politics, and their efforts warrant further academic examination. As this thesis demonstrates, this mobilization can help to forward community based approaches in incremental ways at least. Moreover, a typology of the potential diaspora mobilization can demonstrate a spectrum of diaspora mobilization around these issues that have not been examined previously. In this way, diaspora mobilization around issues of transitional justice and peace does not necessarily represent a bottom-up or a top-down approach, but rather a collaborative, side-by-side effort with civil society actors and others on the ground as well as state and international actors working on a multitude of levels.

3.5 Addressing the Nexus between Transitional Justice and Peace and Conflict through Diaspora Research

Considering the complicated domestic puzzles at hand, diaspora can prove an effective transitional justice partner in countries such as BiH. Transitional justice can be a mechanism driving diaspora mobilization, especially when one considers memorialization efforts and the numerous fundraising activities instituted in the diaspora for such projects, some of which will be addressed in the empirical chapters. Research on diaspora has not been explored in depth in this field, which is surprising considering the lively discussion of diaspora influence in peace studies and the interconnection between transitional justice and peace studies. In part, this is because transitional justice efforts are often focused on the countries and developments within those countries that lead to change, rather than transnational actors. While the previous section discussed some of the research that has attempted
to address this gap in more detail, this section examines the interrelationship between transitional justice and peace and conflict research in more depth to explore the potential of diaspora involvement which will be examined empirically in later chapters.

Hayner has noted the importance of record setting for transitional justice mechanisms such as truth commissions to clarify and minimize competing or new narratives from setting in.  

By exploring what motivates diaspora to undertake the kind of work traditionally reserved for states and courts when it comes to transitional justice, we can better understand processes of diaspora mobilization. This is particularly relevant if diaspora indeed do develop stronger reconciliatory attitudes in their host countries, as argued by Kostić and Hall.

Other authors develop theoretical frameworks that are useful to consider when employing transitional justice mechanisms, but do not include potential of external actors who can contribute and hamper these processes. Diaspora are such actors, often intimately connected to the processes but share different perspectives from local leadership or populations in their homelands. This relationship is important to consider, especially in the case of a diaspora such as the Bosnian one, many of whom often return and engage with the homeland.

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Transitional justice efforts have the potential to aid in reintegration processes and trust building for those displaced by conflict, especially in countries such as BiH. 199

The intersection between transitional justice and peacebuilding scholarship and practice in fact has been highlighted more recently in an effort to demonstrate the interplay between practical and conceptual challenges. This is noteworthy as there is little scholarship which aims to connect the two fields, thus making exchange of concepts, analysis, and practice as well as findings limited. 200 Focusing on post-Yugoslav case studies, the authors juxtapose similar turns in each literature that assert the importance of local ownership as well as the inclusion of justice in peace, creating ‘new possibilities for understanding the aftermath of conflict’ 201 and focusing on how communities address ‘subtle forms of dispossession and victimhood.’ 202

Often, local actors are not examined in detail and their contributions and challenges to peacebuilding and transitional justice not understood in depth. The rest of the essays in the volume focus on this in particular, though none of them address the potential influence of diaspora. Hronesova 203 focuses on victims groups who end up competing against one another for limited resources within a post-conflict system as a result of post-conflict dynamics while Lai demonstrates that local actors with socioeconomic justice agendas are marginalized from transitional

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201 Ibid. 9.
202 Ibid. 12.
justice discussions. O’Reilly examines the shortfalls of transitional justice and post-conflict processes in adequately addressing questions of gender, leaving local actors to take these on themselves through initiatives like the Women’s Court in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

A systematic analysis conducted by Miller and Lecy using an innovative methodological approach, ‘structured literature review’ by examining cross-citation efforts between literatures, confirms what the previously mentioned articles discuss using empirical examples. They find a limited amount of bridging between more legal approaches and what they consider ‘psycho-social’ approaches. “In practice, where one calls for the funding and administration of criminal tribunals and international courts, the other calls for facilitated dialogue groups and collaborative cross-community projects, which go far beyond participation in negotiations and agreements.” The authors contend that more interdisciplinary research between the two needs to happen, an effort to sharpen scholarship on the interactions between local and international actors as well as to enrich understanding of the complexity and conceptualizations of post-conflict settings.

Through the analysis of diaspora actors, the cleavages between local and international actors can be analyzed further and the gap between the literatures addressed. By examining diaspora mobilization, this thesis incorporates peace and conflict literature and transitional justice scholarship, contributing both empirical examples, as well as furthering theoretical knowledge. Hence, it contributes both to

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the diaspora research which has traditionally been more focused on peace and conflict research, as well as to transitional justice literature, where this is more of an emerging topic.

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter has not only highlighted previous literature on Bosnian diaspora and diaspora mobilization, but it has also shown the links between transitional justice and diaspora, looking at the potential of diaspora actors in furthering transitional justice processes, as well as links between diaspora and peace and conflict literature. Further chapters will address how diaspora engage with issues of transitional justice in their homelands, both from their host countries and transnationally.

Diaspora are increasingly recognized as viable actors in transitional justice processes and the existing literature examines processes on the local level and from bottom up perspectives. The translocal element of diaspora mobilization can shed further perspective on these approaches, as will be evidenced in the following chapters. In particular, these chapters will tease out how host countries influence diaspora mobilization, but also how the co-occurrence of other factors leads to different types of diaspora mobilization around issues of transitional justice and peacebuilding more broadly. This comparative engagement represents a novel contribution to these literatures and aims to bridge them in turn.

This discussion is especially applicable when considering the proliferation of literature on BiH and its governmental structures, political gridlock after Dayton, and transitional justice and peacebuilding related academic literature, without much of pointed and detailed examination about the involvement of diaspora. As Jones has argued, “only by paying attention to the ways in which institutional transformations play out within the context of transition can one understand the
potential for, and challenges to, postwar transition.” The following chapter will examine the research design and methodology. It will address the puzzle presented in previous chapters and outline how the pathways that diaspora mobilization can take in relation to transitional justice processes in post-conflict homelands will be analyzed.

Chapter 4 Research Design and Case Selection

Diaspora are external autonomous actors, but they are far from unified or homogenous. “This inherent diversity prevents any abusive generalization, as some diaspora members are highly politicized, while others are most certainly not.”208 They can be in opposition to on another, or alternately cooperate to further similar agendas among more populous communities. Diaspora thus cannot be categorized strictly through transnational, economic, ethnonational, cultural, historical, or political factors, nor through positive or negative influences.209 All continue to shape the diaspora, both from its perceived homeland, but also its host country or countries.210 In this way, the diaspora is not just transnational, but also particular in the unique communities on each host country level.211

Diaspora mobilization can take on engagement with a variety of claims, depending on these factors, and it is the mobilization through these claims that this thesis is interested in exploring. What kind of environment encourages mobilization? What kinds of claims help diaspora mobilization?

To gain a better understanding of how diaspora mobilize, it makes sense to examine this from a comparative perspective to better analyze how the contexts in

which diaspora finds itself influences mobilization. When looking at integration, the academic literature has argued that the level of integration in a host country affects how ‘extreme’ diaspora becomes.\textsuperscript{212} Thus, those who are not as well integrated find more orientation towards their homeland, becoming ‘long-distance nationalists,’ as Anderson’s now infamous research argued.\textsuperscript{213} On the other hand, diasporas who find themselves integrated into host countries can nonetheless mobilize, importing conflicts into their new communities in hybrid ways, potentially mobilizing differently than anticipated.\textsuperscript{214}

Thus, this thesis is concerned with typologizing diaspora mobilization, particularly conflict-generated diasporas. This chapter will briefly outline the puzzle of the thesis and proceed with the methodology of the research, noting the importance of the research design. It will then proceed with the conceptualization and operationalization of diaspora mobilization before moving on to introduce the hypotheses and the typological table that results from it. Then, it will highlight how a two-level comparative analysis will help to answer the puzzle of the thesis. It will also elaborate on the case selection. Further, this chapter outlines the fieldwork and provides a overview of the interviews undertaken for this research.

The central puzzle of the thesis is concerned with diaspora mobilization, in particular around claims related to transitional justice and fostering peace in post-conflict societies. How do conflict-generated diaspora utilize the political environments in which they are embedded to mobilize? By looking at diaspora


mobilization from a comparative perspective, I allow for a detailed look at the differences in homeland contexts to come to the forefront when diaspora mobilization is concerned, as well as the analysis of transnational cooperation when it comes to diaspora mobilization. Thus, the case selection is based on one homeland context, Bosnia and Herzegovina, with three different hostland contexts – Germany, France, and Sweden. Further, in the case of France, I also examine how the hostland context encourages transnational mobilization with Bosnian diaspora in Switzerland. In this way, the thesis aims to analyze diaspora mobilization through a transnational lens, by examining how different environments foster diaspora mobilization, both between host countries and between host and home countries. In a post-conflict environment such as BiH, it is important to understand the influence of external actors, whether institutions, other states, or non-state actors such as diaspora. In particular, the ways such actors can maintain or further peace or antagonism is integral to helping to move such environments to advance transitional justice and democratization goals.

Prior research demonstrates that the more integrated a diaspora is within a host country, the more of a role it can play in transferring liberal values to its homeland, 215 which in the case of post conflict societies is a particularly salient potential of diaspora mobilization. On the other hand, Koinova argues that diaspora are acutely aware of the environments in which they operate and thus can mobilize using different frames within their host countries, which in turn can sustain their activities. 216 In either case, diaspora mobilization results through the actions of


diaspora members who, within a smaller group, initially mobilize amongst each other, and then spark further engagement among the diaspora population through collective claims which resonate within the community. The following section will outline in more detail what this thesis is concerned with when discussing diaspora mobilization as well as operationalize it to better showcase the empirical data at hand.

4.1 Conceptualization and Operationalization of the Dependent Variable

In this thesis, I interested in examining and tracing the level of diaspora mobilization, the dependent variable. I conceptualize diaspora mobilization as acts and incentives by diaspora members in an organized fashion based on claims and goals rooted in the homeland as well as the hostland. In this thesis, I am interested in further exploring how collective claims rooted in transitional justice, the citizenship regimes of host countries, and the translocal community within the diaspora influence conflict-generated diaspora mobilization. In the case of diaspora mobilizing for collective claims, these are often made not only on behalf of the diaspora population, but local actors in the homeland population such as returnees as well, who might be affected by transitional processes in the homeland.

Diaspora mobilization has been examined from different perspectives in the academic literature. One strand of research focuses on diaspora as viable actors in civil war situations and their potential for influence. Other research has focused on the influence of diaspora and economic remittances, or to their significance in

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transnational networks. Empirical case studies have been particularly rich in examining the ways in which diaspora mobilize, both from political science as well as sociological perspectives. However, theorizing about mechanisms has been limited, particularly when considering diaspora mobilization in connection with transitional justice and peacebuilding related claims in post-conflict homelands.

There are nonetheless exceptions which inform this thesis and shape the thinking about examining diaspora mobilization as a dependent variable. Adamson focuses on transnational dynamics by examining the Kurdistan Worker’s Party and the Turkish state during the 1980s and 1990s. She treats diaspora mobilization in two different ways, both examining the process as well as the impacts of diaspora mobilization. She argues for studying mechanisms in order to learn more about the micro-processes involving diaspora actors in violent conflicts as well as the dynamics which might in turn help to influence them.

Koinova emphasizes the duration of as well as the channels through which diaspora mobilization occurs. She notes the importance of traumatic contentious issues which lead to sustained mobilization among conflict-generated diasporas. In the post-conflict time period, this contention remains a key driver of diaspora mobilization rather than conflict dynamics that might be at play. This article

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builds on Koinova’s previous work on different channels of mobilization. However, Koinova provides more comparative examples utilizing sovereignty based claims among Armenian, Albanian, and Palestinian diaspora groups in the United Kingdom. She examines the hostland’s foreign policy stances towards the diaspora groups’ claims as well as the diaspora’s positionality vis-à-vis the host state in helping to determine whether diaspora groups pursue transnational diaspora mobilization or not.223

The typology of diaspora mobilization developed here follows on these approaches but focuses on collective claims related to transitional justice and peacebuilding. Specifically, it is concerned with the post-conflict period rather than the mechanisms of diaspora mobilization during conflict. Thus, diaspora the pathways that lead to it are analyzed rather than their impact considering the transitional homeland environment which is influenced by a number of other factors. In this sense, it examines how different variables play a role in the process of diaspora mobilization comparatively, rather than focusing on the duration or particular channels of mobilization.

This does not discount the external factors which influence the potential of diaspora mobilization such as geopolitics, ongoing conflicts, or other internal political issues inherent to the homeland or the hostland. Some of these will be addressed in the empirical chapters as well, and considered more thoroughly in the conclusion of this thesis. These types of diaspora mobilization might also fall into either inactive or reactive diaspora mobilization types. At this point it is worthwhile

to introduce the four types of diaspora mobilization developed by incorporating typological theory with existing research on diaspora for this thesis.

*Inactive diaspora mobilization* is signified by a lack of transitional justice claims around which to mobilize. Thus, the diaspora finds other means to reinforce belonging to the diaspora society such as cultural activities without political engagement. This might include involvement in purely social activities with other diaspora members in order to build community, or it might involve taking trips together to socialize. It might even involve engagement within the hostland society. However, it does not include political activities geared at the homeland. In some ways, this mobilization echoes the mobilization that Koinova notes among Croat and Serb diasporas in the Netherlands who only mobilize sporadically in the post-conflict period.\(^2\)\(^2\)\(^4\) In this dissertation, inactive diaspora mobilization due to the lack of transitional justice based claims serves the role of also typologizing a negative case\(^2\)\(^2\)\(^5\) of diaspora mobilization. While diaspora might mobilize in other ways, they will not always mobilize around issues of transitional justice. It is nonetheless important to understand inactive diaspora mobilization in order to better examine why positive cases of diaspora mobilization occur and how these pathways might coincide.

*Reactive diaspora mobilization* on the other hand envisions diaspora mobilization in the sense that it does not engage with host country actors and instead focuses on individual diaspora members’ claims. It thus reacts on its own rather than building networks and attempting to mobilize larger groups within a diaspora community or across diaspora communities. On one hand, it can mean that reactive


diaspora mobilization can potentially sabotage post-conflict processes in terms of transitional justice and peacebuilding in the homeland since it does not cooperate nor coordinate with actors in either of the countries, nor transnationally. In this instance, reactive diaspora mobilization echoes the kind of diaspora involvement that can exacerbate conflict dynamics and is usually considered as representative of a lack of integration within hostlands. However, on the other hand, reactive diaspora mobilization can also mean that particular individuals within a hostland engage on their own initiative in order to affect change. This might be representative of particular individuals who feel they have more social capital in the homeland and thus are more likely to make overarching claims in reaction to the homeland.

Often, reactive diaspora mobilization is a result of not being part of a more vibrant diaspora community. In this way, diaspora mobilization would be a reaction to a lack not only of integration within the host community but also a lack of belonging to a local diaspora community, hence the lack of a translocal community. Reactive diaspora mobilization is further operationalized through a lack of connection with the homeland in regards to political claims and a lack of community around which to congregate in order to further claims.

*Involved diaspora mobilization* represents the most diversity of diaspora mobilization as well as the most comparative possibilities on two levels – between different hostlands, as well as within the same hostlands. Involved diaspora mobilization engages hostland resources and opportunities if possible, yet is at the same time signified by the potential of translocal community structures carrying out most of the diaspora mobilization, or collective claims mobilizing diaspora members towards action. An example thereof might be considered cooperation with a host country government in order to further diaspora claims. Involved diaspora
mobilization might occur in response to events that happen in the host country or political issues that are related to the diaspora or its status within the host country. In this situation, involved diaspora mobilization is exemplified through the engagement of diaspora actors who seek to become part of the dialogue within the host country in order to improve the image of the community or to further a particular claim or advance a goal of the community. Involved diaspora mobilization can foster more transnational diaspora mobilization in order to strengthen the overall impact of diaspora mobilization. This reflects on the examples that Koinova notes at diaspora mobilization in the United Kingdom.226

The final category of diaspora mobilization is engaged diaspora mobilization. In this type, diaspora mobilize in transnational ways and involve both local actors in the homeland as well as in the host country. Engaged diaspora mobilization is signified by diaspora action both in the host country as well as the homeland. The engagement in the homeland can be focused more locally on a particular community or may tackle more general issues in regards to transitional justice. In the host country, engaged diaspora mobilization is signified through involvement in host land politics as well as public engagement. Engaged diaspora mobilization shows the most agency in that it requires an engagement in both countries and a continued networking among its members who are ready to act and mobilize towards shared goals. Engaged diaspora mobilization is signified by the highest autonomy by its members, who act with particular goals for their homeland in mind. This can support or push policy in the homeland in a particular direction, as well as attempt to influence policy in the hostland. Engaged diaspora

mobilization is signified by its actors who are proactive and innovative in furthering their goals, and not only seek recognition but also want to have input into political-decision making. Engaged diaspora activists are interested in participating in decision-making. In this way, they can potentially also further their claims on a transnational basis, working with similar actors in other countries.

It must be noted this thesis is not interested in individual remittances and sporadic actions that might be considered a means of mobilization. Rather, the focus is understanding the process of diaspora mobilization that is organized through groups of individuals who share similar claims and in turn attempt to advance the transitional justice processes of their post-conflict homelands. The thesis seeks to understand how the factors present in their host countries influence this mobilization, and demonstrates this through comparative case studies.

4.2 Conceptualization and Operationalization of the Independent Variables

If we look at diaspora mobilization through the lens of engagement on four different levels, the question arises about how the homeland context influences diaspora mobilization, in particular across different host countries. There are three different independent variables this thesis considers for diaspora mobilization to take effect.

The first independent variable is the level of migration integration based on the openness of the incorporation regime of the host country. This variable takes low, medium and high as values, based on the differing citizenship regimes.\textsuperscript{227} The second independent variable is a translocal diaspora community, based on the homeland local community, though increasingly also in the diaspora community developed in the hostland. The third independent variable relates to claims, which

\textsuperscript{227} The ERC project utilizes Marc Howard’s classification in order to select the cases. Howard, Marc Morjè. \textit{The Politics of Citizenship in Europe.} New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
often revolve around issues of genocide remembrance and commemoration. The following three sections conceptualize and operationalize these three independent variables in more detail.

4.2.1 Citizenship Regime

The citizenship regime of a country indicates the host country environment an immigrant or refugee population might find itself in and represents the ways in which it is expected to integrate. In turn, how an immigrant or refugee population can participate in a host country can in turn influence how diaspora mobilize, whether their actions are focused only on the homeland or whether they choose to be active within the hostland as well.

The first independent variable is based on Howard’s ‘Citizenship Policy Index’ or CPI, as the rest of the research in the ERC ‘Diasporas and Contested Sovereignty’ project. Howard devised a coding scheme based on whether a country grants citizenship at birth, residency requirements that qualify individuals for naturalization, and the allowance of dual citizenship. The CPI was developed with the comparison of fifteen EU countries in mind, bringing citizenship to the forefront of a comparative politics framework. Even though most countries have liberalized their citizenship regimes over the last thirty years, he groups countries based on anti-immigrant sentiment and right-wing politics that have resulted in a restrictive backlash to account for the change of policies with similar values.228

The CPI values are calculated for EU countries in the 1980s and in 2008 with scores between 0 and 6. Zero represents the most restrictive citizenship regime and 6 represents the most liberal citizenship regime. Howard groups countries into

four different empirical chapters based on the liberalizing trends of citizenship regimes during this period. Sweden, Finland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Portugal were liberalizing their citizenship policies over this period. Austria, Denmark, Italy, Spain, and Greece are grouped as representative of ‘restrictive citizenship policies.’ Germany, a particular case, is examined as having partially liberalizing policies despite some backlash, and France, Belgium, the United Kingdom, and Ireland as having historically liberal citizenship regimes that have nonetheless had periods with citizenship battles in the political sphere.

As countries have liberalized citizenship regimes, their CPI values have also been adjusted. Germany, France and Sweden present a diverse set of cases along a spectrum of the CPI. Sweden, due to a liberalized policy has moved from 1.72 to 5.47. Germany’s partial liberalization is reflected in a move to 2.04 from 0. France, already considered liberal during the 1980s, has only been adjusted slightly to 4.97. This presents three values along the developed index of citizenship regimes. Moreover, considering that both Germany and France had substantial populations of Yugoslav citizens as guest workers, different waves of individuals from the region have been subject to changing citizenship regimes. Conflict-generated diaspora members who arrived in the 1990s were subject to particular citizenship regimes in each of the three countries examined. They exhibit varied levels of integration and feelings of belonging to adopted countries. For example, they might be more inclined to mobilize hostland institutions as citizens of those countries than those individuals who are not. As a result of the previous migration wave from the same region, the way the conflict-generated diaspora group interacts

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with those who might have different status as former guest workers might also differ.

I operationalize this variable using Howard’s framework. Using these four different values makes more sense than Howard’s initial CPI values only because it takes into account the historic dimension and change in citizenship policies that European countries have undergone, mentioned previously. Considering that many countries had Yugoslav guest worker migration and established migration trends under which Yugoslav, and later Bosnian citizens, fell, this independent variable is better to operationalize in this way rather than simply through the CPI. The four values are ‘Liberalizing Change,’ ‘Restrictive Continuity,’ ‘Partial Liberalization,’ and ‘Historically Liberal Countries.’ Sweden falls under the first category. Germany is considered ‘Partial Liberalization,’ while France is historically liberal.\textsuperscript{230}

While some of the conflict-generated diaspora throughout countries in Europe had previous experience, or where potentially guest workers themselves, the citizenship regime variable will help to determine how these individuals experience their host country and its politics. Sweden has liberalized its citizenship policy, thus ensuring that refugees and immigrants who arrive have a clear path to citizenship within five years. On the other hand, Germany, with several changes in its citizenship laws, particularly throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, complicated the path to citizenship for some of the diaspora population, as well as their children, who were not allowed to hold dual citizenship with Bosnia and Herzegovina until recently. In France, the path to citizenship as well as provisions for dual citizenship have been relatively similar to Sweden, yet there was already a particular guest

\textsuperscript{230} Ibid., 31.
worker community in France when the conflict-generated group arrived. Further, France, while allowing for citizenship, has somewhat different approaches to how its migrants are represented in the public sphere with more emphasis on French values than Sweden, which allows for more diverse approaches. Thus, in each of the cases the citizenship regime influences diaspora mobilization in different ways, which will also be explained further in each of the empirical chapters.

4.2.2 Translocal Diaspora Community

Local-level politics in the homeland are important to consider with conflict-generated diaspora. These local communities are the ones to which diaspora continue to have ties, yet to which they might not be able to return. When post-conflict homelands are concerned and the importance of local dynamics considered, the importance of a translocal community becomes rather apparent. These translocal ties form the basis of relationships among diaspora members and can reinforce and build community in the hostland. Thus, the second independent variable examines the presence or absence of a translocal diaspora community in the host country context.

Translocality, translocalism, and translocal are used interchangeably to emphasize the local-local connections within transnationalism.231 This can be thought of as a triadic relationship between “transmigrants, the localities to which they migrate, and their locality of origin.”232 This research stresses the importance

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of localized contexts for social action which can shape transnational processes. “Research on translocality primarily refers to how social relationships across locales shape transnational migrant networks, economic exchanges and diasporic space.”\textsuperscript{233} However, these ‘translocal’ connections, embedded in particular places that diaspora members maintain, have been largely unexplored in the literature on diaspora mobilization. The importance of social relationships between individuals that travel across borders and help to shape diaspora networks, this thesis argues, lies inherently in the translocal community presence. Hence, this thesis examines the importance of translocal community for diaspora mobilization.

Previous research has examined translocality from a geographical and anthropological perspective, by situating it in urban contexts or by stressing the importance of hometown associations in fostering relationships between homelands and host states. Translocal connections are the building blocks for hometown associations, and maintain their focus on their homeland, whether to send remittances or help organize migrant networks in their countries of settlement.\textsuperscript{234} Sinatti examines translocality among Senegalese in Italy, noting how connections made in the homeland, or based on the homeland, ultimately help immigrants to relate to one another and build community.\textsuperscript{235} Research on a rural South Indian village and its connection abroad in Singapore highlights the importance of the translocal connections as existing and bridging “the local community, the host society, to the homeland nation to a broader Hindu identity.”\textsuperscript{236} This thesis adopts

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this concept of translocality and seeks to apply how it influences diaspora mobilization.

I contend that diaspora mobilization happens especially in translocal communities, those remain rooted to the places to which they originally belonged, sometimes even on a small-scale level such as a specific village. In this way, these transnational networks are not strictly deterritorialized as they remained tied to one another through perceived shared connections.237

Halilovich focuses on translocality in Bosnian diaspora communities with an emphasis on their new homes. He notes that ‘trans-localism complements transnationalism, especially when debating forced displacement and the reconstruction and performance of local identities in refugee and migrant communities…’238 It is a shared connection of a place that helps to drive their mobilization as it binds them in the transnational spaces in which they find themselves, across different host countries and communities. This is no way particular to Bosnian communities, but in general to migrant communities, which might be clustered in their host countries by the localities in which they originally come from, for example, through chain migration.

The variable is dichotomous in that I differentiate between the presence or absence of a translocal community in the host country. I argue that translocal communities can be catalysts for diaspora mobilization. Shared memories, experiences, and perceptions of a place, usually the community in the homeland, and trust of one another enable mobilization. The translocal community manifests

in two different ways in the diaspora – either through formal hometown associations and connections, as noted in previous research, or through informal ties developed in diaspora that are based on shared belonging to a particular community, most often delineated by the original locality in the homeland. Formal hometown associations or factions of groups from one hometown or region are often very vocal and present among diaspora populations, and are thus readily discernible. Informal translocal community ties are teased out during fieldwork through semi-structured interviews with questions about diaspora mobilization related to localities in the hometown. Ultimately, translocality underlines the transnational connections that diaspora have but also emphasizes their situatedness in the places from which they come from as well as the places to which they migrate or to which they settle. Without examining whether there is a translocal community within the host country, diaspora mobilization cannot be understood completely.

Finally, utilizing translocal community as an independent variable implements the approach that Wimmer advocates for in thinking about research designs including diaspora, focusing on localities, individuals, class or institutional settings rather than simply ethnicity. This helps to shift the focus from ethnic origin, often at the center of discussions on BiH, and advocates for a more inclusive, multi-level research design that incorporates other mechanisms that potentially have an effect but are often neglected. “The obvious task ahead is to develop a


systematic comparative explanation of differences and similarities in the social and categorical boundaries that structure these [neighborhood] settings.\textsuperscript{241}

4.2.3 Collective Claims

The third independent variable focuses on collective claims made in relation to transitional justice or peacebuilding processes or grievances diaspora feel due to a lack thereof. When these claims are made effectively, diaspora mobilize in different ways. In a post-conflict homeland environment, claims are usually related to grievances regarding unfulfilled transitional justice goals towards which the diaspora mobilizes. BiH remains at an impasse when it comes to transitional justice implementation, as discussed in the previous chapters. Thus, there is a variety of grievances which could be iterated by the local community and the diaspora in order to become collective claims. It is particularly interesting to examine which claims diaspora utilize and how they mobilize over particular issues, as these often become defining claims for the diaspora to mobilize around. At the same time, examining these claims in different host lands provides further contextual analysis about the pathways to diaspora mobilization around these issues. By collective claim, I mean here the different ways in which diaspora expresses its frustrations and aims for peacebuilding and transitional justice to be implemented. This is not to discount mobilization that is not inherently political, such as on a cultural level involving social gatherings meant to reinforce connection to the diaspora community within a host country. Rather, the focus of this thesis is to examine the claims which have a particular transitional justice or peacebuilding perspective and which are, in turn, made by the diaspora repeatedly in order to mobilize. These collective claims help

\textsuperscript{241} Ibid., 47.
to strengthen diaspora mobilization and to maintain it at the same time as it brings individuals together.

Collective claims are often related to commemoration, attempting to correct for homeland political narratives. They are also often related to discrimination in the post-conflict period, particularly of returnees or minority populations, discriminatory practices in education, and claims about political corruption. Claims associated with transitional justice are concerned with furthering transitional justice processes, going beyond trials, truth commissions, investigations, and amnesties. In fact, collective claims utilized by diaspora reflect their attempts at civic engagement in the homeland. In this sense they help to influence bottom up approaches to transitional justice within the diaspora. This is important when considering that transitional justice activism is increasingly all-encompassing in regards to addressing transitions from conflict to post-conflict states, and often blurred with peacebuilding.

Often, diaspora respond most clearly to collective claims related to genocide recognition and remembrance, as evidenced through their transnational mobilization around the Srebrenica Genocide. How these claims are made in the diaspora in order to gain support will be examined throughout the thesis, in particular how such claims might be divisive for the community. Diaspora communities are also able to transcend these claims and translate them beyond its


244 Karabegović, Đženeta. 2014. “‘Što Te Nema?’: Transnational Cultural Production in the Diaspora in Response to the Srebrenica Genocide.” *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 20 (4): 455–75.
community to mobilize within the host countries as well. This thesis furthers this analysis by examining how claims in conjunction with the other two variables influence different outcomes of diaspora mobilization. They are observable in that they are placed at the forefront of diaspora activities, often given as motivation for mobilization, and reinforced repeatedly as a means of soliciting greater mobilization among diaspora.

### 4.3 Hypotheses

The table above represents the four types of diaspora mobilization as outcomes of the three different independent variables discussed in the preceding section. This typological approach leads to better comparison across different examples of diaspora mobilization and provides a framework for helping to explain the causal paths of diaspora mobilization from a theoretical perspective. Process tracing examines how these variables in conjunction with one another lead to different kinds of diaspora mobilization.

While the thesis explores four conceptualized levels of diaspora mobilization using the case studies, it starts with a simple assumption around the collective claim variable. This assumption can be expressed as follows: *In the absence of a collective claim being made, there will not be engaged diaspora mobilization for transitional justice.*

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Citizenship Regime</th>
<th>Collective Claim Made</th>
<th>Collective Claim not Made</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Presence of Translocal Community</td>
<td>Absence of Translocal Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberalizing Change</td>
<td>Engaged</td>
<td>Involved</td>
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<tr>
<td>Partial Liberalization</td>
<td>Involved</td>
<td>Involved</td>
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<tr>
<td>Restrictive Continuity</td>
<td>Involved</td>
<td>Reactive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historically Liberal Countries</td>
<td>Engaged</td>
<td>Reactive</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The table presented above leads to the following hypotheses:

**Hypothesis 1:** Open citizenship regimes, whether liberalizing or historically liberal, and the presence of a translocal community within them where collective claims take hold, lead to engaged diaspora mobilization. Thus, the more open the citizenship regime is, permitting diaspora to freely maintain and exercise its identity, as well as maintain dual citizenship, the more likely it is to take action and work with the host country as well as homeland organizations. Engaged diaspora mobilization reflects a wider repertoire of claims on which to mobilize and sustains this mobilization through engagement both in the hostland and homeland.

In turn, this reflects what Koinova describes about diaspora behavior by utilizing ‘the responsiveness of their host-state to these claims that helps sustain and expand their initial moderate behavior and prevent other diaspora individuals and
groups from becoming more radical over time. At the same time, this builds on Shain’s research reflecting on diasporas in an American context. Through this typology, it expands Shain’s research within a European context. Moreover, it demonstrates how a more open citizenship regime enables diaspora mobilization in potentially productive ways in the homeland and at the same time contributes to its development within the host land through more integration with host land institutions. The translocal community here plays an essential part in mobilizing a greater number of diaspora individuals and reinforcing its mobilization in a sustained manner. There is familiarity in these translocal connections that is only built further over time spent in the hostland.

I expect that in countries where there are larger translocal communities from BiH, there will be more diaspora mobilization, especially towards issues of transitional justice when that translocal community comes from corresponding communities in BiH, such as Prijedor. Previous research conducted points in this direction as well using examples from the Netherlands. Thus, this hypothesis seeks to explore this relationship in more detail.

\[ \text{(H1: Open citizenship regimes + presence of translocal community + collective claim made} \rightarrow \text{Engaged Diaspora Mobilization)} \]

**Hypothesis 2:** Open citizenship regimes that have liberalized more recently and the presence of collective claims without a translocal community lead to involved


diaspora mobilization. I hypothesize that there will be involved diaspora mobilization in the presence of collective claims and liberal citizenship regimes. But, due to the lack of translocal community, this diaspora mobilization will not be engaged. A translocal community allows for engaged diaspora mobilization to develop and flourish, enhancing it and rendering it as an important vehicle for mobilization among the group. However, involved diaspora mobilization could be symbolic of a high presence of diaspora entrepreneurs,\textsuperscript{250} rather than a larger translocal community, indicating that there are highly motivated individuals who, even without a translocal community, engage in sustained diaspora mobilization, likely on a transnational basis.

\textit{(H2: Open citizenship regimes + absence of translocal community + collective claim made $\rightarrow$ Involved Diaspora Mobilization)}

\textbf{Hypothesis 3:} Partially liberal citizenship regimes with collective claims lead to involved diaspora mobilization, regardless of the presence or absence of a translocal community. Similar to the hypothesized interaction of independent variables in Hypothesis 2, involved diaspora mobilization is predicted here. The partially liberal citizenship regime acts as a limiting factor to the kind of diaspora mobilization. This hypothesis emphasized the host country influence on the diaspora mobilization. Process-tracing during fieldwork illuminates how the same diaspora mobilization outcome is possible in different citizenship regimes. At the same time, this hypothesis also emphasizes the potential of transnational diaspora mobilization in citizenship regimes that are not fully open.

(H3: Partially liberal citizenship regimes + collective claim made → Involved Diaspora Mobilization)

**Hypothesis 4:** In a more closed citizenship regime, with the presence of a translocal community and collective claims made, there will be involved diaspora mobilization. Here, the interplay between the citizenship regime, the translocal community and the claims demonstrates the importance of the translocal community and the claim in interacting in order for diaspora mobilization to occur. Thus, this mobilization is similar to the mobilization hypothesized in the previous hypothesis, yet there is less involvement with the hostland politics due to the more restrictive regime.

(H4: Restrictive Citizenship Regimes + presence of translocal community + collective claim made → Involved Diaspora Mobilization)

**Hypothesis 5:** In a relatively closed citizenship regimes, as well as historically liberal countries that restrict their citizenship regimes, there will be reactive diaspora mobilization without a translocal community with a collective claim made.

The hypothesis qualifies previous academic work by denoting reactive diaspora mobilization as not producing desirable outcomes based on the closed integration regime, which does not foster participation of the diaspora community in the host land environment. Østergaard-Nielsen argues that “radicalization feeds on marginalization. If an organization is excluded from dialogue with host-country authorities it has less incentive to modify its aims and strategies.”251 In the case of

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251 Østergaard-Nielsen, Eva. 2006. “Diasporas and Conflict Resolution – Part of the Problem or Part of the
reactive diaspora mobilization, members might be considered more along the lines of a ‘confrontational actor.’\textsuperscript{252} Reactive diaspora mobilization is exemplified by individual diaspora members who act out in their host communities in order to gain a voice but are often unsuccessful in their endeavors due to a lack of engagement with both their host as well as homelands. Thus, they are unable to forward transitional justice goals in their homeland and might be considered disruptive. This can also lead to a perception of their lack of integration in the host land, or put simply, a lack of fitting in.

\textit{(H5: More restrictive citizenship or historically liberal regime + absence of translocal community + collective claim made $\rightarrow$ Reactive Diaspora Mobilization)}

\textbf{Hypothesis 6: Regardless of the type of citizenship regime and the presence or absence of a translocal community, there will be inactive diaspora mobilization, without collective claims made.} This hypothesis posits there needs to be a collective claim made to have diaspora mobilization for transitional justice or peacebuilding. Thus, the importance of claim-making and the context within which it is made is highlighted, a connection that academic literature is increasingly exploring, and one this thesis builds on.\textsuperscript{253}

\textit{(H6: Any citizenship regime + presence or absence of translocal community + absence of collective claims $\rightarrow$ Inactive Diaspora Mobilization)}

The following section will further explain the research design and case selection of this thesis to explore how the causal relationships posited by the

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hypotheses will be examined. The empirical cases help to examine the typologies created and allow for further development as well as a more detailed understanding of the processes leading to each of the types of diaspora mobilization developed by the typological theory.254

4.4 Comparative Method and Case Selection

This study is based on a qualitative research design using a two-level comparative lens, focusing on three countries (Germany, France and Sweden) with Bosnian diaspora populations as well as different cities within BiH (namely Prijedor, Banja Luka, Sarajevo, and Srebrenica).255 Three different cases enable a more in-depth analysis while at the same time encouraging comparative analysis. The four cities serve as translocal sites of diaspora mobilization. One of the strengths of the comparative approach is that it aims to analyze why the differences in policy lead to different outcomes, in this case, varied diaspora mobilization. Examining diaspora mobilization on the spectrum of integration regimes aids the typological analysis. Each of the countries has fostered different types of mobilization and teasing out these differences is a key feature of this thesis.

Lijphart outlines four different strategies to strengthen the comparative method – increasing the number of cases as much as possible, reducing the ‘property-space’ of the analysis, focusing on ‘comparable’ cases, and focusing on ‘key’ variables.256 His seminal article remains a lucid account of the main challenges and advantages of the comparative method and is thus valid to utilize

here. His suggestions have been considered in the development of the research design and are discussed further in this section. The thesis employs these different strategies and attempts to rectify the challenges of using case studies in combination with the comparative method – namely, external validity.

The three countries were chosen for four reasons. First, each country case can be represented on the continuum of citizenship regimes. Thus, they are comparable based on the first independent variable and elucidate the significance of citizenship regimes for diaspora mobilization. Using Howard’s framework, as discussed in the previous section, Sweden and France are both liberal countries, though Sweden is a more recent adapter, while France is considered ‘Historically Liberal.’ Germany is country that is considered as partially liberal, having undergone many changes in its citizenship regime.

Second, each of these three countries hosted guest workers from the previous regime (Yugoslavia), and each country was the recipient of conflict-generated diaspora during the 1990s. Sweden hosted the least guest workers, yet accepted a high number of refugees. Germany hosted the highest number of guest workers and also accepted the highest number of refugees, though most of them did not stay in Germany over the long-term. France had a stable yet low number of guest workers and accepted a lower number of refugees. The different dynamics are explored further through process-tracing, discussed in the next section.

Thirdly, each of the three country cases provides different environments for translocal communities to develop, both as a result of a combination of former guest workers and refugees, or diaspora communities that develop in the hostland based on similar transnational experiences they share. This has been explored with the hypotheses and the typology noted above. The strength of local communities and
feeling of membership as part of that community is something that has been acknowledged within the academic literature within BiH. I am interested in seeing how these relationships hold and sustain themselves when individuals live in diasporic spaces. At the same time, the comparative lens on the level of the hostland countries will explore the new relationships that diaspora build among themselves when mobilizing in new communities and how these new environments encourage or discourage such actions. Thus, the two-level comparison allows for tracing the combination of both host country and local influences.

Finally, these three countries provide different environments for transitional justice based collective claims to take hold. Having three different country cases provides the opportunity to explore potential collective claims and explore how they take different shape in different citizenship regimes and translocal diaspora communities. The second level of comparative analysis is also helpful in examining collective claims as localities in the homeland can serve to activate particular claims within particular diaspora communities. Here the interaction between translocal community and collective claims are highlighted through process-tracing, as discussed in this chapter.

Banja Luka and Sarajevo are the two largest urban centers in BiH, while Prijedor and Srebrenica are both smaller cities. The demographic picture in each of the four localities has changed as a result of the war, with some return in each of the cities as well internal migration flows. Prijedor stands out as there has been a larger number of returnees to Prijedor than to Banja Luka. As a result, Prijedor and

its surrounding region should also have more translocal connection across the globe. These local elements have different implications on the way that diaspora mobilize on issues of transitional justice, depending on the actors they have on the ground as well as abroad to help them further their claims.

Thus, understanding the importance of the factors in the host countries becomes essential in understanding how diaspora mobilization might differ. At the same time, this will become evident when examining the translocal community. While diaspora mobilization examined in this thesis is not exclusive to these four cities, they provide a strong starting point due to different potential collective claims that can arise from each of them. The local communities in the homeland today look different demographically than they did in pre-war BiH. At the same time, neither Prijedor and Srebrenica are mono-ethnic communities today.258

4.5 Process Tracing and Typology

This thesis utilizes process tracing as one of the main methods to examine how diaspora mobilization develops, diffuses, and continues to influence in the post-conflict setting. As George and Bennett explained in their exemplary methods book on case studies, ‘Process tracing provides a check on whether the explanations developed from typological comparisons are spurious.’259 By using a two-level approach, both in different countries as well as different localities, I can draw on and compare not only several types of diaspora mobilization but also variety among them.


Process tracing helps to explain how diaspora mobilization takes place, adding a structured and focused comparative element when examining the typological analysis.\textsuperscript{260} It lends itself well to “to the study of the intentional behavior of individuals and organizations because this often involves the use of qualitative variables that are difficult though not necessarily impossible to quantify in a fruitful way.”\textsuperscript{261} The Bosnian diaspora in Sweden organizes in part through diaspora associations for youth, women, and hometown associations in combination with ‘clubs,’ centered in a variety of Swedish towns and cities where diaspora members meet, gather, and organize. In many ways, this diaspora is the most visible of the three, both in the host country as well as the homeland. Their focus on projects that raise the visibility of their community both in Sweden and BiH is interesting in itself. The German diaspora population from BiH is complex in that there is a large group that is second generation, some of the so-called original \textit{Gastarbeiter} (guest workers), who migrated to Germany before the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Thus, the wave of Bosnian refugees accepted by Germany during the 1990s had a sizeable network to interact with. This created specific dynamics and relationships within the host land, different from other countries.\textsuperscript{262} The diaspora population in France is the most understudied and the empirical contributions of this thesis will cast a new light on the types of mobilization present there.

Thus, hypotheses and the typology developed can be tested and potentially improved on. I am interested not only in purely successful efforts, but also how they might change over time or ultimately fail. Even failed initiatives are of interest as


the process by which they a group of individuals mobilizes to forward these claims contributes to a more succinct understanding. This will help to adjust the typology if necessary and to add further independent variables, which might be causally relevant for diaspora mobilization. Here, the process retains the significance as it tries to identify how diaspora mobilization happens in different settings and what contributes to it, thus identifying the intervening causal process between the independent variable and the outcome of the dependent variable.\textsuperscript{263} Interview data and participant observation during fieldwork is supplemented with data from a variety of media sources chronicling processes as they occur.

\textbf{4.6 Interviews and Field Work}

Semi-structured interviews with diaspora actors elucidate on their engagement processes, but also inform comparative analysis of individuals’ experiences. They also shed lid on their understandings of the homeland and host land contexts in which they mobilize. Diaspora members are aware of each other’s transnational activities, sometimes even collaborating together, as will be discussed further in Chapter 5. During interviews, diaspora members interviewed would remark on the activities of Bosnians in the United States, or in Norway, or the UK, and in turn question the researcher about these further. One respondent mused, responding to his own question, “I mean, we all know how well they are organized in Sweden, but what is it like in the US? They work so much, they don’t even have time for the community.”\textsuperscript{264}

Diaspora members were interviewed in each of the three countries where diaspora mobilization was analyzed: Sweden, France, and Germany. Interviews

\textsuperscript{263} Ibid., 205-206.
\textsuperscript{264} Respondent DE24 (2014) Interview in October, Munich, Germany.
including probing question about what motivates individuals to mobilize, how the experience within their host countries influenced these decisions, or whether other factors did so as well, and to what extent. The questions draw both on actual events and activities they have participated in as well as their political views about events, which might, in turn, motivate their actions. Further interviews were conducted in Switzerland in order to capture transnational diaspora mobilization in France, as well as the United Kingdom and the United States, in order to triangulate information gained from interviews.

The questions asked were similar in each country, depending on the individual being interviewed, thus allowing for structured comparison.265 This allows for comparison of the mechanisms of diaspora mobilization originating in the different host countries. Interviews and participant observation combine positivist and reflexive scientific methods. Further, this inductive approach moves towards middle range generalization using specific cases, in an effort “to move from the ‘micro’ to the ‘macro.’”266

Lastly, interviews were conducted in Bosnia and Herzegovina during participant observations of commemoration and diaspora organized events, as well as with returnees who collaborate with diaspora actors, and Bosnian government officials and civil society actors. Moreover, several focus groups were organized in order to gather information in both France and Bosnia and Herzegovina, in order to capture the uniformity of opinions by diaspora members or returnees, respectively. Interviews with the Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees and several other Bosnian politicians and institutions helped to shed light on the way the diaspora is


perceived as well as how its significance and political potential within Bosnia and Herzegovina is considered. Conclusions drawn in the thesis were informed by these interviews, focus groups, as well as the fieldwork conducted and are referenced by footnotes throughout the thesis. A more detailed interview guide can be found in the Appendix of this thesis.

The average time of interviews was 90 minutes, though some interviews were considerably longer due to interviewees’ desire to relay biographical data at the beginning of the interview. Interviewees ranged in age from their late 20s to their late 70s, with the majority of individuals in theirs 30s to 50s. A third of the interviewees were women. 25 interviewees, about a quarter, noted they were not Bosniak. More than three quarters of the interviewees stressed they were Bosnian and did not want to be classified only by their ethnic background, as mentioned in the introductory chapter. The individuals who explained they were not Bosnian but Bosniak diaspora members were from the Sandžak region in Serbia and Montenegro. There were no interviewees who were Bosnian Serbs or Bosnian Croats who felt the need to accentuate that. Instead, they simply called themselves ‘Bosnian’ in the same way that Bosnian Muslims also did more often than identifying themselves as exclusively Bosniak. All of the interviewees were involved with initiatives or were in leadership positions in diaspora organizations in their communities, or had insights about the community in their professional lives. In Germany and France, several of the interviewees had experience as guest workers prior to the war, and then as conflict-generated diaspora during and after the war. They maintained different levels of contact with the homeland, including individuals who spent months in BiH on an annual basis. However, most of them spend the majority of their time in their host countries, most of them have dual
citizenships or permanent residence statuses in their host countries, and are involved in their new communities in a variety of ways.

The information gained in interviews was triangulated using a variety of primary and secondary sources in Bosnian, German, Swedish, and English. These included academic books, articles, working papers as well as reports and policy papers published by non-governmental organizations, political party documents, news websites, as well as diaspora Facebook sites. Additional information has been gathered through further conversations with journalists and through participant observation. These have included rallies, cultural gatherings, commemoration ceremonies, diaspora organization meetings to which the author was privy to, embassy events, as well as events where diaspora met with non-diaspora in their homelands to promote their activism.

Attendance at these events helped to contextualize how diaspora see the world and how they communicate amongst each other as well as continue to build their translocal communities. I had repeated interactions with a majority of the interviewees either through follow-up e-mails or phone calls or through attendance at the aforementioned events. Though there are always methodological challenges with this kind of research, I sought to triangulate the information and the process tracing for this thesis in a comprehensive way through this approach. The following section will discuss in more detail issues of positionality that I encountered as a researcher as well as how I addressed my own potential bias.

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267 There are several Facebook groups that diaspora is particularly active on. These include more specific groups such as the Čvari Omarske / Guardians of Omarska, Svjetski Savez Dijaspore Bosne i Hercegovine, as well as more general groups such as DIJASPORA BiH.

4.7 Positionality of the Researcher

Academic debate in the field of political science ethnography has a rich tradition in regards to the importance of ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ statuses as well as the implications thereof on fieldwork. A more recent volume provides a good overview of the limited ways in which political science methods have moved towards pushing researchers to not only consider their positionality but also the power of their authorship and their interviewees and informants’ participation in the research process. Perhaps in an effort to encourage this kind of reflexivity, they note it is interviewees appreciate honest exchanges and a demonstrable understanding of the researcher’s role as it helps to build trust but also reinforces more rigorous processes during fieldwork.

Further, the insider-outside divide has been examined in migration research and problematized. In particular, five different types of ‘third positions’ that a researcher might find themselves in, ranging from an ‘explicit third party’ position to an ‘apparent insider’ have been considered. “It is conceivable that an ethno-national insider researcher would want to emphasize insider status as source of legitimacy and authority, but that the informants would see the researcher as a clear outsider on other grounds.” This continuum of insider-outsider is defined through markers including name, age, and gender, but also considers markers such as

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language skills as well as language used, cultural competence, sustained commitment, religion and migration experiences.

I identified with the position of an ‘apparent insider,’ though this varied depending on the country in which I was doing fieldwork, complicating my positionality further. From the initial planning of this thesis, to conducting fieldwork, to writing, I have been acutely aware of the hybrid position I hold in relation to my research informants, and the potential benefits as well as drawbacks this brings to how I conduct my research. As an individual born in Yugoslavia, with a grandmother who was married to a Gastarbeiter and lived in Germany since the 1980s, my family and I escaped Banja Luka, my hometown, to become refugees in Germany, by virtue of this connection. In the late 1990s, we immigrated to the United States. Finding initial interviewees in Germany who would be able to provide more historical perspectives about Bosnians in Germany proved to be easier by virtue of utilizing my parents’ knowledge of the community during the early 1990s. Due to my previous research in Sweden, I had also already developed relationships with diaspora organizations and diaspora representatives, which eased data gathering and provided me references to mention when contacting potential interviewees. This presented more of an initial challenge in France, in part also due to my limited knowledge of French. Nonetheless, by virtue of being Bosnian, and speaking, reading, and writing the language fluently, I was able to contact and gain access to communities which might otherwise be reluctant to respond to interview requests. What they perceived as a shared identity helped me to promote richer data gathering. Further, by virtue of my ‘insider knowledge,’ I was able to draw on analytical insights that could be lost on a researcher without ‘diaspora’ experience.
Often, interviewees assumed my political leanings, or understanding of certain dynamics because of my name,\(^{272}\) or the knowledge they gathered of my background. In interviews as well as exchanges with one another, diaspora members often asked when I was last ‘down there,’ referring both to BiH in general, as well as the local community in Banja Luka, if applicable. During interviews as well as participant observation at diaspora events, I was often asked what kind of coffee I drink, in part to establish a mutual connection, but on another level, in order to assert a level of authenticity which might otherwise be questioned for a variety of reasons, including my age. While this might initially sound strange to a reader unfamiliar with Balkan coffee culture, it is something diaspora members are acutely aware of. During interviews, it was often noted that they had made Bosnian coffee rather than espresso or drip coffee which they might otherwise drink by themselves, without other Bosnians around, especially for me. One interviewee noted, “This interview feels extra special because I made Bosnian coffee.”\(^{273}\)

As a researcher, understanding some of these subtle differences led to building trust with interviewees by showing knowledge of their own region as well as understanding how to differentiate it from the regional cuisine of another part of the country. While cuisine tends to be one of the clearest examples, any similar cultural markers also apply, from greetings, dress, to popular culture knowledge and ability to reference it back to diaspora members. Sometimes, these cultural norms might be translated in unique ways and incorporated into host land contexts

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\(^{272}\) One’s ‘ethnic background’ as Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat, or Bosnian Serb can often be assumed by either the first name or the last name. In my case, there are strong Bosnian Muslim connotations as my first name means Heaven or Paradise in Arabic and is generally rare.

\(^{273}\) Respondent SWE7 (2014) Interview in June, Varnamo, Sweden
such as home decorations, which mimic those in Bosnia, with additional American or Swedish influences, as Halilovich also notes in his research with diaspora.274

However, as an apparent insider, there are often situations where a researcher might feel that they are also considered a potential collaborator of the diaspora due to the level of perceived ‘familiarity.’ Understanding and managing expectations of diaspora as well as local dynamics in both their host country community as well as the local politics in the homeland remained highly relevant throughout my fieldwork. Often, I reinforced my own political neutrality in explaining why I did not engage in political discussions with diaspora members, but rather wanted to know their opinions and reflections.

On a final note, I was surprised to find how often language skills were invoked during my fieldwork. Language remains a key marker, in particular in migrant oriented settings where retention of language can be seen as an important tool in maintaining contact with a homeland. Almost two decades following much of Bosnian diaspora’s arrival in various countries across Europe, fluency in the native language is particularly treasured and appreciated, as many, in particular second generation individuals, as well as those who arrived in their host countries at younger ages, are less skilled at speaking their native languages without foreign accents or grammatical errors. Throughout my fieldwork, the ease with which I used Bosnian, as my level of fluency in the language, something I took for granted, was repeatedly remarked upon by interviewees. Thus, I was often perceived as more ‘Bosnian’ than ‘diaspora,’ and in part, I felt, taken more seriously.

4.8 Conclusion

This chapter has focused on the research design and case selection, addressing methodological questions as well as setting out the perspective of the researcher as an apparent insider. The dependent variable, diaspora mobilization, was conceptualized and operationalized, as well as the three independent variables: citizenship regime, translocal community, and collective claims. The chapter also introduced the typology of diaspora mobilization for transitional justice claims as well as the hypotheses this generated as a result.

In the section thereafter, I moved on to further elucidate on the comparative method as well as the two-level research design including case selection. In particular, it also highlighted the qualitative research methods used and their applicability for this research, as well as their complementarity in helping researchers trace causal relationships. The chapter concluded with a section about the unique positionality of the researcher with diaspora, in diaspora, as diaspora and the advantages as well as challenges this presented during fieldwork.

The following three chapters will apply the research design developed in this chapter and discuss the empirical findings of the field work in Sweden, Germany, and France respectively. They will tease out the differences between the three cases, as well as within the cases themselves, to generate a better understanding of the host land environments and their influence on diaspora mobilization, as well as the pertinence of translocal community in the hostlands, and the collective claims which are used to encourage mobilization in the first place.
Chapter 5 Bosnian Diaspora in Sweden – Modeling Citizenship

Transnationally

The underlying question of this thesis is interested in the pathways of diaspora mobilization in different political environments. The Swedish case study, representative of an open citizenship regime, is thus an important one to consider in regards to diaspora organization, integration, transnational activities, and ultimately, diaspora mobilization. It provides a valuable comparative case study to examine how mobilization emerges, how it is triggered, and how it persists. The typological model introduced in previous chapters hypothesizes three different types of mobilization to be discernable in Sweden as a state representative of the ‘Liberalizing Change’ citizenship regime: engaged, involved, and inactive. In the model, the engaged category remains singular, as a result of the presence of a translocal community as well as an open citizenship regime, when collective claims are made. Involved and inactive diaspora mobilization are also possible in other citizenship regimes. This corresponds to hypotheses 1, 2, and 6. The empirical data will show the variation between engaged and involved diaspora mobilization as well as elaborate on examples of inactive mobilization. In engaged diaspora mobilization, each of the independent variables play a demonstrable role in mobilization, whereas in involved and inactive mobilization, the presence or absence of a translocal community or collective claims help to determine what kind of diaspora mobilization will result. This variation will continue to be drawn upon throughout the following chapters as well.

While previous studies are insightful about the integration of Bosnians in Sweden, echoing the research in migration, political perceptions and levels of diaspora mobilization remain understudied, as demonstrated in Chapter 2. It is
certainly true that there are Bosnian Swedes who have run or hold political office in Sweden, such as Aida Hadžialić,275 Amna Ibršagić, and Jasenko Selimović, to name a few. However, how Bosnian Swedish diaspora members mobilize towards with a focus on contentious issues that are at the heart of transitional justice and peacebuilding debates has not been explored in more detail. Diaspora understanding of what incorporates transitional justice is representative of broader understandings and is firmly rooted in the belief about the potential of activism by citizens to further these agendas.276 This chapter tests the hypotheses generated by the typology in the previous chapters using the Swedish case study. The following section provides some of the context of Bosnian diaspora in Sweden. It provides a unique case study not just for Sweden, but generally on migration and integration of refugee populations debates.

5.1 Overview of Bosnian Organizations and Diaspora in Sweden

Previous studies have placed the number of diaspora members at an estimated 80,000 individuals.277 According to Statistics Sweden, as of 2014, there were a little over 57,000 Bosnian born individuals living in Sweden, with around 39,000 with Swedish citizenship, acquired between 2000 and 2014. The same agency reports that around 6,500 individuals have Bosnian citizenship without a Swedish citizenship as of 2014. This number has declined from a high of over 55,000 people in 1996. According to the same, there are approximately 72,000 people born in

275 Aida Hadžialić resigned from her position as Minister for Upper Secondary School, Adult Education and Training in August 2016 after a random police stop while driving across the Öresunds bridge between Denmark and Sweden over the legal alcohol limit.
Yugoslavia who lived in Sweden in 2009. Most have established residency and citizenship since the mid-1990s as a result of Swedish policy towards Balkan refugees. 96% of the Bosnian refugees who arrived in Sweden during this period have stayed, in comparison to Germany where only 6% of the population remains. Hence, this group represents one of the largest transnational populations of Bosnians in Europe and the world.

While exact numbers are difficult, it is estimated that at least half of these individuals are members of voluntary associations, many of them Bosnian-Swedish clubs for example, which are generally encouraged and supported by the Swedish state as a way of building social capital and engagement with local communities. Within this organizational structure is the umbrella organization of Savez Bosanskohercegovačkih Udruženja u Švedskoj (Bosnian and Herzegovinian Association of Sweden). Within it many individual associations operate. They are based on hometowns such as the Savez Banjalučana u Švedskoj (Association of Banja Lukans in Sweden), or as women’s organizations, Savez Žena u Švedskoj (Association of Women of Sweden). Then there are also local clubs which combine the name of the Swedish town and something symbolic of BiH, such as Ljiljan Motala (Motala Lillies). There are over 100 of these organizations, often in each Swedish municipality, offering a place for Bosnians to gather.

While many echoed concerns from their initial time spent in Sweden, being disoriented and not belonging, under trauma, and not speaking the language, most retain gainful employment almost two decades after settling in Sweden. Over time, they start to feel a sense of belonging within the communities in which they find themselves. As a minority group in Sweden, Bosnians can admit their children to Bosnian language courses through the Swedish school system, and nearly all interviewees with children have done so, with some who have even taught themselves. This helps the second generation maintain a connection to the homeland, and to form friendships with others who they might not otherwise get to know. In many ways, the Bosnian community in Sweden has integrated well.

Many within the Bosnian diaspora community in Sweden know each other and have built networks, collaborating on projects most often focused on highlighting the diaspora community in Sweden, and promoting their homeland in a positive light, through cultural events. During the early 1990s, they were instrumental in helping to open a BiH Embassy in Sweden, and some served in different capacities over the last twenty years as translators, and advisors, whether informally or formally. A majority cited using the diaspora networks they have built in Sweden to engage with citizens in BiH outside of their own familial and friendship ties in BiH today. They have created and continue to publish a range of periodicals for the consumption of the Bosnian diaspora which, deduced from interviews, is often their main source of keeping up with the situation at home. In the past, they have undertaken voter registration drives and often attempt to spend

at least a few weeks in BiH every other year, if not on an annual basis. These spontaneous activities have helped to contribute to building a translocal community based on the Swedish Bosnians who are active within these organizations.\textsuperscript{283}

The next sections will focus on the types of diaspora mobilization that are hypothesized in the Swedish case study: engaged, involved, and inactive. This empirical work helps to specify the typology of diaspora mobilization developed throughout this thesis, as well as further and enrich it through examples. It is worthwhile to remind the reader of the hypothesized types of diaspora mobilization for a citizenship regime such as Sweden, represented as ‘Liberalizing Change’ using Howard’s framework.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Citizenship Regime</th>
<th>Collective Claim Made</th>
<th>Collective Claim Not Made</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberalizing Change</td>
<td>Presence of Translocal Community</td>
<td>Absence of Translocal Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>Engaged</td>
<td>Involved</td>
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5.2 Engaged Mobilization in Sweden

Hypothesis 1 predicts the interplay between independent variables that leads to engaged diaspora mobilization. To remind the reader, it can be expressed as

\textsuperscript{283} This general overview of the community is informed by the interviews with the leadership of several of the largest Bosnian diaspora associations noted in this chapter.
follows: \( H1: \text{Open citizenship regimes + presence of translocal community + presence of collective claims} \rightarrow \text{Engaged Diaspora Mobilization} \).

Thus, this section will examine in more detail several initiatives to examine the different processes that nonetheless can lead to engaged diaspora mobilization. It provides insight into the impact of the citizenship regime in combination with translocal community as well as collective claims.

5.2.1 The APU Network – Engaged Diaspora Mobilization

This section emphasizes the open citizenship regime of the Swedish state as being one of the three mechanisms of this diaspora mobilization type. The APU’s initiatives confirm the hypothesized relationship which leads to engaged diaspora mobilization. They utilize both translocal relationships within the Bosnian Swedish community, but also actively work on recruiting new members to build collaboration and to grow. Through these Swedish built networks, as a result of the citizenship regime, the diaspora is able to utilize their networks and experiences to mobilize around a number of collective claims.

These two initiatives demonstrate how diaspora in an open citizenship regime, with collective claims, and a translocal community mobilize towards transitional justice and peacebuilding. Fieldwork in Sweden established this engaged diaspora mobilization has led to a multitude of other projects as well, discussed in the sections below. Through the sense of creating impact around transitional justice and peace activism, the diaspora mobilization also branches out into more initiatives, both related to the homeland, but also in order to continue to sustain its own community in the host land. Throughout fieldwork in Sweden, interviewees noted their sustained involvement in Swedish non-profit organization, as well as the communities in Sweden in which they live. For many of them, this
might include serving on an organization or town board, being involved with drug
and alcohol abuse prevention, as well as women’s groups. “Swedes do not socialize
like we do. They join clubs. So I joined associations and clubs. And then we started
doing the same among each other. There is support in the community here for all
kinds of activism.”284 Repeatedly, these instances of involvement in the hostland
were cited as helping to inspire them for similar advocacy work when it comes to
the issues important for the future of their homeland.285

In Sweden, the diaspora utilize resources in the host land to help further
their initiatives. Through this, they continue to stress their Swedish citizenship and
belonging as well as their appreciation of Swedish organizations in helping them to
spread awareness about particular claims related to their homeland. This includes
for example a solidarity among the members of the APU to being multi-ethnic and
focusing on their ‘Bosnian roots’ and shared ideas about their homeland at peace,
rather than on members’ ethnonational background. One interviewee noted that she
found it unnerving that Bosnian institutions they worked with required them to
declare particular members as Bosnian Serb, Bosnian Croat, and Bosnian Muslim
and bring three representatives to a roundtable that was organized in Sarajevo.286 In
fact, APU’s members note specifically that they are Bosnian, rather than focusing
on their ethnonational background. A Bosnian Serb member noted, “I can just be
Bosnian here, focus on the good things about our country, and I don’t have to
explain my background. That’s how it was before the war. We don’t use labels,
here.”287 This sentiment was echoed repeatedly in interviews with APU members.

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287 Ibid.
The APU Network was formed in the early 2000s through informal gatherings of Bosnian Swedes enrolled as students at the Royal Institute of Technology (KTH) in Stockholm. APU, an acronym, stands for Akademici, Poduzetnici, and Umjetnici. Translated it means academics, entrepreneurs, and artists, highlighting the founders’ belief that there is a need for collaboration among these three fields among diaspora members. According to the organization’s President in 2014, by calling it a network, they wanted to emphasize the importance of it being “transparent, dynamic, social, flexible and effective.”288 There are a little over 300 members who pay annual dues, which go towards the events and activities the network coordinates. Through socializing, the group found that they were interested in carrying out projects and ideas to support both the Bosnian Swedish community as well as their homeland. Understanding that for it to be successful, they needed more of the community members to be engaged, the idea of the APU network came to light.

The group initially aimed to promote relationships between Bosnian Swedes in the three fields mentioned earlier, and to promote entrepreneurship and education in their homeland, as its members believe this is the prime way for the country to move forward. They have built their translocal community around their Bosnian experience in Sweden as well as their shared experiences in Prijedor, Banja Luka, Sarajevo, and other cities. When asked about the importance of their homeland locality in their relationships, interviewees noted that their experience in Sweden brought them together more than their lives in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as many of the members were too young to have established networks ‘back home.’ However,

they still noted that they utilized their parents’ connections or social media based on translocal ties when they organized events in Sweden.\textsuperscript{289}

While the network is expressively apolitical in the sense that its leadership and members do not officially endorse any political candidates, do not campaign on their behalf, and are distrustful of what they consider a hostile political climate in their homeland, its mobilization is nonetheless political in other ways. However, they approach many of their initiatives and projects utilizing the framework of human rights and discrimination, genocide awareness, and democracy promotion. In this sense, they consider the importance of transitional justice and peacebuilding agendas in their homeland and choose to incorporate it into their activities. As translocal actors, they are well positioned to do so as they have relevant understanding of both the homeland environment as well as the opportunities in the hostland that can help to enable them.\textsuperscript{290}

Over time, the aim of the volunteer-based network has also become to foster public debate in Sweden not only about their homeland, BiH but also about how Bosnians contribute to Swedish society. Thus, they remain devoted to encouraging their unique perspective as Bosnians in Sweden, as well as strengthening Swedish economic development and political policies in their homeland. According to members interviewed, they envision the network acting as a bridge between Sweden and Bosnia in helping to strengthen the relationship between the two countries. Over the last few years, the group has worked hard in order to become a viable partner in both Sweden and BiH. The APU network was the only group invited

\textsuperscript{290} Ibid.
from Sweden for a roundtable discussion and meeting about diaspora engagement and investment in 2014.²⁹¹

Its members believe that the Bosnian state does not do enough to promote its interests, nor the interests of the diaspora, and thus they consider themselves as filling this void. Many are frustrated with the bureaucratic political set-up in their homeland and feel no allegiance towards any political party. Even though they vote, they do not think their vote makes a difference as they consider the politicians corrupt and uninspiring.²⁹² For example, one of the interviewees spoke at length about the lack of viable political candidates in the Republika Srpska that he felt represented him and other diaspora members whose home is now part of the Serb-dominated entity.²⁹³

The APU network is considered a partner and valuable interlocutor by the Swedish Embassy in BiH. They were instrumental in gathering funds after the floods in the region devastated BiH in spring of 2014, raising more than 755,000 SEK (close to 60,000 GBP) from Sweden in their aftermath. This shows its capacity and ability to react to events in the homeland.²⁹⁴ Here again, they demonstrated no prejudice towards raising money for communities across the country. “The whole country suffered from the floods, this is not about the RS or the Federation.”²⁹⁵

However, the Network also has several ongoing projects that have been sustained over the years and offer an insight into its vision for the homeland from a Swedish perspective. The following sections will first explore their activities directly related to collective claims, and the following sections will highlight other projects.

5.2.1a APU and Commemoration

In May 1992, the Bosnian Serb government in Prijedor issued a ‘white armband decree’ for the community which declared all non-Serbs needed to hang a white flag from their windows and wear white armbands in public. This marked the remaining non-Serb individuals who had not been sent to several concentration camps in the area and served as a general tactic to instill fear in them. Since 2012, on the 20th anniversary of this event, returnees, diaspora members, organizers from the community, and others have commemorated this event on May 31st by wearing a white armband for the day to raise awareness. The event also serves to remember 102 children killed in the city during the war and the close to 700 individuals who are still missing from the locality duet to the political regime of the period. Around 53,000 non-Serbs were expelled from the city, 3173 civilians were killed, with thousands being subjected to concentration camps such as Omarska, Manjača, and Trnopolje in the area during the 1992 – 1995 period. This collective claim related to the injustices in Prijedor has gained attention from diaspora communities and has in turn been taken up by them all over the world, and is particularly evident through the mobilization in Sweden through the APU Network.

In 2015, the APU Network organized a discussion event in Stockholm for White Armband Day seeking to raise awareness of the crimes committed in Prijedor and the lack of political action in BiH in this regard. Members wanted to highlight the local government’s denial of atrocities, the unequal treatment of non-Serbs in the Prijedor region, and the challenges of the returnee community to an audience outside of the Balkans. One of APU’s members, Haris Grabovac, who works for the EXPO Foundation (of Stieg Larsson fame), Satko Mujagić, a long-time activist from Prijedor who resides in the Netherlands and is a concentration camp survivor, Holocaust survivor Emerich Roth, and Mona Sahlin, a Swedish politician, were all part of the panel. The discussion focused not only on how to prevent future atrocities, remembrance of the Prijedor victims but also featured an exhibition of photographs from the region to provide a clearer picture of BiH and the aftermath of the conflict for attendees. The discussion focused on local transitional justice initiatives as well as the returnee community in Prijedor. The panel also discussed local government’s denial of atrocities that occurred between 1992 and 1995. They drew parallels from WWII to engage the topic and stressed the importance of standing up to nationalism in Sweden. Nearly 200 people attended including Bosnian diaspora members and Swedish individuals who were interested in learning more about the country. Thus, APU was able to spread their message beyond the diaspora community. Moreover, they helped to promote transitional justice agendas in the homeland and to offer support for truth-seeking and commemoration activities such as the White Armband Day.299

299 The event was co-organized with a Swedish organization, ABF Stockholm, a non-profit organization that provides adult education. Information about the event can be found at http://abfstockholm.se/event/2015/05/vitabandsdagen/.
Unlike diaspora communities who showed solidarity with the White Armband Day through social media, Swedish diaspora members organized an event that focused on providing education about White Armband Day and its significance for BiH, but also connected this to Swedish society. This ability to move beyond the individual experiences of the Bosnian diaspora members to relate to the wider audience is commendable. By engaging speakers who were not from the region, they demonstrated the universality of their collective claim not only within the diaspora but also beyond. This created a dialogue about lessons for Swedish society gleamed from the diaspora’s homeland, BiH. The Swedish citizenship regime encourages this kind of transnational engagement. Commemorations and annual events such as White Armband Day provide a platform for continued engagement and learning, ensuring diaspora visibility. The APU Network members to co-organized the event with a Swedish non-profit organization, and also showcased the diaspora’s integration within Sweden as the diaspora panel members from Sweden are recognized as prominent journalists and activists themselves. Thus, they are able to elevate transitional justice discussions about processes in the homeland within the host country as well, mobilizing as theorized.

The ability of the Network’s members to utilize collective claims from their homeland to bring awareness of it both within their homeland contexts as well as their hostland confirms this hypothesized relationship of engaged diaspora mobilization. The translocal community the APU Network has sustained helps them organize events which promote activism and engagement around issues in BiH. Thus, their engagement occurs in both communities. Grabovac also took Swedish diaspora and non-diaspora members to Prijedor to relate the pertinence of the
collective claims the diaspora raised to the Swedish audience. This initiative, as hypothesized by the typology, is representative of engaged diaspora mobilization. While the White Armband Day engagement focuses on remembrance, memorialization, and awareness around Prijedor, the APU Network also engages collective claims related to the Srebrenica Genocide, as evidenced in the following section. On both occasions, the rhetoric of these initiatives is not nationalistic in tone and exclusively is inclusive rather than focused on propagating a Bosniak diaspora identity. Instead, it encourages dialogue and emphasizes the APU’s multiethnic membership in supporting these kinds of activities.

5.2.1b APU Network and Srebrenica Genocide Awareness

The original collaboration between EXPO and the APU Network began after a Srebrenica genocide denial campaign started in Sweden, initially through the showing of a Norwegian documentary film, Srebrenica: A Town Betrayed. Members of APU organized by writing op-eds in Swedish newspapers, along with EXPO, to argue against the film being shown on Swedish Public Television. Originally, a Swedish Facebook group called “Swedish Television spreading lies about Srebrenica,” organized the campaign. Within one day of being launched in 2011, it had over 5,500 followers, the majority Bosnians who live in Sweden.

Jasenko Selimović, a prominent Bosnian Swedish diaspora member who served as Minister of Integration with the Folkpartiet Party, a centrist party in Sweden, wrote widely read editorials in Expressen criticizing the film for pandering to conspiracy theories that denied the Srebrenica genocide and the suffering.

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300 Grabovac writes extensively in Swedish for EXPO, and his reflections on Facebook from the aforementioned visit can be found online https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=1551671455097736&set=pb.100007646881308.-2207520000.1472811481.&type=3&theater.

301 The group can be found at https://www.facebook.com/groups/svt.srebrenica.reagera/
arguing it was Islamophobic and anti-immigrant in nature. In it, the organizers were clear about differentiating that the campaign was against genocide denial and not about any internal politics within BiH. The diaspora was interested in ensuring that genocide denial would not be permitted within Sweden, as many felt deeply connected to the issue. This spillover of a lack of transitional justice in the homeland was obvious in the homeland and Bosnians quickly mobilized against it.

On September 4th, 2011, several days after the first editorial was published, diaspora members laid flowers next to a picture of Srebrenica victims’ coffins in front of the Swedish Public Television offices in Stockholm, Gothenburg, and Malmö, as a sign of protest. Bosnian diaspora members continued to show up in all three cities throughout the day, laying flowers and taking moments of silence for Srebrenica Genocide victims. Some of the individuals were Bosniak, though the majority of the organizers, including Selimović, do not prescribe to ethnic labels, instead preferring to be called Bosnians, or Swedes from former Yugoslavia.

Along with EXPO, Swedish politicians, most notably Fredrik Malm, who was previously engaged with Armenian genocide recognition in Sweden as well as Kurdish diaspora activism, joined Bosnian Swedes in condemning the showing of the documentary as well as writing op-eds in support of the facts about Srebrenica that were established at the ICTY. The political editor of one Swedish newspaper examined the background of some consultants on the documentary, determining


they were all historical revisionists with Serb nationalist links, including a Bosnian Serb wartime nationalist propaganda radio host, Ozren Jorganovic.\textsuperscript{305}

Collectively, they started a conversation in Sweden about BiH, genocide, nationalism, and segregation in society in the most-read newspapers in the country to acknowledge genocide denial as well as a small group of extremist leaning Serbs. The Swedish Review Board for Radio and Television (\textit{Granskningsnämnden för radio och TV (GRN)}) received over 40 complaints about the film.\textsuperscript{306} Fredrik Malm, the Swedish MP, was heavily targeted by Serb nationalists in Sweden and harassed due to his activism through social media and e-mails as well as verbally.\textsuperscript{307}

The events following the documentary showing and response to activism in Sweden led members of the APU Network to organize efforts for Srebrenica commemoration activities in Sweden on an annual basis to continue to work against genocide denial and hate in Sweden. While there were some sparsely organized Srebrenica commemoration activities throughout the country prior, a centrally organized manifestation was not part of the Bosnian diaspora activities before. The most notable previous commemoration of the Srebrenica Genocide occurred in 2009 as a result of several Bosnian organizations along with the Islamic Society in Sweden helping to organize an art installation, a so-called public nomadic monument, Što Te Nema?, on Norrmalmstorg, a central square in Stockholm.\textsuperscript{308} In the aftermath of the documentary showing in Sweden and the subsequent discussions about how best to respond, Bosnian Swedish diaspora individuals as


\textsuperscript{306} Respondent SWE6 (2014) Interview in June, Stockholm, Sweden.

\textsuperscript{307} Ibid.

well as Swedish activists had organized around a collective claim and felt compelled to continue their work.\textsuperscript{309}

Starting in 2013, APU Network organized a central, annual commemoration event on the same main square, with a minute of silence, several speakers, notably those who are involved in anti-extremism in Sweden. Close to 300 people attended the event.\textsuperscript{310} The commemoration ended with the attendees collectively walking to Malaren, a nearby lake, and placing lilies, the Bosnian national flower, into the water, in symbolic commemoration to the victims. Further, leading up to the event, they hosted a panel discussion about BiH, Srebrenica, and genocide, as well as initiated several article in Swedish newspapers about the events, commemoration, and the political situation in BiH.\textsuperscript{311} One of the panelists, Borka Pavićević, is a well-known Serbian playwright, pacifist, and liberal as well as founder of a non-profit called the Center for Cultural Decontamination, named for its work to combat a ‘contaminated’ political culture in Serbia. By inviting a Serbian as one of the panelists, the event also highlighted the importance of standing up to genocide denial and ethnonationalist politics in the region of their homeland, regardless of one’s ethnic background. At the same time, it added important context for attendees from Sweden without diaspora background who did not have previous knowledge about Srebrenica.\textsuperscript{312}

Like many, Bosnians felt that the Russian veto of a UK resolution in front of the UN in early July 2015 declaring Srebrenica a genocide was an egregious

\textsuperscript{309} Respondents SWE5 and SWE6 (2014) Interview in June, Stockholm, Sweden.
offense, for which they mainly blamed the Serbian president Aleksandar Vučić and
the president of the Republika Srpska entity Milorad Dodik. Again, editorials were
published to voice their opinion and their anger at what they consider genocide
denial and ethnonationalist political agendas in the homeland. Alen Musaefendić, a
Bosnian Swedish journalist and a Banja Lukan, wrote about this, connecting
genocide denial of Srebrenica to the greater ethnonationalist politics dominating the
region today. ‘I neither can nor want to forget,’ connecting being expelled from his
hometown in Banja Luka at gunpoint, and the Srebrenica genocide.313 Selimović
evoked memory in his editorial leading up to the Srebrenica genocide 20th
anniversary, connecting it to the Holocaust. In this way, Bosnian diaspora members
are interested in incorporating themselves into transitional justice processes in the
homeland but are also invested in doing so in their host country in an effort to
promote these processes and highlight their potential role.314

Media attention in Sweden around the 20th anniversary of the Srebrenica
Genocide further focused on Srebrenica as Carl Bildt, a Swedish politician who
served as Minister of Foreign Affairs, was a mediator in the Balkans for the UN at
the time. He continues to comment on the region in Swedish media.315 In
combination with the media attention and APU’s sustained efforts at creating
commemoration activities in Stockholm over the years, hundreds of individuals
gathered in the square, Bosnian diaspora members as well as Swedes.

Refik Hodžić, the Communications Director of the International Center for
Transitional Justice, a Bosnian living in the US who is originally from Prijedor, was

315 He continues to tweet his insights on the region @carlbildt.
one of the key speakers. His speech consisted mostly of what he called a message of warning to Swedes as well as a political plea for help in moving towards transitional justice in BiH, instigated through Sweden’s connection to Bosnia and the number of diaspora members:

“I did not come to you to talk as a victim. Bosnians are not victims. That is not our identity. We are a proud people...We are not here to cry to you about how something horrible happened to us. We are here to warn you. As I described to you, Srebrenica genocide, was a final outcome of a political goal. That political goal was based on ethnic discrimination, ethnic exclusion, and racism. And you have to keep this in mind as you struggle with your own problems...”

This speech shows the Bosnian diaspora’s taking back of their identities, 20 years after the end of the war, so as not to be labeled victims anymore. This reflects that they are not just re-negotiating their labels vis-à-vis Swedish society when it comes to finding employment or gaining medical access to trauma benefits as Eastmond notes, but also negotiating the importance of this identity when it comes to being Bosnian, regardless of their ethnic background. Diaspora members with little personal experience and memory of the war, having arrived in Sweden at a young age, attended the event as well. There is clearly more to being Bosnian, or Bosnian Swedish in their case, than the victim identity, or an exclusive ethnonational identity, and this is slowly coming to the forefront. It reflects a more productive dialogue among the community that goes beyond a well-established victim identity towards one that is more forward-looking, both in the Swedish as well as Bosnian political contexts. Other speakers echoed the same sentiment.

Hodžić spoke of how it was possible for genocide to occur in Europe after the Holocaust and followed up with how genocide denial continues to occur in not only BiH as well as in Sweden.

“But Sweden is our friend. Sweden opened its doors to Bosnians when they needed it most. Sweden plays a very important role as a member of the EU. We need your help. 20 years later, we did not overcome the legacy of genocide in BiH. You can see that today. If you see the news from Srebrenica, you will see how badly we need a political project of reconciliation…A political project that is based on truth and justice.”

These sentiments mirror the sentiment of Bosnian diaspora activists in Sweden who are involved in the APU Network. While there is no interest in participating in what they consider a ‘political circus,’ mobilization on issues of minority rights and transitional justice and peace claims continue to fuel them.

These two initiatives stress the importance of diaspora mobilization in Sweden to help raise awareness of ongoing transitional justice and peacebuilding processes related to the homeland, and genocide denial and remembrance issues at large. They emphasize the strength of their community in influencing public perception and understanding of their homeland in Sweden. This engaged diaspora mobilization, focused on both the homeland as well as the hostland, has led to further diaspora mobilization initiatives discovered during fieldwork chronicled in the following sections. While this activism is also rooted in the same principles as the initiatives discussed until now, it also moves beyond them in an effort at sustainable peace in the long run, rather than only transitional justice processes.


5.2.1c APU Network and Våra Barn

The APU Network has created a hub for diaspora engagement in Sweden, collaborating with smaller initiatives to raise their profile and further causes they find important about their homeland. One of these has been a long-time collaboration with Våra Barn, or Our Kids, an initiative launched in England and Sweden by Bosnian diaspora members from the Mostar region, to help improve the lives of children in an orphanage. The organization’s mission is focused solely on bettering the life of the orphans and young adults in need in BiH. Over the years, the organization has also built a group home to which orphans and children with disabilities transition to after they turn 18, modeled after group homes for young adults in Sweden. In fact, the organization’s diaspora members often implement solutions they see in Sweden in BiH, tailoring them to local needs, and focusing on the idea of local empowerment, to encourage sustainability of its projects.321

While the collective claim here is expressed more regarding supporting a particular population in the homeland locality, diaspora members are cognizant of the importance of their engagement in helping to rebuild the community. Their donation drives stress the lack of state financing for the orphanage in the post-conflict period. Particularly in Mostar, politically divided between Bosniak and Bosnian Croat politicians, the post-conflict period has only weakened the city’s institutions and its ability to care for vulnerable populations. The collaboration between the APU Network and Våra Barn in supporting the locality in Mostar through the orphanage and encouraging local ownership among the orphans is one of the few ways that positive change in post-conflict environments can develop.

particularly around peacebuilding in this divided society. \footnote{Djurasevic, Aleksandra, and Joerg Kieling. 2015. “Urban Transition and Sustainability. The Case of the City of Mostar, Bosnia and Herzegovina.” \textit{Eastern Journal of European Studies} 6 (1): 5–29.}\footnote{Respondent SWE15 (2014) Interview in June, Stockholm, Sweden.} Utilizing their translocal connections in Mostar in combination with the diaspora network in Sweden, the organization demonstrates another example of engaged diaspora mobilization, albeit using a collective claim more broadly related to peacebuilding than to transitional justice.

The initiative started as a result of the Mostar translocal diaspora community in Sweden. In conversations with one another in England and Sweden, they remembered the orphanage, which existed before the war, and how the community in Mostar would come together to support orphans. One interviewee noted that she felt like and her sister had more siblings growing up because of the orphans who they played with regularly.\footnote{Respondent SWE16 (2014) Interview in June, Stockholm, Sweden.} This inspired them to create a non-profit organization which aims to provide support for the orphanage in the post-conflict environment.

The board of directors and many of those involved in the organization are originally from the Mostar area and think of themselves as citizens of Bosnia rather than signifying themselves based on their ethnic background, even though there are both Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats who are in leadership positions.\footnote{Koinova, Maria. 2012. “Autonomy and Positionality in Diaspora Politics.” \textit{International Political Sociology} 6 (1): 99–103.} By operating independently of the politicized environment within their homeland, they promote an inclusive, post-conflict BiH through their initiatives focused on orphaned youth, usually as a result or consequence of the war. Koinova has discussed the diaspora’s autonomy and the implications thereof on diaspora activism.\footnote{Koinova, Maria. 2012. “Autonomy and Positionality in Diaspora Politics.” \textit{International Political Sociology} 6 (1): 99–103.} This engagement demonstrates their resolve to their local community
in the homeland despite the lack of government support for orphanages. It is important here to note that these projects are geared towards rebuilding the social fabric and should not be considered as development projects solely. Rather, as Duthie argues, this kind of work is often complementary to transitional justice efforts.  

The APU Network has been collaborating with Our Kids through fundraising efforts and by way of social media, to spread their latest news and other relevant information widely. Some members have visited the orphanage in person during travels in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and many donate to the organization on a monthly basis. They stressed the importance of investing in the next generation in BiH, as they consider the failure to take care of the youth in BiH and the general lack of good education opportunities to be one of the major failures of the Bosnian government towards its citizens.

Education and youth often were at the forefront of interviews with Bosnian diaspora members, in part because many also had to return to school once they moved to Sweden. They acknowledge the importance of access to education in opening up opportunities for them in the hostland. They recognize the benefit of their activism for the homeland community for long-term peacebuilding. At the same time, the opportunities afforded diaspora members through the Swedish integration regime are reflected back to their activism in the Mostar region through their engagement with the homeland. The translocal variable is particularly relevant here as activism is focused on the particular locality in the homeland.

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5.2.1d APU Network and Homeland Non-Profits through a Transitional Justice Lens

Diaspora is able to incorporate their collective claims into their mobilization in both the host country and the homeland when there is an open citizenship regime. This section addresses how diaspora actors utilize the resources of their host country in helping to channel diaspora mobilization. This section presents further examples of the hypothesized relationship noted at the beginning as well as demonstrating the richness of the engaged diaspora mobilization type enabled through the open citizenship regime beyond issues of transitional justice and to broader peacebuilding initiatives, in particular related to development and working with non-profits.

Working with the city of Stockholm’s Office for Voluntary Return, the APU Network has helped to establish a connection between the civil society sector and diaspora members by organizing the ConnexChange since 2012. This event serves to connect civil society actors who focus on improving the post-conflict environment of the diaspora’s homeland through innovative means. This conference and networking are meant to help transfer knowledge about working in civil society and has focused on youth and education over the last couple of years, in an attempt to further the peacebuilding process in BiH through these areas.

Through the ConnexChange event, the APU Network established a partnership with an organization in Bosnia, Bosana, that provides funding for students in BiH to attend college and receive job training to be competitive. Diaspora actors involved with APU repeatedly cited the importance of education in BiH as creating opportunities and strengthening the post-conflict environment.328

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The charity is led by a Bosnian American returnee who is invested in building a brighter future for children in post-conflict BiH.

Education in the post-conflict period has been divided and contested between the two entities, with curriculums highly politicized, examined at length elsewhere, through both policy and academic sources. Unlike state or sub-state level programs that are limited and sponsored by the government, Bosana’s students are picked based on their merits and need, and are not selected based on ethnicity, which entity they live in, or whether or not their families have ties to political parties. Each year, the organization sponsors around twenty students and helps to fund their living expenses as well as room and board while they are in college as long as they maintain good grades.

This mission aligns with the goals of the APU Network. By collaborating with a local organization that has diaspora ties, they feel comfortable engaging in issues they consider the state neglects. APU leadership members noted that one of the main attractions to working with the Bosana Foundation is its founder, who lived ‘in diaspora’ before returning to BiH, and thus was able to connect with them in more succinct ways than local organizations. Bosana focuses on supporting students in BiH, mostly orphaned or those with financial difficulties who might

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otherwise not be able to go to school due to financial difficulty. Their mission statement is clear about their aspirations for Bosnian society: “We hope that through the empowerment and education of youth history does not repeat itself and that Bosnia and Herzegovina can once again be a country that boasts peaceful multi-ethnic and multi-cultural traditions.” This speaks to wider transitional justice goals of a post-conflict state that incorporates education within its agenda.333

The APU Network demonstrates, through its various engagement in both homeland and hostland, the ability to be flexible in the ways they create impact, continuously innovating through collaboration with other actors and organizing with a variety of partners to forward their mission. While the hypothesis developed demonstrates the interaction of the independent variables theoretically, this section has enriched this through empirical examples that showcase the variety of ways in which engaged diaspora mobilization could further be channeled in the future in countries with open citizenship regimes.

5.3 Involved Diaspora Mobilization in Sweden

Hypothesis 2 predicts the interplay between independent variables that leads to involved diaspora mobilization. To remind the reader, it can be expressed as follows: \((H2: \text{Open citizenship regimes} + \text{absence of translocal community} + \text{collective claim made} \rightarrow \text{Involved Diaspora Mobilization})\). This section describes in more detail some of the pathways that led to involved diaspora mobilization, in an effort to test this hypothesis. It demonstrates the kind of collective claims that forward this kind of diaspora mobilization without the presence of a translocal

community, or a weak translocal community. The SDBiH, a diaspora political party, exemplifies the hypothesized diaspora mobilization. While they mobilize based on particular collective claims, due to the lack of a translocal community, their diaspora mobilization remains involved.

5.3.1 Stranka Dijaspore – The Party of the Diaspora

The Party of the Diaspora BiH, or Stranka Dijaspore BiH (SDBiH), was formed in 2007 in Gothenburg, Sweden. The party’s founders are Bosnian diaspora members who felt unrepresented by the local politicians in their homeland. In particular, their platform consists of increasing representation of Bosnian diaspora citizens in BiH as well as Bosnian citizens on a civic basis rather than on an ethno-national basis. They want to strengthen the relationship between the diaspora and the homeland in more formal ways as a political party in power. Its founders envisioned it as an alternative amidst the political climate in BiH. At the inaugural event of the party, around 120 individuals gathered in Gothenburg to show their support. Its leadership at the time was based in Sweden, with the exception of one individual, Senada Telalović Softić, based in Australia.334

While most of the leadership team has remained in Sweden, the headquarters of the party has since been relocated to Sarajevo. The party holds its annual meetings in BiH, with the most recent one being held in Banja Luka. In its initial stages, the SDBiH focused on getting its message out to members in the diaspora and encouraging diaspora voter registration. They spearheaded voter registration of Bosnians in diaspora by helping to organize voter registration drives and collaborated with Bosnian civil society organization Prvi Mart to do so. Organizers from BiH gave presentations hosted by the SDBiH throughout Sweden

at different Bosnian Swedish diaspora events to spread the message. The activists from BiH usually stayed with SDBiH members or their accommodation was otherwise organized through them.³³⁵

By 2014, it ran 146 candidates at all levels of government in BiH, and won two seats, one in the National Assembly in the Federation entity of the country, and the other at the cantonal level in Gorazde. They boasted of having over 10,000 members worldwide. Throughout the 2014 election campaign, the party cooperated and collaborated with the Domovina (Homeland) coalition. This was a shared platform between smaller political parties that stressed a civic minded approach to Bosnian politics. Their political agenda had a transitional justice approach as it stressed the importance of recognizing the rights of returnees and truth-seeking measures in relations to ethnic cleansing and genocide. This agreement also stipulated that if elected to office, politicians would work towards changing the political system set up by the Dayton Peace Accords in order to moderate the dominant ethnonational discourses and to have stronger relationships with the diaspora.³³⁶

The SDBiH have strong collective claims, outlined in their party platform and reiterated on a regular basis as the political party is organized around them. Many of the claims center around opposition to existing political rhetoric and policies which they see as obstructing transitional justice and peacebuilding processes. They have identified a number of ineffective policies within both the Federation as well as RS which in turn are often echoed by other political parties

³³⁶ This coalition was organized by the Prvi Mart initiative, which was particularly active leading up to the 2014 election season in BiH, and was headed by Emir Suljagić, a Srebrenica survivor, writer, and politician. Their main outreach activities focused on diaspora voter registration, with particular success in Sweden and Germany.
that are similarly oriented at changing the political environment in BiH. Issues surrounding education are often also the focus of the claims. For example, they support joint language teaching in schools in BiH rather than divided classrooms for students of different ethnonational backgrounds with Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian in turn. Thus, they focus on the uniting factors among Bosnians, regardless of their ethnic background, rather than the divisive elements, although stressing the importance for an understanding of past events and commemorating atrocities remains at the forefront of their activities. Their platform does not evoke Bosniak ethnic identity, rather choosing to focus on a multi-ethnic Bosnian label.

Even though the party continues to exist and attempts to gain momentum in the fragmented political environment of BiH, they have not been able to mobilize large groups of diaspora. There is very little translocal community presence. The party’s leaders are from different cities within BiH including Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Mostar, Bratunac, Goražde, and others. The party is composed of individuals who share beliefs and are trying to build a political party outside of the homeland, without particular connections to any city in the homeland. Their networks are based on individual ties rather than on a reliance on their translocal ties amongst each other. This was to a degree admitted by one of its political candidates when he noted that they were really more of a ‘Swedish political party’ than anything else in an interview during the 2014 election period.

To be fair, their inability to mobilize strong support speaks to the difficulty of establishing a political following amidst the political environment in BiH where

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337 Their Facebook presence can be found at [https://www.facebook.com/SDBiH/](https://www.facebook.com/SDBiH/), though the Party’s president is more active in posting regularly on his personal social media, which can be found at [https://www.facebook.com/edin.osmancevic.5?fref=ts](https://www.facebook.com/edin.osmancevic.5?fref=ts).

the same wartime parties have dominated the political scene since the end of the war in 1995. The three leading parties have managed to ensure their longevity within the consociational political structure in BiH through nationalist claims, which leave little room for multi-ethnic political parties succeeding. Hence, party competition in BiH remains within ethnically homogenous electoral constituencies, despite incremental steps forward. These challenges remain equally difficult for new parties formed in the homeland as well.

Despite their limited success in Bosnian elections or within the wider diaspora community in Sweden, the SDBiH represent an alternative political path in the politics of their homeland and utilize collective claims to energize diaspora voters about practical things such as registering to vote. Utilizing the size of the Bosnian diaspora community in Sweden, they established and registered a political party that managed to compete in local elections even though they were largely unsuccessful. While their success is limited in part due to their lack of a translocal community, their mobilization nonetheless demonstrates the validity of the second hypothesis to a large degree.

5.4 Inactive Diaspora Mobilization in Sweden

Hypothesis 6 describes the combination of independent variables that lead to inactive diaspora mobilization generated from the typology developed in chapter 4. To remind the reader, it can be expressed as follows: (H6: Any citizenship regime + presence or absence of translocal community + no collective claim made → Inactive Diaspora Mobilization) This section examines different variations of

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340 Bosnia’s local elections in 2016 only confirm this with the SDA, HDZ, and SNDS parties, each representing nationalist blocs, remained largely in power.
inactive diaspora mobilization of Bosnians in Sweden in order to determine how well the hypothesis holds. Inactive diaspora mobilization, while not necessarily politically engaged around issues of transitional justice, can still provide interesting insights about how the interaction of different independent variables results in one kind of diaspora mobilization.

5.4.1 Banja Lukans in Sweden

In the case of Banja Lukans in diaspora, inactive diaspora mobilization occurs amidst a multitude of potential collective claims, which are nonetheless not taken up, as the translocal Banja Lukan community manifests itself much more in the host countries than in the homeland locality. This section examines the translocal community variable in one of the more significant translocal groups within the Bosnian Swedish diaspora, Banja Lukans. It examines how the lack of organizing around a collective claim ultimately leads to inactive diaspora mobilization. Due to the lack of a narrative that includes collective claims related to transitional justice or peacebuilding that take hold within the community, Banja Lukans struggle to mobilize for their local community in BiH, unlike individuals from Prijedor.

Banja Lukans are one of the largest translocal groups within Sweden. They make up as much as a quarter of the diaspora population in Sweden. Thus, it makes sense that there is both an umbrella organization of Banja Lukans in Sweden as well as many smaller clubs within Swedish municipalities that have Banja Lukans as the main constituency. These individuals identify as Bosnian or Bosniak, with Bosnian taking precedence during interviews, noting their lack of religiosity

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as well as their disassociation with the homeland’s ethnonational classification in the post-conflict period.\(^{342}\)

Nearly all of these individuals became refugees in Sweden by virtue of the fact they were identified as Bosnian Muslim, and thus, unwanted, in their hometown during the war between 1992 and 1995. For those who were lucky to leave the city towards the beginning of the war, in 1992, the memory of pre-war Banja Luka lives on, a multiethnic second city to the capital, Sarajevo, in the southeast of the country. For others who escaped Banja Luka thereafter, these memories are in addition to being internally displaced within their hometown, often going into hiding as it was being taken over by Bosnian Serb paramilitary units, before escaping.\(^{343}\)

Unlike Sarajevo, there were virtually no battles, nor a siege during the war. The city was taken over almost overnight, ethnically cleansed of its previously multi-ethnic character, most of its non-Serb population dispersed, or marginalized to the extent that they disappeared from the public sphere. This included the destruction of the Ferhadija, a mosque in the city center for which Banja Luka was famous, the removal of busts from statues within city parks that were non-Serb, and the renaming of streets as well as city boroughs that had non-Serb connotations.\(^{344}\) Banja Luka’s character was thus changed from the outset of the war, with the city designated as Serb territory within BiH. City parks were altered, built over, and replaced with nationalist monuments and squares, further emphasizing the now


\(^{343}\) Ibid.

Serb character of the city. An interviewee noted that she always finds it strange to see any remnant of belonging to Bosnia in Banja Luka today. “At least they left Hotel Bosnia,” referring to a popular meeting spot and hotel in the city center.

Srdan Šušnica, a Bosnian Serb in Banja Luka who is often cited by diaspora members recently wrote about this frustration. “It brings me no pleasure to live in the street that bears the name of Chetniks from World War II, let alone for someone whose family was expelled or killed by the Serb army.”

Realizations like this have halted diaspora mobilization in Banja Luka, unlike in other places such as Prijedor, where collective claims have mobilized diaspora. For Banja Luka diaspora members, they see little that resembles a viable future in a city that is similar to the city which they left before the war, and no institutional collaboration to engage them in becoming part of the character of their homeland city again. In a sense, the translocal community exists only in certain limited spaces within the city. The translocal community is maintained in Sweden and other hostlands, with very little in the locality in the homeland. Their activities are thus mostly focused on the few events they have annually as well as encouraging broader Bosnian diaspora mobilization in Sweden beyond Banja Luka.

Banja Luka remains the capital of Republika Srpska today. It remains the center of Serb ethnonationalist rhetoric, with threats that undermine the country’s sovereignty dominating the political rhetoric, as exemplified by the entity’s

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347 The term Chetnik is usually associated with Serb nationalist forces during WWII. The term is also used sometimes to refer to more contemporary Serb nationalists, in part due to a shared ideology about a ‘Greater Serbia.’

President, Milorad Dodik. 349 For Banja Lukans abroad, the Dayton political structure has created a problematic relationship with their former city of residence. Diaspora members often echo that Banja Luka is now an unknown city to them upon returning. Street names and anything else in the city that reminds one of its once multiethnic character, in particular Bosnian Muslim influences, have been erased or changed. They consider this not only a reflection of change, which is inevitable in any environment, but change that is purposefully meant to eliminate them from the public eye and narratives about their homeland. In this sense, they consider the continued existence of the RS, with its political elite, a grave injustice to them.350

Initial return to Banja Luka in the postwar years was thus difficult. Individuals did not feel welcome in their own cities anymore. This uneasiness with the homeland on a local level, the level of hometown, has remained for many Banja Lukans, as noted in interviews repeatedly. Property return after the war entailed a bureaucratic process they were unfamiliar with and one which often took longer than they anticipated, with some individuals needing several years before they had cleared up their property claims.351 This has proven to be disastrous for the retention of the city’s multi-ethnic character. Due to initial struggles, many diaspora members sold and exchanged their apartments and homes for property in the Federation entity of the country. 352 Thus, diaspora members have in effect broken their own translocal relationships with the city, and maintain the translocal relationships

351 Ibid.
352 Respondent BH19 (2015) Interview in July, Banja Luka, BiH.
outside of it, through social networks, and at get-togethers with other Banja Lukans in diaspora.

Those individuals who have retained their property and thus their physical connections to Banja Luka, as well as the small returnee community of the city, confine themselves to a neighborhood outside of the city center and only meet in a few places within the city. They collaborate with returnees in Banja Luka and organize an annual memorial event to civilian victims of the war in Banja Luka. Each summer, they gather on one of Banja Luka’s bridges in the particular neighborhood where many returnees are, overlooking the Vrbas river to commemorate victims, regardless of their ethnic background. As part of the ceremony, they throw flowers in their name, and take a few moments of silence in their honor. However, the event goes by mostly unnoticed in the local media and does not engage with the politicians in the RS or the Banja Luka community. It serves as a symbolic event for them, and is, in large part, simply ignored, or responded to with silence by the Bosnian Serb authorities.353

Along with returnees, diaspora members have also advocated for the return of street names to what they were before the war, as well dedicating a particular boulevard in the Mejdan part of the city, to the prolific Banja Luka children’s author, Nasiha Kapidžić-Hadžić. They have not voiced this around a collective claim and rather discuss it in terms of its symbolic significance for Banja Luka. However, such initiatives remain in the beginning phases, and like the previous one noted, remain ignored by the local media outlets. Rather, the poetry readings the diaspora members organize to commemorate the author feature prominently in

Bosnian diaspora magazines. They are utilized to socialize with other diaspora members who happen to be in Banja Luka during the summer.\textsuperscript{354} Nonetheless, some effort has been made, despite the lack of a collective claim, to mobilize the diaspora from Banja Luka. Over the last decade, a small portion of the diaspora community, in large part through the help of the Banja Lukans in Sweden, and with the declarative approval of the Bosnian Serb government in Banja Luka, has organized several annual events to highlight both the diaspora community as well as Banja Luka’s non-Serb community. The “Traditional Days of the Diaspora,” which happen during the second week in July, help diaspora build relationships with the Banja Luka government, as well as with Banja Lukans across the diaspora and those in Banja Luka proper.

Often, the diaspora hosts a concert with musicians from Banja Luka, to contribute to the cultural scene of the city. Similar events do not happen in Sarajevo, indicating the separation between the diaspora and the local population in Banja Luka. The president of the Banja Lukans in Sweden nonetheless stressed that hosting such events not only maintains relationships, but also that it can encourage reconciliation amongst each other, and strengthen the bonds between the diaspora, particularly the younger generations, with Banja Luka.\textsuperscript{355} He hopes that by maintaining a presence in the Banja Luka community, there will be more discussions and that reconciliation among its citizens can also occur. While this is an optimistic and hopeful outlook, it has not led to more diaspora mobilization in the Banja Luka community.

\textsuperscript{354} Participant Observation, July 2013, Banja Luka, BiH.; Participant Observation, July 2014, Banja Luka, BiH.; Participant Observation, July 2015, Banja Luka, BiH.
\textsuperscript{355} Respondent SWE3 (2014) Interview in March, Motala, Sweden.
While fieldwork revealed little diaspora mobilization move recently, interviewees did note previous diaspora mobilization around Banja Luka around the reconstruction of the Ferhadija mosque. It was destroyed in 1993 during the war, much like other Ottoman architectural symbols within BiH, including an arched bridge in Mostar called the Old Bridge, perhaps one of the most recognized architectural symbols in the Balkans. After the war, diaspora members rallied around plans to rebuild the mosque, though this was mostly in support of the local Islamic society and individuals who had remained in Banja Luka rather than stemming from the diaspora.

The official opening of the reconstruction was scheduled in May 2001 on the anniversary of the mosque’s destruction during the war. Buses arrived in the city, both with Banja Lukans who were living in the Federation, as well as Bosnian Muslims who wanted to support the event. Swedish diaspora members made the trip back to BiH specifically to be able to attend the ceremony.356 However, it ended prematurely as the attendees were attacked, rocks thrown at them, buses lit on fire, and the building in which they were meeting was vandalized. International dignitaries who were in attendance remained locked in a building nearby until SFOR forces were able to attend to them.

Ultimately, the Banja Lukan diaspora in Sweden has been able to replicate some of their former community in their new homeland due to the sheer number of individuals from this city living in Sweden today. Together, they attend events in both Sweden and Banja Luka and reinforce their translocal connection. Due to a lack of organized political mobilization around particular collective claim, their

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mobilization remains inactive. However, the translocal community remains active in the diaspora and supportive of broader overall Bosnian diaspora initiatives.

5.4.2 A Caveat on Inactive Diaspora Mobilization

Through participant observation of diaspora events in Sweden organized by a variety of these kinds of diaspora organizations, this inactive participation, as set out by the typology, became evident. Without a collective claim, their focus and mobilization remain cultural. Mobilizing politically is often not voiced explicitly. There is an inherent absence of a collective claim being voiced, or an outright disdain for politics, dismissed as something they left behind when they left the homeland. Many of the Bosnian Swedish associations fall into this category.

While not engaged with collective claims that foster diaspora mobilization around issues of transitional justice or peacebuilding, these associations and organizations should not be discounted. They provide a meeting place for Bosnians to gather, to celebrate holidays, and to speak their language. Translocal communities can develop, be maintained, and sustain themselves, as Halilovich has also pointed out within particular communities in Australia.\(^\text{357}\) In turn, collective claims can potentially come to the forefront at a future time. Considering the openness of the citizenship regime, it is possible for diaspora to mobilize in different ways if this was the case.

Over the last few years, there has been an increased interest in cultural manifestations, most often in the form of folk dancing, passed down to the second generation. Often, these are teenagers, some born in Sweden, who feel connected to their homeland through this activity, but are also able to make connections with

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other Bosnian Swedish youth as a result. According to several respondents, this becomes an easy way to get the second generation involved, speaking the language and engaging with one another. They worry that otherwise the second generation will lose their connection to Bosnia and Herzegovina and will not have friends who are from their homeland either, no sense of community among the diaspora. Older individuals in the repeat the importance of maintaining these cultural connections to the homeland, even as they speak disparagingly about the political environment in BiH.\footnote{Respondent SWE2 (2014) Interview in March, Stockholm, Sweden; Respondent SWE10 (2014) Interview in June, Gothenburg, Sweden; Respondent SWE3 (2014) Interview in March, Motala, Sweden.}

### 5.5 Conclusion

Sweden’s citizenship regime has enabled Bosnian refugees who arrived in the country from former Yugoslavia to integrate and become citizens. Many of these individuals are part of hometown associations in Sweden and participate in the Bosnian Swedish community in the municipality they live in, visiting their homeland on a regular basis during the summers, and maintaining transnational lives. This chapter discussed three different types of diaspora mobilization as theorized by the typology, reflecting on the openness of the citizenship regime, the translocal community and collective claims.

The APU Network is the hub of engaged diaspora mobilization in Sweden. It is concerned with implementing change in BiH as well as networking for that change amongst its members in Sweden around issues of transitional justice and peacebuilding. Its members are involved with governmental actors in both homeland as well as hostlands and encourage economic development as well as political goals in line with European integration, and a multi-ethnic model of
citizenship for the country. When it comes to issues of transitional justice, the diaspora mobilizes not only to voice injustice in their homeland, but also to correct misperceptions abroad, in the belief that this will create pressure in the homeland and support civil society actors on the ground lobbying for change.

The establishment of a political party for the diaspora in Sweden demonstrates the involved nature of the Bosnian Swedish diaspora, and ability to balance transnational lives between host and homeland for its members. While this is a relatively recent political party on the Bosnian scene, their willingness to coalition with local actors to balance more ethnonationalist parties in the RS as well as in the FBiH demonstrates a political understanding of the homeland that is forward-looking. Finally, inactive mobilization is evidenced by the lack of collective claims being made focused on transitional justice and peacebuilding agendas in the Banja Lukan community as well as throughout more cultural associations of Bosnian Swedes in the country. However, this does not preclude the possibility for future mobilization should there be a collective claim around which diaspora can mobilize. In particular, this chapter also elaborate on the importance of the translocal community and the ways in which this variable is more complicated.

The following chapter will explore variations of diaspora mobilization in Germany as well as show different pathways among initiatives that fall within the same type of mobilization. The chapter will also touch on the different emphasis each of the independent variables plays on diaspora mobilization. This is particularly interesting to consider as Germany’s significance as a historical migration destination for Bosnians and former ex-Yugoslavs remains relevant in the way diaspora members mobilize.
Chapter 6 Bosnian Diaspora in Germany – Historically Involved Diaspora Mobilization

The previous chapter noted the different pathways of diaspora mobilization in Sweden and how they correspond to the typology of diaspora mobilization. This chapter will highlight some of the relevant empirical data about Bosnian diaspora mobilization in Germany in relation to the typology created. There is limited diaspora mobilization around issues of transitional justice, and the mobilization that is evident fits within the involved diaspora mobilization category, as hypothesized by the typology created, even though there are variations between different initiatives. Most notable are efforts in Germany by diaspora members interested in the role of Islam in German society, thus promoting the Bosnian Muslim identity within Germany within a larger framework of immigrants. Inactive diaspora mobilization is also evident, as predicted by the typological model.

This chapter will delve more deeply into how translocality and transnationalism differ in the Bosnian German community due to the historical migration from the region. It will juxtapose the mobilization of Bosnian diaspora in Germany to Sweden, which will be further addressed in the conclusion as well. The following sections will examine the historical links of migration between former Yugoslavia and Germany, before delving into the analysis of examples of involved and inactive diaspora mobilization.

6.1 Overview of Migration between Former Yugoslav Countries and Germany with a Focus on Bosnia and Herzegovina

Germany’s relationship with the countries of former Yugoslavia dates back further than the other two case studies examined. Hence, this chapter will first briefly go over the history of migration in Germany from Yugoslavia. Throughout the period
of the 1960’s until today, the relationship between Germany and Yugoslavia was marked by cooperation in terms of guest workers and later, refugee admission. During the 1990s in the midst of war outbreak in BiH Germany accepted some of the highest numbers of refugees from the fledgling country, approximately 320,000.359

Today, the Bosnian population in Germany is estimated to be around 160,000.360 This is slightly lower than the number of Croatian born individuals living in Germany, which is close to 163,000, and is almost four times the number of those born in Serbia living in Germany, close to 41,000.361 Today, individuals coming to Germany from BiH today are students and some guest workers. Bosnian citizens who seek asylum in Germany today are mostly Bosnian Roma citizens, based on discrimination claims in BiH. According to the Bosnian Embassy in Germany, very few of these individuals succeed, especially as there are asylum claims from refugees from the Middle East more recently. They are thus often rejected, and the individuals deported. Consular officers in the Embassy also echoed that most of the citizens they work with are Bosnian Roma who are trying to settle in Germany, rather than conflict-generated diaspora. The remaining population that finds itself in Germany has largely adjusted to post-war life in Germany, whether as ex-Yugoslavs, Bosniaks, Bosnian citizens who are in Germany to study or work, or as permanent residents and citizens of Germany.362

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360 Respondent DE1 (2014) Interview in September, Berlin, Germany.
This population represents some of the most diverse Bosnian diaspora populations in Europe. It includes former guest workers (*Gastarbeiter*) and conflict-generated diaspora members who came to Germany during the 1990s. Further, it also includes individuals who arrived to Germany to study or work in the post-conflict period, yet might nonetheless identify as diaspora and mobilize with conflict-generated individuals. Thus, it is worthwhile to examine this population in more detail and how their mobilization has changed over the last two decades.

Individuals from former Yugoslavia started arriving in Germany in the late 1960s on a regular basis as many were recruited to work in what, at the time, was Western Germany. The bilateral agreement in 1968 envisioned more than half a million workers to come to Germany over a period of five years. It was beneficial to both countries due to growing unemployment in Yugoslavia as a result of structural economic changes and the need for workers in Western Germany. Thus, despite initial ideological concerns by the Western German about Tito, the president of Yugoslavia, the agreement proved viable for both countries. Shonick sums this up well:

‘Despite the political difficulties that plagued the relationship between the two states, the FRG was an attractive destination for many Yugoslavs looking for work because of its proximity to Yugoslavia, the availability of jobs, and the comparatively high wages paid by West German companies. For its part, the Yugoslav government sanctioned the labor migrations because they decreased the problem of unemployment in Yugoslavia and because the remittances of these guest workers also proved to be crucial for the Yugoslav economy.’

From the outset, remittances back to the former Yugoslav countries became a staple of the *Gastarbeiter*, or guest worker, experience. For many of the individuals,

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coming from poor, rural, and uneducated backgrounds, the remittances sent back home were essential for their respective families’ survival back home. The Yugoslav state encouraged this by creating cultural policies that focused on increasing the sending state’s reach to its increasing guest worker numbers. The same also feared emigrants and political exiles to Germany, afraid that they guest workers would negatively influence the population back home or abandon the ideals of socialism altogether while abroad. Nonetheless, remittances during this period rose, not just from Germany. In 1963, the amount received by the country was the equivalent of 41 Million US Dollars. By 1974, Yugoslavia received 1.6 Billion US Dollars from remittances. The number increased to a little over 2 Billion by 1977 and was close to 5 Billion by 1980. According to the German Federal Statistics Office, the number of Yugoslavs in Germany during this period reached as high as 239,519 individuals in 1970.

Similar to concerts attended by diaspora from the region today, the Yugoslav state was adamant about guest workers to attend cultural entertainment activities, which the Yugoslav state helped organize. These events were meant to help Gastarbeiter maintain connection to their homeland, with expressively ideological messages in support of the homeland political regime. The performers gave tours across Germany. Often, these happened around the same time as relevant state holidays in Yugoslavia. Due to financial challenges, the state enlisted non-

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governmental associations based in Germany to help them, even though both the state and the associations were often averse to each other. This in large part as some of these Matice Iseljenika were associated with anti-state actions and often propagated respective republics such as Croatia or Serbia, rather than the ‘brotherhood and unity’ political viewpoints of Yugoslavia as a whole.367 “Behind the curtain of spontaneous patriotism and impeccable brotherhood and unity displayed on stage, concurrently, interrepublic conflicts and constant paranoia of nationalist excesses kindled backstage.”368 Overall, this demonstrates that for both Yugoslavia and Germany, the migration that occurred during this period was considered temporary. However, many of the Gastarbeiter in Germany continued to work and stay in Germany on a repeated basis leading up to the conflict.

While the migration debate heated up in Germany during the 1980s, Yugoslavs remained relatively unaffected in the public sphere. This is interesting as they constituted the second-largest group of foreign residents in Germany after Turks from the mid-1970s through the mid-1980s, even though Germany’s bilateral agreement with Yugoslavia was ratified later than other countries, in 1968. By the early 1980s, German political and media debates centered around how best to resolve the status of individuals who had ended up staying in Germany, some bringing over family members, both from the perspective of integration into German society as well as legal status. The idea of guest workers who would return to their homelands once they were finished working had proven unrealistic. German policy makers were faced with the fact that their country was one in which many

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368 Ibid., 375.
guest workers were instead living more permanently than they had anticipated.\textsuperscript{369} Yugoslavs were inconspicuous in these debates and were perceived as integrating well however. Within both German as well as Yugoslav circles, they were referred to as \textit{Jugovići} and \textit{Jugošvaben}, respectively, connoting their combined identity as both Yugoslav and German. In the case of \textit{Jugovići}, this usually had the connotation of guest workers from Yugoslavia, while \textit{Jugošvabe} also indicated and acknowledged the fact that guest workers often settled with Germans. Hence, their children were considered \textit{Jugošvaben}, literally combining the words \textit{Yugo} and \textit{Schwabe}, a colloquial term used for German in the former Yugoslav space. In former Yugoslavia, they were often referred to as 'Švabe' or 'Gastarbajteri,' playing on the same names as in Germany.\textsuperscript{370}

In a longitudinal study of migrants in Germany between 1985 and 1997, (ex)Yugoslavs had the highest amount of interethnic contact with Germans. The other groups included in the study were Turks, Italians, Spaniards, and Greeks.\textsuperscript{371} Previous studies of integration within German society among Yugoslavs and other migrant groups also note that Yugoslavs achieve higher social standing as compared to Turks.\textsuperscript{372} This helps to explain why they were often not the target of German debates on immigrants compared to Turks or Greeks. For many Germans, Yugoslavia was not so foreign itself due to their frequent summer trips there during

the 1970s and 1980s. More recent studies of second-generation Yugoslavs in comparison with second-generation Turks in Germany show that Yugoslavs tend to fare better with integration, particularly when looking at education, though they are still not precluded from discrimination altogether. In part, this reflects how well positioned Bosnian Muslims in Germany are to take a leading role in the debate about the influence of religion, particularly Islam, in the public sphere, as will be evidenced in the later sections.

For the former refugees, trauma has been a consistent factor that influenced their staying in Germany and was continuously stressed in several interviews with Bosnian diaspora members in Germany, as opposed to those in Sweden and France. Trauma claims were able to prevent them from receiving the dreaded 'Abschiebung,' being deported, from Germany back to Bosnia and Herzegovina, after the war. Ultimately, only 6 percent of the Bosnian refugee population remained in Germany after the war. Third destination countries such as the United States, or return to the homeland were the two most common end results for most of the population by the late 1990s. This dynamic changed the conflict-generated diaspora population in Germany, reducing it to individuals who associate their relationship to the homeland with trauma, making mobilization difficult.

Since the end of the war, around 15,000 people are estimated, according to the Bosnian Embassy, to have renounced their Bosnian citizenship for German citizenship. Unlike France or Sweden, German law did not allow for dual

citizenship until recently.\footnote{German citizenship laws changed in the early 2000s to allow for dual citizenship to individuals born in Germany, but this does not apply for most of the Bosnian refugees who came to Germany during the 1990s, hence forcing them to choose one or the other.} As Germany has a semi-open citizenship regime, the typology predicts that most of the mobilization will be involved, rather than engaged or reactive. Following the reasoning of previous research, this chapter also notes certain differences across Germany, as cross-local perspectives are increasingly relevant when considering claims made by migrants.\footnote{Koopmans, Ruud. 2004. “Migrant Mobilisation and Political Opportunities: Variation among German Cities and a Comparison with the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.” \textit{Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies} 30 (3): 449–70.} There are markedly different kinds of mobilizations in different cities in Germany. Berlin has an active ex-Yugo scene, particularly on a cultural level, while Munich has more of a Gastarbeiter community. Bosniak Islamic Centers are peppered throughout the country. The following sections highlight this, noting the differences between communities this mobilization falls within. These are by no means exhaustive, but serve to be reflective of the fact that while there is a large population of Bosnians in Germany, very few of them are conflict-generated and thus diaspora mobilization is thus somewhat more nuanced than typologized.

The following sections will focus on diaspora mobilization in Germany in relation to the typology. The fieldwork conducted brought additional variables to the forefront in the German case, in particular due to the historical migration of former Yugoslav and later Bosnian guest workers to Germany. These will be discussed in more detail in the following sections. Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to remind the reader of the hypothesized types of diaspora mobilization for a citizenship regime such as Germany in the period most relevant for Bosnian diaspora, represented by ‘Partial Liberalization’ using Howard’s framework.
6.2 Involved Mobilization in Germany

Hypothesis 3 predicts one of the pathways that lead to involved mobilization. To remind the reader, it can be expressed as follows: \((H3: \text{Partially liberal citizenship regimes} + \text{collective claim made} \rightarrow \text{Involved Diaspora Mobilization})\). In this case, the presence or absence of translocal community does not impact the level of mobilization but might lead to different pathways.

These sections will draw on further details to potentially differentiate whether there are other factors that might explain or predict differences in diaspora mobilization. The empirical research in Germany provides insight into the variety of involved diaspora mobilization. At the same time, due to the limited opportunities in Germany for homeland claims within German public debates, involved diaspora mobilization is exemplified through an engagement with relevant topics in Germany such as multiculturalism and Islamophobia in order to foster diaspora mobilization. This is also evidenced in similar research on Kurds and Turks in Germany, in both first and second generations.\(^{379}\)

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6.2.1 Bosniaks in Germany

German incorporation is understood not to include collaboration with migrant organizations, nor does it seek out political participation from them on a federal level, but rather relegates this to the subnational level, to each particular Land.\textsuperscript{380} Fieldwork on Bosnian diaspora organizations in Germany initially differed from the Swedish case study as contacts were more difficult to find regardless of the high number of individuals living in Germany from the region. Migrant and diaspora organizations in Germany are rather insular from one another and few have transnational links or represent themselves as representative of the Bosnian diaspora in Germany. One of the key Bosniak diaspora organizations, established originally in 1989 as the first such organization in Germany, is the Islamski kulturni centar Bošnjaka, or Islamic Cultural Center of Bosniaks in Berlin.

Berlin and Stuttgart both have large Bosniak populations and thus both have similar organizations involved in the daily lives of its community, established within a few years of 1992 primarily as religious centers by guest workers and refugees. During the war period between 1992 and 1995, they organized fundraising and provided help to Bosnia and Herzegovina, whether it was sending aid convoys to war zones within the country, or helping incoming refugees get settled in Germany.\textsuperscript{381} Today, their activities are not as focused on the homeland as they are on ensuring that the second generation in Germany remain fluent in the Bosnian language and providing them with community engagement opportunities. This diaspora mobilization, while at times more active in relation to homeland politics, largely conforms to the involved diaspora mobilization type. The organization in

\textsuperscript{381} Respondent DE18 (2014) Interview in September, Stuttgart, Germany.
Stuttgart differs slightly in that it is more focused on maintaining the religious identity whereas the community in Berlin is younger and more reflective of their mobilization, and thus identifies beyond their Bosniak identity as Bosnian diaspora.

For this community, highlighting a ‘Bosnian’ style of Islam, which is more moderate and in line with integration in Western society, is highly important. Bosniaks in Berlin seek to represent a version of being Muslim disassociated with extremism and easy to accommodate in European countries. Their activism in Germany around ‘Migrantenpolitik’ is especially relevant due to the refugee crisis in the Middle East and increased Islamophobia across Europe. Beyond this, they are interested in bringing to the forefront something about Bosnia and Herzegovina that is not associated with the conflict of the 1990s, to showcase their contribution to their hostland, as well as to move beyond the war trauma many carry.

‘Otherwise, you have an identity crisis!’ Travljanin, the organization’s President, notes by way of explanation. Bosniaks in Germany are more likely to engage discussions about dual citizenship in Germany, how to integrate incoming refugees to the German way of life, and how to ensure that they are part of shaping this debate within their hostland.

Prior research has shown that the “the impact of individual rights (such as, citizenship rights) often goes hand in hand with that of group rights (such as cultural rights).” As such, it has found that political mobilization is more difficult in

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384 Respondent DE16 (2014) Interview in September, Berlin, Germany.
Germany for Muslims, particularly in an atmosphere of Islamophobia. Thus, it becomes instructive to consider the mobilization of Bosniaks in Germany as they have attempted to carve out space for themselves within the political discourse of multiculturalism and Islam in Germany. The Bosniak population in Germany is particularly interesting as they do not necessarily conform to stereotypes of the Muslim ‘other,’ in the same way that Yugoslavs did not to the migrant or guest worker ‘other’ during prior debates about migration in Germany.

Travjanin is involved in German politics, particularly around issues of Islamophobia. Under his leadership, the organization has become part of a larger consortium of Islamic organizations in Germany who lobby for minority rights, and note the increase of Islamophobic commentary within German society. This has led to involvement in both the Berlin Senate as well as the SDP party, traditionally associated as being more friendly to immigrants.\(^{387}\) For those involved with migrants in Germany and German politics more generally, they realize the importance of migrant rights with new waves of refugees arriving. ‘These are all partial solutions, not comprehensive ones.’\(^{388}\) By involving his community in the current debates in Germany around integration and migrant rights, he believes that the Bosniak community can create a bigger impact than in BiH proper. Whether this involves building dialogue with other religious communities throughout Germany or building a German speaking transnational Islamic community that encompasses more than just Bosniaks, in both cases the effort remains focused on the hostland. In effect, the community does not express collective claims towards the homeland.

\[^{387}\] In the 2016 local elections in Berlin, a Bosnian immigrant to Germany, Maja Lasić, won the SDP seat.
The Bosniak leadership in Germany is relatively young. They have come of age in Germany and have learned the language and experienced Germany as home in a different way than the guest workers before them. The association to the homeland is very different as there is little of the ‘Yugoslavia’ they remember, unlike generations before them. They are largely conflict-generated. Their political participation and discussions often center around German debates rather than those in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They believe that the Islamic Society is not responsible for the political engagement of the diaspora and that separate organizations need to organize this. This was echoed on numerous occasions by Bosniaks in Germany. The understanding of ethnonationalism in the homeland, what Travljanin calls the ‘three-headed monster presidency,’ discourages Bosnian visions within politics and he thinks that strengthening Bosniak institutions is not helpful for the Bosnian state.\textsuperscript{389} It is interesting that they emphasize their Bosniak identity in Germany, yet do not want to be politically engaged with the homeland as Bosniaks, choosing to forego the local political structures in BiH.

However, Bosniak diaspora organizations retain institutional connection to the \textit{Rijaset}, which considers the various Bosniak Islamic Centers part of its congregation. Thus, they separate their religious identity from their political identities.\textsuperscript{390} When asked about membership and support of Bosnian political parties, responses varied. Individuals responded with \textit{Stranka Demokratske Akcije} (\textit{SDA}) – the Bosniak right party usually associated with Bosniak ethnonationalism and aligned with the Rijaset, \textit{Socijaldemokratska Partija} (\textit{SDP}) – the former Communist, now Social Democratic party, \textit{Demokratska Fronta} (\textit{DF}) – an offshoot

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{389} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{390} Respondents DE5 (2014) Interview in September, Berlin, Germany; Respondent DE18 (2014) Interview in September, Stuttgart, Germany.
\end{itemize}
of SDP and a relatively new party with a similar party platform, and Naša Stranka – a relatively new party focused on civil belonging with a stronghold in Sarajevo politic.391 This demonstrates more variety among the Bosniak diaspora members in regards to political party membership than expected. Since there is little to no political campaigning in the diaspora, this is a potential avenue for political parties to utilize in the future, particularly considering the potential of diaspora voting.392 At the same time, it recognizes that the Bosniak diaspora members in Germany are open to political parties that are not expressively Muslim, and that there is less support for the Bosniak ethnonationalist leading party, SDA, than anticipated.

It also represents a more nuanced belief about homeland politics than is often expressed in Bosnia and Herzegovina as it discourages the monopoly of one ruling Bosniak political party. When asked to elaborate on this in interviews, several leaders of the Islamic Society of Bosniaks in Germany, in both Berlin and Stuttgart, noted how the SDA, the dominant Bosniak party in BiH, takes for granted the fact that it represents all Bosniaks in BiH as well as in diaspora. They do not feel particularly acknowledged or represented by these individuals. Instead, they hold them in part responsible for the political ‘standstill’ (zastoj) when it comes to certain issues such as EU accession, or not ensuring basic services for all citizens in BiH. Several individuals highlighted a stronger relationship between the state and diaspora was necessary, to engage the diaspora in a more productive way.393

Speaking of the SDA, one respondent noted, “They come when the election is near, and we don’t hear from them otherwise. They are stuck in the past.”

Fieldwork in Bosnia and Herzegovina revealed that Bosniak organizations were instrumental in supporting diaspora voter outreach across Germany through the *Prvi Mart* initiative during Bosnian elections in 2014. Spearheaded by returnees from the Srebrenica region in elect a Bosniak mayor in Srebrenica in 2012, this collective organized a ‘pro-Bosnian’ umbrella coalition called ‘Homeland’ or *Domovina* in time for elections in 2014, as discussed in the previous chapter.

Here, Bosniak religious organizations found an opportunity. They supported diaspora voter outreach, helping *Prvi Mart* organizers disseminate information among its members. *Prvi Mart* was organized to raise awareness of Bosnian citizens living abroad who were still eligible to vote in their pre-war districts, many of which fell under the jurisdiction of Republika Srpska. *Prvi Mart’s* claims about the importance of providing political voice for returnees and those who were eligible to vote in Republika Srpska, with the potential and promise to provide a platform for less ethnonational, Bosnian Serb-centered politics, helped to mobilize Bosniaks in Germany. In Berlin, where many members were from the Srebrenica region, the translocal community mobilized around the belief that the *Domovina* coalition, if elected, would be able to effect change in homeland politics.

In discussion about collective claims they would mobilize around potentially, representatives of Bosniak organizations in Germany agreed about the importance of commemorating Srebrenica. However, they did not see it necessarily

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394 Respondent DE16 (2014) Interview in September, Berlin, Germany.
as a mobilizing tool for their community. One of the interviewees noted that Germans are understanding of the importance of genocide remembrance and commemoration and that there is little room for genocide denial in the German public sphere, whether in regards to the Holocaust or Bosnia and Herzegovina.\footnote{Respondent DE4 (2014) Interview in September, Berlin, Germany.} This does not mean that Srebrenica is not an important aspect of their identity, but rather that mobilization does not occur in the same way around issues of Srebrenica remembrance for Bosniaks and Bosnians in Germany, as it does in other countries, such as the Netherlands.\footnote{Koinova, Maria. 2015. “Sustained vs Episodic Mobilization among Conflict-Generated Diasporas.” \textit{International Political Science Review}, July.} “The legacy of the Holocaust in Germany makes denial difficult. Germans are sensitive about this,” one interviewee noted.\footnote{Respondent DE8 (2014) Interview in September, Berlin, Germany} Instead, mobilization is focused more on the importance of building the community in Germany, integrating the community into German debates or, if provided the opportunity, collaboration with homeland organizations such as \textit{Prvi Mart}, as evidenced in this section.

Overall, Bosniak diaspora organizations in Germany demonstrate their potential for involved diaspora mobilization, but they indicate more of an involvement in the hostland politics and maintaining a religiously minded community. The German incorporation regime has increasingly provided them opportunities to be represented on the subnational levels in their communities, to also further conversations about the importance of Islam in Germany. Throughout interviews, they maintained their lack of political engagement in the homeland and rather noted their role in spiritual matters of its members. Mobilization around diaspora voter registration and outreach was limited to supporting the \textit{Prvi Mart} initiative during the 2014 elections, which has not been sustained for the local
elections in 2016. The translocal community does not seem to play a role in Bosniak organizations, in large part as religion plays a greater role for those who become involved. Thus, when there are collective claims from other groups that identity with Bosnia and Herzegovina, they have the potential to mobilize, but generally focus more on their hostland community than on mobilizing around transitional justice or peacebuilding claims in the homeland.

6.2.2 Avangarda

The Munich-based group *Avangarda* and its leadership places no emphasis on the perceived ethnic belonging of its members. While their claims are not framed in transitional justice specifically, they further a vision of their homeland that is democratizing faster and has less contention among its local political actors in regards to war-time claims. The group demonstrates the diversity within involved diaspora mobilization in that they partner with the host country government as well as with local actors in the homeland, to help organize around particular events or issues related to peacebuilding. In particular, a high level of translocality is also evident.

Formed in 2005, *Avangarda* has been mobilizing both in Germany, as well as, increasingly, with other diaspora groups, in Sweden most notably. While the group is small, they have a clear agenda about the peacebuilding and transitional justice goals they have for BiH and are interested in furthering these through their mobilization, in collaboration with German and European institutions. Unlike other diaspora groups examined throughout this thesis, *Avangarda’s* members are all younger, having few or no memories or direct experience of wartime BiH.
Avangarda’s activism is informed by their mission for a ‘united, sovereign, and democratic’ BiH. They consider a large number of citizens in BiH as disenfranchised by the political elites in the country and are frustrated that their homeland has not yet achieved candidate status to the European Union. Those who have grown up in BiH have left the country for lack of economic opportunities and have chosen to educate themselves or work in Germany, learn to speak German, and try to build a future. They maintain an interest in their homeland and collaborate with diaspora members who have been in Munich longer, such as guest workers.

They attempt to lobby host country actors in helping to forward their vision of the homeland. While their claims are not necessarily transitional justice related in the sense of focusing on victims’ claims, they are nonetheless focused on helping to implement a more politically and economically sustainable future in their homeland, from their position in the host country. Avangarda was also part of voter registration efforts during the 2014 elections in BiH, stressing the importance of the diaspora vote in the democratic process and long-term peacebuilding in the country, especially in returnee communities. In 2014, they worked with the members of the Foreign Ministries in the United Kingdom as well as Germany on recommendations which ultimately were included in the the British-German initiative for BiH. Thus, they have helped to influence foreign policy initiatives of the hostland.

The group’s members consider this as their citizenship duty as they feel many diaspora members are not up-to-date with the latest political developments in the homeland, particularly those eligible to vote in the RS. The strength of

401 Respondent DE21 and DE22 (2014) Interview in October, Munich, Germany.
translocal ties within the *Avangarda* collective inform its engagement. Its leadership has consistently been from the Prijedor area and has had strong translocal connection to the Prijedor region. Additionally, an individual from Prijedor owns a café in Munich, fostering this translocal community and serving as a diaspora meeting place.⁴⁰²

In 2013, the group promoted and participated in the Bosnian and Herzegovinian Diaspora Investment Forum (*BHDiaFor*) in Prijedor.⁴⁰³ Members recognized this as an opportunity to showcase the potential of their homeland transnationally through economic development by fellow diaspora members. *Avangarda* engaged potential diaspora investors in the Munich area to consider building transnational business ties between Germany and BiH.⁴⁰⁴ At the same time, *Avangarda* has utilized its translocal ties to connect with the APU network in Sweden. The two diaspora organizations leadership noted they are usually reluctant to collaborate with local actors they do not know in the country of origin. However, amongst the diaspora, they expressed how they utilize translocal connections to build collaboration with local actors across the homeland.⁴⁰⁵

Unlike the Bosniak organizations mentioned in the previous section, *Avangarda* utilizes commemoration around the Srebrenica Genocide as a collective claim to engage more diaspora members to mobilize in the host country. They are not interested in engaging with the homeland government in regards to this. Rather, they are interested in engaging around issues of discrimination and remembrance.

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⁴⁰² For example, the author met with the organizers of the Avangarda group in said café as it was well-known and suggested by the individuals.
⁴⁰³ Respondent DE28 (2014) Interview in October, Munich, Germany. Respondent BH17 (2014) Interview in June, Sarajevo, BiH.
⁴⁰⁴ Participant Observation, August 2013, Sarajevo, BiH. This was the second annual BhDiaFor event.
in Germany. They organized broadcasts that were shown in twenty different cities in Germany during several years that informed citizens and sparked debate, rather than one event which attracted only diaspora members. The group’s leaders thus aim to show how migrants in Germany want to be part of discussions about multiculturalism and integration and thus also strengthen German society, rather than be a nuisance and cause of concern. Amidst increasingly populist discourses in German media as well as reflected in German local elections with the rise of the AfD, a right-wing populist party, they see this as their particular contribution as well as duty, particularly reflecting on political discourses in the homeland.\footnote{Respondents DE21 and DE25 (2014) Interviews in September, Munich, Germany.}

*Avangarda* provides an example of involved diaspora mobilization in Germany, which aims to develop a translocal community among its members to ensure their mobilization can be sustained, both in collaboration with German institutions, but also transnationally, through working with other diaspora groups, such as in Sweden. While the transnational efforts are still nascent, *Avangarda* continues to establish itself as a group of young Bosnians in Germany who are willing to lobby for a more productive future in their homeland. The members’ energy and youth ensures that second-generation and younger Bosnians in Germany have a platform for mobilization should they choose to make collective claims in regards to transitional justice and peace in their homeland. At the time of writing however, these were rather limited.

6.2.3 From Involved to Inactive: The SüdOst Center

The SüdOst Center in Berlin is one of the few institutions that has remained constant since the late 1980s focusing on gathering and helping those from all of former Yugoslavia living in Germany. During the breakup of Yugoslavia and the
subsequent wars, this institution served as a space for diaspora to meet and gather, as well as develop their new community in Germany and seek support from those who were already in Germany, the *Gastarbeiter*.

The Center’s activities, depending on the time period, thus fall into both types of theorized diaspora mobilization. Initially and throughout the war in former Yugoslavia, while the strength of the translocal community was limited, there were collective claims about incoming refugees which led to involved diaspora mobilization around issues of return migration and refugee integration as well as raising awareness of the ongoing atrocities during the war. Later on, without a lasting translocal community, as refugees returned to BiH or moved to third countries such as the United States, mobilization organized with the help of the Center is representative of the inactive mobilization type as there are no collective claims being made on behalf of the diaspora population in regards to transitional justice or peacebuilding in the homeland.

Established as meeting point for guest workers and refugees from not just Bosnia and Herzegovina, but the whole region of former Yugoslavia, the SüdOst Center, or “südost Europa Kultur e.V.” was established by Bosiljka Schedlich, a Croatian born, naturalized German who considers herself a Yugoslav.407 Having arrived in Germany in the late 1960s during the first wave of guest worker exchanges between the former Yugoslavia and Germany, Schedlich settled in Berlin where she married and had children. By the time Yugoslavia started dissolving, she had established a vibrant community around her of individuals who had connections to the region, yet felt frustrated at the dissolution of their home country before their eyes.

They resolved to maintain normalcy “rather than giving in to nationalist rhetoric” during the conflict, mainly by organizing cultural events and peace in the region. They quickly became a central meeting point for refugees, mostly from the Bosnian conflict, who were urban and educated, predominately from Banja Luka and Sarajevo. On weekends, artists, writers, actors, activists, and intellectuals met here to discuss the political climate in their homeland and built a community amongst each other. They often organized small donation drives amongst each other to send to humanitarian organizations helping in the conflict in their homeland. The SüdOst Center provided a sanctuary away from the reality of their situation and served as a place where refugees came together, networked, learned German, and supported one another.

During this period, the conflict-generated diaspora and the Gastarbeiter community can be classified as involved in the sense that they organized around collective claims about ending the war in their homelands. Many were supportive of maintaining Yugoslavia as it existed, and did not support ethnic cleansing by any of the groups involved in the conflict. This multi-ethnic group fostered ties amongst each other very quickly. While many of the individuals were meeting one another for the first time under the circumstances of their living in Berlin, there was nonetheless a strong sense of translocal community since many of the refugees knew each other from their social circles in Banja Luka and Sarajevo. Thus, they quickly found common ground and connected with one another in Berlin.

The main two groups within this community were the former Gastarbeiters who, like Schedlich, wanted to maintain a sense of ‘Yugo’ within Germany, of

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408 Ibid.
belonging to a greater idea, and for most of these individuals, the war was not a lived experience. The second group was composed of refugees who had escaped as a result of the war. Many were traumatized as a result. In this sense, the Center offered a refuge from the war and a community of people with shared cultural norms, appreciation for art and literature, film and music.

However, this community was in many ways not permanent, as the changing political solution in BiH as well as the legal status of a large part of the refugee community in Germany was always in question. The refugee community knew that their legal status in Germany was precarious. While the center helped with advocacy for the refugees in Berlin and wider Germany, there were limited paths to settlement and citizenship for many of the refugees who arrived in Germany during the war. Unlike in Sweden, they received temporary protection status with the understanding by the German government that at the end of the conflict, most, if not all, would be repatriated. While German law different in each of the sixteen Länder in Germany, mandatory repatriation started in some of the regions as early as 1996, continuing into 1997 and on. The activism in the Center focused on helping these conflict-generated individuals maintain residency in Germany rather than having to return to war-torn communities back home.

Today, the size of the Bosnian population in Berlin is less than a third of what it was during the war, an estimated 320,000 in 1996. During this immediate post-war period, SüdOst was instrumental in helping refugees prepare ‘Atteste,’ documents that detailed the trauma they had experienced, enabling a way for them

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410 Respondents DE4 and DE8 (2014) Interviews in September, Berlin, Germany.
412 Ibid.
to remain in Germany by arguing they were unable to return to their homeland. Many individuals who were successful were from the Srebrenica area as well as other rural areas in BiH. This population differed from the diaspora members who were organizing during the war, many of who left, either to return to BiH, or to third countries. The individuals who were traumatized were less likely to mobilize and continue to be inactive in regards to the politics of their homeland. Therapy sessions for trauma victims, including men, were set up within the Center and continue to this day.\footnote{Respondents DE6 and DE7 (2014) Interview in September, Berlin, Germany.}

As the diaspora population has changed, so has the diaspora mobilization. Today, narratives of victimhood remain dominant among the population that uses the Center and political mobilization is limited to symbolic acts within the community. Schedlich believes that the trauma therapy groups the SüdOst Center provides as well as the women’s groups within the sphere of this should not be long-lasting, but acknowledges that the process of healing continues for many within the greater Berlin community.\footnote{Respondents DE4, DE6, and DE9 (2014) Interviews in September, Berlin, Germany.} Unlike the diaspora community that was dominant at the Center during the war and the immediate post-war period, this community is still managing its trauma and finding ways to integrate within the German citizenship regime. There are limited collective claims being made and the Center exists mainly to maintain a sense of community among them. The following section goes into more detail about inactive diaspora mobilization in Germany.

6.3 Inactive Diaspora Mobilization in Germany

Hypothesis 6 predicts that in the absence of a collective claim in any citizenship regime, there will be inactive diaspora mobilization. This can be expressed as
follows: \(H6: \text{Any citizenship regime + presence or absence of translocal community + no collective claim made} \Rightarrow \text{Inactive Diaspora Mobilization.}\)

However, it is interesting to note whether the presence of a translocal community makes a difference in how diaspora mobilize overall, rather than simply around issues of transitional justice and peace.

The following sections demonstrate several examples of inactive diaspora mobilization in Germany captured during fieldwork. As noted in the previous chapter, inactive diaspora mobilization can take different forms and the initiatives explored here are intended to highlight rather than capture the plethora of activities that might fall within the purview of inactive diaspora mobilization.

6.3.1 Supplementary Bosnian Schools

Interviewees throughout fieldwork always emphasized the importance of education for their children and the opportunities that education provides their children in host countries. When it comes to the diaspora community, often, the importance of Bosnian language comprehension is stressed among diaspora members. Before the war in former Yugoslavia, supplementary Yugoslav schools operated throughout Germany, which then dissipated into some schools, corresponding to each republic within the federation, which taught the respective curriculum of each country.

This trend has continued and remains one of the main ways that diaspora members in Germany mobilize. While this involves some cooperation with homeland institutions, this mobilization does not organize around transitional justice related issues in the homeland, but rather around the maintenance of the diaspora community. In this sense, the theorized inactive diaspora mobilization type prevails due to the lack of a particular collective claim related to the homeland.
The students in the German Bosnian supplementary schools, while mostly Bosniak, are not exclusively so, with some parents rejecting the Bosniak label and instead identifying as Bosnian.415 These schools are not organized based on the presence of a translocal community, but rather on a joint belief that the second generation should retain the language as well as the established continuation of supplementary schools in Germany over time. This reflects the overall belief of maintaining the Bosnian heritage while integrating into German society echoed throughout interviews.

Supplementary schools in Germany have a somewhat contested history, depending on their implementation across the Ländere. In Bavaria, a model prevailed which provided education in the native language of the students and did not seek to integrate them with German pupils. German language in these schools was limited. In other regions, for example in Berlin, integration was considered the main goal of supplementary schools, hence instruction focusing on transitional classes with intensive German language education which aimed to integrate students into the German education system as quickly as possible.416 While different, both systems limited the amount of interaction of guest worker students with German students. “Neither approach nurtures the educational needs of children who are, in fact, growing up at ‘Turkish-Germans,’ ‘Greek-Germans,’ or ‘Yugoslav-Germans.’ The policies and programs in each work to negate one side of the hyphen and thus work against what are in fact the beginnings of an ethnically pluralistic society.”417

417 Ibid., p. 264.
During the Yugoslav period, children of guest workers attended these schools, with the curriculum approved by the Yugoslav state to ensure that children would be able to return without difficulty to the education system of Yugoslavia once the parents returned. Rist notes that in the 1974 – 1975 school year, 510 of the 1,600 Yugoslav students attended supplementary schools organized by the Yugoslav government, with the others presumably choosing to forgo it and remain in German public schools only. Children of guest workers as well as guest workers in Munich, the capital of Bavaria, noted during interviews that they spent one to two years in these schools before returning 'home' and continuing their education. These schools often measured up to the educational standard of Yugoslavia as children could seamlessly transfer between Germany and Yugoslavia during their education, in a way staying within the Yugoslav education system regardless of where they grew up.

After the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991, these schools ceased. Instead supplementary schools for the incoming refugee populations in Germany from the region were established. Teachers who were refugees themselves organized and taught at these schools. Between 1994 and 1997, approximately 140 students attended Bosnian supplementary schools in Berlin at the high school level. The BiH government considered them as equivalent to schools in BiH proper, issued curricula for them, and paid teachers small stipends. The schools enabled collaboration and exchange of vital information about their residential statuses in Germany, as well as the changing political landscape in their homeland. By 1997 however, these supplementary schools, funded by the Bosnian state, had minimal

418 Ibid.
enrollment due to the number of refugees who returned to their homeland or immigrated to third countries such as the United States.

Ultimately, the program was reduced to language and cultural education at lower levels rather than full-time operating schools, hoping to ensure that younger Bosnian children maintain a relationship with their mother-tongue.421 At present, these supplementary schools continue to operate throughout Germany even as all the children that attend them attend German schools, almost all having been born in Germany as well.422

In Germany, the schools form a union, headed by a former Bosnian consul to Germany, Haris Halilović. Its main objective for the 25 schools in Germany organized throughout the country, including those that operate within Bosniak Islamic Centers, is to provide language instruction. This helps to ‘preserve the Bosnian language and culture among the citizens of BiH living in Germany, as well as support their better integration into society and the fight against assimilation.’423 This updated mission statement reflects that the Bosnian diaspora schoolchildren today will likely be staying in Germany and not ‘returning to the homeland.’

The administration of these Bosnian schools today falls under the auspices of the Ministry of Civil Affairs, though there is little oversight into the programs. The most recent approved syllabi date from 2008.424 Neither the Ministry of Education, fragmented into separate ministries in each canton as well as the RS, nor

421 Respondent DE2 (2014) Interview in September, Berlin, Germany. The same was echoed by Respondents DE3 and DE26, DE19, and DE27.
423 Ibid.
424 Ministry for Civil Affairs, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2014.
the Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees which is responsible for diaspora homeland relations, liaises regularly with diaspora groups in these schools.425

Moreover, these schools today face problems of enrollment, regardless of the importance of retaining Bosnian language is stressed in interviews. One of the main organizers of the Bosnian schools in Germany echoed this during an interview, noting that there was an additional challenge in maintaining enrollment as well.426 In fact, according to Eurostat’s results from 2011, close to 2000 individuals who are Bosnian born in Germany are under 15 years old.427 In other words, this is only close to 1% of the whole population. While this does not account for children born to one or two Bosnian parents in Germany, who under new citizenship laws are accounted for as Germans with migrant backgrounds, it nonetheless reflects a much smaller number of second-generation Bosnian diaspora who would potentially be able to mobilize in their parents’ homeland. At the same time, this also reflects the parents’ desire to ensure their children are fully integrated and given opportunities in the German system, thus only maintaining cultural ties to Bosnia and Herzegovina, rather than citizenship rights or the grievances of their parents.428

Without establishing ties to the homeland through these language schools, translocal communities, or collective claims, the second generation of Bosnians in Germany has little potential of mobilizing as a diaspora around issues in their homeland effectively. The supplementary schools, without support from the

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425 During the 2014 Bosnian Diaspora Congress in Sarajevo, there was a workshop organized in order to discuss supplementary schools with homeland institutions responsible for working on these issues, but governmental representatives voiced their frustration at the fragmented education system in BiH and thus, their lack of engagement with the diaspora.


homeland, and with low enrollment rates in the hostland, will likely not create future opportunities for diaspora mobilization. In this sense, these schools represent one of the paths of inactive diaspora mobilization, but show little promise of evolving into more.

6.3.2 Women’s Groups

As noted previously, inactive mobilization is empirically difficult to ascertain and locate as inactive mobilization and thus is often unaccounted for in research. However, throughout the research period in Germany, interviewees mentioned they were part of diaspora women’s groups, usually in informal settings.\(^{429}\) This differed from Sweden, where women have two different women’s diaspora associations and where some have run for political office in Sweden.\(^{430}\) Usually, these informal groups included activities such as gardening together, helping each other fill out forms, or offering a safe space to discuss trauma. The groups, established towards the end of the conflict in BiH, have not stopped meeting over the last two decades.\(^{431}\) Interviewees stressed the importance of developing trust and relationships among the women themselves rather than building networks targeted towards political mobilization.\(^{432}\)

Inactive diaspora mobilization in women’s groups can potentially be explained by the high levels of refugees with trauma who ended up staying in Germany at the end of the conflict. Often, these are associated with trauma-related


\(^{432}\) Respondent DE10 (2014) Interview in September, Freiburg, Germany.
guilt and feelings of shame, which affect the further emotional development of individuals.\textsuperscript{433} In a comparative study of refugees from former Yugoslav countries, with the largest number thereof from BiH, around 60\% in Germany, the UK, and Italy, those interviewed in Germany were found to have experienced the most trauma. "Refugees in Germany reported experiencing the highest number of traumatic events; particularly higher rates were evident for interpersonal assaults such as sexual and nonsexual assaults and torture. They also reported experiencing the highest number of post-migration stressors."\textsuperscript{434} This can potentially further impede individuals' willingness to participate in political mobilization. One interviewee cited that she does not attend commemoration activities or diaspora events because it 'brings back too many memories.'\textsuperscript{435}

One woman’s group organizer in Germany noted that most of the women’s group participants were employed while their husbands were unemployed. She mentioned this was in large part as women were more open to working, regardless of what the work entailed, while many of the husbands considered more remedial jobs as unsatisfactory.\textsuperscript{436} In Germany, Bosnian diaspora women use women’s groups among themselves as a social way of interacting with one another as well as reflecting on their new lives in Germany. For many, it offers an escape from their everyday life and empowerment amongst one another. Research in Sweden echoes

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[435]{Respondent DE7 (2014) Interview in September, Berlin, Germany.}
\footnotetext[436]{Ibid.}
\end{footnotes}
that diaspora women are often the ones, regardless of trauma, who are more resilient and have higher levels of employment, regardless of their level of education.437

The women’s groups of Bosnian diaspora members who meet in different cities in Germany are notable for their emphasis on building relationships among Bosnian diaspora women. Their activities do not translate to shared initiatives or diaspora mobilization beyond their women’s groups, as they do not made collective claims in the name of the diaspora as a whole. Instead, they discuss the importance of overcoming trauma. Interviewees were uninterested in questions about the political situation in the homeland. Rather, they preferred to discuss migration challenges they had been through in Germany, and the process of settling in Germany after the conflict in BiH ended in 1995.438

These groups, though representative of inactive diaspora mobilization, offer a form of release for diaspora who are traumatized and who have few other outlets. While they may not mobilize towards issues of transitional justice or peace, these women’s groups nonetheless form a community of survivors who can comfort each other and serve as resources for one another. There is some potential for them to be engaged around issues of transitional justice or peace activism once they are able to move beyond the trauma they have experienced. One interviewee reflected on this possibility as follows, “When my paperwork here is complete, I will dedicate more time to BiH.”439 She was reflecting on the importance of the citizenship regime and stressing she needed to feel safe in Germany first before becoming more involved.

6.4 Conclusion

Today, few of the former refugees from Bosnia or guest workers from Yugoslavia, even those who have secured German citizenship, would consider themselves or their children, in the words of one of the interviewees, to be ‘Bio-Deutsche,’ organic Germans. They are largely absent from German migration debates today despite their migrant backgrounds, similarly to the guest workers during the Yugoslav period, blending into Germany society. This provides them an opportunity to participate in the debate and offer their own perspectives on refugees, Islam, multiculturalism, and integration. Considering more recent migrants and refugees arriving in Germany from Syria and the Middle East, Bosniaks in particular consider it a duty to participate within German institutional dialogues in order to ensure that Islamophobia does not flourish and that an understanding between the belonging of Islam within modern Germany society develops.440

Diaspora mobilization takes different forms in Germany. In many instances, it has grown out of previous efforts established before that have simply continued after BiH gained sovereignty, and have since adjusted for the new context. Involved diaspora mobilization is evident among Bosniak diaspora members to mobilize their religious identities within the German context to contribute to host land debates. They have taken advantage of the opportunity to present themselves as Muslims in Germany and to highlight their contribution to German debates around citizenship, religion, and minority rights.

Mobilization in Germany happens with specific goals in mind, usually geared towards integration in Germany. As expected, the diaspora is not as engaged in homeland politics as they are in Sweden. Many of the activities, due to a lack of

440 Respondent DE16 (2014) Interview in September, Berlin, Germany.
collective claims made, and in part due to a higher level of trauma than in countries such as Sweden, have led to higher levels of inactive diaspora mobilization. It will be interesting to explore whether the second generation of Bosnians, with dual citizenship, will mobilize in more involved ways over time by voicing collective claims and finding new opportunities to engage with their homeland.

The following chapter will explore the French Bosnian case study in more detail as well as the initiatives within this community. The French case study offers a different co-occurrence of the independent variables and the typology thus hypothesizes different kinds of diaspora mobilization in France as a result. The chapter will provide an overview of an often neglected diaspora community due to its small size, but it will also point out the different kinds of fragmentation within this community that are less evident in the Swedish and German cases.
Chapter 7 Bosnian Diaspora in France – Small and Fragmented

The previous chapter noted the variety of involved and inactive diaspora mobilization in Germany, as a result of different population waves, first from Yugoslavia and later from BiH, arriving and settling in Germany, returning to BiH, or resettling in third countries such as the United States. This chapter will examine diaspora mobilization in France, providing particular insight into this small, understudied community. This chapter addresses two issues. It provides a brief overview of the French Bosnian community, with a particular focus on the Bosniak community, split into Bosniaks from BiH and Bosniaks from Sandžak, a region of Serbia and Montenegro. Through this dynamic, the translocal community variable is analyzed further. Secondly, the chapter examines the community with a view towards the typology developed to provide a comparative perspective empirically which highlight different pathways to diaspora mobilization. Fieldwork revealed a quite fragmented community not rallied around a particular organization, group, or collective claim. Thus, it is unlike diaspora mobilization examined in the two previous chapters. Firstly, an overview of migration trends between former Yugoslavia and BiH and France are necessary to contextualize and situate the community.

7.1 Migration Trends to France between the 20th century and at Present

According to the 1991 Yugoslav census, there were 3787 Bosnian citizens living in France. This is roughly comparable to 4271 in Sweden.\(^{441}\) However, unlike Sweden, which took on Bosnian refugees during the war in large numbers, as

evidenced by the previous chapter on Sweden, France did not do the same and consequently has a lower number of Bosnians living there today. This section will explore the historical migration trends between the region and France in more detail.

Unlike the Yugoslavs in Germany, often compared to the Turks in Germany, Yugoslavs in France were relatively negligible. To put this into perspective, less than 2% of the immigrant population in France was from former Yugoslavia according to the French census of 1982. Other migrant groups were dominant in France, in part due to its colonial past. Thus, dominant migrant groups in France in the post-WWII period were from former French colonies in the Maghreb such as Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. 442 Further, social science research in France, focused rather on French integration models rather than on migration, nonetheless neglected systematic academic inquiry, thus helping to also explain some of the relative dearth of publications on migrants in France in comparison to Germany and Sweden. 443

Between the two World Wars, there was a steady flow of Yugoslavs who moved to France to work in agricultural, industrial, or other jobs, to improve their socio-economic standing in the homeland. They usually settled in similar regions as their co-patriots, so that there was a greater contingent of Slovenes in Moselle working in the mining industry. 444 This speaks to the potential of translocal connections being established by host state policies. The particular worker’s

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programs encouraged chain migration from the same region as this established a regular flow of seasonal workers. They were politically inactive and did not consider France a settlement country. In fact, the number of Yugoslavs returning from France was at a higher level than those leaving for France in the years leading up to WWII.445 Most of the guest workers in France were from Slovenia rather than Bosnia and Herzegovina or the other republics within the Yugoslav federation. This general trend continued until the mid-60s when Yugoslavia renewed its relationship with France for workers to emigrate in an organized way once again.

The Yugoslav migration wave to France from 1965 on was composed of guest workers in metals, construction, and agriculture industries. The number of Yugoslavs in France surged to a high of 70,280, according to the French census in the early 1970s. Due to the impending oil crisis and new restrictive French immigration policies from the mid-1970s, this number decreased to 64,420, as evidenced in the 1982 census.446 By 1984, most of the Yugoslav in France lived in the Paris area (close to 62%). Comparing the population from each of the republics, it is notable that the largest portion of the population was from Serbia, amounting to a little over 70%. The number of Bosnians only amounted to 9.8% according to the 1981 census, or 4,834 individuals.447 The number of Bosnians in the 1991 was below this number, 3,787. While there were some individuals who remained in France leading up the eventual war and breakup of Yugoslavia, close to 25% of the Bosnian population in France returned to its homeland or left France between 1981

445 Ibid., 290.
447 Ibid.
and 1991. This goes largely in line with French citizenship policy, limited to temporary stays by guest workers throughout this period.

While the French citizenship regime is considered to be historically liberal, French domestic politics nonetheless played a role in culling the number of refugees and asylum seekers admitted. Thus, between the 1980 – 1990 period in which the number of Yugoslav guest workers in France overall declined, the number of refugees admitted overall also decreased. An exception were Cambodian refugees who resettled in France in larger numbers, mainly in Lyon and Paris, starting in 1975. This was due to their ‘invisibility’ through assimilation within French society, and an established relationship between France and Cambodia including educational exchanges.448 More broadly, in 1981, 80% of the 20,000 individuals who sought asylum in France were recognized as refugees. The number declined to 20% by 1999 for the roughly 30,000, according to the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless People.449 Thus, the number of Bosnians admitted to France as refugees was also much lower than in other European countries. Valenta and Ramet estimate the population today to be around 5,000 individuals, slightly higher than the population was in the early 1990s.450

As the 2013 Bosnian census results do not account for the diaspora, there is not an up-to-date number of Bosnians living in France today from Bosnian sources. However, the French Census data from 2008 seems to point to a somewhat higher number, albeit still lower than most European countries, at 9,135. By comparison,

the number of Croatian citizens in France according to the same data source is lower at 3,533, while the number of Serbs is much higher at 43,112. ⁴⁵¹ Taking into consideration historical migration flows discussed in previous paragraphs, this seems to be in accordance. It accounts for a small number of refugees who were granted asylum and thus a clear path to citizenship.

Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to note, according to Eurostat, that 13,958 individuals living in France today had Bosnia and Herzegovina as their country at birth. ⁴⁵² Some of the discrepancies between these numbers surely accounts for births between the years of data collection (Eurostat was published in 2011, whereas the French Census in 2008), it is also quite likely that there are Bosnians living in France that have dual citizenship. This means they do not appear in the French census as Bosnian citizens.

Recent French census data seems to confirms this. It lists 12,923 individuals living in France who were born in BiH. ⁴⁵³ Accounting for the number of people in France with Bosnian citizenship above (9,135), this highlights a discrepancy of close to 3,000 individuals born in BiH living in France today who do not have Bosnian citizenship. There are potentially two reasons for this. They could have renounced their Bosnian citizenship for French citizenship, or for a Croatian or Serbian citizenship respectively, if they are Bosnian Croats or Bosnian Serbs. To the best of the author’s knowledge, there is no detailed data about these numbers

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available by any of the data gathering agencies of the countries mentioned before. Thus, it is safe to assume that the Bosnian community in France is closer to 9,000 individuals rather than 5,000, as estimated by the previous research, in line with the French census numbers.

The following sections will analyze the community’s mobilization patterns in more detail, particularly how these align with the typology developed and examined in Swedish and German hostlands in previous chapters. It is worthwhile to remind the reader of the hypothesized types of diaspora mobilization for the French citizenship regime, represented as ‘Historically Liberal’ according to Howard’s framework.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Citizenship Regime</th>
<th>Collective Claim Made</th>
<th>Collective Claim not Made</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Historically Liberal Countries</td>
<td>Presence of Translocal Community</td>
<td>Absence of Translocal Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engaged</td>
<td>Reactive</td>
<td>Inactive</td>
</tr>
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7.2 Engaged Diaspora Mobilization in France

Hypothesis 1, explored in Chapter 5, theorizes how the co-occurrence of the three independent variables leads to engaged diaspora mobilization. In short, it can be expressed as follows – \( H1: \) Open citizenship regimes + presence of translocal community + collective claim made \( \Rightarrow \) Engaged Diaspora Mobilization. While the typology hypothesizes the probability of engaged diaspora mobilization, fieldwork
in France did not reveal this to be the case. Rather, fieldwork revealed that individuals in France collaborate transnationally with Bosnian diaspora in Switzerland in an engaged way, a different kind of translocality. The French citizenship regime and understanding of integration provides little opportunity for collective claims to be at the forefront, thus rendering most immigrant groups, like the Cambodians in France mentioned previously, effectively invisible from French public debate. Finally, the Bosnian Embassy in France has also rarely been a place around which diaspora members might meet and organize.

Two examples stand out in France as exhibiting some of the same features of engaged diaspora mobilization as hypothesized, and they will be explored in the following two sections. The first one is an instance of a transnational engaged diaspora mobilization. Due to the lack of translocal community in France and without much space for collective claims, Bosnians in France collaborate transnationally with Swiss Bosnian organizations. The second is a humanitarian organization made up of former guest workers and conflict-generated diaspora members who organize around issues of education in the homeland as well as youth more generally using collective claims focused on transitional justice and peacebuilding.

7.2.1 Transnational Diaspora Collaboration in Switzerland

Unlike France, Switzerland has traditionally attracted labor migration of Bosnians from the Podrinje region in eastern Bosnia around Srebrenica and Bratunac. During the 1990s, Switzerland also accepted Bosnian refugees fleeing the war, from the same area. Most of the 24,500 refugees registered in Switzerland between 1992

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and 1995 came from either the Prijedor area in the northwest of the country or from around Bratunac. Older individuals and a few young families repatriated to their villages in the post-war period while retaining some family members in Switzerland who help to support extended networks back at home. Further, due to translocal connections with a small group of Srebrenica refugees living in France, near Lyon during the post-war period, the communities in Switzerland and France established transnational ties between France and Switzerland.455

This dynamic has sustained itself around the Annual Peace March in the Srebrenica region. This innovative remembrance and, ultimately, driver for economic development, was started by Srebrenica survivors who had resettled in Switzerland in 1996 as a way to help them deal with the trauma of surviving the Srebrenica genocide.456 Along with Swiss individuals who were active in helping the Bosnian refugee community in Switzerland, a little over fifty people organized a walk in Bern to symbolically represent the route they had traversed to escape the Srebrenica Genocide and to draw attention about what they had survived the year before.

By 2004, members of the Solidarite Bosnie (Solidarity Bosnia) organization which includes Swiss people without a Bosnian background, as well as diaspora members in Switzerland and France, organized the Peace March in BiH. They wanted to bring awareness of the returnee community and to introduce individuals from Switzerland and France, including student groups, to the area. Collective claims around ensuring that the Srebrenica genocide is not negated but rather remembered and commemorated drive all these activities. In particular, the

organizers and participants stress the importance of highlighting the returnee community in the Srebrenica region and their perseverance, as well as the need to help them rebuild their community after genocide. Ultimately, after conversations and meetings with both local politicians as well as the Potočari Memorial Center, the first March happened between Nezuk, where the Bosnian front line was in 1995, and Srebrenica, in July 2005.457

Over a decade later, the Peace March endures. Every summer, for the three days leading up to the burial ceremony each July 11th, close to 5,000 individuals walk from Nezuk (near Tuzla) and Potočari, tracing the route which survivors undertook to escape in July 1995.458 Many participants are under 30 years old, and might only have little connection to Srebrenica, or even live abroad.459 Through participant observations for two years, I encountered individuals from the United States, Germany, France, Switzerland, Australia, Austria, Italy, as well as from throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. Through informal conversations, participants echoed they felt they were paying homage to the victims of Srebrenica by symbolically marching back to the land from which approximately 10,000 Bosnian Muslims fled in July 1995. They interact with the returnee community as they walk the route and learn about the locations of several mass graves sites along the path. Moreover, some stay within returnee homes for around 30 Bosnian marks per night,

459 Respondent BH14, FG2, and FG3 (2013) Interviews in July, Srebrenica, BiH.
providing an economic boost for the community where many households receive little or no income whatsoever.\footnote{Participant observation revealed that the returnees who hosted Marchers usually hosted anywhere between 3 to 10 for at least one night. For reference, hosting 10 guests would be the equivalent of most returnees’ monthly incomes, thus supplementing their livelihood in a meaningful way.}

This small number of French Bosnian diaspora members are active in promoting this Annual Peace March in the Srebrenica region not only by participating but also by raising awareness about it in France, albeit this happens on a smaller scale than in Switzerland. The author was present at one such event in Paris which attracted an audience of around 50 individuals who were eager to learn about Srebrenica and participate in the March.\footnote{Participant Observation, November 2014, Paris, France. This was a fundraiser organized by French Bosnians who work with Swiss Bosnian organization Solidarite Bosnie to raise awareness of the Peace March in Srebrenica each summer.} The event included a Srebrenica genocide survivor who had lived in Switzerland but had since returned to BiH. He presented his story and discussed the Peace March and its significance to him and the community in BiH, highlighting the importance of economic development for the region. He also emphasized that the trail was open throughout the year and that returnee families were eager to provide accommodation.\footnote{Ibid.} While events like this are relatively rare in France, they nonetheless demonstrate that the community can, through transnational cooperation with a diaspora and activist community in Switzerland to help make an impact in the homeland. Their engaged mobilization around organizing the Peace March and helping to sustain the returnee community is based on peacebuilding and transitional justice principles utilizing collective claims about supporting returnee communities and raising awareness of the Srebrenica Genocide.
Building off the idea of the Peace March concurrently, the Bosnian diaspora community in Lyon has worked to provide returnees in eastern Bosnia economic development opportunities through microfinance of returnee projects and endeavors. They were in part financially supported by the French government to aid returnees to the region. This collaboration started in 2007, the organization, Mir Sada (Peace Now), hired a Tuzla based project manager to coordinate their efforts in 2009. Tuzla has the highest number of internally displaced in the country, with many individuals from the Srebrenica region. The non-profit’s members believe that humanitarian actions do not amount to lasting peace and that helping returnees develop economic development opportunities provides the communities which they return to an opportunity to recover and work towards building a common future. Through these goals, collective claims focused on peacebuilding and goals of achieving transitional justice are evident. Interviewees emphasized local approaches to helping these communities rather than international approaches. They acknowledge the importance of these initiatives in addition to judicial approaches such as verdicts made in The Hague by the ICTY. “These communities need to rebuild. They need to have a future. They need to trust each other.” Since 2007, they have helped to fund 100 different projects to ease the daily lives of returnees in an aim for reconciliation.

Ultimately, this example of transnationalism offers a cross-sectional perspective of the engagement of Bosnians in France and Switzerland between 2007 and 2014. Due to common goals and proximity with one another in the diaspora,

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466 Respondent FR2 (2014) Interview in February, Lyon, France.
they have started to collaborate to bring awareness of BiH as well as improve the lives of returnees. In a sense, the importance of translocal connections between the returnee community and Switzerland as well as the returnee community and France are highly important. Considering the Bosnian diaspora in France represents the smallest population of the three case studies examined, this innovativeness of coupling with diaspora groups in Switzerland emphasizes the resourcefulness of diaspora members. Thus, the engaged diaspora mobilization transnationally between France and Switzerland occurs on a smaller scale than the engaged diaspora mobilization examined in Sweden, yet it nonetheless is proven in part.

7.2.2 Aide a l’éducation en Bosnie-Herzegovine

There are few diaspora organizations that have been operating in France over the last few decades. One of the most enduring, *Aide a l’éducation en Bosnie-Herzegovine* (Help Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina), focuses on creating spaces of interaction for BiH youth, including shared computer labs and joint French language lessons. While they do not consider themselves as political, their actions nonetheless have political implications due to the mobilization they encourage. They do not organize around collective claims focused on genocide remembrance, but rather aim to create an impact on the homeland communities through education, discouraging divided schools. This claim is based on the importance of peacebuilding, mainly trust among those communities ravaged by war, ensuring that conflict is not carried over into the next generation. Their level of translocalism is relatively high, both in the connections they feel towards their communities in the homeland, but also amongst each other, with over half of the
members having come to France prior to the breakup of Yugoslavia as guest workers, or as refugees from the same regions.467

The Association of Bosnians in France, established in 1991, has around 500 members. Its members mostly arrived in France as Yugoslavs within five to ten years before the war of 1992 to 1995 to work. Others came as refugees towards the beginning of the war. Nearly all have since become citizens of France.468 They were instrumental in establishing the Bosnian Embassy in France by taking over the space that was previously the embassy of Yugoslavia towards the very beginning of the war in early 1992.469 The association maintains a policy of support for BiH as a state with a vision that embraces all of its citizens, regardless of their ethnic, national, or religious backgrounds. Some members identified as Bosnian, others as Bosniak, although they refer to Yugoslavia during interviews often.

The association’s logo is a play on the Bosnian flag and highlights its sentiments. Instead of having stars as the flag does, there are a variety of symbols signifying the different peoples who make up BiH to reflect the association’s inclusivity, such as the Star of David, the Crescent Moon, the Bosnian Lily, a star (for Yugoslavs), and a cross instead.470 When asked about the logo, the president noted the importance of diversity within former Yugoslavia, comparing it to the French fraternite and Yugoslav ideals of ‘Brotherhood and Unity.’471

Their claims are presented as an important issue which concerns the society in the homeland as a whole. The translocal community connections become important in the homeland context as they help members select where their

468 Respondent FR3 (2014) Interview in February, Lyon, France.
470 Ibid.
donations can both make an impact but also be relatively easy for them to place and feel they have given back something to the community. Thus, even though the community is composed of both guest workers and conflict-generated individuals, and they have different collective claims than the diaspora examined in Germany or Sweden, there is still engaged diaspora mobilization as hypothesized. This stresses the importance of the host land context and the citizenship regime of France. They collaborate with French institutions to a degree as well as with institutions in BiH.

Utilizing their knowledge of and contacts from their previous communities in Bosnia, the associations’ members build relationships with particular schools and coordinate computer donations through them. Association members enjoy making local news in their former localities for their contribution, which they consider as further strengthening to their position in the local community.472 This helps to explain why the initial activities of the association were in the Trebinje region rather than in other parts of the country, as its president is from this community and maintains translocal ties with it.473

For those who emigrated to France as guest workers or arrived as refugees, their understanding of identity often remains tied to being Yugoslav. They do not identify with new political realities of the region and demonstrated a disengagement from the ethnonational politics in BiH, including politicians. In fact, in interviews, members of the diaspora voiced frustrations with the Dayton Peace Treaty and the political system that it has created and often spoke about the fact that they do not vote in Bosnian elections as a result.474 Their main contention is the focus on

ethnicity over individual citizenship and belonging. Several expressed frustration about the existence of Republika Srpska, though this was not the case for all of their members, who, pragmatically, considered it legitimate as the result of a peace agreement.\textsuperscript{475} Still, this does not impede their activism in their homeland. In fact, the organization collaborates with different institutions in BiH, including in the RS, to channel their activism. One interviewee noted there is in fact little to no hostility, even though there is initial caution, because the officials in diaspora’s old localities in the homeland are different from the individuals they knew before.\textsuperscript{476}

During the war between 1992 and 1995, they organized convoys from within their community as well as from French citizens with food, clothes, a form of humanitarian aid, and regularly sent it to a variety of locations in BiH. Thus, they developed a relationship with the Red Cross organization in both France and Bosnia and Herzegovina. They recognized this as a particular need during the war as well as a way to remain connected to their homeland localities.\textsuperscript{477} Since the war, their mission has been focused on improving education to help the next generation in BiH.\textsuperscript{478} Although their aims are not rooted in traditional transitional justice language, the approach is focused on peacebuilding in these local communities as a whole, seeking to mitigate the divisive education system and create more opportunities for students in divided schools or among returnee populations.

One of the main initiatives the Association has been focused on have been computer donations to schools in divided communities. The initial donations were in places where members of the association had local connections, whether from

\textsuperscript{475} Respondents FR1, FR7, and FG1 (2014) Interviews in February, Paris, France.
\textsuperscript{476} Respondent FR6 (2014) Interview in February, Paris, France.
\textsuperscript{477} Respondents FR1 and FR6 (2014) Interviews in February, Paris, France.
\textsuperscript{478} Respondent FR7 (2014) Interview in February, Paris, France.
before the war or built in France thereafter. Its members were adamant that their donations were to be used by all students, regardless of their background, and regardless of the schools’ parallel curriculums. In their negotiations with different schools, they stressed that the computer labs were for the use of all the students throughout the school day. This reversed the separation of students and placed them back into a united school, even if for a short period of the school day.

Since 2002, the association has donated computer equipment to over forty schools in BiH. They joined a French umbrella organization, La Voix de L’Enfant (The Voice of the Child), to further their mission in BiH. Most of the schools, as mentioned previously, are selected on the basis of the diaspora members knowing someone locally, whether within the school system or within that community, who in turn helps the organization get in touch with logistics. They work with the Red Cross in BiH to coordinate transport between France and BiH. Drljević repeatedly noted the importance of this collaboration in helping to legitimize them in both France as well as make their work in BiH easier.

Since 2004, they have lobbied for French language education in their translocal communities in collaboration with the French Embassy in BiH. They have identified this as a way to integrate children of different backgrounds in the classroom to increase learning and to move beyond the ‘one roof, two schools’ system. As its president of the association argued, if the children are all speaking French with one another, they might build relationships which they otherwise cannot do in segregated and politicized language courses of Bosnian, Croatian, or

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480 Ibid.
While it is difficult to measure the impact of these initiatives in the long-term due to remaining difficulties in the structure and provision of education in BiH, the Association of Bosnians in France mobilizes as theorized to a certain degree. While its members are both former guest workers and conflict-generated individuals, it is nonetheless interesting to note that they mobilize in similar patterns.

7.3 Reactive Diaspora Mobilization in France

Hypothesis 5 theorizes how the co-occurrence of the three independent variables leads to one of the pathways which represent reactive diaspora mobilization. It can also be expressed as H5: More restrictive citizenship or historically liberal regime + absence of translocal community + collective claim made $\rightarrow$ Reactive Diaspora Mobilization.

Reactive diaspora mobilization has the potential to dissuade from its goals, as noted in Chapter 4. It can vilify the diaspora, or overemphasize their role rather than their actions. Due to the lack of translocal community, individual agency thus becomes relevant. On the other hand, it can also glorify those who mobilize and thus overemphasize the diaspora’s role. This section notes several diaspora members’ activities in France in an effort to examine the hypothesis’ relevance.

The first example is a Bosnian with French citizenship who regularly returns to her hometown, Banja Luka and has strong translocal connection to her hometown context, but does not in France. Like individuals from Banja Luka who live in Sweden, she believes in maintaining a multi-ethnic presence in her hometown rather than a dominant Serb one. She remained involved in the lives of her friends in Banja Luka as well as those who left the city throughout the 1990s, and retained a strong

\[483\] Ibid.
connection to her hometown despite changes both demographically as well as politically.

After realizing that one of her Banja Lukan friends who owns a traditional Bosnian house in Banja Luka in the city center, but lives in the diaspora, was interested in selling, she convinced her to delay the sale and instead use the home as gathering space for cultural events and preserve it as representative of historic architecture in Banja Luka. This home, owned by one of Banja Luka’s most famous families, Ćejvan, is one of the few traditional Bosnian homes left in the city. Others were destroyed during an earthquake in the 1960s, and those that remain have largely been sold, demolished, or are not inhabitable as their owners have left the city. The house had previously been used for humanitarian purposes (*Merhamet*) during the war, and was to some degree known in the city already. Ultimately, in collaboration with local activists who are committed to restoring the home, and by agreement with the owners, this individual coordinated the opening of the BASOC (*Banjalučki Socijalni Centar* or Banjalukan Social Center). The center is the only one in Banja Luka that focuses both on maintaining Banja Luka’s heritage as well as hosting events on post-socialist Bosnia and Herzegovina with aims to raise awareness and activism around active citizenship, feminism, and equality in BiH.\(^{484}\)

In this example, diaspora mobilization relied on the importance of translocality in the hometown with a group of local activists and a shared belief about preserving cultural heritage which operated as a collective claim. While this claim is not explicitly framed as a transitional justice goal, this individual’s mobilization around the particular goal is nonetheless evident. As such, it is perhaps

\(^{484}\) Participant Observation, July 2015, Banja Luka, BiH at meetings about BASOC as well as the house that serves as its headquarters. The BASOC is a new organization. Its Facebook presence is at https://www.facebook.com/%D0%91ASOC-1449923621977011/info/?tab=page_info.
also reflective that beyond anything else, personal effort and engagement can result in incremental results, even if a larger diaspora group is not mobilized.

Another example of reactive diaspora mobilization is demonstrated by an interviewee from Gradiška who spends summers there and is involved in helping to organize events on a regular basis. While seemingly inactive, when asked about her perspectives on transitional justice in the region, she emphasized that for her this was best achieved by remaining engaged in her hometown community and helping to rebuild trust. She leads a transnational life, splitting her time between Paris and Gradiška. She highlighted how suživot is only possible if there are more returnees and if the diaspora remain engaged in their hometowns in the post-conflict period.485 “With suživot, we can have peace again.” 486 This amounts to very individual action, rather than diaspora mobilization on a group level. However, her claims in regards to transitional justice are very much rooted in very localized action within a post-conflict community. By spending more time in her hometown and remaining active within it, she believes she can help foster more community in the post-conflict space. A seemingly small action, nonetheless underlined by a clear agenda related to peacebuilding.

The concept of suživot is multi-layered and, as previous research shows, understood in a variety of ways, both in the diaspora and in the homeland. Roughly translated as co-life, or living together, it stresses the importance of multi-ethnic community. Previous research demonstrates this relates to an identification of life in Yugoslavia pre-conflict, and an understanding that it is the only way to move

485 Funk, Julianne. 2015. “Bosnian Diaspora Experiences of Suživot or Traditional Coexistence: Bosnian Lonac, American Melting Pot or Swiss Fondue?” Paper presented at Diasporic and Migrant Identities: Social, Cultural, Political, Religious and Spiritual Aspects in Sarajevo, BiH.
towards reconciliation in the post-conflict phase. “The former diversity is more memory than current reality, although memory constitutes to poignantly condition perceptions of reality.”

A third example is Jasna Samić, a prominent Bosnian and French author, who, while not necessarily fitting the hypothesized reactive type, nonetheless exhibits some similar features through her engagement with the homeland. She also leads a transnational life between Paris and Sarajevo and feels at home in both cities. As a dual citizen since the war and novelist, she does not consider herself a ‘dijasporac,’ or a diaspora member, similar to the two previous examples. On the contrary, her writing often pokes fun at the guest worker mentality as well as war refugee memories of the homeland as naïve. “They are longing for something that does not exist.”

She has published several books that focused on how the diaspora looks back at the homeland, being out of touch with the realities of the homeland, its political corruption, and longing for something that is impossible to hold on to. When asked about transitional justice and diaspora mobilization, both in France as well as in other countries, Šamić responded with a bitter laugh of resignation, not believing either as having the potential to succeed in today’s BiH. For her, the post-conflict political environment rewards corruption. She notes that it encourages

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487 Funk, Julianne. 2015. “Bosnian Diaspora Experiences of Suživot or Traditional Coexistence: Bosnian Lonac, American Melting Pot or Swiss Fondue?” Paper presented at Diasporic and Migrant Identities: Social, Cultural, Political, Religious and Spiritual Aspects in Sarajevo, BiH.
490 The book Frost and Ashes was published in 1997. Another book title is Room with a View of the Ocean, and she has an essay titled Paris War Diary. She has published widely, both fiction, as well as scientific works on Orientalism, Sufism, and religion, having been a Professor in the Department for Oriental Philology at the University of Sarajevo until the beginning of the war in 1992, when she was dismissed.
a turn towards Islamized political societies which she considers to ultimately hold the country’s democratic development and justice back.\textsuperscript{492} Media outlets in Bosnia often quote her criticisms of the current political regime, particularly of the Bosniak leadership in Sarajevo.

These three individuals, in part due to a lack of a larger Bosnian community in their host country, France, their dual citizenships, and the frequency of their trips to the homeland, do not mobilize in the host country, France. Instead, they feel they can channel their activities at homeland institutions and collaborate with local actors. The French state does not help them to organize as migrants and rather encourages them to embrace French values and integrate. They do not feel there is space for collective claims that focus on BiH in the French public sphere and express similar sentiments to Cambodian communities in France who only organize amongst themselves.\textsuperscript{493} Interviewees have repeated they do not feel that they are ‘real’ diaspora in this sense.\textsuperscript{494}

While these examples are based on individual incentives, these actions do partially confirm reactive diaspora mobilization as hypothesized. However, neither of them are reactive in a combative way in which it was hypothesized they might be. Instead, these three examples demonstrate some activism on their behalf in line with the transnational lives they lead and peacebuilding incentives they support on an individual basis. Their locally based actions inherently encourage peacebuilding from below, even though they do not necessarily frame them as such. However, these mobilizations are more focused on the individual incentives of the individuals.

\textsuperscript{494} Respondent FR1, FR6, and FR7 (2014) Interviews in February, Paris, France.
who maintain strong translocal ties in their homeland community. In this sense, the hypothesized reactive diaspora mobilization type could be amended. Hence, when there is an element of translocality available in the homeland, diaspora demonstrate more of an individualistic mobilization.

7.4 Inactive Diaspora Mobilization in France

Inactive Diaspora Mobilization is hypothesized as a potential type of diaspora mobilization in each of the citizenship regimes. It is also expressed by hypothesis 6 which indicates that in the absence of a collective claim there will be inactive diaspora mobilization and be expressed as follows: (\(H6: \text{Any citizenship regime + presence or absence of translocal community no collective claim made} \rightarrow \text{Inactive Diaspora Mobilization.}\)) Here the translocal community variable is valuable to consider as it can result in different pathways, depending on its presence or absence, of diaspora mobilization, and the ways in which it also is fragmented.

When asked about the Bosnian French community, a representative from the BiH Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees did not find that it is one of the communities that are active, nor is the French Bosnian community considered as relevant by the Ministry.\(^{495}\) In a two-volume collection listing prominent Bosnians living in the diaspora in 2009 and 2010, only five out of the nearly 400 individuals listed live in France.\(^{496}\) They vary in age and profession and live dispersed throughout France. However, there is no network of Bosnia professional associations or organizations in France as there is Sweden through the APU

\(^{495}\) Respondent BH4 (2013) Interview in July, Sarajevo, BiH.
network, or in the United States with the Bosnian American Academy of Arts and Sciences for example.497

During interviews in France, inquiring about both connections with other Bosnians as well as with Bosnian institutions among those in France, interviewees repeated there was a sense of disengagement. While this echoes to some degree interviewees’ responses in Germany, in France they added that this was reinforced by the Bosnian Embassy in Paris. The ambassador at the time of fieldwork, Nina Sajić, was, according to interviewees, uninterested in engaging non-Serb Bosnians in the French community.498 They cited that there were no events organized by the Embassy for Bosnian national holidays.499 Moreover, they noted that the Ambassador attended events organized by the Serbian Embassy and behaved as a representative of RS, rather than the country as a whole.500 Considering that the contact with diplomatic staff is often the only contact diaspora members have with officials from the homeland, sour relations, echoed by the interviewees, did not engender them to collaboration with official homeland actors.501

Bosniak associations, organized within mosques, or džemat, in France, provided no examples of diaspora mobilization. Rather, they serve as religious gathering places its attendees. When asked about political mobilization, including voting, interviewees cited that they didn’t feel there was any emphasis on Bosnian politics within their communities. They noted that Sandžaklije, individuals from Sandžak, a predominately Muslim region in Serbia, are in the leadership of their

497 Their website can be accessed at http://bhaaas.org/.
498 Unlike in Sweden and Germany, I was unsuccessful in establishing contact with the Bosnian Embassy in Paris to discuss the Bosnian community in France or their activities in general.
499 The debate about which national holidays to celebrate in BiH remains a contentious issue.
501 Ultimately, in 2014, a new Ambassador arrived, Ivan Orlić, who improved relations by inviting Bosnians living in France to the Embassy for several events and meetings.
mosques and that political discussions around mobilization were thus limited as this is not their homeland.

Not having a translocal community in the hostland was echoed throughout interviews, and often given as a reason for diaspora members remaining uninvolved in the homeland. Interviewees noted they do not feel they belong to a greater Bosnian community in France and thus prefer to spend time in BiH on an annual basis and participate in their local communities in the homeland.\textsuperscript{502} When asked about post-war BiH vs. pre-war BiH and the relationships within their local communities, interviewees repeatedly noted they had little problems with individuals they knew ‘before.’ Instead, they expressed most frustration with how ‘provincial’ their former localities had become since the war, referring to internally displaced individuals within BiH, or Bosniaks from Sandžak who have moved to Sarajevo and the region over the last two decades.\textsuperscript{503} In BiH, they retain the social circles they know from ‘before,’ in this way further building translocal relationships between themselves and their homeland community, but not expanding this in the hostland due to the lack of other Bosnian diaspora members from these same localities.

While similar sentiments, to a degree even prejudice about Bosniaks from Sandžak were shared by diaspora members in Sweden and Germany tangentially, they were more strongly voiced in France. This is likely because of the most common space for Bosniaks to meet one another, or potentially even mobilize, as demonstrated in the German chapter, are Islamic communities. In France, particularly at the fieldwork sites in Paris and Lyon, Bosniaks from Sandžak are

\textsuperscript{502} Respondent FR1, FR6, and FR7 (2014) Interviews in February, Paris, France.
more dominant than Bosniaks from BiH. As a result, there is little to no mobilization in regards to transitional justice with a view towards BiH. The following section explores this dynamic further.

7.4.1 Lack of Mobilization in BiH due to Sandžaklije

The lack of a translocal community among the Bosniak community in France in BiH, as well as the lack of a collective claim is representative of the fragmented community. During a focus group with a dozen participants in a Bosniak mosque in Paris, there were only a few individuals from BiH proper. Politically, they all supported the SDA, the majority Bosniak party in both BiH as well as Serbia, which has advocated for Sandžak to be autonomous within Serbia.

These divisions within the Bosniak diaspora in France were more prominent than in the other two case studies examined. In part, this is because the number of Sandžaklije who had moved to France in the pre-conflict period was greater than Bosnians, who identified with their Yugoslav identity over their religious identity, and the number of Bosnian refugees during the 1990s on the whole smaller than in the other two cases.

To remind the reader, the three recognized constituent peoples of BiH today are Bosniaks, the Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Serbs. One of the main contentions among those who advocate for constitutional change in the political structure of BiH is that this discounts ordinary Bosnians who do not consider themselves as ‘constituent,’ as well as other minorities such as Roma and Jews. Further, the two neighboring countries, Croatia and Serbia, maintain political linkages with the respective ‘constituent’ peoples in BiH, whether through rhetoric or through political parties. In turn, Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb nationalist politicians consider themselves as belonging to one of these countries, with BiH as a
secondary, geographic, home. For example, the Bosnian Croat President Dragan Čović votes in Croatian elections as he holds a dual citizenship with Croatia. In contrast, Bosnian Muslims have no other country to which a large percentage have allegiance or hold dual citizenship with in comparison to Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats. Thus, they are perceived as propagating BiH and its sovereignty most vigorously.

However, this standard narrative neglects a Serb minority in the Sandžak region who are predominately Bosnian Muslim and might consider BiH as their homeland. Bosniaks are understood to constitute Muslims from BiH and Sandžak. In certain countries, membership in Islamic organizations is in part determined by national belonging, particularly when there are large numbers of individuals who live there. In France, while there are several Bosniak mosques, there has not been a proliferation of these mosques, in part because of the lower number of refugees during the 1990s, unlike Switzerland which accommodated a higher number of refugees. Most of them are led and dominated by individuals from the Sandžak rather than BiH. This has led to some resentment from the Bosnian Bosniak population, who consider the Sandžaklije to propagate mobilization for their own region as well as to generally be more conservative in their beliefs. “The Sandžaklije have taken over the mosque, I barely go there anymore. We used to have cultural events, now women are barely welcome” one respondent noted.

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Prior research on Bosniak communities in Switzerland has found differences between those who have been in Switzerland for several generations and those who arrived more recently in the country. In some communities, this has lead to a split and establishment of separate mosques in certain communities such as St. Gallen.\textsuperscript{507} Rather than this split happening, respondents in France noted that in the case of individuals from Sandžak increasingly taking on leadership positions in their community mosques, they stopped going regularly.\textsuperscript{508}

Thus, the Bosniak diaspora community’s mobilization in France is limited to helping raise funds for mosques or smaller development projects in Srebrenica, as the symbol of Bosniak victimhood, or for mosques in communities where other individuals from Sandžak have settled. In essence, they mobilize around religious collective claims connected to translocal communities that are most often not based in BiH, but rather in their respective homelands in Serbia or Montenegro for example. When asked about politicians they support, while some noted SDA politician and Bosniak member of the BiH Presidency Bakir Izetbegović, more interviewees noted religious leaders such as Mustafa Cerić, the former head of the Islamic Society, as being more influential in their lives.\textsuperscript{509} More in-depth research on this community could potentially shed light on their motivations and this particular religiously oriented mobilization should be considered for future research.


\textsuperscript{508} When asked about similar developments in Germany, interviewees confirmed that the Islamic communities in Stuttgart were also split between two different mosques, one with more members from Sandžak and the other with more members from Bosnia.

\textsuperscript{509} Respondent FR8 (2014) Interview in February, Paris, France.
7.5 Conclusion

While diaspora groups are not homogenous as has been explored in previous chapters, this chapter demonstrated some of these dynamics using the Bosnian and Bosniak diaspora in France. In a smaller population such as in France, this heterogeneity is magnified and ultimately stifles the mobilization process. This chapter also provided a test case for the hypotheses of the typology related to historically more liberal citizenship regimes such as in France. The chapter demonstrated that the engaged diaspora mobilization does not quite fit the French case completely, there is nonetheless mobilization that happens along the lines of peacebuilding and transitional justice, lending credence to the typology. This chapter also highlighted different pathways to inactive diaspora mobilization, and expanded on reactive mobilization by noting the importance of the strength of translocality in the homeland.

There is not as much Bosnian diaspora activism in France generally in comparison with Sweden and Germany. However, diaspora have partnered with a Swiss and French organization and organize an annual Peace March in Srebrenica and raising awareness about the Srebrenica genocide. In another instance, there has been mobilization with a Paris based group which is involved in improving education in the homeland as they consider this within larger frames of rebuilding their post-war communities. Overall though, the French Bosnian diaspora community is fragmented in two different ways. Firstly, individuals from the Sandžak region dominate the Islamic Societies which have traditionally afforded space for Bosniaks from Bosnia to organize on a political level. The Sandžaklije mobilize around issues related to Sandžak, and while they see Srebrenica remembrance as important, this is not the basis of collective claims with Bosniaks
from Bosnia. Secondly, there is little overlap between the different waves of migration to France from Bosnia, negating the potential for a translocal community to develop among them to share a common platform. The lack of collective claims that unify the community and the lack of translocality among diaspora due to fragmentation among both their origins as well as the times in which they arrived in France leads mostly to individual mobilization or passivity.

The *Džemat Paris* (Bosniak organization in Paris) individuals and leadership were unaware of events organized by *Solidarite Bosnie*, noting they did not know much about the Peace March and the organizers themselves.\(^{510}\) This indicates there is limited communication and overlap of activities. It demonstrates the insular nature of the different communities within the population. For the Bosnians in the Lyon community and particularly those who had translocal ties in Srebrenica, the activities around the Peace March were more familiar, indicating the importance of translocal connections in mobilization, and transnationally between France and Switzerland due to the translocal relationship to Srebrenica.

The same dynamic was evident in the summer of 2015 when Bosnian Swiss diaspora members organized a commemorative public art performance in Geneva. The nomadic monument entitled ‘*Što te Nema?’*\(^{511}\) attracted a number of families from the region who live in France. When asked about their attendance, they echoed the importance of commemorating Srebrenica as they were from the region or had ties to it through their knowledge of the Swiss Bosnian diaspora organization, and the fact that there was a lack of similar activities in France.\(^{512}\)

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\(^{512}\) Participant Observation, July 2015, Geneva, Switzerland. This was at a Sto Te Nema? event organized in Geneva with over 100 diaspora members attending and volunteering throughout the day.
Individuals who arrived in France before the war in comparison to those who arrived during and after the war feel distinctly more Yugoslav than Bosnian. They have retained their homes in Bosnia where they return on a regular basis during the summers, but have French citizenship and identify with it primarily. There is a distinct lack of identification with being victims among these individuals, with some even voicing this themselves.\textsuperscript{513} This is in part as they identify the homeland to be Yugoslavia and thus the war in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995 does not hold much significance for them as they do not have first hand experience with it. In essence, they have no traumatic past to overcome, unlike conflict-generated diaspora members; their experience of the homeland is separate from war.

The following chapter will summarize the findings of this dissertation and reflect on the typology, as well as potential avenues for future research. It will also explore the generalizability of this typology for other conflict-generated diaspora within Europe, and reflect on how the project can also expand further into other Bosnian diaspora communities in other countries.

Chapter 8 Conclusions – Bosnians Abroad as Transitional Justice Actors?

This thesis was informed through an interest in diaspora, contested sovereignty, post-conflict society, and transitional justice. The study’s aim was to provide theoretical grounding with rigorous comparative empirical research to these topics. At the center of the empirical analysis was the homeland, Bosnia and Herzegovina, a country that continues to be in transition with internally contested sovereignty after more than two decades. Along with the region, it has been the focus of transitional justice and peacebuilding research as an important case, as well as some diaspora research due to the number of refugees as a result of conflicts of the 1990s. These research agendas have largely been conducted in parallel, rarely intersecting or speaking to one another. Although there is well-established research and scholarly interest in these fields, studies are rarely comparative, usually focusing on one case or a diaspora within one host country for example. While these studies help to enlighten the understanding of diaspora relations in particular integration regimes, they do not provide explanations about how conditions in these integration regimes impact and influence diaspora mobilization. The research on the intersection of diasporas and transitional justice is a developing field, both theoretically as well as empirically, as noted in the previous chapters.

Hence, this thesis set out with a question: How do diaspora utilize the political environments in their hostlands when they mobilize towards issues of transitional justice and peace? In what ways and why? This final chapter will briefly discuss the empirical findings and analyze the typology set out in previous chapters, and amend the typology as a result of the empirical testing as well as elaborate on potential other ways to improve it. Subsequent sections will discuss the implications
of this study for theory, for policy, and practice. The chapter ends with suggestions for future research on this topic.

8.1 Main Findings

Based on the intersection of three different independent variables – the citizenship regime, the translocal community, and collective claims – I developed a typology of diaspora mobilization with a view towards transitional justice and peacebuilding, understood from a broader perspective and focused on diaspora initiatives from below. In this vein, the thesis has aimed for mid-range generalizations through comparative work. The four types of diaspora mobilization that were theorized in the typology are engaged, involved, inactive, and reactive.

*Engaged diaspora mobilization* is evidenced through particular collective claims made, the presence of a translocal community, and occurs in historically liberal or open citizenship regimes. It utilizes both host and home country institutions in order to address particular claims and is often sustained. *Involved diaspora mobilization* offers the most diversity when it comes to diaspora mobilization, as different interplays between independent variables lead to similar diaspora mobilization. It was hypothesized in all three different citizenship regimes. In involved diaspora mobilization, diaspora actors utilize either host land or homeland influences, rather than both. Often times, diaspora mobilization is particularly concerned with issues of transition and their own migration to the host country, evidenced by their practices, leading to diaspora mobilization in the hostland around issues of peacebuilding rather than transitional justice in the homeland. *Reactive diaspora mobilization* relies more on the strength of existing collective claims and responds to them without the presence of a translocal community, but usually to a smaller degree as a result. It can also seem more
combative than productive. Finally, *inactive diaspora mobilization* is marked by a lack of collective claims made to mobilize the diaspora, rendering this kind of mobilization culturally based or focused on other non-political activities.

This typology was in turn tested in three different countries (France, Germany, and Sweden) in Europe with Bosnian-born individuals. The typology was largely confirmed in Sweden. In Germany, a number of different pathways that led to involved diaspora mobilization were examined. In the French case, fieldwork provided new insights into the typology and expanded on the idea of reactive mobilization. In this case, the hypotheses generated by the typology were partially confirmed.

In each of the cases, the citizenship regime in which the diaspora was embedded played a vital role in their mobilization as well as their outlook towards the homeland. Collective claims focused on transitional justice understood from a broader perspective or focused on issues of peacebuilding, were also explored. These usually were concerned with issues of memorialization or focused on helping communities on the translocal level. Very similar collective claims, in particular those based on grievances around issues such as genocide remembrance, produced different kinds of mobilization depending on the citizenship regimes in which they were made. Finally, the importance of the translocal community came to the forefront throughout fieldwork. It is through these translocal connections that diaspora members often find initial inspiration and motivation to mobilize, and further, to sustain the mobilization. Translocality helps them to remain tethered to their homeland localities despite the fact that their homeland has contested sovereignty. The strength of these translocal communities among diaspora and local populations often helps to determine the levels of diaspora mobilization, rather than
simply the translocal community in the host country. This is particularly the case with localities where there are contentions between the diaspora actors and the local governments.

The six hypotheses which were generated by the typology were as follows:

**H1:** Open citizenship regimes + presence of translocal community + collective claim made → Engaged Diaspora Mobilization

**H2:** Open citizenship regimes + absence of translocal community + collective claim made → Involved Diaspora Mobilization

**H3:** Partially liberal citizenship regimes + collective claim made → Involved Diaspora Mobilization

**H4:** Restrictive Citizenship Regimes + presence of translocal community + collective claim made → Involved Diaspora Mobilization

**H5:** More restrictive citizenship or historically liberal regime + absence of translocal community + collective claim made → Reactive Diaspora Mobilization

**H6:** Any citizenship regime + presence or absence of translocal community + collective claim absent → Inactive Diaspora Mobilization

Empirical evidence supported H1, with a wealth of diaspora mobilization, for transitional justice and peacebuilding and beyond, which was a result of Bosnian diaspora in Sweden collaborating with one another and forming an umbrella network which acts on their behalf in Sweden and BiH. Utilizing translocal relationships between its members in the homeland as well as in the hostland, the organization has been instrumental in helping to bolster the image of Bosnians in Sweden as well integrated individuals who are interested in helping their homeland move forward. Through their sustained engagement on several different fronts,
evidenced throughout Chapter 5, their activities are focused on implementing change in BiH as well as retaining a connection between Sweden and BiH.514

H1 was further supported in France, though with less evidence, in large part due to the small community and the fact that integration in France limits diaspora engagement with host country institutions. However, transnational collaboration between French and Swiss diaspora organizations has led to engaged diaspora mobilization in the Srebrenica region, in part due to the translocal communities present in both France and Switzerland. Further, conflict-generated diaspora in collaboration with former guest workers have organized a non-profit that aims to influence education in Bosnia and Herzegovina, developed through translocal connections.

H2 was also supported by empirical evidence. By establishing a diaspora political party in BiH with headquarters in Sweden, there has been a high level of involved diaspora mobilization. Many of the claims this group has is echoed in BiH, focusing on the importance of citizens’ voices to be heard amidst the ethnonational political debates which continue to dominate in the homeland and often discourage transitional justice implementation on the local level. In particular, their lack of overarching success can be attributed to the lack of translocal society, as hypothesized, which limits the group’s ability to be more relevant in local communities in the homeland as well as their sister communities in the diaspora, whether in one country or transnationally.

Involved diaspora mobilization is also predicted by H3, and it is largely supported by evidence from Germany within Bosniak associations in particular as

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514 This can also be taken quite literally as the organization has been instrumental in trying to establish regular SAS flights between Sweden and BiH most recently.
well as Bosnian organizations more generally. Here, it is interesting to note how in a partially liberal citizenship regime, when there are collective claims, there is some mobilization, regardless of the presence of translocal community or not. However, when there is translocal community, it seems that the mobilization is a bit more sustained. Further, while claims are not always aimed at transitional justice in the homeland, involved diaspora mobilization is also evident in the hostland around issues that are relevant here, such as Islamophobia, evidenced through the engagement of Bosniaks in Germany, who do not really mobilize on account of the homeland.

The only hypothesis that was not tested in this thesis was H4. The typology introduced included restrictive citizenship regimes, but neither of the three case studies examined fit. Future research could also incorporate a case study that has a more restrictive citizenship regime according to Howard’s framework, such as Austria. Considering that the type, hypothesized here, is involved diaspora mobilization, this would provide yet more comparable examples of involved diaspora mobilization across a spectrum of cases with different citizenship regimes as well as translocal community. It would further also be able to tease out potential other variables to include in the typology as well as how translocality impacts it.

H5 predicted reactive diaspora mobilization in both restrictive citizenship regimes as well as those that are historically more liberal. In the French case, the evidence supports the hypothesis partially, as translocal community seems to play a role in mobilization, particularly through diaspora members’ explanations of their continued engagement with the homeland communities in transition. However, in one example, a prominent French Bosnian author engages with the homeland in a reactive way through her resignation and questioning of the homeland politics about
ideas of citizenship and political society. The initiatives discussed in France do not engage in French society about issues in their homeland, sometimes even emphasizing their belonging in France. Their incentives, largely difficult to measure, can be understood to be individualized incentives for transitional justice from below.

Hypothesis 6 is largely supported by the evidence provided by fieldwork in Germany, France, and Sweden. In all three cases, there are examples of inactive diaspora mobilization. However, in some cases, in the presence of a translocal community, the potential for greater diaspora mobilization is possible due to the strength of the translocal connections. However, this diaspora mobilization might be more overarching rather than focused on transitional justice or peacebuilding goals. This is evidenced by the Banja Lukans of Sweden who sustain their translocal communities in the diaspora but do not mobilize based on collective claims to a large extent.

In Germany, H6 was supported by evidence from supplementary Bosnian schools as well as women’s groups. While there are collective claims that could be made around the importance of unified historical narratives in BiH, which is linked to education and transitional justice, they are not made in an effort to mobilize the diaspora in this regard. Instead, the emphasis has been teaching on Bosnian to the communities in Germany. The same was evident in women’s groups in Germany that focused on building community and overcoming trauma together. In France, the fragmentation within the community between Bosniaks from Bosnia and Bosniaks from Sandžak came to the forefront more than in the other two cases.

515 For example, she writer her novels in French rather than Bosnian/Serbian/Croatian.
Without a collective claim being made explicitly within the community, inactive diaspora mobilization is best evidenced through attempts to maintain the heritage and culture of the diaspora, and to ensure that the second generation maintains some connection to it. In a sense, this mobilization is more alike to diaspora maintenance.

In light of the findings discussed, the typology developed can be amended as follows in order to account for the hypotheses that were tested during fieldwork. Here, the inactive mobilization has been reinforced with the idea of diaspora maintenance, as discussed in the section about inactive diaspora mobilization in Sweden among Banja Lukans, the supplementary schools and women’s groups in Germany, and the fragmentation within the diaspora group between Bosniaks from BiH and Bosniaks from elsewhere. Also, due to the lack of hypothesis testing in a ‘Restrictive Continuity’ citizenship regime during the fieldwork, the typology has been amended to reflect the hypotheses that have been tested.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Citizenship Regime</th>
<th>Collective Claim Made</th>
<th>Collective Claim not Made</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Presence of Translocal Community</td>
<td>Absence of Translocal Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liberalizing Change</td>
<td>Engaged</td>
<td>Involved</td>
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<tr>
<td>Partial Liberalization</td>
<td>Involved</td>
<td>Involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historically Liberal Countries</td>
<td>Engaged</td>
<td>Individualistic/Reactive</td>
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In short, these hypotheses presented a variety of different pathways which led to four types of diaspora mobilization. Among the three variables which were tested, the translocal community variable played a particular role in the involved diaspora mobilization type in each of the three citizenship regimes. While it was originally anticipated that there was a presence or absence of translocal community, empirical research demonstrated that it matters whether there are translocal ties that remain the homeland as well as in the hostland for mobilization under different circumstances. For conflict-generated diaspora, the levels of translocality play a particular role and were in turn teased out in each of the three country cases, in particular utilizing translocal connections based on cities such as Banja Luka, Prijedor, Srebrenica, and Sarajevo.

8.2 Theoretical and Policy Implications

By developing a typology of diaspora mobilization, this study aimed to minimize some of the inherent challenges of multi-sited fieldwork by identifying and tracing three independent variables that influence diaspora mobilization, with a particular focus on transitional justice and peacebuilding. This thesis thus further builds on the role of diaspora in transitional justice approaches in post-conflict homelands, a topic gaining prominence in both academic and policy perspectives. It contributes to a more thorough understanding of Bosnian diaspora mobilization on a comparative level.

Moreover, it has implications for ongoing research on the relationship between the global, the national, and the local in transitional justice, the role of diaspora and other external actors in these processes, and the ways in which these in mobilize in turn. This thesis brings to the forefront translocality, combining the transnational and the local by noting the importance of local knowledge and
understanding as well as grounding in the wider world. In many ways, this echoes the development of transitional justice research which has increasingly focused on local dimensions (see chapter 3). Moreover, it integrates translocality in political science research.

In light of the ongoing refugee and migrant crisis in Europe as well as beyond, this research is particularly relevant for policy and practice, as countries such as Syria will undoubtedly undergo transition in the future as well. How their diaspora will mobilize around issues of transitional justice in Syria could be informed by this work, and there is some comparative work which has begun to undertake this already. Understanding how diaspora mobilize can help policy makers interested in supporting transitional justice processes. For host countries, it is particularly relevant as they navigate their own policies towards countries in transition. For example, Germany has accepted an unprecedented number of Syrian refugees and migrants, just as it did during the 1990s. A better understanding of how the citizenship regime influences diaspora can contribute to better policy decisions, whether around questions of integration, questions about hostland policies towards homelands, or overall support for transitional justice and peace activism.

A further implication of this research is for the policies of homelands towards their diasporas. While several countries have Ministries for Diaspora that are active and continue to foster relationships with their diaspora populations, Kosovo and India being most noteworthy perhaps, this is not a norm for most post-conflict countries with diaspora populations. This research provides some insight

into the ways in which diaspora mobilize around relevant issues in their homelands and thus can help guide homeland policies in order to gain support from diaspora members as well, beyond including them in post-conflict peacebuilding processes for example. These can be by way of transitional justice measures, such as in Libya, economic development measures, or political participation.

This research provides insight into diaspora activism and outlines the resourceful ways in which diaspora mobilize from their host countries around collective transitional justice and peace based claims. The institutions with which diaspora members choose to collaborate often reflect their levels of integration and reflect back on the citizenship regimes they find themselves in. In turn, this affects the potential they have in influencing these post-conflict processes in their homelands. Further, international organizations and institutions that are heavily invested in peace processes in post-conflict homelands can learn from diaspora strategies, particularly on the local level using their translocal connections. Thus, this research helps to inform and can be an integral party of determining policy decisions in both homelands and host countries as well as for international organizations lobbying for transitional justice and peacebuilding efforts.

8.3 Future Research

Further scholarly work could take on aspects of the research explored in this thesis to address gaps in knowledge, policy, and understanding. In short, this could be in the form of theoretical work on diasporas and transitional justice, empirical work, or policy-oriented work. These will be explored in this section.

The first natural continuation of this research would be to increase the number of case studies or the number of diaspora populations. This would help to draw further conclusions about the generalizability of the typological model as well
as to expand on it. For example, further examining the US Bosnian population, or the Bosnian diaspora population in other countries in more detail, such as Switzerland or Austria, would help to build further on the Bosnian diaspora case study, as well as provide a case study of restrictive citizenship regimes through Austria. Considering that a hypothesis remained untested based on the original typology created, this seems a natural continuation of this research.

On the other hand, there are sizeable other diaspora populations in Europe that would be worthwhile to study to examine the causal paths their mobilization takes vis-à-vis the typology developed in this thesis. This broader set of diaspora cases could be analyzed within one particular citizenship regime, or across different citizenship regimes, depending on whether there was interest in a particular country and its different diaspora populations, or diaspora populations across different countries. In this way, there could be more focus on process tracing and unpacking particular variables presented in the typology further, expanding, or finding new ways of increased generalizability for the typology.

Future research can also take on a multi-methodological approach, combining both quantitative as well as qualitative methods. Through survey research, the reasons for involved mobilization could be explored further to gather more variables for this distinct type of mobilization across different countries.\textsuperscript{517} This would require more resources and collaboration with several institutions in helping to find diaspora individuals to contact but would further unpack an interesting area of research. At the same time, reactive as well as engaged mobilization could be further elaborated on, exploring additional causal

\textsuperscript{517} The ERC Project ‘Diasporas and Contested Sovereignty’ will conduct survey research focused on diaspora mobilization comparatively in 2017.
mechanisms that influence diaspora mobilization, that are harder to extrapolate with qualitative research.

There are several further questions and that could be featured in future research apart from the methodological innovations mentioned above. As noted from the introductory chapter, diaspora collective claims are considered a key variable in diaspora mobilization. Future research could explore diaspora perceptions and participation regarding particular mechanisms of transitional justice – whether courts, truth and justice commissions, or particular local efforts exclusively. As more case based research emerges, more potential for comparative work on several diasporas will be possible, potentially collaboratively. For example, diaspora mobilization around truth and justice commissions could be compared with local and civil society partnerships diaspora forge to forward transitional justice and peacebuilding agendas in post-conflict homelands. Are certain claims more prone to a particular kind of diaspora mobilization and how to these pathways differ? The intersection of diaspora and transitional justice research is interesting to consider as this is a fledgling field with potential to expand the way we think about transitional justice and peacebuilding actors in post-conflict countries that have diaspora populations, but also how we implement these processes and find inclusive means to do so from a policy perspective.

Moreover, research on translocalism can help to shed light on how transnationalism is evoked in the everyday and sustained over time. Understanding how attachment to formative places and relationships can translate into political action and activism in a globalized world is becoming increasingly relevant. People’s perception of shared experience in creating communities, building movements, and sustaining activism, whether transitional justice related or not,
beyond their places of origin is especially interesting to consider. For example, Black Lives Matter has chapters in the United Kingdom as well as across different states in the U.S. Translocal connections enhance our understandings of transnationalism and global politics and the activism that happens as a result. Local communities in which individuals first build their lives and which they share despite national and international environments impact the ways in which these individuals mobilize.

More thought could be given on the relationship between homelands and hostlands and how diaspora influence this relationship. Whether through lobbying, as understood in the US context, or through civil society actions, diaspora populations help to shape public perceptions about their homelands, in both positive and negative ways. For example, there is already interesting being developed in relation to statebuilding and diaspora. Further, the influence of political parties in the homeland has been touched on in this thesis and can further be elaborated on. It is generally understood that diaspora vote for more nationalist parties, leading to extrapolation that diaspora are also more nationalist. More recent research including this thesis seems to point in the direction that diaspora can also act as moderating actors in the political discourses of their homelands, particularly in transitional situations. For example, an overwhelming number of interviewees disagreed with the political elite of their homeland, echoing allegations of

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corruption, and displaying their frustrations openly. As one interviewee noted, “I have nobody to vote for, nobody I respect, so I don’t vote at all!” Research on diaspora attitudes and perceptions as well as sustained diaspora action towards transitional justice can take into account more than diaspora voting trends.

This study has developed a typology of diaspora mobilization for transitional justice and peacebuilding based claims in different citizenship regimes across Europe. It has established the importance of the interplay between translocal communities among the diaspora as well as collective claims as mobilizing factors for diaspora groups in addition to the host land environments which channel diaspora mobilization in different ways through citizenship regimes. The research conducted has gathered new empirical evidence which has been informed by several different strands of academic literatures. While it has explored the intersection of diaspora, transitional justice and peacebuilding through diaspora mobilization, more research is necessary in order to improve the typology developed and to expand on the ways in which post-conflict homelands can continue in their peacebuilding and transitional justice processes. If this chapter serves to place into context this study and indicate the potential of the scope of future research, there is little doubt left these vibrant academic fields will continue to flourish for many years to come.

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Appendix I

Due to the nature of the ERC ‘Diasporas and Contested Sovereignty’ stipulations, interviews were anonymized for confidentiality. In order to encourage transparency, the two sections of this appendix offer some further insight into the research methods. The methodology used for this study is further discussed within the thesis, and thus there is no need to repeat this information here. The first appendix provides some of the initial guiding questions and topics inquired about during interviews, as well as the informed consent letter which was presented, explained, and discussed with participants before interviews took place. While all interviewees were comfortable being interviewed or taking part in a focus group, some were not comfortable signing forms, citing concerns about bureaucratic measures, not being comfortable signing English forms, and general distrust with ‘foreign’ institutions. In these cases, they provided verbal consent. The second appendix provides an overview of the interviews and focus groups conducted, the capacity in which individuals were interviewed, and the locations of the interviews.

On a final note, nearly all of the interviews were conducted in Bosnian, or a combination of Bosnian and English. Bosnian and Swedish, Bosnian and German. I let interviewees choose their preferred language of communication, and obliged if they felt the need to switch between languages for particular questions. If individuals did not speak Bosnian or felt uncomfortable speaking Bosnian, we did not stray away from English or German. Considering that the overwhelming majority of interviews were conducted in Bosnian, the following section will outline the themes which I asked about rather than providing verbatim translations of the questions.

Interview Structure Overview
The interviews conducted for this study followed a similar structure based on a list of prepared questions that were derived from the interests and questions of the thesis as well as informed by the literature consulted. Some interviews were more informational in nature, particularly at the beginning of fieldwork. Not all the same questions were asked each time, depending on the interviewees, but the priority remained the same – to establish how diaspora mobilize politically, both within the homeland as well as the hostland, particularly around issues of transitional justice. Some interviewees served in official governmental or institutional roles, in either the homeland or the host country. I asked them about diaspora involvement in their work as well as potential collaborations or contentions they might have with diaspora.

All interviews started with me introducing myself and explaining what the larger ERC Project ‘Diasporas and Contested Sovereignty’ was focused on, before discussing in a bit more detail my own PhD research. Often, I also provided further information about myself, such as my place of birth (Banja Luka), the fact that I have also lived ‘in diaspora’ (particularly during interviews in Sweden and Germany as I have lived in these countries), or a shared acquaintance (if the individual was referred by another diaspora member).

The interviews started with me asking interviewees to provide a general introduction. If they were representatives of a diaspora organization, I further asked about their role there as well as the organization’s mission had changed over the years. I also asked about informal ties they might have to diaspora organizations or similar immigrant networks in both their country of residence as well as
transnationally. In order to open up the conversation, I asked interviewees what they considered the ideal diaspora engagement towards the homeland to look like in, both generally, as well as more specifically around issues of peacebuilding, reconciliation, and transitional justice. This was followed by questions about whether the organization they are part of has organized any initiatives that would help to move towards that ‘ideal’ version, or if the individual has been part of any.

In the following section of the interview, I asked interviewees about the main challenges facing Bosnia and Herzegovina today as well as the main issues they felt were relevant for the country. These were open-ended on purpose as I did not want to lead interviewees towards questions in regards to grievance claims, though I did ask them to specify in more detail once they began discussing.

As the interview moved on, I asked interviewees to discuss in more detail their engagement, or the most relevant three initiatives they could think of with diaspora involvement in relation to their homeland. Then I inquired about their reflections about these initiatives as well as their sustainability and whether there were any local actors in the homeland, transnational diaspora partners, or host country institutions and organizations that were relevant for diaspora engagement. I asked about the diaspora’s potential in changing the trajectory of the homeland. Here I also elaborated with questions about homeland politics and interviewees’ reflections on the same. In particular, I asked them to reflect on and give particular examples of collaboration with homeland institutions or individuals, and how this might reflect diaspora influence in the homeland.

In the following set of questions, I inquired about translocality and the interviewees’ relationship to their homeland city and region. Here I also asked if they could speak more generally or in more detail, depending on where the answers were leading. I also asked if they could think of diaspora members that were particularly more active, or less active, and why this was the case, both in the homeland as well as in the host land, as well as how this had changed over the years. This included also reflections about the Federation as well as Republika Srpska politics and diaspora standing in both.

Further, I asked interviewees about host country politics and their perceptions about the diaspora as well as the homeland in general. I inquired about what they viewed as their role within the host country society and questions of belonging. Here, I also asked about the issues they felt resonated in relation to their homeland in the host country, regardless of whether it was positive or negative. I also inquired about informal and formal ties with host land institutions the diaspora organization might have, or that might exist directly between the host and homelands.

Before finishing the interview, I asked if there was anything else they would like to add and if they felt I had overlooked anything during my questions, as well as whether they could provide me with further potential contacts.

As part of the ERC project, we conducted several coding exercises in which we coded some of our own and each other’s interviews in an effort to find mutual issues that were important comparatively across our cases as well as elucidate our own work further. This coding helped to inform the comprehensive survey for the larger ERC project. Further, it also served as the foundation for my own interview analysis.
Informed Consent Letter

Dear Madam/Sir,

My name is Dženeta Karabegović and I am a PhD Research Fellow at the Politics and International Studies Department at Warwick University. I would like to express my gratitude to you for your interest to be included as an interviewee in this large academic project, which aims to better understand how diasporas in Europe mobilize transnationally to affect political change in their countries of origin in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East. The project is conducted on behalf of Warwick’s Politics and International Studies Department and is sponsored by the European Research Council. My specific sub-project is a comparative study of the transnational mobilization of the Bosnian diaspora in Europe with regard to the post-conflict reconstruction processes in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH). The study is embedded in scholarship on conflict and post-conflict processes, transitional justice, genocide remembrance, and state-building.

Today I would like to talk to you about your experiences as an active member of your community, and about your connections to your country of origin, country of settlement, third countries with which you maintain active connections, and the European Union and other international organizations. I also would like learn what ideas and processes concerning your ethno-religious community are most important to you. I hope you do not mind that I record this interview to ensure quality transcription and publication. If you mind, or if you want to stop the recording or note-taking at a certain point, please let me know. Your participation is voluntary. If you want to say something relevant to this research that is not included in the interview questions, please feel free to do so.

The results of this interview will be included in academic articles, an edited volume, a book [for the PI and Post-doc], and thesiss [for the Ph.D. students] that will be turned into books in the future. Since we also want to make a real-life impact, we will also communicate results to the media and the policy-making community. In order to protect the privacy of participants, we anonymize the interviews, unless you explicitly say that you want to go on record with your statements.

If you have any further questions about this project, your participation in it, or about me, please feel free to ask me now or at any time in the future. Thank you for your cooperation in advance.
Yes, I understand the nature of this research project and agree to participate:

________________________________________________________________________

I agree to maintain the anonymity of the above signed:

________________________________________________________________________

[name and signature of researcher, place, date]
## Appendix II – List of Interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview Code</th>
<th>Capacity</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Month and Year</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BH1</td>
<td>Returnee from Prijedor, Omarska Survivor, Activist, collaborates with Diaspora</td>
<td>Prijedor, BiH</td>
<td>July-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BH2</td>
<td>Returnee Activist from Prijedor, collaborates with Diaspora</td>
<td>Prijedor, BiH</td>
<td>July-13</td>
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<td>BH3</td>
<td>Staff, Council of Europe</td>
<td>Sarajevo, BiH</td>
<td>July-13</td>
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<td>BH4</td>
<td>BiH Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees</td>
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<td>July-13</td>
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<tr>
<td>BH5</td>
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<td>July-13</td>
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<tr>
<td>BH6</td>
<td>Returnee, from Sarajevo, Non-profit Sector</td>
<td>Sarajevo, BiH</td>
<td>July-13</td>
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<tr>
<td>BH7</td>
<td>Activist, Returnee from Srebrenica, collaborates with Diaspora</td>
<td>Srebrenica, BiH</td>
<td>July-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BH8</td>
<td>Senior Staff MFS Emmaus Organization, Returnee from Tuzla</td>
<td>Srebrenica, BiH</td>
<td>July-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BH9</td>
<td>Former President of Preporod, worked with Diaspora and Returnees during the 1990s</td>
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<td>July-13</td>
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<td>BH10</td>
<td>Returnee from Zenica, not involved in diaspora activity</td>
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<td>July-13</td>
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<tr>
<td>BH11</td>
<td>Diaspora Activist in Sweden, more involved around Bosniak issues</td>
<td>Srebrenica, BiH</td>
<td>July-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BH12</td>
<td>Diaspora Returnee and Activist from Srebrenica</td>
<td>Srebrenica, BiH</td>
<td>July-13</td>
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<td>BH13</td>
<td>Diaspora Returnee from Banja Luka</td>
<td>Banja Luka, BiH</td>
<td>July-13</td>
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<tr>
<td>BH14</td>
<td>Returnee from Srebrenica Area, Organizer around Peace March</td>
<td>Srebrenica, BiH</td>
<td>July-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BH15</td>
<td>Communications Director for Prvi Mart</td>
<td>Sarajevo, BiH</td>
<td>August-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BH16</td>
<td>Youth Organizer working with Diaspora</td>
<td>Sarajevo, BiH</td>
<td>August-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BH17</td>
<td>BiH Diaspora Forum Founder, Returnee Activist from Prijedor</td>
<td>Sarajevo, BiH</td>
<td>June-14</td>
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<tr>
<td>BH18</td>
<td>Returnee Activist, works with APU Network</td>
<td>Sarajevo, BiH</td>
<td>July-15</td>
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<tr>
<td>BH19</td>
<td>Returnee and Activist from Banja Luka</td>
<td>Banja Luka, BiH</td>
<td>July-15</td>
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<td>DE1</td>
<td>BiH Embassy Senior Leadership, Berlin</td>
<td>Berlin, Germany</td>
<td>September-14</td>
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<td>DE2</td>
<td>Diaspora Activist, Former Supplementary School Attendee, Active with Bosnian Islamic Cultural Center</td>
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<td>September-14</td>
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<td>DE3</td>
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<td>DE4</td>
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<tr>
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<td>DE6</td>
<td>Diaspora Member, Bosnian Women's Group, SudOst</td>
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<td>September-14</td>
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<tr>
<td>DE7</td>
<td>Diaspora Member, Bosnian Women's Group, Supplementary School Teacher</td>
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<tr>
<td>DE8</td>
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<td>September-14</td>
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<td>DE9</td>
<td>Bh Initiative Leadership, Activist in Germany</td>
<td>Stuttgart, Germany</td>
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<td>DE10</td>
<td>Diaspora Member and Organizer, does not participate in Diaspora Organizations</td>
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<td>DE11</td>
<td>2nd Generation Diaspora in Germany, works in Stuttgart city institutions on diversity and integration</td>
<td>Stuttgart, Germany</td>
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<td>DE12</td>
<td>Diaspora Member, Bosnian Club Stuttgart</td>
<td>Stuttgart, Germany</td>
<td>September-14</td>
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<td>DE13</td>
<td>Representative of Hrvatske katoličke zajednice Bl. Alojzije Stepinac i Sv. Martin</td>
<td>Stuttgart, Germany</td>
<td>September-14</td>
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<tr>
<td>DE14</td>
<td>Senior Staff at BiH Embassy, Stuttgart</td>
<td>Stuttgart, Germany</td>
<td>September-14</td>
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<td>DE15</td>
<td>Senior Staff at BiH Embassy, Berlin</td>
<td>Berlin, Germany</td>
<td>September-14</td>
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<tr>
<td>DE16</td>
<td>Diaspora Activist, Former Supplementary School Attendee, Active with Bosnian Islamic Cultural Center</td>
<td>Berlin, Germany</td>
<td>September-14</td>
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<td>DE17</td>
<td>Former Supplementary School Leadership in Berlin</td>
<td>Berlin, Germany</td>
<td>September-14</td>
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<tr>
<td>DE18</td>
<td>Gastarbeiter, Diaspora Member, SDA supporter</td>
<td>Stuttgart, Germany</td>
<td>September-14</td>
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<tr>
<td>DE19</td>
<td>Former BiH Consul in Germany, Diaspora Member, Supplementary Schools Leadership</td>
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<td>September-14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Position/Role/Activity</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Date</td>
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<td>DE20</td>
<td>IZBN President, 2nd Generation Diaspora Member</td>
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<td>September-14</td>
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<td>DE21</td>
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<td>Munich, Germany</td>
<td>October-14</td>
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<td>Leadership Avangarda BiH</td>
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<td>DE23</td>
<td>Former Senior Staff at BiH Embassy in Munich, Diaspora Member</td>
<td>Munich, Germany</td>
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<td>DE24</td>
<td>Diaspora Activist during the 1990s, arrived in Munich as a Refugee</td>
<td>Munich, Germany</td>
<td>October-14</td>
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<td>DE25</td>
<td>Diaspora Activist, 2nd Generation Diaspora</td>
<td>Munich, Germany</td>
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<td>DE26</td>
<td>Diaspora Member, Bosnian Club Stuttgart</td>
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<td>DE27</td>
<td>Diaspora Member, Concentration Camp Survivor</td>
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<td>DE28</td>
<td>Former Avangarda Leadership</td>
<td>Munich, Germany</td>
<td>October-15</td>
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<td>FG1</td>
<td>Bosnian French Dzemat Members, Focus Group (11 Participants) Organized after Friday Prayers</td>
<td>Paris, France</td>
<td>February-14</td>
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<tr>
<td>FG2</td>
<td>Srebrenica Area Returnees and Diaspora Members, Focus Group (5 participants) Organized during the Peace March</td>
<td>Srebrenica, BiH</td>
<td>July-13</td>
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<td>FG3</td>
<td>Srebrenica Area Returnees, Focus Group (6 Participants) Organized during the Peace March</td>
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<td>July-13</td>
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<tr>
<td>FG4</td>
<td>Srebrenica Area Returnees, Focus Group (5 participants) Organized during the Peace March</td>
<td>Srebrenica, BiH</td>
<td>July-14</td>
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<tr>
<td>FG5</td>
<td>Srebrenica Area Returnees and Diaspora Members (8 participants) Focus Group Organized during the Peace March</td>
<td>Sarajevo, BiH</td>
<td>July-14</td>
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<tr>
<td>FG6</td>
<td>Konjevic Polje Parent Protestors, Focus Group (9 Participants) Organized during Sarajevo Protests</td>
<td>Sarajevo, BiH</td>
<td>September-13</td>
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<tr>
<td>FR1</td>
<td>Bosnian Diaspora Member in France since 1970s, not very active in diaspora organizations</td>
<td>Paris, France</td>
<td>February-14</td>
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<td>FR2</td>
<td>Bosnian Diaspora Member, MirSada</td>
<td>Lyon, France</td>
<td>February-14</td>
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<tr>
<td>FR3</td>
<td>Bosnian Diaspora Member, does not participate in diaspora organizations</td>
<td>Lyon, France</td>
<td>February-14</td>
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<td>FR4</td>
<td>MirSada, Solidarite Bosnie, Peace March Activist</td>
<td>Geneva, Switzerland</td>
<td>February-14</td>
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<td>FR5</td>
<td>Solidarite Bosnie, Peace March Activist, Organizes Bosnia related events in Geneva and Paris</td>
<td>Geneva, Switzerland</td>
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<td>FR6</td>
<td>Diaspora Organizer and Leadership of Aide a l’éducation en Bosnie-Herzegovine</td>
<td>Paris, France</td>
<td>February-14</td>
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<td>FR7</td>
<td>Has lived in France since 1970s, does not participate in Diaspora Associations</td>
<td>Paris, France</td>
<td>February-14</td>
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<td>FR8</td>
<td>World Bosniak Congress, Džemat Paris Leadership</td>
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<td>SWE1</td>
<td>Bosnian Diaspora Member, Sweden, Banja Luka Association</td>
<td>Sarajevo, BiH</td>
<td>August-13</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWE2</td>
<td>Diaspora Member, Sweden, Former BiH Embassy Staff in Stockholm, Women's Organization</td>
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<td>March-14</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWE3</td>
<td>President, Banja Luka Diaspora Association</td>
<td>Motala, Sweden</td>
<td>March-14</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWE4</td>
<td>President, Ljiljan Motala Association, APU Network</td>
<td>Motala, Sweden</td>
<td>March-14</td>
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<td>Stockholm, Sweden</td>
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<td>SWE6</td>
<td>Swedish Parliament Member</td>
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<td>SWE7</td>
<td>President of Bosnian Women's Organization, Sweden</td>
<td>Varnamo, Sweden</td>
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<td>Malmö, Sweden</td>
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<td>SWE9</td>
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<td>June-14</td>
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<td>Former Leadership SDBiH</td>
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<td>SEEBA Founder, APU Network Member</td>
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<td>Former APU Network Leadership, Diaspora Activist who also lived in Germany</td>
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<td>Founder of Vara Barn, APU Network</td>
<td>Stockholm, Sweden</td>
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<td>UK1</td>
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<td>UK2</td>
<td>Leadership Svjetski Savez Dijasppore Bosne i Hercegovine (SSDBiH), SDBiH Member</td>
<td>Birmingham, UK</td>
<td>May-14</td>
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<td>US1</td>
<td>US Based Diaspora Activist from Prijedor</td>
<td>New York City, USA</td>
<td>April-13</td>
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<td>US2</td>
<td>Diaspora Member, Former Teacher in Supplementary School in Berlin</td>
<td>Phone Interview</td>
<td>June-16</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
References

Academic Articles, Books, Working Papers, and Reports


Funk, Julianne. 2015. “Bosnian Diaspora Experiences of Suživot or Traditional Coexistence: Bosnian Lonac, American Melting Pot or Swiss Fondue?” Paper presented at Diasporic and Migrant Identities: Social, Cultural, Political, Religious and Spiritual Aspects in Sarajevo, BiH.


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